Dancing around Belligerency

Spanish-German Relations during World War II

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The Second World War has had a profound effect on recent history, how we understand Europe and what we consider necessary to build stable democratic societies. At a juncture in which the most important legacy of that conflict, the European Union, is being questioned and where nationalist populism is on the rise, it seems particularly important to look back and re-evaluate the global conflict in a new light. Indeed, the conflict left no European nation untouched. The Spanish case shows how the war had a serious impact not only on the belligerent nations but also neutral and non-belligerent ones. This special section aims to explore the dynamics of relations between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany during the Second World War, and in doing so contribute to a better understanding of the conflict. The analyses brought together in these pages aim to place Francoist Spain in the broader context of the global conflict, focusing particularly on the transnational contacts between fascist and para-fascist movements,[1] Spain's engagement with the Nazi-fascist European project and the role of neutral countries in the midst of total war. Rather than focusing excessively on Spain's potential entry into the Second World War, the different contributions look more broadly at Spanish-German relations in this period. Such a viewpoint illuminates not only the role Spain had within Nazi foreign policy or the inner workings of Francoism and Nazism, but also key themes in the field of European history.

On 23 October 1940, after the fall of France and at the high point of the Falange's dreams of imperial expansion, Francisco Franco and Adolf Hitler met in the French town of Hendaye, which lies just over the border from Spain. They met to negotiate Spain's limited participation in the Second World War. However, Franco would end the meeting refusing to enter into the war. Some might argue that Germany's failure to take over Gibraltar was one of Hitler's most costly mistakes, but at the same time Franco's refusal to engage in the project came to be one of his most fortunate decisions. The mythification of the Hendaye meeting proved extremely successful. For decades after 1945, Franco was presented as a brilliant statesman, a fatherly figure who had kept the Axis powers at bay and saved Spain from yet another tragedy.

By 1943, both the mythification of Hendaye and the rejection of the term 'totalitarianism' (replaced, conveniently, with the concept of 'organic democracy') presented a new and successful narrative that in the post-war period would present a sanitised version of Spain's role in the Second World War. Francoist Spain entered a process of rhetorical de-fascistisation. In this context, marked by the Cold War, former diplomats like W.L. Beaulac helped consolidate the myth, characterising Francoist

[1] On the concept of para-fascism see R. Griffin, 'Stating the Nation's Rebirth: the Politics and Aesthetics of Performance in the Context of Fascist Studies' in G. Berghaus (ed.) Fascism and Theatre: The Politics and Aesthetics of Performance in the Era of Fascism. (Oxford 1994) and R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London 1994), 120–8.

Spain as a 'silent ally' of the victorious powers.[2] Equally unsurprising is that historians close to the regime further supported this thesis, presenting Franco's Spain as a long-haul neutral.[3] But it was probably Detwiler's work[4] that helped establish the myth solidly at the core of a more general historiography, inside and outside of Spain.

In fact, it was not until the 1980s, once democracy was established in Spain and historians had access to new sources, including the publication of Ramón Serrano Suñer's memoirs,[5] that the scholarly narrative began to seriously challenge the myth of Hendaye. Particularly important in this process was the work of Javier Tusell and Genoveva Queipo de Llano, which showed how Spain intended to enter the war after the fall of France. A development only prevented by Germany's lack of insistence, the Mediterranean's marginal importance within Nazi war strategy and Italy's desire to avoid a strong competitor in North Africa.[6] Since then, other historians have further demonstrated the Francoist regime's desire to enter the war as a way to restore the long-lost empire.[7] In this context, Ros Agudo and Norman Goda have showed how Spain pursued its own military aims and considered operations against not only Gibraltar, but also Morocco, Portugal and even France, none of which necessarily involved consultation with the Axis powers.[8]

However, none of these works settled the overall debate on when exactly Spain shifted its position solidly away from the Axis, if at all. For some, most prominently Wingeate Pike, Franco never abandoned his admiration for Nazi Germany. According to him, even Jordana, the neutralist minister, presented strong continuities with the Germanophile policies of Serrano Suñer.[9] However, between roughly 2008 and 2019, historians have clearly identified Francoist Spain as a covert ally of the Axis and established the waning of this support sometime between January and September of 1943; a shift marked by the battle of Stalingrad, the fall of fascist Italy and – contrary

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[2] W.L. Beaulac, *Franco: Silent ally in World War II* (Carbondale, IL 1986).

