



Please cite the Published Version

Ellison, Mark , Pollock, Gary  and Grimm, Robert (2020) Young People's Orientations Towards Contemporary Politics: Trust, Representation and Participation. *Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft*, 23 (6). pp. 1201-1226. ISSN 1434-663X

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11618-020-00984-4>

Publisher: Springer Verlag

Version: Accepted Version

Downloaded from: <https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/626895/>

Additional Information: This is an Author Accepted Manuscript of a paper accepted for publication in *Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft*, published by and copyright Springer.

Enquiries:

If you have questions about this document, contact openresearch@mmu.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in e-space. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our Take Down policy (available from <https://www.mmu.ac.uk/library/using-the-library/policies-and-guidelines>)

Metadata of the article that will be visualized online

Article Title	Young people's orientations towards contemporary politics: Trust, representation and participation	
Journal Name	Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft	
CopyrightHolder	The Editors of the Journal (This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)	
Corresponding Author	Family name:	Ellison
	Particle:	
	GivenName:	Mark
	Suffix:	
	Organization:	Manchester Metropolitan University
	Address:	M15 6LL Manchester, UK
	Email:	m.ellison@mmu.ac.uk
Author	Family name:	Pollock
	Particle:	
	GivenName:	Gary
	Suffix:	
	Organization:	Manchester Metropolitan University
	Address:	M15 6LL Manchester, UK
	Email:	g.pollock@mmu.ac.uk
Author	Family name:	Grimm
	Particle:	
	GivenName:	Robert
	Suffix:	
	Organization:	Ipsos
	Address:	Paris, France
Schedule	Received:	7 January 2020
	Revised:	17 July 2020
	Accepted:	19 October 2020
	Published online:	
Abstract	<p>Over the last thirty years voter turnout in elections at both national and European levels has in many countries fallen albeit with some notable increases in the most recent years. This, together with a decline in the perception of political efficacy and falling trust in political institutions, has been argued to have resulted in a democratic deficit (Norris 2011). Drawing on original data from thirty research locations in fourteen European countries as part of the MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) project we explore young people's attitudes towards politics and their political behaviour. Our research confirms findings in existing literature: many young people feel that their political system is not working for them. Our results show that many young people harbour deep-seated cynicism towards the political class and tend not to trust political institutions including parliament and political parties. We also demonstrate, however, that the majority of young people are, in fact, interested in politics. Moreover, young people tend to support democracy as a political system. They also continue to perceive voting as the most effective form of participation. That a considerable number of young people are not actively participating in political processes is at odds with their professed beliefs. This paper contributes to understanding the contemporary political orientation of young people by exploring both their attitudes and behaviour.</p>	

Zusammenfassung In den vergangenen dreißig Jahren ist die Wahlbeteiligung junger Bürger in nationalen und europäischen Wahlen kontinuierlich gefallen. Kürzliche Ausnahmen bestätigen die Regel. Abnehmende politische Effizienz und fallendes Vertrauen in Institutionen resultierten in einem demokratischen Defizit (Norris 2011). Basierend auf quantitative Primärdaten aus dreißig Regionen in vierzehn europäischen Ländern untersuchen wir das Interesse, die Einstellungen und Meinungen junger Menschen zu Politik und ihr Handeln bzw. ihre aktive Teilhabe an politischen Prozessen. Die Daten wurden als Teil des MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) Projekts erhoben.

Unsere Forschung bestätigt die in bestehender Literatur dargestellten Ergebnisse: viele junge Menschen glauben, dass ihre Interessen durch das politische System nicht vertreten werden. Sie hegen einen tiefen Zynismus gegenüber der politischen Klasse und tendieren dazu, politischen Institutionen, Parlamenten und Parteien nicht zu vertrauen. Aber unsere Daten zeigen auch, dass trotz dieses Misstrauens, ein Großteil junger Menschen sich durchaus für Politik interessiert und sich positiv für die Demokratie als politisches System ausspricht. Auch sehen die meisten von ihnen demokratische Wahlen als die effizienteste Form der Partizipation und Mitgestaltung. Diese positive Grundeinstellung steht im Widerspruch zur aktiven Beteiligung junger Menschen an politischen Prozessen. Dieser Beitrag trägt zum gegenwärtigen Verständnis politischen Verhaltens und den Einstellungen junger Menschen in Europa bei.

Keywords separated by '-' Democracy - Politics - Political efficacy - Political participation - Young people

Keywords separated by '-' Politische Partizipation - Demokratie - Europa - Jugendforschung - Vertrauen

Please note: Images appear in color online but will be printed in black and white

Young people's orientations towards contemporary politics: Trust, representation and participation

Mark Ellison  · Gary Pollock · Robert Grimm

Received: 7 January 2020 / Revised: 17 July 2020 / Accepted: 19 October 2020
© The Editors of the Journal

Abstract Over the last thirty years voter turnout in elections at both national and European levels has in many countries fallen albeit with some notable increases in the most recent years. This, together with a decline in the perception of political efficacy and falling trust in political institutions, has been argued to have resulted in a democratic deficit (Norris 2011). Drawing on original data from thirty research locations in fourteen European countries as part of the MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) project we explore young people's attitudes towards politics and their political behaviour. Our research confirms findings in existing literature: many young people feel that their political system is not working for them. Our results show that many young people harbour deep-seated cynicism towards the political class and tend not to trust political institutions including parliament and political parties. We also demonstrate, however, that the majority of young people are, in fact, interested in politics. Moreover, young people tend to support democracy as a political system. They also continue to perceive voting as the most effective form of participation. That a considerable number of young people are not actively participating in political processes is at odds with their professed beliefs. This paper contributes to understanding the contemporary political orientation of young people by exploring both their attitudes and behaviour.

Keywords Democracy · Politics · Political efficacy · Political participation · Young people

M. Ellison (✉) · Prof. G. Pollock
Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, M15 6LL, UK
E-Mail: m.ellison@mmu.ac.uk

Prof. G. Pollock
E-Mail: g.pollock@mmu.ac.uk

Dr. R. Grimm
Ipsos, Paris, France

Einstellungen junger Menschen zur Politik: Vertrauen, Wahrnehmung und Partizipation

Zusammenfassung In den vergangenen dreißig Jahren ist die Wahlbeteiligung junger Bürger in nationalen und europäischen Wahlen kontinuierlich gefallen. Kürzliche Ausnahmen bestätigen die Regel. Abnehmende politische Effizienz und fallendes Vertrauen in Institutionen resultierten in einem demokratischen Defizit (Norris 2011). Basierend auf quantitative Primärdaten aus dreißig Regionen in vierzehn europäischen Ländern untersuchen wir das Interesse, die Einstellungen und Meinungen junger Menschen zu Politik und ihr Handeln bzw. ihre aktive Teilhabe an politischen Prozessen. Die Daten wurden als Teil des MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) Projekts erhoben.

Unsere Forschung bestätigt die in bestehender Literatur dargestellten Ergebnisse: viele junge Menschen glauben, dass ihre Interessen durch das politische System nicht vertreten werden. Sie hegen einen tiefen Zynismus gegenüber der politischen Klasse und tendieren dazu, politischen Institutionen, Parlamenten und Parteien nicht zu vertrauen. Aber unsere Daten zeigen auch, dass trotz dieses Misstrauens, ein Großteil junger Menschen sich durchaus für Politik interessiert und sich positiv für die Demokratie als politisches System ausspricht. Auch sehen die meisten von ihnen demokratische Wahlen als die effizienteste Form der Partizipation und Mitgestaltung. Diese positive Grundeinstellung steht im Widerspruch zur aktiven Beteiligung junger Menschen an politischen Prozessen. Dieser Beitrag trägt zum gegenwärtigen Verständnis politischen Verhaltens und den Einstellungen junger Menschen in Europa bei.

