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Fighting Talk: War and Combat in Popular Discourse and the *Epitaphios Logos*

1. Introduction

Everyone who works on Athenian history owes a profound debt to Loraux. Her research revealed how the *epitaphios logos*, despite its expressed purpose as a eulogy for the war dead, functioned as an expression of civic ideology.¹ Of course, considerable time has elapsed since the publication of *The Invention of Athens*, but scholars continue to pay Loraux the same compliment Thucydides offered to his predecessor Herodotus: some quibble over detail, but most continue where she left off.² This, clearly, is the most sincere compliment any academic can receive, and it is the aim of this chapter to continue that intellectual trend by contributing a little to the understanding of the discursive and normative context into which that oration was delivered.

2. The Epitaphic Ideal

The civic role of the *epitaphios logos* in the transmission of ideology as well as in the creation and shaping of memory is well established.³ Yet Athens was more than just a city-state, she was a warrior society, and while the orations served the wider community, they also served a distinct military system. That system had a long and glorious history: Athenians fought and died for their *patris* throughout Greece, as well as in Asia and North Africa, not to mention the waters of both the Aegean and the Mediterranean.⁴ Such activities take a distinct form in the *epitaphios logos*, and this form, in many respects, was determined by the

¹ Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 77-131, 263-327.

² Thucydides famously cavils (1.20.3), but nevertheless starts his own history where Herodotus left off.

³ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 95-154, 196-237.

⁴ See esp. Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*; Pritchard, *Athenian Democracy at War*.

Athenians' belief in their own autochthony.⁵ This belief, as Rosivach revealed, embraced two distinct traditions, namely an early conviction that the Athenians had always lived in Attica, and a later belief, which became conflated with the first, that this indigenous population had sprung from the very soil of Attica.⁶ In this *Weltanschauung*, the Athenians formed a closed biological elite resembling an extended aristocratic family, with all members sharing the same lineage and character.⁷

This character had three main features. Firstly, the Athenians were just: unlike the Dorians, who took their homeland by force,⁸ the Athenians, as *autochthones*, were untainted by the aggressive acquisition of territory and so possessed an innate sense of justice.⁹ Secondly, the Athenians were courageous enough to do what justice demands, and since their courage was also innate,¹⁰ unlike the Spartans, they did not have to distort their society into an ugly mechanism designed to enforce conformity and compliance.¹¹ Thirdly, the Athenians were patriotic: with their natural sense of justice and their innate courage, they were willing to fight, kill, and if necessary, die in defence of their homeland.¹² Naturally, for those who

⁵ Dem. 60.4-8, 12; Gorg. fr. 6; Lys. 2.17-20; Hyp. 6.7; Plat. *Menex.* 237a-38b, 244b, 245d-e; Thuc. 2.36.1; cf. Isoc. 4.24-5; Lyc. 1.41, 100-01, with Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 132-71; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 226-29.

⁶ Lys. 2.17, with Rosivach, 'Autochthony and the Athenians', 294-306.

⁷ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

⁸ Apollod. 2.8.1-5; Diod. Sic. 4.57.1-58.6; Thuc. 1.12.1-4.

⁹ Dem. 60.7-8, 10-11, 18, 27-31; Gorg. fr. 6; Hyp. 6.5, 10-17, 19-23, 34-7, 40; Lys. 2.7-17, 22, 34-5, 41, 44, 47, 55, 60, 67-70; Plat. *Menex.* 239a-b, 239d, 240e, 242a-c, 244e; Thuc. 2.40.4-5; cf. Isoc. 4.26-7, 34-46, 51-3; Lyc. 1.42, 49-51, 68-74, 144, 147, with Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

¹⁰ Dem. 60.1-3, 6, 12, 17, 26, 29, 33-34; Gorg. fr. 6; Hyp. 6.1-3, 8, 15-19, 23, 28-29, 40; Lys. 2.3, 5, 14, 27, 41-43, 46-47, 51, 61-70, 73; Plat. *Menex.* 237a, 242e, 245d-46a, 246d, 247d-e; Thuc. 2.35.1, 39.1-4, 42.3-4; cf. Hdt. 5.78.1, with Balot, *Courage in the Democratic Polis*, 'Pericles' Anatomy of Democratic Courage', 505-25; Brock, 'Mythical *Polypragmosyne*', 227-38; Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 132-71; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

¹¹ Thuc. 2.37.1-41.5; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 2.1-11; Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 99-123; Bosworth, 'The Historical Context of Thucydides' Funeral Oration', 1-16; Cartledge, 'A Spartan Education', 79-90; Ducat, *Spartan Education*; Harris, 'Praise of Athenian Democracy', 157-168; Kennell, *The Gymnasium of Virtue*; Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 132-71.

¹² A principle expressed, for instance, in terms of patriotism (Dem. 60.3, 25-31; Hyp. 6.4-9; Lys. 2.6, 17-20, 41-43, 54-61, 70-71; Plat. *Menex.* 235a-c, 237a-39a, 245d-46a; Thuc. 2.36.4-41.5, 43.1), the requirement to sacrifice for the collective (Dem. 60.1, 7-8, 18-20, 23-24, 27-31; Hyp. 6.16-17, 26; Lys. 2.4-6, 21-26, 33-43, 49-53, 61-66, 69-70; Plat. *Menex.* 237a, 239a, 240c-e, 241a-b, 242a-c; Thuc. 2.36.4, 42.3-4, 43.1-2, 43.5-6; cf. Lyc. 1.43-5, 49-51, 57, 63-7, 76-8), protect dependents (Aesch. *Per.* 246-434; Dem. 60.29-30; Hyp. 6.20-21, 36-37; Lys. 2.36-37, 39-40; cf. Lyc. 1.141-5) and avoid shame (Dem. 60.1, 25-29; Hyp. 6.3; Lys. 2.23, 25-26, 62, 68-69; Plat. *Menex.* 246d-e; Thuc. 2.42.4, 43.6).

possessed it, this unique character came with a unique strategic mission, which was not just to advance the interests of Athens, but also to lead and protect Greece.

Naturally, such beliefs are reflected in the portrayal of military activity in the *epitaphios logos*, which was shaped by the need to demonstrate the continuity of Athens' mission as well as every Athenian's ability to discharge it.¹³ This required the provision of carefully selected examples of Athenian conduct, starting with exploits drawn from a canonical set of four myths:¹⁴ the defeat of the Amazons, in which the Athenians defeat a culturally monstrous invader;¹⁵ the expulsion of Eumolpos, which features a Thracian king leading another unsuccessful invasion;¹⁶ the expulsion of Eurystheus, which imagines the Athenians protecting the children of Heracles and defeating yet another invasion;¹⁷ and finally, the *Seven Against Thebes*, which features Athens enforcing Hellenic *nomoi* regarding the proper burial of the war-dead.¹⁸

The inclusion of some or all of these myths in the *epitaphioi* establishes Athens as an isolated bulwark against aggression, a defender of Greek morality and refuge for the weak,¹⁹ and this message is reinforced by manipulation of narrative content and emphasis. For instance, whilst other authors eliminate ambiguity through brevity, Lysias, whose substantial speech was never meant for delivery,²⁰ provides considerable detail, and what he says about

¹³ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

¹⁴ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237, also Parker, 'Myths of Early Athens', 187-214; Rosivach, 'Autochthony and the Athenians', 294-306; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 210-12; cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.22.6.

