How Nations Use Sport Mega-Events to Leverage Soft Power: A New Rise in East Asia

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Abstract

This thesis examines the phenomenon of how nations host sport mega-events for the purposes of leveraging soft power. In contrast to studying nations of developed or emerging nations, this thesis focuses on the East Asian region to compare nations that have hosted the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. Therefore, the countries and sport mega-event that have been chosen to be compared are South Korea’s hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, China’s 2008 Beijing Olympics, and Japan’s soon to be hosted 2020 Tokyo Olympics (in 2021). This inductive, qualitative research applies a constructivist/interpretivist paradigm, multi-method case-study research design – using interviews, focus groups, government documents, and print media. It sheds light on understanding why East Asian nations are competing to host sport mega-events, how those nations contemporarily define soft power, and if there is an East Asian style of hosting SMEs.

The analysis focuses first on understanding each nation’s international soft power package. Next, the thesis touches upon how each nation defines soft power and looks into the nation’s domestic and regional soft power tactics, again providing a soft power package respectively. Lastly, using thematic analysis with the results, the thesis investigates whether ultimately there is a possible East Asian type of sport mega-event soft power package.

Overall, this research claims that nations do host sport mega-events to leverage domestic, regional, and or international soft power. It supports the arguments that have been brought up in the field of study. Also, the interpretation of the findings show that there are overlapping soft power themes and tactics amongst each case-study, ultimately creating a kind of regional type of hosting sport mega-events. Therefore, this thesis’ conclusion is that there is indeed a possible regional type soft power package, although, the themes themselves could also be used to give a similar rationale why an individual nation would host a sport mega-event.
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Part I

Chapter 1

Background of Sport Mega-Event Studies

Sport mega-event (SME) research and the legacies thought to accrue from them is still at an early stage, as is knowledge of the rationale behind why nations continue to host these events. The practice of hosting events, such as the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, started as early as 1896 in Athens and 1930 in Uruguay, respectively. There are numerous reasons to host SMEs, whether it be for the hoped-for economic benefits, nation branding, and so on (Nauright, 2013), and although there is a long history of hosting practices, research into SMEs only started in early 2000, when Roche defined mega-events as “large cultural events with distinct character and massive global appeal,” usually created by collaborations of national governments and international non-governmental organizations (Roche, 2000: 1). Roche’s research compares the Olympics and Expos (also known as ‘World Fairs’), acknowledging that there is a connection between globalization and mega-events that justifies the study of sports using international relations concepts (Ibid).

This review will mainly focus on theoretical and informative academic journal articles that are up to date in this field. The review will also identify areas of study undertaken in the past in order to the rationale of this research project. Thus, the review will be presented in two parts. First, it will provide the definitions of mega-events and SMEs, as they are essential to understand how the research was formulated and carried out. Part one of the review will also introduce the studies that have already been conducted with respect to SMEs (i.e. legacies, leveraging, etc.). Furthermore, this section will touch upon how the view of sports has changed throughout time to understand how international relations concepts are useful in explaining many of the issues related to the study of SMEs.

Secondly, the review will introduce certain international relations concepts that could also help explain why nations host SMEs. Thus, part two of the review will discuss and explore the connection of SMEs and “soft power” by looking into the various arguments presented by past scholars. The review concludes with an account of limitations and how this particular project
takes forward current research in this area. The research questions driving this project – and therefore shaping this literature review – are as follows:

1) Why are East Asian nations competing to host SMEs?

2) What is the contemporary definition of soft power?

3) Is there an East Asian style of hosting SMEs?

PART ONE

What is a Mega-Event?

First, it is important to comprehend what a mega-event is and why scholars would bother to research them. The study of mega-events dates back to when Ritchie originally called mega-events “hallmark events” and defined them as major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term” (Ritchie, 1984: 4). As evident from this definition, mega-events were originally understood primarily as tourist attractions. According to Jafari (1988: 272), he stated that “in the mind of the majority of the participants and in the word of most presentations, mega-events still meant simply mega-onslaught of visitors.” It was also suggested that there should be a minimum of one million visitors to allow an event to be qualified as a mega-event (Marris, 1987). Later, the study of mega-events was expanded to include the impact of hosting such events. For example, Roche furthers Ritchie’s definition by stating: “mega-events are short term events with long-term consequences for the cities that stage them. They are associated with the creation of infrastructure and event facilities often carrying long-term debts and always requiring long-term use programming” (Roche, 1994: 1). Roche not only broadly defined the purpose of hosting mega-events for long-term consequences but also brought up the difficulties of maintaining mega-event facilities and infrastructures. The definition thereby shed some light on the importance of mega-events and its influences.
The debate of defining mega-events continued with Jago and Shaw (1998: 29) who argued that mega-events are “a one-time major event that is generally of an international scale. A major event is a large-scale special event that is high in status or prestige and attracts a large crowd and wide media attention.” This definition was still in line with the original concept that mega-events are important sources of leisure and tourism, but it also showed that there was no widely accepted definitional framework for what Jago and Shaw call “special events” (referring to mega-events).

The turning point of mega-event research occurred when Roche re-visited and furthered his definition by adding a political component. Roche stated that mega-events are “large scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000: 1). Importantly, he added that mega-events “are typically organized by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organizations and thus can be said to be important elements in ‘official’ versions of public culture” (Ibid.). Roche thus brought in an international dimension to mega-events by creating a bridge between mega-events and politics; he clearly stated that national governments and international non-governmental organizations collaborate to organize these events.

Subsequent scholars have expanded on Roche’s definition, adding other aspects of mega-events. For example, Gold and Gold discuss the economic influence of mega-events, stating that they are “cultural and sporting festivals that achieve sufficient size and scope to affect whole economies and to receive sustained global media attention” (Gold and Gold, 2011:1). Similarly, Müller vaguely extends Roche’s definition - without directly stating political aspects - suggesting that SMEs are events “that attract a large number of visitors, have a large mediated reach, come with large costs and have impacts on the built environment and the population” (Müller, 2015: 638). Still, there is no one definition that is globally accepted. There are, however, numerous supporters of Roche’s definition (Horne, 2007, Kellet et. al, 2008, Matheson, 2009 and Grix and Houlihan, 2014) that justify studying SMEs with a political aspect.
What is a ‘Sports Mega-Events’?

Sport and leisure have often been looked upon as a “‘trivial’ or marginal phenomenon, and simply unworthy of serious sociological study” (Horne et al., 1985: 1). As time went on, the social significance of sport increased, especially with respect to SMEs (Tomlinson and Young, 2005; Young and Wamsley, 2005; and Vigor et al., 2004 in Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 2). It is important to consider SMEs “within the field of other non-sporting events since most of the relevant research and analysis incorporates events of various types (e.g. commercial, cultural)” (Malfas et al., 2004: 210). Because the definition for mega-events is still under debate, it is no surprise that there is no one set definition for sport mega-events. This research project aligns itself with Roche (2000: 1) similar to Horne and Manzenreiter, who state that the two main features of mega-events are “that they are deemed to have significant consequences for the host city, region or nation in which they occur, and secondly, that they will attract considerable media coverage” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 2).

Having discussed the definition of SMEs, and given the variety of sporting events, one could still wonder whether all SMEs are considered “mega-events” or if there are different categories. Some scholars argue that the biggest and most significant SMEs are the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, which they label as first-order SMEs, while “other events such as the Cricket and Rugby World Cups and the European Champions League [are] defined either as second tier or second-order major events, or as regional events” (Grix, 2014: 573; O’Brien and Gardiner, 2006; Black, 2008; Walters, 2008). For example, Black (2007: 264) believes that second-order SMEs (i.e. Commonwealth Games) are being used as a “launching pad” for other bids. He gives the example of when the “Indian government and Olympics Association officials signalled their intent to bid for the Summer Olympics shortly after Dehli was awarded the 2010 Commonwealth Games” (Black, 2007: 264). For the Winter Olympics, Baade and Matheson (2003) argue that it does not fit in the category of a ‘mega’ but qualifies as a second-order major international sporting event. Müller interestingly states: “mega-events have different dimensions in which they can be ‘mega’ and not all mega-events are ‘mega’ in the same dimensions and to the same degree” (Müller, 2015: 627-8). Even though there is a distinct difference among SMEs, the categorization of SMEs still continues because many people come from different cultural backgrounds, priorities, and interests.
To understand the rationale of SME research, it is essential to introduce some of the studies that have already been carried out by scholars. The first type of study that scholars have looked into was SMEs and their legacies. The concept of ‘legacy’ has been either misquoted or misunderstood in many studies in the area of sports (Grix et. al, 2017), and this is evident when looking at policy documents, media articles, private-sector reports and academic works on first- and second-order SMEs (Black, 2008 in Grix et. al, 2017). Although there have been extensive studies done on legacies emerging from sporting events, a clear-cut definition of sports legacy is still under debate and ambiguous. Currently, the definition given by Preuss (2007: 211) is one of the most commonly cited, where he states that legacies are “planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created by and for a sport event that remain for a longer time than the event itself.”

A possible way to grasp the burgeoning literature on SMEs is to use the categories of legacies put forward by Grix et. al. (2017: 3). The specific yet overlapping categories are: a) economics, b) urban regeneration, c) national pride/feel-good factor, d) increased participation in physical activity and sport, and e) international prestige and ‘soft power’.

Malfas et al. (2004: 218) introduce economic significance into the study of SMEs, stating: ‘economic benefits are the prime motive’ for hosting SMEs. However, the bitter truth is that it is difficult to justify economic benefits that is “known” to derive from SMEs. Horne and Manzenreiter state: “with respect to megaprojects there is a similar fantasy world of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, underestimated environmental impacts and over-valued economic development effects” (Ibid: 10). Economic legacies are recently understood as cities and nations earning large sums of money that are acquired from ticket profits, increased employment rates for the local population, and an indirect rise of short- and long-term foreign investments, as well as from inbound tourists (Grix et. al, 2017: 3).

However, SMEs do not necessarily add much to a nation’s economy per se: “despite the enormous cultural penumbra of the World Cup and the Olympics, the events are really quite small quantitatively in relation to the economy of the host country” (Zimbalist, 2015: 38, see also: Allmers and Maennig 2009, Maennig and Zimbalist 2012,). Their economic legacy lies in showcasing their current economic development as Cornilissen (2010: 3008) states, specific to emerging nations, the common ground for hosting an SME is “to showcase economic achievements…” In other words, hosting SMEs is not an indication that the nation would be
achieving economic benefits for hosting SMEs but a strategy of signaling the nation’s already made economic achievements.

Urban regeneration depicts the benefits to society, specifically touching upon the host’s opportunity to redevelop infrastructure. Focusing on both the Summer and Winter Olympics, Essex and Chalkley (2007: 19-20) stated that “events usually require the construction of new or substantially refurbished facilities, often rehabilitating former industrial and brownfield sites. [...] these facilities can be used to stage other sporting, cultural or commercial events in the future.” Although urban regeneration is possible with SMEs, the interest of citizens could be of another matter, which makes the legacy overly optimistic (cf. Gold and Gold, 2008; Short, 2008; Alm et al, 2014 from Grix et al, 2017: 3).

The third category deals with the exuberance created and surrounding the event, which raise the level of national pride (cf. Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Tomlinson and Young, 2006; Giulianotti, 2016) and ultimately develop into the feel-good factor bestowed upon the host nation’s citizens. However, this category has not been elaborated to the extent to be significant to be the sole reason for a nation to host an SME.

The fourth legacy hypothesizes that, in viewing the star athletes and role models, and with the inclusion of the enthusiasm felt during the event and sporting facilities available post-event together, SMEs heighten the participation of sport massively in the host country (cf. Nicholson et al, 2011; Frawley et al. 2013; Weed, 2014). It was thought that this would be able to prevent diseases caused by unhealthy lifestyles and ultimately led to long-term savings in health costs. However, there is little evidence that an SME may have a direct effect on sport participation (Grix, 2012).

Finally, it is believed that SMEs offer a great opportunity for cities and nations that seek to build up their global image. Grix et al. (2017: 3) state that “such a platform is used to showcase the host nation, reshape dominant attitudes, transcend provincialism and historic insecurities, and/or embrace globality, competitiveness, and excellence.” Going beyond branding, states can utilize SMEs as a “soft power package” that nations pursue to increase their global influence (Grix and Brannagan 2016). This research project is in line with the idea of nations leveraging on soft power since this ‘legacy’ is one that most nations would agree works (cf. Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Chaliap and Costa, 2005; Cornelissen, 2010; Van Hilvoorde et al., 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011, Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016).
Interestingly, there has always been a divide in opinions when it comes to the legacy of SMEs – one side being positive and the other negative. With the legacies stated earlier, in most cases, discussions were positive. Grix et al. (2017: 4) label those with a positive outlook of SMEs as a “coalition of beneficiaries”, that is, “stakeholders that emphasize the positives of hosting SMEs.” The members of this group vary from international governing bodies, such as FIFA, national governing bodies, to politicians, sports administrators, business leaders and certain branches of media. With all such positive insights and possible propaganda, who would state the negatives of SME legacies? Even though SMEs have been commonly associated with economic benefits, academics have given plenty cases where SMEs have led to a legacy of financial burden to hosts. A good example of this was the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, where the city was left with a debt up to £178 million (cf. Chalkley and Essex 1999; Searle, 2005), as well as Montreal’s 1976 Summer Olympic, with debt nearly up to £692 million (cf. Gratton et al. 2000). Even with urban regeneration, heightened sports participation and tourism, scholars have been skeptical of the benefits of these legacies (cf. Preuss, 2004; Toohey and Veal, 2007; Grix, 2014). Although SMEs help promote a city or state, there are cases where a host may be vulnerable to the global attention that follow from these events, and it is possible that one’s international image could be negatively affected. Such criticism led to the term ‘soft disempowerment’, coined by Brannagan and Giuliani (2014; 2015: 706), which emphasizes the opposite effect of soft power. This research project is in line with the popular contemporary argument that SMEs can be used as a tool to leverage a nation’s soft power. Many international dimensions have been connected to the usage of SMEs. Before introducing them, it is imperative to understand how the view of sport has changed in the realm of international relations.

Sports in International Relations

There is a long history of nations that hosted first-order SMEs such as the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. Sports and SMEs have many political influences that are not given enough attention, particularly when looking through the lens of international relations. Hosting SMEs is much more than putting a new nation on the map. Here, the once well-known “Ping Pong Diplomacy” is a good example, where a ping pong tournament was organized between China and the US and a table tennis tournament was used as a diplomatic tool, allowing China to open up to the international society especially the US (Espy, 1979:17).
A more recent example of how sport is used as a tool for diplomacy was when South Korea hosted the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, when South Korea invited their Northern counterparts to participate, leading to Kim Jong Un’s (the North Korean leader) public announcement in his New Year speech announcing that the North will be attending the Games by sending “athletes as well as a cultural troupe” (BBC, 2018). This statement was a semi-breakthrough for the diplomacy of North and South Korea (Ibid.). Both examples above represent the idea of sport being used as a “softening-up” device, which shows that even a sporting event can create bridges between nations, inviting them to “open up” to the international society (Espy, 1979: 17). This argument now seems more plausible than ever, since the international system currently appears to be leaning towards diplomacy and globalization.

Others, however, argue that sports and politics should be separated and treated as opposites. In the beginning of Taylor’s work, he initially discusses how many sport fans are disinterested in politics and believe that sport should be independent and restricted from government influence. Taylor also argues that the reverse holds true - that sport is ignored in politics - giving sport and politics a case of mutual neglect (Taylor, 1986: 23). Still, Taylor believes that international relations scholars should consider sport and its political significance: “sport is not only a transnational activity, it can also be an instrument of government policy” (Ibid: 32). Indeed, sport may be used for foreign policy purposes. A good example of this is the Ari Sports Cup, an under-15 football tournament, organized by the Inter-Korean Sports Exchange Association (BBC, see Bicker, 2018). The under-15 tournament kicked off in 2014 and it was what Choi Moon-soon, governor of South Korea’s Gangwon province, said that “we used this last thread of communication between the two countries to ask North Korea to come and take part in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics” (Ibid). If having sports contacts between nations can be considered as improving diplomatic relations, it certainly highlights the scale and importance of SMEs.

Similar to Taylor’s ideas, Strenk believes that sport can affect the outcome of foreign policies, which is connected to “sports politics.” Strenk gives the example of the Soviet Union and how they used sport as a foreign policy “designed to win friends and impress the Third World and neighboring countries” (Strenk, 1979: 3). For example, sporting performance was very important in China. According to Hong et al. (2005: 518), he states that “sport has always been
one of the most powerful weapons in the Chinese Communists’ arsenal” and that “China’s sporting success demonstrated the fact that socialism was superior to capitalism” (Ibid.). China’s modern sporting successes come from the roots of the Chinese elite sport system, which was learned from the Soviet Union in the 1950s (Ibid: 512), indicating the importance to sporting performances as well as hosting SMEs which is evident from China’s hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Russia’s hosting of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, furthered later in this paper. Strenk’s idea thus shows how sports can not only open up or isolate a country, it can also solidify domestic and regime interests. In other words, sporting performances can bestow a sense of national pride to countries through the athletes that represent them as well as promote their regime to the world of sports, giving them the sense of “superiority.”

Because the role of sports in politics has changed throughout time and proven to be a great influence globally, what must be considered here, is how SMEs fit into the landscape of international relations. There is no theory in dealing with this question, but there are certain themes on which one can focus. For example, when considering the costs of hosting either the Summer Olympics or FIFA World Cup, it is critical to express the reasons why many emerging nations have the ambition to host SMEs. Grix and Houlihan (2014: 79) discuss the politically instrumental use of sport, particularly SMEs, by states eager to promote themselves, such as what Germany did in 2006 in an attempt to positively alter long-known stereotypical images of their state. Indeed, nation-states such as China, South Africa, and Brazil having the opportunity to host SMEs was a great achievement and opportunity for “signaling their individual arrival as credible powers but also collectively the new order of things not only in international sports but in the international system per se” (Grix and Lee, 2013: 1). These examples justify the notion that SMEs are not merely a social phenomenon of “putting a nation on the map,” they are opportunities for countries to showcase their development and credibility internationally. Grix and Lee note that characteristics such as China’s authoritarianism, high levels of income disparity in Brazil, and a high level of corruption in South Africa are ones that are hardly attractive domestic political values to display to other nations (Grix and Lee, 2013: 6-7). However, by hosting international sporting events such as the Olympics or FIFA World Cup, countries have the ability to show the world that they do possess universal norms that are much more likely to be accepted globally (Ibid.)

The study of emerging states hosting SMEs misses the consideration that states have their own definition and ambitions of soft power. A good example of this is when Russia hosted the Sochi
2014 Winter Olympics, where homosexuals were banned at the games, going against international norms as well as the “spirit of the Olympics” (BBC, 2014). This was interpreted as Russia’s way of displaying to the world that bringing the games to Sochi was already a great feat and that it will focus on domestic ambitions, or what could be comprehended as domestic soft power (Grix and Kramareva, 2017: 462).

**Part Two**

**International Dimensions**

The second part of the literature review discusses the international dimensions that have been frequently used to explain the reasons why nations host SMEs. In doing so, this will contribute to the understanding of the contemporary definition of soft power and justify the feasibility of the research project. The international dimensions that were commonly used to explain why nations use SMEs are public relations, public diplomacy, and international prestige. Soft power can be looked upon as an umbrella of the three dimensions; however, touching upon the dimensions separately helps to understand and justify the research of SMEs and their usage for nations leveraging soft power.

**Public Relations**

Public relations, according to Ivy Ledbetter Lee, is “the art of relating one’s ideas and purposes to the public, or the activity of explaining one group within society to another” (Hiebert, 1966: 113). He also stresses that, for a successful relationship between any two groups, communication is essential and calls it “publicity.” Lee has often been called the “father of modern public relations” (Ibid: 113). Later, Bernay’s definition adds the concept of adjustment saying that “public relations is the attempt, by information, persuasion and adjustment, to engineer public support for an activity, cause, movement or institution.” (Bernay, 1955: 3-4). Then, during the mid-1970s, Harlow reviewed the changes of public relations definitions. His definition was:

> Public relations is the distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance, and cooperation
between an organization and its public; involves management of problem or issues; helps management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps management [to] keep abreast of and effectively utilize change, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication as its principal tools (Harlow, 1976: 36).

Simply put, public relations is generally commonly known “as the management of communication between organizations and its publics” (Grunig and Hunt, 1984: 6). Given the definitions of public relations, how does it connect to bidding nations and hosting SMEs?

The debate for using SMEs as a vehicle for delivering public policy goals has recently been analyzed by scholars (e.g. Chalip, 2006; Misener and Mason, 2006; Richards and Palmer, 2010). For example, Foley et al. (2015: 332) states that “sport mega-events represent a visible and, ostensibly, collectively owned platform that – their proponents argue – can be used to help achieve a series of political, economic, social and cultural objectives for their promoters.” When it comes to hosting the Olympics, the “IOC stipulate that that local consent must be agreed in the form of public opinion surveys and other means of gauging public support and governmental commitment” – further explaining that if one of the subgroups expresses negative reactions, the delivery of improving infrastructure, transportation, legislation, and much more will be sluggish (Foley et al., 2015: 334). Thus, even though hosting SMEs may seem beneficial, one should understand that it is possible that there could be contested views of what may seem to be an exceptional usage of public spending and values. For example, Brazil had difficulties when it came to the support from the public for hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup. A mass population of Brazilians went on strike across the country to protest the impoverished public services and government waste and corruption (Financial Times Leahy and Blitz, 2013). China, on the other hand, was able to do the opposite. China often had foreign media around the world pointing fingers at their lack of human rights. When China’s Beijing was selected to host the 2008 Summer Olympics, countries’ perception and narratives of the nation in global media changed after its successful delivery of the 2008 Olympic Games (Nye, 2004). Indeed, Young (2008) notes that the general public diplomacy of China’s Olympics seems to have been positive. Additionally, Foley et al (2015: 333) states: “Having been portrayed as being repressive, antidemocratic, ignoring concerns on pollution, and ‘hard’ on censorship and as having issues with human rights, the country used the aura of the Olympic Games and its ‘brand values’ as well as an impressive public relations offensive to counter
negative media perceptions.” Therefore, it is not enough for authorities to just bring in the “feel-good factor” or tourism and economic upgrades. Rather, “nation states, bidding cities, and sanctioning bodies need to ensure that evaluative mechanisms are derived from propositions, meanings, and ‘feelings’ that the event is, or will be, valued within citizens’ everyday lives and impact positively upon them for a foreseeable future” (Foley et al., 2015: 345). Authorities that are closer to the community and possess a large asset of cultural experiences thus recognize the need to make a convincing argument that SMEs are viewed as positive – especially for the public (Foley et al, 2015). SMEs therefore have various impacts in society, but there is another dimension that could be mistaken for public relations – that is public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a term that deals with “government communication aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the ‘hearts or minds’ of the people. Public diplomacy however can also refer to domestic public(s) in two ways either as the domestic input from citizens for foreign policy formulation (engaging approach), or explaining foreign policy goals and diplomacy to domestic public (explaining approach)” (Szondi, 2008: 6). Canada is an example of the engaging approach, where citizens are engaged in foreign policy, which could be useful for higher transparency as well as liability in foreign policy (see Lortie and Bédard, 2002). Melissen (2005: 13) refers to the domestic socialization of diplomacy as public affairs, similarly to the US approach where public affairs involve the function of American officials who explain and defend American foreign policy to the American public via the press. In other words, the function of public diplomacy is to “sell” foreign policy decisions domestically, after policies have been made and acknowledged. Malone (1985: 199) gives a similar definition of public diplomacy, describing it as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their governments.” Malone further states that the content of public diplomacy describes activities directed abroad in the areas of information, education, and culture, whose goal is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens (ibid).

It has been argued that “public relations and public diplomacy do seek similar objectives and use similar tools to reach those objectives” (Kiehl, 1989 in Signitzer and Coombs, 1992: 145).
Signitzer and Coombs (1992: 145) add to this by stating: “neither public relations nor public diplomacy is fully equipped to handle the new demands which face them. Public relations is fairly unsophisticated in the strategies nation-states employ when engaging in international public relations. International public relations is designed for corporations.” Another convergence that has been debated upon is between the concept of public diplomacy and nation branding. To simply define nation branding, “it concerns applying branding and marketing communications techniques to promote a nation’s image” (Fan, 2006: 6). Gudjonsson (2005) defines it very similarly but pinpoints the government as the branding initiator, recognizing its implied involvement and influences. Following Gudjonsson, Szondi (2008: 12) states that the “interesting trend is that while in public diplomacy the visibility and role of government is decreasing, giving ways to more credible actors, such as NGOs and other non-state actors, nation branding practitioners call for more government involvement to achieve co-ordination and a holistic approach.” This shows that there are two similar targets involved in nation branding and public diplomacy – the domestic and foreign public citizens.

Cull (2008: 118) argues that “sports can be a cultural export in their own right and the spectacle of hosting or winning at a major sporting event can raise or maintain the profile of an actor.” In this sense, hosting or participating nations of SMEs can bring up the public diplomacy domestically and abroad. As the study of diplomacy in sport grew, it led to a new term now commonly known as sport diplomacy. Sport diplomacy is part of the umbrella of public diplomacy. According to Murray (2012: 581), he states that sport diplomacy is facilitated by traditional diplomacy and “uses sport people and sporting events to engage, inform, and create a favorable image amongst foreign publics and organizations to shape their perceptions in a way that is more conducive to achieving a government’s foreign policy goals.” Murray also interestingly states that SMEs such as the World Cup and the Olympics give host nations the opportunity to improve engagement with foreign publics, giving the example of China’s Beijing 2008 Olympics and how the Chinese Communist party used the Olympics to claim their identity domestically and abroad and gained much praise (Murray, 2012: 582). China’s recognition came from “technical and organizational competencies and the ostentatious showcasing of its economic power” (Horton, 2008: 861). It is an essential part of public diplomacy to be able to sell one’s image as positive, but it is also the authorities that should first be able “to build long-term relationships based on trust and credibility, eventually leading to an enabling environment for effective government policies” (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 256).
International Prestige

Prestige is a powerful asset because “if your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it” (Gilpin, 1981: 31). The terms discussed before including international prestige overlap with the broader strategy of nation branding. According to Wood (2013: 387), in international relations, prestige is considered “subordinate to material and strategic goals, or as an ideational construct for which instrumental aspects are extraneous; prestige resides in the background of many analyses…prestige is distinct but not isolated from power: material social or imagined.” International prestige is how a nation shapes their image on the global stage (Haut et al., 2017: 4).

Some scholars believe that hosting sport mega-events and sporting successes can raise the level of a nation’s international prestige (see Preuss, 2007; Grix and Brannagan, 2016; Haut et al., 2017). Thus, it is no surprise that governments are eager to legitimize hosting SMEs. Scholars such as Black (2008) believe that government investment in hosting first- and second-order SMEs is justified due to the materialization of certain social and political outcomes. With a similar thought, Cha explains: “the degree to which sport is wrapped up with prestige and national reputation will naturally have a bearing on its utility as a diplomatic tool, as an instrument for sanctioning, or as an agent of political change” (Cha, 2016: 140). It is important to understand that sport, national image, and international prestige are somewhat connected. SMEs in particular have the ability to bring in emotions and other subjective outcomes - politicians are given “a common vision to gain international prestige, citizens are emotionally involved and private industry is inspired by welcoming an extraordinary and world-wide recognized event” (Preuss, 2007: 218). In order for a nation to be able to heighten their international prestige, an identity must be made; Preuss (2007) believes that this can be done by hosting SMEs. Without domestic support and change in sentiments, it would be difficult to lead to the change in a nation’s image. A good example of this was when Seoul hosted the Olympic Games in 1988, which helped establish a national perspective, a sense of exuberance, participation and recognition, and being viewed internationally of modernity and technologically advanced (Denis et al. 1988: 229). Another example was when China showed off its position as one of the world’s leading economies by hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Lin, 2004). Therefore, it is evident that SMEs are used to signal certain levels of prestige to the international community.
Scholars agree that prestige and soft power – which will be discussed later – are becoming extensively crucial, which may have led to the growing attention to sport in international relations. With respect to sporting success and international prestige, Grix and Houlihan (2014: 576) suggest that “international sporting success, whether by national teams and athletes competing abroad or by the effective staging of a sports mega-event, provides arenas for development of soft power through which states seek to ‘attract’ others with their values and culture and persuade them to want what they want by projecting a specific ‘image’ to foreign publics…” It therefore seems that being able to create an image, or moreover, being able to project an image at the global stage could lead to improving one’s international prestige. Even states like Germany were able to change the perception of others and past stereotypes by hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2006 – and focusing at what is termed as ‘image leveraging’ (Grix, 2012; 2013).

Before moving on to soft power, it is essential to understand the difference between “power” and “prestige.” Allison and Monington (2002: 11) differentiate the two stating:

“We must surely allow that there can be benefits in status or prestige which are distinct from those in power. If the distinction is allowed, it would also follow that in the absence of ‘great games’ like imperialism and the cold war, the importance of prestige would increase at the expense of power. A less state-oriented international society might contain many states and regions whose interests lay primarily in their brand image rather than in any sense of ‘power’ or ‘control’ they might seek to exercise over the rest of the world.”

Thus, foreign policy can be explained in greater detail, particularly when it deals with the concept of soft power (Nye, 2004). Within the perspective of Allison and Monington, ‘prestige’ or ‘brand image’ is not entirely different from power, but a special form of power (Haut et al., 2017).

**Soft Power**

When most think of the word “power,” the use of force over another for a certain outcome may come in to mind. However, when it comes to international politics—and knowing how
interdependent the world is becoming—the definition of power seems to be shifting to mean the ability to influence the behaviors of others. The concept of soft power was coined by Joseph Nye, who described how one country can use its influence over another to cause it to do something that the country wants, in contrast to using traditional hard power, such as military force and economic power (Nye, 1990: 166). Nye argues that there is “an increase in the role of soft power – the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and payment,” (Nye, 2014: 19), and defines power as the ability to “influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004: 1). This is not to say that soft power would be an absolute substitute for hard power, but rather that it is a different tactic that could co-opt with hard power (Nye, 2009: 160). Soft power is more of a conversion process, where “nation-states consider their ability to translate soft power assets into expected gains through a broadly defined range of public diplomacy and strategic communication initiatives” (Hayden, 2012: 277). For example, the Republic of Korea is now popular for its television dramas and music, popularly known as KPOP (Roll, 2018). Nye and Kim believe that this “Korean Wave” is enhancing the country’s soft power and influencing the popularity of its exports ranging from mobile phones, cosmetics, and consumer electronics in the global market (Nye and Kim, 2013: 1). Understanding the concept of soft power, one should consider that soft power has different levels of attraction in politics: domestic, regional and international (Grix et. al., 2019).

Domestic soft power, as iterated before, was well represented by Russia hosting the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics and banning homosexuals - which was against international norms - even though hosting the Olympics was the Russian government’s strategy to “flex their muscles” for bringing a SME to the citizens of Russia (Grix and Kramareva, 2017: 462). In the realm of politics, however, Nye believes that when a nation’s credibility is weak, public diplomacy falters and cannot convert cultural resources into the soft power of attraction (Nye, 2008: 101). For example, the US’s “exaggerated claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda may have helped mobilize domestic support for the Iraq War, but the subsequent disclosure of the exaggeration dealt a costly blow to American credibility” (Nye, 2008: 100-1). Such examples show that the success of building soft power “involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye, 2004: 8).
Regional soft power explains how a nation’s culture or foreign policy can be seen as attractive in a region (i.e., Asia, Europe, etc.). A good example was given by Raouf, where she states that “Iran uses ideology as a source of soft power and a tool in its regional foreign policy” (Raouf, 2017). She claims that Iran wants to represent itself to the Middle East as a revolutionary regime against the US and Israel and enhance relations with Shiite groups in Arab countries of Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen. Furthermore, she adds that Iran uses this ideology in order to persuade others that they share similar interests and values with neighboring countries (Raouf, 2017). In a way, it is Iran’s tactic to present itself as a representative of the Shiite in the Middle East with the ambitions to persuade them by showing that “it defends their interests and to convince them that its own national interests are their interests too” (Raouf, 2017).

Economists also take an interest in soft power because they believe that some governments follow the procedures of state-sponsored soft power. The Chinese government, for example, is understood to be heavily investing in China’s soft power resources, particularly the 500 “Confucius Institutes” made within 140 different countries (Economist, 2017). However, it has been said by Nye that governments should not manufacture soft power and that America’s soft power had come from civil society, that is, it is organic: universities, foundations, Hollywood and pop culture (Economist, 2017). Furthermore, the article adds on that China’s 软实力 ruan shili (soft power) was government led and argues in favor of Nye that the state-sponsored soft power tactic of China is actually far from what it has intended to do. The ties between the soft power resource and the regime interest were coupled too closely creating their outcomes to backfire (Economist, 2017). Interestingly, economists not only acknowledge and closely follow Nye’s definition of soft power but were also able to spot what the possible flaws of China’s soft power tactic. Additionally, seeing that the concept ‘soft power’ is being mentioned in different academic disciplines, other than IR, highlights its importance in contemporary studies. On the contrary, there are other things to consider when revisiting the term soft power.

When looking at the definition of soft power, one should consider that this concept was coined in 1990 and was followed up with clarifications throughout. Many historical events have occurred during that era. First, in 1989 there was the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany leading to the unification of West and East Germany in 1990. In 1991, the Soviet Union had fallen.
ending the Cold War. With this, some scholars believed that “although realism’s concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, they have been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas” (Waltz, 2000: 5), bringing about Nye’s concept of soft power. However, Nye’s concept of soft power needs to be understood within the context of the historical events and sentiments of the time. Today, soft power appears to be following Rosecrance’s definition of bipolarity (Rosecrance, 1966: 314-5), where the two super nations are the US and China. Disregarding the two states’ differences in regime type, the definition of soft power would most likely be different from nation to nation. This makes it essential to understand the political sentiments within a nation in order to understand how that nation define and attempt to accrue soft power.

Sport Mega-Events and Soft Power

To understand soft power, it is important to understand nations’ political sentiments as well as the events that have occurred domestically. Huish et al. (2013) give the example of Cuba’s sport-based internationalism. They state that the “Cuban government creates and seeks opportunities to engage in collaboration, diplomacy, commerce, and trade in order to pursue its own concepts of progressive international development, which involves garnering much needed hard currency and political benefits for its national interests” (Ibid: 26). In this way, the article describes the nation’s political sentiments before touching upon Cuba’s use of sports in its policies.

