

Turkey's New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Case of Somalia and Sudan

Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud

PhD 2023

Turkey's New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa
The Case of Somalia and Sudan

MOHAMED OMAR HAGI MOHAMOUD

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of Manchester
Metropolitan University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

Department of History, Politics and Philosophy
Manchester Metropolitan University

2023

Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	VII
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>IX</i>
Declaration.....	X
Abstract.....	XI
Chapter 1 – Historical Background	10
1.1. Turkey-SSA Relations.....	10
1.2. The Era of the Ottoman Empire.....	11
1.3. The New Republic.....	12
1.4. Turkey-Africa: New Foreign Policy Stance.....	13
1.5. Structure of the Thesis.....	18
Chapter 2 – Literature Review	22
Chapter 3 – Methodology and Research Design	31
3.1. Structured, Focused Comparison.....	31
3.2. Methodological Approach.....	35
3.3. Methods of Data Gathering and Analysis.....	41
3.4. Research Ethics	50
Chapter 4: Turkey’s Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Somalia	52
4.1. Introduction.....	52
4.2. The Current Political Situation in Somalia.....	56
4.3. Turkey and Somalia Establish New Relations.....	68
4.3.1 Turkey-Somalia Historical and Cultural Affinities	74
4.3.2 Turkey’s Political and Diplomatic Support	81
4.3.3 The Current Security Situation in Somalia	85

4.3.4	Turkey-Somalia Security Cooperation	87
4.3.5	Turkey's Economic Role in Somalia: Trade, Development and Humanitarian Assistance	96
4.4.	Somalian Perspective: Turkey's Engagement accepted.....	107
4.5.	Conclusion.....	124
Chapter 5: Turkey's Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Sudan.....		129
5.1.	Introduction.....	129
5.2.	The Current Political Situation in Sudan.....	131
5.3.	Turkey and Sudan Established New Relations.....	147
5.3.1	Turkey-Sudan Historical and Cultural Affinities	149
5.3.2	Turkey's Political and Diplomatic Support	151
5.3.3	The Current Security Situation of Sudan.....	154
5.3.4	Turkey-Sudan Security Cooperation.....	159
5.3.5	Turkey's Economic Cooperation in Sudan: Trade, Development and Humanitarian Assistance.....	162
5.4.	Sudanese Perspective: Turkey's Engagement accepted.....	169
5.5.	Turkey's Political Relations with Sudan and Somalia: Examining Similarities and Differences.....	182
5.6.	Conclusion.....	190
Chapter 6: Turkey's New Aid Model for Developed-LDC Relationships: A Comparison to Traditional West and Chinese Aid Models.....		193
6.1.	Introduction.....	193
6.2.	Foreign Aid	196
6.3.	Western Development Model.....	198

6.3.1	Western Aid Conditionality.....	200
6.3.2	Western Aid and Good Governance Agenda.....	202
6.3.3	Western Humanitarian Aid.....	209
6.3.4	Western Economic Aid.....	212
6.3.5	Western Military Aid.....	216
6.4.	Chinese Development Model.....	219
6.4.1	China’s Unconditional Aid.....	223
6.4.2	The Strategy of Belt and Road Initiative.....	226
6.4.3	Chinese Humanitarian Aid.....	231
6.4.4	Chinese Economic Aid.....	236
6.4.5	Chinese Military Aid.....	241
6.5.	Chinese and Western Development Models: SSA's Traditional Partners Comparison.....	242
6.6.	Turkish Development Model.....	244
6.6.1	Turkish Unconditional Aid.....	249
6.6.2	Turkish New Foreign Aid Formula.....	251
6.6.3	Turkish Humanitarian, Economic and Military Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan.....	254
6.7.	How Turkish Aid Model Differs from SSA’s Traditional Aid Models.....	263
Chapter 7 – Conclusion.....		270
7.1.	Chapter 4: Turkey’s Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Somalia.....	272
7.2.	Chapter 5: Turkey’s Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Sudan.....	280
7.3.	Chapter 6: Turkey's New Aid Model for Developed-LDC Relationships: A Comparison to Traditional West and Chinese Aid Models.....	289

7.4. Empirical Contribution.....	302
7.5. Limitations and Future Research.....	309
Bibliography.....	313
Appendix.....	358

Word Count: 79, 982

Acronyms

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AFDB	African Development Bank
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AP	Association Press
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEIK	Foreign Economic Relations Board
EU	European Union
FFC	Forces for Freedom and Change
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
FOCAC	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
HIPC	Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HoA	Horn of Africa
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Istanbul Policy Center
KIZILAY	Turkish Red Crescent
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OLIC	Low-Income Countries
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SFOPS	State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
SNA	Somali National Army
SPA	Sudanese Professionals' Association
SPLAM/A	Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSF	Somali Security Forces
TDA	Turkish Development Assistance
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Funds
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

Acknowledgement

This intellectual trip has been in the making for four years. Multiple people deserve recognition and gratitude for their contributions to this dissertation. I am happy to say please accept this as a symbol of my appreciation for all your support to my lovely and gorgeous wife, Samira Ali Obsiye and my beautiful daughters, Tusmo, Dekka and Isir, who relentlessly supported me during my academic journey, which resulted in many hours of my absence while reading, writing, and travelling. I do not think I would have been able to pull this off without the support of my loved ones.

Dr. Steven Hurst, my principal supervisor, deserves a great deal of appreciations for providing me with the intellectual and academic support I needed, as well as the unwavering and endless encouragement and guidance of written notes that allowed the chapters of this dissertation to mature and evolve. I appreciate all of the advice and suggestions that you have given me throughout the journey, which have inspired me to stay focused and work hard to completion.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to the many Somalis and Sudanese people who offered me their precious time and expertise, without whom this thesis would not exist. This includes politicians, high-ranking government officials, businesspeople, journalists, academics, and others who have selflessly agreed to be interviewed for this project – and who will remain anonymous. Individuals that sponsored fieldwork in both nations and gave crucial help, contacts, and knowledge during the process are also included. Thank you to everyone.

Declaration

I declare that this unaided work is my dissertation. To the best of my knowledge, none of the content has previously been published or submitted to another university.

Abstract

This thesis presents a detailed perspective of SSA relations with Turkey. It seeks to understand the elements that influence SSA nations' acceptance of Turkey's relationship in great detail. Initially, Turkey-SSA relations were viewed as unidirectional. The existing literature focused on Turkey's motives, interests, and foreign policy choices. SSA countries have been perceived as passive targets that solely accept relations for the sake of foreign aid. While acknowledging that SSA are impoverished nations seeking foreign aid, in this study, I explore various factors that influence SSA nations' acceptance of Turkey's relations. The first of which is historical and cultural ties. Religion and Turkey's anti-colonial history have the potential to be perceived as legitimising force and have acted as one of the soft-power pillars supporting SSA acceptance of Turkey. Moreover, SSA nations are autonomous agencies with their own foreign policy agendas other than shared history and culture. Their individual reasons for developing and maintaining a relationship vary due to differing political, security, social and economic contexts.

This research employed a structured, focused comparison. The instrument utilised to collect the data important to this study was semi-structured interviews meant to assess relevant information. And, as one cannot draw definite conclusions from a single example, the study adopted multiple case study method to achieve more robust results. Somalia and Sudan were chosen as the two most prominent examples of the phenomenon under examination. Somalia and Sudan were chosen because they are the two SSA countries with whom Turkey has formed the most extensive partnerships in recent years, yet their reasons, motivations and benefits of the relationship differ. The former established its ties with Turkey reasons related Somalia's national sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity while assisting it in reestablishing its economy, political stability, and robust national army. Sudan's relationship with Turkey is personal rather than national or strategic in character due to the country's one-man-show leadership style. Discussing SSA's political, economic, and security benefits as well as their shared historical and cultural affinities, the thesis claims that the relationship between Turkey and SSA is likely to continue for two primary reasons. Initially, both Turkey and SSA are mutually benefiting from the relationship. Second, because Somalia and Sudan lack viable alternatives to Turkish backing, it is probable that the relationship will continue. On the other hand, the thesis identified prospective impediments to the partnership, particularly the disadvantages of SSA's poor political institutions and internal challenges.

Chapter 1 – Historical Background

1.1 Turkey-SSA Relations

According to Özkan, Turkey's documented longstanding relationship with the continent of Africa is split into three historical periods; the first is the epoch of the Ottoman Empire, a period in which the Ottoman state put its centre of attention on the northern part of Africa while establishing trade and security cooperation partnerships on certain other parts of the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa (Özkan, 2010). During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey counted the Somalis and the Sudanese among its allies in the Sub-Saharan Region (Mohammed, 2015; MFA, 2014). The historical and cultural connections between Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa will be discussed in detail in the following chapters of the thesis.

The second era is the secular period of the Republic of Turkey between 1923 and 1998. During this period, Turkey's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa diminished and became less important. The relationship with the SSA can be seen at its lowest level in terms of diplomacy, trade and security cooperation. The third historical track is from 1998 onward. The new relationship can be seen as one where there has been a renewed focus on Africa following the adoption of the Turkey-Africa Action Plan, which was a few years after the victory of the AKP when Turkey declared the Year of Africa in 2005 (Idriss, 2020; Özkan, 2010). These historical periods will help us shed new light on Turkey's past and present relations with Africa. Notably, these intervals will explain the transformation period of Turkey under the reign of Erdogan—the new strategic ambition of the AK party, which later filled with broader strategic realities of

winning the Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa relationship (Yavus and Öztürk 2019; Vertin, 2019).

1.2. The Era of the Ottoman Empire

Turkey opened its first relations with Africa at the end of the 16th century. Over the course of the Ottoman Empire's few involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey's relationship with the continent focused on defence and companionship (Özkan, 2008; Szabla, 2018). The economic and trade relationship between the empire and SSA were less important at the time of the Ottoman Empire (Özkan, 2010). Under the Ottomans Turkey's Africa relation focused on the Muslim populated countries in the northern regions of the continent – territories that shared some commonalities with the empire, including religion and other cultural norms include Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, (Dodo, 2016; Nazli, 2005). Although the Ottoman Empire recognised the strategic importance of the East and the Horn of Africa trade routes, it never had the chance to control countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The empire's engagement with the rest of the continent was minimal (Ugur, 2005).

In spite of the fact that the Ottoman Empire has little influence over Sub-Saharan Africa, the Empire established good relations with the Muslim Sultanates in the region, particularly the Harar and the Zanzibar Sultanates. The Harar Sultanate was a power that exercised control over the eastern territories of the region, including Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea Djibouti and Ethiopia. The Ottoman state provided military and economic support to the Muslim Sultanates of Harar and Zanzibar in order to prevent the European colonial powers from gaining influence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Siradag, 2016; Ugur, 2005). The Ottomans also established relations with the southern part of the continent. Likewise, the empire sought to find allies from other strategic parts of

the continent, particularly those south of the equator that occupied an important geopolitical position between south-western Asia and the Arab world (Besenyo and Olah, 2012). The empire sent Imams to the Muslim community of South Africa and it established its first diplomatic representation in the southern part of SSA in 1861 (Özkan, 2010).

1.3 The New Republic

Turkey – South African political relations in the 19th century were reliable and robust, but the collapse of the Ottoman state and the establishment of Turkey's new secular republic in 1923 led to significant change. Initially Turkish relations with Africa were neglected due to the internal problems of the new Republic. Turkey's new administration at the time focused on building new institutions and a new mini state economy after the collapse of the empire while establishing good relations with its neighbours. Subsequently Turkey started to revive its relations with North Africa, but that effort was limited because of the Cold War. Turkey's foreign policy was aligned with the US and other western countries during the Cold War, and thus Turkey had no comprehensive strategy regarding the continent (Kaya and Warner, 2012; Tepeciklioğlu, 2012).

The new Republic of Turkey was founded on October 29, 1923. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the country's first President. The new Republic of Turkey encountered many internal challenges, including political and economic instability such as the fall of the value of the currency, trade imbalances and inflation (Mather, 2014; Lewis, 1958). Its initial focus was thus on establishing internal political and economic stability.

Nevertheless, successive governments in Ankara understood the importance of the continent and never stopped campaigning for the independence of Africa. Turkey was among the first UN member states that campaigned for Africa's independence as Turkey always wanted to revive its diplomatic relations with the continent of Africa (Idriss, 2020). And after years of internal challenges, the new Republic of Turkey started to re-develop its relations with Africa, establishing its first diplomatic, trade and technical cooperation with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone (Tepeciklioğlu, 2018; Ipek and Beltiken, 2013). The new Republic of Turkey was very small in comparison to the Ottoman Empire in terms of economic size and military power and it could not meet the demands of Africa (Takim and Yilmaz, 2010; Cengi, 2020). As a result, during these times, the new Republic of Turkey's diplomatic and trade engagement with Africa was "at its lowest point" (Özkan, 2010; Dodo, 2016).

1.4 Turkey-Africa: New Foreign Policy Stance

In 1998, Ankara adopted a new foreign policy strategy to Sub-Saharan Africa, known as the new Action Plan for Opening up to Africa (Tepecikliogu, 2017; Özkan, 2010). The aim of this policy was to improve the diplomatic relations that Turkey has with the Sub-Saharan Africa (Özkan, 2010) and to increase its influence in the region through the exercise of soft power politics, establishing new cultural and political relations, providing development and humanitarian assistance and building strong trade and economic ties with Sub-Saharan Africa (Bilgic and Nascimento, 2014).

When the foreign policy of Opening Africa Action Plan came into place, it took a long time to be implemented until the AKP government came into power because of Turkey's internal economic and security challenges (Bilgin, 2005). It was the new

government of the AKP party that attached special importance to this foreign policy (Idriss, 2020). In 2005, three years after AKP came to power, Turkey initiated a new strategic engagement with the SSA. It declared the Year of Africa – and that was the declaration of Turkey's strategic partnership of SSA (Dodo, 2016). Since then there has been an increasing revival in Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (Tür, 2011).

Turkey's revival turned out to be an aggressive interest in developing relations with the continent (Özkan, 2008), driven in part by the failure of its application to accede to the European Union. In October 2005, the EU began membership negotiations with Turkey, marking a turning point in Turkish-EU relations. However, the negotiations are tied to a larger collection of unsolved and highly sensitive political matters, the most fundamental of which is the Cyprus dispute. Unresolved Aegean disputes with Greece and the Armenian question provide a further set of broader external issues that impact the day-to-day framework of the negotiations. Kurdish minority rights and the European Court of Human Rights' judgement asking for a retrial of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan are two internal problems that may have an impact on the negotiations. The EU membership process has placed Turkey in the difficult position of balancing its internal and external policy difficulties (Aybat, 2006).

Growing euroskepticism among Turks began when the EU Council imposed constraints on Turkey's negotiations, leading some Turks to question whether the EU intends to admit Turkey to the European Union Club (Goff-Taylor, 2017). As a result, the Turkish government began to consider additional foreign policy choices, and Sub-Saharan Africa became a special area of interest for Turkey (Shinn, 2015).

In 2008, the African Union Summit offered Turkey an observer status. Subsequently Turkey started to engage Africa's regional economic organisations such as the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Between the years of 2008 and 2014, Turkey formalised its strategic partnerships, it also established new diplomatic and trade relations with most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tepeciklioglu, 2017).

In 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul hosted the first-ever Turkey-Africa summit with more than 50 African Head of States in Istanbul. In 2014, another African Union – Turkey Summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea and this produced the Malabo Declaration or Joint Implementation Plan of Turkey and Africa (Turkish MFA, 2018). The plan covers multiple sectors of economic, culture, politics and security cooperation (Meltem, 2016; Turkish MFA, 2018).

Turkey's envisioned plan in Sub-Saharan Africa was threefold. Firstly, it was to build diplomatic relations with the core African countries such as Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Ethiopia and Tanzania. For example, the Istanbul Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 paved the way for Turkey's new diplomatic establishment in the continent. Turkey opened dozens of embassies in less than a decade. The AKP government mission is eventually to open Turkish diplomatic missions in all 54 countries of Africa (Daily Sabah, 2018). The second element was to establish an economic relationship with the continent (Kedir, 2016; Ipek 2014). Africa is a key target market for Ankara's private and state-owned companies: "Not only does the Africa constitute a vibrant market for the Turkish exports, but also it provides cheap raw materials for the Turkish industry" (G. Kizilarlan, 2019). Thirdly, security played an important role in Turkey's diplomatic and

economic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (Daily Sabah, 2019). Turkey sought to establish military cooperation strategies with some selective African states, including Somalia and Sudan (ICG, 2014). Turkey asserts that its military bases are training camps, and their goal is to help settle internal and regional crises (Nassir, 2017). However, other explanations suggest that the military bases enable Ankara to deploy substantial air, ground, and naval assets to strategically important regions far beyond its borders and to challenge its regional rivals – primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Iddon, 2019).

In the words of one Turkish defence analyst, “Turkey has formal expeditionary bases” in Somalia and Sudan along with informal military activities in Libya (Özgül cited in Iddon, 2019). In most cases Turkey signed an agreement with the host governments. However, all these agreements stand on shaky grounds as the governments of Somalia, Sudan and Libya are so weak, hence Turkey’s agreements depend on geostrategic factors beyond the control of Ankara (Gürbüz cited in Iddon, 2019). With this fragility in mind, Turkey is trying to also combine its security element with aid, trade, diplomatic and cultural relations when dealing with the wider Sub-Saharan Africa nations (Ipek 2014; Iddon, 2019). Over the years Turkey has successfully forged strategic partnerships with Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. It constructed and set up its largest overseas military bases in Somalia and Sudan, and increased its presence across the region (Kasapoglu, 2017; Shay, 2018).

However, the primary objective of Turkey’s SSA strategy is to foster its economic and political interests. Between the years of 2002 and 2017, Turkey’s trade volume with

SSA increased dramatically (Daily Sabah, 2018) from less than a billion-dollars to 26 billion dollars. The trade aspiration of Turkey is to increase its total trade with Africa to 50 billion dollars by 2020 (Daily Sabah, 2019). Not only trade, but the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the SSA countries also reached a new peak. In 2009, Turkey had only twelve embassies in Africa – mainly in the North of the continent. Now there are more than forty-one Embassies in Africa in addition to Consulate General in the self-declared sovereign independent country of Somaliland. Likewise, there is a growing number of SSA embassies in Ankara (Shinn, 2015; MFA, 2015).

In addition, Turkey is also providing development and humanitarian aid to the continent in an effort both to legitimise its presence and to promote the wellbeing of the developing countries (Siradag, 2017; Özerdem, 2013). In doing so Turkey seeks to demonstrate to the world its capability as an emerging power, and that she is not only engaged in self-interested trade and economic relationships (Bacýk, 2007).

Although Turkey is delivering aid to much of SSA, it prioritizes certain countries such as Somalia and Sudan. These countries were picked because Turkey's interest is not only driven by the economic importance of SSA but also by a desire to influence the Muslim populated countries in SSA (Shinn, 2015). As with the Ottomans Islam has become an important political instrument for Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party. The source of the success of Turkey's strategic engagement with SSA is in part the historical links which Turkey had with the Muslim countries in Africa (Wheeler, 2011).

Most of the SSA Muslim populated countries' point of view is that "Turkey, as heir to the Ottoman Empire, is Islam's last fortress and the natural leader of a revival of Muslim civilisation" (Tol, 2019). The intention of Turkey is not only to invest in economic and security facilities but also to promote its religious/spiritual influence among Muslim nations. Turkey is constructing mosques and Islamic schools, as well as investing in its language to revive Ottoman history through Turkish scholarships (Tol, 2019). Turkey thus seeks to exploit a common religious identity and to use that to expand its influence through demonstrating solidarity with/support for co-religionists in countries like Somalia and Sudan (Siradag, 2017; Elmi, 2017).

1.5. Thesis Structure

The following is a listing of the seven chapters that make up this study.

Chapter one, which is divided into three historical eras, introduces Turkey's long-standing link with the continent of Africa. The first is the Ottoman Empire era, during which the Ottoman state focused on the northern portion of Africa while forming partnerships for trade and security cooperation in a few other regions of the continent, particularly the Horn of Africa. The second era spans the Republic of Turkey's secular period from 1923 to 1998. Turkey's ties to Sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated and lost importance throughout this time. The relationship with the SSA is at its lowest level in terms of diplomacy, commerce, and security cooperation. The track from 1998 onwards makes up the third historical segment. The approval of the Turkey-Africa Action Plan, which came a few years after the AKP's victory when Turkey proclaimed 2005 to be the Year of Africa, can be considered the beginning of a new partnership that has a renewed focus on Africa (Idriss, 2020; Özkan, 2010; Donelli, 2021).

Chapter two is a literature review that looks at the existing scholarship on Turkey-SSA ties. It summarises the extant theoretical and empirical literature review linking Turkey's new strategic engagement in SSA. Additionally, it points out areas of debate and disagreement while highlighting the current gaps in the body of knowledge.

Chapter Three is the methodology chapter, which justifies and discusses the entire approach and design of the research. This chapter discusses the research methodology, a structured, focused comparison, as well as the methodological approach, data collection and analysis techniques, and ethical considerations.

Chapter Four looks at the importance of the independent variables that were chosen, concentrating on how Somalia has improved Turkey's relations with it in terms of political and diplomatic ties, the economy, security, cultural affinity, and historical linkages. Before delving into the factors, this chapter provides an overview of Somalia's political, economic, social, and security conditions. In the first section of this chapter, I describe Somalia's political situation in the present day. It explains in great detail if Somalia's government is able to maintain control over its borders or whether it seeks foreign assistance for security, political, and economic support. A contextualization of the analysis of the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia is provided in the second section. Each component of the assessment provides a description of the model, nature, and goals of the Turkish strategy in Somalia. It highlights the knowledge gaps about how Somalis view Turkey's engagement in Somalia, reasons why, from Somalia's point of view, was the relationship formed? And whether or not the Sub-Saharan country benefited from the relationship.

Chapter Five focuses on the importance of the independent variables that have been chosen, with a focus on how Sudan has benefited Turkey's political and diplomatic, economic, security, cultural affinity, and historical connections. In the first section of this chapter, it outlines Sudan's current political climate. It describes whether the Khartoum government is capable of maintaining control over its territory or whether it looks to other sources for security, political, and economic support. The second section contextualises the analysis of the nature of Turkey's relationship with Sudan. Each part of the research provides a model and summary of Turkish objectives and strategies in Sudan. In the final section of the chapter, I therefore examine the empirical context underlying the controversial themes. I compare and contrast empirical data by piecing them together in order to fathom why Khartoum established relations with Ankara and if the Sub-Saharan nation has distinct political interests in Turkey's relations.

Chapter Six, with a focus on Somalia and Sudan, analyses the methods Turkey employs in its foreign aid model, including political backing, state-building, trade, investment, security aid, humanitarian relief programmes, and development partnership endeavours. Western and Chinese models of foreign aid are discussed in the first two sections of this chapter. The initial sections of this chapter provide an overview of foreign aid and its primary characteristics, which can serve as a comparison basis for extant foreign aid practises. The concluding section of the Turkish foreign aid model explains the Turkish aid model through the lens of SSA. How do SSA countries view the Turkish model? To demonstrate the SSA's explanation of Turkey's aid model, it compares the Turkish model to the established modalities of

Western and Chinese foreign aid. It offers a novel SSA perspective on how Turkey's new strategic engagement, particularly the aid model, differs from Africa's traditional partners.

Chapter Seven serves as the study's conclusion by offering an overview of the most critical analysis of the research findings in light of its aims and the value of its contribution. In addition, it identifies the limitations of the study and makes suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

The literature on Turkey's new relationship with SSA is extensive and expanding. However, most of the existing studies focus on the relationship from Turkey's point of view. The existing scholarship concentrates on Turkey's economic and security benefits from its growing involvement with the SSA countries. In doing so, these studies overlook to consider two significant issues. Firstly, they fail to consider the viewpoint and interest of the SSA countries who are partnering with Turkey in this new relationship. Why they accept Turkey's engagement and what they hope to get out of it are key questions that require answering if we are to fully understand these relationships and the likelihood of their endurance. closely related to the aforementioned matter, lies the inquiry into whether the Turkish strategy towards these nations embodies a genuinely novel approach, particularly in relation to the deployment of foreign aid, which is distinct from the traditional Western and subsequent Chinese engagement with Africa.

A 2011 study (AEO, 2011) across four multilateral institutions concluded that Turkey had become one of the most significant external actors in Africa. Mainly, the report focused on the economic and security dimensions of Turkey's new engagement in Africa and how the story of Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa became a success from a Turkish point of view. Similarly, Özkan (2010) and Gunay (2011) focus on the strategic benefit to Turkey of its bilateral relations with Africa, particularly how its diplomatic efforts raised its exports with the continent of Africa in terms of trade. Bilgic and Nascemento (2014) claim that Turkey, under the auspices of the AKP party, has emerged as a generous donor to Africa and expanded its areas of influence in the SSA countries. Demirci and Mehmet (2018) similarly argued that the economic and political relations between Turkey and the SSA countries have significantly improved

in both ways. Researchers have also studied the type of trade which Turkey has with SSA countries, noting that the Government of Turkey has moved beyond traditional government-to-government dealings, and focused on non-conventional foreign policy of helping its business organisations and other non-state actors to engage with the Sub-Saharan Africa (Ipek and Biltekin, 2013; Kaya and Warner, 2012).

The exact nature of Turkey's strategy and objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa remains a subject of discussion. Özkan (2016) found that Turkey's strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa took new shape between 2005 and 2015. He stated that Ankara's foreign policy strategy and objectives "began with a modest humanitarian dimension", but has changed "at an ideational, societal and institutional level" and now ranges across economic, social, political and security relations.

Akpınar (2013) argues that Turkey's initial step was to expand its diplomatic relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, opening embassies in both core and fragile countries such as Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. Turkey's diplomatic focus is something that has been heavily researched among scholars. Habiyaemye and Oğuzlu (2016) argue that Turkey's expansion of diplomatic relations was designed to "strengthen and legitimise its new relations with Africa" in order to secure the additional trade benefit of export markets and investment opportunities. That study also focuses on the role of development assistance to various Sub-Saharan African countries, and explains how Turkey is leveraging aid and development assistance as a foreign policy instrument. It concludes that the current strategy toward Africa is making Turkey a global player that can use its ideology and politics "at the service of its economic relations" (Habiyaemye and Oğuzlu, 2016).

Shinn (2015) argues that Turkey's foreign policy strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa "is driven by the region's growing strategic importance" Some suggested that this shift was prompted by the end of the Cold War. Dahir (2018) found that "the disintegration of the Soviet Union paved the way for Turkey to increase its outreach to different regions while still maintaining its traditional alliance with the West" (Hammoura, 2017; Hurriyet, 2018; Kalin, 2011).

Others, such as Langan (2016) claim that Turkey is reviving the strategy and objectives of the Ottoman Empire in representing Turkey as "a nation with a moral mission' and a 'civilisational duty'" (Langan, 2016). He further argues that argue that Turkish leaders, academics and historians want to draw upon Ottoman history to accentuate "shared cultural bonds cultivated between divulging groups of geographically distant peoples during the zenith of the Ottoman Empire" (Langan, 2016). Meera Venkatachalam (2019) concurred and suggested that this was driven by the fact that "After 1998, Turkish leaders needed to create a new 'personality' for the nation" (Venkatachalam, 2019).

On the other hand, other studies emphasise Turkey's business oriented strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ahmet Davutoğlu, a Turkish academic, politician and former diplomat who was the Prime Minister of Turkey and leader of the Justice and Development Party from August 2014 to May 2016, emphasizes that Turkey's soft power engagement is not only limited to diplomacy, or establishing new embassies in Africa. It also organises and hosts bilateral meetings bringing together the business communities and politicians of the two sides. Other scholars focus on the geostrategic objectives of Turkey and Africa's geographical importance.

Seale argues that Turkey emerged as a “powerful independent actor at the heart of a vast region that extends from the Middle East to the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia” and sought to expand its influence “using diplomacy rather than force” (Seale, 2009).

For the most part, the existing literature also depicts Turkey's new-found strategy toward Africa as a success story. Akca (2019) concluded that Turkey was "frequently portrayed" as an emerging regional power with aspirations to become a global power as a result of its economic and military advancement and the effectiveness of its contemporary foreign policy agenda, particularly in Africa. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations adds to this by noting that the economic and security development of SSA has "raised the regions relevance as a geostrategic location leading to a proliferation of foreign military bases, frequently accompanied by soft-power approaches such as investments by foreign companies". The study also found that Turkey's developmental and economic role in this context "has generally been positively received" (CRU Policy Report, 2019).

This review of the literature shows that, with few exceptions, the majority of research on the relationship between Turkey and SSA focuses on the motivations and interests of Turkey and/or the effectiveness and success of Turkish policy towards the continent from a Turkish point of view. For example, Elem Tepeciklioğlu and Ali Tepeciklioğlu (2021) focused on Ankara's soft power strategies, including public diplomacy, humanitarian and development aid, religious activities, and the economic and military facets of Turkish policy, including trade relations, commercial practises, security cooperation, and peacekeeping discourse. They examined Turkey's all-encompassing interest in the continent and its ambition to rise to prominence in the region.

They did this without addressing the other side of the equation, notably the policy choices available to different autonomous African nations. The preceding studies fail to address why the SSA partners embraced Turkey's engagement and/or how they benefited (or did not benefit) from it. There is a significant void in the secondary literature regarding why SSA countries welcomed Turkey's engagements and how and to what degree they profited from this relationship. Within the context of the wider academic field of Turkey-SSA relations, the research focuses on Turkey's successive cultural exchanges, diplomacy, economic relations, foreign aid, and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. It does not sufficiently consider the other side of the equation.

What we thus find is a one-sided analysis that explores Turkish policy in great detail but largely ignores that of the SSA actors. This is the gap that this study seeks to fill – examining the other perspective – the SSA point of view and why it matters. These countries have their own autonomy and we need to understand their foreign policy choices and what they hope to get from this engagement, in order to get away from the analysis in the literature which simply treats SSA countries as passive targets of the Turkish foreign policy. Hence, the study seeks to restore their autonomy and foreign policy to the analysis. It is, moreover, difficult, if not impossible, to understand how the relationship is likely to develop without understanding what the SSA partners hope to get from it.

Something else which is largely absent from the existing literature is the question of to what extent Turkey's recent policy toward SSA represents an innovation in relations between developed and less-developed countries or between aid donors and recipients.

The various studies considered above do not specifically consider Turkey's uniqueness when compared to the other global actors in Sub-Saharan Africa in a great detail.

Özkan, (2017), Donelli, (2018), and Cannon, (2017) are a few of the extremely limited secondary sources that have attempted to define Turkey's development model in SSA. Yet, Turkey's foreign aid model in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has not been thoroughly analysed and contrasted to Western and Chinese aid models. For example, according to Özkan, at the societal and state levels, religion and trade are the main forces behind Turkey's foreign aid policy. He argued that on the ideational front, there has been a fresh geographical imagination in Turkey that perceives Africa from a completely different perspective than a decade ago. Donelli stated that non-conditionality principle, a crucial tenet of the Beijing Consensus, is one of the factors that Turkey combines with two elements from the Arab model—religious significance and aid as an instrument for foreign policy. This makes it particularly noteworthy because it is not just a combination of the Washington and Beijing Consensus. Donelli (2018) conceptualised the foreign policy approach of maintaining a foot on mixed models of the West and South-South divide as allowing the AKP to receive one type of 'tangible benefit' from its relations with the West while simultaneously seeking others by distancing itself from the West. While Cannon explained the factors behind Turkey's nascent successes in sub-Saharan Africa. He stated that six important factors enabled Ankara's new approach to the SSA: the timing of Ankara's initial engagement, the capacity for risk of Turkish government and businesses, Turkish goods and expertise, the projection of Turkish "soft power," generally favourable or unformed views of Turkey in Africa given its lack of imperial baggage, and Turkey's highly coordinated and unilateral approach to engagement with African states and leaders, which

generally eschews joining forces with other alliances or international organisations (Cannon, 2017).

Nevertheless, when examining the developed-LDC relationship, there is a paucity of empirical research on whether the Turkish model is comparable to the old Western Aid models or the Chinese model (Hausmann, 2014; Davutoğlu, 2010a). Individual studies and comparisons of the Western and Chinese approaches to foreign aid are well-established (Burnside and Dollar, 2016; Liu and Tang, 2017; Yu Zheng, 2016). However, the question of whether the new strategic engagement of Turkey is different from either of them has been largely neglected (Hausmanns 2014; Tepeciklioğlu, 2018). Given that Turkey is not as rich and powerful as China and the Western countries and cannot provide as much as these countries in terms of aid we need to understand how Turkey has managed to be so effective in securing its strategic objectives in SSA and why SSA countries have been so willing to accept Turkey's development cooperation. The different academic studies examined above do not consider the question of Turkey's uniqueness when compared to the other global actors in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, a second objective of this study is to characterize and define the Turkish "model" and to determine whether it is different the existing Western and Chinese models and how and why that matters to the SSA countries.

The nature of the interests of the SSA countries in their relationship with Turkey and of the Turkish aid "model" feed into a third question, namely the durability of Turkey's new partnerships in SSA. Turkey is facing economic and social challenges when

dealing with LDCs, especially when delivering humanitarian assistance. Some of the studies show that Turkey's expanding efforts in SSA are facing new internal and external challenges (OECD, 2016; Shinn, 2015). Kutlay (2015) lays the foundation of this argument and identifies Turkey's socioeconomic and political tensions i.e. the unexpected devaluation of the Turkish currency against the American Dollar, the uncertainty of exchange rate and the problems of the domestic and Foreign Direct Investment as well as the "weakening bond and stock markets". A primary source of the financial service company of RaboBank (2016) also states that the medium term outlook of Turkey has faced the most pronounced risks because of the persistent and large current account deficits. It could also be argued that Turkey is not facing only internal economic and financial problems; it encounters external challenges as well. Cook and Ibish (2017) have argued that worsening diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Gulf Arab countries might undermine its expansion in Africa, mainly in the Horn of Africa.

Nevertheless, there is a limited focus in the literature on whether Turkey's strategy is likely to prove sustainable given the internal and external challenges facing Turkey. The existing scholarship has largely overlooked the internal challenges at home but, more importantly, by neglecting to consider the perspective and interests of the SSA countries it ignores a key part of the external picture as well. Not only are there questions over how long Turkey can deliver humanitarian aid, military assistance and invest in education and cultural issues, there is also the question of whether Turkey's model of its relations with SSA and the benefits accruing to the countries of SSA are sufficient for the latter to wish to maintain the relationship and to prefer or privilege that

relationship over the alternatives. This study will build on the existing work and seek to fill the above-mentioned gap within the scholarship.

In sum, the research questions to be addressed by this thesis are:

1. What explains the willingness of individual SSA countries to accept Turkey's new strategic engagement with the region? How do they benefit from their relationship with Turkey and what are the similarities and differences between individual SSA countries?
2. Does Turkey's strategic engagement represent a new model of developed-LDC relations (as compared to the Western aid model and the Chinese model)?
3. Does analysis of the current relationships Turkey have with SSA suggest that these relationships are likely to prove sustainable?

Chapter 3 – Methodology and Research Design

3.1. Structured, Focused Comparison

The general method employed in this research is Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison (SFC) (George, 2017). The approach was developed in an effort to improve upon the limitations of a single case study, which fell out of favour for being too particular, unscientific and non-replicable—alternatively, there was a lack of basis for systematic comparison (George & Bennett 2005, p. 68). SFC is a methodological tool designed specifically for comparative politics (Drozдова and Gaubat, 2009) It sets out a framework in which separate cases can be presented alongside each other in a way that renders their complex and diverse contexts comparable – making the multiple cases/comparisons as rigorous as possible, in order to draw out common themes (George & Bennett 2005, p. 68). To achieve this, it narrows down the basis of comparison to a set of key commensurate indicators. It allows researchers to engage an in-depth case study and provide rich detail relevant to other large statistical studies, without compromising the validity and sound findings of the research (Kachuyevski, 2014).

The aim of the method is to render qualitative case studies as scientific as possible by making them systematic in their analysis (Lauren, 1979; Falkowski, 1979). The researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective, and these questions are asked of each case. The method prevents researchers, foreign policy advisers and decision-makers from trusting a single historical analogy in dealing with a new case while at the same time aims to make multiple cases comparable by identifying common questions and variables to compare (George and Bennett, 2005, 58). It is used to construct comparable context and determine the relationship between

two or more variables of similar groups or conditions by comparing the two variables (Bukhari, 2011). The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined (George and Bennett, 2005). The method’s ‘structured’ nature is generated by the production of a set of standardised research questions to be answered in relation to each case, such that the plethora of historical and empirical material generated from a case can be pared down to that relevant to a fixed research aim (George & Bennett 2005, p. 67).

Once the relevant factors (variables) are identified, it is necessary to identify appropriate cases. It is of a great importance to simplify the variables in order to ensure that the chosen cases are comparable. SFC is designed to minimise the problems with multiple case studies by rendering compared cases as alike and comparable as possible and to control the difficulties associated with trying to compare different cases by neutralising the too many variables problem. It is to ensure that the comparison is valid and like is being compared with like by narrowing down the issues, actors, causal factors and other variables to a few particular vectors. In other words, the method helps us to avoid defining the problem too narrowly, or limiting its relevance and scope. Kachuyevski's (2014) case study of the Soviet Union is a notable example of the method's utility.

Kachuyevski wanted to explain why some of the various multi-national post-Soviet states descended into bloody civil wars while others managed to maintain peace. She therefore employed what is known as the “most similar method of comparison” because she sought to explain a difference in the dependent variable, namely the presence or absence of civil war in similar post-Soviet states. In her study, she

addresses the comprehensive summary of the previous research on the topic in order to identify the gaps of the existing scholarship, and find out what possible factors might explain the difference between those states that fell into civil war and those that maintained peace. Kachuyevski then generated a set of research questions.

Secondly, having established the research question one needs to identify possible explanatory variables. In the example here, Kachuyevski identified the balance of power between ethnic groups within a state and nature of the of the newly independent states' economic relationship with Russia (degree of dependence or autonomy) as possible explanatory variables.

Thirdly, once the variables are identified the next step is to select appropriate cases for comparison. Cases are chosen on the basis that they enable the analyst to test the selected variables as well as that they are representative of the overall class of cases being studied. Kachuyevski's appropriate cases from the available range of the Soviet Union were Estonia, Moldova and Ukraine. The key reason to choose these cases is because the cases have different outcomes when they come to violent conflict - they differ in the dependent variable whilst being similar in as many theoretically significant areas as possible, enabling the few differences to be analysed systematically in order 'to determine whether those differences explain the differing outcomes (Kachuyevski, 2014). Kachuyevski's chosen cases were similar in that they all included Russian minority groups fearing negative consequences in the newly independent post-Soviet states, weak central authorities and border disputes.

Although SFC can give the impression that the approach is a systematic, smooth and unproblematic mode of analysis there are some critics that warn against uncritical adoption of the method (Azarian, 2011). One criticism relates to the problem of over-determination/too many variables (Hellberg, 2017; Newton and Van Deth 2010: 407). Although the problem can never be eliminated, structured, focused comparison is designed to minimise such a problem by selecting as representative a set of cases as possible by rendering compared cases as alike and comparable as possible to limit the problem (Kachuyevski, 2014). In other words, having established the need for multiple case studies SFC is designed to minimize the problems with multiple case studies by rendering compared cases as alike and comparable as possible and to control the difficulties associated with trying to compare different cases by neutralising the too many variables problem. This is what the structuring and the focusing is all about. It is not simply to render comparison manageable. It is the best available means to ensure that the comparison is valid and like is being compared with like.

Other critics include Drozdova & Gaubatz (2009). Their objection is to the absence of quantitative analysis. They argue that SFC as a qualitative methodology, employing, in their words a 'simple visual or conceptual comparison' of cases, fails to provide the analytical guidance necessary to weigh the comparative causal weight of variables and risks omitting undetected variables due to the bias of the researcher, while overestimating the significance of certain variables for the same reason. In response Levy (2008) and Glaser and Laudel's (2019) observe that not all problems are susceptible to quantitative analysis. They stated that SFC, as a broad set of methodological commitments and practices, can be used in many different ways depending on the methodological tools it is combined with—from process tracing to

statistical analysis (as part of a mixed quantitative-qualitative study)—and it is the way in which SFC as a comparative case study process is combined with these other methodologies that gives the method its value. Regarding the issue of bias in selection of explanations Levy (2008) approves of the theory-driven nature of SFC. By letting theoretical themes drive the research, the ‘causal propositions’, logical inferences, author’s biases, and ideological inclinations are made explicit, while the theoretical research agenda is granted centre stage, rather than being lost in the complexity and multiplicity of analytical orientations. Specifically, addressing the issue of bias, Levy notes that all theories are biased - all one can do is be explicit about one's theory, so everyone is aware of it (Levy, 2008).

3.1. Methodological Approach

As previously stated, the research questions that this project intends to answer are as follows:

1. What explains the willingness of individual SSA countries to accept Turkey's new strategic engagement with the region? How do they benefit from their relationship with Turkey and what are the similarities and differences between individual SSA countries?
2. Does Turkey's strategic engagement represent a new model of developed-LDC relations from SSA’s perspective (as compared to the Western aid model and the Chinese model)?
3. Does an examination of Turkey's current relations with SSA countries indicate that these relationships (and Turkey's strategy) are likely to be sustainable?

To provide a solution to the first and second questions, SFC will be utilised. The data gathered during this analysis, which will include a systematic summary of the principal benefits and drawbacks of the two-way relationship between Turkey and SSA, will be used to answer my third question. In other words, the data generated from questions one and two will be used to help answer question three, taking into account whether the SSA countries are benefiting from and desiring to continue the relationship.

Starting with question 1, the first step in any SFC is to identify the variables and commensurate indicators of my study. In this case, the literature review identified several variables that might explain the receptiveness of SSA countries to the new Turkish engagement strategy:

1. **Economic benefits:** since 2005 a rapid progress has been made in Turkey-SSA relations in terms of both economic cooperation such as trade and investment, and/or development and humanitarian aid. The type of aid includes development aid, humanitarian aid, financial assistance, and technical assistance. **Hypothesis 1:** SSA countries are motivated to accept Turkey's engagement primarily to secure their economic benefits.
2. **Security Benefits:** Turkey has increased its security presence in SSA, constructing new military facilities/bases, signing military cooperation agreements, and providing military aid, training and arms sales. Given their relative weakness, and often facing potential external and internal security threats, SSA countries may be motivated by Turkey's ability to bolster their security capacity, especially in a context where Western states are reluctant to

provide security assistance. **Hypothesis 2:** SSA nations are primarily motivated to accept Turkey's engagement to obtain security benefits, such as security cooperation, intelligence sharing, military equipment, and training.

3. **Diplomatic Benefits:** By establishing embassies in over forty-seven SSA nations, Turkey has substantially strengthened its diplomatic ties in the region. This diplomatic recognition, as well as the possibility of having Turkey's considerable diplomatic weight on one's side, is one reason why SSA states may welcome Turkey's engagement, especially if they have few established or powerful allies. **Hypothesis 3:** SSA countries are motivated to accept Turkey's engagement primarily to secure the diplomatic benefits that result.

4. **Political Benefits:** Many SSA governments are ineffective, lack legitimacy, or face other political challenges. To the degree that Turkish engagement allows them to reduce those political constraints, it is a potentially persuasive reason for SSA states to welcome Turkish political assistance. **Hypothesis 4:** SSA countries are motivated to accept Turkey's engagement primarily to secure the political benefits that result.

5. **Cultural affinity and historical relations:** Turkey share a religious identity (Islamic branch of Sunni Islam) with some SSA countries along with historical ties dating from the Ottoman Empire. **Hypothesis 5:** SSA countries are motivated to accept Turkey's engagement primarily because of their cultural and non-colonial historical ties.

After determining the possible variables, I identified two situations that were similar. This study adopts a multiple case study method to achieve more robust results because one cannot draw firm conclusions from a single example and the correlations between Turkey and SSA may differ between countries. This thesis identifies situations that are similar in terms of the outcome/dependent variable since the study seeks to find the causes of SSA countries' willingness to accept Turkey's engagement. In this analysis, I focus on Turkey's ties to Somalia and Sudan. These two countries were chosen because they are the two countries in SSA with which Turkey has developed the most extensive relationships in recent years; as such, they are the two most prominent examples of the phenomenon under examination.

Both Somalia and Sudan welcomed Turkey's new relationship wholeheartedly. Both governments have allowed Turkey to invest their ports and airports, to build military facilities on their territory and to take the highest stake of economic and investment concessions in their respective countries. Other huge direct investments undertaken by Turkey in Somalia and Sudan include schools and hospitals. In these two cases there are thus extensive similarities in the dependent variable (the outcome). Both countries agreed to forge strong ties with Turkey.

In an ideal world, when seeking to explain a similarity in the dependent variable one chooses cases which differ as much as possible in relation to the selected independent variables, thus minimizing the number of potential explanations that need to be examined. In this case, however, that has proved difficult. Both countries show lots of similarities in the independent variables while their dissimilarities are quite limited. This reflects the fact that the members of the pool of potential candidates for this study such

as Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Kenya do not vary extensively in terms of the potential independent variables. Most are economically and diplomatically weak, face security and political challenges and have large Sunni Muslim populations.

It is therefore impossible, at this stage, to eliminate potential independent variables at the start and it is necessary to consider all of the possible variables order to determine whether, under more detailed examination, they prove to be significant determinants of each country's relationship with Turkey. Under those circumstances it was felt best to choose the two countries with the most extensive and significant relationships with Turkey since they are likely to yield the most detail in relation to the full set of variables and thus offer the greatest degree of insight into the Turkish-SSA relationship.

In order to evaluate the significance of the potential independent variables it is necessary both to further specify them and to establish a more detailed set of research questions that will guide the analysis of the specific variable in each case examined. For example, the structural variable identifies and measures the political status and the level of socioeconomic development, i.e., whether the states (Somalia and Sudan) in question weak, strong, or poor. This is to explain the vulnerability of the political and socioeconomic situations, and that might be the reason that led these states to seek relationships with an external backer to help prop up the regime. On the other hand, as derived on the literature review this could be Turkey's new foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, which might focus to make relations with the weak states such as the war-torn Somalia or politically fragmented Sudan rather than dealing with the strong states in Sub-Saharan Africa for economic, security and political purposes. In addition, it is also to explain whether the states in question share a positive cultural and

historical tie with Turkey that might sustain partnership. Above all, the benefit variables will also allow me to assess whether the states in question gained economically, and/or in terms of security and political/diplomatic benefits from Turkey's relationship, Turkey, established SSA relations to play a more important role on the global stage and to be more engaged in the international system. Since establishing connections with SSA, Turkey has made tremendous progress in a variety of domains, including trade, investment, cultural projects, security and military cooperation, and development/humanitarian initiatives (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019; Donelli, 2021). Using the same variables, this thesis attempts to determine whether those SSA nations also benefited from the relationship. These explanations give new insight on the SSA's acceptance of Turkey's relations.

Each of the independent components is described in depth in the five variables given below, along with the precise research questions that need to be answered to ascertain how important each component is to the three scenarios' relationships with Turkey.

- a. To spell out the political variable the emphasis here is on the political stability and capacity of the country's existing state or government. Is the regime/government stable or does it confront considerable political obstacles, and if so, what are the nature of these obstacles? Does the government have effective control over all its territory and the ability to successfully enforce its rule?
- b. The emphasis of the economic variable is the widespread poverty and/or economic weakness in the country, and if so, in what ways? Does it make

- a concerted effort to receive assistance and economic support from other countries? Has the economic situation of the country seen a significant improvement as a result of aid, trade, and investment from Turkey?
- c. Does the nation in question confront substantial challenges to its national security from either the outside or the inside? Is it able to deal with those dangers without assistance from other sources? Has the support that Turkey gave regarding security been significant? Is the capability of the country to deal with the security risks that it faces significantly improved as a result of the help that has been provided?
 - d. Do the people of this country and those of Turkey hold similar cultural and religious beliefs? Is there a historical connection between this country and Turkey? If that is the case, was the historical relationship favourable or unfavourable? What evidence is available to suggest that the country's policies toward Turkey have been influenced by its cultural or historical ties?
 - e. Is the country in question diplomatically isolated or weak? To what extent has Turkey provided active assistance seeking to reduce that isolation/weakness? Has that support materially reduced that country's diplomatic isolation/weakness?

3.3 Methods of Data Gathering and Analysis

Primary data was gathered from Somali and Sudanese officials working or in charge of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Planning, Trade, Development, Agriculture, Energy and Mineral, and other relevant government departments and agencies dealing with investment, international cooperation, and foreign aid.

In addition to conducting interviews with research participants, the study drew upon several primary sources. Firstly, it incorporated ministerial statements concerning the relations between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), encompassing business agreements, contracts, and related matters. Secondly, the research used interviews conducted by prominent foreign media outlets such as the BBC, Reuters, and Al-Jazeera, along with local SSA media and Turkish media agencies, featuring discussions with government officials from SSA countries. These sources included news reports and speeches where SSA officials emphasised their ties with Turkey, thereby outlining their expectations and aspirations for the bilateral relationship.

Despite the fact that only a few SSA government officials, mainly from Somalia, gave interviews in English, the vast majority of these interviews, speeches, and remarks were delivered in local languages. As a native Somali speaker, I was able to translate interviews conducted in Somali, and all pertinent data from interviews conducted in Somalia was utilised. It took some time to carefully translate and ensure that the meaning and objective remained the same; nevertheless, the interviewees were comfortable giving and explaining the interview in their own language. Even though it was time-consuming to translate and transcribe twice, the data provided was useful for the research.

The majority of interviewees in Sudan spoke English fluently; however, two interviewees, both government officials who witnessed the signing of two economic agreements between Sudan and Turkey in 2017, agreed to write down and explain

further whether Sudan benefited Turkey's economic ties. Both officials wrote their explanations in Arabic, which I was also able to translate due to my proficiency in reading and comprehending the language. To be more accurate, I also used Google Translation and subsequently asked them for feedback on whether I translated well. Both parties confirmed that the translation is correct. Moreover, Arabic was used in areas in which they felt that they could explain well in their own language. Fortunately, although I understand some Arabic, the interviews helped me write down areas in which they explained Arabic. The two officials written explanations were included in the data analysis. There is also some written news from Somali and Sudanese print media, radio, and televised shows (editorials, newspaper articles, debates, and public panel discussions) written/spoken in Arabic or Somali about Turkey's engagement that discusses SSA's perspective.

Despite the above, taken as a whole, both Somalian and Sudanese institutions lack extensive documentary evidence of their activities and decision-making processes. Official foreign policy archives pertaining to Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relations do not exist, and what might exist is not accessible to scholars. Various reasons can be held to account for this, including weak institutions and poor governance as well as the fact that centralised and authoritarian regimes have tended, as with their counterparts in other parts of the world, to keep their decision-making processes and any paper trails that might have resulted from them secret. Both Somalia and Sudan are plagued by significant challenges related to a lack of transparency and accountability in public institutions. The most significant figure who controls everything is the top official of a government entity. For example, government

ministries and other senior officials in public institutions have complete authority over the resources and information. They set policies and exclusively make decisions. Public institutions resemble solo performances - one-man-show.

Moreover, both Somalia and Sudan exhibit characteristics of oral societies, where the expression and preservation of their cultural heritage are deeply intertwined with their social and political spheres. Within the context of decision-making and issue evaluation by senior government officials, the majority of policies in SSA countries are not formally documented, with verbal communication being the primary mode of conducting business. At times, policies are merely formulated in the minds of government officials. In the case of Somalia, while a government official may articulate the desires of their country, the institution they lead lacks a written record of its priorities. These policy documents are not typically passed down from predecessors to successors. Conversely, Sudan follows a somewhat distinct approach. Although oral communication predominates in many transactions, significant matters are documented; however, access to this information remains limited.

Thus, much of the available information regarding relations between SSA and Turkey or other nations can only be obtained by speaking to the senior government officials in command of these institutions. As there are no archives to cite, the information available is the direct oral evidence from senior government officials in charge of a related institution during the Turkey-SSA relationship. Interviews with senior government officials from Somalia and Sudan, such as ministers, ambassadors, diplomats, former Heads of States, members of legislative bodies, and former senior

government officials, are therefore among the most essential primary data obtained and on which this thesis is based. Through my professional work, I have made contacts with officials from the aforementioned states as well as individuals who have served in diplomatic roles within these contexts. Leveraging these connections, I have been able to secure opportunities and establish initial contact even without physically travelling to Somalia and Sudan. Furthermore, as a diplomat myself, while some encounters took place during face-to-face interviews conducted in a third country, I successfully engaged with current and former government officials from Somalia and Sudan via Skype without travelling to Somalia and Sudan.

The primary foundation of this thesis relies upon an array of semi-structured interviews conducted with government officials hailing from Somalia and Sudan, thereby serving as the principal source of original primary evidence. In addition, a written questionnaire was offered to the participants as an alternative, especially for those who could not attend/participate interviews. I managed to approach senior government officials from the government institutions of Somalia and Sudan via Skype and a few of them in person. Consequently, I was able to conduct interviews with senior government officials in each country. In both countries, I managed to interview 43 incumbent high-rank senior government officials. Accessing government officials is extremely difficult, and the issue at hand is highly sensitive. Fortunately, my diplomatic career helped me approach high-rank senior officials and diplomats who were willing to share the information with a guarantee of anonymity.

The rest of the interviewees were former government officials, and people involved in the issue of Turkey-SSA relations from both countries, such as researchers, advisors,

and professors who work for both governments, businesspeople involved in Turkey-SSA business projects, analysts, journalists, writers, and commentators, all of whom have good relations with the SSA administrations.

This led to an increase of 14 interviews, bringing the total to 57. Originally, I was able to schedule interviews for close to seventy individuals in total; however, the pandemic led to a significant reduction in the number of interviews. I attempted to conduct Skype interviews, but many interviewees, especially those who were currently employed by government agencies, withdrew due to job security issues and other personal matters. They were opposed to having their images and utterances recorded. Alternately, a few were discovered on questionnaires. Even though I am well-versed in the code of conduct and set of rules outlining the norms, rules, and responsibilities or proper practises of foreign government officials and diplomats, I discovered during my research that approaching government officials and asking questions regarding political and foreign relations issues is extremely sensitive in Somalia and Sudan.

It is essential to acknowledge a number of limitations associated with the missing interviews. First, there are considerable limitations imposed as a direct result of the pandemic. Second, due to ethical considerations, I omitted security-related inquiries regarding the specifics of SSA's security benefits. Nevertheless, the reduced sample size had no effect on the required evidence. Significant numbers of senior government officials, entrepreneurs, and senior government advisors from both countries who were involved in Turkey-SSA relations were able to participate in the study, and their contributions enriched the findings. The 57 participants met the requirements for

obtaining enough insight. However, if the desired number of participants had been there in person, more additional information may have been gathered.

Those who withdrew were both Sudanese and Somali civil servants. Although I thought they were essential because they were involved with government agencies in charge of education, healthcare, and agriculture and were familiar with the available archives, they were not as vital as the highest-ranking government officials who engaged in the research. In addition, an abundance of primary and secondary documents about Turkey's support for education, health, and agriculture are available in both Sudan and Somalia to make up for the absence of interviews with these civil servant officials. However, there are areas where I would have liked to see more evidence regarding interviews. Due to ethical considerations, I omitted military-related questions from my interview form. I recognise that military issues may be sensitive, so interviewees may be reluctant to address the majority of their components. Nonetheless, several of those I interrogated via Skype divulged vital security information. I extracted and drew a thoughtful conclusion from the available empirical material and factual narrative by analysing the majority of the information in the analysis on Turkey's military establishment (military bases in Somalia and Sudan) from the existing primary and secondary data sources. As research can never be completely impartial, it is recognised that this limitation can only be partially addressed.

All the interviews conducted; I used semi-structured interviews. The importance of using the semi-structured interviews is to understand in-depth the nature of Turkey's engagement in SSA. As the research participants have different backgrounds such as academics, ministers, high-rank government officials, diplomats, businesspeople, the

semi-structured approach will help us understand the other actors' perspective – the SSA, other than Turkey. The format of semi-structured interview encourages two-way communication between the interviewer and interviewee. This allows a comprehensive discussion between the researcher and the research participant. It also helps us explore the experiences and the opinions of the research subjects so that in-depth information can be collected.

In other words, conducting interviews helps us understand the foreign policy choices of the SSA countries and what they hope to get from this engagement, in order to get away from the analysis in the literature review in which simply see SSA countries as passive targets of the Turkish foreign policy. It also helps us understand whether this Turkey-SSA relationship is sustainable and whether it is different to their versions of the aid model. Hence, the study seeks to restore their autonomy and foreign policy in the analysis.

The interviews have their limitations, however. For example, my interview questionnaire did not include questions related to military issues. Because military issues are a potentially sensitive issue, therefore interviewees might not be willing to discuss most aspects of it. Consequently, Turkey's military establishment (military Bases in Somalia and Sudan) can only be analysed through use of the existing primary and secondary data sources such as newspapers, academic articles, published government documents, policy briefs, politicians' statements that have made in the news or during speeches. The interview questionnaire focused on issues related to the research questions on the effect of historical and cultural ties, economic benefits, particularly, development aid, investment and bilateral trade balance, political and

diplomatic benefits engagement/challenges, humanitarian assistance and other social related issues. Despite the fact that I did not include military issues in my inquiries, few of my research participants brought up the topic of Turkey-SSA military aid. Although I deemed the security-related primary issues to be significant and utilised them in the thesis, the analysis of these issues mostly relied on secondary data.

On the other hand, regarding history and culture, it is difficult to measure the effect of historical and cultural ties in the same way as the other variables being analysed. To determine whether historical relations and cultural affinities contribute to Turkey's relationship with SSA, I will evaluate how Somalis and Sudanese view their relations with Turkey and seek to determine to what extent their perceptions of the historical ties between their country and the Ottoman Empire/modern Turkey and of the common religious affinities play a role in their attitude and policy toward Turkey.

Primary sources of Turkey's relations with SSA are quite limited. For example, the primary materials available that discuss Turkey's interactions with SSA in the areas of security and economic benefits are limited. This is due to the high degree of uncertainty associated with the actual data. For instance, I do not have access to some information regarding the aid provided for security, such as the level of military training, the quantity of weapons supplied to the government army, and the level of economic rewards – the actual figures the investment and development aid have never been made public.

Therefore, the research collected information from secondary academic scholarship, papers and reports from international research institutions and intergovernmental

organisations. Having gathered the data, the study employs qualitative data analysis of the interviews, and other policy material by decoding and construing to identify views held by SSA countries towards Turkey and other foreign powers in comparison. It also creates the comparative analysis of the secondary data that has been gathered. After gathered and collected the primary data on Turkey/SSA relations, I analysed each story to look for insights, and accurate of deep understanding about Turkey engagement in SSA Africa, while at the same time compared and contrasted Somalia and Sudan as case studies – the two countries in which Turkey established special relationship. The approach compares the empirical data by piecing them together and finding way in which the individual countries in Africa currently benefit from Turkey's new strategic engagement with the region and seeking to determine whether the Turkey's strategic relationship represents a new model compared to the Western aid and the Chinese development model.

Research Ethics

Research into Turkey's relations with SSA poses some significant difficulties. The political and security situations in Somalia and Sudan are not safe enough to conduct research about sensitive issues such as military cooperation or foreign policy issues toward another foreign country while you are on the ground. In this regard, conducting research about sensitive issues is impossible while you are in Somalia or Sudan. I have also detailed the strategies that I implemented in an effort to overcome these challenges. I acknowledged, for instance, that interviewees were reluctant to answer military-related questions; consequently, I decided to collect and analyse the other available primary and secondary data in order to elicit and draw a thoughtful conclusion from the available empirical material/factual narrative. In the course of looking for people to interview for my research, I came into yet another ethical dilemma.

I targeted government officials such as ministers, former heads of state, diplomats, senior political advisors, and other influential individuals who know more about Somalia-Turkey relations and Sudan-Turkey relations from both sides, such an endeavour posed a risk to government officials, particularly in terms of job security. Then I decided to conceal all government officials' identities. The most influential individuals, including former government officials, wished to remain anonymous and have their names and positions omitted from the research.

In this regard, it is relatively difficult to juggle two vital tasks simultaneously. The first is to protect my participants' identity while maintaining the validity of the research. As the ethical guidelines recommend in order to protect the identity of the participants for their future career and safety - see, for example, the Economic and Social Research Council's Framework for Research Ethics (ESRC, 2012) and the Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002), I decided to hide both their names and official government titles, instead assigning common titles like the minister, official, and diplomat. I conceal their organizational affiliations as well. It was a difficult choice to balance the need to conceal the identities of the participants with the need to acknowledge their significant contribution to the research (Giordano et al.: 2007). Due to the political and security situations in Somalia and Sudan, I believe it was necessary to make this concession in order to approach decision-makers who were familiar with the specifics and details of the relationship between Turkey and the two Sub-Saharan nations and to conceal their true identities as a result of sharing sensitive information.

Chapter 4: Turkey's Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Somalia

4.1 Introduction

The recent thawing of relations between Turkey and Somalia began in 2011 when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan travelled to Mogadishu with his family and a large group of business and diplomatic officials (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). The Turkish foreign minister indicated to the BBC that they aimed to dispel the notion that the city was off-limits. At the time of the visit, Somalia and the countries of Eastern Africa were experiencing the worst drought in sixty years. The United Nations estimates that approximately twelve million people are affected. Somalia, where five of its regions were experiencing famine, has been the hardest afflicted (BBC, 2011). According to a United Nations assessment, natural and artificial calamities, a ruinous war against Al-Shabaab, and the greatest famine in Somali history have killed 250,000 people (UN News, 2013).

Erdogan's historic trip was the first by a non-African leader to Somalia since 1993. It shattered the common narrative that Somalia, especially its capital Mogadishu, was no-go-zone due to the security danger posed by Al-Shabaab (Özkan & Orakci, 2015). According to Abdirzack, a former high-ranking government official who is now involved in Turkey-Somalia business relations and was in office when the partnership began in 2011, argued that Erdogan's visit to Somalia was crucial. He pointed out that "everything was electrified by Erdogan's arrival, which gave a tremendous message to the world and the Somalis who had been forgotten" (Abdirzack, 05/12/2021).

Although Abdirzack has personal business deals with some Turkish companies in Somalia, the majority of interviewed officials concur with his argument, which alludes to the role Turkey's leadership has played in bringing the plight of Somalia's people to the attention of the international community. Turkey's role in offering a successful model for humanitarian aid and development in Somalia is widely seen as vital by the people of Somalia (SucuoGlu and StearnS, 2016; Shire, 2019). Somalia and Turkey's development collaboration is multifaceted, spanning the military, the social sector, the economy, and the construction of physical (roads, ports, airports, hospitals, schools) and human infrastructure (Cannon, 2021; Shire, 2019).

This chapter examines the significance of the selected independent variables, focusing on Somalia's positive impact on Turkey's relations in the areas of political/diplomatic, economic, security, cultural affinity, and historical ties. The purpose of this analysis is to discover which independent variables play a more significant part in explaining the situation in Somalia, as well as which ones are either less significant or do not play an essential role at all.

Before examining the variables, this chapter describes the political, economic, social, and security situation in Somalia. The first few sections explain Somalia's current situation using available and accessible policy documents and reports from think tanks, written work from International and UN NGOs, secondary data from independent researchers, academic papers, mainstream media news, editorial newspaper opinion pieces, and most importantly interviews from current and former government officials.

The majority of the primary sources for the chapter's main sections come from interviews with high-ranking Somali government officials who have inside knowledge about the relationship's objectives, benefits, and constraints.

Due to their years of experience and positions of authority, the information provided by the senior government officials can be deemed useful, as they are aware of and comprehend the motivations underlying Somali policy. In contrast, politicians and government officials may have personal or political motives for supporting or opposing an issue. Therefore, it is essential to consider the political and personal interests of politicians and government officials. For instance, the interviewed politicians who currently hold office view Turkey-Somalia relations as strategic and vital, whereas others, such as members of parliament and some former high-ranking officials, view Turkey-Somalia relations as partial. In other words, the majority of government officials from South and Central Somalia support Turkey-Somalia relations, whereas officials from other regions of Somalia, such as Puntland and Jubaland, are concerned about Turkey's relations with Somalia and view Turkey's relations with Somalia as being centred on Mogadishu. This is due to Somalia's patrilineal clan system, on which the country's political system is founded. Each major clan administers and dominates at least one federal state, including Mogadishu, Somalia's capital city. Nonetheless, the majority of the officials interviewed were high-ranking government officials who were present and active in the establishment of Turkey's new strategic partnership with Somalia.

In the first section of this chapter, I illustrate the contemporary political situation of Somalia. It documents in detail whether the government of Somalia is able to control its territory or whether it seeks outside intervention for humanitarian aid, political and economic assistance, and security support. The second section contextualizes the analysis of the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia. Each element of the examination describes the model and nature of the Turkish strategy and objectives in Somalia. In doing this, it draws attention to the gaps in the body of knowledge regarding how Somalis view Turkey's involvement in Somalia and whether or not the Sub-Saharan nation benefited from the relationship.

