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# EVERY LOSER WINS? LEVERAGING AN OLYMPIC BID

TOM BASON

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of  
the requirements of the Manchester  
Metropolitan University for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Economics, Policy and  
International Business  
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First of all, this thesis would not have gotten off the ground without the support of my supervisor, Prof. Jonathan Grix. The support he has offered throughout has been second to none and I could not have asked for a better supervisor. This research started at the University of Birmingham and ended up at Manchester Metropolitan University, and so a massive ‘thank you’ to everyone at both institutions for their support.

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## Abstract

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This research investigates the ways in which cities leverage Olympic bids for positive outcomes. Recent Olympic bid cycles have seen a decline in interest in hosting the Games and so the IOC is seeking to encourage bidders to consider how a bid can benefit a city. This is not necessarily a new concept, with case studies including Lyon 1920 (Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010), Manchester 2000 (Cook and Ward, 2011), Berlin 2004 (Alberts, 2009), and Toronto 2008 (Oliver, 2011), yet research into this area is still emerging. This present research contributes to the existing literature, through considering the leveraging strategies employed as part of the bid, rather than post bid legacies.

To answer the research question of how cities can leverage Olympic bids, two stages of data analysis were conducted. A content analysis was conducted of 16 bid cities' answers to the question 'what will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?' (IOC, 2009: 66). Second, qualitative case studies were developed using Cape Town and Toronto's bids for the 2004 and 2008 Games respectively; 31 interviews were conducted with various stakeholders across both bids.

The data collection identified three key leveraging objectives: urban development, sports development and raising the city's global profile. The key finding is that the Olympic bid provided cities with the opportunity to leverage national government funding. The leveraging strategies for sports development and the raising of the profile were less successful as these strategies were implemented solely by the city and did not appear to have the same level of planning as the urban development goals. This research has contributed to the burgeoning literature surrounding Olympic bidding, but perhaps the practical implications are more significant. This research provides bidders with information regarding how an Olympic bid can benefit a city, irrespective of the bid's success. In particular, cities should view a bid as an opportunity to catalyse or contribute to already existing plans. Without this level of strategic planning forethought, it is unlikely that the leveraging plans will be successful.

## Statement of Authorship

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The thesis is submitted in the fulfilment of the requirements of Manchester Metropolitan University for the degree Doctor of Philosophy. No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this university or another institution of learning. Some sections of this thesis have contributed to research elsewhere. The publications in question are the following:

Elements of Chapter 3 contributed to the following conference presentation:

- Leopkey, B., Bason, T., Dowling, M., Salisbury, P., Tinaz, C. and Grix, J. (2018) 'Failed Sport Bids: A Scope of the Literature'. Paper presented at: *NASSM Conference 2018*. Halifax, Nova Scotia, 9<sup>th</sup> June.

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- Bason, T. (2016) 'Every Loser Wins? A Case Study of Cape Town's Olympic Bid'. Paper presented at: *1<sup>st</sup> Tesa International Conference*. Cape Peninsula University of Technology Cape Town, South African, 22<sup>nd</sup> September.

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# 1 Introduction

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## 1.1 Introduction and Purpose

This thesis explores how cities seek to use bids for mega-events for the good of a region. More specifically, this thesis investigates the ways in which unsuccessful bids for the Olympic Games are leveraged to bring positive impacts to a city.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background to the research and provide a rationale and context for the study. First, the current bidding 'crisis' facing the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is discussed. Next, it is demonstrated that there is a gap in the literature for a study of this nature. Then, the research question which guide the study is introduced, together with the aims and objectives. Finally, an overview of the research undertaken will be provided.

## 1.2 Background to the Research

It can be argued that sport mega-events are facing their worst crisis since the bidding scandal surrounding the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. This crisis can be characterised in three current interlinking trends. First, it is clear that there is an issue in attracting cities and nations willing to host sport mega-events. Since the reintroduction of the modern Olympic Games by Pierre de Coubertin in 1896, 34 hosts for the Summer Games have been chosen across 20 nations (IOC, n.d.). For much of this time, the competition to host the Games has been as fierce as the battle for medals within the stadia; on average, five cities

compete to host each Olympic Games. Unlike the battles within the stadia, in this competition, there is no silver medal.

However, in recent years, this competition has calmed, with a significant reduction in the number of bids. The 2004 Olympic Games saw a post-war record of 11 bidders, with every continent except Oceania submitting a candidate (Sydney had hosted the previous event in 2000). Since this high point, the number of bidders has steadily declined, culminating in there essentially being only two bidders (Los Angeles and Paris) for both the 2024 and 2028 Games. Figure 1.1 below shows the number of bidders for every iteration of the Olympic Games to date.




Figure 1.1: Number and profile of bidders for Summer Olympic Games 1896-2028

While there are likely to be a multitude of reasons for this drop-off, an obvious possible reason is the rising costs involved in hosting mega-events; the

second current trend. In recent years, hosting has appeared to resemble an arms race, with successive hosts seeking to make their Games bigger and better than the previous iteration, with all the additional costs that this entails. The 2008 Olympic Games were believed to have been the most expensive in history, costing \$44 billion (Rabinovitch, 2008). Six years later, this expense was eclipsed, as Russia's official spend on Sochi's hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games was \$55 billion (Adesnik, 2014). These costs only relate to the actual hosting of the event; for example, the construction of infrastructure needed for the sporting events. Both Beijing and Sochi entered into a competitive bid process that would have seen further expense. Figure 1.2 shows the cost of hosting mega-events since the turn of the century.




Figure 1.2: Cost of Staging Sport Mega-Events, 2000-2018<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Full references can be found on page 56



These cost increases provide great justification for critics of hosting mega-events and, in particular, the opportunity cost of hosting these events. Cost increases have resulted in bidders withdrawing from the race before the final decision is made. This issue came to a head with the bids for the 2024 and 2028 Olympic Games. Five bidders formally became candidate cities for the 2024 Games; however, Budapest, Hamburg and Rome all withdrew their bids. This left just Paris and Los Angeles in the running, the fewest bidders since Los Angeles bid for the 1984 Games. In an unprecedented move, the IOC decided to award both the 2024 and 2028 Games at the 131<sup>st</sup> IOC session in Peru in 2017, with Paris being awarded 2024, and Los Angeles hosting in 2028.

*Table 1.1: Referenda on Olympic Games Since 2000<sup>2</sup>*

<b>Event</b>	<b>Venue</b>	<b>Outcome of referendum</b>
2006 Winter Olympics	Sion, Switzerland	Bid
2010 Winter Olympics	Vancouver, Canada	Bid
2010 Winter Olympics	Bern, Switzerland	Not bid
2022 Winter Olympics	Vienna, Austria	Not bid
2022 Winter Olympics	Graubünden, Switzerland	Not bid
2022 Winter Olympics	Oslo, Norway	Bid
2022 Winter Olympics	Munich, Germany	Not bid
2022 Winter Olympics	Kraków, Poland	Not bid
2024 Summer Olympics	Hamburg, Germany	Not bid
2026 Winter Olympics	Sion, Switzerland	Not bid
2028 Summer Olympics	Vienna, Austria	Not bid

These withdrawals from the bid process by Budapest, Hamburg and Rome are not remarkable. Indeed, they are indicative of this trend in recent years, which

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from Maennig (2017)

has seen public support for the hosting of the Games dwindling. As can be seen in Table 1.1, referenda held for Olympic Games early in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century were all in favour of bidding; however, this trend has very much reversed, with seven recent completed referenda resulting in cities not bidding for the Games.

