

Deconstructing Denigration:
Conceptualising and Conquering the
'Barbarians' of Gaul and Germania
(58BCE-16CE)

By M. Sparks

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Germania (58BCE-16CE)

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
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Abstract:

Modern connotations of the term 'barbarian' are as caricaturing as they are pervasive. Arising from antique notions of cultural demarcation, this designation conjures the image of a wild uncivilised people and has been employed by elite cultures throughout history to dehumanise other culture groups. Furthermore, there is a belief in scholarship that this caricaturing and dehumanisation directly impacted the extent of Roman brutality enacted in *Barbaricum*. This thesis sets out that ethnic origin had little to no impact on the determination of Roman armies to commit extreme violence. Analysis of similar conduct throughout the Mediterranean demonstrates the universality of the practice was predicated by the milieu of the period. The effects of the ethnographic demarcation of these are seemingly less important to those alternate factors within the empire.

Moreover, literary usage of the term '*Barbarus*' during the period in which these peoples were incorporated indicates the complexity of the word's terminology; demonstrating modern perceptions are warped in comparison to ancient definitions. By assessing the relationship between the Romans and the term 'barbarian', one can see that ancient conceptualisations of the word are often contradictory and contrasting with their contemporaries, as well as to those in modern minds. Through consideration of these two aspects - the predicating factors for extreme violence and the terminological ambiguity - it becomes clear that the term's impact had little effect on the Roman military, yet remarkable effect on tropology in the literary sphere.



Introduction: Civilising *Barbaricum*

“The emperor nevertheless refused the request of the soldiers for a donative, declaring that whatever they obtained over and above the regular amount would be wrung from the blood of their parents and kinsmen”

Cass. Dio 72.3.

The period of Roman expansion across Europe, and the *Pax* which followed it, was long held to be a period of the civilised civilising the uncivil, with ‘Romanisation’ spreading deep into the provinces and Roman culture being absorbed by the savages beyond Italy.¹ Roman historiography – especially that focused on imperialism and Romanisation – older than around 50 years has often championed this theme – specifically, Romans actively spreading civilisation to a barbarian world.² Though there were many critics in the post-enlightenment period, the notion of ‘civilising’ the ‘barbarian’ is as old as the Empire itself and Rome is often held as a paragon of this practice.³ Supporters of imperialist regimes in recent centuries have held up this ideal – with particular attention to the regions in which these recent empires exercised control – in archaic attempts at justifying the regime under which they lived.⁴ Yet the notion is not black and white, nor is it even entirely correct. As the centuries and methods of analysis have advanced, so too has our understanding of the actual picture of Roman expansion, and we realise *Pax* was not all too peaceful.⁵ In recent decades, following the collapse of the world’s modern empires – and more importantly the opening of the study to a greater range of students – research into Roman imperialism has shifted dramatically, and as such the quality of scholarship has greatly improved. Modern literature has become less a tool for the validation of one’s hegemony, based on antiquity’s aristocratic literature and outdated mentality, and has

¹ The extent of *Pax*, or ‘peace’ and the terminology surrounding it is, however, highly contentious, see, n.17.

² A succinct overview of this practice is offered in Morley, N. *The Roman Empire: Roots of Imperialism*, (London: Pluto Press, 2010), pp. 38-69; On the issues and limitations with the term Romanisation, see Webster, J. ‘Creolizing the Roman Provinces’, *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 105, No. 2, (2001), pp. 209–25; on the evolution of the terminology’s usage see Hingley, R. ‘Not so Romanized? Tradition, Reinvention or Discovery in the Study of Roman Britain’, *World Archaeology*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2008), pp. 427–443.

³ Noteworthy dedicated studies on this Western justification are presented in; Heraclides, A, and Dialla, A. *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), pp. 31–56; Parchami, A. *Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica and Americana*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Erskine, A. *Roman Imperialism*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 3-7; throughout Morley, *The Roman Empire*.

⁴ Seeley, J.R. *Roman Imperialism*, (Roberts Brothers: Boston, 1871), is a striking example; Cf. *Tolk. Lett.* 77. Wherein Tolkien tells of regular employment of “*Carthago delenda est*”.

⁵ As is illustrated in the now classic rebuttal of the Cambridge Ancient History’s *Imperial Peace* entry ‘peace is not what one finds in its pages’, Goffart, W. *Rome’s Fall and After*, (London: Hambledon Press, 1989), p. 111.

become more a scientific analysis of all available data.⁶ With the greater incorporation of empathetic lenses on those once deemed ‘barbarian’, our modern understanding of this once massive empire is significantly adjusted.

In the modern world, the word ‘barbarian’ is inseparable from the Victorian ideal of the uncivilised rabble of beard-toting vagabonds, with no grasp of advanced aspects of society.⁷ While modern pop-culture focusing on Caesar and Augustus further compounds the association of the barbarian caricature with Celtic and Germanic cultures, modern non-academic works by classicists and historians also continue to uphold the association of primitivism and brutality, substantiating the negative ‘barbarian’ stereotype.⁸ Increasingly, modern historians and archaeologists studying the lives and the conquests of those in *Barbaricum*, are becoming aware of the dramatic opposite, though progress is still slow.⁹ For in deference to Roman and Greek suggestions, many of these northern cultures were a highly developed range of peoples with an advanced artistic style, higher understanding of literature than once opined, and possessing various degrees of societal organisation. The development in archaeological practice and post-imperial approaches has shone a new light on who the real ‘barbarians’ were, or rather that the classification of ‘*barbarus*’ could easily be applied to the *populi Romani* and her ‘glorious’ legions. The celebrated occupiers who had received the wealth of attention before the 1980s, were, in many regards, more rapacious, pugnacious, and possessed with an uninhibited avarice. Nonetheless, Roman (and Hellenic) xenophobic stratification wrapped within the term ‘barbarian’ has resulted in a multi-millennia-old denigration. From Machiavelli to Boris Johnson, the glorification of the Roman elite and vilification of the Roman subject have both long been in the traditions of Western aristocracies and ruling classes.¹⁰ Like the word ‘pleb’, ‘barbarian’ has transcended Roman history and from the 2000s became especially dominant in political discourse when one needs to denigrate a section of a population.¹¹

⁶ For the usage of the Romanisation framework in modern discourse see, Gardner, A. ‘Thinking About Roman Imperialism: Postcolonialism, Globalisation and Beyond?’, *Britannia*, Vol. 44, (2013), Pp. 1–25.

⁷ Boletsi, M. *Barbarism and Its Discontents*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 1–9.

⁸ A striking example is found in Holland’s succinct overview of Gaul in a *Sunday Times* Bestseller, ‘beyond the Alps... lay the wild land of Gauls... here dwelt teeming hordes of barbarians’, Holland, T. *Dynasty: The Rise and Fall Of The House Of Caesar*, (London: Abacus, 2015), p. 17.

⁹ Etherington, N. ‘Barbarians Ancient and Modern’, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 1, (2011), pp. 36–40; Halsall, G. *Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

¹⁰ Both Machiavelli’s *Prince* and *Discourses* are guilty of this; so too is Johnson, B. *The Dream of Rome*, (London: Harper Perennial, 2007), particularly pp. 15–17.

¹¹ The 2012 ‘Plebgate’ being an obvious example, see, Booth, R, ‘Andrew Mitchell row – timeline’, *The Guardian*, (19/12/2012); Unknown Author, ‘Andrew Mitchell announces resignation over ‘Plebgate’ claims’, *Channel 4 News*, (19/10/2012); Cf. Boletsi, *Barbarism and Its Discontents*, pp. 39–45 on examples of the term’s usage in modern political discourse, particularly following the 9/11 attacks.

Modern subconscious associations with the term barbarian are in many ways a continuation of general ancient conceptions, but analysis of the Roman conceptualisation shows a fascinating level of nuance to the term's usage and the place it had within the Roman mind. It is interesting that many of these 'barbarian's' descendants recorded in the works of Caesar and Tacitus go on to play prominent roles within the Roman system post-conquest, yet in the histories they are often little different to animals. This incorporation of the cultures, that we see increasingly from Claudius onward, presents an interesting contrast to how their forebears were framed. To what extent then was being 'barbarian' transient to the Romans? And moreover, how did a 'barbarian' being at the other end of the *gladii* make a difference to the Legionary wielding it?

This paper will build upon the numerous modern works published by Prof. Roymans of the Northwest European Archaeology Department at *Vrije Universiteit* Amsterdam. Particularly, his work on the conflict archaeology of Roman interaction along the Rhine frontier in Northern Gaul. Many of these works have proved integral to the production of this thesis and are discussed where appropriate. Of particular importance is his 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping: Investigating Caesar's Actions in the Germanic Frontier Zone', wherein he sets out to address the question: 'Which stereotypical image of *Germani* did Caesar employ, and to what extent did it influence his political and military decision-making on the Germanic frontier?'¹² The issue of stereotyping receives the least focus in Roymans' paper and is limited to determining that Caesar conducted massacres of *Germani* due to racial prejudice as a 'plausible' motivation. He forwards the notion of 'a threshold of extreme violence' (TEV) factoring in the occurrence of massacres, implying the caricaturing of *Germani*, by both Caesar and the contemporary elites, lowered the Roman threshold to use extreme violence against these tribes during Roman military actions.¹³

This thesis seeks to expand upon this proposition and examine the true extent, if any, of variability in military action determined by ethnological distinction, with a specific focus on Caesar; approaching Roymans' investigation into the phenomenon of stereotyping with an alternate lens of inquiry, considering both his datasets along with those collected in researching this paper. As is demonstrated below, this is not simple: the Roman mind of the First Century BCE is multifaceted, yet nonetheless, we are presented with myriad fascinating nuances which both confirm and negate Roymans' suggestions. In the Roman psyche, being barbarian was not a static being, yet it was; it was a foreigner, but not always; it is the marker of their perceived

¹² Roymans, N. 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping: Investigating Caesar's Actions in the Germanic Frontier Zone', *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, Vol. 32, (2019), pp. 439-458.

¹³ Roymans, N. pers. comm. 2023.

civility, yet in actuality Roman ignorance and/or contempt. Our understanding of the term is forever mired in ambiguity, like that of the ancients, but investigation into the conceptualisations of the word presents an intriguing image of intricate intersocietal relationships.

Determining the extent of the effect of conceptions of the 'barbarian' on Roman brutality towards the Germanic and Celtic cultures in the early empire is a complex matter.¹⁴ At the onset then, in order to gain an understanding of the extent, one must establish a rudimentary knowledge of what: A) the concept of 'barbarian' was in the Roman mind, and B) a *more accurate* understanding of the societal backgrounds of those deemed as such. Chapter I serves to satisfy these requirements, therein the reader is provided with a survey of the ancient '*Barbarus*': discussing etymological routes, targets of the designation, and the Roman propagandistic imagery, before providing a succinct review of pre-Roman Germanic and Celtic cultures which contradicts said propaganda.

Providing a foundation for the understanding of the Roman term 'barbarian', and those ascribed as such, is important because retention of modern conceptions of barbarian have the potential to distort interpretations in the proceeding pages of the dissertation. Chapter I thus allows the reader the opportunity of separating modern connotations from the word thereafter. The need for this separation is not superficial: conflation of modern associations of the term with the historical accounts may lead one to suspect such barbarity is reserved for the 'barbarians' on account of their primitivity and this was simply not the case. There is a compelling argument that Roman conduct in *Barbaricum*, was itself 'barbaric,' and moreover, this conduct provides the subject examined throughout Chapter II. Therein, three aspects are explored in relation to the Roman conquests of Northern Europe:


- (1) Mass slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants.
- (2) Devastation of farmland, nature and towns/*oppida*.
- (3) Mass enslavement of conquered peoples.

As is shown from compiling episodes of Roman violence during expansion into Celtic and Germanic territories in line with these criteria - both from archaeological evidence and historical accounts - Roman barbarity in the region is unquestionable. Chapter III, however, establishes the argument that this brutality was not unique in the north, nor even to the Carthaginian south, but all across the Mediterranean. By compiling select episodes from the

¹⁴ For avoidance of confusion, any form of 'Germany' shall be used in reference to the ancient regions and peoples, the modern peoples and regions shall be referred to in the native *Deutsch und Deutschland*.

larger timeline, again in line with the above criterion, one is presented with a picture of indiscriminate violence. Be it the razing of Corinth or Carthage, the massacre at Athens or the sacrilege in Judea. It becomes evident that being a ‘barbarian’ had little impact on the nature of military expansion or on the legionaries’ treatment, as Roman behaviour was universally brutal. Greek or Gaul, Germanic or Jewish, none were spared the rapacity of the legions. Roman conduct was all too often indiscriminate, rapacious and sanguine, regardless of ethnicity. Investigations into the myriad examples of Rome’s brutal regime discussed throughout the pages of Chapter III present this stark reality. Illustrating a vast tapestry of cultures and ethnicities that made up the Empire at its peak, each reduced to a simple task, a mere *Provincia*, each to be at the whims of the Roman governor with their booty-hungry legions.¹⁵ Subsequently, each *provincia* or region then underwent the brutal Process of Assimilation into the Roman imperial machine (see [Figure 1](#)), with only a minority of opposing cultures fully resisting.¹⁶ As shall be demonstrated, in almost every single region they sent their legions, their ‘threshold for extreme violence’ was surpassed and so ensued andrapodisation, slavery, theft and massacre. From the Euphrates to Inverness, and the Sahara to the Danube, Roman practice is relatively consistent, and aspects of this universal brutality occupies Chapter III.

Figure 1: The Process of Roman Assimilation



Each *Provincia* did have unique catalysts that diminished violence thresholds, and moreover, Roman authors often justified these massacres in their accounts. Yet nonetheless, understanding of these unique catalysts and justifications are redundant without consideration of the milieu of the period; the tumultuous years of the late Republic followed by the abrupt diversion of imperial focus following the ageing of Augustus. Conquest was no longer saturated in factional competition driving endless expansion, instead increase in territory became

¹⁵ On the earlier evolution of the term *provincia*, see Richardson, J. *The Language of Empire Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 1-62.

¹⁶ Parthia, Caledonia and *Germania Magna* are the most notable.

piecemeal and limited to the behest of the premier (see n.249). Frequency of brutality increases with the Empire's growth and then declines suddenly with the stasis of the Empire. Thus, determination of the *universal* influences on the diminishment of the 'threshold of extreme violence' (TEV) is equally as vital as the assessment of any specific ethnological influences from being a 'barbarian'. Developing the argument that the importance of the target being a 'barbarian' on the severity of the massacres is reduced in light of alternate factors diminishing the threshold for extreme violence, namely financial gain and the deterrence of insurrection. Consideration of the multitude of facets affecting the Roman world at the time shows a war machine drunk on conquest, with every sip of victory and power ushering yet another bloodthirsty expansive thrust. Whether conscious or not, the Roman Imperial system was built upon, and sustained by, war, robbery, and enslavement: as Rome and her political elite increased in power, so did the frequency and extremity of violence in the *Provincia*.¹⁷ The campaigns against the *Germani* and Celts were unfortunately at the peak of this sanguinity, and their suffering of brutality was seemingly inevitable in consideration of Roman precedent. Understanding of the complexity of the Roman world in the first centuries BCE and CE then is fundamental to understanding why Roman barbarity was inflicted upon the people of the north (and the rest of the empire's conquests).

Yet, as with most things of this nature, there are nuances and caveats which are presented repeatedly throughout the thesis. Roymans' hypothesis of variation in Gallic and Germanic treatment is not incorrect and cannot be settled until these nuances are explored and rationalised, as there is an undeniable measure of discrepancy these too must be examined. The final chapter of the thesis then serves to address these fascinating intricacies in the term's usage and conceptualisation in the Roman mind and Roman literature. The 'scale of barbaric primitivity' in some ways was affected by proximity, yet that is not always the case; the barbarity of a people and their lands made them unworthy of conquest, but not always. A barbarian was someone who was an enemy, but not necessarily. The term and its employment in ancient works is wrapped in contradiction and complication. And though any attempt at definite modern conceptualisation is futile, exploration of the complexity is nonetheless required in determining its effect on the TEV. For in Caesar at least we see an interesting pattern in the employment of the term, a pattern with fascinating implications. Through the presented comparison of literary accounts and imperial policy in Chapter V, the discrepancies between the two northern cultures

¹⁷ Though individual events have different causes, catalysts, and considerations, the results are the same regardless, see Rich, J. 'Fear, Greed and Glory: The Causes of Roman War-making in the Middle Republic', in *War and Society in the Roman World*, edited by Rich, J. and Shipley, G. (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 38-68.

of Gauls and *Germani* becomes strikingly apparent, and their relationships with Rome remarkably intricate. The conclusion drawn is clear: the caricature of barbarism may have had less significant implications for their slaughter - ethical demarcation being rather superficial in consideration of military conduct - yet it nevertheless becomes undeniably significant in its effect on incorporation into the Empire proper.

A Note on Methodology:

Endless contribution to the topic of territorial incorporation within the Roman system has created a discipline predominantly debating concepts such as *Pax Romana* and Romanisation. Yet more often these terms are oversimplifications of complex notions when one considers the time, region, and extent of several million square kilometres within the Roman *Limes*. Modern literature has aimed at tackling these archaic notions and have such produced fairly adequate definitions with the required degree of elasticity allowing for the avoidance of the quagmire of competing opinions that both terms can become can quickly become embroiled in. This is a study into the '*Barbarus*' of the Roman mind, and Roman treatment of these peoples deemed 'barbarian', not a paper discussing the myriad tangents of the contemporary studies of cultural replacement or synthesis. This thesis in no way aims to revive these discussions as they have been sufficiently investigated elsewhere.¹⁸ Though not mentioned in the paper itself, both aspects do deserve brief mention. In following the burgeoning modern consensus, the *Pax Romana*, in a modern context shall be considered in the background of the study as the period of *central* Roman stability 31 BCE-160 CE, debates on its end and beginning, and to its extent, though fascinating, do little to further this topic.¹⁹ Furthermore, 'Romanisation', being the conscious effort of Roman officials to incorporate subjects within Roman cultural models and governmental control, falls outside our principle area of study, here we are chiefly concerned with the military and political assimilation 58-16 CE, not the spread and/or adoption of Roman culture generally seen later in the timeline.

A Note on the Sources

¹⁸ Studious discussion on the *Pax Romana* and its myriad tangential aspects and arguments are offered by Cornwell, H. *Pax and the Politics of Peace: Republic to Principate*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), particularly pp. 11-42; Woolf, G. 'Roman Peace', in *War and Society in the Roman World*, edited by Rich, J. and Shipley, G. (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 171-194; Parchami, *Hegemonic Peace and Empire*, pp. 15-58; foundational surveys on Imperialism can be found in Cornell, T. 'The End of Roman Imperial Expansionism' in *War and Society in the Roman World*, edited by Rich, J. and Shipley, G. (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 164; and Eckstein, A.M 'Conceptualizing Roman Imperial Expansion Under the Republic: An Introduction', *In A Companion to the Roman Republic*, edited by Rosenstein, N. and Morstein-Marx, R. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 567-589; a thorough and interrogating study is offered by Morley, *The Roman Empire: Roots of Imperialism*.

¹⁹ With the threat to the Italian province in the Marcomanni wars, it is difficult to rationalise the often-espoused ending of 180CE.

In a discussion of the ancient world there are obvious major limitations on evidence and thus there is restriction on any degree of certainty one can ascertain from primary accounts. For various points in our timeline we rely on ancient conjecture alone, and as such, much of the modern historiography on such periods is weighted with conjecture also. Nonetheless, empiricism can be employed in regard to certain themes, and where so is employed throughout the thesis. The advancement in archaeological excavation and recovery has dramatically altered understanding of antiquity and has allowed for a greater wealth of resources in pursuit of the central questions within this thesis. And with the theme of researching the ancient conceptualisation we are at less of a disadvantage when it comes to antique commentary. Regardless of the inaccuracies and fabrications in ancient testimony, we are looking at the accounts of the barbarian and employment of the term and accordingly historical bias is a specific facet of investigation. We can therefore navigate these differences and discrepancies within the texts which in other studies may become a hindrance. Moreover, in investigating literary accounts which are pertinent, in order to minimise issues presented while dealing with historical works, multiple translators' notes, Latin reconstructions, and English translations have been consulted where available, alongside the author's own translations of Latin texts where necessary.

A Note on *De Bello Gallico*:

Due to the prominence that Caesar's *Commentaries* plays in this paper, it is pertinent here to provide the reader with the framework of analysis the works shall be considered against. Published in eight books, (seven by Caesar, the eighth by Hirtius after Caesar's death),²⁰ *De Bello Gallico* details the general's campaigns, conquest, and the subsequent rebellions in North-Western Europe. While ostensibly a historical record, a journal, and at times an ethnography, the work has multiple layers of inferable purpose, potentially (and most likely), serving as propaganda to increase his reputation back in Rome.²¹

The works, being written by the general himself, along with the purposes the texts served, has understandably prompted a plethora of differing opinions on different aspects of the books, though many of these debates are redundant here. One major debate which has arisen around the book is pinpointing the precise year of the work's composition and in what form it took -

²⁰ Gardner, J. *Caesar: The Conquest of Gaul*, (London: Penguin Books, 1982), p.24.

²¹ See Krebs, C. 'More Than Words. The *Commentarii* in their Propagandistic Context' in *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, edited by Grillo, L. and Krebs, C.B. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2017), pp. 29-42; with Batstone, W. 'Caesar Constructing Caesar', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, edited by Grillo, L. and Krebs, C.B. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2017), pp. 43-57.

episodic or collected.²² Various arguments are forwarded: some scholars argue for a single period of composition, around 52-51 BCE; while others propose that different sections were written throughout the Gallic campaigns.²³ When it comes to the date of writing these points are, however, superficial here, this discretionary detail is of lesser importance to this thesis. Regardless of its time of publication, the work still fulfils a propagandic purpose; either combating the early dissent or serving to muster support before his civil war. And the time of writing does not necessarily affect the veracity of those aspects of which this thesis is concerned. Many of the issues with reliability are, again, of lesser consequence to this here. Aspects liable to error are insignificant; as is noted below. Caesar may report 430,000 Usipetes and Tencteri of whom large numbers had been killed, but the number is inconsequential, we can take for a certainty that this represents a large population with excessive deaths.²⁴ It does not have to be 430,000 *Germani*, nor even 200,000, it could be 20,000 and the significance here remains the same, it was still a massacre. The numbers could not be verified by other Romans easily, but the scale could be. The fear of the Germans relayed in Book I can also easily be verified, individual reasons for terror are harder to confirm, but a general panic of the officers is harder to fabricate.²⁵ His ethnographic descriptions of Germania too, though can be more easily exaggerated for the further reaches of the province, the territories and peoples closer to the Rhine could not be exaggerated to such an extreme degree as the entire army witnessed them. One must remember, as Powell reminds us:

‘Caesar when he wrote the *Bellum Gallicum* was an object of hatred and terror for many in the ruling group of his state. His accounts would be studied in Rome with acute prejudice... For Caesar, to distort unobtrusively was not a simple matter.’²⁶

Therefore, within the framework of this thesis, we can proceed with an understanding that aspects may be altered, exaggerated, or even omitted, yet with due caution and consideration

²² An overview of this debate is offered by Wiseman, T.P. ‘The Publication of *De Bello Gallico*’, in *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, edited by Welch, K. (Cardiff: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), pp. 1-10.

²³ Riggsby, A.M. *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), p. 9; Wiseman, ‘The Publication of *De Bello Gallico*’, pp. 1-10.

²⁴ Caes. *BG.* 4.15

²⁵ Caesar reports the panic manifested in the junior offices before spreading to the troops, Caes. *BG.* 1.39.

²⁶ Powell, A. ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of a Massacre’, in *Julius Caesar As Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries As Political Instruments*, edited by Welch, K. (Cardiff: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), p. 111.

these obstacles may be circumvented.²⁷ Balsdon, concluding his 1957 article *The veracity of Caesar* sums the issue up well:

‘The truth no doubt lies somewhere between the view of those who reject nearly every word that Caesar wrote and those who believe that every statement of Caesar is true.’²⁸

Dealing with aspects of context, audience, and veracity are deeply important in studying Caesar and his *Commentaries*, yet here we are dealing with the conceptualisation of the ‘barbarian’ and how this affected his campaigning in *Barbaricum*. Caesar may have invented certain fictions and additional mythologies concerning those beyond the Alps, but regardless, he was working with a perception of the barbarian long set. We have plentiful examples of a similar ‘Barbarian’ construct from other Roman authors which, as we will see, correspond with Caesar.

²⁷ Powell, in discussion of the issues around omission, provides a detailed deconstruction of the composition of the Sabinus affair. Wherein he persuasively argues Caesar’s care in painting the legate in an unfavourable light, demonstrating Sabinus as a poor commander, potentially attempting to minimise charges against himself. Powell, A. ‘Julius Caesar’ pp.115-123; see also Welch, K. ‘Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries’, in *Julius Caesar As Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries As Political Instruments*, edited by Welch, K. (Cardiff: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), pp. 95-96.

²⁸ Balsdon, J. P. V. D. ‘The Veracity of Caesar’, *Greece and Rome* Vol. 4.1, (1957), p. 27.



Part One: Conceptualizing The Caricature



Chapter I: Wir Sind Keine Barbaren

'His humiliation was great enough as it was, but it was aggravated by the despicable meanness of the Gauls, who produced unjust weights, and when the tribune protested, the insolent Gaul threw his sword into the scale, with an exclamation intolerable to Roman ears declared, "bar bar bar"'

Liv. 5.48.9.

At the beginning of this research process, study was conducted with an aim of creating a greater understanding of the lives, cultures and societal development of the nations beyond the Alps, those myriad tribes and peoples collectivised by the Romans under the denigrative name 'Barbarus'. During this initial process, it quickly became clear that the term 'barbarian' itself, though employed in many of the works cited throughout the course of this paper, is highly problematic in modern historical studies of pre-Roman Gaul, Britannia, and to an extent, Germania. The connotations of the word within scholarship is compounded with pop-culture to conjure the stereotype of an illiterate unkept primitive (see Plates 1-15 for examples of these depictions). The continued employment of the term barbarian immediately and unconsciously instils the biased stratification the word was popularised for thousands of years ago. Yet despite the growing tendency of empathy towards these cultures, the word is still in use and retains its ancient connotations in the scholarship and the wider public, especially within pop culture. In 21st-century Britain and America there are similar words from past periods, applied to strata of society, designed for the denigration of peoples, which are now mostly, but not universally, considered taboos.²⁹ 'Barbarian' has not been consigned to this socio-linguistic confinement. One of the first known words employed by European cultures for the defamation of a people is still widely used and attributed freely to our ancestors and even our contemporaries. This despite more recent examples of denigrative language being frowned upon and often classed as

²⁹ Jeshion, R. 'Expressivism And The Offensiveness Of Slurs', *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 27, (2013), pp. 231-59, provides a detailed discussion on myriad terms used in the USA, many are/were employed in the UK too; in 2020 one such taboo word was labelled "...the filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English language." See Wilson, C. 'N-word: The troubled history of the racial slur', *BBC*, (5/10/2020); in 2009, Prince Harry was criticised for the use of racial slurs not noted by Jeshion, one aimed at Asian and middle eastern cultures, for an overview of the story, see Bates, S. and Norton-Taylor, R. 'Video nasty: Prince Harry faces racism inquiry over footage of 'Paki' [sic] remark', *The Guardian*, (12/01/2009); In Britain, one such term employed by the Prince still punctuates sections of British vernacular, Alibhai-Brown, Y. 'In Your Face Racism Has Returned and Few are Fighting Against It', *Independent*, 09/11/2014; Thapar, C. 'Britain, racism and the 'P-word': a GQ special report', *GQ Magazine*, (27/01/2020); Jamal, U. 'For British Asians, the word P*ki is haunting and painful', *Aljazeera*, (25/11/2021).

'hate speech'.³⁰ As we shall see below, these cultures were not primitives, nor wild animals, their language was sophisticated and their living habits, though not Mediterranean, cannot be classed as primitive. Greco-Roman markers of 'barbarism' seem naught but the subjective opinions of a particular author. Even today, nomadic cultures exist, wooden houses are still common and sought after, beer is amongst the most consumed alcohol in the Western world, and men are still want to fight bare-chested and raise a 'warcry'. In contrast to Roman and Greek opinion, the cultures of *Barbaricum* were complex and myriad.

In light of these points, it is pertinent therefore to provide the readers of this paper a succinct survey of this initial research, to serve as an adequate foundation aiming to dispel ancient and modern connotation alike; connotations and evocations which have seen Gallo-Germanic cultures so often dehumanised. Neither ancient nor modern commentator is innocent: the survey below will, therefore, allow the reader the opportunity of a moderate re-humanisation of these cultures and thus introduce a measure of *Verständnis* in future discourses.

Regarding βάρβαρος & BARBARVS

The origins of the term 'Barbarian' are known to a certain extent: it is first seen in Ancient Mycenaean form 𐀓𐀓𐀓 (pa-pa-ro); before making its way to the Classical Greek βάρβαρος.³¹ The word is often espoused to have an onomatopoeic etymology: there exists an adage that has it, to the Greeks, listening to a non-Greek speaker would be the equivalent of hearing "bar bar bar bar."³² The extent of truth in this proverb is of course dubious. The fact that Greek authors would often employ tropes suggesting foreign dialects resemble the chirping of a bird when discussing those they deem 'barbarian' does suggest a measure of aphorism in the myth.³³ However, when the root of the Latin term '*Barbarus*' is considered alongside the root of one of the key aspects a 'barbarian' exhibits, the beard (*barba*), a more plausible answer arises. The Proto-European roots for the facial garment **bhardh-eh'* suggests it was the humble beard

³⁰ The CPS considers 'any use of derogatory language towards ethnicity, race, nationality or religion' in building Hate Crime Cases <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/racist-and-religious-hate-crime-prosecution-guidance>; Furthermore, use of such terminology can lead to imprisonment under UK Law 'https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/racist-and-religious-hate-crime-prosecution-guidance#a16

³¹ KN X 206, Dx(?) 207, X. 207, X. 8054; PY. Cn. 643. +, see Chadwick, J. & Killen, J. T. 'The Knossos Tablets (Third Edition)', *Bulletin Supplement (University of London. Institute Of Classical Studies)*, No. 15, (1964), p. 158, 186; Bennett, E. L. *Et Al.* 'The Knossos Tablets', *Bulletin Supplement (University of London. Institute Of Classical Studies)*, No. 7, (1959); Ventris, M. *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 568.

³² The adage even made its way into the Encyclopaedia Britannica, see Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Barbarian". *Encyclopedia Britannica*, (15 Feb. 2023), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/barbarian>. [Accessed 25 April 2023]: the only instances of the term in Homer are in describing those 'βαρβαρόφωνος', 'of uncouth of speech' in the translation of Murray. *see also* Aesch. *Ag.* 1051; Plat. *Prot.* 341c; *Soph. Aj.* 1263; Strab. 10.3.17.

³³ Aristoph. *Birds*, with Bravo, C.D. *Chirping Like the Swallows: Aristophanes' Portrayals of the Barbarian 'Other.'* (UMI Dissertation Publishing, University of Arizona, 2012); and Hdt. 2.57 with How, W.W. and Wells J 'Notes for 2.57' in *Herodotus: The Persian Wars Vol. I Books 1-2*, [trans, Godley, A.D. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920)]; Diod. Sic. 5.31.1, too mentioned the supposed uncouthness of the Northern language.

which gave them their defamatory name, the Latin of which is *'Barba'*.³⁴ The etymology, however, is lost to the past, yet the link between *Barba* and *Barbarus* cannot go understated, as Toner reminds us:

'Even if there was no etymological link between the Latin words for beard, *Barba*, and Barbarian, *Barbarus*, the terms, acquired shared connotations of rough, rustic unkemptness.'³⁵

By the first century BCE, Roman men seldom wore long beards, with these being restricted to periods of mourning, and hardship, as well as being the 'philosophers trademark'.³⁶ Leaving notions of gender and rights of passages of beard growth aside, the long and shabby beard generally served as the aesthetic divide between 'civil' and 'barbarian'.³⁷ And thus, regardless of the plausibility of either aforementioned etymological suggestion, in either case, they are both significant: on the one hand it could be as simple as an onomatopoeic racial slur, and on the other a clear distinctive marker of 'otherness'. Both aspects, then, substantiate denigrative aspects with the word, its origins, and its conceptualisations.

