The confidence game: intelligence, deception and subterfuge

Crowley, Jason ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1836-2777 (2023) The confidence game: intelligence, deception and subterfuge. In: A Cultural History of War in Antiquity. The Cultural Histories Series . Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781350052567 (In Press)

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Abstract

The costs of losing a battle, or worse still a war, could be severe, and it is unsurprising that the Greeks did all they could to win both. Consequently, they could not afford to ignore intelligence gathering, disdain deception or scorn subterfuge. Admittedly, they celebrated those who died in combat, and considered such a death ‘beautiful’, but they still preferred to defeat their enemies without dying in the process. To avoid this, the Greeks attempted to reduce the odds they faced by outwitting their opponents and attacking them when they were unprepared or at a disadvantage, and as such, they committed their troops to main force encounters only as a last resort, or when they could be confident in victory. This, of course, is entirely understandable. After all, to paraphrase Patton, the object of war is not to die for one’s country, but to make the enemy die for his.