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Title:

Adorno and Phenomenology: between Hegel and Husserl

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Abstract:

Adorno develops critiques in parallel of the phenomenologies of G.W.F. Hegel and of Edmund Husserl. While respecting their differences, he rehearses conjoined objections to their accounts of philosophy, and of progress, of history, and of nature. Critical of Hegel's idealist dialectics, and of Husserl's transcendental idealism, Adorno also in his readings of their texts reveals a textual materiality of their philosophical enquiries, which provides material evidence in support of his critique. This essay seeks to reveal the dynamic of this process, and show certain parallels with results supplied in the phenomenological enquiries of Michel Henry, and in the deconstructions of Jacques Derrida. If an epoch may still be captured in the concept, then the negative dialectical conceptuality developed by Adorno must capture a condition common to that epoch, and, in part, shared by other such thinkers.

Key Words:

phenomenology, history, nature, natural history, melancholy, messianism, Europe, spirit, horizon, concept

Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) has two sets of objections to the phenomenologies of Hegel and of Husserl, on which he works across the gap imposed on him by exile, in 1933, and return to Germany, after the Second World War.ⁱ He rehearses a series of philosophical reservations, and on that basis develops objections to each of them; and he adduces social, historical and cultural considerations, to suggest that philosophical enquiry is in need of a thoroughgoing reform, if it is to provide a conceptuality, adequate to the task of making sense of current conditions. He states at the start of his preface to *Negative Dialectics* (Adorno (2001[1966])):

The formulation 'Negative Dialectics' runs up against the inheritance.ⁱⁱ

and his introduction invokes the famous Marxist claim, about the moment at which a philosophy of freedom might have been actualized, in revolutionary transformation; 'Philosophy, which once seemed to have been overtaken, remains alive since its moment of actualization was missed.'

(Adorno (2001[1966]) p. 15). In a later section, subtitled 'An excursus on Hegel', he discusses a relation between Hegel's concepts of spirit and world history (*Weltgeist*), and his own preferred conception of natural history, which owes a certain amount to the enquiries of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). This notion of 'natural history' leaves neither concept, neither history, nor nature, unaltered; it is to be distinguished from Hegel's notion of a 'philosophy of nature', as a study of essences. This philosophy of nature sits between a logic, as the articulation of the concept, and a philosophy of spirit, as a reunification of a logic of the concept and a philosophy of nature, as organized by Hegel in drafts for his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1970 [1830]).ⁱⁱⁱ

For Adorno, two sets of forces, in the twentieth century, increase the obstacles to successfully pursuing philosophical enquiry, which he, all the same, seeks to take up within the lineage of the great systems of German Idealism: Kant, Schelling, Hegel, as put in question by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Husserl. This is the inheritance against which negative dialectic runs up. The unity of a history, in which a cumulative process of philosophical refinement is in play is put in doubt; and, for Adorno, there has been an intensification of processes alienating humanity from itself, and denaturalizing nature, as they are taken up, and transformed by technological interventions of all kinds. Adorno is persuaded by the Marxist critique that natural forces have been transposed into historically determinate forces and relations of production, while historical processes have become subordinate to decision procedures, and administrative imperatives, now also referred to as the logic of governmentality, rendering them self-organizing systems, and depriving history of its erstwhile status as a domain of free acts, performed by self-determining human beings. Both Hegel and Husserl are in their different ways committed to an ideal of progress within philosophy, and, thereby, for human history as a whole. Adorno questions all three aspects of these claims: the internal consistency and plausibility of Hegel's and Husserl's versions of phenomenology; the commitment to the concept of philosophy, as a unifying trajectory of cumulative self-improvement, with the concepts of *Geist*, of spirit, for Hegel, and of *Sinn*, or meaning, for Husserl playing critical roles; and the overarching hypothesis about a destiny for humanity, in an ideal of progress. The main focus here will be on the philosophical contestation of phenomenology, and on a certain ambivalence in Adorno's approach to it, but the wider background framed by the second two claims provide access to the historical context in which the discussion takes place.

Two sets of historical evidence are important for Adorno. There are firstly the evidences and consequences of social and racial horror, attendant on the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany in 1933. He analyses at some length the trauma of this, experienced individually, as a man in enforced exile, and as one of a generation whose lives were disrupted, ruined, or terminated in the death camps. He addresses these processes in his moving composition of a series of fragments, on this current condition, published after the war as *Minima Moralia: fragments from damaged life* (1978 [1951]).^{iv} These were composed in part during the Second World War, during Adorno's exile in the United States, and in part in its immediate aftermath, and the title alone indicates fractures both in personal experience, and a fractured state of both world, and of the entities, or states of affairs in that world, of which the social historian seeks to make sense. This publication also bears witness to a struggle to find a form suitable for the articulation of his vision of a philosophical program of incompleteness and melancholy, in the wake of the high hopes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The writings of both Benjamin and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) play a role in his development of an aphoristic, disjointed mode of presentation.

The second set of evidences is a series of substitutions whereby the means to an end becomes an end itself. In his Dedication, Adorno writes:

The relation between life and production, which in reality debases the former to an ephemeral appearance of the latter, is totally absurd. Means and end are inverted

Adorno (1978 [1951]) p. 15

Such a process of inversion is analyzed in the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977 [1807]), in the section on force and understanding, where Hegel formulates a law of the inverted world, governing immediate perception.^v The presumption there that the extremes of displacement and misrecognition can and will be rectified in a subsequent movement of history, for Adorno can no longer be made. In the opening sentences of his Dedication, Adorno invokes the notion of a melancholy science, which is to take the place of the joyful, affirmative science, proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche, in *The Gay Science* (1974 [1887]).^{vi} In an inverted world, where consumption takes priority over production, and imperatives of production take priority over those of life, Hegel's attempt to trace a self-realization of truth, as partially presented in the evanescent, is to be resisted: it is for Adorno the evanescent as fragment which may reveal the truth of the current condition.