Schlüsselwörter Politische Partizipation · Demokratie · Europa · Jugendforschung · Vertrauen

1 Introduction

Political participation takes many forms (Verba and Nie 1972) including voting in elections, non-electoral participation and protest action, and is shaped by demographics (Marien et al. 2010), democratic performance (Norris 2011) and political socialisation (Sigel 1965). Formal types of participation including voter turnout in elections at both national and European levels has in many countries fallen over the last thirty years, though there are indications that this is starting to reverse (Politico 2019). This trend is particularly pronounced among young voters (Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Sloam and Henn 2019) with studies suggesting that recent generations of young people are least likely to either vote (Kimberlee 2002; Wattenberg 2006) or to participate in formal political organisations such as political parties and trade unions (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). However, young people who are either too young to vote or wish to participate through broader political expressions (Pilkington and Pollock 2015), do so via non-electoral forms of participation and protest action (Stockemer 2014). Democracy, or ‘government by the people’ implies participation by the people (Coppedge et al. 2011; Lijphart 2012). A functioning democracy pre-

93 supposes broad participation of citizens in the political process. Falling participation,
94 together with a decline in the perception of political efficacy and falling trust in po-
95 litical institutions, has been argued to have resulted in a 'democratic deficit' (Norris
96 2011). Arguably, the growing democratic deficit has in recent years contributed to
97 increased levels of political volatility as evidenced by the emergence of new political
98 parties who have made quick gains in many European countries.

99 This paper draws on original data from 30 research locations in fourteen European
100 countries as part of the European Commission funded Framework Seven Research
101 Project Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE).
102 A common survey instrument was administered face to face to respondents who
103 were aged 16 to 25 at the time of the study in 2012/13. Utilising these data, we
104 explore how young people's attitudes towards politics and their political behaviour
105 varies across our study sites and European countries. Deploying multilevel regres-
106 sion analyses, we examine how factors including demographics, political sociali-
107 sation and perceived democratic performance act as both enablers and barriers to
108 a young person's political participation. The paper is structured as follows, first, we
109 present a summary of the theoretical framework and the development of our hy-
110 potheses; second, we describe our data and the methods employed; third, we present
111 our results before discussing results and conclusions.

112 113 114 **2 Theoretical framework**

115 116 **2.1 Political participation**

117
118 Participation is a broad umbrella term and despite the attention it has been given by
119 social science scholars, there is no agreed definition. A number of definitions focus
120 on the process of 'society shaping'. For instance, the Youth Partnership (2014, p. 1)
121 define participation as '*involvement and engagement of people in decision making*
122 *and shaping of their living conditions*'. Vromen (2003, p. 82f.) defines participa-
123 tion as '*acts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically*
124 *concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in*'.

125 Within participation, a distinction needs to be made between a narrow inter-
126 pretation of politics (Furlong and Cartmel 2012) as traditional, institutionalised,
127 conventional or direct forms of participation, such as voting and membership, and
128 broader political expressions (Pilkington and Pollock 2015) including non-institu-
129 tionalised or indirect forms of participation. Henn and Foard (2012, p. 65) suggest
130 that "*today's generation of young people are interested in political affairs, and they*
131 *are keen to play a more active role in the political process*". Young people want to
132 engage in politics, but less so in traditional party politics (Norris 1999, 2002). Non-
133 institutionalised forms of political participation allow young people to participate at
134 the same time keeping "*some distance from the political system by trying to have an*
135 *indirect impact on political decision-making or by circumventing the political system*
136 *all together*" (Marien et al. 2010, p. 189). This type of participation requires less
137 commitment and it is possible to opt-out at any point (Li and Marsh 2008; Trechsel
138 2007). Young people often now choose to participate in less professionalised and

139 controlled political activities such as in online forms of participation (Norris 2001),
140 political consumerism (Stolle et al. 2005) or non-institutionalised activities in gen-
141 eral (Norris 2003), leading to a diversification of political activities which young
142 people participate in. Over the past decades, there has been a move from collective
143 forms of participation to more individual forms, which mirrors theories around post-
144 materialism and individualisation (Inglehart 1977). Perhaps the various climate re-
145 lated activities taking place across the world during 2019, notable for its inclusion
146 of school children taking time off on Fridays to demonstrate (#FridaysfortheFuture),
147 inspired by the Swedish activist Greta Thunberg, shows these tendencies to have
148 become more strongly embedded.

149 Political Participation together with civic engagement (Berger 2009) are complex,
150 intertwined and evolving as new means of participation appear. Scholars have made
151 various attempts to develop typologies of participation (Berger 2009; Ekman and
152 Amna 2012; Teorell et al. 2007; Verba and Nie 1972). Typologies have become more
153 sophisticated and focus around a number of dimensions, for example Verba and Nie
154 (1972); voting, campaign activity, contacting and cooperative/communal activities
155 dimensions; or Teorell et al. (2007); electoral participation, consumer participation,
156 party activity, protest activity and contact activity. Ekman and Amna (2012) typology
157 incorporates different forms of non-participation (or disengagement), involvement,
158 including civic engagement (latent political) and political participation (manifest)
159 which are then segmented into individual forms and collective forms.

160 We utilise questions from the MYPLACE survey on, voting in national elections,
161 together with twenty additional questions covering different ways of being politically
162 active during the previous twelve months. Factor analysis is used to reduce the
163 number of items and to construct multi-item scales for our dependent variables.
164 Leading from the item reduction we identified a typology of three distinct groups
165 of political participation: Voting in National Elections, traditional forms of non-
166 electoral participation and protest action participation. The construction of these
167 categories of participation are explored in more detail in the methodology section
168 & Table 3 in the appendix.

169 Most research examines political engagement amongst young people at only
170 a single country level, with little attention across different countries (Kitanova 2019;
171 Norris 2003; Sloam 2016). Local political cultures and heritages can influence par-
172 ticipatory behaviour, act as catalyst of as barriers. Recently, studies have examined
173 issues across countries utilising the MYPLACE data (Grimm et al. 2017; Pollock
174 et al. 2015). Additional studies have utilised data from waves 1–5 of the European
175 Social Survey (ESS) (Sloam 2016) and Eurobarometer (2013) survey (Kitanova
176 2019) to examine youth political participation in the EU. These studies have identi-
177 fied that overall youth political participation varies across countries (Kitanova 2019;
178 Sloam 2016). These are particularly nuanced, and shaped by local context, indige-
179 nous participatory cultures (Sloam 2016), with differences between the wealth of
180 a state, and ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies (Kitanova 2019; Sloam 2016).

181 Our data is of importance in being able to comparatively analyse, using an input
182 harmonised instrument (Pollock 2018), a range of countries in terms of their diversity
183 of democratic experiences. Our analysis shows distinct differences between locations
184 in post-socialist countries which have shorter democratic trajectories than locations

185 in other parts of Europe, though sometimes these differences are not so clear and
 186 suggest that within this group that there is also significant diversity. The importance
 187 of political path dependency across Europe has been noted elsewhere (Kitanova
 188 2019). We incorporate Welfare State type (Kaariainen and Lehtonen 2006), includ-
 189 ing five categories; Post-socialist, Nordic, Conservative, Mediterranean and Liberal;
 190 the human development index (HDI) and the corruption perception index (CPI) as
 191 contextual variables. It is at this comparative level where our research makes the
 192 most substantial contribution to existing knowledge.