Digressionary discussions of mythical etymology aside, the Greek *βάρβαρος* is, less limited in its application to that of the Roman *'Barbarus'*. For, in the Hellenic world, the word was applied to any non-Greek speaker, Celt and Persian alike; unlike the Roman application to those lacking in civility.³⁸ The general Greek conceptualization was that the world consisted of only *Hellenes* and *Barbaroi*, and these were natural enemies.³⁹ Modern commentators, however, should be cautious to not to conflate all non-Greeks within the term 'barbarian', as Plato's *Stranger* reminds us.⁴⁰ Mitchell seems to have forgotten this, though her discussion on Aeschylus' writings does serve to illustrate that the dichotomy between the Persian 'barbarian' and Greek was not as rigid as the Isocratic suggestions.⁴¹

³⁴ Specifically those from North-Western Europe roots, see Mallory, J. P. and Adams, D. Q. *The Oxford Introduction to Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 178.

³⁵ Toner, J. 'Barbers, Barbershops and Searching for Roman Popular Culture', *Papers of The British School at Rome*, Vol. 83, (2015), p. 96.

³⁶ Pertinently illustrated by donning of a beard following the *Clades Variana*, Suet. *Aug.* 23; Caesar's following the Eburonean ambush of Cotta, Suet. *Jul.* 67; Herodotus and Livy tell us Egyptians of their times too practised this growth in mourning, Hdt. 6.117; Liv. 44.19.6-7 on hardship, Plut. *Cat. Min.* 53; Liv. 27.34.5; on philosophers see, Dio Chris. 72.2, for more on Roman wearing of Beards, Toner, 'Barbers and Barbershops', pp.95-100.

³⁷ As Livy tells us, a man having 'a long beard and hair' gives 'a savage wildness on his countenance', Liv. 2.23.4; Suetonius moreover suggests shaving is a 'manly habit' Suet. *Cal.* 10.

³⁸ For discrepancies in Greek and Roman perceptions, Riggsby, A.M. *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 215-216.

³⁹ Plato. *Rep.* 5.470c, *Menex.* 237; Isoc, *Panath.* 4. 157, *Panath.* 12163; Aristot. *Pol.* 1.1255-156

⁴⁰ Plat. *Stat.* 262d; wherein the Socratic dialogue possesses an interesting contradiction.

⁴¹ Mitchell, L.G. "Greeks, Barbarians and Aeschylus' Suppliants." *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 53, No. 2, (2006), Pp. 205-223; Hall offers a superlative study on the Grecian creation of the term, E. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

Regarding the Caricature

Over the centuries the imagery of a stereotypical 'barbarian' has seen little evolution. Modern visual representations and conceptions are fairly loyal to historical descriptions. Some aspects of the caricature are correct, yet the picture presented is often distorted or a bastardization. Here then is provided a summary of ancient literary representations followed by iconographic representations over the centuries (see Plates 1-11).⁴² The term 'barbarian' had many connotations, and the ethnologies produced by the Mediterranean authors are predicated on biases, subjective taste, and their ignorance of societal developments and norms in '*Barbaricum*.'

There are several examples of exaggeration, but there are also logical connotations in the socially constructed barbarians. These cultures were generally considered by the ancients to wear ragged and untidy beards if male, as well as multiple suggestions of their having unkept and/or different hairstyles (see Plates 12-15; Cf. Plate 11, which though lacking a full beard does depict a moustache).⁴³ So too were their clothes alien or primitive, as they were draped in strange and/or simple garments, like the 'barbaric' trousers, if they were clothed at all.⁴⁴ In many accounts depictions, both ancient (see Plates 11-12, 14-15) and Modern (See Plates 1-2, 4-6, 8-9); Barbarians are often depicted mostly, if not fully, naked, further substantiating the crude and bestial nature of the peoples, yet this is more so in Combat.⁴⁵ Regardless, both of these framings had a conscious connotation, to paint these cultures as wild animals, little more than beasts, a trait clearly presented in Plates 1-15.⁴⁶ But in consideration of the geographical and climatological aspects of their territories variations in garment is to be expected. The colder climates beyond the alps demand a greater deal of difference to the warmer clime of the Mediterranean. Long hair, trousers and thick garments are to be expected of northern cultures. Adaptation to environmental circumstance, reflected in their aesthetic choice (and to house structures), clearly demonstrate societal sophistication.

Though the Roman framing of these aesthetic properties as a marker of primitivity does continue in modern perceptions, one need only look at the progressions in the modern West to see the growing acceptance and realization that cultural uniqueness and perceived eccentric

⁴² There was an obvious lull in the representation of the barbarian as we see it now, following the dissolution of the West, Christianity retained ideals, yet a major resurgence came following the Renaissance, Jones offers an authoritative survey of these particular developments, Jones, W. R. 'The Image of The Barbarian in Medieval Europe', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13, No. 4, (1971), Pp. 376-407.

⁴³ Amm. Marc. 15.12.1 Diod. Sic. 5.28.1-3 Strab. 4.5.3, Tac. *Agri*. 11.

⁴⁴ Diod. Sic. 5.30.1; Tac. *Germ*. 17; clothing is, however, less represented in ancient iconography, see Plates 11-15, Cf. Plates 1-10, which show that as the centuries progressed; animalistic and feral clothing is exacerbated in representations. Where nakedness is depicted in more modern times, there is generally body paint also, see Plates 1-2.

⁴⁵ Polyb. 2.28-30, 3.114; Diod. 5.32.5.

⁴⁶ Dion. 14.10; Flor. 1.20, Cassiod. *Lett*. 40; See also Aesch. 7.457 '*Their muzzles whistle in a barbarian way*'.

styles of hair and fashion have no detriment on the capacity of an individual. Yet the visual representations presented below show that these adaptations are still, as always, caricaturised.

Again, as with aesthetics, the reality of biological categorization is distorted in the ancient framing. For one, the barbarians are always taller than those of Mediterranean descent.⁴⁷ Yet, Roman ridicule of the height difference is potentially a demonstration of the ignorance of the impact of diet on human growth. The Romans were aware that Celto-Germanic cultures had a primarily herding and hunter-gatherer society, but one does not require Woolf's reminder that there is strong evidence to support the tendency for those with diets with heavy amounts of milk and meat tend to grow larger and produce larger children.⁴⁸ As with the contemptuous view of aesthetic fashion, this Roman trope of their exaggerated height is but an example of Classical writer's condescension of cultural practices and phenomena.⁴⁹ While discussing diet note too should be made of the contradiction of barbarian farming (see below): they are often espoused to lack this advancement in society, but Roman historians contradict this by accounting that their crop cultivation was conducted where the land was appropriate. Most evidently, how would they produce their barbaric beer for their innate alcoholism without farming?⁵⁰

Considering their social organization, it, too, is framed as universally primal, but not always. In this respect, Roman authors neglect to extend their sentimental reverence of tradition to those cultures beyond the Alps. To the Romans and Greeks, the myriad 'barbarian' cultures lacked developed societal structure, all being slaves to a king,⁵¹ and to Dio's offence, some even subjects of women.⁵² Not to mention their being nomadic or domiciled within primitive unfashionable dwellings.⁵³ Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of the Roman political system knows that criticism of other governmental structures is hypocritical. Roman longevity can hardly be credited to Roman governmental institutions alone, especially given the many instances when the inefficiencies within their system caused monumental devastation. Moreover, in a modern context, we would challenge anyone if they suggested that the Roma or other traveller cultures are primal and less civilized. It is merely different, and the continuity of a tradition, not an

⁴⁷ Dion. 14.12; Diod. 5.28.1, 5.32.2; Strab. 4.5.3 Tac. *Germ*, 20, *Agri*. 11; Caes. *B.G.* 6.21; Amm. Marc. 15.12.1.

⁴⁸ Woolf, G. *Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West*, (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2011), p. 32-34.

⁴⁹ For example, see Suet. *Gai.* 47.

⁵⁰ Dion. 13. 10-12; Diod. Sic. 5.26.2-3 Tac. *Germ.* 22-23 CF. Caes. *B.G.* 6.21, Polyb. 2.19.

⁵¹ Tac. *Agri.* 12 The Greeks in particular emphasise the point of servility, see Demos, 15.15; Diod. Sic. 5.21.6; Eur. *Hel.* 275; Arist. *Pol.* 1.2.1252b2; a succinct, yet commanding survey on inequalities in Gallic societies is provided in, Woolf, G. 'Generations of Aristocracy', *Archaeological Dialogues*, Vol.9 No.1 (2002), pp. 8-11.

⁵² Cass. Dio 62.1.1, 72.3.2.

⁵³ Tac. *Germ.* 16; Caes. *B.G.* 6.22; Polyb. 2.17.

inability to innovate. And when it comes to Romans and notions of traditional continuity, any insult offered externally is entirely hypocritical.

The same hypocrisy can be found in other major tropes inseparable from both the modern and ancient conception: the belligerence, the ruthlessness and the warlike nature of the 'barbarian'. Interestingly and seemingly contradictory, the ancients did, however, conceive their armies as poorly developed and prone to rout; when not in battle, troops would lavish themselves in idleness.⁵⁴ Martial sophistication is explored in greater depth below, here we shall tackle with the hypocrisy of this testimony. On the one hand, we cannot discount that their warlike nature is down in part to an unconsciously realized necessity, being reactionary to external factors of the period. Every pre-modern society had external pressures, and as such, a warlike or belligerent nature is not something to be unexpected in antiquity, rather, it was the norm in that time across the Mediterranean world.⁵⁵ Antiquity is saturated with manifestations of the narrative of tribes that are unfriendly, maybe Greek, maybe Celtic, maybe Roman, marching into other's territory, stealing their wealth, their livestock, even their wives and daughters; killing all the men surviving. This aspect of history has the potential to make a culture warlike, as it did in Rome, as it did in Greece.⁵⁶

On the other hand, we must also consider the possibility that their warlike nature was in general, a fabrication, or at least exaggeration, by classical authors in their attempts to justify the atrocities committed; if the barbarians are devoid of civilization, why would they warrant civilized rules of war? This moral dilemma, however, is for the discussion below. And as will be seen, rules and morality are strained if not non-existent in pre-modern war (and unfortunately in some modern theatres), one cannot disregard the fact that Romans and Greeks treated other

⁵⁴ On their warlike nature: Strab. 4.4.3; Tac. *Germ.* 6-8, 14, *Agri.* 8., *Hist.* 4.16; Polyb. 2.32, 2.33, 2.35; on idleness Tac. *Germ.* 4, 15, *Agri.* 11, Cf. Idleness and Roman decay Levick, B. "Morals, Politics, and the Fall of the Roman Republic." *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (1982), pp. 53-62.

⁵⁵ Both cultures are well known for their martial cultural attachments, Hanson forwards that to the Greeks, 'war was the most important thing we humans do', Hanson, V.D. *The Wars of the Ancient Greeks*, (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 18; for discussions on the role of war as portrayed by elites in Rome see Rosenstein, N. 'Aristocratic Values' in *A Companion the Roman Republic*, edited by Rosenstein, N. & Morstein-Marx, R. (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), pp. 365-382; for Ancient Greece, Van Wees, H. 'War and society', In *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, Edited By, Sabin, P. Van Wees, H. and Whitby, M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 273-300.

⁵⁶ Rubio, A.P. 'Singing The Deeds Of The Ancestors The Memory Of Battle In Late Iron Age Gaul And Iberia' in *Conflict Archaeology Materialities of Collective Violence from Prehistory to Late Antiquity*, Edited By Fernández-Götz, M. and Roymans, N. (London: Routledge, 2018), p.183; Goldsworthy, A. *Pax Romana*, (London: Orion Publishing, 2017), pp.55-56; Morley, *Roots of Roman Imperialism*, pp. 30-33.

Romans and Greeks just as badly as they treated 'barbarians' in many cases, even if the Romans are quick to neglect this reality.⁵⁷

The 'barbarian' was in all ways the antithesis to what the Greco-Romans deemed as the apotheosis of civilisation, beasts who practised inhumane crimes, not only the sacrifice of humans, but also cannibalism.⁵⁸ When considering the actual manifestations, such as the aftermath of Varian disaster in 9 CE and the display of the victory, the depravity accounted by Tacitus in his panegyric to the glory days of conquest is not to be immediately believed as common Germanic practice.⁵⁹ The trophy site at Teutoburg was much more than a simple barbaric custom. According to current archaeological and literary accounts, human sacrifice itself was limited to the rarest occasions in Germania, though if the contemporaries are to be believed the tradition lasted for over a millennium. Suggestions of sacrifice nonetheless are only found predominantly in either Roman sources discussing Celtic societies or in the later Nordic Sagas.⁶⁰ Therefore the plausibility of the Roman accounts depends wholly on the word of an enemy commentator. Archaeological records of human sacrifice in Deutschland can only be found for the aftermath of the *Clades Variana*, or in the late Third Millennium BCE.⁶¹ The common practices for Germanic tribes following victory are thus seldom found in our records and those that are available in no way resemble the practise at Kalkriese.⁶² In consideration of these factors then, it is evident the brutality witnessed by Germanicus' column and uncovered by Tony Clunn is seemingly an example of a rarely occurring phenomena, catalysed by excessive mistreatment which shall be explored below (see chapter III).

⁵⁷ An excellent example for this can be found in the treatment of Generals during civil war. Ostracising and delineating rhetoric is applied to belligerents throughout the civil conflicts of the first century BCE. The framing of Roman citizens by other Roman citizens as 'pirate', 'Gladiator' or 'hostis' to legitimise the prosecution of a foreign war against them, not a civil one, clearly demonstrates a ubiquity to the practice of dehumanisation exists in the Roman military and political spheres of the day, see, Cornwell, H. 'The Construction of One's Enemies in Civil War (49-30 BCE)', *Hermathena*, No. 196/197, (2014), pp. 41-68; this dehumanization then give way to higher degrees of violence than would be expected against fellow citizens, Lange, C.H. 'The Logic of Violence in Roman Civil War', *Hermathena*, No. 196/197, 2014, pp. 69-98.

⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. 5.32.3; Plut. *Quaes. Rom.* 83; Luc. *Phars.* 1.450-458; Caes. *BG.* 6.16, 17.3-5; Suet. *Claud.* 25; Cic. *Font.* 31.3; Tac. *Ann.* 1.61; on cannibalism see Herod. *Hist.* 4. 64; Strab. 4.5.5, Tac. *Ann.* 14.30.

⁵⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.60-63.

⁶⁰ Dowden, K. *European Paganism: Realities of Cult from Antiquity to Middle Ages*, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 179-188; MacCulloch, J.A. *Celtic and Scandinavian Religions*, (Chicago: Academy Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 54-57.

⁶¹ For the bronze age evidence of sacrifice see, Spatzier, A. and F. Bertemes, 'The Ring Sanctuary of Pömmelte, Germany: a Monumental, Multi-Layered Metaphor of the Late Third Millennium BC', *Antiquity*, Vol. 92, No. 363, (2018), pp. 655-673.

⁶² For the archaeological surveys of the *Clades Variana*, Wilbers-Rost, S, et al. 'The Ancient Battlefield at Kalkriese', *RCC Perspectives*, No. 3, (2012), pp. 91-111; Morgan, D. 'The Generalship of P. Quinctilius Varus in the *Clades Variana*.' *Antichthon*, Vol. 53, (2019), pp. 94-98; Meyer, M. 'The Germanic-Roman Battlefields of Kalkriese and Harzhorn: a Methodological Comparison', In *Conflict Archaeology Materialities of Collective Violence from Prehistory to Late Antiquity*, edited by Fernández-Götz, M. and Roymans, N. (London: Routledge. 2018), pp. 365-384.

With the various mischaracterisations, misnomers, and manufactured attributes of the barbarian thus established, we may proceed with the understanding that, in the literary framing at least, the Celts, the Britons, the Scythians, the Persians, the Germans, and nearly every other people were, to the supremacist Romans, sub-human.

While discussing caricature it becomes pertinent to briefly assess how this caricature is framed and affected by language. In the below chapters the Roman hypocrisy in this framing shall be dealt with, here instead focus should be placed on how the brutality of the '*barbarian*' has been substantiated and perpetuated within modern language and the imagery it evokes. As we have seen, 'barbarian' originated as a term used to label 'outsiders' who spoke foreign languages and lacked sophisticated social structures. As interactions between the 'civilised' and the barbarian were rarely amicable, 'Barbarity' emerged as the noun form, encapsulating this perceived primitivity along with the 'savagery' and 'cruelty' attributed to these 'barbarians' - whether factual or not. Pillaging hordes, ritualistic sacrifices, primitive architecture, and brutal warfare became axioms of barbarity, both in ancient and modern perspectives. This ethnocentric lens with which the terminology was applied painted those deemed 'barbaric' as inherently violent, establishing the potential for our modern association with the term with 'brutality'.

The terms 'barbarian', 'barbarity', and 'brutality' have become inextricably linked in modern parlance, their meanings interwoven and often used interchangeably.⁶³ The Cambridge Thesaurus lists barbarity and brutality as synonyms, while dictionaries record them in varying terms as exhibiting cruelty and savagery.⁶⁴ The terms are near inseparable in modern usage; and the caricature reflects that. In more modern depictions (see Plates 1-4 and 10) brutalism is a clear theme, tattered hides, nakedness, horns, warpaint and an all too feral feel is compounded with darker palettes reinforcing an intimidating and primal nature to the 'barbarian.'

Plates 11-14 demonstrate that in antiquity, the imagery centres arounds of uncouthness, simplicity, and primitivity. A theme generally continued through the medieval and early modern periods, (see Plates 5-9). The barbarians of these periods are commonly naked and lack more of the brutalist nature imagined in later centuries. Regardless of the lack of ancient 'brutalist' imagery; the rhetoric discussed above clearly demonstrates this link in ancient

⁶³ Cambridge Dictionary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), s.v. "Barbarian"; Cambridge Dictionary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), s.v. "Barbarity"; Cambridge Dictionary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), s.v. "Brutality".

⁶⁴ Cambridge Thesaurus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), s.v. "Barbarity"; cf. Cambridge Thesaurus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), s.v. "Brutality".

terminology. Clearly then, imagery and rhetoric surrounding these terms exposes implicit dehumanisation.

Depictions of Germanic and Celtic Peoples in Pop Culture:



Plate 1: Modern depiction of Thusnelda, the wife of Arminius, [Barbarians, Netflix, 2020: Season One Episode 6]



Plate 2: Concept art for Britons in the Boudican Revolt, (Ryse Son of Rome, Crytek, 2013)



Plate 3: Depiction of Picts in the Second Century CE [Centurion, Marshall, N. Pathé 2010]




Plate 4: Fantasy representation of a barbarian on a movie poster [Conan The Barbarian, Dino De Laurentiis Corporation, 1982]




Plate 5: Joseph-Noël Sylvestre's *The Sack of Rome by the Visigoths*, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sack_of_Rome_by_the_Visigoths_on_24_August_410_by_JN_Sylvestre_1890.jpg], (1890)



Plate 6: Lionel Royer's *Vercingétorix Throwing his Weapons at the Feet of Caesar*, held in the Musée Crozatier (1899)



Plate 7: Otto Albert Koch' Varusschlacht. Held in the Lippisches Landesmuseum (1909)



Plate 8: Portraits and Dresses of the Most Remarkable Personages in England Prior to the Norman Conquest Plate 1, From Barnard, E. *The New, Impartial and Complete History of England*, (1791)



Plate 9: Philipp Clüver's 'Germanic Warriors' from, *Germania Antiqua* (1616)




Plate 10: Leone Leoni's 'Sarmatian Barbarian' in Milan, (1500s)



Plate 9: *The Dying Gaul*, recreation of Third Century BCE statue depicting its namesake, held in the Capitoline Museum (inv.S 747)



Plate 10: *Ludovisi Battle sarcophagus*, depicting Roman battle against the invading Gothic tribes Ca.250-260 CE. Held in the Museo Nazionale Romano (inv. 8574)



Plate 11: Second century depiction of Dacians (Trajan's Column Scene 25)



Plate 12: Obverse of L. Hostilius' 48 BCE Denarius, depicting a Celtic portrait; Reverse of L. Hostilius' 48 BCE Denarius, depicting a Celtic chariot (RRC. 448/2a)



Plate 13: Augustan coin representing capitulating Gaul (RIC 1 416, p.74)

Regarding the Relationship Between Roman and Celto-Germanic Cultures Pre-Caesar

Much of the hostility by the Romans for these so-called 'barbarians' north of the river Po originates from two major events in their collective psyche. The first is from the sacking of Rome in the fourth century BCE; during the migrations of the Senones, the peoples who would later settle in Cisalpine Gaul.⁶⁵ Roman vengeance in this region would be exacted over a century later in their conquest of the Senones, however, the anti-Gallic and especially the anti-migratory rhetoric became entrenched. The second - and more contemporarily apparent to Caesar - of these migrations substantiating the early fear of 'barbarian' migration in the Roman mentality, is the epilogue of the long Germanic wars. Following several centuries of near-constant conflict and while Roman military attention was focused in Africa, many Germanic tribes, collectivized under the titles Cimbri and Teutones, began their exodus south: inflicting one of the greatest, yet less discussed, defeats of the legions in history, on the fields of Arausio.⁶⁶ The situation for the burgeoning empire was dire, the defeats led to a collapse in legislative norms seeing the 10-year re-election restrictions on the Consulship usurped by necessity.⁶⁷ The man given the reins was then seemingly forced to undergo the long overdue reformation of the legionary system in

⁶⁵ Liv. 5.34-49; Plut. *Cam.* 15-30; Polyb. 2.18; Diod. 14.113-116; Dion. 13.6-12.

⁶⁶ This defeat is often superseded in modern literature by focus on Carrhae, Cannae and Adrianople, yet it was equal in reported devastation; Amm. Marc. 24.6.7; App. *Gall.* 3.18; Cic. *De Or.* 2.199-200; Diod. Sic. 36.1.1; Eutrop. 5.1.1; Flor. 1.38.4; Gran. Lic. 33.11-12; Liv. *Peri.* 67.2; Oros. 5.16.2-7; Plut. *Sert.* 3.1, *Luc.* 27.7; Sall. *Jug.* 114.1; Tac. *Germ.* 37.5; Vell. Pat. 2.12.2.

⁶⁷ Marius was granted several successive consulships in aims to tackle the threat in Africa and Europe in 107BCE, Sall. *Jug.* 73.1-7; Cic. *Off.* 3.79; Vell. Pat. 2.11.2; Plut. *Mar.* 8; then from 104- 100BCE, Cic. *Prov. Con.* 19; Sal. *Jug.* 114.2; Liv. *Per.* 67-68; Plut. *Mar.* 11,-12 14, 22, 28; Diod. 36.10.1; Cass. Dio 27.94.1; Vell. Pat. 2.12.

remedy.⁶⁸ These reforms allowed Marius to stabilize the frontier, but the Roman world was forever changed.

One struggles to dispute Woolf's argument that the caricatures outlined above can be attributed as a blatant attempt 'to emphasize the threat they (the Celts) posed to the Romans', one can extend this statement to their perception of the Germans too.⁶⁹ Throughout the entirety of Roman history this anti-migratory rhetoric dominated the 'Roman' mind (in all the various manifestations of the concept of 'Roman').⁷⁰ One by one, various 'barbarian' cultures would make their way south and provide substantiation for this fear providing some of the most serious *Clades* of the Republic and Empire, Allia (387 BCE),⁷¹ Arausio (105 BCE),⁷² Abrittus (251 CE),⁷³ and Adrianople (378 CE).⁷⁴ The Gothic migration in the second century CE caused the displacement and resulting incursions of the trans-Rhenian Marcomannic and steppe tribes into the limits of the Empire in the ensuing Marcomanni and Germanic wars of Marcus Aurelius (160-180 CE); just as the Hunnic migration in the Third brought the Gothic tribes to the same outcome. Before long, these eastern migrants too would enter the Empire and reap their own slaughter in the twilight years of the Western half. These later defeats, however, provided the death knells of the Empire, the Roman victory at the Catuvellauni fields in 451 CE was a mere swan song in comparison to Camillus, Marius and Caesar.

At the start of the first century BCE, these earlier migrations of, and defeats by, Celto-Germanic tribes had thus cemented a prejudice which in turn would be substantiated by aristocrats in their justifications for subsequent atrocities. Three particular aspects become prevalent and pertinent, therefore. The barbarians are: A) primitive in comparison to Rome, B) a natural 'nemesis', and C) having of strange religious practice

Regarding Celto-Germanic developmental Sophistication:

The aspects of barbarism outlined by the ancient commentators is in many senses detractive from the reality of the societies beyond the Alps. In more recent decades there has been an

⁶⁸ Situations had been developing internally which also predicated a need for reform, the defeats at Noreia and Arausio served only to highlight the necessity of immediate change. Moreover, change cannot solely be ascribed to Marius, many aspects of the form were mere substantiations of previous unofficial adaptations as well as some changes to practice happening later under other Roman generals such as Sulla, See Cary and Scullard, *The History of Rome*, pp. 216-221; with Cagniat, P. 'The Late Republican Army (146-30BC)', in *A Companion to the Roman Army*, edited by Erdkamp, P. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2007) (ebook, Part II, Chapter 5).

⁶⁹ Woolf, *Tales of the Barbarian*, p. 23.

⁷⁰ Gardner, J.F. 'The 'Gallic Menace' in Caesar's Propaganda', *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 30, No. 2, (1983), pp. 181-182.

⁷¹ Liv. 5.-34-49, 6.1.10-11, 6.28.5-6; Tac. *Hist.* 2.91; Verg. *A.* 7.717 App. *Gall.* 1.1, *Ital.* 1.9[*pos.24*]; Eutrop. 1.20; Diod. 13.113-116; Dion. 13.6-10; Flor. 1.7-8; Plut. *Cam.* 14-30; Polyb. 2.17-18

⁷² Sall. *Jug.* 114.1; Diod. 36.1; Liv. *Per.* 67.1; Vell. *Pat.* 2.12.2; Tac. *Germ.* 37; Plut. *Sert.* 3.1, *Luc.* 27.7, *Cam.* 19.7; Flor. 1.38.4; App. *Gall.* 3.17; Eutrop. 5.1.1; Gran. *Lic.* 33.12; Oros. 5.16.2-7.

⁷³ Zos. 1.23; Aurel. *Vic.* 1.29; Zon. 12.20.

⁷⁴ Amm. *Marc.* 31.13-15; Zos. 4.105-107; Zon. 13.17.

increase in frequency and strength of studies into Celtic and Germanic tribes, wherein the term 'Barbarian' is seldom found. Yet when these cultures are discussed within a Roman context, they instantly, and immediately fall under this classification. Conversely, the lives and practices of these peoples serve as a contrast to the Greco-Roman 'barbarian' nomenclature and, indeed, the Romans were generally aware of this. If one considers the conflicting accounts of Caesar and Tacitus in their descriptions of Germania and the *Germani* for example, we are told of both the practice of, and the simultaneous shunning of, agriculture.⁷⁵ Yet as was mentioned above, the German love of beer substantiates the existence of cultivation. With the remaining pages of this chapter then, attention should be drawn to other areas where, subjectively, the cultures classed as barbarian show levels of sophistication.

For Celtic societies we can draw from the wealth of studies into the many *oppida* to highlight aspects denoting sophistication in civil life. In these northern cities we see many of the general Roman perceived markers of civilisation, which, as will be discussed in Chapter V, directly affected Roman policy.⁷⁶ In both Britannia and Gaul we see many of these *oppida*: large, fortified hill settlements, either permanent domiciles or, in other cases, smaller *oppida* acting similarly to the Saxon Burh system of the ninth Century CE, being places of refuge for the satellite towns.⁷⁷ The tribes of these territories operated in degrees of confederacy, having councils to conduct a range of social and political tasks and adjudicate grievances.⁷⁸ Various *oppida* are found in Germania, along with the smaller *Viereckshenzen* enclosures which are more numerous in the

⁷⁵ Sievers, S. 'Germania in the Late Pre-Roman Iron Age', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of Roman Germany*, Edited by James, S. and Krmnicek, S. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp.20-21; Cf. Caes. *BG.* 4.1, 6.29.

⁷⁶ On the social developments in relation to urban developments, see Fernández-Götz, M. 'Urbanization in Iron Age Europe: Trajectories, Patterns, and Social Dynamics', *Journal of Archaeological Research*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (2018), pp. 117-64; Moore, T. 'Alternatives to Urbanism? Reconsidering 'Oppida' and the Urban Question in Late Iron Age Europe', *Journal of World Prehistory*, Vol. 30, No. 3, (2017), pp. 281-300; Pitts, M, and Perring, D. 'The Making of Britain's First Urban Landscapes: The Case of Late Iron Age and Roman Essex', *Britannia*, Vol. 37, (2006), pp. 189-212; Alvarez-Sanchis, J.R. 'Oppida and Celtic Society In Western Spain', *e-Keltoi: Journal of Interdisciplinary Celtic Studies*, Vol. 6. The Celts in the Iberian Peninsula Article 5. (2005) pp.255-285; Sinner, A. G. and Carreras, C. 'Methods of Palaeodemography: The Case of the Iberian Oppida and Roman Cities in North-East Spain', *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 38. (2019) pp.302- 324. On the issues with the term, and nuances in terminological ascription see, Moore, T. 'Beyond the Oppida: Polyfocal Complexes And Late Iron Age Societies In Southern Britain', *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*, Vol.31. (2012), pp. 391-417; Licerias-Garrido, R. 'Inside Oppida Territories: The Late Iron Age in The Iberian Eastern Meseta (Central Spain)', *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*, Vol.41, (2022), pp. 190-193; for an overview of the *Oppida* in general, Bernhard, M. *The Celts: A History from Earliest Times to the Present*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 66-73.

⁷⁷ For an introduction to the *Burh* System and the development and social structures in Saxon Britain, Flemming, R. *Britain After Rome: The Fall and Rise 400-1070*, (London: Penguin, 2011), pp 241-268.

⁷⁸ Though most evidence for this comes from Roman Sources, see Cunliffe, B. *The Ancient Celts*, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp.234-236; with Haywood, J. *The Celts: Bronze Age to New Age*, (London; Routledge, 2004), pp.34-38.

region.⁷⁹ *oppida* development in southern Germania and the Jastorf culture is generally considered a result of the proximity of the *La Tène* culture, with Deutsch scholars classifying southern Deutschland as a 'Contact Zone', where we see cultural influence along with the transfer of technology.⁸⁰ It should also be stressed, following the example of several scholars of the later Roman Empire, who determinedly insist on the disunity within Germanic cultures, that the same is true, if not more so, in the earlier period and cultures of focus in this paper. The clans and tribes of Gallia and Germania were myriad and no way as united as is presented in the Roman accounts.⁸¹ Often 'confederations', were merely allies by necessity, not by any recognized kinship.

Another striking aspect of these societies which negates their supposed primitivity is their traditions in art and craftwork (see Plates 16-24.).⁸² Finds from archaeological surveys show that regardless of subjective taste, the materials produced by these 'primitives' refute said designation. Plate 17-19 and 22-24 especially demonstrates that these are no mere amateurs, not the Gauls, nor the Britons, nor the Germani. The formwork is near impeccable and rivals material from the Mediterranean in aesthetic beauty, clearly showing tribal grasps with complex metalwork. Primitivity cannot so flagrantly be attributed to these cultures, even less so the Gallic Celts, who, as Plates 20-21 show, incorporated artistic style in their coinage. These two plates along with plate 19 demonstrate not only Mediterranean influence, they also show Gallic abilities to incorporate foreign and native design in their own art and numismatics. The extent of practice and dedication required for the levels of intricacy displayed in the below Plates is predicated on societies with stable organization, which, in turn facilitates craftspeople committing time to training in these challenging skills rather than agricultural labour.⁸³

Moreover, repeated Roman adoption of 'barbarian' military equipment demonstrates their martial craft was too not as basic as suggested. Throughout Rome's long relationship with the myriad 'barbarian' cultures, time and time again, the Romans adopt militaria once used to defeat

⁷⁹ An authoritative survey of settlements in Germania is provided by Sievers, S. 'Germania in the Late Pre-Roman Iron Age', pp. 9-15; on Germanic housing in the Rhineland, Roymans, 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', pp. 445-446.

⁸⁰ Sievers, S. 'Germania in the Late Pre-Roman Iron Age', pp. 6, 16. Young provides an authoritative discussion of a similar effect with Roman Proximity post 50BCE, Young, A. T. 'From Caesar to Tacitus: Changes in Early Germanic Governance circa 50 BC-50 AD', *Public Choice*, Vol. 164, No. 3/4, (2015), pp. 357-378.