¹⁵ Dem. 60.8; Lys. 2.4-6; Plat. *Menex.* 239b; cf. Isoc. 4.66, 68-70.

¹⁶ Dem. 60.8; Plat. *Menex.* 239b; cf. Isoc. 4.66, 68-70; Lyc. 1.98-101. See also Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38; Hanink, 'Epitaphioi Mythoi and Tragedy', 289-317.

¹⁷ Dem. 60.8; Lys. 2.11-16; Plat. *Menex.* 239b; cf. Isoc. 4.54-65. See also Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 222-26.

¹⁸ Dem. 60.8-9; Lys. 2.7-10; Plat. *Menex.* 239b; cf. Isoc. 4.54-65. See also Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38; Hanink, 'Epitaphioi Mythoi and Tragedy', 289-317; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 218-22. For the importance of burial, see Eur. *El.* 890-961, *Phoen.* 1480-1765, *Supp.* esp. 1-41, 520-63, 650-733, 754-77, 935-45; Soph. *Ajax.* 820-30, 1062-90, 1130-62, 1325-73, *Ant.* 21-81, 200-10, 249-77, 450-96, 519-30, 683-724, 1192-1205, *Oed. Col.* 1397-447; Thuc. 4.44.5-6.

¹⁹ Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38; Mills: 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 210-12.

²⁰ Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 157-64.

the defeat of the Amazons is revealing.²¹ As Todd notes, Theseus' rape of Antiope is omitted but the identity of the Amazons as the 'children of Ares' is emphasised, that is to say a detail that undermines the didactic message (by implying a degree of Athenian culpability) is suppressed, whereas one that corroborates it (by stressing the warlike nature of their enemies) is emphasised.²²

The same processes can be observed in the second set of material from which exploits are drawn, namely Athenian history.²³ The surviving *epitaphioi* feature an extensive period of Athenian history that ranges from Marathon to the Lamian War, but this seemingly impressive chronological coverage is merely a reflection of the period covered by the corpus as whole.²⁴ Individual orations typically offer only a small selection of historical exploits,²⁵ but they invariably start with the Persian Wars.²⁶ This exploit appeals to an Athenian audience, naturally, because it involves an Athenian-led defence of Greece against a barbarian invader, but its deployment also reflects the desire to establish the continuity of Athens' strategic mission.²⁷

The order in which the Persian Wars appears, then, is revealing, as is the manipulation of narrative content and emphasis. For instance, to emphasise Athenian primacy the *epitaphioi* focus on Marathon,²⁸ and in the fullest account of the battle, Lysias makes that location itself proof of Athenian prowess, since the Persians recognise that Athens, as the

²¹ Lys. 2.4-6.

²² Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 215-18.

²³ Hunt, 'Athenian Militarism', 225-42; Mills, 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83; Rosivach, 'Autochthony and the Athenians', 294-306; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Yoshitake, 'Arête', 359-77.

²⁴ The main subjects covered by the corpus are: Persian Wars (Dem. 60.10-11; Gorg. fr. 5b; Hyp. 6.37-38; Lys. 2.20-47, 56-57; Plat. *Menex.* 239a-b, 239d-40e, 241a-42a; Thuc. 2.34.5, 36.4); Pentekontaetia (Lys. 2.48-57; Plat. *Menex.* 242a-c; Thuc. 2.36.2-4); Peloponnesian War (Lys. 2.59-60; Plat. *Menex.* 242c-44d); Athenian *Stasis* (Lys. 2.61-6; Plat. *Menex.* 243d-44b); Spartan Hegemony (Lys. 2.59-60; Plat. *Menex.* 244c-45e); Macedon and Chaeronea (Dem. 60.19-24); Lamian War (Hyp. 6.10-23).

²⁵ Demosthenes, for example, briefly mentions the Persian Wars and then moves straight to Chaeronea (60.10-11, 19-24). For selection more generally, see Dem. 60.9, 15; Hyp. 6.4-6; Isoc. 4.74; Lys. 2.54; Plat. *Menex.* 246a-b; Thuc. 2.36.4, 43.1.

²⁶ See above, n.25; cf. Isoc. 4.66-72, 82-3, 85-100; Lyc. 1.68-74.

²⁷ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 210-12.

²⁸ See above, n.25, with Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 132-71; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

head of the snake, must be crushed before the rest of Greece can be conquered.²⁹ Again, as Todd notes, Lysias suppresses details which detract from the desired message: to avoid implying that the Athenians provoked the Persians, the Ionian Revolt is omitted as is the burning of Sardis; similarly, to avoid any suspicion of Athenian timidity, Lysias also overlooks the disagreement amongst the Athenian *stratēgoi*; finally, to portray Athens as an isolated bulwark, protecting Greece from invasion, Lysias even suppresses the presence of the Plataeans.³⁰

The portrayal of other historical exploits also follow this pattern: they offer an Athenocentric account of Greek history demonstrating Athenian prowess as well as moral virtue and fitness to lead.³¹ Naturally, since Athenian history included numerous defeats, failure could not be suppressed entirely. However, in the *epitaphioi*, even defeat is didactic. Demosthenes, for instance, depicts those killed at Chaeronea in 338 BC as steadfast Athenian and Panhellenic patriots who remained true to their cause, their ancestors and their tribal heroes until death, thereby transforming a military defeat into a moral victory.³²

Autochthony, then, bequeathed to the Athenians both a unique character and a unique strategic mission, and the mythical and historical exploits contained within the *epitaphioi*, thus served to establish the continuity of that mission as well as every Athenian's ability to discharge it.³³ This created in the mind of every citizen the expectation that he was both able and obligated to live up to the deeds of his ancestors,³⁴ and the recurring nature of the *patrios*

²⁹ Lys. 2.20-6.

³⁰ Hdt. 5.97.3-103.2, 6.108.6-113.2, with Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 230-4, also Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Walters, "'We fought alone at Marathon'" 199-211; Yoshitake, 'Arête', 362.

³¹ Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 132-71; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Rosivach, 'Autochthony and the Athenians', 294-306; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 249-63, with n.25 above. See also Lys. 2.47; Thuc. 2.36.2-4, 41.3-5; cf. Andoc. 3.30; Lyc. 1.42.