193 Therefore, we expect that:

194 H1: there are different levels of political participation, attitudes towards politics
 195 and political behaviour at both national and regional levels across Europe
 196

198 2.2 Demographics and participation

199
 200 The literature suggests that institutionalised political participation is unequal across
 201 specific demographic groups with age, gender, class and education all strongly
 202 correlating with political participation (Marien et al. 2010).

203 Age is a significant barrier to participation, with young people in most European
 204 countries not eligible to vote until they turn 18 years old. Politicians focus their at-
 205 tention predominantly on policy issues relevant to eligible voters. As a result, young
 206 people feel ignored and marginalised (Henn and Foard 2014), and are generally
 207 denied an effective voice and unable to play an active part in the political process
 208 (Furlong and Cartmel 2012, p. 26). This leads young people to participate in other
 209 forms of political expression including forms of protest politics (Stockemer 2014).

210 The literature frequently mentions gender as a significant barrier to participation
 211 with women engaging less than men (Inglehart and Norris 2003, Pfanzelt and Spies
 212 2018). It has been argued that gender socialisation from early life leads to lower
 213 levels of political motivation, interest, political knowledge and trust in political effi-
 214 cacy (Beauregard 2014, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). However, some authors have
 215 pointed out that women are more likely to participate in cause orientated than cam-
 216 paign orientated activism (Childs 2004). This is evident in recent years, with women
 217 gaining more visibility with the Friday for the Future and #MeToo movements.

218 The final focus is on social class. Socio-economic inequalities contribute to sig-
 219 nificant variations in political participation. Representative democracy has a middle-
 220 and upper-class bias (Touchton and Wampler 2014, p. 1446). People with higher
 221 incomes, higher education and stable family situations, are typically more likely to
 222 participate in politics (Milbrath and Goel 1977, Nie and Verba 1987) and social and
 223 political organisations (Rosenstone and Hansen 2002). Parents with higher levels of
 224 education and a high socio-economic status pass onto their children through political
 225 socialisation, political awareness and social capital, including access to community
 226 and education resources, which leads to increased political participation (Flanagan
 227 and Levine 2010). Therefore, we hypothesise that:

228 H2: participation is differentiated by demographics (age, gender and social
 229 class)
 230

2.3 Democratic performance and participation

Democratic performance is increasingly seen as a major factor in political participation. Democratic performance is defined and understood in different ways, however includes the following: “*regime endurance or longevity; government efficacy; and, the fulfilment of liberal democratic values, or as a measure of the quality of democracy itself*” (Foweraker and Landman 2002, p. 45). The democratic deficit (Norris 2011) is linked to falling trust in political institutions and the declining perception of political efficacy. Trust in government is a mainstay of democracy (Christensen and Laegreid 2003). Hooghe and Marien (2013) identify that citizens with high levels of political trust are more likely to participate in traditional or institutionalised forms of political participation. The reverse is true, with political trust negatively associated with participation in non-institutional forms. However, “*it needs to be stressed that being distrustful and critical of representative democratic institutions is not necessarily the same as apathy and disinterest in politics; in fact, quite the contrary*” (LSE 2013, p. 25). Negative press coverage of political integrity and performance has led to a negative orientation towards government and politicians, leading to cynicism and distrust (Dermody et al. 2010; Fu et al. 2011) therefore it is important to consider how young people are informed about politics and how media influences political efficacy and participation.

Verba et al. (1995) also state that both political interest and political efficacy are crucial determinants of political participation. Political efficacy or the perception of how citizens can effectively change politics through different means are explored by Niemi et al. (1991, p. 1407) who identify two components of political efficacy, including the self-perceived ability to understand politics and to participate in an effective manner. Henn and Foard (2014) distinguish between internal efficacy (own knowledge and understanding) and external efficacy (opportunities to participate meaningful in political affairs). These components also incorporate political competence and awareness (Hooghe and Marien 2013; Verba et al. 1995). The MYPLACE survey asked respondents three questions regarding political knowledge which were then aggregated into a political knowledge scale which can be considered as internal efficacy. This also links to interest in politics and how young people are kept informed about politics, as part of the political socialisation process (discussed below). External efficacy incorporates concerns regarding structural and institutional changes, which may lead to social dislocation, which makes young people less confident that political activity is likely to be effective (Horvath and Paolini 2014). These are considered as two types within the MYPLACE data, effectiveness of legal or non-violent activities and effectiveness of illegal or violent activities.

We also asked young people two questions around democracy; First, how young people feel about democracy as a political system. This is important due to Eastern European countries adopting democracies over communist regimes since 1989. Secondly, the performance of a democracy through issues of trust, cynicism, efficacy and perception of politicians being interested in young people all contribute to an overall satisfaction with democracy. We therefore hypothesis that:

H3: poor perceptions of democratic performance decrease participation

2.4 Political socialisation and participation

Sigel (1965) states that political socialisation is “*the process by which persons learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours accepted and practiced by the ongoing (political) system*”. Political socialisation of young people starts at home. In order to participate in politics, young people need information on which to base their participatory decisions and acts (Verba et al. 1995). This information through political discussion and political interest are the most important determinates of political participation (Marien et al. 2010). Research into political socialisation shows that children growing up in families who discuss politics, are more likely to acquire awareness, knowledge and understanding about politics, and a greater degree of political confidence (Henn and Foard 2014), increasing participation.

However, recent research has moved focus from parents and schools, and includes voluntary associations, mass media, peer groups and informal interactions (Hooghe 2004). Young people keep themselves informed about politics and current affairs through different forms of media consumption as well as discussion with peers. ‘Informational use of media stimulates youth discussion and expression, which in turn boosts civic and political participation’ (Lee et al. 2012, p. 686). Following from the above, we consider political socialisation at a number of levels: individual, family and institution levels.

At an individual level, the MYPLACE survey asked young people questions about political interest, political knowledge for example in Henn and Foard’s (2014) internal efficacy, and how much time the young person spends keeping themselves informed about politics/current affairs.

At a family level, we included learnt behaviours, including how often parents vote in elections, the perceived Interest in politics of parents, and how often the young person discusses political issues with their parents.

It is also important to consider the institutional level in the political socialisation (Hooghe 2004). Aside from school, religious institutions are among the few places where young people interact with adults outside their families (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009). Religious leaders, as spiritual and moral leaders, make *political* speeches raising awareness of issues and encouraging members to participate and act upon these (Djupe and Gilbert 2002; Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009). However, affiliation and attendance at religious institutions varies markedly across age groups and our study locations. Pew Research Center’s (2018) study of religious commitment identified that weekly attendance at religious institutions varied from 25% of the population in Portugal to only two percent in Estonia. Young people and adults also interact in other settings including clubs, groups and civic organisations. We also capture membership, participation and/or volunteering at fifteen different types of organisations, as a participation index. Therefore, In this paper, we incorporate attendance at religious events and participation across a range of organisations, as forms of organisational political socialisation. Young people who have access to a range of organisations develop social capital, leading to an increase in political participation (Flanagan and Levine 2010). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis;

H4: political socialisation (through political interest and knowledge, parents voting and discussing politics and organisational contacts) increases the levels of participation

Finally, we aim to understand differences in political participation of young people across Europe. One of the main goals of this research was to explore how local context influences participatory behaviour. Therefore, we expect;

H5: that the local context (i.e. demographics, democratic performance and political socialisation) are significant between different forms of participation.