Further, the costs in Figure 1.2 relate only to the hosting costs; each of these cities spent more during the bid phase. For example, England spent £21 million on its bid to host the 2018 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup (BBC Sport, 2011); this expense was viewed disparagingly within English football, with little consideration as to whether any good may have come from it. While £21 million is far less than the billions that are needed to host the Olympic Games, it is not an insignificant investment. The cost is intensified when you consider that entering into a bid is essentially a gamble. If there are five bid cities for every iteration of the Olympic Games then, by default, four of these lose, and their investment into the bid process is also lost.

These increased costs, as a result, lead to the third identifiable trend within hosting; the nature of the nations hosting the events. As costs rise and nations are held accountable to the populace, the number of states willing to host these mega-events is rapidly shrinking, resulting in a change in the nature of hosts. The 1990s were characterised by advanced Western nations hosting. The FIFA World Cup was hosted in Italy, USA and France, while the Olympic Games were held in Spain and the USA. After the turn of the century, it was clear that there was a plan for developing nations, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia,

India, China and South Africa) nations in particular, to host mega-events. From 2008-2018, Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa hosted six of the seven football World Cups or Summer Olympic Games.

Yet, while many commentators noted the rise of BRICS nations in hosting mega-events (Zimbalist, 2016), this was arguably not the real trend. Rather, mega-events were being bid for and hosted by nations which had little obligation to their citizens and only wished to spend large amounts of money to showcase themselves to the rest of the world (the idea of hosting mega-events to leverage international prestige is covered further in Chapter 2); the 2018 FIFA men's World Cup took place in Russia, while the 2022 Winter Olympics will be hosted in China and, in the same year, the World Cup will take place in Qatar. These nations are among those with the fewest political rights in the world. Freedom House, a non-governmental organisation, categorises the three nations of Russia, China and Qatar as 'Not Free', with an average 'freedom rating' of less than 20% (Freedom House, 2018). The awarding of World Cup and Olympic events to these nations has led to strong criticism of FIFA in particular, with allegations of bribery as part of the bid process, culminating in 14 FIFA officials being arrested (Bason et al., 2018).

These issues with the hosting of mega-events have led to changes within the IOC, as it seeks to entice more nations to bid. The IOC has encouraged bid cities to consider the fact that losing a bid may not be entirely negative. While bidding for the Olympic Games, each candidate city now completes a Candidature Questionnaire. In 2008, as part of the bid process for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, a new question was introduced; 'What will be the

benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?’ (IOC, 2009:66). Every bid city reaching the Candidate Stage since has had to answer this question.

### **1.2.1 Agenda 2020**

In the decade since this question was added, the bid crisis has become more prominent, and so the IOC introduced Agenda 2020. Agenda 2020 encompasses a wide range of recommendations relating to the reform of many elements of the Olympic Games (IOC, 2014a). Of particular note are the first three recommendations:

*Shape the bidding process as an invitation (IOC, 2014:4)*

Cities considering submitting a bid will be given more information on the bid process and the requirements of a bidder. This information will include the formal procedures that a bidder needs to follow, and also information as to how previous bidders have ensured that a legacy is possible from a bid.

*Evaluate bid cities by assessing key opportunities and risks (IOC, 2014:5)*

Rather than encourage bidding cities to construct new facilities, ‘the maximum use of existing facilities and the use of temporary and demountable venues where no long-term venue legacy need exists or can be justified’ (IOC, 2014:10) will now be viewed as a positive. While this recommendation has good intentions, as will be seen in Chapter 3, a positive impact that a bid may have is the construction of new facilities. If the building of new stadia is viewed as a negative when assessing the bid, this could make bid cities less likely to invest before the award decision is made.

*Reduce the cost of bidding (IOC, 2014:6).*

In order to reduce costs, the number of presentations a Candidate City is required to make will be reduced, while the IOC will fund much of the required travel for the bid teams; however, while this recommendation also comes with good intentions, the reduction in cost is likely to be modest compared to the current level of expense that bid cities face. Full information regarding the costs of bidding, and suggestions to reduce costs further is detailed in Chapter 3.

### **1.2.2 The New Norm**

In February 2018, the IOC developed Agenda 2020 further with the implementation of 'The New Norm', a set of 118 reforms that reimagines how the Olympic Games are delivered. These new reforms focus on three areas: candidature, legacy and the seven-year journey, and it is the first area, 'candidature', that is of relevance to this study. In part due to the already-mentioned bidding crisis, the IOC reviewed the candidature process and has implemented six new measures. First, there is to be a new stage of dialogue between interested cities and the IOC, with the IOC footing the cost of technical experts who provide the bid cities with support. The IOC will also work closely with stakeholders involved in the bid, carrying out its own feasibility analyses. Finally, the candidature stage will be shortened and streamlined, with the requirements for candidate cities being simplified. Through the implementation of these new measures, the IOC is seeking to simplify and reduce the costs of the Olympic bidding process (IOC, 2018a).

### 1.3 Practical Implications

As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the IOC is currently facing a bidding crisis. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the IOC took the unprecedented step of awarding two Olympic Games in the same session. This followed FIFA's decision to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cups at the same time in 2010. The IOC has taken steps to resolve the bid problem, with the first three of the IOC's 40 recommendations for reform relating directly to bidding and to the bid process; however, the issue shows no signs of abating. Therefore, the primary practical implication of this research is that it will provide bid cities with information as to how an Olympic bid can be leveraged for positive outcomes. As has already been discussed and will be further demonstrated in Chapter 3, a bid for a mega-event is an expensive undertaking, with a prevalent view being that if the city does not ultimately host the mega-event, then this money has been lost. This research demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case and that it is possible to use a bid for a sport mega-event to provide positive benefits for a city and/or nation.

Given the issues faced by the IOC and potential bid cities, it is perhaps a little surprising that there has, thus far, been very little research investigating whether the bid process itself can generate positive outcomes for a region. The next section will consider the academic contribution that this research will have.

## 1.4 Academic Contribution

The fall in the number of bidders for mega-events is a relatively new issue, and thus research into Olympic bids is sorely underrepresented in the literature. This is slightly surprising given the sheer number of Olympic bids. Since St. Louis was selected over Chicago to host the 1904 Games, there have been 146 unsuccessful bids just for the Summer Olympic Games alone. The IOC itself collates literature regarding the legacies and impacts of the event. Of the 411 research articles identified by the IOC pertaining to legacy and impact, just 13 exist regarding 'Other Candidate Cities' (Olympic Studies Centre, n.d.).

