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Tesar, Marek, Duhn, Iris, Nordstrom, Susan Naomi, Koro, Mirka, Sparrman, Anna, Orrmalm, Alex, Boycott-Garnett, Ruthie, MacRae, Christina, Hackett, Abigail, Kuntz, Aaron M, Trafi-Prats, Laura , Boldt, Gail, Rautio, Pauliina, Ulmer, Jasmine B, Taguchi, Hillevi Lenz, Murriss, Karin, Kohan, Walter Omar, Gibbons, Andrew, Arndt, Sonja and Malone, Karen (2021) Infantmethodologies. Educational Philosophy and Theory. ISSN 0013-1857

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2021.2009340>

Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Version: Accepted Version

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Infantmethodologies

Marek Tesar, Iris Duhn, Susan Naomi Nordstrom, Mirka Koro, Anna Sparrman, Alex Orrmalm, Ruthie Boycott-Garnett, Christina MacRae, Abigail Hackett, Aaron M. Kuntz, Laura Trafi-Prats, Gail Boldt, Pauliina Rautio, Jasmine B. Ulmer, Hillevi Lenz Taguchi, Karin Murriss, Walter Omar Kohan, Andrew Gibbons, Sonja Arndt and Karen Malone

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1 DISCUSSION



2
3 **Infantmethodologies**

4
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Q1

14
15 **Introduction: towards the philosophy of infantmethodologies**

16 Infantmethodologies is a concept that was playfully invented to gauge philosophical interest
17 in the intersection between infants (or a child; or infancy; or childhood) and methodologies
18 (and philosophies, theories and concepts). This provocation aims to debate this intersection and
19 weaves thinkers from around the world in order to generate discussion on the question, 'How
20 do we study a child?' Asking this question generates further questions: What processes, meth-
21 odologies, and methods are in place, and when does such an interface occur? What theories,
22 concepts and philosophies come to mind when such a question is asked?

23 How to methodologically study an infant is an equally complex question for the child psy-
24 chologist, the paediatrician, the educator, the philosopher or the methodologist. It requires us
25 to ask, how do we understand an infant (and childhood) and how do we understand method-
26 ologies? Are methodologies (and its powerful 'methods') even the right concepts when we
27 engage infants or young children? This collective paper reaches for this threshold space, and
28 for the creativity and the openness to debate the philosophical questions that arise from such
29 intersections.

30 Infantmethodologies could have been very much mis-represented in this process. CDC (2021)
31 provides us with guidance on how to measure a child at home. The World Bank gives us a
32 toolkit for measuring and 'doing it right' (World Bank, 2021). This paper, however, aligns more
33 closely with philosophy as a method, which is a concept that is often useful to utilise when
34 thinking about these intersections, including the intersection among methodology, philosophy
35 and a child (Tesar, 2021). There is something powerful when we think of the right methodology;
36 and there is something very seductive to debate when we have the child at the centre of
37 philosophy and methodologies. Equally, one may understand infantmethodologies as to study
38 a child – an infant – as someone utterly other to the adult and the human. Infant and child-
39 hood methodologies have been contested during each era, especially when they are traced in
40 philosophy (see Malone et al., 2020).

41 Infantmethodologies is another instalment in a series that started with *Infantologies* (Peters
42 et al., 2020), followed by *Infantologies II - Songs of the Cradle* (Gibbons et al., 2021b);
43 *Infantilisations* (Tesar et al., 2021c), *Infantasies* (Gibbons et al., 2021a), *Infanticides* (Tesar et al.,
44 2021b) and most recently with *Infantographies* (Tesar et al., 2021c). We have also recently

44 completed collective thinking with philosophers of education asking, 'What is the future of
45 philosophy of education?', in which Western, Global South and Indigenous philosophers and
46 thinkers contemplated how they see the future of the discipline. Many considered the future
47 to be linked with the idea of the demise of 'the method', and with deconstructing and
48 re-thinking the importance of traditional Western ontologies, epistemologies and axiologies
49 (Tesar et al., 2021a). Similarly, in this collective writing, the threshold of the infant and meth-
50 odologies – infantmethodologies – is alive, powerful and productive. While perhaps traditionally
51 it has faced substantial methodological shifts and failings and direct criticism, this collective
52 writing offers a different view. Here we see this threshold as: shared labour (Duhn); the anni-
53 hilation of Infantmethodologies (Nordstrom); creative activities (Koro); praxiography (Sparrman
54 and Ormalm); zoom and the act of knowing (Boycott-Garnett, MacRae and Hackett); a philo-
55 sophical orientation (Kuntz); motion and aesthetics (Trafi-Prats); the imminence of infancy
56 (Boldt); beyond human (Rautio); incubations (Ulmer); *queer-feminist philosophical methodologies*
57 *of the infant-toddler-child* (Lenz Taguchi); childlike deconstruction (Murriss); and child-like ques-
58 tions (Kohan). We start this reconceptualisation of Infantmethodologies where we perhaps
59 should: geborenssein.

60 Geborenssein

61 Iris Duhn
62 Monash University
63

64 In this short text, I ponder the idea of 'becoming life' as an invitation to be curious with
65 infantmethodology. The very idea of infantmethodology is an invitation to play with language
66 and with emerging liveliness. At this time of planetary upheaval, when new life emerges into
67 precarity, the very idea of 'becoming life' as hope and as possibilities for yet-to-be-imagined
68 futures is invigorating. Infantmethodology generates curiosity about nascent methodological
69 futures.

70 I have been thinking with Hannah Arendt's (1981) 'Geborenssein', translated into English as
71 either 'being born' or, following German syntax, as 'birthed being' or, also possible, 'birthed
72 being'. As is obvious from my attempt at translation, 'Geborenssein' invites the mind to enter
73 into complexity, ambiguity and linguistic meandering. 'Being birthed' hints at the labour that
74 is involved in being born, while 'birthed being' indicates that birth is shared labour. The one is
75 born from the body of the other through shared action. Perhaps infantmethodology could be
76 conceptualised as shared labour and as the event of something new coming into life that is
77 created from and with an existing body?

78 Arendt (1981) herself refers to *Natalität* as the philosophical concept of 'Geborenssein'. This is
79 translated into 'natality' in English renderings of Arendt's work. Arendt, as a 20th century humanist
80 philosopher, puts much hope and belief in humanity's ability to become enlightened, to progress
81 towards mindful rationality and clear-eyed agency for the betterment of all. In this vein, she
82 refers to natality as a miracle that disrupts human expectations. Natality in its essence holds
83 the promise of new beginnings, to be realised through actions that follow from 'being birthed'.
84 In Arendt's philosophy, this is limited to humans as humans hold Enlightenment's hope of, and
85 belief in, freedom, solidarity, tolerance, secularism and universal rights. At the heart of Arendt's
86 belief lies the hope for western liberal democracies as a robust political system that cradles
87 and treasures natality as its creative life force (Kristeva, 2001). It is through the miracle of birth
88 that it becomes possible to engage in this thinking-with the mystery of new life as it emerges
89 into air and separation.