The present research project believes that there are no multiple set reasons for a nation to host SMEs. Rather, it is important to pinpoint the nations’ ambitions and soft power outcomes. SMEs have always been coupled with various legacies or reasons in order to explain why nations host SMEs, but specified domains need to be made for this to be a viable study. With the additional concept of soft power, sport mega-events can strengthen the concept of how a nation can promote its culture and foreign policies in order to get what it wants from other nations. According to Grix and Brannagan, one strategy to move away from “hard” to “soft” power is by utilizing SMEs. SMEs can be used as a tool for increasing a nation’s prestige, improve its image, and also contribute to increasing “the likelihood of the bidding state’s acceptance on the world stage” (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 252). Furthermore, it is interesting to see how soft power resources are categorized in the domains of culture, tourism, branding,
diplomacy and trade - what Grix and Brannagan call the “SME Soft Power Package.” (Ibid: 260). By creating fixed, yet overlapping categories, Grix and Brannagan are able to map out what will be investigated and create specific foci that can influence the types of data that may be collected. In doing so, Grix and Brannagan’s research creates a road map of how to investigate other examples of nations hosting SMEs. Having a “road map” for investigation, coupled with understanding the sentiments (and political sentiments) of a specific nation, will not only allow a clear comprehension of how SMEs generate soft power, it will also display an extensive understanding of how the nation being investigated uses SMEs to generate soft power resources.

Conclusion

This section explains not only how the study of sport has changed throughout history but also shows a clear relationship of the role of sports in international relations. Furthermore, it creates a bridge to understanding the concept of how SMEs can influence a nation’s soft power, as well as how it can be a soft power resource itself (Grix and Houlihan, 2014: 1). In short, it is no longer possible for sport and IR to ignore each other. Many academics have worked on specific legacies of SMEs, but it is crucial that one understands that soft power is the umbrella of most legacies – whether it be from nation branding, tourism, or diplomacy (Fan, 2010: 100), (Kalin, 2011: 9), (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 260). What many academics have not considered extensively yet how states in the international stage may have different ambitions or a different concept of soft power. A nation-to-nation comparison, or a discussion of emerging states’ use of SMEs by analyzing their soft power strategies, may contribute to the study of why nations want to host SMEs. However, such a comparison fails to consider case-study replicability (Yin, 2003: 53). Nations that have hosted an SME, especially those that are coming from different regions and regime types, would likely show different outcomes, considering their diverging cultural backgrounds. Thus, this research project will focus on how nations could host SMEs to leverage regional soft power, if such power exists at all. Additional research could also shed light on why countries are beginning to co-host SMEs. Furthering research in this area will not only contribute to how specific nations use SMEs to leverage soft power, but also how a region utilizes SMEs to leverage its soft power.
Chapter 2
East Asia and Sports

This chapter intends to lay out the background of nations that will be focused on for this research. It discusses and justifies why case studies will be taken from these nations – reasons for using a multiple case-study approach will be included in further detail in the methodology chapter. It is essential to understand a nation’s socio-economic, socio-cultural and sporting background within which its sporting background has developed. This is due to understanding that a nation’s “political, economic, and intellectual developments took a long time for their growth, and proceeded at a different pace in the various countries” (Kohn, 2017: 3); that is, different countries are at different stages of development. Central to this research are the East Asian states China, Republic of Korea, and Japan. These states in particular have been selected as they represent the key competing nations in the region, both in terms of economic and political power. Also, the three countries have been chosen for this research to follow the comparable model of nations that have hosted a SME. Equally, each state has hosted what was discussed before as first-order sports mega-events: the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup. These first order events are of a different magnitude to second or third order events. Although there are two Summer Olympic cases (China and Japan) and one FIFA World Cup (focusing on Korea’s hosting), the research is still consistent when it comes to comparing nations in East Asia that have hosted a first-order SME. This now leads to introducing the three nations and their sporting backgrounds.

China’s socio-economic data

The People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国), hereafter China (中国), is a massive land that borders with North Korea, Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. China is the 5th largest country in the world in terms of landmass and the second largest of the popularly known BRICS nations behind Russia (1st) and ahead of Brazil (6th), India (8th), and South Africa (26th) (CIA World Factbook, 2018). China is known for being the most populous nation in the world with a population of 1.4 billion citizens and within the huge population, 91.6 percent are Han Chinese, 1.3 percent Zhuang or 7.1 mixed race or ‘other’ ethnic origin – there are 56 different ethnic groups recognized by the Chinese Government (ibid.) China was ranked as the
Joonoh Brian Jeong

second largest economy in the world considering nominal GDP per capita behind of the US in 2016 (Grix et. al., 2019: 70). In terms of purchase power parity (PPP), China’s GDP is $15,535, making it below the world average of $16,136; however, it is ahead of other BRICS nations of India ($6,572), South Africa ($13,225) and Brazil ($15,128) and only second to Russia ($23,163) (World Bank, 2016).

China has celebrated remarkable growth over the past thirty years with living standards developing exceedingly for a great amount of the nation’s residents due to economic reform, a booming industrial sector and the expansion of state backing to key industries (Grix et. al., 2019: 70). On the contrary, the quality-of-life gains that correlate with the free market system first introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 did not circulate uniformly throughout the country with huge income differences continuing despite a downwards trend since 2010 (Han et. al., 2016). With continuous and widespread income differences over the past quarter of a century gets China noticed as one of the most uneven societies with the upper-class 1% of the population owning around 30 percent of the nation’s wealth, while the poorest 25 percent of the population own merely just 1 percent of total wealth. (Wildau and Mitchell, 2016). In 2017, the Gini coefficient – which measures the extent of inequality of income distribution – China was 0.42 (World Bank, 2017). To understand what this figure means, the World Bank acknowledges that a coefficient of above 0.40 shows severe income inequality. In comparison to other BRICS nations, India (0.35) and Russia (0.37) are in a better position while Brazil (0.51) and South Africa (0.63) are doing worse than China (Ibid.).

China announced its 13th Five Year Plan which promised to double the nation’s GDP by 2020 and to the ends of this, introduced a yearly growth rate target of 6.5 percent (china-un.org). In order to carry out these ambitious objectives, China has devoted its support to numerous state-owned enterprises which are viewed as crucial to the nation’s ‘economic security’ (Zhang, 2015). Although the reaffirmation of the leading role of the state as an operator to economic success it has been cited as essential to preserving China’s global competitiveness (ibid), others question the everlasting viability of such a tactic with efficiency trade-offs, of entrepreneurialism and diminished foreign direct investment (FDI) being noted as manifestation of extreme statist approach to Chinese development and advancements (Kennedy and Johnson, 2016). Given the economic perspective, China’s global power is evidently growing in terms of both political and economic might, as the role of China in recent tensions between the US and North Korea indicates (Time, 2017).
China’s socio-cultural aspect

Before discussing China’s sporting background, it is essential to understand the socio-cultural aspect of the nation. For many centuries ago, China has adapted what the Chinese call *guanxi* (关系), which is an important cultural and social element in China that literally means interpersonal relations (Luo, 2007: 2). This aspect of Chinese society “has been functioning as a clan-like network since Confucius codified societal rules, values, hierarchical structures and authority during the sixth century B.C.” (Park and Luo, 2001: 456). Moreover, from institutional perspective, *guanxi* is an output of immature legal and regulatory structure (Guthrie, 2002: 74). *Guanxi* may emphasize relationships, “Chinese have much stronger tendency to divide people into categories and treat them accordingly (Huang and Wang, 2011: 120). *Guanxi* is more than just giving gifts in order to attain a favorable business exchange. Luo and Chen (1996 from Huang and Wang, 2011: 121), “many Western business people are often in danger of overemphasizing the gift-giving and wining-and-dining components of a guanxi relationship, thereby coming dangerously close to crass bribery or to being perceived as meat and wine friends,” which is a Chinese metaphor for mistrust. Huang and Wang (2011: 121) believe that “*Guanxi* rests on the cultivation of long-term personal relationships, a condition existing to some extent in every human society. However, Chinese *guanxi* is pervasive; it is distinct because it has a central role in daily social business life.”

*Guanxi* is now more widely accepted by Western management and practitioners of the latter terminology and has “recently gained its status as a legitimate socio-cultural construct in Western mainstream literatures of cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, political science, and business and management” (Farh et. al., 1998; Hwang, 1987; Jacobs 1982; King, 1991; Nee, 1992; Tsui and Farth, 1997; Tsang, 1998; Xin and Pearce, 1996, Yang, 1994 in Chen and Chen, 2004: 305). Some studies have claimed that *guanxi* is a form of social capital (Luo, 2007: 412; Wong, 2000). *Guanxi* “refers to the concept of drawing on a web of connections to secure favors in personal and organizational relations” (Park and Luo, 2001: 455). Furthermore, Chinese citizens and organizations pursue guanxi “energetically, subtly and imaginatively, which governs their attitudes toward long-term social and personal relationships (Ibid.). *Guanxi* are “life spheres, so there are families-, friendships-, political-, and business-*guanxi*” (Chen and Chen, 2004: 307). *Guanxi* is important since other viewpoint of *guanxi* was brought as a social relationship that is mostly used instrumentally, one who brings welfare,
and brings up social needs to replace for the inability of the state to provide (Xin and Pearce, 1996).

Sports in China

The People’s Republic of China was created in 1949 and sport has played a role in the country’s development – similarly to other authoritarian regimes at the time (Soviet Union, East Germany, etc.) where sports and physical activity was utilized to generate a healthy population, guide the construction of national identity, “flexing the muscles” of socialism/communism, and to ultimately gain international prestige (see Zheng et. al., 2018 for China in Grix et. al., 2019). China followed the Soviet model of elite sports development in the 1950s, including the introduction to what were known as sports schools that were used develop the future sporting heroes of the nation (Rio dan, 1980). After an unstable two decades in China where sport was no longer prioritized, elite sports is back on the agenda by mid-late 1970s.

China has been one of the most successful nations in elite sports in the world, especially when it came to the occasions of the Olympics. China usually finished in the top four in the Olympic medal ranking table, except when they dropped to 11th during the 1988 Seoul Olympics in Korea (Grix et. al., 2019). The slump led to changes in the nation’s elite sport system, which was able to produce top three ranking in the last five Olympics and being ranked first in the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Ibid.) China’s sports policy has always been keen on elite performances however, Chen et. al., (2018) gives a stance that there is a small divergence from an elite sport only policy – which is closely connected to the nation’s ambitions of modernization (cf. Xu, 2006). China has always prioritized elite sport success and along with other communist states, has seen their success as an expression of their ideological regime type (see Dennis et. al., 2012). As an example, the Olympic Games, is a large-scale event that attracts global attention to a nation’s “handling of the event and its political and social systems” (Grix et. al., 2019: 71). Having said this, the host’s performance in the Olympics medal ranking table usually becomes a sign of those systems’ strengths in relations to other nations (see Van Hilvooorde, Hilling and Stokvis, 2010). China’s sport policy has revolved around to what is locally known as ‘Juguo Tizhi’ (whole country support elite sports system) throughout the 1990s and especially since 2000 (Hong, 2008: 35; see China’s sport policy in detail see Zheng et. al., 2018). The main philosophy of Jugou Tizhi is that central and local authorities should
use all various resources to support the elite athletes in China to succeed in the international level (Ibid). China’s sport policy is similar to the UK’s, mainly prioritizing on developing elite athletes and hosting mega-events, especially aiming for Olympic medal achievements (cf. Hong and Zhouxiang, 2011). It could be insinuated that China believes that SMEs are a vehicle to show a global audience of their growing economic and political power; in 2001, Beijing was awarded to host the 2008 Summer Olympics, eight years after a hair-inch loss in a bid for the 2000 games (New York Times, 2001). Further, China’s ambitions for elite sport policy were realized by the nation’s recent acquisition of the 2022 Winter Olympics (although the bid had more of a regional economic development rationale), it allows the “Chinese capital to become the first city to host both versions of the Games in more than a century of Olympic history” (BBC, 31 July, 2015). Leading up to the 2008 Games, the Chinese General Administration of Sport and local authorities invested in many elite training facilities, from the Duoha High Altitude Training Camp in Qinghai (track and field) in 2004, the China Paralympic Research Centre at Xi’an Sport University in 2006, and most importantly, to the 35 billion RMB 5 (£3.4 billion) National Team Training Center at Beijing Sport University in 2006 (Wei et. al., 2010: 2395).

Any discussion of sports in China ought to mention the example of what is famously known as ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ in 1971, an event which could be interpreted as the ‘ice-breaker’ role for sport (Grix, 2015: 156). After the US table tennis team was hosted by China in 1971, “President Nixon lifted a 20 year trade embargo; thus initial sporting contacts between the US and China led on to more formal discussions and negotiations, following a basketball competition between the two countries one year later” (Espy, 1979: 123), for the purpose to aid communications after a long halt in relations (Ibid.) This means that in this case, sport can create bridges for diplomatic relations. However, sport moves away from ice-breaker when hosting an SME and it tends to become a attraction for global attention towards the host nation. When China was awarded to host the 2008 Olympics, this Olympic spectacle could be argued as one of the most successful in terms of enhancing a nation’s reputation (Nye, 2012).
Beijing 2008 Olympics

China selected to host the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics was not to show the global community that it is a changed nation but rather an “emerging, alternative power to those in the West, similar to Russia (Grix et. al., 2019: 74). From 2008-2022, China’s hosting was the first of the emerging states and it signals a “bold move on behalf of the IOC, signaling the international acceptance of this one-time pariah state” (Ibid.). The IOC was merely bringing the games and following what the once head of FIFA Sepp Blatter, called the ‘New Lands’ (Reuters, 2010). The latter, it is quite evident that the Olympic and FIFA are extending to new and large markets. The choices being India, China, Russia, Brazil and Qatar for recent and upcoming make this trend possible, while – India, China and Brazil will be among the four largest economies by 2030 (Economist, 2011). China sport and sporting successes were used to domestically justify their own political view, with some arguing that the Beijing Olympics was more for strengthening domestic support than show-casing the nation to the world (Brownwell, 2008). For China, the nation is one of the leading states in hard power (economics and military), behind the US – and used the Olympics as a way to leverage domestic (Blanchard and Lu, 2012: 573) and international soft power (Hunter, 2009). With the latter, Liu et. al. (2014: 488) suggests that the Chinese authorities put a great amount of effort to “increase the confidence and self-esteem of the Chinese people”. As said before, even because of China’s sporting performance successes in 2008, this could be an additional factor of showing the domestic citizens of the ‘superiority’ of their nation. Also, Manzenreiter (2010: 42) gives a fair example that the Chinese government “were overwhelmingly addressing domestic concerns and the need of educating the Chinese for the challenges of globalization and immediate encounters with the West.” Furthermore, reported by Shanghai residents – they stated that the main benefits of the games were “psychic income and social capital” and the same participants “appeared ambivalent about the promotion of China’s international image and status’ (ibid.: 495). In short, ‘psychic income’ refers to the ‘feel good factor’ (discussed in the previous chapter) and social capital “generally refers to social connections and networks between people” (Grix et. al., 2019: 74).

The 2008 Olympic Games scale and cost estimated up to approximately $42 billion and at the time this was an extraordinary amount. The games commenced with a booming opening ceremony, which apparently cost $100 million (for figures, see WSJ, 16 July, 2008). Although it may be difficult to precisely pinpoint the impacts of hosting the 2008 Olympics, this event –
along with other aspects in the Chinese soft power package (i.e., language and economic relations discussed later in this paper) – plays a major part in declaring China’s intentions of playing a key role in global affairs. In addition, Grix et al (2019) developed a soft power package that will be compared to the soft power package this research formulated in chapter 5. With giants China modernizing and developing their sports, what are neighbors like South Korea doing?

**South Korea’s socio-economic data**

Officially called the Republic of Korea (대한민국), this nation is located in East Asia and constitutes the southern half of the Korean Peninsula (giving the reason of being popularly known as South Korea) and borders the Yellow Sea and the East Sea with an homogenous ethnicity (CIA World Fact Book, 2019) – surrounded by three of the greatest nations in the world: Russia, China and Japan (Macdonald, 2018: 2). Although comparably small to the latter nations, South Korea is currently considered an advanced economy nation of the Group of Twenty (G20) along with the United States, Canada, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and Australia (MGM Research, 2019). Before devastations of Japanese oppression of Korea from 1910 to 1945 and the Korean War fought in their own soil (1950-1952), Korea was a peaceful country because “the Korean people have virtually no record of aggressive ambition outside their peninsula” (Macdonald, 2019: 2). Furthermore, historically Korea had dealt with numerous invasions within its two thousand years of recorded history, suffered five major occupations by foreign powers and had four wars in the past hundred years fought in and around Korea (Ibid.). Despite this, South Korea has enjoyed considerable economic success.

In 1953, the end of the Korean War, South Korea was left as one of the poorest countries in the world, with so many soldiers and civilians killed along with the ten thousand UN soldiers. It looked “impossible that in less than 50 years Korea had rebuilt its physical and human infrastructure and was ready to join the small group of developed countries known by some as the ‘rich man’s club’ (Johnston, 2016). This extraordinary development became to be known as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’ (Ibid.). “‘Miracle of the Han River,’ named after the economic comeback of post-war Germany, was an outward facing and export-centric economic policy that ushered in an era of industrialization and massive technological development following a complete depletion of capital stock post-war” (Kharas et. al., 2014)
South Korea’s current GDP as of 2018 is $1.619 trillion when it only had a GDP of $3.597 billion in 1960 (World Bank, 2018). South Korea’s GDP per capita was estimated to be around $31,363 in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). In comparison to the population in 1960, approximately 25 million – the population is now approximately 51 million (Ibid). Although Korea’s GINI coefficient is 0.35 (OECD, 2017), under the average of severe income inequality (discussed before) and performs well being ranked above average in housing, civic engagement, education and skills, jobs and earnings, personal security – it lacks in subjective well-being, environmental quality, social connections and work-life balance (OECD Better Life Index).

Currently, South Korea’s economy is at a slump where “economists expect Asia’s fourth-largest economy this year to grow at its slowest rate since 2012 as the US-China trade war threatens to exacerbate a downturn hitting electronics exports” (Financial Times; White, 2019). Furthermore, the Moon administration has taken office in 2017 and since then, the administration has launched a big shift in economic order to bring about income inequality and discourage the dependency on the ‘chaebol’ (재벌) (top richest companies that drive the country’s economy) – which eventually led to raising taxes, minimum wage and capped working hours with hopes to improving consumption and employment (Ibid.).

South Korea’s socio-cultural aspect

This nation’s socio-cultural aspect is similar to China’s guanxi but yet quite different. It is often claimed that in Western civilization individualism is dominant and in East Asia, countries such as Korea, collectivism is a big part of the culture (Oyserman et. al., 2002). Also, although generally claimed, Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that individuals second their own personal goals to collective ones and view themselves connected to others. Korea’s collective culture is very strong and it dates back to the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) (Ha, 1986: 3). It was during the 1860s, “many peasant rebellions occurred to the oppressive government” (Ibid: 7). The reason revolutionary farmers gathered was due to “national security and welfare for the people (to break down the antagonism of the feudal classes, oppose oppression and exploitation and achieve human liberation)” (Ibid: 8). This movement was called the Donghak Peasant Revolution
Explaining the Donghak Revolution shows that Koreans are relatively collectivists. In Korea, from 1987 to 2016 there has been various nationwide protests. Korean citizens in 1987 won over military dictatorship from a series of protests, throughout the 1990s to 2000s, there were numerous civil protests against issues: import of US beef to government mismanagement of the ferry accident in 2014 – ultimately leading to the impeachment and imprisonment of former president Park Geun-hye (Kim, 2020 The Guardian). Therefore, “Korean politics since the 1990s can thus be characterized as a period during which citizens became increasingly emboldened in their relationship with the state, forcing governments to take their wellbeing seriously” (Ibid). Other than the Olympics, another nationalistic SME is the FIFA World Cup. South Korea’s concrete collectivist culture was well represented during the 2002 World Cup. According to authorities, “more than three million people were on the streets of Seoul” (BBC, 2002). Even though this gathering was not a protest, huge number of citizens gathered collectively to support their national team.

Sports in Korea

The Korea’s have been split since the end of the Korean War “where an armistice was signed by U.S. Army Ltd. Gen. William K. Harrison Jr. of the United Nations Command Delegation and North Korean general Nam Il, who also represented China – on July 27, 1953, putting an end to the roughly three years of fighting of the 1950-1953 Korean War” (Waxman, 2018). Still, the war has not ended since the armistice was a ceasefire and not a peace treaty – something not many people realize (Ibid.). Having set the stage, one could be interested in understanding how sport developed within South Korea, despite all the atrocious events the nation has dealt with (from Japanese colonialism to the unfinished war with the north) it still was not an easy ride domestically. After the foundation of the Republic of Korea, the first Olympics the state participated in was surprisingly Helsinki in 1952, and since then, it has participated continuously in the Olympics – other than not participating at the 1980 Moscow Olympics following the US’s boycott (Hong, 2012: 23). One may think it would have been difficult to send athletes abroad during wartime, however the decision to send officials and athletes was allowed with the belief that it would leverage self-confidence among the Korean citizens and represent the strength of the nation (Ibid.) Although winning three bronze medals, this did not convince the Korean government to be involved in sport (Korea Olympic
Committee, 1997) where the government’s interest declined although the Korean government created The Physical Education and Sports Promotion Law of 17 September 1962, often credited with revolutionizing Korean sport, stating goals to enhance the citizen’s physical fitness, fostering healthy minds and to give the citizens a contented life through popular sport\(^1\) – and until 1980 when the interest of elite sport success was revitalized – simultaneously coupled with the interest of hosting sports mega-events (Hong, 2012: 24). South Korea hosted the 1988 Summer Olympics, and it was viewed as “rebranding Seoul as the capital of a modern, dynamic country, and shaking loose some of the grim associations of the 1950-1953 war. The year 1988 was basically the coming-out party for Korea on the world stage” (Hineks, 2018). To others, it was a “fascinating illustration of a ‘marriage’ between politics and sport that greatly advanced the status, success and popularity of Korea. It is also interesting to add the viewpoint that President Chun used the 1988 Olympics as a chance to show that the authoritarian regime was pursuing more of democracy (Kihl, 2015). Regardless, the 1980s and 1990s could be described as the ‘autumn when the fruit of sport ripened’ (Ha and Mangan, 2002: 231). South Korea’s medal ranking was at its best in Seoul 1988 with a medal ranking of fourth place and standing in fifth at the end of London 2012 (Kelly and Mangan, 2015: 141).

To host the 1986 Asian Game and the Olympics in 1988, it was the acceleration of the elite Korean sport’s power – and this is where President Chun founded the Ministry of sports in 1982 and enlisted d Roh Tae-woo as minister of sport (Hong, 2011: 983). In Roh’s inaugural speech he stated:

The Ministry of Sport was established with the purpose of fully committing to the preparation for the Seoul Asian Games and Olympics and [sic] be ready for entering the developed sport nation. To achieve the aim, we will put every effort into talent identification, training coaches, sport science, remodeling old facilities, strengthening the sport organizations such as KSC and National Sports Federations, and developing school and society, military sport (Im, 1998: 235).

From 1980 to 1997, this was the era where the emergence of “modern” South Korea, that lasted well until the outbreak of the 1997 IMF financial crisis (Hong, 2011: 978). However, it was argued that South Korea’s ambitions to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup was because the event

“appeared to be a perfect vehicle for recovery, and Korea was also intent on rebranding itself as an advanced modern society and economy” (Hong, 2011: 984). Another commentator suggested that through the IMF crisis, the World Cup in 2002 was a way to bring back the confidence of the Korean citizens (Park, 2008). If South Korea’s 1988 Summer Olympics was a “coming-out party” how is their hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup?

South Korea and the 2002 FIFA World Cup

When South Korea was awarded to co-host the 2002 FIFA World Cup with Japan, some initially assumed that one of the reasons for Korea’s bid for the World Cup was for using the event as a ‘catalyst for peace’ on the Korean peninsula (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998: 118). However, Butler (2002) suggested that this World Cup was co-hosted by the two nations due to internal power struggles within the FIFA organization which sparked the creation of a weak alliance between the two East Asian nations where their relationship were highly severed by Japan’s colonization and oppression of the Korean peninsula in 1910. Focusing on South Korea, Naughright and Parrish (2012: 221-222), state that 10 new stadiums were built at the cost of 2 billion US$. The games took place from 31 May to 30 June with 32 teams from five football confederations and covered 64 matches with a total audience of approximately 2,705,197 spectators which gives an average of 42,268 attendances per match (ibid). This event was broadcast in 213 countries around the world and an estimated television audience of 28.8 billion (ibid). On the contrary, it is also suggested that “the 2002 World Cup appeared to generate more societal and cultural benefits (i.e. cultural exchange between tourists and residents, finding the cultural identity of local communities, understanding of other societies, preservation and development of the local culture and natural resources and restoration of historical buildings) than eco-nomic gains for South Koreans” (Li and McCabe, 2013: 396) – which may be in agreement with the idea of bringing back the Korean citizens’ confidence (see Park, 2008).

It is not too surprising that little research has been carried out on the perspectives of both Korea and Japan of this World Cup. This could be due to the reason “the event was never initiated as a joint venture and neither nation saw the event as a leverage opportunity to improve the relationship with the other host” (Heere et. al., 2012). However, the Korean Overseas Information Services (2004) reported an increase in political dialogue of politicians of both
nations as a consequence of co-hosting the World Cup. Lee (2006) reported that there was a rise in Japanese consumers of Korean culture, such as movies, TV series, books, during the famously known “Korean Wave” in the years following the 2002 World Cup. Another report suggested that Japan’s youth population have changed their perception toward Koreans residing in Japan (Noguchi, 2005). Although these examples are perspectives of bilateral relations between Korea and Japan, it could be suggested that that South Korea hosted the 2002 World Cup with the purpose from being “in the shadows” of China and Japan hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics (Mclaughlin, 2001: 485) and especially Japan when dealing with the 2002 World Cup. China’s ambitions were to showcase domestically and internationally a new image of ‘modern’ China using the 2008 Olympics and Korea’s goal was to use the 2002 World Cup as a ‘peace catalyst’ with Japan or for more recognition, it only justifies looking into Japan and their hosting of the 2020 Summer Olympics.

Japan’s socio-economic data

Japan (日本), Nippon, is an island located in East Asia that is between the North Pacific Ocean and the East Sea, east of South Korea and consists of ethnic groups of Japanese (98.1%), Chinese (0.5%), Korean (0.4%), and others (1%) which includes Filipino, Vietnamese, and Brazilian (2016 est.) (CIA World Fact Book, 2019). Japan has a GDP of $4.97 trillion (World Bank, 2018) and has a GDP per capita of $41,340 (Ibid.) which is significantly higher than South Korea’s. Japan’s GIINI coefficient (income inequality) is 0.34 (OECD, 2019) which is not too different from South Korea’s 0.35 representing that South Korea and Japan are doing better than China in terms of income inequality (World Bank, 2017). Japan’s population is approximately 126.17 million (CIA World Fact Book, 2019), much higher than South Korea’s and evidently still significantly lower than China’s population. On the contrary, this nation has seemed to be having demographic problems where their population growth rate is declining faster at rate of -0.21 percent – which means that Japan’s natural population is declining faster than most states in the world (Financial Times, see Harding, 2019).

Japan’s imperialism were shattered but “the Japanese economy rose from the ashes of the Second World War to achieve a status of the largest international creditor country in the late 1980s” (Ikeda, 2018: 1), where the so-called “Japanese miracle” includes Japan’s quick recovery between 1945 to 1955, an even better and rapid economic growth between 1955 to
1973, fast recovery from repetitive increased oil prices in the 1970s, and for having a “better-than-average growth” since 1974 when the global economy was in recession (Ibid.). Since the 1990s the economy has been battling deflation for almost 20 years putting doubt on “Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Abenomics – his drive to lift the country out of stagnation. (World Economic Forum, 2016; see Breene). Breene suggested that the cause of this was because of Japan’s stock market and properties bubbles burst, companies prioritized in cutting debt, shifting manufacturing overseas – which led to stagnant wages and consumer spending significantly decreased. In short, to explain the latter, “once deflation set in consumers started to expect prices to fall and they delayed spending for as long as possible in order to save money. That perpetuated the problem and continued the cycle” (Ibid). Furthermore, it is interesting that this also brings us back to being aware that Japan’s demographical issues could also cause Japan’s GDP shrinkage – due to their rapidly aging population and shrinking workforce (Financial Times, see Romei, 2018). Although Japan qualifies and was invited to be part of The Group of Seven (G7), Japan is the slowest growing of the G7 economies, with Japan’s GDP ranked second only to Italy (Ibid.). Japan currently with a weaker yen (Japanese currency) celebrates an influx of foreign tourists which may likely support the economy in the coming years (Japan Times, see Ajima, 2017). Having stated the latter, it could be possible that Japan and their hosting of the 2020 Olympics was aiming for rebirth of the Japanese economy (CNBC, 2013 see Twomey, 2013). But could hosting 2020 Olympics help domestic issues stated within the Tokyo 2020 Games Foundation Plan (Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2013)? As this will be discussed further later, it is essential to understand Japan’s socio-cultural background after getting a sense of the nation’s socio-economic aspects.

Japan’s socio-cultural aspect

Japan’s socio-cultural aspect is very different when compared to China and Korea’s. What is most profound about the Japanese culture and society is that it is created by what Roudometof (2016: 2) calls ‘glocalization’ or simply put, “global localization” which “is often attributed to Sony Corporation’s CEO Akio Morita.” Although this term is considered related to micro-marketing in business, Japan’s culture develops from the concept of glocalization (Robertson, 1995). In Japan, “glocalization dochakuka (deriving from the word dochaku “living on one’s own land”), originally the agriculture principle of adapting one’s farming techniques to local conditions, but also adopted in Japanese business for global localization” (Robertson, 1995:
28). Japan is the ideal example of what Westney (1987) describes as cross-societal emulation that took place during the early Meiji period (1868-1912) (Norman, 2000: xv). It has been emphasized that it should be realized that nation states - especially during the nineteenth century (Westney, 1987: 11-12) - have been engaging in scrupulous learning from exterior societies, thus showing that nation-states have incorporated various ideas from outside of their own. Japan has had many influences from other nation-state societies.

Contemporary Japan is a mix of cultural influences. Japan’s “language, art, architecture, religion and government are all inconceivable without the influence of Chinese and Korean culture” (Haffner et. a., 2009: 17). Japan as the rising sun only came about due to it describing from the viewpoint of China to its West – which in some sense, “an intercultural identity is infused into the very heart of Japanese consciousness (Ibid). With the addition of Korea teaching Japan’s indigenous ancestors best practices to farm rice, Portuguese introducing bread (pan in Japanese or panem in latin), the creation of sudoku, originally originated by Howard Garns (an architect from Indianapolis), and inclusion of the Japanese tea ceremony, very famous in Japan, was brought to life by Zen Buddhism, originating from India suggests that there is no monolithic culture in Japan; it is just a richly multicultural society (Ibid.).

Understanding the roots and aspects of contemporary Japanese culture, the next section will discuss Japan’s sport development. It will start out with the nation’s hosting of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics and their upcoming second time hosting of the 2020 Summer Olympic Games.

Tokyo Olympics 1964

The cancellation of Tokyo hosting the 1940 Olympics should not be ignored when discussing about the 1964 Tokyo Olympics because “the original proposal to schedule the Olympics in Tokyo directly after the 1936 Berlin Olympics, seemed to bond Germany and Japan” (Low, 1999: 39). In 1938 the conflict with China and scarcity in materials such as steel led to Japan withdrawing from hosting the 1940 Olympic games (Ibid.: 39-40). However, after the extensive damages in the Second World War, what followed as result was extreme poverty, scarce food supplies and low standards of human survival (Ozaki and Kaneko, 2011: 82). Even when dealing with such difficulties it was the spring of sporting activities nationwide (Ibid.).
Even with Japan’s rapid economic growth and the end of post-war reconstruction, the government’s priorities were industrial sector advancements, and tax revenues from high economic growth were not well invested to Japanese citizen’s everyday lives (Miyamoto, 1976). Also, another factor that was suggested that an exceptional reason to the sluggish progress of sports promotion was in 1958, when Tokyo was selected to host the Olympics in 1964, an inordinate amount of government funds were being spent related to the Olympics. However, direct sporting investments was only limited to constructing sporting facilities in which the events were held – giving priority to business interests and neglecting the physical well-being of the citizen (Ozaki). The Ministry of Education has admittedly stated that “either directly or indirectly, physical education and sport in Japan developed with the Olympics. Issues of physical education and sport in Japan cannot be discussed without mentioning the Tokyo Olympics” (Mombusho, 1961: 9). This referred to a situation where policies that tended to the citizen’s sport activities within their community were neglected due to government emphasis of having a successful Olympics (Ozaki and Kaneko, 2011: 84).

Looking back to post-war Japan’s foreign and domestic policy, what became to be known as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ – that consists of three main principles: “placing the highest national priority on economic growth, avoiding contentious international issues and relying on the United States for security” (Droubie, 2011: 2309). Furthermore, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised (Constitution of Japan).

The latter was stated to suggest that Japan was reborn by staging the Olympics. Instead of being viewed as feared and despised because of a world war, it would rather show Japan as peaceful internationalist (Ibid.). Hosting the 1964 Olympic was the precise staging of a “peaceful” Japan since in the Olympic Charter (at the time) stated that the Olympics would “create international amity and good will, thus leading to a happier and more peaceful world.” (Brundage and Otto, 1964). Furthermore, the Japan Sports Association (JASA) stated the following under ‘Olympic Ideals’:
The Olympics are a sporting competition between individuals and teams, not confrontational competition between countries. Therefore, there are no rankings between countries. The goal is to contribute to everlasting peace by deepening of friendship and understanding of each other through competition by people of the world who have set aside their political, ethnic or religious consciousness.

This could suggest that the Olympics was the vehicle of attaining support for a nation that viewed itself as fundamentally peaceful (Droubie, 2011: 2310).

The 1964 Olympics was not all “sunshine.” Previously, the discussion was based on how the staging of the Olympics was to show the world a new rebirth of a peaceful nation. However, it was suggested that Japan was also trying to “impress the rest of the world with the high level of Japanese technological achievement, as the global media focused on the Tokyo Olympics,” and because of their haste (and dirty politics) the projects ended up costing $1 billion, which was twice the amount of the original budget – and roughly one-third the total cost of the games, which compelled the JNR president to resign” (Japan Times, see Whiting, 2014). Furthermore, the infrastructure advancements made for the Tokyo Olympics affected much of its navigable waterways, by installing columns of support to construct a highway and other construction underwater, many river docks became useless, which led to more job losses and with additional consequences to the environment with fishes dying with accumulation of biochemical waste known as hedoro in Japanese (Ibid.)