⁸¹ Etherington, *Barbarians Ancient and Modern*, p.37; on the diversity of Germanic structure, Price, A.H. 'Differentiated Germanic Social Structures', *Vierteljahrschrift Für Sozial- Und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Vol. 55, No. 4, (1968), pp. 433-448.

⁸² Chadwick, N. *The Celts*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 220-55.

⁸³ Licerias-Garrido, 'Inside Oppida Territories', p. 188, following; Ruiz-Zapatero, G. and Andálvarez-Sanchis, J. 'Centres of power? Society and population in the Northern Plateau of Spain (ca. 800-400 BC)', *Veguetta*, No. 15, (2015), pp. 224-226.

them.⁸⁴ Be it the adoption of the *Gladius Hispanensis*, the co-opting of the *Scutum*, or the employment of the Galea Helms and Lorica Gallica (often termed *Lorica Hamata*), the Roman soldier was often not too dissimilar to Gallic elite troops in arms.⁸⁵

With regard to military sophistication and Roman emulation of such, another fascinating aspect must be addressed. This topic also draws attention to the intricacy within the linguistic and literary traditions of the peoples of the time, as well as providing another potential etymological relationship. There are multiple forms and derivatives which include or derive from the stem 'barba', remembering that morphological evolution accounts for the shift in both vowels and consonant representation and pronunciation. The derivative of concern here is symbiotic with the 'barbarian', the 'Barditus' or 'Barritus' (depending on period and writer). It was the 'war cry' to the Romans, the 'battle-dance' to the northern tribes, and not to forget also the Latin term for the trumpet call of an elephant.⁸⁶ Ammianus tells us "This shout in the very heat of combat rises from a low murmur and gradually grows louder, like waves dashing against the cliffs".⁸⁷ There are contradictory accounts of the duration; Vegetius notes it begins once armies meet to increase the impact, whereas Tacitus suggests it is drawn out both before and during impact, stressing a musicality to the *Barritus*.⁸⁸ Despite slight contradictions, all accounts are conclusive in the form it takes and the effect it can have.

Whether or not the etymology of the term is in relation to beards or elephants, or whether it stopped as battle commenced or continued through the din, the actual dancing and singing with aims of self-encouragement and destroying enemy morale demonstrates a level of sophistication of 'barbarian' cultures martial art, which often proved successful. The act itself is relayed prior to and throughout the Roman timeline and also in Germanic iconography proceeding the collapse of the West. The war chant is ubiquitous in ancient warfare, and its effect could deter even the most steadfast of armies. Even the civilized cultures of Greece and Rome employed forms of war cries.⁸⁹ For the Romans we have several examples of usage of a

⁸⁴ Le Bohec. *The Imperial Roman Army*, (London: B.T. Batley, 1994), pp.122-123.

⁸⁵ Multiple helmets employed throughout the various iterations of the Roman army are of Celtic influence: the early Montefortino, the Coolus; On the *Lorica*, Var. *De Ling. Lat.* 5.116.

⁸⁶ Perkins notes in a commentary of the Tacetian work, how Müllenhoff equates the *Barditus* to a similar etymological route of Barbarian and beard, Perkins, R. *Thor the Wind-raiser and the Eyrarland Image*, (London: University College London, 2001) pp. 51-52.

⁸⁷ Amm. 16.12.43.

⁸⁸ Tac. *Germ.* 3; *CF.* Veg. *Mil.* 3.18.9; Diod. 5.29.3.

⁸⁹ It is employed by most civilizations in the works of Diodorus, Diod. Sic. 13.46.2, 13.55.6 13.56.6, 13.99.1, 14.72.4; For the Grecians, it is termed the *Paian*, a cry and/or song before battle, for example, Diod. Sic. 13.15, 14.23; Thuc. 7.44.6; Again, here we see the relation to avian creatures, Hom. *Ill.* 3.1 Verg. *A.* 7.705; Polyæn. 3.9.8. Like the Germanic *Barritus*, the *Paeon* is a form of Hymn, propitiation and/or praise of gods, for example, Aeschin. 2.163; Aesch. *Ag.* 238; Thuc. *Hist.* 6.32.2; Strab. 9.3.10; Plat. *Rep.* 2.383b.

simple shout in the Republican period and the reign of the emperors.⁹⁰ The Romans eventually adopted the more melodic form of the cry; Speidel, suggests troops learnt the practice from the various Germanic forces employed by Rome.⁹¹ The *Barditus* was not just a song of war, but a dance to celebrate it and preserve the tales of the tribe's heroes.

Herein we see the final, yet one of the most fascinating aspects of Germanic and Celtic culture noted in this survey; their oral tradition in comparison to written accounts.⁹² The sophistication of this practice cannot be understated, nor can it be deemed primitivistic. We know in some cases writing was employed, as Caesar himself tells us, the Helvetii at least employed Greek letters in recording census figures.⁹³ Yet voice remained the predominate transmitter of information. The preservation of events in oral form, while both Celtic and Germanic cultures from at least the first centuries BCE and CE had written languages, demonstrate that this culture was not ignorant nor primal. Rather, they chose to pursue traditional continuity, and again the Romans were in no position to judge others negatively for that.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Caes. *BG.* 3.92; Cass. Dio 38.45.5; Liv. 4.37.9; Plut. *Crass.* 27.1; Tac. *Hist.* 18.3.

⁹¹ Speidel offers a fascinating analysis on the *barritus* in Speidel, M.P. *Ancient Germanic Warriors: Warrior Styles from Trajan's Column to Icelandic Sagas*, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), pp. 98-112.

⁹² On oral tradition see, Duddy, T. 'Derrida and the Druids: Writing, Lore, and Power in Early Celtic Society', *Religion & Literature*, Vol. 28, No. 2/3, (1996), pp. 9-20.

⁹³ Caes. *BG.* 1.29.

⁹⁴ On Cisalpine Gallic literature, Häussler, R. 'De-Constructing Ethnic Identities: Becoming Roman In Western Cisalpine Gaul?', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*. Supplement, No. 120, (2013), p. 55. Celtic cultures employed the Latin alphabet, which is exemplified by Celtic numismatics, Williams, J. 'New Light on Latin in Pre-Conquest Britain.' *Britannia*, vol. 38, 2007, pp. 1-11; Mays, M. 'Inscriptions On British Celtic Coins', *The Numismatic Chronicle* (1966-), Vol. 152, (1992), Pp. 57-82. Whereas the Germanic cultures developed the runic *Futhork*. The Germanic script is said to have developed between 100BCE and 100CE, yet there are speculations; Green, D. H. *Language and History in the Early Germanic World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.254; Rosenfeld, H. "Buch, Schrift Und Lateinische Sprachkenntnis Bei Den Germanen Vor Der Christlichen Mission." *Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie*, Vol. 95, No. 3, (1952), pp. 193-194; Mees, B. 'Runes in the First Century', in *Runes and Their Secrets; Studies in Runology* Edited by, Stoklund, M. *Et al.* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2006), pp. 201-232. Looijenga provides a comprehensive study of the origins of this alphabet in a collection of works, Looijenga, T. *Texts and Contexts of the Oldest Runic Inscriptions* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), *Runes around the North Sea and on the Continent AD 150-700; texts & contexts* (Groningen: University of Groningen, 1997); see also Fischer, S. *Roman Imperialism and Runic Literacy: the Westernization of Northern Europe (150-800 AD)*, (Uppsala: Department of Archaeology and Ancient History of Uppsala University, 2005), p.45, who suggests that language this language developed in response to Latin literacy, rather than being a unique development. Abdale, J. R. *Four Days in September: The Battle of Teutoburg*, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2013), Google E-book, pp.41-42, suggests the Germanic script is a bastardised form of Northern Italian letters.

Examples of Germanic and Celtic Arts and Iconography




Plate 14: The Svingerud Runestone, being dated between the 1 CE and 250 CE is the earliest of our archaeological references of the Germanic Fuþark. Held in the Historical Museum at the University of Oslo



Plate 15: Agris Helmet, found in France dated Ca. 350 BCE, held in the Musée d'Angoulême



Plate 16: Silver Brooch Hispanic Gaul Ca, 300-150 BCE, Held in the British Museum,



Plate 17: A Basse-Yutz Flagon found in France dated Ca.420-350 BCE, Held in the British Museum



Plate 18: Gallic coin ca. First Century BCE, Allen, CCCBM 2.411. p.65.



Plate 19: Gallic coin first Century BCE CCCBM 2.562.p.70



Plate 20: Germanic Bead, Dated Ca. 1-200 CE, Held in the British Museum



Plate 21: The Snettisham Great Torc, Ca. 150-50 BCE, British Celtic Torc, held in The British Museum



Plate 22: Germanic Copper Strap Mounts ca. 100s CE, held in The British Museum



Part Two: Conquering The Caricature



Chapter II: Veni, Vidi, Violavi:

‘...their children and their wives should be dragged off into slavery, that they themselves should be slaughtered — the inevitable fate of the conquered.’

Caes. *BG.* 7.14.10.

To begin the investigation into the effect of the above caricature, that of the savage, wild, and unkempt primitive peoples, on the Roman threshold for extreme violence (TEV) and their conduct in conquest, the natural start is unquestionably a discussion on Gaius Julius Caesar, as it was during Caesar’s campaigns in which Gaul was brought under Roman control and the Roman expeditions to the other northern regions initiated. The campaigns themselves are well documented, and as such here shall be provided only a brief synopsis, highlighting points pertinent to various sections of the thesis.⁹⁵ In 58 BCE Julius Caesar was granted the three northernmost Roman *Provincia* of *Gallia Cisalpinia*, *Gallia Transalpina*, and *Illyria*. In the first year of his tenure he exploited two aspects to justify a conflict beyond Roman limits: A) the migration of the Helvetii, playing on the centuries-old Roman fear of migratory ‘barbarians’ discussed in Chapter I; and B) the defence of the Roman allies the Aedui (in response also to the Helvetian migration), a common Roman *Cassus Belli*.⁹⁶ Both reasons are hard to accept at face value, and unsurprisingly in discussions of this sort, competing opinions saturate the Caesarian historiography.⁹⁷

De Bello Gallico: A Barbarian Holocaust?

When considering the justification given by Caesar in the opening of the war to his contemporaries, it should be remembered that his uncle Marius had defeated a threat of a similar sort to the migratory Helvetii only one or two generations earlier, during the migration of the Cimbri and Teutones (113-101 BCE).⁹⁸ The damage of the Cimbrian War - as it has come to be known by historians - was therefore still within living memory and certainly within generational memory in 58 BCE, Caesar himself referred to it in the prelude to the campaign

⁹⁵ Primary sources detailing the war can be found in the Timeline below from pp.91-103. For modern narratives, Boak, A. & Sinnigen, W. *A History of Rome to A.D.565*, 5th ed, (London: Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 225-230; Scullard, H.H. & Cary, M. *A History of Rome* (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), pp. 258-265; both prove sufficient foundations.

⁹⁶ The issues in Gaul which had allowed for the justification of the campaign had been brewing for a few years prior to Caesar’s arrival in the province, Cic. *Att.* 1.19.2, see also Cornwell, H. ‘Roman Attitudes To Empire And Imperialism: The View From History’. *Journal Of Roman Archaeology*, Vol. 32. (2019), pp. 478-479.

⁹⁷ The notable opposing opinion is Caesar’s need for wealth accumulation, which shall be discussed in depth below.

⁹⁸ Both Caesars’ Romano-Gallic Provinces were sites of Roman defeats: Vercellae in Gallia Cisalpina and Aqua Sextiae in Gallia Narbonensis. Both regions which had gained Roman citizenship and were subject to Caesar’s levy; on the enfranchisement of the province see, Ewins, U. ‘The Enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul’, *Papers of the British School at Rome*, Vol. 23, (1955), pp. 89-95.

against Ariovistus.⁹⁹ As such, he would thus be able to leverage this generational memory in both justification of his preventative measures to the senate and people, but moreover, in stoking fervour for his recruitment drive in his Gallic provinces.¹⁰⁰

There were major Romano-Italian cities in the region at the time of the migration, and one need only consider the continued veneration of Remembrance Day to realise the insignificance of a mere 40-year separation – even considering a shorter life expectancy of antiquity.¹⁰¹ Many of the legionaries whom Caesar levied would potentially have grown up with stories from both father and grandfather, telling of the ‘barbarian’ and the glory of war. Granted many veterans would not have settled in the regions subject to Germanic incursion, but the Cimbrian wars correspond to the period where veterans were liable to land grants, often in regions of deployment. Therefore, the suggestion that some veterans would have probably received their land grants in regions previously threatened by the migratory Germans is not too outlandish. Due to the lack of historical records, it is hard to validate the scale of the Marian Gallic settlement, we are told only of the passing of:

‘...a law to divide the land which the Cimbri had seized in the country now called Gaul by the Romans, and which was considered as now no longer Gallic but Roman territory.’

App. *B.Civ.* 1.29.1.

The only other evidence we have for Marian settlement is for those in Sardinia and Africa.¹⁰² Consistency of land allocation was a subject of great consternation to the Late Republic, being a main contributor to the regime’s collapse, but for Marius’ mules at least, land grants were honoured.¹⁰³ Thus it is not entirely foolish to suspect the potential for generational influence by

⁹⁹ Caes. *BG.* 1.39.

¹⁰⁰ Caesar often includes migration as his justification for conflict, Caes. *BG.* 1.6-7, 1.30-32, 4.4 with 4.8; yet this is understandable considering Caesar’s political opponents at the time such as Cato, see Plut. *Cat. Min.* 21.8-9, 22-24, 26.1, 27-39, 31-33, 41-42 49, 51.1, Caes. 21.8-9, *Pomp.* 51-52; see also Powell, A. ‘Julius Caesar’, p. 127; Raaflaub, K.A. ‘Caesar, Literature, and Politics at the End of the Republic’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, edited by Grillo, L. Krebs, C.B. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2017), pp .18-20.

¹⁰¹ For example Narbo Martius est. 118BCE, Mutina and Parma est. 186BCE, and Aquileia est.181BCE, for more on this early colonisation, see Ewins, U. ‘The Early Colonisation of Cisalpine Gaul’, *Papers of the British School at Rome*, Vol. 20, (1952), pp. 54-71.

¹⁰² On Africa, Aur. Vic. *De Vir*, 73.1; Caes. *BC. Afr.* 56.3; on Corsica and Sardinia, Cic. *Balb.* 48; Vell. Pat. 1.15.5; Sen. *Dia.* 11.7; Plin. *NH.* 3.80; Aur. Vic. *De Vir*, 73.1.

¹⁰³ Issues with Land distribution began in earnest under the Gracchans and often resurfaced in the turmoil that followed, Beard, M. & Crawford, M. *Rome in the Late Republic*, 2nd Ed. (London: Duckworth, 1999), pp.6-7, 80-82; Henderson, M. M. ‘Tiberius Gracchus And The Failure Of The Roman Republic’, *Theoria: A Journal Of Social And Political Theory*, No. 31, (1968), Pp. 51-64; Patterson, J.R. ‘Rome and Italy’ In *A Companion the Roman Republic*, Edited by Rosenstein, N. & Morstein-Marx, R. (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), pp. 616-621. For an overview of the topic throughout the Republic, Broadhead, W. ‘Colonisation, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, in *A Companion to the Roman Army*, Edited by Erdkamp, P. (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), pp. 148-163; Patterson, J.R.

veteran fathers and grandfathers in a recruitment drive by Caesar to defeat the new incarnation of the archaic Roman nemesis.¹⁰⁴ This, however, will always remain conjecture, interesting conjecture which, if more heavily supported in evidence may provide key insight into the effect of the 'barbarian' construction. But with the lack of testimony of those enlisted, it remains conjecture, nonetheless.

This new levy of Caesar's, and his existing allocated legions, thereafter, began a 3-year period of invasion, wherein major examples of violence were acted upon the Gauls and Germans. By 55BCE, many of the recently 'allied' or subjugated tribes began a series of rebellions, culminating in a mass uprising by the majority of the province under the leadership of Vercingetorix in 52BCE. The revolt, like all others, was suppressed. Yet minor dissent continued in various regions.¹⁰⁵ This minor disaffection became sporadic, and Roman attention in Gaul was withdrawn during the turmoil of the Caesarian wars.¹⁰⁶

If Caesar's autobiographical, third person, self-aggrandising *De Bello Gallico* has any scintilla of truth in its numerical assertions, the reader is told of around 2/3 of Gaul being andropodised or sold into slavery during the near ten years of his governorship. Over long years of war, Gaul, Britain and Germania all burned at the hands of his revered legions.¹⁰⁷ There are many examples of significant violence to be found during Caesar's campaigns, though to focus on all events in detail, one would require a study in and of itself. In lieu of this, a summary is provided below with a particular focus on episodes discussed throughout this Chapter. Criteria of entry are as follows:

1. Mass slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants
2. Devastation of farmland, nature and towns/*oppida*.
3. Mass enslavement of conquered peoples.

'Military Organization and Social Change in the Later Roman Republic', in *War and Society in the Roman World*, edited by Rich, J. and Shipley, G. (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 100-104.

¹⁰⁴ For historical citations of the conflicts with 'barbarian' migrants see Timeline (particularly articles for the 390s BCE, and the Cimbrian War).

¹⁰⁵ A Final rebellion is raised in the later years, the account is given in *De Bello Gallico*, yet the author is Hirtius, not Caesar.

¹⁰⁶ It would not be until Augustus had concentrated power into one role that investment into Gaul became a substantial Roman Province, rather than a mere Roman subject.

¹⁰⁷ The 14th legion becomes particularly important serving in most of the campaigns discussed in this paper, levied by Caesar in 57BCE in the recently emancipated Alpine provinces, they were almost destroyed by Ambiorix in his revolt, yet over the Republican wars they were reconstituted to full strength, going on to take part in the Germanic and Pannonian occupations and the following revolts in these regions, continuing under Germanicus in the Arminian campaigns. Several decades later they were sent with the Claudian invasion force of Britain and participated in defeating Boudicca at Watling Street. As Saturninus rose his province in rebellion the now *Limes* based legion joined in his insurrection before their redeployment in Pannonia, where they would go on to support their legionary commander Severus in his bid for power in the Year of 5 Emperors.

Table 1 Episodes of Violence in the Gallic Campaigns ¹⁰⁸

Reference	Year/s	Culture Group	Description	Sources
Helvetian Campaign	58BCE	Celtic	Caesar declares of the 368,000 Celts in the Helvetian migration, only 110,000 returned following their defeat Slaughtering of both combatants and non-combatants at the baggage-train	Caesar, <i>B.G.</i> 1.29; Plut. <i>Caes.</i> 18.4; Cass. Dio 39.48.2; Flor. 1.45.2-3.
Ariovistus	58BCE	Germanic	Slaughtering of both combatants and non-combatants on the banks of the Rhine Plut:80,000 dead App:800,000	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 1.53; Plut. <i>Caes.</i> 19.11-12; App. <i>Gall.</i> 4.22; Flor. 1.45.10-13
Belgica	58BCE	Gallo-Germanic	Inhabitants and booty collectively sold off, reported 53,000 sold into slavery. ¹⁰⁹	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 2.33; Flor. 1.45.4.
Venetian Campaigns	57BCE	Celtic	In order of making an example of these tribes, Caesar had the tribal chieftains (Senate), executed and all the men sold as slaves	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 3.16; Flor. 1.45.5.
Aquitanian Campaigns	57BCE	Celtic	Of the Aquitanian and Cantabrian only ¼ of the 50,000 survived	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 2.3.26; Flor. 1.45.6.
Against the Menapii & Morini	57BCE	Germanic	Following the retreat into the woodlands, Caesar begins a programme of deforestation to prevent guerrilla tactics	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 3.28; App. <i>Gall.</i> 1.4; Flor. 1.45.6.
Against the Usipetes & Tencteri	55BCE	Gallo-Germanic	After defeating the armed force, the legions slaughter women and children in the camp and trapped by the confluence of the Muesse/Rhine. ¹¹⁰ Caesar's account would lead one to believe the majority of a reported 430,000 Germans were slain or lost their lives in flight. ¹¹¹	Caes. <i>B.G.</i> 4.14-15; Plut. <i>Cat.</i> 51.1, Caes. 22, <i>Comp. Nic. c.</i> <i>Crass.</i> 4; App. <i>Gall.</i> 1.4;

¹⁰⁸ Numbers presented here must be subject to intense scepticism, as in most cases they are derived from the ancient sources. Where numerical significance outweighs proportional significance within the paper there shall be further discussion within the appropriate places, either in the footnotes for the table or in the later pages of this thesis.

¹⁰⁹ Sheers and Roymans identify Thuin, Belgium as the site where Caesar defeated the Aduatuci; with their observation of lack of mid-principate materials, high quantities of Roman militaria, as well as C14 dating between 90BCE-60CE, Caesar's claims of tribal enslavement are somewhat substantiated, though the number still remains unknown. Roymans, N, and Scheers, S. "Eight Gold Hoards from the Low Countries. A Synthesis." *Late Iron Age Gold Hoards from the Low Countries and the Caesarian Conquest of Northern Gaul*, edited by Nico Roymans et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012) pp. 20-24, 29; with Scheers, S, et al. 'Three Gold Hoards from Thuin', *Late Iron Age Gold Hoards from the Low Countries and the Caesarian Conquest of Northern Gaul*, edited by Roymans, N. et. al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), pp. 71-108.

¹¹⁰ This confluence does not remain, however, following the Paleo-geographic reconstructions of Cohen et al. 2012. Roymans provides a sufficient argument in support of this confluence being located between the modern Rossum and Kessel; See Roymans Conflict Archaeology, 311-312 with Cohen, K.M., et al. *Rhine-Meuse Delta Studies' Digital Basemap for Delta Evolution and Palaeogeography*, (Utrecht: Dept. Physical Geography, Utrecht University. 2012).

¹¹¹ See also Ando, C. 'Aliens, Ambassadors, and the Integrity of the Empire', *Law and History Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2008), p. 8; with Lee, K. H. "Caesar's Encounter with the Usipetes and the Tencteri." *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (1969), pp. 100-03; Roymans, N. 'A Roman Massacre In The Far North: Caesar's Annihilation Of The Tencteri And Usipetes In The Dutch River Area', in *Conflict Archaeology Materialities of Collective Violence from Prehistory to Late Antiquity*, edited by Fernández-Götz, M. and Roymans, N. (London: Routledge. 2018), 306-329; Bellemore, J. *The Roman Concept of Massacre: Julius Caesar in Gaul* In *Theatres Of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity Throughout History*, Edited by Dwyer, P. and Ryan, L. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), pp.38-49; Morrell, K. 'Cato, Caesar, and the Germani', *Antichthon*, Vol. 49, (2015), pp. 73-93 has a particular focus on legality of Caesar's conduct: Roymans, *A Roman Massacre*, pp. 310 & 325, however, is right to point out both these major tribes still exist in the

				Flor. 1.45.7.
Across the Rhine	55BCE	Germanic	Caesar reports deforestation and the destruction of vacant towns and villages.	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 4.18-19; Eutrop. 6.17; Caes. <i>BG.</i> 4.16-19; Cass. Dio 39.50; Flor. 1.45.14, 2.30.21-22; Oros. 6.9.1; Plut. <i>Caes.</i> 23.1.
Reaction to Morini revolt	55BCE	Germanic	Caesar orders the destruction of fields and villages belonging to the tribes.	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 4.38.
In Britain	54BCE	Celtic	Stealing of livestock and slaughter of fleeing townspeople, and defenders.	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 5.21; Flor. 1.45.18-19.
Revolt of Ambiorix	54/53BCE	Gallo-Germanic	Culmination of this conflict leads to the near eradication of the Eburones, with them disappearing in the historical record. ¹¹²	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 6.34-35; Flor. 1.45.8.
Sack of Genabum	52BCE	Celtic	Looting and razing of the city, inhabitants captured	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 7.11; Flor. 1.45.23.
Sack of Avaricum	52BCE	Celtic	Indiscriminate massacre once walls are breached. ¹¹³ Caesar reports of only 800 survivors of the 40,000 within the <i>oppida</i>	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 7.28; Flor. 1.45.23.
Besieging Alesia	52BCE	Celtic	Denial of non-combatants escape of the <i>oppida</i> , leaving them to starve in no-man's land	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 7.78; Flor. 1.45.23-25.
Aftermath of the Victory at Alesia	52BCE	Celtic. potentially including Germanic ¹¹⁴	After defeating the relief army, a 'great slaughter' occurred immediately and at midnight Caesar ordered a second pursuit resulting in 'a great number taken and slain.' Though numbers are not given, Caesar reports that without the Aedui and Avernii prisoners there remained enough prisoners to distribute one to each man in the army for plunder. ¹¹⁵	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 7.88-89; Cass. Dio 40.39-43; Plut. <i>Caes.</i> 27; Flor. 1.45.23-26.
The Carnutes	51BCE	Celtic	Reported this tribe lost the majority of its populace.	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 8.4-5.
Further Campaign against the Eburones	51BCE	Germanic	Caesar determines to further ravish the territory to deter further alliance to Ambiorix	Caes. <i>BG.</i> 8.24-25

principate and as such Caesar's testimony is further undermined. The Tencteri fought against Rome in 16BCE (Cass. Dio 54.20.4) and the Usipetes in 14CE Tac *Ann.* 1.51

¹¹² Roymans, and Scheers, 'Eight Gold Hoards from the Low Countries', pp. 12-14.

¹¹³ Caesar recounts the massacre at Cenabum was in retaliation to the slaughter of Roman inhabitants at the onset of the revolt, Caes. *B.G.* 7.3, with 7.28

¹¹⁴ With the location of Alesia, and the assertion that all of Gaul was in rebellion, it is not entirely unprovable that many Germans were amongst the relief force sent and slaughtered in the aftermath, however, there is little mention of the makeup of this second army in the sources

¹¹⁵ Following the interpretation presented by Reddé, M. 'The Battlefield of Alesia', in *Conflict Archaeology Materialities of Collective Violence from Prehistory to Late Antiquity*, edited by Fernández-Götz, M. and Roymans, N. (London: Routledge. 2018), pp. 330-332 Caesars legionnaires probably numbered around 40,000-60,000, suggesting a minimum of 40,000 enslaved if one were to exclude the Auxiliary forces fighting for Caesar. Furthermore, considering the conservative estimates of around 70,000 for the size of the relief forces; Delbruck proposes 50,000, in, Delbruck, H. *History of the Art of War, Volume I, Warfare in Antiquity*, [trans. Renfroe, W.J. (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990)], p. 504.

Subjugation at Uxellodunum	51BCE	Celtic	Caesar ordered the severing of the vanquished's hands	Frontin. <i>Strat.</i> 3.7.2; Caes. <i>BG.</i> 8.40-44.
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The eighteen above examples, reported by the Roman sources, illustrate a brutal campaign even if numerical assertions are suspended in favour of relative proportions. There is no way to truly validate the number of casualties and displacements from the episodes above, nonetheless, these numbers are those Caesar and other commentators were promoting, and scales of violence can still be determined to a sufficient extent.¹¹⁶ Here the works of Roymans become significantly pertinent. The archaeological surveys conducted by him and his colleagues shines new lights on the brutality inflicted over the course of the Caesarian *Violatio*. These papers survey archaeological datasets from Gaul and Germania, which are analysed within the context of Caesar's expansions between 58 and 50BCE.¹¹⁷ The picture produced is a stark one. Roymans does make note that there has been attempts by scholars to downplay the full impact of the Roman expansion on the populace in the regions of study, principally due to the over embellishment of the ancient authors.¹¹⁸ Yet regardless, despite the debated reliability of Caesar's commentaries and the numbers he purports within the text, these are in some way proportionally corroborated by the archaeological surveillance conducted and reported in the papers presented by Roymans *et al.*¹¹⁹ Sites such as Thuin and Kessel show large spread destruction exacted on the *Germani* in the period, and locations and materials correlate to the Caesarian testimony.¹²⁰ Roymans' investigates datasets including a variety of collections of latent glass bracelets, large numbers of *fibulae*, bodily remains, Roman and Germanic militaria, numismatic materials, and other various collections of artefacts collected from several sites from the upper Rhine through to lower Belgium.¹²¹ The data collected presents a scene of dramatic scales of death, depopulation, and decline in many tribal localities in the region around the time

¹¹⁶ As aptly demonstrated by Henige, there has been a plethora of attempts at enumeration, Henige, D. 'He Came, He Saw, We Counted: The Historiography And Demography Of Caesar's Gallic Numbers', *Annales De Démographie Historique*, (1998-1), pp. 215-242. Moreover, Caesar's testimony was subject to contemporary scrutiny, Coulter rightly points out that any 'seriously distorted... facts would arouse a storm of protest', Coulter, C.C. 'Caesar's Clemency', *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 7, (1931), p. 514.

¹¹⁷ See Roymans, N. *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power: The Batavians in the Early Roman Empire*, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2004), pp. 9-54, 103-133, 146; Roymans, N. et al. "Roman Imperialism and the Transformation of Rural Society in a Frontier Province: Diversifying the Narrative", *Britannia*, Vol. 51, (2020), pp. 4-7; Roymans, & Manuel "Reconsidering the Roman Conquest", pp. 418-420, and Roymans, N. 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', pp. 439-458.

¹¹⁸ Roymans, N. 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', p. 443.

¹¹⁹ See footnote 108.

¹²⁰ See footnotes 102-103; with Roymans, 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', pp. 441-443.

¹²¹ Roymans, 'Caesar's annihilation of the Tencteri and Usipetes', pp. 306-329, 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', pp. 443-455, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power*, pp. 107-132, 149-161.

of the entrance of Caesar into Gaul; which aligns with the genocidal declarations of the ancient *Commentaries*.¹²²

One particularly significant example that demonstrates the brutality of Caesar is the aforementioned site at Kessel, sitting at the confluence of the Rhine and Muesse, Roymans is led to believe that this is the site of the annihilation of the Belgic tribes under Ambiorix.¹²³ The author notes the site's materials were found during dredging operations and thus this presents issues with interpretation. Nonetheless, the vast amount of bone material, being male and female, and young and old - dated to the Late Iron Age - with 'dramatic' signs of peri-mortal wounds, along with tribal ornamentation and militaria identified, lends credence to Roymans' suggestion of this being the site of the Germanic massacre in 55BCE. If we accept the assessments presented above, Caesar's reported desire for 'the race and name of that state (Eburones) be annihilated' seemingly came to fruition.¹²⁴

Privation in the Principate

If we are then to accept, in at least proportional terms, the testimony of the ancients, the first wave of occupation shows a significant degree of interpersonal violence and violation against the northern cultures. Unfortunately for students of military history, accounts of the subsequent campaigns are not as thorough in their details. For the attempted occupations in Germania, our chief contemporary is Velleius Paterculus, the others account the conflict much later: Tacitus at the dawn of the second century CE, Dio in the third. These latter authors provide the wealth of our materials for the occupation of Britannia, Though of lesser focus here, Britannic Celts still allow us a sufficient comparison to their mainland cousins. Again, these accounts are in no way as thorough as the Caesarian commentary, however, with the criterion employed in Table. 1, there are episodes of violence to be found.¹²⁵

¹²² There are alternate suggestions for the decline in settlement usage, climate change and famine are amongst the most cited, yet in agreeance with Roymans, the Caesarian impact cannot be understated, on the archaeological evidence of decline, Roymans, 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', pp. 452, 454, p. 455 address opposing suggestions.

¹²³ Particularly, Roymans, '*Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power*', pp. 103-62

¹²⁴ Caes. *BG.* 6.34.8; with Roymans, 'Conquest and Mass Violence', pp.441-443, 'A Roman Massacre', pp. 312-319

¹²⁵ One must consider the alternate purposes of the Caesarian and post-Actium texts along with the disconnection of later authors to the events they narrate, see Marincola, J. 'Tacitus' Prefaces and the Decline of Imperial Historiography', *Latomus*, Vol. 58, No. 2, (1999), pp. 391-404.

