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# Police crisis negotiation

An assessment of existing models

Dawn Archer and Matt Todd

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## Introduction

Modern crisis negotiation involves a law enforcement official communicating with subjects who are threatening violence to themselves and/or others. Such subjects may pose a suicide risk, be engaging in some form of domestic or workplace violence, be part of a hostage or barricade situation (cf. criminals who are attempting to escape following a botched robbery) and/or be seeking to commit a terror-related act. This chapter begins with descriptions of, first, the origins of modern crisis negotiation and, then, three psychological models developed in the USA that have come to dominate the crisis negotiation field in the twenty-first century (Vecchi *et al.* 2005; Kelln and McMurtry 2007; Hammer 2007). As will become clear, even though the aim of negotiator training - across the globe - is to help negotiators hone a set of *communication-based, crisis intervention skills*, the psychological orientation of their models has meant the field has made limited use of (relevant) linguistic theories and research until recently. We nonetheless describe a new toolkit for UK police negotiators that combines linguistic techniques with psychological principles (Archer *et al.* 2018) as a means of ensuring negotiators are trained in the HOW as well as the WHY and WHAT of negotiation. WHY, here, equates to the need to shift subjects to a mindset/behaviour that is safer for them and/or others, and WHAT to the stages needed to achieve this. HOW, in contrast, ensures a focus on the actual skills needed to be able to:

- Accurately and quickly assess which interactive techniques are likely to work, in a given crisis incident (and why).
- Identify whether/when the negotiation is in danger of breaking down (and why).
- Realign the interactional strategy to achieve better engagement with the subject(s) as and when the need arises.

We conclude by outlining these models' strengths and limitations when facing a particular type of terror-related act - the marauding terrorist attack (henceforth MTA) - prior to introducing a fourth psychological model (Taylor 2002), also developed in the UK, that can help negotiators to better understand the (altered) dynamic of such engagements, communicatively speaking.

## **The origins of (modern) crisis negotiation**

The kind of crisis negotiation techniques used today have their origins in 1970s America. Concerned by too many injuries and deaths at some high profile incidents, Harvey Schlossberg, Frank Bolz and others began promoting alternative approaches to the then-preferred 'hard tactics' of (violent) tactical assault. One of these high profile events was the 1972 Munich Olympics disaster. This terror-related incident resulted in twenty deaths. Ten were part of the Arab terrorist cell that had taken Israeli athletes hostage, nine were among the Israeli hostages, and one was a German police officer (Becker 2008).

As well as being a trained psychologist, Schlossberg was a working police detective at the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Working with Bolz - a lieutenant in the same police force - Schlossberg created guidelines for hostage negotiation, based on the principles of *containing* the situation and *negotiating* until all avenues were exhausted and/or the situation was resolved (Schlossberg, 1979). The two men also established a Hostage Recovery Program for NYPD colleagues that - for the first time - promoted hostage negotiation over tactical response. One technique promoted, as part of this program, was that of active listening (Royce 2005) in order to reach an understanding. Another was finding ways of both slowing down the negotiation process and reducing the emotional intensity of the situation such that subject and negotiator had an opportunity to 'talk things out' more rationally. A third was having effective ways of securing the negotiation context/perimeter so that negotiator and subject were in a position to be able to talk things out safely (Schlossberg and Freeman 1974).

Incidents like a gunman taking hostages at a Swedish bank in 1973 - and the hostages ultimately taking his (rather than the police officers') side in a 131-hour standoff - also fed into the programme. In particular, negotiators were made aware of the need to understand the behaviour/s of subjects, hostages and any others (directly) involved, however meaningless or irrational that behaviour might at first appear (Becker 2008). As will become clear in the following sections, until very recently, much of that understanding has been based upon psychological principles and techniques.

## **Crisis negotiation models**

Three models that highlight the dominance of American ideas in respect to the psychological aspects of crisis negotiation are the Behavioural Change Stairway Model (henceforth BCSM)

(Vecchi 2005), the Structured Tactical Engagement Process (henceforth STEP) (Kelln and McMurtry 2007), and the model known by the acronym, S.A.F.E. (Hammer 2007). *S*, here, stands for ‘Substantive demands’, *A* for ‘Attunement’, *F* for ‘Face’ and *E* for ‘Emotional distress’.

## BCSM

BCSM was designed and developed by Vecchi and colleagues through the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit (Vecchi *et al.* 2005; Ireland and Vecchi 2009). Now regarded, by many, as a staple within the high-stakes world of crisis negotiation, its primary focus is upon the WHAT of influence, that is, upon what steps are necessary for the negotiator to achieve the ultimate step of *behavioural change* (Archer *et al.* 2018). Figure 1 captures one version of the BSCM, where *active listening* (henceforth AL) constitutes the starting point for a negotiator (but see also below).