After the post-war period, physical education was introduced in Japan with a westernized curriculum, and after hosting the 1958 Asian Games and nomination to host the 1964 Olympics, “the Japanese legislature passed the 1961 Sports Act which incorporated articles on both elite sport and mass participation, though the former, which was deemed important in terms of national pride and international image, was given greater prominence” (Henry and Uchiumi, 2001: 171-2). It could be due to this Japan surprisingly was able to rank third in medals, winning 16 gold medals, just behind USA and Soviet Union, suggesting that the Japanese sports performance accomplishment during the 1964 Tokyo Olympics “served to reinforce the growing pride in their achievements, in both sport and the world of trade” (Low, 1999: 44). After hosting the Summer Olympics in 1964, Japan were quickly able to host the Winter Olympics in 1972 in Sapporo and later again hosted the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano. Now, the Summer Olympics have been awarded to Japan and Tokyo for a second time around. The rationale behind this decision, and its comparison with 1964, forms part of the analysis in later chapters of this thesis.
Tokyo 2020

Tokyo’s Olympic bid document with their slogan as “Discover Tomorrow”, stating that it summarizes their vision – further explaining that ‘Discover’ “captures the spirit of exchange and friendship that fuels the best Olympic and Paralympic Games. Games when the Olympic values enhance the life of the Host City and its people; and those people – and their own culture and customs – in turn enhance and enrich the Olympic Movement (Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Bid Committee Candidature File, 2013). The ‘tomorrow’ was simply describing the future (Ibid.). Furthermore, the committee state that the 2020 Games concept has been constructed closely with city and national governments to make sure that it reinforces and “accelerates long-term development strategies for the Japanese citizens” (Ibid.). With the following stated it could be viewed that Japan is keen on improving national issues, since the Tokyo 2020 Olympics “will reflect themes of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rebirth’ (Reuters, see Tarrant, 2018). It has also been stated that “a key theme in the run-up to the Games has been the recovery from the devastating earthquake that struck Japan in 2011” (Ibid.).

Toshiaki Endo, a member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party) as well as former Vice-Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), is someone who “recognised sport as an important political issue for the nation” (Shimizu, 2014: 611). He stated the purpose for hosting the Olympics:

I think we must use this opportunity to motivate people and get them to look positively toward the future. Secondly, from the moment Japan is chosen to host the Olympics, everyone in the world concerned with sports will focus their eyes on it. They will carefully watch what is happening in the country until the Olympics are held in Tokyo. Just as we consciously keep a watch on London, the world will consciously watch Japan. This will greatly increase Japan’s presence (Endo et. al., 2012).

Not only does Endo touch upon domestic issues such as the rapid aging of the Japanese population but he also insinuates that he wants to bring back the confidence and motivate the citizens of a brighter future. The latter not only falls in to the category of nationalism but also could be considered as trying to utilize an SME as a way of recovery for domestic issues.
Another viewpoint that could be discussed upon is how the 2020 Games could help Japan internationally and more importantly, economically (since their economy has been stagnant after the economy bubble burst discussed before). One view was brought up suggesting that Japan’s hosting of the 2020 Olympics would increase foreign tourists and increase investments for infrastructure associated with the event (Bank of Japan, see Osada et. al., 2016: 1). However, although it could “bring about monetary economy boost in the form of sales of official goods, tourism, and so on” (Asia-Pacific Journal), most countries that have hosted the Summer Olympics, have seen minus figures the year after the event, which gives out a credible reason to question Prime Minister Abe’s “Abenomics” (Ibid.). Also, it has been reported that the Tokyo Olympic cost is not what was presented to the public, stating that “auditors put total spending directly linked to the games at $24.7bn, about four times the figure envisioned when Tokyo named host city in 2013” (Financial Times, see Lewis, 2018) – which is in doubt it suits what the IOC wants since the massive amount of money could discourage cities bidding for future events (Ibid.). Japan may ultimately be attempting to use the 2020 Olympic as a way to boost public spending in the hopes of countering a potential economic slowdown (Japan Times, 2019).

Concluding remarks

Given the background of each nation’s sports background and their significance, it helps to understand each nations’ various backgrounds but also hint at how sport is significant in politics (covered in the previous chapter). Understanding the sporting origins and sentiments of the nations discussed is essential because it represents the vast differences and possible similarities in each nation’s situation. From 2018 to 2022, three Olympics (two Winter and one Summer Games) have been hosted in East Asia: 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics and 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics). Furthermore, it has been stated that the selection of Olympic host city is an arduous “interplay between political and economic environments of the world when the host city selection process playing out” (Bloomberg, see Sen, 2018; see also Roche, 2000).

These three nations (China, Korea and Japan) have become the frontiers of hosting sport mega-events in the East Asian region and it seems like the attempts for future bids will not end soon. In fact, China has ambitions of hosting a World Cup, after South Korea and Japan hosted the
2002 World Cup, both nations still attempt to bid for the acquisition of hosting another World Cup and more surprisingly, South Korea has proposed to co-hosting an SME with their Asian neighbors: North Korea, China and Japan (China Daily, 2018). This chapter displayed the background and more in detail, sporting background of each nation focused in this research. The next section turns to the methodology chapter of this thesis which will include further justification of why these three nations and case studies have been chosen.

Chapter 3
Methodology

This chapter will layout the methodological considerations for the inquiry of how nations in East Asia use SMEs to leverage soft power domestically, regionally, and internationally. Before discussing the analysis and results this chapter explains how the research background, reviewed literature, and concepts – touched upon in previous chapters – are linked to the empirical sources of this research. By doing so, the chapter is divided into three sections.

In the first section, the nature of the study is clarified by understanding its main characteristics: a constructivist / interpretivist research paradigm. It is not to say that this section is to solely justify which research paradigm to use – leading to methodological justifications – but it is also touches on ontological and epistemological positioning and their relationship with the construct of the research and research questions. The second section discusses the multiple strategies used to best obtain knowledge of how nation(s) in a specified region utilize SMEs to attain soft power outcomes. This includes outlining the rationale behind utilizing a multiple-case, qualitative approach – including a brief overview of each nation. The last section gives an explicit explanation of the methods of data collection and analysis, concentrating specifically on 1) semi-structured interviews, 2) secondary data analysis 3) descriptive statistical analysis 4) print media, and 5) government documents. Taken all into consideration the research paradigm, strategies and methods, developed and built together the purpose of collecting relevant data with which to the answer of the research questions: a) why are East Asian nations competing to host SMEs, and b) what is the contemporary definition of soft power?
Constructivism and Interpretation

First, it is essential to understand the philosophical positioning of the researcher and the research project. When given the philosophical positioning, it creates a “frame” which represents various beliefs about the nature of the social world and the process it might be explored (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 10). This implies that philosophical assumptions construct the research methodology and help indicate the choices made in creating the research design. It not only gives the researcher the ability to adapt their research to a specific research design, but also enables strengths and limitations of the research design, help define how and where evidence is collected, and finally how the evidence will be understood (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008: 21). To understand about the philosophical underpinnings of this project, the two key concepts ontology and epistemology are introduced. Both are important to clarify, as this aids understanding of the nature of different research paradigms and their methodological applications. Likewise, Grix (2002: 175) believes it is essential to show the (inter)relationships of the key concepts of building a research project: ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods.

Ontology is the starting point of a research project, which represents the researcher’s assumptions of reality (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988: 509). A simpler way of understanding this is that ontological assumptions have to do with what people believe establishes social reality (Blaikie, 2000: 8) or “the adoption of some picture of the nature of social being” (Lewis, 2002: 17). When researchers seek a reality, researchers are referring to knowledge that is external to them – for those who follow a foundationalist approach (i.e., positivism). Ontology is the beginning stages of research where the researcher’s epistemological and methodological stance usually follows. Hay states that the researcher’s ontological position is an “answer to the question: what is the nature of social and political reality to be investigated” (Hay, 2002: 61). It is essential to note that Hay not only touches on social reality but he refers also to the political, since one of the main components of this research project is the international relations (IR) concept – soft power. Also, one should note that it is crucial to consider that when pertaining to social research, researchers are bound to have different cultural and educational backgrounds that could lead to a deviation of views of realities in the world, as well as assumptions supporting their approaches to social analysis (Grix, 2002: 177). Ontological assumptions therefore, cannot be contradicted by factual data but rather they are a way of representing,
introducing, and reasoning how a research project came about in context to the researcher’s personal view of reality (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 5-6).

The most common ontological perspectives are ‘objectivism’ and ‘constructivism’. Objectivism is “an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” (Grix, 2010: 61). Constructivism is another ontological positioning that “asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2001: 16-18). If this particular research project were possibly to adapt the objectivist approach, the researcher would have to be able to formulate an actual way of measuring soft power – previously discussed in literature review. Some scholars have attempted to numerically quantify soft power, however, realistically the objective of measuring soft power is overrated due to the highly subjective nature of soft power. There is not – and there is never likely to be – an exact formula that could perfectly quantify soft power. This can be viewed as a limitation to this research project in the views of objectivists, but it gives a clear justification to adapting this research to the lens of constructivism.

The research project deals with the continuous practices of nations hosting SMEs dating since 1896 in Athens (Olympics) and 1930 in Uruguay (FIFA World Cup). However, it has caught the attention of the researcher that East Asian nations are highly interested in hosting first-order SMEs. Moreover, it is evident and a reality, to the researcher, that the East Asian region has become a new powerhouse market in hosting SMEs with Pyeongchang, Rep. of Korea having just hosted the 2018 Winter Olympics (although not first-order), Tokyo, Japan soon hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics, coming around for a second time after hosting in 1964, and finally, Beijing, China soon to host the Winter Olympics in 2022. This is what Horne and Manzenreiter called the “East Asian Era” knowing that starting from 2018 to 2022 the Olympic Winter and Summer Games will be held in East Asia (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2017: 6). See below for a list of all the sport mega-events – including first-order and non-first-order events – hosted or to be hosted in the East Asian region:
It has become a common ground for many scholars to argue that SMEs “are increasingly being used by states of all political hues to project an image to the outside world, and acquiring and hosting have become key factors in local and national development strategies” (Grix et al. 2015: 467-8). Comprehending that there are multiple reasons why nations host SMEs, it is highly believed that it is a tactical change for employing “hard” to “soft” power with states progressively using sport and especially SMEs (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 252). In addition, in alignment to Roche’s definition discussed in the prior chapter, the researcher believes that there is a deeper intent to the usage of SMEs – understanding that these events are constructed by national governments and international non-governmental organizations – bringing in the concept of soft power seems necessary and suitable to understand the phenomena of nations hosting SMEs throughout history. Therefore, given credit to prior academics, it gives an opportunity to understand the effects of hosting SMEs in the East Asian region. Therefore, the ontological positioning also helps craft the research question: why are East Asian nations “competing” to host SMEs? Not only is it evident to see the frequency of hosting large-scale sporting events in the region, but it is also the researcher’s goal to understanding that with so

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tokyo Summer Olympics (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Osaka Winter Olympics (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul Summer Olympics (Rep. of Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Korea/Japan FIFA World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing Summer Olympics (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Pyeongchang Winter Olympics (Rep. of Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020(1)</td>
<td>Tokyo Summer Olympics (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>Beijing Winter Olympics (China)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
many costs to hosting these events, what could be the main reason a nation or now even a region would want to host SMEs. For constructing the research question: what is the contemporary definition of soft power? – was formulated by understanding that the concept soft power was coined in 1990. But it is evident that when dealing with different countries, the definition of soft power changes due to the various situation(s), cultural background or current status of the nation. Moreover, as mentioned before in the previous chapter, this concept was created at a time where it is important to highlight that one year before the concept of soft power was published, the Berlin Wall was demolished, the US and Soviet Union declare the end of the Cold War – in 1990, East and West Germany ratify reunification, and finally, a year after in 1991, the Soviet Union falls. After thirty years the concept has been revisited numerously for the purpose of polishing the concept – and since there are different definitions of soft power according to different nations – nations and specific cases could be investigated upon reading print media to understand the sentiments of the nations in order to get a better understanding of its societal atmosphere.

In light to the researcher’s realities, this particular research follows the ontological positioning of constructivism since the essence of this philosophical positioning is that – learning is done by engaging in constructing one’s own knowledge and meaning from their experiences (Fosnot, 1996; Steffe and Gale, 1995). This theory can date back to many philosophers such as Dewey (1938), Hegel (1807; 1949), Kant (1781; 1946), and Vico (1725; 1968). von Glasersfeld (1984, 1990) proposed three essential epistemological principles of constructivism with a fourth added by interpretation of other works.

1. Knowledge is not passively accumulated, but rather, is the result of active cognizing by the individual;
2. Cognition is an adaptive process that functions to make an individual’s behavior more viable given a particular environment;
3. Cognition organizes and makes sense of one’s experience, and

Having mentioned upon the adaptive learning process and information constructing procedures of the researcher, this allows the researcher to adapt a specific type of constructivism – social constructivism.
Social Constructivists follow the four principles mentioned before. The four epistemological emphases direct to defining principles that keep the social nature of knowledge and stand on the position of that knowledge comes from social interaction and language usage, thus making it a shared, rather than an individual experience (Prawatt and Floden, 1994). The occurrence of these social interactions comes about within the social-cultural context, which results of social interaction constrained to a specific time and place (Gergen, 1995; Vygotsky, 1978). Bakhtin (1984: 110) best exemplifies this positioning in saying: “Truth is not to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction.” In truth, the realities of social constructivism are socially constructed and agreed upon truth resulting from “co-participation in cultural practices” (Cobb and Yackel, 1996: 37). Explaining about social constructivism not only shows that it fits the four epistemological tenets above but also leads to the discussion of the formulation of the research topic. The research topic was formulated which is evident through understanding the perspective of the researcher’s realities and events that have occurred and that will be happening in the near coming years.

Constructivism could generally be seen as “more focused” on meaning than structure, however, what has been discussed in detail commits to both because it explains the logical process of the research by defining and explaining the researcher’s realities to the construction of the research topic and research questions. By doing the latter, it ultimately also connects to the epistemological adaptation.

Epistemology

An epistemology is the relationship between the researcher and the reality or how this reality is captured or known (Carson et al., 2001: 1). In other words, epistemology is how researchers go about uncovering this knowledge and learn about reality (Blaikie, 2000: 8). A much simpler way of understanding epistemology was given by Grix, stating that it is mainly about the knowledge gathering process and “concerned with developing new models or theories that are better than competing models and theories” (Grix, 2002: 177). Guba and Lincoln state that the epistemological question is: “what is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known,” and adds on to saying that the solution to the
question is “constrained by the answer already given to the ontological question (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 108).

The two most common epistemological positionings are ‘positivism’ and ‘interpretivism’. In dealing with epistemology, positivism, is “an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of natural sciences to the study of social sciences” (Bryman, 2001: 12-13). In addition, Collins states that positivism “is in accordance with the empiricist view that knowledge stems from human experience. It has atomistic, ontological view of the world comprising discrete, observable elements and events that interact in an observable, determined and regular manner” (Collins, 2010: 38). It is to say that researchers that follow the objectivist standpoint will lead to a positivist epistemological standpoint. Also, it is possible to say that positivism relies on numeric information that could result to statistical analysis which suits the likes of scientists. Interpretivism is an epistemological positioning that “is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2001: 12-13). To choose one or the other positionings will define and lead a researcher to employ different methodologies, methods and even sources.

The research project positions itself in the realms of the interpretivist standpoint. Positivists could argue that without numeric or “concrete” facts the research of soft power legacies connected to SMEs would be idiosyncratic. Moreover, its common that extreme positivists would argue that the latter could be applied to the social research with the assumptions that “the social world can be studied in the same way as the natural world, that there is a method for studying the social world that is value free, and that explanations of causal nature can be provided” (Mertens, 2005: 8). In dealing with this research project, it must be considered that because there are subjective components to the concept of soft power (Watanabe and McConnell, 2008: 194), this is the key reason that using a positivist approach is difficult to utilize for this particular research. Saunders et al. (2007: 129) believes that narratives is accepted as good quality data for interpretivists. Moreover, critics could argue that narratives are more of a written account of connected events, a story. On the contrary, it is proper to understand that narratives “emphasizes relational dimensions to events, behaviours, practices, and utterances” (Saunders, 2006: 2). In most cases, when one follows the ontology of objectivism or constructivism the epistemology would follow through with the epistemological
standpoint of positivism and interpretivism respectively. This is well represented from the figure below:

![Diagram showing the relationship between positivism, interpretivism, and post-positivism](source)

Source: Adapted from (Marsh and Stoker, 2010: 186)

As displayed in the figure, it can be seen that from the left being positivism and the right being interpretivism, although deriving from objectivism, there is post-positivism that is in the middle of positivism and interpretivism. Post-positivist research, characterized by Ryan, states that:

- Theory and practice cannot be kept separate. We cannot afford to ignore theory for the sake of ‘just the facts’;
- The researcher’s motivations for and commitment to research are central and crucial to the enterprise (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 1-2 in Ryan, 2006: 12-13);
- The idea that research is concerned with correct techniques for collecting and categorizing information is now adequate (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 3 in Ryan, 2006: 12-13).

Source: Adapted from (Ryan, 2006: 12-13)

It is important to note that with this approach, it adapts the mixed methods approach of combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. It may seem like a more concrete and favorable approach but on the contrary, the researcher believes that there is more “depth” in understanding resources through “perceived” knowledges because the research project is seeking to understand a specific phenomenon of why nations host first-order SMEs and in use for the three levels of soft power outcomes. Interpretivists also use quantitative data, but the
emphasis is not on the method but what the researcher say about their findings (Johansson and Osterman, 2017: 6903).

Before stating which approach the research project will adapt, one must comprehend the difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative research approach is to “abstract from particular instances to seek general description or to test causal hypothesis; it seeks measurements and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers” (King et al. 1994: 3). Replication of methods is very important to quantitative supporters since the work is subject to verifiability, “which provides an air to legitimacy, reproducibility, reliability and objectivity” (Grix, 2010: 118). This form of research seeks to find general patterns and relationships among variables and is compatible also for those who are testing theories and making predictions (Ragin, 1994: 132-6).

Qualitative methods on the contrary could be seen the opposite of quantitative research, where it requires an in-depth investigation of knowledge through the procedures of participant observation, employing the interview technique, archival or other documentary analyses, or ethnographic study (Ragin, 1994: 91). In most cases, qualitative researchers will tend to work in the interpretivist philosophical positioning, “using methods of data generation which are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which the data are produced” (Grix, 2010: 120-1). This research will be adapting the qualitative approach because not only does the research follow a constructivist ontological and interpretivist epistemological positioning but also because “there are areas of social reality which statistics cannot measure” (Silverman, 2000: 8); which in this case the researcher believes that soft power would be difficult to quantify because of the many possible components of subjectivity that entails this terminology. With reference to the prior figure, it is comprehensive that the research should adapt the qualitative approach.

Case Study

The case study approach is a common technique used in social science research. Case studies according to Eisenhardt (1989: 534), “is a tactic which target comprehending the dynamic present within single settings.” With a defined research question present in a general topic, the researcher has the chance to choose certain organizations (or also people) to approach and kinds
of data to collect (Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, the existence of stated constructs is essential in creating the beginning stage design of research that is based on theory building (Ibid. :536). If the constructs are consistently significant throughout the research, the researcher will obtain solid grounding of an emerging theory. Having stated this, this research is not presumably being done because of an emerging theory but it allows space for contributions to the field of study. Moreover, case-studies “facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 544). Although there are different types of case study approaches, Yin (2003: 53) believes that it is preferable to use a multiple case study approach over a single case design. Multiple case studies allow the researcher to investigate differences and similarities within and between cases with an aim of replicating findings across cases.

The next process of this research project involves a case study, using three different nations’ SMEs. The three nations were selected because they are not only the dominant SME hosts in East Asia but also to fit accordingly to Yin’s idea of replication. If the differences and or similarities are significant and consistent, a contribution to knowledge is most likely to be emergent. The objective of using the three nations’ SMEs is to show the key similarities or differences of each country’s soft power leveraging outcomes in order to be able to create a forthcoming East Asian regional SME “soft power package.” The case studies that will be utilized were discussed in the previous chapter, listed below:

- 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan
- 2008 Beijing Olympics
- 2020 Tokyo Olympics

The three case studies represent a rise in East Asia in the realms of the SME market. Although it may be difficult to generalize that each of the three nations had similar ambitions of leveraging soft power, the main objectives are to examine the following:

- What the nations planned in order to leverage domestic, regional and international soft power outcomes by hosting the event.
- What strategies and policies were used to achieve soft power.
- How the different levels of soft power outcomes were evaluated post-event.
Understanding the purposes of case study selection, it is essential to express what will be done within each case studies – starting out with the explanation of utilizing interviews.

Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups

Talking to people is a common way of gathering information needed especially for this research. Interviews are a common method of data collection used in research projects, but it is essential to understand the different kind of interview techniques. There are three types of interview techniques in the realms of social science: structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. According to Grix, structured interviews are very related to survey questionnaires “on which answers to predetermined questions are written in specific sections instead of given orally” (Grix, 2010: 127). With this interview technique it may limit the participant’s answers as well as limit the interviewee’s true answer to certain questions, which could lead to the possibility of biases.

For the purposes of gathering oral data, this research will be utilizing the semi-structured interview method because the researcher believes that this method will bring out “the bigger picture” of why nations chosen for this specific research host SMEs. The goal of semi-structured interviews is to acquire a wider understanding of the relations between variables for explanatory purposes. One of the main advantages of utilizing semi-structured or unstructured interviews is it achieves a thorough understanding of the reason interviewees adhere to context that is not predetermined by the researcher’s hypothesis (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008: 143). With this interview technique the interviewer leads and defines the case for which knowledge is being desired. This allows the interviewee to speak freely, adding in subjective opinions and detailed explanations. This research project finds the semi-structured interview technique suitable because the concept of soft power has subjective attributes that is difficult to measure quantitatively, making it difficult to use the structured interview approach. The disadvantage to the semi-structured interview is that it is feasible that the researcher could be exposed to interpretations and highly subjective opinions of the informant. Krueger and Casey explain that focus-group interviewing (which could be applied to semi-structured interviewing) is about discussing but also
…about listening. It is about paying attention. It is about being open to hear what people have to say. It is about being nonjudgemental. It is about creating comfortable environment for people to share. It is about being careful and systematic with the things people tell you (2000: xi).

Semi-structured interviews have been used in many fields of studies. Geographers for example have used semi-structured interviews for the purpose of gathering data in various subjects. Winchester (1999: 61) carried out interviews and questionnaires to attain various information about the characteristics ‘lone fathers’ and the matter of marital failure and post-marital conflict in Newcastle, Australia. Valentine (1999) interviewed couples together or separately for the purposes to understand gender relations in households and Johnston (2001) conducted interviews with participants and organizers at a gay pride parade in Auckland, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview was also used by Duffy et al. (2011) carried out on-the-spot interviews with participants in a folkloristic parade in which were performing songs and dance presenting their Swiss-Italian heritage.

A focus group consists of a group of people, in an informal meeting setting and the purpose is to promote a conversation on a specific topic – that is set up and facilitated by the researcher (Morgan, 1997; Stewart et al., 2007; Gregory et al., 2009). This method is an effective way of gathering data and information for this topic because “facilitator or moderator of focus groups keeps the group on the topic but is otherwise non-directive, allowing the group to explore the subject for as many angles as they please (Clifford et al., 2016: 145). When proceeding with focus groups the procedure may take from one to two hours and the key characteristic is the multiple symbiosis between the members of the focus group (Morgan, 1997: 12; Bredford and Burgess, 2001). The initial structure of semi-structured interviews and focus groups may be similar in the fact that they are conversational and informal and allow for open responses rather than a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. On the contrary, there are differences between focus group and semi-structured interviews. As stated in the latter, focus groups is based on gathering data from the interactions between a group, whereas for semi-structured interviews – it is the interaction between just the interviewer and the interviewee (Clifford et al., 2016: 146).

The semi-structured interview method is argued to be the most commonly used qualitative methods (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 213). Furthermore, in this case both semi-structured interviews and focus groups can be utilized together in the means as supporting other methods or due to the purpose of triangulation in a multi-methods research. Valentine explains:
“Often researchers draw on the many different perspectives of sources in the course of their work. This is known as triangulation. The term comes from surveying, where it describes using different bearings to give the correct position. In the same way researchers can use multiple methods or different sources to try and maximize their understanding of a research question” (2005: 112).

Semi-structured interviews and focus groups are more than just a ‘discussion’. The researcher will construct specific questions, choose key participants, and simultaneously “transcribe data while at the same time remaining cognizant of the ethical issues and power relations involved in qualitative research. The interviews will take place in a face-to-face setting with key personnel that were involved in organizing the specific SMEs according to the case studies discussed before. Interviewees of the respective case studies were chosen on the factor of their ability to contribute to information connected to the research (Sekaran, 2000: 277). The interviewees will be selected in the areas of:

1. National Olympic Committee / National Football Association (Representatives and members involved in organizing the respective events)
2. Event Organizers
3. Non-governmental Organizations (FIFA and IOC)
4. Government Personnel (Involved in organizing respective events from case studies)

By carrying out the interviews with the listed area of participants, the findings aimed to highlight what the nation’s domestic, regional and international soft power leverages were by hosting SMEs, which strategies were put into place to achieve the nation’s desired soft power leverage before, during and after hosting, how the different levels of soft power were evaluated post-event and which level of soft power leverage from the event actually came out to be a result. Interviews will be recorded after consent is given from the participant in order to catch key statements relevant to the analysis of the research. The technique that will be used for sampling recruitment is snowball sampling. “The snowball sampling outreach strategy finds an individual (the “source”, also referred to as the “seed”) who has the desired characteristics and uses the person’s social networks to recruit similar participants in a multistage process” (Sadler et al., 2010: 370). In continuation to the latter concept, once the initial respondent or participant aids in bringing in other participants themselves, this is where the “snowball” gets larger and larger – rolling down the hill where it gives the researcher the chances of getting
more participants for interview (and in this case focus group) data collection (Wasserman et al., 2005). The key point to the concept of snowball sampling is that it is a type of “recruiting mechanism” that could enable “to reach a hard-to-reach target group in a more pragmatic and culturally competent way” (Sadler et al., 2010: 370). With this particular research project, the researcher understands that there could be difficulties in reaching certain participants – especially potential participants from government or participants on the top of the hierarchy from certain organizations. It leaves the researcher the rationale decision to use this sampling technique to get to certain individuals or groups for the purposes of data collection. Indeed, some may argue that this technique could lead to biases, where the sample might add in someone who is over-represented of individuals with their many social connections who may share similar characteristics or opinions (Magnani et al., 2005). Interviewees will be listed in Appendix 2.

When it comes to formulating questions, Dunn (2005: 81) explains: “it is not possible to formulate a strict guide for every interview (and focus groups in this case) context.” From this, the researcher believes that it is important to understand where these participants are coming from (background), the positions in their respective working fields (hierarchy) and the importance of letting participants understand that their identity will be unanimous when this research will be published. The researcher believes that depending on the hierarchy of positions in the work force of the chosen areas, the answers could diverge away from what the researcher is actually looking for in participant’s responses. Therefore, it is important to formulate questions, construct a comfortable environment for interviewees and focus groups – while reassuring participants that their recorded responses will be used without identifying the participant’s identity – in order to get the favorable responses for this research project. To this end the interview questions formulated for interviewees and focus groups can be seen at Appendix 1. The primary source of information – interviews – will be coupled with secondary sources in the rationale to strengthen the research justifications. In addition, the researcher believes that there should be more than one primary data which will be discussed further in this chapter.
Secondary Data Analysis

There are various meanings to data analysis that may “appear in literature, many with subtle differences which together suggests a lack of consensus about what is meant by the term” (Smith and Smith, 2008: 3). For example, a definition for secondary analysis of survey data was given by Hyman (1972: 1), that it is “the extraction of knowledge on topics other than those which were the focus of the original survey.” Another definition of secondary analysis was given to the purposes of emphasizing the convenience for investigating new research questions: “the study of specific problems through analysis of existing data which were originally collected for another purpose” (Glaser, 1963:11) – or: “the further analysis of an existing dataset with the aim of addressing a research question distinct from that for which the dataset was originally connected and generating novel interpretations and conclusions” (Hewson, 2006: 274). On the contrary, secondary analysis could potentially re-analyzing existing datasets with statistics or logical approaches in a way that: “secondary analysis is the re-analysis of data for the purpose of answering the original research questions with old data” (Glass, 1976: 3). Among researchers that are looking for the essence and definition of secondary analysis is that it associates the usage of another researcher’s data – “a collection of data obtained by another researcher which is available for re-analysis” (Sobal 1981: 149). What should be emphasized here is the difference between secondary and primary analysis “which involves both data collection and analysis, while secondary analysis requires the application of creative analytical techniques to data that have been amassed by others” (Kiecolt and Nathan, 1985: 10).

There are many different types or forms of secondary sources whether they are numeric or non-numeric. For this particular research topic, it will be utilizing both non-numeric, or qualitative secondary data, and numeric data. Qualitative data can be retrieved from interviews (as discussed before), ethnographic accounts, documents, photographs or conversations (Smith and Smith, 2008: 5). This project will be using past academic documents in support of this research for the purposes of strengthening arguments and justifications. Pertaining to numeric secondary data, this will come in the forms of descriptive statistics that past academics or even print medias had published. The next section touches into how the thesis will be providing descriptive statistics throughout data analysis.
Descriptive Statistics

Comprehending that this research project is strictly an inductive, constructivist/interpretivist study, only words can explain so much – especially when many could argue that without any empirical data (numerical data) it is difficult to justify an argument or statement. Or according to Weber (2004, viii), “there are no differences between positivists notions of validity.” If research is not pragmatic or adapting the positivist viewpoint generalizability is important – defining what descriptive statistics is and its usages. According to Urdan (2011: 2-3):

“Descriptive statistics apply only to the members of a sample or population from which data have been collected. In contrast, inferential statistics refer to the use of sample data to reach some conclusions (i.e., make some inferences) about the characteristics of the larger population that the sample is supposed to represent.”

Comprehending the purpose of utilizing descriptive statistics, this takes us back to referring to the purpose of the research project. For this topic of interest, the researcher understands and believes that a regional SME “soft power package” is possible. Even with the distinct societal, cultural and government regime differences it is still understood that governments and non-governmental organizations (in this case FIFA and IOC) collaborate together in making hosting SMEs possible (discussed in literature review referring to Roche’s definition of SMEs) (Roche, 2000). With this having been stated, the researcher believes that the responses given from participants will have certain patterns and overlaps – enabling and justifying even more the usage of the interview methods as well as the referencing of print media. Among print media, certain statistics are given to understand how some nations will associate the nation’s success or even shortcomings to the hosting of SMEs. This will be touched upon further when discussing about the importance of print media analysis.

Print Media

Media such as newspapers articles and reports is a common source used in research. According to Grix, print media “can be a useful complement to interviews and statistics” (Grix, 2010: 134). Moreover, he states (ibid.: 134) states that if someone were to pursue a contemporary study, it could help inform one “of wider sentiments in the country you are studying.” From
the latter statement, it could help strengthen this research project since it deals with case studies from three different nations. Understanding the sentiments of each SMEs in the three different countries could help define certain patterns of how SMEs influence the nations soft power. Furthermore, it allows the evaluation of soft power outcomes prior, during and post-events coupled with data from interviews. So why study or refer to print media? According to Wodak and Krzyżanowski (2008: 32), “their (print media) ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, public attention and political influences, should generate an intrinsic interest among social scientists.” Also, it is interesting to notice that a considerable amount of information journalist use come from organizations that have “organized relationships with the press” (van Dijk 1988: 120). In this case, organizations can vary from government, national committees and more. Specific to this research project, these so-called SMEs will have a substantial amount of print media coverage around the world other than the broadcasting rights each event sells off to certain broadcast companies. Since the focus of this research will be based on SMEs in three different nations, the main domestic print medias (English based) of each nation are listed below with general background details:

Republic of Korea:

The Chosun Ilbo (조선일보 or 朝鮮日報): Is one of the major newspapers in South Korea, headquartered in Seoul, that celebrates almost a century of journalism being established in the year 1920, that claimed in 2010 that it is the “largest newspaper in Korea with a print circulation of 1.84 million. The Korean Audit Bureau of Circulation on Monday released figures for the certified circulations of 116 newspaper companies nationwide” (Chosun Ilbo, 2010). Other than presenting their online content in English and Korean, Chosun Ilbo also translates their contents in Chinese and Japanese (Ibid.).

The Dong-a Ilbo (동아일보): was founded and published in 1920 and has a approximately one million copies in circulation daily, “targeting opinion leaders along with the general public as its main readers” (Dong-a Ilbo). This newspaper has international partnerships with news organizations such as Japan’s Asahi Shimbun and China’s People’s Daily and the Dong-a Ilbo is also stationed in five cities worldwide which include New York City, Washington D.C., Tokyo, Beijing, and Paris – providing digital e-news in Korean, English, Japanese, and Chinese (Ibid.).
China

China Daily (中国日报): Based in Beijing, China Daily is an English-based daily print media. China Daily, was established in 1981 (China Daily). According to China Daily, “the average daily circulation is more than 200,000, one-third of which is abroad in more than 150 countries and regions” (China Daily). As a print media group, this print media also runs China Business Weekly, China Daily Hong Kong Edition, Reports from China, Shanghai Star, Beijing Weekend, 21st Century, 21st Century Teens Senior and Junior Editions, and finally the China Daily website (www.chinadaily.com.cn). Their mission states that they want to help “the world know more about China and the country’s integration with the international community, China Daily is regarded as one of the country’s most authoritative English media outlets and an important source of information on Chinese politics, economy, society and culture” (China Daily. This print media is often known as the “Voice of China” or “Window to China” and they serve as a crucial reference to Chinese readers who want more information about the world (China Daily). Interestingly, this print media is the only representative of China in the Asian News Network (ANN), which is a non-governmental media organization which consists of 14 English-based print medias (China Daily).