[3] R. De la Cierva, *Historia del franquismo : orígenes y configuración (1939–1945)* (Barcelona 1975); L. Suárez Fernández, *España, Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desde 1939 hasta 1945* (Madrid 1997).

[4] D.S. Detwiler, *Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar* (Wiesbaden, 1962).

[5] R. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: memorias* (Barcelona 1977). See also: H. Saña, R. Serrano Suñer and H. Thomas, *El franquismo sin mitos : conversaciones con Serrano Suñer* (Barcelona 1981).

[6] J. Tusell and G. García Queipo de Llano, *Franco y Mussolini* (Barcelona 1985).

[7] P. Preston, 'Franco and Hitler: the Myths of Hendaye 1940', *Contemporary European History*, 1, 1 (1992), 1–16; A. Marquina Barrio, 'La neutralidad o la pérdida de la neutralidad en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Cuestiones pendientes de un debate todavía inconcluso', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Hª Contemporánea* 7, (1994), 313–322; W.H. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia ; London 2000); X. Moreno Julia, *Legión Azul y Segunda Guerra Mundial. Hundimiento his-pano-alemán en el Frente del Este, 1943–1944* (Madrid 2014).

[8] M. Ros Agudo, *La gran tentación : Franco, el Imperio colonial y los planes de intervención en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona 2008); N.J.W. Goda, *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America* (College Station, TX 1998); N. Goda, 'The reluctant belligerent. Franco's Spain and Hitler's War', in C. Kent, T.K. Wolber and C.M.K. Hewitt (eds.), *The Lion and the Eagle: Interdisciplinary Essays on German-Spanish Relations over the Centuries* (New York, NY 2000), 383–396.

[9] D.W. Pike, *Franco and the Axis Stigma* (Basingstoke 2008).

to Pike's thesis – Jordana's neutralist policy.[10]

However, Hendaye has continued to cast a long shadow over the study of German–Spanish relations during the Second World War. This has resulted in a rich historiography, but one overtly focused on three main themes: the question of Spain's entry into the war; the Blue Division; and the reasons behind the regime's survival after 1945. This in turn has favoured a proliferation of studies overtly focused on Spain without necessarily integrating the country's history into a broader framework, which would allow for a better understanding of the Second World War. However, the new consensus, paired with an increasing internationalisation of Spanish historiography, has allowed historians to focus on more under-researched topics, even though Spain's potential entry into the war usually remains in the spotlight. In this sense, recent studies have drawn attention to a more nuanced evaluation of the Blue Division's role within the Waffen SS,[11] a renewed interest in analysing the extent of Spain's assistance to the Axis,[12] and a strong development in the field of propaganda and German-Spanish cultural relations.[13] It is the aim of this special section to move firmly away from the shadow of Hendaye and, in so doing, advance the field by focusing on three less-explored but key areas: transnational fascism; the construction of the New Order; and neutrality studies.

The rise of comparative and transnational history has allowed for a much-needed shift in fascist studies. The historiographical framework has now broadened and is no longer overly concerned with delimiting and defining. The current historiography now both acknowledges the pivotal role of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy and considers the existence of a post-liberal departure in the inter-war period and its necessary analysis.[14] As Constantin Iordachi and Aristotle Kallis have posited, this new historiography considers the study of hybrid or fascisticised political movements in their own context; it avoids treating them as mere copies of two allegedly perfect models: Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.[15] In so doing, these new modes of study depart

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[10] S.G. Payne, *Franco y Hitler: España, Alemania, la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el Holocausto* (Madrid 2008); E. Sáenz-Francés San Baldomero, *Entre la antorcha y la esvástica: Franco en la encrucijada de la II Guerra Mundial* (Madrid 2009).

[11] X.M. Núñez Seixas, *Camarada Invierno : experiencia y memoria de la División Azul (1941–1945)* (Barcelona 2016).

