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DIDDOS: An approach for detection and identification of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) cyberattacks using Gated Recurrent Units (GRU)

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Abstract

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks can put the communication networks in instability by throwing malicious traffic and requests in bulk over the network. Computer networks form a complex chain of nodes resulting in a formation of vigorous structure. Thus, in this scenario, it becomes a challenging task to provide an efficient and secure environment for the user. Numerous approaches have been adopted in the past to detect and prevent DDoS attacks but lack in providing efficient and reliable attack detection. As a result, there is still notable room for improvement in providing security against DDoS attacks. To overcome the problem of DDoS attacks detection, in this paper, a novel high-efficient approach is proposed named *DIDDOS* to protect against real-world new type DDoS attacks using Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) a type of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). For effective performance results different classification algorithms are applied Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), Naive Bayes (NB), and Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) are utilized to detect and identify DDoS attacks. For the performance evaluation metrics like accuracy, recall, f1-score, precision are used to evaluate the efficiency of the machine and deep learning classifiers. Experimental results yield the highest accuracy of 99.69% for DDoS classification in case of reflection attacks and 99.94% for DDoS classification in case of exploitation attacks using GRU.

Keywords: Cyberattack, Cybersecurity, DDoS, IDS, Deep Learning, GRU, Malware, Network, RNN, Traffic

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1. Introduction

Internet security is one of the paramount challenges and primary concern of Information Technology (IT) specifically for the Internet of Things (IoT), Mobile devices, and Medical data [1, 2, 3, 4]. As the demand for IT services is increasing, similarly potential cyberattacks are increasing rapidly [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Among the many existing cyberattacks (i.e., DDOS, phishing, zero-days, rootkits, drive-by, password, SQL injection, ransomware), the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack can be utilized to breach the intranet and Internet resources of a particular organization or online business [10, 11, 12, 13]. Usually, in this attack, legitimate users are deprived of using web-based services provided by a large number of compromised machines that are highly vulnerable. DDoS attacks attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. DDoS attacks are sent by two or more persons, or bots [14, 15], while DoS attacks are sent by one person or system. A bot is a compromised device created when a computer is penetrated by software from a malware code [16]. In this paper, the main focus is to keep an eye on DDoS attacks. These can be implemented in network, transport, and application layers using different protocols, such as TCP, UDP, ICMP, and HTTP. Furthermore, a DDoS attack [17, 18, 19] can be a large-scale coordinated attack on the provision of services of a victim system or network resources, launched indirectly through a large number of compromised computer agents on the internet [20, 13, 21]. Before applying an attack the attacker takes a large number of computer machines under his control over the internet and these computers are vulnerable machines. The attacker exploits these computer weaknesses by inserting malicious code or some other hacking technique so that they become operational under his command.

DDoS attacks are constantly evolving as the nature of the technology used and the motivations of the attackers are changing. Even today, perpetrators are being caught and charged with DDoS attacks launched via botnets that cause tens of thousands of dollars of damage to the victims. Last year's massive attack on Estonian Government web sites bought this attack method squarely into the public eye [22]. DDoS attacks on the Internet can be launched using two techniques. In the first technique, the attacker sends some malicious packets to the victim to confuse a protocol or an application running on it (i.e., vulnerability attack [23]). The Second technique essentially includes the network/transport-level/application-level flooding attacks [23], in which an attacker to do one or both of the following: (i) interrupt a legitimate user's connec-

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29 tivity by exhausting bandwidth, network resources, or router processing capacity or (ii) disrupt services of
30 a legitimate user's by exhausting the server resources such as CPU, memory, disk/database bandwidth and
31 I/O bandwidth.

32 State-of-the-art studies [24, 25, 26] lack in providing accurate detection of real-world new types of Dis-
33 tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) cyberattacks and identify the type of DDOS attack. (i.e., NTP, UDP). The
34 *DIDDOS* improves the detection and identification of real-world new types of Distributed Denial of Service
35 (DDoS) using customized GRU as well as addresses the limitation of limited attack samples (imbalanced
36 data) in the dataset by improving the representation of minority class.

37 The main contributions to this paper are:

- 38 • Propose an approach named *DIDDOS* to detect a real-world Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
39 cyberattacks and identify the type of DDOS attack.
- 40 • Evaluate the effectiveness of the *DIDDOS* using conventional machine learning classifiers (i.e., Naïve
41 Bayes (NB), Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO)) and deep learning approaches by using Gated
42 Recurrent Units (GRU) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN).
- 43 • Present a comparative analysis with state-of-the-art studies and conventional approaches (i.e., Recur-
44 rent Neural Networks (RNN), Naive Bayes (NB), Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO)).
- 45 • Experimental results conclude that GRU provides efficient detection and identification rate than RNN,
46 other conventional algorithms, and state-of-the-art studies.

47 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly covers the related work and recent
48 advancements on DDOS attack detection and identification. Section 3 provides extensive discussion on
49 the selected dataset. Section 4 presents the proposed approach *DIDDOS* for DDoS attack detection and
50 identification. The experimental setup and results are articulated in Section 5. Section 6 presents the
51 comparative analysis with state-of-the-art studies and conventional machine learning algorithms and overall
52 discussion. Section 7 concludes the paper and leads towards future work.