People’s Daily (Online) (人民日报): People’s Daily Online was founded in 1997. Also based in Beijing, this news media is not merely a public media but also a cultural company (People’s Daily Online). On 2012, the online news media went public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which made it the first news website listed on the A-share market. Other than Chinese, news is presented in Japanese, Korean, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, German and Portuguese (People’s Daily Online). According to People’s Daily Online, “China’s leaders attach great importance to the development of People’s Daily Online” and also state President Xi Jinping’s visit (Ibid). Their core businesses are media, information services, big data and investment. While have already established 31 branches within just mainland China, they also have representative offices in New York, Tokyo, San Francisco, Seoul, London, Moscow, and so on (People’s Daily Online). This print media “engages in extensive cooperation with foreign media, and has established partnership with over 80 overseas media organizations. Their cooperation ranges from content exchange, cooperation in database, joint construction of channels and sections, to co-production and dissemination of TV programs.
Japan:

The Japan Times (株式会社ジャパンタイムズ): The Japan Times is Japan’s largest and oldest English-based daily newspaper headquartered in Tokyo. It was founded in 1897 for the purpose of giving the Japanese citizens the chance to read news in English to aid Japan to be part of the international community (Kamiya, 2011: 3). This news media publishes three periodicals which are The Japan Times, The Japan Times Weekly, a weekly English-based tabloid and Shukan ST, a weekly tabloid, that aims at Japanese learning English (The Japan Times). The Japan Times news contents are News: that focus on domestic and world news or domestic and overseas business news, Opinion: which are mainly editorials and have general contents: Life, Community, Culture, Sports and City Guide.

The Japan News by The Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞): This news media was founded in 1955. The Japan News is an English-based daily news published by the Yomiuri Shimbun – a leading Japanese newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan (The Japan News). Their main mission was stated “to offer the latest and most reliable information about Japan to the world” (The Japan Times). This news media has partnership with The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and The Times of London, while the ANN includes The Yomiuri Shimbun and The Japan Times as its only members from Japan (The Japan Times).

It is well understood that there could be biases within print media (Abell et al., 2008: 12). However, triangulation could help lessen the biases of data since it is also a way of cross-checking data and. Grix quotes: “An example of cross-checking data which have been collected using different methods is the comparison of interview transcripts and with published documents, or statistics derived from a local investigation which are compared with other national, statistical sources for accuracy” (Robins, 1995: 72 in Grix, 2010: 137). The next section will discuss the usage of government documents.

Government Documents

The analysis of government documents is important due to the fact that what enables nations to host SMEs are the collaborations between governments and non-governmental organizations (FIFA and IOC). The first type of document that must be specified here are the initial bids
given to these non-governmental organizations (FIFA and IOC) that were presented in order to understand the basic purpose of the nation’s and or city’s ambition to hosting their respective SMEs. The bids in the researcher’s view is similar to an application of purpose and value expressed to FIFA and IOC enabling them to be selected specifically to be able to host the World Cup or Olympics respectively. According to scholars the competition to host SMEs is at a high in which some would suggest and label this as a “bidding war” (see Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002 discussing on bidding wars with the 2006 FIFA World Cup). According to Horne (2007: 88): “During the preparation of the bid and competition to win the right to host mega-events such as the Olympic Games ‘bidding wars’ are particularly apparent.” Adding on to this, Horne (Ibid.) argues that during the bidding process, it is very likely that benefits are over-estimated and costs are underestimated and that these predictions are likely to be presented convincingly but yet prove to be mostly inaccurate (Ibid.). This brings us back to asking why nations would want to go through such procedures and still carry on hosting such events. The so-called bid war in the researcher’s point of view – not only presents nations’ initial reasons and ambitions of hosting events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics but also shows what they are striving to show the domestic, region and international audiences. Having stated this, it connects to the researcher’s rationale of dividing the level of analyses into the latter three (domestic, regional and international).

Data Analysis

This section discusses how this particular research will use inductive thematic analysis in dealing with the data collected. According to Braun and Clarke (2006: 78), “thematic analysis should be seen as a foundational method for qualitative analysis. It is the first qualitative analysis that researchers should learn, as it provides core skills that will be useful for conducting many other forms of qualitative analysis.” Holloway and Todres (2003: 247) classify ‘thematizing meanings’ as one of the few shared universal skills across qualitative analysis. Also, this research is using multiple qualitative methods, where Boyatzis (1998) characterizes it as tool to use across different methods.

Understanding thematic analysis, what is considered a theme? Braun and Clarke (2006: 82) explain that “a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.” With
selected themes, there are two primary ways of undertaking thematic analysis: the inductive or ‘bottom up’ way (Frith and Gleeson, 2004). As mentioned, this research will use the inductive thematic analysis approach, which means that the themes that were identified are closely connected to the data themselves (Patton, 1990). Braun and Clarke (2006: 83) state “inductive analysis is therefore a process of coding of data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions. In this sense, this form of thematic analysis is data-driven.” In short, “thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Ibid.: 79).

In thematic analysis there are two terms that must be touched upon, ‘thematic DA’ and thematic decomposition analysis. ‘Thematic DA’ is utilized to indicate a vast range of pattern-type analysis of data, coming from thematic analysis within a social constructionist epistemology, to analysis that is alike to the interpretative collective form of DA (Clarke, 2005). Thematic decomposition analysis “is a specifically named form of ‘thematic’ DA, which identifies patterns (themes, stories) within data, and theorizes language as constitutive of meaning and meaning as social” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 81).

Utilizing the case study approach, Eisenhardt (1989: 540) advises that instead of delivering every detail, it is preferable to arrange a summary of key findings and patterns. He also notes that all data should be well put in the research which could help other researchers understand the decisions and process. Having considered this, this research will take the six steps that originated from Braun and Clarke (2006):

1. Familiarizing yourself with your data
2. Generating initial codes
3. Searching for themes
4. Reviewing themes
5. Defining and naming themes
6. Producing the report

Data analysis would be simpler because of the use of case studies. It enables the researcher to compare and explain things in a deeper sense. What needs to be made sure of is that the data do measure or define what the researcher claims, and that interpretations do result from them (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006: 1). The expected results are that there are similarities in SME hosting
discipline where the final product is an East Asian SME “soft power package,” looking at the three levels of soft power outcomes in all three nations. Using multiple sources, triangulating the data derived from interviews, focus groups, print media, government documents and through the case studies creates a stronger evidences base, as long as there is consistency of replication within the case studies. Below provides an overview of the different elements that the data analysis uses:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus Group</td>
<td>1 Group (3 participants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Print Media</td>
<td>Chosun Ilno &amp; Joongang Ilbo</td>
<td>China Daily &amp; The People’s Daily (Online)</td>
<td>The Japan Times &amp; The Japan News by The Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Documents</td>
<td>Korean World Cup Organizing Committee Report</td>
<td>Beijing’s Olympic Action Plan</td>
<td>- Tokyo 2020 Candidature File (Bid Document)</td>
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**Conclusion**

This inductive qualitative research is set out to use multiple qualitative methods. By using first and secondary sources, this research project hopes to create a regional SME “soft power package.” The East Asian regional soft power package allows comparison with the soft power packages/strategies of emerging states and Western states. The research project was structured
not only by justifying and connecting the researcher’s ontological and epistemological positioning to the research topic and questions, but justifications were made also by giving meaning to this particular research by creating a structure on how each method is also connected to one another making it a comprehensible research topic. One of the possible shortcoming that will be considered with this project is the accessibility of government documents and personnel. Government documents could be a great source to strengthen the triangulation of data, however, it needs to be comprehended that these documents need to be accessible within all three nations. This is due to the purpose of comparability and to fully carry out the process of triangulation. The contribution of knowledge for this project will not only be a possible redefined SME “soft power package” of China with new additions of Korea and Japan, but most importantly intends to create an East Asian regional SME “soft power package.”

Part 2

This section of the thesis discusses each case study’s soft power background; soft power priorities; their rationale for hosting their respective SME; their domestic, regional, and international soft power tactics; and finally, their soft power outcomes. In doing so, this not only facilitates exploration of a phenomena using multiple sources of data (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 544), but also remains in line with Yin’s (2003: 53) multiple case study approach with the aim of investigating differences, similarities, and replicating findings across chosen case studies. Each case study will consist of what was discussed briefly in Part 1, a so-called soft power package. Grix and Brannagan (2016: 252) have categorized the soft power package as having five resources: “Culture,” where a state’s culture is the main aspect that makes the nation attractive; “Tourism,” closely linked with “Branding” and “Diplomacy,” which are the third and fourth resources respectively – ‘serving as purposes to attract foreigners to a country, raising the business in the tourist industry’(Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 260); “Branding,” takes “Tourism” and “Culture” and packages them together in a way of “selling” a country externally; “Diplomacy,” is a general resource that pertains to state-to-state relations, “but also encompasses the multitude of actors now involved in diplomatic relations (Ibid.); and finally “Trade,” is a common resource where states will gather all the resources above to enhance their trade and economy (Ibid.). As a reference, the soft power packages in each case will resemble the figure below:
Case study analysis will be discussed in chronological order starting with the Korea/Japan FIFA World Cup, focusing on Korea.

Chapter 4

Republic of Korea

This chapter will touch upon South Korea’s (will now just be called Korea unless specified) hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup and how the nation used the event for domestic, regional, and international soft power. The chapter will first proceed by discussing Korea’s rationale for hosting the 2002 World Cup with responses with mixed themes of show-casing the nation and Korea’s collectivist society, and the nation’s footballing prestige. Next, it will discuss how Korea defines soft power with interview responses categorized in themes of credibility, strong cultural assets and cultural attractiveness, state-led soft power, and nation branding. Furthermore, the chapter will continue to discuss Korea’s soft power resources leading to the nation’s soft power package (international soft power strategy) and Korea’s domestic and regional soft power tactics. Finally, the chapter will be concluded by discussing the overall affects the 2002 FIFA World Cup had on Korea to becoming a new global player.
South Korea’s Rationale for Hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup

To set the stage for South Korea’s hosting of the 2002 World Cup Interviewee K1 (December, 2019) recalls a moment when he worked for the organizing committee and the challenges he had to face and encounter in order to eventually bring the event to Korea as a co-host with Japan. Interviewee K1 recalled:

The president of FIFA was from Brazil, João Havelange, and Brazil was ready to select Japan to host the World Cup in 2002. Brazil had close relations with Japan due to Japanese immigrants 100 years ago. So, if the World Cup was going to be held in Asia, there was no doubt that Brazil was going to support Japan. Here, I decided to go to Argentina for help because I understood that they are sporting rivals with Brazil. I appealed to an Argentinian bureaucrat saying that it was frustrating that Brazil was going to select Japan without considering a different nation like ours (Korea). I was told that I came to the right place and we spoke for some time. It seemed that FIFA was reconsidering their position and I approached a Japanese bureaucrat and suggested that Korea and Japan have not been in the best relations and Korea has been under Japanese rule for 35 years – so it may be a good opportunity to make this sporting event a turning point for South Korea and Japan. Eventually, this is how the event became a co-hosted event.

Understanding how difficult it was for Korea to attain the rights to host the 2002 World Cup, it was critical to notice that there were diplomatic ties involved between nations even before the host selection process. In 1958 it was the 50th anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil, which is evidence that Japan and Brazil did have diplomatic relations for almost 100 years (Suzuki, 1965: 117). That is not to say that Brazil was going to select or push for Japan to host the 2002 World Cup only because of their longstanding diplomatic ties, but it would be much less preferable for Brazil to choose Korea, which was not a well-known country in Asia and had a lesser number of years in diplomatic ties with Brazil (only 60 years of relations as of 2019) (Brazil MOFA). The respondent was forward looking when he saw the 2002 World Cup as an opportunity to normalize the relations between Korea and Japan. Therefore, it was not completely wrong to think that the world cup was a diplomatic normalizing event as “both parties understood well that there was an opportunity to make effective use of the World Cup as moral leverage in diplomatic relations” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002: 13). However, it is possible that on Japan’s side, they could have believed that accepting to co-host the event would be equivalent to “re-orienting Japan’s relations with South Korea toward the future without having to make the apologies and compensation that South Korea demanded as a prerequisite to such a development” (Butler, 2002: 52). According to surveys the relations of
Korea and Japan seemed to have improved. In 2002, a survey was conducted by Choson Ilbo, Gallup Korea and Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun on 1,011 Koreans and 1,043 Japanese where “75% of the former and 65% of the latter thought bilateral relations between the two nations have become better through co-hosting the 2002 World Cup. Only 4% of the Japanese said relations got worse, while not a single South Korean did so, and 26% and 25%, respectively said there was no change” (see Hong; Chosun Ilbo, 2002). Furthermore, in 2005, it marked the 40th anniversary of South Korea’s and Japan’s normalization in diplomatic ties, and the two nations had designated 2005 “as a year to promote mutual understanding and friendship” (Chosun Ilbo, 2004). In 2004, to encourage civilian exchanges, Tokyo had already considered dispensing with visas for Korean visitors after having done this once in 2002 during the World Cup (Ibid). Eventually both nations are in better terms, where in 2005, “South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed in a summit last month to promote visa-waivers for South Koreans visiting Japan and double the number of direct flights between Gimpo and Haneda airports to eight a day” (Ibid, 2005).

The relations between Korea and Japan are akin to a seesaw due to their fluctuating affinities towards each other. Currently, Korean and Japanese relations have deteriorated significantly because in 2019 Japan “slapped export restrictions on certain high-tech materials used to make microchips to Korea, which in itself was transparent retaliation in a spat over compensation for Koreans forced into labor for the Japanese in colonial times” (see Lee; Chosun Ilbo, 2020). In response to this, Koreans started to boycott Japanese goods, which “led to sharp drops in sales of Japanese cars, Honda Korea suffered a poor operating profit, only a tenth of the previous year's figure. With Nissan withdrawing from the South Korean market, the remaining Japanese car companies including Toyota and Honda are making every effort to win back the hearts of South Korean consumers via marketing and promotion activities” (see Kim; Dong-a Ilbo, 2020). In light of the events discussed, the relations between Korea and Japan are not completely severed and there were some improvements after the two nations co-hosted the World Cup. Understanding how Interviewee K1 (December, 2019) played a crucial role for bringing in the rights to co-host the 2002 World Cup for South Korea, it would be essential to comprehend what Korea wanted to attain from hosting the World Cup. In the next section, it will discuss on those that believe that show-casing Korea to the World was the main rationale for hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup.
Show-casing Korea and its Collectivist Society

To some, the hosting of the 2002 World Cup came from certain legacies from hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics. When asked about South Korea’s rationale for hosting the 2002 World Cup, Interviewee K2 (October, 2019) believed the show-casing the nation was most important, by expressing that:

countries in general want to showcase their credibility or display to the international society that the nation is responsible. It is very symbolic to host sporting, cultural, or political events for nations to show their role in the global order and this has been evident throughout history with majority of cases that were successful. Even though Korea attained independence from imperialist oppression and became a divided country, South Korea was still able to industrialize and develop very quickly – ultimately being able to mark South Korea as a responsible player at the global stage. Looking back at the enhancements achieved by hosting the 1988 Olympics, there was no other world sport event larger in scale but the FIFA World Cup – and this was an event that has always had some kind of positive outlook for host nations. Also, Asia’s economy was rising at the time and it was possible that there were some shared feelings that the World Cup should be hosted in the Asian continent. South Korea’s rationale to host the World Cup was due to the collective national ambitions to showcase Korea to the world (author’s emphasis).

The respondent brought up how hosting events such as sport mega-events are symbolic for nations to showcase a nation on a global stage. The latter fits well with the idea of “symbolic politics - a chance to signal important changes of direction, reframe dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key messages of change” (Black, 2007: 261). Also, the respondent touched on Korea’s rapid development even having to experienced Japanese imperialism (1910-1945) (Henry, 2016: ix), becoming a divided country, industrializing, and ultimately becoming a “responsible player at the global stage.” The turning point was in 1997, “when Korea faced the financial reserve crisis but managed to turn it into a new opportunity through restructuring and downsizing on a massive scale. Many firms went belly up, but surviving companies, which grappled with poor governance and excessive debt, have morphed into global players with efficiency and competence” (Dong-a Ilbo, 2020). In addition, the interviewee spoke about South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Olympics and how the “feel-good-factor” of hosting the 1988 Olympics led to Korea hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup with Japan. The above respondent believed that with collective national ambitions, the Korean citizens wanted to showcase Korea to the world.
In a similar vein, Interviewee K3 (November, 2019) believes similarly that the World Cup is an event for show-casing the nation to the world but adds a specific cultural resource of Korea’s. He said:

In 2002, we had just entered the 21st century, and Korea’s development throughout the years had been quite quick. Even before hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Korea was already considered a developed nation economically. During that time Korean culture such as Hallyu was rising globally, and geopolitically, even though Korea is a divided country, the staging of a sporting event that promotes peace was a great idea. The whole world was watching this event and it was the perfect event to showcase Korean culture and economic achievements.

The respondent not only stated that the World Cup event was the perfect event to showcase a country’s culture and economic achievements – hinting that the event can be used to attain soft power, but the interviewee also brings up a specific soft power resource that could be showcased: Hallyu. This resource is an umbrella term of a number of Korean trends which will be discussed in full later in the following sections. Another interesting theme is raised by Interviewee K4 (November, 2019) who emphasizes that Korea is a collectivist society:

one of the first things Korea was signaling to the world was their capability to hosting a mega-event as big as the FIFA World Cup. At the bidding stage, we were able to gain certain soft power outcomes because we were able to show that Korea was capable of doing things that Japan does. Japan chose to go for co-hosting which was a sense of acknowledging that Korea is now a capable or credible nation – at the same level as theirs. Another soft power image that was attained during the preparations to host the World Cup, Korea’s football stadium infrastructures were much less than Japan, but Korea’s collectivist society was able to perfectly construct the infrastructures needed at a short amount of time, to be able showcase a successful event. This showed to the global audience that Korea is a “can do nation” when dealing with difficult tasks. I highly believe just after hosting the World Cup, when investors think about where to invest, and Korea is one of the options on the list, I highly believe that these positive images would have come to their mind.

This response, connects very closely to the argument made by Grix and Lee (2013: 521) that success “in the bidding process to host the Olympics and the World Cup is a remarkable achievement in itself, signaling their individual arrival as credible powers but also collectively the new order of things not only in international sports but in the international system per se.” Furthermore, the respondent also expressed that Korea wanted to be seen as a nation that can
handle difficult situations, a “can do nation.” As discussed before, Korea’s quick recovery of the IMF Asian financial crisis was a good example of the nation handling a difficult situation. However, there is another example during the IMF crisis showed that Korea is indeed a “can do nation” of collectivists, that was South Korea’s gold collection drive. This national collective action happened the near panic following the announcement that Korea had applied for a bailout loan from the IMF, a wide variety of civic groups began calling on Koreans to make sacrifices for the good of the country” (Kim and Finch, 2002: 125). The gold collection drive was where millions of households, an action that was led by many housewives in Korea sacrificed or sold their possessions of gold to help contribute to resolving the IMF crisis. Amongst contributors, the then-President Kim Dae-jung also joined in the act, donating “a miniature golden tortoise and four golden “good luck keys” weighing 393 grams” (Ibid: 126).

In the end, the respondent claims that more investments would have been made in Korea after the hosting of the 2002 World Cup. This may have been possible not solely because Korea was able to co-host the World Cup, due to the financial crisis, Korea opened the domestic financial markets to foreign investors – which “led to a surge of foreign investment in Korean financial markets, particularly the stock market. As a result, foreign holdings hovered close to forty percent of market capitalization of the Korea Stock Exchange in early 2002” (Shin, 2005: 1).

South Korea has shown some resilience during the 1997 financial crisis and was quick to recover through collective actions and many other reforms showing the mentality the Korean citizens had during the time.

With a similar outlook, it was agreed that hosting the 2002 World Cup was not only to compete with Japan, but also believed that 2002 was the right time for Korea to host the World Cup in order to showcase the nation’s prowess. Interviewee K5 (October, 2019) said:

from what I understand, at first, Korea was not going to apply to host the FIFA World Cup. However, we noticed Japan was bidding, and there is always a sense where Korea likes to compete with Japan in some aspect, so we started our bid late. Once we knew that FIFA wanted to come to Asia, we thought it would be an even more historical event if Korea and Japan co-hosted the event and there was no better time to do it. That was the rationale to maybe why Korea wanted to co-host the event. The main rationale to hosting the World Cup was to raise the level of South Korea’s diplomacy and economy, and lastly, we did not want to lose to Japan.

The respondent above brought up the ongoing rivalry between Korea and Japan even during the bidding process. However, this participant brings a new rationale for Korea hosting the 2002 World Cup – to enhance diplomacy. From the prior responses above, the Korea-Japan
relations have been discussed, however, it is possible, after Korea recovered from the 1997 financial crisis and hosted the 2002 World Cup, Korea’s diplomacy status may have improved. There was the belief that football can foster regional stability and the World Cup brought South Korea better relations with neighbors, North Korea, China, and Japan (see Moll; UPI, 2002). Such diplomatic improvements could be connected to South Korea’s frequency in hosting SMEs after the 2002 World Cup. Korea hosted the 2011 Daegu World Championships Athletic, the 2014 Incheon Asian Games (a regional SME), and the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics (Lee, 2017).

Interviewee K6 (October, 2019), also touches on the notion of nation branding who believes that nation branding can come from show-casing the nation, the collectivist citizens, culture, and much more during the hosting of SMEs. Interviewee K6 (October, 2019) claimed:

The situation was a difficult one because Japan had planned to bid and host the FIFA World Cup much earlier than Korea. Korea came in the middle of the bidding process to declare their spot in trying to win the rights to host 2002. It is not to say that Japan does not have these aspects but the Korean citizens at this point worked really hard with a lot of collective extraneous force, with the desire and efforts to do whatever it takes to be able to attain the hosting rights. Like the Olympics, the Asian Games, IAAF, the FIFA World Cup is also a big event. With these big events, it is not just the goal of hosting a sporting event but also the ambitions of the host nation show-casing their nation, the citizens, culture, standard of living, economic prowess and so on. Show-casing all these kinds of things could help brand the country to the world and hosting the World Cup will be able to create a better diplomacy for Korea.

The interviewee also brings up the Korean citizen’s collective efforts to be able to host the 2002 World Cup, which was referring to no other than Korea’s quick recovery of the financial crisis in 1997, which was exactly one year after from being awarded to co-host the 2002 World Cup. Korea “graduated from the World Bank’s lending list and it became a member of the OECD in 1996. Although Korea did receive an emergency financial aid package from international development banks during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it managed to overcome the crisis and in 2000 made its way out of the OECD-DAC list of aid recipients” (Chun et. al., 2010: 790). In 2009, Korea joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was Korea’s way of signaling their eagerness to share its rapid development experiences (Ibid.). The respondent interestingly claimed that show-casing the nation, the citizen collectivism, culture, standard of living, and economic prowess could
contribute to a nation’s branding and with this branding being showcased at the World Cup, the nation’s diplomacy could be enhanced. Korea’s passport is considered one of the strongest passports, currently being able to travel to 189 destinations visa-free (Chosun Ilbo, 2020), which could help understand the reach of Korea’s acceptance internationally.

Continuing with the rationale theme of show-casing the nation, Interviewee K7 (November, 2019) similarly expressed:

the 2002 World Cup was going to be the first to be held in Asia and Japan’s economy was at the top in comparison to other nations in the region. However, when it came to footballing results, Korea’s footballing record should not be ignored – which could have been one of the driving reasons Korea wanted to also host the World Cup. There may have been some kind of rationale to showcase how well the Korean economy has developed to the global audience, however, I also believe Korea wanted to raise their level of football and display that Korea is also a strong sporting country within the region and globally.

Even after the World Cup, a good number of footballers were invited to several leagues in Europe. Korea was not only quite fortunate to get to the semi-finals of the 2002 World Cup, but because of how well Korea did in the 2002 World Cup, a good amount of Korean footballers were able to be recruited to European leagues (Lee, 2014: 100). It is what Cornelissen and Solberg (2007) claim that one of the important aspects of the FIFA World Cup is an event where footballers can use the World Cup as a stepping-stone to be able to play in foreign leagues.

Another interesting connection to the theme of show-casing a nation, it was expressed that economic benefits are not tangible right away from hosting SMEs, unless the host nation is able to successfully showcase the country’s culture. Interviewee K8 (November, 2019) said:

The world will ultimately get a taste of the host nation’s culture and economy. Economic benefits may not be tangible right away for host nations but there will be long-term benefits when the host nation successfully showcases their culture to the world. Also, I believe that without hosting a sport mega-event such as the World Cup, it would be very difficult to get much attention from the international society.
The respondent expressed that without hosting a SME it would be difficult for a nation to get much attention from the international society. SMEs are events where athletes and fans, gather for the common purpose of sport and all eyes are on the host nation with nearly 1.5 billion viewers having watched the World Cup (Hispanicad.com), which is why sports is a part of culture and SMEs are a major resource of soft power (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 260). Therefore, when possible, a nation would want to host a SME, so that they could be part of the “international club” which in part could help bring up the nation’s status and credibility as expressed before.

In line with the theme that Korea, as a collectivist nation, believed it was the right time to host the World Cup Interviewee K9 (Oct, 2019) says:

similar to hosting the Olympics, when a country is growing and the society and culture is maturing, the citizen’s desires will rise as well. It was a rising interest amongst the Korean citizens that collectively believed that Korea should be capable of hosting the FIFA World Cup. When wanting to host an event such as the World Cup, there needs to be national and social ambitions. Even though hosting the World Cup was right after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, where the economy was getting worse, national morale was down, unemployment was on a rise, it was still a natural timing for Korea to host the World Cup in 2002 for recovering from the financial crisis quickly. The citizens believed, with the confidence attained from hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics, they should be able to host the 2002 World Cup.

The response above was in accordance that of Interviewee K2, K4, and K6 that the 2002 World Cup hosting was possible due to the Korean citizens collective interest. Also, the respondent agreed that after Korea’s quick recovery from the financial crisis, it was a confidence booster with the additional memories of hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

From a semi-structured focus group of four participants, the accumulative response was in line with the theme of show-casing the nation to the world. Choi et. al. said that:

one of the reasons that Korea wanted to host the 2002 World Cup was because Korea wanted to raise their competitiveness in relation to Japan’s. Also, with the confidence attained from hosting the 1988 Olympics was one of the biggest factors for the collective support for wanting to host the World Cup – Korea was signaling to the world that it is no longer a developing nation. Therefore, it was a time that Korea wanted to showcase a newly developed Korea.
Many of the overall responses given by the participants have touched upon Korea’s collective society and the prevailing rivalry between the Koreans and the Japanese. Also, many respondents have discussed on the country’s capabilities and how the feel-good factors that came about from hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics was a big factor to also wanting to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup.

Footballing Prestige

Another theme was brought up that a nation should also be able to host the FIFA World Cup based on footballing prestige or what was also briefly expressed by Interviewee K7 (November, 2019) that Korea had ambitions to raise the nation’s footballing level. Although discussing more on the nation’s footballing prowess, the rationale is still in line with the idea of hosting SMEs as a vehicle to show-casing the nation to the world. Interviewee K10 (October, 2019) said:

Korea started the bidding process late. FIFA’s rotation system of selecting host nations was just presented, and if the World Cup were to be held in Asia, and when just looking at footballing prowess, Korea would have been the better choice. Korea qualified for 4 World Cups consecutively before the 2002 World Cup which was a record better than any other Asian nation. So, when just looking at the footballing reason, if FIFA were to host the World Cup in the Asian region, it made more sense to do it in the country that had more footballing successes. Also, in the general sense, I believe hosting the World Cup was a good chance to showcase the nation to the world in many aspects.

Currently, Korea has qualified for the World Cup nine times consecutively since 1986 which is evidence where Korean football should not be considered weak in the Asian region. Therefore, the interviewee believed that Korea had more of the footballing credentials for hosting the 2002 World Cup when compared to Japan’s World Cup qualifications at the time, only one – they qualified for the 1998 World Cup. By understanding the rationale(s) for Korea hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, it is also important to understand how Korea defines soft power.
Korea’s Definition of Soft Power

Credibility

Here, it discusses how Korea defines soft power in the themes of credibility, strong cultural assets and attraction, and image and branding. First, with credibility, it was described that Korea defines soft power in line with Nye’s but is less about whether soft power was about attraction rather than coercion and payment, hard power (Nye, 2008). Interviewee K2 (October, 2019) said:

I believe currently one of the most important factors of soft power and what makes soft power possible is “trust” and “creativity.” I believe when a nation is strong in these two aspects, they will be known as a nation with strong soft power. During the 2002 World Cup, we used the phrase “Dynamic Korea” to commercialize Korea and I was honestly worried with this phrase. With the word dynamic and dynamism, there could be a negative interpretation of how it may represent an “unpredictable” Korea whereas I wanted a phrase that would represent a secure, organized, creative, developed Korea. While show-casing all of these aspects of the nation, I was hoping Korea would be able to be seen as a trustful and creative nation throughout even after the World Cup.

The above respondent brings up the idea of trust, which could fall into the category of credibility. Nations bid for and host SMEs because most nations believe it brings up their nation’s credibility, which is a way of showing the international society that their nation has international norms and values (Grix and Lee, 2013). Pertaining to creativity, the interviewee was touching into a nonmilitary influence. This falls into Wilson III’s (2008: 112) argument where he stated that “a country’s capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armored divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and nonmilitary influence.” Therefore, “trust” (credibility) and “creativity” are in fact an important aspect to soft power. During the 2002 World Cup, Korea’s security was on the high where National Intelligence Service (NIS) chief Shin Gun stated in late January of 2002 that they “acquired a list of 2,000 international terrorists, and banned their entry to the country. International agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will be cooperating with us during the World Cup” (Dong-a Ilbo, 2002) – ultimately representing how Korea was making sure to host a secured and safe World Cup. Korea represented their organization with the convenience of foreigner’s entry to Korea of the World Cup, Korea allowed “World Cup ticket holders will be issued a multiple tourist visa, valid for three months, to simplify immigration procedures, and tourists from the countries where no visa is required
will be allowed to stay as long as 90 days, instead of the current 30 days, while matches take place” (see Kim; Chosul Ilbo, 2001). Korea strategically hosted the country’s largest international mobile communication exhibition ‘Expo Comm Korea 2002, “where latest Information Technology (IT)-related products and services gathered” (Dong-a Ilbo, 2002) where Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, SK Telecom, KTF, and more were able to show off their latest technology and internet service speeds (Ibid.) – representing the development of the nation. In route with the respondent’s ambitions, it seemed that Korea has used the 2002 World Cup momentum well, given the example of events during and before the actual hosting of the World Cup.

In line with Nye’s definition of soft power (Nye, 2008) and also giving an example of Korea’s soft power resource, Korean pop-culture (Hallyu), which will be extended upon later, Interviewee K4 (November, 2019) keeps with the theme of credibility by stating:

the World Cup hosting in itself was a huge resource for Korea’s soft power. After the hosting the games, many people started to get interested in Korean culture, arts, and what Korea is well known for now, Korean pop-culture. The 2002 World Cup was another chance for the world to see Korea again as much more credible and attractive. Soft power is about being able to attract other people around the world of the nation’s cultural assets. The World Cup was the perfect show-casing of Korea and its soft power assets.

The respondent expressed soft power resources that this thesis categorizes in culture. However, when referring to sports and SMEs, these two are interchangeably categorized in the categories of a nation’s culture, tourism, and branding – still making them a credible resource. The next section will discuss those who discussed about Korea’s strong cultural assets and attractions when asked how Korea defines soft power.

**Strong Cultural Assets and Attractiveness**

Another theme was brought up when asked to define soft power. Some believed that Korea has strong soft power assets or attraction. With some reference to the times Korea had a monarchy system and concluding with the claim that Koreans have a good sense of hospitality, Interviewee K3 (November, 2019) stated:
Korea has been a country that was traditionally strong when it comes to soft power. Korea did not necessarily have strong hard power in the past, but I do believe Korea had strong soft power. I personally believe that the main point of soft power is the strength of a nation’s culture. I believe Korea’s culture and arts has its strength and I highly believe that hospitality is a strong asset of Korea.

According to the respondent, Korea had been traditionally exposed to the concept of hard power and soft power. The respondent said this because he was referring to the Koryo dynasty in Korea, when the king had two different group of advisors called the mun-in (문인), which translates to the literal people (people of education), and the mu-in (무인), which translates to those who support forceful policies (military) (Park, 2020: 25-26). The mun-in were the ones that could be seen as the ones that could be seen as the ones supporting cultural attraction and the mu-in were the ones that supported military force. Furthermore, the respondent discusses how the Korean government practiced hospitality, where Korea was expecting at least 100,000 Chinese visitors and the government increased the flights and ships, made only Chinese immigration inspection boards, posted Chinese on informational boards, and recruited more Chinese interpreters (See Chol, 2001, Dong-a Ilbo). The government also initiated the ‘World Cup diplomacy’, a “program of which is inviting VIP and their spouses, such as presidents of the final competition entries and the Korean War aids, the committee of Nobel Prize, and the secretary general of the UN, to the World Cup games.” This also is evidence that SMEs are indeed a meeting point for leaders around the World, which shows the political side of hosting an SME. When successfully carrying out this kind of hospitality, the host nation will be able to “raise the bar” of the nation in various aspects.

Following the theme of strong cultural asset and attraction, a specified soft power resource, Hallyu, is brought up which will be discussed in details later with another sports related soft power phenomena, Interviewee K7 (November, 2019) claimed that:

Korea has focused on a lot of hard power (referring to military power) for a while, but recently I noticed that the situation has changed and there are many Korean soft power resources that actually does have global reach. Korea has companies that have a global reach such as Hyundai and Samsung but Korea also has “Hallyu” which has recently been on a huge rise and when specifically looking at the boy band, BTS (Bangtan Sonyuh), I believe culturally this group has a much bigger impact on South Korea’s cultural attraction. Even in the sporting sense, footballers such as Song Heung-min and
the then Park Ji-sung also got people to be interested about Korea. What the World Cup did itself was showcase all these soft power assets to the global audience.

The interviewee claims that Korea has been focusing a lot on hard power lately. South Korea had deployed a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery from the US which enraged the Chinese – with many having boycotted South Korean business in China (Chosun Ilbo, 2017). Also, “South Korean strongly indicated the possibility of developing three 4000-ton nuclear submarines” which are considered as “one of the key strategic weapons to address North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and keep neighboring countries in check” (See Sang, 2020, Dong-a Ilbo) – an action that fits into the tactic of military deterrence (Berejikian, 2002). Interestingly, there has been another reference to Hallyu, which will be discussed specifically later in this dissertation which is part of Korea’s pop-culture. However, this respondent also claimed that it is possible that Korean footballer’s migration to foreign leagues and their successes would spark the interest of Korea. Korea had several unexpected results during the FIFA World Cup – leaving aside whether the results were controversial – Korea displayed some footballing prowess at an international sporting event by finishing in fourth, which in itself could bring about a nation’s soft power (Freeman, 2012). With such great results, it was the start of Korean footballers heading to Europe, such as players like Park Ji-sung and the current Son Heung-min. Therefore, even with their successes abroad it could be possible that it could raise fan’s interests of Korea.

