Chapter 5: Care

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Abstract

This chapter presents 'radical care' as an ethical-methodological framework through which the disruptive arttext might be fostered.

Badiou's notion of a fidelity—a connection existent within the present but which will, barring extreme events, pass through the threshold to a wide range of possible futures—is taken up. Love and friendship are considered as possible forms of such fidelity, but in seeking a more flexible and material criterion of connection, attention turns to care.

The chapter reflects on the discourse of critical care developing within feminist technoscience, and offers examples such as a collectively run Italian kindergarten and the Black Panthers Party's programme of free breakfasts for schoolchildren through which to explore the multifaceted qualities care can hold.

In seeking to incorporate a greater unpredictability and immediacy into care though, through which technospheric abstraction might be disrupted, a concept of 'radical care' is set out.

This chapter builds on Alain Badiou's formulation of 'fidelity' discussed in *Chapter 3*.[1] Holding onto an onto-epistemology of motion as inherent within being, a resilient framework by which we might collectively be and act in relation to one another is developed, without recourse to a transcendental or

external ground. Amid the inequalities and insecurities of the present, 'radical care' is proposed as

this framework, from and through which acts of disruption, including arttexts, might project.

POSSIBLE FIDELITIES

Chapter 4 developed a schema by which an arttext might potentially disrupt the textual structures of the technosphere. However, such possible interjections need to be considered in relation to the relentless reproduction of 'the way things are', as was explored in *Part A*'s three chapters.

Acknowledging this bleak reality, is there any way of being, of holding ourselves and one another to account, that is critical toward the dominant regime and constitutes a form of existence which is counter to it? Can we conceive of a collective form of being which might support and enable the production of disruptive arttexts, both in sustainably enabling the conditions for their material production, and in holding them ethically and politically to account?

Ways of Being: Love

James Bridle proposes love and unknowing as routes beyond abstracting computational thinking, and proceeds to develop these into an idea of guardianship, premised on ethical virtue and thinking clearly and acting 'correctly'.[2] While the term guardianship manages to engage the important idea of a site or territory developed in *Chapter 2*, while avoiding the issues of property and resultant power asymmetry in hospitality discussed in *Chapter 3*, this emphasis on clarity and correct action seems to fall in line with Fredric Jameson's cognitive mapping, which under-recognises the entanglement of self within the structure.[3] Bridle's emphasis on acting ethically correctly, rather than engaging politically in the messy complexity, follows from this. However, the technosphere is a structure which, as Bridle elsewhere makes powerfully clear, is shifting faster than we can grasp it clearly, but within and upon which it is nevertheless imperative to act, to attempt to break the cycle of its reproduction.[4] Setting guardianship aside as ineffectively cautious and impossibly seeking of objectivity then, does 'love' offer something important, perhaps chiming with the post-individual pro-human stance *Chapter 1* advocated, as we try to develop an enmeshed but autonomous resistance?

Hannah Arendt's analysis of love, drawing on Saint Augustine's writings on the topic, is as much a reflection on the process of subjectification.[5] She centres human life around an unknown future anticipated through fear and desire: a reiteration of the cusp, or threshold, to the unknown now familiar from the discussion of the event in *Chapter 3*, but here focused on the individual, or perhaps human.[6] In a faith context, this future exists outside of our material reality. With the foreclosure of the future described in *Chapter 1*, it is unsurprising these transcendentally envisaged futures hold appeal.

There is a paradox inherent within love approached in terms of faith. On the one hand it pushes a commitment to the abstract, a holding out for the transcendental ('Love God'); while on the other it commands an embracing of positionality within a specific context ('Love thy neighbour').[7] The former foregrounds the dogmatic, while the latter centres on the historical and material. To translate this out of religion into philosophical terms though, we can see the paradox as being present within subjectification. We are read and read ourselves as autonomous individuals, while simultaneously being completely entangled in and produced by our context.

In a foreshadowing of the discussion of friendship to come below though, Arendt navigates this paradox by considering the neighbour as a mirror of the self.[8] In their failing to live the 'good' life, and in being castigated for this, the neighbour functions as a warning against backsliding. Conversely, if they excel, or are at least viewed as such, they become the target to emulate. Thus the relationship to the other, when framed through this paradoxically transcendental gaze—though possibly disguised beneath outward acts of compassion—becomes rooted in self-formation, subjectification and individuation. The more closely just beneath or above ourselves on the ladder we perceive others to be, the more precisely we gauge our own position, and seek to maintain or improve it.[9] This process, in a secular contemporary context, is mirrored in how we are subjectified within neoliberalism.

A further concern in this formulation of love on a transcendental ground, and the resultant individuation, is the rendering of the 'other' human as object that occurs. This is perhaps not

surprising, given the primacy of 'Love God' over 'Love thy neighbour'. The position the other is cast into is one without agency or potential to rupture the neat construction of the individuated self that their very presence within the relation is secondary to.[10] The transcendental lover does not enter into a mutual bond of care with the other, because their historically and contextually rooted pain, vulnerability and human-ness are all ultimately reduced to inconsequentiality in relation to the ahistorical perfection the individuated self will proceed into. Love remains abstract: constituting the subject, but in separation from their political context.

There is a circularity in the way these religious premises of faith, which were transposed wholesale via the 'protestant work ethic' into capitalism, and placed further upon and within the individual in post-Fordism, now reacquire a more explicit transcendentalism in some of the accelerationist discourses emanating from Silicon Valley.[11]

What is needed is not this centripetal model of relationship, of love or care as spokes coming out from a single subject (who, to continue the metaphor, is actually more interested in the axle). What is required is a de-centred network or web of care, where the bonds of relationship are, or at least seek to become, pluri-directionally equal in terms of affect and agency, and themselves become the focus rather than the individuals linking them. In removing the existential relief of a transcendentalism to fall back upon, the inequalities of vulnerability within our world become all the more starkly experienced, and the urgent need for these bonds of care, for everyone, become all the more apparent.

Abandoning transcendentalism, or any supposedly fixed ground for that matter, is necessary though. Capitalism has proven able to subsume any would-be ground. Only in untethering from a co-optable fixedness might we form capacities of resistance that can remain outside of it. In this free-floating groundlessness, the bonds of relationship are all the more vital if we are not to lose ourselves within an unnavigable expanse of desubjectification.

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Like Arendt, Badiou is critical of a transcendental framing of love, and instead proposes considering it as an imminent fidelity which opens up a 'two scene' (or perhaps better, 'plurality') of interconnected positionality.[12]

In Badiou's schema, the event-encounter of 'falling in love' is the intervention which is retroactively inscribed as evental through the ensuing commitment to the work of love.[13] The co-vulnerable, co-committed relationality of love as a fidelity, which he outlines, seemingly holds some of the same resiliences and potential resistances toward the technospheric stasis as friendship and care which will be discussed below.