Adorno here also appeals to a knowledge of Husserl's conception of an intuition of essences, its role in his phenomenology and connection to a revisiting of Cartesianism:

Of this the Cartesian rule that we must address ourselves only to objects, 'to gain clear and indubitable knowledge of which our minds seem sufficient', with all the order and disposition to which the rule refers, gives as false a picture as the opposed but deeply related doctrine of the intuition of essences. If the latter denies logic its rights, which despite everything assert themselves in every thought, the former takes logic in its immediacy, in relation to each single intellectual act, and not as mediated by the whole of conscious life in the knowing subject.

Adorno (1978 [1951]) p. 80-81

Adorno critiques Husserl's notion of a 'whole' of conscious life, and deploys the objections developed in relation to it against the various totalities and reconciliations proposed by Hegel. It is a whole marked by fragmentation and difficulty, and a movement left in suspension by the incompleteness of the supposed mediations of *Geist*, which should have carried itself over into an actualization of reason and order in the world. Instead Adorno affirms a priority of a materially given world, as covered over in a confusion about a supposed relation between nature and history. Adorno's readings of Husserl and of Hegel are therefore violent, for Adorno seeks to wrench apart conceptual insights and commitments, which he values, from their embedding in an unacceptable infrastructure of European self congratulation, and an outdated concept of history. In the course of this account, a certain set of parallels with the engagements of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) with both Hegel and Husserl will come into view, with respect to the role of the concepts of spirit and of meaning, of horizons, and of means and ends, and concerning the status of a concept of life, as intimately associated with that of death.

1: On a movement of thought:

Already in 1932, before the time of exile, Adorno questions the adequacy of the inherited distinction between the natural and the historical or moral sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), in his Frankfurt lecture, 'The idea of natural history'. This questioning of conceptions of history brings him into conflict with the phenomenologies of Hegel and of Husserl, and their respective takes on history, of which they seek to make sense, with Hegel, through a notion of world history as a divine judgment on the world, and, with Husserl through a conception of a horizon of inclusivity. Adorno questions how it is possible to access, and maintain an availability of, states of affairs in the world, and indeed to the relevant concepts, with which to analyze them. He also objects to the presumption of a unity of meaning and order, in the world, underpinning their respective accounts of the systemic relations between thought contents, linguistic expression and states of affairs in the world. Adorno is rather committed to the thought of an originary contestation concerning meaning, and evaluations of those states of affairs. The presumptive unity and availability of entities, ordered in a world is, for Adorno, moot, as a consequence of an increasingly fragmented order of things, and a tendency to generate sets of concepts which rather cover over than reveal that order. These challenges are connected by him to, and articulated with the use of notions of class conflict and of ideology, as a critique of systems of ideas, as necessarily and systemically distorted, to favor of one set of commitments in this contestation with others. These commitments form the basis of his critique of and differences with these versions of phenomenology.

The objections raised by Adorno, to the supposed separation between a domain of nature and a domain of history have become all the more pressing since his death in 1969.^{vii} There is now much more recognition of the force of a critique of a supposed, indeed unquestioned status of superiority for European culture, and to an idea or ideal of progress attaching to it. In the writings of both Hegel and Husserl, there are unacceptable claims concerning an ahistorical nature of certain peoples, which it is impermissible to repeat, and with respect to whole peoples, whole continents of peoples, in part in support of, and in part creating what they suppose themselves to prove: the status thereby attached to a concept of history, associated with that culture and supposed superiority. Adorno can thus be seen to be in some sympathy with the claims of his contemporary, the social anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1908-2009), as rehearsed in Levi-Strauss: *The Savage Mind* (1966 [1962]), perhaps better translated as 'Untamed Thinking'. Levi-Strauss, in a critique of Jean-Paul Sartre on history and materialism, supposes this concept of history to be the myth peculiar to European peoples, to be filed alongside the myths analyzed by ethnographers, in their studies of the peoples and cultures thereby sidelined as beyond the reach, or subordinated within the scope of that concept of history. In *Tristes Tropiques* (1961 [1955]) Levi-Strauss explores, in more personal detail, a record of the attendant encounters between technologically enhanced and indigenous peoples, whose ways of life struggle to survive against the multiple challenges of wealth and weaponry, violence, disease and exploitation. In the current context of climate change debate, and in the light of contributions by indigenous peoples seeking to protect uncultivated lands from environmental damage from ever expanding demands of global capital these concerns come all the more powerfully into focus.

However, neither Husserl nor Hegel are committed to an atemporal, ahistorical modes of enquiry. Indeed their claims to take seriously modifications, across time and history, of the basic contents of experience, of conceptions of experience itself, and in modes of materialization of what

there is, of what is taken to be matter, attracts Adorno's respect, even if sometimes that respect appears grudging. His analyses have a certain proximity to the claims to concreteness, the attempt to do justice to 'things in themselves', one of four principles in terms of which phenomenological commitment may be determined.^{viii} The current upsurge of populism and insularity, masked as an affirmation of localism, revives outworn notions of nation and sovereignty, which would for Adorno be a matter of the greatest suspicion. In the nineteen thirties, Husserl affirms a strong conception of universalism, under the rubric 'the idea in the Kantian sense', as a form of resistance to the Nazi appropriations of a notion of humanity, in the name of which Nazi regimes unleashed persecutions, murder, and genocides. Hegel's endorsement of state power is not to be confused with an endorsement of fascism, since the system he proposes always seeks to reveal the hidden commonality underpinning temporary outbursts of dissension, civil war, or persecution of marked groups. State power, for Hegel, relies on conceptually secured distinctions, ethics and morals, politics and public order, executive and symbolic power, and on an orderly division of labor, with respect for tradition, as opposed to the deliberate development of mutually competing, or indeed obstructing governmental institutions, characteristic of authoritarian regimes and their totalitarian successors. The distorting effects of importing outdated or anachronistic concepts, to cover over what is distinctive about a current conjuncture, is for him always important to note.