Table 2: Episodes and Inferences of Violence post-Caesar

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Year/s</u>	<u>Culture Group</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Sources</u>
Augustus and Vinicius in Germania	Ca. 25BCE	Germanic	Augustus hailed Imperator and awarded a triumph for campaigns in ca.25BCE suggesting substantial deaths and/or captives	Cass. Dio 53.26.4.
Princes in Rhaetia	16BCE	Celtic	Deportation of military-age men	Cass. Dio 54.22.4-5.
Drusus in Germania	Ca.14-10, 9BCE	Germanic	Little is given on the campaigns themselves, however, we are told much blood was spilled. Devastation of Sugambri territory. Drusus awarded Triumphal honours for Germanic campaigns	Vell. Pat.2.97.3 Cass. Dio 54.21.2, 54.33.5.
Vinicius in Germania	1-4CE	Germanic	Vinicius is awarded a partial triumph suggesting substantial deaths and/or captives	Vell. Pat. 2.104.2.
Germanicus in Germania	Ca. 10-16CE	Germanic	Awarded a Triumph	Tac. Ann. 1.55-56.
			‘All who suffered from the disabilities of age or sex were immediately taken or slaughtered’	
			‘Laid waste the open country’	
			‘Fire and bloodshed’ were enacted against the Angrivarians	
Slaughter of broken Arminian army for seven Roman Hours	Tac. Ann. 2.17-19			
‘Ravaging and destroying’ tribes in the interior of Germania Magna	Tac. Ann. 2.25.			
Revolt of Sacorvir	27CE	Celtic	Devastation of Sequani villages	Tac. Ann. 3.45.
Isla Mona	CA.60.CE	Celtic	Attempted destruction of sacred Druidic site, occupation abandoned due to Boudican revolt	Cass. Dio 62.7-8; Tac. Ann. 14.29-30, Agri. 18

As is initially obvious, there is less of a wealth of accounts to draw upon following the establishment of the Principate, but as is discussed in the succeeding pages, this brevity has its explanations, and nonetheless, these examples alone suggest a measure of continuity in treatment against the *Germani*. Having set out myriad examples of brutality against the ‘barbarians,’ it now becomes pertinent to examine Roman conduct in the larger Roman world, in order to determine whether this brutality was unique, and whether Roymans’ contention that violence was exacerbated by ‘barbarism’ is correct. Quite simply, the conduct was not unique to the north, yet the picture across the Empire is somewhat more complex.

Chapter III: Carthago Delenda Est

“Maidens would be dishonoured, and youths abused; that children would be torn from the embraces of their parents; that matrons would be subjected to the pleasure of the conquerors; that temples and dwelling-houses would be plundered; that massacres and fires would follow; and that every place would be filled with arms, corpses, blood, and lamentation.’

Sal. *Cat.* 51.9

Roman brutality during the central phases of the process of Roman assimilation is by no means limited to the ‘barbarians.’ Examples of indiscriminate violence by the Romans, on the scale of those discussed in the previous chapter, can be found all along the timeline and across the ‘known world’. There was similar conduct in Greece, Judea, Africa, Hispania and even in Italy that provides interesting comparative points to that in Germania, Gaul and Britain. With these set out, it thus allows us a foundation for determining the military impact of the ‘barbarian’ construct in ‘*Barbaricum*’. For in order to ascertain whether their ‘barbarism’ had any impact on lowering the threshold for extreme violence (TEV), one must examine the myriad examples of similar Roman behaviour elsewhere, before assessing the factors causing the diminishment of both a general’s and a soldier’s TEV. These pages shall provide examples which will allow for such an examination in the succeeding chapter.

As any ancient historian is aware, the history of Rome is peppered with atrocity. The sources do not err on the side of conservatism in testimonies and numbers. In Italia we are told of the war band of Romulus (CA.771-717 BCE) abducting women from their neighbours;¹²⁶ the landed troops of Tiberius Aemilius’ and their laying waste of Sabine territory (CA.460s BCE)¹²⁷; and Roman andrapodisation of the Senones (284 BCE).¹²⁸ The picture was little different to how the Romans treated ‘civilised’ Greeks, as can be seen with the sack of Syracuse (212 BCE)¹²⁹; the treatment following the Third Macedonian War (168 BCE);¹³⁰ and the razing of Corinth (146 BCE).¹³¹ Regardless of the legitimacy of their claims, the testimony of the Roman authors does naught oft criticise the immorality of their deeds.

¹²⁶ Liv. 1.9-10.

¹²⁷ Liv. 2.62.

¹²⁸ App. *Gall.* 2.13.

¹²⁹ Polyb. 8.3-7; Plut. *Marcellius* 19; Liv 25.40.

¹³⁰ 150,000 slaves are reported to have been taken following Roman victory, Liv. 45.34.5; Plut. *Aem.* 29.4.

¹³¹ Polyb. 39.12-13; Paus. 7.16.7-8; Vell. Pat. 1.13; Cas. Dio [Zonar]. 70-71? Also, on the destruction of Thebes and Chalcis, see Liv. *Perio.* 56.4-5.

One Cannot Deny *Direptio*

In truth the Roman war machine was brutal in victory regardless of *ethnos* and placed the conquest of an enemy amongst the most principal of achievements.¹³² Ziolkowski's 1993 chapter '*Urbs direpta*' is of particularly significance in this regard.¹³³ This is a study tracing the behaviour of mainly pre-Marian troops after the subjugation of an enemy force, predominantly in a fortification, hence the designation of *Urbs*. The second word making up Ziolkowski's title however is of more importance. The Latin word *direptio* itself evolved from multiple roots which are similar to our modern associations with the term: all which illuminate its attached horrors.¹³⁴ In English these term roughly translates to 'plundering,' 'pillaging,' 'theft,' and 'rape', but is best encapsulated in our modern 'sacking': that following a siege or capture of a marching camp.¹³⁵ In Tacitus we see a detailed account of a sack; this time, however, by Romans, against Romans.¹³⁶ As here we are focusing on the period prior to Caesar's northern campaign, our principle source with a clear description, however, is undoubtedly Polybius: A Greek 'Romanophile', tasked with spreading Roman history to a recently capitulated Hellenic populace.¹³⁷ Polybius, like Caesar nearly a century later, is particularly descriptive in his *Histories*. In the passage relevant to this chapter, he tells us how:

'...one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but dogs cut in half, and the
dismembered limbs of other animals.'

Polyb. 10.15.5

¹³² There was a minimum of 5000 souls claimed for the exalted Triumph: the chief prize for Republican generals, as is attested by Val. Max, 2.8.1; however, this author was writing in a time the Republican Triumph was a thing of the past.

¹³³ Ziolkowski, A. '*Urbs Direpta*' in *War and Society in The Roman World*, edited by, Rich. J And Shipley G. (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.69-91.

¹³⁴ *Direptio* is a compound word, made up from the prefix 'dis-' meaning to tear apart or asunder, see 'dis3' in *A Latin Dictionary*, edited by Short, C. and Lewis, C. (Oxford: Oxford and Clarendon Press, 1879); and 'rapio' meaning to rob, plunder and to mutilate, see 'R.2.rapio' in *A Latin Dictionary*, edited by Short, C. and Lewis, C. (Oxford: Oxford and Clarendon Press, 1879).


¹³⁵ 'D.38. *direptio*', in *A Latin Dictionary*, edited by Short, C. and Lewis, C. (Oxford: Oxford and Clarendon Press, 1879); the term is used around 80 times by Livy see Packard, D.W. *A Concordance to Livy: Vol I*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 1275-1277.

¹³⁶ Sack of Cremona: Tac. *Hist.* 3.33-34; Dio's account is less descriptive, however, in his discussions on the Batonian Revolt, he inadvertently tells his readers that the sacking was the expectation of a Roman army in the successful conclusion of a siege; 'The Romans, ignorant of what they had done, rushed in after them, expecting to sack the whole place without striking a blow' Cass. Dio 56.11.4.

¹³⁷ Arriving in Rome in 167BCE, Polybius set out to account the rise of the Roman Imperium, an achievement 'unparalleled in human history,' Polyb. 1.1; A commanding overview of the author and the context of his work is offered by the esteemed Walbank, see Walbank, F.W. *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Walbank too provided a more digestible summary for the Penguin translation of Polybius' *Histories*, see Walbank, F.W, 'Introduction' in *Polybius: Rise of the Roman Empire*, Edited by, Radice, B. (London: Penguin Classics, 1979), pp.9-40.

The narrative which both precedes and follows these lines is equally saturated with instances of exceptional brutality, with each phase of violence distinguished by a trumpet call. Polybius herein provides us with an intricate account of the process following the Roman victory at Nova Carthago which can be simplified to the below process:

Figure 2: Polybian Model of *Urbs Direpta* ¹³⁸



As is detailed exceptionally throughout Ziolkowski’s study, there is a major variability between each instance. For example, Livy is often at pains to stress the ‘indiscriminate’ massacre was directed against military age men alone, rather than the Polybian suggestion of blind slaughter.¹³⁹ Nonetheless, through his analysis of the process, Ziolkowski highlights an obvious pattern *post-victoriam* across the timeline, regardless of any specific differences between each episode. Accordingly, the basic model outlined in Figure 2 from the second century BCE holds up throughout the timeline, despite situational deviation. The process of the sackings discussed in *Urbs Direpta* is illuminating; though the author’s focus is primarily placed on the application against cities, he highlights facets of *Direptio* that were manifest on many battlefields in northern Europe and the rest of the Roman world. The *Direptio*, even though authors such as Caesar do not explicitly use the term, was nonetheless exacted against the tribes of Gaul, Germania, and Britannia. Andrapodisation in these regions was just as bad, if not worse, than those in Carthage, Greece, or the Po Valley. These elements of a sacking, and their occurrences across the Mediterranean, function as our first comparative point, and many were of similar magnitude to the atrocities committed in *Barbaricum*.

As is highlighted above, even by the time of Polybius, the process of *Direpta* itself was the norm following a victorious non-capitulatory siege or the defeat of an army, with certain exceptions dependent on circumstance. In a process the legionaries had long become accustomed to, the loser’s city or marching camps would, in most cases, be subject to at least one, if not all, of the following (select Roman examples of which shall cited for each, though the process can be identified in many other antique cultures’ martial practices):

¹³⁸ Polyb. 10.15.

¹³⁹ For comparison of Livian and Polybian discrepancies on targets of slaughter, Ziolkowski, ‘*Urbs Direpta*’, pp.77-78.

- a) Andrapodisation.¹⁴⁰
- b) Captivation of inhabitants.¹⁴¹
- c) Theft of property and wealth.¹⁴²
- d) Rape of women, children, and adolescents.¹⁴³
- e) Burning of properties or entire town/city/camp.¹⁴⁴

Carnage for Carthage, Game Over for Greece

If old adages are to be believed one could also add salting of the earth to the list.¹⁴⁵ Those outlined above are the most frequent circumstances, but again, it must be stressed that there were inconsistencies to the extent of violence, and oftentimes the more severe of these occurrences were conducted in cities which resisted occupation or were in rebellion. Both points pertinent to a comparison in the treatment of cultures (see Chapter IV). With the examples cited in the footnotes above, it becomes clear the Romans practised wholesale slaughter and enslavement long before Caesar, Augustus, and Claudius launched their northward expansions. Though there are a plethora of examples one could employ in comparison, the violence inflicted upon Hellenistic, Jewish and Phoenician cultures is particularly significant. Here we shall consider the three overarching aspects outlined in Chapter II:

- (1) Mass slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants,
- (2) Devastation of farmland, nature and towns/*oppida*,
- (3) Mass enslavement of conquered peoples.

Table 3: Select Episodes and Inferences of Violence and Insult prior to the Gallic Wars

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Year/s</u>	<u>Culture Group</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Sources</u>
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¹⁴⁰ Dion. 19.13; Liv. 5.21.12-15, 23.17.10, 24.30.4, 24.39.4-7, 25.31.8-14 26.46.10, 27.16.1-9, 28.19.9-18, 28.20.7 31.23.6-10, , 31.27.4, 43.5; Polyb. 1.24.11, 1.39.13 8.3-7; App. *Hisp.* 32, 52, *G.W.* 2.13 *Pun.* 3.15, 15, *Mith.* 6.38, *Paus.* 7.16.8; Zonar. 8.11.10, 8.14.7, 9.10.2, 9.31.5-7; Sall. *Jug.* 91.6-7; Plut. *Marc.* 19.3-4, *Sull.* 14.10; Diod. 23.9 *Caes. BG.* 7.28.

¹⁴¹ Liv. 4.59.75. 22.1 27.16.1-9, 35.40 38.43.4-5 45.34.5; Diod. 23.9; App. *Pun.* 3.15, *Mith.* 6.38 *Paus.* 7.16.7-8. The case of Sulpicius Galba provides an interesting example where thereafter followed a legal battle to free those captured, see App. *Ib.* 59-60; Cic. *Brut.* 89; Liv. *Oxy.* 49.98, *Peri.* 49.17-19; Nep. *Ca.* 3.4; Suet. *Galb.* 3.1; Oros. 4.21.10; Plut. *Cat. Maj.* 15.4; Val. Max. 8.1.2, 8.7.1, 9.6.2.

¹⁴² Liv. 4.59.7-11, 5.21.12-15, 22.20.9, 23.15.6, 24.39.4-7, 25.25.9, 25.40.1, 25.30.12 26.46.10, 29.17.15, 31.23.8, 31.27.4, 31.45.7 & 15, 35.40, 37.32.12-13 45.34.5; Tac. *Hist.* 3.33; App. *Pun.* 19. 127, 20.133; Diod. 23.9. Distribution of said booty even has its dedicated discussion in Polybius, Polyb. 10.16; Paus. 7.16.7-8.

¹⁴³ Liv. 1.9-10 29.17.15; Tac. *Hist.* 3.33; Cic. *Ver.* 2.4.116.

¹⁴⁴ Livy is particularly saturated in cases of arson, see: Liv. 2.62. 10.44.1-2, 22.20.8, 23.15.6, 24.35.1-2, 26.46.10, 28.20.8, 31.23.6-10, 31.27.4, 31.45.12, 38.43.4, 27.16.1-9; additionally, Tac. *Hist.* 3.33; App. *Pun.* 19.12, *Mith.* 6.38; Diod. 23.9, Cass. Dio 69.14.1.

¹⁴⁵ There is, however, nothing substantial in antique writings to support that the land of Carthage was salted following Rome's final victory, see Ridley, R. T. 'To Be Taken with a Pinch of Salt: The Destruction of Carthage', *Classical Philology*, Vol. 81, No. 2, (1986), pp. 140-146.

Sack of Syracuse	213/212 BCE	Sicilian Greek	Troops told to not kill Archimedes during the sack. Indiscriminately killing the populace, the troops kill Archimedes	Livy, 25.31.9-10; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 19. 5-6.
Sack of New Carthage	209 BCE	Phoenician along with, Hispanic and African Mercenaries and subjects	Large scale slaughter and ransacking of the city following capture. Some sources suggest degrees of clemency in the general.	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 5.22-23; Cass. Dio 16.57.42-43; Cass. Dio [Zon.] 16.9; Polyb. 10.15; Liv. 26.47-51; Gel. 7.8.3; Val. Max. 4.3.1; Frontin. <i>Strat.</i> 2.11.5, 3.9.1. Silius. 15.214-250; Plut. <i>Mora.</i> 196b; Aur. Vic. <i>De Vir. Ill.</i> 49.7; Oros. 4.18.1; Eutrop. 3.15.
Sack of Ilturgi	206 BCE	Phoenician along with, Hispanic and African Mercenaries and subjects	Livy tells us the Romans 'slaughtered the unarmed and the armed alike, ... even so far as to slay infants,' before razing the settlement	Liv. 28.20; App. <i>Hisp.</i> 7.32.
Punishment of the Epirots	168-167 BCE	Hellenic and Illyrian	Sacking of numerous cities and the enslavement of reportedly 150,000	Strab. 7.7.3; Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 29; Liv. 45.34.1-7.
Massacre in Lusitania	150 BCE	Lusitanian Celts	Galba massacres a reported 30,000 Lusitanian rebels and sells more into slavery	Cic. <i>Brut.</i> 89; Nep. <i>Cat.</i> 3.4; Liv. <i>Peri.</i> 49.17, <i>Ep.Ox.</i> 48; Vall. Max. 8.1.2, 9.6.2; Suet. <i>Galb.</i> 3.2; App. <i>Hisp.</i> 59-61; Oros. 4.21.10.
Sack/Razing of Carthage	146 BCE	Phoenician, and African Mercenaries and subjects	City is destroyed, reported 50,000 slaves taken. The ruined earth was 'salted'	Polyb. 39.8.6; Cic. <i>Agr.</i> 2.51, 2.87; Diod. Sic. 32.4.5, 32.6-9; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 51.1-5, <i>Ep.Ox.</i> 51.146; Vell.Pat. 1.12.5; Val. Max. 1.1.18; Flor. 1.31.18, 1.32.1; App. <i>Pun.</i> 133; Sall. <i>Cat.</i> 10.1, <i>Jug.</i> 41.2, <i>His.</i> 1.10; <i>Heroin. Chron.</i> 1871; Oros. 4.23.5-6;

				Cass. Dio (Zon) 21.9.30; Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> 33.150.
Sack/Razing of Corinth	146 BCE	Hellenic	When the Romans entered the city they began systematic andrapodisation, wanton destruction followed.	Cass. Dio (Zon) 21.9.31; Cic. <i>Agr.</i> 2.87; Diod. Sic. 32.4.5, 32.27; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 51.6-7, Ep. Ox. 52; Polyb. 39.2; Strab. 8.6.23; Petron. <i>Sat.</i> 50; Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> 34.6, 35.24; Flor. 1.32; Paus. 7.16.7-8; Aur. Vic. <i>De. Vir. Ill.</i> 60; Oros. 5.3.
Sack of Athens	86 BCE	Hellenic	According to Plutarch, 'many say that it (blood) flowed through the gate and deluged the suburb' (Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 14) Large numbers of slaves taken following Mithridatic Rebellion, 200,000 dead and equal enslaved according to Velleius Florus, writing much later dismisses Roman brutality	App. <i>Mith.</i> 8.38-39; Diod. 38.6.1; Eutrop. 5.6; Flor. 1.40.10 Liv. <i>Peri.</i> 81.1, <i>Obesq.</i> 56b; Oros. 6.2.5; Paus. 1.20.4-7; Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 14, <i>Mora.</i> 7/505; Vell. <i>Pat.</i> 2.23.3.
Forced Relocation of Thebans	86 BCE	Hellenic	Thebans forcibly removed from their homes and resettled,	Paus. 9.7.1.
Mithridatic Defeat at Chaeronea	86 BCE	Hellenic/Pontic ['Barbarian'] ¹⁴⁶	War-dead left on the field of battle. Troops left to pillage Boeotia	App. <i>Mith.</i> 10.50-54; Eutrop. 5.6; Gran Lic. 25-26; Oros. 6.2.7; Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 21-26.
Destruction of Ilium	85 BCE	Hellenic	Upon gaining entry into a city which was both loyal to Sulla, as well as the city of a mythical Roman origin story, the General Flavius	August. <i>De.Civ.</i> 3.7; App. <i>Mith.</i> 53; Cass. Dio Frag. 30-35.104; FGrH. 252.a3 Liv. <i>Peri.</i> 83.2, <i>Obesq.</i> 56b; Oros. 6.2.11;

¹⁴⁶ We are told much of the weaponry as well as the contingents were of 'barbarian origin'.

			ordered the town be put to the torch. ¹⁴⁷	Strab. 13.1.27/594.
Ransacking of Greek Temples	85 BCE	Hellenic	In need of financing the civil war Sulla ransacks temples of Apollo, Asclepius and even the Temple of Zeus at Olympia	Diod. 38.7
Pillaging of Asia Minor	Mithridatic Wars	Hellenic	Generals such as Flavius and Flaccus ravage lands and plunder wantonly	Examples include App. <i>Mith.</i> 11.53; Pseud. Aur. Vic. 70.1 Diod. 38.8;
Pompey in Jerusalem,	60s BCE	Jewish	Pompey violates Judaic law and enters the Temple	Liv. <i>Fr.</i> 26a; Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 1.152-153, <i>AJ.</i> 14.72; Tac. <i>Hist.</i> 5.9; Flor. 1.40.30; Euseb. <i>Hist. Ec.</i> 1.6.6; <i>Heiron Chron.</i> 1950; August. <i>De Civ.</i> 18.45
Caligulan Crisis in Judea	38-41 CE	Jewish	Caligula after a series of regional issues and riots, orders a statue in his likeness be erected within the Temple, Gaius died before the Statute was put up	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 18.8
Crucifixion of Rebellious Jewish Peoples	70-71 CE	Jewish	Innumerable Jewish captives crucified	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 5.11.1

Though the list is evidently inexhaustive, the employment of this selection is to provide the reader with comparisons to Tables 1-2 Many entries are focused in the first century BCE to allow the reduction of most variables. Both the troop composition and the zeitgeist of the period are similar enough to allow a detailed comparison for the basis of *direptio* and violence in general. Furthermore, this also allows comparison against the axioms of barbarity outlined in Chapter I. Hellenistic cultures provide a comparison on point A in the list above. As was discussed earlier, the Greeks had their own conceptions, ascriptions, and interactions with the ‘barbarian’, and both the Greeks and Romans deemed themselves superior to those they considered ‘barbarian’. But evidently, Rome did not allow their similar ‘civility’ with the Greeks to prevent the massacres

¹⁴⁷ This city is often referred to by its other name, Troy. Archaeological survey has indicated inhabitation in the Iron Age layer concludes around this period, see Jablonka, P. 'Troy', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Bronze Age Aegean*, edited by Cline, E.H (Online Edition: Oxford Academic, 18 Sept. 2012) with Jablonka, P. 'Troy in Regional and International Context', in *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Anatolia: (10,000-323 BCE)*, Edited by McMahon, G. and Steadman, S. (Online Ed. Oxford Academic Handbooks, 21 Nov. 2012).

detailed above. For point B an obvious comparable nemesis is the Carthaginian example. Though earlier than most of our examples, the extermination policy inflicted upon Carthage in the last war, particularly, has symmetry with the conduct against the *Germani*. The Judaic example serves to provide a comparative piece for the religious aspects of 'barbarian' nature. Both the Druid and Jewish populations famously suffer at the hands of the Romans. Though Caesar is innocent in major persecution of either.

Following an initial comparison of Tables 1-3 (even in the latter's brevity), it appears any distinction between barbarian and non-barbarian mattered for naught to the Romans militarily. Violence is indiscriminately inflicted upon Greek, Gaul, Jewish and German alike; the relevance of the sociological construct was thus superficial. However, further examination complicates initial assumptions. What is striking upon review of all tables in conjunction is that the majority of cases, as with the Athenians, and as with the Eburones, were conducted following a rebellion (or rather resistance), regardless of location or *ethnos*. For the Athenians and Eburones, to continue the example, the violence followed Roman assumption of regional power. Both featured massacres of Romans, both were conducted by a Roman in need of shoring up his wealth and power, and both resulted in a massacre of natives.¹⁴⁸ Even Ariovistus, though not explicitly a rebelling subject, is a disaffected ally whom Caesar saw as betrayer and infringer on other allied tribes. The result of continued disaffection of the Belgae and their military victories, is born of the same sentiment behind the infamous '*Carthago delenda est*', which rings true in Caesar's: 'the race and name of that state (Eburones) may be annihilated'.¹⁴⁹ In modern morality, clearly, resistance to Rome is not an ethical justification for the localized andrapodisation, rapine and plundering which occurred repeatedly, and often even after the acquiescence of opposition. But in terms of the severity of Roman treatment, resistance appears the universal instigator, nonetheless. Even the select examples provided above demonstrate that this was as true for Mediterranean expansion as it was in Northwest Europe, this point, however, shall be addressed in greater detail below. Clearly, attempts at justification for Roman conduct provided in the ancient sources, on the basis of them being superior in morality to any of their 'barbarian' counterparts, should be immediately dismissed.

¹⁴⁸ The Mithridatic wars leading to the sack of Athens were instigated by the Asiatic Vespers, the reported massacre of 80,000-150,000 Roman (and Italian) citizens, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 7; Liv. *Peri.* 78.1; Vell. Pat. 2.18.1-2; Val. Max. 9.2e.3; Memn. 22.9; Plut. *Sull.* 24.4; Tac. *Ann.* 4.14; Flor. 1.40.7-8; App. *Mith.* 22-23, 58, 62; Cass. Dio 31.101, 109.8; August. *De Civ.* 3.22; Oros. 6.2.2-3; moreover, the Athenian siege was long and drawn out, *Direpta* thus too influenced by need and/or desire of legionary frustration exertion. Ambiorix, similar to Arminius after him, orchestrated the slaughter of an unsuspecting legion he had pledged to allow safe passage, Caes. *BG.* 5.24-37.

¹⁴⁹ Aurel. Vic. *De Vir. Ill.* 47.8; Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 15.20; Flor. 1.31; Plut. *Cat. Maj.* 27.1; Cf. Caes. *BG.* 6.34.8.

Furthermore, we are rarely actually told that barbarity, or even the actions of barbarians, is the cause of a massacre, with the exception being Ambiorix.¹⁵⁰ Regardless, the paucity of examples of similar conduct perpetrated by ‘barbarian’ cultures *post-victoriam*, in the historical accounts, offers a point of comparison. In his ethnographic descriptions of the *Germani*, Caesar rather hypocritically accounts how these cultures regard a:

‘...true sign of valour when the neighbours are driven to retire from their lands and no man dares to settle near’

Caes. *BG.* 6.23

This passage acts as a denunciation against the *trans*-Rhenian cultures. As Hornblower robustly suggested, these lines are probably naught but a rhetorical tool employed by Caesar in his propagandic justifications.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, the likely reliability of this testimony is significantly reduced.¹⁵²

Crucially, every other event of barbaric conduct enacted by the Celts and *Germani* are always justified by the Roman authors like Caesar, Tacitus, and Livy; unlike Roman brutality which is often condemned by those same authors.¹⁵³ The significance of this is interesting, as though the ‘barbarians’ are deemed savage and wild, their actions in war are given more substantial justification than that offered to the actions of Romans. Furthermore, various accounts of ‘barbarian barbarity’ highlight commonalities with Roman practice, whilst exposing Roman hypocrisies. Livy tells us of the diplomatic instigation of the war leading to the *Clades Allia*, following Roman depositions:

‘...the Gauls were enraged, as they had every right to be, and returned to their people with open threats of war’

Liv. 5.36.11.

Vercingetorix, Ambiorix and the other rebel ringleaders in the 50sBCE were roused to war for freedom, and more importantly due to the malevolence of the occupying legions.¹⁵⁴ Arminius and his *Germani* were provoked by Varian mishandling of the province.¹⁵⁵ The Boudican sacks

¹⁵⁰ As Riggsby reminds us, Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*, p.215.

¹⁵¹ See n.93.

¹⁵² Allen-Hornblower, E. ‘Beasts And Barbarians In Caesar’s ‘Bellum Gallicum’ 6.21-8.’ *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 2, (2014), pp. 682–693.

¹⁵³ Again, one is reminded of Appian’s commentary on S. Galba, *App. Ib.* 59-60.

¹⁵⁴ As is attested by Caesar himself ‘Gaul was incensed at all the insults experienced since it was brought in subjection to the authority of Rome’ *Caes. BG.* 5.29.4.

¹⁵⁵ Again, we see the Tacitean trope of analysis through the ‘barbarians’ voice, *Tac. Hist.* 4.74.

of Camulodunum, Londinium, and Verulamium were the result of Roman mistreatment in the occupation phases in Britannia. For the queen specifically, we are told of the defilement of her daughters being a chief instigator of insurrection.¹⁵⁶ This highlights another darker facet of *Direpta* that Ziolkowski discusses, a facet the ‘barbarians’ are not reportedly guilty of in Roman texts: the rape of the inhabitants; one of the more horrifying examples of interpersonal violence inflicted upon a defeated populace.¹⁵⁷ It is one of the most animalistic aspects of conflict, and the perpetuation and even weaponization of rape is not unknown in antiquity, examples are all too prevalent.¹⁵⁸ The extent of reference to it is restricted, however, by circumstance. Ziolkowski is of the opinion that the soldiery generally had free reign to commit these horrible acts at their whim, and therefore reporting of it was unnecessary, as it was convention. He cites the infrequency of mentions, and also that those acts reported (particularly in Tacitus) are only there to reemphasize this feature as a norm of the *Direpta*. Ziolkowski caveats the point with the difficult suggestion that ‘more attractive’ victims may have been spared, but as Vikham notes, this is only due to their ‘higher economical value’, thus suggesting more torment and violation in the Roman slave trade.¹⁵⁹ The repeated violations in the case of the Britannia are amongst the historically cited causes for Boudicca’s insurrection, but as a cause of disaffection it was not restricted to the ‘barbarians’. One need only recall the mythologized story where the atrocious act lies as subtext in the motivation for the kidnaping of the Sabine women to see its innateness in Roman military culture.¹⁶⁰ Physical violation was so prevalent across antiquity that sexual assault was not even restricted to troops against foe: there are numerous examples of hierarchical sexual exploitation by the Roman officer corp.¹⁶¹ Again Roman interpersonal sexual violence is evidently indiscriminate.

With regard to a lack of discrimination on religious grounds, it is apt to consider Tacitus’ description of the battle site of the *Clades Variana*, as it provides another example of perceived ‘barbarian barbarity’ and Roman hypocrisy. In his account of Germanicus’ beholding the site, there is little that stands out as exceptional in comparison to the horrors entered into the above tables:

¹⁵⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 14.31, *Hist.* 4.14, *Agri.* 15?

¹⁵⁷ Ziolkowski, ‘*Urb direpta*’, pp.72-73; see also Vikman, E. ‘Ancient Origins: Sexual Violence in Warfare, Part I’, *Anthropology & Medicine*. Vol. 12. (2005). Pp.21-31.

¹⁵⁸ Cicero, *Phil.* 3.31; Reeder, C.A. ‘Wartime Rape, the Romans, and the First Jewish Revolt’, *Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Period*, Vol. 48, No. 3, (2017), pp. 363–85.

¹⁵⁹ Ziolkowski, ‘*Urbs Direpta*’, p.78; Cf. Vikman, ‘Ancient Origins: Sexual Violence in Warfare’, p. 28.

¹⁶⁰ Livy reports the women were taken to sustain the population, see *Liv.* 1.9-10.

¹⁶¹ *Dion.* 16.4.1-3; *Cic. Mil.* 4.9; *Val. Max.* 6.1.10-12; *Plut. Mar.* 14.3-5.

‘...hideous to sight and memory... In the plain between were bleaching bones, scattered or in little heaps, as the men had fallen, fleeing, or standing fast. Hard by lay splintered spears and limbs of horses, while human skulls were nailed prominently on the tree-trunks. In the neighbouring groves stood the savage altars at which they had slaughtered the tribunes and chief centurions. Survivors of the disaster... told how here the legates fell, there the eagles were taken... They spoke of the tribunal from which Arminius made his harangue, all the gibbets and torture-pits for the prisoners, and the arrogance with which he insulted the standards and eagles’.

Tac. *Hist.* 1.61.

The most striking scenes were the nailed Roman skulls on the tree trunks and that Arminius had torture-pits for the prisoners. In reality, most of the other things described are universal in their occurrence, rather than any particularly ‘barbarian’ trait. The ‘savage altars’ are more likely a *Tropaion*, at which the enemy officers were executed. Moreover, the severing of heads was a practice not unknown to the Romans.¹⁶² It appears Tacitus’s offence came principally from the neglecting of battlefield cleaning which is demonstrated by his lengthy description of the dead strewn across the land from their rout. The other major offence taken was the disrespect offered to the legionary *Aquilae*. Yet these Tacitean protests against Arminius’ conduct are again, as is the author’s habit, hypocritical. If we consider the Republican period there are many examples of similar conduct such as Chaeronea, Sulla’s sack of Greek temples, and Pompey’s offences in Jerusalem. All show Roman perpetration of comparable actions to the Arminian forces. Examples from the Current Era which are closer to the accounts of Tacitus reinforce the notion of a pervasive and unanimous Roman religious ignominy.

Despite the oft repeated claims about Roman respect for other religious traditions, in practice this is less apparent.¹⁶³ The Roman’s little regard for Judaism, and their resultant conduct, was as heinous to the Jewish people, as were the actions of the *Germani* to the Roman Eagle to Tacitus. It should be remembered that around two centuries after Pompey’s early insults, upon visiting the ruins of Jerusalem left in the wake of the ‘Great Jewish Revolt’ (66-73 CE), Hadrian constructed a new city on the site, *Aelia Capitolina*. Yet, this was not enough for the man who is remembered in history for his grand construction works, insult was further added upon the

¹⁶² Marius being an obvious example see App. *BC.* 94; interestingly Caesar to practices this, see Caes. *BG.* 5.58; Cf Caesar’s hypocritical indignation of Ptolemaic practice against Pompey; Caes. *BC.* 3.103-104; Liv. *Peri.* 112.4; Vell. *Pat.* 2.53.2-4; Quint. 3.8.55-57; Plut. *Brut.* 33.3-5, *Pomp.* 77.1-80.2; Flor. 2.13.52-55; App. *B.Civ.* 2.89-90; Aelian. *NA.* 12.6; Cass. Dio 42.3-9; Aur. *Vict. Vir. Ill.* 77.9; Oros. 6.15.28-29.