A particular quality which Badiou develops is the corporeality of love.[14] This bodily-ness (which he contrasts against friendship) emerges in his rejection of the transcendental. However, in seeking another initiator for (or enactment of) love, he seems to dialectically reify sex (or at least sexual desire) as the sine qua non of pro-human relationality. This becomes somewhat exclusionary and problematic in seeking collective resistant ways of being, especially as (even accepting a subjective personal position) there is an under-questioned monogamous, binary heteronormativity to his framing of sex.[15] More fundamentally, Badiou's intrinsically sexual love ultimately falls back on the self-interested individualism of sexual pleasure, via the same logic by which Badiou himself observes Jacques Lacan denied the possibility of a sexual relationship.[16] I am inclined to agree, within the urgency of the technospheric present, with Maggie Nelson, who writes 'there is some evil shit in this world that needs fucking up, and the time for blithely asserting that sleeping with whomever you want however you want is going to jam its machinery is long past'.[17] Whether framed theologically or sexually, love as a resistant fidelity too easily slips into an individuated transcendentalism.

Therefore, while I gratefully borrow Badiou's concept of fidelity, I will shift away from love to consider some alternative operators. Friendship and, especially, care offer more fluid multifaceted capacities of resistance toward, and resilience within, the technosphere.

If not love then, might friendship operate as a fidelity enabling a resistant, resilient network of relations? In building a viable concept of radical care, theorisations of friendship offer some important points of consideration.

In *Politics of Friendship*, Jacques Derrida explores the paradoxical 'contretemps' he sees at the centre of the friend relation.[18] He uses this term to encapsulate, as the French suggests, two contrasting senses of time. On the one hand, there is a duration: a shared history and reality that underpins the friendship, which (to use Badiou's terms) forms a fidelity that, barring an extreme event, the friends can reasonably expect to carry forward through the event into the future. The other aspect of the contretemps though, is the potential for shift or change as the two friends, rather than allowing their self-subjectification to proceed as a relatively discrete and un-interfered with loop, open themselves up to one another in co-affect and co-vulnerability. This potentially destabilises the two selves, opening unpredictable aleatory futures out of the event-encounter.

Badiou's terminology continues to map closely onto Derrida's conception of friendship. For Badiou, the event-intervention loop was prevented from becoming a closed circle reproducing itself by instead spiralling it out in a fractal of other potential dimensions, with a separate event creating the context for the next intervention.[19] Similarly, in this friendship dynamic, the opening up of the circle of self to the other produces the external impetus to destabilise the self.

A further aspect of the contretemps is that friendship is not just a model that might be applicable to care, but itself needs care.[20] For the durational fidelity to be sustainable through the instability, it needs to be committed to. This is where an element of radicality starts to enter, because a friendship that is only committed to *so far* echoes back to hospitality, and is ultimately premised on the self and

self-interest. A radical friendship has to commit to the challenge, rupture or even potential destruction of the present self; only with this is the fidelity meaningful. Another way to put this is that the fidelity has to have already passed through the event, whatever the event. This is friendship, but also, to go back to Badiou, this is fidelity.[21] Such commitment also fragments the threshold, which is constructed in terms of conditionality. Without this opening up of oneself to the unknown, both friendship and fidelity sit within the present reality, when they only have any potentially generative meaning beyond this when they transfer themselves across into the void. Committing them into that void is a small way to reclaim the future at a personal level, to hold open that unknown chance, *despite* the risk of potential rational self-disinterest. If we do not do this, are we not simply being opportunistic and entrepreneurial within a virtuosic economy: ideal neoliberal subjects?

Derrida rejects the notion of an 'ideal' friendship, which would simply be a replacement transcendentalism.[22] Instead, each friendship should be recognised as contingent, developed through committed nurturing. It is a human-to-human relationship built not on a transferrable code, but on entangled embodied experience. This contingency, operating outside the code-able and commodifiable, is a characteristic that can hold friendships apart from subsumption into the technosphere: a friendship premised on a genuine co-vulnerability and co-affect can hold the potential to be a resilient site of resistance.

David Webb builds on Derrida's conception, but develops it through Michel Foucault's writing on care for the self and the other, making more explicit the need for unconditional commitment within friendship, to enable radical, unknown new (counter) subjectifications.[23] He develops the two intersecting subjects of the friendship in a way that helpfully takes us beyond two overly simple loops of subjectification colliding and opening one another out. The entanglement of the two co-equal entities is not occurring on a singular axis, but across multiple facets of the intersecting selves (for Foucault, these are our self-relation and relations to forms of knowledge and normativity).[24] There is a deep, unknowable opening up of the self, which entails unanticipated co-realisations, but the process can only occur when both parties commit despite the potential vulnerability.

The friendship relation is non-linear and unpredictable. The multiplicity of axes of intersection and co-affect that are formed, if cared for and sustained, exponentially multiply the complexity and unknowability of potential futures. The encounter is not one of outward-facing skin touching on outward-facing skin, producing one or two new future-voids, but instead a deep porous overlap of each self into the other, creating multi-dimensional voids of potential futures (and selves within them), in continuous formation and reformation.

The form of profound friendship being described here is very distant from the notional, mediated, textual 'friendships' leveraged by Facebook and other social media, and the investment of committed time and effort (to produce care) needed from each human means there is some limit to the number of friends any single person might have.[25] However, that it is more than one further multiplies the potentially opening futures of each friend, and also enables the building of chains of linkage, the formation of a mesh across which affective encounters might pass through multiple persons in committed relationship with one another.[26] Here, there is a glimpse of a de-individuated pro-human network operating to a logic autonomous from the technosphere. Might this be a fertile site for disruptive arttexts?

Gilles Deleuze describes the potential of flow through affective encounter within and between enmeshed spirals of interconnected subjectification as 'turbulent flow'.[27] It is important to acknowledge that this turbulent flow, in as much as it does enable the aleatory production of unpredictable contexts, selves and voids, is still presently existent within a sub- and supra- structural matter of the totalising hegemonic context of the technosphere, the dominant proper text. Friendships exist in an exhausting context of being and surviving, and an equally exhausting effort of self-reflection is continuously needed to guard against our thinking and acting within them becoming technospherically inflected, echoing the psychology-affecting feedback loops discussed in preceding chapters. In its would-be totality, the technosphere is impossible to view or grasp from outside and it is thus not helpful to think of it as a ground tethering the otherwise free-floating multi-dimensional

mesh of friendship interconnections, but instead as a matter or substance through which the bonds of friendship must burrow and push. These bonds are not materially other, but can be thought of as a different texture of that same material. The dominant technospheric texture constantly seeps into the bonds, and encourages them back to the default state: continual care is needed to hold open the channels of this atypical intra-material mesh. It is not just at the textural boundary, where the dominant texture encroaches, that the alternate is pulled back to the norm (though this may be where the pull is strongest); it is as if the matter of the atypically textured filaments itself is subject to a gravitational pull, though this is not a natural gravity. If not actively maintained and cared for in their alternate texture, bonds of friendship revert back to the technospheric standard.