The focus for this discussion is on notions of system, as explicitly and implicitly invoked by Husserl and by Hegel. Adorno puts in question Husserl's concept of *Sinn*, meaning, and of a horizon, and of the associated notions of general and regional ontology, founded in a reconfigured notion of essence. Adorno objects strongly to Husserl's notion of a *Wesensschau*, an intuition of essences.^{ix} The parallel critique, in relation to Hegel's philosophy, is of Hegel's concept of *Geist*, and of the status assigned to the work of the concept. These concepts, of *Geist*, and of a unifying horizon, provide a framing through which to join together the otherwise isolated appearances of what there is arrive for attention. There is however a genuine sense in which Adorno admires the enquiries of both Husserl and Hegel, rather more than he admires say those of Martin Heidegger, and of Otto Bollnow, both of whom come in for criticism in his *Jargon of Authenticity: on German ideology* (1966 [1964]), or of Jean-Paul Sartre and Georgy Lukacs, who he critiques for the over complications of their notions of engagement in politics, and reconciliation with a march of history. The associated notions of both politics and history are for Adorno no longer adequate to capture what is current in contemporary conditions. In section 29 of *Minima Moralia*, Adorno claims: 'the whole is not truth', in an inversion of Hegel's claim, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977[1807]): 'the truth is the whole', and elaborates:

In Hegel, self-consciousness was the truth of the certainty of one's self, in the words of the *Phenomenology*, the 'native realm of truth'. When they had ceased to understand this, the bourgeois were self-conscious, at least in their pride at owning wealth. Today self-consciousness no longer means anything but reflection on the ego as embarrassment, as reflection on impotence, knowing that one is nothing.

Adorno 1978 [1951] pp. 49-50

Hegel's account of consciousness invites this historical relativization, in the absence of securing a concept of absolute spirit, in which all division and separation is overcome. A contrast with Husserl's account of consciousness might then be drawn in terms of Husserl's account of the potentiality and

necessity to reduce the contingent and historically limited features of the consciousness of individuals, as actualized in their affirmations of self as ego, to an absolute transcendental consciousness, as condition for any consciousness whatsoever. This then would be in common and available, once the required procedures of reduction on the empirically given states of individual egos have been performed, to all self-conscious beings.

In the early 1932 lecture, 'The Idea of Natural History', Adorno seeks to construct a concept of history which dissolves the increasingly unhelpful basic status attributed to a distinction between nature and history, and highlights the idealizations and expropriations implicit in the dominant concept history, which sustains the development of the human sciences, or *Geisteswissenschaften*. As remarked, he has both Marxist, and philosophical reasons for proposing this rethinking, which increasingly now dovetails with environmental and deep ecological concerns, and to challenges to the curriculum to decolonize, by recognizing the role of those human sciences in the formation of distinctions between peoples as historical and as non-historical, on the basis of now evidently indefensible concepts of racial difference and historical destiny. Important for Adorno already at this time, before his exile from Germany and before the Nazi accession to government in 1933, is a Marxist concept of ideology, and an affirmation of a need for a critique of systems of distorting ideas, putting all concepts, as commonly used and as technically adapted, under suspicion of colluding in injustice, and assisting in maintaining oppressions in the world. Here he might be thought to be in some sympathy with Edmund Husserl's demand that a radical bracketing of presupposition and of an uncritical naturalism be performed on all common sense and taken for granted conceptions about what is to be found in the world.

From *Logical Investigations* (1977 [1900 -]) to *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (1931 [1913]), Adorno follows the line of Husserl's developing account of the need to interrupt the immediacies of conscious awareness by operating a series of reductions, to eliminate what Husserl calls the naturalist attitude, in favor of uncovering a properly philosophical attitude, committed to truth and universal scope for its claims. Along this trajectory, Husserl shifts from invoking a notion of categorial intuition, developed in the much redrafted Fifth Investigation, to account for example for human awareness of principles of identity and non-contradiction, into a notion of an inspection, or intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*), coupled to a faculty, or cognitive capacity, called *Anschauung*, to which Adorno takes exception. This shift in Husserl's angle of entry is then further complicated by Husserl's recognition in the mid- thirties, in response to the rise of Nazism, that there is a crisis for European humanity, in its abandonment of its own ideals: the commitments to rigorous scientificity, to truth and to that same universality, which are indeed already abandoned by the arbitrary exclusion of whole peoples from the history. In their jointly authored text, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972 [1944]), Horkheimer and Adorno draw attention to Husserl's account of a crisis for the European inheritance, in his Vienna Lecture of 1935.^x There is also Husserl's invocation of a concept of transcendental history to be considered, which would have to be a history corrected from the distortions of a history, written by the beneficiaries of Empire and of European supremacism.

An uneasiness about precisely which Husserl to address here is noted in some of the extensive secondary literature. The role of his associates assisting him in rewriting his texts, Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink, has left some confusion about what exactly Husserl's own views may have been. The writings of Eugen Fink, in his discussions of

operational as opposed to thematised concepts in Husserl's writings, would be one a source to look for discussion of how the term 'horizon' may work rather as a provisional conceptual commitment, not yet established by phenomenological and transcendental reduction.^{xi} These are provisional not definitive results, and the contrast with the register of Hegel's claims for his results is stark. A proximity between Adorno and Husserl in particular can be seen rather to fuel his thoroughgoing critique of, and, in some ways to be explored here, misrepresentations of Husserl's writings and enquiries. These are to be, in part, rescued here from Adorno's critique of an adoption of an over idealized conception of consciousness, of history and of meaning. For alongside a dominant response to Husserl's phenomenology, as a reinvention of transcendental idealism, in the manner of Kant, there is a claim to be examined that Husserl remains committed to an originary status for empirical and realist origins for the meanings and concepts, which, while worked over and processed in a collectively constituted domain of transcendental consciousness, do not originate in subjective and contingent cognitive processes.

In addition to a tradition of Marxist appropriations of Husserl's phenomenology, starting with Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), there are the enquiries of Michel Henry (1922-2002), who insists that phenomenology must and can be an enquiry only on the basis of analysis of materializations of human living, with an emphasis on concepts of life, and affect, on analyses of auto-affection and the interiority of human beings as living entities, as the ground and source for all human ideation.^{xii} His critique of Marx and of Marxism, for failing adequately to explore the materiality specific to human embodiment, would also be a powerful challenge to the versions of Marx and Marxism adopted by Sartre and by Lukacs, with which Adorno is also in dispute.^{xiii} The reception by Michel Henry of Husserl's legacy might usefully be set up as a challenge to an inheritance, presumed by Adorno, to focus on and through Martin Heidegger's innovations. Where Adorno, in the main, focuses on the trajectory of Husserl's thinking for 1900 to 1913, this French reception of Husserl, starting with Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Derrida, with Michel Henry, and of course Maurice Merleau-Ponty put the emphasis on responding to the dual imperatives of the analyses of inner time consciousness, and of the specificities of embodiment, and the primordial data of the human as a living being, as opposed to an intuition registered in a single, momentary present.