Figure 1. Behavioural Change Stairway Model (BCSM)

AL, in this case, means listening in order to understand what the subject has said through his/her words and emotional displays, and then reflecting that understanding back to the subject. This can involve different types of listening in practice. Negotiators engage in *focused* listening in order to signal their attentiveness to every word spoken by the subject. This enables them to assess what a subject means and to identify the relevant hooks (theme, person, event, etc.) to draw on when seeking to ‘extract’ them from the crisis (Strentz 2013: 17). *Responsive* listening is used when a negotiator wants to let the subject know they are psychologically present. They might use minimal encouragers (*uh-huh* and *mmm*), short questions (*oh? really?*), head nods/tilts, eye contact, mirroring behaviour, etc. (where the visual channel is available), for this purpose. *Reflective* listening builds upon responsive listening techniques, with the aim of encouraging the subject to keep talking. The negotiator might paraphrase the subject’s utterance/s in their own words, for example, and/or use emotional labels in a way that signals their engagement with the subject’s perspective: in particular, how they ‘seem’, appear or ‘sound’ to them (Vecchi *et al.* 2005: 542). This has the added benefit of providing a mechanism via which negotiator and subject can clarify potential misunderstandings.

Negotiators use these techniques to demonstrate not only that they have heard and understood the subject but also to build empathy (the second stage of BCSM) and rapport (the third stage of BCSM). The aim of these particular stages is to secure the subject's trust, based on the understanding that, once such trust has been secured, it can lead to a temporary relationship between negotiator and subject that is built on a perception of likeability and mutual understanding. The final stage of BCSM - influencing the subject toward behavioural change - is believed to then become more likely: especially where a subject demonstrates their amenability to tell their story and/or share any needs they may have with the negotiator (Strentz 2011).

Vecchi's (2009) emphasis, when it comes to these latter stages, is very much upon WHY they are needed, psychologically speaking, rather than upon which (linguistic) skills a negotiator might use to achieve each stage. He also appears to suggest that behavioural change can only take place when all of the other stages of the model have been successfully completed. In practice, the journey to behavioural change is rarely unidirectional, however. Rather, negotiators find themselves moving up and down the various stages as a negotiation unfolds. Progress (when it occurs) tends to be incremental as a result. A negotiator might build enough rapport and trust to be able to influence a person threatening suicide to climb onto the right side of a bridge or to influence a hostage taker to release some of his or her hostages. At this point, that negotiator – and his/her team – then need to (re)assess where they believe they are, with regard to BCSM, and use this knowledge to plan their next move.

Prior to moving on to a discussion of STEP, it is worth highlighting the slightly different design of the UK BSCM model, given its inclusion of Emotional Intelligence (EI) and AL as supporting elements to - rather than having AI as one of four stages of - the behavioural change process. EI is deemed to be a necessary part of the UK-based model because of a negotiator's need to be able to understand and manage not only the emotion(s) of others but also their own emotion/s (Mayer and Salovey 1997). As AL is recognized as a support throughout, the four stages of the stairway, in this case, are *initial contact, rapport and empathy, trust and attunement, and influence, persuasion and problem-solving* (Archer et al. 2018: 183; cf. Vecchi *et al.* 2005).

## ***STEP***

STEP (Kelln and McMurtry 2007) is a theoretical model derived from the Trans-theoretical Model of Change (Prochaska and DiClemente 1994). The underpinning hypothesis of both STEP and the Trans-theoretical Model is 'that a person must recognize...there is a problem with his behaviour, must decide to change the behaviour, must develop a plan for change, and must follow through on that plan' (McMains and Mullins 2014: 138) if change is to be achieved. Kelln and McMurtry believed that existing models had not adequately explained to negotiators HOW and WHY influence and behavioural change occurs. STEP thus focuses upon the four stages of change that (from the model's perspective) move a subject from crisis to peaceful resolution, as well as WHAT a negotiator might do at each of these stages to help the subject accomplish this change (cf. Archer *et al.* 2018).

A subject experiencing the first - *pre-contemplation* - stage is deemed to see no reason to change, and to be resistant to any suggestions that s/he needs to do so. Behaviours typifying this stage include ignoring and, when interaction does take place, arguing. The role of the negotiator, during pre-contemplation, is to develop a rapport with the subject. Once achieved, s/he might then find ways of 'validating the [subject's] lack of readiness to change': this might involve 'making resistance [appear] normal' as well as 'supporting' any efforts the subject makes 'to re-evaluate his or her behaviour and situation' (McMains and Mullins 2014: 139). Techniques that are argued to be potentially beneficial to the negotiator include 'using reassurance, empathy, sharing commonalities, humour, being nonjudgmental, and active listening' (McMains and Mullins 2014: 139).