As *Chapter 2* explored, in our contemporary reality we are *de*subjectified as much as we are subjectified, in the interests of new forms of capitalism circulating around (and within) us.[28] The process described above, of making oneself vulnerable and porous and opening out potential future self-hoods in entangled encounter with others, could be framed as an a-critical replication of processes of desubjectification, echoing the value now placed on teamwork, networking and collaboration. As previously argued, the centring on human-to-human, as opposed to individuated, relations is key in avoiding slipping into this. In maintaining an apart-ness while being within, we tread a finely balanced path: contestation of an assumed discrete autonomy is required, as is resistance to collapse into complicity within the hegemonic structure. This is exhausting, making a committed care for one another all the more vital.

We need to move beyond a narrow single-axis similarity-difference understanding of the friendship relation.[29] However, without care, this expanding out of the complexity of the relationship will not remove the risk of overlooking the deeply ingrained inequalities inscribed in material, cultural and social positions built though shared historical reality. Proximities (of all types, not just spatial) mean there are affinities for friendship between those who are similar. The risk in this is that rather than friendship becoming a counter-mesh of co-equality, it instead breaks down into un- or under-connected sub-networks reinforcing positions of *in*equality, with little intersection between these.

Thus, while we do need to think of friendship as a co-entangled navigation through an aleatory durational set of encounters, we also need to acknowledge that we are situated with differing degrees of difference to one another, as read through technospheric subjectification, and these differences are material. Our positionality must be reflected upon. To ignore this is to claim the modernist-liberal tabula rasa which whitewashes past exploitations and their ongoing effects. Friendship needs to be cared for, and treated with care.

CRITICAL-RADICAL CARE

Ways of Being: Care

Care seems to offer a glimmer of a fidelity which might critically and resistantly destabilise the threshold. It sits beyond a concept of static hospitality (implicitly premised on inequality, property and power): the person who cares must be willing to be moved by the other, to take on 'response-ability'.[30] This is a mutually fluid basis in equality at odds with the proprietorial dominance of hospitality. Care must be performed with care: it is a self-reflexively contingent process, very different from either the rigid, abstract transcendentalism or exclusionary, implicitly sexual framing of love. There is an ongoing committed laborious materiality to care, whereas it is possible to 'love' without wishing to do the work of love.[31] A bodily-ness of care goes beyond that of sexually framed love to incorporate the erotic, but also myriad other forms of embodied contact. While friendship is perhaps the closest of the related fidelities discussed, care might be distinguished from it by a greater capacity to move beyond falling into relations of proximity and similarity. Additionally, care better holds open the possibility of relations without an assumption of reciprocality based on a-critically assumed equality of agency (which, in failing to consider structural inequalities, denies the possibility of many friendships).[32]

Care, in contrast to friendship, can also more easily be extended to the non-human.[33] And while this is not the focus of this book, it is clearly of urgency at a time of environmental and ecological crisis. I do not shy away from the human-centricity of the term 'non-human' though, precisely because, in this important extension of care beyond the human, it is nevertheless vital to hold onto care for the human, acknowledging the massive disparities of human vulnerability to the effects of immanent threats such as the climate crisis. Centring on the human also resists the capitalist conception of care for goods and property (or even of humans as property, as discussed below).[34]

Care cannot be thought in abstraction, outside the structures within which we think it. Before considering it as a basis for contesting the technosphere, it must be acknowledged that for many, care, particularly in its material bodily aspects, occurs *within* capitalism, serving as a contributor toward rigidly stratified social reproduction.[35] In *The Undying*, Anne Boyer describes the medicalised body within pharma-capitalism as a key site at which multiple forms of care within capitalism intersect in unequal social stratification. Those materially providing for the basic needs of her ill body, and undertaking the discomfortingly invasive sustaining of it in its vulnerability, and also those who carefully and methodically extract, record and input the data underpinning her treatment, are all disproportionately female and people of colour; in contrast to the doctors, who interpret and decide but do not actually touch.[36] Hegemonic structures can also appropriate care through romanticising it, in terms of repair, or 'make do and mend'. Without criticality, these narratives can become complicit within austerity capitalism which appropriates a frugal human resilience in the interests of an extractive system.[37]

Discourses of 'positive discrimination' and 'diversity' can on the surface appear to align with care's emphasis on equality and connection beyond the similar or proximate. However, these invitations to a web of relations are typically framed as a means of better enabling integration into an established structure premised on the neoliberal individual. This is very different to a counter-network of care existing autonomously to the hegemonic structure.

Exploitative, capitalist appropriation of care has a long history. Christina Sharpe sets out the interwoven productions of racist discourses and modern capitalism through and in horrific acts of dehumanising violence upon the black body.[38] Transatlantic slavery coincided with a set of technologies of financialization and abstraction which have expanded exponentially since to produce our present context.[39] The Africans in the hold on the middle passage were translated across a threshold into becoming financial instruments; whether as dehumanised labour, or beyond this into a distant fixing point for financial speculation, largely invisible to the speculators.

Sharpe recounts the story of the slave transport ship the Zong, infamous for the murdering by throwing overboard of over one hundred humans in order to claim their 'insurance value'. The ship had previously been named the Zorgue, and operated out of Dutch-speaking Middelburg, with 'zorgue' meaning 'care' in Dutch.[40] That a slave ship could be called 'care' underlines how, in this earlier sub-type of capitalism, a logic of profit and property operated upon a substrate of violence. In the terms of the hegemonic structure, the captain was acting with great care, only his care was for his profit and a return to investors. In a brutal foreshadowing of the way we are abstracted into textual forms within the technosphere, the Zong murders demonstrate an uncritical adherence to a logic that even other humans might be considered solely as property, potential extractable labour, and textualised financial value. In slavery, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's argument that private property is the origin of inequality reaches its nadir.[41]

The legacy of the Black Atlantic has continuing affect, which will be further discussed below. While we can recognise some aspects of the abstracting violence manifested in the Zong murders as now being a dispersed logic affecting a broader range of humans, it is especially important at the same time to again emphasise that exploitation and violence within the technosphere are not equally distributed, and compounded exploitations and exclusions continue through it, not least of black people and people of colour.[42]

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A pro-human care, contesting power, will mostly not emanate from power, since that would usually be illogical to the operating of that power within a proprietorial and acquisitive world.[43] This care must operate within a world it finds objectionable, and thus has a resistance implicit within it.[44] There is a performed disconnection within a pro-human care: in seeking a caring way of being, one frequently has to ironically *not* care about the individuating logics of the technospheric world around us.[45]

What might an equitable re-finding of, reasserting of, the human within this counter-logic of care look like? The co-equal human must be plural, must be relational, in acknowledgement of the notion of self-ness being irremovably formed in a fluxing intermeshing with context, not least other human selves. The very notion of 'human' needs to be acknowledged as extended beyond a discrete bounding skin: stretched outward, and indeed inward, in messy interplays. In place of a proper-textual code of property-inequality as our basis of relating, how can this co-equal human plurality move forward as a counter-way of being, of co-being, or perhaps inter-being?