[12] R. García Pérez, *Franquismo y Tercer Reich : Las relaciones economicas hispano-alemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Madrid 1994); C. Leitz, *Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Oxford 1996); J.L. Rodríguez Jiménez, *Los esclavos españoles de Hitler* (Barcelona 2002); J.R. González, 'El espionaje nazi', in E.G. Seoane and J.R. González (eds.), *War zone: la Segunda Guerra Mundial en el noroesta de la península Ibérica*, (Madrid 2012), 209–242.

[13] I. Schulze Schneider, 'La propaganda alemana en España 1942–1944', *Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea*, 7 (1994), 371–386; I. Schulze Schneider, 'Éxitos y fracasos de la propaganda alemana en España: 1939–1944', *Melanges de la Casa de Velázquez*, 31 (1995), 197–218; J. Hera Martínez, *La política cultural de Alemania en España en el periodo de entreguerras* (Madrid 2002); N. Sesma Landrin, 'Propaganda en la alta manera e influencia fascista. El Instituto de Estudios Políticos (1939–1943)', *Ayer*, 53 (2004), 155–178; M. Janué i Miret, 'España y Alemania: Historia de las relaciones culturales en el siglo XX', op. cit., 1, 69, Special Issue (2008).

[14] A. Kallis, 'The "Fascist Effect": On the Dynamics of Political Hybridization in Inter-War Europe', in A.C. Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*, (London 2014), 36.

[15] C. Iordachi, 'Fascism in Interwar East Central and Southeastern Europe: Toward a New Transnational Research Agenda', *East Central Europe*, 2-3, 37 (2010), 161–213; A. Kallis, 'The

from well-known frameworks, more prominently Paxton's five stages of fascism and the theory of 'generic fascism',[16] to favour an analysis more focused on contacts, influences and the transference of illiberal political ideas between different political movements. Whether we talk of para-fascist movements or fascisticised projects,[17] it is evident that fascism exerted a critical influence over the European political spectrum of the 1930s, but one that did not always entail the perfect reproduction of the Italian or German models. In this vein, Rodríguez Barreira's work has already shown the importance of looking at these fascist and hybrid movements through a comparative lens, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics through which they related to one another.[18] Moreover, if, as Glenda Sluga has argued, the Spanish Civil War was one of 'the most obvious examples of transnational links in the history of interwar fascism and anti-fascism',[19] one that produced a regime so closely linked to the Nazi-fascist project that it would not break off diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany until 1945,[20] it seems even more necessary to explore the Spanish case within a broader European context, particularly if we want to properly understand the post-liberal departure of the 1930s–40s.

The articles collated in this special section attempt to engage critically with these issues, looking at the connections and links established between the Nazi regime and Spanish fascists, para-fascists and fellow travellers. In this way, some of our authors make important inroads in the underresearched area of party-to-party relations[21] by focussing on the cooperation and interconnection between the Spanish Falange and the Nazi Party. Meanwhile, others focus more generally on how the Nazi project was received by contemporary Spanish political and intellectual elites. In this vein, Núñez Seixas' contribution focusses on how Nazi Germany influenced foreign visitors. He places these encounters within a much longer period starting in the 1920s and focuses on the transnational influences of both Italian fascism and German national socialism over Spanish elites. He then shifts attention to the experiences of Blue Division soldiers

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"Fascist Effect": On the Dynamics of Political Hybridization in Inter-War Europe', in A.C. Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*, (London 2014)

[16] R.O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York, NY 2004); R.O. Paxton, 'The Five Stages of Fascism', in *Comparative Fascist Studies*, ed. C. Iordachi (London and New York, NY 2010), 165–186.

[17] The concept of fascistisation has been thoroughly explained by Ismael Saz, 'El franquismo: ¿régimen autoritario o dictadura fascista?', in J. Tusell (ed.), *El régimen de Franco, 1936–1975: política y relaciones exteriores*, (1993), 189–202; I. Saz, 'Fascism, Fascistization and Developmentalism in Franco's Dictatorship', *Social History*, 29, 3 (2004), 342–357. See also: A. Kallis, '"Fascism", "Para-fascism" and "Fascistization": On the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories', *European History Quarterly*, 33, 2 (2003), 219–249.