As soon as the subject expresses an awareness of the seriousness of their situation and/or begins to contemplate the possibility of change - however tenuous - they are argued to have entered the second - *contemplation* - stage. Subjects might ask questions regarding what will happen if they come out/down, etc., suggesting they are 'weighing alternatives' without necessarily committing themselves to change. The negotiator is encouraged, at this point, to continue developing an alliance, whilst guiding the subject to consider change as positive. Strategies might include identifying and promoting (expectations of) 'future plans' at the same time as 'creating discontent about the current situation', for the subject, by 'personaliz[ing] the risk' to them and showing 'concern for [their] safety' (McMains and Mullins 2014: 139). The subject enters the third - *preparation* - stage on recognizing that a change (in circumstances) is needed and on demonstrating their willingness to begin planning for that change. The negotiator's role, in which case, switches to: helping the subject problem-solve/plan an exit strategy; ensuring such an exit can be undertaken safely; remaining sensitive to the subject's concerns throughout; and avoiding any impression of rushing the subject. The final - *action* - stage is the point at which the subject carries out the (agreed) plan. Techniques a negotiator might draw on here include reinforcing the subject's decision to surrender, signaling their safety is a priority, and giving instructions to the subject that are short and unambiguous.

As STEP is a theoretical model, it is understood that crisis events can be - and often are - far messier than the above stages suggest. Negotiators may find that earlier stages have to be revisited during the final action stage when a subject is suddenly overcome with fear, and begins to show renewed signs of hesitancy, for example. In such circumstances, a negotiator would need to help him/her work through and overcome that fear before proceeding with the action plan. The type of crisis incident may also affect the time it takes to work through the four stages of change. Negotiators may be able to work through the stages faster with respect to a spontaneous siege than they would a planned siege, for instance. McMains and Mullins (2014: 140) warn, however, that it is also possible for spontaneous sieges 'to become stalled at the [first] stage'. They provide the example of a failed bank robbery, which turns into a siege involving hostages. The subject is likely to have mixed feelings over surrendering in this case. It 'would end the stress of managing an unplanned-for event' but also result in jail time; hostages mean s/he has to manage them (and, potentially, their need for food/water/toilet facilities, etc.) but they also provide her or 'him with

some sense of safety' (McMains and Mullins 2014: 140). Ambivalence can also be a factor affecting whether subjects move from crisis to peaceful resolution. Negotiators thus need to stay alert to signs that a subject has mixed feelings when it comes to them (and/or any suggestions they make), to authority more generally, to others they may be holding hostage and/or themselves and their ability to cope. On such occasions, a negotiator's best course of action, according to McMains and Mullins (2014), is to identify any emotion/s underpinning such ambivalence/s, as well as 'the specific frame (issue) with which the [subject] is concerned'. This brings us to our third American crisis negotiation model based (primarily) on psychological principles: S.A.F.E. (Hammer 2007).

### **S.A.F.E.**

Mitchell Hammer and Randall Rogan began to conceptualize their communicative interaction model in the 1990s (Hammer 2007), based on a dataset of American hostage crisis, barricade and suicide incidents. The objective of their 'real-world', practice-based approach was to identify those communicative behaviours that could escalate or (preferably) de-escalate such incidents, although Hammer (2007:7) has since claimed the model can also be used in other types of 'conflict interaction' where there is (i.) a perceived threat combined with (ii.) high stress/emotion (in particular, anxiety, fear, stress and anger).

The authors' original model was based on the four psychological frames making up the acronym, 'F.I.R.E': Face, Instrumental demands, Relationship and Emotion (Rogan *et al.* 1997). When the acronym was deemed to sound too overtly tactical, however, Hammer and Rogan rejigged the model to create the new acronym, S.A.F.E. However, the psychological frames captured by the revised acronym - Substantive demands, Attunement, Face and Emotional distress – remained similar in content to the original four.

This particular three-step model focuses, primarily, upon what Archer *et al.* (2018: 182) call the WHY - that is, the reason for attempting influence (visualized in Figure 2). As a first step, a negotiator seeks to identify the subject's (as well as his or her own) predominant psychological frame from the four S.A.F.E. possibilities (Hammer 2007: 72). As a second step, the negotiator (N, in Figure 2) seeks to match his or her communication style to the subject's predominant frame. As a final step, s/he finds a way to shift the subject (S, in Figure 2) to another, *safer* frame for them (and/or others).



Figure 2. S.A.F.E.

A subject is said to have a substantive demand frame when their focus is upon instrumental bargaining and other situationally related issues. They might demand something as sizeable as a car, a helicopter or (interaction with) a legal professional, for example, or something as basic as food and drink. A subject is operating from within an attunement frame when their focus is upon the quality of their relationship with another or others, which may (or may not) include the negotiator. They might indicate a closeness to or distance from another or others, for example. They might also indicate the extent to which they feel they can or should trust another or others (including the negotiator). When a subject's predominant psychological frame is that of face, their focus is argued to be upon (projected) self-image and reputation such that they demonstrate a concern with respect to how they are being perceived by another or others (including the negotiator). An emotional distress frame is characterized by a subject's focus on their - usually, negative - feelings (e.g., anger, contempt, fear, sadness, etc.).