A pro-human care centres upon the relation rather than the individual at either end, emphasising their bound up-ness within one another, and thus the need to continually reflect upon the bond as pivotal to a way of being rooted in equality.

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The 2015 themed issue of *Social Studies of Science* responded to Maria Puig de la Bellacasa's earlier paper in the same journal which advocated a shift from concern to care, to develop a discourse of 'critical care'.[46] For care to be critical it needs to be perpetually unsettled, in continual contestation with itself and the contexts within which it sits; it is a fluid, political thing. In so being, care functions as an active form of counter public as developed in *Chapter 2*. It opens itself up in continual dimensions of further countering, refusing to ossify. Michelle Murphy writes that there are at least four meanings to care: it is emotional attachment and fondness; it means to provide for, sustain, and look after; it is attention and concern, watchfulness and caution; and it is a troubled, worried, unsettledness.[47] A more condensed setting out of these multiple aspects inherent within care is subsequently offered by Puig de la Bellacasa who identifies three principle dimensions within it.[48] There is material care as labour and work, either for other humans in variably direct, proximate forms, or for some other object or process. There is care as affect and affection, in the forming and nurturing of the inter-human bonds between us. Often ephemeral, this aspect of care frequently falls outside of

designated remunerated labour, though mirrors many of the skills which are elsewhere economically valued.[49]

While these two dimensions to care align with writing on social reproduction, Bellacasa's third aspect, ethical and political care, is an important extension beyond this within critical care.[50] A more abstract engagement with the injustice and inequality of the world within which more material and affective forms of care are desperately needed, it is a slowing down and acknowledging of complexity and a refusal to presume, and it is a critical attention and concern for something (something which one may not be the principal affectee of). It is a troubled-ness with the current state of things; an ethics and politics of refusing to accept the stasis of the technosphere.

There is a positionality to any discourse, which it is important to consider. For example, Murphy notes that some of the discourse of care emerging from feminism in the 1970s presumed and accepted a site of capitalism, whiteness and (post-)coloniality.[51] A vital aspect of critical care, in avoiding a similar subsumption by broader existent hierarchies, is to be continually self-reflexive: to bring its acknowledgement of complexity and troubled-ness with the current state of things to itself. It needs to remain fluid, continually contesting itself. Care must be reclaimed, not from impurities, but from attempts to simplify it.[52]

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In working with this multi-dimensional, self-reflexive concept of care, it is vital that the hierarchies of the technosphere are not allowed to develop within it. Care needs to be taken, for example, to avoid a valorising of the conceptual and discursive dimensions of multifaceted care as being in any way superior to, precedent to, or determining of the material aspects of care. To fall into this is to a-critically replicate the hierarchy of labour types in the technosphere as set out in *Chapter 1.*

The *Pirate Care conference,* hosted by the Centre for Postdigital Cultures at Coventry University in June 2019, coalesced in a related way to the argument presented here, around care as resilient resistance to property. A number of presentations focused on piratically misusing the technosphere's own infrastructures to enable pockets of equality within highly unequally structured systems such as pharma-capitalism or financialised intellectual property.[53] Others approached care from a political standpoint, addressing sites of particular vulnerability.[54] Amidst these though, one speaker shared an example of a collective model of nursery care developed where state provision was lacking.[55] I draw attention to this to emphasise how mutually vital to one another Puig de la Bellacasa's three dimensions of care are.[56] Thought through these dimensions, the development of a collective, equitable nursery model can be a precursor to parents or guardians, sharing the labour of childcare, being enabled to consider contingent ethical and political complexities of care (including the lack of state-provided care producing the need for such a nursery in the first place). At the same time, the politics implicit within the nursery can be framed and practised with care at their centre owing in part to the reflexive consideration which the nursery has enabled. And furthermore, the collective nursery, almost like a site of (artistic) practice inseparable from its surrounding social, political and economic contexts, alongside being a practical enabler, might itself be precisely where those contingent ethical and political complexities of care can be most fruitfully developed.[57]

To offer another example, The Black Panther Party's 'Free Breakfast for School Children' programme can somewhat similarly be seen as a site where these different aspects of care mutually interrelated. The breakfast programme was materially much needed in the US at the time, with 12.6 million children living in households experiencing food poverty.[58] The programme thus provided vital immediate material care in the meeting of a need perpetuated by structures the Panthers opposed (and this food provision was therefore required of all chapters of the party). At the same time, the programme also acted as a vector disseminating the Panthers' broader political project and granting it greater positive publicity.[59] Recognition of this significance of the breakfast programme was made clear in an internal memo written by FBI Director J Edgar Hoover in 1969 which stated 'The [programme] represents the best and most influential activity going for the [Black Panther Party] and,

as such, is potentially the greatest threat to efforts by authorities to neutralize the [Black Panther Party] and destroy what it stands for'.[60]

Beyond this dialectical relationship between overarching political aims and immediate material actions though, as with the nursery above, the breakfast programme enabled a vital reflexivity of care within the party's internal structure. In prioritising the assertion of racial equality, many women in the party had accepted a degree of gender inequality in its workings.[61] However, the breakfast programme's centring of material care created a site at which greater gender equality could be fostered through the bodily practice of working hard alongside one another, in combination, crucially, with recognition of the vital importance of this as a vector in furthering the Black Panther Party's broader aims.[62] Asserting gender inequalities was incompatible with the urgently needed material care of the busy and extremely effective breakfast kitchens.