In continuation of the theme of strong cultural assets and attractiveness, it is again claimed that South Korea was a country that has been developing soft power for a long time throughout history and in line with Nye’s definition of soft power (Nye, 2008). Interviewee K6 (October, 2019) claimed:

Korea has been working on developing soft power non-stop. It is not just from hosting sporting events but also in hosting arts and cultural events. Korea is a nation that has been working on creating and strengthening the nation’s soft power. Korea has a vast amount of soft power resources, but the level of their reach will vary. For example, Korea’s KPOP is a very developed industry that has massive global reach. Even as we speak, there will be more resources developing as we learn how other resources are becoming well known. With all the experiences we attain from developing these so-called soft power resources, I believe it will be easier to create an even more developed Korea.
The participant also brings about the popularity of Korea’s top developed soft power resource, KPOP. The respondent believes that Korea has many soft power resources developing within the nation, with each differing in appeal and reach – those of global reach and those that are still under development within the nation. Also, the interviewee interestingly claimed that by experiencing the development of soft power resources, it will be able to develop the nation as well.

In continuation of the theme of strong cultural asset and attractiveness, while also in line with Nye’s (2008) definition of soft power Interviewee K9 (October, 2019) claimed:

I don’t believe there is a different definition of soft power in Korea. Hard power is military power whereas soft power would be the country’s culture, arts, or societal aspects such as the citizen’s consciousness and dignity. By hosting SMEs, it will not only raise the citizen’s consciousness in Korea, but Koreans will want to showcase to the world of the etiquette that exists within the Korean society – or even to show that Korea has universal norms.

The respondent divided and rightfully categorized hard power with military power and soft power with culture and arts, which in this dissertation, go in the same category. Dignity, which also could mean prestige, fits into one of the major components of soft power. International prestige specifically with the additional public relations and diplomacy creates a nation’s soft power – all of which could go into the nation’s attractiveness.

**Nation Branding**

Another theme that came up was the idea of nation branding. Based on a certain soft power resource, the resources must be recognizable to its origin of country. In other words, one way soft power is defined in Korea, is by how a resource defines the nation’s identity. Interviewee K8 said:

I believe it depends on how a certain asset becomes a nation’s identity. These identities can come from certain resources such as culture, music, food, sports, etc. These things could bring up certain comments like: “Korean food is good,” “Korea’s sport is the strongest in Asia” etc. So, for the resources (culture, music, etc.) to be part of the soft power play it needs to give people around the world a concrete thought of how they would define Korea as a brand.
The interviewee’s response on soft power and national identity is similar to White's argument where he claimed: “brands and products evoke perceptions that have the potential to affect the overall image of their country of origin” (White, 2012: 110). Also, the respondent also brings in the fact that soft power and the resource consumers’ reactions are subjective. In order for a soft power resource to have extensive reach, it must leave a concrete impression on those consuming it.

Following the theme of nation branding, Choi et. al., responded in saying that soft power in Korea:

is not necessarily a concept that was well used in Korea, but the idea of public diplomacy was focused on recently. In Korea, it seems that the idea of national image and branding are some of the aspects focused on when dealing with soft power. A good example of this is how Korea is currently branding itself as a sort of mainstream, called Hallyu (the “Korean Wave”).

It is worth noting how public diplomacy is focused on specifically for soft power in Korea – different from this thesis that focuses on public relations, public diplomacy, and international prestige as an outcome of soft power. It is also possible since soft power or public diplomacy policies have only recently been focused on recently in Korea. Also, with the success of Hallyu, Korean trends are becoming mainstream which becomes a part of the Korea's branding as a new trend maker.

State-led Soft Power

Another respondent categorizes rightfully that the hosting of the 2002 World Cup was a state-led soft power resource. Interviewee K5 (October, 2019) claimed that:

hosting the 2002 World Cup itself was a soft power resource itself but since this kind of event is supported by the nation’s government, it is more like a state-led or government supported soft-power resource. If there was no support from the government, the hosting would not have been possible. We used embassies and cultural centers to commercialize the 2002 World Cup. Even the former president of KFA, former Vice President of FIFA, and mostly well known as Hyundai’s Heavy Industry owner, used many Hyundai group offices around the world since there would be more offices than diplomats around the world.
The interviewee specified what a government-led soft power resource is but also added in the factor of how the 2002 World Cup – focusing on the Korean side – was commercialized and showing the international reach of Korea’s global brand, Hyundai. With the many Hyundai related offices and embassies and cultural centers around the world, not only would Korea be known for hosting the 2002 World Cup, but ultimately grasping an opportunity to showcase the nation to the world. After defining soft power in Korea, other than hosting SMEs, it is essential to see the various soft power resources that Korea has.

**Korean Soft Power Resources**

Korea has many soft power resources and it is worth noticing how the government has taken organically established resources and uses them to not only benefit the industry but also the nation. In this section it will discuss the beginning of *Hallyu,* “Korean Wave,” what resources are considered *Hallyu,* and the direct state-led soft power resource: Korea’s biggest language institution.

**Hallyu: The “Korean Wave”**

Korean pop culture, discussed earlier in this thesis, was on the rise in the Asian region from early 2002, just about when the FIFA World Cup was going to be hosted in Korea and Japan. During the early 2000s, there was “an increasing amount of Korean popular cultural content – including television dramas, movies, pop songs and their associated celebrities – has gained immense popularity in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other East and Southeast Asian countries” (Shim, 2006). The Korean pop culture, or more well known as *Hallyu* – brought up by interviewees previously – is a major source of soft power for Korea for its initial regional reach, which enhanced to a global one. Some studies claimed that Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 2002 FIFA World Cup contributed to improving Korea’s image as a vacation destination, ultimately raising the number of tourists (Kim and Morrison, 2005; Lee et. al., 2005; Lee and Taylor 2005). Furthermore, the popularity of *Hallyu* has also been a significant contributor to the growth of international arrivals in Korea (Kim et. al., 2007; Kim et. al., 2009; Lee et. al., 2008; Su et. al., 2011). Therefore, with the rise of Hallyu, Korea co-
hosting the 2002 World Cup made a favorable impression on Korea (see Soh, Dong-a Ilbo, 2017). It was also favorable to Korea entering the Japanese music market (BBC, 2020). With this said, Interviewee K2 (October, 2019) recalled:

hosting the 2002 World Cup contributed to the rise and emergence of Korea’s Hallyu. In 2001 December 1, in Busan, Korea held the World Cup Group Stage Draw where it would present which nations would play with another in slots. While proceeding with this event there were many performances and celebrities. The event was planned with entertainment management companies and professionals in the field of cultural policy.

The interviewee not only expresses that the 2002 World Cup was a kind of starting point of Hallyu, but also claimed that there were many different forms of Hallyu performances used during the event. Although there is no agreed definition of Hallyu, it is basically an umbrella of “a variety of popular cultural activities and expressions, including TV dramas, films, situation comedies (sitcom), computer games, K-pop music and fashion” (Kim, 2007: 525).

**K-pop**

An example of an international hit was PSY’s song called “Gangnam Style,” that gained so much popularity all over the world that on Youtube the song had a historic 2 billion views (Kim, 2007: 525). To understand the current reach of K-pop, specifically K-pop boyband BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan), a research institute reported that BTS “are worth about 4.1 trillion won ($5 billion) to the country’s economy every year - equivalent to the contribution of 26 mid-sized companies” (The Strait Times (ST), 2018). Also, BTS has created new history to K-pop “by topping the Billboard’s Hot 100 chart” (Dong-a Ilbo, 2020).

**K-Food**

Korea hosts various food festivals such as the Kimchi Festival, and other food culture festivals (see Kim; Chosun Ilbo, 2002). What must be noticed of these agricultural food festivals events is that they are mostly government supported projects for promoting tourism and development in rural Korea (Kim and Jamal, 2015) – and also a tactic currently for attracting tourists
internationally and regionally. (East Asian). However, other than Korea’s traditional foods, a new fad of food culture was born after the 2002 World Cup, when “people gathered at pubs to watch the match over chicken and beer” (See Chang; ST, 2019). It is the combination of chicken and beer (maekju in Korean) therefore in short, chimaek, that has caught global fame. It was also noticed for a diplomacy act called “Chimaek Diplomacy” because of South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in inviting Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to join him next time to enjoy chicken and beer the next time he visits Korea (Ibid.). The Prime Minister replied on Twitter that he would “look forward to taking up (the) offer the next time” he is in Korea (Ibid.). Currently, Korea holds the Chimaek Festival in the city of Daegu annually and over 1 million people visit every year, with 125 fried chicken chains and beer brands participating at the event (Chosun Ilbo, 2019). One thing to note, is that the global fad of chimaek was driven by K-drama, “most notably the 2014 drama series, ‘My Love from The Star,’ which saw the female protagonist craving chimaek when it snowed” (Ibid.). This show’s popularity brought in thousands of tourists to Korea for chimaek parties (see, Chang; ST, 2019). After discussing some of Korea’s organic soft power industries and how interconnected they are, a major state-led soft power resource will be introduced next.

King Sejong Institute Foundation

The King Sejong Institute Foundation (KSIF) is “an educational institute established by the Korean government to promote and support Korean language and culture to the worldwide public” (Eom et. al., 2019: 101). KSIF supports King Sejong Institute was founded in 2012 in accordance to the Korean Constitution: “Clause 2 of Article 9 of the Framework Act on the Korean Language to generally manage and oversee the Korean government’s task of spreading the Korean language and culture” (KSIF, 2014). As of June 2020, the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (KMCST) and KSIF reported that there will be 34 new King Sejong Institutes (KSI) which brings it to 213 KSIs in 76 different countries – the first KSI was made in 2007 (KSIF, 2020). There are 32 KSIs in America, 53 in Europe, 10 in Africa, 114 in Asia and 4 in Oceania (Ibid.).

The Korean government has made partnerships with universities and K-pop entertainment agencies to find ways to promote the Korean language in order to enhance Korean culture spread to the world (see Kwak, 2020, Korea Times). According to Korea’s KMCST, the Korean language is the 14th most widely used language in the world and 73 million speakers
use Korean as their first language (Ibid.). Furthermore, the culture ministry is planning on spending 89.4 billion won ($75 million) by 2021 to “vitalize Korean language education” (Ibid.). The Korean language learning product that partnered with BTS, “Learn! Korean with BTS” sold out in 20 minutes in the US and in three hours in Japan, leading to the immediate need of a second printing (Ibid.). This evidently shows the popularity of K-pop and how it is also attracting many around the world to learn the Korean language. It is also worth noting that in 2012, officials announced that “the inhabitants of the Solomon Islands will adopt Hangeul, the Korean alphabet, to preserve their spoken languages” (see Oh, 2012, Korean Herald) – showing also a different influential usage of the Korean language. Understanding how many of Korea’s soft power resources are connected, it is important to see how Korea uses their soft power resources.

Korea’s Soft Power Package

International

Based on interview responses and research, Korea’s soft power package looks like this:

First, it is essential to understood that hosting an SME falls into this category since sport itself falls into the realms of “Culture.” Korea’s government has taken the initiative of grasping the opportunity of expanding national identity through Hallyu (the “Korean Wave”) and hosting international sporting events. As said before, the Hallyu, was at a high in the early 2000s in the
East Asian region, hosting the FIFA World Cup was one of the driving factors of the multiple Hallyu resources’ international reach. To keep the nation’s international prestige, Korea will continue to bid and host international sporting events and specifically SMEs. Seoul’s Sport Minister Do Jong-hwan said “South Korea will sound out the North over a possible joint bid for the 2032 Summer Olympics and is also keen to advance the idea of a Northeast Asia bid to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup” (see Rutherford; Reuters, 2018), showing that hosting SMEs are South Korea’s priorities. Also, with Hallyu’s rising global reach, the demand for learning Korean culture and language was followed. Therefore, the alliance made by the Korean government, entertainment groups, and universities, discussed earlier, to export the Korean language will contribute well to globally expanding Korea’s national identity abroad. In particular the expansion of the many KSIs can be used to “diffuse Korean culture and language overseas by offering Korean language education, improving cooperation among nations regarding intercultural issues, and enhancing cultural diversity through the international exchange of language and culture” (Eom et. al., 2019). as a result of being able to win the hearts and minds of global consumers.

For “Tourism,” Korea uses the strategy to showcase Korea to the world by establishing the numerous KSI around the world, driven by the rising popularity of Hallyu resources K-pop and K-drama. It was claimed that in 2014, there was an estimate of 14.2 million foreign tourists that visited Korea, which was “a 16.6 percent increase from 2013, when 12,175,550 visited Korea” (Dong-a Ilbo, 2015). More recently, in 2019, the number of foreign visitors to Korea has reached a new record of 17.25 million (Chosun Ilbo, 2019). Although it is difficult to say that the majority of foreign tourists visiting Korea is due to the influence of Hallyu, it is still well known that Hallyu does have an impact on tourism in Korea (Bae et. al., 2017). With “Branding,” Korea wants to show the global audience that Korea is a credible, advanced, and safe country and that it has become mainstream. Korea has consistently hosted events after hosting the 2002 World Cup, such as the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, 2015 Gwangju Universiade, and most recently hosted the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. By doing so, it contributes to raising the nation’s credibility. Also, Korea’s collective society and its quick response to societal difficulties has been well represented during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and profoundly well noticed for how well Korea is dealing with the current COVID-19 pandemic, as discussed before. With the ongoing popularity of Hallyu, it welcomes Korea to be part of the mainstream spotlight. The combination of these resources could make South Korea as a new global player.
In “Diplomacy,” Korea strategizes to expand Korea’s international prestige by establishing strong diplomatic networks. Korea intends to establish strong diplomatic networks with Hallyu. After hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, “the Korean government, under the auspices of the Prime Minister, created the National Image Committee. Designed to develop a strategy to improve Korea’s global status, the committee later developed into the Presidential Council on National Branding in 2009” (Choi, 2019: 14). With the rise of Hallyu resources, that also seem to be becoming mainstream, the Korean government leverages diplomatic relations so that Korea can be a new contender of regional power and global reach. Finally, “Trade,” Korea is looking for ways to export Korean language, culture and products globally. With KSI, Korea’s technology, and the rising popularity of Hallyu resources, mostly driven by K-pop and K-drama, this will give a significant rise in exports of Hallyu and Korean products. From a survey conducted of 12,663 K-pop fans from 111 countries by the Korean Tourism Information, it showed evidence that “people’s interest in K-pop has spread to other areas such as Korean food (82.7 %), Korean drama (79.1 %), Korean language (63.8 %) and Korean beauty (products) (63.7 %)” (see Shin, 2019, Dong-a Ilbo). It is possible to say that Hallyu and Korean products is no longer a fad and a part of the mainstream picture (Ibid).

Domestic

The previous section discussed the soft power package, which is Korea’s international soft power strategy. This section will discuss how bringing in the 2002 World Cup in 1996 was a soft power either to increase the approval rates of a leader or domestic support of a government (Lee, 2009) – this being Korea’s domestic soft power tactic. The Korean president when Korea attained the hosting rights (1996) of the 2002 World Cup was Kim Young-sam, who was president from 1993-1998. Kim Young-sam was known for ending decades of military rule – he was “a central figure in South Korea's pro-democracy movement, he opposed the country's military dictators for decades” and “as president, he laid the foundation for a peaceful power transfer in a country that had been marked by coups” (see Kim; Independent, 2015). However, he has also been “accused of mismanaging the economy during the Asian financial crisis that toppled some of the country's debt-ridden conglomerates and forced the government to accept a $58bn bailout from the IMF” (Ibid.). Therefore, Kim Young-sam had both the highest and
lowest record of approval with “83 percent and 6 percent in his first year and fifth year, respectively” (see Lee; Korea Times, 2016).

Kim Young-sam utilized the 2002 World Cup to raise the Korean citizen’s confidence and strengthen the nation’s collectivist society. He not only has made Korea a more progressively democratic nation, but also has brought in a SME that could give Korea global attention. Kim Young-sam simply jogging in a ‘2002 World Cup’ T-shirt and cap (Butler, 2002: 45) was an act of patriotic nationalism. Even when the World Cup was being played out in 2002, after Kim Young-sam’s term as president was over, when looking back at the sporting event at a national level, Korean supporters were performers and the worldwide audience were the spectators (Lee and Cho, 2009: 93). Kim Young-sam was able to solidify Korea’s naturally collective society. The domestic soft power tactic at the time would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raise the confidence of the</td>
<td>- 2002 FIFA World Cup</td>
<td>A stronger collective Korean Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean citizens.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently, Korea’s President Moon Jae-in is trying to attain political legitimacy in extensively promoting peace within the Korean peninsula. This was very well represented when South Korea hosted the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and “the two Koreas marched under one flag at the opening ceremony” (Dong Ilbo, 2018) and also had a unified Korean women’s ice hockey team (Ibid.). The Pyeongchang Winter Olympics brought the two Koreas and the United States together and it was arguably the best opportunity to bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula (Ibid). To this end, Korea’s current domestic soft power would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attaining political legitimacy in promoting peace</td>
<td>- Hosting International Sporting Events</td>
<td>- A new chapter in North and South Korean negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>(2018 Pyeongchang Olympics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though North Korea has been untrustworthy with their demands of weakening South Korea’s military defenses, and regardless of the outcome, it shows that an SME is the perfect environment for bringing back leaders to the negotiation table. It was reported that Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yo-jong, personally delivered a letter to President Moon after attending the Pyeongchang opening ceremony (see Kirk; Independent, 2018).

Regional

Korea’s pop-culture was already very influential in the early 2000s in the East Asian region, touched upon before. With the forces of K-pop and K-drama Korea has become the mainstream of entertainment in East Asia and more recently it is getting recognized globally. Having discussed the reach of *Hallyu* extensively, Korea’s regional soft power tactic looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Maintain regional consumers of <em>Hallyu</em></td>
<td>- <em>Hallyu</em> (i.e., music, TV drama, food, etc).&lt;br&gt;- KSI</td>
<td>- Sustainable rise in regional consumers of <em>Hallyu</em>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the rise of exports of Korean entertainment and products, as discussed before, Korea will currently want to make sure that the “Korean Wave” is sustainable. Fortunately, the breakthrough of *Hallyu* in the East Asian region is still thriving. Although Korea currently has a difficult diplomatic rift with Japan, Korea’s K-pop and dramas are still the mainstream in Japan (see Park; Korea Times, 2020). With Korean film, ‘Parasite,’ awarded Best Picture at the 2020 Oscars, Korean dramas released through Netflix contributed to broadening the *Hallyu* fan base, especially at times with the COVID-19 pandemic (Ibid.). With all these soft power tactics (domestic, international and regional), and with well-maintained quality of resources, this could lead to a brighter future for South Korea.
Blossoming of the Mugunghwa

The Republic of Korea has been labeled in the global stage as ‘divided nation’, nation of high growth, or a ‘nation of the Asian financial crisis’ “which were rigid terms that described the image of Korea” up until Korea hosted the 2002 World Cup (Korean World Cup Organizing Committee Report). Although Hallyu was well known in East Asia, but to the world, the awareness of Korea in East Asia was limited. However, after hosting the World Cup, the awareness of South Korea enhanced. The Korea Tourism Organization reported from an online survey that had 16,678 participants, 74 percent have answered that they know Korea, compared to only 43 percent who already who knew Korea before the World Cup (Korean World Cup Organizing Committee Report). Therefore, it shows, from the survey, that the awareness of Korea internationally has been enhanced by 31 percent. Contributing to this was Korea’s unexpected results during the World Cup, which was an “eye-opener” to the world, seeing Korea place 4th in the tournament. With Korea’s results, it gave a logical basis for making another slot for an Asian team in the next World Cup (Ibid.). The 2002 World Cup was also a chance for the world to see and witness the collective Korean society and citizens which gives rise to Hallyu, the “Korean wave.”

With the rise of Korean pop-culture, especially K-pop and K-drama – now, one of the mainstreams around the world, the awareness of Korea as a nation could be even higher. With the effects of hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics, 2002 FIFA World Cup, and the recently 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, Korea has joined a new group of global players where hosting SMEs is a norm to not only gather people around the world for the purpose of sports but to showcase national prowess to the world. To this Interviewee K2 (October, 2019) stated that:

hosting the Olympics in 1988 was the like planting a seed of the nation and then hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was the blossoming of the seed to a flower. I believe all the other sporting events Korea hosted until the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, was making sure that the blooming flower can be maintained and sustainable.

With Korea’s multiple organic and state-led soft power resources, which includes Korea’s Hallyu and collectivist society and international sporting events and KSI, respectively, it creates a preferable outcome for Korea to be a part of the “global players group.” This will depend on how well Korea can make their resources sustainable and attractive in relations to the nation’s hard power.
Concluding Remark

The Republic of Korea has grown extensively after claiming their independence from Japanese imperialism and after the Korean War. Not only has the economy grown quickly, labeled as ‘Miracle of the Han River,’ but Korea was able to nurture and foster their culture nationally, regionally (East Asia), and internationally. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was Korea signaling that it is no longer a developing nation and hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was Korea signaling to the world that it has now become a part of the global players group. The developments showcased came from various areas of Hallyu: technology, societal and governmental restructuring, Korean citizen collectivism, K-pop, K-drama and so on. Even the choreography of the “Red devils” Korean fans’ five clapping chant at the football stadiums during the world cup was a part of Hallyu and an amazing sight to the international audience. Without the boost of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Korea would have difficulty grasping global attention being stuck between two big nations like China and Japan.

The growing popularity of Hallyu has led Korean products and Korean society to be one of the mainstream focuses in the international society. Not only do Korean citizens and industries have to maintain a positive collective outlook, but the Korean government must also be able to follow through by maturing nationally and presenting well internationally. The Korean government must be able to present the nation to countries in the region and abroad, based on the founding constitutions of the nation – ultimately protecting the country’s sovereignty and the citizens interests. Therefore, finding the right balance between soft and hard power is critical.

Korea must continue bidding and hosting SMEs and other international sporting events to display additional eye-catching things it can signal to the world – considering the size of the nation. Also, the FIFA World Cup now seems to be leaning towards co-hosted events again, which would be of Korea’s interest to choose the right nation(s) to run for a bid for the next available FIFA World Cup and Summer Olympics. Although, in the near future it may be questionable if countries would want to jointly bid with countries that do not follow human rights or respect international norms. Korea could be on the road to becoming a future candidate of smart power making it imperative the nation finds the balance between soft power and hard power. The Republic of Korea could make its way up in the global players group.
Chapter 5
People's Republic of China

The following analyzes and discusses China’s usage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics to leverage soft power. The chapter first proceeds by discussing the rationale for hosting the 2008 Olympics with responses categorized in themes of peaceful rising China and show-casing China. Next, it discusses how China defines soft power with responses coming from themes of different from Nye, borrowed from Nye, similar with Nye and finally, nation branding. Furthermore, the chapter will continue by discussing China’s various soft power resources, display China’s soft power package, leading to the analysis of China’s domestic and regional tactics. The chapter concludes by discussing China’s soft power difficulties. To this end, the first section of the chapter will start off with a statement from the Beijing Olympic Action Plan.

China’s Rationale for hosting 2008 Beijing Olympics

China’s rationale to hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics was specifically expressed in the Beijing Olympic Action Plan. It stated that:

we (China) will take the hosting of the Olympic Games as an opportunity to popularize the Olympic spirit, promote the traditional Chinese culture, showcase the history and development of Beijing as well as the friendliness and hospitality of its citizens. We will also take the Games as a bridge for cultural exchanges in order to deepen the understanding and enhance the trust and friendship among the people of different countries. We will always give first consideration to the need of people, especially the athletes and provide favorable natural and cultural environment and quality services for them (Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG).

The action plan above, is clear evidence that nations would host SMEs to attain the opportunity to showcase not only the city (in this case Beijing), but also the nation’s cultural assets, history, and development. This again fits into Grix and Brannagan’s (2016) claim that nations want to host SMEs to showcase their culture or cultural assets since SMEs, iterated before, are considered as cultural assets. Also, the BOCOG stated that they would use the Olympic Games “as a bridge for cultural exchanges” (BOCOG) and this was done by hosting a series of Olympic-oriented activities, constructing modern cultural facilities, protecting and displaying
the historical and cultural heritage of the city, creating a favorable environment for cultural tourism, providing good working conditions for media, and finally promoting national solidarity (Ibid). Touching into the rationale brought up by the BOCOG, the first theme, peaceful rising China, will be discussed and analyzed.

Peaceful Rising China

Although the BOCOG has stated China’s rationale and action plans to hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics, there were political usages to hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics. With this, Interviewee C1 (November, 2019) stated:

I think the first most important reason for China to host the 2008 Olympics because it was China’s way of signaling to the world audience of their peaceful rising. Also, it was also trying to showcase China’s economic growth since the economy was growing annually by 14 percent and China wanted the international society to accept China’s rising. Another reason for hosting was because of nationalism. Understanding how the Olympics changed Japan after 1964, and South Korea in 1988, China also wanted to join this type of development. China wanted to show to the world that China’s nationalism was strong, and the nation will develop even stronger after hosting the 2008 Olympics. Also, it was a chance to show the world that a country with a socialist society can co-exist with western democratic ones and China wanted to be part of the international society.

The interviewee has claimed that China was trying to signal to the world and specifically western democratic nations, that China is a peaceful rising nation. During the opening ceremony, “a 25-metre-long scroll unrolled in the centre of the stadium on which performers danced, painting the Chinese character ‘he’ with their bodies” (Tzanelli, 2010: 225) – the character “he”, “the motto of the 2008 Olympics, denotes harmony and peace (Ibid). Also, China’s foreign policy at the time was based on a peaceful rising China, which can also be interpreted as China’s soft power resource (Cho, and Jeong: 2008). While expressing peace, China also had the ambitions of showing off their economic growth and prowess, but most importantly wanted to promote China’s market economy system. Claiming that hosting the 2008 Olympics games would create a new image of Beijing, the organizing committee promoted that “the principle of fair entry and fair competition will be followed in order to form a socialist market economy, which conforms to international practice” (BOCOG). Although
being called the socialist market economy, the BOCOG expresses that the market conforms to international practices, which is a way of promoting the Chinese economy market to the world and signaling that China is now “open” for international business.

The respondent also brings up the rationale that host the 2008 Olympics would bring up the Chinese citizen’s nationalism. This again fits into the idea of how the government was able to bring in the “feel-good” factors for hosting the event (Cornilessen et. al., 2010). China’s Communist Party were able to legitimize their political power by bringing the Olympics – a world class sporting event – to the Chinese. This was a way of being accepted to what was discussed in the recent section, that the country was being welcomed as a new global player in the international society. Furthermore, it was expressed by the interviewee that there was some benchmarking of other East Asian nations such as Japan and South Korea. The interviewee believes that when a nation hosts an SME, such as the Olympics, it represents the strength of the nation and China wanted the developmental legacies that Japan and South Korea got from hosting the Olympics. Also, China wanted to improve their reputation by hosting the Olympics which Nye acknowledges that the hosting did indeed improve China’s reputation internationally (Nye, 2012). However, there were some shortcomings to China’s reputation changing ambitions that will be discussed in detail later.

In line with the rationale of peaceful rising China, another rationale was brought up that hosting the 2008 Olympics could enhance China’s international reputation while also being able to bring up national cohesion amongst Chinese citizens. Interview CA (November, 2019) claimed that:

China bid to host the Olympics several times before being able to host 2008. The Summer Olympics is the most prestigious international sporting event. Arguably China believed that it would boost the economy, but it was actually an opportunity to improve China’s image to the international society and signal to the global audience that China is a peaceful rising nation. It was also a way to bring up the confidence and nationalism of the Chinese citizens.

The interviewee believed that China hosting the 2008 Olympics was a way to show the truth behind the curtains, by creating a better reputation or image, showcasing economic prowess, and ultimately attaining international prestige, which will also boost the confidence of the Chinese citizens and raise Chinese nationalism. The next theme that will be discussed is how some believe that the purpose of hosting the 2008 Olympics was to showcase the nation to the global audience. The next section will discuss the theme of showcasing China.
Show-casing China

Another rationale for hosting the 2008 Olympics was the belief that China was using the Games to showcase China to the world. In addition, China had a few natural disasters before the 2008 Olympic Games commenced and the rationale for hosting the Olympics was even more clear so that it could be used as a remedy, a way of bringing up the citizens domestically. With this Interviewee C2 (November, 2019) stated:

in 2008, there were a few issues such as an earthquake in Si Chuan and China needed some kind of positive remedy to bring back the confidence of the citizens. The whole country since 2001 collectively worked on being able to successfully host the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. Also, hosting the Beijing Olympics was a great opportunity to showcase China’s economic growth while also labeling Beijing as a choice of tourism. Politically, hosting the Olympics was a way of opening up the country to help the country’s diplomacy. Furthermore, it was an opportunity of objectively showing the Chinese culture and help the world to have a better understanding of China. Instead of just the media, the Olympic games itself will show the world the development of China. Through hosting Beijing 2008, it will also help us host other international games such as the Winter Olympics that is coming soon.

The respondent referred to the unfortunate earthquake that ravaged Sichuan in May 2008, with a death toll that exceeded 12,000 and 9,000 people trapped (China Daily, 2008). China showcased the power of their economy by spending about $5 billion US dollars just for logistic services (People’s Daily, 2003) and as stated before in the previous chapter, a total of $42 billion. Also, by hosting the 2008 Games, China was able to showcase Beijing as a tourist attraction by taking the opportunity “to make good use of the tourist resources in Beijing, an overall planning of the city's major tourist sites will be made so as to develop classic tourist products with unique cultural flavors” (BOCOG). Also, “designing and developing tourist commodities, which bear strong Beijing features, will be encouraged and commercial streets will be established to offer more shopping facilities for tourists as well as athletes during the Olympic Games” (Ibid.). The 2008 Olympics was a game changer for the world to better understand China. It was claimed that the Beijing Olympic Games was able to change the minds of people and media of the Western nations and that China should be re-appraised and known rationally (People’s Daily, 2008). It was also reported that Americans have appealed to discard the outlook of the “China threat theory,” which could have led to the thought of a brighter US-China relations future (Ibid). In other words, the Beijing Olympics has enabled the people across the globe to have more opportunities to know China better as well as the high hope and firm conviction of the Chinese people for advancing the harmonious world” (Ibid.).
In accordance to the theme of showcasing the nation, China also had ambitions to show-case economic development and bring up the awareness of China to the world. The respondent also adds that hosting the 2008 Olympics was a confidence booster and that another rationale for hosting the Olympics was to foster a national image domestically and internationally. Interviewee C3 (November, 2019) said:

I believe there were two reasons China wanted to host the 2008 Olympics. The first, was to showcase China’s economic growth, and the second, to show the national image of China domestically and internationally. China wanted the global audience to be aware of China. Also, China wanted to show domestically to the citizens that China is not as poor as before. China wanted to show the world a newly developed China and I believe the opening ceremony well represented this. In many of the western nations, some actually think that the Chinese are very under-developed and don’t see Beijing as an international city. Therefore, the Chinese government wanted to show the world what China was really about, in such a way, it was a way of showing the ‘real’ China, since other nations had misunderstandings of China.

The respondent touches on the rationale that the Chinese government wanted to host the games because SMEs “are believed to help brand national and government images of the host country (Chen, 2012: 731). While trying to promote the national image abroad, the host government is also promoting itself domestically. It is possible that “the Beijing government, still an authoritarian regime, aimed its efforts at the Chinese people for the political objective of legitimizing the ruling regime” (Ibid.). Furthermore, this was well expressed that there was collective support for hosting the 2008 Olympics and the BOCOG stated that “a campaign of “civility improvement” will be launched citywide, involving communities, various business sectors, and citizens.” (BOCOG). This was going to be shown by “the fundamental values of "loving the country, abiding by the law, politeness, honesty, solidarity, friendliness, thriftiness, independence, devotion and contribution" will be promoted in the whole society, so as to raise the level of civility of the city as a whole and create a favorable social environment for the Olympic Games” (Ibid.). The Chinese government was not only trying to promote the civility of the city, but was also promoting how China is becoming more international by providing foreign language training for those working in the service sector (Ibid.). Being a secular nation, the Chinese government wanted to show how accepting China by stating that the “policy towards nationalities and religions and the Regulations on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Minority Ethnic Groups will be fully carried out, to raise the citizens' awareness of national solidarity, to raise the minority nationalities' enthusiasm to participate in the
Olympic-related activities, and to make the Beijing Olympic Games a national festival for all the ethnic groups” (BOCOG).

Still following the theme of showcasing the nation, even as China was evidently able to showcase the nation to the world, this in itself was a way that boosted the Chinese nationals, with the belief that China is now a global power. Interviewee C4 (November, 2019) claimed:

> even though I personally thought China was capable of hosting the Olympics in 2000, it seemed that the international society still had their doubts, so China was prepared to win the next Olympics and eight years later, China prepared and was able to showcase a more developed China. In 2008 China showcased their economic development well to the world. I believe the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics was also an opportunity of strengthening the nationalism of Chinese citizens. In addition, China understood the importance of hosting this event seeing how well it has impacted Japan and South Korea.

Many of the respondents, including the interviewee above, have claimed that China, up until hosting and after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, created a better image of the nation to the international society or made a better reputation. It was also claimed that BBC conducted an opinion poll in the US, South Korea, Brazil and India, where the poll outcome showed that China is a not a global problem maker—which also apparently led to an enhancement to British-China relations (People’s Daily, 2008). This respondent also insinuated that China was benchmarking neighboring East Asian nations with the belief that there were positive impacts to hosting the SME like the Summer Olympics. Understanding the various rationale for China to host the 2008 Olympics, the next section will discuss how China defines soft power. It is essential to discuss and analyze this since it is possible China defines soft power differently from Joseph Nye’s definition.

**Soft Power in China: Different from Nye**

China’s global power is growing and evident from one of China’s rationale of hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics; the Chinese government knows that image is very important. Even though China has great military and economic power, China has a mix of international images. China, may have one of the most impressive economies, however, “its repressive political system and mercantilist business tarnishes its reputation” (Shambaugh, 2015: 99). Since soft power could be defined differently or used interchangeably depending on a nation’s regime type, it is
important to understand how China defines soft power. China’s definition or referral to soft power is quite different from Joseph Nye’s definition. Interviewee C1 (November, 2019) explains:

The definition of soft power that China uses is totally different from Joseph Nye’s and the western country’s definition. From the western viewpoint of power, a demonstration of this is when a stronger nation has influence over a weaker one, in Chinese we call this *quan li*, which translates to power. But in China, the nation uses the word *ruan shi li*, where *shi li* means compatibility and it is not power based. Therefore, the word *ruan shi li* means soft compatibility. The soft power concept in China is not to influence other nations. China is only trying to increase Chinese domestic politics and not interfering with the affairs of other nations. China is trying to re-educate the society with Confucianism and Marxism. Once China is confident with their domestic culture, then China could try sharing these values abroad, such as using the Confucius Institutions, which fits to the ideology of *shi li* (compatability).