3 Data and methodology

3.1 MYPLACE data

The MYPLACE questionnaire survey was a common research instrument administered to a representative sample of 16–25 year olds in 30 carefully selected research locations (illustrated in Fig. 1) in 14 different countries. The data was collected between September 2012 and April 2013, with an achieved overall sample of 16,935. Each participating country selected two contrasting locations (with 4 in Germany: 2 in the old East and 2 in the old West) where the criteria for selection was that there were a priori reasons to suggest that the attitudes, behaviour and experiences of the young people would be different. This means that we have a range of re-




Fig. 1 Research locations included in the MYPLACE project

369 search sites, each with distinct features which are unique to themselves and which
370 require an understanding of local as well as national contexts to fully appreciate the
371 reasons why young people hold the attitudes that they do. It is important to reiterate
372 that these are a series of local case studies and not nationally representative results
373 (Pollock 2018). This data set captured an important moment in Europe at the start
374 of the wave of post austerity populism that has swept through the continent. The
375 seeds of the contemporary hold that populist and Eurosceptic forms of politics have
376 taken are present in this data and formed important analytic themes (Grimm et al.
377 2017; Pollock et al. 2015).

378 Participating countries reflect European diversity in terms of level of integration
379 (for instance EMU and Schengen membership), length of membership (founding
380 members like Germany, second Spain and Portugal and third wave Estonia, Slovakia)
381 prospective members (in case of Croatia), welfare regimes and historic legacies (post
382 socialist, southern European dictatorships, long established stable democracies). We
383 can also differentiate between degrees of impact of the recent economic crisis and the
384 sovereign debt crisis with stable economies in the north and economies struggling
385 with austerity measures in the south.

386 387 **3.2 Approach to data analysis**

388
389 The analysis of the MYPLACE data are presented in two sections. The first section
390 provides a descriptive analysis at either a consortium wide level or a location level
391 (based on the 30 individual locations) for key dependent variables including: 'vot-
392 ing in national elections', 'traditional participation', 'protest action participation'. To
393 analyse the political behaviour of young people beyond electoral participation, the
394 MYPLACE survey included questions on 20 different political activities (see Table 3
395 in the appendix). Respondents were asked if they had undertaken each of these ac-
396 tivities once, twice or three or more times in the last 12 months. Factor analysis was
397 used to identify specific components within the 20 activities and for the purposes
398 of this paper two groups are used; traditional forms of participation (five activities)
399 and protest action (five activities). These groups were tested for internal reliability
400 using Cronbach's alpha at a consortium and national level to ensure a consistent
401 measure of the concept. To standardise each derived variable, a participation score
402 out of 100 was created for each. We then present key independent variables ad-
403 dressing barriers to participation of; 'efficacy', 'trust towards core national political
404 institutions', 'cynicism: attitudes towards politicians and politics', 'satisfaction with
405 democracy', 'positive views towards a democratic system'. Independent variables
406 were constructed using the same method as the dependent variables, drawing on
407 a range of questions and tested for internal reliability.

408 Secondly, we present three multi-level regression models, to identify significant
409 coefficients of participation and to compare and contrast the different forms of partic-
410 ipation. Multi-level regression models are appropriate when data are nested, like the
411 MYPLACE data i.e. individuals within a study location, nested within a country. The
412 literature suggests that a number of variables should be predictors of participation.
413 As discussed, these can be grouped under demographics, democratic performance,
414 political socialisation, and contextual. We have included demographic variables such

415 as age and gender, together with parental social class (parental employment and ed-
416 ucation when respondent was aged 14). Democratic performance includes the levels
417 of trust in political institutions, cynicism towards politicians, interest that politicians
418 have in young people, together with satisfaction with democracy, positive views
419 towards a democratic system and efficacy (both non-violent/legal and violent/illegal
420 efficacy. Political socialisation includes Individual influences includes; the young
421 person's political interest, political knowledge (Internal efficacy) and how much
422 time they spend keeping yourself informed about politics/current affairs. Family
423 influences includes; Interest in politics of parents, how often they discuss political
424 issues with parents and how often do parents vote in elections. Organisational influ-
425 ences included attendance at religious events, membership of political parties and
426 a civic participation index. In addition to the individual variables additional contex-
427 tual variables we have used are Welfare State type (Kaariainen and Lehtonen 2006),
428 including five categories; Post-socialist, Nordic, Conservative, Mediterranean and
429 Liberal; the human development index (HDI) and the corruption perception index
430 (CPI).

431 Table 4 in the appendix illustrates the logic of the thematic clustering for the
432 independent variables used in the regression modelling. Three models were tested:
433 Model A: Traditional participation, Model B: Protest Action and Model C: Voting
434 (only eligible participants)—have voted/have not voted for a variety of reasons.
435 The dependent variables for traditional participation and protest action participation
436 are scale variables (measured on a 0–100 scale with 0 = no participation, maximum
437 participation); therefore a standard multi-level model is used. Voting is a binary
438 variable (1 = voted, 0 = did not vote), therefore a logistic multi-level model is used.

439

440

441 4 Results

442

443 4.1 Describing youth political engagement across Europe

444

445 The descriptive analysis that follows presents, for each location in the study, the
446 mean values on a series of scales and variables which help us to understand the
447 aggregate picture across Europe, and address H1: that there are different levels of
448 political participation, attitudes towards politics and political behaviour at national
449 and regional levels across Europe. These charts are colour coded (red, green, purple
450 and blue) to match the country groupings illustrated in Fig. 1. Figs. 2, 3 and 4
451 present our dependant variables, Figs. 5, 6 and 7 illustrate democratic performance,
452 and Figs. 8 and 9 forms of political socialisation.

453 Firstly, looking at the whole sample of young people in all our research locations
454 who were eligible to vote, 70.3% voted in the last national election. This is con-
455 siderably higher than results in the Eurobarometer and ESS studies and reinforces
456 the need to understand that our survey data is not nationally representative but is
457 representative of the chosen locations. Of the eligible young people who didn't vote,
458 11.7% were 'unable to on the day', 8.0% stated that 'for me, voting or not is equally
459 pointless', 5.9% stated that 'no party aligned to views' and 4.1% 'did not vote to
460 show my dissatisfaction with politicians and parties'.

Fig. 2 Overall Voting in National Elections (%) by location





Fig. 2 illustrates the percentage of young people voting in national elections broken down by research location. The locations vary to a large degree from Odense Center (DK), with 94.2%, and Nuneaton (UK), 38.7% with the lowest rates of voting. Of interest is the relative closeness most pairs of national locations, with the exception of Finland, which suggests that for many countries there may be evidence of a national propensity.

Fig. 3 illustrates the participation scale for young people taking part in traditional forms of participation (5 activities) 12 months prior to the survey. The survey asked if respondents had; ‘Volunteered in an election campaign’, ‘Contacted a politician or local councillor’, ‘Collected signatures’, ‘Given a political speech’, or ‘Distributed leaflets with a political content’. These questions have been used to create a participation scale on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing most active. The overall average for all locations is 3.31 demonstrating low levels of participation. This varies from Jena (DE-E), with 5.3, with the highest score of traditional participation to Sopron (HU), 0.4 with the lowest rates.

Fig. 4 illustrates the participation scale for young people taking part in forms of protest action participation (5 activities) 12 months prior to the survey. The survey asked a series of Protest Action questions; including; ‘Participated in a demonstra-


Fig. 3 Traditional forms of Participation by location



tion', 'Participated in a strike', 'Participated in a violent political event', 'Occupied buildings or blocked streets/railways' and 'Participated in a 'flashmob''. These questions have been used to create a protest action scale on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing most active. The overall average for all locations is 5.4 demonstrating low levels of protest action participation. There is a large variation between locations, varying from Sant Cugat (ES) 20.10 with the highest scale of protest action participation to Ozd (HU), 1.0 with the lowest rates. Locations in Spain, Greece, and Germany have the highest proportions of young people participating in protest actions. We need to remember that during this time there were a great many demonstrations in Greece and Spain protesting about austerity and the strategy of the EU in regard to countries with acute financial problems.