53 **2. Related Work**

54 The number of DDoS attacks is increasing every year and from statistics [27] of Cisco Visual Network-
55 ing Index (VNI) in 2017, it is confirmed that DDoS attacks are anticipated to double to 14.5 million by 2022.

56 This shows that DDoS attacks are increasing at a very unpleasant rate. However, this is a very challenging
57 task to update the detection techniques up to the current DDoS attacks. The authors in [28] proposed the
58 dataset "DDoS Attack 2007" containing the traffic traces for one whole hour stored in the pcap format and
59 details of attack traffic to the victim, as well as responses to the attack from the victim. In 2004, the authors
60 Mirkovic and Reiher et. al. [23] introduced classifications of different DDoS attacks and conceivable guard
61 components. The attacks were classified as automation, vulnerability, source address validity, attack rate
62 dynamics, characterization, the persistence of agents, victim, and impact on the victim. In automation-
63 based techniques, the machine is checked for vulnerability. In this research, the activity feed is checked to
64 access the DDoS resistance mechanism. The authors in [29] performed a study that proposes a classification
65 dependent on the degree of automation, architecture, impact, vulnerability, attack rate dynamics, scanning
66 strategy, propagation strategy, and packet content. They also categorize the data into prevention and detec-
67 tion groups and claim that this classification is the best to detect where was the attack originated. The study
68 also proposed a framework that can detect any DDoS attack using the K-means algorithm. However, no
69 experiments are being conducted to validate the proposed classification.

70 In 2016, the study [30] concentrated on DDoS Taxonomy in the cloud computing paradigm. The authors
71 propose the classification for the different potential DDoS attacks as a degree of automation, vulnerability,
72 attack rate dynamics, and attack impact. Some resembling work was researched by [23] but it was unique
73 because of DDoS attack classification features which include real-time response, throughput, request, re-
74 sponse time, and zero-day attack detection ability. The research by Masdari and Jalali [31] concentrated
75 on the analysis of DDoS attacks in cloud computing. In their study, they showed that different DDoS at-
76 tacks by showing how these attacks violated the vulnerabilities. Lastly, the study also characterized the
77 DDoS attacks dependent on some modules like virtual machines, cloud scheduler, hyper-visor, web service,
78 cloud clients, IaaS, and SaaS-based attacks [32]. The most effective cloud computing attacks have been
79 recognized as bandwidth attacks, connectivity attacks, resource exhaustion, limitation exploitation, process
80 disruption, data corruption, and physical disruption. The primary features of the researches are discussed in
81 Table 1.

82 Modi et al.[34] proposed a NIDS that integrates the Naive Bayes classifier and Snort. In their study,
83 they showed that Snort signature-based detection system filters the captured packets. The captured packets
84 will be divided into two sets: intrusion packets and non-intrusion packets. The intrusion packets will be
85 logged and denied by the system. Meanwhile, the non-intrusion packets will be pre-processed and fed

Table 1: Primary Features of the Related Works [24] in Terms of Providing Multilevel Protection

Authors	OSI-Layer	Network-Based Environment	Known Attacks/ Potential threats	Defense Mechanism
[23]	×	×	✓	✓
[29]	×	×	✓	✓
[30]	×	Cloud Computing	✓	✓
[31]	Application Network Transport	Cloud Computing	✓	✓
[33]	Application	×	✓	×

86 into the anomaly detection module. The anomaly detection module employs the Naive Bayes classifier to
87 further classify the non-intrusion packets into normal and intrusion packets. Once the packets are classified
88 as intrusions, they will be logged and denied. Only when the packets are labeled as normal can they
89 be allowed to go to the system. Similarly authors in [35] proposed a deep learning model for anomaly
90 detection in connected vehicles. Qin et al. [36] designed a similar framework as [37] did. Jing et al. [38]
91 have proposed a Support Vector Machine(SVM) with a new scaling technique in 2019. The necessary steps
92 are: (1) divide the dataset into the training set and testing set; (2) Pre-processing the data (both training
93 set and testing set) with scaling technique; (3) Train the SVM model with the training set; (4) Test the
94 model with the testing set; (5) Record the classification result. Authors in [39, 13, 40] used various feature
95 engineering and machine learning for the intrusion detection.

96 In the area of intrusion detection, several researchers endeavour hard to develop effective model for the
97 intrusion detection in RNN [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. Yin et al.[41] use RNN with forwarding propagation
98 and weights updates (backpropagation). Qureshi et al.[42] rebalanced the KDD'99 dataset before training
99 and testing. The proportion of abnormal data in the training set is rebalanced to 46.5%. The authors
100 have referred to the work of Bajaj et al. [47] about feature reduction and dropped some features in the
101 preprocessing to improve the detection rate. Althubiti et al. [43] use Long-Short-Term-Memory RNN and
102 ADAM optimizer. Meng et al. [44] took a further step and integrate kernel PCA and LSTM. Kernel PCA is a
103 type of dimension reduction technique and this technique is different from PCA because it generalizes PCA
104 from linear to nonlinear dimension reduction. The overall Detection Rate tested on KDD'99 is 99.46%,
105 while the False Alarm Rate is 4.86%. Le et al. [45] compared several gradient descent optimizers with
106 LSTM. Gradient Descent is a classic optimizer used in deep learning. However, there are many variations

107 of Gradient Descent optimizers. The scope of all the above attacks is limited because there are new attacks
108 that can be carried out using TCP/UDP based protocols at the application layer.