³² Dem. 60.19-24; cf. Lyc. 1.1, 16, 37-45, 49-54; Hunt, 'Athenian Militarism', 225-42; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Shear, 'Their Memories Will Never Grow Old', 511-36; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

³³ See above, ns.11-12.

³⁴ See esp. Dem. 60.7-11, 27-31; Hyp. 6.37; Lys. 2.3-17, 20-66; Plat. *Menex.* 239a-46a; Thuc. 2.36.1-4; cf. Dem. 18.1-207, with Brock, 'Mythical *Polypragmosyne*', 227-38; Carter, 'The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric', 209-232; Shear, 'Their Memories Will Never Grow Old', 511-36; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

nomos ensured that, by the time a man was called upon to fight, he had been repeatedly exposed to the epitaphic ideal.³⁵ Consequently, he would have received proof of Athenian character in the heroic exploits of his ancestors, he would have believed that he too possessed that character as a result of his own autochthony, he would have internalised the martial values of his society,³⁶ and he would, as a result, have felt the crushing weight of expectation, emanating from all Athenians, both the living and the dead, impelling him towards the battlefield.³⁷

The portrayal of military activity in the *epitaphios*, then, is aimed at impressing upon each Athenian the obligation to contribute to the fulfilment of Athens' strategic mission and his innate ability to do exactly that. This, together with the subsequent valorisation of those who discharged this duty to the fullest extent by dying in combat,³⁸ served to integrate Athenian citizens into an endless and mutually reinforcing process, since if they heeded the message of the *epitaphios* and died in combat, they became part of the process of ensuring

³⁵ Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 263-327; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

³⁶ For the *epitaphios* as a mechanism of secondary socialisation, see Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 1-18, 99-123; Blanshard, 'War in the Law-court', 203-224; Collard, 'The Funeral Oration', 39-53; Shear, 'Their Memories Will Never Grow Old', 511-36; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237; Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias*, 213-15.

³⁷ The epitaphic ideal demanded Athenians emulate the dead (Hyp. 6.30-34; Lys. 2.61-2, 68-70; Plat. *Menex.* 235b, 236e, 242d-e, 246b-47c, 248d-e; Thuc. 2.41.5, 43.4-5, 44.3-4) and their ancestors (Dem. 60.7-11, 27-31; Hyp. 6.37; Lys. 2.3-17, 20-66; Plat. *Menex.* 239a-46a; Thuc. 2.36.1-4), with compliance rewarded by the honours bestowed through the *patrios nomos* (Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, 105-26; Humphreys, 'Family Tombs and Tomb Cult', 96-126; Hunt, 'Athenian Militarism', 225-42; Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, esp. 15-131; Low, 'Commemoration of the War Dead', 341-58; Monoson, 'Citizen as *Erastes*' 253-76, with n.38 below). See also Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 1-18, 99-123, 'Topographic Semantics', 499-539; Balot, *Courage in the Democratic Polis*, 218-55, 'Pericles' Anatomy of Democratic Courage', 505-25; Carter, 'The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric', 209-232; Pozzi, 'Thucydides ii.35-46', 221-231; Shear, 'Their Memories Will Never Grow Old', 511-36; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 196-237.

³⁸ The war dead were accorded signal honours: *prosthesis* (Thuc. 2.34.2); *ekphora* (Plat. *Menex.* 236d; Thuc. 2.34.3-5); public burial (Dem. 60.1, 33; Lys. 2.66, 80; Plat. *Menex.* 234b; Thuc. 2.34.1-2, 5; cf. Lyc. 1.44-5); *agōn epitaphios* (Dem. 60.36-7; Lys. 2.80-81); *epitaphios logos* (Dem. 60.2; Plat. *Menex.* 234b-35a, 236e; Thuc. 2.34.6); epigraphic commemoration (Thuc. 2.43.3-4); support for orphans and perhaps other dependents (Dem. 60.32; Hyp. 6.42; Plat. *Menex.* 248c-49c; Lys. 2.75-6; Thuc. 2.46.1); annual rites (Plat. *Menex.* 249b). For the glory of death in combat and its associated *kleos* in the epitaphic idea, see Dem. 60.1-3, 19, 26-27, 32-7; Gorg. fr. 6; Hyp. 6.1-2, 18-19, 24-30, 41-3; Lys. 2.1-2, 23-24, 79-81; Plat. *Menex.* 234b, 236e, 239b-c, 241a, 242c, 246a-b, 247d, 248b-c; Thuc. 2.42.2-4, 43.2-44.2, 44.4, 46.1; cf. Isoc. 4.83-4, 186; Lyc. 1.44-6, 49-51, 100, 110, with the living's admiration for the dead expressed in Aesch. *Lib.* 345-62; Dem. 60.1, 6, 12-14, 23, 33; Hyp. 6.24, 28; Lys. 2.66, 72, 76, 79-81; Plat. *Menex.* 234b-35a, 242d-e, 243b-d; Thuc. 2.35.2-3, 43.4-5, 45.1-2.

the next crop of Athenians exhibit the same willingness to sacrifice their mortal lives for their immortal collective and its perennial pursuit of primacy.³⁹

3. The Epitaphic Ideal in Popular Discourse

Popular discourse, naturally, is unconstrained by such principles, yet, reflections of the epitaphic ideal are readily detectable in tragedy, comedy and forensic oratory, at all four levels of military activity, namely: the strategic level, which concerns the formulation and pursuit of strategic aims; the operational level, which concerns the operations launched in the furtherance of those aims; the tactical level, which concerns the engagements fought during the execution of those operations as well as the experiences of the men who fought in them; and finally, the societal level, which concerns the impact military activism has on Athenian society.⁴⁰

At the strategical level, Athens is portrayed as powerful, moral and altruistic.⁴¹ For instance, in Euripides' *Heraclidae*, the children of Heracles come to Athens as suppliants, seeking protection against their father's enemy, Eurystheus, who desires their execution. His demands for the surrender of the children are incompatible with Athenian morality, but their rejection leads to the threat of *stasis* and the actuality of a war which, naturally, the innately-courageous Athenians win.⁴² The same validation is observable at the operational level, where Athenian victories are celebrated.⁴³ The battles of the Persian Wars, particularly Marathon and Salamis, are used to evoke Athenian greatness, for example, in Aristophanes'

³⁹ Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, 105-26; Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 77-131.

⁴⁰ For epitaphic affirmation in tragedy, see Green, 'War and Morality', 97-110; Hanink, 'Epitaphioi Mythoi and Tragedy', 289-317; Mills: 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83. For comedy, see Konstan, 'Ridiculing a Popular War', 184-199, and for the lawcourt, see Blanshard: 'War in the Law-court', 203-224.