Fig. 5 illustrates young people's trust in political institutions. The survey asked questions regarding levels of trust towards 'core national political institutions', 'the head of government/PM', 'parliament' and 'political parties'. These were combined to create a 'Trust' variable and standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing the greatest trust. The overall average for all locations is 41.8 demonstrating relatively low levels of trust towards political institutions. This varies from Kuopio

Fig. 4 Protest Action by location




(FIN) with 61.8 with the highest levels of trust to Argyroupouli (GRE) with 24.2 with the lowest levels of trust.

Fig. 6 illustrates young people levels of cynicism towards politicians and politics. The survey asked two questions; ‘Politicians are corrupt’ and ‘The rich have too much influence over politics’ which have been combined to create a ‘Cynicism’ variable standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing most cynical. The overall average for all locations is 69.2 demonstrating high levels of cynicism towards politicians and politics. This varies from New Philadelphia (GRE) with 85.7 with the highest levels of cynicism to Odense Center (DEN), 43.2 with the lowest levels of cynicism. Locations in Mediterranean countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain are most cynical of politicians and politics.

Both Figs. 5 and 6 suggest a certain Nordic propensity for high trust/low cynicism and the opposite for the Mediterranean locations. It is of interest that the post-socialist locations sat between these two poles.

The survey asked the question ‘On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?’ This was standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing most satisfied. The overall average for all locations is 50.1 demonstrating average levels of satisfaction with democracy. This varied from Odense Center


Fig. 5 Trust in political institutions by location

(DEN) with 74.3, with the highest satisfaction with democracy to New Philadelphia (GRE), 33.4 with the lowest satisfaction with democracy. There is strong regional variations with locations in Denmark, Finland and Germany with the highest levels of satisfaction followed by post-socialist countries and Mediterranean countries the lowest levels of satisfaction.

Respondents were also asked about their support for democratic systems 'Having a democratic, multi-party system' and 'Having an opposition that can freely express its views'. These were combined and standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing high levels of support towards democratic systems. The overall average for all locations is 72.7, demonstrating very high levels of support for Democratic systems. This varies from Odense Center (DEN), 86.3, with the highest levels of support to Vyborg (RUS), 59.3 with the lowest levels of support.

Fig. 7 illustrates very clear regional groupings when comparing mean location values of satisfaction with democracy (x-axis with low satisfaction on the left to high satisfaction of the right) by views on democratic systems (y-axis with negative views at the bottom to positive views at the top). Locations in the Mediterranean countries (blue) cluster and have positive views on democratic systems, but have level low levels of satisfaction with democracy. The Danish, German and Finnish

Fig. 6 Cynicism by location



(green) locations are generally clustered in the top right with positive views towards democratic systems and high levels of satisfaction with democracy. Locations in post-socialist countries (red) are clustered occupying the centre of the graph. Of the two UK locations, Coventry is closest to the Danish and Germans and Nuneaton with the post-socialist locations cluster.

Young people's interest in politics is captured in Fig. 8, standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing the most interested. The overall average for all locations is 44.6, demonstrating medium levels of interest in politics. This varies from Jena (DE-E) with 61.7 with the highest levels of interest to Sopron (HU), 30.0 with the lowest levels of interest. Young people in locations in Germany and Denmark are clearly have the most interest in politics, and locations in Hungary are least interested, though low levels are also observed in locations in Latvia, Slovakia and Portugal.

Taking political interest a little further, Fig. 9 illustrates the frequency of young people discussing political issues with parents, standardised on a 0 to 100 scale, with 100 representing the highest frequency. The overall average for all locations is 33.3 demonstrating low frequencies of discussion. This varies from Sant Cugat (ES) with 46.8, with the highest frequency of discussion, to Sopron (HU), 23.7 with the lowest

Mean location values for satisfaction with democracy (x) by positive views on democratic systems (y) ($r=0.414$)




Fig. 7 Satisfaction with democracy by positive views on democratic systems ($n=10,899$)

frequency of discussion. Moreover, there is strong regional variations with locations in Spain and Denmark with the highest frequency of discussion about politics. Post-socialist countries have the lowest frequency of discussion about politics. There is, as would be expected a certain correspondence between the responses to this question and general political interest.


4.2 Enablers and barriers to political participation

The multilevel regression analysis that follows, presents variables the literature states should be predictors of participation at an individual level, together with broader country level contextual variables. Results from the multiple regression analysis addresses hypotheses 2–5. Table 1 illustrate the results if the three regression models (empty model, individual level and country level variables) for each of the three dependent variables.

The importance of locally specific explanations (hence multi-level modelling) is illustrated by the intra class correlations. For two of the three models demonstrates that it would be inappropriate to treat the data set as unstructured. The analysis must take into account that there are 30 different locations as by doing so the predictive power of the models is significantly enhanced by 16.4% for protest action and 7.7% for voting, however, public traditional is only 1.8%.

Table 2 presents the coefficients (B), levels of significance and standard error (SE) for individual and contextual variables for the three models. Firstly, addressing the contextual variables; the country level variable indicating welfare state type (Esping-Andersen 1990, Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006) identified a significant contrast between post-socialist countries and Mediterranean countries, which are

Fig. 8 Young person's interest in Politics by location




more likely to participate in protest action; and Liberal (UK) locations which are less likely to vote. The higher a country is on the Human Development Index, the more likely young people are to vote ($p < 0.01$) and participate in protest action ($p < 0.1$). These findings further support H1, however, the corruptions perception index is not a significant contextual variable. Table 2 presents coefficients under the following groups, by our three types of participation. This allows a comparison between the types to test H5. These are discussed individually and across models below.

4.3 Demographics barriers

With regards to demographic barriers (H2), contrary to the literature (Marien et al. 2010), there were no statistical significant differences between males and females for traditional forms of participation and voting in national elections. However, males were more likely (at $p < 0.1$) than females to participate in protest action. This is likely due to the gender socialisation. The youngest in the survey are more likely to participate in traditional participation and protest action than older youth because these are the only means to participate politically at such a young age. Of the

Fig. 9 Talk to parent's about politics by location



young people who were eligible to vote, the older amongst them were most likely to vote ($p < 0.1$). Social class shows to be significantly associated with participation. Respondents with a lower parental class are less likely to participate in traditional forms and protest action than respondents with a high parental social class. This is also true for voting in national elections, although at $p < 0.1$.

4.4 Democratic performance barriers

Addressing H3, young people with lower levels of trust in political institutions and higher levels of cynicism are more likely to participate in protest action. However, young people who are less cynical about politicians are more likely to vote. Young people with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy are more likely to participate in traditional forms and protest action. Efficacy shows to be significantly associated with participation, in accordance with Norris (2011). Legal forms of efficacy have positive significant relationships with voting, traditional and protest action forms of participation. As expected, respondents who feel that illegal forms of efficacy (illegal and violent protest activities) can influence politics in their country have a significant positive association with protest action and a significant negative

Table 1 Variance components of regression models

		Empty model (random intercept only)—Model 0	With individual level explanatory var's—Model 1	With country level explanatory var's—Model 2
<i>Model A:</i>	σ (individual level)	0.009690	0.007437	0.007437
<i>Public</i>	σ (location level)	0.000176	0.000057	0.000051
<i>Tradi-</i>	-2 log likelihood	-19,575.6	-22,252.8	-22,207.6
<i>tional</i>	df	3	27	33
<i>Model B:</i>	σ (individual level)	0.009871	0.008475	0.008475
<i>Protest</i>	σ (location level)	0.001933	0.001337	0.000692
<i>Action</i>	-2 log likelihood	-19,275.3	-20,718.9	-20,703.0
	df	3	27	33
<i>Model C:</i>	σ (individual level)	0.522718	0.2308272	0.224420
<i>Voting</i>	σ (location level)	0.147076	0.091384	0.077485
	-2 log likelihood	32,376.709	34,164.147	34,208.155
	df	3	27	33

($p < 0.05$) association with voting in national elections. Respondents with positive views to democracy as a political system are more likely to vote. Respondents with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy are more likely to participate in both traditional and protest action.