109 This work aims to overcome the limitations in such a way that a dataset that has been released in 2019
110 is utilized. The dataset includes new attacks that can be carried out using TCP/UDP based protocols at
111 the application layer. Machine and deep learning-based approaches are being conducted to evaluate the
112 detection and identification of DDOS attacks.

113 **3. Dataset Selection**

114 For the DDoS attacks, different datasets are used by numerous researchers that contain information
115 about a variety of attacks. But new attacks are made which poses a security challenge. So, that is why
116 datasets are updated to increase security. We needed a newly released dataset that contains the latest in-
117 formation about Distributive Denial of Service attacks or DDoS attacks. So, for this research, a recently
118 published dataset CICDDoS2019¹ is selected, which contains benign and the most up-to-date realistic back-
119 ground DDoS traffic, which resembles the true real-world data. It also includes the results of the network
120 traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter-V3 with labeled flows based on the time stamp, source, and destination
121 IPs, source and destination ports, protocols, and attacks. For this dataset, the abstract behavior of 25 users
122 based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols was established.

123 In Section 2, as explained that there exist no other datasets that have captured modern reflective DDoS
124 attacks. The new reflective DDoS attacks are NTP, NetBIOS, SSDP, UDP-Lag, and TFTP. The important
125 part of analyzing the network packets is to keep the payloads while anonymizing the traffic. The above
126 datasets anonymized the traffic but removed the payloads which shows the datasets discussed in 2 were not
127 complete and the selected dataset CICDDoS2019 for this research is better concerning the factors complete
128 traffic, attack diversity, data source heterogeneity, complete interaction, and complete capture. A graphical
129 representation of different DDoS attacks and their types can be seen in Table 1 which was introduced by
130 [24] by Iman Sharafaldin in 2019. In this dataset, there are different modern reflective DDoS attacks such
131 as PortMap, NetBIOS, LDAP, MSSQL, UDP, UDP-Lag, SYN, NTP, DNS, and SNMP. Moreover, 12 DDoS
132 attacks include NTP, DNS, LDAP, MSSQL, NetBIOS, SNMP, SSDP, UDP, UDP-Lag, WebDDoS, SYN,
133 and TFTP are used on the training day, and 7 attacks including PortScan, NetBIOS, LDAP, MSSQL, UDP,

¹[48] CICDDoS2019 Dataset Link: <https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ddos-2019.html>

134 UDP-Lag and SYN in the testing day. The traffic volume for WebDDoS was so low and PortScan just has
 135 been executed in the testing day and will be unknown for evaluating the proposed model.




Figure 1: Graphical Representation of DDoS Attacks Hierarchy and Categorization

136 3.1. Reflection-based DDoS Attacks

137 Are those kinds of attacks in which the identity of the attacker remains hidden by utilizing legitimate
 138 third-party component. The packets are sent to reflector servers by attackers with source IP address set to
 139 target the victim & rsquo s IP address to overwhelm the victim with response packets. These attacks can be
 140 carried out through application layer protocols using transport layer protocols, i.e., Transmission Control
 141 Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), or through a combination of both. In this category, TCP
 142 based attacks include MSSQL, SSDP while UDP based attacks include CharGen, NTP, and TFTP. Certain
 143 attacks can be carried out using either TCP or UDP like DNS, LDAP, NETBIOS, and SNMP.

- 144 1. **MSSQL Attack:** Microsoft Structured Query Language (MSSQL) injection is an attack that makes
 145 it possible to execute malicious SQL statements [49].
- 146 2. **SSDP Attack:** An SSDP attack exploits Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) networking protocols to
 147 send a large amount of traffic to a victim to overwhelm their computing resources [50].
- 148 3. **DNS Attack:** A DNS attack exploits vulnerabilities in the DNS [51].

- 149 4. **LDAP Attack:** LDAP injection is an attack used to exploit web-based applications that construct
150 LDAP statements based on user inputs [52].
- 151 5. **NETBIOS Attack:** A security exploit in Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS) allows an
152 attacker to see information in computer memory over a network [53].
- 153 6. **SNMP Attack:** A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) attack generates a large amount
154 of traffic which is directed at victims from multiple networks [25].
- 155 7. **PORTMAP Attack:** PORTMAP is an attack on TCP or UDP port 111 which is a service used
156 to direct clients to the proper port number so they can communicate with the requested Remote
157 Procedure Call (RPC) service [25].
- 158 8. **CharGen Attack:** Character Generator Protocol (CharGEN) flooding is an attack that is carried out
159 by sending small packets carrying a spoofed IP of the victim to internet-enabled devices running
160 CharGEN to exhaust computing resources [25].
- 161 9. **NTP Attack:** NTP is an amplification attack in which the attacker exploits publically accessible NTP
162 servers to overwhelm the target with UDP traffic [54].
- 163 10. **TFTP Attack:** A TFTP attack exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability in a Trivial File Transfer
164 Protocol (TFTP) server [55].