[18] Ó. Rodríguez Barreira, 'The Many Heads of the Hydra: Local Parafascism in Spain and Europe, 1936–50', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 49, 4 (2014), 702–726.

[19] G. Sluga, 'Fascism and Anti-Fascism', in A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, (Basingstoke 2009), 382.

[20] Preston, 'Franco and Hitler: the myths of Hendaye 1940', 2.

[21] K.-J. Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y 'Tercer Reich' : España en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Madrid 1986); W.H. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany collaboration in the new order* (Columbia 2000); A. Morant i Ariño, '"Una importante expresión de amistad hispano-alemana". Les visites de Pilar Primo de Rivera l'Alemanya nacionalsocialista, 1938–1943', in A.L.y.H.U. (coords.), *I Encuentro de Jóvenes Investigadores de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea*, (Zaragoza 2008); A. Morant i Ariño, 'Envers la Nova Europa (i tornada). La collaboració de la Sección Femenina i del Frente de Juventudes en les activitats "culturals" de les Joventuts Hitlerianes (1940–1943)', in L. Cabana, Santidrián (coords.), *VII Encuentro de Investigadores del franquismo*, (Santiago de Compostela 2011), 571–581.

during the Second World War. His contribution thus provides an overall analysis of these contacts, as it considers not just the so-called political pilgrimages of fellow fascists to Nazi Germany[22] but also of other travellers that came to be influenced by the Nazi project in one way or another. As a result, his contribution to this issue highlights the complex reception of national socialism by the Spanish right and puts Spain's engagement with the New Order during the Second World War into perspective.

Toni Morant devotes his attention to a very under-explored theme in the historiography. The study of fascist and para-fascist women's organisations has been generally overlooked; the analysis of how they worked to shape national and international politics has been ignored. It is here where Morant's work makes its most important contribution, not just to the study of transnational fascism but also of gender studies. *Sección Femenina*'s passionate engagement with the New Order project adds not just to our understanding of party-to-party relations between fascist and para-fascist movements, but of the New Order in general. The activities of these women illustrate clearly how Nazi Germany replaced fascist Italy as the preferred model in the minds of many among the political elites of Francoist Spain, which in turn highlights the period (1941–3) during which the New Order project gained more traction. Moreover, as this contribution emphasises, the preeminent place these women had in these contacts and exchanges demonstrates not just how the Falange's engagement with the Nazi-fascist project stemmed from a blend of ideological affinity and political opportunism, but how the same root allowed these women to make a claim to a place in the political space.

If there is any area in which links and connections between these movements can be better explored, then it is the study of the New Order. As Benjamin Martin has demonstrated, the Nazi-fascist cultural New Order, while ultimately aimed at achieving hegemony in Europe, succeeded in mobilising supporters throughout the continent.[23] This was not just a clear manifestation of the pivotal role these countries played within the post-liberal departure from democracy of the interwar period, but also of the mobilising power of the Europeanist discourse. As Ute Frevert has argued, Germany's 'love affair with Europe' in the interwar period had a defensive character that it maintained under Nazi rule. While it certainly seems as if the New Order was no more than a propaganda through which Nazi Germany sold its war aims to other countries, beneath that there also lay a desire to defend the European continent both from the United States' economic hegemony and Soviet Russia's political project.[24] A desire shared by many other European countries, which between 1941 and 1943, came to see Nazi Germany as the only nation capable of rising to both challenges. In this sense, Martin makes a very important point: the New Order sparked genuine interest because it seemed to address real issues.[25] This is something that comes across clearly throughout our special section, showing how, while engagement with the New Order was marked by an asymmetrical power dynamic, it did not entail directly copying Nazi-

[22] W.H. Bowen, 'Spanish Pilgrimages to Hitler's Germany: Emissaries of the New Order', *The Historian*, 71, 2 (2009), 258–279.
[23] B.G. Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture* (Cambridge 2016).
[24] U. Frevert, 'Europeanizing Germany's Twentieth Century', *History and Memory*, 17, 1–2, Special Issue: Histories and Memories of Twentieth-Century Germany (2005), 87–116.
[25] Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture*, 277.

fascist ideas and methods. Rather the creation of a milieu in which different political movements pursued their own agendas, accepting, in the case of non-belligerent nations such as Spain, the Nazi-fascist hegemony insofar as it aided them in achieving their own aims and developing their own projects. This becomes particularly clear in the case of the Women's Section of the Falange, studied by Morant, and of the strong collaboration between the Falange and the German embassy in terms of propaganda, clearly demonstrated in my article.