A lack of literature on a subject does not immediately mean that research needs to take place. However, given the escalating costs of bidding (to be discussed further in Chapter 3), it seems pertinent to consider the extent to which bids have provided benefits for a bid city and/or nation. This potential benefit may help explain why nations such as Puerto Rico and Cuba have bid for the Olympic Games, with little chance, in reality, of actually hosting a Games. Thus, this research will seek to fill a gap in the literature; that of the benefits that can be teased out of bids for the Olympic Games.

In addition to expanding upon the extant literature regarding bidding cities, this research also develops the theoretical understanding of leverage. As is seen in Chapter 2, much of the literature regarding leverage is focused on the strategies employed to benefit from hosting events. The present study adapts Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage to include the bid phase for the Olympic Games.

Further information regarding the literature surrounding leveraging mega-events, and the impact of mega-event bids, can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.

## 1.5 Research Question

This study starts with one primary research question: **'In what ways have bids for the Olympic Games been leveraged for positive outcomes?'**

With this principal question as the starting point, the aims and objectives are as follows:

### 1.5.1 Research Aim

The primary aim is to investigate the different ways in which cities have leveraged bids for the Olympic Games.

### 1.5.2 Research Objectives

- 1) To examine a range of unsuccessful Olympic bids to identify the leveraging strategies employed, if any.
- 2) To scrutinise two bids in detail to explore the leveraging strategies put in place and the outcomes of these strategies.
- 3) To adapt Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage to view demonstrate leveraging opportunities for bidding cities.

## 1.6 Chapter by Chapter Outline

This section outlines the structure of this thesis. Given that this research focuses on a specific section of the area of mega-events, **Chapter 2** first



introduces the wider literature. Key definitions are introduced, with consideration of the difference between *legacy* and *leverage*. This research uses the concept of leverage, and so the application of leverage to mega-events is analysed. The chapter introduces the theoretical model of event leverage around which this research is structured.

Once the concept of leverage and the theoretical model to be used have been introduced, **Chapter 3** examines the literature surrounding the impact of failed bids. This part begins with a brief history of Olympic bidding to provide the historical context, before it identifies the key periods during the bid process. The main areas of leverage are then introduced, followed by an introduction to the two cities included as case studies.

In **Chapter 4**, the methodology used in this research is explained. This chapter starts with a review of ontological and epistemological positions, which then inform the methods used for data collection: content analysis and interviews. Throughout this chapter, the methods utilised are justified, together with the steps taken to ensure that the research is reliable and valid and that it adheres to all ethical guidelines.

**Chapter 5** is the first chapter in which empirical data is provided. This consists of a content analysis of the 16 candidate cities' answers to the question, 'What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?' (IOC, 2009:66). Data is presented first in terms of themes, and second by categorising the bidders. This chapter corresponds to objective number one.

Following the secondary analysis, the primary data collection is introduced in **Chapters 6 and 7**, and achieves objective two. In these two chapters, the strategies employed to leverage Cape Town's and Toronto's bids for the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games respectively are introduced. The empirical data is presented first, before it is linked to the literature on leveraging.

Finally, **Chapter 8** concludes the research. This chapter begins with a discussion of the results presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; demonstrating the consistency of the findings. The conceptual framework, utilised to framework this research, is then applied to the data. Following this discussion, the practical and academic contributions of this research are presented, before the limitations of the research are then considered. This thesis finishes with a discussion of directions for future research.

The structure of the thesis is summarised in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Structure of the Thesis

Chapter	Section	Key Content
1	Introduction	Background and rationale; research question, aims and objective
2	Literature Review: Leveraging	Introduction to mega-events; leverage or legacy; theoretical concepts regarding leverage
3	Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events	Historical context of bids; areas to leverage; Cape Town 2004 and Toronto 2008
4	Methodology	Methods used and data collection
5	Results: Candidate File Analysis	Secondary data analysis of Olympic Candidate Files 2016-2024
6	Results: Cape Town Case Study	Interview and documentary analysis regarding Cape Town's bid for the 2004 Olympic Games
7	Results: Toronto Case Study	Interview and documentary analysis regarding Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympic Games
8	Conclusion	Discussion of the data analysis; conclusions; practical and academic implications; areas for future research

## 1.7 Summary

This introductory chapter has outlined the background and context for this research; that is, that in recent years there has been an alarming decline in the number of bids submitted for the Olympic Games. This chapter has also begun to introduce the theoretical and practical implications of this research; these will be expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter then introduced the research question, aims and objectives underpinning this research before outlining the remainder of this thesis

## **2 Literature Review: Leveraging Mega-Events**

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### **2.1 Introduction and Purpose**

Following on from the previous chapter, which introduced the research and stated the research question, the next two chapters place this research within the field of mega-events and, in particular, sport mega-events. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, there is scant literature available regarding the ways in which an Olympic bid has been leveraged for positive outcomes. Therefore, this chapter discusses the current literature surrounding the leveraging of mega-events before Chapter 3 considers the impact that an Olympic bid may have on a city.

This chapter starts with the placement of mega-events within the field of mega-projects, reviewing the differing definitions of major, hallmark and mega-events (Section 2.2). Much of the literature surrounding mega-events focuses on the idea of 'legacy' and 'leverage'; accordingly, this chapter defines what is meant by these terms (Section 2.3.1). Following this, detailed information is provided on the various leveraging strategies that host cities have put in place (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Finally, this chapter concludes with the introduction of the academic framework around which the research will be structured (Section 2.4).

### **2.2 What is a Mega-Event?**

Given the focus of this research on mega-events, it is first important to define what is meant by the term 'mega-event'.

### **2.2.1 Definition of ‘Mega-Event’**

Mega-events are considered to be part of the wider events industry, which covers a spectrum of events from the World Cup and Olympic Games, through to Christmas fetes in the local village hall. There have been numerous attempts to classify different types of mega-event, with no agreed-upon definition. Jago and Shaw’s (1998) definition is one of the more commonly used; identifying mega-events as being either unplanned and ordinary, or planned and therefore special. Jago and Shaw go on to divide the special, planned events into minor events (local, attracting a small audience) and major events (attracting a larger audience, media attention, prestigious, and can generate legacies). These major events are then divided again, into hallmark events (infrequent, with a fixed location), and mega-events (unique events whose location moves). In contrast, Bowdin et al. (2006) treat major events, hallmark events and mega-events as separate categories, placing them on a scale of impact; measuring attendance, media, profile, infrastructure, cost, and benefits.