90 Perhaps infantmethodology provides opportunities to shift methodological concerns and
actions from human exceptionalism towards the more-than-human hope and belief in planetary
rights, solidarity with the diversity of earth beings, freedom from domination, exploitation and

91 extraction for all beings? This would be a shift towards earth citizenship (Shiva, 2003) and
 92 towards methodologies that flow away from human exceptionalism and across species divisions.

93 I am intrigued by the affect of thinking with natality and thinking with *Geborenssein*. I am
 94 reminded of Donna Haraway's (2016) delight for mud and for belonging to the earth. I am here
 95 because I am made of earth, of calcium and phosphate, and all those crystallised traces of
 96 elements and minerals, this incredible miracle of coming into being and being here. *Geborenssein*.
 97 It makes me shiver with awe to be of earth. For infant methodology, this attunement to liveliness
 98 in all its forms and to the unexpected solidarities and alliances that emerge when planetary
 99 natality becomes hope and belief in the Arendtian sense, is exciting and invigorating.

100 **Long live le' enfant terrible**

102 Susan Naomi Nordstrom
 103 University of Memphis

104 A conventional Western conceptualization of time makes infant methodology an impossibility.
 105 An infant has yet to become beholden to a construct of time in which past, present, and future
 106 are clearly delineated. Infant time is a series of *nows* punctuated by affective shifts of bodily
 107 needs, larger humans, nonhuman animals, and nonhuman objects. These events happen and
 108 pass through infants from sunrise to sundown, though most infants do not seem to notice,
 109 much less care about, these markers of time. Constructs such as sunrise and sundown construct
 110 time into something that can be made predictable and manageable.

111 Western adults have a peculiar passion for organizing time. Elaborately color-coded diaries
 112 that align with apps inform adults when, where, and sometimes how to be. These calendars,
 113 planners, and apps are worshiped as gods and goddesses. Not one day can go without praying
 114 to their altars. Each prayer expresses gratitude for a well-organized past as well as beseeches
 115 an equally organized present and an even more organized future. Each prayer petitions for
 116 predictive moments of relief in a chaotic world.

117 Infants do not recognize these gods and goddesses. If anything, they pray to a delightful
 118 *enfant terrible*, an unconventional super infant who howls, squalls, and cackles at such a con-
 119 ception of time. These prayers to *le' enfant terrible* destroy things like schedules and planners
 120 that assume mastery of a series of event-filled *nows*.

121 These prayers annihilate the term 'methodology.' The etymology of the term methodology
 122 includes that of the term *method*. *Method* derives from the Greek, of a pursuit or following
 123 after. This indicates a construction of a time in which there is a past one can follow after. One
 124 follows after phenomena hoping to organize them, represent them, and make them
 125 become known.

126 If an infant's time is a series of *nows*, then there can be no methodology. One cannot follow
 127 after, much less grasp, a series of robust, urgent, and unending series of *nows* with a prede-
 128 termined methodology. *Le' enfant terrible* laughs at the mere thought of such a possibility as
 129 they smash infant methodology to smithereens.

130 Western adults experience these series of *nows*, too. They just have accepted the construc-
 131 tion of time that makes methodology both possible and desirable. They must make themselves
 132 as vulnerable as infants are to the series of *nows* to soften their skulls to something otherwise.
 133 Adult bones must become so vulnerable that they can become shaped by a series of *nows*.
 134 A body made malleable by the series can be born again and again to an inquiry practice that
 135 is continuously transforming with and transformed by the series of *nows*. Such supple bodies
 136 must swear allegiance to *le' enfant terrible*, one who shatters conventional constructions of
 137 time and delightfully coos and giggles through a series of *nows* that mutate all that it passes
 through. Perhaps only when adults can be made soft by the birthing canal of a series of *nows*
 can we then begin to articulate what infant inquiry might become.

138 **Infant-methodologies**

139 Mirka Koro

140 Arizona State University

141
142 In this brief imaginary I propose that infant-methodologies as methodological practices cannot
143 be completely planned and known in advance. In addition, infant-methodologies always carry
144 intersectionality, hybridity, and multiplicity (also conceptual and theoretical) within them. Infancy
145 and infant-methodologies can be framed as important in their unfinished time dimension, urgency,
146 and immediacy, while also partially unknown and unrecognizable in their practices, forms, and
147 intentions. It is also possible that to achieve a sense of tentativeness, infant-methodologies might
148 need to forget predictability, traditional scientific method, and concerns about validity and gen-
149 eralizability. Rather, they could function as promises, hesitations, and speculations. Not much may
150 be known about infant-methodologies beyond senses, relational experiences, and materiality, and
151 scholars may need to acknowledge that much of sensing and living could be beyond human
152 recognition and sensibilities. Infancy also operates at the level of minor; something that works the
153 major from within in subtle ways changing directionality and qualities. Like Manning's (2016) notion
154 of minoritarian tendencies, infant-methodologies create subtle shifts and continuous variations
155 within the experience and field of methodologies. Potential methodological pathways could be
156 only tentatively designed and conceptualized since infant-methodologies operate in the present
157 through their activation, complex and situational aesthetic forces, and material and relational
158 elements. In addition, the tentativeness of infant inquiries, knowing, living, and being is always
159 plural and could be situated, for example, in the intersection of Deleuze's (and Guattari's) becoming
160 (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Whitehead's process philosophy (Whitehead, 1978), and Shaviro's specu-
161 lative realism (2014). Deleuze's becoming brings to the forefront methodological differences within
162 the (infant) sameness and seemingly similar (infancy) which enable scholars see the world differently
163 and anew. Continuous production of 'something' will shape complex actions and outcomes asso-
164 ciated with these processes. In addition, infant-methodologies as creative activities move through
165 different (infancy and methodology) events. Becoming infant time stimulates methodological
166 assemblages, hybridity, and liminal spaces and various forces (data, subjectivities, analytics, power,
167 matter and more) create speculative scenarios where infant-methodologies become possible, each
168 time differently. Intersecting infant-methodologies multiply and ongoingly intersect with multiple
169 theories and concepts without taking a stable form of anything from the past and anything that
170 could be anticipated. Interrelated events, feelings, arts, ethics, and senses shape the
171 onto-epistemological experiences and processes creating 'whats and hows' of actual occasions and
172 temporal entities such as radical forms of methodology. 'Speculative philosophy has an irreducibly
173 aesthetic dimension; it requires new, bold inventions rather than pacifying resolutions' (Shaviro,
174 2014, p.43). Thus, infant-methodologies are always virtual and surprising in their processes of
175 production and composition. Infant-methodologies approach an object *for its own sake* beyond
176 legitimacy, usefulness, and assumed interpretations and relational functions. Finally, the aesthetics
177 of infant-methodologies build on affective potentialities and they cannot survive without creativity,
178 experimentation, ethical responsibilities, and care. Infant-methodologies function as a matter of
179 degree and help us to build a world of relational differences within continuously shifting (and
180 growing) relational ecologies.