However, this engagement with the Nazi-fascist project was not exclusive to the higher echelons of the Falange. As Núñez Seixas and David Brydan argue in their respective articles, the New Order attracted a much broader range of Europeans for a variety of reasons. In this sense, Brydan's piece on the Blue Division's health services allow us to see the New Order as so many participants at the time must have seen it, as a forum for scientific, intellectual and professional exchange. This in turn highlights something cultural historians have already noted when evaluating German-Spanish relations in the 20th century: how culture progressively became a political and expansionist instrument, which served to amplify Germany's political influence.[26] The combination of genuine intellectual collaboration and ideological motivations comes across clearly in the way the Nazi Party, the Hitler Youth and the Ibero-American Institute worked closely with the Spanish health services in Berlin. However, it is also important to note how, as both Seixas and Brydan show, these encounters were marked not just by the dynamics of European fascism in broad terms but more importantly by a view of German efficiency and a civilising mission that had been influencing Spanish elites since the 19th century. Moreover, as most of our contributors point out, several of the most committed collaborators of Nazi Germany had been Germanophiles during the First World War or had spent part of their formative years in Germany.

As this special section will show, Spanish engagement with the New Order stemmed from different motivations. Some, most notably Spanish Falangists and Blue Division volunteers, committed to the project because they identified with or admired the Nazi ideology. Others engaged with it because they saw their future success – be that in imperial, professional or political terms – in Nazi Germany's military might and eventual victory. At the same time, many among the Spanish radical right, not necessarily Falangists, projected on Nazi Germany some of their most pressing concerns. For them, Hitler became a crusader, the gatekeeper of Christian European civilisation, even the avenger of Spain, who would settle the score with the nation's traditional enemies, most prominently Britain. It is, in this sense, particularly interesting to see how the same propagandistic arguments exploited by the Nazi propaganda apparatus in Spain, as explored in my article, found traction among many fellow travellers to Germany, as shown by Núñez Seixas. To what extent this phenomenon was a direct result of the strong collaboration between Falange and the German embassy in Madrid and what kind of interactions existed between the narratives spread by these fellow travellers and the construction of a successful propagandistic discourse remain to be explored. In any case, it is evident that Spanish–

[26] O. Gliech, 'Lateinamerikanische "Multiplikatoren" im Visier. Kulturpolitische Konzeptionen für das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut zum Zeitpunkt seiner Gründung', in R. Liehr, G. Maihold and G. Vollmer (eds.), *Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*, (Frankfurt am Main 2003), 17–66; Janué i Miret, 'España y Alemania: Historia de las relaciones culturales en el siglo XX', 16.

German collaboration was not exclusively rooted in an admiration for the new Nazi-fascist order, fear or political and strategic opportunism, but in a highly positive and lasting image of Germany that stoked Spaniards' fascination with National Socialism.

Moreover, while most articles highlight the period spanning 1937 to 1943 as the highpoint of Nazi-fascist influence in Spain, they also show how fascination with Nazi Germany died slowly, particularly among Falangists. Here, Falangist reticence to let go of the idea of the New Order was marked both by an ideological kinship and political opportunism, as letting go of the German ally meant acknowledging that the best moment for the Falangist project to develop had passed. In this sense, the destiny of fascist and parafascist movements came to be almost inextricably linked to the fate of the New Order, which in Spain resulted in the Falange's receding into the background.

Nonetheless, Spain's place within the Nazi project was not exclusively determined by ideological kinship or the overdue payment of a debt incurred with the Axis powers during the Spanish Civil War. While both these factors played a key role in shaping Spanish–German relations during the Second World War, my contribution to this special section suggests there were other equally important factors to consider. Focusing on the study of Nazi propaganda, her work reveals interesting aspects on the value of neutrality and the aims of German foreign policy.