S.A.F.E. shares some important similarities with BCSM. 'Relationship development during early phases of interaction' (Wells *et al.* 2013: 475) is emphasized, for instance, 'as a means of enabling the negotiator to influence the subject's behaviour more successfully in later phases of their interaction' (Archer *et al.* 2018: 182). However, S.A.F.E. is much more overt, than BCSM, when it comes to encouraging negotiators to make use of the linguistic as well as the behavioural content provided by a subject. The subject's language choices are argued to be useful when assessing their mindset (Hammer 2007: 100), for example. The model draws upon concepts that are common within linguistics in this regard: in particular, face(work). This said, a S.A.F.E. focus upon the latter tends to be restricted to the types of 'personal identity concern' shaping a suicide intervention or the social identity concern shaping a barricade/hostage situation (Hammer 2007: 92). This is in spite of a key acknowledgement, by Hammer (2007: 92), 'that face-threatening acts' can 'escalate conflict...while face needs that are honoured and[/or] are perceived to be validated' tend to 'de-escalate the situation'.

Archer *et al.* (2018: 195) have argued that it is problematic to separate face(work) 'into a discrete frame', as the S.A.F.E. model does, as face issues are going to be especially salient in vulnerable interpersonal situations, 'even when individuals' or, indeed, the negotiators themselves, 'are operating from within other [predominant] frames' (see also Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998: 190). As evidence, Archer *et al.* (2018) provide their pragmatic analysis of the last four minutes of a two-hour exchange, from 2007, between a 20-year-old man, named Grant Sattaur, and a US Police Negotiator, from Oceanside California, which ultimately resulted in Grant killing himself. Extract 1 captures the last 11 turns of their ill-fated interaction.

(1)

Negotiator.	[...] listen to me. Put the gun down and come outside. Can you do that?
Grant.	No.



Negotiator. Why not? What's gonna happen? I told you what's gonna happen, didn't I?

Grant. I know what's gonna happen.

Negotiator. Yeah. You are gonna end up going to a hospital tonight.

Grant. And to jail.

Negotiator. Maybe, maybe not. Is that better than dying? Yeah?

Grant. You can give me an assurance  
[G's speech overlaps N's speech, making G's speech inaudible]

Negotiator. I don't know ... I am worried about getting you outside. Okay? Did see a TV show on, called Baretta? And you know what the saying was? If you ain't got the time, don't do the crime. Okay? You have an anger problem. That's obvious. Okay? You are stubborn. That's obvious. But you know something? I am ten times more stubborn than you. And you know another thing?

Grant. Yes.

Negotiator. I will stay here all night. And I will talk to you until you put that gun down and come outside. Because it is not gonna do any good. We're not gonna come inside and confront you ... even if you <indistinct> we are not gonna come inside. That's too dangerous. We are not going to put our cops in danger because you're being stubborn. What happens with your parents <indistinct> hustling home and something happens to them on the way home? Think about that. Think about your parents. Think about your kid brother. That's what you need to think about. Alright? How old are your mother and father? [\*shot fired\*] Shot fired! [\*phone dialing sound\*] Are you there? Are you there?

Prior to this, Grant had already disclosed feelings of depression. He had also agreed with the negotiator's assessments that (a) he would continue to 'hide in [his parents'] house', (b) his own behaviour was having a negative effect on others, and (c) he was a 'coward'. When considered cumulatively, such behaviour is indicative of someone who is seeking to hide/experiencing shame: even to the point of committing suicide (Hammer 2007: 101). When added to Grant's comment (above) regarding going 'to jail', and his seeking 'an assurance' it would not happen, there is thus strong evidence that Grant's predominant frame at the time was one of emotional distress.

Strategies a negotiator might draw upon in response to an emotional distress frame include acknowledging 'the subject's devastation' and countering any sense they may have of being completely "cut off" from others' (Hammer 2007: 105). In Grant's particular case, the negotiator might have also emphasized there were people to help, once he came outside, and that his priority was as much Grant's safety as it was others'. Regrettably, the negotiator opted, instead, to provide Grant with a perfunctory reassurance that served to exacerbate the situation at the same time as

creating face issues for the 20-year-old. He told Grant he would ‘end up going to a hospital [that] night’ before then answering Grant’s concern about going ‘to jail’, following any hospital visit, with the somewhat facetious rhetorical question, ‘Maybe, maybe not. Is that better than dying? Yeah?’. According to Archer *et al.* (2018: 188), the rhetorical question suggested the negotiator had not fully appreciated ‘that, for some’ (especially suicidal) subjects ‘death can be a positive outcome that eradicates their pain’. The negotiator’s subsequent interruption of Grant as he sought reassurance from him that he would not go to jail equated, moreover, to an attack on Grant’s negative face: that is, his ‘want’ to be able to act freely, without imposition (Brown and Levinson 1987). His going on to belittle Grant’s fear of imprisonment, by mentioning the ‘TV show...called Baretta’, and suggesting to him, ‘if you ain’t got the time, don’t do the crime’ served, in turn, to attack Grant’s positive face: that is, his ‘want’ to be approved of/appreciated/considered/liked, etc. (Brown and Levinson 1987).