To add further to the confusion, the same events have often been classified differently. For example, the Olympic Games have been classified as ‘hallmark events’ (Smith, 2001; Westerbeek et al., 2002; Solberg and Preuss, 2007) and ‘mega-events’ (Pomfret et al., 2009; Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011; Giulianotti et al., 2014). Even among those authors using the term ‘mega-event’, there is no clear, readily-agreed definition, with most agreeing with Roche’s (2000:1) definition that mega-events are ‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character,

mass popular appeal, and international significance', which are 'typically organised by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organisations and thus can be said to be important elements in 'official' versions of public culture'. Roberts (2004) adds to this, by identifying that mega-events are often one-off events that do not take place in the same way each time.

However, these definitions could be used to apply to Jago and Shaw's (1998) definitions of major, hallmark and mega-events. While the size of the event is a factor when establishing whether it reaches 'mega' status, the placement of these boundaries is less obvious. A range of different events have been classed as 'mega-events' in the literature; the Olympic Games and the World Cup are the two most recognised mega-events, due to their size and global attention. Yet, other events such as the Paralympic Games (Dickson et al., 2011; Misener et al., 2013), Winter Olympic Games (Deccio and Baloglu, 2002; Baade et al., 2009), and even the likes of the British and Irish Lions playing three rugby union tests in tours of South Africa (Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011; Fourie et al., 2011) have been classified as mega-events. The extent to which a rugby series consisting of two teams playing each other on multiple occasions can be applied to either Roche's or Jago and Shaw's definition of mega-events is debatable, certainly given that there is a limited number of nations globally with an interest in the sport of rugby union.

A more recent attempt to define mega-events has seen a new classification; 'giga-events'. Müller (2015a) uses four factors derived from previous definitions to classify 13 different events: (1) the number of people who attend,

(2) media reach, (3) total cost, and (4) infrastructural development. Each of these can be problematic individually. For example, Marris (1987) suggested that mega-events require a minimum of one million visitors, but this restricts mega-events to those which take place over a longer period as no stadium can accommodate one million attendees for a single event. Conversely, media-reach perhaps benefits shorter events, with viewers of the UEFA Champions League Final, which lasts 90 minutes, possibly having a higher average viewership (165 million worldwide watched the 2014 final (UEFA, 2014)) than the Olympic Games which lasts for several weeks. Finally, using total cost and infrastructural development may limit mega-events to occurring only in certain countries. Los Angeles' hosting of the 1984 Olympic Games is famed due to a lack of infrastructural investment, yet few would contend that this is not a mega-event. Müller uses these four factors to assign points as to whether they are L, XL or XXL, finding that seven events are 'major', five are 'mega' and the Olympic Games are 'giga'.

This classification does have obvious flaws; the use of media rights is becoming further problematic with the development of online media, with websites such as Periscope allowing the piracy of such events. A second issue is that only one iteration of each event is considered, with the Super Bowl being Müller's smallest event. This is due to the selected Super Bowl being held in New Orleans' Mercedes-Benz Superdome, built in 1975, and is the only Super Bowl since 2010 not to be played in a purpose-built stadium.

Similar to Müller (2015a), Black (2008) identified a number of 'second-order' and 'third-order' events. Second-order events, while still having a global

interest, do not have the same sort of profile and interest in them as ‘first-order’ events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup. Black identifies the Commonwealth Games, and the Cricket and Rugby World Cups as ‘second-order’ events, and those events that have a more regional interest, such as the Africa Cup of Nations or Pan American Games, as ‘third-order’ events. Coates (2012) identifies several events that are generally not considered to be mega-events, for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Winter Olympics is often seen as a mega-event (Deccio and Baloglu, 2002; Baade et al., 2009), yet this is perhaps due to the immediate association with the Summer Olympics. Other events that Coates classes as ‘not-so-mega events’ are Formula 1 Motor Racing, NASCAR, the X-Games, the Rugby World Cup (identified by Jones (2001) as a mega-event) and UEFA’s European Football Championship.

Müller’s (2015a) classification is notable for its lack of non-sport mega-events; only the Shanghai Expo in 2010 is a mega-event, according to Müller, with all non-sport ‘mega’-events being given a value of zero for media attention. This supports Bowdin et al. (2006), who identify only the World’s Fair as a mega-event, while Hiller (1995) recognises conventions as being mega-events. However, there have been a number of non-sport events in recent years which have garnered great media attention; the Royal Wedding in 2011, and Barack Obama’s inauguration have both been estimated as having global television audiences of over one billion (Irvine, 2009; Winnett and Samuel, 2011). However, perhaps due to their ad hoc nature, there is little academic literature on non-sport mega-events.



### 2.2.2 Mega-projects

Mega-events can be placed inside the field of 'mega-projects', which are identified as being 'large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people' (Flyvbjerg, 2014:6). Both the Olympic Games and World Cup fit this definition. The idea of a specific cost being used in a definition can be troublesome; for example, one billion dollars in 2012 in London is likely to have a different value to one billion dollars in 2022 in Qatar, as inflation and exchange rates fluctuate. However, the figure of one billion dollars used by Flyvbjerg is to be used as a guide rather than a specific characteristic and, in any case, the hosting of both the World Cup and Olympic Games requires far more investment than this (see Figure 1.2 on page 3).

A key characteristic of mega-projects is that they are often poorly managed, overrun in terms of cost and time, and fail to produce the effects post-event that were initially promised (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). Yet, despite this, mega-projects are appealing, with Flyvbjerg (2014:8) identifying four reasons for this to be the case. The first, which is perhaps the least relevant to sport mega-events, is the opportunity for engineers to develop new and innovative technologies which can potentially be viewed as the best or first of their kind. Secondly, mega-projects appeal to politicians, primarily because of the public exposure the politicians are afforded. However, should a mega-project ultimately be unsuccessful or of no value, those politicians responsible for instigating the project could suffer a loss of reputation as a result. This was

seen in the UK following the building of the Millennium Dome by the Labour government, which attracted fewer than half its predicted visitors. Coupled with the political appeal are the economic benefits of a mega-project, with the construction and ongoing maintenance thought to provide jobs and inject money into the economy. Finally, workers and managers of mega-projects enjoy the opportunity to develop something that will be viewed as iconic.

### **2.2.3 Section Review**

This section has summarised the key definitions as to what constitutes a 'mega-event'. This research will use Black's (2008) classification of there being first, second and third order mega-events and this literature review will focus mainly on the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, together with the Football World Cup. Both leveraging and bidding for mega-events are relatively new areas within the academic literature, and so this literature review is constrained by a lack of prior research. The first phase of this research (secondary data analysis of bid books) will use both the Winter and Summer Olympic Games, while the primary research will focus on the bids for two Summer Olympic Games.

## **2.3 Impacts of Mega-Events**

Section 2.2 identified what is meant by the term 'mega-event'. Several of the definitions included reference to the significant costs of hosting an event; therefore, there may be some expectation from host cities that they will receive benefits in return. This section will now consider the terms 'legacy' and

'leverage', before introducing the theoretical framework on which this research will be based.

### **2.3.1 Legacy and Leverage**

Much of the discourse surrounding the impacts of mega-events uses the term 'legacy' to discuss what happens due to, and after, the hosting of a mega-event.