For instance, the majority of scholars who wrote about Turkey-SSA relations overlooked the SSA countries' foreign policy choices. Previous experts regard SSA countries as poor countries that embrace partnerships solely for humanitarian and development assistance. They are primarily seen as dependent states with little to no autonomy or choice. While acknowledging SSA's economic, security, and political fragility, as well as the reality that such countries seek foreign aid, this chapter emphasises that these countries are autonomous agencies with their own foreign policy agendas and reasons for preferring relations with certain countries, particularly Turkey. In the latter portion of the chapter, I therefore examine the empirical context underlying the contentious themes. I compare and contrast empirical data by stitching them together in order to comprehend why Somalia established relations with Ankara and whether the Sub-Saharan nation has distinct political interests in its relations with Turkey.

4.2 The Current Political Situation in Somalia

This section establishes the empirical context of the political situation in Somalia. It provides an overview of the political climate in Somalia, beginning with the conclusion of the Cold War and continuing up to the present day. In addition to this, it sheds light on Islamist insurgency groups operating in Somalia and the role the United States plays in Somalia in terms of its war on terror. It also illustrates the multiple fault lines between the weak Federal Government in Mogadishu and the autonomous tribal and regional states in Somalia. This section will discuss the diversity of regional governance structures in Somali territories, which is highly challenging and frequently reflects a fragile and divided political system. It will demonstrate the extent to which the Federal Government of Somalia is dependent on foreign security, humanitarian, and economic aid.

The political system of Somalia is the product of the colonial administrations of Italy, the British and the French (Lewis 1988[1965]:40). Somalis were divided into five regions or territories, Italian Somalia, British Somaliland, French Somaliland, later known as Djibouti, Somalis in Kenya, known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Somalis in Ethiopia region, known as the Haud and Reserve Area (now referred zone five, or region five of Ethiopia). Italian Somalia was acquired in the late 1880s by the Italians (Heritage Institute, 2013; Blasberg, 2018), whereas the British Empire occupied Somaliland in 1884 and the French in Djibouti in 1884 (Adamu, 2009). In 1960, on 26th June, British Somaliland gained its independence from Britain, while Somalia, which was at the time the Trust Territory of the United Nations, officially the Trust Territory of the Italian administration, gained its independence on 1st July 1960, five days after British Somaliland (Omar, 2021). The two territories merged and

established parliamentary democracy under a unified single national identity (Kenning, 2011).

Somalia was a democratic state from 1960 until 1969 when Siad Barre, a Somali dictator who led the Somali Democratic Republic as president from 1969 to 1991, ascended to power through a coup d'état (Samatar, 2016). Throughout the 1970s, Barre fostered close ties with the Soviet Union, however, when Barre attempted to reclaim the Somali area of Ogaden from Ethiopia the Soviets opted to support Ethiopia. This infuriated Barre, resulting in the breakdown of ties between Somalia and the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States (US) established good relations with Somalia. In the late 1980s, following the Ogaden War, Barre's northern (Somaliland) policy caused civil unrest (Venugopalan, 2017). A bloody civil war took place between the central government of Mogadishu and the people of Somaliland in 1980s. The outbreak of civil strife in the 1980s led to the fall of the central authority of Somalia. Siad Barre's 21-year reign crumbled in January 1991, and Somalia slid into a full-scale civil war (Atalay, 2019).

As a result of the removal of Siad Barre, it became difficult for Somalis to unite under a single state and form a government as clans became fragmented (Tyndall, 2020). A civil war erupted, resulting in a crisis that harmed the population's well-being and eventually led to famine. Since then, the continuing power of armed groups of warlords has further aggravated the country's vulnerable condition. Consequently, the mix of social, economic, and political factors and the availability of weapons to civilians of different clans have prolonged the Somali conflict (Osman, 2007). In response to the continuous violence and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia, the United

Nations Security Council passed Resolution 733 in January 1992, imposing an arms embargo on the country. The ban was amended later to allow limited arms deliveries to Somali government forces (SIPRI, 2022).

Due to the diverse interests of numerous nations in the early 1990s, UN and US activities in Somalia overlapped (Hammond, 2018). Millions of Somalis were afflicted by years of regional strife and civic unrest. Humanitarian organisations provided food and medical supplies, and when supply convoys passed through regionally controlled areas, they were seized by local warlords. Resolution 794 of the United Nations Security Council approved all measures required to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies in compliance with peacekeeping duties (Kidwell, 2020) and the US military engaged in Operation Restore Hope – a famine relief mission that evolved into nation-building. Operation Restore Hope was the first major humanitarian military action of the Post-Cold War era (Hammond, 2018; Kidwell, 2020). The military effort was plagued with problems from the outset. The security effort was hindered by the absence of a national Somali leadership and the constant chaos on the streets of the capital city of Mogadishu. After a US operation in Mogadishu led to the death of 18 US military troops as well as hundreds of Somali militia fighters and civilians the new U.S. president, Bill Clinton, ordered the withdrawal of all United States soldiers from Somalia. One year later, United Nations forces pulled out as well, leaving the country in the midst of clan conflict (Hammond, 2018).

Since the withdrawal of the US and the UN, both the nature of the Somali conflict and the international context in which it has occurred have undergone continuous change. Clan factionalism and warlordism gave way to a globalised ideological warfare. Some

contend that the seeds of violent Islamist movements were sown from 1993 to 1999 when the chaotic environment in Somalia presented a new opportunity for foreign jihadist organisations, who wanted to globalise Somalia's conflict by supporting its extremist groups and importing extreme Islamic jihadists. In addition, the refugee flows from Somalia to neighbouring countries exacerbated the political instability of the region, while the allegiance of Islamists in Somalia heightened the fear that Somalia could become a safe haven for transnational jihadi terrorists to launch attacks in the region and possibly the West (Bradbury and Healy, 2010). In light of these factors, the international community's concern for Somalia increased, with a focus on the visible and repeated repercussions of these crises (EU Briefing Report, 2010). In 2000, Djibouti hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta. The 'Arta process' produced a Transitional National Government (TNG) that commanded some national and international support. However, In Somalia, the TNG did not continue the reconciliation efforts that began in Arta but instead aligned itself with powerful Mogadishu clans and the Islamist economic class (EU Briefing Report, 2010).

In 2002, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a Somali National Reconciliation Conference was held in Kenya in a further attempt to reconcile the warring factions in Somalia (Bryden, 2013; Bradbury and Healy, 2010). In 2004, the conference appointed 275 transitional members to the federal parliament. Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, a veteran warlord and former president of Puntland, was chosen president of the new transitional federal administration by the parliament. While the TFG was now the internationally recognised government of Somalia and enjoyed international support, it lacked both the capacity and legitimacy to conduct negotiations and it failed to improve the overall security situation, especially in

Mogadishu, or to provide Somalis with basic services. As more than 90% of the Southern Somalia was controlled by various Islamist and tribal warlord forces, Yusuf named Baidoa as the provisional TFG headquarters (Bradbury and Healy, 2010; EU Briefing Report, 2010).

In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) completely subjugated the warlords and took full control of a large portion of Mogadishu and other important southern regions of the country with the help of a strong militia that included the group that would later become known as Al-Shabaab (EU Briefing Report, 2010). The ICU was initially a loose network of Islamic Courts in Somalia that oversaw security and criminal management, where the latter (Al-Shabaab) emerged openly for the first time in 2006 as the most radical element inside the Islamic Courts Union's military component. In response President Yusuf called for Ethiopian troops to deliver his government to Mogadishu (Bryden, 2013). The fragile situation rapidly deteriorated in 2006 as Ethiopian troops intervened to protect the TFG. Despite the fact that the Somali President had requested Ethiopia's cooperation, thousands of Somalis took to the streets to protest the Ethiopian intervention (NBC News, 2006). After a period of power, the ICU was dismantled by Ethiopian forces (CISAC, 2019).

Al-Shabaab militants were not, however, eradicated. Al-Shabaab began as an autonomous organisation leading an expanding rebellion against Ethiopian military forces (Anzalone and Warner, 2021). Today, Al-Shabaab, or "the Youth," is a Somalia-based Islamist militant organization that controls Somalia's major towns and extensive swaths of the Somali countryside. The Al-Shabaab insurgency remains the greatest security threat in Somalia's war-torn country, and it continues to launch violent

operations against the African Union as well as civilians (Felter, et al. 2021). Its primary objective is to establish a Somali Caliphate of the Wahhabi Islamic sect in Somali-inhabited areas of the Horn of Africa by exploiting the vacuum in Somalia's failed statehood, and by using the Ethiopian and United States strategic interventions in Somalia as rallying points, and motivating factors among Somali youth as a driving force for recruitment and national discontent (Ali, 2008).

Following the defeat of the ICU, after two decades of state collapse, civil war, state, warlordism, radical Islamic control, and weak transitional governments, the international community helped Somalia form a federal political system and mapped out a path towards stabilisation, recovery, and reconstruction (Desai, 2019). Since the formation of the federal system, Somalia has received fresh international support, both politically and monetarily, as it implements essential reforms to end years of strife and provide a better future for its people (EU, Report, 2018). In 2007, with the approval of the United Nations, the African Union's Peace and Security Council deployed a regional peacekeeping mission called the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to Mogadishu and some of its surrounding administrative districts. The mandate of the mission, according to the official Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 (2007), documents signed by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union on the African Union Mission in Somalia, is to support the "transitional federal government structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid" (Musoma, 2021).

Moreover, the international community invested in Somalia's state-building agenda (Report, ReliefWeb, 2021). For instance, the international community sponsored dozens of conferences on national reconciliation in Somalia between 1991 – 2004 in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Egypt and Kenya, but none of these conferences produced significant results (Mukhtar, 2009). Again, in 2012, the international community represented by fifty-five Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, country representatives and international organisations met in London and discussed the political future of Somalia (Tran and Borger, 2012). The United States, UK and the European Union pledged support for the plan put forward by the United Nations, which outlined the replacement of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia with a permanent federal system recognised by the international community (Hirsch, 2012). Since then, the international community has provided more support for the reconstruction of state institutions, the improvement of economic resilience, and the reduction of poverty. Somalia receives billions of dollars in official development assistance (ODA), largely split between state building, humanitarian and development aid (United Nations Somalia 2021 Report).

Today's Somalia, formally known as the Federal Republic of Somalia (the self-declared unrecognised Republic of Somaliland excepted), consists of five federal member states and the Banadir regional authority (Mogadishu). For decades, it has been the world's primary failed state (Bouckaert, 2008; World Bank, 2005). The breakdown of the central authority and its prolonged war have caused thirty years of anarchy and lawlessness. The lengthy civil war, political instability, terrorist activities, trade implications on maritime insecurity created by Somali piracy in the Red Sea, and recurring famine have made Somalia one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan

Africa (Bradburry & Heally, 2020). Regarding famine, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies estimated in 2021 that more than 5.6 million people in Somalia could not fulfil their daily food requirements due to recurrent drought, flooding, conflict, and the impact of COVID-19 and desert locust infestations (2021, IFRC). Protracted conflict and the absence of a strong central government are the major causes of Somalia's humanitarian and security issues. The UNHCR estimates that there are one and a half million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia, while almost a million Somali refugees are in neighbouring countries. The majority of these refugees are located in Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2017). Hundreds of thousands of civilians, primarily children, women, and the elderly, perished as a result of the fighting in Somalia.

U.S. leaders mostly kept out of Somalia's civil war and restricted U.S. operations to targeting al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia, primarily through the CIA (Hathaway and Hartig, 2022). In 2008, the United States designated Al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organisation and in 2013, the United States military deployed a small number of advisors to Mogadishu to bolster AMISOM operations. Over the years, the U.S. advisory presence in Somalia grew as AMISOM became more effective, removing al-Shabaab from regions it held and capturing more of Mogadishu, allowing more civilian aid to enter the country. U.S. support for AMISOM intensified, with U.S. forces undertaking air attacks in what the Pentagon termed "collective self-defence" of its Somalia allies (Hathaway and Hartig, 2022). The United States occasionally conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab agents. However, al-Shabaab continued to adapt to pressure. It employed hit-and-run guerilla tactics against AMISOM instead of defending territory. With its severe justice system and toll collection, the group both

won over and intimidated local inhabitants. In stark contrast to the broken government in Mogadishu, the Shabaab system provided justice and conflict resolution, despite being ruthless and intolerant (Hathaway and Hartig, 2022).

In addition to targeting al-Shabaab the United States assists Somalia's security sector, which includes its military, police, and judiciary systems (Williams, 2020). The United States provides increased financial support to the AMISOM deployment in Somalia, according to the State Department Report on Integrated Country Strategy (2020). Since 2006, the United States has provided more than \$3 billion in foreign aid to Somalia. The United States trains DANAB, a U.S. training elite, at a U.S. military airstrip in Baledogle, Somalia (Iman, 2021). The airstrip serves as a base for Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia as well as Somali Special Forces (BBC, 2019). Turkey has also established its largest overseas military facility near Mogadishu, increasing its footprint in the Horn of Africa region (Al-Jazeera, 2017). The United Kingdom and the European Union also aid Somalia's security forces. China and Russia increased their presence in Somalia – both countries reopened their embassies trying to renew their interests in Mogadishu. The Gulf State countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are also competing forces in Somalia (ICG, 2018).

In addition to its internal conflicts, Somalia is currently embroiled in a regional conflict involving Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on one side and Qatar and Turkey on the other (Donelli and Cannon, 2021). This conflict in the Middle East is driven by competing ambitions to exert control over Somalia and its regional federal states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider Somalia their "western security flank". Somalia provides the UAE and Saudi Arabia with a major opportunity to diversify their

economies. Somalia is a vital port developing a strong bridgehead with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in a variety of areas, including real estate, infrastructure, construction, food production, and agriculture (Calabrese, 2022). Nonetheless, the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has changed due to the influence and rivalry of Gulf states. The UAE and Saudi Arabia both had a role in facilitating the recent rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, proving that Gulf leaders can influence their African counterparts to work toward peace (Donelli and Cannon, 2021). The spillover of Gulf power rivalry into Somalia, however, demonstrates that instability may also be sown in other parts of the region. Tensions between Mogadishu and regional authorities in Somalia had escalated since late 2017 when the rivalry between the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar spilt over into the country (ICG, 2018; Donelli and Cannon, 2021).

The fierce rivalries underlying the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) conflict have added a deadly new dimension to Somalia's instability. Competition between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey has exacerbated long-standing intra-Somali disputes: between groups in the city, between Mogadishu and the regions, and between Mogadishu and the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland (ICG, 2018). Disputes pitting the central government against competing factions in Mogadishu and against federal states and Somaliland might intensify as Mogadishu-GCC relations deteriorate (ICG, 2018).

On the other hand, Qatar and Turkey, whose investments and political interest are entirely in Mogadishu, are focused on assisting the Mogadishu government, not its federated regional states. The federal authority in Mogadishu and the semi-

autonomous provinces of Puntland and Jubaland have long been at odds and the Gulf crisis has further widened Somalia's divisions. The central administration has remained neutral to the chagrin of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while Puntland and Jubaland have backed against Qatar. Political conflicts between Mogadishu and regional authorities undermine efforts to strengthen Somalia's peace and security (Reuters, 2018; ICG, 2018; Max Security, 2015). All of these states provide support to Somalia's security sectors. Although the international community, for many years, has endeavoured to build peace and create political stability in Somalia, the conflict in Somalia seems intractable (Ali, 2016).

In 2012, for the first time since 1991, Somalia elected a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. The United States formally recognised the new Federal Government in Mogadishu on January 17, 2013, two years after Turkey established its Embassy in Mogadishu. The indirect election process was not clean because of corruption and bribery (Smith, 2012). Again, in 2017, another indirect election took place in Mogadishu "in a process marred by corruption" (Moore, 2018). Moreover, the 2017 indirect presidential and parliamentary elections had their own security challenges. During the election period, the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab increased suicide bomb attacks and assassinations to disrupt elections (Ali, 2016). Al-Shabaab is capable of disrupting and attacking Somalia elections anytime. The damage is greater without AMISOM.

In 2017, Al-Shabaab assassinated some delegates to the parliamentary and presidential elections (Kahiye, 2021). Due to the dangers of Mogadishu, the polls have been held in a strongly guarded building adjacent to Mogadishu's airport (Cannon,

2019; BBC, 2017). During the 2017 elections, the airport was declared a no-fly zone, and all vehicular movement was prohibited. All of the Somalia presidential contenders endorsed the 2017 election, including Farmajo, the former President, as well as the current President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. According to the Associated Press, Somalians welcomed Farmajo's election victory. However, once Farmajo's four-year tenure in office expired, the parliament granted him a two-year extension to remain in office. This culminated in the outbreak of clan-based violence between Somalia's army formations. The mansions of the presidential candidates were besieged by troops loyal to the opposition, and heavy weapons were used near the President's office (BBC, 2021).

Despite this economic, security, and political turmoil, the president sought to continue in office (Nor, 2021). Farmajo undercut the hard-won federal structure supported in by the United Nations and the international community (Majid et al., 2021; Hirsch, 2012). To boost his chances of reelection, Farmajo attempted to install compliant regional leaders in Jubaland, Puntland, Hirshabelle, South-West, and Galmudug (Majid et al., 2021). Although Farmajo was successful in parts of his authoritarian initiatives (Galmudug, Southwest, and Hirshabelle federal states), he was unable to enter Puntland and Jubaland, the two central federal states (Kalmoy, 2021). Since the conclusion of President Farmajo's term, there have been disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister. The long-term negative effects of Somalia's political and security development led to the lack of loyalty of Somali Security Forces (SSF) to the state, reliance on foreign aid, foreign intervention roles between the Federal Member States and the Central Government in Mogadishu, and the uncertainty of power and resource distribution (Mandrup, 2021).

In 2022, former Somali leader Hassan Sheikh Mohamud defeated Farmajo to become president in a ballot restricted to the country's parliamentarians. Due to security concerns, the voting was limited to Somalia's 328 members of parliament (Ali, 2022). Again, the poll took place at the Afisioni tent at Mogadishu's airport. The African Union Mission in Somalia's successor, African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), was tasked with securing the venue. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will face many pressing issues on his first day in office. This year's elections took place during the worst drought in forty years. According to the United Nations, six million Somalis, or forty per cent of the population, face extreme hunger. On the security front, Al-Shabaab, has proven to be a resilient guerilla force with control over large portions of land in the south and central regions of the country (Hiiraan, 2022). The gang is able to collect resources, either livestock or cash, from the local populace and utilise the territories as a base to execute operations against the Somali government and African Union forces at will (Hiiraan, 2022).

4.3 Turkey and Somalia Establish New Relations

This section describes and analyses Turkey's involvement in Somalia and how Somalia has benefited from its relationship with Turkey on all fronts – political, economic and security benefits. First, it summarises Turkey's rapid response to famine. Second, it highlights Turkey's political, cultural, social, economic and security involvement in Somalia - a multi-directional approach to humanitarian support, development aid, and security assistance in Somalia. In doing so, it intends to establish Turkey's strategic objectives in Somalia while giving new insight on what Somalia hopes to gain from the partnership.

In 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, now the President of Turkey, and his family visited Mogadishu for the first time (Durmaz, 2021). The stated purpose of the visit was to respond to the country's need for famine relief (BBC, 2011; MFA, 2015). Turkey came to Somalia to help during the famine when other countries dithered because they were unsure whether aid could reach the most vulnerable people in South-Central Somalia as Al-Shabaab ruled most of the famine-affected regions (Ahmed, 21/12/2021; Durmaz, 2021). Therefore, Erdogan's approach was excellent in its first impression as it came when other international donors hesitated to provide aid (Özkan, 2015; Siradag, 2015). His visit was historic and earned him moral praise (Cannon, 2016). Erdogan was the first non-African leader who came to Mogadishu and provided more aid to the most vulnerable people in Somalia (BBC, 2011).

The bilateral relations between Turkey and Somalia were lauded by two interviewees, both of whom were former high-ranking government officials from the foreign and finance ministries who were present during the establishment of the relationship. Both of these interviewees run Turkey-affiliated contractors and NGOs. They argued that Turkey responded to the crisis when Somalia was amid the worst famine. In addition, they highlighted the failure of the international community to deliver food to Somalia's most vulnerable citizens during the famine, and argued that Somalis embraced Turkey's narrative as a good companion and alternative because Turkey arrived in Somalia at the right time (Ahmed, 21/12/2021; Businessman. 1, 13/11/2021). Other high-ranking government officials, and now businessmen agreed that Turkey's arrival in 2011 as the catalyst for the two countries' improved relations (Businessman. 2, 15/11/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021). However, not all Somali officials believe Turkey's

engagement in Somalia was a humanitarian mission. Evidently, like every other nation, Turkey has its own foreign policy strategy towards Somalia, and relationships are always two-way – not one-way. A member of the Puntland Parliament (Puntland is a Federal Member State of Somalia), who is concerned about the economic and security relations between Turkey and Somalia and who believes that Mogadishu is benefiting enormously while the rest of Somalia is not, contends that bilateral relations should be mutually beneficial, meaning that all Somalis should benefit from Turkey's relations, not just those in Mogadishu and its surroundings (MP. 2, 10/08/2021).

Nonetheless, the people of Somalia, notably those in Mogadishu, regard Turkey as a friendly nation – and associate – that gives aid and collaboration due to its timely assistance. A prominent government official and former presidential candidate who firmly supports Turkey-Somalia relations argued that Ankara is not only the nation's best ally but also its strategic partner and Somalia's most reliable friend (Official. 2, 13/01/2021). According to Safer World and the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) research, Turkey's engagement in Somalia has grown in prominence over the last decade. Turkey surpassed the United States as the third-largest humanitarian donor in 2013 (Saferworld & IPC, 2015; Özkan, 2014). Turkey's quick response to famine and its common faith, Islam, history, and cultural ties enabled it to create positive relations with Somalia, which had faced decades of economic, political, and social hardships (Özkan, 2015; çöen, 2016). Since then, it has provided humanitarian aid and offered additional support to the Somali people and government (Antonoppoulus et al., 2017; Donelli, 2021; Cannon, 2021).

In addition, Turkey's involvement in Mogadishu has expanded and played an important role in Somalia's state-building, governance, security aid, education, health, trade and investment (Özkan 2014; Cannon, 2016; Demirci and Mehmet, 2018; Donelli, 2021). For example, Turkey's approach to state-building was considerably different from that of other countries. Since the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991, the international community has funded Somali national conferences to rebuild the Somali state. Several officials stated that the top-down approach was to blame for the failure of their initiatives. All Somali peace talks in Cairo, Djibouti, and Kenya have failed to bring Somalia to peace (Borrell, 2022; OCHA, 2000; Menkhaus, 2006).

Turkey's new approach to state-building, on the other hand, is entirely different. Turkey is collaborating with Somalia's civil societies and non-state actors, including religious groups, traditional leaders, youth, and business communities, to assist in the state-building process. Since 2013, Turkey has helped the government in Mogadishu in organising traditional chiefs' conferences and has attempted to mediate a peace settlement between the government and the extremist group of Al-Shabaab (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021: Official. 2. 13/01/2021; Official. 3. 30/10/2021). Turkey is also teaching business sector employees, government officials, and civil servants to strengthen Somalia's public institutions and governance (Stearns and Sucuoglu, 2017).

In other words, Turkey undertakes a wide range of initiatives to engage Somalia further and prevent emergency crises (Donelli, 2021; Kalmoy, 2021). Turkey provided training and capacity building to the government in Mogadishu (SucuoGlu and Stearns, 2016). It strengthened Somalia's important public institutions that support its long-term political, economic, social and security development such as government ministries,

police and military personnel as well as the Somali private sectors and civil society organisations (UN Staff, 1. 12/11/2021; Donelli, 2021; Cannon, 2021).

Although Turkey's engagement with Somalia was initially framed as a humanitarian mission, in reality it was designed to become a long-term strategic engagement in the Horn of Africa region (Donelli, 2015). Turkey understood Somalia's geographical importance as well as economic and security potential (Özkan 2014; Ahmed, 2021). A significant number of primary and secondary sources demonstrate Turkey's political engagement in Somalia differently - Emerging as a crucial player in international affairs, Turkey is having an ever-increasing impact not only in its immediate neighbourhood but also further afield (SucuoGlu and Stearns, 2016; van den Berg and Meester, 2019; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Donelli, 2021). Furthermore, most of the secondary analysis from Turkey's perspective indicates that the primary motivation for Turkey's engagement in Somalia is the desire for international recognition as an emerging force. Internationally, Turkey saw a chance to take advantage of what it regards as an emerging multi-polar world order, which will allow it as a regional power to display its strategic significance and flex its muscles (Donelli, 2021). Hence, it is unsurprising that Ankara has increased its political, economic, security, and social relations with Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the wider continent (Bingol, 2013; Sıradağ, 2016).

The new diplomatic engagement in Somalia allows Ankara to strive to reshape Turkey-Africa diplomatic ties (Jones, 2011). Turkey's engagement in Somalia aims to establish an international ally in a strategic spot close to the entrance of the Red Sea (Barkey, 2021). Somalia borders the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea region, one of the world's most active transcontinental maritime routes. More than 20% of the

international trading activities passes Somalia. In the Gulf of Aden alone, over 200,000 vessels, more than 80% "carrying most of the world's affordable" commodities annually, pass through this route (Johnson, 2014). Somalia has the second-longest coast in Africa and untapped natural resources, including iron, copper, coal, oil, and other industrial and gemstone minerals (UNSC Report, 2011).

The strategic location and natural resources of Somalia, if exploited, will be advantageous for the country. Somalia needs an ally like Turkey to assist in exploiting untapped national resources and establishing new trade routes despite the risk involved. Due to the country's poor reputation for piracy and insecurity, Somalis do not utilise the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, which are vital trade routes. It also failed to attract foreign investment in its onshore and offshore hydrocarbon blocks as well as its enormous mineral deposits. The majority of interviewees, including two officials from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources argue that Turkey can assist Somalia in utilising its natural resources and can become a potential trading partner, thereby transforming Somalia into an investment destination (Official. 3. 30/10/2021; Official. 4. 17/10/2021).

Moreover, a Somali government official, from the foreign office claimed that Turkey's engagement in Somalia is part of a more comprehensive strategic approach designed to broaden Turkey's economic development and international space from Turkey's point of view (Donelli, 2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Somalia's strategic position can play a pivotal role in Turkey's foreign policy strategy to Sub-Saharan Africa as an emerging force (Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015). Ankara perceived Somalia as a "special country that can facilitate Turkey's foreign policy strategy to the African people (Cemgil

and Hoffmann 2016). Somalia shares borders with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Gulf of Yemen, (the borderline between Somalia and Djibouti will vanish if the Republic of Somaliland is recognised). Somalia is the corridor and the bridge that connects the Middle East, Asia, Europe to the Horn of Africa region through the southern approaches of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, Bab el-Mandeb and the Mediterranean Sea (Marchal et al., 2000; Baniela and Vinagre-Ríos, 2012). As mentioned in the previous sections, Turkey developed relations with Somalia for many reasons. Ankara understands Somalia as an important country – a international security and trade route (çöğen, 2016).

4.3.1 Turkey-Somalia Historical and Cultural Affinities

The historical and cultural relationship between Turkey and Somalia dates back to the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. As a result of the Ottoman Empire's assistance and collaboration with Muslim kingdoms against the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires, the first ties between the Somalis and the Ottoman Empire were forged. This relationship appeared to be intended to protect the security and economic interests of the Ottoman Empire in both the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Abdulle, 2019). Although it is difficult to locate a written work from the Somali side defining the core objectives of the Somalis and the Ottoman Empire connection, as Somalis are an oral society, there are several poems celebrating the Ottoman Empire's power influence in the Somali Peninsula. The traditional literature of the Somali people makes it abundantly evident that the Ottoman Empire of Turkey travelled to Somalia in the past to conduct business with the locals, construct mosques and Islamic schools, as well as defend and aid the Somali people in their fight against the invasions of Europeans and Abyssinians. In other words, according to the Somalis, the cornerstone

of this relationship was the defeat of the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Abdulle, 2019; Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021).

Somalis, particularly the Ajuran Sultanate, a Somali Empire that ruled over large portions of the Horn of Africa and dominated trade in the northern Indian Ocean (Luling, 2002; Luc Cambrézy, 2001; Mukhtar, 1989), received support from the Ottoman Empire during the Somali-Portuguese war, and with the import of firearms, they resisted the Portuguese (Strandes et al., 1989). The Somali-Ottoman offensive was able to expel the Portuguese from a number of significant cities, eliminate Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean, and ultimately defeat the Portuguese. Then the Ottoman Empire continued to be the Somalis' commercial partner (Shelley, 2013). Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, successive Ajuran Empires opposed the Portuguese economic monopoly in the Indian Ocean by adopting a new coinage patterned after Ottoman coins, so establishing economic independence in relation to the Portuguese (Freeman-Grenville, 1970).

In addition, the Ottoman Empire maintained excellent relations with the Adal Sultanate, another powerful Muslim empire that dominated the Greater Horn of Africa region — the territory extending from Somaliland to the port city of Suakin Island in Sudan (Trimingham and Leiper, 1970; Owens et al., 2008). The Ottoman Empire supported Adal during the Abyssinian-Adal war (Newman, 1997). In addition, the Adal Empire maintained extensive economic and political ties with the Ottoman Empire (Salvadore, 2019). Under the peak of the Adal Sultanate (1415-1577) the Ottomans incorporated

Zeila and Berbera, the Somalis' two most important port cities (Akalin, 2014; Lewis, 1988). The empire governed and/or collaborated with East African nations but later encountered opposition from European colonial powers. In 1884, when the European Empires came to colonise the Horn of Africa region (British, Italian and French), the Ottomans finally departed from the region (Abdulle, 2019).

However, the relationship evolved after the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Among the factors that altered the relationship was the newly constituted Republic of Turkey's pursuit of a western-oriented foreign policy (Tepecikolu, 2012) and the colonial powers' partition of Somalia. At the time, it seemed likely that neither state had much to give the other. The establishment of two embassies for the two countries in Ankara and Mogadishu in 1976 and 1979, respectively, and Turkey's 10 million dollar contribution to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to the East Africa region during the 1984 famine marked the resumption of bilateral relations between the two countries but this relationship did not endure, as Somalia's government disintegrated in 1991 (Erol & Altn, 2012; Abdulle, 2019).

During the civil conflict in Somalia, Turkey supported international efforts to restore peace and ensure humanitarian supplies. It was a component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia. Turkish humanitarian relief organisations contributed worldwide efforts to ease the crisis in the country (Cannon, 2016). In the 1990s, Turkey's foreign policy underwent a revolution in which nearly all of its components changed (Dine & Yetim, 2012). As a result of this shift, the Africa Action

Plan was announced in 1998 under the direction of former foreign minister Ismail Cem (Sezal, 2016), and 2005 was marked the 'Year of Africa' (Yükleyen & Zulkarnain, 2015) as indicated in the previous sections. In addition, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's 2011 visit to Mogadishu and the reopening of the Turkish embassy in Somalia two decades later have accelerated Turkey's engagement policy in Somalia (Abdulle, 2019).

There has been a rise in the visibility of religious symbols such as the star and crescent at Turkish embassies in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Sudan. Images of this nature have established Turkey as a guardian of Islamic culture in many predominantly Muslim African countries. While these instances are relatively unusual in Turkish embassies around the world, they illustrate the peculiar nature of Ankara's participation with Muslim-majority African nations such as Somalia and Sudan. This indicates that links between Mogadishu and Ankara extend beyond those relating to politics, economics, security, and humanitarian aid. Somalia is noteworthy and represents an innovative aspect of Turkish foreign policy. Both the elite politicians and Turkey academics believe that Turkey's aggressive involvement in Somalia has highlighted its position as a new player with cultural affinity to Mogadishu. While the primary cornerstones of this new policy are humanitarian and development assistance and a significant emphasis on commerce, religion is a crucial and, in some ways legitimising aspect of this involvement (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Official. 4. 17/10/2021; Özkan, 2013).

In addition to official organisations such as the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), Turkish NGOs such as the Human Rights and Freedoms Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH) and the Confederation of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists

(TUSKON) actively contribute to Turkey-Africa ties. Ankara's participation in Somalia and other African nations demonstrates its desire to become a 'political' role on the continent in the future (and not just an economic one). This interest results from the previous engagement and a growing desire to affect structural concerns such as culture, religion, and history. The structural influence of Turkey will be examined in the following chapter (Özkan, 2013; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021). Nevertheless, religion has become a component of Turkey's soft power, particularly in Africa, as a result of the shift toward a multifaceted foreign strategy. Religion and history are subtle yet highly significant aspects of Turkey-Africa ties, with religion possibly playing a legitimising function. This holds true at both the national and societal levels. Until recently, the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs had little role in foreign affairs and was entirely concerned with the religious requirements of Muslims within the country (Özkan, 2013; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021). A substantial amount of primary and secondary data gathered regarding the relationship between Somalia and Turkey imply that Turkey is Somalia's unavoidable saviour (Abdulle, 2019; Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 27/10/2021).

Thus, in order to understand how Somalis view Turkey's new relationship, it is necessary to grasp the historical and cultural affinities between the two countries going back to the 16th century. For instance, Somalis hold the belief that the history of Ottoman rule over the Somali Peninsula was anti-colonial history. Throughout this period, the Ottoman Empire of Turkey supported the Somalis against the Portuguese and Abyssinian empires. Consequently, there is a perception that if Turkey and its empire aided Somalis in combatting colonialism, it is more likely that this new engagement will also assist the Somali government and people in recovering from political instability, economic difficulties, and security problems. The majority of Somali

political elites, including current and former government officials, who I interviewed argue that Turkey and Somalia relationship is mutually beneficial. During the Ottoman Empire, Turkey came to support the Somalis against foreign invasion while expanding its economic ties with the Somalis and the people of the Horn of Africa (Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 3, 27/10/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Hussein, 12/10/2021; MP. 2, 10/08/2021). Moreover, culture, primarily religion, supported Turkey-Somalia relations (Abdulle, 2019). In general, Somalis respect Islam as a culture, religion, and way of life.

Most of the participants in my research hailed Erdogan and the AKP ideology as independent and religious. The majority of those surveyed believe that Erdogan and his AKP party prioritise Islamic identity over secularism. They contend that the Muslim world lacks a leader and that Turkey and Erdogan can fill that void as the Arab World and other Muslim nations continue to struggle with internal political, security, and economic issues (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021). Though he cannot speak for the government and does not want his name revealed, a devout and conservative minister who believes Somalia should be governed by Sharia law pointed out why his country supports Turkey.

Turkey is not a zero-sum problem; every country has its own challenges; nonetheless, Turkey is an autonomous country, a developing force with its own influences; therefore, supporting Turkey and its leadership is something. Muslim nations require a role model, and I believe Turkey is that role model. Therefore, we (Muslim nations) must support Erdogan and Turkey (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021).

A diplomat and senior government official both from the foreign office concurred with the minister's remarks that "at least Erdogan succeeded in making Turkey an independent country that stands with Muslim nations such as Somalia, Libya, and Sudan." (Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021). It is worth noting that the vast majority of those interviewed voiced admiration for Erdogan's leadership style and his relations with Somalia.

In addition, during Turkey's election season, imams in Somalia pray for Erdogan and his party to win. The majority of Somali imams supported changing Turkey's government from parliamentary to presidential. Imams prayed for Erdogan and his family when they contracted the virus during the pandemic. They supported the elections and have recently begun to pray out loud in mosques for Erdogan and his party to win the elections on May 14 in Turkey. The primary argument for their support is that Erdogan and his party have made Turkey an influential nation; consequently, imams urge other Muslim leaders to follow in Erdogan's footsteps. For them, Turkey is a favourable nation, and all of my research participants support Erdogan and the AKP ideology. Somalia's official religion is Islam, and the overwhelming majority of Somalis identify as Muslims. Most adhere to the Sunni denomination of Islam and the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence; Turkey and the Somalis share this Islamic sect. Islam is inextricably intertwined with Somalia's national identity, providing a unified identity for all Somalis regardless of clan affiliations or cultural heritage (Official. 3, 30/10/2021).

Religion is an essential component for Somalis' daily lives. In Somalia, for instance, the concept of a "non-practicing Muslim" is extremely uncommon; everyone is

expected to practice the religion to some degree (Evason, 2017). Religion is a facet of Turkey-SSA relations that the AKP in Turkey understands well. Turkey employed religion as a tactic. In the eyes of many Somalis, the Turkish flag represents Islam because the crescent moon is viewed as an Islamic symbol, despite the fact that the crescent moon and star symbols have historically been employed in a variety of cultural contexts. Nonetheless, a number of Somali officials also shared this with me, emphasising the need for Muslim communities and the governments to support each other. A former government official who worked in Somalia's departments of cultural and religious affairs insisted that Turkey's relations are essential not only for the two peoples of Somalia and Turkey, but also for the Islamic world: "we must strengthen our ties with the Muslim world. They are our siblings, and we must support each other" (Official. 5, 18/04/2021). In this instance, it could be argued that Turkey's non-colonial background during the Ottoman Empire, as well as the AKP's Islamist philosophy, improve Turkish-Somali relations. Somalia welcomed Turkey given that its elites view Turkey as a big Muslim brother who came to support Somalia, or at least because its bilateral relations are founded on mutual benefit. In this context, history and culture cannot be measured as a benefit in and of themselves; however, they have become a tool that has contributed to the very foundations of Turkey-Somalia's good relations (Özkan, 2013; Cannon, 2016).

4.3.2 Turkey's Political and Diplomatic Support

Somalia's current political relationship with Turkey is strong. Both nations have maintained cordial ties and established diplomatic infrastructure in their respective capitals (Sanei, 2013; Warsame, 12/11/2021). Somalia's political leaders believe they

can "return to the world scene" with Turkey's help (Ahmed, 2021). Turkey supported Somalia's Transitional Federal Government when it was weak and unrecognized (MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2013; Siradag, 2015). Ankara funded Somalia's peace and state-building efforts (Aknipar, 2013). Turkey has supported Somalia and advocated UN reform, saying it serves a few states' interests (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Turkey highlighted Somalia's insecurity and starvation in a September 2011 UN General Assembly presentation. In 2011, Turkey became the first non-African country to appoint a new ambassador to Somalia in more than two decades. Turkey acknowledges that the "Somalia crisis" is having an unfavourable impact on both the region and the world. This policy is a geopolitical realization that any peace in Somalia will be temporary if the regional balance is not restored. At the Fifth Annual Meeting of Ambassadors in Ankara on January 2, 2013, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced a coordinated approach for tackling Eastern Africa's political challenges. Davutoglu highlighted Ankara's diplomatic efforts to alleviate tensions with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia (Bakanlarm, 2013; Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Turkey is the only country in the region with diplomatic representation in every country (Shinn, 2015; Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Turkish intervention in "crisis zones" was called "humanitarian" (Davutolu 2013: 866–867). Turkey's massive push into Africa was made feasible by Western failures in the region, especially in Somalia, a "failed state." China's colonial dominance in Africa prompted it (Antonopoulos et al., 2017).

Notably, Turkey and Somalia have distinct perspectives regarding the significance of political relations to each nation. The Turkish government's aim is to maximise the country's potential as a rising global power, and to that end, Turkey is aiding Somalia in

multiple ways (Donelli, 2021). Ankara's political approach to Somalia, particularly Mogadishu and the south-central regions, is divided into three parts: reconstruction, humanitarian/development and peacebuilding. According to the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu, Olgan Bekar,

Peacebuilding and nation-building in Somalia require an all-encompassing strategy. This holistic approach necessitates a humanitarian approach, political engagement, security assistance, and development assistance. A solely humanitarian approach to chronic war zones and conflict-affected nations provides only a temporary answer. Aiding impacted nations concurrently and in conjunction with long-term development, measures strengthen the resilience and capacity of the beneficiaries. This minimises the vulnerability and strengthens the capacity of the recipient local actors to respond independently to humanitarian crises over the long run (Bekar citing in Rising Powers Conference, 2016).

Ambassador Bekar's predecessor in Mogadishu, Dr Kani Torun, likewise emphasises the importance of state-building for peace in Somalia:

State construction is crucial because I have witnessed the devastation that might ensue from a civil war in the absence of a functional State building was our first concern, and we worked closely with the government to change how it functioned. The security area was one in which we collaborated closely with the government. Turkey collaborated with the police and military to construct robust security units to ensure

safety. There will be security investment and other developments. Even aid is connected to safety (Torun, cited in Rising Powers Conference, 2016).

The holistic approach of the Turkish government comprises numerous projects beyond political and diplomatic support. This involves infrastructure repair, such as buildings, institutional capacity building, community social service support, and direct engagement in social relations via education projects and cultural events (Dal and Dipama, 2022). Turkey, for example, renovated critical infrastructure such as Mogadishu's referral hospital and repaired Maka al-Mukarama, Mogadishu's main road that runs through the heart of the capital city. Turkey also provides a significant number of Türkiye burslar (Turkish Scholarship) and civil servant training courses to Somalia's public institutions on an annual basis (Prof. 1, 12/11/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Official. 4. 17/10/2021).

Prior to Turkey's 2011 arrival in Somalia and the implementation of its multi-phased assistance model, the majority of Mogadishu's streets were severely damaged and riddled with potholes. After decades of conflict, war, and destruction, the streets of Mogadishu are currently in much improved condition. In Mogadishu and Somalia, the Turks construct much more than roads, schools, hospitals, ports, and airports. The private construction sector in Somalia presented an opportunity for Turkish midsize companies. In Mogadishu, Turkish companies have begun to construct private residences. Since 2013, construction companies in Turkey have constructed villas, private residences, and four- to five-story buildings (Farhan et al. 2022).

4.4 The Current Security Situation in Somalia

As mentioned above, Somalia is currently experiencing severe levels of political instability and clan separation. The previous and current authorities of the country have failed to bring Somalis peace and stability (African News, 2021). While the political crisis is a possible source of insecurity and conflict, endemic forms of insecurity continue to pose the greatest threat. The ongoing threat presented by Al-Shabaab is of the utmost importance (Menkhaus, 2021). According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the group "remains the primary security threat in war-torn Somalia" (Klobucista et al., 2021; CFR, 2021). Nevertheless, while Al Shabab is the most obvious and threatening source of insecurity in Somalia, it is not the only one. In reality, Somalia's political and security landscape is heavily influenced by a multiplicity of variables and actors determining the control and use of violence. Among these, the clan system and clan militias continue to be an important "explanatory force in Somali politics, society, and economics" (Majid et al., 2021; European Asylum Support Office Report, 2021; ACLED Report, 2019).

Moreover, external players have also contributed to insecurity in Somalia by engaging in rivalries through Somali proxies (Menkhaus, 2021). This is particularly true regarding the connection between the Federal Government of Somalia and the newly formed Federal Member States, as well as their engagement with the numerous international entities operating in the Somali context (notably AMISOM, United States Africa Command, Kenya, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Gulf states). Another primary source of insecurity and mortality in the Somali context is the clan-based struggle for resources, particularly in rural regions (European Asylum Support Office Report, 2021).

The Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia or ISS), with its base in Puntland, remains an additional source of insecurity in the Somali environment (Reliefweb, 2021). Numerous state and non-state armed actors are present in Somalia. According to Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Somali security expert, "more than 60 warring parties are present in the nation, ranging from clan and warlord militias to various other terrorist groups," including the Islamic State in Somalia (Felbab-Brown, 2020).

Regional security forces (AMISOM) and other international actors have been criticised for failing to achieve their mandated goals of creating space for peace and stability in Somalia, for not adapting and reconfiguring themselves adequately to meet the security challenges at hand, and for being too static and reactive. Somalia continues to consist primarily of protected islands surrounded by a "sea" of insecure areas outside metropolitan centres. Al-Shabaab continues to have a relatively high level of legitimacy, and it uses strategic communication and social media to promote its Somali-nationalist, jihadist narrative (Mandrup, 2021).

Somalia's political impasse has hindered the development of efficient security forces and coordinated responses to the insurgent threat. For instance, the 2022 military confrontations between government-controlled forces and Jubaland security forces illustrate the mistrust between the government in Mogadishu and the Federal Member States. Due to the absence of an efficient security sector in Somalia, the Somalis have been unable and unwilling to assume security responsibilities from AMISOM as stipulated in the Somali Transition Plan (STP). They are unlikely to be able to do so in the near to medium term (Mandrup, 2021).

4.4.1 Turkey-Somalia Security Cooperation.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which has been in power in Turkey since 2002, accords Somalia a prominent place in its security policy. Since 2012, the Turkish government has trained hundreds of Somali military and police in Ankara and Mogadishu and in 2017, Turkey opened its most extensive military base abroad in Somalia. The importance of Turkey's attempts to permanently establish security facility in Somalia for its future trade and economic relations in this nation cannot be overstated (Siradag, 2022). According to Cannon, the Turkish military complex should not be viewed as the usual Western military presence in Africa (Cannon, 2021). The majority of Western military stations in Africa do not offer military training to African soldiers (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019, 169-171). In addition, since 2009, Turkey has maintained a naval force in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia, and the Arabian Sea in partnership with the United Nations to safeguard Turkish business vessels, deter pirate activity, and end violent robbery in these places (Siradag, 2022). This section will further explain the importance of Turkey's direct security assistance. From the SSA perspective, the first part of this section will emphasize the arms embargo imposed on Somalia that prohibits Mogadishu from purchasing or receiving the supply of arms from all states. It explains that, despite the arms embargo, Turkey is constructing military installations in Somalia and is committed to building and assisting national militaries in sub-Saharan Africa (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; MP. 2, 10/08/2021 Official. 1, 13/01/2021).

Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been plagued by civil conflict, terrorism, and the lack of an effective military. In this regard the United Nations

Security Council imposed an open-ended arms embargo on Somalia in response to the continuous violence and deteriorating humanitarian circumstances in 1992 (Sipri, 2018; UNSC, 1992, cited UNSC Website). Since 2021, the Council has adopted more than a dozen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) about the continued instability, tension, and bloodshed in Somalia, as well as the repeating incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast (UNSC, 1992, cited UNSC Website).

The resolutions included an annex with a list of numerous categories of military equipment whose transfer to the Federal Government of Somalia always required prior clearance from the Sanctions Committee. Surface to Air Missiles; guns, howitzers, and cannons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm and their ammunition and components; mortars with a calibre more significant than 82 mm; anti-tank guided weapons; charges and devices designed for military use containing energetic materials; and weapon sights with a night vision capability are included in the annex. The resolution does not explain why these things were chosen, and the phrasing used in the annex creates difficulties. For example, "charges and devices intended for military use that contain energetic elements" encompass conventional ammunition. Second, Resolution 2111 reiterated that in the absence of an adverse judgement by the Sanctions Committee, the supply of weapons intended merely to assist in the development of Somali security sector institutions was permitted (Sipri, 2018; UNSC, 1992, cited UNSC Website).

In contrast to earlier resolutions, the Federal Government of Somalia is now responsible for ensuring that the Sanctions Committee is notified at least five days in advance of the delivery of weapons, military equipment, assistance, and training to the

Federal Government of Somalia's security forces. Lastly, the resolutions prohibited the Federal Government of Somalia from transferring firearms to any business or person who is not a member of its security forces. The failure of the resolutions to establish the term "in service of its security forces" is problematic in light of the informal relationships between the armed militias of the Federal Government of Somalia. The resolutions did, however, require the Federal Government of Somalia to report to the UN Security Council on its security forces' organisation, as well as the infrastructure and processes for securing its arms stores (Sipri, 2018; UNSC, 1992, cited UNSC Website).

In March 2014, Resolution 2142 of the Security Council renewed the overall weapons embargo against Somalia and extended the provisions pertaining to the provision of weaponry to the Somali government until October 25, 2014. In October 2014, Resolution 2182 of the Security Council renewed the overall weapons embargo against Somalia and extended the provisions pertaining to the provision of weaponry to the Somali government until October 30, 2015. It also authorised governments, for a period of twelve months, to inspect in Somali waters or on the high seas vessels destined for Somalia that they have reasonable grounds to believe are transporting armaments to Somalia in contravention of the arms embargo. The UN Security Council also decided to require explicitly that states prevent the supply of a list of specified explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology to Somalia if there is sufficient evidence or a significant risk that they will be used in the production of improvised explosive devices. Since then, the embargo has been extended annually and will remain in effect until November 15, 2023 (Sipri, 2018; Reliefweb, 2023; UNSC, 1992, cited UNSC Website).

Despite the United Nations Security Council's arms embargo, Turkey is constructing military installations in Somalia and is committed to building and assisting national militaries in sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey has received repeated warnings from the U.N. Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) for violating the arms embargo by arming Somali police forces without first notifying SMEG and gaining its approval (Ahmed, 2021). UN investigators were called in when a Turkish maritime business delivered military trucks to Somalia in April 2021 without informing the organisation about compliance with sanctions (Bozkurt, 2022). In 2021, a ship carrying trucks to Somalia departed from Turkey and travelled to Mogadishu via the Suez Canal, Saudi Arabia. The corporation and the Turkish government did not inform them about the cargo, according to the Panel of Experts on Somalia of the UN Security Council. In order to determine if the supply in 2021, conformed with UN arms embargo regulations, the panel requested information from Istanbul (Bozkurt, 2022). Other countries that support Somalia's national army, on the other hand, only provide small arms and light weaponry, but Turkey is heavily arming and training SNA units with Turkish-made weapons (Ahmed, 2021). Therefore, the public's acceptance of Turkey as Somalia's strategic ally, the recently strengthening economic/trade ties, the shared Islamic identity, the historical ties, the successful humanitarian assistance model, the international community's consensus to reestablish Somalia's security forces, and the rivalry between regional powers in Somalia are viewed as determining factors in accelerating Turkey-Somalia relations (Gurpinar and Abdulle, 2019; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

In this regard, Turkey desires to create a military base in Somalia in order to train the Somali troops (Nassir, 2017). From the perspective of Mogadishu, the camp will play a vital role in reinforcing Somali military capabilities, thereby contributing to the restoration of the security of the Somali people (Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Although I did not include security questions in my research due to ethical concerns, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, there are a few government officials who argue that one of the major reasons why this relationship became successful, or was accepted in the first place was that Turkey promised and committed to building the Somali National Army in 10 years (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021 Diplomat. 3, 24/11/2022; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Official 2, 13/01/2021). On the other hand, from Turkey's standpoint, the camp's military presence will increase Turkey's credibility as a significant actor in the region's security (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

In 2015, the building of the Turkish military training complex or "base" commenced and on September 30, 2017, Turkey inaugurated the massive military training facility in Mogadishu. According to Turkish and international media, the facility is Turkey's largest foreign military base outside Turkey (2019, Rossiter and Cannon). At the inaugural ceremony, then-Turkish Chief of Staff and current Defence Minister Hulusi Akar claimed that the facility's primary purpose is to train the Somali armed forces and that "this facility would enhance Turkish efforts to ensure regional and worldwide peace and security." In addition, the Somalian Prime Minister emphasised at the inauguration that this base is part of a larger strategy to reconstitute Somalia's army. It is anticipated that the base will train roughly 10,000 Somali forces, with the potential

to train 1,000 men at once. 200 to 300 Turkish soldiers will conduct the instruction (Rossiter & Cannon, 2018).

When Ankara established relations with Mogadishu, security was never missing from any Turkish initiative in Somalia, as Somalia's strategic location and the threat of piracy were always determining factors in the bilateral relationship. Turkey's security interests in Somalia existed prior to Erdogan's visit in 2011, a conclusion that can be reached from the 2010 Military Training Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, which went into effect in 2012 (Turkish Official Gazette, 2011). Participation in the Joint Security Committee meetings, where the Somali government and its international partners coordinated the security sector reform, was another indication of Turkey's determination to become involved in the security of Somalia (Crisis Group, 2012). Wasuge (2016) claims that as of February 2016, Turkey and Somalia had signed or were in the process of negotiating at least fifteen bilateral accords. Turkey looks set on investing in its economic and security links with Somalia for the long haul (Abdulle, 2019). Such an engagement requires a robust military presence on the ground, especially in a country where foreign actors are attempting to exploit weak governmental institutions and state fragmentation (Gurpinar and Abdulle, 2019).

In light of these circumstances, Turkey has contributed to multiple Somali security parameters; it has pledged to contribute to Somalia's military reestablishment and the training of its personnel, and it has signed a number of military training and security cooperation agreements with Somalia since 2009 (Gurpinar and Abdulle, 2019). Turkey appears to be committed to building and helping the Somali National Army defeat Al-Shabaab and establish lasting peace and political stability to boost the

national protection of Somali citizens and the mechanisms of national defence (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Turkey is, moreover, the only foreign country that has made such a commitment. Turkey has also signed several security training pacts with the government of Somalia, including the police and the military (Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015). The two national armies will also agree to share intelligence information to counter maritime insecurity (Diplomat. 3, 24/11/2022; Official 2. 13/01/2021). In the security sector, Turkey is the prime partner of Somalia alongside the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom (Donelli, 2021).

Nevertheless, while there is a hierarchical connection between Turkey and Somalia, the deployment of Turkish military forces cannot be adequately comprehended without considering what Somalia seeks to gain from their presence (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). As Somalia is a fractured nation, and its national army was established with the formation of the first Transitional Federal Government, which resulted from an agreement to merge the militias of various warring factions, the SNA remains a highly fragmented force. Poor training, lack of financing, and pervasive corruption weakened the effectiveness of the SNA (Williams, 2016; 2017; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). Over the past decade, Somali troops have been trained in various countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and by various countries and multinational organisations, such as the United States and the European Union (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019; Backhaus and Korge, 2012; Backhaus and Korge, 2013). It may be argued that the SNA and other Somali security organisations have become even more fragmented as a result of this piecemeal approach to training. There is evidence that some Somali security forces function under the supervision of

their foreign trainers than under the control of the country's elected officials in Mogadishu (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). The SNA's capacity for security and training was weakened by the presence of armed groups organised along clan lines and controlled by outside parties and Somali political elites, as well as by the ongoing UN arms embargo (Prof. 1, 12/11/2021; SIPRI, 2022; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

The Somali government enthusiastically accepted Turkey's offer to train the SNA under a consistent curriculum and provide the force with similar (Turkish) equipment in light of the circumstances mentioned above, particularly the fragmented manner in which various parties have provided security assistance in Somalia and AMISOM's impending departure (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

Nonetheless, a senior government official from the security department, specifically the division in command of Turkey-Somalia security cooperation stated that Turkey's military equipment and training are far superior to what other countries provided to Somalia (Rep. 3, 23/10/2021; Diplomat. 3, 24/11/2022). More than any other of Somalia's foreign sponsors, Turkey has made a long-term commitment to the country's security and stability. Turkey has expressed its understanding of the need for a truly national army and, concurrently, signaled its willingness to provide such training, in contrast to earlier training efforts that were brief and restricted to the training of small military units (Gelle, 2017, Minister Remarks, cited in Sözcü; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). Political leaders and elites in Mogadishu argue that Turkey's efforts to construct a military training facility have been largely successful (Rep. 3, 23/10/2021; Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021). Despite receiving millions of dollars from nations like the United States and the United Kingdom, the Somali Minister of Information

claims that Somalia has never experienced this. Turkey's constructed camp is an institution that will last for 50 to 100 years, which is the difference (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019; Official. 1, 13/01/2021). This will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Turkey and Somalia's security cooperation is an integral part of their bilateral relationship. Somali elites, especially those who wield some type of authority or influence, recall when Somalia was a regional force in the Horn of Africa before it fell apart. The concept of a Somali government backed by a powerful army is still prevalent in the imaginations of Somali elites, including those who are currently serving in positions of power within the government (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021). On the other hand, political elites and government officials of Somalia that I interviewed argued that "the only way the Somali government can restore peace, political stability, and the rule of law is by constructing a strong and capable national army. Officials who were present during the security discussion between Turkey and Somalia – when Mogadishu accepted to host Ankara's military base – are among the research participants. The interviewees, who are current government officials involved in Turkey-Somalia security and other business matters, believe that a strong army can restore peace and political stability and safeguard the nation. These high-ranking officials argue that Turkey is the only country willing to help construct the country's National Army. Since establishing its military facility in Mogadishu, Turkey has trained more than 6,000 troops, provided high-quality light weapons including military vehicles and speedboats, and trained Somali air force officers and pilots (Official. 4, 17/11/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021).

A former Kenyan intelligence officer who expressed concerns about Turkey's military involvement in the Horn of Africa region stated that Turkey's intention is to train 1,000 pilots for Somalia (KBC News, 2020). A few officials interviewed have asserted that Turkey is willing to train Somali pilots, but these assertions are unsupported by substantive evidence. Following the establishment of a Turkish military base in Somalia, the two nations have inked a number of security cooperation agreements, including one centred on intelligence collaboration and the exchange of information (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Official. 4, 1711/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021).

4.3.3 Turkey's Economic Role in Somalia: Trade, Development and Humanitarian Assistance

Turkey's economic relations with Somalia increased as the two countries political relations improved (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Siradag, 2015). Since establishing diplomatic ties, Mogadishu and Ankara have signed a number of agreements for economic and commercial cooperation. Some argue that the longstanding history between the two countries allowed these renewed economic interactions to bring substantial benefits to both nations. Public sectors provide aid and humanitarian development support to Somalia's public institutions and private sectors. Similarly, private sector groups in Turkey have been expanding their economic and commercial relations with Somalia. In less than a decade since the resumption of diplomatic relations, investments on economic infrastructure, health care, capacity building, and training for government personnel have brought about visible changes (Mohamoud, 2021; Siradag, 2017).

Turkish companies started business operations in Mogadishu. Turkish companies manage the ports and airports and Turkish Airlines flies from Istanbul to Mogadishu via Khartoum seven days a week having commenced direct flights to Somalia in September 2013. Somalia had remained a closed country to the rest of the world for the previous two decades, making the launch of Turkish international flights crucial for the country's economic resurgence. With the implementation of the Turkish Airlines, the Turkish business community were able to engage in economic activity more readily in Somalia ("3. Havalimani Dunyanin Tarihinin Degistirecek", 2015).

Several Turkish firms and companies have signed agreements with Somalia's Ministry of Industry and Commerce; officials from the government of Somalia reiterated several times during their visits to Istanbul and Ankara that Somalia is offering its primary resources to Turkish companies, including fishing rights, hydrocarbons, building materials and construction industry (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Official. 4, 1711/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021). According to the World Bank Report (2019), the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) of the Federal Government of Somalia issued offshore fishing licenses for the first time in over two decades legally and transparently. These licenses were awarded following a February 2018 National Security Council (NSC) agreement allowing the exclusive exploitation of tuna and tuna-like species beyond 24 nautical miles [1] from Somalia's coast, outside the zone reserved for Somali fishermen. In 2018, Turkish fishing companies and the Chinese (COFA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources defining the criteria for the operation of fishing vessels within Somalia's EEZ (World Bank Report, 2019; Yener and Calkaya, 2018).

Somalia enacted a new petroleum law to attract additional international investment in the energy sector and offered 15 blocks to oil companies interested in exploring the country's hydrocarbon potential. Erdogan said for the first time in 2020 that Turkey would explore for oil in Somalia. Following a request from Somalia to investigate its waters, Turkey will drill for oil off the Coast of Somalia (Erdogan cited in Arab News, 2020). Moreover, the new elected President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud stated that Somalia and Turkey are considering partnering prospects to investigate Mogadishu's hydrocarbon potential. Mohamud spoke exclusively to Anadolu Agency (AA) during his two-day visit to Turkey at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about Turkey's support for Mogadishu's fight against terrorism, the partnership with Turkey in hydrocarbon resources, and Somalia's strategy in combating the al-Shabab terrorist group. Mohamud stated about the Somalia-Turkey agreement to explore hydrocarbon resources in Somalia:

Turkey is a very sophisticated country in terms of technology, know-how, and technical expertise. We have faith in the Turkish government and Turkish businesses as partners. Various processes and negotiations are going on between the governments of Somalia and Turkey about how we may work together on this hydrocarbon issues as a result, we began negotiating the government-to-government hydrocarbon relationship right away. We are still in the early stages, but we are cooperating (Mohamoud, 2022).

As stated by numerous other government officials, "faith in the Turkish government and Turkish businesses as partners" refers to the notion that Turkey's non-colonial

past and culture (religion as soft power) aid and facilitate relations between Somalia and Turkey (Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Official. 5, 18/04/2021).

Turkey and Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in the energy and mining sectors on 3 June 2016 (Kopar, 2020). Article 1 of the MOU states that this agreement:

seeks to establish a comprehensive cooperation and establishes certain principles for cooperation between the parties in the fields of energy and mining, with the objective of developing and promoting the sectors of petroleum, gas, electricity, mineral and mining, as well as petrol-chemistry, on the basis of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, and the mutual benefits of both Parties" (Kopar, 2020).

Turkey also invested Mogadishu's major infrastructure, including the port, airport, hospitals, and the major road in Mogadishu, the Maka-Al-Mukarama road. The federal government of Somalia signed a historic 14-year contract with a Turkish corporation, entrusting them with the responsibility of operating and reconstructing Mogadishu's port. The federal government of Somalia and the Turkish port operator Albayrak have signed a deal granting Albayrak a new 14-year concession to run the Port of Mogadishu,". Minister of Ports and Marine Transport Mariam Aweys Jama told the media that the agreement would result in considerable investments in the port's facilities and increase national trade (Mukami, 2020; TRTWorld, 2020).

There are two types of actors involved in the Somalia business and reconstruction process: state actors and non-state actors. The Turkish Agency for International

Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA) is one of the most significant state actors working to rebuild the country (Dal and Dipama, 2022). TIKA has implemented a substantial number of projects in Somalia including education, health, infrastructure, and agriculture. On the other side, Turkey's non-state actors, the private sector, are actively participating in economic initiatives in Somalia. Since the formation of Turkey-Somalia relations, the Turkish business community has paid considerable attention to the expansion of economic relationships between the two nations (Siradag, 2017).

In 2013, a consortium comprised of Kozuva group enterprises and TIKA was awarded the airport management contract. Kozuva Group is a transnational corporation engaged in various business operations, including trade, investment, tourism, and building supplies. Under a concession to run the air terminal for twenty years, Favori, LLC manages airport operations. Favori LLC secured a contract with the government of Somalia in 2013. A portion of the contract required the construction of a new international-standard terminal, the management of the facility, and the incorporation of all industry-standard features (Goobjoognews 2015).

In addition, the relationship opened new trade and investment opportunities for the private sector and businesses (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Siradag, 2015). According to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, Turkey's exports to Somalia reached \$272.76 million in 2020. Data collected in 2019 by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, an online platform that focuses on international economic activities, produced a trade specification report on Turkey-Somalia import and export commodities. According to the report, Somalia exported \$6.7 million to Turkey compared to total trade in 2001 of \$516,000 (Siradag, 2015). Meanwhile, Turkey's

investment exceeded 1 billion dollars in the last decade, excluding development and humanitarian aid (Özcan, 2020; Siradag, 2015).

On the development and humanitarian front, Turkish assistance in Somalia currently encompasses various initiatives. Since 2011 TIKA has implemented development and humanitarian projects in Somalia. For instance, during the 2011 famine, Turkish planes delivering relief supplies to Somalia were flown to Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia, while food and medical supplies were given in refugee camps and cities. Since then, hundreds of thousands of people have been treated by hundreds of Turkish physicians in various field hospitals in collaboration with the Turkish Ministry of Health (TIKA Report, 2016; Turhan, 2021). TIKA has also executed many initiatives in Somalia, including agricultural, health, infrastructure, education, and capacity-building projects (Turhan, 2021). The TIKA coordinator in Somalia, Ilham Turus, argues that Turkey's development and humanitarian approach to developing nations are built on a win-win relationship between the country where it operates and the country it represents. He stated that it contrasts with a top-down, Western-style development strategy (Dhaysane, 2022).

"We define our activity as a paradigm of development cooperation as opposed to a concept of development aid. We have built roads, installed solar road lights in Mogadishu, sent students to Turkey for education, constructed a state-of-the-art training and research hospital, the Somalia Civil Aviation Center, an egg poultry farm, greenhouses, and laboratories at various universities, and constructed the Somali parliament building in Mogadishu" (Turus, 2022).

Furthermore, in 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia and Turkish authorities signed an agreement to rebuild and update the Digfer Hospital's infrastructure and services in accordance with international standards (AllAfrica, 2013). Italian architects and engineers were hired to construct Digfer Hospital in the 1960s (Adam and Ford, 1997). In January 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated and formally launched the Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital alongside Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Goobjoog, 2015). Concurrently, the Digfer Hospital was renamed Erdogan Hospital. TIKA also constructed the 200-bed restored Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital. It has an operational budget of \$135.7 million, of which the Turkish government is expected to cover \$85.6 million over the next five years (World Bulletin, 2015).

Based on the information collected from the medical team of the hospital, TIKA supplied the entire hospital's equipment. In terms of equipment and capacity, it is one of the most sophisticated hospitals in East Africa with polyclinics for internal diseases, gynaecology, pediatrics, and urology, as well as a 28-bed Emergency service, four operating rooms, 20 intensive care units, a delivery room with 20 incubators, five x-ray units, four ultrasound units, three echography units, one tomography unit, one mammography unit, one MR unit, and various laboratories (Medical Staff, Erdogan Hospital 2021; TIKA Report, 2016). The maternity and children's hospital in Somalia's capital was also established by the Helping Hands International Humanitarian Aid Association of Turkey. Turkey supplied Mogadishu's 27,000-square-meter, 100-bed hospital with medical supplies and equipment. The centre will offer management, emergency, newborn services, intensive and neonatal care (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016).