The negotiator’s instruction that Grant think about his ‘parents’ and ‘kid brother’ above (in conjunction with his repeated instructions for him to ‘come out/outside’) may be indicative of his attempt to make Grant feel guilty, in the belief that guilt can motivate reparative acts such as a change in behaviour (see, e.g., Tangney 1996: 743). His approach ‘was ultimately unsuccessful, however, because’ he directed negative evaluations at Grant, rather than at his ‘behaviour or actions’ (Archer *et al.* 2018: 195). In the last four minutes of their exchange, for example, he presupposed or labelled Grant a ‘coward’ six times, described him as ‘stubborn’ three times, ordered him to ‘keep his mouth shut’/ ‘shut up’ six times and repeatedly spoke over him six times. Archer *et al.* (2018: 195) contend that, ‘[a]s Grant had already exhibited communicative behaviours indicative of shame – in particular, decreased responsiveness’ – the negotiator’s ‘repeated attack on Grant’s face’ in this way, ‘with little or no attempt at mitigation, *deepened* Grant’s sense of shame, thereby triggering further withdrawal as opposed to compliance or reparative action’. The negotiator then went on to make clear that (because of Grant’s possession of a firearm) his primary objective was the safety of his colleagues (‘cops’) and Grant’s family, rather than Grant himself, thereby attacking Grant’s positive face again. He did so in ways that continued to demonstrate his conversational dominance over Grant, moreover. His focus on *talking at* rather than *listening to* the subject meant that he missed, in turn, the final signs of Grant removing himself completely from the conversation (until the point the subject took his own life).

## **A linguistic toolkit for (UK) police negotiators**

Archer and colleagues have opted for a top-down and bottom-up, empirical-based approach when developing their own linguistic toolkit for UK police negotiators (Archer *et al.* 2018; Archer *forthcoming*). The toolkit has been designed with both negotiator training and negotiators’ professional roles in mind, and deliberately focuses on the linguistic ‘HOW of influence’ as much as the psychological WHY and WHAT (Archer *et al.* 2018: 184). Negotiators learn how to ‘pin down linguistically when the WHY and the WHAT of influence are working well’, for example, as well as ‘when they are in danger of breaking down’ (Archer *et al.* 2018: 185) in a particular type

of crisis incident. Archer has also sought to identify the (potentially differing) linguistic characteristics of incidents relating to domestic or workplace violence, hostage, barricade and suicide so that negotiators have a better sense of what techniques are most drawn upon in which types of incident, and with what consequences (cf. Hammer 2007). This ‘toolkit’ of linguistic resources can be used, moreover, in parallel with or to replace the aforementioned models. For instance, Archer *et al.* (2018) draw on both BCSM and S.A.F.E. to demonstrate how the negotiator (who interacted with Grant) had not made effective use of either model in the aforementioned crisis negotiation. They also explain, linguistically, how the negotiator might have (re)instated components of either model as a means of improving the interaction between them. They explain, in turn, how negotiators can glean a subject’s (as well as their own) state of mind or reality paradigm (Archer 2002, 2011) through paying attention to the language used. Reality paradigms equate to the individual filters interlocutors use ‘to interpret/make sense of their worlds’ (Archer *et al.* 2018: 182). As cases like Grant and his negotiator reveal, they can be in conflict during crisis negotiations especially and, as such, ‘have the potential to shape interlocutors’ face(work)’ (Archer *forthcoming*). Grant was not only labeled a ‘coward’, as previously noted, but also described as ‘not man enough’ to come outside by his negotiator during the last four minutes of their two-hour exchange, for example. The negotiator’s insistence that Grant ‘man up’ revealed his perspective that *real* men cope with ‘being rejected by a girlfriend, struggling with depression’, etc., without resorting to barricading themselves into their home (Archer *et al.* 2018: 189). Given that insult and personal criticism is known to fuel ‘conflict by heightening identity damage’ (Jones 2006: 29), Grant’s resistance to coming outside could have been foreseen. The negotiator continued to censure Grant, nonetheless. He thus missed the opportunity to amend his reality paradigm, when Grant began exhibiting communicative behaviours ‘indicative of shame – in particular decreased responsiveness’ (Archer *et al.* 2018: 195). This was exacerbated, in turn, by the negotiator’s conversational dominance, and with tragic consequences.

Archer (*forthcoming*) analyses a second (US) barricade situation that shares some similarities with the aforementioned incident, to demonstrate how, by being (and remaining) in tune with the subject’s reality paradigm, negotiators can linguistically help that subject move toward a safer frame of mind. The incident took place in July 2016 and involved a 22-year-old heroin addict, Jeremy Davies, and a Columbus (Ohio) police negotiator, Rich Weiner: an audio recording of their interaction is available from YouTube (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fkmJG7hKgeI>). Jeremy triggered the incident when he took control of – and refused to exit – ‘a stationary Columbus police vehicle’ (Archer *forthcoming*), after being pulled over following a traffic violation. Within the first minute of the recorded 78-minute interaction, he made it known that he had access to a firearm within the vehicle, and self-disclosed to anyone who would listen that he ‘[could]n’t go back’ to prison, as he feared he might (having violated his parole by taking drugs). He also instructed police officers to give the order ‘to take the shot’ and ‘shoot’ him – to indicate he preferred death (via suicide by cop) over prison time. Rich’s initial contact with the 22-year-old occurred 1.48 minutes into the recording. After introducing himself, he was quick to address the subject’s most pressing concern of ‘going back to prison’ (see Extract 2).