This looping together of the diverse aspects of critical care as they feed into one another is vital. Within the mix, all facets of care are equally key. *This book* is a text though, and in and of itself falls toward the discursive. I have sought to acknowledge and discuss the more directly material aspects of care, and have attempted to carry some into textual form, as well as emphasising their absolute centrality for the creation of disruptive arttexts, and their subsequent reflexive consideration. This text affirmatively states its co-equal consideration of all aspects of care, and recognises its author's reliance and responsibilities in enmeshments of material and affective care, but is of itself principally discursive and theoretical. I do not apologise for this: while any construction of a hierarchy of elements within care needs to be contested, at the same time the discursive, theoretical site needs to be addressed, not least so that it is not subsumed by uncaring structures.

Sharpe frames care as a project of thought, writing 'thinking needs care […] and that thinking and care need to stay in the wake' (of continual contextual reflexive consideration).[63] This includes writing about it; there is a need to acknowledge the material affect of the act of writing, and a need to write carefully, caring-ly, about care. As her title *In the Wake* asserts, echoing recent lived experience

in Minneapolis, Tottenham and elsewhere, the past does not go away. It folds onto the present and informs the future, as the structure reproduces itself. There is a double meaning to 'wake', both sides of which Sharpe elucidates: that of the wake of a ship, the ripples of the event moving ever further out from it in space and time; and the wake of a funeral, the time of grieving, of recognising that which has occurred and continues to do so.[64] Part of care as a project of thought is to hold these open, to refuse to close them down as resolved and to look only forward, but to recognise them and care about the ongoing affect, and ongoing grief. 'Coming to terms with', a borrowing from law into everyday speech, still entails a freezing out of the fluidity of the human into a contractual text: it is not the aim.

Care can be extended adjectivally into 'caring', but equally important to critical care is that it can become 'careful'. The words care and accurate have a related derivation.[65] More than etymologically interesting though, this highlights that the encoded presumptions of 'accuracy' within the technosphere might themselves need to be contested and have care brought back into them. As Puig de la Bellacasa writes, 'a politics of care goes against the bifurcation of consciousness that would keep our knowledge untouched by anxiety and inaccurateness': care entails thinking beyond a dialectical model whereby the textual, data-orientated, scientist understanding of accuracy is held up against meaningless, irrelevant inaccuracy.[66] Instead, inaccuracy and accuracy need to be recognised as a fluid, porous mesh, often ethically and politically charged. As a binary division between accuracy and inaccuracy needs breaking down, so a singular notion of accuracy also requires fragmenting. Sensuous and apparently irrational aspects of our human-ness need to be recognised as important in themselves, perhaps as means of moving beyond the strictures of computational thinking. The arttext intersects with and affects the technospheric text, but is not bound by the same logics.

Critical care, in its complexifying of accuracy, also helps to reassert a self-reflexive consideration of positionality. Puig de la Bellacasa's arguing for a movement from 'matters of fact', through 'matters of concern', to 'matters of care' is in the first shift a rejection of the stasis of the ossified fold and an asserting of affect, and then in the second, a centring on inequitably dispersed agency and vulnerability across a co-humanity.[67] In recognising our positionality within this, what was presented

as an objective, neutral stasis becomes apparent as a contingently produced, ethically and politically charged, present. It is worth recalling Jean-François Lyotard's thick surface of being and Edmund Husserl's related idea of the moment which contains past and future within it here, both of which can help us envisage such a present.[68] There is far greater complexity, contingently but nevertheless meaningfully formed and forming, than the flatness the technosphere presents. Critical care is a very useful framework in helping us navigate this.

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Joan C. Tronto and Berenice Fisher set out the foundational definition of care upon which critical care builds as being 'everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair "our world" so that we can live in it as well as possible'.[69] However, the digital networks and automated systems and structures mediating and increasingly constituting our world (not to mention feeding back into our conceptions and materialisations of 'self') are moving ever faster. A way of being solely based on critical care may unfortunately find itself continuously left behind and addressing that which has been deemed to have been progressed beyond; accelerated past through new automated technologies operating both within proprietorial black boxes and at speeds beyond comprehension, self-justified and self-reproduced as the necessary condition of the technosphere. Critical care is crucial, but unto the discourse I want to contribute 'radical care'. In radical care, the radically caring disruptive arttext becomes conceivable within *and beyond* our world.

Radical Care

Critical care offers a vital counter-logic to that of technospheric hegemony, producing material resilience which might at specific sites coalesce into instances of resistance. It does this with continual care for itself, avoiding ossifying into another rigid structure. However, in order to contest

strategically at a systemic level, on the event-horizon of the present as it is occurring, something more speculative can be added to it, entering into the unknown spaces of the void without the ethical certainties of having carefully considered care at that specific event. As described, aspects of care are vulnerable to neoliberal subsumption, and the radical form of care can offer some protection against this in leaping away from the expected course, acting to shock and surprise the hegemonic structure.[70] Radical care cannot be based around any false assumption of equality: it has to recognise the variabilities of position, and instead has to carry within its own make-up the *construction* of equality. It can only do so, as will be discussed, by being fully enmeshed with critical care. Far from being a departure or progression from critical care, it is a *dimension of* critical care which I seek to tease out, but which not only remains attached to it but in turn fully holds critical care *within* itself.

Considering care as an ethics-methodology (of resistant, resilient practice-being), to broadly generalise: we might identify critical care as the facet which places slightly greater emphasis on ethics, while radical care opens more space for action. The complexity in each of these slight prioritisations is formed through having the other also already fully there within. The ethical and methodological, and critical and radical, all ultimately coalesce in the political: a politics of care as a way of being beyond the perpetuating inequalities of the technosphere.

There will be periodic moments where a paradoxically careless act, an arttext perhaps, needs to be flung forward as an immediate intervention into the public sphere. By necessity, this act will be unconsidered, carefree, careless. Only in so doing can it hold within itself a fragment of potential to rupture the perpetuating course of uncaring inequality into which it is directed. The fluxing, shifting network of power moves so swiftly to suppress or appropriate critique that radical, careless, anarchic, improper potential underminings of it are vital.

There is a profound care in the nurturing of the co-equal networks out of which this radical act is initiated. There is great care in the reflexive development of the lexis and praxis it proceeds as and from. But it itself is necessarily carelessly carefree and immediate. Radical care as a counter way of

being operates in continual reflexive contestation of itself, but nevertheless coheres as a fidelity which can pass through the threshold of the present, acknowledging the present's deeply flawed material and discursive realities inscribed into its proper text, and offers a glimmer of a possibility of reopening diverse futures through a rejection of the primacy of property in thinking life, labour, object and subject.

The work of care stands in opposition to the violence of stating 'I just don't care', and refusing connection to the human-ness of the other. All of the multiple aspects of critical care constitute the essential work of care which must be always already present at the point of the radically caring unpredictable act. This enfolding of, and enfolding within, critical care is what holds radical care away from accelerationist positions. Whereas a (right) accelerationist view advocates speculative acts according to an individualist logic which willingly dehumanises, the speculative acts of radical care are founded conversely in an ethics centred in co-equal care for the human.