165 3.2. *Exploitation-based DDoS attacks*

166 Are those kinds of attacks in which the identity of the attacker remains hidden by utilizing legitimate
167 third-party component. The packets are sent to reflector servers by attackers with the source IP address set
168 to the target victim & rsquo s IP address to overwhelm the victim with response packets. These attacks can
169 also be carried out through application layer protocols using transport layer protocols e.g. TCP and UDP.
170 TCP based exploitation attacks include SYN flood and UDP based attacks include UDP flood and UDP-
171 Lag. UDP flood attack is initiated on the remote host by sending a large number of UDP packets. These
172 UDP packets are sent to random ports on the target machine at a very high rate. As a result, the available
173 bandwidth of the network gets exhausted, system crashes and performance degrades. On the other hand,
174 the SYN flood also consumes server resources by exploiting the TCP-three-way handshake. This attack is
175 initiated by sending repeated SYN packets to the target machine until the server crashes/malfunctions. The
176 UDP-Lag attack is that kind of attack that disrupts the connection between the client and the server. This
177 attack is mostly used in online gaming where the players want to slow down/interrupt the movement of
178 other players to outmaneuver them. This attack can be carried in two ways, i.e., using a hardware switch

179 known as a lag switch or by a software program that runs on the network and hogs the bandwidth of other
180 users.

- 181 1. **UDP-Flood Attack:** User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding is an attack in which a large number
182 of UDP packets are sent to a victim to overwhelm their ability to process and respond. The firewall
183 protecting the target server is exhausted as a result [56].
- 184 2. **UDP-Lag Attack:** UDP-Lag is an attack that disrupts the connection between the client and server
185 [57].
- 186 3. **SYN Flood Attack:** SYN flood is a denial-of-service attack in which an attacker sends a succes-
187 sion of SYN requests to a target system in an attempt to consume server resources so the system is
188 unresponsive to legitimate traffic [25].

189 TCP-based attacks can employ Microsoft Structured Query Language (MSSQL) or Simple Service Dis-
190 covery Protocol (SSDP) whereas UDP-based attacks utilize CharGen, Network Time Protocol (NTP), or
191 Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). Certain attacks use a combination of these protocols and include Do-
192 main Name System (DNS), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Network Basic Input/Output
193 System (NetBIOS), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), or PORT MAP. SYN flood is a denial-
194 of-service attack in which an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests to a target system in an attempt
195 to consume server resources so the system is unresponsive to legitimate traffic [25]. WebDDoS is an attack
196 to take down the target website or slow it by flooding the network, server, or application with bogus traffic
197 [58]. A TFTP attack exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability in a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
198 server [25]. A DNS attack exploits vulnerabilities in the DNS [25]. PORT MAP is an attack on TCP or UDP
199 port 111 which is a service used to direct clients to the proper port number so they can communicate with
200 the requested Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service [25]. Microsoft Structured Query Language (MSSQL)
201 injection is an attack that makes it possible to execute malicious SQL statements [25]. LDAP injection is
202 an attack used to exploit web-based applications that construct LDAP statements based on user inputs [25].
203 NETBIOS is a security exploit in Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS) that allows an attacker
204 to see information in computer memory over a network [25]. NTP is an amplification attack in which the
205 attacker exploits publically accessible NTP servers to overwhelm the target with UDP traffic [25]. An SSDP
206 attack exploits Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) networking protocols to send a large amount of traffic to
207 a victim to overwhelm their computing resources [25]. SNMP is a Simple Network Management Protocol
208 (SNMP) attack that generates a large amount of traffic which is directed at victims from multiple networks

209 [25]. User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding is an attack in which a large number of UDP packets are sent
 210 to a victim to overwhelm their ability to process and respond. The firewall protecting the target server is ex-
 211 hausted as a result [25]. UDP-Lag UDP-Lag is an attack that disrupts the connection between the client and
 212 server [57]. CharGEN is Character Generator Protocol (CharGEN) flooding is an attack that is carried out
 213 by sending small packets carrying a spoofed IP of the victim to internet-enabled devices running CharGEN
 214 to exhaust computing resources [25].

215 4. Proposed Methodology

216 In this section, we present our proposed *DIDDOS* approach for the detection and identification of DDoS
 217 attacks. The proposed approach comprises data normalization, feature extraction, and classification of
 218 attacks. Figure 2 summarizes our proposed approach which consists of deep learning classifiers for the
 219 classification of multiple types of DDoS attacks. In Figure 2, the detailed methodology can be clearly seen
 220 in which firstly the feature extraction and feature normalization takes place. Then the dataset is checked
 221 and if it has oversampling problems then the dataset is balanced by using SMOTE with the help of the tool
 222 WEKA. After this step, the algorithms are deployed on the datasets to evaluate their performance to detect
 223 malware.




Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the *DIDDOS* Demonstrating the Workflow of the Model

224 4.1. Pre-Processing

In the Pre-processing stage, the dataset is optimized so that the results could be achieved with the highest accuracy. This includes dealing with NaN and duplicate instances. Typically these instances are removed and then the dataset is normalized and scaled according to the algorithm. In this case, MinMax scaling from [59] is used for feature normalization which used the Equation 1 to normalize the data.

$$X_{norm} = \frac{X_i - X_{min}}{X_{max} - X_{min}} \quad (1)$$

225 In equation 1 the variable X_i represents the original value of the feature. Then the minimum value of the
226 feature X_{min} is subtracted from the original feature and divided by the difference between the maximum
227 X_{max} and a minimum X_{min} result of the feature.