Gold and Gold (2009) provide a history of the term 'legacy' in the Olympic Games, identifying that it first appeared in Olympic bid documents for the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games. The first modern Olympics had little concern regarding legacy, aside from the experience that the organisers gained in sports administration. It was not until White City Stadium was built for London's hosting of the 1908 Olympic Games that there was an obvious legacy from a Games. While the term 'legacy' was used during the bids for the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles was the first to use the term on a consistent basis. Yet, as the two subsequent Olympic Games were hosted in non-English-speaking nations, the term was not utilised in either the 1988 Seoul or the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. When the Games returned to the English-speaking world, in Atlanta in 1996, the term 'legacy' became more prominent (Gold and Gold, 2009; Andranovich and Burbank, 2011).

As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the impacts of mega-events are not necessarily always positive for a host. It is perhaps for this reason that the IOC has sought to marry the legacy narrative with hosting, to justify the ever-increasing budgets required to host such an event (Chalip, 2014; MacRury,

2015). The IOC Charter states that the role of the IOC is to 'promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries' (IOC, 2014:17), yet it is less clear about its own definition of 'legacy'. A 2003 IOC International Symposium sought to clarify the definition of legacy but was forced to conclude that the different cultures and languages of the various contributors resulted in several different definitions being used (de Moragas et al., 2003). Indeed, during the 2003 IOC International Symposium, six different authors acknowledged the lack of a clear definition and instead proposed their own definition to be used for the purposes of that specific paper (Barney, 2003; Chappellet, 2003; Essex and Chalkley, 2003; Hiller, 2003; McCloy, 2003; Roche, 2003).

In the years since the symposium, the use of the term legacy has multiplied significantly, and so has the academic understanding of the definition. A key driver of the use of legacy is Preuss, whose 2007 definition is the most widely used. Preuss identified six dimensions that make up a definition of legacy (Preuss, 2007:210-211):

- 1) Legacy continues beyond the event itself. While legacy may originate from structures constructed prior to the event, most legacy occurs from changes that occur during or after the event.
- 2) As the environmental factors change, new opportunities for legacy are derived.
- 3) Legacy impacts different groups of stakeholders in different ways. The same action may bring benefits to one group but negatively impact another.

- 4) Legacy may be tangible or intangible.
- 5) Legacy will typically be restricted to the host area but may permeate beyond the immediate region.
- 6) Legacy may be unintentional; negative impacts are unlikely to be planned.

As can be seen, the definition of legacy is rather wide-ranging and can be used to fit a number of scenarios.

A key criticism of legacy, which will be further demonstrated later in this chapter, is that many hosts expect a positive legacy to occur naturally (Grix et al., 2017) when this is unlikely to be the case. Indeed, as per Preuss's (2015:5) definition, legacy can lead to negative impacts as well as positive. Chalip (2014) notes further issues inherent with the idea of legacy. If legacy is expected to occur as part of hosting, then it is likely to be the responsibility of an organising committee that a) is focused on organising the event, and b) is likely to be disbanded after the event occurs.

Chalip has, instead, been a proponent of the idea of 'leverage'. Whereas legacy focuses on the outcomes of an event, that is, what occurs after the event has taken place, leverage has a different emphasis. Rather, leverage studies the strategies that are put in place by the host organisations to achieve a particular objective (Chalip, 2006). As Chalip (2014) argues, if legacy is unplanned, it may not be immediately obvious what led to this legacy occurring. This is where leverage differs from legacy; if hosts implement specific strategies and tactics, these can be evaluated to measure their

effects. Those strategies that are successful can then be adopted and adapted by future hosts who are seeking to achieve similar positive outcomes.

The term 'legacy' dominates the narrative, both from an academic and practical point of view. Leverage is a more recent concept that first became considered at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. Rather than relying on the Olympic Games to generate positive outcomes automatically for Sydney and Australia as a whole, a series of strategies was put in place to ensure that the Games delivered positive benefits (Chalip, 2002). These strategies sought to leverage the Games to boost Australia's tourism. In the years since, a number of studies have demonstrated how other nations have sought to leverage the hosting of mega-events for positive benefits, such as Germany's hosting of the 2006 World Cup (Grix, 2012), the 2010 South Africa World Cup (Knott et al., 2015), and Qatar 2022 (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014).

This first section has established the key differences between the terms 'leverage' and 'legacy'. This research will be using the concept of leverage rather than legacy. It is not seeking to view the unplanned outcomes of bidding. Instead, this study is investigating the plans that bidders have put in place to leverage positive benefits for the nation or city. However, there is scant literature focusing on the ways that cities have leveraged an Olympic bid for positive benefits. Therefore, this literature review will now consider the ways that leverage has been applied to the *hosting* of mega-events and will introduce the theoretical framework that will be used for this research.

### 2.3.2 Leveraging Mega-Events

The term leverage can be defined as the ‘power to accomplish a purpose’ (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010:509). In the studies of sport and events, it has often been used to describe the ways that sponsors activate their sponsorships. Purely paying a fee and having the company name associated with a sport or event brand will often not gain the sponsor the outcomes they are hoping for. Instead, additional investment is required to create ancillary activities around the sponsorship as a lever to bring additional gains, often through advertising and sales promotions (Papadimitrou and Apostolopoulou, 2015). VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) argue that the leveraging of events has its roots in the business literature, as corporations seek to identify assets, which are used to create value.

Since Chalip introduced the term in regard to mega-events in 2002, leveraging has come to mean the additional strategies that are put in place by hosts to ensure that the hosting of mega-events leads to positive outcomes (Chalip, 2014). Smith (2014) took this further, identifying that there are two ways in which this can be achieved. The first is *event-led leveraging*. Event-led leveraging occurs when hosts seek to amplify the positive benefits that would typically be expected from the hosting of an event and could not occur if the event did not take place. Smith (2014) gives the example of a host putting in place measures to help local businesses secure contracts as well as business associated with hosting. In comparison, Smith also offers *event-themed leveraging*. These are those plans that use the event as a ‘hook’ to achieve objectives; for example, a government may seek to use the hosting of an

Olympic Games to leverage an increase in participation in sport. This is a policy objective that could be sought regardless of whether an Olympic Games is taking place or not, but the hosting may be used to amplify the outcomes.

As with the concept of legacy, the temporal nature of leverage is an important consideration. Sport mega-events have very strict time periods. An event itself is likely to last 4-6 weeks, yet the host has a build-up period that typically lasts seven years before the event takes place. This has been termed the 'pregnancy period' for leverage, which is identified as being the key time for leveraging strategies to be put in place (Weed et al., 2012; Dickson, 2017). These strategies should then last longer than the event itself. This is a key factor of leverage. It is potentially easy for a city to use the time during the event for positive benefits; jobs are created (Feddersen et al., 2007), and there is often a carnival-like atmosphere during the event that can be harnessed (Kellett et al., 2008). However, neither of these benefits is long-term, and once the event finishes, government and media attention move to other areas (Rogerson, 2016).