¹⁶³ Satterfield provides an excellent example of the discrepancies of practicing the *Pax Deorum*, Satterfield, S. ‘Livy And The Pax Deum’, *Classical Philology*, Vol. 111, No. 2, (2016), Pp. 165-76.

Flavian holocaust and Judaism at large when the emperor then decided to construct a temple dedicated to the 'one supreme god', Jupiter.¹⁶⁴ One may suggest that the Judaic comparison is here negated because of their low status in the eyes of the Romans, yet the actions of Sulla demonstrate the Romans extended sacrilege to Greek communities also. In reality, to the Romans, every culture and their religions were subordinate, as is demonstrated aptly by Rutledge's work.¹⁶⁵ Any religious theme in criticism in texts merely demonstrates Roman supremacism rather than any particularly targeted animosity. Moreover, the universality of religious abuse, and the flagrant disregard for the *Pax Deorum*, indicates that as with all aspects of a Roman conquest, this too was indiscriminate.

The last point to emphasize in the universality of Roman abuse is the removal of arms following capitulation. As we have seen, the severity of Roman treatment *post victoriam* is determined by the severity of the resistance to their power both prior to and during the occupation. Tribes who quickly surrendered or allied themselves with Rome were treated better than those who offered more resistance.¹⁶⁶ A commonality, however, between the two is a certain policy which Rome would regularly exercise upon subjugated territories regardless of *ethnos*: the removal of arms. This practice receives specific, yet brief, attention due to the attachment of weaponry to identity for both Celtic and Germanic peoples. Northern European relation with weapons spreads throughout the first millennia in a plethora of mythologies.¹⁶⁷ It is an enduring trope within the Celtic Arthurian legends, with a sword serving as a king-maker either from its removal from the stone or by being given by "strange women lying in ponds".¹⁶⁸ Of course these legends are subject to regional and historical differences, with multiple variations, but the sword is pervasive throughout; be it the Irish mythology of Caladbold, the Welsh Caledwigh or the British traditions with Caliburnus or Excalibur.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Cass. Dio 69.12.1.

¹⁶⁵ Rutledge, S.H. 'The Roman Destruction of Sacred Sites', *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 56, No. 2, (2007), pp. 179-95.

¹⁶⁶ For example the case of the juxtaposed nature of Augustus' Alpine conquests, see Matthews, L. 'A Man-Made Humanitarian Crisis: Augustus and the Salassi' in *Ancient Disasters and Crisis Management in Classical Antiquity: Monograph Series 'Akanthina' no. 10.* edited by Naco del Hoyo, T., Riera, R. and Gómez-Castro, D. (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2015), pp.99-120; cf. Cornwell, H. 'The King Who Would Be Prefect: Authority And Identity In The Cottian Alps', *The Journal Of Roman Studies*, Vol. 105, (2015), pp. 41-72.

¹⁶⁷ A succinct summary is provided in Rubio, 'Singing The Deeds Of The Ancestors' pp. 172-173; see also Kristiansen, K. 'The Tale of the Sword - Swords and Swordfighters in Bronze Age Europe.' *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (2002), pp. 319-332.

¹⁶⁸ Palin, M. *Et al. Monty Python and the Holy Grail*, (1975).

¹⁶⁹ Puhvel, M. 'The Deicidal Otherworld Weapon in Celtic and Germanic Mythic Tradition', *Folklore*, Vol. 83, No. 3, (1972), pp. 213-214.

Tacitus recounts how the Germanic peoples would ‘transact no business... without being armed’ and how arms were these people’s sign of coming of age.¹⁷⁰ But, for the Germanic world, the socio-ideological relationship, to this author, is exemplified by the revered war dance.¹⁷¹ The prominence of the aforementioned *Barritus* in Germanic cultures, both in Tacitus’ time through to the coming of the *Vikingr*, demonstrates the centrality and the pervasiveness of a weapon in the Germanic mind.¹⁷² Aspects of the dance and weapon reverence persist even now in the 21st century, the relationship between many Americans and their guns is overt and needs no example, and in Britain people are not unknown to go bare-chested and raise their own modern *Barritus* at points of confrontation.¹⁷³ Yet regardless, even if the Romans were aware of the symbolic importance of weaponry to these cultures, it meant for naught to the occupiers. Removal of arms is a logical practice in hostile territory, removal of weaponry severely (if not completely) reduces chance of successful resistance. The practice was quite simply a formality of antique warfare; with the Romans practising it elsewhere, like their enemies did.¹⁷⁴

In martial conduct then and throughout the initial phases of Roman occupation and assimilation, it appears there is little distinction in treatment on the basis of ethnicity. The legions, for reasons explored below, were indiscriminate in their rapacity. When one suspends the mythologisation of the ‘barbarian’ nemesis and compares the actions of commoners in Greece or Gaul, modern concepts of barbarity noted in Chapter I align more so with Roman legionaries than those who bore a ‘barbarian’ aesthetic depicted by the Ancients and Pop Culture, it was the Legions who were more often pillaging hordes. Ziolkowski, concluding his study into the *Urbs Direpta*, compounds this notion of the Roman’s ‘barbarity’. His verdict was damning of these *Romani*: to him, the sacking ‘was the suspension of any form of control from above,’ he discredits the notion of Polybian order, and discounts order from *Direptio* entirely. During *Direptio* ‘the soldiers held the power of life and death’ free to rape, pillage, and slaughter indiscriminately.¹⁷⁵ From the analysis of the few examples discussed in this chapter and the

¹⁷⁰ Tac. *Germ.* 13.

¹⁷¹ Even the supreme God Wotan/Odin partook in this ritual, as is shown by *Hávamál* 155.

¹⁷² Speidel, *Ancient Germanic Warriors*, pp. 110-126 provides an insightful discussion into the pervasiveness of this cultural keystone.

¹⁷³ A more astute and fascinating study into this continuity in Germanic cultures is provided by Walsdorf, H. ‘Nudes, Swords, and the Germanic Imagination: Renditions of Germanic Sword Dance Narratives in Early Twentieth-Century Dance’, *Dance Research Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2015, pp. 27-50.

¹⁷⁴ Rubio, *Singing the Deeds*, p. 173; Following Martínez, J.A. *La aplicación del Derecho de Guerra durante la expansión romana (200-167 a.C.): análisis territorial y estudio comparativo*, (Mallorca: Universitat de les Illes Balears. 2015), pp. 176-178. For example of other’s employment see the Livian account of the sack of Victumulae by Hannibal Liv.21.57.13-14.

¹⁷⁵ Ziolkowski, ‘*Urbs Direpta*’, p. 90; others also note the assumption of *Direpta* and the Roman acquisition of booty by the army, Sage, M. M. *The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook*, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008) pp.280-212; Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 43.

previous, this seems a truism across the Roman timeline. The *Germani* and the Celts were not unique in their treatment by Caesar and his legions; one must concur with the opinion of Raaflaub that the Caesarian behaviour is merely 'typical of his expanding state and his society.'¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Raaflaub, K.A. 'Caesar and Genocide: Confronting the Dark Side of Caesar's Gallic Wars', *New England Classical Journal*, Vol. 48, Iss. 1, (2021), p. 73.

Chapter IV: A Lust for Barbarian Booty:

“Gold in Gaul you spent in dalliance, which you borrowed here in Rome”

Suet. *Jul.* 51.

Having thus established that wanton massacre, pillage, and slaughter were universally enacted; we must now consider the factors operating for Caesar and others of his class which diminished their thresholds for extreme violence. In order to truly establish the barbarian factor in brutality, it is pertinent to assess the other causalities of the extreme force beyond simple ethnic distinctions. Like all things of such a nature, causes of brutality and variations in extremity are multifaceted, yet there are two overarching causal themes throughout all the instances listed in the tables above: finance and intimidation.


A Capital Crisis:

On the surface, a discussion on finances may seem out of place in a study of this kind, yet the wealth accumulation in the higher echelons of Roman society is significant with regard to Caesar directly and has another striking impact on the Army's conduct. The importance of the fiscal dimension of the Roman world, discussed in the pages below, reveals an integral cause for the evolution of the Empire, and demonstrates that rapacity in Gaul and Germania was inevitable in Caesar's day. The Roman Republican regime in the first century BCE was heavily entrenched within a cycle of competition by the elite for wealth and power; wherein, expansion of Roman territory increased power within the aristocratic factions, while simultaneously eroding political integrity and state stability. This process is termed by some notable historians the 'Cycles of Wealth Accumulation and Elite Competition' (see Figure 3) yet the malaise is recognised in many contexts, and scholars are unanimous on this general cause of decline, even if they disagree on the nuance.¹⁷⁷ These nuances are less relevant here, what is accepted is that

¹⁷⁷ Morley, *The Roots of Roman Imperialism*, pp. 33-35 For a *Longe Durée* approach to this phenomenon in the later Republic see, Beard, & Crawford, *Rome in the Late Republic*, pp. 12-24. For an analysis of the cause of problems see, de Ligt, L. 'The Economy: Agrarian Change During the Second Century', in *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, Edited by Rosenstein, N. and Morstein-Marx, R. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 590-660. On the Early developments see, Crawford, M, *The Roman Republic*, 2nd Ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 24-25. On the issues of wealth and the Republican decline, Frederiksen, M. W. 'Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 56, (1966), pp. 128-41. On morals, debt and decline, Shaw, B.D. 'Debt in Sallust', *Latomus*, Vol. 34, No. 1, (1975), pp. 187-196; with Levick, 'Morals, Politics, and the Fall of The Roman Republic', pp. 53-62; Lintott, A. W. 'Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic', *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (1972), pp. 626-38. On the issues regarding Land distribution, Brunt, P. A. 'The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 52, (1962), pp. 69-86; Morato, J. 'Praecipitia in Ruinam: The Decline of the Small Roman Farmer and the Fall of the Roman Republic', *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1, (2016), pp. 1-28; On the impact of financial gain and political stability prior to Caesar's career a survey is offered by Barlow, C.T. 'The Roman Government and the Roman Economy, 92-80 B.C', *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 101, No. 2, (1980), pp. 202-19.


following the fall of the Punic threat, factors developed and accelerated the disintegration of most aspects of the Republic, politically, morally, economically, military and socially. The operating cycle of competition was predicated on the hostile acquisition of wealth abroad and internally, in order to gain political elevation in the *Cursus Honorum*. Electoral corruption thus became embedded through individuals aiming for the realisation of their political ascension. In the process of ascension, elites fractured into competing factions, each competing for their own supremacy. Consequently, this factionalism caused by the accumulation cycles itself entrenched an additional cyclical decline (see Figure 4). Thus, the political scene Caesar had entered was one of fierce competition, his ascendancy corresponding to the climax of these cycles. The decay was relatively latent prior to the second century BCE; but following the assassination of the Gracchi the entrenched systems had fully metamorphosed into a symbiotic vehicle of state disintegration. The several civil wars and near misses that had already happened before Caesar's career serves to highlight the calamitous culmination of this cycle. Caesar himself had been embroiled in some conflicts, he was the nephew of Marius, a key instigator of civil war, and his relationship entangled him in the quarrels.¹⁷⁸

Figure 3: Cycles of Wealth Accumulation, Following Morley [Morley, *The Roots of Roman Imperialism*, pp. 33-35]




¹⁷⁸ On Caesar during the Sullan crisis Taylor, L.R. 'The Rise of Julius Caesar', *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1957), pp. 10-18; for his rise in general, Canfora, L. *Julius Caesar: The People's Dictator*. (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 1-60.

Figure 4: Cycles of Factionalism Phases I and II



Phase I



Phase II

The cycle of wealth accumulation began in earnest following the Punic Wars when territorial acquisition became common. For the factional cycle, Phase I developed in the lulls of war following the sack of Carthage, when Rome could idle in 'greed, luxury, and personal

ambition.¹⁷⁹ Following the calamitous year 133 BCE, however, Phase II begins appearing more often and increases in its speed of revolution. Moreover, with the *Cursus Honorum* always being generally restricted to the wealthy of Rome, by the First Century BCE and with the extended cycle of accumulation, wealth had concentrated into a minimal number of participants of the political game and accordingly competition became fiercer and fiercer. Caesar, began his climb when his faction, the *Populares*, were in opposition, and though he was reportedly near bankruptcy, he secured the financial backing needed and on the back of these loans rose through the ranks to the position where he could recuperate monies owed.¹⁸⁰

Each cycle's significance ties into each other, yet here the emphasis is placed on the accumulation cycle. The point to consider is the existence of the wealth cycles in ancient Rome potentially underpinned the financial motivations for Caesars' conquests, and slaughter allows for easier plunder, and enslavement makes for enormous gains. It is a common notion that Caesar desired the Gallic provinces in order to accumulate the wealth needed to pay his debtors, those who funded his political career (and to gain the *gravitas* of victory).¹⁸¹ Financial gain, as Erskine reminds us, had long been a motivator of conflict in ancient Rome, and fiscal gain was a near certainty after victory.¹⁸² If this is to be accepted, then the excessiveness of Caesar's plundering appears increasingly unattached to the 'barbarian' stereotype and due in certain degrees to his need for wealth and for his own aggrandizement. Moreover, as the campaign also served to garner political capital, the continuation of his glory hunting thus predicated extensive and continuous benefaction of his troops through the acquisition of wealth. Caesar found this wealth for his donatives first in Gaul, second in his defeated political opponents.

The notion of Caesar's indebtedness in ancient literature is espoused chiefly by Suetonius, who tell us of the lavish borrowing by Caesar while in pursuit of the consulship.¹⁸³ By his death, he had accrued a personal wealth of reportedly 100,000,000,000 denarii: To put this in context, prior to the wars in Gaul, a Roman legionary could expect an annual salary of around 120

¹⁷⁹ Levick, 'Morals, politics and the Fall of the Roman Republic', p.53; Lintott notes how competition with Carthage had 'compelled the Romans to be politically united, Lintott, 'Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic', p.633.

¹⁸⁰ Frederiksen, 'Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt', pp. 130-131; Lintott forwards an integrating study on both the effect of bribery in the regime and the legalisations enacted to prevent it. These must be considered alongside Caesarian discourse as the dictator operated in the climax of this milieu Lintott describes, see Lintott, A. 'Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 80, (1990), pp. 1-16.

¹⁸¹ Goldsworthy, A. *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, (London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp.185-186.

¹⁸² Erskine, *Roman Imperialism* pp.42-47.

¹⁸³ Suetonius is saturated with mentions of Caesar's fiscal issues and avarice, notably, 13.1, 18.1, 46-47, 51, 54; *CF. App. B. Civ.* 2.13 who only mentions Caesar's debt in passing.

denarii.¹⁸⁴ This reported wealth, however, comes with a major caveat; much of that wealth was accrued during the Civil Wars, not the Gallic Wars, as is indicated by the notable case of the legionary mutinies in 47 BCE.¹⁸⁵ Their defiance of orders, and Caesar's willingness to accommodate them, clearly indicates a lull in income and/or a financial depression following the Gallic campaign. The accounts tell us that this was in part due to demand for back pay and also for release from service (along with the grants attached to return to civil life).¹⁸⁶ If these accounts have any veracity then, the request for back pay demonstrates that his most cherished legion, at least, had not received pay for an extended period. Evidently, the decrease in conflict following Vercingetorix's capitulation placed Caesar in yet another position of fiscal difficulty, but nonetheless, there is plenty of evidence of bounty prior to the lull.

Contemporaries make it somewhat difficult to discern the extent of Gallic War profits compared to Civil War profits, yet it is not entirely impossible. If we are to first to consider the testimonies of the biographer Suetonius, we are given indications in which there may be a measure of truth to be found. While in Gaul, he tells us Caesar:

‘...pillaged shrines and temples of the gods filled with offerings, and oftener sacked towns for the sake of plunder than for any fault. In consequence he had more gold than he knew what to do with and offered it for sale throughout Italy and the provinces at the rate of three thousand sesterces the pound.’¹⁸⁷

Suet. *Caes.* 54.2

Furthermore, we have the marching song of his troops during the triumphal procession which is said to have included the lines at the opening of this chapter. Evidently, Suetonius' writings suggest that throughout his Gallic campaign Caesar was financially reckless and ever finding himself in deficit.¹⁸⁸ To an extent, these testimonies are corroborated. Whether Caesar paid 100 million sesterces or not, he had facilitated the capital to allow him the purchasing of the site for

¹⁸⁴ In the tradition of Brunt who reconstructs testimonies of mainly Pliny, Polybius, and Tacitus; Brunt, P. A. 'Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, Vol. 18, (1950), pp. 50-71, particularly p. 5; with Morris, C.R. and Pecquet, G.M. 'The Calculus of Conquests: The Decline and Fall of the Returns to Roman Expansion', *The Independent Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (2013), pp. 522-525. Coincidentally, pay was raised to 225 Denarii after Caesar's victories cf. Watson, G. R. 'The Pay of the Roman Army. The Republic', *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (1958), pp. 115-117; who has pre-Caesarian pay at 75 Denarii.

¹⁸⁵ On the fiscal causes of this revolt see, Chrissanthos, S.G. 'Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.' *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 91, (2001), pp. 63-75.

¹⁸⁶ Liv. *Per.* 113.6; Frontin. *Strat.* 1.9.4; Tac. *Ann.* 1.42; Plut. *Caes.* 51.2; Suet. *Caes.* 70.1; App. *B.Civ.* 2.92-94; Polyean. 8.23.15; Cass. Dio 42.52-55.

¹⁸⁷ Approximately ½ of the going price according to Rolfe, Footnote 51 for Suet. *Caes.* 54.2 *Suetonius: The Lives of the Caesars*.

¹⁸⁸ One must note that some of Suetonius' sources were hostile to Caesar, such as A. Pollio, Suet. *Iul.* 56.4.

his forum in 54 BCE.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, Frederiksen recalls how once he began profiling in Gaul, he was able to better affect Roman politics.¹⁹⁰

If Pliny is correct, Suetonius' attachment of Roman financial scandals to Caesar are at best mere exaggeration.¹⁹¹ For example, the incident of gold being stolen from the Capitol is attributed by Suetonius to Caesar, yet Pliny testifies a date of 52 BCE, abdicating Caesar of this crime at least. As always, fiscal depravity is most probably a victim of Suetonian over embellishment or sheer erroneousness. If one considers other stories recounted in the *Divus Iulius*, such as the 'pearl issue,' one, like Morstein-Marx, would do well in leaning towards avoiding the Suetonian testimony: as always, the *Twelve Caesars* remains a difficult source.¹⁹² Despite the issues presented by Suetonius the causality, the vehicle, and the effect of Caesar's wealth accumulation is still detectable and immensely significant. As Morstein-Marx makes note, however, Suetonius' work not only seemingly contradicts itself, but it also contradicts the testimonies of Caesar. Caesar's actions are generally justified by himself as retaliatory actions both on his and his army's whim, yet this is entirely expected from propagandic works.¹⁹³

To leave discrepancies on authorial commentary aside and return to Caesarian expenditure we can determine with more certainty, here our attention should turn to the relationship and accounts of military finance and brutality. Roman military campaigns were not cheap, and in order for Caesar to further his fame militarily, he had certain financial obligations to attend, all of which were financed through his rapacious acquisitions on the field. Dealing with military pay is, like most things, a speculative game to an extent, despite the wealth of literary accounts for the entire timeline, the documentary evidence is fairly restricted to the Principate onwards, not the Republic.¹⁹⁴ Regardless even with speculation, and due hesitation, testimonies can provide us with a measure of understanding of the financial demands Caesar faced alongside his political outgoings.

Most obvious is the impact of legionary pay, as we have already addressed legionary bonuses. Caesar's initial army alone would have demanded significant expenditures without the growth of the legions in the subsequent years of his campaign. As Caesar pressed his wars, so too did

¹⁸⁹ Plin. Nat. Hist. 36.103; Suet. Caes. 26.2; Cf. Cic. Att. 4.16. where it is reported at 60,000.

¹⁹⁰ Frederiksen, 'Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt', p. 130.

¹⁹¹ Again one must consider the potential of anti-Caesarian sources being employed by Suetonius, though there is difficulty in identifying Suetonius' sources, see Wardle, D. 'Cluvius Rufus and Suetonius', *Hermes*, Vol. 120, No. 4, (1992), pp. 466-482.

¹⁹² Suet. Caes. 50.2; Morstein-Marx, R. *Julius Caesar and the Roman People*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 616-621.

¹⁹³ Caes. BC. 2.29-33, 6.3, 6.6, 7.1-3, 7.11, 7.28.

¹⁹⁴ For a summary of the sources, Alston, R. 'Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 84, (1994), pp. 113-120; with Watson, G. R. 'The Pay of the Roman Army', pp. 113-20.

he levy more and more troops, going from an initial four legions at the opening of his tenure to ten at the terminus. If we are to work with the lowest of possible estimations, ten legions of 3,500 (accounting for attrition of war), at 75 denarii per annum, the legionary core of his army alone required a minimum of 2,625,000 denarii yearly, this when not accounting for variations in rank pay and also surplus costs. This number does not account for the vast sums required to maintain a force of this size, and the various Auxilia corps in his employ. These burdens alone in normal circumstances would put pressure on a general's ability to be able to finance their troops, but Caesar's expansion, both of his manpower and his sphere of power, increased this demand exponentially.

Once on campaign, this basic pay is overshadowed by the other expenditures of war. Donatives to troops at this point were part and parcel of campaigning, and triumphal laudation and the desire and expectation of *Direptio* was as entrenched as the cycles fortifying it. Throughout the accounts entered into the three tables above, Roman avarice, elite and common, prevails in the narrative as the instigator of rapacity.¹⁹⁵ Booty was the norm of war, and little stopped Romans from getting their booty. As was discussed in Chapter III, to the legionary it mattered little whether it was a Greek, Punic or Gallic house they plundered, gold is gold, flesh is flesh.

On top of the troop pay and donatives, so too did the general have to consider feeding his vast legions. This issue we have seen prevails in the Caesarian narrative and the seizures of materials and sale of slaves certainly contributed to this financing. As we are reminded by de Blois, Caesar had faced mutiny in 48 BCE because the troops, in part, feared a recurrence of food shortages experienced in Gaul.¹⁹⁶ To get a measure of the consumption of a legion, though accounting for peacetime troops, Davies' suggestion allows a proportional representation of the demand. He suggests that a legionary could consume around a third of a tonne of grain stuffs a year, again working with minimal numbers of 3500 in a legion, in 58 BCE this would amount to around 6,993 tonnes, and for the ten legions in 52 BCE, Ca.11,655 tonnes.¹⁹⁷ Even with due caution, this is a considerable amount of food required, and given modern French fields of grain are around seven tonnes per hectare (which one would suppose is far higher than in antiquity), the amount of seizures demanded outweigh any consideration for the enemy one is taking it from.¹⁹⁸ The

¹⁹⁵ See Cagniard, 'The Late Republican Army (146-30BCE)', pp. 114-117.

¹⁹⁶ de Blois, 'Army and General in the Late Roman Republic', in *A Companion to the Roman Army*, Edited by Erdkamp, P. (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), p. 209.

¹⁹⁷ Following, Davies, R. W. 'The Roman Military Diet' *Britannia*, Vol. 2, (1971), p. 123; Cf Eckstein's suggestion a legion of 4,800 in peacetime could consume around 6 tonnes a day, thus 13,410 per annum for six legions at that size, 21,900 for ten, Eckstein, A.M. *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 64, No. 1, (2000), pp. 182-184.

¹⁹⁸ United States Department of Agriculture. 'France: Heavy Spring Rains and Summer Drought Negatively Affect 2018/19 Crops', Commodity Intelligence Report (September 4, 2018).

size of this in translation may seem superficial, but one must remember that in antiquity Gaul had nowhere near the same extent of agriculturally available/cultivated land.

One may suspect that the intensity of violence would increase as his campaigns progressed and his expenditure began to include consolidatory spending (increasing demands on surplus, lumber, food, etc). However, as Table 1 Episodes of Violence in the Gallic Campaigns demonstrates, the intensity of violence was fairly consistent. This however can be rationalised considering Caesar's initial debt and massive expenditures in the early and middling years of the campaign noted above. If we are to accept at least that Caesar was in moderate to major debt at the opening of his time in Gaul, along with the realisation of the exponential costs of running a militarily active *Provincia*, there are thus multiple factors facilitating the need for *major to exponential* acquisitions of wealth. Even if we disregard Caesarian debt, the other financial factors in his 'defence of the Roman state' present a situation where facilitation of monies is paramount, and the Roman way was stealing materials and persons, and selling them. Caesar's campaigns, regardless of their motive, *demand exponential* asset seizure. Insults and grievances against any particular target, or any consideration of ethnicity, to diminish the threshold for extreme violence, pale in consideration of this explicit need for monetary gain.

Again Ziolkowski's work becomes pertinent. The soldiers had come to expect monetary gain and the freedom of *Direptio*. This expectation was also compounded by the 'Cycle of Wealth Accumulation', as though the cycle saw increasing wealth and power in the upper echelons, it in turn led to poorer living conditions for those in the lower echelons, which thus allowed for socio-economic factors diminishing the soldier's TEV, in addition to established precedent.¹⁹⁹ These lower echelons made up the ranks of the Sullan legions, as did they the Caesarian ones, and there is a clear correlation in the extent of privation and acceleration of the socio-political cycles in question. As is pointed out by Crutchfield and Wadsworth, the correlations between poverty and violence are axiomatic in the modern era, and impoverished troops are more inclined to voracious action.²⁰⁰ It is not difficult to suppose this correlation existed prior to the development of modern war and society. If this phenomenon is pervasive, however, and considering the extent of poverty of the troop at the time, then the motivation for the brutality

¹⁹⁹ On conditions for the poor in Rome during the republic see, Patterson, J.R. 'The City of Rome', in *A Companion to The Roman Republic*, Edited by Rosenstein, N. & Morstein-Marx, R. (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), pp. 352-364; Whittaker, C.R. 'The Poor', In *The Romans*. Edited by Giardina, A. [trans. Cochrane, L.G. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)], pp.272-299; Cf. Scobie, A. 'Slums, Sanitation and Mortality in the Roman World', *Klio*, Vol. 68. No. 2 (1986), pp. 399-433; Yavetz, Z. 'The Living Conditions of the Urban Plebs in Republican Rome', *Latomus*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (1958), pp. 500-17.

²⁰⁰ Crutchfield, R.D. and Wadsworth, T. 'Poverty and Violence', *International Handbook of Violence Research*, Edited by, Heitmeyer, W. and Hagan, J. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2003) pp. 67-82.

inflicted against the populaces of Gallia, Britannia, Greece, Jerusalem, and Germania appear even more as a result of financial gain and not racial prejudice. The turmoil in Roman politics itself, and the competitive cycles playing out, thus exacerbated atrocity, seemingly more so than prejudice. The financial aspects of the Roman system predicate violence regardless of target. Racial prejudice does remain a common theme in the literature, yet given the supremacy of the elite, this was more likely a literary disguise for the avarice of themselves and their colleagues.

Intimidating Insurrectionists:

Though it can be determined that the intrinsicity of avarice in the legions was a constant, the general's 'allowance' of the slaughter is pertinent too. We must not neglect another major universal factor diminishing a general's threshold of violence, one which lies separate from any fiscal motivation, as nothing exists in isolation. Roymans is of the opinion that the dichotomy between Roman and 'barbarian' cultures presented in the classical literature, translated onto the battlefield. His argument is valid. Roymans stresses the violence attributed to the northern regions of Gaul is directly correlated with the Roman perceptions of the Germanic peoples.²⁰¹ He points out that, of the five major atrocities he identifies as committed by Caesar in his time in Gallia and Germania, four were acted upon the Germanic peoples settled in the region. However, due to the wider definition of violence in the criterion adopted in chapters two and three, Table 1 shows a near equilibrium in violence against the two culture groups. Yet the table does not actually negate Roymans' suggestion. This is because a higher proportion of Celtic peoples and Celtic land occupied, would suggest that a higher proportion of significant massacres and violations would be visited upon them. However, the quantities presented in Table 1, and those in Roymans' paper, demonstrate that because of the smaller scope of operations in the Germanic regions, empirically, these 'wilder barbarians' actually suffered a higher proportion of violence than their southern cousins.

There were nonetheless other factors at play accounting for the treatment of these Germans beyond any supposed racial prejudice or financial motive, notably their continued resistance. The Helvetii aside, every other belligerent is portrayed as either a rebel or a resistor, in the case of Ariovistus. Moreover, the *Britani* aided rebellious Gauls, thus allowing for the loose justification for these campaigns. Here we should consider Cicero's work, where he offers us a definition of two forms of war: that for defence and that for glory, with the former demanding lesser brutality.²⁰² Considering this contemporary ideology, the relevance of wars against the

²⁰¹ Roymans, N. and Manuel F.G. 'Reconsidering the Roman Conquest: New Archaeological Perspectives', *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, Vol. 32, (2019), p. 420.

²⁰² Cic. *De Off.* 1.33-40.

Celts and Germans being framed as defensive, rather than for glory, cannot be understated; one should not forget that each belligerent actor in the Commentaries instigates – in Caesar’s portrayal – a defensive war.

Interestingly then, in *de Bello Gallico*, seldom do peoples suffer extreme violence, nor even are they deemed ‘barbarian’ until they rebel or insult Rome.²⁰³ Chronological contextualization of the events in Tables 1-3 demonstrates that extreme Roman brutality is generally enacted during the central phases of the process of Roman assimilation, not usually the initial ones, those stages where we see provocation from the latent violence of an occupying legion.²⁰⁴ Harris’s determination that ‘one of the most striking features of Roman warfare is its regularity—almost every year the legions went out and did massive violence to someone—and this regularity gives the phenomenon a pathological character’ should here be recalled.²⁰⁵ This pathological character he addresses is all too apparent to the tribes in the north, as it is elsewhere within the Empire’s eventual limits. And as Dyson rightly notes, during Roman campaigning in the north and the resulting regional exploitation, there is thus always a resulting insurrection.²⁰⁶ Yet this is true whether it was the Greek East or the Celtic West. We can consider this almost universally axiomatic: rebellion was seemingly as inevitable as Roman violence.²⁰⁷ With the events discussed in the prior pages, it is not a stretch to consider a subsequent native massacre axiomatic also (in the north and across all dials of a compass). The use of violence, then, seemingly relates in great part to a continuation of shows of Roman strength, with them manifesting their ‘pathological character’ to terrorise and intimidate subjects, in attempts to deter future resistance.²⁰⁸

A desire to set examples and to discourage defiance is not only an understandable diminishing factor in a general’s TEV, but one also relayed throughout Roman historiography. Caesar himself recounts how his early victories had earned the supplication of Germanic chieftains and later terror tactics kept the Gauls subdued.²⁰⁹ Hirtius too provides a good example:

²⁰³ See Chapter V for Caesar’s employment of the term.

²⁰⁴ By no means is this offering justification for the genocidal dictator: indiscriminate violence is equally abhorrent as targeted violence.

²⁰⁵ Harris, W.V. *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B. C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 50-53.

²⁰⁶ Dyson, S.L. ‘Native revolts in the Roman Empire’, *Historia: Zeitschrift Für alte Geschichte*, Vol. 20, No. 2/3, (1971), p. 239.

²⁰⁷ Even In Italy we have the revolts of the Falisci; endless struggles with the Samnites and Etruscans, the defections during the second Punic War; the revolt of the Fregellae and the Social War.

²⁰⁸ See Dench, E. *Empire and Political Culture in the Roman World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 105-133.

²⁰⁹ Caes. *BG.* 2.35, 5.54.

‘Caesar... being under no fears of being thought to act severely from a natural cruelty... if several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their rebellion might be the more conspicuous.’

Caes. *BG.* 8.44.

Josephus, as a further example, recounts the slaughter of deserters to deter other troops from fleeing.²¹⁰ Indeed, Diodorus tells us directly:

‘Those whose object is to gain dominion over others use courage and intelligence to get it, moderation and consideration for others to extend it widely, and paralyzing terror to secure it against attack’

Diod. *Sic.* 32.2.

The opening of Diodorus’ Book 32, from which this passage is taken, offers one an intricate analysis of the dichotomy of Roman clemency and terrorism, with the author making explicit links between Roman depravity and the terrorizing motivation behind it.²¹¹ Taking of towns and harrying territory in aims of deterrence of further resistance is seen often in Livy, and he alludes to its popularity in antiquity, directly in a Hannibalic context, (27.39.11-13), indirectly in the suppression of classes in the Greek context, (34.27), and the Etruscan employment in early Roman expansion (6.10).