Where Adorno denounces a reified self-consciousness of actual human beings, caught up in their own self-absorption, the notion of transcendental consciousness acquires for Adorno the status of a delusory self-absenting from that actuality, predicated on a certain immunization from the joint scourges of poverty, misery, and failures of recognition in a world by others. Disenfranchisement as a result of statelessness is a condition experienced and explored by Adorno, and of course by his many contemporaries, among others Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt. Hegel's account of consciousness can be refuted by Adorno, by appeal to Hegel's own insistence on considering consciousness always and only in the historical contexts of given consciousness, and of consciousness given to itself. Twentieth century consciousness, for Adorno, is marked to such a degree by the advent of popular culture, Madison Avenue promotions and the administration of things, to a degree requiring a whole new conceptuality and a method of retreat from the public sphere, in order to bring out its truth. Husserl's account by contrast is accused of an unacceptable abstraction. The history of Europe from 1807, when Hegel publishes his *Phenomenology*, to 1947, when Adorno finalises a draft of his *Minima Moralia*, rather serves to confute than confirm any hypothesis that a cumulative process of self-emancipation and enlightenment, overcoming gaps between actual and ideal consciousness, might be thought to be taking place.

Lenin's notion that crisis must deepen before history will turn again towards an historical materialism of emancipatory process is a further dimension in the context in which Adorno is thinking and working. He remarks of Stalin:

The subjective pre-condition of opposition, unco-ordinated judgment is dying out, while its gesticulations continue to be performed as group ritual. Stalin only needs to clear his throat and they throw Kafka and van Gogh on the rubbish heap.

Adorno (1978 [1951]) p. 207

Husserl's attempt to de-historicise consciousness, and Hegel's attempts to affirm historical processes as operating in support of a program of emancipation and enlightenment, come under pressure in the twentieth century, with a growing surmise that all is not well with this concept of history. Where both Hegel and Husserl return to Descartes' re-opening of the question of philosophical origins, their proposals about how to remedy fault lines in the Cartesian account are markedly different. Adorno, by contrast, does not propose a return to Descartes, on consciousness; he rather proposes a return to the *res extensa*, extended matter, to emancipate it from its tutelage, as subordinate to the *res cogitans*, of Cartesian analyses, which migrates then into the various accounts of consciousness and of self-consciousness provided in the interim. Above all Adorno contests the notion that uniquely in Europe, first with the Greeks and again in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some significant advance in reason and freedom took place. A critique of European superiority is developed in the analyses conducted with Max Horkheimer, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The radical separation, in both human and natural science, of a stance of observation from that which is observed, is brought under fire. For as much as there is a myth of the givenness of objective states of affairs to be disputed, so is a myth of the detached neutral stance of subjectivity in dispute. This arrives in their analysis of the image of Odysseus, returning from the sack of Troy, hearing, but able to resist the song of the sirens, by dint of tying himself to the mast of his ship, while his deafened companions carry on rowing. This they describe as combining myth and rational labor.

2: decolonizing phenomenology:

After the Second World War, Adorno published a study of Husserl, translated as *Against Epistemology: a metacritique: studies in Husserl and phenomenological antinomy* (1986 [1956]) and of Hegel, *Hegel: Three Studies* (1999 [1962]). They both show signs of sedimentations of enquiries stretched out over the intervening years of exile. While Adorno and Horkheimer, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, had acknowledged Husserl's response to, and critique of a crisis in the European world, starting with the Vienna Lecture in 1935, the later monograph returns to the pivotal move from the descriptions of conscious activity, in the *Logical Investigations* (1900-), to the affirmation of a transcendental turn in 1913. Adorno accepts the dominant reading that this is a turn towards idealism. Husserl's program, of detaching consciousness from its context, by virtue of the series of reductions, to reveal a more basic connection to a givenness of what is, for both Horkheimer and Adorno, affirms an impossible, and ideologically motivated separation between the natural animal, the human being, or Marx's *Menschenwesen*, and its impact on its natural surroundings. Above all class privilege and, by extension, the lottery of place and time of birth are obscured in this move,

whereby all are supposed to have available to them a place in scientific progress, and the chance of contributing to it.

Jacques Derrida, in his second essay, in *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason* (2005 [2003]), also identifies Husserl's place in the problematic program of affirming an inheritance of Enlightenment, with its emphasis on a teleology of reason, and concepts of calculation and sovereignty.^{xiv} Derrida draws attention to Husserl's role in 1935-36, in starting at least an analysis of a crisis in European humanity, with his Vienna lecture, 'Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity' (Husserl 1970 [1935]). He also analyses how these concepts of Enlightenment and of a distinctively European Rationality assign concomitant privileges both to the human species among natural species, and to Europeans, from this small, insignificant promontory jutting out from the vast Asian continent. Christophe Menke (1998 [1988]) has explored a cross over between Adorno and Derrida, on the function assigned by both for a certain negative power for reason,^{xv} although where Derrida disaggregates inheritance by insisting on differential articulations of textuality, Adorno seeks a more direct return to notions of matter and materialization. The complementary move of exploring a proposal by both Adorno and Derrida, to affirm a space opening up, in advance of any separation between the human and the natural sciences, and joining up to the current context of climate disaster, remains to be taken up. Negative dialectics and deconstructive reading of text, for both of which the whole is the untrue, provide interlocking sites of resistance to practices of operationalizing concepts, imposing unity where there is none.