4.5 Political socialisation

Hypothesis (H4) addresses political socialisation though individual political interest and knowledge, parental influence and organisational contacts is examined at multiple levels. As literature has stated (Marien et al. 2010), young people who are interested in politics are significantly ($p < 0.001$) more likely to participate in the three forms of participation. Respondents with the highest knowledge of politics are more likely to vote in national elections than respondents with less knowledge. However, respondents with limited political knowledge are more likely to participate in protest action than respondents with the highest political knowledge. Although significant, young people keeping themselves informed about political issues has a negligible effect. Political socialisation via parents is significant, which is consistent with previous studies (Henn and Foard 2014). The more the young people discuss politics with their parents, the more likely they are to participate in traditional voting forms of participation and protest action. Parents participating in elections also has a strong association with young people voting ($p < 0.001$) and participating ($p < 0.1$). However, parents' interest in politics has a negative association with both traditional forms of participation and voting.

As we had expected, at an organisational level, young people who are members of political parties are more likely to participate and vote than non-members. This is also the case for young people who participate in a range of civic engagements. Similarly, young people who attend religious events on a frequent basis are more likely to vote than people who don't. It is of interest, however, that young people

Table 2 Multilevel regression models for traditional participation (A), protest action (B) and voting (C)

	Model A: Traditional n2 = 33 n1 = 10,902			Model B: Protest Action n2 = 33 n1 = 10,899			Model C: Voting n2 = 33 n1 = 7008		
	B		SE	B		SE	Exp(B)		SE
Intercept	0.129	*	0.057	-0.254	-	0.170	0.001	**	2.655
Individual variables									
<i>Demographics</i>									
Male	0.002	-	0.002	0.003	~	0.002	1.056	-	0.088
Female (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Age	-0.001	*	0.000	-0.001	*	0.000	1.034	~	0.019
Parental Social Class 1: (low)	-0.005	*	0.002	-0.008	***	0.002	0.821	~	0.104
Parental Social Class 2	-0.004	-	0.003	-0.007	*	0.003	1.115	-	0.110
Parental Social Class 3	-0.001	-	0.003	-0.002	-	0.003	1.074	-	0.099
Parental Social Class 4: High (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Democratic performance</i>									
Trust in Political Institutions	-0.001	-	0.005	-0.022	***	0.006	0.980	-	0.256
Cynicism	0.009	*	0.005	0.018	***	0.005	0.712	*	0.147
Politicians interest in Young People	-0.014	***	0.004	0.004	-	0.004	0.771	-	0.196
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.016	**	0.004	-0.043	***	0.005	0.939	-	0.252
Positive view towards Democracy	-0.013	**	0.005	-0.009	-	0.005	1.679	*	0.247
Legal Efficacy	0.029	***	0.006	0.028	***	0.006	2.156	*	0.273
Illegal Efficacy	-0.003	-	0.004	0.042	***	0.004	0.662	***	0.122
<i>Political Socialisation</i>									
Interest in Politics	0.043	***	0.004	0.030	***	0.004	3.011	***	0.129
Political Knowledge 1: Low	0.005	~	0.003	0.010	**	0.004	0.371	***	0.156
Political Knowledge 2	-0.001	-	0.003	-0.002	*	0.003	0.439	***	0.119

Table 2 (Continued)

	Model A: Traditional n2= 33 n1= 10,902		Model B: Protest Action n2= 33 n1= 10,899		Model C: Voting n2= 33 n1= 7008				
	B	SE	B	SE	Exp(B)	SE			
Political Knowledge 3	-0.001	-	0.002	0.001	~	0.002	0.750	**	0.105
Political Knowledge 4: High (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Inform on politics	0.000	***	0.000	0.000	***	0.000	1.001	-	0.001
Parent's interest in politics	-0.024	***	0.004	-0.005	-	0.004	0.662	*	0.175
Talk to parents about politics	0.020	***	0.004	0.018	***	0.005	1.511	**	0.146
Parents have voted	0.006	~	0.003	0.007	~	0.004	6.483	***	0.171
Religious Events: never	0.001	-	0.003	0.015	***	0.003	0.613	***	0.121
Religious Events: Frequent (ref)	-0.001	-	0.002	0.005	-	0.003	0.800	*	0.088
Religious Events: Frequent (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Member of political party: No	-0.165	***	0.005	-0.046	***	0.005	0.544	*	0.254
Member of political party: Yes (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Participate Index	0.261	***	0.010	0.293	***	0.011	5.598	***	0.484
Contextual variables									
Nordic	-0.011	-	0.010	-0.013	-	0.030	0.929	-	0.485
Conservative	-0.009	-	0.009	0.015	-	0.029	0.541	-	0.399
Mediterranean	-0.010	~	0.005	0.045	**	0.016	0.756	-	0.231
Liberal	0.002	-	0.009	-0.035	-	0.029	0.202	***	0.307
Post-socialist (Ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Human Dev. Index	0.069	-	0.072	0.399	~	0.217	2992.917	**	2.684
Corruptions Per. Index	0.000	-	0.000	-0.001	-	0.001	0.999	-	0.008

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ~ $p < 0.1$

967 who never attend religious events are more likely to participate in protest action than
968 young people who do attend religious events.

971 5 Conclusion

972
973 The political participation of young people varies significantly across Europe at both
974 national and regional levels, confirming previous studies at a European cultural level
975 (Kitanova 2019; Sloam 2016) and hypothesis 1. Our descriptive analyses identifies
976 that there are distinct clustering of participation, views on democratic performance
977 and political socialisation by welfare state region, representing age of democracy and
978 local context including impact of the economic crisis. This study has identified that
979 there are significant barriers to participation as identified in the literature (Hooghe
980 and Marien 2013). Our regression models identify that young people from families
981 with low parental social class are less likely to participate in voting, traditional
982 forms of participation and protest action than those young people from families
983 who high parental social class. Young people are more likely to participate in non-
984 electoral forms (traditional and protest action) than older people, and older people
985 are more likely to vote (18–24 in sample), although, beta coefficients are small.
986 Gender is not significant (apart from males for protest action), although in general
987 confirms hypothesis 2 that participation is differentiated by demographics. Political
988 socialisation of young people is an important factor towards increasing levels of
989 participation confirming hypothesis 4. Young people who are more interested in
990 politics are more likely to participate, higher political knowledge is significantly
991 linked to voting in national elections, however, young people with lower political
992 knowledge are more likely to participate in protest action. Family influences such as
993 talking with parents about politics and parents voting have significant positive effect
994 on participation. Frequent attendance at religious events increases the likelihood of
995 voting, however, young people who never attend religious events are more likely to
996 participate in protest action. Political party membership and participation in various
997 forms of civic engagement increases all forms of participation.