179 **Babyography**

181 Anna Sparrman and Alex Ormalm

182 Linköping University

183 We want to think about *infant methodologies* through Annemarie Mol's concept of praxiogra-
184 phy (Mol, 2002). Praxiography was developed with ethnography in mind, excluding the 'ethno-'

185 in favour of practice (Jensen & Gad, 2009). The idea we follow is that practices enact babies
 186 and babies enact the practices in which they are engaged. It is important to note that we are
 187 not talking about infants because the term 'infant' directly implies speechlessness and lack of
 188 language (Peters et al., 2020, p. 16). The concept mutes babies and ignores other ways of being
 189 in relation. The everyday concept of 'baby' belongs to no specific methodological convention
 190 and is therefore open for situating babies within their lived practices (Orrmalm, 2021).

191 Consider Ron Mueck's sculpture, *A girl*. (Click: <https://www.gallery.ca/magazine/exhibitions/imitation-and-illusion-ron-mueck-at-the-wag>)¹ It is a realistic looking sculpture of a newborn
 192 baby in all her naturalness placed on a white museum podium. She is lying on her side with
 193 traces of blood remaining on her body and part of the umbilical cord still attached. Her face
 194 is wrinkled and her eyes swollen, making her look simultaneously both young and old. She is
 195 naked, unprotected and without the parents or material things usual for a Western, ethnically
 196 white baby. She is still, as though asleep. Through her extraordinary size, which is revealed by
 197 her relation to the person in the background, the baby dominates the space, even though there
 198 is no activity. As this baby is a sculpture, there can be no motion, and still she a/effects and
 199 challenges us. How is this baby part of enacting herself, the woman, the space, her naturalness
 200 and babyhood? And can this baby do anything for other babies?

201 Her size and complete exposure urge us as researchers to stay with her stillness. This giant
 202 baby sculpture moves the idea of babies as research subjects past being explained through
 203 their caregivers, or the prospects of development and growth. She makes us reflect on an
 204 ethnographic study with a one-month-old baby conducted by Alex in which the video obser-
 205 vations were stopped every time the baby fell asleep, because seemingly nothing was going
 206 on. This resulted in very little recorded research material. Instead, we need to keep the video
 207 recorder on to enable us to recognize the a/effect that babies have just through their stillness,
 208 and how this stillness, such as during sleep, invades space far beyond the baby's body. This
 209 can be illustrated by the way in which adults make calm soft loops around sleeping babies so
 210 as not to wake them. Thinking with Mol suggests that things and people are made in and
 211 through practices; this means that, even when seemingly doing nothing, babies are taking part
 212 in this enactment.

213 These two babies help us to push praxiography one step further by recognising the enact-
 214 ment of stillness as moments when *something* is indeed going on, and as practices that con-
 215 stitute babies and their surroundings. We exclude 'praxis-' in favour of 'baby-' and call this
 216 babyography, a method for staying with the babies *whatever* is seemingly going on.

217 **The (im)possibilities of zooming with babies**

218 Ruthie Boycott-Garnett, Christina MacRae and Abigail Hackett
 219 Manchester Metropolitan University
 220

221 We see the babies in momentary sweeps of the phone or as they move their bodies into the periphery
 222 of the screen. As a mam tells us a story of her day, the baby's hand stretches out to the ceiling and stays
 223 in the centre of the shot, fingers splayed, a solid silhouette. Sometimes the weight of their bodies, and
 224 the movements they make in their mam's arms, causes moments of juggling, shifting and rearranging of
 225 baby and phone so that the phone lies at an angle and I see the whole room on a slant.

226 (Field notes, Boycott-Garnett, January 2021)

227 Babies have always presented a challenge to traditional methodologies, disrupting assumptions
 228 about communication, rationality, and agency that undergird qualitative methodology (Gottlieb,
 229 2000). Elwick et al. (2014) suggest babies show us that we *cannot* fully know them; we are
 230 forced to confront the impossibility of knowing. Likewise, for Cannella and Viruru (2004), working
 231 with Glissant's concept of opacity, this impossibility of knowing is productive.

232 This last year, Boycott-Garnett (first author) moved some of her fieldwork, intended to be
 233 with parents and babies at a playgroup in northern England, onto Zoom. During these sessions,
 234 babies were frequently present but out of shot, glimpsed as movement or sound on the other
 235 side of the screen. Zoom, as a tool for communication, is set up for a speaking subject in the
 236 middle of the screen. Babies' bodies, movements and sounds exceed the boundaries of the
 Zoom screen whilst altering what the researcher can see.

237 Video has long played a central role in educational research (de Freitas, 2016) and particularly
 238 in conceptualising the developing infant by 'shaping the narrative of unilinear progress from
 239 immaturity to maturity' (MacRae, 2019, p. 2). Scholars have productively experimented with
 240 video to disrupt habitual assumptions about childhood through, for example, slow motion video
 241 (MacRae, 2019) or film shot from unexpected angles. However, fieldwork over Zoom brings into
 242 sharp relief our habitual thinking in assuming we need to create visual material of infants in
 243 order to shift these habits.

244 Whilst doing in-person fieldwork is a multi-sensory experience (beyond vision), we still tend
 245 to create fieldnotes or visual materials based on what we perceive and can make sense of. In
 246 that sense, the field is a site of extraction (of meaning) but at the same time, it is also a site
 247 of production through the encounter - through us 'being there'. As a virtual fieldsite, Zoom
 248 undercuts the ethnographic authority of authentic being-there and perceiving-whilst-there.
 249 Babies' momentary movements in and out of the field of vision resist meaning/interpretation
 250 and displace the site of the encounter. Perhaps this contributes to the discomfort we feel as
 251 ethnographic researchers on Zoom. Added to this displacement, the researchers might encounter
 252 the baby but the baby might not encounter the researcher. Such research can never be about
 253 knowing babies but rather, asking: *How is my knowing changed when I encounter the impossibility
 of knowing this baby?*

255 **Philosophical methodologies – infantmethodologies**

257 Aaron M. Kuntz

258 Florida International University

259 There is the tendency, a reflex, to understand the infant as a new beginning, some empty
 260 potential absent inscription. Similarly, there seems to be a corresponding claim for an 'infant
 261 methodology' as a mode of inquiry that has yet to take shape or endure the moulding of a
 262 control society—a not-yet that remains on the precipice of being claimed among the popula-
 263 tions that inform biopower. This is the seduction of an extracted new beginning—an outside
 264 untethered to the norm of the day. It is also the misguided search for a wholly neutral entity—
 265 the infant as perfectly balanced emptiness. Of course, this notion of the infant as some unblem-
 266 ished dawn—an in-between unmarked by the intensities of previous day or forthcoming
 267 future—is misplaced. As Deleuze (1990) notes, 'in a control-based system nothing is left alone
 268 for long' (p. 175).