228 4.2. Feature Extraction

229 After pre-processing the raw data, the data is in good shape to extract features. The dataset is distributed
230 in 13 categories each representing a different DDoS attack. These different attacks are NTP, UDP, DNS,
231 LDAP, MSSQL, NetBIOS, SNMP, SSDP, SYN, UDP-Lag, Web-DDoS, TFTP, and Portmap attacks. The
232 dataset CIC-DDoS2019 [48] is a combination of numerous numeric and object types from which only nu-
233 merical types are extracted. This step is necessary to ensure improvement in the efficiency of classification
234 models.

235 4.3. Oversampling

236 Oversampling is achieved by increasing the minority classes using the Synthetic Minority Oversampling
237 Technique (SMOTE) [60]. SMOTE is a statistical technique for increasing the number of instances in
238 a dataset such that all class labels have the same number of instances. It generates new instances from
239 existing minority cases. First, the minority class instance is randomly selected by SMOTE and finds its k
240 nearest minority class neighbors. The synthetic instance is then created by choosing one of the k nearest
241 neighbors b at random and connecting a and b to form a line segment in the feature space. The synthetic
242 instances are generated as a convex combination of the two chosen instances a and b.

243 4.4. Classification Models

244 For the classification deep learning algorithms are used such as Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), recurrent
245 neural network(RNN), and machine learning algorithms are Naive Bayes (NB), Sequential Minimal Opti-
246 mization (SMO). Below, a brief introduction is provided to each algorithm.

247

248 1. **Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)** aims to solve the vanishing gradient problem which comes with a
249 standard recurrent neural network. GRU can also be considered as a variation on the LSTM because
250 both are designed similarly and, in some cases, produce equally excellent results. In this research, the
251 GRU model is used because it trains the dataset faster, executes faster, and uses less memory.

252
253 2. **Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)** is a generalization of a feedforward neural network that has
254 internal memory. RNN is recurrent as it performs the same function for every input of data while
255 the output of the current input depends on the past one computation. After producing the output, it is
256 copied and sent back into the recurrent network [61]. In this research, the RNN model is used because
257 the size of the dataset CICDDoS2019 is large and even if the dataset input size is larger, the model
258 size does not increase.

259
260 3. **Naive Bayes (NB)** is a classification technique based on Bayes' Theorem with an assumption of
261 independence among predictors. So, this classifier assumes that the presence of a particular feature
262 in a class is unrelated to the presence of any other feature.

4. Bayes theorem checks probability $P(c|x)$ from $P(c)$, $P(x)$ and $P(x|c)$ as shown in equation 2 from
[62] and $P(c|x)$ is the posterior probability of class ($c, target$) given predictor (x , attributes), $P(c)$
is the prior probability of a class, $P(x|c)$ is the likelihood which is the probability of predictor given
class and $P(x)$ is the prior probability of predictor [63]. In this research, the NB model is used
because the dataset CICDDoS2019 .

$$\frac{P(x|c)P(c)}{P(x)} \quad (2)$$

263 5. **Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO)** is an algorithm for solving the quadratic programming
264 (QP) problem that arises during the training of support vector machines (SVM). Instead of an SVM
265 algorithm that uses numerical QP as an inner loop, SMO uses an analytic QP step [64]. In this research,
266 the SMO algorithm is used because it is a very fast algorithm and very robust with a high input
267 dimension dataset.

268 5. Evaluation and Results

269 The results are evaluated based on Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-score. Accuracy is commonly
270 taken as the performance evaluator in most cases but in the case of dataset imbalance problem, F1-score is

271 the optimal choice to evaluate the performance of the classifier. F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision
 272 and recall.

273 5.1. NTP attacks

274 The results for NTP DDoS attacks are shown in Table 2 in which the highest accuracy achieved is
 275 99.52% by using the GRU algorithm. Other algorithms: RNN, SMO, and NB achieve the accuracy of
 276 99.35%, 98.89%, and 96.65%. In the case of naive Bayes, the accuracy is 96.65% which is low as compared
 277 to other algorithms because it needs more data instances. Other algorithms used are not dependent on
 the quantity of data. Figure 3a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the highest

Table 2: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting NTP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.52	99.31	97.12	98.37
RNN	99.35	99.45	96.50	97.07
SMO	98.89	99.0	98.91	98.90
NB	96.65	97.3	96.75	96.83

278
 279 accuracy of 99.5% is achieved at 42th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 97.5% and goes up to 99.5%
 280 and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 99.87% and goes
 281 up to 99.5%. It slightly went down at the 6th epoch. Figure 3 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with
 282 epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.01% at the 44th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.09% and goes
 283 down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in Figure 3b.

284 5.2. UDP attacks

285 In the case of UDP attacks, the highest accuracy of 99.69% is achieved by using GRU and RNN classifi-
 286 cation algorithm and the other models were also very accurate in which SMO and NB achieved an accuracy
 287 of 99.60% and 99.20% as shown in Table 3. Figure 4a presents the accuracy convergence with respect
 288 to epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.76% is achieved at 42th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins
 289 at 98.7% and goes up to 99.8% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test
 290 accuracy starts at 99.87% and goes up to 99.7%. It slightly went down at the 15th epoch. Figure 4 depicts
 291 the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.01% at the 46th epoch.