998 Young people who are more cynical are less likely to vote and more likely to
999 participate in protest action. Lower trust in political institutions also increases protest
1000 action. Young people with positive views towards democracy are more likely to vote.
1001 However, there are higher levels of traditional participation, when young people have
1002 more negative views towards democratic systems and less satisfied with democracy.
1003 Therefore, the findings are mixed in confirming hypothesis 3: poor perceptions
1004 of democratic performance decrease participation, however confirm hypothesis 5:
1005 that different predictors are significant between forms of participation. Traditional
1006 and protest action forms of participation are different from the voting in national
1007 elections. Voting is more ‘universal’ than the other forms of participation. Young
1008 people participating in traditional forms in general have stronger negative democratic
1009 barrier perceptions, but this provides an avenue to participate at a young age.

1010 There are a number of limitations of this study; first, a single cohort only pro-
1011 vides a snapshot in time (2012/13), a time of economic crisis and the sovereign debt
1012 crisis with stable economies in the north and economies struggling with austerity

1013 measures in the south clearly influencing the results. The case study approach is
1014 not nationally representative, therefore not fully comparable with the ESS or Euro-
1015 barometer surveys, nor comparison with adult populations (Sloam 2016). Also, we
1016 have only examined aggregate forms of participation, rather than the 20 individual
1017 types that were used to construct them. Nonetheless, our data represents an impor-
1018 tant historical era during which the immediate effects of the financial crisis were
1019 felt across Europe. In addition, through the questionnaire being input harmonised it
1020 is fully comparable between the research locations and is therefore superior to any
1021 other international comparison of youth political participation undertaken hitherto.

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

1031

1032

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

Appendix

Table 3 Dependent variable construction

Questions	Variable	Cronbach alpha
There are different ways of being politically active. During the last 12 months, how often have you done the following? (never, once, twice, three times or more)	Traditional participation	Alpha= 0.690, varies from 0.529 in western Germany to 0.810 in Hungary
– Volunteered in an election campaign		
– Contacted a politician or local councillor (e-mail/ phone/SMS/letter/fax etc)		
– Collected signatures		
– Given a political speech		
– Distributed leaflets with a political content		
There are different ways of being politically active. During the last 12 months, how often have you done the following? (never, once, twice, three times or more)	Protest Action	Alpha= 0.621, varies from 0.308 in Finland to 0.795 in Hungary
– Participated in a demonstration		
– Participated in a strike		
– Participated in a violent political event		
– Occupied buildings or blocked streets/railways		
– Participated in a 'flashmob' (a spontaneous demonstration organised by social media)	Voting	–
Derived variable from;		
Did you vote in the last [country] national election?		
Could you tell me which of the following reasons best explain why you did not vote? (excluding "I was not eligible")		

Table 4 Thematic clustering of independent variables in the regression modelling

Theme	Sub-theme	Variables used			
Barriers	Demographics	Age			
		Gender			
		Parental Social Class			
	Democratic Performance		Trust towards core national institutions		
			Cynicism		
			Politicians interested in Young People		
			Satisfaction with Democracy		
			Positive views towards a democratic system		
			Efficacy		
			External efficacy (Non Violent Efficacy)		
			External efficacy (Violent/Illegal Efficacy)		
			Political Socialisation	<i>Individual</i>	Political Interest
					Internal efficacy: Political Knowledge
		<i>Family</i>	How much time to spend keeping yourself informed about politics/current affairs (Inform)		
			Interest in politics of parents		
			Discuss political issues with parents		
			How often do parents vote in elections		
Attendance at Religious Events					
Contextual		<i>Other institutions</i>			
		Member of political party			
		Participation Index			
		Welfare State			
		Human Development Index			
		Corruption perceptions index			

References

- Berger, B. (2009). Political theory, political science and the end of civic engagement. *Perspectives on politics*, 7(2), 335–350.
- Childs, S. (2004). A British gender gap? Gender and political participation. *The political quarterly*, 75(4), 422–424.
- Coffé, H., & Bolzendahl, C. (2010). Same game, different rules? Gender differences in political participation. *Sex Roles*, 62(5–6), 318–333.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., & Semetko, H. A. (2011). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: a new approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(2), 247–267.
- Dalton, R., & Wattenberg, M. P. (Eds.). (2000). *Parties without partisans: political change in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Djupe, P. A., & Gilbert, C. P. (2002). The political voice of clergy. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 596–609.
- Ekman, J., & Amnå, E. (2012). Political participation and civic engagement: towards a new typology. *Human affairs*, 22(3), 283–300.
- Fieldhouse, E., Tranmer, M., & Russell, A. (2007). Something about young people or something about elections? Electoral participation of young people in Europe: Evidence from a multilevel analysis of the European Social Survey. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 797–822.
- Flanagan, C., & Levine, P. (2010). Civic engagement and the transition to adulthood. *The future of children*, 20(1), 159–179.
- Foweraker, J., & Landman, T. (2002). Constitutional design and democratic performance. *Democratization*, 9(2), 43–66.
- Fu, H., Mou, Y., Miller, M. J., & Jalette, G. (2011). Reconsidering political cynicism and political involvement: a test of antecedents. *American Communication Journal*, 13(2), 44–61.
- Furlong, A., & Cartmel, F. (2012). Social change and political engagement among young people: generation and the 2009/2010 British election survey. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65, 13–28.
- Grimm, R., Pollock, G., & Ellison, M. (2017). Eurosceptic youth, interest, trust and ideology. In B. Leruth, N. Startin & S. Usherwood (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of Euroscepticism*. London: Routledge.
- Henn, M., & Foard, N. (2014). Social differentiation in young people's political participation: the impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 17(3), 360–380.
- Hooghe, M., & Marien, S. (2013). A comparative analysis of the relation between political trust and forms of political participation in Europe. *European Societies*, 15(1), 131–152.
- Horvath, A., & Paolini, G. (2014). Political participation and EU citizenship: perceptions and behaviors of young people. <http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/tools/documents/perception-behaviours.pdf>
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution. Changing values and political styles among western publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jahn, D., Düpont, N., & Rachuj, M. (2018). Left-Right Party Ideology in 36 Countries (Greifswald Comparative Politics Working Paper No. 11). <http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/gcp/GCP-11-2018.pdf>. Accessed 11 Dec 2019.
- Jan, T., Charron, N., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Sundin, P., & Svensson, R. (2013). *The quality of government basic Dataset made from the quality of government Dataset (version 15. May 13)*. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, The Quality of Government Institute. <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>
- Kaariainen, J., & Lehtonen, H. (2006). The variety of social capital in welfare state regimes—a comparative study of 21 countries. *European Societies*, 8(1), 27–57.
- Kimberlee, R. H. (2002). Why don't British young people vote at general elections? *Journal of Youth Studies*, 5(1), 86–98.
- Kitanova, M. (2019). Youth political participation in the EU: evidence from a cross-national analysis. *Journal of Youth Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2019.1636951>.
- Kostadinova, T., & Power, T. (2007). Does democratization deepen participation? Voter turnout in the latin American and eastern European transitional democracies. *Political Research Quarterly*, 60, 363–377.
- Li, Y., & Marsh, D. (2008). New forms of political participation: searching for expert citizens and everyday makers. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38, 247–272.
- Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. Yale: University Press.