One of the most infamous acts of Roman intimidation of rebels and dissenters is known throughout the Western world, regardless of one’s knowledge of the Empire itself: the crucifixion. Cicero was rather unfavourable of the practice.²¹² Nonetheless, the tactic was pervasive at least in the first centuries BCE and CE. The most notable (secular) occurrences being that of Spartacus’ slaves and the Jewish rebels in the Great Jewish Revolt.²¹³

Understanding of the Roman war machine’s literary accounts and the actions they detail, be it massacre in a city or crucifixions along the *Via Appia*, Romans frequently employed depravity as deterrence. One need only consider the practice of decimation, the role of the *Triarii* in the early legions, or the fear of the Centurion to see this intimidation internally; factors which no

²¹⁰ Joseph. *BJ.* 6.111.

²¹¹ Particularly Corinth and Numantia, Diod. *Sic.* 32.4.4-5.

²¹² This indignation was, however, in the context of the punishment of a Roman citizen, see Cic. *Ver.* 2.5.169-170.

²¹³ For Spartacus, App. *B. Civ.* 1.120; Oros. 5.24.8; for the Jewish rebels, Joseph. *BJ.* 5.11.1.

doubt impacted the psychological frame of mind of the legionaries.²¹⁴ The sources all demonstrate the relationship between Roman displays of strength and insurrection, and resistance to their supposed deserved dominance. Polybius recounts 'how it is a peculiarity of the Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main strength'; it is hard to disagree with this suggestion.²¹⁵ In all areas Roman 'strength' is pervasive, and it had to be so, to maintain an empire of whose footprint was in many regards extortionary. Luttwark's analysis of power and force demonstrates the importance of Roman terror and their continued supremacy, noting the psychological impact of Roman strength on both the *Romani et Peregrini*.²¹⁶ Pacification by peaceful means was always generally an afterthought.²¹⁷ As with Corinth and Carthage nearly a century earlier, the more extreme massacres were demonstrations of the Roman capacity of 'making a point'.²¹⁸ And when states continued in their resistance, it led to annihilation for any transgressor, regardless of race.

Caesar's justifications, considered alongside the intrinsic avaricious dynamics within the Senate and the army; the 'Roman peculiarity' of displays of strength in all things; and the chronological occurrence of extreme violence means that, even if there existed racial prejudice, its relevance was subsumed by these other mitigating factors. If we leave racial prejudice aside, we can determine that both the Seubi and the Helvetii threatening Roman and *amici* territory, along with Caesar's immediate need for slaves and booty, led to depravity in this first year serving as both A) the foundation of wealth recuperation for Caesar, and B) a message to surrounding tribes of what resistance to Rome offers. Caesar reports that, with the subjugation of the Aquitani and Ventii by P. Crassus, all Gaul was at peace and under Roman dominion, any further military action was thus framed as insurrection. This framing seemingly served to justify further wealth acquisition and harsher messages to potential rebels through the employment of extreme violence.

²¹⁴ On internal intimidation, Lutz, B.J. and Lutz, J.M. 'Political Violence in the Republic of Rome: Nothing New under the Sun' *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (2006), pp. 491–511; Messer, W.S. "Mutiny in the Roman Army. The Republic." *Classical Philology*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1920, pp. 158–75 Coulston, J. 'Courage and Cowardice in the Roman Imperial Army', *War in History*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2013), pp. 7–31.

²¹⁵ Polyb. 1.37.

²¹⁶ Luttwark, E. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981) PP. 3, 195–200.

²¹⁷ This can be seen in most provinces especially post 100BCE. Gaul and Britain both had delayed developments, their formative years seeing little investment or heavy-handed governorship. For this phenomenon in Britain, Bowden, W. 'The Urban Plan of Venta Icenorum and Its Relationship with the Boudican Revolt', *Britannia*, Vol. 44, (2013), pp. 145–169; Fulford, M. 'Nero and Britain: The Palace of the Client King at Calleva and Imperial Policy towards the Province after Boudicca', *Britannia*, Vol. 39, (2008), pp. 1–13; Gambash, G. 'To Rule a Ferocious Province: Roman Policy and the Aftermath of the Boudican Revolt.' *Britannia*, Vol. 43, (2012), pp. 1–15; in Gaul see, Woolf, G. *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 112–135.

²¹⁸ Both cities coincidentally saw reinvestment 100 years after their sack under Julius Caesar.

Reconciliation with Roymans' suggestion, that violence was amplified by Roman xenophobic representation, then becomes somewhat more complex upon consideration of the imperial policy and milieu outlined above, all of which provide an abundance of factors diminishing a TEV, which are arguably more significant. For each massacre, one cannot neglect the myriad conscious and unconscious influences in diminishing thresholds of violence, along with those substantiating its occurrence. We must consider A) the cycles predicating the need for expansion and acquisition, B) the financial needs of the general, C) individual soldiers' financial salary and normal expectation of extra booty, D) the logistical costs of the army, E) military prestige required by the general conducting the campaigns, F) the cost of the projection of prestige propaganda, G) duration and intensity of resistance, and H) extreme intimidation tactics employed to deter new or further resistance.

As highlighted in the above chapters, racial distinctions mattered a negligible amount to the rapacious legionary once battle closed; the same appears to be the case for the *Imperator*. Caesars' allowance of violence is little different to that of Sulla or Scipio. However, as mentioned above, there remains the interesting pattern in his employment of the term 'Barbarus'.

Chapter V: Discrepancy and Dichotomy

‘It is well known that none of the German nations inhabit cities; or even admit of contiguous settlements. They dwell scattered and separate, as a spring, a meadow, or a grove may chance to invite them.’

Tac. *Ann.* 16.

As we have seen, militarily, the conceptualisation of ‘Barbarian’ as one all-encompassing designation had relatively little significance in Roman military treatment, especially in the first century BCE. Other factors operated which were more significant in causing their brutality, most pertinently, Roman avarice and display of power. There does, however, remain fascinating nuances in terminology, wherein the importance of Roman conceptualisation of the ‘barbarian’ mattered significantly in imperial relations with northern peoples, and the barbarians more generally. There is an undeniable ambiguity *and* transience in ‘barbarism,’ which directly affected imperial policy more so than military doctrine, and this is illustrated through the obscurity of its definition and the contradictions in its ascription. One needs only consider the Ubii to see that the Romano-Germanic relationship is more complex than simple racial abhorrence. As we see above, Germanic genocides were of a retaliatory nature, not an ethnic one. If Caesarian genocide was racially motivated, why would he continue good relations and moreover hire a personal guard of ‘wild animals’?²¹⁹ This author doubts he would. It is clear his systematic exterminations were tribally focused, not ethnically. This does not mean, however, that variations in perceptions did not exist, but they existed within a nexus of nuance.

Of the modern historiography, attention must be given to the works of Almagor who, addressing issues with the terminology of ‘barbarus’, identifies three common uses in the works of Strabo which can generally, but not universally, be attributed to other authors of the epoch. He suggests these uses are to emphasize divisions in parties on the basis of their ethnos, language and/or culture.²²⁰ Almagor is correct to an extent, but in *De Bello Gallico* there is greater nuance to the term. At the dawn of Caesar’s invasion there existed a clear stratification in the nature of the ‘barbarian’, this is explicit in regard to the northern cultures. Initial readings of the *Commentaries* suggest the Germans appear to the Romans as *more* barbarian than the *less*

²¹⁹ This German guard eventually developed into the *Germani Corporis Custodes* of Augustus. These were formed, disbanded, and reformed throughout the Principate before finally ceasing by the Tetrarchic military reformation, le Bohec, *Imperial Roman Army*, p. 23.

²²⁰ Almagor, E. ‘Who is the Barbarian? The barbarian in the Ethnological and cultural taxonomies of Strabo’, in *Strabo’s Cultural Geography*, Edited by Dueck, D, Lindsay, H. Potthecary, S (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 43.

barbaric Celts. Discrepancies between the treatment of Gauls and Germans is seen throughout Caesar's narrative, and even throughout the reign of the emperors, yet the situation is much more interesting upon deeper consideration. With these discrepancies, Almagor can only take us so far in our understanding, despite his astute interpretation. The remaining pages of this thesis will be dedicated to exploring this interesting phenomenon: the fluidity and complexity of Caesar's 'Barbarian'. By building on themes discussed throughout this paper one can discern complexities in definition in both Caesar's time and the early principate. However, our understanding of the true extent of Roman cultural demarcation comes not from Rome's military sphere, as we have seen that this conduct is always indiscriminate. Rather, it is in policy, in the aristocratic world, and in the organization of the Imperial system itself, that we see nuances in treatment: treatment dependent on ethnicity, thereby highlighting the complexity of the term 'barbarian'.

The Barbarians of *De Bello Gallico*

Allen-Hornblower, in her 2014 article discussing Caesar's description of Germans, highlights a pertinent aspect which establishes the premise of ethnic stratification: Gaul is a land of fields and milder tempered folk suitable for the yolk; whereas *Germania Magna* is a land of mystical beasts, and commentary on Germanic tribes often refers to Germans as animals unfit for domestication. Certainly, the imagery evoked in the Roman ethnographies is one of an untamed and untameable land and peoples.²²¹ A historian may, however, erroneously interpret this as diatribe against the *Germani* as a whole, perceiving it as naught but xenophobia. If we observe the intricacy of the uses of barbarian in Caesar's work, we are presented with a more nuanced picture:

²²¹ Allen-Hornblower, 'Beasts And Barbarians In Caesar's 'Bellum Gallicum'', pp. 682-93; The former ethnographic tangent is offered prior to his first *trans-Rhenian* campaign; *BG.* 4.1-4 provides the first of such accounting of the Seubi, Ubii, Usipetes and Tencteri, and the latter during the second, 6.11-20 provides a description of the Gauls, 6.21-28 provides the secondary description of the culture and topography and Germany, 6.29 Caesar accounts his withdrawal to Gaul.

Table 4: Uses of *Barbarus* forms in *De Bello Gallico*

<u>Celti</u>			<u>Germani</u>		
<u>Reference</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Form</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Form</u>
Against the Seduni and Veragri	3.6.2	<i>Barbarorum</i>	Ariovistan Campaign	1.31.5	<i>Barbari</i>
Venetian Campaign	3.14.4	<i>Barbaris</i>		1.31.13	<i>Barbarum</i>
	3.14.11	<i>Barbari</i>		1.33.3	<i>Barbaros</i>
	3.15.4	<i>Barbaris</i>		1.40.9	<i>Barbaros</i>
				1.44.9	<i>Barbarum</i>
			News of Caesars victories disseminating across the Rhine	2.34.1	<i>Barbaros</i>
Aquitaine Campaigns	3.21.2	<i>Barbari</i>	Against the Usipetes and Tencteri	4.10.4	<i>Barbaris</i>
First British Expedition	4.21.9	<i>Barbari</i>	Bridging the Rhine	4.17.10	<i>Barbaris</i>
	4.24.1	<i>Barbari</i>	Incivility of the Morini	4.22.1	<i>Barbari</i>
	4.25.1	<i>Barbaris</i>	Ambiorix uprising	5.34.1	<i>Barbaris</i>
	4.25.2	<i>Barbari</i>		6.10.2	<i>Barbaros</i>
	4.32.2	<i>Barbaris</i>		6.29.2	<i>Barbaris</i>
4.34.5	<i>Barbari</i>				
Aimed at the Senones during the Ambiorix uprising	5.54.4	<i>Barbaros</i>			
<i>Hirtian entries:</i>					
Post-Alesian Revolt	8.8.1	<i>Barbarorum</i>		6.34.6	<i>Barbaris</i>
	8.10.1	<i>Barbaris</i>		6.35.6	<i>Barbari</i>
	8.10.4	<i>Barbarorum</i>		6.37.7	<i>Barbaros</i>
	8.10.4	<i>Barbari</i>		6.37.9	<i>Barbaris</i>
	8.14.3	<i>Barbari</i>		6.39.3	<i>Barbari</i>
	8.15.1	<i>Barbari</i>		6.40.8	<i>Barbaris</i>
	8.15.6	<i>Barbari</i>		6.42.2	<i>Barbaros</i>
	8.29.2	<i>Barbarorum</i>			
	8.32.2	<i>Barbaros</i>			
	8.36.4	<i>Barbarorum</i>			
			<i>Hirtian entries:</i>		
			Further campaigns against the Eburones	8.24.2	<i>Barbarorum</i>

On the surface, if we discount the Hirtian entries, the above table suggests the notion of *Germani* being more ‘barbarian’ in the eyes of the author, as Caesar predominantly employed the classification in reference to both cis and trans-Rhenian *Germani* in greater frequency.²²² Of the 31 entries by Caesar, only 12 are employed in relation to Celtic tribe; moreover, the frequency of ascription to Celtic tribes is in reference to Britannic and Atlantic tribes, not the eastern Gauls. Initial interpretation of Table 4 then suggests a notion of proximal effect. The closer to Rome peoples were, directly correlated with tribal civility: the Germans, western Gauls and Britons, being further away, were more ‘barbarian’ than the likes of the Averni and Aduai. Antique cultures perceived climate as a deciding factor, with the central Mediterranean

²²² Throughout the rest of the works, Caesar mostly refers to these peoples by their Latinised tribal names or an individual’s names. There are a few instance of other offensive terminology, though these are infrequent. A common term often used alongside *Barbarus* is ‘*homines feros*’ for example, see *BG.* 1.31, 1.33, 1.47, with, 2.4, 4.10.

producing those most adequate for civilisation with the effects lessening as one proceeded beyond the centre.²²³ The climatological factors do affect the appearance of cultures granted, but it has little effect on civility. Proximal effect, however, could see the dissemination of Mediterranean cultural practices and traditions through trade to the peripheral cultures, this, in the Roman perception, reduced barbarity and increased civility.²²⁴ Attention should be drawn to the dating of artefacts presented in Chapter I (see, Examples of Germanic and Celtic Arts and Iconography): sophisticated craftwork in earlier years came from Gaul, whereas Germanic examples appear only later in the timeline, corresponding to their closer border with Rome.

However, the employment of the term 'barbarian' in practice is more complicated and cannot be distilled to proximal effect alone. The first applications of *Barbarus* in *De Bello Gallico* are in reference to Germanic peoples, not the migratory Helvetians whose narrative opens the *Commentaries* and who share imagery with the migrations of old. The account of the prelude and conflict with Ariovistus in the later passages of Book 1 illustrates this complexity, and examination demonstrates that the barbarian ascription is not due to his Germanic origin, but his rejection of Rome.²²⁵ On the one hand we are told that legionaries and officers under Caesar became fearful of a potential Germanic conflict on account of their ferocity, martial prowess, and stature.²²⁶ This potential mutiny is moreover framed as being fostered amongst the unbloodied urbanites, before disseminating into the wider legions. Here the modern reader is presented with the evocation they may relate to the 'barbarian' caricature. Yet on the other hand, in placation of the near mutinous soldiers, we are given a wealth of insight into the contradictory nature of Ariovistus' 'barbarism'. During the German's speech, Caesar remarks on how in his consulship, Ariovistus became an *amicus*, an 'ally' and 'friend', of Rome.²²⁷ In the initial passages of the Ariovistus narrative, Caesar's references to the Germanic king are appropriately amicable, with Caesar repeatedly telling his reader that Ariovistus would be rational enough to understand the appropriateness of, and accept, the terms offered to him. As Caesar acclaims, 'Ariovistus was not such a barbarian'.²²⁸ Regardless of Caesar's unknowable true intentions with the Cis-Rhenian *Germani*, his narrative presents the reader with the suggestion

²²³ Herod. *Hist.* 4.16-4.32, Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 7.1-2, 2.18.190; Vitruvius. *De arch.* 6.1; Halsall, G. *Barbarian Migrations*, pp.45-47.

²²⁴ We are told this is the case for some British tribes by Diodorus, *Diod. Sic.* 5.22.1. Moreover, one must remember, as pointed out by Woolf, origins of the oppida in southern Gaul correspond to the period of Hellenic, Punic and Etruscan exploration in the sixth and seventh centuries BCE; there is thus the possibility of external and therefore proximal influence on gallic infrastructural development too, Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, pp. 107-108

²²⁵ For the entire campaign; Caes. *BG.* 1.30-54 Cass. Dio 38. 34-50; Oros. 6.7.6; Plut. *Caes.* 19; sufficient modern narratives offered in Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, pp. 224-232.

²²⁶ Caes. *BG.* 1.39-41; Liv. *Peri.* 104.2; Frontin. *Strat.* 1.11.3, 4.5.11; Plut. *Caes/* 19.3-5; Flor. 1.45.12; App. *Gal.* 4.21; Cass. Dio 38.35-45; Quint. 3.8.19-21; Oros. 6.7.6-7.

²²⁷ The alliance was established around 59BCE; Caes. *BG.* 1.35.2, 1.40.2; App. *Gal.* 4.21; Plut. *Caes.* 19.1.

²²⁸ Caes. *Gal.* 1.44.9.

that Caesar aimed for continued friendly relations. Unfortunately for the two parties and whatever respect existed, there also existed an underlying superstition of each other (according to Caesar), and the deputation failed, what follows is accounted above. With the deterioration of the situation, the recurrence of denigration in order to justify Caesarian attack is not too outlandish a suggestion. Especially when one considers the fact that the employment of the term by Caesar himself follows a consistent trend: tribes became 'barbarians' either when they were in uprising, or when Caesar was in need of justification.²²⁹

Table 4 also demonstrates a lack of the term 'barbarian' in the dialogue during the initial Belgic campaigns. An omission the significance of which cannot be understated. Caesar acknowledges a large predominance of the peoples in this region are Germans, even the Eburones are mentioned, but he does not frame any of these as barbarians in these passages. This is the campaign with the weakest of *Casus Belli*, with only rumours of a Belgic confederation justifying Caesar's infringement.²³⁰ Interestingly, the massacre at the conclusion of the conflict is relayed as normal Roman practice, not as an attempt at extermination. To the deputations at Aduatica:

'...Caesar replied that he would save their state alive rather because it was his custom than for any desert on their part, if they surrendered before the battering-ram touched the wall... He would do, he said, what he had done in the case of the Nervii and command the neighbours to do no outrage to the surrendered subjects of Rome.

Caes. *BG.* 2.32

Caesar, before framing these peoples as *Barbari* in the later books, here seeks their incorporation within the *imperium* as *Germani* and Celt. The subsequent massacre is framed as a result of their faux surrender, which then led to the common Roman practice of andrapodisation, not as a consequence of their *ethnos*. This notwithstanding, Caesar complements the tenacity of the defenders: 'The enemy fought fiercely, as was to be expected of brave men'.²³¹

After this campaign Caesar considered Gaul a subject and thus, we see the spike in the term's usage after 2.35. Relayed in the latter half of this book, Caesar frames his southwestern campaigns as the suppression of the insurrections of the Aquitaini and Venetian tribes, who are thus, to Caesar, 'barbarians'. The Ambiorix affair initiated the next frequency of 'barbarian' ascription and then the word disappears from Caesar's repertoire. The omission of the term in

²²⁹ The trend of alteration of view in light of situational change is not restricted to Caesar, Halsall, *Barbarian Migrations*, p. 56-57.

²³⁰ Caes. *BG.* 2.1-3.

²³¹ Caes. *BG.* 2.33.

book seven is an interesting point for consideration. As although Caesar's protagonists are in 'rebellion', they are not labelled 'barbarian' at any point in the *Commentaries*. The tone throughout the narrative suggests a measure of respect for Vercingetorix and his skills in strategy and tactics.

If we return to Roymans' inquiry on the 'barbarian' factor in these events, and consider its use by Caesar in his works, the caricature that appears in the latter parts of the *Commentaries* further suggests that racial or ethnic delineation was mere literary tropology. For example, one can easily accept Allen-Hornblower's conclusion that the contrast in Books Four and Six in style of description are designed as a justification for aborting the campaign in a wild land. The suggestion that Caesar's digressions on ethnography may serve only to demonstrate that Germania and its wild lands are not worth conquest, is entirely reasonable.²³² Yet acceptance of this point does not prove the hypothesis that *Germani* were, as a whole, *Barbari*. Moreover, neither does it suggest a justification for a racially motivated genocide, rather the contrary: it merely serves to demonstrate the literary devices of his propaganda, not his ethnic biases.

The Hirtian entries of Book 8, though not written by Caesar, are important here as this book frames the Celts as 'barbarian' as they rise in insurrection in the final years of the campaign, while their northern cousins are mostly termed *Germani*. The exception being the single mention of 'barbarians' Caesar feared would raid from Germania. This is understandable, however, considering Ambiorix, and/or various Eburones remnants who escaped across the Rhine. Regardless, what Hirtius again demonstrates with his overwhelming Celtic ascription, alongside the multiple examples in the Caesarian books, is that the use of the term 'barbarian' was often merely denigration of present opposition. More so employed when a speaker or writer aimed to dehumanize this opposition. This is even the case when the 'other' is not of typical 'barbarian' origin. Though not Roman, the panegyric of Evagoras by Isocrates is a fine example, remembering, of course, that Greeks deemed all non-Greeks as 'barbarian'.²³³ Regardless, the judicial battle between Demosthenes and Aeschines exemplifies the use of the term for offence, as modern readers would not recognise the characters termed as such 'barbarian'.²³⁴ The term barbarian is not employed until any particular tribe offered stiff resistance, and as Allen-

²³² Roymans, *Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping*, p. 456 see footnote 54; this notion is also identified in Tacitus, Tan, Z.M. 'Subversive Geography in Tacitus' *Germania*', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 104, (2014), pp. 181–204.

²³³ Isoc. *Eva*, 9.66.

²³⁴ see Demosthenes *On the False Embassy & On the Crown* with, Aeschines' *Against Timarcus, & On Embassy*, particularly; Demos. *Fals. Emb.* 19.305, 19.308; Cf. Aeschin, *Emb.* 2.183; this debate also highlights the inference of shame associated with the accusation of being Barbarian, the imagery conjured at times are those of childish bickering's, best represented by the words of Pee-wee Herman, "I know you are, but what am I?".

Hornblower points out, the negative descriptions increase in the latter stages of the *Commentaries*, the point after which Caesar determined them ‘subjects’.

The emerging reality is that the term ‘barbarian’ is naught but defamation, denigration, and/or derision. Traits attached to the term discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis are, of course, markers for social differentiation as a theoretical construction. In practice, it more often presented caricatures of reality, blatant fabrications, subjective determinations, and even traits which Hellenes and Romans themselves possessed. Caesar, in the majority of cases, never used the term unless there was causality, no tribe is immediately ‘barbarian’ until they challenge Roman dominance. Upon this resistance, in most cases, often corresponding to locations and governmental sophistication, the term ‘barbarian’ is used repeatedly. Unfortunately, Caesar relays no justification for his methodology of ascription, and we can only speculate as to why eastern rebels, unlike those of Belgica and the Atlantic coast, were not ‘barbarian’. Considering the location of these tribes we see the notion of proximity, but variability in the term’s deployment by Caesar shows it was not as simple as proximal determination, as the Eburones are only described as such following their rebellion. Yet the lack of the term in Book 7 suggests that proximal effect still mattered. From Caesar’s usage, it is evidently difficult to discern the nuance.

A Scale of Barbarism:

The variable use of terminology, such as Vercingetorix’s avoidance of the ascription of barbarian, demonstrates the complexity of the concept of ‘barbarism’ in the period, and to Caesar specifically. The transience of the Roman ‘barbarian’ is important and to understand the proximal notion of barbarity, recognition of this transience is paramount.²³⁵ Though not directly conveyed in the passages, it is pertinent to recall that many of those in Caesar’s drafts were the Roman descendants of Brennus’ Celtic barbarians, these now civilized folk fought under the Emperor against their trans-alpine kin. Their being closer to Rome had accelerated their social development to the point of successful integration, and so they now engaged in *Direptio* under an *Aquila* and were not barbarians anymore.

To compound this notion, the Romans acknowledged that to the Greeks they themselves were once deemed barbarian; a Greco-Roman writing in the Principate had no issue attributing barbarism to the Romans, even through a Greek voice: Pyrrhus, in first witnessing the *Romani*,

²³⁵ On the transience of the Roman ‘barbarian’; Dench, E. *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples from the Central Apennines* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.11; Marshall, E. ‘Constructing The Self and Other in Cyenaica’, in *Cultural Identity in the Roman Empire*, Edited by Berry, J. and Laurence, R. (Taylor & Francis Group, 1998), pp. 49-63.

is attributed an all too pertinent quotation: "The discipline of these Barbarians is not barbarous".²³⁶ Again, one must remember that variations in usage was applicable in Caesar's time, as is demonstrated by his contemporary Cicero:

‘...Scipio: “Now tell me, was Romulus a king of the barbarians?”’

‘Laelius: “If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid he was; but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans.”’

‘Scipio: “For the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race (gens)”’

Cic. Rep 1.58.

Whether or not the speakers accept Greek notions, they are presented as being all too ready to contemplate Roman barbarism. This, in itself, is telling. Without a transient element in barbarism, the mere suggestion that Romans may have been barbarian themselves would be an egregious proposition. Yet it is not received as such, and they go on to resolve Romulus as not barbarian. This entire passage presents the modern reader with an interesting contradictory notion. The argument brought forward by Cicero's Scipio is that, because 600 years was not that long ago, as they are not barbarians in the second century BCE, they cannot have been barbarians in the eighth. The contention arises earlier in the discussion, with Laelius' remark that 400 years of state growth is “Hardly enough to bring it to maturity”.²³⁷

The import of this, within the context of the entire discourse, is the demonstration that the Roman perception of political evolution versus the transience of barbarism is both ambiguous and juxtaposing. On the one hand, Cicero is rationalizing them as not barbarian as they are not too far removed from contemporary Romans in culture, but on the other, he is inadvertently insinuating they have barbaric traits. In a character's voice, we are told that the Romans of the time themselves were still ‘immature’. This immaturity in the context of anacyclical reasoning is that the infantile stage of the process is being under kingship, but this is juxtaposed with Romulus' people not being barbarian. In direct contradiction, however, with their kings and in their primitive anacyclical state; northern peoples *are* barbarian. As Anacyclosis is presented as a natural cycle by its ancient proponents, it affected all peoples, not just Greeks or Romans specifically.

²³⁶ Plut. *Pyr.* 16.5; see also *Cic. Rep.* 1.37/58.

²³⁷ *Cic. Rep.* 1.58

Even in Greek social theory, there were those who argued that being ‘barbarian’ was not a permanent unchangeable state of being. When not an insult, ‘barbarism’ is, as Isocrates and Thucydides conceived, a state but a precursor to civility.²³⁸ Reconciling this with the Ciceronian dialogue is difficult, yet one must understand that, to the Romans, ‘barbarian’ was an even more complex notion than to the Greeks.

There is no definite, recognized barbarian, nor was the transience ever effectively demarcated. Despite all the occurrences of the ‘barbarian’ in classical literature discussed in this thesis, we are never presented with a universal form: ‘a barbarian is X, Y, and Z.’ The only definite is that all the factors informing the term are *indefinite*. The word, unlike modern denigration based on race, was dynamic, fluid, malleable: a device to be manipulated to fit the usage of the user, not any certain classification. The only other near certainty is the universality in the perception of them having kings, which only reinforces transience when considering antique perceptions of Anacyclosis. The sub-human aspect of the ascription is constantly undermined by the ability of barbarians to be more ‘civilized’ than others, though in practice determinations of civility are often equally ambiguous. Regardless of the discrepancy in markers of civility, the transience of barbarism to Rome was evidently certain: it could have been no other way without the genocidal suppression of so-called barbarian peoples. How could Cassius Dio describe the ancestors of his Celtic senatorial colleagues as such, without an unspoken acceptance that ‘barbarism’ was not a static state of being? Again, why would Caesar and his heirs hire a bodyguard of ‘animals’ who were as uncontrollable as Seneca suggests?²³⁹ These questions are difficult to rationalize if one continues with the modern perception of barbarism or, moreover, applies an element of stasis to the term.

This transient conceptualization is demonstrated throughout *De Bello Gallico*. Brown’s discussion of the account of P. Aquitanus puts forward the suggestion that, in its construction, Caesar’s aim was ‘not only to condemn German treachery and justify Caesar’s vengeance but to redeem Gallic weakness and honour the role of Gallic cooperation in the struggle against barbarism’.²⁴⁰ His argument is robust and the notion of a civilized (or more civilized) Gallic race is clearly demonstrated throughout the Caesarian narrative. Not only can one follow Table 4 to see this pattern of framing in a larger scale - with the obvious omission of the term’s usage for closer Celtic tribes - there are other inferences throughout the books. The early observation by

²³⁸ In Thucydides’ opening remarks, he posits a notion that even the *Hellenes* were barbarians at one point, deserving no discerning appellation, see Thuc. 1.3.

²³⁹ Sen. *De Ira*. 2.15: describes Germans as wild animals.

²⁴⁰ Brown, R.D. ‘A Civilized Gaul: Caesar’s Portrait of Piso Aquitanus (‘De Bello Gallico’ 4.12.4-6)’, *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 67, No. 3, (2014), pp. 391-404.

Ross of Caesar's plaudits of his opponents must not be forgotten. All too often Caesar juxtaposes his slanderous treatment of the barbarians with smatterings of flattery and admiration, as in the case of Ariovistus.²⁴¹

The case of the Ubii too serves as a prime example of the complexity of Roman barbaric perceptions. In 6.10 clear demarcation is made between the two Germanic tribes in question, one being barbaric, while the Ubii were 'more civilized', as such the former were labelled barbarians, the latter were not. In the *Gallic Wars*, it is clear that the Gallic people generally are one more suitable for incorporation within the empire; the Germanic peoples whose culture and lands were unsuitable and populated with fantastical beasts were less so. This differentiation is relatively secure, as it is related within the *Commentaries* itself:

'(The Ubii) ...are somewhat more civilized than the other folk of the same race, because their borders touch the Rhine and traders visit them frequently and... have grown accustomed to Gallic fashions.'

Caes. *BG.* 4.3.²⁴²

The importance of the above passage cannot go understated, for herein we are given yet another indication of the complexity of the 'barbarian' and how the term acted as a differentiation between cis and trans-Rhenian cultures. Although we have determined that barbarian-as-Caesarian-tropology is usually a response to resistance, the continuing complexity of the term and its societal demarcation, though ambiguous, remains apparent. If we put aside the idea that the Ubii were not barbarian because they offered no resistance, this passage refers again to the notion of proximal effect: the tribe, being closer than many other groups, were more civilized and therefore not barbarian. It is reasonable to consider that the Gauls, living in cities and having greater intertribal connectivity and trade networks, along with greater adoption of Mediterranean culture, were generally less barbarian and closer to Roman notions of the civilized than those without these advances, and this is demonstrated by the omission of the word in book seven of the *Commentaries*. Ubiian emulation of these practices, and their supplication to Rome likewise, elevated them in the Roman mind; whereas the closer Suebi, and their continuation of trans-Rhenian culture, alongside their supposed insults of Rome, negated their proximal civility and substantiated their barbarity in the Caesarian accounts. The Belgic Germanic peoples, though at first not barbarians, were also emulating the cultural practices of

²⁴¹ Ross, J.H. "In Behalf of Caesar's Enemies." *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 8, (1939), pp. 449-460.

²⁴² *CF.* Caesar. *BG.* 6.10.

their Celtic neighbours but later offered stout resistance, which explains the frequency of their ascription as 'barbarian' in the middle books.

Conquering the Concept

What is equally fascinating is how this transient conceptualization manifested in Roman policy of conquest and incorporation. For both Julius and Augustus Caesar, distinctions of barbarity would become a buffer to their expansions. In the small passage from Caesar, above, the interpretation of barbarism saw Gaul receive trade investment where Germania did not. After his fateful rebellion, Arminius was little different to Vercingetorix: initially somewhat victorious, then at various points defeated by the Romans. And Tacitus at least claims that like Gaul after its insurrection, Germania was re-subjugated.²⁴³ But *Germania Magna* did not receive the effort of reconsolidation that the *Tres Galliae* had. Whether or not proximity had any effect, Gallic systems of government and its burgeoning sophisticated infrastructure provided a system from which Rome could usurp power. Germania, on the contrary, inhabited by myriad fractured tribal structures with less-to-no levels of what Rome perceived as sophistication, needed greater investment to bring the region out of its pre-determined primitivity. From the accounts of ancient authors, the picture is presented that Germania, in order to be incorporated into the Empire must be tamed. Why it was *not*, is an interesting topic with considerable relevance here.