While there are opportunities for leverage, it is unlikely that an event organising committee will be able to take advantage of them. After all, with the eyes of the world upon them, any organising committee is likely to be solely focused on ensuring that the event takes place successfully (Chalip et al., 2016). Further, the organising committee is likely to be disbanded shortly after the event takes place and is unlikely to consider long-term legacies at the expense of hosting a successful event in the short-term (Theodoraki, 2007; Agha et al., 2012). This lack of post-event continuation is thought to have contributed



towards London's failure to leverage successfully the 2012 Olympic Games (Bell and Gallimore, 2015).

Consequently, the leveraging literature notes the importance for a host to ensure that a separate organisation is responsible for making sure that leveraging plans continue beyond the event itself. This was demonstrated successfully at the 2011 Rugby World Cup, as a separate organisation was formed to ensure that the event was leveraged to enhance tourism, exports and branding (Dickson, 2017). This approach has further benefits, in that it frees the organising committee from needing to consider legacy at the time of the event (Chalip and Heere, 2014).

The need for a separate delivery organisation is particularly necessary when leveraging strategies encompass more than one event (Ziakas, 2015). Chalip's (2004) initial model for event leverage (to be discussed further in Section 2.4) featured an event portfolio, and this concept has been explored further by Ziakas (2010). The concept involves using the cross-leveraging of a portfolio of events with the product and service mix of the host; this can involve a region hosting multiple events on a regular basis, together with the involvement of a one-off mega-event (Ziakas, 2013). A key aspect of cross-leveraging is recognising that different events can attain different goals within the portfolio (Ziakas, 2010); a separate delivery organisation will be needed to ensure that these differing goals are achieved. However, while cross-leveraging can bring obvious benefits to a region, there are potential issues; cross-leveraging may require a holistic approach, involving inexperienced

businesses which view each other as competitors and so do not wish to work together (Chalip, 2014).

### **2.3.3 Areas to Leverage**

This chapter has so far discussed leverage from a holistic point of view. However, given the differences and nuances between different hosts, it is unlikely that each is seeking to leverage the same outcomes. Therefore, it is now important to consider the different areas that host cities and states wish to leverage.

One of the first ways to categorise areas of leverage is using the 'triple bottom line'. This is a concept that was introduced in 1994, encouraging firms to look beyond the bottom line of a profit and loss account and, in addition, to consider social and environmental development (Weed, 2009; Ziakas, 2015). However, it does not take more than a cursory glance at the literature to see that states have objectives that move beyond those named in the triple bottom line. While these three areas may be appropriate for a business to focus on, they do not represent the full spectrum of objectives for a nation. Therefore, in addition to economic, social and environmental strategies, leveraging for sports development, nation branding and international prestige will also be considered.

#### **2.3.3.1 Economic**

There has long been a view that hosting a mega-event will automatically lead to economic gains. First, hosting is often thought to increase tourism. This increase occurs on a short-term basis, as attendees enter the economy and spend money which then multiplies through the economy (Lee and Taylor,

2005). Moreover, the hosting of a mega-event leads to wider tourism gains, as people around the world are made aware of the host and its benefits (Karadakis, 2010). Similarly, a nation that hosts a mega-event signals to the rest of the world that it is a nation that can be traded with (Rose and Spiegel, 2011). Finally, hosting a mega-event is thought to lead to job opportunities. Studies have shown that Barcelona 1992, Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000 all saw falls in unemployment around the Games (Centre for Regional Economic Analysis, 1999; Hotchkiss et al., 2003; Malfas et al., 2004).

However, none of these four economic gains is guaranteed. For every example of a nation benefitting economically from hosting a mega-event, there are just as many examples of a negative legacy. For example, there is little guarantee that any money spent will stay within the local economy and it appears to be unlikely given the international nature of the organisations involved in mega-events (Matheson, 2009). Even if local businesses are selected to work with the event, it is possible that the organisers will source products and services from outside the local area (Porter and Fletcher, 2008). Furthermore, the hosting of an event may actually discourage spending. There is evidence to suggest that a displacement effect may occur, as people actively avoid the area that is hosting due to fears of artificially raised prices and overcrowding (Karadakis et al., 2010). Finally, while unemployment may reduce during an event, this is also likely to be problematic. First, it is possible that additional employees are brought in from other areas, and indeed other countries, but if these workers then move their earnings outside the economic area, then the host region does not benefit economically. Second, many of

these jobs are likely to be in construction, and therefore not sustainable post-event (Briedenhann, 2011).

Consequently, if economic benefits do not occur naturally, hosts need to put in place strategies and tactics to ensure that the local area does benefit. Indeed, the first leveraging model focused on ensuring economic benefits. This model, and the one that will be central to this research, is Chalip's (2004) schematic representation of event leverage. In this model, Chalip divides leveraging strategies into two areas: immediate and long-term leverage. Immediate leverage focuses on maximising the spending by visitors to the event, with Chalip offering four means by which to achieve this. First, visitors who attend the event should be encouraged to spend more. There will likely already have been spending on tickets, food and drink, but visitors should also be persuaded to visit local tourist attractions. A way of encouraging this is to increase the length of time that visitors remain in the host area, as the longer a visitor stays, the more money they will spend. Chalip also recognises the earlier mentioned issue of keeping money in the local economy by engaging local businesses in the event. This also contributes to Chalip's final point; enhancing business relationships. The hosting of mega-events provides a unique opportunity for local businesses to work with international sponsors (Chalip, 2004).

Grix et al. (2017) argue that local businesses are often excluded in favour of international organisations. Kirby et al. (2018) take this idea and modify Chalip's (2004) model to incorporate the ways in which micro and small businesses can be included within the hosting of a mega-event. Kirby et al.

identify three phases of the hosting process (bidding and selection, planning, and delivery and handover) and provide a series of strategies and tactics for bidders and hosts to leverage a mega-event to benefit local businesses. Many of these strategies involve the harnessing of greater cohesion, both between the event organisers and local businesses, but also between the businesses themselves.

Indeed, one of the earliest leveraging strategies to be discussed in the literature was Sydney 2000's Business Club Australia initiative (O'Brien, 2006). The Australian government recognised that the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games would involve a wide range of corporations; from local businesses supplying the Games to international conglomerates which pay large sums in sponsorship fees. Yet, there was no formal way for these disparate organisations to connect (O'Brien, 2006). Thus, Business Club Australia was formed, with a wide range of stakeholders in the Games; businesses, executives attending the Games, and sponsors were all included. Business Club Australia had both a physical and virtual hub, with international visitors being paired with potential domestic business partners to enhance international trade (O'Brien, 2006). O'Brien reported that the Business Club Australia initiative was successful, and several similar schemes have been implemented in the years since. However, the initiative was not without issue. As has already been discussed, timing is also very important in leveraging strategies, and O'Brien found that Business Club Australia was marketed to Australian businesses too early. In addition, the inclusion of Olympic sponsors,

although adding a degree of legitimacy to the initiative, precluded other potential businesses from taking part.