With the extensive explanation on the difference between soft power, China’s *ruan shi li* (in this case soft compatibility), and *quan li* (power, authority), it shows that China has been emphasizing in enhancing and prioritizing domestic soft power. Although the meaning may be different, it does not mean the ultimate outcome of China’s soft power tactic is different from Nye’s definition because China still cares about its international image and reputation. However, it is also well worth noting that the interviewee stated that China is only trying to increase Chinese domestic politics without getting in the way of other nation’s affairs. China is well known for respecting another country’s sovereignty (Pan, 2010) however, some current events seem to show differently. When Korea accepted the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System missile defense system in 2017, and China was concerned that the radar can reach Chinese territory, “China and Russia have raised concerns, saying the system could affect the regional security (BBC, 2017). After Beijing formally stated their concerns, what followed was “an outpouring of anger by Chinese consumers against the South Korean retailer Lotte, which allowed THAAD to be installed on one of its sites. Several of Lotte's stores in China have been closed down suddenly. Beijing rejects claims of economic retaliation” (Ibid.) – this in some way could be interfering with Korea’s national sovereignty and could create a tension not only in international politics or business affairs but this could affect China’s soft power. Also, the interviewee claimed that China is re-educating the Chinese society with Confucianism and Marxism. This can seem like a way for Beijing to boost China’s nationalism, however, this idea of re-education has led to events that could be counter-productive to China’s
soft power potentials. As stated before, the BOCOG has stated that China would protect ethnic minorities in China as well as giving the convenience to athletes of different religions (BOCOG). In the 2000s and to the run up of the 2008 Olympics, the free Tibet movement was popularized. It was popular “from celebrity endorsements to Simpsons cameos, the media launched the plight of Tibet into the Western imagination; the suffering of Tibetans under a foreign regime became well known (see Dolma, Foreign Policy, 2020). Currently, China also had problems recently with Uighur Chinese in the Xinjiang province, where China has used re-education camps to combat “terrorism and religious extremism” – thousands of Muslims were locked up unlawfully without any trial or charge, with no access to any kind of legal processing (BBC, 2018). Lastly, the respondent brings up one of China’s main soft power resource, the Confucius Institution, which will be discussed in detail later. The main thing to understand from this response is that China may try to differentiate ruan shi li to Joseph Nye’s soft power, but the way China has ambitions of showing the world what China is really about, is not much different from Nye’s idea of cultural attraction. Also, China’s government is using it as a sense of legitimizing their political power domestically and internationally. Even with the current events that may be tarnishing China’s image and the nation’s desired soft power outcomes, it does not mean it is the end of the road for China. The nation’s soft power resources are abundant and their reach of influence are not to be underestimated. The next theme that will be discussed is how China borrowed the term soft power from Nye.

**Borrowed from Nye**

Another theme arises when it is believed that the origin of ruan shi li was borrowed from Nye’s term soft power. While also listing what China considers as soft power, Interviewee C2 (November, 2019) said:

China has borrowed the concept of soft power from Joseph Nye. In 2007, President Hu Jin Tao put forward this concept at a committee cultural meeting. In China, soft power is defined by cultural, historical, and things that contains Chinese traditional values and social policies. Having to do with social policies, there was a saying by Communist Party of China, everything depends on the citizens. When China was in the stages of preparing to host the Olympics, the citizens had the strongest power to host such activities. There is an advantage for such policies because there were millions of volunteers and this may have been different from other countries.
According to the interviewee’s response, the former president of China, Hu Jin Tao, expressed “the need to enhance Chinese culture as the country's "soft power" in his keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)” on the 21st of October 2007. (Xinhua, 2007). The highlights of his speech:

- to step up the development of the press, publishing, radio, film, television, literature and art, give correct guidance to the public and foster healthy social trends;

- to strengthen efforts to develop and manage Internet culture and foster a good cyber environment;

- to continue to develop nonprofit cultural programs as the main approach to ensuring the basic cultural rights and interests of the people, increase spending on such programs, and build more cultural facilities in urban communities and rural areas;

- to vigorously develop the cultural industry, launch major projects to lead the industry as a whole, speed up the development of cultural industry bases and clusters of cultural industries with regional features, nurture key enterprises and strategic investors, create a thriving cultural market and enhance the industry's international competitiveness;

- to establish a national system of honors for outstanding cultural workers.

(Ibid.)

It shows, that even before hosting the Beijing Olympics, China was planning on becoming a soft power aggressive nation. By understanding the definition difference of China’s ruan shi li, and how China’s government wants to attain soft power, it seems that soft power in China is ultimately for raising China’s domestic cultural influence and legitimizing the power of the Communist Party domestically and internationally. The participant also brings up that everything depended on the citizens to be able to host a successful Olympic event and because of the collective policy, it was easy to find volunteers for the event. It was claimed that there were half a million volunteers that worked in Beijing and the other Olympic venues and there were more than a million applicants (Olympic News, 2008). Quoting Subinay Nandy, UNDP
Country Director in China, at the launch of the Olympic Volunteers Project, he said: “The 2008 Olympic Games offers China and the world an opportunity to take a big step forward in raising global awareness of the power contributed by volunteers, not only to sport, but also to the well-being of whole society worldwide” (Ibid.). With China’s volunteerism, it represented Chinese the collective feelings of the Chinese citizens and their aspirations to hosting a successful a global SME and showing to the world a newly developed and matured society. The next section will discuss how soft power in China, is similar to Nye’s concept of soft power.

Similar to Nye

The last participant claimed that China’s definition is not much different from Joseph Nye’s. While also touching into China’s rationale again, Interviewee C4 said:

I believe when scholars in China discuss about soft power the definition is not too different from Joseph Nye’s. When hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s priorities were bringing up the nationalism of the Chinese citizens and to also project a positive image and create a good impression of China to the world. After hosting the 2008 Olympics, I believe the understanding of China’s culture and civilization is better understood than before.

The above response believed that China’s ruan shi li is not different from Joseph Nye’s soft power. The respondent also highly believed that China’s image was positively accepted globally and that nations had a better impression of China. Hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics was a great success for China. It seems from the responses that China legitimizes domestic soft power greatly but also highly cares about the perspectives of other nations to China.

The next interviewee gives a brief comment on the difference between hard power and soft power and adds what China considers as soft power resources. Interviewee C3 (November, 2019) claimed:

I think hard power is related to the economy and military force and things other than that are a means of soft power, such as: culture, values, social system, and etc. I believe how China solves certain problems and showing the world that China is a peaceful rising nation is a kind of soft power.
The respondent rightfully categorizes economy and military force as hard power and culture, values and social systems as soft power. What is important to notice is that the interviewee’s definition of soft power is similar to Nye’s (2009) definition that culture, values and policies are what are considered as soft power. Also, the participant raises a point that China solving world issues and showing that it is a peaceful rising nation one of its soft powers. Having to do with solving world issues, it was claimed that between the years 2001 to 2005, “according to the analysis of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), inflation in the U.S. was reduced by 0.28 percentage points annually, by 0.37 percentage points in the European Union (EU), and by 0.65 percentage points in Japan, due to its export price affect” (People’s Daily, 2008) so “when world food prices are soaring and global food security is facing a grave threat, China, with a population of over 1.3 billion, has basically achieved its self-sufficiency in food (Ibid.). Also, dealing with global security, since 1989 – 2008, China “has participated in 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations and sent an accumulative total of more than 7,000 peacekeeping soldiers to the troubled countries and regions (Ibid.). Furthermore, China did host the Six-Party talks based on the nuclear issue in the Korea peninsula (Ibid.). The respondent also believes that China’s foreign policy of a peaceful rising China was a kind of soft power which goes in line with the argument of Cho and Jeong’s (2008), touched upon previously. The last theme of this section is how soft power is

Nation Branding

The theme nation branding came about when soft power was defined, similarly to Nye’s definition, but under soft power tactic: national image (branding). Interviewee C4 (November, 2019) claimed:

soft power is an intangible asset of power which comes in form of culture, arts, and so on. Soft power is the most important when it comes to changing or showing how a nation wants to be perceived in the international society – a national image. From here, I believe the most important thing is understanding how others, in the international society, will accept the national image, culture and etc., is essential.

The participant stated that it is essential for a nation to understand how the international society accepts their national image. This tactic of creating a national image fits well with nation branding – which this thesis considers an important strategy for developing a nation’s soft
power. According to Fan (2008:155), “nation branding has been practiced in two different ways: one is closely related to place branding or destination marketing with specific commercial purposes (promoting tourism or inward investment)” or “focuses mainly on the political or diplomatic dimension” (Ibid.). Without singling out a nation, “a successful nation branding campaign will help create a more favorable and lasting image among the international audience, thus further enhancing a country’s soft power” (Ibid: 147). China’s branding tactic will later be discussed in further details. Understanding how China defines soft power, the next section will touch in to China’s soft power resources.

**China’s Soft Power Resources**

**Confucius Institute**

It was expressed before by Interviewee C1 (November, 2019), that “once China is confident with their domestic culture, then we could try sharing these values abroad, such as using the Confucius Institutions, which fits to the ideology of shi li.” It seems that the Confucius Institution is China’s bridge for spreading the Chinese language and culture abroad. With “China’s economy and exchanges with the world have seen rapid growth, there has also been a sharp increase in the world’s demands for Chinese learning. Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name the Confucius Institute” (Hanban.org, 2014). With such attractiveness economically and culturally, China capitalized by using the Confucius Institute so that it can “build harmonious foreign relationships, enhance socio-cultural understanding, globalize Chinese culture and promote collaboration with foreign countries” (Lo and Pan, 2014: 512). From 2004 to 2011, China has established 353 Confucius Institutions in primary and secondary educational institution in 104 countries (Chinese Language Council International 2011).

One of the main purposes of the Confucius Institution is learning the Chinese language. Also, the ideology of language and its usages are defined by beliefs, perception, and emotions about the language (Gil, 2017). Having to do with China’s ambitions to externally spread their language, there is proof that suggests that the Chinese language is thought to be a bridge where knowledge and understanding of their culture and the country itself can be transmitted to the
world (Ibid.). In other words, China’s external spread of their language can be thought as a
global project that has the purpose of creating a favorable environment by projecting positive
images of China; deepening the understanding of China’s national and international position;
appraisal of China; and winning the hearts and minds for China’s position and ambitions in
world politics (Gil, 2017; Lampton, 2008).

Former Chinese President Hu Jin Tao, at the opening ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial
Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing (19 July 2012), claimed that
due to the 29 Confucius Institutes or Classrooms made in 22 African nations, he claimed that
“China and Africa have enjoyed closer ties of solidarity and coordination featuring mutual help
and mutual support in international affairs” (China Daily, 2012). This could be China’s way of
creating closer ties with the African continent. However, recently, the situation has been
difficult for the Confucius Institution. In the Hanban website, it states that “all institutes must
abide by the Confucius Institution constitution, and not participate in activities that are
inconsistent with their mission” (see Jakhar, 2019, BBC). Due to this and China’s censorship,
“the institute have been accused of pressuring host universities to silence or censor talks on
topics considered controversial to Beijing (Ibid.). It is now becoming a growing concern
globally, where closures of the institute are happening in the US, UK, France, Sweden and
Denmark (Ibid.). The Confucius Institute has a long history and currently reaches to 157
countries, providing education to 11 million students (see Yang and Pan, 2019, China Daily),
and it is one of China’s strongest state-led soft powers. It would be unfortunate for China and
especially the Confucius Institution to lose the momentum it once had. The next soft power
resource that will be discussed is the international students in China.

International Students in China

Like the role of the UK “at its imperial zenith and of the United States ever since the 1950s”
where “training future generations of intellectuals, technicians, and political elites from other
nations is a subtle yet important form of soft power” (Yang, 2007: 25) – China, is now fulfilling
this role. With the future generation elites getting a taste of Chinese culture, society, language,
history, and politics it will lead to influence them to be closer to Chinese viewpoints and
interests (Ibid.). The number of international students in China is very high where “according
to the China’s Ministry of Education, in 2018, 492,185 international students from 196
countries pursued higher education in China (see Sunar, 2020, China Daily). It was interesting to notice that the latter reference was a China Daily article written by a Doctoral student in International Relations at Central China Normal University in Wuhan, China – he claimed “China will be focusing on winning the hearts of today’s youth and future leaders across the world” (Ibid.). The latter is possible because the students and visitors will learn how China developed while still preserving their culture; China has become an essential nation for trade amongst developing nations; and “people and political leaders from different countries are getting aware of Chinese culture, traditions, societies, economy, and development” (Ibid.).

The Chinese government also believes that overseas Chinese students are a source of soft power. China’s Ministry of Education once published a directive in 2016 to make patriotic education stronger in China’s education system. The directive stated:

Harness the patriotic capabilities of overseas students, establish an overseas propaganda model which uses people as its medium and the sharing of personal ideas as its instrument, and create a propaganda effect where everybody plays a role, where every individual acts as a people-to-people ambassador, and where every sentence uttered easily reaches the hearts and minds [of foreign publics].

This directive is evidence that the Chinese government also believes that overseas Chinese students are also considered a soft power resource. This could be due to overseas Chinese students that “have become a major presence in tertiary education around the globe” (Bislev, 2017: 104). Considering the huge population of China, the interaction of Chinese students and Chinese citizens in exists globally. The following soft power resource will discuss China’s global media ambitions.

Media Monopoly – Xinhua News Agency

Another scheme that fits into China’s soft power tactic and resource is their ambitions to expand their media presence overseas. China’s goal is to create their own international media empire ‘to break what it considers “the Western media monopoly”’ (Shambaugh, 2015: 102). The Xinhua News Agency is China’s official state news that domestically and internationally reports news and has 3,000 journalists, of which 400 are based abroad in 170 bureaus (Ibid.). The agency intends to expand the number of staff at existing bureaus and will upgrade the online presence with audio and video context (Ibid.). It did not take long for media to quickly
pick up on “China’s economic internationalization – the “Going Out Campaign” – was expanding beyond finance or infrastructure and into the media and telecommunications sectors” (Zhang et. al., 2016: 79; see also Barboza, 2009). China’s Xinhua is not just worried about gaining money while believing it could rival and compete with Western news companies like Reuters, Bloomberg, United Press International and Associated Press, but China’s goal is also to expand their global image (Shambaugh, 2015:103). It was reported in 2009 that the Chinese government was planning to use RMB 45 billion (approximately $6.6 billion) for expanding China’s main media organizations of: China Central Television (CCTV) and Xinhua (Chen and Wu, 2009).

It has also been claimed that China is also trying to make a breakthrough in foreign radio waves, where “China Radio International, formerly known as Radio Beijing, was founded 1941 as a wartime propaganda tool against Japan but now has far greater reach” (Shambaugh, 2015:103). China Radio International broadcasts in 27 overseas bureaus and is broadcasted in 38 languages. Although China’s media and radio global expansion could be viewed as propaganda apparatus (Ibid.), it still shows evidence that China was on a soft power aggressive for a voice in the global media market. The next section will discuss China’s ambition in disseminating Wushu globally and with the goal of making it an official sporting event in the Olympics.

The Wushu Movement

China is well-known for their martial arts which are very well-known globally. This section intends to discuss about China’s Wushu and how China is pushing ever harder to make it an additional sport at the Olympic Games. Chinese martial art, “as a cultural carrier of China, is also a cultural messenger of communication with the world” and it played “an active role in promoting the development of human health, world friendship and international cultural economy” (Liu, 2018: 201). Also, it was claimed that martial arts enhanced China’s peaceful rising image (Huang, 2012).

Zhang Yuping, deputy head of Chinese Wushu Administrative Center of State General Administration of Sport said: "despite the failure of wushu, or Chinese martial arts, to be included in the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, the bidding efforts have significantly boosted the development of the sport around the globe" (see, Ma, 2017, China Daily). The amount of members in the International Wushu Federation increased from 116 to 149 in 2008 (Ibid.). The
International Wushu Federation “submitted its application for inclusion to the IOC in 2001, 2008, and 2011, but failed each time,” with the first two applications rejected at the initial stage by the IOC and the 2011 bid falling short of votes at the last stage (Xinhua, 2020). China’s consistent bidding shows their persistence in wanting to showcase their cultural sport internationally. However, it seems that there is more to China’s ambition of including Wushu into the Olympics, as Zhang said: “our goal is to promote traditional Chinese culture to the world and give the world a sport from China” (see Ma, 2017, China Daily). Although only appearing as exhibition events during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2014 Nanjing Youth Olympic Games, Wushu has will finally be making its debut as an official sport at Senegal’s 2022 Dakar Youth Olympic Games (Xinhua, 2020). The addition of Wushu as a sporting event could help expose China’s culture significantly to the world, making the Wushu movement a clear soft power resource. The final section will discuss how recently China is the number one distributor for personal protection equipment.

**Personal Protection Equipment**

In Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, there were several reports of viral pneumonia which is now known as COVID-19 (Zhan et. al., 2020). After the breakout, which may have affected China’s image, masks and other personal protection equipment (PPE) were imperative to possess in fighting the spread of the pandemic. It was reported that “the world’s reliance on Chinese personal protective equipment has grown sharply as the country boosts exports to meet demand, even as nations seek to increase domestic production and diversify sources” (see Hoyama and Hosokawa, 2020, Nikkei Asian Review). Also, it has been estimated by the Peterson Institute for International Economics that “China already exported more respirators, surgical masks, medical goggles and protective garments than the rest of the world combined” (see Bradsher, 2020, NYT). Furthermore, to understand how dominant China is in the PPE industry, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, said that from March through May 2020, China had exported 70.6 billion masks, where “the entire world produced 20 billion last year, with China accounting for half” (Ibid.). While dealing with the pandemic, China and the US are still undergoing a conflict in trade, the US are still purchasing PPE materials (Horta, 2020). China’s lead in the manufacturing of PPE and distributing in large amounts globally, could be their way of having the world collaborately fight against the ongoing pandemic.
By understanding the numerous soft power resources China has – the ones discussed here are the most salient of many – it is important to look into China’s soft power tactics and understand the nation’s soft power trends. The next section displays China’s soft power package and discuss the nation’s international, domestic and regional soft power tactic respectively.

China’s Ruan Shi Li Tactics

International

Referring to the interview responses and research, China’s soft power package looks like this:

China’s cultural tactic is to extend the global reach of Chinese culture, by using the Confucius institutions as a bridge for disseminating Chinese culture. The Confucius institution was even used for publicizing the awareness of Wushu. To spread Wushu globally, “China has sent coaches to foreign countries and cooperated with the Confucius Institute worldwide to develop training courses for overseas practitioners, while the country's governing body for the sport has adopted standardized movements and scoring systems” (Ma, 2017, China Daily). By hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China was able to become an eye-opener to the world and soon again the Olympic games will be coming back to Beijing where China will be hosting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. China has the ambitions to keep hosting SMEs so that it can showcase the country’s culture as well display the ongoing development of China. Ultimately,
China’s cultural tactic has gave rise to China’s domestic soft power. With “Tourism,” during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, as discussed before, China wanted to showcase itself as a new tourist attraction destination – well expressed in the Beijing Action Plan. China took the opportunity during the 2008 Beijing Games to show the world of the nation’s wonders and many other UNESCO World Heritage. Currently China has 37 Cultural sites, 14 natural sites, and 4 mixed, and Beijing has 7 sites, including the Great Wall of China. China had 415 million inbound tourists in 2019 (Travel China Guide). China’s branding strategy is a two-fold. First, during early 2000s, interviewee C1 claimed that during the Jiang Zemin era it was proposed to brand China as peaceful rising nation. This was possible by hosting 2008 Beijing Olympics, showcasing their eye-catching opening ceremony, the Wushu Movement, and the dissemination of Confucius Institutes playing the role of a bridge for Chinese culture, language, and even Wushu to be spread out globally. The second branding strategy was to brand China currently as a regional and global leader. China currently wants to show that they are the strongest country in the East Asian region and also show that China can compete against Western democratic nations alone, specifically the US. This was boosted by China’s President Xi Jinping in his publication, *The Governance of China*, he proposed that:

‘to strengthen our cultural soft power, we should disseminate the values of modern China […] More work should be done to refine and explain our ideas, and extend the platform for overseas publicity, so as to make our culture known through international communication and dissemination’ (Xi, 2014 from Lam, 2018: 388).

This leads into the next resource, discussed before, how China invested large sums of money in 2009 to spread Chinese news across the world using the Xinhua News Agency and CCTV. President Xi wanted more overseas publicity and wanted to make sure that China had multiple soft power resources to counter Western influences, especially in global media and the dissemination of the Confucius Institutes (Lam, 2018). This was done in order to show the world the power of the Chinese Communist Party and to show the alternative world order of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Lam, 2018: 387). China is going out hard against the US recently, however, China still cares about their global image and this is evident after being able to host 2008 Beijing Olympics. Therefore, China’s diplomatic strategy is to showcase China as an attractive nation. China is doing this by showing the large number of international students in the nations and by creating Confucius Institutes all around the world to show the attractiveness of their nation. Finally, with “Trade,” China currently wants to show that the nation cares for the world by being the leading manufacturer of PPE and providing them to globally, especially to developing nations that are reliant on China. With leading manufacturing
of PPE and helping to provide them globally could improve China’s image which was labeled as “mask diplomacy” (Verma, 2020).

Comparison with Grix et al. (2019)

Although a soft power package has already been created before, there are specific differences between the current package and the one created by Grix et al (2019).

Referring to the figure above, there are distinct differences specifically when it comes to listing the resources used to reach specific soft power outcomes. In “Culture”, Grix et al (2019) used the dissemination of Confucius Institutes as the strategy and in this thesis the Confucius Institutes as the resource for achieving a rise in domestic soft power – where in Grix et al (2019) the latter was used as the strategy. What must be taken from here is that in this thesis, unlike Grix et al (2019), the soft power package results were focusing on the outcomes of China’s most current status – this is also evident when looking at the “Tourism” strategy outcomes. Grix et al (2019) focuses on the number of tourists specifically during 2008 whereas this thesis focuses on the number of tourists until the run up of the pandemic. In “Branding,” the major difference was the outcome where Grix et al (2019) focused on China’s sporting aspect and this thesis focused on China’s ultimate international political goal.

Sourc: Grix et al (2019: 76)
Joonoh Brian Jeong

al (2019) focused on China’s trade ambitions in contrast this thesis focuses on China’s international relations goal and outcomes. Finally, “Trade,” Grix et al (2019) uses a sports strategy, resource, and outcome. This thesis focuses on the world’s dependency on China’s mass manufacturing capability, especially when it came to providing PPE and masks during the pandemic. Although different things were brought from both packages, this thesis is in support and aligned with the positioning made by Grix et al (2019). By understanding China’s international soft power trends, it is worth looking into the nation’s domestic and regional soft power tactics.

**Domestic**

China’s hosting of the 2008 Beijing Games was similar to Russia’s reason of hosting SMEs, to raise the legitimacy of the ruling elites domestically (Grix et al., 2019). To be specific, it could be viewed that China hosted the 2008 Olympics in order to boost the morality of citizens, national cohesion, and to legitimize the power of the Chinese Communist Party. After the Beijing Olympics China invested to improve the nation international media capabilities which could be seen as a way of boosting a country’s soft power, however this “this attitude toward media control is closer to the party-state’s traditional views of propaganda than Nye’s understanding of soft power” (Edney, 2012: 913). China follows a system of propaganda where the government has the ability or attempts to control media or other soft power resources which, which Nye warned that this would bring down the credibility of the government (Ibid.). Therefore, there is a higher chance that China does indeed follow more of a propaganda system than following Nye’s understanding of soft power. This also fits into what interviewee C1 adds by saying:

to China, the domestic policies are the priorities and not foreign policy. So, the soft power here is to attain national cohesion and for the citizens to follow the ways of the Communist Party. Therefore, there is no time or ambitions to influence other nations, which shows that ruan shi li (soft power) is mainly focused on domestic matters. China must follow the “Xi Jinping thought” and this is ruan shi li, where China needs to adapt socialism with Chinese characteristics.

This response above strengthens the argument that China’s government follows the system of propaganda. So, it is as Edney (2019: 914) claims that China’s propaganda efforts are broadly
to promote Chinese culture internationally and to increase China’s international voice are undertaken primarily in order to shape a public opinion environment conducive to the pursuit of the CCP’s domestic political agenda, while domestic efforts to ‘build cultural soft power’ face the difficult challenge of balancing the public’s demand for information and entertainment with the party-state’s desire to maintain control over these areas and to generate cohesion within society and between society and the CCP.

Understanding China’s domestic and international propaganda system, China’s domestic soft power scheme looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raise domestic soft power</td>
<td>- Hosting International Sporting Events</td>
<td>- Stronger national cohesion between society and Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Dissemination of Confucius Institution abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Internationalizing Xinhua News Agency and CCTV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it may seem that China’s propaganda system seems to prioritize on the power of the Chinese Communist Party, China also has foreign exerting propaganda since the nation, like any other, care about its global image. Having looked into China’s domestic soft power tactic it would be interesting to see China’s regional soft power tactic.

Regional

Although it was thoroughly expressed that China has a strong propaganda system domestically and abroad, China still considers it is necessary to have good relations with its neighboring countries in East Asia. According to Grix (2019: 74): “China’s hosting of the Olympics could be read not as an attempt to present a changed nation to the international community, but rather one that has shifted from being a regional superpower to a global power.” It has been quite a
while that China has been actively involved in international affairs, where China has become more confident in asserting ‘Chinese interests and ideas’ (Breslin, 2013). However, it must also be considered that China’s rise especially in the East Asian region is observed and perceived with a lot of skepticism. It mainly comes from China’s domestic distress that is coming from strong nationalism and the communist party system. With this in mind and according to the research, China’s regional soft power tactic looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China as regional/global leader</td>
<td>- Hosting international sporting events</td>
<td>Higher US interaction within East Asian nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Global dissemination of Confucius Institution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Election of Xi Jinping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though China hosts SMEs, being able to bring the Olympics for the 2022 Winter Games, and with Xi Jinping boosting the morale of the Chinese citizens domestically using the system of domestic and international propaganda, the East Asian region has become much more complicated with the US having much more elevated interactions with South Korea and Japan (Korean Herald, 2020). This is because China’s hard power is rising substantially while China’s soft power is not being well accepted in the region – especially from nations such as South Korea or Japan (Nye, 2012). Also, it must be noted that China’s soft power aggressive resources are primarily state-led which creates room for skepticism. China’s soft power outcomes would have been more well accepted in the region if the resources were coming from the nation’s civil society (Nye, 2017). Furthermore, propaganda is not a credible source of attraction and “China needs to give more leeway to the talents of its civil society, even though this is difficult to reconcile with tight party control” (Ibid.). With so many rich soft power resources, China seems to have mixed soft power outcomes and a difficult favorable outcome in the East Asian region. The next section will discuss the China’s soft power difficulties.
China’s soft power difficulties

China has so many soft power resources and the nation has become one of the strongest internationally. Coming back to the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it was an event that helped improve China’s reputation, “but shortly afterwards, China’s domestic crackdown in Tibet and Xinjiang, and on human right activists, undercut its soft power gains (Nye, 2012). It is worth noting that the Chinese government has often claimed that China is losing to Western soft power and there is a need to fight back (Ibid). Furthermore, it seems that the Chinese government does not understand that “using culture and narrative to create power is not easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities (Ibid). With all huge amounts of investments made in the various industries for China’s soft power aggressive, the Chinese government needs to understand that soft power cannot be bought (Shambaugh, 2019: 107).

Even though China has world class history, cuisine, and human capital, and extraordinary economic development, following Nye’s suggestions, discussed earlier if the political system follows its propaganda system and does not respect human rights, and enable freedom of human development, it will only tarnish their soft power outcomes. Even when signaling a peaceful rising China and showing off the world of their soft power, when “authorities are stepped up repression and systematic abuse against 13 million Turkic Muslim, including Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs, in the Xinjiang region” (Human Rights Watch, 2018), this would not necessarily be viewed as “peaceful.” Also, with recent assault on of Hong Kong in 2018, “particularly the rights to free expression, association and political participation” has worsened.

China’s economic growth and military power has grown substantially, and this may have pressured neighboring countries in search of allies to balance rising China’s hard power or even investing more on their own hard power resources (Nye, 2012). However, if a nation “can also increase its soft power, its neighbors feel less need to seek balancing alliances” (Ibid.). South Korea and Japan are following this tactic due to China’s hard power rise and lack of soft power (Ibid.). China is nation of vast soft power and if the nation wishes to be viewed as one of the most attractive country in the world, these will be a few things the elites of the nations will have to consider.
Concluding Remarks

The Chinese civilization is one of the oldest civilizations in the world. China has a rich culture base and the country’s soft power resources are not to be underestimated. Chinese soft power resources range from culture, cuisine, education, advancements in global business and trade and technology, etc. which all could easily compete or rival against almost any country in the world, even the US. In this chapter, it has discussed upon China’s overall soft power package as well as China’s regional and domestic soft power strategy. Although some of the difficulties of China’s soft power have been discussed upon, it does not mean that China does not get favorable outcomes – it fails in meeting the nation’s full soft power potentials when following Nye’s definition of soft power. Hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics and investing in many different types of soft power resources was a great strategy but it misses one major component, a soft power resource that originates from civil society. If the Chinese government can loosen ends of a tightened down civil society, the society, rich in creativity, will be able to produce a mainstream soft power resource. China’s domestic and international propaganda scheme has been explained in detail because China has been signaling that the nation is a peaceful rising nation, however domestically the image is different. If China can find a strategy that could raise their credibility it will benefit the nation, specifically the nations perceived image in the East Asian region. With a growing economy and military capability, it will only cause other Asian nations to balance the threat through the US. The dissemination of the Confucius Institutions globally was a great tactic but its influences fall short if it is part of the international propaganda formula. Spending billions of dollars on a charm offensive is a great start and China is already a contender to a new world order. It is imperative that China continues to host SMEs and makes sure that the government can keep true to what the games are being signaled to the world. If China really does care about their image globally, it is also important the policies and the actions used domestically does not go against international norms, regardless of the nation’s sovereignty. Also, China needs to find a soft power that is credible and accepted within the region because there is nothing more important than to have good relations with your neighboring countries. Taking for granted that many nations rely on China for economic benefits, this may not be enough for China to get favorable outcomes. China has the potential to be an alternative global power, and it will be observed closely in 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, what China will display, since the situation is not looking the best for China’s soft power currently. China has the creativity, historical traditional culture, and the resources to captivate the hearts and minds of the international society.
Chapter 6
Japan

The following chapter analyzes how Japan could utilize the Tokyo 2020 Olympics to leverage domestic, regional and international soft power. The chapter first proceeds by touching on Japan’s rationale for hosting two Tokyo Olympics (1964, 2020(1)). By touching into the general rationale(s) for hosting the 1964 Olympics, the rational for hosting Tokyo 2020 will be presented in the themes of revival of Japan, nation branding, and political legitimacy. Furthermore, the chapter will continue in discussing how Japan defines soft power in the themes of culture and branding. After discussing the multiple soft power resources Japan has, Japan’s soft power package (international tactic) will be displayed which will conclude the section by discussing Japan’s domestic and regional soft power tactics. This chapter will conclude on how Japan could brand their nation’s revival by internationalizing Japanese society and omotenashi.

Japan’s Rationale Behind Hosting Two Tokyo Olympics (1964, 2020(1))

Tokyo will become a double host of the Summer Olympics after it held the first in 1964. Before discussing Japan’s rationale behind hosting the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, the reason(s) behind hosting 1964 will be touched upon first. Looking at the events that occurred between 1945 to 1964, one can infer how well Japan was developing economically and internationally leading up to hosting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics (see table X below). After the Second World War, there were many reformations that the Japanese had to proceed with in order to recreate their national identity. Politically, and traditionally, Japan was not known as a democratic nation, although in 1889, Japan had fostered a European type constitution making it difficult to say that the democratic government system was forcefully imposed by the Americans during Japan’s American post war occupation (1945-1951) (Neary, 2004: 666). Japan’s post war political reformation was mainly focused on democratizing and demilitarizing Japan. With the contributions from the US, Japan’s new constitution was drafted and revised by the Japanese cabinet and two houses of parliament, ultimately making the Emperor of Japan no more than just a “symbol of the state” – leaving Japan’s Emperor with weakened or no political significance (Ibid.) – similar to the British system. Also, Article 9 in the Japanese constitution
keeps Japan from having an offensive military to this day, making them dependent on the US for providing safety in the region, while allowing the Japanese to focus completely on economic recovery (Ibid.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic Economy</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Overseas Event(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>- Second Yoshida administration</td>
<td>- Beginning of IMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>- Dodge Plan - Exchange rate (fixed at 1$ = 360 yen) - Tax Reforms</td>
<td>- Beginning of GATT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>- Police Reserve Force (founded by Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s direction)</td>
<td>- NATO is founded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>- Self Defense Forces (established)</td>
<td>- Korean War ends with Cease-fire armistice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order for Japan to host the 1964 Olympics, according to Grix and Kramareva (2017: 466), “Japan was endorsed by the US at the time in return for a full-hearted acceptance of democratic values and a repudiation of revisionist sentiments.” This seemed like a mixture of the US hard power military pressure and US soft power in political values. To the Americans, or Western society, it could be interpreted that the 1964 Tokyo Games was a huge US project (Ibid), representing American superiority as “a society worthy of admiration and deserving emulation” (Brzezinski, 1998: 8). The 1964 Tokyo Olympics was labeled as Japan’s return to the world stage, declaring the revitalization of its economy, by hosting a SME that was signaling peace after their devastation from the Second World War (Orttung and Zhemukhov, 2014).

(Adapted from Iyoda, 2010: 3-5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>- GATT (membership)</td>
<td>- Social Democratic Party (reunified); Liberal Democratic Party (formed) (LDP holds) power until 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- First 5-year government plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td>- United Nations (member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Ikeda Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>- OECD (starts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>- Article VIII Party of the IMF; OECD member</td>
<td>-Tokyo Olympics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1964 Tokyo Olympics

It is possible that by grasping part of the rationale behind hosting 1964 Tokyo Olympics rationale, a better understanding of why Japan would want to host the 2020 Tokyo Olympics could be gained. With some historical insight, Interviewee J1 (December, 2019) stated:

after 1945, the war ended so Japan was depressed, and the economy was almost at zero. During the Korean War (1950-1952) Japan’s economy was recovering and progressed well. In 1958, Tokyo was chosen to host the 1964 Olympic Games, so this is where Japan’s economy started to develop internationally. The 1964 Tokyo Games was Japan’s game changer and was a sign of Japan’s development era. So, we all remember once the Olympic Games come, the Games can motivate the citizens, the companies, the city and there are lots of positive effects that we can easily expect.