In 2012, according to Abdulahad Kokdagi, TIKa's coordinator in Somalia, a workshop was conducted with Somali officials to create a report on what was required to rebuild Mogadishu's roadways. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency will rehabilitate roads in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia (Anadolu Agency, 2012). TIKa and Turkish construction firms constructed Mogadishu's principal road network in the city's core. Subsequently TIKa rebuilt the city streets of Mogadishu, which were severely damaged during the Civil War. Turkey also created additional highways connecting several districts in Mogadishu's capital and other adjacent regions. Newly constructed roadways connecting the city's major regions have helped to normalise Mogadishu's social and economic life. In addition, the freshly installed solar-paneled street lighting has allowed the residents of Mogadishu to continue living without security concerns after sundown. In Mogadishu, a city formerly associated with perpetual warfare and violence, children have resumed playing games in the evenings, and residents have begun gathering beneath streetlight poles (TIKA Report, 2016).

Turkey also supported Somalia's human infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Education of Somalia, TIKa has provided Mogadishu and South-Central orphanages with clothing and educational supplies. In addition, new orphanage facilities were constructed (Özkan and Akgun, 2020). Since 2011, TKA has helped numerous educational institutions in Mogadishu with educational materials and reconstruction, enhancing their physical capacities and allowing thousands of students to receive basic educational services (Özkan, 2020). TIKa has organised four-month sewing classes for female victims of gender-based violence in Somalia, in addition to providing them with business equipment and nutritional aid. Assisting graduates of these

courses in establishing their enterprises; according to TIKA's publications, such programmes are intended to enable women to generate economic value for their families and communities (MOE, 2022). In addition, since 2011 when Turkey and Somalia formed their relationship, hundreds of Somalis have realised their dream of earning a degree through Turkey's scholarship programme. After more than a decade, vast numbers of Somali students enroll in the programme annually, making Somalia one of the leading African countries sending students to Turkey for higher education. They return to their nation in big numbers to assist their people. Among them is Somalia's Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who studied in Turkey after becoming a diplomat and served as justice minister (Dhaysane, 2022).

In the agriculture sector, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) constructed training greenhouses with irrigation systems with the required equipment and supplies in several regions of Somalia (Reliefweb, 2021). As part of the "Agricultural Development Project", the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) donated seeds and chemical fertilisers to the South-West State of Somalia. TIKa provided 100 farmers with seeds and chemical fertilisers as part of the "Agricultural Development Project" in order to support the advancement of agricultural research and production activities in the region, build capacity, and serve as an example for farmers. TIKa provided tractors and other agricultural machinery and equipment to CSET-affiliated farmers in 2020. As a continuation of the initial project, 100 small-scale farmers were provided certified seeds (Sorghum, Corn, and Cowpea) and chemical fertilisers. As part of the Agricultural Growth Project, which was executed to assure agricultural development in the South-West State of Somalia, efforts were taken to boost crop yield and quality in agricultural output and prevent future famine.

Furthermore, as both Somalian and Turkish businesses are eager to enter the lucrative agriculture industry, a number of exhibitions organised by Somalia and Turkey have begun in Somalia and Istanbul, attracting hundreds of participants, including the business community from all sectors of agriculture, in order to teach businesses interested in the agriculture sector how to increase their yields and access the international market (Mukami, 2019).

Turkey's sustained presence in the country has enabled its business sector to capitalise on its growing interest in the comparatively underdeveloped and potentially lucrative Somali market. The promotion of Turkish investment and corporate interests, according to Turkish government officials, complements Turkey's political, developmental, and humanitarian programmes. The above-mentioned repair and operation of Mogadishu's port, airport, roads, and hospitals are the most prominent examples of Turkish corporations' involvement in the building, infrastructure, energy, and transportation sectors (SucuoGlu and Stearns, 2016).

Somalia is an impoverished nation that seeks not only humanitarian assistance and development aid but also trade and investment. Despite the fact that peace and political stability are major concerns for foreign investment in Somalia, senior Somali officials contend that Turkey is a courageous nation that took the risk of investing in Somalia (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021). However, there is no evidence to support their claim that Turkey is Somalia's largest investor. Even though the former Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia, Mahdi Mohammed Gulaid, stated that Turkey invested more than \$100 million in Somalia, there is no evidence from the Somali side proving the precise amount of all Turkey projects that were approved by

the Somali parliament. Although there are concessions and joint ventures on Mogadishu port, airport, hospital, and road repair projects, no exact amount of such investment has officially been disclosed by the government of Somalia. It has been reported in Turkish media that Ankara exported more than \$386.35 million to Somalia in 2022. This information is supported by the international commerce database, COMTRADE. The most recent update to Turkey's exports to Somalia—data, historical charts, and statistics—was in May 2023 (Trading Economics, 2023).

The evidence presented thus far has shown Turkey's robust economic ties with Somalia (Orakci, 2022). Nevertheless, the vast majority of interviewed officials minimised the importance of Turkey's economic support. They focused primarily on the other benefits, such as political and security support. This reflects the fact that, although the existing literature on Turkey-SSA relations is primarily concentrated on Turkey's economic support and humanitarian diplomacy to SSA countries, from Somalia's perspective, Turkey's political and security support is significantly more important than humanitarian aid and trade (Omar, 12/12/2021; Official. 5, 18/04/2021; Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021). When compared to the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and several Gulf States, Turkey's economic aid to Somalia is significantly lower (ODA, 2021 cited in UN Somalia Website), Turkey's significance to Somalia is distinct from that of other nations. Turkey supports Somalia on the international stage, assists Somalia's government in reconciliation and peacebuilding, and, most significantly, aids Somalia in building its national army (Geeddi, 12/12/2021; Amb. 2, 14/02/2021; Researcher. 1, 13/02/2021).

4.5. Somali Perspective: Turkey's Engagement Accepted.

As Özkan and Orakci argue, the prolonged civil war and the crisis of famine and food security in Somalia in 2011 gave Turkey a space in Eastern African politics and allowed it to increase its involvement in Somalia (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Furthermore, Somalia's Federal Government has sought international support as the current administration in Mogadishu cannot deal with the consequences of decades of the civil war, political instability, absence of public services such as education, health and clean water (Özkan and Orakci 2015; Kalmoy, 2021). Nevertheless, the benefits of the relationship to Somalia have never been analyzed in detail from the Somali perspective.

In August 2021, Turkey and Somalia celebrated the 10th anniversary of a new relationship in Ankara and Mogadishu. The two countries' officials made statements during the celebration ceremony. They summarised their views of the relationship emphasising all areas of Turkey-Somalia cooperation (Kalmoy, 2021). The Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia indicated the importance of the relationship. In his speech, he emphasised Turkey's efforts in the state-building process in Somalia and the economic and technical assistance that Turkey provided to Somalia. He argued that "tangible progress has been achieved including education, health, business relationship, economic development, bilateral relations and the rebuilding of Somali national army and diplomacy" (Guleid, 2021). Turkey manages Mogadishu port and airport. Abdirahman Beyleh, the Minister of Finance, indicated that the port and airport of Mogadishu had contributed significantly to the national government revenue as Turkey invested in the infrastructure of the port and the airport (Beyleh, 2021).

Officials from Somalia and Turkey focused on political, economic, humanitarian and security cooperation (Kalmoy, 2021). It could be argued that Mogadishu's political, economic, and security fragility was the fundamental reason for the establishment of robust diplomatic relations between Somalia and Turkey. As stated in the previous sections, since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia's central government has been weak and unable to control the city and its surrounding regions. After Somaliland's declaration of independence in 1991, the two states that had merged in 1960 again became separate. Other new clan-based organisations arose in Somalia's southern and central regions (Stremlau, 2019). Due to the disintegration of the country's political system, the central federal government in Mogadishu requires international assistance in state building – particularly, areas of political support, security assistance and economic aid.

As previously discussed, Mogadishu receives more economic assistance from the country's traditional partners (the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States) as well as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; however, Mogadishu lacks assistance in specific areas at this time (Sheikh, 2017; ICG, 2018). Mogadishu's two primary objectives are political and security support. The Federal Government of Somalia desires a good friend that can support Somalia in the international arena—a friend that can defend Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity without interfering with Somalia's domestic authorities, which are tribal Federal Member States (Dahir and Ali, 2021). An ally who can contribute to the consolidation of Somalia's national identity. Furthermore, Somalia wishes to construct its National Army; however, the country is subject to an arms embargo, so Mogadishu

requires a friend who can support the government's request to the United Nations to lift the arms embargo (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021). Likewise, Somalia desires a country that can assist in the development of its national army by providing military aid and training (Rep. 3, 12/11/2021; Diplomat. 3, 24/11/2022). Taking all of these factors into account, the arrival of Erdogan in Mogadishu raised Mogadishu's hopes, and it now appears that Mogadishu has a new friend (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021).

Moreover, the historical and cultural ties between Mogadishu and Ankara during the Ottoman Empire were an essential factor in the development of the relationship between the two countries. Using the history of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a non-colonial state that assisted the Somalis during the Portuguese and Ethiopian invasions. Besides, the Ottoman Empire was an excellent trading partner with Somalia in the sixteenth century. Mogadishu sees that Turkey is a reliable comrade that shares strong cultural affinities and historical ties with the people of Somalia (Shay, 2018). Therefore, apart from history and culture that put the foundation of the two countries contemporary relations, Somalia established relations with Turkey for several reasons, two of which were more essential to Somalia.

The first reason why Somalia sought a relationship with Turkey was to gain political support from Ankara (Özkan, 2016; Siradag, 2013). The successive administrations in Mogadishu pursue relations with Ankara to empower itself against its federal member states that have strong relations with other countries. Mogadishu officials argue that when compared to other foreign entities that involve themselves in Somalia's internal politics (Shay, 2018; Official. 3, 30/10/2021). In other words, the Somalia sought Turkey's relations is the trust that Turkey supports Somalia's unity

and political independence. When explaining the unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Somalia, the issue of Somaliland comes first. Unlike Somalia, which has been mired in conflict and instability for the past three decades, Somaliland has been peaceful and stable due to solid democratic institutions and a vibrant private sector-based economy (Elmi, 2016). Since the dissolution of the union with Somalia, and unlike the latter, Somaliland has also been able to contain terrorism, violence and piracy in its territory and continues to act as a bulwark against the ravages of those ills for its neighbours (Njeri, 2018; Abdi, 2021). Somaliland has been outside of the union with Somalia for a period (1991- present) more than it was part of that union (1960-1991). In 2012, the London Conference on Somalia put forth a proposal that initiated Somaliland-Somalia discussions.

According to article six of the London communique, 'the Conference recognised the need for the international community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG or its replacement may establish to clarify their future relations" (FCO, Communique, 2012). Since then, Somaliland and Somalia held their first dialogue in London. A few months later, a 'dialogue process design' was established in Istanbul on the 19th January, and a subsequent meeting of Heads of State was held in December of 2014, but the process has not progressed any further since then. The process was haphazard and lacking in momentum in Istanbul when it was ongoing. In 2015, the talks collapsed in Istanbul (Muhumed, 2019).

The factors that led to the collapse of the talks include a lack of commitment to fulfilling the agreements reached in previous rounds of the dialogue and the lack of an impartial mediation body. A Somaliland diplomat who participated in Somalia-Somaliland

dialogue in Istanbul and Ankara argued that Turkey is not a fair arbiter, but a dishonest broker. Turkey wants to push Somaliland to unite with Somalia, and it is doing so in the interest of Somalia. Turkey is not? impartial in Somaliland-Somalia dialogue (Diplomat. 2, 17/11/2022). Another government official concurs with such an account:

Look what Turkey is doing in Mogadishu. It established a military base to train Somalia military personnel, supplies military equipment to Somali National Army, and has other economic and trade interests in Mogadishu. Turkey controls the port and the airport of Somalia. How can we trust that Turkey is playing an impartial role in Mogadishu-Hargeisa talks? (Official, 5. 29/03/2022).

From Somaliland's point of view, Turkey is perceived as a biased entity rather than a neutral mediator. Conversely, Somalia holds a preference for Turkey to act as a mediator between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mogadishu trusts that Turkey's efforts in the Somaliland-Somalia dialogue will lead to unification, while Somaliland remained sceptical about Turkey's relations with Somalia. Turkey only recognises the Federal Government in Mogadishu as the sole legitimate administration of entire Somalia, including Somaliland as many other countries do (Canon, 2021).

Moreover, Turkey is more supportive of Mogadishu's position than other countries. Despite the fact that the rest of the world recognises Mogadishu's government as Somalia's sole political entity, Turkey is the only country committed to Somalia's unity in the face of Somaliland. The position of all other countries is to support any dialogue that Somaliland and Somalia agree to establish to clarify their future relations. On the

contrary, Turkey's present position is that it solely supports Somalia's unity (Somaliland MFA, 2018). Turkey attempted to mediate five rounds of discussions between Hargeisa and Mogadishu for the purpose of unity. Although Turkey has often attempted to act as a mediator in Somalia-Somaliland negotiations, Hargeisa does not view Turkey as an objective and fair arbitrator, but rather as a dishonest mediator, as Ankara is committed to preserving Somalia's geographical integrity on the basis of the 1960 union. stating that the Turkish offer was "not genuine", and that Istanbul was "part of the Somalia/Somaliland dispute." (Somaliland MFA, 2018). The Somaliland opposition leader also stated that "the Turkish offer of Somalia-Somaliland dialogue is not serious and lacks political credibility," (Fahamu Network, 2016). American Enterprise Institute researcher Micheal Rubin said that Turkey does not have a track record as an honest broker and that President Erdogan has an ideological objective that does not value Somaliland's democracy and security. It is essential that any such mediation extend beyond a particular nation. The Somaliland administration indicates that Turkey's investments and assistance to Somaliland and Somalia are unequal (Rubin, 2019).

Moreover, from Somalia's perspective, Turkey's political and diplomatic support is quite exceptional and advantageous in comparison to that of other power nations with which Somalia has relations. For instance, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other emerging regional economic powers such as the Gulf States support Somalia's sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity; however, they also recognise that Somalia is a weak and fragmented nation-state. Consequently, each of these nations provide some form of political support to Somalia's regional states, including Puntland and Jubaland (Official. 1. 13/01/2021).

These nations also view the Republic of Somaliland as a separate entity, despite the fact that they do not officially recognise Somaliland. Nonetheless, they engage with Somaliland's government and public institutions (Ahmed, 2019). The United Arab Emirates, for instance, invested in Berbera Port and Airport – Somaliland's most vital infrastructure. The UAE also invested in the Berbera Corridor, which the Somali government viewed as an act of aggression and the Mogadishu parliament vetoed (Donelli and Cannon, 2021). Furthermore, with the exception of Turkey, it appears that all other countries exercise a multitrack policy strategy in which they engage Somalia's federal member states.

However, Turkey takes an entirely different approach. Turkey's political and diplomatic support is limited to Mogadishu, where the Federal Government is based. All of the participants in my study acknowledged that Turkey's engagement is unprecedented. Some praise Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia, arguing that it aids the central government (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Official. 1. 13/01/2021). Others contend that Turkey is ignoring the reality on the ground, which is that Mogadishu does not represent the entirety of Somalia (MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021).

Nevertheless, since 2011, Turkey has been more vocal on the international stage and has provided Somalia with political and diplomatic support. Erdogan has stated multiple times that Turkey stands in solidarity with their Somali brothers and sisters. Turkey desires to support Somalia's political stability. Since establishing diplomatic ties with Somalia, Turkey has facilitated Somalia-Somaliland dialogue in Ankara and Istanbul. Turkey engaged both traditional leaders and religious organisations to assist

the government of Somalia in achieving peace and state-building. The Federal Government of Somalia has confidence in Turkey's new approach and sole engagement with the government of Mogadishu, which has further strengthened the two countries' official relationship (BBC, 2011; MFA, 2015). It appears that Turkey's relations with the government of Mogadishu have enabled the country to better manage its limited resources and support on all fronts. Mogadishu's government is pleased with its engagement with Turkey because it believes it receives strong political and diplomatic support on the international stage. In addition to this, it is clear that Turkey is merely supporting Mogadishu's initiatives with regard to the consolidation of Somalia's peace and political stability (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 5, 18/04/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021).

Indeed, not even Somalia's federal member states favour Turkey's unique approach to Somalia. Many Somali academics, businesspeople, students, current and former government officials from the other regions of Somalia believe that only the central government in Mogadishu benefits from the Turkey-Somalia relations (Official. 4, 27/10/2021; Rep. 1, 12/05/2021). Certainly, the regional federal states of Puntland and Jubaland oppose Turkish engagement in Mogadishu, particularly Ankara-Mogadishu relations (Minister. 4, 04/01/2021; Minister. 5, 09/01/2021; MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 6, 1/08/2021; Hussein, 12/10/2021;). Hassan, a former Puntland minister, who advocates the interest of his regional state argue that "Turkey's engagement in Somalia is different from others as Turkey only emphasises the government in Mogadishu" (Hassan, 15/03/2021). A significant number of participants from the other regions of Somalia oppose Turkey's relations with Somalia. These groups argue that Turkey is only investing and engaging Mogadishu and the central authority, not Somalia as a country. They opposed Turkey's projects in Mogadishu because they

wanted Turkey to be equitable in its cooperation throughout the country. They want Turkey to support their constituencies, not only Mogadishu and its environs. These MPs speak for their regions and federal member states only, not on behalf of Somalia as a whole.

Turkey is building roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu. Most of its aid goes to the South and Central regions of the country. Mogadishu receives most scholarships and infrastructure investments such as the port and the airport (MP. 2, 10/08/2021). Almost 75 per cent of the military personnel training inside Camp TURKSOM are from Mogadishu (MP. 3, 13/08/2021).

Other interviewed ministers from the federal member states of Somalia also echoed the argument that Turkey's engagement is unfair and imbalanced on this issue. "Turkey will use and utilise our resources in the name of Turkey-Somalia relations, and it is merely engaging Mogadishu and its business communities" (Minister. 4, 04/01/2021). Another federal member state minister reiterated:

What Turkey does not understand is the social and political structure of Somalia. Mogadishu cannot represent all the administrative regions of Somalia. Our country adopted a decentralised federal system where each federal member state is an independent entity when it comes to trade, investment and public relations (Minister. 5, 09/01/2021).

Officials from the other federal member states urge Turkey to join the ranks of Somalia's other foreign and regional partners, who work with not only the central administration in Mogadishu, but also with other regional states. They want Somalia

to be so decentralised that each federal member state deals with foreign entities on its own, with no central authority. They do so because they consider Somalia's national government to be a regional authority ruled by a single tribe. Puntland and Jubaland, for example, aligned with other foreign organisations in the region, while Mogadishu allied with Turkey. Given contrasting viewpoints from different regions of Somalia, the long-term viability of Turkey's relationship with Somalia is questionable as domestic resistance grows and regional competitors such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates seek to exploit it (Fick, 2018, cited in Reuters). Several government officials echoed this message, highlighting the regional competition between Turkey and other Gulf states in Somalia (Minister. 1, 12/01/2021; Minister. 2, 12/01/2021). Independent critics believe that Somalia is "caught up in a regional struggle between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on one side, with Qatar backed by Turkey on the other" (Fick, 2018). The United Arab Emirates operates in the Horn of Africa region, including Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Yemen. In Puntland, the United Arab Emirates also maintains an anti-piracy training centre (Cannon and Donelli, 2019). The UAE also invested millions of dollars in Bosaso Port (Hassan, 2018; Donelli and Cannon, 2021). During Saudi Arabia's naval and air embargo of Qatar in response to the latter's alleged support for terrorism, the federal states of Puntland and Jubaland supported Saudi Arabia and its allies (Dahir and Ali, 2021; Harun, 12/12/2021). The Mogadishu government, in contrast, shut down UAE operations in the city (Hassan, 2018).

Turkey's role in Somalia is thus clearly divisive. Most of the political elites from Mogadishu, welcome Turkey's involvement while those from the regions see it as of no benefit at best or as a potential threat at worst. Whilst the enthusiasm of those in Mogadishu is partly driven by cultural affinity, religion and historical ties (Shinn, 2015),

the central government in Mogadishu also intends to control its federal member states, who are independent and have the power to make their own decisions (Ramni, 2021; Reuters, 2017). The successive leadership in Mogadishu have perceived that the self-governing of the federal states poses a challenge to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia (Dahir and Ali, 2021). Officials from the central government in Mogadishu argued several times in public that it is dangerous and difficult to function, "such an autonomy system of the federal system not only decentralised the already weak state in Somalia, but it also separates the Somali people into clan lines, and it is against the ideals of the modern state (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021). An envoy of Somalia also argues:

The main reason why Somalia wants to strengthen its relations with Turkey is that Ankara wants to support the central government and not interfere with the internal division and proxy war in Somalia. Since it arrived in Mogadishu, Turkey has been helping the central government with humanitarian aid, multiple development assistance, budgetary support, and major investment concessions with the port and the airport of Mogadishu. Ankara's relations with Mogadishu will empower the Federal Government against its the Federal Member States in order to allow full control of Somalia (Rep. 3, 23/10/2021).

It thus seems clear that the main attraction of the Turkish relationship to the government in Mogadishu is that Ankara wants to support the central government and not interfere with internal conflict and proxy war. Since arriving in Mogadishu, Turkey has provided humanitarian relief, development assistance, budgetary support, and

investment concessions for the port and airport. Ankara's connections with Mogadishu will empower the Federal Government against the Federal Member States dominating Somalia.

Second, Somalia sought Turkey's relations is to support the Somali National Army. Most of the senior officials in Somalia, including the former and incumbent high officials, indicated that Somalia's foreign policy strategy is closely tied to building its national security infrastructure to safeguard national unity, political stability, and economic development. A nationalist and high-ranking government official, who advocate Somalia's unity and sovereignty indicated that the first priority of the Mogadishu administration is to build a strong national army that can protect the interest of the country, "the people of Somalia demand peace and stability from their government, and the only way we can make this happen is to build a strong national army, not to continue the dependency of the African Union Mission in Somalia or other foreign security forces" (Official, 3. 30/ 10/2021). This perspective is reiterated by Somalia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "one of the main reasons of why this country (Somalia) is suffering is lack of National Army, which resulted in chaos, political instability, social fragmentation, economic problems and insecurity" (MFA, 12/01/2022).

One could argue whether the Mogadishu administration aims to establish a strong national army capable of maintaining national unity in order to defend the "national interest" or whether the ruling elite's self-interest in enhancing its own power take precedence. In practice the two motivations clearly elide and are mutually reinforcing. Since Somalia's independence, two prominent clans have dominated the country's leadership. All presidents and prime ministers are members of the Darood and Hawiye

clans. And after the downfall of the rule of Siad Barre, Somalia's leaders have been in office for only four to five years. Most notably, the sub-clans of the two clans also compete, making it difficult for a clan to keep control for more than one presidential term. The two clans are nationalist clans, which means that their leaders advocate for the unity of all Somali ethnic communities, including those in the Horn of Africa - the ethnic territories where Somalis presently or historically reside. Hence, the leaders of these clans argue independently that they are always defending the national interest, based on the concept that the leader's patriotism and devotion to the nation-state supersede other individual or group interests. In other words, since 1990, Somalia's government has been alternatively dominated by two of the country's most powerful clans - one clan at a time. Therefore, despite competing for power, these officials from the government in Mogadishu want to further the future interests of a strong government in Mogadishu that dominates all Somalis rather than their own particular interests (MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021).

A significant number of the research participants stressed the importance of the Somali national army for peacebuilding. Yusuf Omar and Mahdi Geeddi, former Somali Members of Parliament argued that AMISOM is not contributing to Somalia's peace. The mission only protects government premises such as the President Office, Cabinet Offices and Houses of Parliament. It is making little progress against Al-Shabaab (Omar, 12/12/2021; Geeddi, 12/12/2021). It was also suggested that it is time for AMISOM and its donors to think of a direct transfer of security responsibility to Somalia's armed forces (Researcher. 1, 13/02/2021; Amb. 2, 14/02/2021). Despite the peace and security support from the international community, however, the

internationally supported government in Mogadishu has failed to build an effective national army. According to Paul Williams, since 2008, “dozens of foreign states and multilateral organisations invested hundreds of millions of dollars to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA). So far, they have failed” (Williams, 2019). One reason for this is that the arms embargo imposed by the UN has meant that Mogadishu could not construct its national army in the way that it wished. Therefore, Mogadishu relies on Turkey for the training and capabilities building of the SNA because Ankara disregards the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council (Bozkurt, 2022).

In contrast to Turkey, the majority of Somalia's so-called "friends" were not interested in providing aid to the Somali people or arming the country's military, preferring instead to impose additional sanctions. Turkey has been warned multiple times by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) of the United Nations for breaking the United Nations arms embargo by providing equipment to Somali police forces without first contacting SMEG and obtaining its approval (Ahmed, 2021). A high-ranking government official therefore indicated that one of the important reasons why Somalia accepted Turkey's unique relations was Erdogan's promise to construct a powerful national army that would enable the government to control the country's territory while the international community support has failed due to arms embargo.

Erdogan did not only come to Mogadishu to help the people of Somalia from the famine crisis. He came to build strong economic, security and political relations with Somalia. As our government presented its security priorities, Erdogan and his delegation agreed to support Somalia's national army. The two sides agreed that at least two-thirds of the Somali National Army should be trained and equipped within ten years. At the time of our request, the

Somali National Army (SNA) was an army in name only (Official. 4, 17/10/2021).

Another high rank official concurred:

Each militia remains loyal to different Somali powerbrokers, or sometimes foreign governments, which do not have security cooperation with Somalia. Turkey promised to build a reliable national army that can safeguard the powers of the central government and the country's national interest (Muse, 16/07/2021).

Another high-ranking government official also argued that "most of the politicians of Somalia do not have the morale and enthusiasm to defeat Al-Shabaab or stabilise the country". He also reiterated that Somali elites and politicians failed to work together to make Somalia peaceful, "if Turkey helps the government in Mogadishu build its national army, it will be the only way to stabilise the country from the prolonged civil war, terrorism activities and political instability" (Official. 3, 30/10/2021). Other government officials argue that "prior Turkey's relations, Somalia lacks an effective national army with the capability and morals to defeat Al-Shabaab. The foreign troops, particularly AMISOM and other Somali armies invested by the foreign powers, cannot liberate the country from the terrorist groups and other spoilers in Somalia" (Official. 1, 13/01/2021).

Both the available secondary sources and interviews emphasise the issue of the national army, proposing that Somalia needs security first before everything else in order to reconcile its people and build its economy (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Williams,

2019; Robinson, 2019; Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 2, 13/11/2021). To this end, from the perspective of the central government, to change the security landscape of Somalia, the government in Mogadishu trusts that Turkey is the only country that can help Somalia rebuild a Somali National Army. Hence it encourages strengthening Turkey-Somalia relations. From the above, it is clear that other countries failed to assist Somalia's national army effectively due to the resolution passed by the UN Security Council to maintain a weapons embargo against the country.

The third reason why Somalia sought Turkey's relations is twofold; rebuilding Somalia's economic and human infrastructure. The decades of war and political instability in Somalia destroyed both the human and economic infrastructures of the country (Farah, 2021; Healy and Bradbury, 2010). The central government of Somalia trusts that Turkey will rebuild Somalia by providing scholarships and training to the young people while building the economic infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, ports, airports, and the extractive industry such as mining and oil exploration (SucuoGlu and Stearns, 2016; Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center (IPC).

Our government understands that the Turkish government is ready to help Somalia build its social infrastructure, particularly the education system, health-related services infrastructure, and the training of the public servants, diplomats, police, justice system, including building the capacities of courts and other public provisions" (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021).

Turkey is a reliable partner. Turkey's leadership came to Somalia during the famine to help the people of Somalia. Turkey was the first country that establishes its diplomatic infrastructure in Mogadishu. It built roads and hospitals. It invested in the significant economic infrastructure of the country, such as ports and airports. Ankara provided hundreds of scholarships to Somali students. Somali people, particularly Mogadishu and South-Central communities, viewed Turkey's involvement as honest and humanitarian” (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021).

As shown above, the political elites in Mogadishu argue that Somalia could become a major economic powerhouse with the support of Turkey; therefore, most of the officials from the central government in Mogadishu emphasised the importance of Turkey-Somalia relations on economic development. The Minister of Fishery and Marine Resources of Somalia argue "Now we have started work on the development of Somalia as well as [it] becoming a major economic power with the support of Turkey" (Esref, 2018, cited in Anadolu Agency). Most of the political elites in Mogadishu trust that Somalia benefits from its relations with Turkey in all areas of economic development and technical assistance. The ties between Turkey and Somalia are founded on the Muslim fraternity (Şafak, 2018). According to Şafak, Turkey represents a safety net for Somali people going through humanitarian, economic and military crises. The central government of Somalia sees that the Ankara-Mogadishu relationship has led to a resurgence of economic development as well as the value of skill training, education and human capital development (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Şafak, 2018).

Despite the fact that, from Somalia's standpoint, Turkey's support is preferable, the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States offer Somalia substantial assistance in all of these areas. During the research questions, I attempted to remind participants, particularly government officials, that most humanitarian, development, military and social support comes from western nations. However, their responses appear remarkably similar; first, Turkey came to Somalia when all other nations had left. Second, there are cultural and historical ties between Turkey and Somalia. Third, Turkey provides military weapons and training to tens of thousands of Somali National Army soldiers, more than any other nation (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Rep. 2, 28/11/2021; Rep. 3, 23/10/2021).

Conclusion

Clearly, this chapter has shown the main factors explaining Somalia's acceptance of Turkey engagement. First, I began by discussing the historical and cultural ties between the two nations, which facilitated a rapid strengthening of the relationship. due to the two nations' deep cultural and historical connections, Mogadishu sees Turkey as Somalia's most promising ally among other countries (Official. 2, 13/01/2021). This refers that the decision of Somalia to accept Turkish diplomatic overtures was significantly influenced by their common history and culture (Donelli, 2019).

As one of Somalia's closest allies, Turkey is viewed favourably by Somalia's Federal Government. In other words, historical and cultural ties play a crucial part in Somalia and Turkey's tight relationship (Shay, 2018). Somalia, as an aid recipient, receives greater humanitarian help and financial subsidies from its traditional donors. In

comparison to western support per nation, Turkey's assistance is minimal. The United States, the individual countries of the European Union, and the United Kingdom provide the majority of Somalia's humanitarian and development assistance.

However, the cultural and historical ties between Turkey and Somalia make the Turkish government's backing more evident. From Somalia's point of view, Turkey's cultural and historical ties are distinct and anti-colonial (Rep. 2, 28/11/2021). The Somalis say their victory over the Portuguese and Abyssinian empires laid the groundwork for this union. Somalia's elites are hopeful that with Turkey's help, the country can reclaim its former power and stability, much like Turkey did in the 16th century when it helped the Somali people obtain freedom from the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires. Ottoman security and commercial interests in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula drive this partnership (Abdulle, 2019).

In other words, Somalia's openness to Turkish involvement can be traced back to a number of underlying elements, including historical and cultural affinities, political/diplomatic relationships, security concerns, and economic interests. And yet, Somalis put so much faith in Turkey's links precisely because of the similarities between Ankara and Mogadishu. In other words, the fact that Somalia and Turkey share historical and cultural affinities is one of the most essential reasons why Somalia formed relationships with Turkey in the first place, alongside receiving political/diplomatic, security, and economic support from Turkey (Özkan, 2010; Cannon 2016; Donelli, 2021).

Second, in the case of Somalia, political/diplomatic benefits account for its support of Turkey's presence. Somalia's federal government views its relations with Turkey as having the potential to yield political and diplomatic benefits. The leadership in Mogadishu understands that Somalia can return to the international stage with Turkey's political and diplomatic backing (Ahmed, 2021; MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015). The political elite in Mogadishu is certain that Turkey would support the central government and not intervene in Somalia's internal conflict and proxy war. The government in Mogadishu also understands that Turkey will stand for Somalia's unity, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and political and security independence. Somalia hopes to improve relations with Turkey since Ankara is backing the central authority and has no intention of becoming involved in the country's proxy war and internal struggle (Official. 1 13/01/2021; Dahir and Ali, 2021).

Third, Turkey's promises to assist Somalia in rebuilding its military, combating Al-Shabaab, and ensuring permanent peace and political stability (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017) are crucial to comprehending Somalia's acceptance of Turkey's commitment (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Due to Somalia's arms embargo, Turkey is the only nation to have made such a pledge. The governments of Turkey and Somalia have reached multiple security training agreements, with Turkey providing training to the Somalian police and military (Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015). Somalia needs a reliable ally to support the Somali National Army and aid in political reconciliation. Turkey has committed to being the only foreign power to considerably improve Somalia's national security and defence capabilities. Since 2013, multiple security training agreements have been struck

between the governments of Turkey and Somalia, with Turkish trainers instructing Somalian police and the military (Akpınar, 2013; Siradag, 2015). Turkey is also assisting the Somali government in its efforts to rescind the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations' and the Security Council (Official. 3, 30/10/2021)

The Somali government enthusiastically accepted Turkey's offer to train the SNA under a consistent curriculum and provide the force with similar (Turkish) equipment in light of the circumstances mentioned above, particularly the fragmented manner in which various parties have provided security assistance in Somalia and AMISOM's impending departure (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). According to senior Somali government officials Turkey's military equipment and training are far superior to what other countries provided to Somalia (Official. 2, 13/01/2021; Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Official.1, 13/01/2021).

Fourth, the Federal Government of Mogadishu is hoping to get financial aid from Turkey. Turkey's and Somalia's governments' ties extend far beyond the provision of humanitarian aid and economic development support. Close links exist between Turkey and Somalia in the fields of trade and investment. Since establishing diplomatic ties (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021; Siradag, 2015), Mogadishu and Ankara have signed various economic and commercial cooperation agreements. Investments in economic infrastructure, healthcare, capacity building, and training for government personnel have yielded visible results since the restart of diplomatic relations (Mohamoud, 2021; Siradag, 2017). The ports and airports are run by Turkish companies, and Turkish Airlines just started offering uninterrupted service to Somalia. Somalia's Ministry of

Industry and Commerce has signed agreements with a number of Turkish enterprises and corporations giving them access to the country's fishing rights, hydrocarbons, construction industry, and other key resources (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021).

Mogadishu's political, economic, and security instability is the primary reason Somalia established strong diplomatic connections with Turkey; yet cultural and historical commonalities have become the primary explanatory cause for Somalia's trust in Turkey's connection.

Chapter 5: Turkey's Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Sudan

5.1 Introduction.

Relations between Turkey and Sudan date back decades, but it was not until the AK Party came to power that Turkey prioritised Sudan in its foreign policy. To further their political, economic, and military ties, Erdogan first travelled to Sudan in 2006 as Prime Minister (Shay, 2018). Once again, in 2017, a government and business delegation led by Erdogan landed in Khartoum after he was elected president of Turkey (van den Berg and Meester, 2019). The trip was planned to further the existing political, economic, and military ties (Shay, 2018; Aljazeera, 2017). Sudan's strategic location as a passageway to the Red Sea and Africa is a driving factor in Turkey's desire to increase its regional diplomatic and military footprint (Shay, 2018). The advancement of political, economic, cultural, security, and military ties are just some of the outcomes of Sudan's appointment as a gateway to Africa. On the other hand, the people of Sudan see Turkey as a friend and a brother who can help them politically, economically, and militarily (Rakipolu, 2021; Anadolu Agency, 2017; Soufi, 08/8/2022). In other words, from Khartoum's perspective, many have termed Turkey a great friend and ally that arrived to support the Sudanese government and people, and wants to assist in a win-win and mutually beneficial manner (Shay, 2018).

This chapter examines the significance of the selected independent variables, with an emphasis on the positive effects of Sudan on Turkey's political and diplomatic, economic, security, cultural affinity, and historical ties. It explains the political, economic, social, and security situation in Sudan before examining the variables. The first few sections explaining the current situation in Sudan are based on policy

documents and reports from think tank institutions, written work from international and UN non-governmental organisations, and other secondary data from independent researchers, such as academic papers, opinion pieces, mainstream media news, and editorial newspaper articles. The majority of the primary sources for the chapter's main sections are interviews with high-ranking Sudanese current and former government officials who have firsthand knowledge of the relationship's objectives, benefits, and challenges.

Due to their years of experience and positions of authority, the senior government officials' information can be regarded as useful, as they understand and familiar with the motivations underlying Sudanese policy. However, politicians and government officials may support or oppose an issue for personal or political reasons. Therefore, it is essential to consider the political and personal interests of government officials and politicians when evaluating their claims. For example, the officials I interviewed represent different political interests within the same government. Some government officials, diplomats, and senior political advisors supported the regime of al-Bashir, whereas others supported al-Burhan or his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Members of the opposition, former government officials, and independent elites have their own distinct perspectives and interests. In contrast to Somalia, the reasons why Sudan established close ties with Turkey are, according to Sudanese government officials, generally consistent. Their explanation is that the establishment of relations between Khartoum and Ankara was largely motivated by the interests of the Sudanese leadership at the time. In other words, although the political perspectives and interests of the interviewees differed, their explanations for why Sudan accepted the relationship were remarkably similar. In the first section of this chapter, I describe the

current political climate in Sudan. It details whether the Khartoum government is capable of controlling its territory or whether it seeks humanitarian aid, political and economic assistance, and security support from outside sources. The second section contextualises the analysis of the character of Turkey and Sudan's relationship. Each component of the analysis describes the model and essence of Turkish objectives and strategy in Sudan. Consequently, I investigate the empirical context underlying the contentious themes in the chapter's final section. I compare and contrast empirical data by piecing them together to comprehend why Khartoum established relations with Ankara and whether the Sub-Saharan nation has distinct political interests in Turkey's relations.

5.2 The Current Political Situation in Sudan.

Similar to Somalia, to understand the current political, economic, and security situation in Sudan, it is necessary to document the state's fragility in some detail. This section presents the fundamental empirical context of the political situation in Sudan. It briefly describes the numerous military coups that occurred in Sudan during its independence. Particularly, the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Sadiq Al-Mahdi following the chronology of events that transpired during Omar Hassan al-Bashir's rise to power and subsequent fall: the succession of South Sudan, the protracted conflicts in Darfur and Southern Kordofan, and the humanitarian crisis in Blue Nile. This section also outlines Sudan's political instability, severe economic issues, widespread conflict, and insecurity — a circumstance that subsequently prompted the protests and civil disobedience that toppled the military administration of al-Bashir.

Since Sudan gained its independence in 1956 upon the termination of the condominium of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, its political situation was always full of uncertainty. Sudan has experienced multiple military coups and revolutions since its independence (BBC, 2021). In 1989, an Islamist military coup d'état led by al-Bashir overthrew the fledgling democracy of Sadiq al-Mahdi (Ryle and Willis, 2019). When Bashir's election as president was announced, it was clear that the Muslim Brotherhood supported him. Sudan was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood from 1989 to 2019, with all its officials, including the highest-ranking military junta, being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement was founded by its ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi, who developed its programme, which was then implemented by al-Bashir, who was carefully selected from the military cadre to take over on the night of the coup, under the supervision of al-Turabi himself, until they disagreed and diverged a decade later (Luehr-Lobban and Lobban, 2001; AL-Harhi, 2020).

In 1991, Al-Bashir and his Islamist allies imposed Sharia law, further dividing the country's Muslim, Arabized north from the predominantly animist and Christian south. Al-Bashir was then elected president in October 1993, Sudan has been riven by several internal conflicts and challenges during al-Bashir's term. This includes the war in South Sudan and its secession, the violence in Darfur and South Kordofan, and the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Blue Nile. The Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile is an armed conflict between the Sudanese Army (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a northern affiliate of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan. The battle between the Government of Sudan and Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLAM/A)

began in 1983, following the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The disagreements over resources and power, the role of religion in the state, and the right to self-determination between Sudan and the SPLM (now South Sudan) reached a boiling point during al-Bashir's presidency (UNMIS, 2022). Eventually, Al-Bashir and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, negotiated an agreement under international pressure. The deal granted the southern Sudanese the right to vote in 2005 on whether or not their region would remain part of Sudan.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 January 2005 officially ended hostilities between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan Armed Forces of the national government (SAF). In January 2011, the referendum on the self-determination of Southern Sudan was held and on 7 February 2011, the referendum commission announced the official results, revealing that 98.83 per cent of voters supported independence (BBC, 2011). The same year, South Sudan joined the UN as its 193rd member state. Sudan has economic challenges as a result of South Sudan's independence since the new country took control of the southern oil fields, which accounted for three-quarters of the country's oil production in 2011.

Since 2003, the Darfur region that is located in the western part of Sudan has been the scene of appalling levels of violence (Sikainga, 2009). Rebel groups in Darfur revolted over alleged government atrocities and mistreatment by attacking the government. In response Al-Bashir solicited the aid of the Janjaweed militias, whose brutal tactics have terrorised the region. The conflict in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of thousands of individuals and the displacement of more than two million people. The United Nations has labelled it the "biggest humanitarian crisis in the

world," while the United States government has called it genocide. The violence and damage are sometimes compared to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. These horrific events have captivated the global community and garnered extraordinary media coverage. Eventually the African Union sent a modest peacekeeping force in Darfur region in 2007 (Al-Jazeera, 2020).

Moreover, Khartoum has been at war with rebel forces in the Blue Nile region for decades. In 2011, forces loyal to former president Omar al-Bashir initially attacked the Blue Nile, one of two regions of the country held at least partially by the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N). When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was completed in 2005, helping to end more than two decades of civil war and paving the way for South Sudan's independence, the destinies of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile - long disregarded by Khartoum – remained unsolved (Mednick, 2019).

The conflict in South Kordofan shows little indication of ending soon. There are echoes of the civil war that occurred between 1984 to 2002, but the dynamics are very different. Political marginalisation, land dispossession, and unfulfilled promises continue to be the core reasons for the conflict. In some locations, the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile border states is reaching a crisis, with grave risks to the physical safety of residents, restricted access for humanitarian organisations, and rising humanitarian needs. The current conflict stems from long-standing tensions that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) failed to address (HPG, 2012).

Due to the conflicts of Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Darfur (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). The Sudanese government, which is not a signatory to the ICC statute, disputed the claims in 2008 and pronounced al-Bashir innocent.

Anti-government protests erupted across Sudan in 2018, originally in response to severe price hikes and food shortages (Horn Institute, 2019), but quickly turned into calls for al-Bashir's resignation. The Security forces of Al-Bashir replied with a ruthless crackdown that resulted in the murder of hundreds of individuals. In an effort to suppress the 2019 protests, Al-Bashir declared a state of emergency prohibiting all unauthorized gatherings and granting security forces vast authority (Balestrieri, 2022). Outside the Khartoum military headquarters, a massive sit-in demonstration began. Twenty-two people were slain by security personnel as they attempted to disperse the sit-in. The Sudanese army arrested al-Bashir, declared that it would be in power for the next two years, suspended the country's constitution, and shut off its borders and airspace. In addition, a state of emergency lasting three months has been established (AP, cited in VOA, 2019). As protests were often violently dispersed, leaving many dead, and at least 1,000 demonstrators arrested, calls for President al-Bashir to resign were increasing, and protection concerns were growing (ICG, 2019; OHCHR, 2019; Amnesty International, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2019; HRW 10/2/2019).

The previous administration of Sudan, which had been in power for thirty years, was overthrown by the Sudanese people's intense anti-government rallies on April 10,

2019. The uprising of the people eventually resulted in a new administration being installed. This new government took over from the previous government, which had been in power for thirty years. There has been the establishment of a new civil transitional administration that is recognized by the international community. This administration will rule for a period of three years, and then there will be elections that are free and fair. In October 2021, the Sudanese military forces seized over and dismissed the civilian components of the transitional government, which had come to power in July 2019, intending to transform Sudan into a democracy by 2023 (Former official 17/02/2022; ACAPS, 2022).

Since the coup, large-scale protests against military authority and deadly battles with security forces have occurred nearly every week, particularly in Khartoum and Omdurman. These demonstrations have frequently ended in injuries, deaths, and infrastructure destruction. The security situation in Sudan remained stagnant. Despite this, resistance committees continued to organise nationwide protests on a regular basis. Protesters continued to resist the military authority and denounce the deteriorating economic conditions, frequently by blocking roadways. Organisers continued to encourage peaceful protests. However, a few protestors engaged in a confrontation with the security forces. The latter continued to disperse the demonstrators using tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and occasionally live ammunition. Prior to rallies, Sudanese police frequently block major roads and bridges, particularly in Khartoum (UNSC Report, 2022).

According to the article, it has been more than three years after the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. Since the military takeover in October 2021,

the political and security circumstances have been static for nearly six months. The state of emergency was established when the coup was overthrown on May 29. "The promised transition to civilian government and democracy is in jeopardy", and "the window of opportunity for Sudanese actors to settle the political issue is closing." (UNSC Report, 2022).

When the revolution of 2018 began, there was no leadership. When the rebellion was already in full swing, the SPA only joined in as a mobiliser and communicator. Later, the SPA, political parties, and armed formations associated with Sudan's Revolutionary Front formed the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), which negotiated a power-sharing agreement with the military on behalf of the civilian population. However, before the coup, both the FFC and the SPA disintegrated along historical fault lines, and the question of how to deal with the security accord underpinning the coup (Alexander, 2022; CRU, Report, 2021). Once more, the protest movement is directionless. Political parties and security agents alike have attempted to infiltrate and co-opt resistance organisations in an effort to further their agendas and bolster their support base and revolutionary appeal, respectively (Marovic and Hayder, 2022; CRU, Report, 2021).

Since then, the grave security situation in Sudan has resulted in poverty, food insecurity, and economic difficulties for the Sudanese people. At least 14.3 million Sudanese will require humanitarian aid in 2022, up from 13.4 million in 2021. Nearly a quarter of the population faces food insecurity due to a socioeconomic crisis characterised by high inflation rates and currency depreciation. In some regions of the

country, inter-communal conflict and violence also contribute to a large number of internal and international migrations (Dag, 2022, cited in Anadolu Agency).

A professor who is also a senior advisor to one of the Sudanese ministries discussed the humanitarian crisis and the role of the military in the context of ongoing demonstrations. The widespread insecurity, roadblocks, and communication blackouts caused by the demonstrations impede humanitarian access throughout the country. International financial help to the country has been suspended because of the military takeover (Diplomat. 4, 19/12/2021). It has also exacerbated the deterioration of the Sudanese economy, contributing to high inflation rates, the depreciation of the Sudanese pound, and shortages of hard cash and foreign reserves. In 2021, Sudan bought more than 80 per cent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine; the Russian invasion of Ukraine and associated interruption of supply networks are likely to have an impact on the prices of grains and fuel. Estimates for June through September 2022 indicate that 11,600,000 Sudanese are food insecure or face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels of food insecurity. A researcher and former government official who is now a senior policy advisor outlined the origins of Sudanese food insecurity and internal displacement of the Sudanese people. Food insecurity is caused by a below-average wheat harvest season (March–April) in 2022, deteriorating economic conditions, and intercommunal confrontations leading to displacement and impacting the agricultural sector (Researcher. 2, 13/02/2021). The crisis in Ukraine and Sudan's limited ability to buy wheat and compensate for shortfalls due to a lack of foreign cash exacerbates the problem. In June, the food access shortage in Darfur caused the deaths of children and the elderly (ACAPS, 2022).

Sudan's security issues extend beyond its borders. There are also proxies in Sudan that spark the country's internal problems. Analysts and pro-democracy activists are concerned that the financial and military help provided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Sudan's interim military administration amid protests merely reinforces their allies within the country. Conflicting interests in Sudan might set the two Gulf superpowers against the Qatar-Turkey regional axis, which would be problematic for the prospects of a democratic transition in Sudan (Furlow, 2019).

A Sudanese diplomat addressed the regional proxy and the role of foreign actors in Sudan's political instability. The rising involvement of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Qatar in Sudan posed a threat to the likelihood of a democratic transition. In the absence of a diplomatic response from the United States, Europe, or international organisations, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and by extension the Sudanese military council, may feel emboldened to suppress further protests. Hosting a new regional dispute will only diminish Sudan's chances of achieving a democratic transition or, at the absolute least, avoiding a descent into civil conflict. In Libya and Syria, for example, fighting regional factions has prolonged debilitating civil wars and given fertile ground for the emergence of rebel organisations, which frequently sow further disorder (Diplomat. 5, 11/09/2021). As the United States and other global powers continue to turn a blind eye to Sudan's revolt, intervening powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Qatar will be encouraged to repress rallies and impede the Sudanese people's demand for a complete democratic transition (Furlow, 2019).

As mentioned above, the demonstrations that led to Al-Bashir's removal were provoked by the economic crisis Sudan has experienced since 2018. Due to the termination of wheat and flour subsidies in February 2018 and the persistent devaluation of the Sudanese pound (SDG), there were shortages of vital commodities and foreign currency. The economic crisis disrupts public services, affects agricultural activities, and causes severe increases in the price of staple items (FAO, 2018; Fewson, 2018). The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning published a report titled; Implementation of Istanbul Plan of Action for Least Developed Countries 2011-2020. The report stated that the country's economy had lost 40% of its national revenue. While 90% of its export declined due to the secession and independence of South Sudan. The report also stated the higher unemployment rate, low economic growth, and the conflict problems in Sudan. The war in Sudan displaced millions of people to Sudan's neighbouring countries and left millions in IDPs camps (MOFPEP Report, 2019). It also has a massive external public debt of approximately US\$ 50 billion, which the IMF deems unsustainable. However, for economic and political reasons (including Sudan's inclusion in SSTL), it was unable to access the HIPC. Sudan's economic problems were compounded by sanctions (Louise, et al. 2019; (Holmes, 1993).

Soon after the United States and its allies imposed trade sanctions, Sudan faced extreme economic pressure (OFAC Report, 2021). The Trump administration, however, declared that his administration would remove Sudan from the list of state-sponsors of terrorism 18 months after the people of Sudan overthrew Omar al-Bashir (Finnegan, 2020). In return, Sudan would be required to recognize Israel. The US

Supreme Court also ruled that in order for sanctions to be lifted, the Republic of Sudan must "pay punitive damages alleging that Sudan had assisted al Qaeda in its attack in 1998 outside the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania" (Abubaker et al. 2020).

Although the United States lifted the sanctions in 2021, Sudan's political uncertainty and the economic situation remained the same. Sudan suffers enormous external debt of more than 50 billion US dollars. Although levels of poverty and debt are high in Sudan, which can make the country eligible for special assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, it currently cannot access funds from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (MOFPED Report, 2019). In order to access HIPC and overcome debt relief, Sudan has first to tackle many issues, including its political instability as well as agriculture and land reforms (Gold 2021). Sudan is a foreign aid-dependent country. The prolonged conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, which resulted in large displacement, increased humanitarian assistance over foreign development assistance of Sudan (MOFPED Report, 2019). Sudan's economic problems are devastating the low-income families in Sudan and young university graduates looking for employment in businesses and public institutions (Ali, 2019; AFDB Report, 2012).

Some interviews concurred on Sudan's economic hardship, unemployment, political instability, famine and prolonged conflict. A professor who was affiliated with the Open University of Sudan and later assumed the role of a senior economic advisor within one of Sudan's ministries expressed that the deteriorating economic condition of the country is primarily attributable to political challenges. She argues that "the country's

prolonged conflicts, frequent famine, external pressure and the current political power struggle between the military and the civilian groups will put Sudan and its people in a very difficult position" (Prof. 3. 20/10/2021). This analysis is supported by other sources (MOFPED Report, 2019; Abubaker et al., 2020; OFAC Report, 2021).

Sudan's political instability, severe economic problems, widespread conflict, and insecurity have in turn resulted in foreign interference from regional powers such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Mquirmi, 2021). The rich Gulf countries, particularly Turkey and the Gulf Arab countries, have more influence in their system (Feierstein, 2020; Mquirmi, 2021). The next section demonstrates how external factors influenced Sudan's political elites. I argue that Sudan is fragile, measured by UNDP and World Bank indicators of fragility on poor governance, insecurity, economic stagnation, poor human development, environment, and demographic problems. According to a report produced by Carleton University international donors reiterated the importance of aid commitment. Sudan requires more international assistance in order to achieve a successful transition to democracy (Stevens et al, 2020).

While economic hardship undoubtedly played a role in the 2018 protests that led to Bashir's overthrow, the opposition to the Arabization and Islamization policies imposed during the thirty years of Al-Bashir's rule also played a significant role in Sudan's uprising. Women and the younger generation of Sudan led the revolution as they demanded a democratic system and freedoms in Sudan (ReliefWeb, 2022). People in Sudan, primarily women and the younger generation, put freedom and democracy first. In this revolution, they demanded full democratic rule (Awad, 2021; Pessoa, 2021; Magdy, 2019). In other words, the 15- to 30-year-old generation was raised under the

authoritarian control of the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP, 1989–2019) and never experienced Sudan without an Islamist president. Therefore, their interactions with the state and attitudes towards the government have been profoundly impacted by the Islamist culture (Aalen, 2020). This time, not only are youth and women experiencing economic hardship, but they are also demanding their freedom and democracy. Two interviewees, both businessmen who advocate for human rights and democratic rule in Sudan, reaffirmed this message, highlighting the significance of freedom and democracy under civilian rule (Mustafa, 14/03/2021; Ali, 15/03/2021). Both interviewees also claimed that Sudan's succeeding military rulers are hardline Islamists who oppose democratic rule. Several times, they restated that the Sudanese people desire to elect their government and have freedom of expression in their political, economic, and social lives. The argument was closely tied to Asal's (2019) and Ahmed's (2019) explanations. In this case, Asal pointed out, "Although the Islamists have successfully created a parallel state in Sudan for the last three decades, the political shift of power away from the Islamists, which the 2018 popular uprising represents, makes the political future of Islamism bleak" (Asal, 2019). Again, Ahmed stated that the:

Generation leading the uprising is the one born and raised during the 30-year rule of Omar al-Bashir. They have been the main target of the regime's Islamization and Arabization policies that have been particularly harsh against women's freedoms and rights. Now, young Sudanese women are at the heart of the uprising (Ahmed, 2019).

According to Human Rights Watch, in Sudan the security services used excessive force against the government opposition, the media, freedoms of movements, and public opinion. Government detained politicians, human rights activists, journalists and protesters. Other factors were pushing the uprising and civil disobedience, such as economic hardships, conflicts in Darfur, and the Kordofan and Blue Nile (HRW Report, 2019). The military dissolved the government of Sudan. A military council announced that the country would go under two years of transition of power. Deadly clashes occurred between the people and the military on several occasions (Sirgany et al., 2019). There were ongoing demonstrations in the streets across the country, mainly in Khartoum, the capital city. The military imposed three months of emergency and thirty days of curfew during the civilian demonstration. The people of Sudan have widely rejected the coup (Hoffmann, 2021).

The country's elites, younger generation and its well-known Sudan Professional Association (SPA) expressed their rejection soon after General Awad Ibn Auf from the Sudanese military toppled Al-Bashir's regime. Although the protesters and involved civil society organisations felt some relief about the toppling, days later, the protesters and civil society organizations opposed the two years military transition of the Sudanese army announced by General Auf (Hajayandi, 2019). They do not want to see the overthrowing of a thirty-year military rule and replacing the same military regime with another name. People in the streets of Sudan demanded the establishment of a new civilian government (Sirgany et al., 2019). This resulted in the Chief General of Sudan's army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, removing Sudan's transitional government to appoint a new governing sovereign council on 21st August 2019 as part of transitional democracy for Sudan (Aljazeera, 2021).

Sudan's transitional government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the Sudanese military led by General al-Burhan made a power-sharing deal, expected to last 39 months. The deal stated that the military would lead the council for 21 months, followed by 18 months of civilian control (Kirby, 2019). The Sudanese people rejected the deal, and thousands of people protested against the power-sharing agreement, to which the military responded with force. Protesters demanded a return of complete civilian rule, a situation that led to the civilian Prime Minister's resignation on 25th October 2021. The resignation of Abdalla Hamdok resulted in Sudan's political power residing with the military again (BCC, 2022).

In his resignation speech, Hamdok said he tried his "best" to prevent the country from "sliding into a disaster" but warned that Sudan is "currently passing through a dangerous turning point that may threaten its survival (Hamdok, 2022).

I accepted the post of Prime Minister in August 2019 based on the constitutional declaration and political consensus between the military and civilian components, a model that I commended at several events. However, it failed to continue with the same harmony when it began (Hamdok, 2022).

Nevertheless, al-Burhan argued that the primary purpose of the power-sharing agreement of the sovereign council between the civilians and the Sudanese military led by him was to oversee a transitional period from a military regime to democracy (Hoffmann, 2021). Speaking exclusively to Aljazeera, General al-Burhan reiterated several times that he would not be part of Sudan's government after the transitional

period. He pointed out that "he is committed to a smooth democratic transition when elections are held in 2023 (Aljazeera, 2021). This followed a mix of escalated tensions between Sudan's military and civilian leaders of the sovereign council (Hoffmann, 2021).

Interviewed ambassadors, diplomats, and civil servant officials from the foreign office, department of defence, and interior ministry who were based in Sudan at the time of the revolution and still work for the government in various departments indicated that the military leaders' intention was not to democratise Sudan but rather to regain control of the country (Amb. 5, 01/12/2021; Official. 6, 25/02/2021; Amb. 6, 18/11/2021). All of these officials appear to favour Sudan's transition to democracy. To be precise, it is worth noting that most of the government personnel interviewed were civilians with no military background, and they all support civilian governance and democracy in Sudan.

Other high-ranking Sudanese officials from the foreign office and the department of finance and economic planning also stated why the army sought to abolish the civilian administration in the first place. They argued that al-Burhan and his deputy Dagalo intend to install groups loyal to the military within the civilian government because Burhan recognises the difficulty of toppling the civilian government in the current state of civil disobedience (Official. 5, 18/11/2011; Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Official. 9, 15/12/2020). A situation that led to the formation of a transitional government followed. Nevertheless, after the resignation of Hamdok, the former chairman of the Sovereign Council in Sudan, General al-Burhan is now the de facto Head of State of Sudan. Currently Sudan is under the rule of the Sudanese Army Forces Commander in-Chief

(Walsh et.al, 2021 cited in New York Times; Kottasova and Mackintosh, 2021, cited in CNN). Hoffmann, 2021; Aljazeera, 2021; Abdelaziz, 2019).

5.3 Turkey and Sudan Established New Relations

This section will briefly summarize the nature and extent of the relationship between Turkey and Sudan. First, it summarises how Turkey's new ties with Sudan were developed, mainly by strengthening the long-standing alliance and introducing brand-new fields of cooperation. Second, it highlights the bilateral military and economic partnership agreements as well as the historical, cultural, political, economic, humanitarian, and development links between Sudan and Turkey. It aims to do this by outlining Turkey's strategic goals in Sudan and providing fresh perspective on what Sudan seeks to gain from the alliance.

Although relations between Turkey and Sudan have long existed, Turkey established its new strategic relationship with Sudan after the AK Party came into power. Erdogan first visited Sudan in 2006, when he was the Prime Minister, to expand their political, economic and military cooperation (Shay, 2018). Prior to the visit of President Erdogan, Sudan politically leaned more toward Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates than Qatar and Turkey (Custers, 2020). Since then, Sudan shifted from its former allies of the GCC, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, toward Turkey and Qatar (van den Berg and Meester, 2019).

In 2017, a large delegation led by President Erdogan paid two days state visit to the Republic of Sudan (van den Berg and Meester, 2019). According to the Sudanese foreign minister, the purpose of the visit was to strengthen the long-established

relationship between the two countries while establishing new areas of cooperation (Aljazeera, 2017). Erdogan sees Sudan as a regional gateway to the Red Sea and Africa to help Turkey expand its strategic engagement and diplomatic presence across the continent (Shay, 2018).

The Sudanese government welcomed Turkey-Sudan strategic relationship and perceived Turkey as a friend and a brother that came to support Sudan when the Western countries imposed more sanctions on their country (Rakipoğlu, 2021; Anadolu Agency, 2017; Soufi, 08/8/2022). According to Musa and Ma'ruf, pseudonyms, two Sudanese government officials who have worked in Sudan's Ministry of Industry and Trade since 2006, Turkey exploited the absence of international investment in Sudan to its advantage (Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). Sudan was experiencing severe economic, security, and political problems when Turkey decided to establish new ties with the nation. People in Sudan were suffering from increased unemployment and poor social services (FAO, 2018; Fewsnet). Sudan's government and al-Bashir's leadership were failing as a result of international pressure and internal challenges (Musa, 20/08/2021). There was a good reason for al-Bashir to find a new partner and friend who can assist in such a difficult time, not only for the sake of a friend but a partner that can invest and assist in the devaluation of the Sudanese currency, speak for Sudan in the international arena, and deliver humanitarian and development projects in Sudan (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). In this regard, Sudan benefits from Turkey's location and status as a great African nation, while Sudan's leadership, which has been isolated internationally, views Turkey as an ally nation that can assist them on multiple fronts at this crucial time (Official. 6, 25/02/2021; Amb. 6, 18/11/2021).

Turkey's cooperation agreements, humanitarian assistance and bilateral development projects with Sudan demonstrate how important Ankara sees Khartoum's new strategic engagement as being to Turkish objectives in SSA (Turkish MFA, 2018). Since 2006, the engagement from Ankara to Khartoum has been consistent in many fields. Due to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which has resulted in the political, economic and security fragility described above, Turkey has provided significant political support to Sudan. The two countries' Heads of State agreed on political, economic and security cooperation during their meeting in Khartoum in 2017. Moreover, the two countries signed several Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), including military cooperation, renewable energy, economic and fiscal cooperation, and the implementation protocol of cash assistance and cooperation protocols between the Turkey and Sudan foreign ministries (DailySabah, 2021).

5.3.1 Turkey-Sudan Historical and Cultural Affinities

Turkey and Sudan share a history and cultural affinities. Both countries are Muslim majority nations. The Turkish relationship with Sudan and North Africa dates back to the fifteenth century (Turkey MFA, 2016). During the Ottoman Empire, Sudan was part of the vast swaths of the Muslim world in which the Ottoman Empire ruled (Shay, 2018). In 1527, the Ottomans occupied several vital locations, including the Ports of Suwakin and Musawwa. The occupation of Suwakin facilitated direct interaction between the Ottoman Sultans and the Funj kingdom, an ethnic group with origins in what is now southeast Sudan (Perry, 1990; Muhammed and Yahia, 2015). The Ottoman Empire and its control in Sudan have experienced numerous ups and downs. In order to secure control of all of North and East Africa and its gold, gum, and "unsalvable populace," the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul authorised a succession of military wars to

capture Abyssinia and the Funj Sultanate. In addition, in 1535, the Ottomans fought their way up to the 19th Cataract on the Nile. In 1584, they fought the Funj and took control of the Nahas region. Finally, in 1820, Turkish troops stormed the Funj Sultanate (Muhammed, 2015). From that point on, the Turks initiated political and administrative reforms in Sudan (Peacock, A.C.S, 2012).

During its reign, the Ottoman Empire contributed to Sudanese political and economic structures (1821-1885) Sudan was ruled by General Governors appointed by the Islamic Empire. They enacted laws and imposed fines. As a result, the Turkish had chosen the appropriate officers to collect those fines from all the population with the assistance of the tribal chiefs. Different currencies were also made by the Turkish to serve as money sums. The Post Office was Turkey's most outstanding achievement in economic progress. They established a headquarters branch in Khartoum and opened branches in all other regions (Muhammed, 2015). They also introduced new modes of communication. Examples include telegraphs, post office boxes, telephones, and typewriters. As a result, the Turkish created a middle-class stratum whose real income was mostly dictated by their salaries and allowances, while the majority of them relied on their private jobs to make a living. As a result, large marketplaces formed, especially in metropolitan areas, big villages, and small towns (Fadl, 2004; Muhammed, 2015). Since the Ottoman sovereignty of Sudan, between 1820 and 1885, Sudanese-Turkish relations have been firmly established. The Ottoman-Egyptian administration of Sudan produced several cultural, educational, social, political, and military similarities. The Ottoman-Egyptian rule of Sudan has contributed significantly to the formation of the country's geopolitical map.

Moreover, numerous terminology and vocabulary used in Sudanese colloquial language, as well as cultural norms, are viewed as being unique to Sudanese society among sub-Saharan African nations, which has been regarded as a legacy of that historical period (TIRAB , 2021). Therefore, the modern Turkish-Sudanese relationship is largely a continuation of the historical and cultural ties that were established in earlier centuries. Turkey's relations in the modern Sudan extend beyond government-to-government ties and resemble interactions between individuals on a more personal level (Shay, 2018) The non-state actors in Sudan have excellent relations with their counterparts. Turkey provides Sudanese students with more scholarships. Turkey Scholarships will provide young Sudanese students with cost-free access to the most prestigious universities in Turkey. In Sudan, Turkey established elementary and secondary institutions. The Sudanese educational system includes a Turkish curriculum (DailySabah, 2022). Turkish businesses engage in trade with Sudanese businesses, and the Turkish government has excellent relations with both Sudanese civil societies and political organisations (Mashamoun, 2022).

5.3.2 Turkey's Political and Diplomatic Support

When Turkey established its new relations with Sudan, unemployment was as high as 18 per cent, the conflict between Khartoum and Juba was at its peak, and the international community was pressuring the administration of al- Bashir to de-escalate the hostilities in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile (Ali, 2019; AFDB Report, 2012). According to Turkey's account, the purpose of the new engagement with Sudan was to provide humanitarian assistance and help the country's economic growth while participating in a variety of business sectors (Hussein, 2022).