Mhanna et al. (2017) tested the immediate leveraging strategies of Chalip's model on London's hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games. The key finding of this work was that without carefully planned strategies, economic benefits do not occur. First, there was an issue with the location of the Games. London 2012 was deliberately built in the East End of London to regenerate the area. Indeed, the hosting of the Games was itself a leveraging strategy. As the Mayor of London at the time of the bid, Ken Livingstone, said: "I didn't bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics because it's the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the government to develop the East End" (Evening Standard, 2008). Using a mega-event to catalyse regeneration of an area is prominent in the literature (Barghchi et al., 2009; Stevens, 2005). However, this causes difficulties if principal tourist attractions are elsewhere in the city. Mhanna et al. (2017) found that visitors to the East End were reluctant to travel to the other areas of the city housing the tourist attractions. In addition, the excitement generated throughout the UK surrounding the Olympic Games meant that many people preferred to watch the Games rather than partake in more conventional leisure activities. This supports Green's (2001) work around subculture. It is not enough to expect that visitors will automatically visit the tourist attractions that are already there; rather, hosts should seek to augment the mega-event with additional activities and entertainment.

In addition to issues in enticing visitor spend while in London, there were also problems with increasing the length of visitor stays. As Chalip (2002) himself had previously noted, many visitors base their travel around the event itself and have their travel booked long in advance (Mhanna et al., 2017). Furthermore, tickets are often sold through approved agencies which have little interest in encouraging visitors to stay longer (Chalip, 2002). This adds weight to the earlier assertion that the 'pregnancy period' is an important period for leveraging strategies. If a host waits until the event itself to attempt to lengthen visitor stays, this is likely to be far too late.

Chalip's (2004) model also identifies strategies for long-term economic benefits, both of which lead to enhancing the image of the host. A mega-event will have the eyes of the world upon it via the global media (Karadakis et al., 2010; Knott et al., 2015). For example, the broadcasting rights to the 2018 Football World Cup were sold to 219 territories across the globe (Bason et al., 2018). A mega-event, and a sporting event in particular, is a unique opportunity for a host to get its message to the rest of the world. In order to do this, the host needs to work with various external organisations. First, the event will be advertised by the governing body (i.e. IOC or FIFA), and the host should seek to build relevant images of the regional area into this advertising (Chalip, 2004). Second, the event will be reported on by various media outlets. Green et al. (2003) suggest that media outlets and reporters should be provided with the information and images that the host wishes to convey to the world. Finally, many sponsors will use images of the host region to strengthen their links with the event in the eyes of the consumer and avoid being ambushed by marketing

(Chalip, 2004). Again, it would be prudent for the host region to work with sponsors to ensure the images and messages being conveyed are the ones that the host wishes to communicate.

This approach can also work in another beneficial way. A host region can use the idea of the mega-event in its future promotion and advertising material (Chalip, 2004). This can be particularly successful if the event has an image that the host wishes to transfer to its own image and can then build this image into its current marketing mix (Chalip, 2004). However, it should be noted that this is most likely to be successful if the event is contributing to an already existent promotional strategy, rather than being expected to generate interest on its own (Swart and Bob, 2004).

### **2.3.3.2 Social**

Closely linked to economic leveraging are the social impacts of hosting. Indeed, many commentators have noted that social legacies are a natural by-product of economic leveraging; that is, if a region successfully leverages economic benefits, then it is possible that society within the region will also be made more affluent. However, this can be a double-edged sword, for if event organisers believe that social legacies will occur naturally, then they are less likely to employ economic leveraging strategies (Bob and Swart, 2010).

It is clear that the hosting of events can create positive feelings for residents of the area where the event is taking place. This has been described as 'community spirit' (Malfas et al., 2004; Kellett et al., 2008) and was noted during the FIFA World Cup in South Korea (Kim and Morrison, 2005). These positive feelings, or community spirit, are not limited to the immediate local



area, with spillover effects being reported by Deccio and Baloglu (2002), and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011). The positive feelings towards an event ex-post are often at odds with negative feelings before the event takes place; Kim et al. (2006) found that prior to the 2002 Football World Cup, residents ranked social problems as their third largest issue. By the time the event had taken place, social problems were deemed to be the least troubling issue (Kim and Petrick, 2005).

Of a similar nature to community spirit is the 'feel-good' factor that can be created. Both these impacts are difficult concepts to quantify, and so data has often been anecdotal. One way in which it can be estimated is through calculating 'willingness to pay'. Du Plessis and Maennig (2007) found that German residents would pay a cumulative total of €640 million to host the 2006 Football World Cup; however, it should be noted that this is well below the overall cost of over €3 billion (DW.com, 2006).

Given the similarities between community spirit and the feel-good factor, it is unsurprising that the criticisms are similar. First, it is noticeable that many of the cited instances occur when the host team is successful during the tournament. The South Korea, Germany and South Africa national teams all achieved beyond expectation as they hosted World Cups, leading Heere et al. (2013) to suggest that it might be advantageous for governments to invest in the success of their sports teams rather than hosting events. However, this is not in agreement with Kavestos and Szymanski's (2010) assertion that hosting an international football tournament increases life satisfaction, but national team success does not. Second, the temporal aspect of both is questionable.

Both tend to occur as the event itself is taking place, with Kim and Petrick (2005) noting that enthusiasm for hosting an event dissipates only three months after the event has taken place.

If these impacts cannot then be classed as legacy, they can still play a part in leveraging social benefits. As with economic leveraging, Chalip (2006) was the initial proponent for leveraging for social outcomes. In this paper, Chalip observes that events can be liminoid; that is, they engender a feeling of *communitas* within the participants and therefore can be used to generate liminality through the fostering of social interaction and creating a feeling of celebration (2006). Chalip (2014) later notes that the liminoid feeling can be focused to achieve specific social objectives through four primary methods: a) the event can be affiliated with a social cause, b) the sporting subculture can be aligned with the social issue, c) visitor stays may be lengthened to maximise exposure to the social cause, and d) targeting event visitors with specific causes. However, whereas Chalip's model for economic leverage has been tested at events (O'Brien, 2006; Perić et al., 2016; Mhanna et al., 2017), there has been little empirical analysis into the creation of liminality at events. Despite this, Grix (2016) suggests that such collective feelings conceptualised in '*communitas*' and feel-good factor play a crucial role in society letting off steam and developing a sense of 'we-ness' amongst its citizens.

That is not to say there has been no research into leveraging mega-events for social gain. One of the key criticisms of mega-events, and even their leveraging, is the distribution of benefits. The same impact may benefit one group of stakeholders while at the same time disadvantaging another. While

numerous hosts have stated that society will be better off as a result of hosting a mega-event, these benefits are very rarely focused on the worse off in society (Minnaert, 2012). Indeed, as Smith (2014) notes, those who are already worse off in society are likely to be those most disadvantaged by the event itself. For example, there has been a recent trend of cities using the hosting of mega-events to regenerate poorer areas of a city. However, as Malfas et al. (2004) noted, a direct impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was an increase in house prices and rents in the poorest areas of the city, by 7% and 38% respectively. This has further implications if public taxes are paying for the event (Kellett et al., 2008).