269 Given this, I offer a series of questions that aim to situate the infant as a problem, though
 270 not one to be solved (solving a problem concludes its potential, closing it off and confining it
 271 to the answered—we do enough of this in education): 1) How to understand an infant outside
 272 a progressive (and developmental) model built through the force of a 'becoming-adult'? 2) What
 273 relations mark us as no longer an infant, no longer young—when is an infant no-longer? 3) What
 274 are an infant's effects, the means by which an infant extends beyond itself; an infant as excess(ive)?

275 Such questions perhaps nudge us to an orienting inquiry with the infant that is not depen-
 276 dent on its subjected definition (not making a subject of an infant). The first question addresses
 277 the truncated potential to situate an infant as a possible-adult—a predetermined unfolding
 278 outside itself yet into a prescribed spatio-temporal locale. The second asks for a relational
 understanding of the term—infant-in-relation. And, the third refuses an infant-subject, as though

279 it could exist unto itself. These are but some of the philosophical challenges invoked by the
280 notion of an infant, given our contemporary moment.

281 And, of course, similar challenges extend to the very notion of inquiry itself. That is, how
282 might inquiry refuse a determined progressive ordering bent on invoking a destined place
283 achieved over prearranged time? What are the blurry definitional limits inquiry might provoke
284 as the material for transgressive potential? And, how might inquiry generate effects that extend
285 beyond its prompted ordering, its habitualized claim on producing meaning that ‘makes sense’?

286 In response, we might invoke a notion of ‘infantmethodologies’ as a philosophical orientation
287 that learns from the problem of the infant yet refuses easy claims on that problem’s conclusion.
288 To invoke infantmethodologies, then, is to engage in a philosophically recursive process of
289 discerning, mapping, and producing. That is, one discerns normative ordering, maps the limits
290 of what has become, and experimentally generates relational effects that exceed the contem-
291 porary moment. In real ways, infantmethodologies work to short-circuit material processes of
292 rendering probable the unpredictable—disrupting the very logics under which control and
293 governance operate.

294 **Background-foregrounding childhoods**

295 Laura Trafi-Prats

296 Manchester Metropolitan University

297
298 In this short piece, I am thinking with a 5-minute video featuring a three-year-old girl and
299 her mother playing. The video is part of a dataset collected in a workshop that I facilitated
300 with six children (3-6years of age) and their mothers, titled *Moving with lines and light*². The
301 girl runs around her mother, who is sitting in the floor. The mother holds a torch projecting a
302 light beam. Every time that she reaches the projection, the girl stops, gathers force, propels
303 her body up, and jumps on the bright oval shape.

304 Earlier footage from the girl and mother shows them repeatedly using their bodies as ways
305 of relation and communication. One can see them outstretching towards each other, holding
306 crayons in both hands, striking, and dabbing the space in between; the girl circling around the
307 mother’s body while tracing her contour; the mother drawing and redrawing an arched line at
308 the girl’s feet as she jumps over. All are examples of kinaesthetic compositions and re-compositions
309 of bodies that relate because they move. Such movement is what makes the relation of girl
310 and mother to take form again and again in trajectories that ‘exceed the predominance of the
311 ground’ (Manning, 2012, p. 6). Without a fixed place, these bodies in movement become sen-
312 suous, carrying the environment with them (Massumi, 2002). By stopping and starting the video,
313 I notice the girl’s blurriness, her body being a volume without a clear contour blending with
314 spatial, material and digital processes, passing from one state into another.

315 Almost two decades ago, Ellsworth (2004) argued that architecture, like the curated archi-
316 tecture of an open wood floor fully covered with paper, combined with media, like crayons,
317 torches, projections, could shape pedagogies that could think of subjectivity as relational pro-
318 cesses of taking-form rather than make subjectivity fit in the fixed points of a grid of established
319 social formations (Massumi, 2002). Playing with photographic layers helps me to think of child-
320 hood as taking-form through space, time, and materiality. I compose a tryptic of the girl jump-
321 ing¹. In each image, I layer two video-stills and set the foreground layer at a lower opacity. This
322 makes aspects of both layers, background and foreground, visible while others ungraspable.
323 Manning (2020) writes that in practices of background-foregrounding we can perceive ‘what is
324 not quite within the register of the perceptible’ (p. 17). As a method, background-foregrounding
325 cultivates an attunement to what is difficult to observe and verbalize in children’s lives, making
it felt through an aesthetics of co-composition, blurriness, vibrancy, molecularity, and layers of
duration that momentarily touch upon qualities of experience that were unknown to us. Thus,

326 background-foregrounding reveals ‘the differential that moves experience from the shape we
327 know to an unshapeability that affects the knowing’ (Manning, 2020, p. 23). It trumps the
328 knowledge of childhood and demands of slow encounters where adults become more sensitive
329 to childhoods that emerge in activity in constant peaks and falls of experience, always opening
330 to new modes of existence yet to be known.

332 **Fernand Deligny and the imminence of infancy**

333 Gail Boldt

334 Pennstate University
335

336 In his introduction to the English translation of Fernand Deligny’s (2015), *The Arachnean and*
337 *Other Texts*, Bertrand Ogilvie writes that Deligny suspends the ‘inaugural gestures’ of Louis
338 Althusser’s interpellation and its close relative, psychoanalysis. For Deligny, these gestures — the
339 calling into being of the subject through the hail of the authority or the Law of the Father
340 — represented a narcissistically flattering image of humans as able to dominate one another
341 and deny the efficacy of the other-than-human to affect, to matter. Deligny worked in France
342 from the 1930s to the 1980s, primarily with non-verbal autistic children by the 1960s. His pas-
343 sion was to enter the world of children outside language (Boldt & Valente, 2014). Non-verbal
344 autistic children, not submitting to the demands of normalization instantiated through language,
345 could for Deligny be considered separate from the strictures of interpellation (Krtolica &
346 Sibertin-Blanc, 2019).

