Corporate Networks and State Power: Russian State-owned Enterprises and Interlocks

Cronin, Bryce and Sosnovskikh, Sergey ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3744-740X (2025) Corporate Networks and State Power: Russian State-owned Enterprises and Interlocks. In: Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2025, 25 July 2025 - 29 July 2025, Copenhagen, Denmark. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

State capitalism involves direct state activity as an economic agent, exerting influence over companies and markets through various institutional mechanisms beyond simple asset ownership. It remains under-explored across different institutional contexts and within the field of business network studies. This gap underscores the need to complement recent academic discussions on the varieties of capitalism, further enriching our understanding of its diverse manifestations. Using the Orbis database and a unique dataset of Russian state officials, this study employs social network analysis to examine both formal ownership and informal board interlocks. The findings show that although state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia represent only 2% of firms, they account for a third of revenue and assets, reflecting the state’s disproportionate economic power. Additionally, interlocking directorates, with shared directors (including former politicians), create informal control channels, extending state influence beyond SOEs. As a result, this dual mechanism blurs the lines between the public and private sectors. The study also introduces a refined framework for understanding state influence in autocratic economies like Russia, proposing Network State Capitalism as the dominant model, with formal and informal control mechanisms operating simultaneously. These insights have broader implications for other emerging markets.