A prevalent argument as to why Rome ceased occupation in Germania is the damage done by Arminius.²⁴⁴ However, there are other, stronger reasons for the withdrawal that suggest that Arminius was of little concern in the decision, and our emerging dichotomy in civility between Gaul and Germania bears greater significance.²⁴⁵ First to point out is that the Romans were not

²⁴³ Woolf is too of the opinion that Tacitean commentary in this section of the *Annals* suggests Germanicus' aims were the recovery of Germania Magna, not just repudiation. Woolf, G. "Cruptorix and His Kind.: Talking Ethnicity on the Middle Ground." In *Ethnic Constructs in Antiquity: The Role of Power and Tradition*, edited by Derks, T. and Roymans, N (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009) p. 207.

²⁴⁴ On the fortification of the Rhine, see Tac. *Ann.* 2.7; On the suggestion the Clades instigated Rome's withdrawal, Bordewich, M. 'The Ambush That Changed History', *Smithsonian Magazine*, (2006), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-ambush-that-changed-history-72636736/>, [accessed 29/03/2023]; this is a misnomer espoused in the academic field also, for example, see Vasile, L. "Clades Variana' and 'Postliminium", *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 50, No. 4, (2001), p. 496; Johnson, *The Dream of Rome*, pp. 5-21; Wilcox, P. 'Germanics and Dacians', in *Rome and Her Enemies*, edited by Penrose, J. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005), p. 202; Mata, K. 'Of Barbarians and Boundaries: The Making and Remaking of Transcultural Discourse', in *Romans & Barbarians Beyond the Frontiers: Archaeology, Ideology & Identities in the North*, edited by Sanches, S.G. and Guglielmi, A. (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2017), p.8; these examples are drawn from minor notes within alternate studies, Wells goes further and dedicated full attention to this notion, see Wells, P. S. *The Battle that stopped Rome*, (London: Norton Publishing, 2004).

²⁴⁵ One is inclined to agree with Heather's suggestion Arminius only won a 'fluke victory' which by no means could impact Roman imperial trajectory, Heather, P. *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 55.

averted by a mere loss, nor several. Losing three legions paled in comparison to Cannae, Arausio and Carrhae, only the latter of which led to Roman retirement from the campaign. One could make the counter argument that, of the three examples, only Carrhae occurred during a foreign campaign of potential occupation. Cannae occurred during the Hannibalic invasion of Italy; Arausio during the Cimbrian migrations, and as such the suggestion could be made that the Romans did not have the choice of withdrawal, only capitulation or continuation. Yet to accept this argument one would need to disregard many similar occurrences. Whilst in Gaul and Britain, there was no great ambush, nor loss of three legions in one, there were equally hazardous events. The storms of the English Channel and damage to the Roman vessels did not deter further attempts on the island. The massacres in Asia and Genabum did not discourage consolidation of Greece nor Gaul. Though Caesar understandably is hesitant in recounting the true extent of Gallic scorched earth tactics, he nonetheless in offhand comments mentions the dire state of attrition to his forces.²⁴⁶ Even the damage done to the Caesarian forces during Vercingetorix's rebellion did not inhibit the pugnacious *Imperator*.

Moreover, as can be seen by the subsequent victories in Germania, the *Clades Variana* only stalled the Roman consolidation. Consolidation steps are explicitly seen in the last years of Germanicus's vindictive campaigns, with trans-Rhenian territory receiving fortification.²⁴⁷ Would Germanicus order this exertion of effort if he knew of his imminent withdrawal? What was the point of establishing fortified routes deep into a province without aims of continued action in the area? Why not instigate a process of border deforestation and devastation and focus on the establishment of the future *Limes*? It is hard to accept Germanicus that would have, considering the tenacity of the campaigns. The *clades* then, do not appear as the determining factor behind withdrawal, which occurred just under a decade later. In comparison to various Roman military defeats before and after, the loss at Teutoburg is hardly as momentous as often portrayed in pop culture (and Suetonius).²⁴⁸

The second major point contradicting the magnitude of the *Clades* is the nuance in Roman policy of conquest. For Gaul, conquest was the application and success of 'hard' dominance in

²⁴⁶ A passage narrating events at Avaricum serves as an apt example: the entire camp was starved and Vercingetorix had captured legionaries who had been so hungry as to have snuck out of camp in search of distant sustenance, *Caes. BG.* 7.20; again, one must remember that though embellished, Caesar's work was subject to scrutiny by contemporaries and as such his works cannot embellish too greatly on ratifiable events, extreme hunger is one such event.

²⁴⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 2.7 tells us 'The whole stretch of country between Fort Aliso and the Rhine was thoroughly fortified with a fresh line of barriers and earthworks'. Footnote 19 of the Loeb Classical Library's 1932 edition determines this to be in a range of ca.23-85 miles depending on the identification of Aliso. Modern identification of the site places it at Haltern where exists modern reconstructions.

²⁴⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 23.

the region, overlaying an additional layer of government to existing tribal structures. For Germanic peoples beyond the Rhine, attempts at this form of domination failed, not only due to a lack of comparable social and proto-urban development, but also in part due imperial change. Conquest declined as the nature of Roman expansionism under the emperors evolved. As power was concentrated into the hands of the emperors, the aristocratic engine of the major Republican expansion discussed in Chapter Three had declined rapidly. The result cannot be understated, conquest of territory was no longer the springboard into politics and, as such under the Principate, expansion became the duty of the emperor and his family alone, not competing governors.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, even family campaigning too was often shunned by a premier, lest their heirs gain more popularity with the *Populus* than he in Purple. This is at least the rationale which the authority on the subject proports in his account: Tacitus suggested that Tiberius grew jealous of Germanicus' popularity.²⁵⁰ This cannot be disregarded while considering the reasons for aborting the campaigns, yet there is also another concurrent aspect of withdrawal.

If one were to set Tiberian policy on expansion aside and return to a consideration of the absence of the cycle of wealth accumulation, one is presented with the argument that most other factors mattered only superficially in comparison. Augustus and his immediate heirs needed no wealth, Caesar and Augustus had done a good job acquiring it all. With both the lack of internal political profitability, and an extensive financial drain on the treasury from a trans-Rhenian Germanic conquest, there was just no incentive to continue the campaign. Even Spain with its extensive mines proved ultimately low in profitability, nor was the wealth acquired from the East any better: neither campaign covered itself financially in the long term.²⁵¹ The immediacy of wealth requisition and the ease of its distribution, however, along with the need for military renown alongside that of financial gain, accounts for the extended expansion during the Republican period. By the time the cycles had subsided, these motivators no longer manifested to the extent they had during the Gallic Wars. For the majority of the first two

²⁴⁹ For discussions and summaries of this phenomenon see, Cornell, '*Roman Imperial Expansionism*'; with Mattern, S. 'Rome and the Enemy; Imperial Strategy in the Principate', in *Roman Imperialism*, Edited by Champion. C.B. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); see also Cornwell, H. 'Roman Attitudes To Empire And Imperialism', pp. 482-483; Sidebottom, H. 'Roman Imperialism: The Changed Outward Trajectory of the Roman Empire', *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 54, No. 3, (2005), pp. 315-330; military expansion still provided the potential of diverted loyalty from the premier and thus debates on cessation are commonplace. Reasonings provided by the antique historians for cessation in Gaul and in general, are as conflicted as modern, both Dio and Tacitus infer that this evolution was a result of the first Princeps encouraging a policy of stasis to his successor; Tacitus' suggestion that it was either due to 'fear or jealousy' from Augustus of potential usurpers of fame, Tac. *Ann.*1.11, this notion continues in his discussion on Germania proper, citing Tiberius' fear of Germanicus' fame as the reason for the abandonment of *Germania Magna*, Tac. *Ann.* 1.52, 2.26, 2.73, 3.2.; Dio's discussion is less focused on emotion, in Cass. Dio 56.33, he suggests the reason a stasis policy was pushed is that any further expansion of the empire, in any direction, would inevitably make the current borders harder to defend.

²⁵⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 2.26.

²⁵¹ Morley, *Roots of Roman Imperialism*, pp.27

centuries CE, wealth and renown were a singular need of an emperor, not for the competition of varying oligarchic factions. Nonetheless, even in those examples of later expansion, there is usually one of these justifications prevailing. Expansions of the Julio-Claudian dynasty appear more for renown than profit.²⁵² Trajan's Parthian campaign is too attributed by Dio to be influenced by the premier's want of fame.²⁵³ His operations in Dacia and the Flavian expansion into the Agri Decumates are, however, seemingly logical; retaliation for the former, consolidation of a frontier for the second.²⁵⁴

In their 'barbarity', unlike the Celts of Gaul and Britannia, those of *Germania Magna* had little to no pre-existing tribal centres upon which Rome could overlay her *Civitas* system.²⁵⁵ There was little to no known material wealth in the province and its peoples were too 'barbarian'. Already in the earliest passages of the *Commentaries* the Rhine appears as a border of the civilized, or rather 'civilizable' world.²⁵⁶ The development of *oppida* in Gaul along with its adoption of multiple Mediterranean practices had moved them towards the side of civility on the spectrum of barbarity. In the wild lands of Germania with less settlement development, the Romans had to not only build the cities themselves, they too had to establish other hallmarks of civilisation.²⁵⁷ Germania required these structures, both physical and bureaucratic, to be manufactured, all at the expense of the Roman Empire with little prospect of reimbursement.²⁵⁸ They had attempted this level of investment once, but by the time the legions resettled the region following Germanicus' vindictive campaigns, Tiberius had halted his efforts, recalling him and not installing a successor. Unlike Caesar's 'wild and untameable' reasoning before him, Tiberius relayed no rationale for his cessation, the closest we have is the testament that Augustus had instructed him not to enlarge the empire, yet Germania had not been definitely abandoned until after his passing.²⁵⁹ Regardless, both abortive attempts of Caesar and the later Augusti serve to demonstrate degrees of 'barbarity' directly related to considerations of profit,

²⁵² The most notable example being Claudius' invasion of Britannia, Suet. *Claud.* 17.1; Dio, however, only accounts Bericus' request for aid as the motivation, Cass. Dio 60.19.

²⁵³ Cass. Dio 68.17.1.

²⁵⁴ Jones, B W. 'Domitian's Advance into Germany and Moesia', *Latomus*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (1982), pp. 329-335, with, 'The Dating of Domitian's War against the Chatti', *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (1973), pp. 79-90.

²⁵⁵ The approach, many antique imperial systems employed, Hasselgrove, C. 'The Romanisation of Belgic Gaul: some Archaeological Perspectives', in *The Early Empire in the West*, Edited by, Blag, T.F.C. and Millet, M. (Oxford; Oxbow Books Ltd, 2002), p. 45.

²⁵⁶ Roymans, 'Conquest, Mass Violence and Ethnic Stereotyping', p. 456.

²⁵⁷ Tac. *Germ.* 27; The prime example of this is the establishment of Waldgrimes; for a survey on the archaeological findings of cities built both east and west of the Rhine see Carrol, M. *Romans, Celts, and Germans*, (Charleston: Tempus Publishing, 2001), 34-64; and Curry, A. 'The Road Almost Taken', pp. 32-37.

²⁵⁸ The historical authors espouse the riches of both Britannia and Gaul, yet to the Romans, Germania possessed little material wealth Strab. 4.5.3; Cf. Tac. *Germ.* 5; an insightful explanation of costs of expansion is offered by, Cornell, 'Roman Imperial Expansionism', pp. 146-149.

²⁵⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.11

supposed 'civility', and the Zeitgeist of the period, all which determined Roman desire for conquest. The majority of Germania was not worth the effort, but some, closer, and more friendly tribes, would be granted land in the borders of the Empire.²⁶⁰

In summary of Part II, it is evident due to the nuances involved that we can never gain any measure of certainty as to what a 'barbarian' *actually was*. Though through examination of available materials, we can nonetheless determine A) first and foremost, in conjunction with Part I, 'barbarian' is often simply an insult; B) the Romans perceived barbarism in an ethnological sense as a scale, though timeframe is ambiguous; C) degrees of 'barbarism' can (but not always) be lessened through proximity to civilized states; and D) The *majority* of Germans were more barbaric to Caesar than a *large* proportion of Gauls, but this may have been down to their resistance.

²⁶⁰ The most notable of these transferred tribes is the Batavians of the Chatti. Though beyond the scope of this thesis, the developments of the Batavi in the Roman world prove the continuation of the nuance, contradiction, and ambiguity of 'barbarism'; Slofstra, J. 'Batavians and Romans on the Lower Rhine: The Romanisation of a Frontier Area', *Archaeological Dialogues*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002), pp. 16-38; Roymans, *Identity and Imperial Power*, pp. 55-66.

Conclusion and Envoi:

'It was the right of war that conquerors dictated as they pleased to the conquered; and the Roman people also were accustomed to dictate to those whom they conquered... according to their own choice'

Caes. *BG.* 1.36.1

As we have seen, the concept of 'barbarian' is saturated with complexity and nuance, especially in the writings of Caesar. The word's ascription is simultaneously ethnographical, denigrative, and a designation of variable primitivity. The roots of the words have a potential to date far before the scope of investigation of this paper and, as a result, with its age the etymology of the word is obscured in tropology, amusing and interesting tropes, yet tropes, nonetheless. The early hostile relations with Gauls from ca. 390BCE onwards and Germans ca.113BCE, had created and substantiated within the Roman psyche a caricature which, as we have explored, was heavily demonizing and often mischaracterizing. The 'barbarian' tribes were ascribed animalistic traits, blatant fabrications, and characteristics lauded in Mediterranean cultures, yet demonized in 'barbarian' ones. Human sacrifice is found only in the lesser 'barbaric' Celts, seldom in the wilder Germans. Their height and aesthetic are heavily determined by locality, they preferred oral over written traditions despite possessing unique or co-opted letters, and their martial nature is no different from the renown of battle in Mediterranean cultures. The nature of the lifestyles and cultures of the so-called barbarians was complex and Roman and Greek presentation was, all too often, derisive parody.

When it came to Roman incorporation of the demonized peoples, Roman brutality was wrought on nearly all and sundry. The fields of Gaul and the forests of Germania burned as their people fell to the *Gladii et Pilla*, or were doomed to a life in the slave markets. Roymans and his colleagues have done extensive work ratifying a proportion of Caesar's *Commentaries*, demonstrating the horrifying extent of Roman occupation. Though there is less of a wealth of similar research conducted for similar privation during the principate, inferences from works like Tacitus, Dio, and Velleius Paterculus, demonstrate at least a measure of continuity in this rapacity under a new regime.

Determination of any influence of racial stereotyping in the extent of the depravity, however, is challenging. One can easily accept there must have been some influence of the caricature. Yet, when considering the Roman threshold for extreme violence, negative treatment due

specifically to any of their 'barbarian' characteristics are seldom found in the literature, especially in the context of the *Commentaries*. More often extremities of violence discussed in Chapters Two and Three are seemingly reactionary in the eyes of contemporaries, or at least resulting from alternate factors than the target's ethnicity. The malevolence directed upon Avaricum is little different to the 'rivers of blood' in Athens, in terms of extremity of violence. The extermination of the Eburones has no significant distinction in Roman policy from elsewhere in the Mediterranean, following military defeat and humiliation, as with Carthage and Corinth. Militarily, the Romans were simply brutal, Greek or German, Carthaginian or Celt, extreme violence was used ubiquitously during Roman expansion.

The 'Cycles of Wealth Accumulation and Elite Competition' predict an insatiable need for incessant acquisition in the realization of personal ambition and political elevation. One could reasonably suggest that Caesar could have been in Parthia, in Greece, or Africa, and would have operated in a similar manner. His need for seizure of assets and thus requisition through enslavement would have prevailed, regardless of any literary caricatures that the Romans were all too ready to manipulate on a whim. From the testimony of the sources, and from the datasets here produced, this analysis above all presents the picture that brutality was indiscriminate and seemingly inevitable; migrations and resistance merely provided an apt justification to disguise avaricious need.

To return to our consideration of whether the 'barbarian' stereotype mediated the violence of conquest. It must be complemented by a consideration of other potential causes: A) a Republican general's own financial situation; B) the myriad financial pressures to continue to establish political clientages and relationships, and to substantiate his military renown; C) pay for the ever-growing number of troops under his command and the logistical cost this created; D) the normalities and expectations of Roman soldiers in enacting *Direptio*; E) the duration of resistance, and the perceived insults and military humiliations, that instigated the most atrocious of Roman retaliations; F) the cycles predicating need for expansion and acquisition; and G) extreme intimidation tactics employed to deter new or further resistance. Similar, if not identical, factors operated universally in the period, and the brutality that Romans recognized was in no way unique to his region of study. There were thus many factors acting to diminish the Roman threshold for extreme violence, and any particular ethnic bias against the *Germani* was relatively superficial in the face of these additional considerations.

Moreover, the ambiguity wrapped within the term 'barbarian' and the nuance of its use diminishes any recognition of prejudicial exceptionalism in military conduct between 58-

50BCE. Exceptional factors only seem to manifest in the literature and in the establishment of hard power. Literarily and conceptually the Gauls, to the Romans, were less barbarian, their development toward Mediterranean style social organisation, whether influenced by proximity or not, allowed the Romans to humanize more so the Gallic peoples than those with less Mediterranean influence; it also allowed for easier social incorporation into an Empire which operated more as a pyramid scheme than a unified state.

It is clear the Roman's perceived barbarity of many of the Germans posed a more difficult challenge to incorporation, even if military conquest was not an issue. With less societal infrastructure and cohesion, Roman imposition of power on pre-existing tribal hierarchies was impossible in this region, yet pacification was not. As is demonstrated by the Ubii, the Chatti, the Batavi and Marcomanni, there was a measure of acceptance of more 'barbarian' barbarians within the Empire. Regardless, Roman incorporation of these tribes in the period of study demonstrates that racial prejudice only went so far. Imagine a personal guard of Hitler being made up of Jewish troops, or the Robert E. Lee's guard consisting of enfranchised slaves, it would have been highly unlikely to happen, yet German bodyguards were accepted. The complementary nature of Caesar in the *Commentaries* goes beyond the exaggeration of an opponent. Through his early amicability – which he at least offers to the Germans and Gauls alike – though we should be aware of propaganda portraying a merciful demeanour, Caesar is communicating to Roman citizens a level of civility in the northern tribes, until they evoke his wrath. In *De Bello Gallico*, and to Caesar at least, only after a culture has offered insult (whether real or subjective), does a people become termed 'barbarian', never initially, never without provocation.

Timeline of Gallo-Germanic and Roman Relations

753 BCE-213 CE:²⁶¹

753 BCE: Mythical Founding of Rome and accepted date for the foundation in the Roman Calendar

390/387 BCE: Gallic migration into the Italian Peninsula under the leader Brennus, culminating in the defeat of the Roman army at Allia. The Gauls sack Rome. The city was later recaptured by the dictator Camillus; Gallic tribes not, however, expelled from *Italia*. (App. *Gall.* 1.1, *Ital.* 1.9[*pos.*24]; Eutrop. 1.20; Diod. 13.113-116; Dion. 13.6-10; Flor. 1.7-8; Liv. 5.-34-49; Plut. *Cam.* 14-30; Polyb. 2.17-18). (Plut. *Marc.* 3.3 Strab.6.4.2, Vell. Pat. 1.14.1-2 makes mention of the loss of Rome to the Gauls). The day and the river subsequently became ill-omened, remembered in the literature as *Dies Alliensis*, with a prohibition on the conduction of commerce that day thereafter (Liv. 6.1.10-11, 6.28.5-6; Tac. *Hist.* 2.91; Verg. *A.* 7.717)

Ca.361-358 BCE: Roman army clash again with the Gallic tribes in *Italia*, with battles at Anio (361BCE) and Pedum (358BCE) (App. *Gall.* 1.2, *Sam.* 2.13; Dion. 14.8-10; Eutrop. 2.5-6; Flor. 1.8.20; Front. *Strat.* 2.4.5; Liv. 6.42.5-7 7.9-15; Plut. *Cam.* 40-41; Polyb. 2.18)

284-283 BCE: Clashes between Rome and a Samnite and Gallic alliance (App. *Gall.* 2.13; *Sam.* 2.14; Cass. Dio *Frag.* 8.38; Dion. 19.13; Eutrop. 2.10; Flor.1.8.21; Front. *Stat.* 1.2.7; Liv. *Peri.* Polyb. 2.19-20; Strab. 5.1.6, 6.4.2)

238 BCE: Consular forces attack Cisalpine Gauls (Cass. Dio 12.18; Liv. *Per.*20.3; Oros. 4.12.1 Polyb. 2.21)

236 BCE: Consul Lentulus Conducts campaigns against Ligurians (Cass. Dio (Zos) 12.18; Eutrop. 3.2)

233 BCE: Fabian leads successful campaigns against the Ligurians (Plut. *Fab.* 2; Cass. Dio (Zos) 12.18)

226 BCE: Romans bury alive Greek and Gallic persons as sacrifices to propitiate the god's safety from an invasion. (Min.Fel. *Oct.* 30.4, Plut. *Marc.*3.4, Plut. *Mor.* 83, Cass. Dio (Zos.) 12.19, & Liv. 22.57 has both male and female Greek and Gaul; Oros. 4.13.3 does not include a Greek male)

225-222 BCE: Conflicts between Rome and Gallic tribe with battles at Faesulae, Telamon (225 BCE) and Clastidium (222 BCE). Rome victorious and Insurbes and Boii become tributary states. (Cass. Dio (Zos.) 12.19-20; Eutrop. 3.5-6; Flor. 1.19-20; Polyb. 2.21-31; Plin. *NH.* 3.24; Flor. 1.20.3; Livy. *Peri.* 20.8? -10; Oros. 4.13.5-10) (it is at this point Cisalpine Gaul is treated as a *Provincia* in Livy, and accounts hereafter are often classed rebellions)

218-200 BCE: Boii and Insurbes along with trans-alpine Gauls ally with Hannibal against Rome and re-open hostilities playing a key part in the Second Punic War (Cass. Dio (Zos.) 12.15, 13.8. 18.9.15, Cass. Dio 18.58.5; Eutrop.

²⁶¹ This is a moderately critical construction of Roman-Gallic and Romano-Germanic relations up to the point when the provinces in question received Roman Citizenship under the *Constitutio Antoniniana* ca.212 CE; building on previous research, this list compiles myriad primary accounts, as such citations in text are often dependant on other works and where required have been considered against various secondary works referenced throughout the Dissertation. Furthermore, for texts such as Appian and Dio, various compilations and translations have been considered and versions shall be included within the Bibliography. Due to the myriad competing sources on definite dates, those throughout are approximated, with the focus being on the chronology of events rather than debates on issues with calendars. Years, therefore, are provided in many cases to provide structure and guidance to the reader. Authorial works such as Zosimus, Zonares, and Aurelius Victor have been cited where mentions of events correlate, however, many works referenced throughout are erroneous and/or conflicting, mention of these discrepancies shall be omitted for the purpose of this timeline and discussed within the dissertation where appropriate.

3.8; Liv. 21.25, 21.29.6, 21.52 22.1.2 31.10.1-11) some tribes providing part of the key Cavalry wing for the Carthaginian army at Cannae (Liv. 22.46-50; Polyb. 3.110-117)

199 BCE: Praetor Baebius' forces defeated by Insurbes (Cass. Dio (Zon) 18.9.15; Liv.632.7.5-8)

197 BCE: Insurbes and Cenomani army defeated by Cethegus (Cass. Dio (Zon) 18.9.15; Liv. 32.29-30, 33.23.1; CIL_6.31630)

196 BCE: Minor successful consular campaigns against Boii and Insurbes (Cass. Dio (Zos.) 12.20; Liv. 33.36.4-15, 33.37.1-9; Orosius. 4.20.11)

195 BCE: Boii defeated by Flaccus near *Silva Litana* (Liv. 34.22.1-3)

194 BCE: Conflict with and defeat of Cisalpine Celts at the battle of Placentia (Liv. 34.46-48, Oros. 4.20.15-16)

193 BCE Conflict with and defeat of Cisalpine Celts at Mutina (Liv. 35.3-6; Oros. 4.20.17)

192 BCE: Boii attacked and defeated by Roman army (Liv. 35.21)

191 BCE: Clash between Boii and Romans (Oros. 4.20.21; Liv. 36.1.9)

190 BCE: Further clashes with Boii and the Ligurians (Liv. 37.2.5-6)

189 BCE: Ligurians ambush L. Baebius' forces, (Liv. 37.57.1-2; Oros. 4.20.24)

187 BCE: Continued actions against Ligurian tribes (Liv. 39.1-3)

186 BCE: Ligurians defeat a Roman consular army (Liv. 39.20; Oros. 4.20.26)

184 BCE: Ligurian province cited as being the only one in which war was happening for this year, (Liv. 39.38). Military actions were still, however, being conducted as is shown by A. Terentius in Hispania (Liv. 39.42.1)

183 BCE: Cisalpine provinces again assigned to the consuls. Additionally migratory transalpine Gauls settle in Aquileian territory prompting military action against them (Liv. 39.45). This trend of Consular assignment of Northern Italian provinces continued annual until 171BCE, with many sporadic appointments thereafter (Liv. 40.1.1, 40.18.1, 40.35.7 40.44.3 41.1, 41.5.5 41.14-15, 41.19.2, 42.1.1, 42.20.11. 45.16.3) after 171 the norm became one consul being granted Italy, with campaigns projected north.

182 BCE: Consular campaigns against Ligurian Celts (Liv. 40.16.4; Plut. *Aem.* 6)

179 BCE: Consular campaigns against Ligurian celts. A group of reportedly 3000 transalpine celts were denied settlement in Italia (Liv.40.53)

177 BCE: Revolt of Ligurian tribes, suppressed by Consul C. Claudius (Liv. 41.12)

176 BCE: Consular operations against Ligurians led to the death of the consul Q. Petillius (Liv. 41.17-18; Val. Max. 1.5.9, 2.7.15; Fron. *Strat.* 4.1.46)

Ca.171/170: Roman forces ravage Alpine Celtic territory prompting deputation for Gallic noble (Liv. 43.5)

167 BCE: With little activity in Northern Italy, Roman forces decide to devastate the region unprovoked (Liv. 45.44.1)

166 BCE: Marcellus campaigns in the Alps, and Gallus in Liguria (Liv. *Peri.*46)

152 BCE: Vague account of success in Gallic conflict but unspecified which Gaul (Obesq. 18)

125 BCE: Roman Trans-Alpine expedition against Gallic Celts, subjugation of the Salluvians (Amm. Marc. 15.12.5; Liv. *Peri.* 60.2, 62, Obesq. 30)

Ca.122- 118 BCE: Roman army embark on an expedition against the Averni, Ruteni and Allobroges under Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus (Amm. Marc. 15.12.5; Aethen. 4.152Cic. Font. 115.35; Caes. *BG.* 1.45; Eutrop.4.22.1 Flo. 1.37 Strab. 4.1.11; Liv. *Peri.* 61; 62.1Val. Max. 9.6.3; Vell. Pat. 2.10.2, 2.39. Sen. *Ben.* 4.30.2: Plin. Nat. 7.51; Juv. Sat. 8.13): founding of *Aquae Sextiae* (Liv. *Peri.* 61, Cassiod. *Chron.* 632) establishment of the Colony *Narbo Martius* in transalpine Gaul, (Vell. Pat.1.15.5)

113-101 BCE: Cimbrian War (App. *Gall.* 3.17-19; Diod. 36.1, 36.3; Caes. *BG.* 2.4, 2.29, 7.77; Cass. Dio *Frag.* 27.94; Eutrop. 4.25, 4.27, 5.1-2; Vell. Pat. 2.12.1-5; Front. *Strat.* 1.2.6, 2.4.6, 2.7.12; Flo. 1.38; Liv. *Peri.* 67-68; Plut. *Mar.* 11-27; Tac. *Hist. Germ.* 37; Obseq. 38)

95/94 BCE: L. Crassus campaigns in unspecified region of Gaul (Cic. *Inv. Rhet.*, 2.111, *Pis.*62, *Brut.* 256, *Ascon.* 14-15; Val. Max. 3.7.6)

94 BCE: Rebellion of the Salluvians, suppressed by G. Caelius (Liv. *Peri.* 73.10)

76 BCE: Rebellion of unspecified Transalpine Gauls, (Cic. *Leg. Man.*, 28-30)

63/2 BCE: Allobroges become embroiled in the Catiline conspiracy (App. *B. Civ.* 2.4; Cass. Dio 37.34.1; Cic. *Cat.* 3.1-12, *Flac.* 102; Sall. *B. Cat.* 40-41.44; Plut. *Cic.* 18.4.)

