A critique of selected key aspects of Hayek's 'The mirage of social justice'

Carey, James (2001) A critique of selected key aspects of Hayek's 'The mirage of social justice'. Doctoral thesis (PhD), Manchester Metropolitan University.

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Abstract

This thesis consists of four main chapters; excluding the main introduction and conclusion. The first main chapter consists of justifications for the content of the other three. It is within the latter three that the principal ideas of this thesis are contained. The second main chapter contains several interrelated arguments designed to undermine three of Hayeks' key claims. These claims are the following. First, a legitimate distinction can be drawn between private and public concerns. Second, this distinction can be drawn by appealing to some notion of ordinary belief and discourse. Third, there can (in terms of some such notion) be morally neutral manipulations of legislation. (The term 'manipulation' is intended here in the broadest possible sense. For it is intended to mean not only implementation and/or repeal of legislation, but also refusals to do either). The third main chapter includes an exposition of several arguments and claims defended by Hayek (1976) in his The Mirage of Social Justice. It also includes responses to them by the present author. Finally, the argument of the fourth main chapter will be as follows. There may be several 'ordinary' notions of what a prediction is. Some such notions may be mutually incompatible. Hence, another possible example of the unreliability of 'ordinary' belief and discourse as a basis upon which to arrive at persuasive conclusions. Also therefore, some 'ordinary' notions of what a prediction is may be confused and mistaken. For, they mistake what a prediction is for what a correct prediction is. This happens, perhaps because 'ordinarily' people associate the concept of a prediction with what they can correctly predict rather than with what they cannot successfully predict. Furthermore, they thus associate, for correct predictions are more useful to their aims than incorrect ones; as indeed Hayek implicitly accepts; he justifies his 'rules of just individual conduct' on the basis of what can and cannot be ordinarily predicted. One dubious implication of his position is that most of the time most people believe that predictions of a relatively general kind are easier to make correctly than those of a relatively less general kind. Another equally dubious one is, that they choose their 'rules of conduct' on the basis of this belief. Finally, even if they did, they would be doing so on the basis of a belief that is false.