Figure 3: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to NTP Attacks

Table 3: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of UDP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.69	98.1	98.21	98.3
RNN	99.69	98.41	97.94	98.35
SMO	99.60	99.61	99.61	99.61
NB	99.20	99.31	99.24	99.29

292 Training loss starts at 0.07% and goes down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable
 293 as shown in fig 4b.

294 5.3. DNS attacks

295 In Table 4, it can be seen that by using the SMO algorithm the highest accuracy achieved is 99.75%
 296 and with other algorithm techniques such as GRU, RNN and NB the accuracy achieved is 99.51%, 99.72%
 297 and 99.35% for DNS attacks. Figure 5a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the
 298 highest accuracy of 99.72% is achieved at 46th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 98.25% and goes
 299 up to 99.6% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at
 300 98.65% and goes up to 99.65%. It slightly went down at the 20th epoch. Figure 5 depicts the convergence
 301 of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.01% at the 48th epoch. Training loss starts
 302 at 0.06% and goes down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig




Figure 4: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to UDP Attacks

Table 4: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of DNS attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.51	98.42	97.21	97.20
RNN	99.72	98.12	99.59	99.32
SMO	99.75	99.80	99.80	99.80
NB	99.35	99.40	99.40	99.40

303 5b.

304 5.4. LDAP attacks

305 For LDAP attacks, the highest accuracy achieved is 99.96% by using the SMO model. The remaining
306 algorithms were GRU, RNN, and NB through which the achieved accuracy is 99.95%, 99.94%, and 99.82%
307 as shown in Table 5. Figure 6a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the highest
308 accuracy of 99.95% is achieved at 4th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 99% and goes up to 99.9%
309 and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 98.1% and goes
310 up to 99.95%. Figure 6 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest
311 loss of below 0.01% at the 15th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.06% and goes down to 0.005%. Then the
312 convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 6b.




Figure 5: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to DNS attacks

Table 5: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for detecting of LDAP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.95	99.16	99.88	99.32
RNN	99.94	99.40	99.77	99.48
SMO	99.96	99.71	99.91	99.87
NB	99.82	99.80	99.80	99.80

313 5.5. MSSQL attacks

314 The MSSQL attack results are shown in Table 6 in which the highest accuracy of 99.94% is achieved
 315 by using the SMO algorithm and with GRU, RNN, and NB algorithm the accuracy achieved is 99.82%
 and 99.83%. Figure 7a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the highest accuracy

Table 6: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of MSSQL attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.82	98.11	99.10	99.06
RNN	99.83	98.04	99.55	99.31
SMO	99.94	99.90	99.90	99.90
NB	99.83	99.80	99.80	99.80




Figure 6: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to LDAP Attacks

317 of 99.83% is achieved at 8th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 98.4% and goes up to 99.8% and
 318 after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 98.1% and goes
 319 up to 99.95%. Figure 7 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest
 320 loss of below 0.01% at the 48th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.08% and goes down to 0.01%. Then the
 convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 7b.




Figure 7: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to MSSQL Attacks

321

322 5.6. NetBIOS attacks

323 In the case of NetBIOS attacks, the highest accuracy of 99.94% is achieved by using the GRU algorithm.
 324 By using other algorithms: RNN, SMO and NB achieved the accuracy of 99.89%, 99.93%, and 99.87% as
 shown in Table 7. Figure 8a presents the accuracy convergence concerning epochs and the highest accuracy

Table 7: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of NetBIOS attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.94	99.11	99.90	99.49
RNN	99.89	98.10	99.81	99.10
SMO	99.93	99.90	99.90	99.90
NB	99.87	99.90	99.90	99.90

325
 326 of 99.94% is achieved at the 35th epoch. The training accuracy curve begins at 98.8% and goes up to 99.9%
 327 and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 99.3% and goes
 328 up to 99.9%. Figure 8 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss
 329 of below 0.01% at the 48th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.06% and goes down to 0.004%. Then the
 330 convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 8b.




Figure 8: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to NETBIOS Attacks

331 5.7. SNMP attacks

332 For SNMP attacks, the highest accuracy achieved is 99.99% by using the SMO algorithm, and by using
 333 GRU, RNN, and NB classification techniques the achieved accuracy is 99.97%,99.79% and 99.87% as
 shown in Table 8. Figure 9a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the highest

Table 8: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of SNMP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.97	99.35	99.55	99.67
RNN	99.79	99.42	96.15	97.25
SMO	99.99	99.97	99.97	99.97
NB	99.87	99.90	99.90	99.90

334
 335 accuracy of 99.97% is achieved at 9th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 98.25% and goes up to
 336 99.9% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 98.8%
 337 and goes up to 99.9%. Figure 9 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the
 338 lowest loss of below 0.01% at the 8th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.09% and goes down to 0.006%. Then
 the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 9b.