61 BCE: Tensions erupt between Allobroges and Rome. Rome victorious (Caes. *BG.* 1.6, 1.44; Cass. Dio 37.48; Cic. *Prov.* 32; Liv. *Peri.* 103.3)

59 BCE: Caesars Consulship. Passing of the *Lex Vatinia*: law granting Caesar governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria for five years, further he managed to receive Transalpine Gaul, (App. *BC.*2.13; Cass. Dio 38.8.5; Eutrop. 6.17; Oros. 6.7; Plut. *Caes.* 14.9, *Cat. Min.* 33.3, *Crass.* 14, *Iul.* 14.10, *Pomp.* 44.3; Schol. Bob. 146; Suet. *Caes.* 22.1 Vell. Pat. 2.44.4). Alliance formed with Germanic king in Gaul Ariovistus (Caes. *BG.* 1.35.2, 1.40.2; App. *Gall.* 4.21; Plut. *Caes.* 19.1)

58-49 BCE: Caesars' Gallic war

- 58 BCE: Caesar' campaign begins against the migrating Celtic confederation comprising tribes of the Helvetii, Rauraci, Tulingi, Boii and others,(Caes. *BG.* 1.2-29; Cass. Dio 38.31-33; Eutrop. 6.17; Flor. 1.45.1-4; Oros. 6.7.3; Plut. *Caes.* 18)
 - Cited their migration as his *Casus Belli* (Caes. *BG.* 1.3-7; Cass. Dio 38.31.2);
 - Confederation defeated at battle of Bibracte (Caes. *BG.* 1.23-29; Cass. Dio 38.33)
- 58 BCE: Caesar goes to war against the Germanic Ariovistus in Northeast Gaul, a former ally of Rome (Caes. *BG.* 1.30-54; Cass. Dio 38. 34-50; Oros. 6.7.6; Plut. *Caes.* 19)
 - The Seubi are defeated at the Vosges River, and Ariovistus fled beyond the Rhine (Caes. *BG.* 1.51-54; Cass. Dio 38.50.4-5)

- 57 BCE Caesar campaigns in *Belgica* against the Gallo Germanic tribes, such as the Aduatuci, Nervii confederation, (Caes. *BG.* 2.1-33; Cass. Dio 39.1-5; Flor. 1.45.4; Oros. 6.7.11; Plut. *Caes.* 20) Servius Balba subdues tribes of the Veragri and Allobroges (Cass. Dio 39.5)
- 56 BCE Campaign takes Caesar south to Aquitania and begins his subjugation process (Caes. *BG.* 3.7-27 Cass. Dio 39.40-43; Flor. 1.45.5-6; Oros. 6.8) When Caesar returned north, his lieutenants Sabinus and Crassus continued fighting with local tribes (Cass. Dio 39.45-46)
- 56-55 BCE: Caesar continues operations against Germanic tribes as the Tencteri and Usipetes reportedly cross the Rhine into Treveri territory, following a massacre of the Germanic troops, the cavalry retreated across the Rhine into friendly territory (Caes. *BG.* 3.28-29, 4.15; Flor. 1.45.6-14; Oros. 6.8.22; Plut. *Caes.* 22) This conflict and withdrawal provoked Caesar's first expedition across the Rhine (Eutrop. 6.17; Caes. *BG.* 4.16-19; Cass. Dio 39.47-50; Flor. 1.45.14, 2.30.21-22; Oros. 6.9.1; Plut. *Caes.* 23.1) Dio's report is particularly interesting as he cited Caesar crossed in aid of the Ubii after first being denied the excuse for bringing by the Sugambri sheltering the defeated Germans (Cass. Dio 39.48.4-5)
- 55 BCE Caesar's first British expedition (Caes. *BG.* 4.20-36; Eutrop. 6.17 Flor. 1.45.16-17; Vell. Pat. 2.46.1; Oros. 6.9.2-9; Plut. *Caes.* 23.2)
- 55 BCE: Minor revolt by the Morini (Germanic) (Caes. *BG.* 4.37-38)
- 55 BCE: Law passed extending Caesar's governorship by five years, (App. *B. Civ.* 2.18; Caes. *BG.* 8.53; Cic. *Phil.* 2.24; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 43.5, *Crass.* 15.5, *Pomp.* 52.3; Vell. Pat. 2.46.2; Dio has this law being passed with the *Lex Trebonia*, Cass. Dio 39.36.2)
- 54 BCE: Caesar launches second expedition to Britain (Caes. *BG.* 5.1-25; Flor. 1.45.18-19; Vell. Pat. 2.47.1)
- 54-53 BCE: Initial Gallic revolt under Ambiorix and suppression (Caes. *BG.* 5.26-6.44; Cass. Dio 40.31-32; Oros. 6.10; Plut. *Caes.* 24; cf. Flor. 1.45.7, who has Ambiorix prior to the British Expedition)
- 52 BCE: Major Gallic rebellion under Vercingetorix (Caes. *BG.* 7; Cass. Dio 40.33-44) Flor. 1.45.20-56; Oros. 6.11; Plut. *Caes.* 25-27)
- 52 BCE Vercingetorix is defeated and captured at Alesia. (Caes. *BG.* 7.75-89; Cass. Dio 40.39.44)
- 51 BCE: Major revolt suppressed (Caes. *BG.* 7.90)
- 51 BCE Minor revolts suppressed (Caes. *BG.* 8.1-48)

Ca.39/38 BCE: Uprising in Aquitania are suppressed by Agrippa (App. *B. Civ.* 5.75.1, 5.92; Cass. Dio 48.49.3; Eutrop. 7.5)

Ca. 38 BCE: Expeditions by Agrippa across the Rhine mark the beginning of Augustan campaigns in the region (Cass. Dio 48.49.3; Tac. *Germ.* 28; Strabo. 4.3.4; Cf. Flor. 2.30.22 who suggests Drusus as the successor to Caesar's bridging)

34 BCE: Augustus plans to emulate Caesar and determines on an expedition to Britannia yet this is later abandoned (Cass. Dio 49.38.2)

Ca.30 BCE: The Celtic tribes' revolt against Imperial control (*Res Ges.* 26)

30-27 BCE: Octavian's position evolves into a post equal to Emperor (*Princeps*), and hereafter becomes known as Augustus (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.1; Cass. Dio 53.2-23; Eutrop. 7.8; *Res Ges.* 1-35; Suet. *Aug.* 26-28; Tac. *Hist.* 1.2-3; Vell. Pat. 89-90; Zos. 1.6.1-2)

Ca. 26 BCE: Augustus initiates campaigns against various Alpine tribes and aborts invasion of Britain (Cass. Dio 53.22.5)

25 BCE: Suppression of the Salassi tribe in the Alps, with 40,000 people being sold into slavery (Strabo 4.6.7; Cass. Dio 53.25.3-5)

25 BCE: Marcus Vinicius Campaigns in *Germania Magna* (Cass. Dio 53.26.4).

Ca.16 BCE: Roman invasion and occupation in Alpine regions under Drusus and Tiberius (Cass. Dio 54.20-22; Eutrop. 7.9 Vell. Pat. 2.95; Flor. 2.22; Suet. *Aug.* 21.1, *Tib.* 9.1-2, *Claud.* 1.2)

Ca.16 BCE: Gaul is invaded by Germanic tribes and the garrisons lose their legionary *Aquila*. Campaigns across the Rhine are then initiated in retaliation (Vell. Pat. 97.1-2; Cass. Dio 54.20.4-5)

15 BCE: Romans begin construction of trans-Rhenian fortress at Dangstetten (Carrol, M. *Romans, Celts, and Germans*, (Charleston: Tempus Publishing, 2001), p. 34)

12-1 BCE: Romans begin the invasion of Germania under Drusus. He is relatively successful and begins establishing more military infrastructure, along with establishing relations with multiple tribes acquiring hostages and auxiliary quotas. (Cass. Dio 54.32-33; Eutrop. 7.9; Flor. 2.30.23, 2.30.26-7; Suet. *Aug.* 20, *Claud.* 1.2)

10 BCE: Roman forces pacify several Chatti tribes (Cass. Dio 54.36.3; Flor. 2.30.23)

9 BCE: Continued campaigning into Chattian territory along with precursory thrusts into Suebian land, Drusus then proceeds to occupy and subjugate territories of the Cherusci. This thrust takes Drusus as far as the Elbe (Cass. Dio 55.1.2; Eutrop. 7.9; Flor. 2.30.23-25; Suet. *Aug.* 21.1; Vell. Pat. 2.97.3)

Ca.9/8 CE: Eutropius reports clans of the Chatti are transferred below the Rhine and become the Batavia (Eutrop.7.9)

8 BCE: Tiberius campaigns in Germania (Cass. Dio 55.6; Suet. *Tib.* 9.1-2)

6 BCE: Tiberius suppresses Germanic revolts (Cass. Dio 55.8.3)

Ca.4 BCE: Establishment of one of the only Roman *Trans-Rhenian* cities (as shown by dendrochronology at the Waldgrimes site; Curry, A. 'The Road Almost Taken,' *Archaeology*, Vol. 70, No. 2, (2017), pp. 32-37)

2 CE: Military campaigns against Germans under L. Domitius (Cass. Dio 55.10a.1)

4 CE: Military campaigns conducted under Tiberius, (Cass. Dio 55.13; Suet. *Tib.* 16.1; Vell. Pat. 2.104-108). Vellius Paternus joins Tiberius's staff (Vell. Pat. 2.104)

6 CE: Campaigns under Tiberius reportedly successful: Advancement to Visurgis, then the Elbe subjugating many tribes in between; the province at this point considered 'conquered' (Vell. Pat. 2.104-108; Cass. Dio 55.28.5)

6-9 CE: *Bellum Batonianum*: Capitalizing on Roman focus in Germany; Dalmatian subjects rose in revolt against Rome (Cass. Dio 55.29-30, 55.32.3, 55.34.3-7, 56.1.1, 56.11-17; Suet. *Tib.* 16; Vell. Pat. 2.110-117): As a result, seven of the Germanic based legions were diverted to this conflict seeing military depopulation of Roman Germania.

9 CE: Revolt of Arminius: (Cass. Dio 56.18-24; Vell. Pat. 2.117-119; Flor. 2.30.31-39; Suet. *Aug.* 23 *Tib.* 17). Evacuation of Waldgrimes settlement (Curry, 'The Almost' Road Taken, p. 37)

10/11 CE: Tiberius and Germanicus launch vindictive action beyond Rhine (Cass. Dio 56.25; Vell. Pat. 2.120; Suet. *Tib. 18*; Tac. *Ann. 1.3*)

19th August 14 CE: Augustus passes away (suggested assassination by Livia). Tiberius ascends (Aurel. Vic. 1.1; Cass. Dio 56.30.1; Eutrop. 7.10; Suet. *Aug. 100.1, Tib. 21-21*; Tac. *Ann. 1.5-6*; Vell. Pat. 2.123-124; Zos. 1.6.2)

<August 14 CE: Germanic (and Pannonian) legions mutiny against Tiberius (Cass. Dio 57.5-6; Tac. *Ann. 1.1.31-49*; Suet. *Tib. 25, Calig. 48*; Vell. Pat. 2.125; on the Pannonian legions specifically, Cass. Dio 57.4 Tac. *Ann. 1.16-30*)

14 CE: Germanicus embarks on invasion of *Germania*, his force consisted of 12,000 Legionaries, 26 Auxiliary cohorts (*Socias Cohortis*) and 8 Cavalry *Alae* (Cass. Dio 57.6.1; Tac. *Ann. 1.49-52*)

15 CE: Raids against the Chatti in early spring (Tac. *Ann. 1.55*)

15 CE: Major summer campaign under Germanicus and Caecina. Location of *Clades Variana* discovered by the Romans. While aiding Segestes, Arminius' wife is captured. Continued campaigning throughout the year (Cass. Dio 57.18.1; Tac. *Ann. 1.56-71*)

16 CE: Major campaign conducted from the sea marking last campaigns of this period. Major battle near Idavisto. Germanicus then withdrew to Rome and investment in Germania officially abandoned (Tac. *Ann. 2.5-26*). The empire hereafter begins a process of fortification of the Rhine and Danubian border regions, known as the *Limes*.

Ca.17 CE: King Maroboduus sends deputation to Rome for aid against Arminius. Drusus sent on 'military apprenticeship to acquire favour' and to 'consolidate a peace'; strongly suggesting Roman military intervention (Tac. *Ann. 2.44-46*)

21 CE: Revolt of various Gallic subjects, inc. Treveri, Aedui, and Turoni under Sacorvir and Florus; suppressed (Tac. *Ann. 3.40-47*)

Ca.26 CE: Apparent incursion of Germanic tribes in Gaul (date suggested by Suetonius' reference to its occurrence during Tiberius' self-imposed exile on Capri, Suet. *Tib. 41*; however, this incursion is uncorroborated and accounted within an unfavourable recount of effects of his isolation)

28/9? CE: Revolt of the Frisii tribes, allies since the elder Drusus' campaigns, Roman defeat (Tac. *Ann. 4.72-74*)

17th September 37 CE: Tiberius either dies, or is murdered by his successor, Gaius ascends (Aurel. Vic. 1.2-3; Cass. Dio 58.28.1-4; Eutrop. 7.11-12; Suet. *Tib. 73, Calig. 12.2-3*; Tac. *Ann. 6.50*; Jose. *BJ. 18.4.2*; Zos. 1.6.2)

<40 CE: Germanic incursions into Gaul later checked by Galba (Suet. *Galb. 6.3*)

40 CE: The Emperor Gaius's military endeavours in Germany and Northern Gaul, culminating in the legendary defeat of Neptune (Aurel. Vic. 1.3; Eutrop. 7.12; Suet. *Cal. 43-47*; Cass. Dio 59.25.1-3). The emperor, while there reportedly massacred legions which mutinied against Tiberius (Suet. *Calig. 48*)

Ca.40 CE: Uprising in Germania when Caligula was back in Rome (Suet. *Calig. 51.3*)

24th January 41 CE: Gaius is murdered, Claudius is chosen as Emperor (Aurel. Vic. 1.3-4; Cass. Dio 60.1.1; Eutrop. 7.12-13; Josep. *JA. 19.1-4*; Suet. *Claud. 10, Galb. 7.1, Gai. 58*; Zos. 1.6.3)

41 CE: Roman Expedition under Galba and Gabinius. Defeat of Chauci and Chatti. Recovery of final Varian *Aquila* (Cass. Dio 60.8.7; Suet. *Galb.* 8.1?)

43 CE: Claudius launches the invasion of Britannia under the command of Aulus Plautius; Initial resistance was offered by Caratacus and Togodumnus, Catuvellauni chieftains commanding a confederation of British tribes. The Britons were defeated, Togodumnus killed and Caratacus withdrew to rally further support. (Cass. Dio 60.19-23; Eutrop. 7.13; Suetonius is surprisingly vague regarding Britannia, Suet. *Claud.* 17.1). Future Emperor Vespasian was amongst Plautius' subordinates (Cass. Dio 60.20.3, 60.30.1-3; Eutrop, 7.19; Suet. *Vesp.* 4; Tac. *Hist.* 3.44), along with his son Titus (Cass. Dio 60.30.1; Suet. *Tit.* 4.1). Lower regions of the island subdued during Plautius' tenure including capture of Camulodunum which prompted the visit of Claudius to the city (Cass. Dio 60.21.2-5)

47 CE: A Cherusci tribe appeals to Rome to provide them a King. Rome sent Italicus nephew of Arminius, whose father Flavius had not rebelled against the Empire. Tacitus accounts the king's success in battles as well as his subsequent exile for lavishness, then reassertion to power by a Langobardi tribe (Tac. *Ann.* 11.16-17)

47 CE: Raids by Chauci provoke Roman expedition under Corbulo. Defeat of Frisii and Chauci (Tac. *Ann.* 11.18-19; Cass. Dio 60.30.4-6)

CA.47 CE: Raids by Chatti provoke Roman expedition resulting in the reclamation of Roman slaves from the Varian disaster. Suebi expel Roman placed king (Tac. *Ann.* 12.27-28)

47-52 CE: Publius Scapula's Governorship of British; Ostorius arrived on the island to incursions of unconquered British tribes into the Roman controlled lower lands; along with a revolt of ally tribes, including branches of the Iceni (Tac. *Agri.* 14, *Ann.* 12.31-32). Scapula later then pressed into Silures territory, who had been rallied against Rome by Caratacus (Tac. *Ann.* 12.33-39)

52 CE: Ostorius dies in post while campaigning against the Silures, Manlius Valens assumes temporary control and the emperor appoints Didius (Tac. *Ann.* 12.39-40)

Ca.52 CE: Revolt of the Brigantes under Venutius (Tac. *Ann.* 12.40)

52-57 CE: Didius Gallus' governorship begins in Britannia (Tac. *Agri.* 14)

13th October 54 CE: Death, potential assassination, of Claudius, ascension of Nero (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.4-5; Cass. Dio 60.33-35, 61.1; Eutrop. 7.13-14; Tac. *Ann.* 12.66-69; Suet. *Claud.* 43-45, *Ner.* 8; Zos. 1.6.3)

Ca.55 CE: Roman military expedition across the Rhine against the Tencteri, major encounters with Hermunduri and the Chatti (Tac. *Ann.* 13.56-57)

57-58 CE: Quintus Veranus' gains British governorship but dies within a year (Tac. *Agri.* 14; *Ann.* 14.29)

58 CE: Frisian tribes occupied Roman controlled Rhineland and were expelled: This land was then occupied by the Ampsivarii tribes. Avitius invades Tencteri land and intimidates German confederation and troubles are averted. (Tac. *Ann.* 13.54-57)

58-60/61 CE: Suetonius Paulinus' British Governorship (Tac. *Agri.* 14, *Ann.* 14.29-38)

60 CE: Attack on Druid enclave Isla mona by Roman Forces (Cass. Dio 62.7-8; Tac. *Agri.* 14, *Ann.* 14.29-30)

60/61 CE: Revolt of Boudicca forces the abortion of the campaign on Anglesey, Iceni along with other British tribes' rebel against Rome, Camulodunum, Londinium and potentially Verulamium raised. British forces defeated at the Battle of Watling Street. Paulinus' severe vindictive actions in the aftermath earned him censure, and he was recalled and replaced by Petronius Turpilianus who is credited for restoring peace (Tac. *Agri.* 15-16, *Ann.* 14.31-39; Cass. Dio 62.1-12; again, Suetonius reduces this episode to a mere mention, Suet. *Ner.* 39.1)

63-69/70 CE: Trebellius Maximus succeeds Turpilianus in Britain (Tac. *Agri.* 16)

Civil wars of 68-70 CE (Year of 4 Emperors):

68 CE:

- Winter/spring: Mutiny of Vindex in Gallia, he forwards Galba for the Purple over Nero (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.5-6; Cass. Dio 63.22; Suet. *Ner.* 40, *Galb.* 9.2; Tac. *Hist.* 1.6.)
- Ca April: Galba 'accepts' Vindex's offer for the Throne and becomes the first of many usurpers of the Principate (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.5-6; Eutrop. 15-16; Tac. *Hist.* 1.5; Suet. *Galb.* 9.2, 10.1)
- May: Vindex defeated by Rufus and Vindex commits suicide (Cass. Dio 63.24)
- June: Nero Commits suicide (9th) (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.5-6; Suet. *Galb.* 11.1 *Nero*, 49-50; Cass. Dio 63.92.2)
- >Dec: Galba Arrives in Rome (Cass. Dio 64.3)

69 CE:

- Early January: Revolt of Upper Germanic Legions in support of Vitellius (Cass. Dio 64.4-5; Eutrop. 7.17 Tac. *Hist.* 1.12.1; Suet. *Galb.* 16.2, *Oth.* 8) Tacitus has Vitellius acceptance of the Purple as the 3rd Jan (Tac. *Hist.* 1.58.1)
- Jan-?: Vitellius gathers support from across Gaul and Britain (Tac. *Hist.* 59-61)
- Jan-Feb?: Vitellian forces pillage across Gaul and the Alpine region, reportedly slaughtering innocents (Tac. *Hist.* 1.63-70)
- 15th January: Otho usurps the Throne, turmoil breaks out in the capital and Galba is eventual killed and butchered by the conflicting factions (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.6.-7; Cass. Dio 64.5-8; Eutrop. 7.16-17; Tac. *Hist.* 1.27-49; Suet. *Galb.* 19-20, *Oth.* 6)
- Ca. 14th March: Otho marches to meet Vitellian troops heading to Rome (Sut. *Oth.* 8; Tac. *Hist.* 1.90)
- March-April: Otho had initial success in the conflicts in Northern Italy against Vitellius, however, Vitellian Germanic troops defeated the Conglomerate Othonian army on the 14th at Bedriacum with a purported loss of 40,000 men (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.7; Cass. Dio 64.10-11; Eutrop. 17-18; Suet. *Oth.* 9.2; *Vit.* 10.1 Tac. *Hist.* 2.11-46)
- 16th April: Otho commits suicide, Vitellian forces assume control of Italy (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.7-8; Cass. Dio 63.15; Suet. *Oth.* 11; Tac. *Hist.* 2.49)
- 16th April<: upon hearing of Otho's defeat, Vitellius sets out for and arrives in Rome (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.7; Cass. Dio 65.1.2a; Suet. *Vit.* 10-11)
- 1st July: Egypt declares support Vespasian as Emperor (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.8; Eutrop. 7.18-19; Suet. *Vesp.* 6.3)
- 3rd/11th July: Judean Romans declare for Vespasian (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.8; Eutrop. 7.18-19; Tac. *Hist.* 2.79; cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 6.3; Dio has Vespasian hailed Emperor first in Judea whilst campaign, then accounting his travel to and declaration in Egypt Cass. Dio 65.8-9)

- 15th July<: Syria along with Asia Minor allied with Vespasian (Aurel. Vic. 1.8; Eutrop, 7.18-19; Tac. *Hist.* 2.81; Cf. Suet. *Vit.* 15 who makes no mention of Syria's chronology which further confuses the timeline, he has this mutiny eight months into Vitellius' reign, but fails to state whether this is measured from his proclamation by the legions in January or the Senate in April), furthermore, he states elsewhere, support being given in July) Moesia and Pannonia follow in siding with the Flavian faction shortly after (Tac. *Hist.* 2.86)
- Ca. August: Mucianus sent with an advance force against Vitellius, (Tac. *Hist.* 2.83). Vitellius send forces to meet the oncoming army (Cass. Dio 65.10; Tac. *Hist.* 2.99.1)
- October: Northern Italy again ravaged by civil war as Flavian and Vitellian troops conduct operations against each other in the region. The conflicts culminate with the Vitellian force's Defeat at Cremona on the 24th October, (Cass. Dio 65.10-15; Eutrop, 7.18-19; Suet. *Vesp.* 7.1; Tacitus' account of these campaigns are extensive with the entirety of *Book Three* dedicated to the account, Tac. *Hist.* 3.1-61)
- December: Defeated forces pursued to Rome. Vitellius finally beaten and executed in Rome (~20th), Vespasian becomes the uncontested ruler (Aurel. Vic. 1.8; Eutrop, 7.18-19; Cass. Dio 65.16-22; Suet. *Vit.* 17; Tac. *Hist.* 3.63-86)
- Throughout 68/69CE: Border tribes, both allied and enemy, in Germania Pannonia and Britannia capitalise on civil war and raid Roman territory. In Britain Venutius instigates a schism in loyalties of the Brigantes (Tac. *Hist.* 3.45-46)
- 70 CE: Revolt of the Julius Civilis (Tac. *Hist.* 4.12-37, 5.14-26; Cass. Dio 66.3; Front. *Strat.* 4.3.14)

Ca.69 CE: Unaligned mutiny in Britannia, Tacitus cites a riotous garrison with little detail beyond it lacking bloodshed and lasted through out the tenure of the succeeding Governor (Tac. *Agri.* 16)

69-70? CE: Vettius Bolanus' British governorship (Tac. *Agri.* 16)

71-73 CE: Pettilius Cerialis' British governorship. Minor campaigning against Brigantes in Northern Britannia (Tac. *Agri.* 17)

73-77 CE; Julius Frontinius' - Roman Author on military treatises- British governorship. Wherein he subdued many remaining Silures (Tac. *Agri.* 17)

Ca. 78-84 CE: Governorship of Agricola in Britannia: his exploits in Caledonia won Titus the hailing of *Imperator* (Cass. Dio 66.20; Tac. *Agri.* 18-46)

<79 CE: unprovoked campaigns in Germania by Domitian (Suet. *Dom.* 2.1)

Ca. 79 CE: Establishment of *Agri Decimates* (Tac. *Germ.* 29)

23rd June 79 CE: Death of Vespasian, elevation of Titus (24th) (Aurel. Vic. 1.10; Cass. Dio 66.17-18; Eutrop, 7.20-21; Suet. *Vesp.* 24, *Tit.* 11; Zos. 1.6.4)

13th Sept 81CE: Death of Titus, potentially assassinated, ascension of Domitian (Aurel. Vic. 1.10-11; Eutrop, 7. 22-23; Cass. Dio 66.26; Suet. *Tit.* 11; Zos. 1.6.4)

Ca. 82CE: Minor expeditions across the Rhine under Domitian (Cass. Dio 67.3-5, 67.4.1; Eutrop, 7. 22; Aurel. Vic. 1.11; Tac. *Agric.* 39; Suet. *Dom.* 6). Domitian potentially after adopts the title Germanicus (*CIL* XIII. 2.1.6821, 7577, 2.2.8664)

80s CE: Chatti expel Cherusci king who then seeks support from Rome, gains financial support only (Cass. Dio 67.5.1)

89 CE: Rebellion of Germanic provinces under L. Antonius Saturninus along with Chatti allies (Aurel. Vict.1.9; Suet. Dom. 6; Cass. Dio 67.11.1-2; Mart. 4.11), Trajan was amongst the suppressors of this insurrection, (Plin. Pan. 14)

96 CE: Domitian assassinated, Nerva chosen as Emperor (Aurel. Vic. 1.11-12; Cass. Dio 67.17, 68.1.1; Eutrop, 7.23-8.1; Suet. Dom. 17.1; Zos. 1.6.4-1.7.1)

Ca.96-98 CE: Amongst Trajan's titles is Germanicus, potentially gained during his time in the Germanic provinces, or maybe acquired during the Dacian campaigns, *CIL*. VII. 1193-1194, XIII. 2.1.5089? 7711, 7573, 9162, 2.28823, 9075, 9128, 9147, 9162)

98 CE: Nerva dies, Trajan becomes Emperor (Aurel. Vic. 1.13; Eutrop, 8.1-2; Cass. Dio 68.4.1; Zos. 1.7.1)

117 CE: Trajan passes, Hadrian ascends (Aurel. Vic. 1.13-14; Cass. Dio 68.33, 69.1-2; Eutrop. 8.4-6; SHA. Had. 4.6-7; Zos. 1.7.1)

117< CE: Unspecified revolt in Britannia (SHA. Had. 5.2)

Ca.122-27 CE: Construction of frontier wall in Britain during Hadrian's tour of the island (SHA. Had. 11.2). Large quantity of dedications suggests extensive investment in infrastructure in this period(for examples see *RIB* 287. 801, 974, 1637, 1638, 1666, 1702, 1736, 1852, 2244, 2265, 3219)

132CE: Hadrian passes away, Antoninus Pius becomes Emperor (Aurel. Vic. 1.14-15; Eutrop. 8.7-8; SHA. Had. 25, Anton. 5; Zos. 1.7.1)

142 CE: Rebellion of Brigantine tribes in Britannia, construction of the Antonine wall (*CIL* X. 515; *CIL* XIII 9079; Paus. 8.43.4; SHA. Ant. Pius. 5.3). Following which, Pius adopted the title Britannicus (*CIL* XIII.2.1.7465, 2.2.9028, 9068)

Ca.142 CE: Campaigns against German tribes under Antoninus (*CIL*. 6.1208; SHA. Ant. 5.4)

7th March 161 CE: Pius Dies, Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius ascend (Aurel. Vic. 16; Cass. Dio 71.1; Eutrop. 8.8-9; SHA. Ant. 12.4-5, Aeli. 5.12, 7, Marc. 7-8, Ver. 3.8; Zos. 1.7.1)

< March 161 CE: Military action in Britannia under Calpurnius Agricola (unspecified whether rebellion or incursion) (SHA. M. Aurel. 8.7-9)

< March 161 CE: Chatti incursions into Lower Germania? and Raetia, checked by Aufidius Victorinus (SHA. M. Aurel. 8.7-9)

Ca.167 CE: Antonine Plague begins in the Empire after being contracted during Verus' Parthian campaign (Aurel. Vic. 16; Herod. 1.12.1-5; SHA. Ver. 8.1-4, Marc. 13.5, 21.6)

166-180 CE: Marcomannic Wars. Border Rivers begin to freeze opening easy routes for Germanic and Steppe incursions. Incursions reaching into Italy. There is a brief hiatus in conflict Ca.169CE. The predominancy of Aurelius' reign is spent combating these threats (Aurel. Vic. 1.16; Cass. Dio 72.2-3 3; 72.12; Eutrop. 8.12-13; Herod. 1.2.5; SHA. M. Aurel. 12-14, 21-22 24.5 27.10, Avid. 3.6, Pert. 2.6; Ver. 9.7-10)

169 CE: Lucius Verus dies in Rome during the Marcomanni *inter-Bellum* (Eutrop. 8.9-11; SHA. *M. Aurel.* 16.3, 17.2-3, *Avid.* 9.5, *Ver.* 9-11)

169 CE: Marcus heads minor Germanic campaign following the death of Verus, proceeding reopening of Marcomannic conflict (Herod. 1.3.5; Eutrop. 8.12 SHA. *M. Aurel.* 17.1, 20.6, *Comm.* 2.5). Marcus adopts the title Germanicus (*CIL* XIII. 2.1.682?{potentially Caracalla})

173 CE: Invasion of the Chatti and Hermunduri repelled by Didius Julianus, Chauca raid Belgica? (SHA. *M. Aurel.* 22, *Did. Iul.* 1.6-8)

176 CE: Clodius Albinus defends Germania and Gaul from incursions. In this tenure he reportedly put down some rebellions (*SHA Clod.* 5.1, 6.3)

170s CE: Situation on the Rhine and Danube in conjunction with Plague forces Aurelius to expand levy potential for both the Legions and Auxilia, notably recruiting Germans against Germans, and also contingents of bandits and Gladiators (Cass. Dio 55.24.4; SHA. *M. Aurel.* 21.6-7; *CIL* III.1980.)

180 CE: Marcus Aurelius Dies while campaigning against the Danubian tribes. Commodus inherits the throne and abandons the Danubian campaigns (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.16-17; Eutrop. 8.14-15; Herod. 1.4.7-8, 1.6.1-9; SHA. *M. Aurel.* 28; Zos. 1.7.1)

184 CE: Caledonii incursion into Northern Britannia, Perennis sent to deal with the raids (Cass. Dio 72.8; SHA. *Comm.* 6.1)

185 CE: Mutiny of British legions against Perennis, these were quelled by Pertinax (Cass. Dio 72.9-10, 74.4; SHA. *Comm.* 6.1, 8.1, *Pert.* 3.5-6)

<193 CE: Commodian campaigns against the Quadi and Germanic revolt which was suppressed: both events mentioned during Commodus' reign yet neither dated nor positioned chronologically (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.17; Eutrop. 8.15; SHA. *Comm.* 13.5-6)

193-194 CE Year of Five Emperors:

192-193 CE

- 31st December/1st January: Commodus assassinated, Pertinax, both son of a freedman and Ligurian becomes Emperor (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.17-18; Cass. Dio 73.22.4-6, 74.1-3; Eutrop. 8.15-16; Herod. 1.17.1-12, 2.1.1; SHA. *Comm.* 17-20, *Pert.* 1.1, 4; *Pesc. Nig.* 2.1; Zos. 1.7.1-2)
- 28th March: Pertinax assassinated, throne auctioned to the highest bidder, Didius Julianus (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.18-20; Cass. Dio 74.10-14; Eutrop. 8.16-17; Herod. 2.5-6; SHA. *Pert.* 14-15, *Did. Iul.* 2-3; *Pesc. Nig.* 2.1; Zos. 1.7-8)
- Spring: Empire fractures and the regional blocks elect their own candidate: Septimius declared emperor by Danubian legions, Pescennius Niger elevated by the Eastern, and Clodius Albinus hailed emperor by North-Western legions (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.19-20; Cass. Dio 74.14.3; Eutrop. 8.17-18; Herod. 2.7, 2.9 SHA. *Did. Iul.* 4-5, *Sept.* 5, *Pesc. Nig.* 2, *Clod.* 1; Zos. 1.8)
- Early Summer: Septimius allies with Clodius, with the latter subordinating himself to the rank of *Caesar*. Septimius then sets out for Rome (Cass. Dio 74.15; Herod. 2.11, 2.15; SHA. *Did. Iul.* 6.1, *Sept.* 5.3; *Clod.* 6.8)
- >June: Septimius reach Italy, Ravenna defects to him and his troops then defeat Didius' forces near Rome (Aurel. *Vic.* 1.19-20; Cass. Dio 74.16-17; Eutrop. 8.17; SHA. *Did. Iul.* 6.3-8)

- 2nd June: Didius executed in Rome by a soldier (Aurel. Vic. 1.19; Cass. Dio 74.17.5; Eutrop. 8.17; Herod. 2.12-13; SHA. *Did. Iul.* 8-9, *Sept.* 1.1, 5.9-10; Zos. 1.7-8)
- Septimius enters Rome (Aurel. Vic. 1.20; Cass. Dio 75/74. 1-2; Herod. 2.14; SHA. *Sept.* 6-7)²⁶²

194-197 CE

- >May: With Rome and his Western flank secure, Septimius begins campaign against Pescennius and following a series of successful battles, the Severan faction is ultimately victorious. (Aurel. Vic. 1.20; Cass. Dio 75/74.6-14; Eutrop. 8.18; Herod. 2.14.5-7, 3.14; SHA. *Sept.* 8-9, *Pesc. Nig.* 5-6, *Clod.* 7.2-4; Zos. 1.8.1)

196-197 CE: Septimius declares Caracalla Caesar triggering Civil war with Clodius in the West. Following the Battle of Lugdunum (19th February 197 CE), Septimius defeats Clodius and becomes uncontested ruler, and began a purge of Clodius' supporters (Aurel. Vic. 1.20; Cass. Dio 76.4-7; Eutrop. 8.18; Herod. 3.5-8; SHA. *Sept.* 10-13; *Clod.* 7-9; Zos. 1.8)

Ca. 207 CE: During his governorship of an unspecified German province, Pupienus has success campaigning against trans-Rhenian tribes (Herod. 8.6.6, 8.7.8; SHA. *Pup. Bab.* 5.9)

208-210 CE: Severus conducts military operation across Hadrian's Wall. Caledonii and Maeatae tribes reportedly subdued before revolting (Aurel. Vic. 1. 20; Cass. Dio 77.11-15; Eutrop. 8.19; Herod. 3.14). Severus undertakes repairs of border walls (Eutrop. 8.19; SHA. *Sept.* 19.2). Dio reports an attempted murder of the Emperor by Caracalla in an engagement with the Caledonii (Cass. Dio 77. 14.2-4)

4th February 211 CE: Severus dies in York. Geta and Caracalla ascend. Operations against the Caledonian tribes aborted (Aurel. Vic. 1.20; Cass. Dio 77.15.2-4, 78.1.1; Eutrop. 8.19; Herod. 3.15 SHA. *Sept.* 19.1-3; Zos. 1.9.1)

26th December 211 CE: Tenuous fraternal relations quickly deteriorated and Caracalla killed Geta. The elder brother then becomes sole ruler and initiates an attempted *Damnatio Memoriae* upon the younger's life (Aurel. Vic. 1.20; Cass. Dio 78.2; Eutrop. 8.19; Herod. 4.3-4; SHA. *M. Ant.* 2.4-11, *Get.* 2.8, 6; Zos. 1.9-10; the *Damnatio*, though unsuccessful, is still visible in the archaeological record: *CIL* XIII 2.1.7734.)

Ca. 212/213: Caracalla passes the *Constitutio Antoniniana* (Aug. *De Civ. Dei.* 5.17; Cass, Dio 78.9; SHA. *Sev.* 1.2 Ulp. *Dig.* 1.5.17; *P. Giss.* 40; *Cf. Vict. De. Caes.* 16.12)

²⁶² The Dian manuscripts for these years in the Loeb edition has a second Book LXXIV listed within that of LXXV and as such an expanded references in order of precedence shall be added where applicable.

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