347 Our overdetermining faith in the domination of language is the focus of my current research
348 and seems an appropriate focus to bring to questions of infant methodology. I am not naming
349 infants as autistic as once was common in psychoanalysis. Rather, I am drawing from Deligny’s
350 insistence on seeing children as something other than ‘processes that must lead to something
351 other than themselves: “the advent” (l’advenue) of the desiring subject’, and ‘that “speaking-being”
352 would not exhaust what it means to be human’ (Krtolica & Sibertin-Blanc, 2019, pp. 215 &
353 218). I am attempting an experiment, asking what might be produced if I approach a kind
354 of research-being with infants in ways that Deligny worked to create a living environment
355 with the children with whose care he was charged, whose difference he had no interest
356 in curing.

357 Deligny was a researcher, mapping the daily ‘lines of wandering’ of the children with whom
358 he lived. But his purpose in research was ‘not to constitute a body of knowledge but to shape
359 a gaze in order to change habits and allow for a common life’ (Ogilvie, 2015, p. 13). His method
360 was resolutely indirect. I am thinking about infant research through Deligny’s method, the focus
361 of which ‘is not that of communication but that of an entry into a resonance of gestures’ (p.
362 13) it requires a focus on imminence, wandering along with, ‘tracing rather than naming or
363 interpreting’ (p. 13).

364 Participating in the immediacy of the lives of infants may offer the daily experience of
365 a-signification, what Deligny (2019) called ‘the unthought-out project,’ which challenges our
366 devotion to will and intention, with its attendant, language. Still, given that there is seemingly
367 not much to think or say about the imminent nature of moment-to-moment life with an infant,
368 much of what we consider about infants privileges infancy as subjectivity-in-the-making.

369 Deligny was devoted to telling the stories of children with autism as self-evidently human,
370 disrupting the versions of what a human can be that rely on purpose, planning, and language.
371 I do not doubt that there are other useful stories to tell about infants including ones
372 that consider infants as purposeful. For now, I am interested in the possibilities of thinking
about infants through Deligny, who worked to enact living in relation to life as imminent,
not dependent upon an imposition of significance or direction or even recognizable
intersubjectivity.

Whose infancy? Ecology and existentialism with human infants, foals, and baby octopi

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Conventional qualitative and to an extent postqualitative methodologies in education and childhood studies tend to include a division into research practices (or methods) for working with child participants, and those used with adults. While this methodological work is much needed as the adult-centrism of science at large is still widely uncontested, *the only* available route is not to counter adult-centrism with child-centrism, especially as this can, at worst, further essentialize and universalize the notions and experiences of ‘child’ and ‘childhood’.

In this brief text the idea of what it is to be an infant in this world is broken free from its anthropocentric cocoon to begin with. Leaning on the recent resurgence of existentialism as coupled with ecology, albeit forming no coherent field (e.g., Gosetti-Ferencei, 2020; Mickey, 2016), I note that methodologies exploring what it means to be human in the midst of unbearable uncertainty and intimate interconnectedness need to break free from the human consciousness and extend beyond humans.

To this end, the following sketch introduces three ecological-existential takes on infancy in an attempt to scramble the monospecies child/adult divide on which to base a methodology: that of a human infant, a foal, and a baby octopus.

The infancy of a human (*Homo sapiens*, lifespan on average 79 years) is defined as the period of life between birth and the acquisition of language. The time of our own species’ infancy is characteristically the great unknown – inaccessible through conscious memories – existence without words, filled with slow and awkward movement, and one of vulnerability and extreme dependency of at least one parent or carer.

Infancy among horses (*Equus ferus caballus*, lifespan of c. 25-30 years) is considered to be the period of life between birth and weaning. The infant foal will stand up almost immediately after birth, its existence epitomized in the ability to flee in a matter of hours, while emotionally dependent on its mother for months. As virtually completely domesticated, the life events of horses are controlled by humans: weaning is made to take place usually between 5 to 7 months of age.

Infancy among octopi (the Giant pacific octopus, *Enteroctopus dofleini*, lifespan of c. 3-5 years) is a period of life from hatching when they are small in size (about the size of grain of rice), until full adult size (20kg and radial span of 6 m). The infant octopi don’t need parental care but hatch into complete independence regardless of their tiny size. The period of their infancy is defined by a very high mortality rate (about 1% of hatched octopi make it into adulthood), and a uniquely fast and adaptive cognitive development.

Ecology, as a branch of biology, often stands for determinism and operates at the level of groups or species, whereas existentialism foregrounds absolute freedom of humans as individuals. Combined, the two offer a frame for exploring the dynamics of individual experiences and choices coupled with co-existence across species and the ensuing differing dependencies and responsibilities (e.g., Barash, 2000). This translates to infant methodologies that explore the beginnings of life as a multispecies phenomenon, accounting for shared vulnerabilities as well as the profound existential differences, and the uneven, situational injustices *within and across species* (Lupinacci, 2019).

Methodological incubation

Jasmine Ulmer
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Sophisticated versions of neonatal incubators involve a variety of environmental controls, many fostering the conditions for growth, development, and health in real time. This is not

420 unlike the application of incubators in scientific laboratories, for instance, where incubators are
 421 used in experimental research to study cell cultures and the conditions in which they grow.
 422 Incubators make for regular laboratory equipment and, having been normalized in science, the
 423 language of incubation has made its way into the larger entrepreneurial vocabulary of which
 424 higher education is a part.

425 There has been a proliferation of university initiatives involving incubation of this sort, and
 426 these go by many names: university accelerators, university business incubators, incubation
 427 centers, research incubators, technology hubs, etc. Across the board, postsecondary incubators
 428 have attempted to promote growth and development by intentionally creating different types
 429 of environmental conditions and controls—ones that strategically and innovatively bring people
 430 together on behalf of common goals. And while growth, development, and short- and long-term
 431 institutional health can be worthy aims in and of themselves, there may also be more that
 432 incubation at the postsecondary level can do beyond solely profitable ventures, perhaps shifting
 433 more emphasis to promoting the public good.

434 The terminology within neonatal incubation and research incubation can be similar, but what
 435 can be overlooked is the focus that neonatal incubation has on sustaining life through safe
 436 and supportive healing. This raises several questions. To start, what if we attended to the people
 437 and ideas within higher education with a similar focus on care, treating people as people along
 438 the way? Furthermore, what intellectual ideas are we growing, what contributions are we develop-
 439 ing, and why are we making the choices that we do?