According to two Sudanese diplomats serving abroad, Turkey has provided Sudan with political, security and development assistance, including funding for economic development programmes, military training and weapons supply and humanitarian aid initiatives. Despite these efforts, the Turkish government has been unsuccessful in promoting peace and political stability in Sudan. Due to the fact that Turkey has vested interests in Sudan, it avoids aligning itself with any particular group. It maintains good relations with the Sudanese government, religious organisations, and civil society institutions to sustain harmonious relations. Turkey is an ardent supporter of Islamic organisations in Sudan, including the military, whose top officials belong to Islamic groups. In general, Turkey's relationship with Sudan is complex and multifaceted. The country has a number of interests in Sudan, and it is trying to strike a balance between these interests by keeping good ties with all of the country's major stakeholders (Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021; Diplomat 7, 18/07/2021).

In addition to Turkey's interests, subsequent Sudanese leaders, notably al-Bashir and al-Burhan, cultivated strong relations with Ankara for their own personal reasons. From Sudan's perspective, al-Bashir and al-Burhan accepted Turkey for their personal interests, some claim that the link between the two regimes, specifically al-Bashir and the Erdogan's AK Party has always been for ideological reasons (Official. 5, 18/11/2011; Official. 6, 25/02/2021; Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Official. 9, 15/12/2020; Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021; Amb. 6, 18/11/2021; Diplomat 7, 18/07/2021;). For example, the Muslim Brotherhood has pushed for an Islamic government in Sudan that abides by shari'a (Islamic Holy Law) since 1949. Forty years later, it allied with Bashir and

seized power through the National Islamic Front (NIF), formerly known as the Islamic Charter Front (ICM) and affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Its primary objective was to Islamize society "from above" and to institutionalize the Muslim Brotherhood in all key governmental, educational, and judicial institutions (Moubayed, 2020). Erdogan, a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, endorsed al-Burhan's political Islam to bolster Turkey's leadership position in the Middle East and the broader Islamic world. He readily supported the government in Sudan alongside Qatar, another supporter of the group, and Turkey-backed MB-aligned figures across the region with diplomatic and financial assistance (Diplomat. 5, 11/09/2021; Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021). Similarities between the ideologies of al-Bashir government and the Erdogan regime complement Turkey's geopolitical goals in Africa. The AKP highlights Turkey's goal to serve as a model for the Muslim world and offer an alternative to Western model. Thus, shared ideology has played a role in Turkey's engagement with Sudan (Mashamoun, 2022). In contrast to Western states, Turkey has not supported the diplomatic isolation of Sudan in response to its human rights violations and connection to Islamist terrorists. In a joint press conference with the president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, President Erdogan remarked that Sudan's embargo and international isolation are unjust to its people and government:

"Trade and economic embargoes against our Sudanese brothers and sisters isolated them from life; however, they patiently exerted efforts to overcome this process." We have never shied away from voicing our opposition to such practices of isolation, and we have always been there for Sudan. We have kept highlighting at every opportunity and at international meeting that these policies

do more harm than good and cause suffering among the civilian public” (Erdogan, cited in TCCB Webpage).

Erdogan views Sudan as a vital ally with which Ankara seeks to strengthen strategic ties. Turkey has formalised its ties with Sudan because of the country's strategic location linking the Middle East and Africa. In 2012, Khartoum, Sudan, played host to the seventh Turkish-African Congress. This gathering of policymakers, academics, and business elites helped shape Turkish foreign policy in the region. Sudan is a strategic partner for Turkey in Africa due to its membership in several regional organisations, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. Using the ethnic populations along its borders and the support it gives to rebel groups in other countries, Sudan has shown that it can influence policies in surrounding countries. For instance, in 2006, the Bashir dictatorship launched an attack on Chad in retribution for the country's assistance of Darfurian rebels from the Zaghawa. This African tribe spans the border between Chad and Darfur. Similarly, when civil war broke out in South Sudan in 2013, Khartoum supported the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (Mashamoun, 2022; Neziroğlu, 2022, cited in Daily Sabah).

5.3.3 The Current Security Situation of Sudan

As previously indicated, Sudan is experiencing substantial political instability, resulting in at least 14.3 million Sudanese requiring humanitarian assistance in 2022. Although Sudan has been unstable since its inception, the political unrest that followed the

military takeover on October 25, 2021, is currently contributing to the country's hazardous predicament. As a direct result of the current socioeconomic crisis, which has resulted in high inflation rates and currency devaluation, about one-fourth of the population worries about not having enough food to eat. Conflicts between different populations and acts of violence in some areas further contribute to the country's high internal and international migration rates.

Both the country's former and current leaders have failed to deliver peace and stability to the Sudanese people (African News, 2021). Even though the political crisis has the potential to generate instability and war, chronic forms of insecurity continue to pose the greatest threat. It is of the utmost importance to handle the continuous threat posed by the several armed groups operating in Sudan (Menkhaus, 2021).

The Sudanese arms market is usually considered one of the world's most robust. There appears to be a clear correlation between the availability of weapons and the persistent state of insecurity in the region, which has led to the militarization of the region's cities and the expansion of a vast number of continuing cross-border and internal conflicts (Reliefweb, 2007). Protracted armed conflicts around the Horn of Africa have resulted in chronic armed violence and rates of internal displacement and refugee flow that are among the highest ever recorded (Reliefweb, 2007).

In other words, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and other armed organizations in its regions are the country's most prominent and deadly source of instability, but they are not the only ones. The political and security environment of Sudan is heavily influenced by numerous elements and individuals, each of which has a part in

determining the use and management of violence. Among these are the diverse racial and ethnic communities, which include Arabs and non-Arab communities. Conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs in the South Darfur province of Sudan are seriously impeding the attempts of the transitional government of Sudan to halt decades-long rebellions in certain sections of the country. These tensions have existed for a considerable time (Magdy, 2020). The clan system and militias remain important "explanatory variables" in Sudanese politics, society, and economics (Magdy, 2020).

Additionally, international players have participated in rivalries through Sudanese proxies, contributing to Sudan's instability (Furlow, 2019). As was discussed in the preceding sections, the recent coups and civil unrest in Sudan are other important factors contributing to the country's high rates of insecurity and mortality (Amin, 2022). Sudan is home to numerous state-sponsored and non-state-armed actors. The military alliance has successfully retained and expanded its influence. However, it is not coherent, and violent conflict amongst its constituent pieces is highly probable. Even though the military bloc has been instrumental in maintaining and increasing its authority, this is the case (de Waal, 2019; Gallopin, 2020). The conflict between the SAF and the RSF continues to pose the greatest threat. However, numerous components of the security apparatus, including former rebel groups, continue to pose a threat by aligning themselves with one of these institutions or exploiting the insecurity for their purposes. As has been the case for the past year, the most likely option is a continuation of bloodshed in the provinces, with subnational rivalries playing out against the backdrop of political instability in the capital (de Waal, 2019).

The spread of irregular and semi-regular armies around the country exemplifies the degree to which the Sudanese state has failed due to numerous coups, escalating debt, and prolonged conflict in rural peripheries. In order to monitor the production of wealth and the violent extraction of it from Sudan's borders, these same forces have constructed a new, complicated rural security infrastructure to replace the decaying one (de Waal, 2019). The political impasse has impeded Sudan's efforts to develop competent security forces and coordinated responses to the insurgent threat. The hostilities erupted in 2022 in Sudan between government-controlled forces and other tribal militias exemplify the hatred between the country's many armed ethnic groups.

In this regard the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Sudan in 2004 in response to the country's persistent humanitarian crisis and serious abuses of human rights. Later, the embargo was imposed on all signatories to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement, a Chad-brokered Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and two rebel factions, the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A).

The resolution established a Security Council Sanctions Committee to oversee the embargo implementation and evaluate requests from the Sudanese government to transfer military equipment into the Darfur region. The Sanctions Committee responded to questions from member nations by making clear that arms transfers to the Sudanese government are allowed outside the Darfur region. Additional penalties, including a travel ban and a freeze on assets, were imposed by the resolution on individuals listed by the Sanctions Committee. Expert panels from the United Nations have consistently spotted military equipment in Darfur that they believe supplied to

Sudan after March 2005. In October 2010, Security Council resolution 1945, which was not adopted unanimously, strengthened the arms embargo by mandating that all States ensure that any sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Sudan that is not prohibited by resolutions 1556 and 1591 is conditioned on the necessary end-user documentation so that States can ensure that any such sale or supply is conducted in accordance with the measures imposed by those resolutions (SIPRI, 2012).

Many scholars, analysts, and specialists such as Sudanese university professors, independent political commentators and members of professional associations in and outside Sudan began referring to the country's political turmoil as a "game of chess" (Mquirmi, 2021). Since US-led sanctions were imposed in 1997, Bashir's ambiguous foreign policy, which involved the forging of multiple partnerships with whoever was ready to assist keep his country's economy afloat, was the cause. Diverse regional and extra-regional powers were therefore interested in the future of Sudan, which is strategically significant. Sudan has natural resources such as natural gas, gold, silver, chromite, zinc, and iron, as well as direct access to the Red Sea, but located in a fragile and unstable region (Mquirmi, 2021).

Nevertheless, the crisis in Sudan is the result of a toxic confluence of factors, including the effects of two decades of economic sanctions, three decades of military dominance in politics, decades of civil wars that resulted in the secession of South Sudan, the instability of the Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan regions, and exclusionary approaches to peace and power (Horn Institute, 2019).

Despite international efforts to impose an arms embargo, Turkey began to sign a deal to set up military stations with the government of Sudan. Turkey is committed to aiding the Sudanese government in building and bolstering its army and security forces. Another factor that has propelled the Sudanese-Turkish relationship is Turkey's ambition to incorporate Sudan into its regional military strategies. Turkey's growing interest in building a naval presence in the Red Sea was displayed in 2014 and 2015 when Turkish vessels docked in Port Sudan for joint military training (Mashamoun, 2022; Winsor, 2015).

5.3.4 Turkey-Sudan Security Cooperation

In 2017, Turkey and Sudan signed a series of bilateral agreements to enhance their military cooperation and to construct a docking facility in the port city of Suakin that would be accessible to both military and civilian vessels (Aksoy, 2021). Another framework agreement signed in 2018 consists of military training – a security pact and counter-terrorism arrangements (KUNA News, 2018). Turkey's plan was to establish new military facilities in Sudan in order to enhance Turkey's security engagement and political involvement in Sub-Saharan countries (Abdulmaarouf, 2018; Shay, 2018). According to World Bulletin (2018), an unpublished study revealed that Sudan and Turkey have also agreed on the establishment of a Turkish military base on Suakin Island. The report also stated the agreement included Turkey's military presence in Port Khartoum, Sudan's major port (Donelli and Cannon, 2021).

From Sudan's perspective, the Suakin Island transaction will deepen the existing ties between the two nations. The agreement will facilitate the provision of training and military facilities by the Turkish government to the Sudanese national army.

It will also aid the Sudanese government in easing the arms embargo imposed on its armed forces regarding Darfur (Official. 5, 18/04/2021; Official. 9, 15/12/2020; Prof. 2, 16/11/2021). In contrast, from Turkey's perspective, the military bases in Sudan are crucial to its regional strategic interests. This geographic reach is crucial to Ankara's Neo-Ottoman Policy. Neo-Ottomanism is a new unofficial foreign policy stance proposed by the Turkish Republic (Donelli and Cannon, 2021). It is strongly associated with "Neo Pan-Turkism," "Pan-Turanism," and "Turkish Eurasianism." After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was vigorously applied toward newly formed Turkic states; currently, it focuses primarily on bolstering Turkey's position in the Arab world, Africa, and the Balkans. "Soft power" used to be the primary means of expressing Neo-Ottoman strategy to Sub-Saharan Africa (Alekseevich, 2018).

Erdogan and his AK Party brought the Neo-Ottomanism agenda to fruition. During Erdogan's ascent to power, Turkish foreign policy has pushed into the African continent as never before in the nation's history, garnering headlines for his significant humanitarian donations and economic cooperation agreements (Kenyon, 2018). Erdogan has visited 26 African countries, a record for a non-African Head of State, and intends to establish Turkish diplomatic representation in every country on the continent (Minister Mevlüt, as cited in Sudan Tribune). Erdogan asserts that Africans have yearned for a true friend who respects their history, culture, traditions, and languages and that Turkey "wants to be true friends with Africa" (Isilow and Calik, 2018). Erdogan sees Turkey as a global force with worldwide reach. Hence, he pursues a foreign policy agenda that reflects this perception of the Turkish Republic (Armstrong, 2018). Thus, the Erdogan-led Turkish government has endeavoured to

expand its global engagement, frequently in less developed countries such as Africa and Latin America (Akca, 2020).

In this policy, Erdogan considers the Turkish Republic a worldwide force with global influence; thus, he pursues a foreign policy agenda that reflects this perception. Thus, the Erdogan-led Turkish government has tried to expand its global engagement, particularly in less developed countries such as Africa and Latin America (Akca, 2020).

Sudan's role as a gateway between the Middle East and Africa prompted Turkey to strengthen its formal ties with the country. Turkey views its interests as offering an alternative model of influence in the area, distinct from the security-driven model of the United States and the economic-driven model of China (Mashamoun, 2022; CSI, 2020; Minister 08/12/2021). The Turkish foreign aid and international relations model will be discussed in detail later.

In other words, as in Somalia, the primary motivation of Turkey in Sudan is to become a regional power (Özkan, 2016; Shay, 2018). From Turkey's perspective, Turkey's relations with Sudan will add more value to its presence in the continent, particularly the Red Sea region (Sıradağ, 2018; Shay, 2018). As with Somalia, Turkey perceives Sudan's geographical importance as well as economic and security potential (Shay, 2018; Tirab, 2022; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). Sudan's geographical location in northeastern Africa, significant population of nearly 45 million people and 530 miles of coastline in the Red Sea are all of importance to Turkey. Suakin Island is one of the most strategic positions in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, East Africa, and Saudi Arabia crossroads. Sudan shares borders with seven countries, including Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. Nile River

flows from Khartoum as the two rivers of blue and white merge in Khartoum all the way to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, Sudan is naturally rich in agriculture. Near the Nile valleys, Kordofan States, Darfur, and Kassala are all fertile land full of farms and livestock herding (World Bank, 2022). Turkey sees Sudan's economic, political and security potential (Shay, 2018) and as an emerging economy and military power, Turkey recognises the importance of regional repositioning (Özkan, 2014). For Turkey's strategic engagement with Africa, Sudan is an important country and thus it is necessary to establish good relations with Khartoum (Rakipoğlu, 2021).

In the areas of security and military cooperation, Turkey and Sudan have signed a total of 21 bilateral agreements. Sudan's Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour, the Defence Ministry is ready for military cooperation with any party, and Sudan is prepared to work militarily with Turkey. According to Ghandour, Sudan has signed a deal that might lead to any form of military cooperation. Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that the agreements include security deals for the Red Sea, adding that Turkey is interested in safeguarding the security of Sudan, Africa, and the Red Sea (Middle East Monitor, 2017).

5.3.5 Turkey's Economic Cooperation in Sudan: Trade, Development and Humanitarian Assistance

As the two nations' political relations strengthened, so did Turkey's commercial links with Sudan (Mashamoun, 2022; Shay, 2018; Şafak, 2017). Ankara quickly established solid business relations with Khartoum on numerous fronts following Turkey's increased involvement with Sudan. The two countries economic relations expanded

beyond trade and investment to development/humanitarian and technical assistance, (Shay, 2015).

On the economic front, new agreements worth hundreds of millions of US dollars were signed to enhance bilateral trade. Turkey and Sudan signed more than twenty-two agreements in many fields (Şafak, 2017; Shay, 2018). In 2018, Sudan signed a framework agreement with the government of Turkey worth \$650 million. The two leaders also agreed to promote 288 projects worth ten billion US dollars in trade and investment projects (Shay, 2018). Since then, Turkey's private companies have started to invest in Sudan. The two countries signed a 100 million US dollars deal on agriculture and oil exploration investments within the same year.

In 2006, the Turkish Delta Petroleum Group announced that it would invest \$60 million in an oil field in Sudan, in addition to Turkey's separate \$100 million in agriculture and oil operations in Sudan. Mehmet Habbab, chairman of Delta's board of directors, claimed that Delta Group had finalised procedures and arrangements for its work in Sudan's oil field. In the initial phase, Delta Group wants to invest \$10 million to develop warehouses and workshops in Khartoum, Port-Sudan, Gedarif, Babanousa, and Al-Obeid. Based on its experience and expertise in this field, according to the Delta management board, Sudan is expected to make significant advances in the petroleum industry during the next few years. After providing them with training, Delta Group will rely on Sudanese labour to benefit the Sudanese workforce (ECOS, 2006). In addition, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry declared, Turkey and Sudan have struck another \$100 million oil exploration pact and an accord assigning hundreds of square kilometres of Sudanese land for Turkish oil company involvement (Reuters,

2018). Turkish Agriculture and Forestry Minister Bekir Pakdemirli said in a statement that the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and Sudan's Ministry of Petroleum and Gas inked an oil field development deal that might result in an initial investment of \$100 million. The ministry did not specify the type or location of the investment, but Turkey's state-run Anadolu Agency quoted Pakdemirli as stating that it was an exploration deal (Reuters, 2018).

Turkey and Sudan's bilateral ties have advanced in numerous domains, including agriculture, energy, health, security, and education, as evidenced by numerous high-level visits and the signing of numerous cooperation agreements. The activities scheduled under this framework are geared toward fostering closer ties between the people of the two nations. The two countries have also attempted to establish a more secure and solid foundation by fostering relationships between civil society organisations, colleges, libraries, and museums. In the contemporary globalised world, where regional operations have also intensified, Turkey and Sudan are still attempting to increase their regional collaboration through bilateral activities (Tasam, 2021).

In 2020, bilateral commerce between Turkey and Sudan totaled 480 million dollars, while the Sudan's trade deficit with Turkey amounted to 270 million dollars. Turkey mainly exports electrical machinery, iron and steel, automotive sub-industry products, boilers, machinery, iron and steel goods, plastic products, non-woven apparel, and paper and cardboard to Sudan. Sudan's major exports to Turkey consist of oilseeds and fruits, sugar and sugar products, raw hides, lacquer, gum, resin, essential oils, and cotton. Turkish firms in Sudan are primarily centred in the industries of iron-steel, cement, PVC production, leather, marble, grain import and export, bakery, curtain

making and furniture, intercity bus transportation, agricultural commodity trading, and trade in white goods (Tasam, 2021).

Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay declared that Turkey and Sudan hope to attain a \$2 billion trade volume within the next five years. During the Turkey-Sudan businesspeople's consultation meeting in Ankara in 2021, Oktay emphasised that Sudan, with its 44 million youthful and dynamic people and plentiful natural resources, is on its approach to becoming a regional hub. Additionally, Vice President Oktay noted that more than 100,000 hectares of agricultural land in Sudan were allocated to Turkey for cultivation. Both countries had agreed to allocate an additional 700,000 hectares to Turkey. Oktay pointed out that "the agricultural production collaboration in this field offers Turkish businesses a big investment potential in Sudan and will also contribute to Sudan's employment, agricultural technology, and food supply security," (Oktay, 2021 cited in DailySabah).

The quantity of investments in Sudan, according to Oktay, reflects the deepening of economic ties between the two countries. During the Sudanese delegation's visit to Turkey, several agreements were also concluded. The memorandums of understanding include collaboration in renewable energy and energy efficiency, a protocol for cooperation between the foreign ministries, economic and fiscal cooperation between the relevant ministries, military-financial cooperation, and a protocol for implementing cash assistance (DailySabah, 2021; Kenzen, 2022).

The other agreements agreed upon between the two governments included Turkish participation in the construction of Khartoum's planned new airport, as well as private

sector investments in cotton production, energy generation, and the construction of grain silos and meat slaughterhouses (Reuters, 2018).

The first Sudan-Turkey Business Forum was held in Khartoum in 2021 with the participation of Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci, Sudan Deputy Prime Minister Mubarak Alfadel, Sudan Financial and Economic Development Minister Mohamed Osman Elrekab, DEK/Turkey-Sudan Business Council Chairperson Mehmet Ali Korkmaz, and 400 Turkish and Sudanese businesspeople. According to Zeybekci, significant progress has been made under the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries although Turkey and Sudan need to address challenges in sectors such as banking and money transfers (Zeybekci, cited in Deik, 2021). Mubarak Alfadel emphasised that high-level meetings and signing agreements are significant steps toward strategic engagement. According to Alfadel, Sudan's natural resources, geographic location, and arable land will combine with Turkey's technological and economic strength. By combining both nations' financial resources and opportunities, Sudan can accomplish significant industrial development. Alfadel indicated that collective investments between Turkey and Sudan would yield one billion dollars by planting one million hectares. As a result, Turkish enterprises will also contribute to infrastructural development (Alfadel and Elrekabi, cited in Deik, 2021).

On the development and Humanitarian front, Ankara has been carrying out humanitarian and development assistance since it established its new relations with Khartoum (Keyman and Sazak, 2014). Turkey provides medical assistance and supplies to Sudanese healthcare centres and constructed hospitals and medical centres. It has also provided hundreds of scholarships to Sudanese university students

(Rakipoğlu, 2021). Turkey's International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), alongside the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), have extended its support to the people of Sudan (Turkey MFA, 2016). TIKA has been at the vanguard of Sudan's development projects, mainly infrastructure projects such as ports and airports, as well as programmes involving water, health, and education (Tekingunduz, 2019). In addition, TIKA and other sub-contracting Turkish NGOs are working with the Sudanese civil societies in small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, Sudan's Turkish Official Development Aid contribution reached 21.33 million dollars in 2011, primarily "humanitarian assistance" (Keyman and Sazak, 2014). TIKA has also extended support in the realm of water supply and engineering, digging wells, training Sudanese water engineers and supporting geophysical research (Tekingunduz, 2019; Reliefweb, 2011; (Parlar Dal & Dipama, 2022; Turhan, 2021).

Turkey offers significant educational opportunities for Sudanese citizens. The Turkish government gives hundreds of Sudanese students financial support through its Turkish scholarship programmes, popularly known as *Turkiye Burslari*. Students engaged in their scholarship programmes have the opportunity to study for free at Turkey's most famous universities (Farooq, 2021). In addition, Turkey formed the Maarif Foundation in 2016 to take over the operation of abroad schools formerly affiliated with the Fetullah school, Missionary Schools in Central Asia that propagated the development of Turkism and Islam (Özkan and Akgun, 2020; Balci, 2003; Turhan, 2021).

Turkey and Sudan have launched a higher education cooperation plan that involves the establishment of a joint institution, networking universities in the two nations, and reciprocal recognition of degrees to increase student and academic mobility (Özkan

and Akgun, 2020). They have also signed agreements fostering university cooperation in various disciplines. Joint academic programmes at the graduate and postgraduate levels, as well as Turkish-Arabic and vocational and technical education courses for Sudanese academics and students, scientific and educational conferences, and workshops on issues of national, regional, and global significance, will be encouraged (Sawahel, 2015; Özkan and Akgun, 2020).

In 2007 Turkey and Sudan signed a convention on health sector cooperation and an action plan to manage a Turkish hospital in the Sudanese city of Kalakla. Several Turkish-built hospitals in Sudan and Ankara renovated their physical conditions, equipment, and training materials (Sudan Tribune, 2007). In these hospitals Turkish physicians have been teaching Sudanese medical professionals and physicians (DailySabah, 2019). Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), a conservative Turkish NGO whose members are primarily Turkish Muslims active in over 120 countries, opened its third Cataract Surgery Center in Darfur's region of Sudan in collaboration with TIKA and other Turkish NGOs provide substantial healthcare aid in Sudan (IHH, 2011). Many non-governmental groups have difficulty visiting west Darfur because of security concerns, but TKA and IHH are able to continue their assistance activities there (IHH, 2011).

The Sudanese Ministry of Finance has struck a contract with the Turkish firm Summa to construct a new international airport in Khartoum at an estimated cost of \$1.15 billion. The Turkish business, Summa, promised to complete the first part of the project within 30 months. Othman al-Rekabi, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning for Sudan, and Salim Bora, Chairman of Summa, signed the deal on behalf of their governments.

Al-Rekabi remarked that the "agreement symbolises a new beginning in the field of private sector infrastructure investments in the country and is consistent with the country's objective of providing inexpensive investment possibilities for domestic and international investors (Middle East Monitor, 2018). According to Al-Rekabi, the ultimate goal of this agreement is the construction of a new international airport in Sudan that reflects well on the country, which enjoys a vital geographical location connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. The direct participation of the Turkish company in infrastructure projects will attract international corporations to invest in similar projects in the country" (Middle East Monitor, 2018).

5.4. Sudanese Perspective: Why Turkey's Engagement Accepted

The fundamental reason why governments in Khartoum established relations with nations like Turkey was to seek aid to mitigate the country's political, economic, and security turmoil. Since Sudan's independence, there has always been political uncertainty. Sudan has experienced numerous military coups and revolutions. The majority of Sudan's Heads of State are military commanders who deposed their predecessors and sought to retain power (Official. 8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9,15/12/2020). A coup d'état, not elections, is the only way for Sudanese presidents to be removed from office, and this is only likely to occur if there are economic difficulties such as higher unemployment and food price inflation (de Waal, 2022). During al-Bashir's tenure, the nation has been riven by internal conflicts and crises, such as the ongoing conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan, the disagreements over the Blue Nile, the rapid deterioration of the economy, the protracted civil unrest, and the lack of political stability (de waal, 2019). As a result, Khartoum's political leaders require foreign assistance, including political support, economic aid, and security

assistance, in order to hold onto their positions of power (Verjee, 2018; MOFPED Report, 2019; Abubaker et al., 2020; OFAC Report, 2021; Ali, 2019; AFDB Report, 2012).

Hence, the contemporary relationship between Sudan and Turkey has been more personal rather than national or strategic. Al-Bashir and al-Burhan's relations with Turkey were never based on the interests of the Sudanese people. It was so much as to ensure their continued authority. However, although both leaders established links with Turkey in order to acquire political, economic, military aid, and also to secure power, their primary goals and objectives for the relationship differ. Al-Bashir intended to establish close ties with Ankara to keep himself in power, and doing so, he wanted to alleviate the economic and political strain caused by sanctions and to evade prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Al-Burhan, in contrast sought positive relations with Turkey in order to mitigate Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Burhan also wants to balance Sudan's allies and friends in order to maintain Sudan's good relations with the region. Therefore, Khartoum leaders accepted Turkey's engagement for two similar but distinct reasons (Rep. 3, 23/10/2021; Rep. 4, 16/06/2022; Researcher. 2, 13/02/2021).

First, Al-Bashir developed relations with Turkey to mitigate the effects of economic challenges caused by sanctions. The Sudanese regime's popularity was falling due to continuous food price hikes as a result of sanctions (Siddig, 2010; Shay, 2018; Mquirmi, 2021; Hamza, 30/11/2021). The secession of South Sudan caused a further deterioration in living conditions and severe economic challenges. Sudan's economy

declined, and its oil production fields lost more than 75% of its revenue sources (Acaps, 2019; Attwood, 2017; F.T., 2019).

A Sudanese diplomat pointed out that "Sudan and al-Bashir himself were in a difficult situation when Erdogan first visited Khartoum as Prime Minister and in 2017 as a President. Al-Bashir was dealing with higher youth unemployment and security challenges, and it was difficult for him to receive security and economic aid from other countries" (Amb.4, 04/01/2020). Many participants agreed that, in response to international pressure from the United States, al-Bashir sought regionally reliable allies such as Turkey to offset that pressure. The sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations negatively affected the economy and the welfare of the Sudanese people as, numerous countries ceased providing development aid to the people of Sudan. In addition, foreign direct investment fell. According to a Sudanese official involved in Sudanese trade and investment:

Sanctions against Sudan made it difficult for international banks to provide services to Sudanese companies. International financial institutions have stopped funding joint ventures and concessions between the Sudanese government and other foreign private and public firms. As a result, financial exchanges and other commercial transactions have become more expensive for the public and private sectors as they seek alternative payment methods" (Rep. 4, 16/06/2022).

Sanctions also resulted in the devaluation of the Sudanese pound (SDG) in November 2017 as the Sudanese regime sought to attract foreign exchange via remittances from

Sudanese abroad and to bring the official rate closer to the ever-expanding parallel rate of exchange. In response to a later economic shock, the Sudanese government abolished wheat subsidies, tripling the price of bread and increasing the cost of other consumer items. 50 to 300 per cent more medicines, 113 per cent more energy, 113 per cent more cooking gas and 62 per cent more cooking oil (US Department of State, 2018). Financial institutions are refusing to provide services due to the country's inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. In essence, the direct cause of the economic crisis led the majority of the Sudanese working class to suffer, while the al-Bashir regime lost popularity and public support as a result of the economic catastrophe (Woodward, 2019).

According to Ma'ruf, "Al-Bashir wanted Turkey's relations to at least mitigate the pressure of the United Nation's sanctions and ICJ arrest warrant at the time" (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). In return, al-Bashir offered Turkey the strategic bridgehead in SSA that it sought. To this extent, al-Bashir's relations with Turkey were based on self-interest. Turkey extended an invitation to al-Bashir and refused to arrest and surrender him to the ICC prosecution (HRA, 2017). Turkey also provided a two-billion-dollar loan to Sudan to support the devalued Sudanese currency and expand Sudan-Turkey trade and investment cooperation (Reuters, 2018).

However, Turkey's financing and investment have made little difference to Sudan's economic circumstances. The economic challenges continued to affect food prices and public services (FAO, 2018) triggering mass anti-al-Bashir demonstrations. Fearing another Arab Spring revolt similar to those that shook the region and jeopardised their own stability in 2011, as it became clear that al-Bashir had failed to quash the uprising, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia began secretly

engaging the Sudanese military to encourage his removal from power (Official. 8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9,15/12/2020). They used the pretence of "stability" to back military and paramilitary groups (Magdy, 2019). Soon after al-Bashir was ousted from power, Turkey-Sudan relations became strained as the new TMC aligned itself with the Gulf States (Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, 2020) placing the future of Turkish-Sudanese relations into doubt (TRT, 2020).

When al-Burhan was named head of the Sovereign Council Sudan experienced a swift international repositioning. Over the course of a year, the Qatari and Turkish clients in Khartoum lost all influence over policy. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided the generals with the financial resources necessary to oppose public calls for civilian government, creating a skewed balance of power that enabled them to navigate a time of great political instability. Subsequently, the Emirates' covert cash infusions allowed the generals in consolidating their control. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sought influence with the new Sudanese regime due to Sudan's strategic importance and their ongoing conflict with Qatar and Turkey. They believe Turkey and Qatar had been empowering the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, which they see as a threat to their existence (Mashino, 2021).

The approaches of the Gulf governments, particularly Saudis and the UAE, toward the Muslim Brotherhood are defined by their conviction that the group poses a threat to their very survival. Given that Saudi Arabia and its neighbours provided asylum to thousands of Muslim Brothers fleeing repression in their Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi home countries during the 1950s and 1970s and employed them in the Gulf's burgeoning educational systems, this is quite surprising. Relations deteriorated when

significant members of MB-affiliated organizations, such as the Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi, the Turk Necmettin Erbakan, and the Afghan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, supported Saddam Hussein following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces (Steinberg, 2014).

After the Muslim Brotherhood won elections in Tunisia and Egypt and became a major factor in Libya and the Syrian resistance, the extent of Saudi hostility toward the group became apparent. It became evident that the Gulf states, with the exception of Qatar, saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a strategic threat due to their worry that it could transplant the successful revolutions in North Africa to the monarchies of the Gulf states, where the Muslim Brotherhood have a presence in all states. Saudi Arabia views Brotherhood ideology as a school of thought competing for allegiance among Gulf populations and threatening the religious legitimacy of the Saudi state, which is founded on the royal family's partnership with the Wahhabi reform movement (Steinberg, 2014; Donelli and Cannon, 2021).

Saudi and Emirati involvement in Sudan reawakened regional tensions between the two Gulf superpowers and the Qatar-Turkey axis (Bakir, 2002; Krieg, 2019; CRU, Report, 2021; Donelli and Cannon, 2021). Both nations' ruling elites are significant supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood organization which they see as a vehicle for extending their influence in the wider Middle East (Başkan, 2016). While the AKP is deeply rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood's "ecology of thought," Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood is based on pragmatism and self-interest. The MB is not politically engaged in Qatar and is not viewed as a threat to the kingdom's security and stability (Roberts, 2017). Between 2011 and 2013, they aided and developed a variety

of Islamist and revolutionary movements to enhance their ties and alter the regional geography by expanding networks of Islamic movements such as Muslim Brotherhood (CRU, Report, 2021). As Turkey and Qatar support the Muslim Brotherhood on a fundamental level, on one hand, it can be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood could be a valuable bargaining chip for al-Burhan's administration to strike a balance between the interests of Turkey and Qatar and those of the Gulf States, with whom al-Burhan allied shortly after assuming power. On the other hand, Al-Burhan preferred positive relations with Turkey to reduce Turkey's backing for the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Burhan also seeks to strike a balance between Sudan's supporters and friends in order to preserve the country's positive relations with the region. In other words, al-Burhan is attempting to achieve his goals by pitting the two opposing groups against one another in the hope of gaining both sides' support (Abdelaziz, 2019; Reuters, 2019).

For some years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been quietly feuding with Qatar and Turkey over their distinct regional outlooks. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been promoting the status quo, while Doha and Istanbul are sponsors and advocates of Islamist forces in the area, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. The two axes have clashed over these ideological disagreements (Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, 2020; Furlow, 2019; Abdelaziz, 2019; Reuters, 2019). Consequently, the fall of al-Bashir was seen by the Saudis and UAE as an opportunity to eliminate the influence of the MB in Sudan and to undermine the Turkish-Qatari regional strategy (Donelli and Cannon, 2021).

In response to the growing influence of the Saudis and UAE in Sudan Turkey extended support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. Previously allied with the al-Bashir

regime the MB lost all influence and immunity following al-Bashir's fall, forcing them to align themselves with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who generously gave them asylum, passports, money, explosives, and weaponry. In the middle of February 2020, a cell of the illegal Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was discovered in Sudan, with plans to conduct terrorist activities in the capitals of both Sudan and Egypt. According to the Sudanese government, Egyptian members of the Brotherhood arrived in Sudan from Turkey (Moubayed, 2020). One Egyptian admitted to using fake Syrian passports provided by the Turkish government to enter Sudan (Ashraf, 2020).

In addition, Turkey engaged and influenced the civilian opposition who oppose the Transitional Military Council led by al-Burhan and his military Junta, which governs Sudan. According to two Sudanese officials in the foreign office, the tensions between Sudan and Turkey resulted in the suspension of earlier agreements struck by the al-Bashir regime with Turkey and the discontinuation of Qatar's foreign aid and investments in Sudan (Official. 8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9, 15/12/2020). The two-year opposition of Turkey also had an economic impact on Sudan's new military rule, as it reduced aid and investment. The fact that Turkey supported al-Burhan's political opposition, and the Muslim Brotherhood posed a political and security challenge for the new Sudanese administration. Consequently, after two years of political estrangement between Ankara and Khartoum, al-Burhan, travelled to Turkey in August 2021 (DailySabah, 2021; Arab Weekly, 2021) with the intention to normalize relations with Turkey, which had been tense for more than two years. Khartoum was now keen to work with Ankara, according to official Sudanese comments (Rakipoğlu, 2021; Lons, 2021). The visit demonstrated that the Sudanese transitional government, which

kept its distance from Turkey for a fair length of time following the coup, had realised that it must extend its foreign policy approach (Raki pođlu, 202).

Al-Burhan re-established ties with Turkey for two reasons. One is analogous to that of al-Bashir, he wants to remain in power, however, he wants to achieve this by not confronting Sudan's regional powers – balancing Ankara and the Gulf States good relations can help him hold on to the power at home (DailySabah, 2021; official. 7, 09/10/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

As tensions and proxies exist between Turkey and Qatar on one side and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other, al Burhan's administration opted to mitigate Turkey's prior dispute with his regime since taking sides may be detrimental to a vulnerable nation like Sudan. The other reason is to mitigate Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to pursue Turkey-Sudan's previous framework agreements signed by al-Bashir (Zain, 2022; Moubayed, 2020). Erdogan and his Islamist supporters, who have supported the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups abroad, signed dozens of bilateral agreements with the al-Bashir regime in an effort to establish alliances against regional adversaries Egypt and the Gulf states. After al-Bashir's administration fell, Ankara continued to back the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in Sudan (Bozkurt, 2019; Soufi, 08/8/2022; Official. 6, 25/02/2021). When al-Bashir's authoritarian regime toppled, both of his successors, Prime Minister Hamdok and the current De Facto Head of Sudan and the Commander-in-Chief, al-Burhan, encountered severe economic, security and political problems as Turkey and Qatar reduced their economic assistance to the Sudanese government and switched their backing to the Muslim Brotherhood (Xinhua Media, 2022).

Therefore, al-Burhan and his government realized that they must avoid confrontation with foreign countries, particularly Turkey, which wields significant political, economic and security influence in Sudan. Turkey and Qatar's shifting of their backing from the Sudanese government to the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan altered al-Burhan's position. Al-Burhan was under economic, political, and security pressure from Sudan's Islamic and civilian opponents, whom Turkey backed. Sameh Eid, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated, "The situation in Sudan is extremely complex, particularly in regard to the Muslim Brotherhood." "The Islamist movement dominated the Sudanese deep state for thirty years under al-Bashir, and they remain pervasive in all Sudanese institutions today." (Emam, 2019).

Although both Turkey and Qatar still support religious groups in Sudan (Barak, 2021; Moubayed, 2020), al-Burhan strengthened existing diplomatic relations with Qatar and Turkey (Anadolu Agency, 2021; DailySabah, 2021). Hamza and Mar'uf, both senior government officials from internal and finance departments emphasised that Al-Burhan is doing so in order to gain economic support and to lessen Sudan's regional proxy war. The current regime's new agreements will increase Turkey's investment in the agriculture and food sectors. It will also continue to wield significant influence in Sudan (Hamza, 30/11/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). Soufi, a Sudanese government official and a former military commander pointed out that Ankara and Khartoum relations are essential:

In reality, Turkey is an emerging power; the region cannot overlook its military influence; Libya and Ethiopia wars are good examples. Sudan understands the

importance of Turkey-Sudan relations; of course, we are welcoming other regional economic powers, and Sudan is ready to strengthen the relations of our Arab brothers (Soufi, 08/8/2022).

Al-Burhan's visit to Ankara also coincided with apparent shifts in Turkey's ideological discourse. Ankara has reduced its support for Sudanese Islamists, allowing the Sovereignty Council to be more receptive to collaboration and eager to pursue Turkish-Sudanese mutual goals based on strategic concerns (Arab Weekly, 2021). Youssef Mohamed Zain, a member of Sudan's Council of Transitional Partners, highlighted:

The visit intends to resolve the concerns that have hampered the restoration of normal relations between the two countries. Topping this list is Ankara's support for Sudan's Islamist movement. The Sovereignty Council of Sudan intends to demand an end to that type of assistance in exchange for facilitating Turkey's economic chances in Sudan (Zain, 2022; Arab Weekly, 2021).

In sum, both al-Bashir and al-Burhan desired to cultivate relationships for their own gain. Al-Bashir intended to establish strong ties with Ankara to assist in resolving the economic and political pressures of sanctions and the possibility of being indicted by the International Criminal Court. On the other hand, al-Burhan seeks to avert a conflict with Ankara and persuade it to withdraw its support from Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Burhan is also attempting to use regional and international overtures in order to secure political and economic benefits that will bolster his grasp on power at home and improve his country's relations with other countries.

In other words, the Sudanese government is cognizant of its diminishing international and domestic legitimacy. Sudan's independence is limited; therefore, al-Burhan needs Turkey's aid within Sudan and the international system. In order to keep control and prevent conflict with Sudan's regional powers, his strong ties with Ankara may be able to assist him in maintaining power at home, as well as counterbalance other regional forces such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In Sudanese domestic politics, there are foreign rivals. The wealthy countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf region "have become more involved in the domestic politics of Sudan. Gulf states assist Sudan with political, economic, and security support". Due to Sudan's economic difficulties and political precariousness (Lons, 2021), Turkey and Qatar have substantial political and economic influence in Sudan as well. Given the current political volatility of Sudan, the current Khartoum administration has developed tight connections with Ankara. Turkey has demonstrated its potential to influence Sudan's internal issues as a regional power. Al-Burhan seeks to avoid any conflicts with Turkey at all costs. He understands the importance of Turkey, a country with significant political and security sway in the region. According to Sudanese officials, the Turkish government has influence in Sudan, not just over government officials but also over business communities, opposition groups, the military, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular (Soufi, 08/082022; Official. 8, 15/12/2020).

Critics argue that Sudan has not benefited from its strategic location for two main reasons on its relations with Turkey (Shay, 2018; Tirab, 2022; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). First, Sudan's prolonged internal conflict and political fragility created tribal clashes and societal fragmentation in which foreign countries could effortlessly

intrude on the internal affairs of Sudan without getting permission from the government in Khartoum (Stevens, 2019). Moreover, Sudan is a fragile state that cannot manage the different interests of foreign forces such as Turkey and the Gulf countries (Aljazeera, 2020; TRT, 2020). Second, humanitarian needs remain high in Sudan (AFDB, 2021 Report; Keyman and Sazak, 2014). The poor economic conditions generated a lack of access to basic services, particularly healthcare, water, food, shelter and education. Therefore, in this case, Turkey and other foreign competing countries in the region used foreign aid to influence their vested interests in Sudan as the countries are heavily dependent on foreign aid (ACAPS Report, 2021; Hamza, 30/11/2021). In other words, Sudan's weakness makes its strategic location an invitation to foreign powers to intervene in order to advance their own strategic objectives (Official. 7, 09/10/2021).

Despite facing pressure from the West over its derailment of democratic transition, Sudan has been eager to upgrade its bilateral ties with Turkey to a strategic level in recent years. Sudan is keener on expanding bilateral cooperation with Turkey (Minister 08/12/2021; Official. 5, 18/04/2021). By approaching Turkey, Sudan hopes to achieve greater independence and emerge from isolation. The recent visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey can be interpreted as a statement from Khartoum's policymakers signaling the country's intent to manipulate its foreign policy (RAKIPOLU, 2021). Since 2006, Turkey has performed a number of military support and cooperation initiatives with the Sudanese government (Researcher. 2, 13/02/2022). Sudan holds the Turkish military industry in high regard due to its accomplishments. Khartoum is aware that Turkey is not only military power but also a nation that shares a great deal with Sudan in terms of history and culture. Therefore, if Sudan's new political elites decide to

restructure the country, Turkey is the most trustworthy nation to look up to (Soufi, 08/082022; Official. 8, 15/12/2020). It appears that Sudan wishes to rewrite its relationship with Turkey. The recent visit by Sudanese officials to Ankara will favour bilateral relations, which may be elevated to strategic collaboration. However, such a development could create a win-win situation for both nations. According to Sudanese diplomat, Khartoum's doors remain constantly open for fostering bilateral relations with Sudan in the interim (Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021; Diplomat. 7, 18/07/2021).

5.5. Turkey's Political Relations with Sudan and Somalia: Examining Similarities and Differences

Somalia and Sudan share important characteristics. Both countries are experiencing prolonged civil wars, political instability, economic difficulties, security challenges, foreign intervention and frequent famine that have made Somalia and Sudan two of the most impoverished nations in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bradburry and Heally, 2020; Yusuf, 12/03/2021). Likewise, as indicated in the primary sources as well as the existing scholarship, Somalia and Sudan remain two of Turkey's "most important partners" in SSA countries with long and deep-seated historical, spiritual and cultural ties (MFA, 2018). Somalia and Sudan accepted Turkey's investment in their ports and airports – Turkey took the highest stake of economic and investment concessions in Somalia and Sudan; they also accepted Turkey's military installations in their respective countries. Turkey's other substantial direct investments in Somalia and Sudan include schools and hospitals.

However, after a detailed examination, the nature of the two relationships is different. Comparing and contrasting the two countries' engagements with Turkey shows how similar and different the two are. Somalia and Sudan both welcomed Turkey's relationship but for different political reasons. 2021). The primary purpose of Somalia's relations with Turkey is to gain Turkey's political/diplomatic, security and economic support in its peacebuilding and reconstruction process (Farah, 01/09/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Due to Somalia's political fragility, the central government of Mogadishu established strong relations with Turkey for four reasons.

First, Mogadishu sees Ankara a reliable friend with which it shares historical and cultural ties. Since the 16th century, when the Ottoman Empire supported and collaborated with Muslim countries against the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires, ties between the Somalis and the Ottoman Empire have existed. The Somalis assert that their triumph over the Portuguese and Abyssinian empires served as the foundation for this alliance. This cooperation seems to be driven by the Ottoman Empire's security and commercial interests in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Abdulle, 2019). The country's elite are optimistic that, similar to how Turkey assisted the Somali people in their independence from the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires in the 16th century, it may aid Somalia in regaining its former power and stability with the assistance of the Turkish government.

Second, Somalia is the site of a proxy war playing out between Somalia's international partners. The successive administrations in Mogadishu established strong relations with Ankara, while other federal states have good relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Federal Government of Somalia argues that Turkey could

be the best friend of Somalia compared to other foreign countries as the two countries share strong cultural affinities.

Third, Turkey promised to rebuild a strong Somali army within ten years. It appears that Somalis cannot make peace with themselves. Somalia required a larger ally to assist with national army and political reconciliation. Turkey is committed to building the Somali National Army and assisting it in defeating Al-Shabaab and establishing lasting peace and political stability in order to strengthen the national protection of Somali citizens and the mechanisms of national defense (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Turkey is the only foreign nation that have made such a pledge. Turkey signed a number of security training agreements with the Somalian government, including police and military training (Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015).

Fourth, Turkey can help Somalia rebuild its economy and political stability. Relations between Turkey and Somalia extend beyond development and humanitarian aid between the two governments. Trade and investment are another major aspect of relations between Turkey and Somalia. The connection created new prospects for trade and investment for the private sector and businesses (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Siradag, 2015). Fourth, Turkey will support the unity, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and political and security independence of Somalia. Because Turkey is supporting the central government and does not want to become involved in the internal strife and proxy war, Somalia wants to enhance relations with Turkey. In Mogadishu, Turkey has helped the central government with humanitarian aid, development assistance and fiscal support as well as large investment concessions at Mogadishu's port and airport. Ankara's relations with Mogadishu will enable the

Federal Government to fully rule Somalia (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Diplomat 2, 17/11/2021).

In the case of Somalia, the fundamental characteristics that explain its acceptance of Turkey's engagement, such as historical and cultural affinities, political/diplomatic, security, and economic factors, are all important explanations for Turkey-Somalia relations. The similarities between Ankara and Mogadishu are precisely why Somalis place so much faith in Turkey's connections. In other words, even though Somalia established connections with Turkey to receive political/diplomatic, security, and economic support, the fact that the two nations share historical and cultural affinities is one of the most fundamental reasons facilitated the relationship.

Sudan, on the other hand, began diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1956. Soon after Sudan's independence, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize it (MFA, 2018). Erdogan visited Sudan twice, once as Prime Minister and again as President of Turkey, in 2006 and 2017 (Van den Berg and Meester, 2019; Shay, 2018). Although Sudan needs external political and economic assistance, its ties to Turkey have always been personal, as noted in the preceding section. According to the vast majority of the primary sources, al-Bashir and al-Burhan's connections with Turkey were never founded on the interests of the Sudanese people. Although both leaders built ties with Turkey to obtain political, economic, and military aid, their fundamental goals and objectives for the relationship are distinct. The succession of Khartoum's leaders welcomed Turkey's engagement on the basis of analogical reasoning, which supports the conclusion that both leaders seek to retain their positions.

Al-Bashir intended to establish solid ties with Ankara to overcome two major hurdles. First, to alleviate the economic and political strain caused by sanctions. After al-Bashir developed good relations, Turkey also rejected freezing government assets and imposing an arms embargo on Khartoum's leadership. Instead, Ankara has declared multiple times that it will back Khartoum in relieving the economic sanctions that have been imposed. Despite the United States-led sanctions against Sudan, Ankara went ahead and negotiated dozens of new trade and cooperation agreements with the country (Daily Sabah, 2021; Afak et al., 2017; Shay et al., 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). In bilateral commerce, Turkey agreed to pay local money, implying that Turkey is assisting Sudan with its political and economic challenges (Deik, 2017). Second, Turkey-Sudan relations also helped al-Bashir escape International Criminal Court prosecution. As a Head of State, it was embarrassing for al-Bashir to remain in Sudan and not attend state visits to foreign countries to meet his counterparts. Following al-Bashir's positive relations with Erdogan, Ankara has refused to put a travel ban on al-Bashir and other senior Sudanese officials and businesspeople. Turkey extended an invitation to al-Bashir and refused to arrest and surrender him to the ICJ prosecution (Keith, 2009; Amnesty, 2009).

Al-Burhan established relationships with Turkey for two reasons. One is analogous to that of al-Bashir; he wants to remain in power, but he does not want to confront regional powers; maintaining good relations with Ankara and the Gulf States will help him retain power at home (DailySabah, 2021; Official, 6, 25/02/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). In other words, the current Sudanese government is cognizant of its waning credibility. Al-Burhan understands that Sudan's independence is limited and that he needs Turkey's help in Sudan and internationally. Ankara's solid relations may

help him keep power at home and balance regional influences like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The second reason is to lessen Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood so that Turkey and Sudan can continue to work on the previous frameworks and accords that were signed by al-Bashir (Zain, 2022; Moubayed, 2020). Therefore, al-Burhan restored relations with Turkey to counteract Turkey's backing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Burhan sought to repair the harsh relations between his country and Turkey, which have existed for almost two years. Burhan's visit comes with apparent ideological discourse developments in Turkey. Ankara has lessened its support for Sudanese Islamists, making the Sovereignty Council more sensitive to cooperate and keen to pursue Turkish-Sudanese mutual objectives based on shared strategic concerns (Arab Weekly, 2021).

In sum, the contemporary relationship that exists between Sudan and Turkey is one that is more focused on personal interest, whereas Somalia's relation with Turkey is motivated by concerns of national interest. Both al-Bashir and al-Burhan developed relations with Turkey to keep themselves in power in order to defeat their political opponents. However, the situation of Somalia is different. Since 1991, two of Somalia's most prominent clans have alternately dominated the government, one clan at a time. As opposition political elites argue that it is their turn to reign, it is difficult for Somalia's sitting leader to maintain his position. While Sudan's political system and administration are run by a single individual or a military elite Somalia's leaders remain in office only between four to five years. Sudan, on the other hand, is a whole other story. Leaders in Sudan can remain in power for many years. Revolutions and coup d'états commonly depose Sudanese leaders. In Somalia, indirect elections are held every four years. Somalia's government is a parliamentary federal system. The

representatives of Parliament and the president are elected through indirect elections — a complex clan-based scheme that favours so-called majority clans and is prone to voting fraud (Waal, 2022).

In addition, the enthusiasm of the two SSA governments for the Turkish relationship differs. Somalia, profits from Ankara's political presence in the country, according to the administration of Mogadishu, which believes that Ankara's political involvement in Somalia offered renewed impetus to efforts to achieve sustainable peace (Abdulle, 2019; ICG, 2012). The current administration of Sudan, in contrast, is more skeptical of Turkey's role in Sudan because Ankara supports both the Khartoum government and the Muslim Brotherhood (Moubayed, 2020) but feels it has little choice but to maintain good relations with Turkey given its limited options.

In Somalia most of the government officials interviewed argued that Turkey's political support makes Somalia a sovereign nation. Before Turkey's relations, most of the foreign diplomatic missions and Embassies were in Nairobi – no single country recognised the Transitional Government of Somalia. Since Mogadishu established its relations with Ankara, Somalia's new friend supports its security, territorial integrity and national sovereignty (20/10/2021). However, most interviewees from Somalia argued that the central government in Mogadishu politically benefited its relations with Ankara, they reiterated that the other parts of the country did not benefit to the same extent (Minister. 1, 15/01/2021; Minister. 2, 12/01/2021). Such a suggestion raises questions about the sustainability of Turkey-Somalia relations. On the other hand, most of the interviewed officials from Khartoum reiterated the importance of the Turkey-Sudan political relationship but a significant number of interviewees claimed

that due to the political fragility of Sudan, the current administration of Khartoum developed its relations with Ankara to mitigate the possibility of the proxy war between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other hand (Hamza, 30/11/2021; Soufi, 08/8/2022). Even though Somalia and Sudan share important characteristics as both countries established relations with Turkey. Mogadishu and Khartoum have strong political ties with Turkey for different reasons.

The analysis developed in chapter four and chapter five demonstrates that Somalia and Sudan have established strong political relations with Turkey for different reasons. While Somalia and Sudan share many similarities in terms of their historical ties with Turkey, the two SSA countries' relationship with Ankara is different. The former established its relations with Turkey to help Somalia rebuild its economy, political stability and strong national army while supporting its national sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity. Sudan's connection with Turkey is more personal than national or strategic in nature. This does not imply that Turkey's relationship with Sudan is more uncertain than Turkey's relationship with Somalia. When it comes to Sudan's politicians, business community, and civil society, Turkey possesses a greater degree of influence than other countries (Diplomat. 5, 11/09/2021). It is difficult for the leader of Sudan to sever ties with Turkey. When al-Burhan assumed power, he attempted to undermine Ankara and established close ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara then backed Sudanese Islamists as well as civilian organizations calling for democratic elections (Diplomat 6, 16/07/2021). For his own benefit, al-Burhan restored relations and promised to honor the two countries' previous agreements and cooperation (DailySabah, 2021; Official.

8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9, 15/12/2020; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

The majority of the evidence suggests that al-Bashir and al-Burhan relations with Turkey were never based on the Sudanese people's best interests. Given the fact that both leaders built ties with Turkey in order to obtain political, economic, and military assistance, their major goals and objectives for the relationship is analogous. Al-Bashir desired strong ties with Ankara in order to alleviate the economic and political pressures imposed by the International Criminal Court's indictment. While al-Burhan established relations with Ankara to counteract Turkey's backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkey to support Sudan's legitimacy domestically and internationally. Al-Burhan also wanted to maintain Sudan's allies and friends to maintain power. The successive leaders of Khartoum accepted the Turkey's engagement for these analogical reasons. In this way, both countries share important characteristics; however, their relations with Turkey differ.

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the primary reasons why Sudan is willing to work with Turkey. In a manner analogous to that between Turkey and Somalia, Ankara has granted Khartoum political, economic, and security support. The two countries also share historical and cultural characteristics which promoted their increased relationship. Leaders in Sudan initially forged ties with Turkey in an effort to revive the country's political, economic, and security stability; however, recent research suggests that relations between the two countries are based more on personal ties than strategic ones. People in Sudan were grateful for Turkey's political, economic, and security aid, but the new regime in Khartoum has used the country's ties to solidify its hold on power.

Al-Bashir hoped to get around two fundamental problems through closer connections with Ankara. Sudan's acceptance of Turkey's engagement in its cause may be primarily attributed to Ankara's efforts to alleviate the country's economic and political burdens due to economic sanctions. As a result of rising food prices brought on by sanctions, support for the Sudanese dictatorship was eroding by the time Turkey established its new ties with the country (Siddig, 2010; Shay, 2018; Mquirmi, 2021; Hamza, 30/11/2021). Al-Bashir had to put in a lot of effort to build relationships with other countries before Turkey in order to receive economic and political support from them (Amb.4, 04/01/2020). As US economic sanctions increased, Turkey increased its support for Sudan.

Despite American sanctions, Ankara has signed numerous new trade and cooperation partnerships with Sudan (Daily Sabah, 2021; Afak et al., 2017; Shay et al., 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). Additionally, Ankara has reiterated its willingness to back Khartoum in its fight to have economic sanctions removed. Turkey has agreed to pay in local currency in bilateral commerce with Sudan, a sign that it is helping the country through its political and economic troubles (Deik, 2017). Despite Sudan's human rights abuses and ties to Islamist terrorists, Turkey has not supported the country's diplomatic isolation. President Erdogan stated that Sudan's embargo and worldwide isolation are unfair to the Sudanese people and government in a joint press conference with President Omar Al-Bashir.

Al-Burhan, who succeeded al-Bashir after the Sudanese military toppled him, rebuilt relations with Turkey for the same objective: to maintain power while continuing to benefit from Turkey's political, diplomatic, economic, and security support.

Sudan quickly changed its international attitude when al-Burhan was named head of the Sovereign Council. Once Turkey supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, however, al-Burhan realised the importance of Turkey's relations to his future leadership. Maintaining excellent relations with Ankara and the Gulf States will aid al-Burhan in his efforts to keep power at home (DailySabah, 2021; Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

Chapter 6: Turkey's New Aid Model for Developed-LDC Relationships: A Comparison to Traditional West and Chinese Aid Models

6.1. Introduction

In response to Question 2, which asks whether Turkey's strategic engagement represents a new model of developed-LDC relations from the perspective of SSA as opposed to the Western aid and Chinese models. Chapter 6 conceptualises the SSA perspective of the Turkish development aid model in comparison to the Western and Chinese assistance approaches. Somalia and Sudan are examples of weak states that Ankara shares certain features with, including religion, history, and cultural affinities. They are two of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of their protracted civil wars, political upheaval, economic challenges, security concerns, international intervention, and persistent famine (Özkan and Orakci 2015; Kalmoy, 2021; de Waal, 2019). As a result, Turkey has tried to broaden its worldwide influence as a newly emerging power by engaging underdeveloped, neglected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with whom it has historical and cultural links (Cannon, 2016; Donelli, 2021).

This chapter examines the tools Turkey uses in Somalia and Sudan, such as political support, statebuilding, commerce, investment, security assistance, humanitarian relief programmes, and development cooperation activities. Western and Chinese foreign aid models are discussed in the first two parts of the chapter. The first sections of this chapter present an overview of foreign aid and its primary characteristics, which can be used as a basis for further comparison – existing foreign aid practices as a concept.

The data is primarily derived from secondary sources, including government and non-government publications, websites, books, and journal articles.

The final part of the chapter offers an explanation of the Turkish aid model through the lens of SSA. How do SSA nations perceive the Turkish model? It compares the Turkish model to the established modalities of Western and Chinese foreign aid to illustrate the SSA's understanding of Turkey's aid model. It provides a novel perspective on how Turkey's new strategic engagement, specifically the aid model, differs from Africa's traditional partners from an SSA point of view. A variety of primary and secondary data sources support the arguments and analyses in this section.

Regarding primary sources, although there are extant Turkey-SSA bilateral agreements and MOUs on physical infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, the agriculture sector, schools, ports, and airport concessions, these documents are inaccessible to the public and are considered confidential by associated organisations. Contacting government officials involved in the economic relationship between Turkey and SSA is the only primary source available. As these records are inaccessible, I approached those involved in Turkey-SSA connections, notably those dealing with Turkish humanitarian assistance, business dealings, investments, and other Ankara-led development cooperation in the region. For example, the majority of interviewees are government officials from departments of trade, investment, finance, international cooperation, agriculture, the ministry of interior, ministry of foreign affairs, petroleum and mineral resources, and port, road, and airport authorities, as well as businesspeople with inside knowledge of the subject. The businesspeople are mostly

contractors who work with the administrations of SSA and who have good relationships with the government departments.

As was noted earlier, politicians, entrepreneurs, and government officials may have individual motives for supporting or opposing a certain policy. For example, in general, politicians and government officials in Somalia and Sudan engage in business deals. Some of them own non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that carry out humanitarian and development initiatives in areas where TIKA cannot go; others are sub-recipients that implement TIKA projects on its behalf. Others belong to large corporations. They own hotels, construction companies, and private schools, as well as small and medium-sized enterprises focusing on the import and export industries. In addition to Turkey-SSA concessions and joint ventures, such as ports and airports, and other Turkish trade and investment initiatives. Some of the interviewees involve Turkey-SSA concessions and joint ventures. As a result, it is essential to take into account the personal interests of politicians, government officials, and companies that do business with Turkey.

Nevertheless, senior government officials' information can be deemed relevant due to their years of expertise and positions of responsibility, as they are aware of Turkey's approaches and engagements, such as humanitarian and development assistance. The fact that these interviewees are involved in Turkey's commercial, humanitarian, and development activities makes them of particular importance since they are able to explain how Turkey's model works and how it differs from Western and Chinese

development models. Therefore, this chapter offers a novel perspective on how SSA countries perceive the Turkish foreign aid model in comparison to traditional foreign aid models.

6.2. Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has various explanations and definitions. According to one broad understanding of the term, foreign aid refers to the international transfer of funds, goods, or services from governments or international institutions to a foreign country or its population. Foreign aid can be monetary, military, or humanitarian (CFI, 2022; Matissek and Williamson, 2020; Mason, 2016; Gentilini et al., 2018). Foreign assistance may take the form of a grant or a loan. It may be a soft loan or a hard loan. Aid can be multilateral, which means that the donor country gives it to an international organization such as the World Bank or the United Nations Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, etc.), which then distributes it among the developing countries, or it can be bilateral, which means that it is given directly from one country to another (Thapa, 2020; Cunningham, H. et.al 2016).

Another important element of foreign aid is whether aid is tied, or untied. Since the formation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), it has been an important question whether aid recipients should be allowed to purchase goods and services from any country ("untied aid") or whether they should be confined to purchasing goods and services from the donor country often called tied aid (Miquel-Florensa, 2007). Development Aid Committee of the OECD defines *tied aid* as official grants or

loans that restrict procurement to enterprises in the donor nation or a small group of countries (Morrisey and White, 1996).

Therefore, tied aid frequently inhibits recipient nations from receiving value-for-money services, goods, or labour. In general, untying aid — that is, removing legal and administrative barriers to free competition for assistance-funded procurement — boosts aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs and enhancing recipient nations' flexibility to chart their own course. It also permits donors to connect their aid programs with recipient nations' objectives and financial management systems with greater care (Sang-Kee Kim and Young-Han Kim, 2016). The DAC supports untying Official Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries because it anticipates untied aid to be more efficient than tied aid due to administrative costs and potential technological incompatibilities between donor and recipient technologies accompanying tied aid. Moreover, linked aid, which is frequently characterized as a covert subsidy to the donor's national industry, allegedly responds to political demands rather than the requirements of recipient nations (Miquel-Florensa, 2007).

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides the standard definition of foreign aid as "financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that (1) have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare (hence excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) are provided as equivalence to monetary transfers between governments of the donor and the recipient" (Radelet, 2006).

However, aid has been employed as a policy instrument beyond the boundaries that common thinking in international relations and economics would suggest it can play. Since it establishes the framework for addressing global poverty, foreign aid often sparks debate. Proponents of aid argue that it can end extreme poverty and reduce the wealth gap between rich and developing countries, while opponents argue that it does neither. Developing countries have given to rich ones for centuries without expecting anything in return. However, it was only in the post-World War II era, especially during the highly polarized Cold War climate, that powerful nations gave to weaker ones to advance their economic development and became mainstream. During this period, the United States and the Soviet Union competed with one another over who could exert the most influence in Third World countries through the employment of aid (Arase, 2017).

Additionally, aid was used to facilitate the opening of developing-world markets and their subsequent incorporation into the global economic system. Since then, the term "foreign aid" has come to denote "development assistance," which has sparked a number of discussions in the academic community. Moreover, it has well understood that some donors have goals apart from helping the poor that they are trying to accomplish through their donations (Arase, 2017).

6.3. Western Development Model

Under the Western assistance paradigm, foreign aid is not exclusively delivered by donor states to recipient state governments. States, civilian agencies, private businesses, charitable institutions, NGOs, and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations are recipients of foreign aid. In the context of foreign aid,

Western donors perceive socioeconomic development as a multi-stakeholder effort achieved through transparency and democratic governance (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021). Western aid has established a framework of generally well-defined principles, accompanied by a statistical measuring and reporting system through the DAC – the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD: aid must go to impoverished countries; it must be used for specific purposes (e.g., health, but not defence); and it must be distributed as grants, or as a loan having an element of grant (concessional loans). While total grants may be counted, only "net" loans are counted (repayment is deducted or grant component is calculated). Western donors report their aid in this standard format to the OECD/DAC, which then makes the specific information transparent (Lomøy, 2021).

Western aid is extensive and frequently saves more lives during disasters than it costs. It rebuilds livelihoods and housing, raises health and living standards, provides medical training and medicines, and good hygiene, clean water, and sanitation. For agriculture, it helps increase food production, improving the quality and quantity of food available. It also encourages industrial development to create jobs and improve transportation. Despite all these efforts, there are still many people who die as a result of disasters. A barrier in and of itself is that it only supports Western concepts like democracy and human rights (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021; Minister2, 12/01/2021; Amb.4, 12.05/2020). In other words, Western aid does not serve a single purpose, such as humanitarian assistance, which aims to better the lives of the poor, primarily in developing nations where economic difficulties, civil wars, and famines abound as mentioned above. However, sometimes the same reason wealth countries provide foreign aid is to pursue their own objectives, such as fortifying diplomacy, bolstering

foreign allies militarily, and expanding their cultural influence in developing countries (Hagi Mohamoud, 2018; Haslam, 2012, p. 148).

6.3.1 Western Aid Conditionality

Studies of Western development assistance have concluded that aid is only effective when recipients have good governance, measured as pro-investment policies, democratic institutions, and political stability; alternatively, aid is only effective when recipients lack strategic importance to donors (Girod, 2018). International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as bilateral donors of the rich Western nations, have been tying the disbursement of their aid to policy reform in recipient countries for some decades now. This practice has been going on for quite some time (Montinola, 2010). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the first organization to implement the strategy, which is more often known as conditionality (Montinola, 2010). Under this strategy, the IMF made loans to countries contingent on those nations lowering both their budget and current account deficits. In the aftermath of the debt crisis that occurred in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to expand the quantity and extent of the policy conditions it imposed, attaching its loans to market-oriented policies such as liberalization of prices, trade, and capital accounts (Bird, 1996).