The critical is not just a check or brake on the radical, restraining the act that looks to leap forward into the unknown. Without enfolding the critical within itself, radical care could become entirely negative: operating solely as attempts to subvert and disrupt the technosphere. In Louis Althusser's terminology though, these interventions would be less likely to 'take hold' as meaningful events without some affirmative, positive element: a narrative of another way of being, much more graspable than a purely negative critique.[71] That positive element is critical care. One manifestation of the critical-radical relationship is thus the radically caring act as a vessel to deliver critical care to a site of potential fracture within the apparently ossified totality of the technosphere. If we take the exposition of invisible labours of care as being a critique of the technosphere—through interrogation of the inequalities of forms of labour within it—, this aligns with Puig de la Bellacasa's view (echoing one of Karl Marx's most repeated quotations) that 'the point is not only to expose or reveal invisible labours of care, but also to generate care'.[72] We can go further than this though: it is not only that we might go beyond critique with the proposing of a new way being, but in radical care enfolding critical

care, that the speculative throwing forward of new ways of being might itself be the most affective form of critique.[73]

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As Puig de la Bellacasa emphasises in *Matters of Care*, a caring approach to thinking-writing entails both an acknowledgement of the multiplicities of authorship, present and historic, that go into any concept, and also an acknowledgement that any new contribution is not some teleological advancement, superseding and overwriting that which came before.[74] I have sought to emphasise radical care's inseparability from critical care, and in so doing acknowledge the lineage of careful authorships it emerges from, in addition to being more widely formed through the whole breadth of lines of research (themselves all building upon others') within this book.

Considering the disruptive affect of radical-critical care, I want to acknowledge a further lineage which is specifically relevant to the disruptive arttext as a potential manifestation of the radically caring act: the historical avant garde. As Marc James Léger argues, avant garde art must draw on its previous selves as a way of holding onto enmeshed autonomy within its context.[75] In the shifting, dematerialised, post-truth cultural space of the technosphere, an artistic (or radical) engagement which does not critically reflect on its genealogy risks losing whatever tenuous positions of autonomy or critique might still remain. As we generate speculative forward-looking acts, if they are to resist hegemony, we can use this history of creative resistance as a navigation aid to better ascertain the potential fractures within the technosphere.

Moreover, holding onto historical counter narratives outside of the present defends alternate ways of being, and resists the subsumption of their archive. In reflecting back upon a set of potential imaginings of diverse futures as themselves being of value, if mainly unrealised, the importance of *openly* speculating and imagining collective futures beyond the present threshold is affirmed.[76] This valuing and sustaining of other ways of being, echoing the proactive reaching out to the other human

in care, is essential in holding onto a complexity in the face of populist and fascist binaries, and techno- and econo-centric claims of indisputable faits accomplis. This is to say that there is no good way of being in the singular. The proposing of the radical continually comes from the outside which must always be kept open (through reflexive counter publics), thus serving to help prevent a centralised ossifying of care too closely related to power. An aspect of caring for care then, is this holding open of the space of the radical. This aligns with an 'anti-anti-art' position, arguing against the absence or foreclosure of speculative, critical, creative acts that might disrupt the proceeding of the status quo.[77] In carefully looking to the future, the radically caring disruptive arttext acts to avoid alignment with any potentially hegemonic emergent vanguard. The radical act must take care: as the analysis of the relations of art within post-Fordism in *Chapter 1* outlined, being in the vanguard or centre of either art or capitalism can swiftly, without care, become one and the same.

Husserl's thick present is vital to radical care.[78] It enables us to think the radical at the speculative leading edge, while still being fully connected to all the essential aspects of critical care in the present reality. Acknowledging the need for paradoxically careless acts, radical care must hold within itself a trust of intent and pre-forgiveness, which this complete mutuality with critical care enables of it. Care itself, like the act, needs to be already flung forward into the unknown, as a fidelity able to cross the threshold into uncertain futures.[79] Care must be trusted as being there in the future-present, it must have already been inscribed, embodied. It must be a way of being out of which the intervention can be trusted to carelessly go, and within which the event might be carefully, caring-ly written. Almost all of the radical acts (including arttexts) will be ineffective, and some will unfortunately be harmful. A caring acceptance of this reality must already be there though, only in so doing can we hold open the potential for the radically caring, careless act to affectively instigate possibilities of new ways of being. This might at times come with great difficulty, not least for the affectee of an unforeseen consequence. This is why the radical must *always* come with (critical) care, but some risk unfortunately remains. The alternative though, is submitting to the foreclosed static present of the technosphere in all its perpetuating inequality, exploitation and violence.

[1] Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* [1988], trans. by Oliver Feltham (New York, NY: Continuum, 2005), pp. 232-237.

[2] James Bridle, *New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future* (London: Verso, 2018), pp. 251-252.

[3] Fredric Jameson, 'Cognitive Mapping', in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 347-358.

[4] Bridle.

Groys describes this ungraspability of the continuously changing context in which we are bound as 'bewilderment'.

Boris Groys, *In the Flow* (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 12, 34, 188.

The paradox of this bewilderment is that while it generates alienation, it does also enable certain forms of connection. In their *sanctioned* use, these connections are premised on an individuated (de)subjectification though.

Marc James Léger, *Don't Network: The Avant Garde After Networks* (New York NY: Minor Compositions, 2018), pp. 1-5.

[5] Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine* [1929], ed. by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[6] Ibid., p. 13.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 105.

[9] Christians might argue that grace, with its universalising non-comparative emphasis, overcomes this issue. This is not the place for a theological discussion of grace, but rather the point made is how this rooting of love/care on a transcendental ground becomes a site of individuation *within the present worldly reality*.

[10] This rendering of the other human as object was central to both platform capitalism as discussed in *Chapter 1* and, arguably, certain models of socially engaged practice as discussed in *Chapter 2*.

[11] Adam Gabbatt, 'Is Silicon Valley's quest for immortality a fate worse than death?', *Guardian,* 23 February 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/22/silicon-valley-immortality-blood-infusion-gene-therapy> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

[12] Alain Badiou with Nicolas Truong, *In Praise of Love* [2009], trans. by Peter Bush (New York NY: The New Press, 2012).

For example, Badiou is critical of Kierkegaard's setting out of a hierarchy of forms of love culminating in the religious.

Ibid., p. 14.

I suggest 'plurality' rather than 'two scene' in attempting to move beyond the binary exclusivity of the formulation of love Badiou proposes.