⁴¹ Something commonly expressed in tragedy (Aesch. *Per.* 246-434, *Supp.* passim; Eur. *Ion*, passim, *Her.* 1163-9, *Heraclid.* 1-607, *IT.* 1-295, *Phoen.* 1480-1765, *Supp.* passim, but esp. 99-194, 297-364, 369-81, 566-84, 1165-1231, *Tro.* 98-235, 308-24; Soph. *Oed. Col.* 258-95, 728-1138) but also found in comedy (Aristoph. *Kn.* 1319-20, *Lys.* 1129-35, 1273-78) and oratory (Dem. 18.1-207; Isoc.4 passim; Lyc. 1.82-9; Lys. 33.1-9, 34.10-11).

⁴² Eur. *Heraclid.* 1-607.

⁴³ Aristoph. *Frogs* 3-34, 190-1, 686-705; Dem. 18.207-08; Lys. 6.74-81, 16.12-19, 19.28, 20.4-5, 14, 22-5, 27-9, 21.2-11, 20, 23-25, 25.12-13.

Acharnians, *Clouds* and *Wasps*,⁴⁴ as well as in Euripides' *Heraclidae*,⁴⁵ while the scale of Athenian success is celebrated in Aeschylus' *Persai*.⁴⁶ At the tactical level, military participation, the glory of battle and the beautiful death are lauded,⁴⁷ for instance in Euripides' *Andromache* as well as in *Trojan Women*.⁴⁸

Finally, at the societal level, popular discourse offers endless expressions of Athenian patriotism and support for the sacrifices that patriotism demands.⁴⁹ Such ideals, of course, are almost absent in Aristophanic comedy, but they appear repeatedly in oratory and tragedy. For instance, Athens is celebrated as 'great', 'honoured', 'renowned', 'gleaming, and 'god-built' in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*,⁵⁰ Euripides' *Hippionichus*⁵¹ and *Iphigenia at Tauris*.⁵² Assertions that speakers have put *polis* before *oikos* are also common in forensic oratory, and feature, for instance, in Lysias 21, where the speaker describes how his household was apparently impoverished through selfless state-service.⁵³

4. Deviance in Popular Discourse

In addition to validating the epitaphic ideal, however, popular discourse also supplies what that ideal suppresses, namely the human experience of war. This was enabled by the nature of the three main genres of popular discourse: in old comedy, *parrhasia* was

⁴⁴ Aristoph. *Ach.* 175-85, 791-701, *Clouds* 985-9, *Frogs* 3-34, 190-1, 686-705, *Kn.* 780-5, 1334, *Lys.* 674-81, *Wasps* 422-60, 710-11, 1060-1120.

⁴⁵ Eur. *Heraclid.* 48-287, 329-473.

⁴⁶ Aesch. *Per.* 1-231, 233-45, 246-464, 697-842. See also Ebbott, 'The List of the War Dead in Aeschylus' *Persians*', 83-96.

⁴⁷ Aeschin. 3.154; Dem. 18.205, 50.63; Is. 6.9; Isoc. 8.39; Lyc. 1.47-8; Lys. 21.24, 27.

⁴⁸ Eur. *Andr.* 1184-85, *Tro.* 375-405, 1118-250.

⁴⁹ Aesch. *Per.* 233-45, 697-842; Dem. 18.1-207; Eur. *Andr.* 410-63, 590-605, *Ion* 1-81, 237-74, 294-8, 472-92, *Med.* 824-34, *Supp.* 909-18; Isoc. 4.24-5, 54, 66, 159; Lys. 19.28, 30, 42-44, 57-8, 62-4, 20.4-5, 14, 22-25, 27-29, 21.2-11, 20, 23-25, 25.12-13, 30.18, 26-27; Lyc. 1.47-48, 94-108, 113, 128-30; cf. Aesch. *Seven* 1-38; Eur. *Phoen.* 358-60, 387-426; Soph. *Ant.* 175-89.

⁵⁰ Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1-110.

⁵¹ Eur. *Hipp.* 423, 974, 1094, 1459.

⁵² Eur. *IT.* 1123-37, 1435-74.

⁵³ Lys. 21.2-11, 20, 23-25, see also 20.33, 25.12-13, 26.22. For the obvious tension that war creates between the demands of the *oikos* and those of the *polis*, see Aesch. *Ag.* 425-65; Aristoph. *Ach.* 130-4, 175-85, 285-95; Eur. *Orest.* 52-9, 71-125, 1105-54, 1302-10, 1353-65, with Balot, *Courage in the Democratic Polis*, 309-29.

permissible and comic criticism condoned;⁵⁴ in tragedy, the sorrows of war were often projected onto non-Athenians, and the audience was protected by dramatic distance;⁵⁵ finally, in forensic oratory, transgressions appear as allegations to answer or accusations to hurl.⁵⁶ Popular discourse, then, offers a uniquely human perspective on Athenian war-making, and this is true at all levels of military activity.

At the strategic level, the epitaphic ideal is challenged by concerns about Athenian incompetence, immorality and aggression.⁵⁷ For instance, in Aristophanes' *Knights*, instead of exercising power morally and altruistically, and winning the willing hegemony of Hellas, Athens has established, in her empire, nothing more than a protection racket.⁵⁸ This protection racket, in *Wasps*, is maintained by the sweat of the poor for the benefit of the rich;⁵⁹ in *Birds*, it involves intervening in the internal affairs of the allies in order to ensure their exploitation;⁶⁰ and in *Peace*, it is presented as the cause of the Peloponnesian War.⁶¹ Worse still, in *Ecclesiazusae*, *Frogs*, *Lysistrata* and *Wealth*, Athenian leaders, who are immoral, greedy and corrupt, have not just caused the war, they have mismanaged the conflict to such an extent⁶² that in *Acharnians*, Aristophanes imagines a lone Athenian, Dicaeopolis, reaching the limits of his patriotism, and breaking with his *polis* in order to make a personal peace with the enemy.⁶³

⁵⁴ Konstan, 'Ridiculing a Popular War', 184-99, also MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens*.

⁵⁵ Mills, 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83, also Balot, *Courage in the Democratic Polis*, 278-94; Brock, 'Mythical *Polypragmosyne*', 227-38; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50.

⁵⁶ Blanshard, 'War in the Law-court', 203-224.

⁵⁷ In tragedy, criticism of Athenian strategic decisions as well as the mechanisms by which those decisions are made are sanitised by generalisation and/or projection onto non-Athenians (Eur. *Hipp.* 486-89, 983-1035, *Med.* 579-87, 1222-30, *Orest.* 696-716, 772-3, 898-930, *Supp.* 230-49, 419-25, 475-85). Comedy, however, can be more direct, and advocate a return to the dual hegemony (Aristoph. *Lys.* 1137-46, 1149-56, *Peace* 1080-1108) and the externalisation of aggression against Persia (Aristoph. *Lys.* 1129-35, 1273-78). For allegations of treachery, corruption and war-profiteering in oratory, see Aeschin. *Against Ctesiphon* 138; *Lys.* 25.19, 30-1, 26.22, 27.9-10, 28.2-7, 11, 29.1-2, 3-7, 31.5-7, 17-19, 26.

