Corporate Networks and State Power: Russian State-Owned Enterprises and Interlocks

Sosnovskikh, Sergey ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3744-740X and Cronin, Bruce (2025) Corporate Networks and State Power: Russian State-Owned Enterprises and Interlocks. In: Academy of Management Meeting 2025, 25 July 2025 - 29 July 2025, Copenhagen, Denmark.

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Abstract

This study explores state-business networks within the framework of state capitalism, a growing phenomenon in emerging economies. State capitalism involves the state acting as an economic agent, influencing companies and markets through mechanisms that go beyond direct ownership. Using the Orbis database and a unique dataset of Russian state officials, the research applies social network analysis to investigate formal ownership structures and informal board interlocks. The findings reveal that while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) constitute only 2% of firms in Russia, they account for a third of revenue and assets, demonstrating the state’s disproportionate economic power. Additionally, interlocking directorates, with shared directors—including former politicians—establish informal control channels, extending state influence beyond SOEs and further integrating state and private sectors. This dual mechanism blurs the boundaries between public and private entities, emphasizing the hybrid nature of state capitalism. The study introduces Network State Capitalism as the predominant model in Russia, where formal and informal control mechanisms operate concurrently. These findings contribute to the understanding of state capitalism in autocratic economies and offer broader implications for other emerging markets, enriching academic discussions on the varieties of capitalism and the role of networks in state-business relations.