The donors from the West, therefore, started tying the provision of their cash to the implementation of policy reforms that were analogous to those of the financial institutions (Montinola, 2010). Most Western donors started tying the distribution of their funds to structural adjustment, which included privatization and public sector reform in addition to measures comparable to those demanded by the International Monetary

Fund and the World Bank (Koeberle, 2003). The disbursement of aid from bilateral donors was frequently contingent on the recipient's ability to demonstrate that they were "on track" with the initiatives of the International Monetary Fund and/or the World Bank (Dijkstra, 2002).

Through international commitments such as the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (adopted at the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid), Western donor countries have pledged to make aid more effective by improving the coordination of donors, the ownership of aid by recipient countries, the alignment of aid interventions with national development strategies, the results-based management of aid, and the mutual accountability between donors and recipient countries. Furthermore, The Accra Agenda for Action placed a significant emphasis on the necessity of enhancing other aspects of the quality of the management of aid, with the end goal of boosting the predictability of aid over the course of the medium to long term (Kangoye, 2011). These declarations encourage the conditionality of aid, particularly regarding good governance agendas such as transparency, democracy, human rights, and accountability. From the Western donors' point of view, conditional aid as a method for enhancing democracy has the potential to affect the growth of democracy through fostering democratic institutions and maintaining a healthy power balance, as well as by giving civil society organizations more authority. The conditionality of the aid was also aimed at strengthening channels that contribute to democracy, such as the average per capita income and education levels (Souki, 2020).

Despite this, conditional aid was successful for Western donors throughout the cold war, contributing to recipient nations' democratization and improved governance

(Robinson, 1993; Stone, 2008). However, when contributors have a variety of other interests that compete with one another, conditionality is only sometimes practical (Bearce & Tirone, 2010). During the time of the Cold War, when the United States and other donors provided assistance to strengthen corrupt but geopolitically beneficial autocracies, on the one hand, this was the situation that prevailed (Brautigam & Knack, 2004, p. 275). On the other hand, the development of China as a significant donor to Africa and developing countries, in general, may present fresh challenges to the efficiency of aid conditionality (Qian, 2015). Since the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the quantity of Chinese development assistance pouring into Africa, including aid and finance, has been expanding exponentially. This trend has continued since the first Ministerial Conference (Thaler, 2012). Aside from the increased amount, the assistance provided by China is frequently regarded as being more appealing by recipient countries since it comes with fewer or no political strings attached and is frequently distributed much more quickly and efficiently than the assistance provided by Western nations (Li, 2017). Therefore, even though traditional donors have voiced their disapproval of China's approach to helping, many African nations welcome assistance from Beijing or, at the very least, are happy to have additional options (Li, 2017).

6.3.2 Western Aid and Good Governance Agenda

The process of decision-making and the method by which decisions are implemented, or not implemented, is what we mean when we talk about "governance" (Unescap.org, 2009). Good governance measures how public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the enjoyment of human rights in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption and with proper regard for the rule of

law (OCHA, 2021). It is the process of determining whether or not these activities are carried out in a manner consistent with the rule of law. In this discussion, the term "governance" might refer to corporate governance, international, national, or local level, or even the relationships between various parts of society (Unescap.org, 2009).

"Good governance" becomes a model to contrast inefficient economies or political entities with viable ones (Poluha and Rosendahl, 2002). The idea emphasises that it is the role of governments and other governing organisations to cater to the general populace's requirements as opposed to specific groups within society. Good governance standards frequently compare other state institutions to those of liberal democratic nations located primarily in Europe and the Americas. This is done because liberal democratic governments are frequently touted as the "most successful. The phrase "good governance" can mean a variety of things depending on the context in which it is used. This is due to the fact that assistance organisations and the authorities of rich nations frequently limit the notion of "good governance" to a set of standards that coincide with the organisation's purpose (Poluha and Rosendahl, 2002).

Foreign aid from Western nations and multilateral organisations had a crucial influence on developing nation's post-World War II growth dynamics. In response to the success of the US-led Marshall Plan in bringing economic stability to war-ravaged Europe, other foreign assistance initiatives for developing nations were developed during this period. However, the effect on growth in many of these aid-recipient nations was less than satisfactory, which has sparked a heated discussion among development economists regarding the effectiveness of aid programmes (Quazi and Alam, 2015).

The traditional pro-aid view, based on the theoretical evolution of the 1950s and 1960s, holds that foreign aid complements the recipient economies' domestic resources, relieves foreign exchange constraints, transfers modern know-how, and facilitates easy access to the global market, all of which contribute to positive economic growth (Chenery, 1965; Papanek, 1972). In contrast, the radical anti-aid viewpoint asserts that foreign aid supplants domestic resources, worsens domestic income inequality and trade balance, finances the transfer of inappropriate technology, and in general, aids in the maintenance of ineffective and corrupt governments in developing nations (Griffin & Enos, 1970; Weisskopf, 1972). In recent years, an intriguing new area of research has emerged, which investigates the connection between the amount of money developed countries receive from other countries and the quality of their governments (Quazi and Alam, 2015). Two primary factors contributed to the emergence of good governance. Before the end of the Cold War, developing countries had difficulties transitioning to a market economy, so they focused their efforts on modernising institutions and the decision-making process (Hout, 2007). Second, during the end of the 1980s, in response to the escalation of economic issues such as the level of external debt, a number of developing nations initiated what is known as a structural adjustment programme (ILO, 1996).

According to the Western aid paradigm, strong governance is a prerequisite for receiving assistance. Potential applicants are required to compete for aid monies. The competition structure is significant for both the donor's pursuit of good governance and the recipients' receipt of funds. The leaders of potential recipient nations view foreign aid availability through this competition as one of their competing goals. The donor country desires a competition in which only one country receives aid. In contrast, the

leaders of the recipient countries prefer that each country get aid proportionate to its governance quality. A poverty trap could be constructed if poverty reduction is a different objective. Using good governance as a criterion, funders may employ bilateral and international agencies (Epstein and Gang 2009). According to Stojanovi (2016), a new paradigm of development strategy based on good governance places equal emphasis on the roles of the state, non-state actors, civil society, and the private sector in the economy and in the process of public governance. It embodies values including increased engagement, transparency, accountability, and public access to information. In addition, it assists in preventing corruption and safeguards basic human rights as well as the rule of law (UNU-IAS, 2015).

In light of this, the contribution that good governance can make toward achieving sustainable development is becoming an issue of paramount significance around the globe (Güney, 2017). There is a strong emphasis on good governance and its crucial role in the SDG Agenda (Personal and Archive, 2019). The SDG Agenda demonstrates an evident dedication to good governance and its critical role. Effective governance structures and mechanisms responsive to public needs provide critical services and promote inclusive growth, as stated in Objective 16. Institutions are the foundation of effective governance. In addition, good governance encompasses state-citizen relations (Dhaoui, 2019). Citizens' engagement in their communities' governance serves dual purposes: first, as an end in and of itself, and second, as a tool for advancing democratic ideals more broadly (Kjellberg, F. 1995).

The United States and other high-income Western countries claim they offer a more honest and open relationship with developing countries than their adversaries,

especially China, as the globe enters a new age of great-power struggle. They contend that low-income countries can benefit most by embracing democracy and freedom while they work to build their economies. In particular, they criticise Chinese investments and projects in sub-Saharan Africa, claiming they are secretive, exploitative, and fueling corruption. They also praise the benefits of the aid provided by several Western nations to less developed nations (Mitchell and Birdsall, 2022).

From a Western point of view, foreign aid should assist governments in strengthening their institutions by giving educational and technical assistance targeted at constructing robust legislative, executive, and judicial systems to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). By reducing corruption through the efficient administration of a country's expenditures and revenue creation, foreign aid is designed to strengthen governance and respect for the rule of law (Sollenberg, 2012). Recently, emphasis has been placed on civil society organisations (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000). The primary sources of democratic assistance are the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations Development Program. The field is also populated by a large number of party foundations and international nongovernmental organisations, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the United States, the German party foundations (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, etc.), the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD), Britain's Westminster Foundation, and the Sweden-based International Institute for Democratic Studies (IIS) (IDEA). With the exception of a few areas of electoral help, the field of democratic assistance has concentrated less on donor harmonisation than the development aid community as a whole (Resnick, 2016).

While development assistance and democratic assistance are not mutually exclusive and overlap in many areas, their ontological grounds for achieving democracy are distinct. Specifically, development practitioners consider aid a medium- to long-term strategy for strengthening democracy, as growth and socioeconomic developments strengthen institutions and lead voters to demand greater political freedom (Carothers, 2009). In contrast, democracy aid focuses on assisting short- to medium-term transformation (Finkel et al., 2007), highlighting the ability of essential actors, the degree of current political freedoms, and the space for contestation (Carothers, 2009). In addition, those involved in democracy aid may consider recipient governments a potential impediment to increased political freedoms, whereas the development community increasingly views recipient governments as partners as indicated earlier (Carothers, 2010; Unsworth, 2009; Wollack and Hubli, 2010). From a substantive standpoint, democratic aid offers few "carrots" or "sticks" compared to the leverage that development aid can exert through conditionality (Carothers, 1999), especially considering that democratic aid remains a negligible proportion of total foreign aid (Resnick, 2016).

Implementing and supporting democratic processes have become an increasing emphasis of Western development aid. Every year, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spends over \$700 million on programmes that promote democracy, such as supporting elections, bolstering legislatures, courts, and political parties, and promoting the expansion and influence of civil society organisations like labour unions and women's and human rights organisations (Carothers, 1999). The United States and other Western donors frequently condition

grants or loans intended for general budget support on performance in the areas of civil liberties, the conduct of elections, and respect for human rights,' according to the World Bank (2003). In the 1990s, when much of the developing world saw a surge of political liberalisation, the prominence of democratic assistance increased. During this time, several bilateral aid agencies promoted democracy and principles of good governance, first concentrating on elections, and building judiciaries and legislatures (see Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999).

Despite the fact that technical assistance geared explicitly toward promoting democracy makes up a small portion of all aid (World Bank, 2003; Knack, 2004). As was previously mentioned, foreign aid comprises numerous forms of funding, two of which are development aid and democracy promotion. Investments in areas like agriculture, education, health, water and sanitation, and transportation are just some ways that development aid is used to help alleviate poverty. World War Two brought about the first major increase in the visibility of development aid as a resource for postwar construction in Europe. Its primary goals have shifted over the years since then. The 1960s saw a concentration on infrastructure, whereas the 1980s emphasised macroeconomic growth and structural adjustment (Resnick, 2016).

Since the 1960s, Western aid has been the preeminent form of international development cooperation, both in terms of scale and politics and philosophy. However, it has never existed in isolation on the global stage. A parallel, somewhat smaller, and less apparent tradition of south-south collaboration has existed in the global north. Emerging nations have sent personnel (doctors, teachers, engineers) and sometimes financial aid to other developing nations. Over time, the United Nations has developed

a loose umbrella body for this development assistance. During the cold war, the Soviet Union and its allies maintained a development partnership with many similarities to their competitors. As numerous Arab nations grew wealthier, an Arab aid system with a loose coordinating structure also emerged (Lomøy, (2021).

6.3.3 Western Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarianism, or the desire to assist those in need, is an idea that has existed for a very long time. However, there is a specific historical and geographical framework for the current international humanitarian system. Its roots are in the history of war and natural calamities in the West, particularly in Europe. However, it is now engaged in a wide range of operations on a global scale, such as meeting needs in conflict or disaster situations, assisting displaced populations in short and long-term crises, reducing risks, being prepared, promoting early recovery, assisting with livelihoods, and resolving conflicts and fostering peace (Davey et al., 2013). The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2022) was published by Development Initiatives, a global organisation that uses statistics and facts to eradicate poverty, decrease inequality, and enhance resilience. According to the study, Western countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) contributed approximately 31.3 billion US dollars in humanitarian help in 2022 (Development Initiative Report, 2022). According to the GHA Report (2018) Western nations continue to provide the vast majority of government money for humanitarian causes. Europe accounts for 48% of humanitarian relief funding, while North and Central America also contributes (33%). The US contributed 88% of the regional total for North and Central America, while the UK contributed 27% of the regional total for Europe (GHA, Report, 2016). The vast majority of these funds are used to offer lifesaving humanitarian help to the world's

poorest and most vulnerable individuals. This assistance consists of essential nutrition programmes, as well as food, water, shelter, emergency medical treatment, sanitation and hygiene services, and other services.

Western humanitarian aid, unlike other forms of international aid, is given as a grant rather than a loan. In addition, the perception that excessive lending has led to significant debt buildup in many developing nations and has not helped them accomplish their development goals is a significant motivator for Western humanitarian efforts. According to this view, grants are the most appropriate type of aid because humanitarian goals primarily drive them. This strategy will likely aid recipient countries in their economic development and increase their likelihood of becoming debt-free (Clements, 2004). Furthermore, Western countries who are members of OECD promote coordinated, efficient, and effective partnerships with developing countries and to demonstrate responsiveness to the requests from partner countries, members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agree to the goal of untying their bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Other Low-Income Countries (OLICs), and IDA-only countries and territories. Reducing transaction costs and increasing recipient countries' autonomy can be accomplished by removing legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for aid-funded procurement (OECD, 2022).

Moreover, humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are the guiding principles for Western humanitarian aid. In addition to being reiterated in resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), these principles are also

embedded in a wide variety of humanitarian standards and guidelines. There is no common reporting requirement or mechanism for foreign or domestic humanitarian assistance expenditures. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) are the primary reporting systems for international humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian donors and implementing agencies are welcome to voluntarily submit their contributions of international humanitarian aid to the FTS, providing they meet a set of agreed-upon inclusion criteria. All Western donors are members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). As such, they must disclose their humanitarian aid to the DAC systems as part of their official development assistance (ODA) in accordance with DAC standards (Development Initiative Report, 2022). The DAC also receives voluntary reports from other states and the vast majority of major international organisations (GHA, 2018).

Nevertheless, since the middle of the twentieth century, Western humanitarian intervention has become the primary instrument defining protection, aid, and democratisation worldwide (Barnett and Weis, 2011). After World War II, the process increased significantly, and much more so in the aftermath of the cold war (CMI - Chr. Michelsen Institute (2016)). In other words, the global aid system has a major imbalance. Donor support groups and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are only two examples of closed-door, predominantly Western donor circles that dominate international governance institutions that discuss and shape humanitarian aid (OCHA, 2010).

Humanitarian action, as practiced by groups like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), entails, at its core, the saving of lives and the mitigation of suffering. Humanitarian aid has always been associated with the West, and its capabilities have been linked to Western political goals and institutions. As illustrated by large NGOs from the Global North and the UN system, institutional humanitarian intervention has significantly increased in the post-Cold War era of capitalism's political supremacy. However, more and more groups are offering humanitarian aid, and their goals increasingly resemble those of liberal democracies. Because humanitarian aid has been employed as a foreign policy or military tool by donor states, this broader type of humanitarianism has become strongly associated with hegemonic power (Whittall, 2015).

6.3.4 Western Economic Aid

For decades, there has been a heated ideological debate about the moral purpose of economic aid: to promote economic progress or to fund initiatives that directly address people's basic needs. European colonisation established the foundation for modern economic aid, which have evolved over the past century to accommodate evolving economic and political interests and a burgeoning humanitarian movement. One hundred years later, new global powers are emerging, and discussions are underway about a third, 'horizontal,' structure based on mutual self-interest (Phillips, 2013; Parlar Dal and Dipama, 2022).

In the 19th century, wealthy Western nations began donating money to less fortunate nations. By the 1920s and 1930s, countries like Germany, France, and Britain were providing consistent help to their colonies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In addition to the ports, roads, and railroads funded with economic aid, many American

entrepreneurs contributed to development aid through the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. After colonial countries won their independence, international aid still prioritised economic growth. There was a widespread belief that nations needed to advance economically to join the ranks of Western Europe and industrialised nations such as Australia, Canada, and the United States (Phillips, 2013).

According to Official Development Assistance, the total amount of money contributed by the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was 178.9 billion US dollars in the form of grants, loans to sovereign bodies, debt relief, and financial contributions to multilateral organisations (ODA Report 2022). Western nations contributed the majority of this money. Each year, the overall amount of aid given by the West fluctuates somewhere around 150 billion USD (Lomøy, 2021).

According to preliminary OECD data, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) granted by the European Union and its Member States reached €70,2 billion in 2021, representing 0.49 per cent of the EU's gross national income (GNI). This is much more than the average of 0.26% among non-EU member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It reaffirms Team Europe as the biggest provider of ODA in 2021, accounting for 43% of worldwide ODA from Team Europe and all other donor nations (EU Commission Report, 2021). It is dedicated to increasing its contribution and providing at least 0.7% of its annual gross national income. EU recognises that monetary help alone is insufficient to eradicate poverty sustainably. Therefore, the EU gives economic assistance to overcome problems in governance, trade regimes, and location and to make the most of globalisation's opportunities (EU News, 2022, cited in EU website). EU also contributes the most to climate finance. It

distributes funding to underdeveloped nations and engages in various political initiatives to decrease poverty. In 2014, the EU and its member states contributed €14.5 billion to climate finance to mitigate climate change and support adaptation projects and programmes in developing nations. The portion of the EU budget devoted to climate finance will surpass 20% by 2020. The European Union and its member states plan to donate an average of €2 billion annually to underdeveloped countries between 2014 and 2020 (EU News, 2022, cited in EU website).

In 2021, the United Kingdom continued to contribute of financing in the form of ODA even though its withdrawal from the European Union became effective on February 1, 2020. This contribution was made outside of the budget. The ODA provided by EU institutions already accounts for this. On an equivalent grant basis, the United Kingdom's performance as a bilateral contributor in 2021 was 15.8 billion US dollars (ODA Report, 2022). However, the United Kingdom's contribution to EU institutions is not included in what is reported as EU collective ODA to prevent double counting between Official Development Assistance (ODA) that is reported as EU collective ODA and ODA that the United Kingdom itself reports (EU Commission Report, 2021).

According to the figures provided by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States of America is the country that contributes the most money to official development assistance (ODA), which is expected to total \$42.3 billion in 2021 at current prices and \$40.7 billion in constant 2020 prices (DAC). The United States ranks 23rd among the 29 donor countries that are members of the OECD due to the low level of official development assistance (ODA) that it provides (0.18 per cent of gross national income;

GNI). The entire funding level for US foreign assistance for fiscal year (FY 2022) was set at US\$58 billion. This baseline budget does not include the US\$29.3 billion in emergency financing that mostly went to Ukraine and Afghanistan. The State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) FY2023 appropriations bill was passed by the House of Representatives of the United States of America on June 22, 2022. This bill allocates US\$66.6 billion in funding for US foreign assistance programmes, an increase of 15% over the levels enacted for FY2021 (Donor Tracker, 2022; (ODA Report, 2022).

The forum (DAC), whose members are Western nations, discusses problems including aid, development, and poverty reduction in developing nations (OECD, 2006). All Western countries that offer assistance are members of the Development Assistance Committee; hence, most Western aid is untied. After lengthy debates on untying aid, most Western OECD members declared they would detach their bilateral financial development loans. The total untied ODA rose from 41% in 2001 to 80% in 2019. Since then, the share of ODA covered by the untied recommendation has steadily increased from 87%. Members of the DAC have gone above the recommendation criteria in their untying efforts. In terms of individual nation performance, most Members have now untied nearly all their OECD-recommended Official Development Aid. Western donors of the DAC agreed to a more concrete definition of ODA, which is still in use today. This definition is approved as part of a revised DAC Terms Recommendation, which sets an overall budgetary target of 84% grant element for each DAC member's ODA programme; special terms are recommended for the least developed countries (OECD, 2006).

Africa is the largest beneficiary of foreign aid worldwide. Africa receives billions of dollars annually in foreign aid from the rich Western countries to alleviate hunger, reduce poverty, economic development, promote democratic government, and the rule of law without risking the peace of its nations (Sollenberg, 2012). In other words, since the 1960s, the West has prioritised supporting developing countries, notably Sub-Saharan Africa, in different forms, including development, economic, social, and humanitarian assistance. Hundreds of thousands of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are combatting deadly diseases and distributing food and water.

6.3.5 Western Military Aid

The end of the Cold War led to the breakdown of an existing, well-established international order. The usual geostrategic and ideological straitjacket began to relax. Without the superpowers striving to bend the dynamics of every situation to their logic, local conflicts and tensions began to escalate. However, the dreams for a safer and less dangerous world quickly faded. Western countries have had difficulty coming to grips with the idea that there is no longer a single adversary that can be easily identified but rather a profusion of smaller, less easily understood challenges to their perceived interests. The international system as a whole has undergone substantial shifts, and along with those shifts have come significant shifts in how security and military support is delivered, required, and utilized. The range of products and services that fall under the purview of international markets for the provision of military and security aid is extensive. It encompasses conventional arms and ammunition, as well as services associated with them, such as training and upkeep, as well as the provision of troops by private military and security organizations (Isbister and Donnelly 2012).

The amount spent on military aid by Western nations is far less than the amount received from weapon sales or military loans offered to some nations. Western nations, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union, provide the majority of military aid to developing nations.

Most recently, the crucial role that Western military assistance played in Ukraine's war against Russia has come to the attention of the United States government that military assistance is an essential component of broader attempts to cooperate on security. A recent analysis by RAND examines security cooperation among the United States, China, and Russia in the context of strategic competition. The report concludes that the United States and its allies have a significant edge over their rivals (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2022).

The United States maintains a strategic advantage regarding scale, quality, and multilateral alignment regarding security cooperation. Despite this, the United States of America and its many partners and allies are said to play the preeminent position in global security cooperation. Even if legacy commitments serve vital U.S. interests, the security cooperation portfolio of the United States and its European allies is misaligned with the needs of strategic competition due to ongoing obligations. This is the case even though the U.S., Middle East and South Asia continue to receive the vast majority of attention from the United States' various security cooperation operations (Mazarr et al., 2022).

In 2017, eleven European countries, including the United Kingdom, contributed a total of \$7.2 billion worth of military aid, with France and Germany contributing the largest

amounts, about \$2 billion each. The entire amount spent by the United States military during the same period was \$35 billion, while the sum total of the assistance provided by the United States military to the top five recipients in the Indo-Pacific Command region was more than \$1 billion (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2022; Mazarr et al., 2022).

The developed nations of the West provide their allies, particularly the less developed nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with military assistance so that these nations and their governments may better protect themselves from external threats. There are significant dangers posed to a great number of nations by armed individuals both within and outside their borders. Especially lacking in resources are developing nations' ability to train and equip their forces, making it difficult for them to protect their territory. Many less-developed countries rely heavily on assistance from more developed countries in the form of military aid. Maintaining peace and security is essential to the economy's growth. Even if talking things out between warring parties is essential, governments also need to have the ability to take military action against aggressors in order to coerce them into sitting down for talks. Providing governments with the resources required to accomplish their security goals is an essential function of military aid (Duncan, 2021).

Providing friendly countries with the appropriate means to ensure their defence is made possible by providing military aid. The provision of military assistance by the United States to Taiwan and by NATO to Ukraine in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the conflict with separatists supported by Russia is an illustration of the practice of assisting less powerful nations so that they may better defend themselves (Lin, 2021; Courtney, 2022). However, critics of military aid also argue that military assistance can contribute to repression or instability by providing warring sides with

additional resources to fight with or by providing support to authoritarian administrations (Seth et al., 2006). The delivery of armaments and the provision of air support or training can increase the capacity of a current administration to put down the rebellion (Arthar, 2019). More specifically, it has been found that an increase in extrajudicial executions is associated with increased military aid. There is a risk that governments that get significant amounts of sponsorship from the outside world will feel emboldened to repress dissenting civilian populations and lose the incentive to reform.

6.4. Chinese Development Model

Since its inception seven decades ago, when China was emerging as a communist state, China has been a prominent actor in international development cooperation and foreign aid. However, China's reputation and role in global governance, particularly in foreign aid and related industries, have improved in recent years, owing mostly to platforms such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Connecting with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and using the BRI as a major platform to achieve key development goals are two ways in which China hopes to take a more proactive approach to foreign aid and move towards a new model of international development cooperation (Yuan and Ouyang, 2022).

There have been three primary motivations for Chinese overseas help, and each has risen and fallen in significance over time. After introducing its reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, China shifted from the political ideology of the 1950s to economic pragmatism, with an emphasis on promoting the country's internal economic growth. China has increasingly used foreign aid as a means of engaging in global

governance in an effort to enhance its international standing and influence through discourse. China's foreign aid plays a significant role in advancing the country's diplomatic and economic goals. Humanitarian organizations provide both short-term responses to emergencies and ongoing aid for causes like poverty alleviation, schooling, and healthcare (Yuan and Ouyang, 2022).

Comparable to Western foreign aid, China provides both grants and financial assistance. On an equivalent grant basis, China's foreign aid is predicted to have climbed from US\$5.1 billion in 2015 to US\$5.9 billion in 2018. The sum is projected to be the same as in 2018, at \$5.9 billion in 2019. In 2019, it represented 0.044 per cent of China's nominal GDP. Bilateral grants and interest-free loans, Chinese government concessional loans (GCLs), and donations to international organisations accounted for 48%, 21%, and 30%, respectively, of the 2019 total (Kitano & Miyabayashi, 2020). Detailing the data, bilateral foreign aid grants and interest-free loan components have gradually climbed since 2016, reaching a peak of \$3,1 billion in 2018. GCLs fell from US\$1.3 billion in 2016 to US\$1.1 billion in 2017 but rose to US\$1.3 billion in 2018 (OECD, 2019).

Since China's reform and openness epoch in the late 1970s, China has lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty. Over the past four decades, the country has shifted from being a major beneficiary of foreign aid to a crucial provider of investment and development resources for the Global South. While both strategies have the same overarching goal—to improve the economic and social welfare systems of developing nations while advancing donor countries' national interests (Cheng, 2019), the Chinese government's approach to ODA is quite different from the norms established by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It also differs significantly from the European and the United States approaches. With the second largest economy in the world, China has strategically positioned itself as the most credible challenger to the United States' supremacy in the international system (Regime and Parisot 2017; De Graaf and Van Apeldoorn 2018).

The nature and breadth of China's rapidly rising overseas aid remain somewhat opaque. First, Beijing did not release official foreign aid figures until 2011, as they considered it "secret information" (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021). Beijing's fears of resentment from millions of Chinese still living in poverty and competitiveness for more aid from recipient nations have prevented it from providing accurate foreign aid data (Zhang, 2020). Second, Beijing's conception of foreign aid frequently matches the country's most recent operationalization of international and domestic policy goals, making it challenging to differentiate aid from other investment and trade transactions. Due to its historical opposition to imperialism and an obsessive urge to connect with the Global South, China avoids labelling its development assistance to other developing countries as foreign aid for political and diplomatic reasons. Beijing prefers to depict its actions in terms of two-way exchanges and two-sided cooperation rather than the donor-recipient rhetoric that promotes hierarchical and unequal power relationships (He 2010, 147). As a result of the fact that notions such as mutually beneficial partnerships and tools such as joint ventures obscure Chinese foreign aid (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021).

China lays a greater focus on the benefits of cooperative and communal economic development when discussing foreign aid in the context of a donor-to-recipient relationship. It emphasizes the needs of and benefits for the recipient countries,

especially the latter's capacity for independent development, and it promotes bilateral relations through economic and technological cooperation. It views international aid as cooperation among nations whose economies are still developing. It focuses on the achievement of practical results. China's white paper for the year 2021 completely avoids using terminology like "donor" to characterize its position. Instead, the document's title uses the term "development cooperation" rather than "foreign aid." Since the year 2000 the extent of China's assistance to other countries has grown at an exponential rate (Yuan and Ouyang, 2022).

Nonetheless, loans, aid, and investments are still treated as one and the same. Since there are at least thirty ministerial-level agencies involved in China's aid management (Zhang 2020, 8), the exact amount of Chinese foreign aid spending and what exactly constitutes aid are both up for debate. In practice, however, Chinese aid includes "attached aid, loans, export credits and tied export credits, and military aid," which are explicitly barred from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) (Hodzi et al. 2012, 86). According to The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2011), there are at least eight different types of assistance, including "complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programmes abroad, and debt relief (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021; Cheng, 2019).

6.4.1 China's Unconditional Aid

Chinese foreign aid is sometimes described as having "no political strings attached," making it a more appealing alternative for many non-Western nations (Wan, 2018). China has consistently asserted, in contrast to Western nations, that its foreign aid is "unconditional"; specifically, China will not attach any political conditions to its foreign aid, will not interfere in the recipient's domestic affairs, and will fully respect the recipient states' right to choose their development paths and models. Again, this divergence is somewhat comprehensible from the standpoint of collaboration between two emerging nations. As previously noted, unconditionality does not prevent economic conditions as aid linking (Min Ye, 2022).

During a state visit to the newly independent Ghana in 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai laid out eight principles for China's economic aid and technical support to other countries; these ideas serve as the historical and strategic foundation for modern Chinese foreign aid (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021; Cheng, 2019). The key principles are: -

1. When it comes to extending help to other nations, the Chinese government always operates under the premise that both parties stand to gain equally from the relationship. It never sees such assistance as unilateral handouts but mutual between the parties.
2. 2). When the Chinese government gives financial assistance to foreign nations, it does so with the utmost regard for the recipient nations' right to self-governance and without attaching any restrictions to the assistance or making any requests for special privileges.

3. China offers financial assistance to recipient nations in the form of loans with no or low interest rates. It is willing to extend the time limit for repayment when necessary to ease the financial burden as much as possible on those nations.
4. The goal of the Chinese government in extending aid to other nations is not to make other nations dependent on China but rather to assist those nations in taking the first steps toward self-sufficiency and independent economic growth.
5. The government of China does everything it can to assist recipient nations in finishing projects that require less investment but provide speedier returns to enable those countries to raise their income and build up their savings.
6. The Chinese government offers the highest-quality equipment and materials produced in China at prices that are competitive with those of foreign markets. Suppose the agreed-upon requirements and quality of the equipment and materials given by the Chinese government still need to be met. In that case, the Chinese government agrees to replace them or refund the payment, whichever option is more convenient for the recipient.
7. Prior to providing any specific form of technical support, the Chinese government will ensure that the professionals of the country receiving the assistance have a comprehensive understanding of the technology.
8. The construction specialists sent from China to help build infrastructure in recipient countries will be provided with the same level of life as their counterparts in recipient nations. It is strictly forbidden for Chinese specialists to make any unique requests or take advantage of any unique luxuries.

The eight principles states to promote recipient countries' capacity for self-sufficiency and independent growth while respecting their right to self-determination, non-

interference in domestic issues, and concentrate on low-cost (but high yield) development initiatives. The use of Chinese-made equipment and supplies, as well as Chinese technical assistance on all development support projects, are two guiding principles that persist to this day. In addition, recipient acceptance of the One China Policy became a non-negotiable condition for obtaining Chinese foreign aid as Beijing's diplomatic recognition struggle with Taiwan escalated. Although China's position in the world has evolved dramatically over the past half-century, the eight guiding principles and two essential conditions have remained largely consistent over that time (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021). The eight tenets of China's overseas aid efforts mirror the many layers of complexity involved in framing them. China's international assistance extends far beyond the bounds of official development assistance (ODA), including military and technical aid, low-cost investments, and the provision of equipment and materials created in China. Grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans are the three main categories of financial resources provided by China for foreign aid, according to the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid published by the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2011 (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021).

The vast majority of Chinese aid is bilateral and therefore does not adhere to the conventional OECD principles of aid conditionality. Critics contend that Chinese infrastructure help, which comes from commodities and labour from China, is primarily meant to serve the requirements of the Chinese government and enterprises rather than to stimulate economic development in recipient countries (Mueller et al., 2022). This view is supported by the fact that Chinese infrastructure aid brings goods and labour from China (e.g., Naim, 2007). As a result, many people are concerned that Chinese help will crowd out local jobs and enterprises, be economically inefficient, and

undercut Western contributors' efforts. Others, on the other hand, contend that Chinese assistance eliminates infrastructure bottlenecks, which are essential for the economic development of less developed countries (e.g., Moyo, 2011). At the moment, there is a great deal of conjecture but not a great deal of actual evidence concerning the factors that determine the distribution of Chinese aid and the effects of Chinese aid on the nations that receive it.

On the other hand, one may also be concerned that the economic benefits of the projects are captured by political elites (e.g., Werker et al., 2009; Dreher et al., 2019) or that they hurt the local population via negative labour market spill overs (e.g., Zhao, 2014), especially given that the aid is driven by the interests of the Chinese government and does not come with any policy conditions attached. This is especially true given that the aid has no policy conditions attached (Mueller et al., 2022).

6.4.2 The Strategy of Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a development initiative spearheaded by China that intends to improve communication and trade across numerous nations in Asia, Africa, and Europe (OECD, 2018). It is a crucial endeavor for President Xi Jinping's plan for China to assume a larger leadership role in world affairs in line with the country's rising influence and stature. The world's lack of adequate infrastructure is a major barrier to economic growth and development; hence this strategy is a major Country Diplomacy for China (Stephen, 2021; The Economist, 2020). China's economic and political clout would grow substantially if its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative were fully implemented (Cheng, 2019).

The Chinese government wants to use the programme to advance several key economic policies. First, as China's economy modernises, one of the most pressing problems is the widening gap between different regions. Chinese leaders count on a transnational infrastructure-building initiative to help strengthen the country's rural and industrial regions. The government of China hopes to use BRI as a springboard to address the country's chronic surplus capacity. It is not about getting rid of extra goods but relocating surplus factories (Cai, 2017). Moreover, China's core provinces' economies have lagged behind the country's wealthier coastal regions, so the government has made it a priority to boost their fortunes through the BRI. The government allocates substantial funding to the BRI Belt and actively promotes commercial competition for Belt and Road projects in order to stimulate economic growth in these central regions (Yu Jie and Wallace, 2021).

Second, another force behind the project is the aftereffects of the 2008 financial crisis. China's government issued contracts to build railways, bridges, and airports as part of a \$4 trillion stimulus programme in response to the catastrophe, but this flooded the Chinese market. With the Belt and Road architecture, China's massive state-owned businesses have access to a new market outside the country's borders (Yu Jie and Wallace, 2021). Moreover, one of the program's less well-known facets is Beijing's intention to export Chinese technological and engineering norms through BRI. The government in China sees this as a critical step toward modernising the country's manufacturing sector (Cai, 2017). China's rivalry with the United States is also a key BRI motivation. The great bulk of Chinese international trade transits the Malacca Strait off the coast of Singapore, a significant US ally. This programme is fundamental to China's aspirations to establish its own, more secure trade routes. There is no doubt

that China also intends to make participating states economically dependent on China, so expanding its economic and political power. In this regard, it resembles the Marshall Plan but with the crucial distinction that China assists other nations only on the basis of shared economic interests.

On the other hand, the expanding BRI debt trap and Chinese economic and political expansionism posed a threat and raised opposition in other nations, and some experts saw the initiative as an alarming extension of China's rising dominance. Recent research on China's overseas development projects between 2000 and 2017 indicates that massive high-interest lending by China's state-backed banks has burdened much of the developing world with burdensome debt loads, while some of the development projects financed by these loans face significant implementation issues (Garver, 2021). The report titled "Banking on the Belt and Road", published by AidData, provides an overview of China's geo-economic strategy both prior to and following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Utilizing insights gleaned from an exceptionally granular dataset that covers 165 countries, 13,427 projects, and a total value of \$843 billion, it describes the shifts that have occurred over time in spending patterns, debt levels, and challenges associated with the implementation of projects. More than 300 Chinese government institutions and state-owned enterprises contributed to the funding of these initiatives (Wooley, 2021).

Ammar A. Malik, a Senior Research Scientist at AidData and co-author of *Banking on the Belt and Road*, stated, "China has swiftly established itself as the financier of first resort for many low- and middle-income countries, but its international lending and grant-giving activities remain shrouded in secrecy (Ganesan, 2021). Beijing's

unwillingness to reveal specific information about its foreign development funding portfolio has made it difficult for low- and middle-income nations to objectively analyse the costs and benefits of participating in the BRI (AidData Report, 2021). It has also made it difficult for bilateral assistance agencies and multilateral development banks to establish how they might compete — or coordinate and collaborate — with China in addressing global issues of concern (AidData Report, 2021; Samson, 2022; Wooley, 2021).

Prior to the BRI, China and the United States competed in terms of overseas expenditures. However, China currently spends more than twice as much as the United States and other big powers. In a typical year during the BRI era, China spent \$85 billion on its overseas development programme, while the United States spent \$37 billion. Banking on the Belt and Road illustrates that Beijing has dominated the international development finance market through debt rather than aid. Since the BRI's inception in 2013, China has maintained a 31-to-1 loan-to-grant ratio (AidData Report, 2021; Wooley, 2021).

Before the BRI, the country's "policy banks"—China Exim bank and China Development Bank—led to a significant rise in international lending. However, since 2013, state-owned commercial banks, such as the Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and China Construction Bank, have played an increasingly significant role, with their overseas lending activities increasing by a factor of five during the first five years of BRI implementation. During the BRI era, the annual number of "megaprojects" financed with loans of \$500 million or more also tripled (AidData Report, 2021; Wooley, 2021).

Despite the fact that developing countries' governments have welcomed massive Chinese investment in the continent and Chinese banks have sponsored various projects across the continent, including a large gas pipeline and railways in Nigeria and Kenya, as well as projects in Uganda, Egypt, and Ethiopia (Yu Jie and Wallace, 2021), there has been growing opposition to the Chinese model of development in Africa from African communities, businesses, intellectuals, and government officials (Official. 8, 30/19/2022). Developing patterns in China's BRI in Africa sometimes generate full-blown conflict about the underlying tensions among the local population (Venkateswaran, 2020). There has been a rise in local protests against Chinese projects. At least a dozen incidences involving the kidnapping and intimidation of Chinese workers working on projects across Africa are examples of "pushback" by African countries on Chinese projects in recent years (Breuer, 2017).

The impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa shows that economic factors influence China's overseas investment decisions. The country needs new emerging markets for its industrial overcapacity due to a declining home economy. China's strategic adversaries and some host African nations worry that China is using the BRI to hide its geopolitical and geostrategic goals (Cai, 2017). These worries are fueled by Chinese developments in East Coast ports and Djibouti's first Chinese military facility. China calls its business investments overseas a win-win collaboration. It looks to be gaining more from its investments than the host countries, especially in Africa. While most BRI projects in Africa build infrastructure, industry, and communication, they also allow Chinese corporations to use their overcapacity and bring labour and commodities into Africa (Venkateswaran, 2020; Carmody, and Wainwright, 2022).

Most skilled labour in industrial projects comes from China, with a few African residents working low-end jobs. With rare exceptions, the BRI is a Chinese-led initiative. China's labour and supplies have greater skills and quality, allowing cost-cutting. However, it has only done a few projects directly assisting Africans, such as increasing local healthcare, skills, and education capability. Protests and project cancellations citing lack of local jobs, mounting debt, and quality standards or malpractice on the ground are also common (Dahir, 2019; Venkateswaran, 2020).

Moreover, according to numerous studies (Dollar, 2016; Akpınar, 2013; Kaya and Warner, 2012; Özkan, 2010), China is Africa's most important trading partner. The economic ties between China and SSA countries have grown exponentially during the past two decades (Euroasian Times, 2017). On the international stage, it is the Western world's primary rival. By way of its South-South Cooperation Framework, China gives free money to African countries south of the Sahara. Trade and investment between China and Africa are explained from a perspective of mutual benefit in the framework for collaboration between the two regions (Liu and Tang, 2017). China's trade policy has been dubbed "debt-trap diplomacy" since it involves "excessively providing loans to the countries of the world, particularly Africa, to get economic or political concessions when the borrowing country defaults with repayments" (Maluka and Lemmy, 2019).

6.4.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid

China's international aid programme is evolving and expanding, generating substantial international humanitarian sectors. In 2017, the Chinese government's aid programme

contributed a record amount of funds to various humanitarian causes. The following year, in 2018, the Chinese government launched a new aid organisation known as the China International Development Cooperation Agency (ICVA, 2019). China contributes bilaterally to over half of its humanitarian funding (OCHA, 2019). Chinese players also frequently prefer to coordinate directly with the national government or the Chinese diaspora, eschewing international coordination platforms that the national government does not administer. This strategy depends on China's status as a South-South development partner (Zhang, 2019).

Tracking China's humanitarian aid and other development finance is "a difficult and contested field of research" (Xu and Carey, 2015, p. 3), with classification challenges and a lack of official data. This is because most of the China's foreign aid (humanitarian, economic, and military) is in the form of bilateral aid, which includes grants and loans. However, I reviewed two occasions in which China gave humanitarian assistance. One is the Asia-Pacific emergency supplies for natural disasters in 2013 – 2017, whereas the other is the 2020 Chinese COVID-19 emergency middle supplies worldwide.

To begin, the Asia–Pacific area has reaped enormous benefits from the humanitarian assistance provided by China. Since the beginning of this decade, 15.9% of China's total financing for humanitarian causes has been allotted to the region (OCHA, 2019). Additionally, China participates in a variety of regional forums. For instance, in 2014, it signed a memorandum of understanding with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build the capacity to respond to regional disasters (Hongbo, 2016). Additionally, in 2015 it co-hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise,

and it has both participated in and hosted regional conferences on strengthening disaster risk reduction (Tan and Cui, 2019).

The Asia–Pacific region is better off due to several of China's policies, including those regarding South-South Cooperation and the prioritisation of China's near neighbours (Hirono, 2018). Its tendency to respond to disasters resulting from naturally occurring hazards, which the region is particularly prone to because it participates in regional humanitarian architecture and its tight alignment to international humanitarian rules in response to natural disasters (ICVA, 2019).

Priorities for reform are shared, such as the importance of DRR and the decentralisation of government. Even while there is widespread concern on a global scale over the influence of China's rising help to the Asia–Pacific region and the objectives behind this aid, China is not yet a large provider of humanitarian aid in the Pacific, and even less so in Asia. The following infographic, compiled using data from the Financial Tracking Service, presents China's contributions to humanitarian aid in Asia throughout the five years spanning from 2013 to 2017 (ICVA, 2019). When comparing important donors of humanitarian relief to Asia, the United States, Japan, and Australia supplied more aid to Asia Pacific countries than China. For example, the United States contributed \$1.9 billion, Japan contributed \$543 million, Australia contributed \$265 million, and China contributed only \$30 million in humanitarian assistance to Asia-Pacific countries (ICVA, 2019).

In 2020 and 2021, Chinese humanitarian aid was dominated by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included supplying medical supplies and medical teams

in 2020 and vaccinations nearly exclusively in 2021 (Lucas, 2022). Due to China's donor technique and the secrecy surrounding its support, it is difficult to establish how much China has spent on pandemic relief; however, experts predict China will spend more on humanitarian aid in 2020 than ever before (Kurtzer, 2022).

According to German Development Institute (2021), China's response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates a shift in its earlier reluctance to participate in the international humanitarian system. China has sent medical teams abroad and shipped hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries during the past year. In addition, China has contributed \$100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and vowed to construct a worldwide humanitarian response depot and centre in China in collaboration with the UN (German Development Institute, 2021).

During the Covid-19 outbreak, analysts predict China will deliver the largest humanitarian aid ever. According to the newly founded China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), a Chinese sub-ministry tasked with coordinating foreign aid, the Covid-19 response will be China's most extensive and comprehensive emergency humanitarian operation since [its] inception. China's humanitarian spending has reached multiple peaks in recent years, illustrating the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) determination to expand disaster response spending (Kurtzer, 2022).

China's Covid-19 aid packages consistently provide humanitarian aid for natural catastrophes while avoiding donations for emergencies involving complex conflicts. A

significant portion of China's humanitarian medical donations has been distributed to nations that have signed BRI economic partnership agreements. For example, on April 6, 2020, China provided medical assistance to 18 African countries, 15 of which are BRI partners. 81 of the 94 beneficiary nations included on the CIDCA website are BRI nations. BRI partners in Europe, including Serbia and Italy, have applauded China for delivering aid on schedule. Notably, reasonably practical Chinese helped improve China's reaction to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. While international donors hurried to contribute crucial resources, China was criticised for its lack of response, particularly in light of its previous experience with the SARS pandemic (Kurtzer, 2022).

The complete dataset on Chinese development aid is the AidData Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, a detailed dataset comprising 13,427 development projects sponsored by Chinese government institutions and state-owned businesses between 2000 and 2017 (AidData, 2021). AidData collects data on development assistance flows corresponding to the OECD definitions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) from a variety of sources, including grant and loan agreements, reports published by Chinese government agencies and state-owned banks, Chinese Embassy and Ministry of Commerce websites, news media sources, and data collected from host countries (Custer et al., 2021, pp. 5–6). AidData is an academic research project that has been in operation since 2004 and is directed by William & Mary², a preeminent public research university, with support from USAID and multiple charitable foundations. AidData classifies aid pledges with OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System purpose codes³. Activities were considered humanitarian for this study if classified in the dataset as emergency response, health, developmental food aid or food security assistance, disaster prevention and

preparedness, or reconstruction, relief, and rehabilitation. These categories account for 1.6% of the total development assistance in the dataset, comparable with prior estimates of Chinese humanitarian spending; for instance, Chinese humanitarian aid accounted for 1.7% of total aid in 2010-2012 (Hirono, 2018, p. 17; State Council Information Office, 2014; UNDP, 2016, p. 1).

Health-related programs accounted for 74% of all China's humanitarian projects between 2000 and 2017 (AidData, 2021). These initiatives include the provision of medical professionals, the construction of facilities such as hospitals, and the donation of medical supplies, equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Nearly half (48%) of the initiatives described as 'other types of emergency response' (representing 17% of total expenditures) comprise emergency food aid. In contrast, the other half covers a variety of other disaster relief efforts, including unspecified money. Long-term developmental food aid and food security are classified separately (8% of expenditures), and just five projects have been designated as disaster prevention and preparedness or as rebuilding, relief, and rehabilitation over the past eighteen years (Lucas, 2022).

6.4.4 Chinese Economic Aid

An increasing amount of attention and research is being paid to China's growing economic and diplomatic involvement in other countries as the country's role on the international stage continues to evolve (Carter, 2017). The Chinese government mainly provides financial aid through grants and interest-free loans administered by the Ministry of Commerce and concessional loans administered by China Exim Bank (State Council, 2014). In China, "foreign aid" encompasses both economic and military

help, whereas "official development assistance" does not. Unlike the Western donors, China includes military support in their definition of foreign aid (Carter, 2017).

As mentioned above, tracking China's economic aid and other development financing is a "difficult and contested field of research" (Xu and Carey, 2015, p.3) characterised by classification difficulties and a lack of openness. In the absence of reliable and comprehensive statistics, common wisdom regarding the impact of Chinese aid on recipient economies is mainly based on anecdotal evidence, notwithstanding China's expanding participation in global development finance (Mandon and Martha Woldemichael, 2022; Cooper, 2019). Beijing does not publish specific country- and project-level details about its foreign aid activities, unlike traditional donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Mandon and Martha Woldemichael, 2022; Strange et al., 2013, Horn et al., 2020).

Despite this, systematic attempts to apply the Western measurement system to accessible Chinese data indicate that annual Chinese aid is in the range of six billion dollars per year and comprises both grants and subsidised loans. Using this amount as a baseline, one could argue that while Chinese help is substantial, it is relatively minor compared to Western aid. Total aid from the West has varied by about 150 billion USD annually. In this context, China would be a medium-sized donor, greater than Norway (just over 4 billion USD) but less than French help and less than one-fifth of American aid (34 billion USD in 2019). As a percentage of China's Gross National Income, the aid is negligible compared to the Chinese economy (Lomy, 2021). China views its economic assistance as global economic support, particularly for the south-south cooperation model. China prefers commerce and investment to economic aid.

Since implementing the 'Going out' policy, China's economic and development cooperation has experienced "unprecedented acceleration", an initiative launched by the Chinese government in 1999 to encourage Chinese investment abroad (Wang, 2016). In conjunction with the China Council for the Promotion of Worldwide Trade (CCPIT), the government has implemented several programmes to aid domestic enterprises in building a global strategy to capitalise on opportunities to expand local and international markets (Carter, 2017).

China has emerged as a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) after three decades of being predominantly a recipient of FDI. Following the introduction of a "going out" strategy around the turn of the millennium, numerous Chinese companies have travelled abroad to invest and conduct business. Much of China's international aid is intertwined with its outbound FDI and has also been rising (Wang, 2016). China is presently one of the ten largest suppliers of international development assistance (Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9) China's development assistance is overshadowed by policy bank lending to developing countries, which is significantly larger. Much literature focuses on China's help and commercial involvement in Africa (Carter, 2017).

According to official Chinese figures, China allocated USD 14.41 billion² for foreign assistance commitments between 2010 and 2012, with 56% in concessional loans, 36% in grants, and 8% in interest-free loans (2014 State Council). The China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) found that from 2000 to 2015, the Chinese government, banks, and

contractors extended USD 94.4 billion in commercial and concessional loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises (Carter, 2017).

China's Going Out strategy has led to a considerable expansion in the country's investment operations in foreign nations, and these increases have been accelerating (Wenbin and Wilkes, 2011). In 2020, China's outward foreign direct investment (ODI) expanded to \$153.71 billion, ranking first on a global scale. In 2020, the ODI growth rate increased by 12.3 per cent annually, reversing a decline of 4.3 per cent in 2019 (CGTN, 2021). China's ODI of \$2.58 trillion at the end of 2020 remained the third largest in the world, after the United States (\$8.13 trillion) and the Netherlands (\$3.8 trillion), according to the Annual Statistical Communiqué of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2020, issued jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (Stats.gov.cn. 2020). China's influence on global direct foreign investment is expanding. The country's ODI accounted for more than 10 per cent of the global total for five consecutive years. China's ODI included 18 industrial sectors in 2020. Four primary businesses, leasing and commercial services, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and finance, accounted for almost 70% of the ODI flow. Additionally, China's ODI contributed to the country's exports of \$173.7 billion, or 6.7% of the overall exports of products (CGTN, 2021).

Among China's varied contacts with Africa, China's economic presence is an important policy instrument, and Africa has been a primary receiver of Chinese aid. China offers eight forms of foreign help: entire projects, products and materials, technical

collaboration, human resource development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programmes, and debt reduction (Sun, 2014).

Most Chinese financing in Africa goes under development finance instead of aid. Chinese government analysts secretly admit this, even though Chinese literature consistently blurs the boundary between the two categories (Sun, 2014). China's billions of dollars to Africa are long-term, reimbursable loans. From 2009 to 2012, China provided Africa with 10 billion US dollars in "concessional loans." (China Radio International, 2012).

China's approach actively adds to the misconception between development finance and aid. The Chinese government pushes its agencies and businesses to "closely mix and combine foreign aid, direct investment, service contracts, labour collaboration, and international trade." [8] The objective is to maximise the practicality and adaptability of Chinese projects to local conditions in the recipient nation. However, this makes it difficult to determine which percentage of the finance is or should be classified as help. According to one reasonable idea, the Chinese government pays the difference between the interest rates on concessional loans supplied to Africa and comparable commercial loans. Consequently, only the minor interest rate differential may qualify as Chinese aid (Sun, 2014). Nevertheless, as China's position in international economic cooperation grows, its economic aid policies diverge from those of Western donors and attract increased scrutiny and criticism (Ferchen, 2020). For instance, difficulties relating to a lack of openness and accountability and the absence of untied aid primarily to Chinese contractors (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018).

6.4.5 Chinese Military Aid

Beijing finished building its first overseas military post in Djibouti in 2017; reports of a possible military base in the United Arab Emirates surfaced the previous year; and this spring, China announced the investment in a Cambodian military camp for what is believed to be exclusive Chinese use. In 2004, China presented the "New Historic Mission" idea, asking for a greater global role for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enable it to undertake "diversified military responsibilities." This was the first stone laid in what would become this foundation (Miller, 2022). The PLA's role in protecting Beijing's expanding global economic interests has become increasingly vital. After China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to create new trade routes connecting China to the rest of the world was announced in 2013, the term took on new significance. For the first time, safeguarding "overseas interests" was labelled a "strategic task" for the PLA in China's 2015 defence white paper. The PLA is aggressively constructing "overseas logistical facilities" to "address gaps in overseas operations and support" for eventualities such as "overseas evacuation," according to the 2019 edition of China's defence white document (Miller, 2022).

Beijing is not only constructing military installations to protect its economic and security interests, but it is also attempting to foster security cooperation with other nations in order to make new strategic partners and friends. Beijing is extending its military aid programme as part of its military diplomacy strategy to garner friends and influence. China gave a total of \$560 million in military funding from 2013 to 2018. Cambodia and the African Union were the leading Chinese foreign military aid recipients between 2013 and 2018. Cambodia received a reported \$100 million in 2016 ahead of elections for Prime Minister Hun Sen. The African Union received \$100 million during Xi

Jinping's 2015 United Nations speech. These indicate two distinct incentives for Beijing. Beijing presumably desired to maintain its influence with the Cambodian government. Beijing undoubtedly sought to increase its soft influence in Africa in relation to the African Union. Another apparent incentive, albeit less prevalent, is to improve China's security by enhancing border stability. This may explain why China pledged \$73 million to Afghanistan in 2016 to combat the Taliban (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2022).

Regarding military aid, the Chinese government has been just as secretive as it has regarded its international aid; commitments to nations like Cambodia and Afghanistan were only made public after those respective governments revealed them. This suggests that the sums estimated for Chinese military aid between 2013 and 2018 may be low.

6.5. Chinese and Western Development Models: SSA's Traditional Partners Comparison

China and the West adhere to different aid approaches. According to Habiyaemye and Ouzlu (2016), China's economic model has altered the "traditional framework" of Western commercial connections with Africa. Import and export trade is at the heart of the Chinese trade model. Due to the continent's enormous potential for economic growth and development, Sub-Saharan Africa is a top priority for China (Lyman, 2012).

This strategy benefited China, which plunders natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) while also supporting autocratic and corrupt regimes there, and it led to poor policy choices in Africa's political openness and human rights (Naim, 2007; Hitchens,

2007; Brautigam, 2010). The environmental impacts of China's approach over the past three decades on its SSA partners have been substantial (Shint, 2011). The "traditional structure" of Western commercial connections with Africa was also altered as a result of China's model (Habiyaemye and Ouzlu, 2016). Western "trade partners" in Africa were worried about Chinese economic expansion across the continent (Yu Zheng, 2016). On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom are notorious for their conditionality and selectiveness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). The West's aid is contingent on African countries maintaining the democratic reforms they have just implemented (li, 2017). From a Western perspective, foreign aid can help improve democratic institutions and government in countries that receive it (Stone, 2008; Stokke, 2013).

In contrast, over the past three decades, China has built a large empire through diplomacy and debt (Mar, 2020). China's new strategy is to lend billions to developing nations for infrastructure construction, mainly in Africa. Most of the country's economic infrastructure must be forfeited if the borrower country defaults on its loan payments, which is a common occurrence (Mar, 2020). By contrast, Western assistance and credit sources want some sort of assurance that their money will be put to good use (Wade, 2002). From the Western perspective, the conditionality of aid and lending works best in countries with good governance, high levels of openness, and low levels of corruption (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Wade, 2002). Nonetheless, as the continent of Africa has its objectives, China has challenged the Western aid model of conditionality. With China's rise and its new approach to international engagement, the Western model of assistance efficacy has been disrupted (li, 2017).

In conclusion, several conclusions might be drawn from the Western-Chinese aid programme comparison. First, China and the US have exploited foreign aid and government funding to achieve their geostrategic and economic agendas. Both donor states have utilised foreign aid to influence recipient governments to their advantage. The US and China began their foreign aid programmes during their economic rises, and the constraints put on recipient countries have helped them expand their markets and accumulate wealth. Second, whereas Western aid has clearly and explicitly described its assistance programmes, Beijing has failed to institutionalise its foreign aid bureaucracy and organise its taxonomy of official development aid schemes to match those of other OECD donor governments. Third, Chinese and US aid legitimisation narratives diverge. Western interventionist aid is focused on market economies, democratic governance, and human rights, whereas Beijing focuses on South-South cooperation, non-conditional benevolence, and a state-centered development model (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021). Their aid recipients represent these distinct legitimisation discourses: Western aid goes to both state and non-state players, but Beijing prioritises states.

6.6. Turkish Development Model

Turkey is one of the OECD's twenty founding members. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Turkey's interest in the OECD centred on the activities of "the OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey," which was founded on 12 July 1962 to monitor Turkey's economic position and calculate the amount of financial aid to be granted to Turkey annually. In addition to the Consortium, Turkey actively engaged in the work of the "Working Group on Turkey's External Debt," which was founded on 17 May 1978 to improve Turkey's management of its growing foreign debt. In conjunction with the EU

accession and national reform processes, Turkey-OECD ties achieved new heights in the 2000s. Ankara's observer position in the OECD Development Assistance Committee has been maintained. Today, Turkish authorities and organisations are monitoring the activities of the OECD more closely, contributing to the organisation and reaping its benefits (Acar, 2012; MFA, 2022).

Despite its membership in the OECD, Turkey has developed its own foreign aid model. Ankara has camouflaged its development assistance in anti-Western and anti-colonial rhetoric, especially when addressing developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa. It also became an alternative to China's state-led development, which prioritises stability over democracy (Aidi, 2022). On the other hand, The Turkish model, as Donelli argued, also takes two aspects from the Arab model - religious meaning and aid as a tool for foreign policy – and combines them with other elements, including a key component of the Beijing consensus – the non-conditionality principle. This makes it especially intriguing, as it is not simply a hybrid of the Washington and Beijing Consensus (Donelli, 2021). This foreign policy approach of maintaining a foot on mixed models of the West and South-South divide enables the AKP to receive one type of 'tangible benefit' from its relations with the West while simultaneously seeking others by distancing itself from the West (Donelli, 2021). In part, Turkey's Total Development Assistance (TDA) is attempting to perform the role of a mediator between Northern and Southern positions and players by taking neither side (Tüylölu, 2021).

In this aspect, Turkey was successful in fusing the anti-colonial past of the Ottoman Empire with the Islamic ethic of charitable giving (Donelli, 2021). Unlike, SSA traditional partners whose model focused humanitarian and development assistance, Turkey's model is all-inclusive package. For example, Turkey is not just providing foreign aid to SSA countries; its involvement is more comprehensive. While providing primarily humanitarian aid, it also seeks to assist SSA nations with state building, military aid, trade and investment (Demirci and Mehmet, 2018; Özkan 2014; Cannon, 2021; Donelli, 2021). On the international stage, Turkey provides political support to its SSA allies. It offers training to the SSA's police, military, coast guard, and intelligence departments (Abdulmaarouf, 2018; Shay, 2018). It additionally supplies military equipment to SSA states (Mashamoun, 2022; Winsor, 2015). Its state-owned and private companies interact with the SSA business communities. Turkey is investing in ports, airports, highways, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and natural resources, including petroleum, natural gas, and minerals (UNSC Report, 2011; (ECOS, 2006). It focuses primarily on education as an instrument of cultural diplomacy (Şafak, 2018). With regard to fostering peace, rapprochement, and mediation inside SSA, Ankara is also adopting an interventionist approach. The model and strategy of Ankara's foreign development are impressive to the SSA nations. When engaging with its SSA partners, Turkey demonstrates a strong commitment. Unlike SSA's traditional allies, Turkey's Head of State, accompanied by senior cabinet members, businesses, and Turkey's TIKA, pledges humanitarian aid first. Erdogan paid a visit to Mogadishu and Khartoum, bringing humanitarian relief as well as a slew of massive business projects, including commercial and investment deals, political backing, and military aid (Gelle, 2017, Minister Remarks, cited in Sözcü; Official, 12/10/2021).

SSA countries recall Turkey's humanitarian support during the droughts of the 1980s. Sub-Saharan Africa suffered a severe drought in 1985 when the region first received Turkey's government aid. The assistance approved by the Turkish government was a \$10 million food aid package. Since then, Turkey has slowly transitioned from a net recipient to a net donor (Aybey, 2008). Several government and non-government organisations administer development assistance (Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Government institutions, NGOs, universities, and other charitable organisations are aiding developing nations with humanitarian, development, and military support. In recent years, Turkey's relief organisations have been active, and the breadth of their work has expanded rapidly (Farah, 01/09/2021; Özkan, 2016). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees the political coordination of these operations among all government entities, while the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency is responsible for the technical coordination (TIKA). Concerning humanitarian aid, the Turkish Red Crescent Society actively mobilises emergency aid for countries or societies impacted by natural or man-made calamities. Its counterpart inside the government structure is the General Directorate of Emergency Management, which is directly supervised by the Prime Minister (Aybey, 2008).

Within the framework of the adventurous nature of Turkish foreign policy, Ankara is efficient in many diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation sectors. According to TIKA Report (2020), the total Turkish development assistance was \$8.797 billion. Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to \$8,124 billion in official flows generated by public institutions/organisations. There are \$682,55 million in private flows. A component of 90,94 million dollars represents multilateral official development aid, which includes dues and contributions to International

Organizations. In addition to its official support, Turkey attracts attention through the assistance of the business sector and non-governmental organisations, totalling around 882.55 million dollars. While non-governmental organisation contributions total 401,87 million dollars. The 280.88 million dollars in direct investments made by the Turkish private sector in developing countries is evidence of Turkey business community's engagement with developing nations (TIKA Report, 2020). Turkey provides various forms of aid, including water purification and nutrition programmes, as well as on-the-ground training for medical professionals, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, fisherman, and farming techniques and technology (Keyman and Sazak, 2014). In recent years, Turkey has retained its status as one of the most generous nations in the world. It ranks second with a ratio of 1.14 per cent of national income to official development assistance (TIKA Report, 2020).

Most Turkish ODA operations in fragile states are demand-driven, with demands from political leaders or, on rare occasions, regular residents (Tarihi, 2012). Such an approach promotes ownership by the recipient country and so helps the implementation of aid programmes (Gole, 2014). Furthermore, like China and the West, Turkey provides foreign aid in the form of grants and loans, with the former focusing primarily on providing humanitarian and technical assistance and the latter on investments in economic infrastructure such as ports, airports, hospitals, schools, roads, etc (Tekingunduz, 2019). Similarly, both the grant and the loan are forms of bilateral financial assistance, which means Turkey directly give aid to its recipient countries (Özkan, 2015; Siradag, 2015).

6.6.1 Turkish Unconditional Aid

Even though Turkey is a member of the OECD and has included the 2020 ODA Index due to its large rise in official development assistance (ODA) funds, the great bulk of Turkey's foreign assistance is unconditional. Turkey does not purposefully aim to strengthen aid conditions such as democratic governance, accountability, and protection of human rights through the assistance it provides (Keyman and Sazak, 2014). It is claimed that Turkey, as a newer contributor, invests in fragile societies with an eye toward its longer-term national and regional goals (MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015).

In other words, Ankara does not impose political conditions on its assistance. When making announcements about Turkey's 'generosity,' the recipient country's foreign policy elite frequently extol it to distinguish Turkey's activities from those of Western contributors (Wheeler, 2013; Donelli, 2021). For Ankara's point of view, the absence of aid conditionality demonstrates its respect for the sovereignty of recipient nations and its agreement with the South-South Cooperation (SSC) principles defined by the United Nations (Tüylolu, 2021).

In this context, Turkish aid officials emphasise the central state's significance for development. They criticise assistance schemes that bypass the active participation of recipient states. As a result, a substantial portion of TDA has been allocated to state-building programmes that aim to improve the capacity of various state services, whether at the central or local level (Diplomat. 2, 17/11/2022; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Businessman. 1, 13/11/2021). Therefore, the TDA focuses more on technical cooperation and capacity building than financial assistance. According to Turkish aid

officials, the emphasis on capacity building and infrastructure projects, in addition to humanitarian aid, strengthens the capabilities of the conflict-affected state (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021). They consequently criticise the traditional donors' method of sequencing,' which entails sending humanitarian aid but waiting for a country to achieve stability before extending technical aid (Minister. 2, 12/01/2021). They believe that Turkey performs both duties simultaneously; that is, it invests in stability (Wheeler et al., 2015; Tüylolu, 2021).

Emerging donors assert that they adhere to horizontality, solidarity, reciprocity, and mutual benefit in the sphere of development assistance. They highlight these characteristics as points of differentiation from traditional donors (Bergamaschi and Arlene, 2017). Emerging donors, including Turkey, differ from OECD-DAC members in that they do not attach economic (such as financial accountability and structural changes) and political (such as governance and institutional reforms) conditions to their aid (Jing et al., 2019). As a demonstration of respect for the sovereignty of a recipient country, they build a virtue out of this (DeBoom, 2019; Tüylolu, 2021). This results in the inevitable criticism from traditional donors that aid without conditions, reinforcing undemocratic governments and their dubious practices (Tüylolu, 2021). Since 2011, Turkey's persistent engagement in Somalia is the most credible and well-known illustration of its claim to the title of a Southern donor. Here, Turkish development assistance stands in stark contrast to the methods of conventional donors (Donelli, 2021). Moreover, this argument is reinforced by cultural/civilizational distinctions and the actual practice of "doing progress" (Tüylolu, 2021).