A second significant aspect of Adorno's objections to the philosophical programs of both Hegel and of Husserl is their presumption of some connection between European history and an idea of progress, and implicitly to an idea of European cultural superiority. Adorno repeatedly draws attention to a need for a cultural response adequate to the corruption and distortions in which he supposes European culture and its North American extensions to be mired. Germany in his time was blighted by anti-semitism; to this day the 'land of the free' remains in thrall to its uniquely racist inheritance, with respect to the legacy of slavery. Adorno is thus in dispute with a certain logic of idealization of what it means to be European, and to a magnification of that logical delusion in what he observes of North American culture during his exile in the United States. Not for him Hannah Arendt's recognition, writing back to German after the Second World War, that: 'there really is such a thing as freedom here'. For Adorno, historical and terminological critique are inseparable, and his principal objection to Hegel Studies would be to an uncritical importation of Hegel's concepts which, while perhaps functioning well in the context of the early nineteenth century, to capture tendencies then at work, have long ceased to function for the purposes for which they were developed. The notion of capturing an epoch in concepts, and of a world history as the judgment of God are key commitments which are disrupted by a thoroughgoing change in the manner in which relations between philosophy, and politics, between history, and religion arrive for discussion.

For Husserl, European civilization is an ideal, giving rise to an 'idea in the Kantian sense' which remains to be actualized. Indeed Husserl diagnoses it, in the nineteen thirties, as in the greatest of jeopardy, in the rise and the persecutions perpetrated by the Nazis in Germany. Husserl dies in Freiburg in April 1938, shortly after the Nazi annexation of Austria in March 1938. By contrast, for Hegel, an ideal of European superiority has already proven itself, in his distinctly selective account of history, for which the Chinese and Indian civilizations count for little, and those of the Americas and Africa for less than nothing. For such accounts, the systemic despoliation of natural

resources by capital, and in colonization proves rather the inventiveness, than the corruptness of the technical advantages enjoyed by Europeans in their developing arms and naval technologies. Hegel's *Phenomenology* is published in Jena, in the year that William Wilberforce secured the passage of the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act through the British Houses of Parliament, although slavery itself was abolished in the United Kingdom and colonies only by passage of the 1833 Abolition of Slavery Act. The role of the slave trade, and all the continuing expropriations of colonization, for the accumulation in Europe of the wealth, financing industrial and technological transformations of all kinds, remains to be fully researched and recognized. In the words of the campaign slogan: if you didn't want us here, you should have picked your own cotton.

For Hegel, human history is the beginning of history, and of an idea of a progress of the consciousness of freedom, is the characteristic feature of consciousness, from which he is then careful to exclude non-Europeans. The degree to which this exclusion is also racially based for Hegel remains a matter for contention. For Husserl, a development and expansion of the powers of consciousness is a marker of historical and cultural development, understood as a collective process. Thus, while Adorno denounces Husserl for having a commitment to a certain bourgeois and individualized understanding of consciousness, he fails to recognize that for Husserl there are material and institutional conditions enabling successful pursuit of such enquiry, and an advantage to collective research. For Husserl, there is also the possibility for an enslaved person to overcome the intellectual restrictions imposed on them, and, connecting with the slave in Plato's *Meno*, acceding to the status of epistemological authority, or, in Husserl's term, to that of a transcendently reduced consciousness, no longer held back by inherited prejudices of all kinds. It is worth noting that while Husserl himself loses civic status, as emeritus professor of Freiburg University, as a consequence of the Nazi Race Laws, it is, for him, also the recognition by philosophical colleagues, and peers, its withdrawal and its absence, which hits hard, confirming Hegel's analyses of importance of mutuality in recognition.

Adorno's critique is developed through a number of distinct registers. In relation to Husserl, it sometimes seems as though Adorno holds Husserl and his version of phenomenology responsible for the political moves subsequently made by Husserl's heir and successor in Freiburg, Martin Heidegger. It is true that Husserl himself only belatedly recognized how Heidegger had taken Husserl's own phenomenological initiatives and transformed them utterly, in the names of the existentials, the experiential structures of self-awareness, worldhood and historicity (*Weltlichkeit* and *Geschichtlichkeit*), which for Husserl remain mired in an uncritical and naturalizing philosophical anthropology. However, Adorno pays less than enough attention to the differences in register between these, and Husserl on the lived world of primordial data intuition (*die Lebenswelt*) and the notion of transcendental history. In the nineteen thirties, Adorno was not to know of Husserl's growing unease at Heidegger's activities, but it became well enough known after Husserl's death, with the move of his widow, Malvine Husserl to the United States. The exclusive focus on the transition from descriptive to transcendental philosophy, from categorial to eidetic intuition and from empirically given to transcendental consciousness, is taken by him to reveal some truth of Husserl's phenomenology as necessary idealist, and focused on a separate and separable conscious ego.

Nor is Adorno inclined to pay attention to the subsequent developments of Husserl's analyses, which come gradually into view with the posthumous publication, again after the Second

World War, of the material explored cumulatively in the lectures in Freiburg, from 1917 to his retirement in 1928. There the constitution of consciousness and the shifts of register back and forth between the empirical and the transcendently given instances are scrutinized in complex and perplexing detail. Adorno does not bring out the relationality of the correlations, in process of development, between the results of the *Wesensschau*, or inspection of essences, and the evidences giving rise to it, in the processes of intuition, as activity, *Anschauung*, which are self-correcting and subject to review and revision. There is a loss both of any sense of the genesis of Husserl's thought and of the way in which Husserl builds into his descriptions a cumulative process of refinement and emendation. The title of Adorno's text on Husserl is here suggestive, with the phrase, a *metacritique of the theory of knowledge: studies of Husserl and phenomenological antinomy* (1985[1956]). This suggests a definitive system to be critiqued, and a system which is concerned only with knowledge.

By contrast, Derrida, in his early, 1953/54 manuscript on Husserl's philosophy, published as *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy* (2003 [1990]), brings out both the importance of the genesis of Husserl's thought, tracing first the trajectory from descriptive to transcendental phenomenology, and then from a transcendental, to a worldly genesis of meaning and sense.^{xvi} The importance of both concepts, of genesis and of sense, is underlined by Derrida in the formulation of a mutually implicating chiasm: that there is a genesis of sense, in the working of synthesis, active and passive, in the constitution of consciousness, and a sense of genesis, as underlying the development, overall of theoretical understanding, within history, as conventionally understood. Derrida is also responsive to the critique in Husserl's descriptions of any tendency to re-naturalize consciousness. For Husserl, consciousness is an achievement, not a given, and the results of the *Wesensschau* are not as stable as Adorno seems to suggest. In his early reading of Husserl, and translation of Husserl's essay, 'The origin of geometry', Derrida remarks in his introduction, as underlined by Marion Hobson, in her preface to the English translation:

the question we will put to Husserl could become the following: Is it possible to ground, in its ontological possibility and (at the same time) in its sense, an absolute dialectic of dialectic and non-dialectic? In this dialectic, philosophy and being would blend together the one in the other, without definitively alienating themselves from themselves.