[13] Ibid., pp. 28, 41-44.

[14] Ibid., pp. 34-37.

[15] This exclusionary position is later extended further through consideration of love within the reproductive family, where it becomes bound up in questions of bio-genealogical lineages of social reproduction which sit uneasily with a desire for equality for all.

Making explicit reference to 'the couple', Badiou proposes a possible definition of his conception of love as 'minimal communism'. In its implicit boundaries and exclusivity, this is a questionable concept more akin to an expanded individualism, and antithetical to a collective, pro-human, equitable way of being *for all*.

Ibid., p. 90.

[16] Ibid., pp.18-19.

[17] Maggie Nelson, *The Argonauts* (New York NY: Melville House, 2016), p. 27.

Pro-human practices, undertaken with care, could at times include 'sleeping with whomever you want however you want' (assuming there is mutual consent); this is to be advocated. My argument is that this is not *on its own* enough, even less so if conforming to an encoded normativity.

[18] Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. by George Collins (London: Verso, 1997).

[19] Badiou, *Being and Event*, p. 209.

[20] This observation prefigures an extensive discussion of care for care itself which will come below.

[21] Derrida, pp. 12-17.

Badiou, *Being and Event*, pp. 232-237.

[22] Derrida.

[23] David Webb, 'On Friendship: Derrida, Foucault and the Practice of Becoming' *Research in Phenomenology*, 33 (2003), 119-140.

[24] Michel Foucault, 'Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two', in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth,* ed. by Paul Rabinow, trans. by Robert Hurley and others (New York NY: The New Press, 1994), pp. 199-205 (p. 201).

[25] Facebook 'friendships' are centred on commodification and individuated subjectification, as examined in detail by Bucher.

Taina Bucher, 'The Friendship Assemblage: Investigating Programmed Sociality on Facebook', *Television & New Media*, 14:6 (2012), 479-493.

[26] This greater and more open interconnectivity is a facet through which fidelities such as friendship can offer more resistant and resilient potentialities than (often comparatively exclusive) love.

[27] Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* [1986], trans. by Seán Hand (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 99.

[28] Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', *October*, 59 (1992), 3-7.

Giorgio Agamben, *What is an Apparatus?*, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

[29] Webb.

[30] Aryn Martin, Natasha Myers and Ana Viseu, 'The politics of care in technoscience', *Social Studies of Science*, 45:5 (2015), 625-641 (p. 635).

The concept of 'response-ability' was notably developed by Barad.

Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

[31] Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds* (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), p. 5.

[32] (While I am differentiating care from love and friendship, relations framed in terms of love and friendship can be, and often are, also relations of care.)

[33] In this, care holds a similar capacity to Haraway's concept of kinship. Haraway's emphasis on 'kin' (as a means of shifting away from connections premised exclusively on bio-genealogy) also aligns with a centring on care in preference to love (which, in Badiou's conception at least, is restrictively premised on a reproductive hetero-normativity).

Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

Badiou with Truong.

[34] As discussed in *Chapter 4*, 'human' is invoked relationally. An essentialist understanding of 'humanity' is rejected.

[35] Shannon Mattern, 'Maintenance and Care', *Places Journal* (2018) <https://placesjournal.org/article/maintenance-and-care/> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

[36] Anne Boyer, *The Undying: Pain, Vulnerability, Mortality, Medicine, Art, Time, Dreams, Data, Exhaustion, Cancer, and Care* (London: Allen Lane, 2019), pp. 61-62.

[37] Mattern.

[38] Christina Sharpe, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

[39] Ibid.

Ramon Amaro, 'Machine Learning, Black Labour and Bio-Epistemic Resistance', presentation at *After Work* symposium, University of West London, 27 January 2018 <https://autonomy.work/portfolio/work-life-labour-automation-conference-photos-recordings/> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

[40] Sharpe, pp. 34-35, 45.

This renaming, or slippage of name, succinctly reflects the remote, abstracted, textualised processes of capitalism of which it was part.

[41] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, or, Second Discourse' [1755], in *Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings,* ed. by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111-231.

We can think of transatlantic slavery as a highly specific and horrifically violent foreshadowing of the passivity and denial of agency discussed in *Chapter 1*, whereby the technosphere exploits our bare existence, our 'being'. Slavery operated on an inverse of this, with 'being' annihilated into labour, and brutal systemic violence removing the capacity of resistance from the subject humans whom it sought to dehumanise.

[42] Cameron Rowland's 2020 exhibition *3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73* was focused on the violent abstraction of black bodies within the entwined histories of transatlantic slavery and capitalism discussed here.

Cameron Rowland, *3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73*, exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, 2020 <https://www.ica.art/exhibitions/cameron-rowland> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

Rowland's exhibition, as well as reflexively turning attention to the ICA's own material entanglement with slavery (e.g. as manifested in its mahogany doors and handrails), also included an 'officer monitor': a device to enable the remote tracking and monitoring of individuals as an alternative to traditional incarceration. This brought the exhibition's historical focus to direct consideration within the technospheric present. Black people and people of colour are disproportionately overrepresented in the prison populations of both the US and UK, and both systems incorporate significant private enterprise, including the operation of 'for-profit' prisons.

'Criminal Justice Fact Sheet', *NAACP website* (2020) <https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

'Race', *Prison Reform Trust website* <https://prisonreformtrust.org.uk/project/race/> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

Clyde Haberman, 'For Private Prisons, Detaining Immigrants Is Big Business', *New York Times,* 1 October 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigration-detention.html> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

Prison Reform Trust, *Private Punishment: Who Profits?* (London: Prison Reform Trust, 2005), available at <https://prisonreformtrust.org.uk/publication/private-punishment-who-profits/> [Accessed 12 April 2023].

[43] Martin, Myers and Viseu, p. 628.

[44] To continue the discussion of 'self-care' from *Chapter 1*, we can consider self-care in its capitalist forms as not finding objectionable the world it operates within, but instead (re)producing a subject better able to converge with that world. Self-care, as commonly presented on Instagram and similar platforms, considers the human as property (even if the owner might be the associated individual). This self-care is performed/re-presented in the capitalist care terms of repairing or maximising the efficiency and exploitability of this piece of property.

As Hobart and Kneese note, contemporary self-care techniques enabling maintenance of productivity are a form of 'New Age salve in a fresh iteration of the Weberian Protestant work ethic'.

Hi'ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, 'Radical Care: Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times', *Social Text*, 38:1 (2020), 1-16 (p. 4).

Published in March 2020, the 'Radical Care' themed issue of *Social Text*, edited by Hobart and Kneese, was the first serious piece of scholarship I encountered specifically using the term 'radical care', around which I myself was already thinking.