⁵⁸ Aristoph. *Kn.* 836-40, although Athens is described as the protector of the islands at 1319-20.

⁵⁹ Aristoph. *Wasps* 519-20, 575, 655-724.

⁶⁰ Aristoph. *Birds* 1021-54.

⁶¹ Aristoph. *Peace* 464-515, 930-46.

⁶² Aristoph. *Frogs* 1443-66, *Eccl.* 111-14, 136-242, *Lys.* 486-506, 1129-56, 1273-78, *Wealth* 377-79, 567-70, also *Peace* 390-99, 442-55, 516-81, 605-720, 917-22, 1126-315.

⁶³ Aristoph. *Ach.* esp. 1-60, 130-4, 497-556, 626-65.

Similarly, at the operational level, popular discourse recognises that Athenian operations were sometimes brutal, punitive, incompetently commanded, and often ended in disaster.⁶⁴ Aristophanes' *Wasps* and *Birds* refer to punitive operations conducted against Scione and Melos, both of which resulted in the andrapodisation of survivors.⁶⁵ Lysias mentions defeat at Aegospotamoi in no less than five speeches,⁶⁶ the failure of the Sicilian Campaign in two more,⁶⁷ and defeat at Nemea in another.⁶⁸ His speeches also focus on the individuals caught up in these events: the speaker in Lysias 21 relates how, in the aftermath of Aegospotamoi, he saved his own ship as well as another.⁶⁹ Similarly, in Lysias 20, the speaker describes how one of Polystratos' sons, who had fought as both a hoplite and a cavalryman on Sicily, continued the fight against the Syracusans from Catana after the massacre of the main force.⁷⁰ Finally, in Lysias 16, the speaker tries to rescue some *kleos* from the Athenian rout at Nemea by stressing how he continued to fight while others fled.⁷¹

There is, then, a detectable divergence from the epitaphic ideal at both the strategic and operational level, and this widens still further at the tactical level. The ideal stresses the glory of military participation, but in both tragedy and comedy, life on campaign can be characterised by physical and psychological hardship: Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* portrays the Greeks at Troy suffering from the wind, the rain, the cold and the vermin.⁷² In Aristophanes'

⁶⁴ For allegations of command incompetence and corruption, see Aristoph. *Kn.* 50-7, 354-5, 389-94, 702, 740-5, 845-60, 1056-66, 1166-7, 1201 (Pylos); Aristoph. *Kn.* 436-9 (Potidaea); Aristoph. *Kn.* 830-5 (Mytilene); *Frogs* 1500-14 (Aegospotamoi). For more general allegations about Nicias, Pericles and Cleon, see Aristoph. *Birds* 638-40, *Clouds* 575-94, 859, *Peace* 65-300, and for the trial of the generals that followed Arginusae, see Aristoph. *Frogs* 416-8; *Lys.* 12.36.

⁶⁵ Aristoph. *Birds* 180-6, *Wasps* 210; cf. Isoc. 4.100-15; Thuc. 5.32.1, 116.4, with Green, 'War and Morality', 97-110. For similar mentions of the storming of Naxos and the Samian revolt, see Aristoph. *Wasps* 281-4, 354-9, and for andrapodisation generally, see Gaca, 'The Andrapodizing of War Captives', 117-61.

⁶⁶ *Lys.* 6.46, 12.43, 14.39-40, 16.4, 18.4, 19.7-23, 30.10.

⁶⁷ *Lys.* 20.4-5, 14, 22-25, 26.21-22.

⁶⁸ *Lys.* 16.12-19.

⁶⁹ *Lys.* 21.2-11.

⁷⁰ *Lys.* 20.14, 22-25.

⁷¹ *Lys.* 16.12-19.

⁷² Aesch. *Ag.* 525-85, also *Per.* 479-514.

Peace, campaign life is characterised by bad food, endless toil, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion.⁷³

Popular discourse also recognises the dread of combat. Fear, admittedly, is acknowledged by the epitaphic ideal, but there it exists only to be overcome, and that is not the case in popular discourse.⁷⁴ Ares appears, in Euripides' *Phoenissae*, as the god of blood and suffering,⁷⁵ and the prospect of entering his murderous arena is, according to Mantitheus (the speaker in Lysias 16), frankly frightening to many Athenians.⁷⁶ Aristophanes, in both *Peace* and *Knights*, goes further, portraying not just fear, but also the physical manifestations of that fear in the form of involuntary urination and defecation.⁷⁷

Naturally, men had good reason to be afraid. As popular discourse acknowledges, close combat with edged weapons was a brutal affair. In the epitaphic ideal, there are only two categories of combatants, the survivors and the glorious dead, but drama and oratory offer an otherwise occluded third category: the wounded. Men suffering with gaping, disfiguring, and maiming wounds all feature in Aeschylus' *Persai*, Euripides' *Phoenissae* and *Rhesus*.⁷⁸

Popular discourse also acknowledges another grim aspect of war denied by the epitaphic ideal, namely the ugliness of death.⁷⁹ In *Agamemnon*, Aeschylus, imagining the destruction of the Greek fleet, describes the Aegean 'flowering with corpses'.⁸⁰ In the *Persai*, he describes the aftermath of Salamis, which features not just countless corpses floating in

⁷³ Aristoph. *Peace* 346-60, 516-81; cf. Thuc. 7.59.2-87.6; Xen. *Hunt.* 11.1-2, *Lac. Pol.* 4.7.

⁷⁴ See Dem. 60.27-31; Lys. 2.23-24, 37-42; Thuc. 2.40.3, 42.4, 43.6.

⁷⁵ Eur. *Phoen.* 239-60, 784-800. See also Hes. *Works.* 140-73; Hom. *Il.* 5.890; Tyrt. fr. 11.7, also 12.34, 19.4.

⁷⁶ Lys. 16.15-17, also Aristoph. *Birds* 289-90, 1470-81, *Clouds* 350-5, *Peace* 444-6, 673-78, 1172-85, 1295-1304, *Wasps* 10-30, 592, 820-25; Eur. *Bacch.* 303-04; Lys. 10.8-9, 12, 21-4, 16.17; Tyrt. fr. 11.22; cf. Thuc. 4.34.7, 7.80.3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.17.

⁷⁷ Aristoph. *Kn.* 1055-6, *Peace* 239-41, 1179-81. For similar symptoms (e.g. chattering teeth, trembling limbs, and pounding heart), see Hdt. 7.231; Hom. *Il.* 13.279-83; Plut. *Ages.* 30.2-4, *Arat.* 29.5; Polyæn. *Strat.* 3.4.8. Thuc. 5.10.8; Xen. *Hiero* 6.3.7.