(2)

Rich. Jeremy tell me why you think you're going back to prison  
Jeremy. [sobbing throughout] 'cos my parole officer violated me because I'm doing drugs man (.) [...] I'm going to prison because I'm doing drugs man [...] I went to prison when I was sixteen man I didn't know how to live out here man (3) I just – I can't go back to prison man I just needed help with the drug problem that was all (.) I got pulled over (.) it's the end of the line man (.) can you tell them please [coughing] just shoot me in the head man please (.) 'cos I don't wanna go back to prison  
Rich. hey Jeremy (.) no one said you're going back to prison (.) and if what you're telling me if this was just a traffic stop (.) this is a small bump in the road right now okay (.) you're not- no one said you're going back to prison (.) and I can hear the pain in your voice so I don't want you to think that way now okay (.) you're thinking way down the line (.) and as far as getting help (.) for your drug problem for your addiction (.) we can help you do that (.) but the first thing we gotta do is get through right now (.) so what I'm asking you to do (.) is I want you to put that gun down

Notice that Jeremy volunteered he had 'got pulled over', but then reverted back both to his belief it was 'the end of the line' for him, and his desire to be shot 'in the head' because he did not 'wanna go back to prison'. Like Grant's negotiator, then, Rich was immediately able to glean - through the subject's self-disclosures – that specific reparative moves were necessary. Those moves, however, would first require 'a change in the subject's reality paradigm' (Archer *forthcoming*). In Rich's case, he needed Jeremy 'to surrender the firearm and then exit the vehicle he had hijacked...under specific, orchestrated conditions' (Archer *forthcoming*), which meant amending Jeremy's perspective that suicide by cop was preferable to prison. Within a couple of minutes of beginning his interaction with Jeremy, Rich was careful to first acknowledge 'the pain' he could hear in Jeremy's 'voice', before then using his validation of his feelings to re-interpret Jeremy's situation. He used his 'pain' to discourage him from thinking about death, for example. He also noted that, if his explanation of this as 'just a traffic stop' was accurate, this was no more than a metaphorical 'bump in the road' – and a 'small' one at that. He suggested, in turn, that 'help' for Jeremy's 'addiction' was possible, but that it was contingent upon the (more pressing) imminent action of Jeremy first putting his gun down (see Extract 2) and ultimately being 'willing to toss [it] out the door' (see Extract 3).

(3)

Rich. [...] would you be willing to toss that gun out the door

Jeremy.                   nope nope not yet man no (.) [sobbing] ‘cause all they’re gonna do is run up on me man (1) I’m already in handcuffs (1) they’re gonna run up on me man and- and take me to jail man (.) that gun’s the only thing keeping me from going to jail right now (..) but I promise you I won’t hurt nobody with that gun

Signs that Rich’s strategy was working were evident even at this early stage. Jeremy responded ‘not yet’ when asked if he ‘would be willing to toss [the] gun out the door’, for example, adding it was ‘the only thing keeping [him] from jail’. He promised not to ‘hurt nobody with’ it, nonetheless. This demonstrated an openness to surrender the gun at some - as yet - unidentified point without injury to others, even though it meant returning to prison.

Some sixty minutes later, Rich was still emphasizing Jeremy had ‘a long life ahead of’ him, but needed to face his obstacles – in particular, his addiction problem (see Extract 4).

(4)

Rich.                   [...] you got a long life ahead of you bud (10) you hear me (.) you’re twenty two years old (.) I got a son that’s twenty two he’s still a kid (1) you got a lot ahead of you (.) but the biggest obstacle you got right now (.) is this addiction problem (.) and this is definitely something that we can get you through

Jeremy.               I hope so (.) I hope so for Chelsea’s sake man (2) I don’t wanna die man but I ain’t scared to (.) I’ll look death right in the eye today if I have to (.) I just want what’s best for her (.) and I’m terrified of leaving her out there alone

Rich.                   I know you had a hard one man (.) that’d be tough on anybody (.) but you’re gonna make it through this one today (.) this is gonna be your second chance (.) do you agree

Jeremy.               yeah I can see that happening

Rich.                   good man

Notice that Jeremy used positive emotion terms such as ‘hope’ in response to Rich, at this point. He hoped that, for his girlfriend, ‘Chelsea’s sake’, his life could be different. He also stated he ‘[did]n’t wanna die’, but was not ‘scared to’, yet was ‘terrified [nonetheless] of leaving her out there alone’. Rich was quick to acknowledge Jeremy had ‘had a hard’ life ‘that’d be tough on anybody’, whilst also reasserting he was ‘gonna make it through this’, to have a ‘second chance’. He then asked for Jeremy’s agreement, which he gave, allowing Rich to positively evaluate him as a ‘good man’. ‘Gonna make it’ relates to a belief-world, the specific aim of which was to counter Jeremy’s own belief-world that he could not ‘go back’ to prison. Belief-worlds are one of several modal-worlds included in the negotiator’s toolkit (Archer *forthcoming*). Some of these are particularly useful to negotiators because of being (potentially) identifiable at the word level. Subject’s want-worlds are identifiable through ‘[don’t] want to/wanna’ statements, for example,

unless designed to get the negotiator to do something (cf. *I want you to...*), ‘in which case they might signal’ a ‘subject’s desire is more akin to [a] necessity’ on their part (Archer *forthcoming*). A subject’s intent and/or level of determination can be distinguished, in turn, from their (frequent) use of ‘(not) going to/gonna’ statements, and their obligation (or not) to some action deictically placed within a future time zone, from their (frequent) use of ‘will’ or ‘promise’ (Archer *forthcoming*).