Derrida/ Hobson (2003 [1990]) p. x, and p. xxix

Here Derrida hypothesizes that the registers of philosophy and those of the matter in hand, as ontology, have remained distinct, as opposed to opening up on to each other, in the manner argued for in their different ways by Hegel and by Husserl.

Derrida, in his 1990 preface, remarks his continuing use, in 1953/54 of the term 'dialectic' in this text, for processes for which he later invented the now well-known if misunderstood notion of *differance*, neither a word nor a concept.^{xvii} He remarks on the boldness of his reading, surveying the whole panorama of Husserl's writings, as governed by some sort of law:

It is always a question of an originary complication of an origin, of an initial contamination of the simple, of an inaugural divergence that no analysis could present, make present in its phenomenon or reduce to the pointlike nature of the element, instantaneous and identical to itself. In fact the question that governs the whole trajectory is already: 'How can the originary of a foundation be an *a priori* synthesis?'

And he then identifies an instability in a series of founding distinctions at work in phenomenology: transcendental/ worldly; eidetic/empirical; intentional/non-intentional; active/passive; present/non-present, originary/derived, pure/ impure etc. Derrida is thus in sympathy with Adorno's critique of Husserl's quest for an absolute first principle or origin for philosophy and truth, which then acquires a curious confirmation in a proliferation of formulations, by phenomenologists themselves, of Husserl's first principle. Derrida remarks on this meshing of Husserlian phenomenology with an inheritance of Hegel's dialectics, which goes by way of a dispute with the analyses of Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (1966 [1943]), which, while not as violent as Adorno's dispute with Sartre, nevertheless underlines how important it is for both Derrida and Adorno to set out a set of differences between Husserl and Hegel as well as to explore their commonalities.

The deployment of the concept of spirit, or *Geist*, is closely bound up with the third moment of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, or Holy Ghost. For, as Hegel seeks to make clear, *Geist* is the medium in which a making flesh of divinity is transposed into the materializations of conceptual differences. That making flesh, as an actualization as matter, is for Hegel a movement inherent to all conceptual structures, which require such determination, in order to acquire the requisite determinacy, to provide determinate delimitation in a concept. For Hegel, the evidences of religious development, reveals a movement from natural to representational, and from representational to revealed religion, as analyzed in the closing sections of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Husserl too is committed to the notion that human beings arrive by way of repeated attempts at pure description and the series of reductions on immediacy given intuitions, at the understanding of what there is, which is granted to divinity by virtue of being the creator of all that there is. It is noteworthy that Derrida wonders whether the very notion of religion already tips the scales in favor of Christianity, over other religions, and indeed over the other monotheisms. ^{xviii} Derrida remarks how, the prefix, 're-', suggests a rebinding together of a community, which has already fragmented, as opposed to any notion of enduring organic community; and he notes an affirmation in Christianity of a system of postponing, while affirming, reconciliation, in a relay of meanings, marking in a decisive event, called the last, or final judgment, in which restitution may be expected, but which may never arrive. Where Derrida seeks a notion of the messianic, and of messianic time, which is a demythologized interruption of time, for Benjamin, there remains a mystical commitment to a moment of transfiguration in which everything remains both exactly the same and utterly transformed into its own apotheosis. It is to this figure of time in Benjamin's writings that Derrida takes the greatest of exceptions. Another commonality between Derrida and Adorno, which remains to be explored, is this resistance to the maintenance in Benjamin's thinking of this mystical element, and to his conception of divine violence. Adorno addresses Benjamin's writings in section 98 of *Minima Moralia*, under the title 'Bequest', and he remarks in his final section, again borrowing from Walter Benjamin:

The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. (Adorno (1978 [1951]) p. 247)

The distinction between this hypothetical stance of redemption, and a notion of actualization, as reconciliation is to be noted. This remark bears perhaps more the imprint of Adorno's reading of Kierkegaard and Benjamin than of Hegel and Husserl.

3: towards a philosophical materialism: a material dialectic of Geist and Horizon

For Husserl and for Hegel, the commitment is to a unity and completability, not just in principle but conceptually, and in actuality, for Hegel as a result of the movement of the concept and its structure as necessarily self-completing, for Husserl, as a result of the efforts of scholars and thinkers in examining and developing systems of description to capture the essential structures of what there is. These commitments Adorno challenges. For Adorno, there is incompleteness, and micro-orders, to be discussed in his celebrated micrologies, and they are not subsumable to an overarching, self-completing system. Here the notion of conceptuality as managing, packaging and overcoming an original, material non-identity is key, with the warning that slogans, about a priority of non-identity over identity do not capture the actual claims variously made by Adorno, firstly about the emergence of a conception of natural history, to take the place of an ideal history, and thereby of any residual conceptions of divine purpose, or providence, and, secondly, about a materialization of dialectics, itself, displacing the abstract aporias of Socratic dialogue, and the conceptual antinomies of Kant's analyses with the actual conflict of daily living in modern societies. This materialization of dialectics is for Adorno emergent in the writings of Hegel and of Marx, and then idealistically betrayed in those of Lukacs and Sartre, and this goes some way to explaining his hostility to them. This materialization is to be understood as taking place, not as Marx anticipated it, in working through conflicting forces and relations of production, but in recognition of the actual, material consistency of physical processes themselves. Increasingly nuclear fission, and metastasising cells, auto-immune systems attacking their own sustainability, and the chance organization of DNA and RNA are emblematic of the processes in question. Global warming and the damaging consequences of the extinction of species on this planet would also fit in the frame here.