440 Responding to the prompt to think through methodological infancy, then, I've been thinking
 441 about how we do—and also do not—support in-progress methodologies through incubation.
 442 This has ramifications within and beyond our research communities, as we are not the only
 443 ones to be affected by the methodologies we sustain and create, including methodologies with
 444 yet-unrealized potential. This is especially important in times of crisis, as methodology has the
 445 potential to help.

446 For many, multiple crises have resulted in ongoing trauma, and those working in higher
 447 education have not been the exception. If and when we return to our campuses, we will be
 448 returning to landscapes that vastly differ from what we unexpectedly left. Beloved colleagues
 449 have suddenly retired, perhaps even passed. For the first time we'll meet the students and new
 450 colleagues we had only interacted with virtually. Research projects have been interrupted, labs
 451 shut down, resources eliminated, units reorganized and reduced, and far more than can be
 452 listed here. All the while, restorative justice is still overdue.

453 The ability of higher education to respond to multiple crises involves research incubation of
 454 a different sort. Namely, one that nurtures the newly reset; one that re-envision opportunities
 455 for health, recovery, and restoration; one that collectively approaches methodological and
 456 research incubation from an expanded and more wholistic point of view.

457 **Philosophical methodologies of the infant-toddler-child (PITCH) as inescapably 458 Queer-Feminist (QF-PITCH)**

459 Hillevi Lenz Taguchi
 460 Stockholm University

461 How can I pitch a vision for *philosophical methodologies of the infant-toddler-child* (PITCH) in
 462 the wake of a global pandemic and climate crisis, which shoves humanity towards the edge of
 463 an abyss, pitching steeply towards extinction? Accompanied by a number of other
 464 companion-species we slither in the leftover, dark, sticky pitch distillation residue of coal-tar
 465 and petroleum. This particular pitch has been generated during a fraction of time of human-driven
 466 natureculture exploitation, as acts of extraction that can be likened to the masculine penetrative
 pitching of the feminized counterpart – and of Mother Earth herself.

467 Consequently, the vitalist force needed for contemporary PITCH must, I claim, inevitably be
 468 of a *queer*-feminist kind – QF-PITCH – to necessarily put the concept itself and its methodologies
 469 into an iterative state of rupture and recreation. In this way, pitch/PITCH can take on the mean-
 470 ing as the verb of *throwing, setting up or establish*, and as an adverb to describe a *downward*
 471 *direction* into an abyss. Or, as a noun of the *playing field*, or a *degree of intensity*, as in the *pitch*
 472 *of music*; and as that destructive, black sticky substance formed in distillation of petroleum.
 473 PITCH, when pitch refers to the *density of character* in print, can thus be queered and recreated
 474 into various forms of practices of knowing.

475 Personally, I am in need a QF-PITCH to avoid the *hyper-humanism* that has emerged with
 476 the Posthumanist/New Materialist turn to ontology: re-erecting a metaphysics of *one* ecology
 477 and system of interconnected life – a materialist monism, sometimes understood as immanence
 478 (Colebrook, 2014). This has undermined the imperative message of the last 35 years of feminisms:
 479 that of a *multiplicity* of realities (ontologies) and ways of knowing (epistemologies), decisive for
 480 a continuous querying of the human tendency to construct yet another God Trick narrative.
 481 My QF-PITCH thus follows Haraway who, since *A Cyborg Manifesto* (1985), calls for inter- and
 482 transdisciplinary engagements. Such engagements neither exclude natural science's *facts* from
 483 the humanities and social-sciences, nor the art of *narration* as a vital methodology of the
 484 natural-sciences.

485 A QF-PITCH attends to how the biological (cellular, molecular) matter of the body-mind of
 486 the infant-toddler-child is a matter of natureculture co-production: i.e., how cells in the embodied
 487 brain are co-constituted by cultural practices in socio-emotional interactions and material events;
 488 and how the cultures of interaction, play and learning are co-constituted *with* the embodied
 489 brain and body. Inquires of infant-toddler-child natureculture co-emergences must consequently
 490 acknowledge the condition of multiple ontologies, to explore the differences and productions
 491 of *differing*, in events of encounter that take place at different scales of worldlings (becomings)
 492 and knowings (scientific facts, experiences, etc.) (Haraway, 2003; Lenz Taguchi & Eriksson, 2021).
 493 QF-PITCH compose *philo-factual* inquiries of multiple and differentiated scientific facts, cultural
 494 notions, meanings and practices. In their flow of encounter, they connect, disrupt, interact,
 495 interrupt, rupture or cause breakdowns, or, if possible, produce a philo-factual provisional and
 496 situated narrative of a speculative real of the infant-toddler-child – as a parallel to the wordplay
 497 of the five-letter word pitch above.

497 **Posthuman infant methodology**

498 Karin Murriss
 499 University of Oulu

501 What counts as a child or infant differs historically and geographically. Philosophical attempts
 502 to define child tend to use the adult human as the norm. The etymology of *infantia* – in-fans,
 503 'not speaking' – implies an adultocentrism (Kennedy, 2020), because it measures the young
 504 child against what she does *not* have, compared with a fully adult human. An infant is regarded
 505 as a human who cannot speak as well as an adult. Speech is used to measure intelligence.
 506 *Infant as concept* signifies absence or deficit of linguistic competence.

507 The Reggio Emilia approach disrupts this adultocentrism, especially in higher education
 508 contexts (cf. Murriss, 2016). The educational philosophy³ troubles an epistemology that focuses
 509 solely on the 'one' (adult)human language that represents the world. Posthumanists Karen Barad
 510 and Daniela Gandorfer (Barad & Gandorfer, 2021, p. 63, footnote 26) argue that, like all material
 511 objects, words and concepts are not detached from the world they represent because this
 512 would already imply a Nature/Culture binary. Reggio Emilia's notion of the 'hundred languages'
 513 of children (as well as the environment) offers ontological natureculture opportunities by includ-
 ing nonhuman bodies, such as sound, clay, fabric, light, water, sand, paper, pen, word and

514 technology. A good example of *posthuman infant as methodology*, it involves a radical paradigm
 515 shift that is not only epistemological, but also ontological and ethical.

516 In challenging Western notions of unilinear progress and temporalities, something of any
 517 age is not an individual body *in* space and time, but part of an intra-connected network of
 518 socio↔political, material↔discursive, nature↔culture and human↔nonhuman relations.