Figure 9: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to SNMP Attacks

339

340 5.8. SSDP attacks

341 The SSDP attacks results are shown in Table 9 in which the highest accuracy achieved is 99.90% using
 342 the GRU algorithm and by using others with algorithms i.e., RNN, SMO and NB the accuracy of 99.87%,
 99.89%, and 99.78% are achieved respectively. Figure 10a presents the accuracy convergence with respect

Table 9: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of SSDP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.91	99.83	99.79	99.69
RNN	99.87	99.05	99.68	99.81
SMO	99.89	99.90	99.90	99.90
NB	99.78	99.81	99.80	99.80

343
 344 to epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.9% is achieved at 45th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins
 345 at 96.7% and goes up to 99.8% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test
 346 accuracy starts at 98.7% and goes up to 99.9%. Figure 10 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with
 347 epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of below 0.01% at the 48th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.12% and
 goes down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 10b.




Figure 10: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to SSDP Attacks

348

349 5.9. SYN attacks

350 In the case of SYN attacks, as shown in Table 10 the highest accuracy of 99.98% is achieved by us-
 351 ing the SMO algorithm and by other algorithms such as GRU, RNN and NB, the achieved accuracy is
 99.69%, 99.7%, and 99.95% respectively. Table 10 shows these results. Figure 11a presents the accuracy

Table 10: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of SYN attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.69	99.11	92.43	96.35
RNN	99.70	99.50	92.24	96.31
SMO	99.98	99.94	99.94	99.94
NB	99.95	99.91	99.91	99.91

352
 353 convergence with respect to epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.7% is achieved at 15th epoch. Training
 354 accuracy curve begins at 98.8% and goes up to 99.7% and after that the convergence of training accuracy
 355 becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 99.3% and goes up to 99.9%. Figure 11 depicts the convergence of
 356 the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.01% at the 17th epoch. Training loss starts at
 357 0.06% and goes down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in Figure
 11b.




Figure 11: Model Accuracy and Loss of SYN Attacks Detection

358

359 *5.10. UDP-Lag attacks*

360 As shown in Table 11, the highest accuracy achieved is calculated by using RNN algorithm that is
 361 99.87%. Other algorithms also achieved good results in which GRU algorithm achieved 99.55% accuracy,
 SMO achieved 99.86% accuracy and NB achieved 96.63% accuracy respectively. Figure 12a presents the

Table 11: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of UDP-Lag attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.87	99.57	98.67	98.36
RNN	99.55	97.60	90.56	94.22
SMO	99.86	99.9	99.91	99.90
NB	96.63	96.51	96.60	96.60

362
 363 accuracy convergence with respect to epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.87% is achieved at 18th epoch.
 364 Training accuracy curve begins at 98.86% and goes up to 99.7% and after that the convergence of training
 365 accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at 98.6% and goes up to 99.85%. Figure 12 depicts the
 366 convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.01% at the 18th epoch. Training
 367 loss starts at 0.06% and goes down to 0.01%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown
 in fig 12b.




Figure 12: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to UDP-Lag Attacks

368

369 5.11. Web-DDoS attacks

370 As shown in Table 12, SMO algorithm achieved the highest accuracy of 96.62% for detecting Web-
 371 DDoS attacks. Other algorithms such as GRU, RNN and NB achieved the accuracy 95.11%, 95.6% and
 372 68.8% respectively. For Web-DDoS attacks the accuracy achieved with naive bayes classifier is 96.65%
 373 which is low as compared to other algorithms because it needs more data instances. Other algorithms used
 are not dependent on quantity of data. Figure 13a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to epochs

Table 12: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of WebDDoS attacks

	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	95.11	96.14	99.32	97.41
RNN	95.60	97.44	99.04	98.36
SMO	96.62	96.70	96.60	96.03
NB	68.80	92.00	68.90	75.10

374 and the highest accuracy of 96% is achieved at 40th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at 89% and goes
 375 up to 95.55% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test accuracy starts at
 376 90% and goes up to 96.0%. Figure 13 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves
 377 the lowest loss of 0.10% at the 48th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.35% and goes down to 0.1%. Then the
 378 convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 13b.




Figure 13: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to Web-DDoS Attacks

379

380 5.12. TFTP attacks

381 The result of TFTP are represented in Table 13 with respect to 4 different classification models. The
 382 highest accuracy that is achieved is 99.97% by using the SMO algorithm. The other algorithms: GRU,
 383 RNN, and NB also calculated excellent results in which the accuracy is 99.83% for GRU, 99.78% for RNN,
 and 98.92% for NB algorithm respectively. Figure 14a presents the accuracy convergence with respect

Table 13: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of TFTP attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.83	99.08	86.16	92.33
RNN	99.78	98.36	83.18	90.17
SMO	99.97	99.94	99.96	99.92
NB	98.92	99.40	98.90	99.10

384
 385 to epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.83% is achieved at 18th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins
 386 at 99.3% and goes up to 99.8% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test
 387 accuracy starts at 99.6% and goes up to 99.83%. Figure 14 depicts the convergence of the accuracy with
 388 epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.013% at the 17th epoch. Training loss starts at 0.04% and goes
 down to 0.013%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes stable as shown in fig 14b.