⁷⁸ Aesch. *Per.* 249-471; Eur. *Phoen.* 1480-1765, *Rh.* 780-819. For the wounded in oratory, see, for example, Lys. 20.14.

⁷⁹ For the ideal of the beautiful death and the beauty of the warrior's corpse, see Eur. *Andr.* 1184-5, *Tro.* 375-405, 1118-1250; Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 125-76; Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 77-131, with n.38 above.

⁸⁰ Aesch. *Ag.* 636-80.

the water, choking the reefs and the shore, but also a description of the Athenians slaughtering those survivors still struggling in the water, who they club to death until nightfall finally ends their screaming.⁸¹ As if this was not grim enough, in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and *Suppliants*, the dead are disfigured and dismembered,⁸² and in the *Antigone*, they stink as they rot.⁸³ Decay also features as a plot device in Menander's *Aspis*, which is a tale of mistaken identity resulting from the unrecognisable appearance of a putrefying warrior.⁸⁴

Unsurprisingly, some men sought to escape such horrors. Consequently, as the speeches of Andocides, Aeschines, Demosthenes and Lysias reveal, to discourage combat avoidance, the Athenians augmented the social pressures they focused on their men with legal coercion.⁸⁵ This took the form of three military *graphai*, which provided punishments for *astrateia* (failure to muster),⁸⁶ *delia* (cowardice)⁸⁷ and *lipotaxia* (desertion).⁸⁸ Finally, in popular discourse, Athenians sometimes diverge from the martial ideal: Aristophanes jokes about cowards⁸⁹ and describes men who are sick of war and longing for peace;⁹⁰ Lysias describes individuals whinging about impending deployment and getting insubordinate, as well as one man who allegedly attacked his *taxiarchos*.⁹¹ Most shockingly, he reveals also

⁸¹ Aesch. *Per.* 246-471.

⁸² Eur. *Phoen.* 1525-29, 1669, *Supp.* 790-836, 940-54, 955-79, Aesch. *Per.* 249-471.

⁸³ Soph. *Ant.* 407-40; cf. Thuc. 4.101.1; Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.9, with Collard, 'The Funeral Oration', 39-53.

⁸⁴ Men. *Aspis* 69-72, 109.

⁸⁵ See Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*.

⁸⁶ Andoc. 1.74; Aeschin. 1.29, 3.175-6; Aristoph. *Kn.* 443; Dem. 21.58, 24.103, 39.16, 59.27; Lyc. 1.147; cf. Lys. 14.5-8, 15.4-5; Plat. *Laws* 12.943a; Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.5.

⁸⁷ Andoc. 1.74; Aeschin. 3.175-6; Aristoph. *Ach.* 1129, *Kn.* 367; Lys. 14.5-8, 10.

⁸⁸ Andoc. 1.74; Aeschin. 3.175-6; Dem. 21.103; Lyc. 1.147; cf. Lys. 10.1, 9, 12, 21-4, 27-30, 14.5-8; Plat. *Rep.* 5.468a.

⁸⁹ Aristoph. *Peace* 1126-315; Lys. 10.1-25, 14.4-15, 17, 21, 30-38, 15.4-12, 16.15, 21.20; Lyc. 7-10, 27, 46-8, 51, 63-7, 76-8, 110-11, 113-14, 150. For jokes about Cleonymos specifically, see *Birds* 289-90, 1470-81, *Clouds* 350-5, 691-2, *Kn.* 1369-72, *Peace* 444-46, 673-78, 1295-304, *Wasps* 10-30, 592, 820-5.

⁹⁰ Aristoph. *Ach.* 186-202, 275-80, 301-11, 556-625, 964-70, 1071-227, *Kn.* 1330-32, 1389-95, *Peace* 334-60, 435-38, 456-59, 464-581, 775-76, 865-67, 1080-108, 1126-355, also Aristoph. *Peace* 464-515.

⁹¹ Lys. 3.45, 9.4-7, 15-16, also Aristoph. *Ach.* 566-625, 716, 960-70, 1071-140, 1175-97, *Frogs* 1069-73; cf. Thuc. 7.14.2; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.19.

how some men avoid a hero's death by surrendering to the enemy in the hope of eventual ransom.⁹²

Divergence from the ideal, then, is particularly wide at the tactical level, and it is wider still at the societal level. Here, expressions of patriotism are common, yet, popular discourse also acknowledges the human cost of that patriotism.⁹³ On stage, the break-up of families is a common motif. Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, Euripides' *Trojan Women* and Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* all depict the pain of separation: women long for their husbands and sons; they suffer from loneliness; and their anxieties are compounded by the circulation of rumours. Similarly, men miss their families; they miss their wives and they worry about their fidelity.⁹⁴

Some separations, of course, are permanent, and the pain of bereavement is another common theme, particularly in tragedy. Grief, of course, is acknowledged in the epitaphic ideal, but there, the pain of the bereaved is muted, controlled and dignified.⁹⁵ This is not the case in tragedy.⁹⁶ For example, in Euripides' *Suppliants*, the pain of the bereaved is so raw that it is considered life-threatening.⁹⁷ This grief naturally problematises the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the collective. Such sacrifices, for instance, that of Creon's son Menoeceus in Euripides' *Phoenissae*, are admittedly patriotically framed,⁹⁸ yet, by emphasising bereavement, they reflect the tension between *oikos* and *polis*, in that 'a public success' is also necessarily a 'a private grief'.⁹⁹

⁹² Lys. 12.20, 19.59, 26.23-24, with additional examples in Pritchett 5.247-53.

⁹³ Eur. *Supp.* 475-85; Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38.

⁹⁴ Aesch. *Ag.* 595-610, 745, 855-913, *Per.* 1-231; Aristoph. *Ach.* 1050-68, *Lys.* 99-145, 586-90; Eur. *Orest.* 375-79, 544-90, 925-30, *Tro.* 1-47.

⁹⁵ Dem. 60.32-7; Hyp. 6.41-3; Lys. 2.6, 70-81; Plat. *Menex.* 247c-48d; Thuc. 2.44.1-4.

⁹⁶ Aesch. *Ag.* 425-65, 745, *Per.* 246-434, 515-97, 909-1079; Eur. *Andr.* 91-116, 1037-46, *Cycl.* 304-9, *Hec.* 315-25, 638-57, *Phoen.* 1284-479, *Rh.* 906-14, 952-92, *Tro.* 375-405, 462-510; Soph. *Phil.* 403-37.

⁹⁷ Eur. *Supp.* 111-285, 790-836, 940-54, 955-1079, 1114-64, also *Phoen.* 1310-1479.