Nevertheless, the potential for Turkey to improve its capacities as a reliable actor in development opens the door to a discussion on the advantages of becoming part of a multilateral system, as well as the possibility of Turkey agreeing to certain conditions that ensure accountability, transparency, and the efficient distribution of aid. In this context, the slight but extensive history of Turkey's work in the fields of humanitarianism and development might provide light on the merits of assisting on a bilateral and unconditional basis (Keyman and Sazak, 2014).

6.6.2 Turkish New Foreign Aid Formula

Turkey's foreign policy towards diverse regions has recently undergone significant shifts, and this has been reflected in the country's development aid strategy.

Turkey's efforts to expand its image in development aid programmes and to participate in South-South Cooperation (SSC) are among the most innovative aspects of its foreign policy (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021). This involvement, on the part of both states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), is evident in Africa. Using lessons learned primarily in the Balkans and Central Asian republics, Ankara has been attempting to establish its own model - a Turkish style of doing cooperation (Özkan, 2017; Donelli, 2018).

The complex situations in Sub-Saharan Africa made it more difficult for Turkey to consider providing foreign aid since Africa has always been viewed as a distant nation plagued by civil conflicts, government corruption, and widespread disease, all of which constrained economic and political situations (Özkan, 2014). Before the Justice and Development Party came to office in 2002, neither Turkey's economic growth nor its foreign economic strategy centred on foreign aid to Africa possessed decisive and

strong innovative power (Yilmaz, 2021). Turkey prioritised establishing strong links with the governments of African nations with which it shares historical and cultural ties. Unlike Africa's traditional partners, religion may be viewed as a legitimising factor and has acted as one of the soft-power components underlying Turkey's foreign aid to Africa. Turkey's overseas assistance is mainly intended to meet the religious approach requirements of Muslim African nations (Harte, 2012).

Turkey's foreign aid strategy has been affected by historical ties to Africa, particularly the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which has also served as the basis for Turkey's perspective on Africa. During the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire governed a large portion of modern-day Africa. During this time, the Ottoman Empire formed solid ties with Africa. Strong ties existed between the Ottoman Empire and North Africa. Historical ties between the Muslim populations of these North African nations and the Ottoman Empire bind them together (Shinn, 2015). In this regard, North Africa has always been considered a significant recipient of Turkish foreign aid. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and several other African nations were a part of the Ottoman Empire, while Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, and Chad lived under the Ottoman Empire; these nations today receive foreign assistance from Turkey (Beseny, and Oláh, 2012).

The AKP, business organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that primarily operate in Muslim African countries where the Ottoman Empire ruled for a long time have brought about a new phenomenon in Turkey's foreign aid policy (Aly, 2014). This phenomenon is based on religious and historical ties. Various NGOs and commercial entities use religion and the history of the Ottoman Empire to motivate and

legitimise their humanitarian initiatives in Africa (Binder, 2014). Turkey recognised and utilised these aspects of soft power to further its economic interests in Africa through foreign aid.

Another vital component of Turkey's soft power is Humanitarian diplomacy to developing nations. In recent years, Turkey has presented itself as an international humanitarian actor and has been heavily involved in various conflict-affected states. Since 2012, Turkey's humanitarian and development aid has increased substantially (TIKA, 2019). The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power in Turkey since late 2002, has promoted the term 'Humanitarian Diplomacy' (HD), a term coined by the country's former foreign minister, Davutoğlu as one of the core pillars of its foreign aid policy (Davutoğlu, 2018). AFAD, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority, and TIKA, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, reinforced this view (Altunisik, 2022).

The term "humanitarian diplomacy" (HD) came into use primarily to refer to the increasing engagement and talks that humanitarian NGOs have been having with many parties in situations fraught with conflict to offer humanitarian assistance (Regnier, 2011). Turkey was one of the first countries to do so and was among those that quickly seized it to define their positions in their respective foreign policies (De Lauri, 2018).

However, the utilisation of HD by governments as a component of their foreign policy has resulted in major difficulties (De Lauri, 2018) and introduced fuzziness to the idea, particularly since its operational application remains to be determined. The analysis of

HD via the lens of the Turkish case is fascinating because it problematises the divide between the so-called conventional donors and emerging contributors, as well as among the emerging donors themselves (Amb, 4. 04/01/2020; Official. 4. 17/10/2021). On the one hand, Turkey's foreign policy has several parallels and contrasts with the so-called liberal peacebuilding and state-building paradigm used by traditional contributors (Altunisik, 2022).

Even though Turkey has adopted a norm-based approach to its humanitarianism, it distinguishes itself from the Western established donors by claiming to act with "conscious" while arguing that the Western donors do not care and engage the recipients on an equal basis (Minister, 2. 12/01/2021). This is how Turkey differentiates itself from the established Western donors. On the other hand, although Turkey is commonly categorised as one of the so-called "rising donors," it can be easily distinguished from the other countries in this category (Representative, 1. 12/05/2021). While other "rising donors," like China, have been staunch defenders of sovereignty and non-intervention norms, Turkey, under the AKP, has been eager to adopt an interventionist stance in its approach to HD and engage in state-building activities (Amb, 4. 04/01/2020). This contrasts with other "rising donors," like South Korea, which has been a staunch supporter of non-intervention norms (Altunisik, 2022).

6.6.3 Turkish Humanitarian, Economic and Military Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan

The simplest method to study and understand Turkey's new model of foreign aid from a humanitarian, political/diplomatic, economic, and military perspective is to look at

Turkey's foreign aid to Somalia and Sudan (Özkan 2014; Donelli, 2018). From SSA point of view, Turkey applies the same foreign aid formula to Somalia and Sudan; hence, it is unnecessary to regard these two Sub-Saharan nations differently in terms of Turkish foreign aid policy (Farah, 01/09/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Regarding Somalia, the new framework for Turkey's relations with Somalia as a developed LDC is multifaceted. Turkey established new relations with Somalia when the international community regarded Somalia as a failed state rife with terrorism and piracy (Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Official. 8, 15/ 12/2020.). Although Somalia was weak and vulnerable when Turkey arrived, Ankara created its diplomatic infrastructure and attempted to provide political support for Somalia's reconciliation and state-building process (Demirci and Mehmet, 2018; Özkan 2014). When Turkey arrived, only the UN and other humanitarian organisations were assisting Somalia's most famine and conflict-affected people. Somalia's administration was ineffective. There are no embassies or foreign missions in Mogadishu, with the exception of Ethiopia, which has a diplomatic presence at Villa Somalia, where the offices of the President and Prime Minister are situated. In 2011, Turkey became the first non-African country in more than two decades to appoint a new ambassador to Somalia, stationed in Mogadishu. Upon his arrival, President Erdogan and his team made the most of Turkey and Somalia's shared historical and cultural characteristics (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021).

Sacred symbols are becoming more widely displayed in both Somalia and Turkey. The ties between Mogadishu and Ankara go beyond the realms of politics, economy, security, and humanitarian aid, as evidenced by this fact. The Turkish government's approach to Somalia is notable and novel (Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Turkey has

emerged as a prominent actor in Somalia thanks to its strong involvement and shared cultural heritage with Mogadishu (Shinn, 2015). In order to understand and assess the potential impact of Turkey's participation in Somalia, it is essential to contextualise the connection between Turkey and Somalia at the state, business, cultural, and non-governmental organisation levels (Cannon, 2016). This new policy is built on a foundation of history, culture, humanitarian and development aid, and a strong emphasis on security, commercial development, and economic growth (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Özkan, 2013).

First, Turkey demonstrated to the Somalis that it is a brother willing to assist in the reconstruction of Somalia's government and nation. Turkey offered political assistance, while the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was weak and unrecognised by the international community (MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015). The majority of research participants, consisting primarily of government officials, intellectuals, and ordinary people, agree that Turkey supported Somalia when its central government was not recognised by the world's most powerful nations and the country required political support (Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, Official. 2, 13/01/2021; UN Official, 1. 12/11/2021; Mustafa, 14/03/2021; Official, 3. 30/10/2021).

Turkey has offered assistance for Somalia and urged reform of the United Nations, which, according to Ankara, serves the interests of only a few countries (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). In a presentation to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2011, Turkey highlighted Somalia's insecurity and famine and explicitly mentioned the problem. Ankara supports Somalia's efforts to achieve peace. It began financing Somalia's political reconciliation - peace, and state-building initiatives

(Aknipar, 2013). In other words, the Turkish strategy to Somalia, notably Mogadishu and the south-central regions, consists of reconstruction, development, and peacebuilding. Many Somali experts contend that Somalia was able to return to the world arena due to Turkey's political support (Ahmed, 2021).

Second, the Somali government and public institutions receive aid and humanitarian development support from the public sector in the form of institutional and technical development assistance (Mehmet Özkan, 2014). The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) carried out the Somalia development and humanitarian projects. Food and medical aid were distributed in refugee camps and cities across Somalia, while Turkish airplanes flew to Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia to distribute the aid (TIKA Report, 2016). Since then, hundreds of Turkish doctors have worked in field hospitals alongside the Turkish Ministry of Health to treat hundreds of thousands of patients (TIKA Report, 2016). Some of the many Somalia-based projects that TIKA has implemented are agriculture, health, infrastructure, education, and capacity-building (Turus, 2022; Dhaysane, 2022).

Third, while Somalia was weak and its people were starving, Turkey did not only politically back the federal government of Somalia or provide humanitarian aid (Abdulle, 2019). However, the Turkish government has also actively encouraged its business communities to invest in the country and undertake trade with the Somali business community (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Siradag, 2015). Turkey and Somalia have been expanding their diplomatic ties, which has opened the door to more trade and business. The Turkish private sector has increased its trade and economic ties with Somalia yearly (Mohamoud, 2021).

Turkey's continued presence in Somalia has allowed Turkish businesses to take advantage of the country's rising interest in the relatively untapped but potentially rich Somali market. According to Turkish government authorities, Turkey's business presence in Somalia is bolstered by promoting Turkish investment and corporate interests (Siradag, 2017). The most visible instances of Turkish firms' involvement in the construction, infrastructure, energy, and transportation sectors are the infrastructure concessions - the restoration and operation of Mogadishu's port, airport, roads, agricultural, and mining (SucuoGlu and Stearns, 2016).

Fourth, Turkey has contributed to a variety of additional facets of Somali security. Since 2009, the Turkish government has signed a series of agreements with the government of Somalia concerning the provision of military training and security cooperation matters. In conformity with (Gurpinar & Abdulle, 2019). In other words, Turkey is committed to the formation of the Somali National Army and to assisting it in its fight against Al-Shabaab, as well as to the establishment of enduring peace and political stability in Somalia to bolster national protection for Somali citizens and the mechanisms of national defence (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Turkey is the only non-Western nation to have made this commitment. Turkey and Somalia's governments have inked several security training agreements involving the Somali police and armed services (Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015). The deployment of Turkish security personnel to a camp near Mogadishu was intended to aid the Somali police and military with training and equipment (Siradag, 2015; Official. 3, 30/10/2021) The two national forces have agreed to share intelligence information to lower the amount of volatility in the marine environment. Principal security partners of

Somalia include the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Turkey is one of these partners as well (Donelli, 2021).

As mentioned above, the foreign aid model in which Turkey applies to Sudan is similar to that of Somalia, however, Sudan's aid priority areas are different so as the nature of the two countries' humanitarian, economic and military/security situations (Farah, 01/09/2021). In the case of Sudan, the new Turkish foreign aid strategy for Sudan is complex. Turkey was one of the first countries to open an embassy in Sudan when the country gained its independence in 1956 (Van den Berg and Meester, 2019; Shay, 2018). As a result of Turkey's greater focus on the Middle East and the Balkans, relations between the two countries have traditionally been cold and distant. Despite political unrest and heavy international pressure from countries like the United States and the European Union, Turkey has maintained positive relations with Sudan when the AK Party came to office (Terzi, 2019). With the AK Party in power, Turkey is looking to increase its strategic engagement and diplomatic presence across Africa. Turkey sees Sudan as a regional gateway to the Red Sea and the continent (Shay, 2018).

Furthermore, as discussed in previous chapters, the government of Sudan saw Turkey as a friend and brother who came to support Sudan when Western countries imposed more sanctions (Rakipolu, 2021; Anadolu Agency, 2017; Soufi, 08/8/2022). Several respondents claim that Turkey has taken advantage of the fact that many countries have been reluctant to engage in Sudan due to its various economic and political issues (Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). Turkey contributes to Sudan in the areas of development and humanitarian relief (Keyman and Sazak, 2014). Ankara's newfound strategic interest in Khartoum is reflected in Ankara's cooperation

agreements, humanitarian aid, and bilateral development initiatives with Sudan (Turkish MFA, 2018). As a result of Sudan's deteriorating political stability, economic security, humanitarian crisis and extended conflict, Turkey expanded its political support for the country. The level of cooperation between Ankara and Khartoum has been primarily constant since 2006 (Alhaz, 2021). Ankara and Khartoum signed several memoranda of understanding (MOUs) covering a wide range of topics, from military cooperation to renewable energy to economic and fiscal cooperation (DailySabah, 2021).

First, Turkey adopted the same aid model to address Sudan's economic, security, and political challenges. When Turkey established new relations with Sudan, the country was in the midst of severe economic difficulties, social instability, political turmoil, and international pressure, particularly from the United States and the United Nations Security Council (Musa; 20/08/2021; MOFPED Report, 2019; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). Turkey has consistently argued that sanctions imposed on Sudan economically and for its security are counterproductive. As mentioned in previous chapters, Erdogan stated that international pressure isolates the government and people of Sudan, which is harmful to their economy (Farah, 01/09/2021). Turkey has made it clear that it does not approve of such measures. Turkey has been quite vocal in international forums about how the political isolation and economic blockade against Sudan are doing more harm than good and are causing pain among the civilian people (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

Internally, also Turkey's new ties with Sudan came at a time when Sudan's unemployment rate was at 18 per cent, violence between Khartoum and Juba was at its height, and the international community was urging al-government Bashir's to end

fighting in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile (Ali, 2019; AFDB Report, 2012). The relationship between Turkey and Sudan has progressed since then. Turkey claims it is reengaging with Sudan to aid in humanitarian efforts and the country's economic development in a number of industry sectors (Hussein, 2022). Moreover, the government in Khartoum sees Turkey as a friend who came at the right time to assist Sudan. Many have said that Turkey is a wonderful friend and ally who came to help the Sudanese government and people at the right time. When compared to Somalia, Turkey's efforts to foster peace and political stability in Sudan were ineffective despite the country's economic progress, security support, and political and development assistance (Diplomat. 5, 11/09/2021). Politically, Turkey's capital city of Ankara supported al-Bashir. Despite diplomatic efforts (Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021), Ankara did not contribute to peace talks between the government of Sudan and its armed rebel opponents and political competitors. This will be discussed the next section in detail later.

Second, The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been at the forefront of humanitarian and development efforts in Sudan, particularly in water, health, and education infrastructure like ports and airports (Tekingunduz, 2019). Over the course of its eight-year existence, TIKA built water pipelines that brought potable and irrigating water to rural communities across eight states in Sudan (Tekingunduz, 2019; Reliefweb, 2011). The Turkish Foundation said it would establish a laboratory for water research and geophysics and provide training for Sudanese engineers on water geophysics. Many people have died in the Darfur region of Sudan, but Turkey has sent humanitarian aid to help (Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Official. 5, 18/11/2011; Official. 9, 15/12/2020). Food, tents, medication, and medical equipment were flown

to Sudan by Turkish cargo planes. Turkey created educational opportunities for the people of Sudan. The Turkish government provides total financial aid to hundreds of students from Sudan annually through Turkish scholarship programmes (Farooq, 2021). Sudan receives significant medical aid from TIKA and other Turkish NGOs (IHH, 2011). Turkey did not just help with infrastructure projects like water purification, healthcare, and school construction (Diplomat 1, 13, 2021). Additionally, it helped the Sudanese government and financial sector advance (Middle East Monitor, 2018).

Third, Turkey has actively pushed its enterprises to invest and do business in Sudan, despite its economic difficulties over the years and the resulting significant unemployment, especially among young people (Diplomat 7, 18/07/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020; Official. 9, 15/12/2020). Sudan's corporate and public sectors have benefited from the billions of dollars invested by Turkish businesses (Tasam, 2021). Trade and corporate investment rose as their relationship developed (Oktay, 2021, cited in DailySabah). Turkey has made substantial investments in numerous fields, including agriculture, fisheries, banking, mining, transportation, infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy (Kenzen, 2022). Tens of millions of dollar oil exploration deal and an agreement allocating hundreds of square kilometres of Sudanese territory for Turkish oil company engagement are just two examples (Reuters, 2018). Turkey's primary investment areas in Khartoum are the construction of the new airport and private sector investments in cotton production, electricity generation, and grain silos and meat slaughterhouses (Reuters, 2018). The Turkish company Summa has signed a deal to build a new \$1.15 billion international airport in Khartoum (Official, 13/11/2021). When the Turkish firm gets involved in infrastructure

projects head-on, it will entice foreign firms to do the same, according to the Middle East Monitor (Shay, 2018).

Fourth, as mentioned above, military cooperation between Turkey and Sudan was formalized through a set of bilateral agreements, and a docking facility for military and civilian vessels was planned to be built in the port city of Suakin (Aksoy, 2021). Part of Suakin had been temporarily given to Turkey so that it could be renovated into a port for civilian and military boat maintenance, a tourist attraction, and a transit point for pilgrims crossing the Red Sea to Mecca (Reuters, 2017). When looking at it from Sudan's standpoint, the Suakin Island deal will only strengthen the connections between the two countries. The national army of Sudan will benefit from the deal since it will make it easier for the Turkish government to provide military training and infrastructure to the Sudanese armed forces (Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021; Diplomat 7, 18/07/2021). Additionally, it will help the government of Sudan lift the arms embargo placed on the country's military forces due to the conflict in Darfur (Researcher. 2, 13/02/2021).

6.6.4 How Turkish Aid Model Differs from SSA's Traditional Aid Models

This section will analyse how Turkey's new strategic involvement is distinct from that of Africa's traditional partners, such as the Chinese approach to aid trade and investment (Yu Zheng, 2016). Although Turkey and traditional SSA partners have certain parallels in terms of aid, trade, and investment (Hausmann, 2014; Davutolu, 2010a; Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Ipek, 2014), Turkey's model of involvement is less clear-cut than the Chinese and Western models (Minister. 1, 15/09/2021).

There are differences in how China and the West approach providing aid. However, new foreign entities in the region, such as Turkey, have been looking for their own ways to make use of Africa's expanding market (Shinn, 2015). A combination of self-interest and philanthropic objectives underlies Turkey's new strategic approach to Sub-Saharan Africa (Hausmann, 2014). While Turkey is providing humanitarian aid to some of the continent's weak states, such as Somalia and Sudan, with which Ankara shares some characteristics, Turkey also provides political support, technical assistance, the creation of security infrastructure, and trade relations (Wheeler, 2011).

Like many other international players in the region, Turkey has begun to introduce its model to Sub-Saharan Africa to capitalise on the continent's expanding consumer market (Yu Zheng, 2016). Attracting new commercial and security partners in Africa is Ankara's primary goal in this partnership (Kaya and Warner, 2012). In contrast to the relationships between other wealthy countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Turkey takes advantage of the region's expanding Muslim population and weak governance (Özkan, 2010; Shin, 2015) to strengthen its own economy and foreign policy and security strategy (Özkan, 2010; Shin, 2015). At first, it created and improved diplomatic ties with SSA nations (Özkan, 2010). The country beefed up its security presence in the area and built one of the largest military bases in Africa, which alarmed the continent's long-standing alliance members (Wheeler, 2011; Kasapoglu, 2017). In addition to China and Western countries, Turkey extends a soft power hand of economic aid and development cooperation initiatives of investment and commerce to Africa as part of its development cooperation with the continent (Shay, 2018).

Turkey has recently inked a slew of FTAs with SSA countries like Senegal and Ethiopia (Minister. 3, 15/01/2021).

Turkey's first goal in SSA was to take advantage of the continent's strategic importance in trade and investment and become a trusted state by creating confidence between African governments (CRU Policy Report, 2019). Turkey's strategy is distinct in prioritising diplomatic entanglement or commercial and security cooperation and other forms of strategic collaboration. There will be a shift in how Turkey approaches cultural and educational ties as part of this new strategy (Kaya and Warner, 2012). For instance, Turkey's new strategic engagement, Sub-Saharan Africa, is now viewed as a complete partner on political, security, and economic matters. The partnership is forward-thinking and "has borne fruit in a very short time," especially regarding diplomatic and economic indicators (Official. 2, 13/01/2021; Minister. 2, 12/01/2021; Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Minister. 4, 04/01/2021). Turkey's commitment to its connections with SSA bodes well for the future of those ties (Özkan, 2010).

It is challenging to earn SSA's trust and become a strategic partner. Africa's new partners must provide assistance to foster positive relations with the continent. Turkey used its anti-colonial history and cultural affinities as a form of soft power. Ankara had no colonial history with Africa, unlike the continent's traditional allies (Bilgic and Nascimento, 2014; Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Daily Sabah, 2018). The Turkish plan was successful quickly, and the country's trade with Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, grew substantially (Anadolu Agency, 2014). This time, the SSA is Turkey's most important trading relationship, surpassing even North Africa, which had previously been its most important trading partner. The Horn of Africa nation of Ethiopia, home

to over a hundred million people, saw an increase of roughly \$4 billion (Daily Sabah, 2014). After witnessing Africa's readiness to expand its economic and natural resource potentials, Turkey is eager to maintain its engagement with the continent. Because of Turkey's status as a rising force, some African countries have designated it as a strategic ally (Official. 2, 13/01/2021; Minister. 2, ; Minister. 4, 04/01/2021). A few years later, Turkey recognised the initiative's value and dubbed it the Turkey-Africa Partnership; Erdogan, a non-African leader, now travels frequently to the continent (Turkes and Getachew, 2014).

In contrast, Western powers maintained their condescending attitude toward developing nations due to widespread views of famine, sickness, civil conflicts, corruption, poverty, and greed (Poncian, 2015). The shift in perspective of Africa as a hub for sickness, economic stagnation, waste, and warfare is the "biggest hurdle that silently inhibits the geometric expansion of trade. From Turkey's vantage point, this stereotyping is an outgrowth of Western media's neo-colonial propaganda designed to discourage investment from Africa (Enwere and Yelmise, 2014). In contrast, Ankara's perspective on Africa has always been distinct from Western knowledge regarding African development partnerships thanks to Turkey's Ottoman Empire experience, which allowed Turkey to shatter the barrier of Western African stereotypes. From SSA vantage point, Sub-Saharan Africa is not a war zone (Minister. 3, 15/01/2021; Minister. 4, 04/01/2021). In Turkey's eyes, Africa is not an undeveloped and corrupt continent; rather, it is a land of untapped promise, rich in unexploited natural resources. The Turkish Petroleum Corporation and Yapi Merkezi were successful in the African countries of Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania, proving the success of Turkey's strategy in SSA (Anadolu Agency, 2014). In contrast to the

persistently unfavourable Western picture of Africa, Turkey does "not perceive Africa as a conflict zone but as a region to which humanity owes a big obligation," as the Vice-Chairman of Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) put it (Daily Sabah, 2014).

According to the 2013 Turkey African policy, "Turkey-SSA relations have been turned into a mutually reinforced political-economic partnership," which explains the divergent self-interests of Turkey and its traditional African partners (MFA, 2015). The central tenets of Turkey's African policy are, as stated by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, for Turkey to defend the legitimate rights and interests of Southern and Eastern Africa (SSA) in bilateral and multilateral talks and to become the voice of Africa, to uphold and support the African principle of "African solutions for African problems" in accordance with the policy of the African Union, and to play a role in disputes and peaceful settlements of Africa when asked to do so (MFA, 2015).

In addition, Turkey's present instrument of soft power, the development and humanitarian aid programmes is the soft hand that supports Turkey's strategic engagement of expanding security and economic links with African countries (Dost-Niyego, 2018). The relevance of SSA's proximity to Turkey and its rapid economic development influenced this view. Turkey shifted its focus away from its traditional regional partners in the Middle East and toward sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a sizable Muslim population (Shinn, 2015). Turkey's perception of having bilateral relations with the SSA countries was self-created. The consensus among SSA countries is that Turkey is engaging Africa in a new way, as seen by its recent actions (Amb. 5, 01/12/2021). Turkey's goal is to boost Africa at the expense of the continent's

longtime allies and former colonial masters (Yildirim, 2016; Nazli, 2016). The "properly conceptualise" of the new Turkey-SSA connections is central to the new AKP engagement policies narrative. Currently, Turkey's official line toward SSA countries is one of mutual cultural appreciation. That is to say; Turkey is interested in free trade while recognising the right of each African nation to make its own political and cultural decisions (Yildirim, 2016).

Turkey, absent from Africa's economic and geopolitical scene for decades, recognised its significance as a region like no other. Ankara, Turkey's capital, has been the site of several summits aimed at fostering collaboration between Africa and Turkey (Kaya and Warner, 2012). Turkey is attempting to rebrand itself as an emerging economic power in order to increase its influence on the global stage. For this reason, Turkey considers Africa to be a keystone in its global system for the 21st century (Muluneh, 2018). Beyond its economic struggles, Turkey is also attempting to develop novel approaches to peacekeeping in Africa, notably among the weak Muslim-majority republics of sub-Saharan Africa (Kaya and Warner, 2012; Daniels, 2012; Kagwanja, 2013). Most African countries, however, do not view Turkey as a colonial power. The increased Turkish presence in Africa has been met with little scepticism across the continent (Amb. 6, 18/11/2021). They began to express satisfaction with Turkey's new security and economic alliance. Turkey will benefit from having a positive image in Africa as a neutral partner and friend to both the United States and China. So, Africa will reap benefits from both approaches (Cagaptay and Yuksel, 2019). The political natures of Somalia and Sudan, however, are distinct. In Somalia, for example, the country's leadership has been dominated by two significant clans, whilst in Sudan, it has always been a group of military elites (Official. 6, 25/02/2021).

Nonetheless, Turkey's development strategy is comparable. Turkey views both countries as economically and strategically significant but politically and militarily weak Muslim nations. Turkey focuses on weak Sub-Saharan nations, such as Somalia and Sudan, with which it had historical and cultural ties during the Ottoman Empire (Amb. 6, 18/11/2021). In this approach, as these fragile SSA nations seek economic, security, and political support from other nations, Turkey provides both humanitarian and development aid and security support and business investments to both the economic infrastructure of these nations and their small and medium-sized businesses (Cannon 2016; Donelli, 2018; Shay, 2018; Özkan, 2020).

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

This research explored Turkey's strategic alliances in the African region known as Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the AK Party came to power, Turkey's relations with the SSA have evolved into a new phase of strategic cooperation. The "Year of Africa" was a declaration of Turkey's strategic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa (Dodo, 2016). Turkey and SSA have taken steps to deepen their relationship, with favourable outcomes for both parties (Tür, 2011).

Since then, Turkey has been one of the most active players in African politics in the past decade. Turkish foreign policy on the African continent has evolved to the extent that is unprecedented in the country's new history, garnering headlines for its substantial humanitarian donations and economic cooperation agreements (Cannon, 2016). Turkey's unprecedented development of security cooperation and its strategic new relationships with Somalia and Sudan prompted academics and mainstream media commentators to highlight Turkey-SSA relations individually.

However, most existing studies focus on Turkey's strategic interests from Turkey's perspective (Özkan, Gunay, 2011; Eyryce, 2017; Shinn, 2015; Cannon, 2016; Donelli, 2021). For instance, the literature on Turkey's strategic engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa focuses mainly on the economic and security benefits of Turkey's new engagement with SSA nations, specifically, how its diplomatic efforts enhanced its exports to Africa. Non-state actors in Turkey, including civil society and commercial organisations, actively participate in Ankara's Africa project with government encouragement and support (Tepeciklioğlu, 2021; Cannon and Donelli, 2019). In other words, the relationship between Turkey and Sub-Saharan African nations, particularly

Somalia and Sudan, focuses on cultural interactions, diplomacy, economic relations, foreign aid, and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. It did not mention the reciprocal benefits of the Turkey/SSA, or why they chose, or accepted Turkey's relations. There is a gap in secondary data and the body of literature regarding; how SSA countries benefited from this relationship. Whether Turkey's aid model differs from that of the traditional partners of SSA, and whether the relationship is likely to continue as long as both sides are benefiting and Somalia and Sudan lack viable alternatives to Turkish support.

In order to address the first two questions, this research employed a structured, focused comparison. Since the study aimed to determine what factors influence SSA nations' acceptance of Turkey's engagement, it focused on identifying cases with a shared outcome/dependent variable. My current research focuses Turkish relationship with Somalia and Sudan. In addition, the study contrasted Turkey's interactions with Somalia and Sudan in terms of its aid programmes against the Western and Chinese foreign aid models. I chose these two nations as prime examples of the issue I am studying because they are the two SSA nations with which Turkey has formed the most profound ties in recent years.

Numerous factors of similarities exist between Somalia and Sudan. As a result of prolonged conflicts, political instability, economic difficulties, security challenges, foreign interference, and recurrent famine, Somalia and Sudan are two of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bradburry and Heally, 2020). It is also clear from both primary sources and extant scholarly work that Turkey continues to rank Somalia and Sudan among its "most important allies" among the countries of Sub-Saharan

Africa (SSA) (MFA, 2018). Turkey took a higher stake in commercial and investment concessions in Somalia and Sudan; they also accepted Turkey's military posts in their respective countries. Turkey invested in Somalia and Sudan's ports and airports, and Somalia and Sudan also accepted Turkey's military installations in their respective countries. Schools and hospitals are Turkey's other major investments in Somalia and Sudan. After closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the two kinds of interactions are distinct. The similarities and differences between the two countries can be seen in their interactions with Turkey. Turkey's partnership was met with open arms in Somalia and Sudan, albeit for divergent political reasons (Özkan, 2013).

This chapter will serve as the study's conclusion by providing a synopsis of the most critical analysis of the research findings in light of its objectives, and the value of its contribution. In addition, it will discuss the limitations placed on the study, along with the recommendations for further research. It starts with a summary of the most critical findings from the thesis, which are organised into the following three analytical chapters:

7.1. Chapter 4: Turkey's Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Somalia

Somalia's political, economic and security crisis harmed the population's wellbeing and eventually led to frequent famine. As a result, the Mogadishu government sought international assistance since it was unable to confront the consequences of decades of civil conflict, political instability, and a lack of public services such as education, health, and clean water (Özkan and Orakci 2015; Kalmoy, 2021). On the other hand, the protracted civil war, drought, and food security crises in Somalia in 2011 left a gap for Turkey to increase its intervention in Somalia (Özkan and Orakci, 2015).

In addition, due to its fast response to the famine and its common religion, Islam, history, and culture, Turkey developed close connections with the country (Abdulle, 2019; Cannon, 2016). Since then, it has provided humanitarian aid and various sorts of assistance to the Somali people and government (Antonoppoulus et al., 2017).

For this reason, the Federal Government of Somalia considers Turkey to be one of Somalia's closest allies among other countries. According to my research, the intimate ties between Somalia and Turkey are heavily influenced by cultural and historical reasons (Özkan, 2013; Cannon, 2016). Turkey's assistance, whether political, humanitarian, or security-related, is not the only assistance that the people of Somalia receive. Other countries, such as the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom contribute substantial support to Somalia; nevertheless, Turkey's support is more evident due to Somalia's cultural and historical ties with Turkey (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 3, 30/10/2021). Many Somalis hold the view that their only historical and cultural ties to the West were established through colonialization. They view Ankara's foreign policy approach as distinct and anti-colonial (Özkan, 2014; Bilgic and Nascimento, 2014; Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Donelli, 2021; Daily Sabah, 2018).

In this chapter, I laid out in four pillars. First and foremost, cultural and historical ties are the primary explanation for Somalia's confidence in Turkey's relations (Ahmed, 2021; MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015; Abdulle, 2019). Due to the profound cultural and historical ties between the two nations, Mogadishu views Turkey as Somalia's most promising friend. Cultural exchange between Turkey and Somalia began throughout the Ottoman era. Links between the Somalis and the Ottoman

Empire date back to the 16th century when the Ottoman Empire supported and collaborated with Muslim countries against the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Abdulle, 2019). The Somalis claim that their victory over the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires formed the basis of this partnership. The Ottoman Empire's security and commercial interests in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula seemed to be the driving force behind this partnership (Abdulle, 2019). There is widespread optimism among the country's elite that, similar to how Turkey aided the Somali people in their liberation from the Portuguese and Abyssinian Empires in the 16th century, it can assist Somalia recover its former strength and stability with the help of the Turkish government (Rep. 1, 12/05/2021; Official. 3, 27/10/2021). In other words, historical and cultural linkages play a major role in the close relationship between Somalia and Turkey (Bilgic and Nascimento, 2014; Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Daily Sabah, 2018; Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Official. 1, 13/01/2021).

Second, I began by discussing the political and diplomatic benefits that the Federal Government of Somalia derives from Turkey's relations. The administration in Mogadishu understands that with Turkey's assistance, Somalia can return to the international stage (Ahmed, 2021; MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015). Moreover, Turkey's political support in the peacebuilding, reconciliation, and state building process is one of the fundamental goals of why Somalia established good relations with Turkey (Farah, 01/09/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021).

As Somalia is fragmented country the successive governments in Mogadishu have forged close ties with Ankara while other Federal Member States have cordial ties with

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Based on the data collected, the political elite in Mogadishu has faith that Turkey intends to back the central government and not intervene with the internal divide and proxy war in Somalia (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Rep. 1, 12/05/2021).

In other words, Mogadishu accepted Turkey's relations because Ankara commits to back Somalia's efforts to maintain its political and security autonomy as well as its unity and territorial integrity. "In light of the fact that Turkey is siding with the central government and has stated that it does not wish to become engaged in the internal conflict or the proxy war, Somalia is interested in strengthening its relationship with Turkey. Turkey has provided humanitarian relief, development assistance, fiscal support, and substantial investment concessions to the central authority in Mogadishu through the city's port and airport. Strong ties between Ankara and Mogadishu will give the Federal Government complete control over Somalia (Official. 2, 13/01/2021; Diplomat 1, 13/12/2021).

Mogadishu recognises the advantages of Turkey's policy solely backing the central government. The successive Mogadishu administration has viewed the federal states' autonomy as a threat to Somalia's unity, sovereignty, and geographical integrity (Dahir and Ali, 2021). A high-rank official from the central government in Mogadishu argued that it is dangerous and challenging to function because "such an autonomy system of the federal system not only decentralised the already weak state in Somalia, but it also separated the Somali people along clan lines, which is contrary to the ideals of the modern state" (Official. 7, 09/10/2021).

I looked at the Federal System of Somalia's foreign policy strategy and the perceptions of the regional administrations of the central government in Mogadishu on the foreign policy front. And I found that the Somali federal member states have no faith in how the central administration in Mogadishu distributes foreign aid. There is a widespread misconception that Turkey is just backing Mogadishu's central authority. Federal officials, on the other hand, are worried that aggressive diplomacy by federal member states with other nations could spark a proxy war in Somalia (Farah, 01/09/2021; ICG, 2018). It is so abundantly evident that the main draw of Turkey's relationship to the government in Mogadishu is Ankara's desire to support the central authority while avoiding its member states. Since its arrival in Mogadishu, the Turkish government has granted investment concessions for the port and airport in addition to humanitarian aid, development help, budgetary support, and military training. The ties between Ankara and Mogadishu will strengthen the Federal Government against the Federal Member States that currently dominate Somalia (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Official. 1. 13/01/2021; MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021).

Third, since the Somali people themselves don't seem capable of settling their differences, Somalia needs a reliable friend and ally to support the Somali national army and facilitate the country's political reconciliation. Within ten years, Turkey has pledged to help restore Somalia's military force. To improve national protection for Somali residents and the defence mechanisms of the country, Turkey has pledged to help create the Somali National Army and aid it in fighting Al-Shabaab and establishing enduring peace and political stability (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017; Cannon, 2021). Turkey is the only foreign country to make such a commitment.

Turkey and the Somalian government have signed a number of security training agreements, with Turkey providing training to the Somalian police and military (Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015; Cannon, 2021).

Turkey established a military base in Somalia to train the Somali military (Nassir, 2017). Mogadishu sees the camp as vital in restoring the security of the Somali people by strengthening the country's armed forces (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017). Since 2009, Turkey has signed a number of military training and security cooperation agreements with Somalia, and in light of these conditions, Turkey has contributed to numerous elements of Somali security (Cannon, 2021). According to (Gurpinar & Abdulle, 2019). It appears that Turkey is dedicated to constructing and assisting the Somali National Army in order to maintain sustainable peace and political stability, which will improve the safety of Somali civilians and the effectiveness of their defence systems (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017; Akpinar, 2013; Siradag, 2015). For the purpose of combating marine insecurity, the two national forces have also agreed to share intelligence information (Official. 3, 30/10/2021; Hussein, 12/10/2021). Turkey, together with the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, is Somalia's primary security partner (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019; Donelli, 2021).

Fourth, Mogadishu's federal government hopes to get economic assistance from Turkey. The ties that bind the governments of Turkey and Somalia go much beyond the provision of humanitarian relief and economic development assistance. Turkey and Somalia have close ties in several areas, including trade and investment. The link opened up previously unimaginable opportunities for commerce and investment for

the business community (Diploma, November 13, 2021; Siradag, 2015). In other words, Turkey not only provided humanitarian aid when Somalia was in famine; it also took the risk of dispatching its private and state-owned firms to trade and invest in Somalia before any other country (MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021).

Mogadishu and Ankara have inked several agreements for economic and commercial cooperation since they established diplomatic ties (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Siradag, 2015). The Turkish government assists public and private entities in Somalia with aid and assistance for humanitarian development. Similarly, private sector organisations in Turkey have expanded their economic and commercial ties with Somalia. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations less than a decade ago, investments in economic infrastructure, health care, capacity building, and training for government officials have produced noticeable results (Mohamoud, 2021; Siradag, 2017).

Turkish businesses have begun operations in Mogadishu. Turkish corporations operate the ports and airports, and Turkish Airlines began direct flights to Somalia. Somalia had been blocked from the rest of the world for the preceding two decades, making the introduction of Turkish international flights important for the country's economic revival (Sabah, 2015).

During their visits to Istanbul and Ankara, Somalian government officials repeatedly reiterated that the country is offering its primary resources, including fishing rights, hydrocarbons, building materials, and the construction industry, to Turkish firms. According to the Report of the World Bank (2019). For the first time in more than two decades, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) of the Federal

Government of Somalia granted offshore fishing licences legally and openly. Following a National Security Council (NSC) agreement in February 2018 permitting the exclusive exploitation of tuna and tuna-like species beyond 24 nautical miles [1] from Somalia's coast outside the zone reserved for Somali fishermen, these permits were issued. In 2018, Turkish fishing businesses and the Chinese (COFA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the parameters for the operation of fishing vessels within Somalia's EEZ with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (World Bank Report, 2019; Yener & Calkaya, 2018).

From the above, it is clear that Somalia's receptivity to Turkish involvement can be related to a variety of underlying factors, including historical and cultural affinities, political/diplomatic support, security concerns, and economic interests. Despite this, Somalis place a great deal of trust in Turkey's ties due to the parallels between Ankara and Mogadishu. Mogadishu sought a dependable partner who could provide political, economic, and security support, and in this scenario, Turkey emerged as the best candidate to meet Mogadishu's needs, which is why Somalia established strong diplomatic connections with Turkey. In other words, Ankara's commitment and consistency in providing political/diplomatic, security, and economic support strengthened the Ankara-Mogadishu partnership (Farah, 01/09/2021; Official. 2, 13/01/2021).

7.2. Chapter 5: Turkey's Political Involvement in Africa: The Case of Sudan

Since Sudan gained independence in 1956 upon the dissolution of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan condominium, its political position has been fraught with uncertainty. Since independence, Sudan has seen many military coups and revolutions (BBC, 2021). During al-Bashir's tenure, the nation has also been riven by several internal conflicts and crises (Sikainga, 2009; Al-Jazeera, 2020). This covers the civil war and secession of South Sudan, the bloodshed in Darfur and South Kordofan, and the disastrous humanitarian crisis in the Blue Nile (UNMIS, 2022). The political instability, severe economic challenges, extensive violence, and insecurity experienced by Sudan have collectively contributed to the nation's vulnerability (BBC, 2021; Sikainga, 2009; Al-Jazeera, 2020; UNMIS, 2022; MOFPED Report, 2019; Ali, 2019; AFDB Report, 2012). These factors have caught the attention of regional states, such as Turkey, prompting their intervention in Sudan's affairs.

Nevertheless, relations between Turkey and Sudan have existed for a long time. The historical and cultural ties between Turkey and Sudan trace back to the Ottoman Empire, which exerted influence over Sudan's political and economic systems, including the establishment of infrastructure and the creation of markets. In recent times, the relationship between Turkey and Sudan has witnessed Turkey's involvement in providing political and security assistance, humanitarian aid, promoting economic development, and participating in diverse business sectors. These collaborative efforts have contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries (Turkey MFA, 2016; Shay, 2018; Perry, 1990; Muhammed and Yahia, 2015; Muhammed, 2015; Yusuf Fadl, 2004; Anadolu Agency, 2017).

In 2006, Erdogan visited Sudan to establish new strategic political, economic, and military cooperation (Shay, 2018). Subsequently, in 2017, President Erdogan led a significant delegation on a two-day state visit to Sudan, aiming to enhance the long-standing partnership and explore new areas of cooperation (van den Berg and Meester, 2019; Aljazeera, 2017). During this visit, Sudan warmly welcomed Turkey's strategic relations amid internal strife and increased Western sanctions (Rakipolu, 2021; Anadolu Agency, 2017; Soufi, 08/8/2022; Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). At their 2017 summit in Khartoum, the two heads of state decided to cooperate in politics, economy, and security, signing several Memoranda of Understanding (Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020; DailySabah, 2021). These agreements covered areas such as military cooperation, renewable energy, and economic and fiscal collaboration (DailySabah, 2021).

In this chapter, I explained why Khartoum's rulers had developed close ties with Turkey for more personal reasons. Of course, Sudan's leaders established relations with Ankara in order to alleviate the country's political, economic, and security instability; however, according to the primary data gathered, the contemporary relationship between Sudan and Turkey is more personal than national or strategic. The interests of the Sudanese people were never at the heart of Al-Bashir and al-Burhan's dealings with Turkey. It was done primarily to maintain their continued authority (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020; Soufi, 08/8/2022).

Unlike Somalia, Sudan experienced a dozen of coup d'états and revolutions since its independence. Most of the Heads of State in Sudan are military leaders who overthrew

their predecessors and then fought to hold onto power (Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). The only means to remove a president from power in Sudan is through a coup d'état, not through elections, and this is only likely to happen if there are economic problems such as rising unemployment and food price inflation (de Waal, 2022; Soufi, 08/8/2022). Hence, the main objective of why Sudanese leaders establishing connections with countries like Turkey was to enlist assistance to lessen the political, economic, and security unrest in the country (Hussein, 2022; Diplomat. 5, 11/09/2021; Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021). A factor that led Khartoum to establish ties with Ankara (Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). In other words, al-Bashir and al-Burhan established relations with Turkey to obtain political, economic, and military aid, as well as to consolidate power. However, their fundamental goals and purposes for the relationship differ (Official. 8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9, 15/12/2020).

Al-Bashir aimed to strengthen ties with Ankara to overcome two major obstacles. First, to relieve the economic and political burden created by sanctions, which, in other words, can keep him in power. South Sudan's independence exacerbated living circumstances and posed serious economic hurdles (Attwood, 2017; F.T., 2019). The Sudanese regime's popularity was dwindling due to ongoing food price increases caused by sanctions (Siddig, 2010; Shay, 2018; Mquirmi, 2021; Hamza, 30/11/2021). It took much work for al-Bashir to gain economic and security assistance from other nations when he forged relations with Turkey (Amb. 4, 04/01/2020). This is because of sanctions implemented by the U.S. and its allies. The sanctions significantly impacted the Sudanese economy and people's welfare because many countries stopped providing development aid to Sudan. International financial institutions have

ceased sponsoring joint ventures and concessions between the Sudanese government and overseas private and public companies.

Furthermore, foreign direct investment declined, making it impossible for multinational banks to provide services to Sudanese businesses. As a result, banking transactions and other commercial activities for the public and private sectors have become more expensive as they seek alternate payment options." (Rep. 4, 16/06/2022). In other words, the Sudanese pound (SDG) devalued in November 2017 due to sanctions. The Sudanese administration attempted to attract foreign cash via remittances from Sudanese abroad and to bring the official rate closer to the ever-expanding parallel rate of exchange oil (US Department of State, 2018). The bulk of the working class in Sudan has suffered directly from the economic crisis, and the al-Bashir regime has lost public support as a result (Woodward, 2019).

Nevertheless, Turkey resisted seizing government assets and placing a weapons embargo on Khartoum's leadership after al-Bashir improved relations. Instead, Ankara has repeatedly stated that it will support Khartoum's efforts to lift the imposed economic sanctions. Ankara negotiated scores of new trade and cooperation deals with Sudan despite sanctions imposed by the United States (Daily Sabah, 2021; Afak et al., 2017; Shay et al., 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). In bilateral trade, Turkey agreed to pay in local currency, indicating that it is aiding Sudan with its political and economic difficulties (Deik, 2017).

Second, relations between Turkey and Sudan also played a role in al-Bashir avoiding extradition to the International Criminal Court. Due to the wars in Darfur, South

Kordofan, and the Blue Nile, the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in Darfur on allegations of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). The Sudanese government, which is not a party to the ICC statute, denied the allegations in 2008 and declared al-Bashir innocent. As a Head of State, it was embarrassing for al-Bashir to stay in Sudan and not travel to other nations to meet with his colleagues. Because of al-Bashir's warm relations with Erdogan, Ankara has declined to impose a travel ban on him and other Sudanese officials and entrepreneurs. Turkey extended an invitation to al-Bashir but refused to arrest and hand him over to the International Court of Justice (Keith, 2009; Amnesty, 2009).

Al-Burhan developed ties with Turkey for two reasons. One is similar to al-Bashir's; he wants to stay in power but does not want to challenge regional forces; keeping good relations with Ankara and the Gulf States will help him keep power at home (DailySabah, 2021; Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). This is due to that Sudan's security concerns go beyond its borders. Sudan has proxies that contribute to the country's internal difficulties. Sudan underwent a rapid international repositioning when al-Burhan was appointed head of the Sovereign Council. Over the course of a year, Qatari and Turkish clients in Khartoum lost all policy power. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gave al-Burhan and his Generals the financial resources they needed to reject popular aspirations for civilian rule, resulting in a skewed balance of power that allowed them to navigate severe political instability. As a result, the Generals were aided in solidifying their grip by the Emirates' covert monetary injections (Musa, 20/08/2021; Soufi, 08/8/2022).

The presence of Saudi and Emirati forces in Sudan reignited regional tensions between the two Gulf countries and the Qatar-Turkey axis (Bakir, 2002; Krieg, 2019; CRU, 2021 Report). Turkey has engaged and influenced the civilian opposition against Sudan's Transitional Military Council, led by al-Burhan and his military Junta. According to two Sudanese officials, tensions between Sudan and Turkey have resulted in the suspension of previous agreements reached by the al-Bashir administration with Turkey and the cessation of Qatar's foreign aid and investments in Sudan (Official. 8, 15/12/2020; Official. 9, 15/12/2020). Turkey's two-year boycott also economically impacted Sudan's new military regime since it decreased aid and investment (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

The fact that Turkey-backed al-Burhan's political opponents constituted a political and security issue for Sudan's new government. As a result, after more than two years of political estrangement between Ankara and Khartoum, al-Burhan visited Turkey in August 2021 (DailySabah, 2021; Arab Weekly, 2021) with the purpose of normalising relations with Turkey, which had been strained for more than two years. According to official Sudanese comments, Khartoum was eager to collaborate with Ankara (Rakipolu, 2021; Lons, 2021). The visit proved that the Sudanese transitional government, which had kept its distance from Turkey for some time after the coup, had realised it needed to broaden its foreign policy approach (Rakipolu, 2021).

The second reason is to mitigate Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood so that Turkey and Sudan may move forward with the framework accords previously signed by al-Bashir (Zain, 2022; Moubayed, 2020). For some years, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been discreetly battling with Qatar and Turkey over their

opposing regional perspectives. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been maintaining the status quo, but Doha and Istanbul have supported and boosted Islamist forces in the region, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. These ideological differences have caused a schism between the two axes (Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, 2020; Furlow, 2019; Abdelaziz, 2019; Reuters, 2019). As a result, the Saudis and UAE saw al-demise al-Bashir as a chance to eradicate the MB's influence in Sudan and weaken the Turkish-Qatari regional agenda. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sought influence with the new Sudanese leadership. They believe Turkey and Qatar have been boosting Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood, which they perceive as a threat to their survival (Mashino, 2021). In response to the growing influence of the Saudis and UAE in Sudan, Turkey backed the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (Bozkurt, 2019; Soufi, 08/8/2022; Off, 25/11/2021).

Turkey support of the Muslim Brother turned out to be a valuable bargaining chip for Turkey Al-Burhan sought positive relations with Turkey to limit Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood (Zain, 2022; Moubayed, 2020). Al-Burhan and his government recognised the importance of avoiding conflict with foreign countries, particularly Turkey, which holds enormous political, economic, and security influence in Sudan. Al-Burhan also aims to achieve a balance between Sudan's supporters and allies in order to maintain the country's good relations with the region. In other words, al-Burhan aims to achieve his objectives by putting two opposing factions against one another to obtain support from both sides (Official. 7, 09/10/2021; Official. 9, 15/12/2020).

The evidence presented has shown that Sudan's current relationship with Turkey is motivated by personal interests, whereas Somalia's relationship with Turkey is motivated by national interests. Both al-Bashir and al-Burhan developed relations with Turkey in order to maintain power and defeat political opponents. Somalia, on the other hand, is in a different situation. Since 1991, two of Somalia's most powerful clans have alternately ruled the country, one at a time. As opposition political elites argue that it is their turn to rule, Somalia's sitting leader needs help to maintain his position. Unlike Sudan, where the political system and administration are run by a single individual or a military elite, Somalia's leaders only serve for four to five years. Sudan, on the other hand, is an entirely different story. Sudanese leaders can stay in power for a long time. Revolutions and coups frequently depose Sudanese leaders. Every four years, Somalia holds indirect elections. Somalia has a federal parliamentary government. The members of Parliament and the president are chosen through indirect elections, a complex clan-based system that favours so-called majority clans and is prone to voting fraud (Waal, 2022).

Furthermore, the two SSA governments' enthusiasm for the Turkish relationship differs. According to Mogadishu's administration, Somalia benefits from Ankara's political presence in the country, which believes that Ankara's political involvement in Somalia has provided renewed impetus to efforts to achieve long-term peace (Abdulle, 2019; ICG, 2012). On the other hand, the current Sudanese administration is sceptical of Turkey's role in Sudan because Ankara supports both the Khartoum government and the Muslim Brotherhood (Moubayed, 2020) but believes that given its limited options, it has little choice but to maintain good relations with Turkey (Diplomat. 6, 16/07/2021; Diplomat 7, 18/07/2021

Most government officials contacted in Somalia believed that Somalia is an independent republic because of Turkey's political assistance. Before Turkey's connections, most foreign diplomatic missions and embassies were in Nairobi; no single country recognised Somalia's Transitional Government. Somalia's new friend, Ankara, has supported Somalia's security, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty since Mogadishu established relations with Ankara (20/10/2021). On the other hand, officials from the federal member states, however, it was believed that the central administration in Mogadishu benefited politically from its relations with Ankara, while other parts of the country did not (Official. 2, 13/01/2021; Minister. 1, 15/09/2021; Minister. 2, 12/01/2021). Such a suggestion calls into question the long-term viability of Turkey-Somalia relations. On the other hand, while most of the interviewed Khartoum officials reiterated the importance of the Turkey-Sudan political relationship, a significant number of interviewees claimed that, due to Sudan's political fragility, the current Khartoum administration developed its relations with Ankara to mitigate the possibility of a proxy war between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other (Hamza, 30/11/2021). Even though Somalia and Sudan share essential qualities, both countries established diplomatic relations with Turkey. For several reasons, Mogadishu and Khartoum have significant political ties with Turkey.

The research provided in chapters four and five shows that Somalia and Sudan have formed solid political ties with Turkey for various reasons. While Somalia and Sudan have many historical ties with Turkey, the two SSA countries' relationships with Ankara differ. The former formed links with Turkey in order to assist Somalia in rebuilding its

economy, political stability, and strong national army while defending its national sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. Sudan's relationship with Turkey is more personal than national or strategic. The majority of evidence reveals that Al-Bashir and al-Burhan's connections with Turkey were never in the best interests of the Sudanese people.

Given that both leaders established relationships with Turkey in order to receive political, economic, and military aid, their major goals and objectives for the relationship are similar. Al-Bashir wants strong connections with Ankara to relieve the economic and political difficulties brought on by the International Criminal Court's indictment. While al-Burhan built contacts with Ankara to counter Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey supported Sudan's domestic and international legitimacy. Al-Burhan also wished to keep Sudan's supporters and friends in power. For these analogous reasons, Khartoum's successive leaders accepted Turkey's engagement. Both countries have fundamental qualities in this regard, yet, their relationships with Turkey differ.

7.3. Chapter 6: Turkey's New Aid Model for Developed-LDC Relationships: A Comparison to Traditional West and Chinese Aid Models

In response to Question 2, Chapter 6 argues that, in contrast to the Western and Chinese aid models, the Turkish approach to involvement with LDCs constitutes a new paradigm in developed-LDC relations. This chapter explains how Turkey's aid model is consistent across all of its engagements. It investigates the methods employed by

Turkey for development, particularly in Somalia and Sudan. This encompasses various aspects such as trade, investments, political and security assistance, humanitarian relief efforts, and collaborative development projects. It begins with a conceptual framework for comparing preexisting foreign aid strategies by outlining the broad strokes and critical components of international assistance. It provides an in-depth breakdown of the Western and Chinese aid models. This chapter concludes with a comparison of Turkey's aid model to Western and Chinese foreign aid approaches. It presents fresh insight into how the aid paradigm employed by Turkey's new strategic engagement with Africa varies from that of Africa's traditional allies. I found that China and the West have different philosophies of aid. According to Habyaremye and Ouzlu (2016), China's economic model has disrupted the "traditional framework" of Western commercial ties to Africa. Import-export commerce is central to the Chinese trading paradigm. China prioritises Sub-Saharan Africa due to the continent's enormous economic growth and development potential (Lyman, 2012).

This tactic benefited China, which plunders natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa while simultaneously supporting autocratic and corrupt regimes there. It resulted in poor policy choices regarding political openness and human rights in Africa (Naim, 2007; Hitchens, 2007; Brautigam, 2010). China's environmental impact on its SSA partners has been enormous over the past three decades (Shint, 2011). As a result of China's model, the "traditional structure" of Western business links with Africa was also disrupted (Habyaremye and Ouzlu, 2016). Western "trade partners" in Africa were concerned about China's continent-wide economic expansion (Yu Zheng, 2016). On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom are known for their conditionality and selectivity economic and development aid model (Burnside and

Dollar, 2000). The West's assistance is predicated on African nations sustaining the democratic reforms they have recently enacted (Li, 2017). From a Western perspective, foreign aid can help recipient nations enhance their democratic institutions and good governance agendas (Stone, 2008; Stokke, 2013).

In contrast, China has constructed a vast empire over the past three decades through diplomacy and debt (Mar, 2020). China's new policy is to lend billions to developing nations, primarily in Africa, for infrastructure development. Commonly, a country's economic infrastructure must be surrendered if the borrowing country defaults on its loan payments (Mar 2020). In contrast, Western aid and credit sources require some guarantee that their funds will be used effectively (Wade, 2002). From the perspective of the West, the conditionality of aid and loans functions most effectively in nations with good governance, high levels of openness, and low levels of corruption (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Wade, 2002). Nonetheless, because Africa has its own goals, China has challenged the conditionality model of Western aid. China's ascent and innovative approach to international engagement has shaken the Western model of aid effectiveness (Li, 2017).

The comparison between Western and Chinese aid programmes reveals multiple implications. Both China and the West have utilised international aid and government funds to further their geopolitical and economic goals. Both donor nations have also employed foreign aid as a means to exert influence on recipient countries. First, China and the West initiated their foreign aid programmes during periods of economic expansion within their own countries. The restrictions on recipient nations have helped them expand their markets and amass wealth. Second, while the West has

unambiguously articulated its assistance programmes, Beijing still needs to institutionalise its foreign aid bureaucracy and structure its taxonomy of official development aid plans to match that of other OECD donor governments. Third, Chinese and American perspectives on the legitimacy of aid disagree. Beijing emphasises South-South cooperation, unconditional benevolence, and a state-centred development model, whereas Western focuses on its interventionist aid on market economies, democratic governance, and human rights. Their aid recipients embody the following diverse legitimation discourses: Both state and non-state actors receive Western help, but Beijing prioritises state actors (Regilme and Hodzi, 2021).

On the other hand, the Turkish approach to international aid is different than the traditional aid models. Although Turkey and traditional SSA partners share some parallels in aid, trade, and investment (Hausmann, 2014; Davutolu, 2010a; Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Ipek, 2014), Turkey's engagement model is not as well-defined as the Chinese and Western models. There are disparities between the Chinese and Western approaches to aid. However, new foreign entities in the region, such as Turkey, have sought ways to make use of Africa's growing market.

Unlike traditional SSA partners, Turkey's concept is an all-inclusive package. For instance, Turkey's involvement in sub-Saharan Africa is not limited to delivering foreign aid; it is more comprehensive. While its primary focus is humanitarian assistance, it also tries to assist SSA states with state building, military assistance, trade, and investment (Demirci and Mehmet, 2018; Özkan, 2014; Cannon, 2021; Donelli, 2021). Turkey gives political support to its SSA allies on the international stage.

It provides training to the SSA's departments of police, military, coast guard, and intelligence (Abdulmaarouf, 2018; Shay, 2018). It also provides arms for defence for SSA countries (Mashamoun, 2022; Winsor, 2015). Its public and private corporations interface with the SSA business communities. Turkey is investing in port infrastructure, airports, highways, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, and minerals (UNSC Report, 2011; ECOS, 2006). It focuses primarily on education as a tool of cultural diplomacy (Afak, 2018). Ankara is also using an interventionist approach to promoting peace, reconciliation, and mediation inside SSA. The SSA nations are impressed by the model and strategy of Ankara's foreign development. Turkey demonstrates a strong commitment when interacting with its SSA partners. Unlike SSA's traditional allies, Turkey's President, accompanied by senior cabinet members, enterprises, and the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA), pledged humanitarian aid first (Gelle, 2017, Minister Remarks, reported in Sözcü; Official. 3, 30/10/2021). While Turkey is busy establishing security infrastructure and economic links in Africa, it also provides foreign aid and humanitarian support to some of the continent's poor states, such as Somalia and Sudan, with which it shares some religious, historical, and cultural traits (Wheeler, 2011).

Furthermore, along with providing humanitarian relief to SSA countries, Turkey also took the chance of sending its state- and privately-owned businesses there ahead of other nations in order to trade and invest. For instance, foreign direct investment in Somalia and Sudan was at its lowest point when Turkey initiated trade and business investments in these nations. Somalia was in chaos and a no-go zone, while the United

States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Sudan (Özkan & Orakci, 2015; Louise, et al. 2019; Holmes, 1993). Turkey took the risk of investing and doing business in SSA. Several government officials from both nations reaffirmed Turkey's commitment and excellent partnership in terms of business investment and security support (Official. 2. 13/01/2021; Official. 3. 30/10/2021; Musa, 20/08/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020).

To capitalise on the continent's developing consumer market, Turkey has begun to introduce its businesses to Sub-Saharan Africa, as have many other multinational businesses in the region (Yu Zheng, 2016). Turkey exploits the region's growing Muslim population and weak governance to bolster its economic, foreign policy, and security strategy (Özkan, 2010; Shinn, 2015). Initially, it established and strengthened diplomatic ties with SSA states (Özkan, 2010). The nation increased its security presence in the region and constructed one of the continent's largest military bases, frightening its long-standing alliance partners (Wheeler, 2011; Kasapoglu, 2017). In addition to China and Western nations, Turkey extends to Africa as part of its development cooperation with the continent. It is a soft power hand of economic aid and development cooperation initiatives of investment and commerce (Shay, 2018). Recently, Turkey signed a series of FTAs with SSA nations, including Senegal and Ethiopia. Turkey establish itself as a trusted nation by fostering confidence between African countries (CRU Policy Report, 2019). For example, Turkey's new strategic engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa is now regarded as a full partner in political, security, and economic affairs (Özkan, 2010).

Earning SSA's trust and being a strategic partner is difficult. Africa's new partners must provide aid to cultivate positive relations with the continent. Like other traditional African allies, Turkey employed assistance as a soft power (Barder, 2009; Haslam, 2012; Daily Sabah, 2018). In a few years, Sub-Saharan Africa surpassed North Africa as Turkey's most important trading partner (Daily Sabah, 2014). After observing Africa's willingness to expand its economic and natural resource potential, Turkey is prepared to continue its engagement with the continent (Turkes and Getachew, 2014).

Due to widespread perceptions of starvation, disease, civil warfare, corruption, poverty, and greed, western powers maintained their patronising attitude toward emerging nations (Poncian, 2015). The shift in perception of Africa as a centre of disease, economic stagnation, waste, and conflict is the "greatest obstacle that discreetly impedes the geometric expansion of trade. From Turkey's perspective, this stereotype results from neocolonial propaganda employed by Western media to dissuade investment from Africa (Enwere and Yelmise, 2014; Bilgic and Nascimento, 2014). As stated by the Vice-Chairman of Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), in contrast to the constant negative Western view of Africa, Turkey "does not view Africa as a combat zone, but rather as a region to whom humanity owes a great debt" (Daily Sabah, 2014). In the eyes of Turkey, Africa is not an underdeveloped and corrupt continent but rather a land of unrealised potential and untapped natural resources. The performance of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation and Yapi Merkezi in Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania demonstrates the efficacy of Turkey's policy in SSA (Anadolu Agency, 2014).

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the central tenets of Turkey's African policy are to defend the legitimate rights and interests of Southern and Eastern Africa (SSA) in bilateral and multilateral talks and to become the voice of Africa, to uphold and support the African principle of "African solutions for African problems" in accordance with the policy of the African Union, and to participate in disputes and peaceful settlements of Africa when requested (MFA, 2015).

In addition, Turkey's current soft power instrument, development, and humanitarian aid programmes are the soft hand that supports Turkey's strategic engagement of expanding security and economic ties with African nations (Dost-Niyego, 2018). This perspective was inspired by SSA's proximity to Turkey and its rapid economic growth. Turkey turned its attention away from its traditional regional partners in the Middle East and toward sub-Saharan Africa, where a substantial Muslim population resides (Shinn, 2015). Self-created was Turkey's perception of bilateral relations with SSA nations. As seen by its recent acts, the consensus among SSA countries is that Turkey is addressing Africa in a novel manner. Turkey's objective is to advance Africa at the expense of the continent's traditional allies and former colonial rulers (Yildirim, 2016; Nazli, 2016). The "appropriate conceptualisation" of the new Turkey-SSA links is crucial to the narrative of the new AKP engagement policy. Turkey's official position toward SSA nations is one of mutual cultural appreciation. In other words, Turkey is interested in free commerce while respecting each African nation's freedom to make its own political and cultural judgements (Yildirim, 2016).

Turkey, missing from Africa's economic and geopolitical scene for decades, acknowledged the region's unique significance. The capital of Turkey, Ankara, has

hosted various summits to boost cooperation between Africa and Turkey (Kaya and Warner, 2012). Turkey is striving to reinvent itself as a rising economic power to strengthen its impact on the international stage. For this reason, Turkey views Africa as a cornerstone of its global system in the twenty-first century (Muluneh, 2018). In addition to its economic woes, Turkey is attempting to establish new techniques for peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly among the weak Muslim-majority nations (Kaya and Warner, 2012; Daniels, 2012; Kagwanja, 2013). However, most African nations do not see Turkey as a colonial power. The growing Turkish presence in Africa has been met across the continent with minimal scepticism. They started to show pleasure in Turkey's new economic and security relationship. As a neutral partner and friend to the United States and China, Africa will profit from Turkey's favourable reputation (Cagaptay and Yuksel, 2019).

Addressing question 3, the political, economic, and security benefits of Turkey-SSA relations have been thoroughly analysed over the preceding chapters. There are two fundamental reasons why I think the relationship between Turkey and SSA is likely to continue. First, At the outset, the partnership has been beneficial for both Turkey and SSA. Turkey, a growing economy, is working to establish a new reputation that would help it establish itself as a major player in international affairs. Turkey considers SSA a vital entry point for its global order in the twenty-first century (Muluneh, 2018).

Ankara desires to strengthen its political, economic, security, and social ties with Somalia, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and the rest of the African continent (Bingol, 2013; Srada, 2016). In other words, Turkey saw an opportunity to capitalise on what it perceives as a developing multi-polar world order, enabling it as a regional power to

demonstrate its strategic importance and flex its muscles (Donelli, 2021). Furthermore, the quick economic rise of SSA and the significance of its geographical proximity altered the perception of Turkey. Turkey established and strengthened diplomatic channels with SSA nations (Özkan, 2010). It boosted its regional security presence and built one of Africa's largest military bases, which alarmed the continent's traditional allies (Wheeler, 2011; Kasapoglu, 2017). With Africa, Turkey extends its soft power through economic aid and development partnerships through investment and commerce (Shay, 2018).