519 Jacques Derrida derides how his methodology of deconstruction sometimes passes as a 'kind
 520 of linguisticist mania'. And indeed, I see a rich diffractive potential in his notion of *childlike*
 521 *deconstruction*. In an interview, Derrida explains that:

522 deconstruction began by *suspecting the authority of language*, of verbal language, and even the trace,
 523 which is not yet, which is not language, which is not verbatim, which is not human, so, the child, *infans*,
 524 is not man. *Infans* is what is not yet man. Hence the question of the animal which is everywhere, no?
 525 Between the child and the animal, there are obviously all the links you imagine. Deconstruction is animal
 526 from this point of view. It is childlike and animal-like. (Cixous & Derrida, 2019, p.158)

527 A childlike deconstruction of concepts has little to do with age, although adults can learn
 528 a lot about how to philosophise from infants who are in the process of acquiring language
 529 (Murriss, 2000). As Barad (in Barad & Gandorfer, 2021) puts it poetically: "You can walk around
 530 in concepts... I walk around in a sentence, I walk around in a word. A word, or even a letter,
 531 entails stories, different stories" (p. 31).

532 Response-able science and philosophy enable the other to respond and to make a difference.
 533 By disrupting the temporality of progress and disrupting humanist binaries (e.g., Adult/Child,
 534 Nature/Culture), posthuman infant methodology embraces childlike deconstruction by coming
 535 to concepts as if we are thinking about them for the very first time, including the concept infant.

537 **Childhood and the time of a childlike questioning pedagogy**

538 Walter Omar Kohan

539 State University of Rio De Janeiro

540 We relate to childhood as we relate to time. If we experience time as a clock, numbering
 541 movement, childhood will also be quantified by numbers. If we consider time as chronological,
 542 with two parts, past and future, being present just a limit between them, for chronological
 543 adults childhood will only be part of their past. If we represent time with a line then childhood
 544 will be a part of that line, the first one (Kohan & Kennedy, 2008).

545 Fortunately, there are many other ways of experiencing, considering and representing time.
 546 Indigenous communities of South America, like the Aymaras, represent the past in front of us
 547 – because it is what we know and see it – and the future in the back, because we do not see/
 548 know it, being the present over us, passing from the back to the front. If we represent time
 549 of human life with a circle, things turn interesting because in a circle any point can be its
 550 beginning and end (and if it is the beginning of the circle it will also be the end of it). So,
 551 where does a circular human life begin? Where is childhood in a circle? It could be anywhere,
 552 everywhere and nowhere.

553 A question that emerges is: is there a time of childhood? Is there a specific childlike expe-
 554 rience of time? Heraclitus seems to be answering positively this question in his fragment 52:
 555 this time is aion, a time of a child playing (Marcovich, 1987). If adult time is composed by past
 556 and future, childlike time is a durative present: no future, no past. Childlike time is not only
 557 the time of the child playing but also the time of artistic creation, of loving, of curious thinking
 558 (Kohan, 2021).

559 How are these considerations about childhood and time related to education? In a very
 560 strong way. In the dominant tradition of what is called Western thought, education has been
 considered dominantly as the formation of the child. Consequently, childhood is understood

561 as a lack, an imperfection, a possibility or a potentiality. And if life moves according to a line,
 562 we need to be prepared for the future movements in a line. But if childhood is understood
 563 as playing, curious, loving and inquired life, then education might be approached as the
 564 caring, remembering and nurturing of childhood. If childhood can be born anytime, then
 565 education might be felt as what sets the conditions for the emergence of a childlike life at
 566 any age.

567 This is what Paulo Freire suggested, the childlike question is the core of education (Freire &
 568 Faundez, 1989). In fact, he was not all that interested in the education of chronological children,
 569 but in a childhood of education, in recovering (the time of) childhood for those adults who
 570 haven't been able, even at a very advanced age, to live a childlike life: people with their child-
 571 hood robbed. Then, who knows, (revolutionary) education itself might be considered as a form
 572 of childhood if after all we are always at the beginning (Horton & Freire, 1990). even when,
 573 like now, it seems we are in the end.

574 **Infantmethodologies: an open review**

576 Andrew Gibbons

577 Auckland University of Technology

578 Alphas are so conditioned that they do not *have* to be infantile in their emotional behaviour. But that
 579 is all the more reason for their making a special effort to conform. It is their duty to be infantile, even
 580 against their inclination. And so, Mr Marx, I give you fair warning.' The Director's voice vibrated with an
 581 indignation that had now become wholly righteous and impersonal - was the expression of the disap-
 582 proval of Society itself. 'If ever I hear again of any lapse of a proper standard of infantile decorum, I
 583 shall ask for your transference to a Sub-Centre - preferably to Iceland. Good morning. (Huxley, 1958, pp.
 584 83-84).

585 The Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning lectures Bernard Marx on his duty to be infantile
 586 even though his clinical hatching as an Alpha in Huxley's *Brave New World* (1958, first published
 587 in 1932) has 'intelligently' designed him with the faculties to be something other than infantile.
 588 Bernard Marx, being other than infantile, *has been observed* to not participate in all the carefully
 589 designed play, nor vigorously consume happy drugs, and be generally reluctant to 'get around'
 590 in efforts of sexual intercourse, whilst entertaining ideas of his being a something of an ...
 591 in-di-vid-ual (shush). Being infantile, then appears to mean being drugged up, promiscuous
 592 (although that's an old-fashioned word that the Director probably would not approve of), and
 593 generally engage in a lot of carefully designed and pointless play (of course it's not pointless
 594 because the point is to be pointless - 'you see what you want to see, and you hear what you
 595 want to hear, dig?' [Nilsson, 1970]). The Director, and Society, has this particular socio-political and
 596 techno-biological construct of the infant. That construct is, in this brave new world, unironically,
 597 almost perfectly constructed.

598 Through infantmethodologies the complexities (although why complexities, why not simplic-
 599 ities?) of the perfection of the infant construct can be explored. Here that exploration takes
 600 the form of a series of questions:

601 What is the apparent genealogy of the word infant? How does the language of infancy
 602 appear in different places and times with different agendas? What words are obstructed by the
 603 word infant: unsaid, invisible? What saying, and what seeing, does infancy make possible? Speak
 604 infant, and enter?

605 In what ways does being infantile produce a relationship to a new body, a new reflex, in
 606 what ways is this relationship understood as a 'shared labour', in what ways is this labour gov-
 607 erned by a policing of bodies, and how can the mapping of these relationships muddle traditions
 608 in linearity and causality? And when and how often and producing what temporal experiences?
 609 And who took notice of the time it took to work together to be infantile?

608 What devices come and go in the measuring of the infantile? Who appears to be controlling
 609 those measures, how might those measures measure the measurers, and how might they be
 610 understood as never really measuring what it says on the packaging? How might these devices
 611 be remediated to reveal that which was not intended to be revealed in the design of the device?
 612 Can it be assumed that the totality of surveillance made possible by the abundance of old and
 613 new and soon to be devised devices are always less than the infinite infant, and that an impos-
 614 sibility of a complete knowledge (a knowledge summit) may cause melancholia and anxiety for
 615 some mainly Modern onto-epistemologies, and maybe there's a pill for that 'know-it-all' condition?