⁹⁸ Eur. *Phoen.* 784-800, 900-1283, also Aesch. *Ag.* passim; Eur. *Heraclid.* 288-607, *IA.* 1374-432, 1532-629, with Mills: 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83, also Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38; Hanink, 'Epitaphioi Mythoi and Tragedy', 289-317.

⁹⁹ Eur. *Phoen.* 1202-83, with n.55 above. For bereavement in comedy and oratory, see Aristoph. *Eccl.* 229-36, *Lys.* 586-90, with Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 1-18; Konstan, 'Ridiculing a Popular War', 184-99.

Bereavement, in public discourse, also has consequences. In contrast, the epitaphic ideal reassures warriors that if they are killed in combat their dependents would be cared for in their absence, since lingering concerns about the subsequent fate of wives, children and parents would undermine the point of the *epitaphioi*, which was to encourage men to risk themselves, and if necessary, to die for Athens.¹⁰⁰ This, of course, was no empty promise, and state support for the sons of the war-dead is well attested. They were maintained at state expense until their majority, at which point the support they had received was displayed at the start of the City Dionysia, where they were paraded before the audience and presented with a panoply.¹⁰¹ Such displays no doubt helped to assuage the fears of combatants in respect of their sons, but it is unclear whether other relatives received anything more than moral support, and inevitably, a man's death left his dependents in a vulnerable position. Certainly, this is the impression given by Lysias 32, which alleges that the widow and children of a man killed at Ephesus in 409 BC were systematically defrauded by his surviving brother.¹⁰²

The death of fighting age men and the loss of the protection they provided could also lead to andrapodisation, a brutal process involving physical and sexual violence, by which surviving members of a defeated community were transformed into *andrapoda*, human livestock.¹⁰³ The Athenians andrapodised a number of Greek *poleis* during the Classical period, and unsurprisingly, fear of this fate often featured on stage.¹⁰⁴ Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, for example, describes the sack of Troy, during which the Greeks kill the men and the children and pile their bodies.¹⁰⁵ In Euripides' *Trojan Women*, the Greeks burst out of the Wooden Horse and slaughter the terrified Trojans, beheading young men in their beds

¹⁰⁰ Hyp. 6.30-4; Lys. 2.61-2, 68-70; Plat. *Menex.* 235b, 236e, 242d-e, 246b-47c, 248d-e; Thuc. 2.41.5, 43.4-5, 44.3-4.

¹⁰¹ Aeschin. 3.154; Isoc. 8.82; Plat. *Menex.* 249a-b; Thuc. 2.46.1.

¹⁰² Lys. 32.4-8, 24-27.

¹⁰³ See above, n.65.

¹⁰⁴ Aesch. *Ag.* 425-65, 782-809; Eur. *Hec.* 229-331, 421, 484-518, 658-80, *IA.* 773-800, *Phoen.* 180-92, *Tro.* 1-47, 98-235, 308-24, 462-510, 598-1332; Soph. *Trach.* 293-334; cf. Isoc. 4.100-115.

¹⁰⁵ Aesch. *Ag.* 335-50.

and making the altars run with blood.¹⁰⁶ In Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, fear of andrapodisation produces panic amongst the women,¹⁰⁷ and in Euripides' *Suppliants*, such fears drive women into the temples where they beg the gods for protection.¹⁰⁸

5. Self-Refuting Rhetoric

At all levels of military activity, then, popular discourse both confirms and challenges the epitaphic ideal, and this incongruence requires explanation. Confirmation, naturally, is easiest to explain. As Thomas argued, the *epitaphios logos*, with its simple message repeated year after year, exercised considerable influence over Athenian thought and memory, especially in the absence of alternatives.¹⁰⁹ The Athenians were also predisposed to accept the patriotism of the *epitaphioi* because they lived in a dangerous geopolitical environment. Admittedly, they, with the other Greeks, were influenced by feelings of Panhellenism, but this 'higher patriotism' was overpowered by their 'lower patriotism', that is to say their fierce loyalties to their own *poleis*.¹¹⁰ This, together with the competitive and militarised mindset of the Greeks, as well as the absence of effective mechanisms for the avoidance of conflict, ensured that Greece was characterised by endlessly internecine conflict.¹¹¹ Unsurprisingly, in such an environment, any state wishing to survive and maintain its sovereignty had to be able to mobilise its manpower and motivate the ongoing expenditure of human lives in the defence of state interests.

Naturally, such aims can be attained through effective use of remuneration or coercion, but patriotism is a more efficient stimulant, since men under its influence willingly

¹⁰⁶ Eur. *Tro.* 531-67, with Green, 'War and Morality in Fifth-Century Athens', 97-110; Mills: 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83.

¹⁰⁷ Aesch. *Seven* 78-368.

¹⁰⁸ Eur. *Supp.* 650-733.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, 95-154, 196-237, also Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 1-18, 99-123; Mills: 'Affirming Athenian Action', 163-83; Prichard, 'Thucydides', 137-50; Shear, 'Their Memories Will Never Grow Old', 511-36; *contra* Brock, 'Mythical Polypragmosyne', 227-38.

¹¹⁰ Mitchell, *Panhellenism*, 77-112.

¹¹¹ See Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, 80-104.

fight and die in the defence of their collective.¹¹² Accordingly, the best way to view patriotism, then, is as an evolutionary adaptation to environmental stimuli. The Athenians, of course, inhabited an environment that required that adaptation, and since they developed, in the *epitaphioi*, an extremely effective mechanism of stimulating such sentiment, it is entirely unsurprisingly to see the epitaphic ideal confirmed in popular discourse.

The point of the epitaphic ideal, however, was to ensure that men came into contact with military reality, and it was particularly effective in so doing. Amongst Athenians, consequently, experience of war was common,¹¹³ and that experience naturally diverged from the ideal portrayed in the *epitaphioi*. The success of the *epitaphioi* thus ironically entailed the refutation of the rhetorical ideal expressed thereby, and this is readily apparent at all levels of military activity. At the strategic level, the Athenians, despite their obvious eagerness to project their failings upon their leaders, were well aware that their strategic conduct was not always guided by Hellenic morality or Panhellenic altruism, quite simply, because they formed Athens' collective executive, and as such, they were responsible for all the decisions that execute made. It was the Athenians, then, who decided to maintain their primacy by force and to punish those members of the Delian League, starting with Naxos in c.467 BC, who tried to evade subjection and exploitation.¹¹⁴

Similarly, at the operational level, the Athenians were well aware that their operations sometimes failed. It was they who marched out to defeat at Delion in 424 BC,¹¹⁵ Amphipolis in 422 BC,¹¹⁶ 1st Mantinea in 418 BC,¹¹⁷ Nemea in 394 BC,¹¹⁸ and Chaeronea in 338 BC.¹¹⁹ They were also well aware that their operations were sometimes brutal and punitive, because

¹¹² For an overview of the complex issue of combat motivation, see Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, 5-21.