Turkey began engaging Sub-Saharan Africa with its own strategy in order to capitalise on Africa's expanding new economic market (Yu Zheng, 2016). The primary objective of this relationship for Turkey is to attract new commercial and security partners in Africa (Kaya and Warner, 2012). Turkey recently negotiated several free trade agreements with the SSA. However, unlike relationships between other powerful countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey's ties to the region rely not only on aid, education, and trade but also on the region's expanding political economic and security importance.

In contrast, Somalia and Sudan benefited Turkey's political, economic, and security relations. Ankara provides economic support to these fragile nations. Turkey's private companies are investing heavily in the infrastructure of the two Sub-Saharan countries, including their ports, roads, agriculture, and airports. In addition to its economic trials, Turkey attempts to develop new conflict resolution methods for Africa, particularly in SSA Muslim-populated countries (Kaya and Warner; Daniels, 2012; Kagwanja, 2013). In addition, Turkey provides assistance to SSA's security sector.

Even though Turkey's cooperation with Somalia was initially framed as a humanitarian mission, it was intended as a long-term strategic engagement in the Horn of Africa region (Ahmed, 2021). Turkey was aware of Somalia's geopolitical significance and economic and security possibilities (Özkan, 2014). Ankara financed peace and state-building initiatives in Somalia (Aknipar, 2013). Turkey has backed the Mogadishu government of Somalia and advocated for its stability, reconciliation, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). In a presentation to the UN General Assembly in September 2011, Turkey emphasised Somalia's insecurity and starvation and asked international assistance for the Somali people and government.

Moreover, the people of Somalia, particularly those in Mogadishu, view Turkey as a friend and ally that provides support and partnership due to its timely assistance (Official. 2, 13/01/2021). Turkey established strong connections with Somalia, which had endured decades of economic, political, and social problems due to its swift response to hunger and its common faith, Islam, history, and cultural links (Abdulle, 2019). In the instance of Sudan, Turkey formed its new strategic partnership with Sudan after the AK Party came to power, despite the fact that contacts between Turkey and Sudan have existed for a long time. The Sudanese government praised the strategic partnership between Turkey and Sudan and viewed Turkey as a friend and brother who came to Sudan's aid when Western nations imposed additional sanctions (Rakipolu, 2021; Anadolu Agency, 2017; Soufi, 08/8/2022). Turkey's cooperation agreements, humanitarian assistance, and bilateral development initiatives with Sudan illustrate how crucial Ankara considers Khartoum's new strategic involvement to Turkish goals in SSA (Turkish MFA, 2018). Since 2006, Ankara and Khartoum have

maintained contact in numerous spheres. Due to the continuous conflict in Sudan, which has resulted in the aforementioned political, economic, and security fragility, Turkey has provided substantial political support to Sudan. During their 2017 summit in Khartoum, the two heads of state decided to cooperate in politics, economy, and security. Several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were signed between the two nations, including agreements on military cooperation, renewable energy, economic and fiscal cooperation, and the implementation protocol of cash assistance and cooperation protocols between the foreign ministries of Turkey and Sudan (DailySabah, 2021).

In addition, neither Somalia nor Sudan view Turkey as a colonial power. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are not sceptical of Turkey's increasing presence on the continent. They began to welcome the new economic and security cooperation with Turkey. They view Turkey as an impartial partner (Cagaptay and Yuksel, 2019). Due to SSA's political, economic, and security issues and the absence of a credible alternative to Turkish support, the connection between Turkey and SSA will likely continue. Nonetheless, the thesis also considers potential obstacles to the partnership, especially the disadvantages of SSA's weak governmental systems and fragmented clan politics. The Federal Member opposes Ankara-Mogadishu relations (MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021; Hussein, 12/10/2021), even though the central government of Mogadishu has built excellent relations with Turkey (MP. 2, 10/08/2021; MP. 3, 13/08/2021; Hussein, 12/10/2021). Because these FMS feel that Turkey only supports and invests in Mogadishu and the central authority, and not Somalia as a country, relations are solely between the predominant clans of Mogadishu and Turkey and not Somalia-Turkey relations. On the other hand, Somalia is a fragile nation, and

external actors contribute to its political fragmentation and insecurity by engaging in rivalries via Somali proxies (Menkhaus, 2021). This is especially true with regard to the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and the newly-formed Federal Member States, as well as their involvement with the numerous foreign organisations functioning within the Somali setting (notably AMISOM, United States Africa Command, Kenya, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Gulf states). The clan-based competition for resources, especially in rural areas, is another leading cause of insecurity in the Somali context (European Asylum Support Office Report, 2021). Despite the potential challenges that these problems may pose to the ongoing positive relations between Somalia and Turkey, the absence of an alternative ally capable of providing support to Somalia in both security and political domains serves to solidify the bilateral relations between the two nations.

On the other hand, Sudan encounters analogous domestic political challenges, alongside the presence of intermediaries involved proxies in the rivalry between Turkey and the Gulf States. The regime led by al-Burhan has attempted to maintain a delicate balance amidst regional rivalries in order to retain power. Despite this, given Sudan's dependence on Turkey and the absence of viable alternatives, it is evident that the strong relations between Sudan and Turkey will likely persist. Ankara continues to be an important ally for Khartoum, ensuring the continuation of their positive bilateral ties. Acknowledging that all of these disadvantages have the potential to impede future Turkey-SSA cooperation. Based on the empirical data analyzed in this thesis, it can be inferred that the Turkey-SSA partnership is likely to continue, given the mutual benefits that both parties stand to derive from their continued collaboration.

7.4. Empirical Contribution

This thesis contributes substantially to the study of Turkey-SSA relations by focusing on the mutual benefit from the SSA perspective, Turkey's foreign aid model, and the sustainability of Turkey-SSA relations. Previous studies on Turkey-SSA relations have predominantly centered on the strategic importance of these relationships from Turkey's point of view (Gunay, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Cannon, 2016; Eyryce, 2017; Shinn, 2015). For instance, the literature on Turkish strategic engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa concentrates mainly on the economic and security benefits of Turkey's new engagement with SSA countries (Shinn, David, 2015; Eyryce, Elem, 2017; Cannon and Donelli, 2019; Cannon, 2021). Existing literature failed to elucidate the areas SSA countries gained from this partnership or why they opted to collaborate with Turkey. The research focuses on Turkey's successive cultural exchanges, diplomacy, economic connections, foreign aid, and investments in Sub-Saharan Africa within the context of the broader academic area of Turkey/SSA relations. It failed to comment on the reciprocal benefits of the relationship between Turkey and SSA.

Before this thesis, we had a one-sided approach focused on Turkey's interests while ignoring those of SSA parties. This is one of the reasons why this study examines the perspective of the SSA and why it is significant. There are a variety of alternative responses to this question. On the one hand, these countries (SSA) have their own autonomy, and we must comprehend why they are buying into this partnership. Fundamentally, it is only possible to predict how the relationship will grow by knowing what the SSA parties hope to achieve. On the other hand, we must comprehend the foreign policy decisions of the SSA nations and what they seek to gain from this

interaction if we are to depart from the analysis in the literature review that views SSA countries as passive targets of Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, this research aims to reestablish their autonomy and foreign policy in the analysis.

The literature analysis revealed, however, that the paradigm of Turkey's new participation in SSA was insufficient, as demonstrated by the existing research. The scholarly studies do not consider Turkey's peculiarity relative to other regional actors in Sub-Saharan Africa. Emerging foreign actors in the region, such as Turkey, have begun to develop their own models to capitalise on Africa's expanding market. To be discussed, however, is, if and how the new strategic engagement of Turkey differs from that of Africa's traditional partners. As Liu and Tang (2017) remarked, China is the largest Western rival. Previous research indicates that China's South-South Cooperation Framework gives unconditional aid to Sub-Saharan Africa by demonstrating a mutually beneficial strategy to trade and investment with its partners.

In contrast, Burnside and Dollar (2016) observed that western countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, are well-known for their conditional and selective development cooperation. However, it remains unclear whether Turkey is advancing an alternative paradigm of aid relations (Hausmann, 2014; Tepecikliolu, 2018). The previous scholarship fails to examine how SSA countries see Turkey's novel approach. Existing literature reflects Turkey's current emphasis on the continent, which is to provide aid, build embassies, and construct military facilities in pursuit of economic opportunities. What we lack here is the engagement paradigm for offering and creating relationships. The aforementioned academic studies do not address the subject of Turkey's uniqueness in comparison to other regional actors in Sub-Saharan

Africa when it comes aid. This dissertation examines which model of engagement Turkey employs with the SSA, if this model differs from the existing Western and Chinese models, and whether this distinction is significant for the SSA nations. In addition, the literature focuses insufficiently on how long this method (Turkey/SSA ties) is likely to be sustainable, considering the challenges faced by both SSA countries and Turkey. Existing scholarship has ignored all of these obstacles, as well as the question of how long Turkey can continue to provide humanitarian relief, military help, and invest in education and cultural concerns to prolong Africa's cooperation. In the literature, we see economic and political difficulties in SSA. There is a gap in the literature on the length of time Turkey can survive these obstacles of political fragmentation and proxies in order to maintain its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis attempts to answer how SSA nations see Turkey's development assistance compared to other conventional partners. Answering these issues will enable us to comprehend the nature, model, and long-term viability of Turkey's ties, strategy, and goals in SSA.

I have argued that, on the one hand, Somalia and Sudan formed substantial diplomatic relations with Turkey due to their political, economic, and security instability. As indicated in chapters 4 and 5, Somalia and Sudan are two of the poorest states in Sub-Saharan Africa due to continuous civil conflicts, political instability, economic difficulties, security challenges, foreign interference, and frequent famine (Bradburry and Heally, 2020; Yusuf, 12/03/2021). Similarly, as evidenced by both primary sources and existing scholarship, Somalia and Sudan remain two of Turkey's "most important allies" in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) due to their extensive historical, spiritual, and cultural ties (MFA, 2018). Turkey received the largest share of commercial and

investment concessions in Somalia and Sudan. Somalia and Sudan embraced Turkish investment in their ports and airports. Schools and hospitals are among the other large direct investments made by Turkey in Somalia and Sudan. I also explained the distinction between Somalia and Sudan.

In making this argument, as I have shown in chapter 4 and chapter 5, I have made four broad contributions of why Somalia established relations with Turkey in chapter 4. First, I found that Turkey's anti-colonial history and cultural affinities, including its strong religious identity, have emerged as integral aspects of Turkey's soft power strategy, potentially serving to legitimize and strengthen its relations with Somalia. Turkey's historical resistance against colonialism resonates with Somalia, a nation that has experienced its fair share of colonial domination and struggles for independence. By drawing on this shared anti-colonial narrative, Turkey established a sense of solidarity and common purpose with Somalia, bolstering its soft power influence. Additionally, Turkey's religious affinities, particularly its commitment to Islam, resonate strongly with the predominantly Muslim population of Somalia. By emphasizing its religious identity and positioning itself as a champion of Islamic causes, Turkey forged deeper cultural and religious connections with Somalia, further enhancing its soft power and legitimizing its relationship with the country.

Second, political/diplomatic benefits account for Somalia's acceptance of Turkey's involvement. The federal administration of Somalia believes that its relations with Turkey have the potential to deliver political and diplomatic dividends. Somalia's leadership recognises that with Turkey's political and diplomatic support, the country may return to the world stage (Ahmed, 2021; MFA, 2011; Özkan, 2014; Siradag, 2015).

The Mogadishu political elite is certain that Turkey will back the central government and refrain from intervening in Somalia's internal turmoil and proxy war. The Mogadishu government also recognises that Turkey will defend Somalia's unity, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and political and security independence. Somalia aspires to enhance relations with Turkey since Ankara supports the central authority and has no intention of becoming engaged in the country's proxy war and internal conflict (Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Dahir and Ali, 2021).

Third, Turkey pledged to rebuild a strong Somali army. Somalia required a larger ally to aid in the national army and political reconciliation efforts. Turkey is committed to building the Somali National Army, defeating Al-Shabaab, and establishing lasting peace and political stability to bolster the national protection of Somali citizens and the national defence mechanisms (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Stearns and SucuoGlu, 2017).

Fourth, Relations between the governments of Turkey and Somalia extend beyond development and humanitarian aid. Turkey can assist Somalia in reestablishing its economic and political stability. Trade and investment are other essential components of Turkey and Somalia's relations. The connection opened up new trade and investment opportunities for the private sector and businesses (Diplomat. 1, 13/12/2021; Siradag, 2015).

In the case of Sudan, in chapter 5, I found that Khartoum's succeeding leadership maintained ties with Turkey to retain its continuous rule and consolidate power. Although al-Bashir and al-Burhan formed links with Turkey to seek similar political, economic, and military aid as Somalia, their essential goals and motives for the relationship are distinct. Al-Bashir intended to enhance ties with Ankara to confront

two formidable challenges. First, to alleviate the economic and political strain imposed by sanctions, in other words, have the potential to maintain him in power. Second, al-Bashir established ties with Turkey in an effort to evade extradition to the International Criminal Court. As a result of the battles in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile, the top prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in Darfur on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide (Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020,; ICC, 2019).

On the other hand, al-Burhan aimed to restrict regional pressures and deal with all adversaries. Despite this, al-Burhan forged ties with Turkey for two reasons. One strategy is similar to that of al-Bashir. He wants to remain in power, but unlike al-Bashir, he does not want to oppose some of the competing regional forces. He believes that maintaining positive relations with Ankara and the Gulf States will support him in retaining power at home (DailySabah, 2021; official, 13/11/2021; Ma'ruf, 15/12/2020). The second aim is to minimize Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood so that al-Bashir's agreements between Turkey and Sudan can continue (Zain, 2022; Moubayed, 2020). It is worth noting that Somalia and Sudan welcomed Turkey's new strategic engagements for different reasons. The latter was driven by the need for its leaders to maintain their grip on power. In Sudan, leaders can extend their rule for as long as they can hold onto power, as only a coup d'état, rather than elections, is the means by which presidents are removed from office. This often occurs during times of economic hardship, such as high unemployment and food price inflation. Hence, forging ties with Turkey becomes crucial for Sudanese presidents, as having an ally like Turkey can provide support and assistance in maintaining their positions. Conversely, Somalia follows a different trajectory. It holds indirect elections every four

years, and since 1991, elected leaders have served only a single term. The power transition in Somalia largely revolves around two major tribes, with a gentlemen's agreement that if one clan is elected, the other clan will expect to assume power in the subsequent term. Therefore, Somalia's narrative is predominantly driven by the national interests shaped by its nationalistic political clan system, while Sudan's engagement with Turkey tends to revolve around the personal interests of its leaders.

In response to question 2, Chapter 6 demonstrates that, in contrast to Western and Chinese aid programmes, the Turkish approach to engagement with LDCs represents a new paradigm in developed-LDC relations. This chapter sheds light on the consistency of the Turkish aid strategy throughout all of Turkey's engagements. As a newly emerging state, Turkey has sought to enhance its global influence by engaging underdeveloped, neglected Sub-Saharan African nations with which it has historical and cultural ties. In other words, Turkey's approach to engaging with underdeveloped Sub-Saharan African nations represents a new paradigm in developed-LDC relations, distinct from Western and Chinese aid models. Turkey's engagement model goes beyond traditional humanitarian and development assistance, emphasising the leverage of historical and cultural ties with the region. The narrative of anti-colonialism and the heritage of the Ottoman Empire form the foundation for Turkey's strong connections with SSA governments, which share deep historical and cultural bonds. Additionally, Turkey's religious affiliation, particularly with predominantly Muslim African countries, serves as a component of its soft power in providing aid (Harte, 2012).

Moreover, Turkey's engagement in SSA encompasses various aspects. It aims to assist SSA nations in state building, military aid, trade, and investment, demonstrating a comprehensive and all-inclusive approach (Demirci and Mehmet, 2018; Özkan, 2014; Cannon, 2021; Donelli, 2021). Turkey offers political support and training to SSA's security forces, supplies military equipment, and engages with the business community through its state-owned and private companies (Abdulmaarouf, 2018; Shay, 2018; Mashamoun, 2022; Winsor, 2015). Furthermore, Turkey invests in various sectors, including infrastructure, agriculture, and natural resources, while prioritising education as a tool for cultural diplomacy (UNSC Report, 2011; ECOS, 2006; Şafak, 2018). Ankara's interventionist approach contributes to peace, reconciliation, and mediation within SSA, earning admiration from SSA nations. Turkey's dedication to its SSA partners is apparent in its provision of not just humanitarian relief but also substantial business initiatives, political backing, and military assistance (Gelle, 2017; Minister Remarks, cited in Sözcü; Official. 1, 13/01/2021; Diplomat. 3, 24/11/2022; Official. 5, 18/04/2021).

7.5. Limitations and Future Research

It is important to recognize several limitations of this thesis. The COVID-19 pandemic and its ensuing repercussions imposed significant practical constraints on the thesis, notably with respect to some key participants, who are all government officials; sadly, two of them passed away as a result of COVID-19, and three of them were suffering from severe symptoms, which prevented them from participating in the research.

I also attempted to travel to countries like Turkey to see some government officials who would like to meet them in person, all from SSA. However, travelling became

impossible, so I could not get the planned number of participants in time for my thesis. As a result, there are significant constraints due to the small sample size and the necessity of going online. However, the majority of the other crucial individuals were able to take part in the study, and their contributions enriched the final results. The 55 people who participated, mainly via Skype, met the bare minimum for gaining insight. However, more useful information might have been gained if the targeted number of participants had taken place in person. This was all owing to the pandemic.

Although George and Bennet (2005) note the limits of structured, focused comparison methods, such as the relative incapacity to determine the frequency or representativeness of specific examples and the limited capacity to estimate the average "casual effect" of variables for a sample (George and Bennet, 2005, p. 22). However, my primary sources also have their limits. For example, I omitted military-related topics from my interview form. Because I recognise that military issues are possibly sensitive, respondents may be unwilling to address most of its components. However, several of those I questioned through Skype disclosed vital security information.

Nonetheless, I analysed the majority of the information about Turkey's military establishment (military Bases in Somalia and Sudan) from the existing primary and secondary data sources to extract and draw a thoughtful conclusion from the available empirical material/factual narrative. For example, first-hand evidence, newspapers, scholarly studies, published government documents, policy briefs, politicians' statements made in the news or during speeches, etc. The majority of available data is derived from secondary sources, which may have biases due to varying human

interpretations. Scarce are the primary papers about Turkey's security contacts with SSA.

Additionally, my career, cultural experiences, and biases should be viewed as both an advantage and a limitation. As a diplomat and Somali national examining SSA ties with Turkey, my own life experience is advantageous, yet my perspectives and biases may limit the scope of the thesis. Another researcher may have analysed the thesis data in a different manner, yielding results that are more objective than mine. It is understood, however, that this constraint can only be addressed partially, as research can never be completely impartial.

Some suggestions for additional investigation have emerged in light of these restrictions and the broader thesis findings. The thesis recognises the fundamental data gaps in understanding the security interaction between Turkey and SSA. The results of this research project demonstrate that Turkey has established a sizable military presence in Somalia and is dedicated to forming the Somali National Army, making it the only external actor to do so. In the meantime, Turkey and Sudan inked a series of bilateral agreements to expand their military cooperation and build a docking facility in Suakin that would be open to both military and civilian vessels (Aksoy, 2021). In 2021, Turkey and Ethiopia inked a military cooperation agreement (Kenez, 2022). An accord on military cooperation with Libya in 2022 is also secured (Belmonte, 2022).

Therefore, it is suggested that future studies look into similar instances of military cooperation between Turkey and other SSA nations. This work will expand upon the

findings of the thesis and lead to the development of new insights. The thesis concludes by recommending that alternative techniques like the one used here be incorporated into future studies of Turkey-SSA. Many of the current Turkey-SSA approaches use a qualitative approach. To look into Turkey-SSA ties from a new angle, a quantitative technique may provide the examination of enormous text-based databases.

Bibliography

Primary Source

Interviews:

Abdirzack, M. Virtual Interview, Businessman and Former High Rank Government Official, 5 December, 2021.

Ahmed, A. Virtual Interview , Political Commentator, and a Businessman, 9 December 2021.

Ahmed, Y. Virtual Interview, Businessman and Former MP, 21 December 2021.

Ali, S. Virtual Interview, Businessman and activist on democratic rule, 15 March 2021.

Ambassador (1) Virtual Interview, 15 January 2021.

Ambassador (2) Virtual Interview, 14 February 2021.

Ambassador (3) Virtual Interview, 15 February 2021.

Ambassador (4) Virtual Interview, 4 January 2020.

Ambassador (5), Virtual Interview, 1 December 2021.

Ambassador (6), Virtual Interview, 18 November 2021.

Businessman (1) Personal Interview, Former Government Official, now Contractor and Turkish Business Affiliate, 13 November 2021. Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Businessman (2) Personal Interview, Former Government Official, 15 November 2021. Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Diplomat (1) Virtual Interview, Chief Political and Economic Counselor, 13 December 2021.

Diplomat (2) Virtual Interview, Commercial Attaché, 17 November 2022.

Diplomat (3) Virtual Interview, Military Attaché, 24 November 2022.

Diplomat (4) Virtual Interview, First Secretary, 19 December 2021

Diplomat (5) Virtual Interview, Military Attaché, 11 September 2021.

Diplomat (6) Virtual Interview, First Secretary, 16 July 2021.

Diplomat (7) Virtual Interview, Second Secretary, 18 July 2021.

Farah, A. Virtual Interview, Government Official, 1 September 2021.

Hamza, R. Virtual Interview, Government Official, 30 November 2021.

Harun, A. Virtual Interview, Former High Rank Government Official, 12 December, 2021.

Hassan, Virtual Interview, Former Puntland Minister, 15 March 2021.

Hussein, M. Virtual Interview, Academic and Former Minister, 12 October 2021.

Ma'ruf, A. Virtual Interview, Government Official, 15 December 2020.

Journalist (1), Virtual Interview, Freelancer and Former Government Official, 15 August 2021.

Minister (1), Virtual Interview, Federal Government Minister, 15 September 2021.

Minister (2), Virtual Interview, Federal Government Minister, 12 January 2021.

Minister (3), Virtual Interview, Federal Government Minister, 15 January 2021.

Minister (4), Virtual Interview, Puntland Government Official, 4 January 2021.

Minister (5), Virtual Interview, Jubaland Government Official, 9 January 2021.

MP (1) Virtual Interview, Member of Parliament and Former Minister, 12 November 2021.

MP (2) Virtual Interview, Member of Puntland Parliament and Former Somalia Minister, 10 August 2021

MP (3) Virtual Interview, Member of Puntland Parliament and Former Somalia Minister, 13 August 2021.

Musa, Hassan, Personal Interview, East Africa Commentator, 20 August 2021, Taipei, Taiwan.

Muse, O. Virtual Interview, Government Official, 16 July 2021.

Mustafa, A. Virtual Interview, Businessman and Human Rights Activist and supporter of democratic rule in Sudan, 14 March 2021.

Official (1), Virtual Interview, Government Official, 13 January 2021.

Official (2), Virtual Interview, Government Official, 13 January 2021.

Official (3), Virtual Interview, Government Official, 30 October 2021.

Official (4) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 17 October 2021.

Official (5) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 18 April 2021.

Official (6) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 25 February 2021.

Official (7) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 9 October 2021.

Official (8) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 15 December 2020.

Official (9) Virtual Interview, High Rank Government Official, 15 December 2020.

Professor (1) Virtual Interview, Former Government Official, 12 November 2021, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Professor (2) Virtual Interview, Former MP, Federal Government, 16 November 2021.

Representative (1) Virtual Interview, Government Official, 12 May 2021.

Representative (2) Virtual Interview, Government Minister, November 28, 2021.

Representative (3), Virtual Interview, Government Official, 23 October 2021.

Representative (4) Virtual Interview, Government Official, 16 June 2022.

Researcher (1) Virtual Interview, Senior Economic and Security Advisor 13 February 2021.

Researcher (2) Virtual Interview, Senior Policy Advisor, 13 February 2021.

Soufi, A. Virtual Interview, Government Official, 08 August 2022.

UN Official (1), Virtual Interview, United Nations Security Official, 12 November 2021.
Nairobi, Kenya.

Warsame, Virtual Interview, Writer and Political Analyst, also Former Government Officer, 12 November 2021.

Books:

Donelli, F. (2021, April 8). *Turkey in Africa: Turkey's Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Elem Eyryce Tepeciklioğlu and Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu (2021). *Turkey in Africa. A new emerging power?* Routledge.

Falkowski, L. S. (1980, August 30). *Psychological Models in International Politics*.
<https://doi.org/10.1604/9780891583776>.

He, W. (2010) China's Aid to Africa: Views on Chinese Aid and Trade in Africa. In J. S. Sörensen, ed. *Challenging the Aid Paradigm: Western Currents and Asian Alternatives* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Justus Strandes, James Spedding Kirkman and Jean Faraday Wallwork (1989). *The Portuguese period in East Africa*. Nairobi: Kenyan Literature Bureau.

Kösebalaban, H. (2011, July 12). *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*.

Lauren, P. G. (1979, October 1). *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*. Free Press.

Lewis, I. M. (2019, May 20). *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Revised, Updated, and Expanded Edition*. Routledge.

Luc Cambrézy, Véronique Lassailly-Jacob, Paris and Développement, L. (2001). *Populations réfugiées : de l'exil au retour*. Paris: Éd. De L'ird, Institut De Recherche Pour Le Développement.

Luling, V. (2002). *Somali Sultanate : the Geledi city-state over 150 years*. London: Haan ; Piscataway, N.J.

Poluha, E., & Rosendahl, M. (Eds.). (2012, October 12). *Contesting "Good" Governance: Crosscultural Perspectives on Representation, Accountability and Public Space*. Routledge.

Sachs, J (2005), *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, New York: Penguin Press.

Samatar, A. I. (2016, September 26). *Africa's First Democrats: Somalia's Aden A. Osman and Abdirazak H. Hussen*.

Shelley, F.M. (2013). *Nation shapes : the story behind the world's borders*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Abc-Clio.

Tepeciklioğlu, E. E., & Tepeciklioğlu, A. O. (Eds.). (2021, July 11). *Turkey in Africa: A New Emerging Power?* Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003049579>

Zhang, D. (2020) . *A Cautious New Approach: China's Growing Trilateral Aid Cooperation*. Canberra: Australia National University.

Journals:

Abbott, G.C. (1970). Economic Aid as a Unilateral Transfer of Resources. *Journal of Political Economy*, 78(6), pp.1213–1227. [Online] [accessed 14 March 2020] doi:<https://doi.org/10.1086/259706>.

Achilles, K., Onur Sazak, Wheeler, T.M. and Auveen Elizabeth Woods (2018). Turkish aid agencies in Somalia Risks and opportunities for building peace. [Online] [accessed 14 March 2020] doi:https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-9830-2015016.

Akpınar, P. (2013). Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy. *Turkish Studies*, 14(4), pp.735–757. [Online] [accessed 15 March 2020].

Altunisik, M.B. (2022). Humanitarian diplomacy as Turkey's national role conception and performance: evidence from Somalia and Afghanistan. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, pp.1–17. [online] [accessed 13 July 2022] doi:10.1080/14683857.2022.2131978.

Annan, K. (2005). 'In Larger Freedom': Decision Time at the UN. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(3), p.63. [online] [accessed 13 August 2020] doi:10.2307/20034350.

Atalay, G. (2019). The Somalia Civil-War from 1988-1991. *Journal Of Humanities And Social Science*. Volume 24, Issue 4, Ser. 2 (April. 2019) 88-94. <https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-ihss/papers/Vol.%2024%20Issue4/Series-2/K2404028894.pdf>

- Aybet, G. (2006). Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges. *Security Dialogue*, 37(4), pp.529–549. [Online] [accessed 03 February 2020]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606072947>.
- Balci, B. (2003). Fethullah Gu"len's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam. *Religion, State and Society*, 31(2), pp.151–177. [Online] [accessed 09 February 2020]. doi:10.1080/09637490308283.
- Baniela, S.I. and Ríos, J.V. (2012). Piracy in Somalia: A Challenge to The International Community. *Journal of Navigation*, 65(4), pp.693–710. [Online] [accessed 09 February 2020]. doi:10.1017/s0373463312000185.
- Bearce, D.H. and Tirone, D.C. (2010). Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(3), pp.837–851. [Online] [accessed 12 March 2020]. doi:10.1017/s0022381610000204.
- Bergamaschi, I. and Tickner, A.B. (2017). Introduction: South–South Cooperation Beyond the Myths—A Critical Analysis. *South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths*, pp.1–27. [Online] [accessed 13 March 2020]. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-53969-4_1.
- BINDRA, S.S. (2018). Foreign Aid And Foreign Policy: An Implementation Process. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, [online] 22(3), pp.126–141. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48520086.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1a4c540781abdb9f0b50975e8d86c9b5&ab_segments=&origin= [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022].
- Boone, P. (1996) Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign FAGIA," *European Economic Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2,
- Bräutigam, A. and Knack, S. (2004). Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, [online] 52(2), pp.255–285. doi:10.1086/380592.
- Brautigam, D. A. (2008). China's foreign aid in africa: what do we know? In *China into Africa: trade, aid and influence*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 197–216. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press.
- Bukhari, S.A.H. (2011). What is Comparative Study. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. [online] [accessed 10 June 2020]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1962328>.
- Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000) Aid, Policies, and Growth," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4,
- Cannon, B. and Donelli, F. (2019). Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity: Evaluating Regional Security Complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. [online] [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3555597>.
- Cannon, B.J. (2016) Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*: Vol. 16, Article 14.
- Cannon, B.J. (2017). *Turkey in Africa: Lessons in Political Economy*. [online] Social Science Research Network. *Florya Chronicles of Political Economy* 3(1), pp. 93-110. ISSN 2149-5750.

Cannon, B.J. (2021) *Turkey's Military Strategy in Africa*. In Eyrice, E. & Tepeciklioglu, A. (eds). *Turkey in Africa: A New Emerging Power?*. Routledge (2021), pp 127-143.

Dahir, A. and Sheikh Ali, A.Y. (2021). Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges. *Regional & Federal Studies*, pp.1–20. [Online] [Accessed 16 March. 2022]. doi:10.1080/13597566.2021.1998005.

David, S. (1979). Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage. *International Security*, 4(2), p.69. [Online] [Accessed 16 April. 2020]. doi:10.2307/2626744.

DeBoom, M.J. (2019). Who is afraid of 'debt-trap diplomacy'? Geopolitical narratives, agency and the multiscale distribution of risk. *Area Development and Policy*, pp.1–8. [Online] [Accessed 20 March. 2022]. doi:10.1080/23792949.2019.1703556.

Donelli, F. (2016) *Becoming Global Actor: The Turkish agenda for the Global South*. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2016, 93-115. [Online] [Accessed 20 March. 2023]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.863448>.

Donelli, F. (2018, January 2). The Ankara consensus: the significance of Turkey's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 30(1), 57–76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2018.1438384>

Donelli, F. (2019). Persuading through Culture, Values, and Ideas: The Case of Turkey's Cultural Diplomacy. *Insight Turkey*, [online] 21(3), pp.113–134. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776106>.

Donelli, F., & Cannon, B. J. (2021, September 9). Power projection of Middle East states in the Horn of Africa: linking security burdens with capabilities. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 34(4), 759–779. [Online] [Accessed 20 March 2023]. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573>

El Karoui, H., The Islamist Factory, Institute Montaigne, 2018, online; Mulcaire, C., Hasan al-Banna and the Political Ideologization of Islam in the 20th Century, E-International Relations, 2016, online; Meijer, R.,

Epstein, G. S., & Gang, I. N. (2009, May). Good governance and good aid allocation. *Journal of Development Economics*, 89(1), 12–18. [online] [accessed 7 September 2020] <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.010>

Foreign direct investment: theory, evidence, and practice. (2002, September 1). *Choice Reviews Online*, 40(01), 40–0422. <https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.40-0422>

Harte, J. (2012). Turkey Shocks Africa. *World Policy Journal*, 29(4), pp.27–38. doi:10.1177/0740277512470926.

Hj Ab Rahman, A., Wan Ahmad, W.I., Adam, F., Ali, N. and Ismail, D. (2015). The Consequences of Ataturk's Secularization on Turkey. *Asian Social Science*, 11(21). [Online] [accessed 14 March 2020]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v11n21p350>.

Holseth, D.M. (2012). Al Shabaab – Is It the New Al-Qaeda? *American Intelligence Journal*, [online] 30(1), pp.78–83. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26201987.pdf?refregid=excelsior%3Aae7baa603010a377db6d39c2b3d5fce2&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1 [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

- Ibrahim, A.A. (1985). Sudanese Historiography and Oral Tradition. *History in Africa*, 12, pp.117–130. [Online] [accessed 14 March 2021] doi:<https://doi.org/10.2307/3171716>.
- İpek, V., & Biltekin, G. (2013). Turkey's foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post-international approach. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 49, 121–156. [Online] [accessed 1 May 2021]. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600002065>
- Isaksson, A.-S. and Kotsadam, A. (2018). Chinese aid and local corruption. *Journal of Public Economics*, 159, pp.146–159. [Online] [accessed 20 December 2022] doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.002.
- Kachuyevski, A. (2014). Structured, Focused Comparison: An In-Depth Case Study of Ethnic Conflict Prevention.[Online] [accessed 26 May 2020] doi:<https://doi.org/10.4135/978144627305013517799>.
- Khayre, A. A. M. (2016). Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. [Online] [accessed 8 February 2022] <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2771125>
- Knack, S. (2004, March). Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(1), 251–266. [Online] [Accessed 22 Oct. 2022]. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00299.x>
- Langan, M. (2016, September 27). Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the 'Neo-Ottoman' challenge to the European Union. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(6), 1399–1414. [online] [[accessed 05 February 2020]. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1229569>
- Levy, J. S. (2008, February). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25(1), 1–18. [online] [[accessed 13 February 2020]. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>
- Lewis, G. L. (1962, January). The Emergence of Modern Turkey. *International Affairs*, 38(1), 107–108. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2611438>
- Li, X. (2017). Does Conditionality Still Work? China's Development Assistance and Democracy in Africa. *Chinese Political Science Review*, 2(2), pp.201–220. [online] [accessed 13 November 2022]. doi:10.1007/s41111-017-0050-6.
- Lloyd, T. Mark McGillivray, Oliver Morrissey, and Robert Osei, (2000) Does Aid Create Trade? An Investigation for European Donors and African Recipients," *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 12, No. 1.
- Mansour, S. A., & Ahmed, Y. Y. (2019, September). Saudi Arabia and UAE in the Horn of Africa. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 12(3), 99–118. [online] [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021]. <https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.123006>
- Matisek, J., & Williamson, J. D. (2020, June 16). Limited Wars in the Periphery: *Expeditions With MCUP*. [online] [Accessed 11 Dec. 2022]. <https://doi.org/10.36304/expwmcup.2020.03>
- Meijer, R. (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood and the Political: An Exercise in Ambiguity. pp.294–320. [online] [accessed 3 September 2020].doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199327638.003.0014>.

Farah, I. (2021). Somalia: Thirty Years After. *Development*. doi:10.1057/s41301-021-00291-3.

Morrissey, O. And White, H. (1996). Evaluating the Concessionality of Tied Aid. *The Manchester School*, 64(2), pp.208–226. [online] [Accessed 17 December. 2022]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1996.tb00481.x>.

Mukhtar, M.H. (1989). The Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia from 1947-1960. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, [online] 17(2). [online] [Accessed 30 December. 2021]. doi:10.5070/F7172016882.

Njeri, S. (2018). Somaliland; the viability of a liberal peacebuilding critique beyond state building, state formation and hybridity. *Peacebuilding*, 7(1), pp.37–50.). [online] [Accessed 30 February 2021]. doi:10.1080/21647259.2018.1469341.

Osman, A.A. (2008). Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality? *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(2). [Online] [[accessed 14 March 2021](#)] doi:<https://doi.org/10.4314/ajcr.v7i2.39412>.

Mehmet Özkan and Şenol Orakçı (2015). Viewpoint: Turkey as a ‘political’ actor in Africa – an assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9(2), pp.343–352. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1042629>.

Özkan, M. and Akgun, B. (2020). *Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation*. [online] Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3580231 [Accessed 18 Jun. 2023].

Özkan, M. (2013, October 22). Does “rising power” mean “rising donor”? Turkey’s development aid in Africa. *Africa Review*, 5(2), 139–147. [Online] [[accessed 14 March 2021](#)] <https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2013.855358>

Parlar Dal, E., & Dipama, S. (2022, October 31). Assessing the EU’s and Turkey’s Triangular Development Cooperation partnership in the Sub-Saharan Africa. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 47(4), 209–234. [Online] [[accessed 18 March 2023](#)] <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221135411>

Peacock, A. (2011, December 20). The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 75(1), 87–111. [online] [Accessed 1 October 2022]. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0041977x11000838>

Qian, N. (2014). Making Progress on Foreign Aid. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. [online] [Accessed 21 October 2022]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482489>.

Quazi, R. M., & Alam, A. (2015, August 25). Foreign Aid and Quality of Governance in Developing Countries: An Econometric Case Study of South Asia and East Asia. *International Business Research*, 8(9). [online] [Accessed 22 December 2022]. <https://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v8n9p16>

Regilme, Jr, S.S.F. and Hodzi, O. (2021). Comparing US and Chinese Foreign Aid in the Era of Rising Powers. *The International Spectator*, 56(2), pp.1–18. [online] [Accessed 22 December 2022]. doi:10.1080/03932729.2020.1855904.

Robinson, C. D. (2019, April 3). The Somali National Army: an assessment. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 35(2), 211–221. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600805>

Robinson, M. (1993). Aid, Democracy and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 5(1), pp.85–99. [online] [Accessed 14 August 2021]. doi:10.1080/09578819308426580.

Rossiter, A., & Cannon, B. J. (2019). Re-examining the “Base”: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia. *Insight Turkey*, 21(1), 167–188. [online] [Accessed 10 June 2021]. <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2019211.09>

Rudincová, K. (2014, September 1). New player on the scene: Turkish engagement in Africa. *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series*, 25(25), 197–213. [online] [Accessed 10 February 2020]. <https://doi.org/10.2478/bog-2014-0039>

Seal, A. and Bailey, R. (2013). The 2011 Famine in Somalia: lessons learnt from a failed response? *Conflict and Health*, 7(1). [online] [Accessed 23 November 2020]. doi:10.1186/1752-1505-7-22.

Siradag, A. (2017). Turkey’s Growing Role as a Security Actor in Somalia: Dynamics and Motivations. *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, [online] 17(2), pp.389–404. [online] [Accessed 23 November 2020]. doi:10.17550/akademikincelemeler.1115931.

Siradag, A. (2017). TURKISH-SOMALI RELATIONS: CHANGING STATE IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. *Inquiry*, 2(2). [online] [Accessed 23 November 2020]. doi:10.21533/isjss.v2i2.86.

Sıradağ, A. (2018). Turkey-Africa alliance: Evolving patterns in security relations. *African Security Review*, 27(3-4), pp.308–325. [online] [Accessed 24 November 2020]. doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1550429.

Smith, S.N. (2021). China’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 17(2). [online] [Accessed 12 August 2022]. doi:10.1093/fpa/orab002.

Somalia Security situation Country of Origin Information Report. (2021). [online] doi:10.2847/32719.

Stevens, L. and Wang, D. (n.d.). The Scope of IMF Conditionality. *International Organization*, 62(4), pp.589–620. [online] [Accessed 13 Sept. 2021]. doi:10.1017/s002081830808021

Tan, B.R. and Cui, P. (2019). International collaboration strives for resilient Silk Road at SiDRR Conference 2019. *National Science Review*, 6(4), pp.619–619. [online] [Accessed 12 August 2022]. doi:10.1093/nsr/nwz075.

Tang, K.-B. and Bundhoo, D. (2017). Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *Theoretical Economics Letters*, 07(05), pp.1473–1491. [online] [Accessed 12 August 2022]. doi:10.4236/tel.2017.75099.

Tepeciklioglu, E. E., Tok, M. E., & Basher, S. (1970, January 1). Turkish and Brics engagement in Africa. *Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)*, 8(2), 48–66. [online] [Accessed 12 August 2021]. <https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v8i2.3>

Tepeciklioglu, E. E. (2017, July 27). Economic relations between turkey and Africa: challenges and prospects. *Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)*, 8(1), 1. [online] [Accessed 12 August 2021]. <https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v8i1.2>

Tür, Ö. (2011). Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP—Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones. *Turkish Studies*, 12(4), pp.589–602. [online] [Accessed 09 February 2020]. doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.622515.

Turhan, Y. (2021, May 31). Turkey's Foreign Aid to Africa: An Analysis of the Post-July 15 Era. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 23(5), 795–812. [online] [Accessed 12 August 2022]. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1935080>

Turkey's Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation. (2020, March 30). *Insight Turkey*, 59–70. <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020221.05>

Tyndall (2020). Mogadiscio's Unenlightened Pilgrim: Farah's 'Links,' Dante's 'Inferno,' and the Somali Civil War. *Comparative Literature Studies*, 57(2), p.235. [online] [Accessed 24 February 2021]. doi:10.5325/complitstudies.57.2.0235.

Uchehara, K.E. (2008). Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Africa. 2(3), pp.43–64. [online] [Accessed 15 February 2022]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.25479>.

Wagner, D. (2003) Aid and Trade—An Empirical Study *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, Vol. 17.

William Johnson, J. (2011). Orality, literacy, and Somali oral poetry. *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 18(1), pp.119–136.

Zhang, D. and Lawson, S. (2017). China in Pacific Regional Politics. *The Round Table*, 106(2), pp.197–206. [online] [Accessed 16 October 2022]. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1296705>.

Yijia Jing, Mendez, A. and Zheng, Y. (2019). New Development Assistance in the Making: An Introduction. *SpringerLink*, [online] pp.1–18. [online] [Accessed 16 October 2022]. doi:10.1007/978-981-13-7232-2_1.

Reports

AMISOM, (2021) In pursuit of peace; AMISOM helps Somalia make steady progress, [online] available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/pursuit-peace-amisom-helps-somalia-make-steady-progress> (accessed 17 May 2021).

Bryden, M. (2013) A Report of the CSIS Africa Program Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government. [online] Available at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

Clans in Somalia Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna. (2009). [online] Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b29f5e82.pdf> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor SOMALIA 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. (2020). [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SOMALIA-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf> [Accessed 11 November. 2021].

Development Initiatives. (2022). *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2022*. [online] Available at: <https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2022/>. [Accessed 17 Dec. 2022].

HRA (2017). *What is Omar al-Bashir Doing in Turkey? – HRA*. [online] Available at: <https://ihd.org.tr/en/what-is-omar-al-bashir-doing-in-turkey/> [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

HRW (). *Human Rights Watch | Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links (Summary)*. [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia/>. [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

HRW (2019). *World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Sudan*. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/sudan#> [Accessed 14 Nov. 2021].

Mashino, I. (2021). *The Bipolar Conflict in the Middle East Over the Muslim Brotherhood - Why Saudi Arabia, the UAE, And Egypt See the Brotherhood As A Threat*. [online] Available at: https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/detail/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2021/08/03/2106e_mashino_e.pdf [Accessed 15 July. 2022].

Melesse, T. M. (2021). International aid to Africa needs an overhaul. Tips on what needs to change - World. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/international-aid-africa-needs-overhaul-tips-what-needs-change> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

MFA. (2018) African Union – Turkey Partnership Joint Implementation Report, 2015-2017, 12 February 2018, [online] available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/african-union---turkey-partnership-joint-implementation-report-2015-2017_-12-february-2018_en.en.mfa (accessed 12 June 2019).

MONTHLY REPORT ON FOOD PRICE TRENDS BULLETIN #10 GIEWS -Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture KEY MESSAGES. (2018). [online] Available at: <https://www.fao.org/3/CA2766EN/ca2766en.pdf> [Accessed 16 Nov. 2020].

Political Process for Sudan: An inclusive intra-Sudanese process on the way forward for democracy and peace [EN/AR] - Sudan | ReliefWeb. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/summary-paper-consultations-political-process-sudan-inclusive-intra-sudanese-process> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021].

R. Marchal, J.A. Mubarak, M. Del Buono, D. L. Manzolillo (2019). *Globalization and its impact on Somalia - Somalia*. [online] ReliefWeb. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/globalization-and-its-impact-somalia> [Accessed 10 Feb. 2022].

Reliefweb (2011). Sudan: Turkey donates over 3.5 million dollars for implementing water technologies and research projects - Sudan | ReliefWeb. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-turkey-donates-over-35-million-dollars-implementing-water-technologies-and> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Reliefweb.int. (2021). *EASO COI Report: Somalia Actors July 2021 - Somalia | ReliefWeb*. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/easo-coi-report-somalia-actors-july-2021> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Reliefweb.int. (2021). *TİKA Supports Agricultural Production in Somaliland - Somalia | ReliefWeb*. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/t-ka-supports-agricultural-production-somaliland> [Accessed 8 Aug. 2022].

Reliefweb.int. (2023). *Security Council Renews Sanctions Regime on Somalia, Mandate for Panel of Experts, Adopting Resolution 2662 (2022) by 11 Votes in Favour, 4 Abstentions - Somalia | ReliefWeb*. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/security-council-renews-sanctions-regime-somalia-mandate-panel-experts-adopting-resolution-2662-2022-11-votes-favour-4-abstentions> [Accessed 18 Nov. 2022].

Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters. (2011). [online] Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202011%20661.pdf> [Accessed 13 Sept. 2021].

Reporting on Debt Relief in The Grant Equivalent System. (n.d.). [online] Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/Reporting-Debt-Relief-In-Grant-Equivalent-System.pdf> [Accessed 13 Dec. 2022].

Roth, K. (2020). World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Sudan. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/sudan#> [Accessed 13 Oct. 2021].

Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition. [online] www.rand.org. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA650-1.html [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Somalia's Prospect Africa Briefing Report. (2010). [online] Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Somalia_Briefing_report.pdf [accessed 30 June 2022].

Sudan US Sanctions: Cancer patients and businesses hopeful. (2017). *BBC News*. [online] 30 Oct. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41749294?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cq23pdqvgm8t/sudan&link_location=live-reporting-story [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus Lessons from Somalia report. (2021). [online] Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Supporting_longer_term_development_in_crisis_at_the_nexus_Lessons_from_Somalia.pdf [Accessed 10 Oct. 2021].

TİKA Report (2020). *Turkish Development Assistance Report*. [online] Available at: https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/old/2022/TurkiyeKalkinma2020ENG_Web.pdf [Accessed 1 Jan. 2023].

UN Report (2019). Republic of the Sudan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Implementation of Istanbul Plan of Action for Least Developed Sudan National Report. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/ldc5/sites/www.un.org/ldc5/files/sudan_istanboul_ipoa.pdf [Accessed 2 Feb. 2022].

United Nations Security Council Report, (2022) Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General [online] Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2234107.pdf> [Accessed 13 Oct. 2022].

United States Department of State. (n.d.). *Sudan*. [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-investment-climate-statements/sudan/> [Accessed 18 Jun. 2022].

web.archive.org. (2018). *Wayback Machine*. [online] Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20181019114550/http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Global-Humanitarian-Assistance-Report-2016_Chapter-4.pdf [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Wolf, C. and Wang, X. and Warner, E. (2013). [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR118/RAND_RR118.pdf [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

World Bank. (1989). *From crisis to sustainable growth - sub Saharan Africa : a long-term perspective study*. [online] Available at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/498241468742846138/from-crisis-to-sustainable-growth-sub-saharan-africa-a-long-term-perspective-study> [Accessed 24 Oct. 2022].

www.sipri.org. (2012). *UN arms embargo on Sudan (Darfur region) | SIPRI*. [online] Available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/sudan [Accessed 14 Oct. 2022].

Yüksel, E. and Tekineş, H. (2021). *Turkey's love-in with Qatar A marriage of convenience CRU Report*. [online] Available at: <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/drivers-of-turkish-qatari-relations.pdf> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

Policy Briefs

Clingendael, (2019) Turkey in the Horn of Africa CRU Policy Brief Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis, [online] available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/PB_Turkey_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_May_2019.pdf (accessed 12 March 2020).

CRU Policy Brief (2022). *The West's struggle in Sudan Standing with the people while being stuck with the coup regime*. [online] Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/Policy_brief_The_Wests_struggle_in_Sudan.pdf [Accessed 13 Oct. 2022].

Fuat Keyman, E. and Sazak, O. (2014). *Turkey as a 'Humanitarian State' POMEAS POLICY PAPER*. [online] (2). Available at: <https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/31364/1/keyman-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state.pdf> [Accessed 1 Jan. 2023].

Policy Brief. (2021). [online] Available at: <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/PB%20Sudan%20Coup.pdf> [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021].

Secondary Sources:

AA, D.S.W. (2021). *10 years of Turkey, Somalia friendship furthers tangible progress*. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/10-years-of-turkey-somalia-friendship-furthers-tangible-progress> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

AA, D.S.W. (2022). *Sudan expresses desire to further strengthen ties with Turkey*. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/sudan-expresses-desire-to-further-strengthen-ties-with-turkey> [Accessed 10 Oct. 2020].

AA, D.S. with (2022). *Sudan is Türkiye's strategic partner in Africa: Ambassador Neziroğlu*. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/sudan-is-turkiyes-strategic-partner-in-africa-ambassador-neziroglu> [Accessed 9 Jun. 2023].

Abdelaziz, K. (2019). Saudi Arabia, UAE to send \$3 billion in aid to Sudan. *Reuters*. [online] 21 Apr. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests-idUSKCN1RX0DG> [Accessed 16 Nov. 2020].

Abdelaziz, K. (2019). Sudan opposition says to nominate members for transitional council. *Reuters*. [online] 10 Jun. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/sudan-opposition-says-to-nominate-members-for-transitional-council-idUSKCN1TB1O3> [Accessed 4 Feb. 2022].

Abdi, J. (2021) An Unusual Unrecognised State. [online] available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356190011_Somaliland_An_Unusual_Unrecognize_d_State [Accessed 10 Aug. 2021].

Abigail Ng (2018). [online] CNBC. Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/abigail-ng/> [Accessed 7 Jul. 2021].

Abou Diab, K. (2018). The strategic turning point in the Horn of Africa | Khattar Abou Diab. [online] AW. Available at: <https://thearabweekly.com/strategic-turning-point-horn-africa> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

Sudan After Sanctions: Sudanese of Relations with the United States 427. (2018). [online] Available at: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/sr427-sudan-after-sanctions-sudanese-views-of-relations-with-the-united-states.pdf> [Accessed 10 Oct. 2020].

Abubaker, H., El-Khoury, N. and Rüdiger (2013). Sudan: Present Situation; Challenges and Prospects. [online] Available at: https://www.mpfpr.de/wp-content/uploads/Sudan-Present-Situation-Challenges-and-Prospects_1.pdf [Accessed 23 Mar. 2022].

ACAPS. (2021). *Complex crisis*. [online] Available at: <https://www.acaps.org/country/sudan/crisis/complex-crisis> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

Acar, T. (2012). The Position of Turkey among OECD Member and Candidate Countries According to PISA 2009 Results. *Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice*, [online] 12(4), pp.2567–2572. Available at: <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1002863.pdf> [Accessed 24 Nov 2022].

Achilles K. *et al* (2015) Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace, [online] available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189390/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2019).

Adam, H.M. and Ford, R. (1997). *Mending rips in the sky : options for Somali communities in the 21st century*. Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea.

AfricaNews (2017). *Somalia calls regions to order for breaching state's neutrality in Gulf crisis*. [online] Africanews. Available at: <https://www.africanews.com/2017/09/22/somalia->

[calls-regions-to-order-for-breaching-state-s-neutrality-in-gulf-crisis//](#) [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021].

AfricaNews (2021). *Somalia to hold presidential vote in October*. [online] Africanews. Available at: <https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/30/somalia-to-hold-presidential-vote-in-october/> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Ahmed, G. (2021). *Far from a benefactor, the Turkish government is exploiting Somalia's fragility*. [online] Middle East Institute. Available at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Ahmed, M. (2020) Is Somalia ready for 1 person 1 vote? [online] available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/is-somalia-ready-for-1-person-1-vote> (accessed 12 June 2022).

Ahmed, W. (2019). *Berbera Port Geopolitics and State-making in Somaliland*. [online] Available at: https://pure.diiis.dk/ws/files/3006484/RVI_Briefing_2019_Ahmed_and_Stepputat_Berbera.pdf [Accessed 7 May 2023].

Ahval, (2019) Turkey's interest in Horn of Africa a multi-faceted affair – analyst, [online] available at: <https://ahvalnews.com/horn-africa/turkeys-interest-horn-africa-multi-faceted-affair-analyst> (accessed 17 March 2020).

Aidi, H. (2022) Africa and the 'Ankara Consensus', Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2022-03/PB_20-22_Aidi.pdf [Accessed 21 May 2023].

Akca, A. (2019) Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey's foreign policy approach to Africa, [online] available at: <https://www.csis.org/neo-ottomanism-turkeys-foreign-policy-approach-africa> (accessed 17 March 2020).

aksam.com.tr. (2015). 3. *Havalimani dnyanın tarihini deęistirecek*. [online] Available at: <http://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/3-havalimani-dunyanin-tarihini-degistirecek/http://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/3-havalimani-dunyanin-tarihini-degistirecek/haber-410602> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2022].

Aksoy, A.H (2021). *Excursus: Turkey's Military Engagement Abroad*. [online] Available at: <https://www.cats-network.eu/topics/visualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-activism/excursus-turkeys-military-engagement-abroad> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

Aalen, L. (2020). *After the uprising: Including Sudanese youth*. [online] Available at: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth> (Accessed 19 Jul. 2022).

Al-Harhi, Z. (2020). *Zuhair Al-Harhi - Bashir and the 'Brotherhood'... a Losing Partnership and a Dark Era*. [online] Available at: <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2410706/zuhair-al-harhi/bashir-and-brotherhood-losing-partnership-and-dark-era> [Accessed 17 Jul. 2022].

Ali, A. (2008). *The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin - A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organisation*. [online] Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55851/AlShabaab.pdf> [Accessed 14 Oct. 2021].

Ali, F. (2016). *The challenges of holding an election in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://theconversation.com/the-challenges-of-holding-an-election-in-somalia-67561> [Accessed 12 Nov. 2021].

AlJazeera (2017). Turkey sets up largest overseas army base in Somalia. [online] www.aljazeera.com. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/1/turkey-sets-up-largest-overseas-army-base-in-somalia> [Accessed 3 Feb. 2022].

Aljazeera (2018). Several killed in Sudan as protests over rising prices continue. [online] www.aljazeera.com. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/21/several-killed-in-sudan-as-protests-over-rising-prices-continue/> [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022].

Amnesty International. (2009). *Turkey: No to safe haven for fugitive from international justice*. [online] Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/11/turkey-no-safe-haven-fugitive-international-justice-20091106/> [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

Antonopoulos, P. (2017) Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa In The Context Of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries, [online] available at: https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/11519765/11231936_Published_article.pdf (accessed 12 March 2020).

Anzalone, C. and Warner, J. (2021). *Al-Shabaab*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0303.xml> [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

AP NEWS. (2021). *In new Sudan, women want more freedom, bigger political role*. [online] Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/khartoum-ap-top-news-omar-al-bashir-cairo-sudan-79f3dfdf9d3444228094998533ac7cc0> [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021].

Apps, P. (2021). COLUMN-New era of robot war may be underway unnoticed: Peter Apps. *Reuters*. [online] 10 Jun. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/apps-drones-idUSL5N2NS2E8> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2021].

Arab News (2018). *Somalia's Puntland region asks UAE to stay*. [online] Arab News. Available at: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1286481/world> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2021].

Arab Weekly (2021). Interests, not ideology drive Sudan's ties to Turkey |. [online] AW. Available at: <https://the arabweekly.com/interests-not-ideology-drive-sudans-ties-turkey> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2022].

Arab, T.N. (2018). *Qatar invests half billion dollars in Sudan agriculture*. [online] <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/>. Available at: <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/qatar-invests-half-billion-dollars-sudan-agriculture> [Accessed 11 Oct. 2021].

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook. (2019). [online] Available at: https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/01/ACLED_Codebook_2019FINAL.docx.pdf [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Arthur, G. (2019). *Arms for Reforms: The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Assistance at Encouraging Human Rights Reforms*. [online] Available at: <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/rv042t86x> [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Asal, M. (2019). Sudan's popular uprising and the demise of Islamism 1. [online] Available at: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism.pdf> [Accessed 8 Sep. 2021].

Aybar, S. (2016) Analysis – What is Next in Turkey's Africa Strategy? [online] available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-what-is-next-in-turkey-s-africa-strategy/692864> (accessed 18 March 2020).

Aybey, A. (2008). *An Emerging Donor in the Mediterranean Basin: Turkey*. [online] Available at: <https://www.iemed.org/publication/an-emerging-donor-in-the-mediterranean-basin-turkey/> [Accessed 1 Jan. 2023].

Azarian, R. (2011). Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science, [online] available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281269760_Potentials_and_Limitations_of_Comparative_Method_in_Social_Science (accessed 10 June 2020).

Barise, H. (2021) Time running out on Somalia's troubled vote as citizens sigh [online] available at: <https://apnews.com/article/mohamed-abdullahi-mohamed-national-elections-elections-somalia-united-nations-b0a417fa59cfdaec7aa266dff8b28d45> (accessed 18 June 2021).

Barkey, H.J. (2021). Turkey's engagement with Somalia offers a window into its strategy to build influence. [online] www.timesnownews.com. Available at: <https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/article/turkey-s-engagement-with-somalia-offers-a-window-into-its-strategy-to-build-influence-in-africa/712528> [Accessed 12 Sep. 2021].

BBC (2021). Somalia violence: Rival units fight amid row over president's term. BBC News. [online] 25 Apr. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56879935> [Accessed 2 Feb. 2022].

BBC (2022). Sudan coup: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigns after mass protests. *BBC News*. [online] 3 Jan. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59855246> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2021].

BBC, (2011) Somalia famine: Turkish PM Erdogan visits Mogadishu [online] 19 Aug. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14588960> [Accessed 18 Nov. 2022].

BBC, (2017) Somalia presidential vote at Mogadishu airport, [online] available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1393932.html> (accessed 17 May 2021).

Besenyő, J. and Oláh, P. (2012) One of the New Competitors in Africa: Turkey [online] available at: http://real.mtak.hu/83768/1/real_OneofthenewcompetitorsinAfricaTurkey_2012_u.pdf (accessed 03 February 2020).

Biddle, S. Macdonald, J. and Baker, R. (2017) Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance. [online] available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

Bilgic, A. and Nascimento, D. (2014) Turkey's New Focus in Africa: Causes and Challenges [online] available at: <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/26668/1/Turkey%20and%20Africa.pdf> (accessed 03 February 2020).

Boahen, A. (1985) General history of Africa, VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935, [online] available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000184296> (accessed 16 March 2020).

Bradbury and Healy (2020) Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, [online] available at: <https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-> (accessed 14 May 2020).

Breuer, J. (2017). Two Belts, One Road? [online] Available at: https://www.eu-china.net/uploads/tx_news/Blickwechsel_OBOR-Afrika_Maerz2018_03.pdf [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Brock, H.C., Joe (2015). Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip. *Reuters*. [online] 9 Jul. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-china-insight-idUSKCN0PJ1LT20150709> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Cai, P. (2017) Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. [online] Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-china-s-belt-road-initiative> [Accessed 19 Oct. 2022].

Calabrese, J. (2022) The 'New Normal' in Saudi-UAE Relations — Tying China In. (2022). *Middle East Institute*. [online] 3 Feb. Available at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/new-normal-saudi-uae-relations-tying-china> [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

Capire. (2021). *Sudanese Coup: Women Struggle for Freedom, Peace, and Justice*. [online] Available at: <https://capiremov.org/en/experience/sudanese-coup-women-struggle-for-freedom-peace-and-justice/> [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021].

Carmody, P. and Wainwright, J. (2022). Contradiction and restructuring in the Belt and Road Initiative: reflections on China's pause in the 'Go world'. *Third World Quarterly*, pp.1–22. doi:10.1080/01436597.2022.2110058.

Carter, B. (2017). *A literature review on China's aid Question*. [online] Available at: https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/177_China_aid.pdf [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

Çelik, E. (2018). *Somalia's economy thrives with Turkey's support*. [online] www.yenisafak.com. Available at: <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/economy/somalias-economy-thrives-with-turkeys-support-2931781> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Chandran, N. (2019). Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments. [online] CNBC. Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Chatzky, A. and McBride, J. (2020). *China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative*. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> [Accessed 17 Oct. 2022].

Chaudhury, D.R. (2018). Africa cancels a Belt and Road Initiative project for the first time. *The Economic Times*. [online] Available at:

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/africa-cancels-a-bri-project-for-the-first-time/articleshow/66363312.cms?from=mdr> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Cheng, C. (2019). *The Logic Behind China's Foreign Aid Agency*. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/21/logic-behind-china-s-foreign-aid-agency-pub-79154> [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022].

China Africa Research Initiative. (2013). *Data: Chinese Global Foreign Aid*. [online] Available at: <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-global-foreign-aid> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

CIA Factbook (2022). Somalia - The World Factbook. [online] www.cia.gov. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/somalia/> [Accessed 9 Sep. 2021].

CIA World Factbook, (2022) U.S. Relations With Somalia [online] available at: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-somalia/> (accessed 18 May 2022).

Clements, B., Gupta, S., Pivovarsky, A., and Tiongson, R. (2004). [online] Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/09/pdf/clements.pdf> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

CMI - Chr. Michelsen Institute. (2016). *The Politics of Humanitarianism. Power, Ideology and Aid*. [online] Available at: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/6037-the-politics-of-humanitarianism-power> [Accessed 17 Dec. 2022].

CNN, I.K. and E.M. (2021). *The military has taken over Sudan. Here's what happened*. [online] CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-coup-explained-intl-cmd/index.html> [Accessed 21 Jun. 2021].

CNN, S.E.S., Nima Elbagir and Yasir Abdullah (2019). *Sudan's President Bashir forced out in military coup*. [online] CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/11/africa/sudan-unrest-intl/index.html> [Accessed 9 Jun. 2021].

Cook, S. and Ibish, H. (2017) Turkey and the GCC: Cooperation Amid Diverging Interests, [online] available at: http://www.agsiw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/GCCTurkey_ONLINE-2.pdf (accessed 03 April 2018).

Council on Foreign Relations (2021). *Al-Shabab*. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Council on Foreign Relations. (2019). *Al-Shabab*. [online] Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab> [Accessed 14 Oct. 2021].

Courtney, W. (2022). *Protecting Ukraine's Future Security*. [online] www.rand.org. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/protecting-ukraines-future-security.html> [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Crisis Group. (2018). *Somalia and the Gulf Crisis*. [online] Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis> [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

Crisis Group. (2018). *The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa*. [online] Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa> [Accessed 18 Jun. 2022].

Cunningham, H. et.al (2016). [online] Available at: <https://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/otago610363.pdf> [Accessed 9 Dec. 2022].

Dahir, A. (2018) Horn of Africa Caught in Between the Qatar-GCC Crisis: Case Studies of Somalia and Sudan, [online] available at: https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/images/files/discussion_papers/HornOfAfricaCaughtInBetweenTheQatarGCCCrisis.pdf (accessed 25 March 2020).

Dahir, A.L (2019). The African countries not signed to China's Belt and Road plan. [online] Quartz Africa. Available at: <https://qz.com/africa/1718826/the-african-countries-not-signed-to-chinas-belt-and-road-plan/> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Daily Sabah (2018) Turkey's Africa initiative sees six-fold rise in trade with continent, [online] available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/02/28/turkeys-africa-initiative-sees-six-fold-rise-in-trade-with-continent> (accessed 13 February 2020).

Dalrymple and Watts, (2016), Somalia: An Overview of Poverty, Vulnerability and Financing [online] available at: <http://www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Somalia-an-overview-of-poverty-vulnerability-and-financing.pdf> (accessed 14 May 2021).

DalsanRadio (2020). *Somalia Approves U.S. \$671 Million Budget for 2021*. [online] allAfrica.com. Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202010300256.html> [Accessed 12 Feb. 2022].

Davey, E., Borton, J. and Foley, M. (2013). *A history of the humanitarian system Western origins and foundations*. [online] Available at: <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/8439.pdf> [Accessed 14 Dec. 2022].

Davies, M. et.al (2008) How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa. [Online] available at: http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/dfid_fa_final.pdf accessed 12 October 2022).

Davutoğlu, A. (2013) Speech at the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference (in Turkish), Ankara, [online] available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayinahmet-davutoglu-nun-v-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptigi-konusma-2-ocak-2013-ankara.tr.mfa> (accessed 12 February 2020).

Demirci, Z. and Mehmet, F. (2018) Turkey in Intense Cooperation with Africa, [online] available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-in-intense-cooperation-with-africa-/1059565> (accessed 20 March 2020).

Dhaoui, I. (2019). M P RA Good governance for sustainable development lyad Dhaoui Good governance for sustainable development. [online] Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/211630209.pdf> [Accessed 14 Dec. 2022].

Dhaysane, M. (2022). *Somali graduates of Turkish scholarship program give back to their country*. [online] www.aa.com.tr. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/somali-graduates-of-turkish-scholarship-program-give-back-to-their-country/2499620> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2021].