- 1197 LSE (2013). Youth participation in democratic life—final report, London school of economics. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEEnterprise/pdf/YouthParticipationDemocraticLife.pdf>.
 1198 Accessed 1 Mar 2015.
- 1199 Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintellier, E. (2010). Inequalities in non-institutionalized forms of political
 1200 participation: a multi-level analysis of 25 countries. *Political Studies*, 58, 187–121.
- 1201 Niemi, R.G., Craig, S.C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national
 1202 election study. *American Political Science Review*, 85, 1407–1413.
- 1203 Norris, P. (1999). Introduction: the growth of critical citizens? In *Critical citizens: global support for
 1204 democratic government* (pp. 1–27).
- 1205 Norris, P. (Ed.). (2001). *Digital divide: civic engagement, information poverty, and the Internet worldwide*.
 1206 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1207 Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic Phoenix: reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: University Press.
- 1208 Norris, P. (2003). *Young people and political activism: From the politics of loyalties to the politics of
 1209 choice?* Council of Europe Symposium: Young People and democratic institutions: from disillusionment
 1210 to participation, Strasbourg.
- 1211 Norris, P. (2004). *Young people and political activism: from the politics of loyalties to the politics of
 1212 choice*. Report for the Council of Europe Symposium: Young people and democratic institutions:
 1213 from disillusionment to participation, Strasbourg, 27–28th November 2003.
- 1214 Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge: CUP.
- 1215 Pearson-Merkowitz, S., & Gimpel, J.G. (2009). Religion and political socialization. In C.E. Smidt,
 1216 J.L. Guth & L.A. Kellstedt (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of religion and American politics*
 1217 (pp. 164–190). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 1218 Pew Research Center (2018). The age gap in religion around the world. [https://www.pewforum.org/2018/
 1219 06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-ages/](https://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-ages/). Accessed 13 June
 1220 2018.
- 1221 Pfanzelt, H., & Spies, D.C. (2018). The gender gap in youth political participation: evidence from Ger-
 1222 many. *Political Research Quarterly*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918775249>.
- 1223 Pilkington, H., & Pollock, G. (2015). “Politics are bollocks”: youth, politics and activism in contemporary
 1224 europe. In H. Pilkington & G. Pollock (Eds.), *Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in con-
 1225 temporary Europe*. Sociological Review Monograph Series. (pp. 1–35). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- 1226 Politico (2019). European elections 2019: Voter turnout. [https://www.politico.eu/interactive/voters-
 1227 turnout-in-the-european-elections/](https://www.politico.eu/interactive/voters-turnout-in-the-european-elections/). Accessed 12 Dec 2019.
- 1228 Pollock, G. (2018). Survey research and sensitivity to context: The MYPLACE project and its case study
 1229 approach. In H. Pilkington, G. Pollock & R. Franc (Eds.), *Understanding youth participation across
 1230 Europe: from survey to ethnography* (pp. 19–36). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 1231 Pollock, G., Brock, T., & Ellison, M. (2015). Populism, ideology and contradiction. In H. Pilkington &
 1232 G. Pollock (Eds.), *Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe*. Sociological
 1233 review monograph series. (pp. 141–166). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- 1234 Pontes, A. I., Henn, M., & Griffiths, M.D. (2017). Youth political (dis)engagement and the need for citizen-
 1235 ship education: encouraging young people’s civic and political participation through the curriculum.
 1236 *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 14(1), 3–21.
- 1237 Sloam, J., & Henn, M. (2019). *Youthquake 2017*. Palgrave Studies in Young People and Politics. [https://
 1238 doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97469-9_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97469-9_3).
- 1239 Stockemer, D. (2014). What drives unconventional political participation? A two level study. *The Social
 1240 Science Journal*, 51(2), 201–211.
- 1241 Stolle, D., Hooghe, M., & Micheletti, M. (2005). Politics in the supermarket: political consumerism as
 1242 a form of political participation. *International Political Science Review*, 26(3), 245–269.
- 1243 Teorell, J., Torcal, M., & Montero, J.R. (2007). Political participation: mapping the terrain. In *Citizenship
 1244 and involvement in European democracies: a comparative perspective* (Vol. 17, pp. 334–357).
- 1245 Touchton, M., & Wampler, B. (2014). Improving social well-being through new democratic institutions.
 1246 *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(10), 1442–1469.
- 1247 Trechsel, A.H. (2007). Inclusiveness of old and new forms of citizens’ electoral participation. *Representa-
 1248 tion*, 43(2), 111–121.
- 1249 Verba, S., & Nie, N.H. (1972). *Participation in America: political democracy and social equality*. New
 1250 York: Harper & Row.
- 1251 Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., & Brady, H.E. (1995). *Civic participation and the equity problem*
- 1252 Vromen, A. (2003). People try to put us down ... participatory citizenship of generation X. *Australian
 1253 Journal of Political Science*, 38(1), 79–99.
- 1254 Wattenberg, M.P. (2006). *Is voting for young people?* New York: Pearson Longman.

Author queries

1 page 1

References in Abstract/Zusammenfassung are not permitted. Please replace.

2 page 2

Please include reference 'Sigel 1965' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

3 page 3

Please insert a citation for reference 'Jahn et al. (2018)' into the main text. Alternatively you can delete the entry from the list of references or ask for it to be added as 'Further Reading'.

4 page 3

Please insert a citation for reference 'Jan et al. (2013)' into the main text. Alternatively you can delete the entry from the list of references or ask for it to be added as 'Further Reading'.

5 page 3

Please insert a citation for reference 'Kostadinova and Power (2007)' into the main text. Alternatively you can delete the entry from the list of references or ask for it to be added as 'Further Reading'.

6 page 3

Please insert a citation for reference 'Norris (2004)' into the main text. Alternatively you can delete the entry from the list of references or ask for it to be added as 'Further Reading'.

7 page 3

Please insert a citation for reference 'Pontes et al. (2017)' into the main text. Alternatively you can delete the entry from the list of references or ask for it to be added as 'Further Reading'.

8 page 3

Please check city and country for 'Ipsos'.

9 page 3

Please include reference 'Youth Partnership (2014)' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

10 page 3

Please include reference 'Henn and Foard (2012)' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

11 page 4

Please verify reference 'Ekman and Amna 2012'. Spelling of author name differs.

12 page 4

The tables in the appendix have been renamed. Please check the adaptation in the captions and references: Appendix A \Rightarrow Table 3; Appendix B \Rightarrow Table 4.

13 page 4

Please include reference 'Sloam 2016' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

14 page 4

Please include reference 'Eurobarometer (2013)' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

15 page 5

Please include reference 'Inglehart and Norris 2003' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

16 page 5

Please include reference 'Beauregard 2014' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

17 page 5

Please include reference 'Milbrath and Goel 1977' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

18 page 5

Please include reference 'Nie and Verba 1987' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

19 page 5

Please include reference 'Rosenstone and Hansen 2002' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

20 page 6

Please include reference 'Christensen and Laegreid 2003' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

21 page 6

Please include reference 'Dermody et al. 2010' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

22 page 7

Please include reference 'Hooghe 2004' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

23 page 7

Please include reference 'Lee et al. 2012' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

24 page 10

Please provide the missing closing bracket for: ...and efficacy (both non-violent/legal and violent/illegal efficacy...

25 page 16 (figure 7)

The manuscript included two different versions of the caption of figure 7. Please check.

26 page 12

Please provide the missing quotation marks at the end of: ...and 'Participated in a ...

27 page 19 (table 1)

Please verify the layout of table 1 by using the PDF of the preliminary print version of the article. The file is accessible under 'Home' (house symbol) under the section 'Download File'.

28 page 16

Please include reference 'Esping-Andersen 1990' in the bibliography or remove the respective reference/references from the text.

29 page 16

Please verify reference 'Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006'. Spelling of author name differs.

30 page 20 (table 2_1)

Please verify the layout of table 2. A dash (–) was inserted into deliberately empty cells. Please confirm.

31 page 24 (table 3)

Please verify the layout of table 3. A dash (–) was inserted into deliberately empty cells. Please confirm.

32 page 25 (table 4)

The structure of table 4 was changed. Please check and make any necessary corrections.

33 page 26

In this citation the value for access date is missing. Please provide the value.