Figure 14: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS Malware with Respect to TFTP Attacks

389

390 5.13. Portmap attacks

391 The result of portmap attacks are represented in Table 14 with respect to 4 different classification mod-
 392 els. The highest accuracy that is achieved is 99.87% by using GRU algorithm. The other algorithms: RNN,
 393 SMO and NB also calculated excellent results in which the accuracy is 99.80% for RNN, 99.86% for SMO
 and 99.1% for NB algorithm respectively. Figure 15a presents the accuracy convergence with respect to

Table 14: Algorithms Proficiency Metrics for Detecting of Portmap Attacks

Model	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1-score(%)
GRU	99.87	98.13	99.45	99.63
RNN	99.80	97.44	99.07	98.30
SMO	99.86	97.50	99.65	98.50
NB	99.18	85.40	99.70	92.00

394
 395 epochs and the highest accuracy of 99.87% is achieved at 16th epoch. Training accuracy curve begins at
 396 99.4% and goes up to 99.81% and after that the convergence of training accuracy becomes stable. Test
 397 accuracy starts at 99.6% and goes up to 99.87%. It slightly went down at the 17th epoch. Figure 15b depicts
 398 the convergence of the accuracy with epochs and it achieves the lowest loss of 0.013% at the 17th epoch.
 399 Training loss starts at 0.045% and goes down to 0.014%. Then the convergence of training loss becomes
 stable as shown in Figure 15.




Figure 15: Model Accuracy and Loss of DDoS malware with respect to Portmap attacks

400

401 6. Comparative Analysis and Discussion

402 In Table 15, the precision, and recall of different models are compared with other state-of-the-art studies
 403 that utilize the CICDDoS2019 dataset for DDoS attack detection and identification. In [24], the ID3 algo-
 404 rithm was used to achieve the highest precision of 78% while other algorithms such as RF, NB, and logistic
 405 regression achieved the precision 77%, 41%, and 25% respectively. Similarly, the research [25] evaluated
 406 the average performance of classifiers and achieved the highest precision of 96.9% by using the bagging
 407 classifier. This research also obtained the results by using other classifiers such as Bayes net, KNN, SMO,
 408 and simple logistic which achieved the precision 96.2%, 96.7%, 93.9%, and 93.1% respectively. The re-
 409 search [65] combined DDoS simulators, BoNeSi and SlowHTTPTest with the CICDDoS2019 dataset. They
 410 achieved an accuracy of 98.9% using the LSTM algorithm and 99.9% using the CNN algorithm. In [26],
 411 2 scenarios were observed and in the second scenario, they used the dataset CICDDoS2019. By using the
 412 CICDDoS2019 dataset the highest precision achieved was 97.89% using the LSTM-Fuzzy algorithm. Other
 413 algorithms were also used such as KNN, LSTM-2, MLP, PSO-DS, and SVM which achieved the precision
 414 of 89.27%, 96.61%, 94.08%, 81.19%, and 97.74% respectively. In the other comparisons, it is observed that
 415 they also achieved good results but our research achieves the highest accuracy of 99.97% using the GRU
 416 algorithm for SNMP attacks as shown in Table 16.

Table 15: Comparison of the *DIDDOS* with State-of-the-art Studies

Paper	Dataset	Precision (%)	Recall (%)
[24]	CICDDoS2019	78.00	65.00
[25]	CICDDoS2019	96.90	96.40
[26]	CICDDoS2019	97.89	93.13
This approach	CICDDoS2019	99.83	99.79

417 In this research, the CICDDoS2019 dataset is passed from a series of steps that include pre-processing,
 418 feature extraction, resolving the oversampling problem, and then the data was split into 11 different attack
 419 files. Due to a very large dataset, a part of the CICDDoS2019 dataset is used for each attack in this exper-
 420 imentation. Firstly in the pre-processing stage, NAN values, duplicate rows of data are removed, and then
 421 the data is normalized with MinMax scaling because the data was less ambiguous with low variance. Then
 422 the oversampling problem is solved on WEKA [66] platform by using a supervised classification technique
 423 called SMOTE [60]. This technique analyzes the data and generates data instances of the minority class of




Figure 16: Comparison of Performance Measures with Respect to Each Attack

424 data to balance the data and avoid over-fitting problems.

425 7. Conclusion

426 In this research, an approach *DIDDOS* is proposed to detect and identify DDoS attacks over the net-
 427 work. The *DIDDOS* is evaluated by using the state-of-the-art CICDDoS2019 dataset by using deep learning
 428 algorithms i.e., GRU and RNN as well as conventional machine learning algorithms NB and SMO. The ex-
 429 perimental results demonstrated that the *DIDDOS* is most efficient for detecting and identifying DDoS
 430 attacks. From the experimental result analysis, it is evident that our proposed approach gives very effective
 431 performance results based on accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. The highest accuracy achieved is
 432 99.91% by using the GRU algorithm in case of an SSDP attack and an average of 99.7 for all other attacks.
 433 In addition to this, for SSDP attacks, the precision, recall, and F1-score are 99.83%, 99.79%, and 99.69%
 434 respectively. For future work, we plan to use this dataset in an intrusion detection system and that network
 435 module can be upgraded to an intrusion prevention system so that the DDoS attacks can be detected and
 436 prevented. By the addition of more malware samples, in the near future, we can also make a generic dataset
 437 that will contain all different categories and types of malware information. This step will allow different

438 areas to use our generic dataset instead of using multiple datasets for each malware classification. This will
439 contribute a positive security service to the world and help to increase the prevention of DDoS attacks.

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