Dodo, M. (2016) Understanding new Turkey-Africa Relations: Rationale and Challenges, [online] available at: <http://www.japss.org/upload/7.%20Dodo%20C.pdf> (accessed 15 February 2020).

Dollar, D. (2016) China's Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources, [online] available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chinas-Engagement-with-Africa-David-Dollar-July-2016.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2020).

Donelli, F. (2015). Turkey's presence in Somalia: a humanitarian approach. *www.academia.edu*. [online] Available at: https://www.academia.edu/22600533/Turkeys_presence_in_Somalia_a_humanitarian_approach [Accessed 3 May 2023].

Donor Tracker. (2022). *United States donor profile*. [online] Available at: <https://donortracker.org/country/united-states> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

DOST-NIYEGO, P. (2018) Turkey's Growing Presence in Africa, and Opportunities and - Challenges To Watch in 2018, [online] available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/turkey-s-growing-presence-in-africa-and-opportunities-and-challenges-to-watch-in-2018> (accessed 13 March 2020).

Drozдова, K. and Gaubat, (2009). Structured, Focused Uncertainty: Information Analysis for Multi-Method Comparative Case Studies, [online] available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451646 (accessed 5 April 2020).

Duce, M. and Banco De España (2003). Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): a methodological note. [online] Available at: <https://www.bis.org/publ/cqfs22bde3.pdf> [Accessed 10 Dec. 2022].

Duncan (2021). *7 Reasons Why Military Aid Is Important*. [online] Humanitarian Careers. Available at: <https://humanitariancareers.com/military-aid-important/> [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Durmaz, M. (2021). A decade of Turkey's rise in Somalia. [online] A decade of Turkey's rise in Somalia. Available at: <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/a-decade-of-turkey-s-rise-in-somalia-49451> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

Eboe-Osuji, C., Judge, P., Morrison, H., Judge, P., Carmen, L., Carranza, I., Solomy, J. and Bossa, B. (2019). *Public document Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal*. [online] Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2019_02856.PDF [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

Economics, T. (2022). Turkey Exports to Somalia - 2022 Data 2023 Forecast 1989-2021 Historical. [online] *tradingeconomics.com*. Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports/somalia> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

economy-finance.ec.europa.eu. (n.d.). *International development aid*. [online] Available at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/international-economic-relations/international-development-aid_en [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Elmi, A. (2016) Ending famine in Somalia, the Turkish way, [online] available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/famine-somalia-turkish-170319101255256.html> (accessed 16 March 2020).

Emam, A. (2019) Sudan likely to hand over Muslim Brotherhood members to Egypt [online] Available at: <https://thearabweekly.com/sudan-likely-hand-over-muslim-brotherhood-members-egypt> [Accessed 3 Dec. 2022].

english.news.cn. (2022). *Feature: Weak economy, political impasse spoil Sudanese Eid joy-Xinhua*. [online] Available at: <https://english.news.cn/africa/20220501/28433b4aa7b842ce9f88734728fd97b6/c.html> [Accessed 15 Nov. 2020].

Enwere, C. Mesut, Y. (2014) Turkey's Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Trends and Challenges, [online] available at: <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105851/1/A8.%20Enwere.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2020).

Enwere, C. Mesut, Y. (2014) Turkey's Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Trends and Challenges, [online] available at: <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105851/1/A8.%20Enwere.pdf> (accessed 10 July 2019).

Epstein, G.S. and Gang, I.N. (2009). Good governance and good aid allocation. *Journal of Development Economics*, 89(1), pp.12–18. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.010.

EU Factsheet, (2018) EU Support for Somalia, [online] available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1243 (accessed 15 June 2021).

eurasianet.org. (2018). *Event | Africa's experience with Chinese investors. Some parallels with Central Asia | Eurasianet*. [online] Available at: <https://eurasianet.org/event-africas-experience-with-chinese-investors-some-parallels-with-central-asia> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

European Commission - European Commission. (2021). *Press corner*. [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/qanda_22_4533 [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Evason, N. (2017). *Somali Culture - Religion*. [online] Cultural Atlas. Available at: <https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/somali-culture/somali-culture-religion> [Accessed 7 May 2023].

Fabricius, P. (2018) AU Summit: Should Africa Worry about the Growing Foreign Military Presence? [online] available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-30-should-africa-worry-about-a-growing-foreign-military-presence> (accessed 12 February 2020).

Factional fighting erupts in Somalia. (2002). *news.bbc.co.uk*. [online] 23 Jul. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2146701.stm> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Fagan, L. (2019). New China-Africa paper calls on West to tone down the BRI drama | Africa Times. [online] Available at: <https://africatimes.com/2019/09/30/new-china-africa-paper-calls-on-west-to-tone-down-the-bri-drama/> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Fahamu.org. (2016). *Somaliland Opposition Rejects Turkish Mediation offer – Fahamu*. [online] Available at: http://www.fahamu.org/ep_articles/somaliland-opposition-rejects-turkish-mediation-offer/ [Accessed 17 Jun. 2022].

Fanani, A. (2011) *The Ottoman Empire: Its Rise, Decline, and Collapse*, [online] available at: [https://www.academia.edu/4983151/The Ottoman Empire Its Rise Decline and Collapse](https://www.academia.edu/4983151/The_Ottoman_Empire_Its_Rise_Decline_and_Collapse) (accessed 6 February 2020).

Farhan, I., Yusuf, M., Wasuge, M., Sharif, Yusuf, W. and And, M. (2022). *Turkey's Role in Public Service and Infrastructural Development in Mogadishu* *Turkey's Role in Public Service and Infrastructural Development in MOGADISHU Somali Public Agenda 2*. [online] Available at: <https://somalipublicagenda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TURKEYS-ROLE-IN-PUBLIC-SERVICE-AND-INFRASTRUCTURAL-DEVELOPMENT-IN-MOGADISHU.pdf> [Accessed 6 May 2023].

Farooq, B. (2021). *Turkey Government Scholarships for Sudanese Students in 2022-2023: Apply Now!* [online] Available at: <https://turkeyscholarship.net/turkey-government-scholarships-for-sudanese-students/> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Feierstein, G. (2020). *THE IMPACT OF MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL COMPETITION ON SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA*. [online] Available at: <https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-08/The%20Impact%20of%20Middle%20East%20Regional%20Competition%20on%20Security%20and%20Stability%20in%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf> [Accessed 21 Jun. 2021].

Felbab-Brown, V. (2020a). *The problem with militias in Somalia: Almost everyone wants them despite their dangers*. [online] Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-problem-with-militias-in-somalia-almost-everyone-wants-them-despite-their-dangers/> [Accessed 2 Feb. 2022].

Ferchen, M. (2020). *How China Is Reshaping International Development*. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshaping-international-development-pub-80703> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

FEWS NET, (2017) *Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Somalia* [online] available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia_Operational_Plan.pdf (accessed 12 June 2022).

Fick, M. (2018). *Harboring ambitions: Gulf states scramble for Somalia*. *Reuters*. [online] 1 May. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-gulf-analysis-idUSKBN1I23B4> [Accessed 11 Jun. 2021].

Filipenco, D. (2022) *DevelopmentAid*. [online] Available at: <https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/141735/what-is-international-aid> [Accessed 3 Dec. 2022].

Fluehr-Lobban, C. and Lobban, R. (2001). *THE SUDAN SINCE 1989: NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT RULE*. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, [online] 23(2), pp.1–9. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41858370.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A80b4d014bdc0ca75f9d475a961cab222&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1 [Accessed 17 Jul. 2022].

Forti, D. (2011). *A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland*. [online] Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137755/op_2011_2.pdf [Accessed 16 Jun. 2022].

France24 (2021). *African Union to broaden Somalia operations*. [online] France 24. Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211011-african-union-to-broaden-somalia-operations> [Accessed 9 Mar. 2022].

G S P Freeman-Grenville (1970). *Coins from Mogadishu, c. 1300-c. 1700.*
Ganesan, R. (2021). *The ugly face of Chinese debt traps: 42 nations owe China debts that exceeds 10% of their GDP, thanks to BRI.* [online] Available at: <https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/the-ugly-face-of-chinese-debt-traps-42-nations-owe-china-debts-that-exceeds-10-of-their-gdp-thanks-to-bri/818845> [Accessed 24 Dec. 2022].

Garver, R. (2021). *China's Belt and Road Initiative Is About Profit, Not Development, Study Finds.* [online] Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-is-about-profit-not-development-study-finds/6252992.html#:~:text=Unlike%20funds%20provided%20by%20many> [Accessed 24 Dec. 2022].

Geis, J. (2016) When to Indict? The Impact Of Timing of International Criminal Indictments on Peace Processes and Humanitarian Action. [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04_peace_and_justice_geis.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

George, A., Case, Gordon, P.I., Laurén, Ed, McKeown, T. and C. Studies (2017). Chapter 3 The Method of structured , Focused Comparison. [online] Available at: <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Chapter-3-The-Method-of-structured-%2C-Focused-George-Case/ea46cbb32bd9db3581a97fba23ba9833279a0e34> [Accessed 5 April, 2020].

George, A. and Bennett, A.O. (2005). Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, [online] available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323547995_Case_studies_and_theory_development_in_the_social_sciences (accessed 5 April 2020).

Glaser, J. and Laudel, G. (2019). The Discovery of Causal Mechanisms: Extractive Qualitative Content Analysis as a Tool for Process Tracing, [online] available at: <https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/3386> (accessed 15 July 2020).

Gold, S. (2021) Sudan clears IMF hurdle on debt relief but faces long road ahead. [online] <https://www.devex.com/news/sudan-clears-imf-hurdle-on-debt-relief-but-faces-long-road-ahead-100275> [Accessed 22 June 2021].

Göle, D. (2014). Turkey's Development Assistance to Fragile States: From Sporadic Actions To System Building Practices. [online] Available at: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/tjir/v13i1/f_0033741_27514.pdf [Accessed 1 Jan. 2023].

Goobjoog News English. (2015). *Turkish company Favori turns around fortunes at Aden Adde Abdulle Airport.* [online] Available at: <https://goobjoog.com/english/turkish-company-favori-turns-around-fortunes-at-aden-adde-abdulle-airport/> [Accessed 7 Aug. 2022].

GOV.UK. (2012). *London Conference on Somalia: Communique.* [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-conference-on-somalia-communique--2> [Accessed 19 Jun. 2021].

Gunay, M. (2011) Turkey-Africa Relations, [online] available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/14_0411gunay.pdf (accessed 12 February 2020).

Habiyaremye, A. and Oğuzlu, T. (2016) Engagement with Africa: Making Sense of Turkey's Approach in the Context of Growing East-West Rivalry, [online] available at:http://www.uidergisi.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/41_2.pdf (accessed 7 July 2019).

Hajayandi, P. (2019). *Op-Ed: Sudan at a crossroads: The leadership of the African Union needs to be stepped up*. [online] Daily Maverick. Available at: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-18-sudan-at-a-crossroads-the-leadership-of-the-african-union-needs-to-be-stepped-up/> [Accessed 12 Jan. 2022].

Hajjaj, M. (2021). *Maarif-run school in Sudan opens for new academic year*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/maarif-run-school-in-sudan-opens-for-new-academic-year/2130845> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Hammond, P. (2018). *Somalia, 1992–94*. [online] www.manchesterhive.com. Manchester University Press. Available at: <https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/9781526130914/9781526130914.00007.xml> [Accessed 11 Jun. 2021].

Hammoura, J. (2016) Turkey expanding to Africa: A case of strategic diversification, [online] available at: <http://www.ioehammoura.com/turkish-affairs/1118/> (accessed 12 March 2020).

Harish Venugopalan (2017). *Observer Research Foundation*. [online] ORF. Available at: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/somalia-a-failed-state/> [Accessed 16 Jun. 2022].

Harmer, A. (2004). *Aid to Poorly Performing Countries: Sudan Case Study Background Paper 5 for ODI study on Poor Performing Countries*. [online] Available at: <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/6153.pdf> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

Harboring ambitions: Gulf states scramble for Somalia. (2018). *Reuters*. [online] 1 May. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-gulf-analysis-idUSKBN1I23B4> [Accessed 18 Jun. 2022].

Harper, M. (2019). Somalia: Jihadists attack US training base at Baledogle. *BBC News*. [online] 30 Sep. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49879607> [Accessed 19 May 2021].

Hausmann, J. (2014) Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation, [online] available at: http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5599/pdf/DP_14.2014.pdf (accessed 27 January 2020).

Hausmann, J. and Lundsgaarde, E. (n.d.). *Turkey's Role in Development Cooperation*. [online] Available at: https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3325/unu_cpr_turkey_dev.pdf [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022].

Healy, S. and Bradbury, M. (2010). *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict | Conciliation Resources*. [online] C-r.org. Available at: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict> [Accessed 12 Aug. 2021].

Herring, E. et.al (2020) Somalia, fragmented hybrid governance and inclusive development, [online] available at:

Hirsch, J. (2012) London Conference on Somalia: New Roadmap, Old Concerns, [online] available at: <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/02/london-conference-on-somalia-new-roadmap-old-concerns/> (accessed 18 May 2021).

History of successful and coup attempts wey fail for Sudan since independence. (n.d.). *BBC News Pidgin*. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2022].

Hoffmann, A. (2022). The West's struggle in Sudan Standing with the people while being stuck with the coup regime. [online] Available at:

[https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/Policy brief The Wests struggle in Sudan.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/Policy%20brief%20The%20West's%20struggle%20in%20Sudan.pdf) [Accessed 13 Oct. 2022].

Holmes, S.A. (1993). TERRORISTS HELPED BY SUDAN, U.S. SAYS. *The New York Times*. [online] 19 Aug. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/19/world/terrorists-helped-by-sudan-us-says.html> [Accessed 17 Jun. 2022].

HPG, (2012) Humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan: the need for a political solution. [online] available at; <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/7691.pdf> [Accessed 27 Nov. 2021].

OECD (2016) OECD Economic Survey: Turkey. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/turkey-2016-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf> (accessed 14 February 2020).

<https://www.washingtontimes.com>, T.W.T. (n.d.). *THALER: China's foreign aid to Africa*. [online] The Washington Times. Available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/14/chinas-foreign-aid-to-africa/>. [Accessed 20 Dec. 2022].

Hürriyet Daily News. (2016). *Turkish charity builds children's hospital in Somalia - World News*. [online] Available at: <https://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkish-charity-builds-childrens-hospital-in-somalia----95722> [Accessed 7 Aug. 2022].

Hurriyet, (2018). Turkey aims to open more embassies in Africa, says Erdoğan. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-aims-to-open-more-embassies-in-africa-says-erdogan-136561> (accessed 11 October 2019).

ICG (2018). The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa. [online] Available at: <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b065-the-united-arab-emirates-in-the-horn-of-africa.pdf> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

ICG, (2021) Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia, [online] available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b176-reforming-au-mission-somalia> (accessed 14 June 2022).

ICVA. (2019). *ICVA-Positive Disruption? China's Humanitarian Aid*. [online] Available at: <https://www.icvanetwork.org/resource/positive-disruption-chinas-humanitarian-aid/> [Accessed 25 Dec. 2022].

Iddon, P. (2019) *The significance of Turkey's overseas military bases*. [online] Available at: <https://ahvalnews.com/turkish-military/significance-turkeys-overseas-military-bases> [Accessed 02 Jan. 2023].

IFRC, (2022) Somalia - Hunger Crisis 2021-2022, [online] available at: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. (2011). *IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation*. [online] Available at: <https://ihh.org.tr/en/news/3rd-cataract-surgery-center-opened-in-sudan-883> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

International Labour Organisation (1996). Trade Unions and Structural Adjustment a Guide for Trade Union Participation. [online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_111437.pdf [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Iman, F. (2021). US to Review Support for Elite Somali Military Unit. [online] VOA. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-to-review-support-for-elite-somali-military-unit-6286599.html> [Accessed 2 Feb. 2022].

IMF. (2014). *Factsheet - Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative*. [online] Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

Integrated Country Strategy SOMALIA FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. (2022). [online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_AF_Somalia_Public.pdf [Accessed 10 Nov. 2022].

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2022). *Sudan: Violence exacerbating poverty and food insecurity*. [online] Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/sudan-violence-exacerbating-poverty-and-food-insecurity> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

International Criminal Court (2019). *Al Bashir Case*. [online] lcc-cpi.int. Available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir> [Accessed 10 Oct. 2021].

Isbister, R. and Donnelly, T. (2012). International Markets for Security and Military Assistance. www.oecd-ilibrary.org. [online] doi:10.1787/5k49dfgj2r4-en, [Accessed 20 Dec. 2022].

Izobo, M. (2020). Title: The Impact of Foreign Aid in Africa: A case study of Botswana and Somalia. [online] Available at: <https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/prolaw/documents/volume-5/2020%20PROLAW%20Journal%20Mary%20Izobo.pdf> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

J Spencer Trimingham and Leiper, T. (1970). *A history of Islam in West Africa*,. London, New York, Published For The University Of Glasgow By The Oxford U.P.

Jama, M. (n.d.). *Somalia and Somaliland: Ruminations on an Interim Settlement Process*. [online] Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/158198533.pdf> [Accessed 10 Aug. 2021].

JIA SIPA (2019). Governance Without Government in the Somali Territories. [online] JIA SIPA. Available at: <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/governance-without-government-somali-territories> [Accessed 6 Jun. 2021].

Jones, S. et.al. (2006) Limited Electronic Distribution Rights. [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG550.pdf [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

Just Security. (2022). *Still at War: The United States in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://www.justsecurity.org/80921/still-at-war-the-united-states-in-somalia/> [Accessed 14 Oct. 2021].

Kahiye, M. (2021) Al-Shabab Threatens to Disrupt Upcoming Somali Elections, [online] available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_al-shabab-threatens-disrupt-upcoming-somali-elections/6208532.html (accessed 18 May 2022).

Kalmoy, A.D. (2021). Turkey-Somalia Relations: A Decade of Substantial Strategic Cooperation. [online] Politics Today. Available at: <https://politicstoday.org/turkey-somalia-strategic-cooperation/> [Accessed 12 Sep. 2021].

Kasapoglu, C. (2017) Turkey's Forward-Basing Posture, [online] available at: <http://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/sinirstratejisi.pdf> (accessed 02 February 2020).

Kaya, K. and Warner, J. (2012) Turkey and Africa: A Rising Military Partnership? [online] available at: https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jasonwarner/files/kaya_and_warner_2013_turkey-africa.pdf (accessed 03 February 2020).

Kedem, Sh. (2021) Erdogan Pledges to Double Bilateral Trade at Turkey-Africa Business Forum, [online] <https://african.business/2021/10/trade-investment/erdogan-eyes-deals-at-turkey-africa-summit/> (accessed May 14 2021).

Kedir, A. (2016) Turkey's Emerging Economic Ties in The Horn Of Africa: The Rise of Virtual State, [online] available at: <https://dergipark.org.tr/download/article-file/581702> (accessed 22 July 2019).

Kenez, L. (2022). *Turkey's ambitious project in Sudan turns into a fiasco - Nordic Monitor*. [online] Available at: <https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/04/turkeys-ambitious-project-in-sudan-turns-into-a-fiasco/> [Accessed 4 Oct. 2022].

Kenyon, P. (2018) Turkey is Quietly Building its Presence in Africa, [online] available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/08/590934127/turkey-is-quietly-building-its-presence-in-africa> (accessed 11 March 2020).

Keyman, E.F. and Sazak, O. (2014) Turkey as a "Humanitarian State", [online] available at: <http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/31364/1/keyman-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2020).

Kirby, J. (2019). *Sudan signs power-sharing deal as its former dictator goes to trial*. [online] Vox. Available at: <https://www.vox.com/2019/8/19/20812054/sudan-power-sharing-deal-al-bashir-trial> [Accessed 14 Mar. 2021].

Kitano, N. and Miyabayashi, Y. (2020). [online] Available at: https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/other/175nbg000019o0pq-att/Estimating_Chinas_Foreign_Aid_2019-2020.pdf [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Kleven, A. (2019). Belt and Road: colonialism with Chinese characteristics. [online] www.lowyinstitute.org. Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-colonialism-chinese-characteristics> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Kopar, R. (2020). *Will Turkey Explore Oil in Somalia?* [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/analysis/will-turkey-explore-oil-in-somalia/28592> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2022].

Kratz, A., Feng, A. and Wright, L. (2019). New Data on the 'Debt Trap' Question. [online] Rhodium Group. Available at: <https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Kutlay, M. (2015) The Turkish Economy at a Crossroads: Unpacking Turkey's Current Account Challenge, [online] available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_10.pdf (accessed 12 April 2019).

Kwemo, A.B. (2017). Making Africa Great Again: Reducing aid dependency. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/20/making-africa-great-again-reducing-aid-dependency/> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

Kurtzer, J. (2022). China's Humanitarian Aid: Cooperation amidst Competition. [online] Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-humanitarian-aid-cooperation-amidst-competition> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

Le Sage, A. (2010). Strategic Forum 1 the TFG to engage in political deal-making that co-opts key subclans and elite actors, and lays the groundwork for effective security operations at a later stage. [online] Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120328/SF257.pdf> [Accessed 25 Feb. 2022].

LEDERER, E.M. (2021). *UN holds emergency session on Somalia's political crisis*. [online] Available at: <https://news.yahoo.com/un-holds-emergency-session-somalias-030407848.html> [Accessed 9 Feb. 2022].

Lin, B. (2021). U.S. Allied and Partner Support for Taiwan [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA1100/CTA1194-1/RAND_CTA1194-1.pdf [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Liu, A. and Tang, B. (2017) US and China Aid to Africa: Impact on the Donor-Recipient Trade Relations, [online] available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bbf0/3a5ca8dd9f84de9976d779e236bb7ed1045d.pdf> (accessed 9 July 2019).

Livingston, I. (2018). *Somalia, facing severe challenges, also shows signs of hope*. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/03/somalia-facing-severe-challenges-also-shows-signs-of-hope/> [Accessed 9 Feb. 2022].

Lomøy, J. (2021) Chinese aid – a blessing for Africa and a challenge to western donors
Lons, C. (2021). *The Gulf states and the Sudan coup – all is not what it seems*. [online] IISS. Available at: <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/11/gulf-states-and-the-sudan-coup> [Accessed 11 Nov. 2021].

Lucas, B. (2022). *China's humanitarian assistance activities in Africa Question*. [online] Available at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/17394/1114_China_hu-manitarian_aid_in_Africa.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

Lyman, P. (2012) China and the US in Africa: A Strategic Competition or an Opportunity for Cooperation? [online] available at: https://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/ChinaandUS_Africa.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2020).

Lyons, J. (2014). Foreign aid is hurting, not helping Sub-Saharan Africa. [online] Le Journal International - Archives. Available at: https://www.lejournalinternational.fr/Foreign-aid-is-hurting-not-helping-Sub-Saharan-Africa_a2085.html Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

Magid, P. and Umar, F. (2018) How Turkey's lira crisis was written in [online] available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/23/how-turkeys-lira-crisis-was-written-in-istanbuls-skyline> (accessed 5 February 2020).

Majid, N., Sarkar, A., Elder, C., Abdirahman, K., Detzner, S., Miller, J. and De Waal, A. (n.d.). *Somalia's Politics: The Usual Business? Conflict Research Programme*. [online] Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110878/1/Somalia_synthesis_v3.pdf [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Mandrup, T. (2021). Security in Somalia beyond 2021 – the future role of AMISOM and the international community. [online] ACCORD. Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/security-in-somalia-beyond-2021-the-future-role-of-amisom-and-the-international-community/> [Accessed 2 Feb. 2022].

Mark, T. and Julian, B. (2012). Somalia urged to unite behind stable government. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/23/somalia-urged-unite-stable-government> [Accessed 13 Nov. 2021].

Mashamoun, J. (2022). *Turkey and Sudan: An enduring relationship?* [online] Available at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-sudan-enduring-relationship#:~:text=Turkey%20has%20been%20actively%20spreading> [Accessed 25 Sep. 2022].

Mason, R. (2016). OECD redefines foreign aid to include some military spending. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/feb/20/oecd-redefines-foreign-aid-to-include-some-military-spending> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2022].

Mather, Y. (2014) The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and Current Conflict in the Middle East, [online] available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270450361_The_Fall_of_the_Ottoman_Empire_and_Current_Conflict_in_the_Middle_East (accessed 12 February 2020).

Matt, K. and Ismail, E. (n.d.). *Proxy War in the Horn of Africa*. [online] Available at: - <https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/proxy-war-horn-africa> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021].

Matteo Salvatore (2019). *African prester john and the birth of ethiopian -european relations, 1402-1555*.

Max Security. (2015). *Tensions Escalate Between Somalia and UAE over port deal | MAX Blog*. [online] Available at: <https://www.max-security.com/security-blog/tetstetete/> [Accessed 19 Jun. 2022].

Maxwell, D., Majid, N., Adan, G., Abdirahman, K. and Kim, J. (2015). *Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice Facing Famine Somali Experiences in the Famine of 2011*. [online] Available at: <https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/Facing-Famine-high-quality.pdf> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Mazarr, M.J., Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N., Blank, J., Charap, S., Chase, M.S., Grill, B., Grossman, D., Massicot, D., Moroney, J.D.P., Morris, L.J., Noyes, A., Pezard, S., Rhoades, A.L., Shih, A., Stalczyński, M., Shostak, M., Thaler, D.E. and Walker, D. (2022).

Meltem, M. (2016) Turkey as an Emerging Power: An Analysis of its Role in Global and Regional Security Governance Constellations, [online] available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31325/RSCAS_2014_52.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 04 February 2020).

Middle East Centre. (2020). *Sudan's Transitional Process in the Face of Regional Rivalries*. [online] Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/11/20/sudans-transitional-process-in-the-face-of-regional-rivalries/> [Accessed 21 Aug. 2021].

Middle East Monitor. (2017). *Turkey, Sudan sign 21 cooperation agreements*. [online] Available at: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171227-turkey-sudan-sign-21-cooperation-agreements/> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

Middle East Monitor. (2018). *Turkish firm to build new Khartoum international airport*. [online] Available at: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180324-turkish-firm-to-build-new-khartoum-international-airport/> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Miller, E.A. (2022). *More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If*. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/china-military-bases-africa-navy-pla-geopolitics-strategy/> [Accessed 29 Dec. 2022].

Miquel-Florensa, J. (2007). *Aid Effectiveness: A comparison of Tied and Untied Aid*. [online] Available at: https://www.yorku.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/205/2020/10/April2007_TiedUntied.pdf [Accessed 13 Dec. 2022].

Mohammed, S. and Yahia (2015). *The Turkish Impact on the Changes Of The Sudanese Socio-Cultural Life and Development*. [online] Available at: <https://www.ayk.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/MOHAMMED-Suleiman-Yahia-THE-TURKISH-IMPACT-ON-THE-CHANGES-OF-THE-SUDANESE-SOCIO-CULTURAL-LIFE-AND-DEVELOPMENT.pdf> [Accessed 25 Sep. 2022].

MOHAMOUD, A.M. (2021). *Turkey-Somalia multitiered relations: Economic vantage point | Opinion*. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkey-somalia-multitiered-relations-economic-vantage-point> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2022].

Montinola, G.R. (2010). When Does Aid Conditionality Work? *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45(3), pp.358–382. doi:10.1007/s12116-010-9068-6.

Moore, J. (2018) Crisis Averted in Somalia's Parliament, but Tensions Simmer, [online] available: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/world/africa/somalia-parliament.html> (accessed 18 May 2022).

Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. (2021). *Is the Muslim Brotherhood losing Turkey and Qatar in the light of the rapprochement with Egypt?* [online] Available at: <https://dayan.org/content/muslim-brotherhood-losing-turkey-and-qatar-light-rapprochement-egypt> [Accessed 11 Oct. 2021].

Moubayed, S. (2018). Turkish base in Sudan a problem for Arab powers. [online] Madote. Available at: <http://www.madote.com/2017/12/turkish-base-in-sudan-problem-for-arab.html> [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022].

Moubayed, S. (2020). Erdogan's Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Africa. [online] European Eye on Radicalization. Available at: <https://eeradicalization.com/erdogans-turkey-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-africa/> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021].

Mquirmi, N. (2021). *PP-25-21 The Sudan at a Crossroads: Multi-layered Fragility*. [online] Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2022-01/PP_25-21_Nihal.pdf [Accessed 21 Jun. 2021].

Mueller, J., Qian, N., Jayachandran, S., Morjaria, A., Udry, C., Baliga, S., Bianchi, N., Boxell, L., Bandiera, O., Dahis, R., Do, Q.-A., Hsieh, C.-T., Karlan, D., Liu, C., Magnaricotte, M., Makarin, A., Naidu, S., Ponticelli, J., Porcellacchia, M. and Redding, S. (2022). *China's Foreign Aid: Political Determinants and Economic Effects* *. [online] Available at: https://www.jorismueller.com/files/chinaaid_latest_draft.pdf [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Mukami, M. (2020). *Somalia: Turkish company to manage Port of Mogadishu*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-turkish-company-to-manage-port-of-mogadishu/2004042> [Accessed 7 Aug. 2022].

Muluneh, N. (2018) Why Africa Remains Underdeveloped Despite its Potential? Which Theory Can Help Africa to Develop? [online] available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325104326_Why_Africa_Remains_Underdeveloped_Despite_its_Potential_Which_Theory_can_Help_Africa_to_Develop (accessed 25 July 2019).

Naidu, S. and Dube, O. (2010). *Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia - Working Paper 197*. [online] Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/bases-bullets-and-ballots-effect-us-military-aid-political-conflict-colombia-working> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

NASSIR, İ. (2017). *Turkey's Military Base in Somalia: Goals and Probable Risks*. [online] ANKASAM | Ankara Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Merkezi. Available at: <https://www.ankasam.org/turkeys-military-base-in-somalia-goals-and-probable-risks/?lang=en> [Accessed 02 Jan. 2023].

Nazli, H.K. (2005) Turkey and North Africa: Challenge and Opportunity, [online] available at: https://esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpg_id_33.pdf (accessed 2 February, 2020).

NBC News. (n.d.). *Ethiopian troops enter central Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna12035106> [Accessed 2 Jul. 2022].

Newman, J.L. (1997). *The peopling of Africa : a geographic interpretation*. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press.

News, A.B.C. (2020). Trump lifts sanctions on Sudan as he announces deal between African nation and Israel. [online] ABC News. Available at: <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-lifts-sanctions-sudan-announces-deal-israel/story?id=73788360> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

News.cgtn.com. (2021). *China tops world for the first time in outward foreign direct investment*. [online] Available at: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-09-29/China-s-ODI-up-12-3-in-2020-13WBTGvyKCQ/index.html> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

Newton, K. and Van Deth. (2010). *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, [online] available from: <https://www.cambridge.org/tw/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/foundations-comparative-politics-2nd-edition?format=AR&isbn=9780521199889> (accessed 12 June 2020).

Nordicmonitor.com. (2022). *UN probes Turkish firm that delivered military equipment to Somalia without notification - Nordic Monitor*. [online] Available at: <https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/un-probes-firm-that-delivered-military/> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

OCHA (2015) *Introduction to Humanitarian Action*. [online] Available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/rc_guide_31_october_2015_webversion_final.pdf [Accessed 10 Dec. 2022].

Ocheni, S. and Nwankwo, B. (2012) *Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa*, [online] available at: https://www.tralac.org/images/News/Documents/Analysis_of_Colonialism_and_Its_Impact_in_Africa_Ocheni_and_Nwankwo_CSCanada_2012.pdf (accessed 11 March 2020).

OECD (2002) *Foreign direct investment for development maximising benefits, minimising costs*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf> [Accessed 10 Dec. 2022].

OECD (2016) *OECD Economic Survey: Turkey*, [online] available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-turkey_19990480 (accessed 25 July 2019).

OECD (2018). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf> [Accessed 17 Oct. 2022].

OECD (2023). *Untied aid - OECD*. Review of the DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2023. [online] www.oecd.org. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

OHCHR. (2015). *UN Human Rights Chief alarmed by Thai Government's adoption of potentially unlimited and 'draconian' powers*. [online] Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2015/04/un-human-rights-chief-alarmed-thai-governments-adoption-potentially?LangID=E&NewsID=15793> [Accessed 16 Nov. 2020].

Omar, M. (2021). *African Studies: One-Year master's degree Thesis 15 Credits. Second Cycle Level1 Somali Irredentism: An analysis of its causes and its impact on political stability in Somalia from 1960 -1991*. [online] Available at: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1580508/FULLTEXT01.pdf> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

OpenDemocracy. (2021). *In Sudan's new revolt, women and youth will not settle for less than full civilian rule*. [online] Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/in-sudans-new-revolt-women-and-youth-will-not-settle-for-less-than-full-civilian-rule/> [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021].

Orakçi, S. (2022) *The Rise of Turkey in Africa | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*. [online] Available at: <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/rise-turkey-africa> [Accessed 6 May. 2023].

Owens, T., Lawson, L. and Kadhim, A. (2008). *NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA*. [online] Available at: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483490.pdf> [Accessed 11 Aug. 2022].

Özerdem, A. (2013) *How Turkey is Emerging as a Development Partner in Africa*, [online] available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/10/turkey-development-partner-africa> (accessed 14 February 2020).

Özkan, M. (2008) *Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects*, [online] available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/40439973_Turkey_Discovers_Africa_Implications_and_Prospects (accessed 07 February 2020).

Özkan, M. (2010) *Turkey's Rising Role in Africa*, [online] available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220048169_Turkey's_Rising_Role_in_Africa (accessed 10 March 2020).

Özkan, M. (2016) *Turkey's African Experience: From Venture to Normalisation*, [online] available at: <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1620.pdf> (accessed February 2020).

Ozturk and Faruk, (2019) *Turkey's Activities 'Wholeheartedly' Welcomed in Africa*, [online] available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-s-activities-wholeheartedly-welcomed-in-africa/1619913> (accessed May 14 2021).

Parry, V.J. (1990). *The Ottoman empire 1520–1566*. 2nd ed. [online] Cambridge University Press. Available at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/new-cambridge-modern-history/ottoman-empire-15201566/174B9A5C5929881D3EFEDDE606EE8025> [Accessed 26 Sep. 2022].

Paul, W. (n.d.). *What Went Wrong With The Somali National Army*. [online] Available at: - <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/what-went-wrong-with-the-somali-national-army/> [Accessed 21 Feb. 2022].

Pei, M. (2020). *China's expensive bet on Africa has failed*. [online] Available at: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-expensive-bet-on-Africa-has-failed> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Phillips, K. (2013). *The history of foreign aid*. *ABC News*. [online] 17 Dec. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-history-of-foreign-aid/5162100> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Ploeg, F. (2007) Africa and Natural Resources: Managing Natural Resources for Sustainable Growth, [online] available at: https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/images/Documents/OxCarre_Policy_Papers/oxcarrepp200801.pdf (accessed 23 July 2019).

Pulitzer Center. (2018). *In the Valley of Death: Somaliland's Forgotten Genocide*. [online] Available at: <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/valley-death-somalilands-forgotten-genocide> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

RaboBank, (2016) Turkey Achievement and Challenges, [online] available at: https://economics.rabobank.com/PageFiles/551/SP1204aru_Turkey_Achievements_and_challenges.pdf (accessed 13 February 2020).

Rakipoğlu, M. (2021). *Sudan and Turkey Head towards Strategic Cooperation?* [online] Politics Today. Available at: <https://politicstoday.org/sudan-and-turkey-cooperation/> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Ramani, S. (2021). *What UAE's growing presence in Somaliland means for its Horn of Africa strategy - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East*. [online] www.al-monitor.com. Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/what-uaes-growing-presence-somaliland-means-its-horn-africa-strategy> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2021].

Recep, H. And Erdoğan, T. (N.D.). *CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY ADDRESS PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY TO THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE 66th SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY NEW YORK, 22 SEPTEMBER 2011*. [Online] Available At: https://Gadebate.Un.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Gastatements/66/TR_En.Pdf [Accessed 10 Aug. 2022].

Refugees, U.N.H.C. for (n.d.). *Refworld | Security Council resolution 1356 (2001) [on the situation in Somalia]*. [online] Refworld. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e945318.html> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Reinl, J. (2014). *Somaliland massacre*. [online] www.aljazeera.com. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/2/6/investigating-genocide-in-somaliland> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

Reliefweb.int. (n.d.). *Summary Paper: Consultations on a*
Rémy, J.-P. (2011). *Kenya develops plan for satellite region of Jubaland on Somali border*. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/08/somali-fears-in-kenya-conflicts> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2021].

ResearchGate. (2013). *(PDF) The Determinants of Unemployment in Sudan: A Co-integration and Error Correction Model Analysis (1981-2011)*. [online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326009478_The_Determinants_of_Unemployment_in_Sudan_A_Co-integration_and_Error_Correction_Model_Analysis_1981-2011 [Accessed 22 June 2021].

Resnick, D. (2016). [online] Available at: <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/42048/chapter/355810243?login=true> [Accessed 22 Oct. 2022].
Reuters, (2017) Turkey to restore Sudanese Red Sea port and build naval dock. [online] 26 Dec. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sudan-port-idUSKBN1EK0ZC> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

Reuters, (2018) Turkey signs agriculture, oil exploration deals with Sudan [online] 11 Sep. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-sudan-idUKKCN1LR13A> [Accessed 4 Oct. 2022].

Robinson, C.D. (2019). The Somali National Army: an assessment. *Defense & Security Analysis*, [online] 35(2), p.1. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/38914771/The_Somali_National_Army_an_assessment [Accessed 12 Aug. 2021].

Robinson, T. and Walker, N. (2019). *Political situation in Sudan*. [online] Available at: <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2019-0158/CDP-2019-0158.pdf> [Accessed 7 Jul. 2021].

SABAH, D. (2021). *Turkey provides special commando training to 150 Somali soldiers*. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkey-provides-special-commando-training-to-150-somali-soldiers/news> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021].

Samson, C. (2022). *Ex-UN attorney says the organization ignores China's alleged human rights abuses due to financial power*. [online] Available at: <https://nextshark.com/ex-employee-un-neglecting-chinas-abuses> [Accessed 24 Dec. 2022].

Sawahel, W. (2015). *Turkey and Sudan announce higher education initiatives*. [online] Available at: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2015012210272387> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

Schmitt, E. (2022). U.S. Carries Out First Airstrike in Somalia Since August. *The New York Times*. [online] 24 Feb. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/politics/somalia-shabab-us-airstrike.html> [Accessed 10 Oct. 2021].

Scoones, I. (2019). The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: what's in it for Africa? [online] STEPS Centre. Available at: <https://steps-centre.org/blog/the-chinese-belt-and-road-initiative-whats-in-it-for-africa/> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Seale, P. (2009) *The Rise and Rise of Turkey*, [online] available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/opinion/05iht-edseale.html> (accessed 10 April, 2020).

Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, James Dobbins (2006). *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? US Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes* [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG550.pdf. [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Shay, Sh. (2018) *Turkey – Sudan Strategic Relations and the Implications for the Region*, [online] available at: http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Shaul_Shay_TurkeySudan_11_01_18A.pdf (accessed 12 February 2020).

Sheikh, A. (2017). Somalia rebukes its states for breaking with Qatar. *Reuters*. [online] 21 Sep. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-gulf-idUSKCN1BW2O5> [Accessed 13 Sep. 2021].

Shinn, D. (2015) *Turkey's engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Shifting alliances and strategic diversification*, [online] available from:

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150909TurkeySubSaharanAfricaShinn.pdf (accessed 02 April 2018).

Shleifer, A. (2009) Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid Citation Terms of Use. (n.d.). [online] Available at: <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8705862/bauer.2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

Sidhu, W.P.S. (2014). *WPS Sidhu on Contemporary Geopolitics*. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

Siegel, A. (1991). *Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia*, [online] cna.org. Available at: https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/2791021100.pdf [Accessed 14 Apr. 2022].

Sikainga, A. (2009). 'The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis': Understanding the Darfur Conflict. [online] Origins. Available at: https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en [Accessed 15 Oct 2022].

Sipri.org. (2018). *UN arms embargo on Somalia | SIPRI*. [online] Available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/embarques/un_arms_embarques/somalia [Accessed 16 Jun. 2022].

SKULD (2021). INSIGHT: Sudan Sanctions. [online] www.skuld.com. Available at: <https://www.skuld.com/topics/legal/sanctions/sudan/insight-sudan-sanctions/> [Accessed 21 Nov. 2021].

Sollenberg, M. (2012). A Scramble for Rents Foreign Aid and Armed Conflict. [online] Available at: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:512184/FULLTEXT01.pdf> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2022].

Somalia PM Roble defiant after President Farmajo suspends him. (2021). *BBC News*. [online] 27 Dec. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59800515> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2022].

Somalia.un.org. (n.d.). *Aid Flows in Somalia 2021 | United Nations in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://somalia.un.org/en/160002-aid-flows-somalia-2021> [Accessed 16 Jun. 2022].

Somalia's new president elected by 327 people. (2022). *BBC News*. [online] 15 May. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61438047> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

Souki, H. (2020). *Foreign Aid's Efficacy through Conditionality*. [online] Available at: <https://borgenproject.org/efficacy-through-conditionality/> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Southern Sudan Referendum on Self-Determination: Legal Challenges and Procedural Solutions. (n.d.). [online] Available at: <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE10.1Marzatico.pdf> [Accessed 27 Nov. 2021].

Stats.gov.cn. (2020). *Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2020 National Economic and Social Development*. [online] Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202102/t20210228_1814177.html [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

STEARNS, J. and SUCUOGLU, G. (2017). *South–South Cooperation and Peacebuilding: Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia*. [online] JSTOR. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25981?seq=1> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Steinberg, G. (2014) *The Gulf States and the Muslim Brotherhood*. [online] Available at: <https://pomeps.org/the-gulf-states-and-the-muslim-brotherhood> [Accessed 2 Dec. 2022].

Stevens, L. and Wang, D. (2020). *Sudan: Freedom, Peace, and Justice*. [online] Available at: <https://carleton.ca/cifp/wp-content/uploads/Sudan-Fragility-Brief-2020-1.pdf> [Accessed 13 Dec. 2021].

Strategic Dimensions of The Sudanese-Turkish Relations and Their Impact on Turkish-African Relations Sudan-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Stratejik Boyutları Ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkilerine Etkisi. (n.d.). [online] Available at: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2094413> [Accessed 21 Aug. 2021].

Strategy, K.S.F.P.R.I. · D., Division PhD, G., agriculture, H. assessment of upstream water management on downstream, hydropower, construction and environment. (n.d.). *Khalid SIDDIG | Senior Research Fellow/Program Leader | PhD, Habilitation | International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. | Development Strategy and Governance Division*. [online] ResearchGate. Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Khalid-Siddiq> [Accessed 10 Oct. 2020].

Sucuoglu, G. and Stearns, J. (2016). *TURKEY IN SOMALIA: SHIFTING PARADIGMS OF AID*. [online] Available at: https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/publication_turkey_somalia_shifting_paradigms_aid_sucuoglu_stearns_final_web.pdf [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Sudan central bank signs \$2 bln loan with Turkish firm. (2018). *Reuters*. [online] 9 Mar. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-sudan-idUSL5N1QR0ZN> [Accessed 15 Nov. 2020].

Sudan Economic Crisis. (2019). [online] Available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20190213_acaps_briefing_note_sudan_economic_crisis.pdf [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

Sun, Y. (2014). [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

Sykes, P. (2015) *Roles and Reality: Turkish and Brazilian Engagement with Africa*, [online] available at: <https://dergipark.org.tr/download/article-file/43401> (accessed 5 March 2020).

Szable, C. (2018) *When the Ottoman Empire Scrambled for Africa: An Interview With Mostafa Minawi*, [online] available at: <https://toynbeeprize.org/interviews/mostafa-minawi/> (accessed 10 February 2020).

Tarihi, G. (2012) *Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, o balıkçıyı unutmadı*. [online] Available at: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-gul-o-balikciyi-unutmadi-20969039> [Accessed 1 Jan. 2023].

Tarihi, G. (2018). *Sudan’s Suakin reveal the location for Turkish military base*. [online] <https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/>. Available at: <https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/africa/sudan-s-suakin-reveal-the-location-for-turkish-military-base-h207207.html> [Accessed 9 Feb. 2022].

Tekingunduz, A. (2019). *The Saudis, Emiratis, and the future of Turkish projects in Sudan*. [online] Available at: <https://www.trtworld.com/africa/the-saudis-emiratis-and-the-future-of-turkish-projects-in-sudan-26103> [Accessed 8 Oct. 2022].

The Economist. (2020). The pandemic is hurting China's Belt and Road Initiative. [online] Available at: <https://www.economist.com/china/2020/06/04/the-pandemic-is-hurting-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative> [Accessed 23 Dec. 2022].

The New Humanitarian. (2019). *Blue Nile: 'Prepare for peace and prepare for war'*. [online] Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/06/11/Sudan-Khartoum-blue-nile-prepare-peace-and-prepare-war> [Accessed 27 Nov. 2021].

Thiel, M. (2004). The conditionality of U.S. & E.U. development aid upon democratization -A comparison. [online] 2(1). Available at: https://www.politicas.unam.mx/cee/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/conditionality_us_ue_development_democratization.pdf [Accessed 22 Oct. 2022].

Thus, W.B.S. to T.N.Y. (1973). U.S. HEARS SOVIET HAS SOMALI BASE. *The New York Times*. [online] 9 Apr. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/09/archives/us-hears-soviet-has-somali-base-moscow-naval-center-said-to-have.html> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2021].

Tokyay, M. (2017). Turkey, Sudan to boost economic and political ties. [online] Arab News. Available at: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1214516/middle-east> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Trading Economics (2023). *Turkey Exports to Somalia - 2023 Data 2024 Forecast 1989-2022 Historical*. [online] Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports/somalia#:~:text=Turkey%20Exports%20to%20Somalia%20was> [Accessed 9 Aug. 2022].

TRTWorld (2020). *Countering UAE, Somalia signs port deal with Turkish company*. [online] Available at: <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/countering-uae-somalia-signs-port-deal-with-turkish-company-40549> [Accessed 7 Aug. 2022].

TSAM (2021) Turkey -Sudan Strategic Dialogue 'Thinking Diplomacy: New World New Horizons' (Turkey -Sudan). (n.d.). [online] Available at: https://tasam.org/Files/Etkinlik/File/VizyonBelgesi/SUS_Vizyon_EN_pdf_80316f87-dd48-4d57-9cf6-fbb299027190.pdf. [Accessed 25 Sep. 2022].

Tsikata, T.M (1998). Aid Effectiveness: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature [online] Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ppaa/ppaa9801.pdf> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

Turkey MFA (2022). Relations between Turkey and Sudan / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [online] www.mfa.gov.tr. Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-sudan.en.mfa> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

Tüyoğlu, Y. (2021). *Turkish Development Assistance as a Foreign Policy Tool and Its Discordant Locations*. [online] Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/CATS_Working_Paper_Nr_2_2021_Turkish_Development_Assistance_as_a_Foreign_Policy_Tool.pdf [Accessed 31 Dec. 2022].

Understanding US Policy in Somalia Current Challenges and Future Options. (2020). [online] Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2020-07-14-us-policy-somalia-williams.pdf> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2022].

Unescap.org. (2009). *What is Good Governance? | United Nations ESCAP*. [online] Available at: <https://www.unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance> [Accessed 14 Dec. 2022].

UNHCR (2017). SOMALIA SITUATION 2017 Supplementary Appeal. [online] Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/591ae0e17.pdf> [Accessed 9 Feb. 2022].

UNMIS. (2017). *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*. [online] Available at: <https://unmis.unmissions.org/comprehensive-peace-agreement> [Accessed 27 Nov. 2021].
USHomeTreasury (2021). Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations. [online] Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20210519_sudan.pdf [Accessed 16 Feb. 2022].

Van den Berg, W. and Meester, J. (2019). Turkey in the Horn of Africa: Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis. [online] JSTOR. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21324?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

Venkatachalam, M. (2019) Turkey in Africa: Voyeurism, Neo-Ottomanism and Islamic Humanitarianism, [online] available at: <https://www.ascleiden.nl/news/working-paper-turkey-africa-voyeurism-neo-ottomanism-and-islamic-humanitarianism> (accessed 12 August 2019).

Venkateswaran, L. (2020). China's belt and road initiative: Implications in Africa. [online] ORF. Available at: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-in-africa/> [Accessed 21 Oct. 2022].

Vertin, Z. (2019) Turkey and the New Scramble for Africa: Ottoman Designs or Unfounded Fears, [online] available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-and-the-new-scramble-for-africa-ottoman-designs-or-unfounded-fears/> (accessed 15 March 2020).

Vidino, L. (2020). *THE ARCHITECTS OF SALVATION*. [online] Available at: <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Kemal%20Helbawy-%20A%20Pioneer%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20the%20West.pdf> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

VOA. (2011). *Siad Barre's Fall Blamed for Somalia's Collapse into Civil War*. [online] Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/siad-barre-fall-led-into-civil-war-020111-115008454/134345.html> [Accessed 14 Oct. 2021].

VOA. (2019). *A Timeline of Key Events in Rule of Sudan's al-Bashir*. [online] Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/a-timeline-of-key-events-in-rule-of-sudan-s-al-bashir/4871412.html> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

VOA. (2022). *Al-Shabab Increases Attacks as Elections Drag in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-increases-attacks-as-elections-drag-in-somalia-/6501820.html> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

Walsh, D., Dahir, A.L. and Marks, S. (2021). Sudan's Military Seizes Power, Casting Democratic Transition Into Chaos. *The New York Times*. [online] 25 Oct. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/world/africa/sudan-military-coup.html> [Accessed 21 Aug. 2021].

Watanabe, Y., Chakraborty, S. and Weiss, P. (2006). *What Determines Bilateral Aid Distribution? Evidence from Major Donors*. [online] Available at:

<https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/2933/06honorsWatanabe.pdf> [Accessed 10 Dec. 2022].

WEF (2018) How a single market would transform Africa's economy, [online] available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/how-a-single-market-will-transform-africa-s-economy/> (accessed 14 February 2020).

Wenbin, H. and Wilkes, A. (2011). *Analysis of China's overseas investment policies*. [online] Available at: https://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP-79CIFOR.pdf [Accessed 26 Dec. 2022].

What are Turkish troops going to do in Qatar? (n.d.). *Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East*. [online] Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/06/turkey-qatar-what-are-turkish-troops-going-to-do.html> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2021].

Wheeler, T. (2011) Ankara to Africa: Turkey's outreach since 2005, [online] available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2011.564426> (accessed 12 June 2019).

Wheeler, T. Sazak, O., Achilles, K., and Wood, A.E. (2015). *Publications*. [online] Available at: <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/893-turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia-risks-and-opportunities-for-building-peace> [Accessed 01 Jan. 2023].

Whittall, J. (2015). *Is humanitarian action independent from political interests?* [online] Sur - International Journal on Human Rights. Available at: <https://sur.conectas.org/en/is-humanitarian-action-independent-political-interests/>. [Accessed 18 Dec. 2022].

Williams, P. (2020) Understanding US Policy in Somalia Current Challenges and Future Options, [online] available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2020-07-14-us-policy-somalia-williams.pdf> (accessed 15 June 2022).

Williams, P.D. (2019). *What Went Wrong with the Somali National Army?* [online] War on the Rocks. Available at: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/what-went-wrong-with-the-somali-national-army/> [Accessed 12 Sep. 2021].

Woods, E. (1997). *Somalia: For many in the U.S., Somalia is viewed as a powerful symbol of United Nations peacekeeping failure*. [online] Institute for Policy Studies. Available at: <https://ips-dc.org/somalia/#:~:text=In%20the%201970s%20the%20USSR> [Accessed 7 May 2023].

Woodward, P.R. (n.d.). *How Sudan's economic crisis had a role in protests that toppled al-Bashir*. [online] The Conversation. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-economic-crisis-had-a-role-in-protests-that-toppled-al-bashir-116405> [Accessed 15 July. 2022].

Wooley, A. (2021). *AidData's new dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects worth \$843 billion reveals major increase in 'hidden debt' and Belt and Road Initiative implementation problems*. [online] www.aiddata.org. Available at: <https://www.aiddata.org/blog/aiddatas-new-dataset-of-13-427-chinese-development-projects-worth-843-billion-reveals-major-increase-in-hidden-debt-and-belt-and-road-initiative-implementation-problems> [Accessed 24 Dec. 2022].

World Bank (2015). *Transition amid Risks with a Special Focus on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Macroeconomic and Fiscal Global Practice*. [online] Available at:

<https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Somalia/somalia-economic-update-october-2015.pdf> [Accessed 2 Oct. 2021].

World Bank (2019). Belt and Road Initiative. [online] Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20190219015644/http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative> [Accessed 23 Dec. 2022].

World Bank, (2002) Socio Economic Survey, [online] available at: http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00523/WEB/PDF/SOMALIA_.PDF (accessed 14 May 2021).

World Bank. (n.d.). Humanitarian Capital? Lessons on Better Connecting Humanitarian Assistance and Social Protection. [online] Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionandjobs/publication/humanitarian-capital-lessons-on-better-connecting-humanitarian-assistance-and-social-protection> [Accessed 10 Dec. 2022].

World Bank (2020). *Aid Flows in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://somalia.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Aid%20Flows%20in%20Somalia%20-%202020.pdf> [Accessed 12 Jan. 2022].

World Bank. (n.d.). *Somalia Issues Fishing Licenses: Fees will Help Develop Fisheries Sector*. [online] Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2019/03/07/somalia-issues-fishing-licenses-fees-will-help-develop-fisheries-sector> (accessed May 14 2021).

World Economic Forum. (2016). *What Somaliland can teach the rest of Africa about peace and stability*. [online] Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-somaliland-can-teach-africa-about-peace-and-stability/> [Accessed 10 Aug. 2021].

World, O. (2020). Turkey (TUR) and Somalia (SOM) Trade | OEC. [online] OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/som> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2022].

www.aa.com.tr. (2021). *OPINION - Turkey's growing smart power in Somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/opinion-turkey-s-growing-smart-power-in-somalia/2340384> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

www.aa.com.tr. (2021). *Turkey to continue standing by 'brotherly' Sudanese people, administration*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-to-continue-standing-by-brotherly-sudanese-people-administration/2332861> [Accessed 13 Sept. 2021].

www.africa.upenn.edu. (n.d.). *South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self Determination, (Riek Machar)*. [online] Available at: https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html [Accessed 27 Nov. 2021].

www.aiddata.org. (2021). *AidData | Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road> [Accessed 24 Dec. 2022].

www.al-monitor.com. (2020). *Will Sudan hand over Islamists to Egypt? - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East*. [online] Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/11/egypt-sudan-handover-islamists-muslim-brotherhood.html> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2021].

www.aljazeera.com. (n.d.). *Somalia beefs up security ahead of presidential vote*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/2/7/somalia-beefs-up-security-ahead-of-presidential-vote> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

www.clingendael.org. (2021). *Turkish and Qatari cooperation on security and defence | Turkey's love-in with Qatar*. [online] Available at: <https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/drivers-of-turkish-qatari-relations/4-turkish-and-qatari-cooperation-on-security-and-defence/> [Accessed 11 Nov. 2021].

www.deik.org.tr. (2021). *Strategic Partnership in Economic Relations of Sudan and Turkey - De...* [online] available at: <https://www.deik.org.tr/press-releases-strategic-partnersip-in-economic-br-relations-of-sudan-and-turkey> [Accessed 26 Sep. 2022].

www.doguafrika.org. (2018). *DAD - Towards A Better Life*. [online] Available at: <https://www.doguafrika.org/blog-detail/37-turkey-and-somali-signed-a-memorandum-of-understaning-on-fishing.html> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2022].

www.eeas.europa.eu. (2018). *International community strengthens support for Somalia's plans for stability and development | EEAS Website*. [online] Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/48542_en [Accessed 16 Jun. 2022].

www.ecosonline.org. (2006). *Turkish firm to invest \$60 mln in Sudan oil field*. [online] Available at: https://www.ecosonline.org/news/2006/turkish_firm_to_invest_60_mln_in_sudan_oil_field/ [Accessed 7 Oct. 2022].

www.eia.gov. (2019). *International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)*. [online] Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/SDN> [Accessed 12 Oct. 2020].

www.hiiraan.com. (2022). *Hassan Sheikh Mohamud defeats Farmajo to become tenth president of Somalia*. [online] Available at: https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/May/186209/breaking_hassan_sheikh_mohamud_elected_tenth_president_of_somalia.aspx [Accessed 25 Nov. 2021].

www.icc-cricket.com. (2019). *ICC announces amnesty*. [online] Available at: <https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/970385> [Accessed 29 Nov. 2021].

www.mfa.gov.tr. (2012). *The Second İstanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, 1 June 2012, İstanbul / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. [online] Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul--conference-on-somalia-final-declaration-1-june-2012-istanbul.en.mfa> [Accessed 19 Jun. 2021].

www.mfa.gov.tr. (2022). *Türkiye's Relations with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. [online] Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/oecd.en.mfa> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2022].

www.oecd-ilibrary.org. (2022). *Home*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/714276e8-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/714276e8-en> [Accessed 2 Jan. 2023].

www.oecd.org. (n.d.). *Donors agree on aid treatment of debt relief - OECD*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/donors-agree-on-aid-treatment-of-debt-relief.htm> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2022].

www.tccb.gov.tr. (2017). *Presidency Of The Republic Of Turkey : 'We Welcome the Lifting of the Unjust Embargo Imposed on Sudan'*. [online] Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87865/sudana-uygulanen-haksiz-ambargonun-kaldirilmis-olmasindan-memnuniyet-duyuyoruz> [Accessed 15 Oct. 2022].

www.tika.gov.tr. (n.d.). *TİKA Supports Agricultural Development in Somalia - TİKA*. [online] Available at: https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/tika_supports_agricultural_development_in_somalia-67041 [Accessed 8 Aug. 2022].

www.tika.gov.tr. (2018). *Turkey keeps breaking records in humanitarian aid and development assistance - TİKA*. [online] Available at: https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/turkey_keeps_breaking_records_in_humanitarian_aid_and_development_assistance-49351 [Accessed 2 Jan. 2023].

www.un.org. (2012). *Opening remarks at Istanbul II Conference on Somalia | United Nations Secretary-General*. [online] Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2012-06-01/opening-remarks-istanbul-ii-conference-somalia> [Accessed 10 Jun. 2021].

www.un.org. (n.d.). *Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia | United Nations Security Council*. [online] Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751> [Accessed 12 Aug. 2022].

Www.Un.Org. (N.D.). *Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery off Somalia's Coast, Authorizes for Six Months 'All Necessary Means' to Repress Such Acts | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. [Online] Available At: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/Sc9344.Doc.Htm> [Accessed 15 Oct 2022].

www.youtube.com. (n.d.). *Turkey secret train 1000 pilot of somalia*. [online] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBeOlonSiSk> [Accessed 8 May 2023].

Year: 2006), U.S.C. (61st (2006). Resolution 1725 (2006) /. *digitallibrary.un.org*. [online] Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/588110?ln=en> [Accessed 13 Aug. 2022].

Yener, D. and Calkaya , M. (2018) *Turkey, Somalia signs economic partnership pact*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-somalia-sign-economic-partnership-pact/1029413> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2022].

Yeni Şafak (2017) is a conservative Turkish daily newspaper wrote about Erdoğan visits to Sudan, [online] available at: <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/photo-gallery/world/president-erdogan-visits-sudan-tumu-2025613> (accessed 16 October 2019).

Yeşilada, B. A. (1999) *The Worsening EU-Turkey Relations*, [online] available at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=polisci_fac (accessed 15 February 2020).

Yuan, J., Su, F. and Ouyang, X. (2022). *China's Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid*. [online] SIPRI. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/sipri-policy-papers/chinas-evolving-approach-foreign-aid> [Accessed 22 Dec. 2022].

Zheng, Y. (2016) *China's Aid and Investment in Africa: A Viable Solution to International Development?* [online] available

at:<https://www.hhs.se/contentassets/bc7089cd2c364b2cae4c287184ad743b/yu-zheng---chinas-aid-and-investment-in-africa-.pdf> (accessed 7 March 2020).

Zirulnick, A. (2011). *South Sudan: a timeline to independence*. [online] The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0708/South-Sudan-a-timeline-to-independence/Sudan-under-Turkish-Egyptian-rule-1820s-1890s> [Accessed 26 Sep. 2022].

Appendix



Interview Questionnaires – Somalia

Research project title: Turkey’s New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan.

Principal Investigator: Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud, PhD in Politics and Philosophy, Department of History, Politics and Philosophy.

My name is Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud and I am the Principal Investigator of this PhD Research. I would like to invite you to take part my PhD research. The aim of the research project is to increase the scientific knowledge of Turkey’s behaviour in terms of diplomacy, security, trade and development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa as an emerging power. Turkey has Become a major regional player in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has succeeded to forge strategic partnerships with Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and many other African countries. It constructed and set up its largest overseas military bases and increased its presence in the region. The growing military presence of Turkey worries the traditional partners of Africa (Wheeler, 2011). However, the relationship between the two sides is broader-based than the construction of military facilities, economic aid and other development cooperation efforts.

The project will shed new light on the reshuffling global landscape of economic and political strength between the great powers of the East and West, with Turkey as a new emerging challenger. Therefore, this PhD seeks to explore what the individual countries of SSA gained and/or expect to gain from Turkey’s strategic engagement.

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of this research project. As a participant, it is your right to know the reasons for the research and why it is important to be done as well as why you have been selected to participate. Please take your time to read the Participant Information Sheet carefully, and then sign the Consent Form. If anything is not clear, or if you require more information, please ask questions for clarity.

Interview Guide;

1. What do you see as the primary socio-economic problems of Somalia?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Interview Questionnaires – Sudan

Research project title: Turkey’s New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan.

Principal Investigator: Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud, PhD in Politics and Philosophy, Department of History, Politics and Philosophy.

My name is Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud and I am the Principal Investigator of this PhD Research. I would like to invite you to take part my PhD research. The aim of the research project is to increase the scientific knowledge of Turkey’s behaviour in terms of diplomacy, security, trade and development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa as an emerging power.

Turkey has Become a major regional player in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has succeeded to forge strategic partnerships with Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and many other African countries. It constructed and set up its largest overseas military bases and increased its presence in the region. The growing military presence of Turkey worries the traditional partners of Africa (Wheeler, 2011). However, the relationship between the two sides is broader-based than the construction of military facilities, economic aid and other development cooperation efforts.

The project will shed new light on the reshuffling global landscape of economic and political strength between the great powers of the East and West, with Turkey as a new emerging challenger. Therefore, this PhD seeks to explore what the individual countries of SSA gained and/or expect to gain from Turkey’s strategic engagement.

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of this research project. As a participant, it is your right to know the reasons for the research and why it is important to be done as well as why you have been selected to participate. Please take your time to read the Participant Information Sheet carefully, and then sign the Consent Form. If anything is not clear, or if you require more information, please ask questions for clarity.

Interview Guide;

1. What do you see as the primary socio-economic problems of Sudan?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

-
.....
.....
2. Do you think that Sudan and Turkey have similar cultures and values, and do you think this is a major factor influencing the Turkish-Sudanese relationship?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

3. Do you think the historic relationship between Sudan and Turkey has been a positive one, and do you think this has shaped current relations between the two countries?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

7. Has the relationship with Turkey benefited Sudan in terms of its security?


.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

8. What do you think is Sudan's primary interest in its relationship with Turkey?
In what areas is the Sudanese government most interested in leveraging its
relationship with Turkey?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

EthOS ID:8372

Version No: 1
28/05/2021



**Manchester
Metropolitan
University**

Participant Identification Number:

CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: Turkey's New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan.

Name of Researcher: **Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud**

1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated..... (version.....) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected.
3. I understand that the information collected about me will be used to support other research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other researchers.
4. I understand and agreed to being audio/video recorded.
5. I understand and agreed to have anonymised quotes.
6. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant


Date

Signature

Researcher

Date

Signature



Informed Consent Form

Please complete and sign this form after you have read the Information Sheet

Project Title: Turkey’s New Strategic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somalia and Sudan.

Thank you very much for your interest in taking part in this research. Before taking part, the researcher should explain the project to you very clearly. If the participants do not wish to be interviewed they can do the questionnaire instead. Any questions and comments arising from the Information Sheet, please ask the researcher for clarification before deciding whether to join in. A copy of this Consent Form will be given to you for later reference.

Participant

I have been given information about “ Turkey’s Strategic Advantage in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Effects of Reciprocity and the Continuing Viability of the New Engagement”. As a participant, I have discussed this PhD project with Mohamed Omar Hagi Mohamoud. This is a part of a Doctoral degree supervised by Dr Steven Hurst, Politics Section of the Department of History, Politics and Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Manchester Metropolitan University.

I agree that:

- I understand what the study involves as I have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet.
- I understand that I can notify the researcher at any time to withdraw immediately if I decide that I am no longer wished to take part in this project.
- I understand that all personal information that I provided during the course of this study will be handled in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. All personal information that I provide will be anonymised prior to publication.
- I understand that there are no recognised potential risks or burdens associated with this study.
- I understand and agree that the researcher explained to me the research project named above and to my satisfaction I agree to take part in this study.
- I understand and agreed to being audio/video recorded.
- I understand and agreed to have anonymised quotes.

By signing below, I am indicating my consent to participate in the research. I understand that the data collected from my participation will be used primarily for a PhD thesis, and will also be used in summary form for journal publication, and I consent for it to be used in that manner.

Researcher Signature _____

Date _____

Participant Signature _____

Date _____