¹¹³ A consequence of an extremely high Athenian MPR (military participation ratio), for which, see Andreski, *Military Organization*.

¹¹⁴ Thuc. 1.98.4.

¹¹⁵ Thuc. 4.89.1-101.2.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 5.6.2-11.3.

¹¹⁷ Thuc. 5.64.1-74.2.

¹¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.13-23.

¹¹⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.85-6; Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.2.2, with n.32 above.

it was they who destroyed hostile communities by andrapodisation, for instance, at Torone in 422 BC, Scione in 421 BC, and most famously, at Melos in 415 BC.¹²⁰ Likewise, at the tactical level, the Athenians were well aware that the epitaphic ideal, which emphasised the glory of battle and the beauty of death, did not match the reality they experienced.¹²¹ As they knew, the deadliest phase of battle was not combat, but rout.¹²² Hoplites in formation were hard to kill, but once they broke and ran, they were easily slaughtered by more mobile troops such as cavalry and light infantry.¹²³ Such troops generally pursued mercilessly because victorious forces desired a high body count to deter future aggression,¹²⁴ and they knew that defeated troops, if given sufficient breathing space, could re-establish their formation. Consequently, to avoid having to refight the same battle twice, the winners generally pursued and slaughtered defeated enemies without mercy.¹²⁵

Unsurprisingly, to avoid such a fate, real Athenians generally responded to defeat by abandoning their arms and fleeing the field.¹²⁶ The vast majority of the dead, therefore, were ingloriously hacked down by enemy cavalry or caught by light infantry. Such a death was horrific rather than beautiful, as, course, was the warrior's corpse.¹²⁷ The casualties produced by close-quarters battle with edged weapons were inevitably mutilated and bloody, and if there was any delay in their collection, as there was after Delion, in 424 BC, they would bloat and discolour as they decomposed under the Mediterranean sun.¹²⁸

¹²⁰ Thuc. 5.3.4, 32.1, 84.1-115.4, 116.4.

¹²¹ See above, ns.38, 47-8, 79.

¹²² See, for instance, Xen. *Hiero* 2.15-16, with Krentz, 'Casualties in Hoplite Battles', 13-20.

¹²³ Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.2, *Cav.* 1.6, *Hell.* 1.2.4-5, *Mem.* 3.3.7, with Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, 46-66; Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece*, 151-63; Worley, *Hippeis*, pp.83-122.

¹²⁴ Hdt. 6.75.1-84.3, 7.148.1-4; Paus. 2.20.8-10; van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 118-38, 'Defeat and Destruction', 69-110.

¹²⁵ Thuc. 4.42.1-44.6, 6.67.1-70.4, 101.1-102.4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.13-21, *Hunt.* 12.5-6, also *Anab.* 6.5.28, 7.3.47, *Hell.* 3.5.19-20, 6.4.8-15.

¹²⁶ Consider, e.g., the aftermath of Delion, 424 BC (Thuc. 4.89.1-101.2), 1st Mantinea, 418 BC (Thuc. 5.72.1-4) and Epipolae, 413 BC (Thuc. 7.43.2-45.2). For the expectation that those caught fleeing would be killed, see Archil. fr. 59, 101; Hdt. 4.136.1; *IG II²* 6217; Plat. *Lach.* 182a-b, *Laws* 4.706c-7a, *Symp.* 221b; Tyrt. fr. 10.21-7, fr. 11.17-20; Xen. *Ages.* 1.32, *Anab.* 6.5.23, *Cyrop.* 3.3.45, 4.2.39, *Hell.* 5.3.2; cf. Plat. *Prot.* 326b-c, *Rep.* 5.468a-b.

¹²⁷ See above, ns.38, 47-8, 79, 82-4.

¹²⁸ Thuc. 4.101.1, with ns.82-4 above.

Finally, at the societal level, the Athenians knew the human cost of patriotism, because they themselves paid it. Athens was often at war, and this entailed the repeated muster and dispatch of forces around the Greek world and beyond.¹²⁹ This inevitably resulted in the separation of men from their families, and such separations were further exacerbated by the nature of Athenian war-making. This was conducted from an impressive economic base, and as a result, was often characterised by prolonged siege operations, as well as extended campaigns in distant theatres of war.¹³⁰ Those campaigns were high risk, and as such, in addition to the usual rate of attrition, they sometimes produced catastrophic numbers of casualties. Bereavement, then, would have been distressingly common, and sometimes, such as after the disastrous Egyptian and Sicilian Campaigns, it must have dominated Athenian life for extended periods of time.¹³¹

In addition to such grief, the Athenians were also well aware of the potential cost of strategic defeat. As Xenophon says, when news of the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotamoi reached the Piraeus, a wail of anguish arose that moved slowly from the Piraeus to the urban centre as news spread from one person to the next. This anguish was, of course, partly related to the fate of those Athenians serving in the fleet, but it also reflected Athenian fears that the fate they had visited on others, namely community annihilation through andrapodisation, would now be visited upon them.¹³² There can be no doubt, then, that the Athenians, from personal experience, knew the difference between rhetoric and reality, and that difference is clearly reflected in their popular discourse.

6. Conclusion

The portrayal of military activity in the *epitaphios logos* and popular discourse, then, is both convergent and divergent because the former is an ideal and the latter is the reflection

¹²⁹ See above, n.4, with Christ, 'Conscription of Hoplites', 398-422.

¹³⁰ See above, n.4.

¹³¹ See esp. Arrington, *Ashes, Images, and Memories*, 91-123.

¹³² Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3, with n.120 above.

of lived reality. The epitaphic ideal provides, through the deployment of mythical and historical exempla, every Athenian with a patriotic mission, and through the ideology of autochthony, it also grants every Athenian citizen the capacity to carry out that mission. Unsurprisingly, given the proliferation of conflict and the need for high levels of patriotism, the epitaphic ideal is strongly reinforced by popular discourse. Nevertheless, the nature of comedy, tragedy and forensic oratory allowed an additional, more human perspective to emerge, and, of course, this is equally unsurprising.

The Athenians inhabited an environment characterised by conflict, and as a result, they had extensive experience of war. Consequently, they knew the difference between ideology and actuality, but, instead of rejecting the epitaphic ideal, they continued to embrace it, even though its rhetoric was refuted by the reality they experienced. This is an indication both of the Athenians' predisposition to and requirement for high levels of patriotism, as well as the success of the *epitaphios logos* in satisfying that demand. Athenian patriotism, however, was neither exclusive nor unthinking. As popular discourse demonstrates, the Athenians were not unreflective automatons. Instead, they formed a warrior society fully aware of the human cost of conflict. That human cost, moreover, clearly concerned the Athenians, yet, in their perennial pursuit of primacy, it was, quite simply, a price they were willing to pay.

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