Interviewee J1’s statement fits well with the argument that “the Olympic games have served as a symbol of modernity” (Tagsold, 2010: 289) and specifically “the 1964 Tokyo Olympics acted as a rite of passage for post-war Japan, symbolizing the modernization of the city and the country” (Ibid.). Connecting back to Grix’s (2017: 4) “coalition of beneficiaries”: those with a positive outlook of SMEs, Interviewee J2 (December, 2019) claimed that

the rationale for hosting the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 was the revival of Japan from their defeat of World War II and to deliver the collective feel-good factors to the public – and also to catch up internationally as a developed nation. Thanks to the 1964 Olympics, so many infrastructural projects were organized, including the Shinkansen (Japanese bullet train).

Here, the respondent makes reference to the sporting legacies of economic benefits, urban regeneration, feel-good factor, and international prestige. Another participant, on the contrary, believed that Japan was still a developing country and still struggling for economic growth during the era of hosting the 1964 games. It is possible that Japan may have been well developed to host the Olympics but

hosting the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo was a way to signal that Japan was eager to show their society to the world. Japan’s rationale for hosting the 1964 Olympics was more based on the idea of economic benefits. With a loan given by the World Bank, Japan created the Shinkansen (Japanese bullet train), which contributed to showcasing to the world that Japan was at the time also a technologically and infrastructurally advanced nation. Japan wanted to showcase their successes (Interviewee J3; December, 2019).
While focusing on economic benefits, another participant compared the 1964 Olympics era to the current upcoming 2020 Olympics, he believed the feel-good factor was different in 1964 – successfully boosting the economy and the morale of Japanese citizens, while currently, the economy has been stagnant for quite some time, leaving Japanese citizens in a state of uncertainty with respect to the nation’s economy. Interviewee J4 (November, 2019) expressed that:

The previous Olympics were held during the post-war period and it showcased a newly revived Japan that led to high economic growth – the GDP rise was about 10%. Many people believed that Japan was growing and at the time the Japanese citizens were confident and optimistic of their future. However, now the situation is different, the economy is declining and not so many people are optimistic of Japan’s future. This is the main difference of the two Olympics. I actually wonder why Japan needs to host the 2020 Olympics because coming back to the rationale of hosting, I personally think it is ambiguous.

Although economically developed, Japan was evidently still growing at the time. Even during the 1964 Olympic Games, there was a rise in the middle-class ‘that rushed to buy television sets to watch the games, as well as other household appliances, leading to the term “Olympic economy.”’ The games were broadcast to the world using communication satellites. It was the first Olympics to use computers to keep statistics’ (see Martin, 2013, WSJ). In a similar vein, Interviewee J5 (December, 2019) briefly stated that:

the first Olympics in Tokyo was the revival of Japan which was hosted 19 years after the end of the Second World War. There may have been an emerging middle class, but it is more likely that the economic benefits started to come through possibly a few years after hosting the 1964 Olympics before Japan’s economy and living standards improved until the economic bubble burst in the 90s.

A number of interviewees concurred that that there were two specific rationales behind Japan hosting the 1964 Olympics – Japan’s revival and economic growth. However, within the rationales given, there are multiple legacies and two uncommon “messages” that could be interchangeably categorized in SME legacies: peacefully emerging nation and trustworthiness. Interviewee J6 (December, 2019) said:

There were two different kinds of rationales to why Japan wanted to host the 1964 Olympics. The first reason was to show the world that Japan is now revived from the
mists of the Second World War and are now a peaceful rising, who are trustworthy, and an internationally credible nation. The other was to boost the confidence of Japanese citizens and the country’s economy.

This also fits into the view of Collins (2011: 2243-4) where she claimed “the organisers of the 1964 Tokyo Games focus on the theme of universalising the Olympic movement, but they also evoked the theme of harmony to reinforce Japan’s ‘peaceful rising’ in their ‘coming out party’ so as not to exacerbate regional fears of a modernising former imperial power.” Continuously in line with the post-war revival viewpoint of Japan and SME legacies stated earlier, the following participant Interviewee J7 (November, 2019), briefly stated that the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo:

was a post-war boost and from what I reckon, there definitely was a morale and economic boosting effect when hosting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and I do believe this is an event (Summer Olympics) that changed the surface of the city.

Lastly, Interviewee J8 (December, 2019) stated – in keeping with the majority participants’ responses that:

The concept of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was: “The World is coming to Japan” and perhaps the Japanese citizens had to adjust their standards to the international one. Also, the game was hosted to show that Japan has recovered from the damage of the war. It was Japan’s “revenge” for having the 1940 Olympics cancelled. The antimilitary people really wanted to revive the Olympic Games (Olympism) and that was the concept brought in during 1964.

In relation to the response above, Collins (2011: 2244) explains that “the 1964 Japanese Olympic bid campaign adopted the successful strategies of the 1940 campaign to universalise Olympism, and they argued that in order for the Olympic Games to be truly universal they would need to be held in various countries throughout the world.”

Supporting the majority of the research participant’s responses, Whiting (Japan Times, 2014) claims that “the staging of the games marked Japan’s re-entry into the world community after two decades of shame and struggle caused by defeat in war and put the cap on what is regarded as the most explosive urban transformation in history.” Furthermore, it is worth noting that all 9 interviewees believed that the 1964 Olympics was an event of showcasing Japan’s revival from World War II and showcasing Japan’s economic prowess on the global stage.
After hosting the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, Japan’s economy rapidly grew, even during the 1974 global economic recession, and up until the early 1990s, when Japan started to battle deflation for the next 20 years (Ikeda, 2018:1). During the 1990s, Japanese products and cuisine were popular but Japan was “somewhat limited by the inward orientation of its culture” (Nye, 1990: 169), which insinuates that Japan is traditionally a closed society and believe in doing things the “Japanese way.” Nye also adds that during the 1990s “many Japanese [were] concerned about their lack of “internationalization” and their failure to project a broader message (Ibid.), showing the backfire of the “glocalization” phenomena raised by Robertson (1995) when dealing with Japan’s soft power. Even with Japan’s dramatic economic enhancements, its image problem still exists, especially in the East Asian region (McConnell, 2008: 18). Japan’s sacrifice of military aggression, its reputation in projecting apolitically reliable and safe society, and its rise in exporting Japanese pop culture creates a vast combination of soft power resources (Ibid.). With such vast soft power resources, Japan’s limitations come from its isolated non-international society and the enduring suspicion that remains, especially in Asian countries (Nye, 2004). (Ibid.). After hosting the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo, Japan celebrated becoming a democratic, non-aggressive militant country, and one of the strongest economies in the world. Having stated the rationale of hosting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) stated that the first Olympics in Japan in 1964 changed Japan greatly and that the second Olympics in Tokyo will not only change Japan, but will also contribute to help changing the world.

If the latter is possible, what are the rationale(s) behind hosting the 2020 Games?

2020(1) Tokyo Olympics

In this section it will discuss the rationale for hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics in the themes of revival of Japan and nation branding and, political legitimacy. First, the section will start out with touching into the significance to how Japan was able to acquire the rights to hosting 2020. This was very thoroughly expressed by Interviewee J8 (December, 2019), he recalled:

In the JOC, there are some commissions similar to the IOC, it was an International Commission meeting held in January 2004. One of the members was the head of the Japanese Football Association Mr. Ogura, and he suggested that the 2002 FIFA World Cup has just finished and whether there would be a possibility to invite the Summer
Olympic Games. The topic and purpose of that international commission meeting was titled: “How to internationalize national federations and the Japanese Olympic Committee.” Since Japan is strong in the fields of diplomacy, economics, commerce and trade, we also wanted to use sports to open up our country. So, I proposed to bid for 2016, and win 2020. If you see carefully, there was a rotation system of how the IOC chose host nations and the only person who took me seriously was JOC President Tsunekazu Takeda.

The participant above not only stated how he foresaw how the IOC was choosing host nations, labeling it a rotation system, but he simultaneously touches upon a rationale behind why Japan wants Tokyo to host the 2020 Olympics: to use a sporting event to open up the country. Interviewee J8 (December, 2019) also adds that:

the 2020 Olympics could contribute to internationalizing the Japanese society and to help the Japanese citizens to be more open-minded and inclusive of foreigners and their diverse cultures.

Mr. Fujiwara has been hoping to revitalize the “closed” Japanese society, but it seems that the majority of respondents believe the Tokyo 2020 Games will be revitalizing Japan as a nation. The next responses are in line with the theme revival of Japan.

Revival of Japan

The majority of respondents – 77 percent – believe that the rationale for hosting the 2020 Olympics is for domestic reasons: the revival of Japan from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami or to find a remedy to Japan’s growing demographical issues. From the Candidature Files of the TOCOG (2013) the letter that was sent from The Tokyo Metropolitan Government Governor Naoki Inose to IOC President Count Jacques Rogge was shown, Governor Inose stated:

The earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 deeply affected the Japanese people, and we are in need of a dream we can share that will strengthen our solidarity. A dream can give us strength, and with strength we can build a future. If Tokyo is granted the honour of hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games, we can demonstrate to the world how far we have come in rebuilding our country, and give courage especially to those who are confronted with a challenge or hardship. I also believe there is no better way to express our gratitude for the friendship and encouragement we received from all over the world.

(Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Bid Committee Candidature File, 2013)
Governor Inose has expressed how hosting the Tokyo Olympics could be a morale booster to those affected by the tsunami in 2011. Not only was it a way Japan could win the bid but for the Japanese government, specifically the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, to legitimize their ambitions of acquiring the rights to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo. Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) stated similarly that:

one of the biggest reasons Japan wanted to host Tokyo 2020 was to show the world that Japan has recovered from the 2011 earthquake. Many countries around the world have given Japan lots of warm-hearted messages and support and Japan wants to thank everyone by hosting the Summer Olympics. Another reason of hosting is to show the new model of sports to the world. The IOC is facing a challenging era where few cities want to host or are willing to bid for the Olympic Games, making it unclear for the future of the Olympic Games. Japan and Tokyo can show the new “style” of Olympic Games aligned with Agenda 2020.

The respondent believes that Japan has received global aid and that the best way possible of showing their gratitude was to host an Olympics inviting people around the world to gather and witness Japan’s recovery. Also, Interviewee J9 touches into how Japan believes it could be a role model for IOC’s Agenda 2020 – which was a plan was mainly about “changes to the candidature procedure, with a new philosophy to invite potential candidate cities to present a project that fits their sporting, economic, social and environmental long-term planning needs” (IOC).

Even though there may have been some international implications to hosting the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, still following the theme revival of Japan, Interviewee J7 (November, 2019) stated:

I don’t think it was to project Japan’s power abroad, I think it was more internal. It’s possible that the reason to host this event was to boost the confidence of the Japanese citizens (from the 2011 earthquake) or even the stability of the government, and some could believe that one of the justifications would be economic benefits, which could be broadly felt.

Pertaining to Japan’s demographic issue, “Japan has faced the social issues of a decreasing population and population aging for quite some time” (See Ariga, Yomiuri Shimbun). Also, there could be an urgency “to consider residential policy for regional cities in an integrated manner with urban planning that will lead to the rebirth and revitalization of central urban areas, and when implementing these measures gaining the cooperation of people through local networks is essential” (Ibid.) It is possible that hosting the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo could do
this. When asked the follow – up question: Could hosting the 2020 Olympics be a way of revitalizing Japan’s confidence and nation’s demographic issues? Professor Uchiyama responded:

The most important policy for Japanese economy and the solution for the low birth rate (demographics) could be rebuilding the social security system and it should be noted that Japanese government has a huge deficit where their debt is twice the nation’s annual GDP. Hosting the Olympics could help but it seems like an unorthodox way of actually dealing with economic and demographic issues.

Although the general public may have the preconception that hosting a SME would boost the economy, only three of the nine participants (33%) believe there will be significant economic improvements and two of those three respondents also believe that there are domestic values to why Japan would want Tokyo to host the 2020 Summer Olympics. Even the benefit of tourism – a domestic based value – was expressed by Interviewee J5 (December, 2019), who said:

I believe one of the main reasons Japan wanted Tokyo to host the 2020 Olympics was due to economic benefits since the economy has been struggling. If there are more tourists coming in, there is a good chance that these tourists will spend a significant amount of money in the country.

The response above shows further evidence that the rationale for hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics could possibly be a revival of Japan’s economy, with the hopes that a rise in inbound tourists during Tokyo 2020 will contribute to economic improvements. Following the theme revival of Japan, expressed that the reason for Japan to host the 2020 Olympics was

Japan’s ambitions to leverage economic benefits since Japan’s current economy has been struggling since the early 1990s economic bubble burst. Also, for sports people, in attaining the rights to host the 2020 Olympics, it gives an opportunity to improve the nations sporting system and to be recognized as a strong sporting nation.

It seems evident that some are expecting the 2020 Tokyo Olympics to be another revival of Japan’s stagnant economy. In other words, some could feel nostalgic of the 1964 Olympic morale boosting effect. Another aspect of a revival was expressed although the rationale of hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics was and presumed that it would be in line with Japan’s and the Japanese government’s ambitions to raise the level of incoming tourists, which could enhance their economy. Interviewee J3 (December, 2019) stated:
Honestly the reason for hosting Tokyo 2020 is not clear to me. I think Japan needs a big event to attract tourists from around the world and Japan’s economy has been struggling for quite a long time. So, I believe the Japanese government are focusing on tourism – one of the industries Japan has been focusing on for a while to make a profit.

With the hopes of a revival of Japan’s economy, the respondent believes that the government is trying to tackle the problem by raising the number of inbound tourists to the country. This way, it is possible that visiting tourists will be able to spend significant amounts of money which could help the Japanese economy. However, there is the possibility that the Olympics could be hosted for a different reason, perhaps for legitimizing domestic politics. The next section brings in a new rational in the theme of hosting an SME for nation branding.

**Nation Branding**

Even with the possible economic benefit that may derive from hosting this event, it is possible that Japan wants to re-showcase to the world that Japan is economically strong and capable to host SMEs consistently. Interviewee J1 (December, 2019) while referring to China’s frequency in hosting SMEs stated:

The big cities in China are very wealthy, and big games will give a very good image to the citizens. City authorities and central government know this and would want to host SMEs. Possibly, with the high contributions of China’s economic development, in comparison to any region, the speed or progress is not as high as China. It does not mean that the cities of China are superior of the ones in Europe, I think it’s mainly the power of economic, economics prevails, money talks. This is why Japan was the safest choice in Buenos Aires in 2013.

The response above may have been referring to how Tokyo was selected to host the 2020 Olympics, but also referred to how important a nation’s economic prowess is in order to show other nations the credibility and prestige a nation holds – aspects that are important in the realms of soft power. The final rationale that follows is hosting SMEs for political legitimacy.
Political Legitimacy

Coming back to the rationale of Japan’s revival of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, two respondents gave an interesting counter response, as mentioned before, that the reference of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami could be a way of the government’s legitimization of hosting Tokyo 2020. Interviewee J4 (November, 2019) claimed that:

> it is possible that Prime Minister Abe wanted to emphasize the recovery of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami to justify the huge expenditures by expanding infrastructure and public services. The overall message could be that Prime Minister Abe has been keen on emphasizing that Japan is back away from economic recession in light to his “Abenomics” and recovering from the earthquake.”

Therefore, there could be some ambiguity to the rationale for hosting the 2020 Olympics. It is possible that the staging of a SME could be used for political legitimacy or for a larger political aim (Cornelissen, 2004: 39). The other counter statement to notion that the Games represents a revival of Japan responses was mentioned by Interviewee J2 (December, 2019), he stated:

> at the host bidding stage, Japan’s rationale was its revival from the 2011 earthquake. This rationale was used to persuade the general public and the IOC committee members. Now, the Olympics is not actively connected with areas affected by the earthquake, so that kind of rationale was just a rhetoric to win the bid. From a questionnaire population survey for the general public, it reported that the majority of people expect an economic impact from the Olympics. So that means, the main rationale for hosting the Olympics is not broadly understood by the general public.

The above quote is interesting as it points to the temporal aspect of bidding for and winning such sports spectacles; the original rationale may well have been linked to the 2011 earthquake and Japan’s revival from it. Over time there seems to be a shift towards a more economic rationale – both from the elites and the general public, given that there was a clear boosting effect after hosting the 1964 Olympics. It could be possible that some Japanese citizens expect the legacies of the 1964 Olympic, or what could be seen purely as the era of Japan’s maturing economy. The following section will discuss how Japan defines soft power.
Soft Power in Japan

This section of the chapter discusses some of Japan’s definition of soft power. Even though Japan has arguably the greatest soft power potential in the Asian region (Nye, 2005), this term is either ambiguous to the Japanese or not fully understood. When asked about the definition of soft power, Interviewee J6 (December, 2019) claimed that

when it comes to the term soft power, it is still a new concept to Japan. Many people cannot point out whether one thing or another is a soft power resource or not.

Also, it is important to understand that the definition may change depending on whether the soft power resources had government involvement. Interviewee J7 (November, 2019) in defining soft power, claimed:

I don’t think there is a unanimous definition (of soft power). When it is non-political, it could be Japanese cuisine, anime, movies, culture, so on.

This response evidently shows that Japan’s definition of soft power is in line with Nye’s definition of cultural attraction when the participant above listed cultural resources of attraction. The next few responses including the previous are categorized in the theme culture.

Culture

The first theme that was brought up when asked to define soft power was culture. Interviewee J4 (November, 2019) expressed:

I can think of Japanese anime, manga, but I don’t think this is the real soft power. I think soft power should be substantial. I do believe that if children around the world have watched Japanese anime or read manga, it could give a good feeling toward Japan it could be called soft power, although I do believe it is a bit indirect. I believe Professor Nye has in mind international organizations, institutions, or cultural norms and I am not sure that Japan has this kind of soft power.

This response touched upon the organic soft power resources, which will be discussed below, but also had some scepticism of the actual reach of these resources. In addition, it is possible
Japan may not have the main soft power resources that could lead to what Nye would see as ultimate soft power outcomes deriving from institutions and cultural norms (Nye, 2004).

Following the theme culture, an example is given when an organic cultural soft power resource such as anime became a state-led resource, creating a bit of confusion. Interviewee J3 (December, 2019) stated:

> at first, the government put emphasis on Japanese traditional arts and culture, but later realized that animation, or what is known as “pop culture” of Japan is very popular around the world. The government wanted to shift their money and invest in the animation industry, however, the ones that work in that industry thought they did not need this kind of relation with the government creating a very strange situation. I believe the definition of soft power in Japan is still in line with Joseph Nye’s definition. I do recall that he has praised Japan as one of the big soft power countries.

It was interesting to notice also that the respondent has touched into the factor of how some soft power resources became a tool for politics, also known as a “state-led soft power resource.” Even with the likes of hosting a SME, including the respondent’s case of anime and Japanese “pop culture”, national authorities could draw on these resources to “achieve precise state-led soft power goals, mainly via signalling particular messages to external audiences, successfully hosting such events and through demonstrating one’s sporting ability on the world stage” (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015: 706). The next theme that will be discussed in the next section is branding.

**Branding**

There is another belief that soft power entails branding, in this case, the image of a city or country enabling soft power results fitting into the idea (Breslin, 2011). Based on the latter, Interviewee J1 (December, 2019) said:

> I think the image of the city is important when it comes to soft power and hosting a sport mega event. I will use the example of men’s tennis; the big events are always four major grand slam events. The first, Melbourne, the second Paris, the next being Wimbledon and lastly, New York. Japan does not have a major tennis event. It is possible that members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government wanted to, in the current situation, stage a big sporting event because it is big power tool to give a good image to its citizens and also improve their worldwide image.
This response shows the importance of hosting SMEs which this response could contribute to being part of the soft power package which will be later discussed. Furthermore, even the consistency of hosting SMEs could be key to the nation’s branding. Congruent to the theme branding, Interviewee J8 (December, 2019) claimed:

The Japanese society in my opinion has been becoming more and more of a closed society in these 50 years. In 1950s and 60s NHK radio sometimes would give harsh criticism about the Japanese government, but now, you can’t find any criticism. This is partly because Japan is very well known for being conservative and comfortable with the old way of living. I personally wanted Japan and Tokyo to host the 2020 Olympics for the main purpose of soft power by showing the world that Japan is now an internationalized society.

Interviewee J8 (December, 2019) not only stated that the major reason Japan should host the Tokyo 2020 Olympics was to acquire soft power, but it was also to show a new soft power that the Japanese society has internationalized, inclusive of non-Japanese cultures and people. In line with the theme of branding, Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) stated:

the Rugby World Cup was recently hosted by Japan and I believe the Japanese style of hospitality for the foreigners was carried out well. Japan is well organized country, not just in hosting the games but also in hosting the international guests.

The above response shows that SMEs themselves are in fact a resource of soft power. The hosting of the Rugby World Cup enhanced Japan’s image as a very hospitable country (World Rugby, 2019). Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) brings up another major point of the Japanese style of hospitality that will be discussed in another section. The overall definition of the accumulative responses of soft power are connected to Nye’s definition. Understanding how Japan defines soft power in the themes of culture and branding, the next section will discuss whether Japan’s priorities for hosting Tokyo 2020 was for domestic, regional, or international soft power.

Tokyo 2020 Soft Power Strategy

It seems that many believe that the domestic reasons for hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics was the most important reason to hosting the event. However, when being asked the question: “How will Japan utilize Tokyo 2020 for regional, domestic, and international soft power and which of them is Japan’s priorities?” Interviewee JA responded:
it is possible Japan have ambitions for a greater presence internationally. It is hard to
say because I am not too sure if there was any strategic cause of hosting Tokyo 2020.
For domestic reasons it could be based on recovering from the earthquake or the
Fukushima accident. Prime Minister Abe has stated that everything is under control
(such as the Fukushima power plant) when actually it may not be true and some believe
he lied. I believe Prime Minister Abe does not have a consistent strategy for hosting
Tokyo 2020. It is much more possible that Japan has focused on domestic and the
international aspect of hosting the 2020 Olympic Games.

This statement shows that it is very possible the rationale of the 2020 Olympics is unclear to
some people and that there will always be some kind of skepticism to hosting SMEs. The tactic
discussed above could be a tactic to legitimize the domestic politics of Prime Minister Abe and
his personally connected ambitions – which will be touched upon later in detail. Interviewee
J1 (December, 2019) said that:

it is possible that some people from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government thought
staging a successful Olympics would give a good impression of Japan to the world – in
terms of corporate image, branding of the city, etc. The National Olympic Committee
stuck to their ambitions which is in the sporting political sense. The central government
only got involved once the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the Japanese National
Olympic Committee agreed to try bidding and host an Olympic.

Interviewee J1 specifically pointed out a few of the plans the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
had when thinking to host the 2020 Games. Also, the interviewee states specifically how each
of the 2020 Olympic domestic organizers – Japan’s central government, JOC, and Tokyo
Metropolitan Government – generally got involved when planning to host the Olympics, while
also pointing out one of the main soft power outcomes of corporate image (discussed later
labelled as corporate Japan is globalizing). Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) stated that:

Domestically, Tokyo 2020 will be activated to increase the engagement of Tokyo and
the other cities. Tokyo 2020 could strengthen the relations with other cities. An example
of this is how we decided on choosing the Tokyo 2020 Games mascot. We asked every
elementary school in Japan to participate in a drawing contest so that the drawings
will be voted upon to be used as the official logos for Tokyo 2020. I think because there
will be three consecutive East Asian hosts for the Olympics, starting from
PyeongChang, I believe all three nations wanted to make sure that they are part of the
Olympic Movement. It is also possible the IOC realizes that the East Asian economy
overall has become one of the strongest. I believe that tourism has been quite strong in
Japan, but it is possible that the number will rise significantly after Tokyo 2020. I
personally believe that the two priorities for hosting the 2020 Olympics Games is for
domestic and international soft power.
The response above, highlights that Japan and their organizers for the 2020 Olympics have focused on domestic and international ambitions of attaining soft power. Also, Interviewee J9 (December, 2019) acknowledges the fact that one of the reasons there were three consecutive Olympics in East Asia was due to its economic rise and that each East Asian host nations wanted to reassure their part in hosting an Olympic. This could insinuate that there is some kind of benchmarking between the East Asian nations – wanting to showcase their prestige, credibility, capability, etc., of hosting an SME. Hosting an SME has become a must for likes of attaining soft power.

Lastly, the next participant discussed the reasons why Japan needs to create more organic soft power resources in order to compete with other nations internationally and the need to appeal their soft power resources – finding the road back to the number one economy that they once were in the 1980s. Interviewee J6 said:

We have to pay attention to many domestic issues and focus on our resources especially when it comes to soft power resources. This can vary from Japanese, pop culture, cuisine, tourism, etc. Without more organic resources created or without being able to appeal these soft power resources, it is possible that Japan will not be able compete internationally with the current economic status. This is why, Japan will try to appeal soft power resources in technology, culture, etc. because we want to be able to get back to the number one economy rank – we once had during the 1980s. The best way to showcase all the sorts of resources is to host the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Also, Japan is a fast-aging country and the Olympic and the Paralympic in Tokyo will be able to be influence and send a message out to the Japanese nationals to be more inclusive of the disabled and elderly. I hope this will change the accessibility for the elderly and disabled which can also be a new infrastructural change not just to Tokyo but all of Japan.

This response not only touched upon Japan’s strive for economic revival, but also additionally stated the hopes that hosting Tokyo 2020 will contribute to a more inclusive Japanese society, with the additions of the disabled and the elderly. Understanding the possible ambitions Japan had for hosting Tokyo 2020 Olympics, the next chapter will discuss the various soft power assets of Japan.

In the next section of this chapter, it will discuss the soft power resources from Japan that are prevailing currently. It is important to discuss them in order to be able to create Japan’s soft power package. Therefore, this section will touch upon five different soft power resources:
Sport for Tomorrow, the Olympic and Paralympic Education, Japan House, Japan Exchange and Teaching, and lastly, Japan’s modern pop culture.

**Sport for Tomorrow**

The first soft power resource Japan has are its many sport related soft power resources and it is not just the hosting of SMEs. This sport related soft power resource is called Sport For Tomorrow (SFT) and it “is a programme which the Government of Japan promotes to contribute to the international community through sport. The programme was announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the IOC Session on the occasion of Tokyo making a bid for 2020 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games” (SFT Report, 2019). Prime Minister Abe’s first introduced SFT at his presentation at the 125th Session of the International Olympic Committee on September 2013 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. His speech said:

> Distinguished members of the IOC, I say that choosing Tokyo 2020 means choosing a new, powerful booster for the Olympics Movement. Under our new plan, “Sport for Tomorrow” young Japanese will go out into the world in even large numbers. They will help build schools, bring in equipment, and create sports education programs. And by the time the Olympic torch reaches Tokyo in 2020, they will bring the joy of sports directly to ten million people in over one hundred countries. Choose Tokyo today and you choose a nation that is a passionate, proud, and a strong believer in the Olympic Movement. And which strongly desires to work together with the IOC in order to make the world a better place through the power sport. (Ibid.)

This speech was not only a way of persuading the international audience to select Tokyo to host the 2020 Olympics, but it also signaled that Japan was pursuing a wider international project that not only contributes to the development of other nations and sports, but also raises the attractiveness of Japan globally. By using this program, Japan intends: “a) to expand the values of Olympic and Paralympic movements to people of all generations, b) to promote international exchange and cooperation through sport, c) to foster international peace and development through sport, d) to improve the access to sport and physical education in developing countries, e) to train future sport leaders at the new international sport academies, f) to strengthen and promote sport for all, and g) to promote the value of sport and develop sport integrity through global anti-doping activities and programmes” (Ubaidulloev, 2018).

The SFT program is also appealing internationally because one of the major components to the program is to tackle the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by using sport. The Agenda
of 2030 for Sustainable Development, that has been approved and adopted by all UN Member States in 2015 “provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future” (UN.org). There are 17 SDG goals at the heart and the SDGs and this project aims to tackle 4 SDGs: Good Health and Well-Being, Quality Education, Gender Equality, and Reduced Inequalities.

The first goal that SFT specifically tries to tackle is Good Health and Well-Being with the Japan Sport Council with many other sport organizations at the frontline (SFT Report 2019). It was reported that “death in Fiji Republic is said to be caused more than 80% of the time by non-communicable lifestyle-related diseases” (Ibid.). Although the country understands the importance of exercise, the physical education is unsatisfactory because physical education only means playing sport. “This program, contributed to support of a fixed physical education and sports policy and use it to prevent lifestyle disease while improving the percentage of those participating in exercise and sports” (Ibid). The second, Goal 4) Quality of Education, where specialists dispatched to support capacity development among Peru’s physical-education teachers again with Japan Sport Council responsible for this project (Ibid.). In 2018, six people affiliated to Peru’s physical education were invited to Japan and were given some insight of Japan’s physical education curriculum – reports say that the invitees after returning to Peru, there has been significant efforts in tackling the issues at the elementary, middle school, and university levels using Japan’s physical education curriculum (Ibid). The third is Goal 5) Gender Equality, where this project was led by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) – they staged a women’s track meet in Tanzania titled (Ladies First). This project took place in Tanzania because the female athletic activity does not reach the levels of neighboring countries. Finally, the last project titled: World Baseball Glove Project with Yomiuri Shinbun, JICA, and the Japanese baseball team Yomiuri Giants initiating the project where the aim was “spreading baseball among developing countries and helping to further youth education” (Ibid). What Sport For Tomorrow has contributed is massive because the number of beneficiaries is more than 9,500,000, there are 202 beneficiary countries, and the number of implemented programs are 5,200 (Ibid).
Olympic and Paralympic Education

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government launched the Olympic and Paralympic Education in order to ensure an effort to create a possible social legacy for the Japanese youth generation. Japan is trying to make a more culturally diverse and inclusive international society using one of the action programs titled: “Global Friendship Project”. Of this project, Interviewee J2 (December, 2019) gives the background and explains:

We (Japan) have a project called Global Friendship Project, which was supported by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. That project originated from the Nagano Olympics 1998. At that time the organizing committee initiated the project One School One Nation. The project was about one school in Nagano needed to select another NOC or participating country and the school had to learn about the culture, history and the general information of the selected country. And through their learnings, that could contribute to our international relations by understanding other countries. Tokyo expanded the project to One School Five Nations and learned about participating countries. This probably changed the youth generation’s international understanding and that could be a kind of legacy. Some host town of the pre-training camps also have that sort of understanding program. At the rugby world cup host town, the Japanese welcomed some athletes by singing their national anthem or by performing New Zealand’s famous Haka.

The second action program that is available is “Tokyo Youth Volunteers”, “a programme to reinforce each school’s efforts to cultivate the spirit of dedication and feelings of consideration for others” (Tokyo Metropolitan Government). The third program is “Smile Project” which is “a project for children to improve their understanding on the personalities and characters of each other, and to develop feelings of consideration for others” (Ibid.), and lastly the “Dream and Future Project”, where “activities are implemented where athletes such as Olympians and Paralympians are dispatched to schools and have direct interactions with children. Allow children to realise the remarkableness of the Olympic and Paralympic Games and increase interest in sports, while also having them develop willingness to endeavor for their dreams and overcome difficulties” (Ibid.).

With these action programs the Tokyo Metropolitan Government labeled the “Five Prioritized Mindsets” (Tokyo Metropolitan Government). The main goals for this project is to create an environment where people can give back to society or be more considerate of one another, and simultaneously increase the self-esteem of children, to make a more inclusive society with people disregarding of their impairment, letting children experience many different sports
developing a mindset of fair play and teamwork and to grow healthily physically and mentally, to maintain the pride of being a Japanese citizen and attaining normative consciousness and public mindedness, and finally, actively communicating with people globally and developing the ability to accept diversity in the world (Tokyo Metropolitan Government). These efforts represent the aspiration of Japan wanting to globally show that Japan is now full-heartedly ready to accept the diverse cultures around the world other than their own.

**Japan House**

Japan House is an overseas hub “founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to showcase and communicate Japan with the international community in 3 cities of the world as part efforts to strengthen strategic global communication. Its purpose is to communicate the various attractions, policies, and efforts of Japan to a wide range of people including people who know very little about Japan, and to enlarge the base of the people who are interested and well-versed in Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan). The first Japan House opened in Sao Paolo, Brazil in 2017 (see Demetriou, Japan Times, 2017) and the next two were built in Los Angeles and London in 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan). The Japan House project “endeavors to present all aspects of Japanese cultures today, from high culture to subculture, to cutting-edge technology and beyond. Japan’s assets are its unparalleled and unique culture, technology, nature, architecture, cuisine, and design. These fascinating aspects of Japan unfolded by the project inspire people to form and nurture a deep and shared appreciation” (Japan House Activity Report, 2019). These hubs have principles in common, where there purposes are to rightfully represent Japanese philosophy from the past and the current, displaying perfect tourist destinations and exhibitions in Japan, providing food and drinks to get a taste of Japanese food culture, and so on. This soft power resource was definitely not an inexpensive asset because Prime Minister Abe has budgeted ¥70 billion ($500 million) “to help get the word out about Japan and ensure that China and South Korea aren’t the only ones controlling the narratives” (see Kingston, Japan Times, 2015) – making this resource a state-led soft power resource and one of the latest Japanese soft power aggressive tactics.

With the agreement of the four organizations – the TOCOG, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, The Japanese Paralympic Committee (JPC), and JOC – they established the Tokyo 2020 Japan House “to expand various competitions and to use sports to contribute to each country and
region through exchanges and negotiations involving each organization” (SFT Report, 2019). There were more than 67,200 visitors (Ibid.). Tokyo 2020 Japan House also made its debut in South Korea’s 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, where the TOCOG was in charge this time for initiating this international public relations activity – “to publicize Tokyo and the Tokyo 2020 Games to international guests related to the Games, the media and spectators” (Ibid.). Here, Tokyo 2020 Japan House attracted approximately more than 150,000 visitors (Ibid.).

**Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET)**

With joint efforts from multiple ministries of Japan: the Ministry of Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program was founded in 1987 (Metzgar, 2017: 2) This program is regarded as “one of the world’s largest exchange programs” and has the reputation for “enhancing international understanding” (JET Program USA, 2017). This particular program “recruits young college graduates from participating countries to spend a year or more living in Japan and serving in one of three positions” (Metzgar 2017: 2), one being Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs), who are partnered with Japanese foreign language teachers working in Japan’s public schools, the second being Coordinators for International Relations (CIRs), who “are placed in municipal and prefectural offices and assist in the planning of activities with an international orientation” (Ibid.) and finally, a small subset of CIRs serve as Sports Exchange Advisors, focusing on “coordination of sporting events (JET Program USA, 2017). The goals of this program are outlined by the three competing aims of government ministries:

“MIC, formerly known formerly the Ministry of Home Affairs, came up with the idea and controls the purse strings. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) instructs schools on team-teaching. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) recruits participants from around the world. The quasi-governmental CLAIR oversees administration. It also has close connections to MIC; CLAIR’s present chair of its board of directors is a retired MIC vice minister. (see Mccrostie; Japan Times, 2017).
According to Nye, exchange programs are able to “create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye, 2004: 107) so Metzgar (2017: 3) regarded JET as part of “a country’s foreign policy toolbox.” Up to 65,000 young people, coming from 65 different nations, with over half of the participants coming from the US have participated in JET as of 2015 (CLAIR, 2015). Although the success of JET program is still a debatable issue (see, McConnell, 2008 Metzgar, 2017 and Mccrostie, Japan Times, 2017), McConnell claimed that the JET program was presented to the US in 1987 as the Japanese governement’s gift to the US hoping to lessen the trade dispute between the two nations. The overall criticism JET has been getting was that there was no quantitative data on JET applicants, participants, and alumni – where “bureaucrats know little about who participates in JET and why, or what happens after they return home” (see Mccrostie; Japan Times, 2017). Nonetheless, this program seems to be a very valuable asset to the Japanese government regardless of their successes or failure because it has been reported by the Japan Association of Corporate Executives in 2015, that an estimated ¥40 billion is spent by national and local governments annually to support this program (see Mccrostie, Japan Times). This is another huge government expenditure, just having discussed Japan House previously. Due to the global interruption of the Covid-19 pandemic, it may seem that there could be some turmoil on how the program could continue when teachers are not getting paid, or worried about getting paid on time (see St. Michel; Japan Times, 2020). Schools have closed to curve the spreading of the virus, leaving many of the non-Japanese English teacher in a state of confusion (Ibid.).

Japanese Modern Pop Culture

When it comes to Japanese modern pop culture, there are a variety of things that come to mind: toys, video games, portable music players, Kawaii (cute) characters, Anime – and “when it comes to modern pop culture, we’ve all turned Japanese” (see Schley; Japan Times, 2020). Schley gives examples given by book author, Matt Alt, of “Pure Invention: How Japan’s Pop Culture Conquered the World, including Hillary Clinton was spending her spare time in 1993 playing Nintendo’s Game Boy (while playing Tetris, a game that was created by the USSR), the Karaoke machine, Tamagotchi, or even as early as 1946, just after the end of the Second World War, “Japan was already exporting toy jeeps to its former sworn enemy” (Ibid.).
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses pop culture, with addition to traditional culture and arts as their main tools for cultural diplomacy, “aiming to further the understanding and trust of Japan” (MOFA, 2017). In the late 1980s, the potential of media culture began to draw attention where Japanese TV shows and pop idols were being accepted in East and Southeast Asia – and because of this, a strong interest emerged in the capability of Japanese media culture to improve Japan’s reputation (Iwabuchi, 2015: 420-1). Here, Iwabuchi gives the example of a Japanese soap opera called, *Oshin*, that was broadcast from April 1983-1984, and it was such a hit that the distributor of the program, NHK International, published it in 1991 (Iwabuchi, 2015: 421). The show *Oshin* was popular among Asian countries and instead of knowing Japan for its cars, technology, and animation, viewers will be able to get the chance of knowing the “real” Japan through a television drama (NHK International, 1991). The drama was well praised, it was thought that the show itself could contribute to “overcome negative historical memories of Japanese colonialism as well as hostility regarding the country’s economic exploitation of the region” (Iwabuchi, 2015: 421). The 1990s was the peak point for Japanese TV dramas, music and the general pop culture in East and Southeast Asia. Iwabuchi believed that “the locally driven spread of Japanese media culture further heightened the expectations among Japanese policy makers that hitherto unfavorable images of Japan would be improved and that unresolved historical issues would be smoothed over” (Iwabuchi, 2015: 422). By understanding the various soft power assets Japan has, Japan’s soft power package will be discussed in detail in the next section.

**Japan’s Soft Power Package**

**International**

Based on the research, the interviewee’s responses and discussing upon Japan’s soft power resources and projects, Japan’s (international) soft power package looks like this:
Starting with “Culture,” Japan’s strategy is fostering a national identity by using cultural assets. Japan’s government is soft power aggressive, because not only is Japan hosting SMEs to be able to showcase their country to the world, they are also looking forward to hosting SMEs regularly – with Japan already bidding for Sapporo to host the 2030 Winter Olympic Games (Livingstone, 2020) – but also Japan created regional based international hubs such as Japan House. It will not only be costly to host the Summer Olympics but as iterated before, assets such as Japan House are not cheap. Another way the Japanese foster a national identity is by creating online curriculum projects at Universities around the World. A good example of this is the University of Pittsburgh online curriculum project called Japan: Places, Images, Times and Transformations (University of Pittsburgh). Here, there are many essays, articles, and other content that provide information about Japan’s culture, history, language, and society. This online curriculum project was sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and by the Japan Iron and Steel Federation, and the Mitsubishi Endowments at the University of Pittsburgh (Ibid.). This also shows that big corporations in Japan are involved in the scheme of wanting to showcase Japan’s culture by supporting cultural assets. Ultimately, by doing this, Japan may be able to extend their cultural influence.

For “Tourism,” Japan uses the tactic of showcasing Japan to the world by showing their capabilities in hospitality, having an open society, and establishing exchange programs. Japan’s hospitality can even be remembered from when Japan hosted the most recent Rugby World Cup. Related to this Interviewee J2 (December, 2019) said:
From looking at the Rugby World Cup 2019, the event presumably contributed a lot to change people’s view of Japan. “Omotenashi” is a spiritual hospitality culture in Japan. This word was highlighted in the bidding process. It’s to welcome guests with great hospitality. As our volunteers and spectators and the host towns of the training camps showed a lot of omotenashi, that can be our soft power enhancement strategy. And I think it actually did work through the Rugby World Cup. That could be a differentiation factor compared to other East Asian nations – the spirit of hospitality that could contribute to enhancing the Japanese brand.

There is another important factor to omotenashi and how this could enhance Japan’s soft power which will be later highlighted in another section. The strategy to show that Japanese people are open society can be done by the initiation of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government – the Olympic and Paralympics Education in Tokyo program – in particular the Global Friends Project. Furthermore, with a teaching exchange program, JET, Japan will be able to attract participants to actually experience and enhance their understanding of Japan which may ultimately improve Japan’s tourism rates (Metzgar, 2017).

In “Branding,” Japan’s strategy is to show how vibrant and forward looking they are. This strategy’s resources will be very similar to “Culture”, using the staging of SMEs and the usage of the international Japan House hubs. This will ultimately help adapt Japan’s image abroad. With “Diplomacy,” Japan’s strategy is to maintain their global prestige and status. The “Sport For Tomorrow” project was not only aimed at giving aid and showing the volunteering spirit of the nation, but Japan was also showing how they wanted to contribute to fighting the SDGs – goals that were found essential and agreed upon by all UN member states (UN.org). By doing this it will give Japan a stronger regional leadership role and global reach due to their rise in international prestige. Finally, “Trade,” Japan wants to signal to the world that they are open for international business. It is not to say that Japan was not open for international business before, they are showing that corporate Japan is globalizing by relaxing visas for foreign workers (BBC, 2018). Furthermore, it will also be a great opportunity for Japan to showcase their latest enhanced technology, such as the facial recognition security system that will be used for identifying athletes, officials, staff, and media members (see Ryall; Japan Today, 2018). Although there seems to be a significant international soft power tactics, Japan also has a possible strong domestic soft power strategy.
Domestic Soft Power

The Tokyo 2020 Olympics was a project that possibly could have had some personal connection to Prime Minister Abe because the prime minister at the time of hosting the 1964 Games was his grandfather, Nobuske Kishi. So, like the 1964 Games, it is possible Mr. Abe could be hoping for economic benefits after showing a bit of progress emerging from the decades of deflation (see Martin; WSJ, 2013). Hosting an Olympic Game puts the focus on the host nation and how the host nations showcase themselves to the world. But could it be possible that the Olympic Games was brought in for the political legitimacy of Prime Minister Abe? Or, are all the projects (i.e., SFT, JET, Japan House), including hosting the 2020 Olympics) and soft power resources, being used for a greater purpose? Prime Minister Abe’s ambitions lay in the realms of creating a stronger Japan.

Prime Minister Abe, in his policy speech to the 166th Session of the Diet (26 January, 2007), outlined what was known as one of his first hallmark program, “A Beautiful Country” (The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet) but it is very possible that what he believed will create “a beautiful Japan” could actually mean an ugly future (see, Kingston; Japan Times, 2017). Prime Minister Abe’s speech discussed domestic agendas such as strengthening the deflated economy, making other regions in Japan attractive, rebuilding education, fixing the demographics issues and most importantly amending constitutions (The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). Currently, it is evident that Mr. Abe’s ambitions are revitalizing Japan’s economy and renewing Japan’s military – which he believes would ultimately bring back the confidence of Japanese citizens (see Tamaki; The Conversation, 2017). In order to do this, “he also knows that to truly win over the rest of the world, it has to win the hearts and minds of global consumers” (Ibid.) This insinuates that Japan could be using their culture as a powerful tool, or at least a power tool for Prime Minister Abe.

With Mr. Abe in office, he has already pulled off the “eight noes” of post-1945 policy which was created by Kenneth Pyle, a professor at the University of Washington (see, Kingston; Japan Times 2017). The “eight noes” are: “no overseas deployment, no exercise of collective self-defense, no power projection capability, no nuclear arms, no arms exports, no sharing defense technology, no military spending above 1 percent of GDP and no military use of space (Ibid.) The only “no” left is the nuclear one (Ibid.). Now, another “no” is the prime minister’s ambitions to revising Article 9. This would not bring in more income to households as promised
by the Prime Minister leading to the “beautiful country” policies – it is just his own “proactive pacifism” (Ibid.).

Having said all this, with the accumulative information and unlike Japan’s international soft power strategy, Japan’s domestic soft power package looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft Power Diplomacy Aggressive</td>
<td>- Host Sport Mega-Events</td>
<td>Win hearts and minds of global consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Japan House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SFT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pop Culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*All of Japan’s soft power resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalized Patriotic Nationalism</td>
<td>- Host Sport Mega-Events</td>
<td>Rise of Japanese citizens’ confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “Abenomics”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Olympic and Paralympic Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>= “A Beautiful Japan”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prime Minister Abe’s lead in trying to revise “Article 9” may well be due to North Korea’s firing a second ballistic missile over Japan (BBC, 2017). However, on the contrary, it is possible that there will be a good number of citizens that would be against Abe’s patriotic policies because it could lead to the US wanting the Japanese to lead expeditions of conflict
that Japan may not have any interest of (see Kingston; Japan Times, 2017). Therefore, it may take more than just winning the hearts and minds of global consumers and the rise of Japanese citizens’ confidence to create Mr. Abe’s “Beautiful Japan.” Although, Yoshida Suga was formally elected to succeed Shinzo Abe recently and Suga has formally expressed that he will be following policies made by Abe (Japan Today, 2020). Therefore, it is still questionable whether it will lead to a “Beautiful Japan” if scrapping Article 9 is part of the Japanese government’s plan. Understanding the possible domestic soft power tactic of Japan, the next section will thus discuss upon Japan’s regional soft power tactic.

**Regional Soft Power**

Japan’s regional soft power comes from their general soft power package strategy “Diplomacy” – maintaining Japan’s international prestige and global status. With the accumulative participant’s interview responses, it is evident that Tokyo 2020 was focusing on domestic enhancement and sustaining their global reach – ultimately giving them the lead in the regional leadership role. When asking if there were any regional ambitions to hosting the Olympics, there were only two responses available of the nine, the first said that the activation of regional influences could have come as early as starting with the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Here, Professor Funahashi said:

> we (Japan) have a unique pop culture, including manga and our historical culture. I think the organizing committee will utilize those kinds of unique Japanese cultures. If you watched the closing ceremony of the Rio 2016 Olympics, we used so many different characters in the movie like Super Mario. That kind of soft power was leveraged in the event and that could be a regional soft power strategy.

So, this also fits well into Japan’s domestic soft power scheme, how Japan is trying to use their pop culture as a political tool. But would this be enough to create relations between Japan and the other East Asian nations? On one side it could be possible, however, the next participant has brought up a tactic that could make Japan as better “role model” to contributing to the international society. In accordance to this, Interviewee J9 (December 2019) said:

> I believe the projects surrounding the 2020 Olympics can be a good resource to the regional aspect as well since it has to do with working on the SDGs. Japan can be a
good role model not only to the region but to the international society using a kind of sport diplomacy in fighting for reaching the SDGs.

The SDGs is an important aspect because these are goals that were accepted by all the UN member states (UN.org). Although Japan may not be contributing to all the 17 SDGs, they are still contributing to many of the developing countries, showing ultimately that Japan has a strong volunteering spirit, global reach in giving aid, and are enhancing their sports diplomacy while doing so. If Japan is able to successfully contribute or help tackle these SDG goals it not only puts them in a good position globally but also in a better position in the East Asian region. Other East Asian nations will be able to refer to Japan’s successful case and replicate. While Japan is showing such soft power outside of Japan, there are still things Japan must work on, that is, making their society full-heartedly inclusive of non-Japanese cultures. Thus, Japan’s regional soft power package would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Japan’s regional</td>
<td>- Global Sport Diplomacy (SFT Project)</td>
<td>Stronger regional leadership role and global reach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prestige and status</td>
<td>- Establish strong diplomatic networks with the goals of contributing to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the SDGs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With Japan’s regional strategy, this then leads to the next section that discusses the issue of Japanese ambitions of internationalizing their society and omotenashi.

Hopes of Internationalizing Japan and Omotenashi

Although Japan has redefined their identity twice – once after the Meiji revolution and the second after World War II (Nye, 2004) – Japan has been able to well preserve their national identity and their traditions throughout and were able to promote this to the world using all varieties of soft power resources. McConnel (2008: 18) states that “Japan’s constitutional rejection of military aggression, its reputation in politically stable and safe society, and the recent increase in its popular culture exports constitute an attractive combination of soft power
resources. Try as it might, however, Japan has not been able to shake its image as an insular society.” Therefore, this is another possible rationale the Tokyo 2020 Olympics should be held, because the event and the projects that are happening around it could help contribute to internationalizing the Japanese society. This could also go into accordance with Nye’s belief that a third transformation is needed for Japan. (Nye, 2004).

There were three core concepts that were presented for Tokyo 2020. The first, “Achieving Personal Best: Striving for your personal best” was to state how all athletes will be given the atmosphere to give their best during the games and that all “Japanese citizens, including Olympic and Paralympic volunteers, will employ their utmost resourcefulness as hosts to welcome visitors from around the world with the best Japanese omotenashi (hospitality)” (Tokyo 2020). The second: “Unity in Diversity: Accepting one another,” entails with making Japan an inclusive society regardless of “race, color, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, level of ability or other status” helping to bring together the citizens of the world. Finally, the third: “Connecting to Tomorrow: Passing on Legacy for the future,” is about how Japan promotes will promote forward looking changes globally, and to give a positive legacy for the next generations. It seems as though Japan is really trying to show a very changed, non-insular, Japanese society. With the core concept Unity and Diversity, the Global Friendship Project, the multiple SFT projects around the world, and the commonly used term omotenashi, it can really showcase Japanese culture and norms to the World. But if Japan will internationalize their society, how can they do this with Japanese omotenashi?

The Japanese spirit of hospitality, omotenashi has four criteria for something to be noticed as omotenashi:

1) Freedom from the pursuit of economic rationalization by eliminating waste, irregularity, and unreasonability.
2) Reconsideration of the uniformity in high productivity through the use of manuals, standardization, mechanization, and automation, even though the high-mix, low-volume production pattern has created personalized consumption.
3) Emphasis on a spiritual rather than materialistic life; that is, ultimate satisfaction is achieved by shifting from possession of material goods to having actual experiences.
4) Recovery and reconstruction of lost human relations.
Hospitality seems to be a known thing internationally and it would not be something totally unique to other cultures or people. Also, it’s a known fact that hotels, shops, etc. in Japan have their staff following instruction books that are based on service and etiquette (see Nicol, 2015 Japan Times). It comes to a point where the hospitality is superficial like “the bowing of the cleaners who rush to prepare shinkansen cars before the next passengers board” (Ibid.). So could there be some recognition of Japan’s omotenashi and internationalizing society through hosting Tokyo 2020?

An issue with omotenashi is that “critics claim protagonists of omotenashi unwittingly provide the service they want to give rather than listening to or understanding what the customer (tourist) really wants or expects” (Williams, 2017: 58). Even though it is highly believed that Japan will host a successful 2020 Games, Japan has worked on making signs in Chinese, Korean and English, but the quality of the language is not predictable and this could be the service (omotenashi) that should be mostly focused on, since there is not much time before hosting Tokyo 2020 (Williams, 2017: 60). Even with the understanding foreign (non-Japanese) countries, cultures and other societal inclusive projects that have been established up to the run up to hosting Tokyo 2020, it is possible that “omotenashi’s arrogancy can be seen to extend to cultural assets that lack interpretation (language or otherwise) for non-Japanese” (Williams, 2017: 58). In some sense omotenashi can be viewed as insular (see, Brasor; Japan Times, 2015) With all that has been said, it is possible that there will need to be discussed “if the country is to best consider how to serve non-Japanese for whom the foreign omotenashi may be incomprehensible or even undesirable” (Williams, 2017: 59). It is possible to say, Japan will have to be able to redefine omotenashi into a more internationalized non-insular hospitality which could also allow the acceptance of non-Japanese cultures. Therefore, hosting Tokyo 2020 and the projects surrounding it, discussed earlier, could be a huge contribution to Japan’s third revival (Nye, 2004) and creating a new internationalized Japan.
Concluding Remarks

Japan has evidently had two makeovers and is in need of a third to activate a revival of its decades long deflated economy. One of Japan’s biggest turning points that may have caught the eyes of the international audience – a soft power act itself – was the factor of Japan giving up their offensive military after World War II, signaling that Japan is a much more forward-looking peaceful nation and could be a role model for other nations for demilitarizing, although with North Korea and China in the region and their actions toward Japan this currently appears very unlikely. Yet Japan was still able to host the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and showcased a tremendously developed Japan to the world. Up until the 1980s Japan was ranked as one of the top economies of the world and having “made in Japan” products was a norm. But after the economy bubble burst, Japan’s economy was stagnant until a few signs of progress that was made by Prime Minister Abe’s “Abenomics”.

What Japan should focus on is how to internationalize their insular society instead of attempting Prime Minister Abe’s possible personal ultimate goal: revising Article 9 from the Japanese Constitution. Japan at the moment is not just worried about their stagnant economy, but also about their demographic issues and fully recovering from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, to the extent it has not fully done so yet. The demographic issues could be solved in a more systematic way by possibly making amendments to the Japanese social security system. From the looks of how the Tokyo 2020 hosting rights was attained, although Japan’s Tokyo may have been the safer choice economically, it looks as though there was some rhetorical usage of the Fukushima incident as well as the “Japanese” hospitality, omotenashi. In addition, deciding to hold the Olympic Torch relay, baseball, and softball games in Fukushima to show that Japan has recovered from the nuclear catastrophe may well signal a recovered Japan or be a dangerous stunt if the area is found to still have nuclear radiation issues – something Japan needs to be able to be held fully responsible for.

It is crucial for Japan, especially the citizenry, to understand fully what the rationale of hosting Tokyo 2020 is and what kind of truthful message it wants to give out to the international audience. It very much seemed like Japan wants to show a “Cool Japan” which London 2012 Olympics did well with in branding a “Cool Brittania.” With the additions of Japan’s Karate and other extreme sports such as skateboarding and rock climbing, it seems Japan is attempting to boost Japanese nationalism with Karate and branding itself as a “cool” forward-looking
nation with the additions of extreme sports. With all the domestic projects going on surrounding the Olympics and the Paralympic Games, these are true attempts of trying to internationalize an insular society but with the depths of Japanese omotenashi, some amendments need to be made. Although Japan is well known for preserving and being conservative of the “Japanese” ways of doing things or glocalizing international norms, it will be difficult or even take a lot more time to make societal changes. Ometanashi needs to transform not just for the societal changing reason but for the country’s productivity

Internationally, Japan is known for being a mature and developed nation. But some of the policies and actions the government has taken nonetheless could actually become a counter argument to Japanese soft power. Examples include the Japanese government reacting slowly to the organized hate speech targeting ethnic Chinese and Zainichi (ethnic Korean residents in Japan); failure to follow through with “womenomics,” the goal of women constituting 30 percent of managerial positions by 2020; gender equality in the labor force is faulty; the dealing of the “comfort women” issue; promoting patriotic education; and “restarting nuclear reactors and signing a nuclear technology transfer deal with India that does not specify nuclear testing as a condition for terminating the agreement” (see Kingston, 2017, Japan Times). Attending to some of these current issues will be a major task. Although it is unfortunate due to the pandemic issue the world is facing, the Olympics has been postponed until 2021 Summer. However, on a positive note, the time can be used to make efforts in dealing with the pandemic rightfully and raising Japan’s overall soft power capabilities. Change will be difficult in Japan, but the changes can definitely be initiated and practiced by hosting Tokyo 2020 with the many domestic projects the government has created. The world sees Japan as a trustworthy and credible democratic nation, and Tokyo 2020(1) will be the time for Japan to fully show their capability, and where trust by itself should be a part of soft power politics.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis examines the ongoing phenomena of how nations in East Asian, specifically Korea, China, and Japan host SMEs, such as the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, to leverage soft power. This inductive qualitative research coming from a constructivist/interpretivist viewpoint, using multiple qualitative methods for each case study, was able to bring two new SME soft power packages (Korea and Japan) and a newly reconfigured SME soft power package (China). In addition, this research was able to show how each nation was able to use SMEs for domestic, regional, and international soft power. From using thematic analysis, this chapter concludes the key findings of the research, in light to the research’s contribution to field of study, contribution to theory, the research limitation(s), and finally, further research.

Key Research Findings

It is evident that nations will and want to host SMEs not only because the world gather at a city or a country, or the world’s population are viewing the event, but also for a primary reason of show-casing the nation to the global society. When answering the research question: “why are East Asian nations competing to host SMEs?” looking at the themes that have been raised from interview responses from each case study, it is worth noting that the only overlapping rationale for hosting SMEs was show-casing the nation to the global audience. The latter theme overlapped with all three case-study nations. East Asian countries (China, Korea and Japan) are in competition with each other due to their eagerness to show-case the nation to the world and flex their power and influence to other nations within the region. Also, when answering the research question: “what is the contemporary definition of soft power?” looking at the themes of how soft power is defined in the respective nations, the theme branding overlapped in all three nations. Although for the theme used for Japan was nation branding, according to Grix and Brannagan (2016), nation branding still falls in the similar category of branding. Although there was an overlapping theme in defining soft power, this thesis believes that every nation will have a different way of defining soft power as expressed earlier in this thesis.
The next key finding comes from the comparison of each nation’s (case study) soft power package (international soft power tactic). This will help in answering the research question: “Is there an East Asian style of hosting SMEs?” When looking at the first category, “Culture,” this strategy overlaps with all three nations, which means that nations want to disseminate or expose their national culture, identity, etc. to the global society and the common resource to be able to attempt this is by hosting SMEs. The next, “Tourism,” it shows that all three nations have a similar strategy with the ambitions of showcasing the nation to the world in order to raise the number of inbound tourists – evidently using different resources. With “Branding,” all nations had different goals since it is very possible all three nations had different strategies at the time of hosting the SME possibly due to the nations’ respective national situation. Also, “Diplomacy,” overlapped between Korean and China, whereas Japan had a different strategy. Korea and China were trying to find ways to show the nation’s attractiveness globally whereas Japan’s goal was to maintain their already strong global diplomatic status. Finally, “Trade,” the strategies do not overlap which leaves it out of being part of the regional soft power package. Therefore, the overall East Asian regional type of hosting SMEs can be created by focusing on the two strategies “Culture” and “Tourism.” Here, it must be noted that for “Culture”, the common resource to carry out the “cultural” goals is to host SMEs since sports in itself is categorized under sports. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that out of the three case-studies, Korea and Japan do not have hosting international sporting events as a key resource for attracting tourists – even though Korea and Japan continue to host many other SMEs up until the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics and Japan’s 2019 Rugby World Cup. With only 2 categories of the 5 overlapping, it is difficult to say that there is an East Asian style of hosting SMEs but it shows that any nation that were to host SMEs would want to express uniqueness when hosting a global sporting event. With these key findings the next section will discuss the thesis’ contribution to the field of study.

**Contribution to Field of Study**

This research was looking into how nations use SMEs, such as the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, to leverage soft power. Whilst there have been studies based on emerging nations’ usage of SMEs for leveraging soft power and how a SME can be a soft disempowerment, this thesis brings in the feature of comparing nations that have hosted SMEs
in their respective region – to this end, this thesis compared Korea, China, and Japan, the leading nations in hosting SMEs in East Asia. Although the comparison of nations was different, this research extends to prior research of the relations between SMEs and soft power. Also, this thesis contributes two more soft power packages, Korea and Japan, and a re-designed soft power package of China – although still in line with the works done by Grix et. al. (2019).

This thesis brings in how to compare soft power tactics amongst nations with the thought there will be overlapping soft power tactics which was the case with the likes of culture and tourism – showing that there is a possible East Asian SME soft power package. Understanding the thesis’ contribution to field of study, the next section will look into the research contribution to theory.

Contribution to Theory

The thesis shows further evidence of why nations around the world and in the East Asian region (Korea, China, and Japan) compete to host SMEs. Although the IOC and the Olympic movement may be in a difficult position, where the number of nations bidding have dropped (MacAloon, 2016), this thesis shows that the reason or rationale for wanting SMEs is not solely for economic benefits but more for attaining soft power. Evidently with all three case-study, all nations have a domestic, regional, and international soft power strategy when hosting SMEs. While using Grix and Brannagan’s (2016) mapped out soft power package and using it to discover the soft power tactics of Korea, China, and Japan, it easily showed their similarities and differences. With Korea, this thesis explains the emergence of Hallyu, and how hosting the 2002 World Cup enhanced its reach, leading up to its mainstream status and how it needs to proceed to be able to maintain it. This could be an additional contribution of the works of Nye and Kim (2013). With many works done on China and its soft power, many sources either do not touch in to or fail to explain China’s difficulties when it comes to soft power. This thesis touches into China’s domestic and international propaganda system and how it could be connected to the nation’s soft power scheme, or what is known as ruan shi li. It seems that China is frequently attempting to host SMEs not only to benchmark other East Asian nations but because the Communist party of China is prioritizing political legitimacy by national cohesion through a state-led socialist system – which may fit with Nye’s (2008) claim that countries must have norms such as national unity and equality for soft power to work. China may have national unity – but it is hard to say that national cohesion came fully from the will
of the citizens. Japan, the nation that leads in soft power in the region is soon to host the Olympics in the summer of 2021 and it seems that the nation is in need of a revival. Nye (2004) stated that Japan has redefined their national identity twice, during the Meiji Revolution and the second after the Second World War, and that Japan is in need of a third revival. This thesis brings up that hosting the 2020 Olympics and finding ways to internationalize their insular society is a good start to contributing to Nye’s idea of the nation’s third national identity revival. Overall, this thesis helps contribute to answer why East Asian nations are competing to host SMEs and what their regional ambitions are – another furthering of the many works that have connected SMEs with soft power. With such contributions to theory comes limits to the research.

Limitations

This thesis was short on using the same number of interviewees throughout each case-study, specifically for China. Also, a focus group was only used for the Korean case-study while and not for Japan and China. Following Yin’s (2003) multiple case-study approach, if there was an equal number of interviewees for each case-study, data triangulation and comparison would have been smoother. Also, since this thesis was a regional study of nations hosting SMEs to leverage soft power, touching into the East Asian geopolitical environment would also help understand how soft power is accepted amongst East Asian nations. For this thesis, the researcher has not used NVIVO for data analysis and it is possible the researcher may have missed an overlapping theme leaving space for a minor error in data triangulation. Also, in Korea’s and Japan’s SME soft power package, dealing with the category “Tourism,” it is possible that hosting international sporting events should be added in as a resource. Sporting events are known for bringing in a large number of tourists – even though it is difficult to justify that all inbound tourists at the time came for the purposes of the event. The importance of these tourists also comes to the idea of the multiplier effect where tourists will go back home and share their experiences with others and possibly bringing in more tourists to that nation. Due to this reason, it is arguable that hosting international sporting events should be added into Korea’s “Tourism” resources in its soft power package. Understanding a few of the limitations, the next section will conclude with further possible research that could derive from this thesis.
Further Research

If nations want to leverage soft power hosting an SME is one of the major tactics. When comparing it within a region it was interesting to notice the similarities and differences in soft power strategies. Recently, SMEs seem to be leaning towards co-hosted events since the US, Canada, and Mexico were chosen to host the 2026 World Cup. It would be interesting to see whether the relations of these three nations would improve with the usages of domestic, regional, and international soft power tactics – that could still differ even though being co-hosted. Another possible further research could be by following the regional comparison concept of this thesis and choosing SMEs that are closer together in time (i.e., Pyeongchang 2018, Tokyo 2020, and Beijing 2022). This way the comparisons of events could be more of ease. This thesis strongly believes that any nation whether developing, emerging, or developed that wants more recognition than it already has globally, must work on bidding and hosting a sport mega-event – especially when the nation has ambitions on leveraging its soft power. It is arguably one of the best and most popular soft power resources to invest on without necessarily the expectations of economic benefits. Even studies focusing on soft power leveraging highlight governments’ promises of legacies to the international non-governmental sports organizations and their national citizens. Brazil’s 2016 Rio Games arguably failed in terms of legacy and questions remain unanswered for future hosts. Having international sports organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, solely interested in the continuation of their respective events, and nations willing to do anything to acquire the hosting rights to these events, it is perhaps time to ask whether these organizations are selecting certain nations on the correct criteria. While the hope is to host an event that could easily win “hearts-and-minds” of global audiences, we need to ensure that host nations are adhering to basic human rights issues. This thesis represented the importance of SMEs for leveraging soft power for three different nations in East Asia and hopes it can be a useful reference to other nations that have the ambitions to host future SMEs.
Appendix 1 (Interview Questions)

Indicative Questions – adapted to each case study

1. What was Japan’s rationale to hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics?
2. How is it different from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics?
3. How does Japan define soft power?
4. How will Japan utilize Tokyo 2020 for regional, domestic and international soft power? Which one is Japan’s priorities?
5. What are some of the expected regional soft power outcomes?
6. Which soft power resources are supported by the government? Please describe.
7. How will Tokyo 2020 change the perception of Japan in the East Asian Region?
8. What foreign policy changes were made to host Tokyo 2020?
9. How is Japan attaining prestige within the East Asian region?
10. How do you think the Tokyo 2020 will be remembered within Japan and the East Asian region?
Appendix 2 (Interviewees)

Interviewees for Korea:

- Interviewee K1 (December, 2019): Lee Hong-gu (former Prime Minister of Korea; Chairman of the bidding committee for 2002 FIFA World Cup)

- Interviewee K2 (October, 2019): Im Chae-min (former Minister of Health and Welfare; 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup Director of Media Support for the World Cup Organizing Committee)

- Interviewee K3 (November, 2019): Suh Kang-soo (Director of the Foreign Culture Promotion Agency of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism)

- Interviewee K4 (November, 2019): Ma Young-sam (Public Diplomacy Ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Korean Ambassador to Denmark and Israel)

- Interviewee K5 (October, 2019): Jeon han-jin (Secretary General of the Korean Football Association; 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup Korean National Team Interpreter)

- Interviewee K6 (October, 2019): Lee Elisa (former Member of the National Assembly; 1973 Sarajevo World Table Tennis Championships Gold Medalist)

- Interviewee K7 (November, 2019): Kim Jong-up (Vice President of the Korea Culture and Information)

- Interviewee K8 (November, 2019): Lim Woo-taek (CEO of BRION Sports Business Group)

- Interviewee K9 (October, 2019): Yook Dong-han (Korean Presidential Secretariat; 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Executive Committee Member)

- Interviewee K10 (October, 2019): Lee Yong-soo (former Vice President of the Korean Football Association; Professor at Sejong University Department of Education)

Focus Group (November, 2019)
- Associate Professor Choi Young-joon (Yonsei University Department of Public Administration)

- Associate Professor Jeong Hun-joo (Yonsei University Department of Public Administration)

- Professor Lee Jung-wook (Yonsei University Department of Public Administration)

**Interviewees for China**

- Interviewee CA (November, 2019): Anonymous

- Interviewee C1 (November, 2019): Professor Li Nan (Senior Researcher at Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

- Interviewee C2 (November, 2019): Professor Liu Jiang Hong (Vice Dean at School of Cultural Industries Management, Communication University of China)

- Interviewee C3 (November, 2019): Ashley Xue (Associate senior editor in CCTV; Television Broadcasting of the 2008 Olympic Games by BOB Company)

- Interviewee C4 (November, 2019): Associate Professor Sun He Yun (Communication University of China, School of International Studies)

**Interviewee for Japan**

- Interviewee JA (November, 2019): Anonymous

- Interviewee J1 (December, 2019): Hiroshi Takeuchi (Kyodo News Editorial Writer and Senior Feature Writer)
- Interviewee J2 (December, 2019): Assistant Professor Hiroaki Funahashi (Waseda University Faculty of Sport Sciences)

- Interviewee J3 (December, 2019): Yoshiko Kojo:

- Interviewee J4 (November, 2019): Professor Yu Uchiyama (University of Tokyo Department of Advanced Social and International Studies)

- Interviewee J5 (December, 2019): Shotaro Kidaka (Project Director Client Group Ticketing Team for The Organizing Committee of the Olympics Paralympic Games)

- Interviewee J6 (December, 2019): Professor Nobuko Tanaka (Toin University of Yokohama, Department of Culture and Sport Policy)

- Interviewee J7 (November, 2019): Professor Nobuhiro Hiwatari (University of Tokyo Institute of Social Sciences)

- Interviewee J8 (December, 2019): Yosuke Fujiwara (former Executive Board Member of the Japanese Olympic Committee)

- Interviewee J9 (December, 2019): Wataru Masuda (Japanese Olympic Committee International Relations Department)
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