Hi'ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, eds., 'Radical Care: Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times' [special issue], *Social Text*, 38:1 (2020).

Hobart and Kneese's definition of radical care as 'a set of vital but underappreciated strategies for enduring precarious worlds' does not articulate the radical in potentially instigating systemic change in the way I develop the term, and is thus more akin to a form of resilience within my lexicon.

Hi'ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, 'Radical Care: Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times', *Social Text*, 38:1 (2020), 1-16 (p. 2).

[45] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p. 78.

[46] Ana Viseu and others, eds., 'The Politics of Care in Technoscience' [special issue], *Social Studies of Science*, 45:5 (2015).

Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, 'Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling neglected things', *Social Studies of Science*, 41:1 (2011), 85-106.

Puig de Bellacasa describes technoscience as a 'world' in which socio-political processes and imaginaries are unavoidably bound up with scientific knowledge and material production.

Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p. 17.

[47] Michelle Murphy, 'Unsettling care: Transnational itineraries of care in feminist health practices', *Social Studies of Science*, 45:5 (2015), 717-737 (p. 721).

[48] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p. 5.

Other overlapping articulations of the complexity of care include, from a design perspective, that proposed in *The Lancaster Care Charter*. Here, for an open-futured design approach, the authors advocate a simultaneous holding onto of 'care of complexity', 'care of the project' and 'care of relations'.

Paul Rodgers and others, 'The Lancaster Care Charter', *Design Issues*, 35:1 (2019), 73-77.

[49] This irony within post-Fordism was discussed in *Chapter 1*.

[50] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p. 5.

[51] Murphy, p. 721.

[52] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p. 11.

[53] John Willbanks, 'Open Science, DIY Bio, and Cheap Data', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://pirate.care/pages/abstracts/> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

Nick Titus, 'I'm My Own Primary Care Provider: Taking Back Control with DIY Medicine in the 21st Century', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgMPGOw3Flg&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=18> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

Gilbert Rodman, 'Whose Culture? Our Culture!: Pirates as Cultural Care/Takers', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDPP-detx5A&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=2> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

Agustina Andreoletti, 'Shadow Libraries: Using Art to Resist', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9J9CfTYHBk&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=5> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

[54] Taraneh Fazeli, 'Sick Time, Sleepy Time, Crip Time: Against Capitalism's Temporal Bullying', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckCkTszuXpk&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=17> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

Kirsten Forkert, Janna Graham and Victoria Mponda, 'Social Media and Refugee Solidarity Networks in the Face of State Failures', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IW-aGqfClIg&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=14> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

[55] Maddalena Fragnito, 'Soprasotto, a Pirate Kindergarten', presentation at *Pirate Care conference*, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n98GxL0OIms&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=11> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

[56] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics,* p.5.

[57] Following this conference, *Pirate Care* developed into an ongoing project centred around an online syllabus.

Pirate Care, *Pirate Care* [project website] (2020) <https://pirate.care> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

The project operates to share information and strategies between instances of specific piratical (e.g. anti-proprietorial) care practice, including those presented at the conference.

The principal organisers of *Pirate Care* state that it is seeking to operate in the grey zones between institutions and on the fringes of legality, premised on solidarity (as opposed to generosity) in taking on risks placed upon others. They refuse a dichotomy between technology and care, actively making (mis)use of contemporary technologies. They state that the project is not one of moving outside law, but of undermining, shifting and disturbing the law where it is not premised on human wellbeing.

Valeria Graziano, Marcell Mars and Tomislav Medak, 'Pirate Care', online presentation as part of *Kunsthalle Wien X Pirate Care,* 14 May 2020 <https://kunsthallewien.at/en/event/pirate-care-ein-talk-mit-valeria-graziano-marcell-mars-and-tomislav-medak/> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

In many ways then, *Pirate Care* as a project operates as an example of radically caring practice as proposed by this book, within an activist context.

[58] Nik Heynen, 'Bending the Bars of Empire from Every Ghetto for Survival: The Black Panther Party's Radical Antihunger Politics of Social Reproduction and Scale', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 99:2 (2009), 406-422 (p. 419).

[59] Ibid., p. 407.

[60] Ruth Gebreyesus, '"One of the biggest, baddest things we did": Black Panthers' free breakfasts, 50 years on', *Guardian,* 18 October 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/17/black-panther-party-oakland-free-breakfast-50th-anniversary> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

[61] Heynen, p. 413.

This occasional placing 'on hold' of gender equality by some black women parallels the aforementioned problematic presumptions of whiteness running through much feminist discourse at the time which Murphy observes.

Murphy, p. 721.

[62] This was a gradual, complex and incomplete process. As Heynen notes, men frequently received disproportionate credit, while women undertook the majority of the work.

Heynen, p. 412.

[63] Sharpe, p. 5.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics*, p. 91.

[66] Ibid., p. 93.

[67] Puig de la Bellacasa, 'Matters of care in technoscience', p. 87.

[68] Jean-François Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy* [1974], trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 4-17.

Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, trans. by John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

Both of these ways of conceptualising our present reality (in line with Puig de la Bellacasa's progression from fact, through concern, to care) emphasise a fluidity and interrelatedness, but also, vitally, hold open a possibility of agency.

[69] Joan C. Tronto, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care* (New York NY: Routledge, 1993), p. 103.

[70] Spade gives a specific example of unpredictable surprise acting as a means of pulling care away from hegemonic appropriation, in the context of disaster relief following the 2018 Puerto Rico hurricane. Mutual aid relief organisers used subterfuge, surprise and audacity to disrupt state inaction: falsely claiming permission to distribute stockpiled supplies from a government warehouse, and producing false documents to enable others to do likewise.

Dean Spade, 'Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival', *Social Text*, 38:1 (2020), 131-151 (p. 138).

[71] Louis Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-87,* ed. by François Matheron and Oliver Corpet, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), p. 172.

[72] Puig de la Bellacasa, 'Matters of care in technoscience', p. 94.

Marx famously stated (and has inscribed on his gravestone) 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it'.

Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' [1845], in *Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume One,* trans. by W. Lough (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 13-15 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm> [Accessed 13 April 2023].

[73] Simultaneously, as Spade notes, new ways of being must themselves be held accountable to ongoing radical critique in order that they do not themselves become exclusionary.

Spade, p. 135.

[74] Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics.*

[75] Léger, p. 28.

[76] This *open* speculation, called for by Vishmidt, was discussed in *Chapter 1*.

Marina Vishmidt, *Speculation as a Mode of Production: Forms of Value Subjectivity in Art and Capital* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

[77] Ibid., pp. 15-20.

[78] Husserl.

[79] Badiou, *Being and Event,* pp. 232-237.