## **Marauding Terrorist Attacks**

Some of the models outlined hitherto have been described in the extant literature as suitable for and/or effective in *all* crisis incidents (Hammer, 2007; Kelln and McMurtry, 2007; McMains and Mullins 2014). This is in spite of being developed with specific incidents in mind: in particular, hostage situations, barricade incidents, and situations where subjects have seemingly exceeded their ability to cope, including suicide threats (McMains and Mullins 2014). Recently, however, the Western world, in particular, has seen an evolution in terrorist incidents, with the rise of Marauding Terrorist Attacks (MTAs). Although there is no agreed definition (to date), MTAs tend to occur across multiple sites (and thus involve more than one terrorist) with the aim of causing mass casualties (using knives, firearms and, in some contexts, explosives and vehicles), in the hope of creating extreme panic and terror in the community or communities affected. Examples of such incidents include the Bataclan Theatre and Hypercashe siege attack in France in 2015. These two incidents are also unusual to some extent, however, as the attackers asked to speak to the police hostage negotiators (Todd *in prep*). These attacks have thus become learning points for national police hostage negotiation teams throughout the world, and are leading them to re-think their approach(es) to negotiating with a terrorist or terrorists during an MTA. One outcome (to date) has been a growing understanding that the types of model discussed hitherto in this chapter may not be suitable in an MTA context, given that they were (primarily) developed to help negotiators (better) tackle emotion driven scenarios or unplanned, unprepared instrumental incidents resulting in substantive, but negotiable demands (such as food and cigarettes, etc.). This explains the extant models’ emphasis, throughout, on creating time whilst simultaneously reducing (overly) emotional behaviour, with the aim of nudging the subject(s) towards more rational thought/behaviour, thereby allowing negotiators to begin (better) managing their demands, extend deadlines (where/when relevant) and reduce any sense of real or imagined threat to them and/or others. MTAs do not tend to share these characteristics. They are generally fast, with a high probability of death or significant harm having been inflicted prior to the authorities becoming aware of the incident. Attackers also tend to be trained combatants, engaging in planned attacks that, in some cases, have been well rehearsed, often with automatic weapons and explosives. Negotiators faced with this type of incident will have little time to plan and prepare, as they might have in a domestic barricade type incident.

Taylor’s (2002) three-dimensional cylindrical model (see Figure 3) may be a more apposite

model, when preparing negotiators to deal with MTAs, than those discussed so far. In part, this is because this particular model is conceptually more complex than the others. In fact, it arguably represents a synthesis of the prominent theories developed by crisis negotiation researchers up to this point. It combines the instrumental, relational and identity components, which characterize subject and negotiator interactions, for example (see especially Donohue and Kolt 1992; Rogan and Hammer 1994; Hammer 2000). This aspect of the model, then, has obvious overlaps with S.A.F.E. (and its predecessor, F.I.R.E.), in that the aim is to identify - with the intention of addressing - the subject's most prominent concern and/or goal. A subject seeking some sort of information exchange, concession, or other tangible commodity or want would be demonstrating an instrumental concern or goal. If they are focused upon issues of respect and trust or their lack, they would be demonstrating a relational concern or goal. If they are focused upon self- and other-presentation, as evidenced by, for example, their use of justifications, profanities and insults, they would be demonstrating an identity concern or goal.




Figure 3. Cylindrical Model (Taylor 2002:17)

As Figure 3 reveals, the three instrumental, relational and identity components are amalgamated within - and replicated at three points on - the metaphorical shape that gives this model its name. Each of these points represents a subject's disposition towards 'avoidance', competition (see 'distributive' above) and cooperation (see 'integrative' above). We use 'competition' and 'cooperation' - in preference to Taylor's 'distributive' and 'integrative' (above) - to signal that this aspect of the model intentionally draws upon theories around cooperative, competitive and avoidance behaviours (see, e.g., Donohue and Roberto 1993; Sillars 1980; Sillars *et al.* 1982). It is here, then, that we see overlaps with STEP: in particular, its associated assumption that the physical, psychological and/or emotional state of a subject will make certain behaviours more likely. Behaviours typifying avoidance include refusing to engage at the outset and, when engagement does occur, refusing to accept responsibility for events. Behaviours typifying a competitive disposition include attacking/challenging the negotiator (or others), undermining their credibility, inciting arguments, rejecting compromises, etc. Behaviours typifying a cooperative disposition include making concessions, reciprocating attempts to build relationships, etc. A third

component within Taylor's model relates to intensity. High intensity dialogue includes anger/verbal threats, demands, profanity, etc., and can be indicative of emotional stress, a strongly-held conviction and/or persuasion attempt (Hamilton and Stewart 1993; Donohue 2001). As such language can have a detrimental impact on crisis negotiations, Taylor (2002) argues that negotiators need to be able to recognize and manage these signs of intensity, prior to attempting to move the subject to a different behaviour.