In the closing sections of *Negative Dialectics*, this has turned into the commitment to a priority of the object, and to a constellation, forged through the juxtaposed readings of Husserl and transcendental phenomenology, on the one hand, and of Hegel, and his phenomenology on the other. Chasing down the convoluted pathways of development in phenomenology, and the fate of Marxism in the twentieth century leads Adorno from a focus on a revived notion of natural history, in the 1932 lecture, 'The Idea of Natural History', through to the hypothesis of a return of philosophy to an originary materialism, which is concealed by a subordination of subjectivity to the more often than not fetishized object of its enquiry. While Adorno does not affirm the inventions of Walter Benjamin, and has differences with Benjamin's insistence on a connection between natural history and mourning, between messianism and a standstill of history, he returns to them in his commemorations of the death of his friend and mentor. For Benjamin, more pressing than a reading of either Husserl or Hegel, are readings of Franz Rosenzweig and of Charles Baudelaire, apparently lesser figures in any history of philosophy, but salient for their explorations, Rosenzweig, for a relation between the three monotheisms, and Baudelaire, for access to an ephemeral concept of redemption. In place of a Redeemer, or Saviour, declaring himself to be the way, the truth and the light, Benjamin's analyses of Charles Baudelaire, lyric poet of late capitalism, is designed, by

piecemeal construction, to reveal a truth of capitalism, and a misfit between an idea of progress and an actual natural history, of which the life as gesture of Baudelaire is emblematic. While Adorno criticized this text in Benjamin's lifetime, he is compelled to turn Benjamin into just such an ephemeral witness to disaster after Benjamin's suicide.

In his lectures from 1964/1965, *History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965* (2001 [1965]), Adorno ties together criticisms of Heidegger's conception of *Sorge*, Otto Bollnow on *Geborgenheit* and Georg Lukacs on *Entfremdung*, in a diagnosis of their collective failure to grasp what is in play in gaps between collective meaning formation, in social processes, and individual attempts at self-identification and affirmation. A hybrid inheritance is under examination in the citation, from Walter Benjamin, also cited by Adorno, from the seventeenth of Benjamin's theses, in his 'On the concept of History', composed shortly before his suicide in 1940:

Historicism rightly culminates in universal history. It may be that materialist historiography differs in method more clearly from universal history than any other kind. Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its procedure is additive: It musters a mass of data to fill in the homogenous empty time. A materialist historiography on the other hand is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well.

Benjamin (2003 [1940]) Number XVII p. 398 ^{xix}

This combination of a movement of thought and its arrest in a moment of understanding forms the basis of Benjamin's notion of a dialectical image with which Adorno is not in sympathy, and which brings Benjamin into proximity with Husserl's notion of an intuition of essences. In these same lectures Adorno makes a quite indefensible, derogatory generalization about Africans, resisting the forces of colonization (Adorno (2003 [1964-5]), and reveals himself to be no less caught up in the prejudices of his time, as he himself seeks to analyze. Further appeal to Benjamin of may be of assistance:

For in every case these treasures have a lineage which he cannot contemplate without horror. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great geniuses who created them, but also to the anonymous toil of others who lived in the same period. There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist therefore disassociates himself from the process of transmission as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.

Benjamin (2003 [1940]) Number VII p. 392

Each human being consists in a microcosm of such a triumphal procession, part captive, part victor, inheriting both barbarism and the cultural spoils of systems of expropriated labor. These lectures prepare the thinking which is formalized in *Negative Dialectics*. There, the concept of *Geist*, in Hegel's enquiries arrives in view, inseparably bound up with the strong concept of the concept, as mythological.

In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno painstakingly disentangles some of these strands one from another, in part with the assistance Benjamin, and his verdict is harsh:

In the midst of history, Hegel takes the side of what is unchanging, of monotony, of the identity of the process whose totality would be sound. He is thus to be charged unmetaphorically with historical mythology.

Adorno (1966): *Negative Dialectics* 350

While the Husserlian surmise concerning a unifying horizon, underpinned by the concept of Sinn, meaning, or sense, is put in question by Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1927), Adorno is impatient with what he terms the abstract nature of Heidegger's conceptions of being and of history. He is far more patient, at least in *Negative Dialectics*, with Husserl's attempts to articulate these two, meaning and horizon, *Sinn*, and *Horizont*, since for Adorno, Heidegger's notion of historicity, *Geschichtlichkeit*, the existential marking of its bearer by its history, has been stripped of all historical content. It is a naturalized notion of history, but as mythic, or manifest destiny, divine ordaining, and fate, *Geschick* and *Schicksal*, by contrast to Adorno's notion of natural history. In summary, Adorno's central objection to Husserl's procedures is twofold: the notion of a direct access to given essences (*Wesensschau*) is objectionable, as is the presumption that there is a determinate content to which to gain access.

For Adorno, determinate content is the result of processes of formation, which cannot even be likened to a process of production, for production implies that the equipment for that production, and a model according to which something is to be produced, are already in hand and adequate to the task in hand. To rescue Husserl from this objection, it is necessary somehow to accommodate and thematize a notion of essences, which are themselves in process of formation, not given in advance of history, ideal or natural. While it is not obvious that this can be done, some appeal to Eugen Fink's distinction between operational and thematized concepts in phenomenology might be of assistance. The presumption that what there is arrives as orderly, meaningful and providing the basis for a unified account, is put in question across the longitudinal dimensions of Adorno's writings. What is to be registered consists rather in complex structures, without self-evidence, lacking identity conditions, or indeed any necessary coherence and consistency. Even in a case where there is self-evidence, determinate identity conditions, coherence and consistency, even so the forces of an administered society may mask or confuse, obstruct and prevent acquisition of any clear and distinct idea of what there is. And an administered society, according to Adorno, is structured systemically in such a way as to promote its own perpetuation, in a structure of auto-telic self-preservation, and to defy critique.

The objections developed in relation to his reading Husserl, Adorno can then deploy in relation to his reading of and understanding of Hegel's grand project. A key feature of administered society, as a form of social organization, decisively emergent in the twentieth century, is a tendency to deprive public space of the dimensions of political contestation and critique, and of any transformatory potential, instead installing bureaucratic normalizing procedures, designed to minimize scope for critique and contestation. These features of administered society also function to block the logic of a conceptual completion theorized by Hegel, as the outcome of a necessary series of appearances of meaning and order, in the logic of *Geist* as self-completing intelligibility. Administered society thus imposes itself as a fourth moment, stalling the movement of dialectical

reconciliation, between the moments of immediacy, in *The Philosophy of Right* (1988 [1821]) analyzed as given in the family; as self-alienated in civil society, in the particularizing forces of public regulation (the police) and the corporation; and their reunion in a universal meaningfulness, captured by the concept, and supposedly arrived at in the affirmations of the nation state. However, the writings of both Husserl and Hegel, for Adorno, have the virtue of demonstrating how the divisions and displacements of meaning, of the concept and of conceptual work, of the idea, and the labor of the concept necessarily take material form, and lose all status as pure abstraction. For these are Hegel's concept and Husserl's horizons of meaning.