616 If the presence of infants was measured to have some benefit for other beings in the pres-
 617 ence of the infant, what might happen to the socio-technical arrangements structured for, in
 618 political newspeak, education and care?

619 How do the senses of infancy map out in the blueprints of a thousand days? And who blows
 620 the whistle when the best intentions of the blueprint don't actually seem to relate to anyone
 621 or thing? If the average is no-one, then what?

622 In what ways is the infant indebted to human recognition and human sensibility, to the
 623 ordering of social and political relationships, to the configuration of things in spaces, and to
 624 place; and vice versa? What habits are revealed in the act of redistributing the debt? How might
 625 those debts be invested and/or exploited and/or realised?

626 These questions vibrate from this collection. In the vibrations are many senses of the idea
 627 of infant and method and methodology and infantmethodologies. As an early childhood teacher
 628 educator, I am excited by the opportunity to share the collection with teachers who are engaged
 629 in the study of teaching. There's a whole wonderful semester of reflection, discussion, research
 630 and practice vibrating out of the text. These vibrations may even engineer a certain way of
 631 thinking for student teachers, something along the lines of, as an early childhood teacher, you
 632 don't *have* to be an adult...

633 Acknowledgement: The questions concerning blueprints and averages was inspired by the
 634 forthcoming Master of Education thesis *Implicit gender bias in music technology education*, by
 635 Daryl Tapsell.

636 **Infantmethodologies: an open review**

637 Sonja Arndt
 638 University of Melbourne

639 This paper is revolutionary. It is simultaneously connecting and disruptive, it interrupts and
 640 interacts, ruptures and relates. It highlights fragilities in knowledge, challenges singular, narrow
 641 exceptionalisms and dethrones dominant (Western) conceptions of what 'infant' can be and
 642 how that can be determined. Following this lead, it breaks down the (predominantly Western)
 643 human inclination to want to know. It also highlights a way of being as reflected in Indigenous
 644 ways of thinking, as Kohan outlines, by seeing the end through the lens of the beginning, and
 645 the future through the lens of the past. In its disruption of disjointed, mono-focused conceptions
 646 of childhood doings/doing childhoods, it compellingly and seductively traverses linguistic, cul-
 647 tural, methodological, human and other-than-human embodiments of infancies and methodol-
 648 ogies for studying infancies. Evoking a literal shiver, the paper uses the opportunity to playfully
 649 engage with infantmethodologies as a blatant disregard of conventional methods and ways of
 650 knowing not only infancy and methodologies, but also common conceptions of knowledge
 651 itself, and the common processes and procedures of its extraction and production, through
 652 various forms of research and its dominant and marginalized positionings. While unsettling,
 653 these disruptions offer glimmers of hope, suggesting that a whole-sale upheaval of conceptions
 654 of infants+methodologies create new thought-ful spaces for reorientations towards the thinking
 and doing of being, of research, of infancy, of humanity and of knowledge.

655 Further rupturing human inclinations to want to know, the paper turns upside-down how
 656 knowledge is acquired and how methods of knowledge acquisition are learnt. It re-places and
 657 re-returns, as Ulmer says, research and its processes into a methodological infancy. Unsettling
 658 infancy – human and non-human – thus not only pushes beyond certainty and beyond the
 659 intimate sense of knowing and connection, but in doing so it evokes a very distinct humility,
 660 placing us as researchers into an infant-like relation with-in the multiplicities of beings in the
 661 world/s in which we research. It foregrounds our relational response-abilities as humans-beings-
 662 things co-existing in ways that we perhaps don't and perhaps never will know but have to
 663 learn and re-learn as we go. And, in re-reminding us of this humility, the paper calls forth the
 664 strength for revolutionary thought, as our relational inter-species end-goal in itself.

665 **Infant-method-ologies – a diffractive caring open(ing) review**

667 Karen Malone

668 Swinburne University of Technology

669 Thinking with infant-*method-ologies* is to be thinking with matters of care.

670 De la Bellacasa (2017), with matter of care thinking, acknowledges a closeness of relations,
 671 as providing possibilities for encouraging awareness, a means for creating knowledge.

672 'Thinking with care as living-with' (de la Bellcasa, 2017, p. 92).

673 Babies nor kin are surrogates for theory making (de la Bellcasa, 2017). Infant-*method-ologies* like Haraway's
 674 dogs 'are not just here to think with, they are here to live with' (Haraway, 2003, p. 5).

675 *injustices within and across species⁴*
 676 *which shoves humanity towards the edge of an abyss*

677
 678 nurturing, yearning
 679 bringing into being
 680 is caring sustenance?

681 Caring effects our thinking of babies.

682 Care, "those layers of labour that get us *through the day*, a material space in which many are trapped" (de
 683 la Bellcasa, 2017, p. 87).

684 '*being birthed*' hints at the labour
 685 '*birthed being*' indicates that birth is shared labour
 686 *staying with the babies whatever is seemingly going on*

687 Care, "moves relational webs, even by creating critical cuts, those who are involved in the
 688 caring are bound to be moved" (de la Bellcasa, 2017, p. 83). Yearnings are possibilities of prox-
 689 imity, caring involves moments, edging-in to the theory making, cutting apart.

690 *babies' momentary movements*
 691 *made soft by the birthing canal of a series of nows*
 692 *partially unknown and unrecognizable*
 693 *with yet-unrealized potential*

694 Paused, misplaced concern

695 Being attentive, to the unknown, a misplaced stranger with a knock at the door.

696 "Body sensing as entangled matter" (Malone & Moore, 2019, p. 14)

697 Body encounters have unexpected outcomes

698 *these bodies in movement become sensuous*
 699 *carrying the environment with them*

700 inviting
 701 sensing

Touch lends itself easily to memory.

Its traces remain on the surface of an infant body, ready to be rekindled (Le Breton, 2017)

Yearnings to touch, for being touched. A permanent in-touch-ness.

this is the seduction of an extracted new beginning

a not-yet that remains on the precipice of being claimed

Touch, thinking, living and care, immanence transcending infant-method-ologies

Notes

1. <https://www.gallery.ca/magazine/exhibitions/imitation-and-illusion-ron-mueck-at-the-wag> Retrieved 4 May 2021
2. Follow this link to access the tryptic: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1S030_Ks86IKdyRAKJtIvDpJwENsy74y5/view?usp=sharing
3. See <https://www.reggiochildren.it/en/reggio-emilia-approach/>
4. *italicised words are the authors

Disclosure statement

Q3 No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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