Wider psychological research than has been highlighted so far in this chapter can also help negotiators facing MTAs better consider WHY an individual may be behaving in a particular way without being drawn (too negatively) into what they are doing. Focusing on the attacker as a person allows the negotiator, in turn, to better prepare their contact/communication strategy within a tight time window. *Thin slicing* allows them to identify brief snippets of information about that individual, akin to 'first impressions', via which they might assess/determine their current and likely behaviour or actions, for example, in line with Ambady and Rosenthal's (1992) assertion that essential information on behaviour can be gathered from brief exposures or interactions of less than five minutes. *Branding* is one means by which negotiators might then use such information. This might equate to altering their own 'personal branding' in order to influence the perpetrator. By way of illustration, Al Qaeda's dislike of Western governments might influence negotiators to disregard any self-reference(s) that identify them as the police (for fear it too closely represents Western authority or authorities for such perpetrators). A related technique, *priming* (Strack *et al.* 1988), involves, first, identifying and, then, using specific words in an attempt to influence another's thinking or behaviour. A negotiator might use 'leader' to prime a perpetrator to take responsibility for the lives of others, for instance. A perpetrator may also trigger a negotiator's use of priming, according to Todd (*in prep*). Negotiators addressed Coulibaly as a 'warrior', once they noticed he referred to himself as a 'soldier' and 'warrior' during the Hypercashe siege, for example (Todd, *in prep*). The negotiators' aim, in this case, was to prime additional warrior-like tendencies in Coulibaly in the hope that he would consider/ultimately release women hostages (given the soldier's/warrior's code of not killing women, children and other innocents) and focus his efforts, instead, on challenging the police directly.

## **Concluding comment**

A chapter on police crisis negotiation was not included in the first edition of the *Routledge Handbook of Forensic Linguistics*. Its inclusion in this second edition is testimony, therefore, to the growing importance of the field. There is still much to do, however, not least because, with the exception of Archer and colleagues, most researchers who focus upon police crisis negotiation discuss these models - and occasionally the techniques used - in their published work without explaining (in any detail) how these models or techniques work from a linguistic perspective. Archer and colleagues have had to focus upon US interactions in their published work (Archer *et al.* 2018; Archer *forthcoming*), due to the current limitations placed upon the use of UK police crisis negotiations in research publications. There are signs, nonetheless, that the argument for



‘incorporating audio and video recordings (and/or transcripts of these recordings) into training’ programs is gaining ground in the UK (Archer *et al.* 2018: 193; Archer *forthcoming*). As Rogan *et al.* (1997: 1) highlighted some twenty years ago now, the latter encourage trainees to recognize the ‘subtle complexities of’ a variety of ‘crisis situations’. Recordings and transcripts of the same also deter them from ever ‘viewing negotiation as a unidirectional process’ that involves learning and then applying ‘specific skills in a top-down, de-contextualised fashion’ (Archer *et al.* 2018: 193), and inspire them, instead, to develop a level of ‘mental flexibility’ (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel 2001: 178) when it comes to both understanding and using language. That such mental flexibility is important in all types of crisis incident – and, in particular, MTAs - has hopefully been made clear to the reader, throughout this chapter. MTAs constitute one of the most complex and demanding types of incident a negotiator will have to face, from our perspective, because of both the (aforementioned) lack of preparation time negotiators tend to have and the psychological make-up of the perpetrator(s) they tend to face. As MTAs are less frequent than other incident types, they also constitute the most understudied currently (academically speaking). Doctoral studies such as Todd’s (*in prep*), which focus on actual MTAs, are thus crucial if we are to fully appreciate what techniques negotiators tend to draw upon when faced with such incidents, which of the current negotiation models those techniques align with (if any) and, hence, the appropriateness of existing training approaches. It is crucial, in turn, in our view, that such studies pay as much attention to HOW negotiators sought to influence the perpetrator(s) – on the limited occasions they were given the opportunity to do so (linguistically) - as we might the (more traditional and more psychologically-focused) WHY and WHAT of crisis negotiation.

## Further reading

For an explanation of:

- The development of crisis negotiation in the US especially, see Noesner (2010), Doering (2016) and/or Lanceley (2003).
- S.A.F.E., see Hammer (2007).
- The cylindrical model, see Taylor (2002).
- STEP, see Kellin and McMurtry (2007)
- BCSM, see Vecchi *et al.* (2005).

For linguistic accounts of specific crisis negotiation events, based on US datasets, see Archer *et al.* (2018) and Archer (*forthcoming*).

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