It is this materialization of inherited abstractions, in analysis of the constraining forces, exercised by inherited philosophical terminology, and their role in the formation of cultural institutions, that Adorno supposes it important to trace out, and affirm, in the ongoing task of rescuing meaning from the fetishisms of positivism, and of histories of philosophy, unmediated by any understanding of the violence of political and economic expropriations, concealed behind a surface of social order. These critiques of Husserl and of Hegel are thus not purely negative; indeed they even take the form of a phenomenology, since they trace the emergence in their writings, against their own intent, of a commitment to a philosophical materialism. These writings have the double effect of revealing a historical process in the development of conceptuality, which otherwise might go unremarked, and of providing the stimulus to do some of the necessary conceptual work, to reveal contingency, restriction and specificity, where the ambition was to demonstrate necessity, universality and completeness. *Negative Dialectics* thereby arrives, as a process of doubled immanent critique, from which lessons may be learned concerning the necessity of restricted ambitions with respect to the scope of such results.

Notes:

ⁱⁱ I am very grateful to Christian Lotz and Eric Nelson, for the original initiative to think further about the relation between Adorno and Husserl, and for a lively discussion at SPEP 56, in Memphis, Tennessee, October 2017; and in debt to Peg Birmingham for suggesting I develop the thoughts presented there at SPEP 56, into this more fully articulated account.

ⁱⁱ See T.W Adorno (1966) p. 19.

ⁱⁱⁱ See G.W.F. Hegel (1970 [1830]): volumes 8, 9, and 10. There is an excellent study of Hegel's philosophy of nature, from which I have learned much by Alison Stone (2005), who also has an instructive essay, 'Adorno and Logic', in Debora Cook ed. (2008), pp. 47-63.

^{iv} See T.W. Adorno (1974 [1951]), a text which consists in three distinct sections dated 1944, 1945 and 1946-1947.

^v See G.W.F. Hegel (1977 [1807]), in the section on consciousness, part three, pp. 95-98.

^{vi} See Friedrich Nietzsche (1974 [1887]), and Gillian Rose (1978), which also has an excellent brief account of Adorno's critique of Husserl, to which I shall return in what follows.

^{vii} See also Deborah Cook (2011), for an extended discussion of Adorno on the concept of natural history, and its arrival already in the writings of Walter Benjamin, for whom literary work takes on the guise of natural entities, with a life cycle, of growth and decay, and an afterlife in cultural memory. She also effectively explores a certain proximity to analyses of ecology, provided by Carolyn Merchant, Arne Naess and Murray Bookchin.

^{viii} Michel Henry has an essay in which he lays out the continuities and differences between four distinct formulations for the principle of all principles, which is supposed to govern phenomenology, from the simplest, the imperative 'to the things themselves', to the most refined, that of Jean-Luc Marion: 'so much reduction thus much givenness', which precludes including Hegel's phenomenology as a phenomenology, properly speaking. See Michel Henry (2015 [1989]): 'Four Principles of Phenomenology' trans Joseph Rivera, in *Continental Philosophy Review*, volume 48 (1) pp. 1-21.

^{ix} See the remarks on this in chapter two, 'Phenomenology and ontology' in Peter E. Gordon (2016): *Adorno and Existence* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2016), which also provides a useful profile of the consequences of Adorno running together his responses to the phenomenologies of Husserl and of Heidegger, to which this discussion will return.

^x See Edmund Husserl (1970 [1935]), and see also the review of Dermot Moran (2012) at <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/husserl-s-crisis-of-the-european-sciences-and-transcendental-phenomenology-an-introduction/>

^{xi} See Eugen Fink (2004 [1957]): 'Operative concepts in Husserl's phenomenology' in Dermot Moran & Lester Embree eds. (2004); and Eugen Fink (1970 [1930]): 'The phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism' in R. O. Elveton ed. (1970) pp. pp. 44-58.

^{xii} For Michel Henry, see *The Essence of manifestation* (1973 [1963]), translated by Gil Etzkorn, and *Material Phenomenology* (2008 [1990]), and *From Communism to Capitalism* (2014 [1990]), all ably translated by Scott Davidson.

^{xiii} See Michel Henry (1983 [1976]), which affirms Marx as a thinker of material reality; and Henry (2012 [1987]), which develops a more critical take on the lack of attention to the dynamics, specific to human embodiment, and to the auto-affection and transcendental life, marking a site at which thought matures.

^{xiv} See Jacques Derrida: 'The 'world' of the Enlightenment to come: (exception, calculation, sovereignty)', in Derrida (2005 [2003]), pp. 117-159. There Derrida connects up the notion of iterability emphasized in his translation of Husserl's Geometry essay, to more recent developments in gene therapy and gene sequencing, see pp. 147-148.

^{xv} See Christophe Menke (1998 [1988]) especially chapters five and six.

^{xvi} See Jacques Derrida (2003 [1990]), which, while published in 1990, was composed much earlier in 1954-1955.

^{xvii} *Differance* arrives in the pages of Derrida (1976 [1967]): *Of Grammatology*, and is emphatically announced to the world in 1968 lecture of that name, subsequently published in Derrida (1982 [1972]): *Margins of Philosophy*.

^{xviii} See Jacques Derrida (2002 [1996]): 'Faith and Knowledge: two sources of 'religion' at the limits of reason alone', translated by Samuel Weber, pp. 40-101.

^{xix} See T. W. Adorno (2006 [2001]) Lecture Sixteen, pp. 145-146, citing Walter Benjamin (2003 [1940]): 'On the concept of history' pp. 389-397. In the Paralipomena, Benjamin remarks that the historical materialist conducts something akin to a spectrum analysis (ibid, p. 402).

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