As Maartje Abbenhuis has pointed out, neutrality has been underrepresented in the history of the war. Nevertheless, over the last few years, historians such as Wylie, Hertog, Kruizinga, Amersfoort, Klinkert and Abbenhuis herself have rescued neutrality from oblivion.[27] They have not only highlighted the complexity of the concept itself, but have encouraged a more nuanced and detailed analysis of neutrality under the challenges of total war. It is within this framework that we can place Peñalba-Sotorrío's contribution to this special section, in which she shows how Nazi Germany's interest in Spain was not as closely linked to its potential entry into the war as the dominant historiography has led us to believe. As the study of propaganda shows, German interest in Spain did not wane after the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and Nazi foreign policy pursued other objectives in Spain than a potential operation against Gibraltar. While this reveals the value of non-combatant countries to military strategy in the age of total war, Falangist cooperation with the Nazi propaganda apparatus, in some cases clearly sanctioned by Franco, shows how, as Wylie has already noted, neutrals were not mere pawns in a game they could not control. On the contrary, they chose not only to stay out of the war, but how to define and conduct their neutrality.[28] As Goda has already noted,[29] and as our contributors make clear, Spain's policy during the Second World War might not have been successful, but it was certainly its own.

Moreover, my contribution encourages us to explore what German policy in neutral

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[27] M. Abbenhuis, *An age of neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815–1914* (Cambridge 2014); N. Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (New York 2002); J. Hertog and S. Kruizinga (eds.), *Caught in the Middle: Neutrals, Neutrality and the First World War* (Amsterdam 2011); H. Amersfoort and W. Klinkert (eds), *Small Powers in the Age of Total War, 1900–1940* (Boston, MA 2011).

[28] Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, 3.

[29] N. Goda, 'Franco's Bid for Empire: Spain, Germany, and the Western Mediterranean in World War II', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 13, 1–2 (1998), 186.

countries can tell us about the overall functioning and decision-making processes behind Nazi foreign policy. As Klaus Ruhl's seminal work has shown, Nazi foreign policy in Spain was pursued, albeit in completely opposite directions, by both the German embassy and diplomatic corps and by the Nazi party and fellow organisations. Moreover, it was in the neutral countries where traditional diplomats had a better chance of imposing their own views, which seems to have involved a policy of continuities with pre-Nazi policies.[30] In this sense, the attempt to transform Spain into a bridge to influence Latin America presented strong continuities not only with traditional German economic interests but also with specific interwar policies.[31] What remains to be explored is to what extent these continuities were a reflection of the stronger influence of the diplomatic corps over the Nazi party in certain countries and how these clashes shaped Nazi foreign policy and, in turn, influenced the development of the conflict. Only a full comparative study will be able to answer these questions.

In the end, despite the extensive body of work we rely on when attempting to broaden our understanding of German–Spanish relations during the Second World War, many questions remain unanswered. What can connections among fascist and parafascist parties tell us about the nature of fascism itself? How can the analysis of the post-liberal departure illuminate our understanding of populism? What can cross-continental engagement with the New Order tell us about the idea of Europe and the power of the European discourse? Is neutrality really condemned to disappear in the modern age, as Nils Ørvik posited?[32] How can the analysis of bilateral relations aid our understanding of the functioning of the Nazi regime? For as this special section will also show, it is within this broader context that we should explore not just German-Spanish relations, but the whole period of the 1930s–40s, looking not just for breaks and novelty in the development of political and cultural relations, but also for continuities in terms of diplomatic and cultural policy.

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[30] Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y "Tercer Reich" : España en la Segunda Guerra Mundial*, 253–254.

[31] Hera Martínez, *La política cultural de Alemania en España en el periodo de entreguerras*, 106; C. Leitz, 'Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic World', *Contemporary European History*, 12, 2 (2003), 183–196; R. Liehr, G. Maihold and G. Vollmer (eds.), *Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main 2003); Janué i Miret, 'España y Alemania: Historia de las relaciones culturales en el siglo XX', 15.

[32] N. Ørvik, *The decline of neutrality 1914–1941. With special reference to the United States and the Northern Neutrals* (London 1971).