Parent (2016) offers a potential solution to this issue, through increasing the involvement of all stakeholder groups in the event planning process. Minnaert (2012) notes that there is very little evidence that this has ever occurred, before reviewing the literature to suggest strategies by which this could be achieved. Minnaert argues that a network should be built involving all possible stakeholders in the event, including the socially excluded. As Balsas (2004) recognises, the hosting of a mega-event may accelerate planning processes, with public participation being thrown aside in a bid to ensure that the city is ready to host the event. Leveraging committees also need to recognise that universal programmes are unlikely to reach those who need them most (Minnaert, 2012). If regions have social groups who are already excluded from general society, there is no guarantee that they will be reached by leveraging tactics. Therefore, organisers need to create specifically focused strategies to ensure that those who need them most are positively affected. Finally, the

already discussed 'pregnancy' period is identified by Minnaert (2012) as being key, as any potential momentum is likely to be lost post-event.

Rogerson (2016) further analyses the ways in which the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games were leveraged to generate social benefits. While Glasgow sought to regenerate a poor area of the city, it passed responsibility for regeneration to the council rather than the responsibility resting with the organising committee. This had a key benefit in that it was built into the long-term plans for the city rather than being an ad hoc occurrence. As a result, the Athlete Village was built with the knowledge that it would be turned into accommodation post-event, crucially including social housing and accommodation for the elderly (Rogerson, 2016).

While Rogerson (2016) demonstrates the way that the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games were leveraged for social benefits, it was not perfect. Prior to the event taking place, there were reports in newspapers that many people were being displaced from Glasgow East End (Saltiel, 2013), with anti-homeless 'spikes' being installed around the city (Evening Times, 2014). This is typical of the displacement that often takes place during the hosting of mega-events, with The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) (2007) estimating that two million people have been displaced from their homes due to the Olympic Games since Seoul 1988. Displacement is one of the five human rights issues identified by Worden (2015), with the others being migrant worker mistreatment, suppression of the media (including journalist incarceration), suppression of free speech and discrimination.

As yet, much of the literature has sought to view how mega-events can be leveraged to bring positive impacts for a region. Weed (2009) argues that this should not be the sole focus. Rather than seeking to leverage positive results, cities should seek to leverage outcomes that mitigate the negative impacts associated with hosting mega-events.

### **2.3.3.3 Environment**

The third aspect of the triple-bottom-line is the environment. The impact that hosting a mega-event has on the environment is often included in leveraging social impacts (Grix et al., 2017). It is perhaps because of this that there is a stark lack of literature surrounding the ways in which a mega-event can be specifically leveraged for environmental gains. This is despite there being a wealth of literature detailing the negative impacts that a sport mega-event may have; an area that has received intense scrutiny since the environmental disaster of the Albertville 1992 Winter Olympic Games (Cantelon and Letters, 2000). A consequence of this environmental disaster was the consideration by the IOC of the environmental impacts of all Olympic Games, resulting in the 'environment' ultimately being added as the third strand of Olympism, together with 'sport' and 'culture'.

As the issue of environmental impacts has become more important in the eyes of the IOC, it has also grown in importance for residents whose local area is likely to be impacted in the long term by newly-constructed infrastructure (Deccio and Baloglu, 2002; Gursoy and Kendall, 2006). Given the pressure on a host to be ready in time for the event, it is possible that environmental considerations will be disregarded in favour of haste (Konstantaki and

Wickens, 2010; Gaffney, 2013). Moreover, this infrastructure has to be placed somewhere, which may include areas of natural beauty. For example, the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games saw a 'sacred' forest being destroyed to make space for a ski slope (McCurry and Howard, 2015). The hosting of a mega-event will not only have a long-term environmental impact, but is also likely to have an immediate impact. Gaffney (2013) estimated that 288 tonnes of waste was produced by the 2013 Confederations Cup, an event that is far smaller in scale than either the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup.

Given the likely negative environmental impacts of hosting an event, it is perhaps rather surprising that there are few studies investigating how mega-events can be leveraged for environmental gains, or even just to mitigate the negative impacts. VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) utilise Chalip's (2004) model to demonstrate the environmental leveraging that took place at the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games. The work of Vancouver can be seen as event-themed leveraging (Smith, 2014); Vancouver did not seek to make the event itself more sustainable, but rather sought to use the Winter Olympic Games as a hook to introduce environmental practices to the city in the long term (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012).

While Death (2011) notes that the extensive media circus that comes with mega-events can be used to generate awareness of environmental issues, he also recognises that net environmental gains are by-products of other leveraging plans. For example, the greatest environmental benefit of the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa was not a direct environmental leveraging

strategy; rather, South Africa set in place a strategy to leverage the World Cup to improve public transportation networks, which indirectly benefitted the environment (Death, 2011).

#### **2.3.3.4 Sport Development**

A second area closely linked to the social impacts of mega-events is sport, and particularly participation. Increased participation in sport is often a key promise made by hosts. For example, London 2012 had the tagline 'Inspire a Generation', yet sport participation figures have declined since the Games (Sport England, 2015). As Weed (2014) notes, there were no firm strategies put in place to leverage London 2012 to increase sport participation. This is indicative of the general trend. Many hosts believe that merely hosting a sport mega-event will automatically lead to enhanced sport participation, despite there being a wealth of literature suggesting that this is not the case (Haynes, 2001; Veal et al., 2012; Taks et al., 2018). Hosts generally believe that a 'demonstration effect' will occur; that is, people will be exposed to sport and thus be inspired to try it themselves (Weed et al., 2012). While a couple of studies have found that exposure to mega-event may increase participation in the short term (Perks, 2015), or increase intention to participate (Bauman et al. 2014), the majority of research indicates that a demonstration effect does not occur.

There are various reasons why a demonstration effect does not necessarily occur. Chalip et al. (2016) offer reasons for this. First, people lacking in self-efficacy may be further put off by the excellence of the athletes, believing that they cannot match the prowess on show. In addition, those who do wish to try

the sports on offer may not be able to. It is reasonable to assume that most sports clubs attempt to operate efficiently, and so may not have the spare capacity to take on additional participants inspired by the Games. Indeed, capacity may actually be reduced during the period of a mega-event if the venues are used for the mega-event itself. Even training facilities in the area may be commandeered by athletes who require such facilities during the event (Chalip et al., 2016; Taks et al., 2018).

As such, there are few examples in the literature of hosts successfully managing to leverage sport participation, and none relating to first-order mega-events. The two positive examples that this literature review has found, both relate to second-order mega-events. First, Frawley and Cush (2011) found that registrations for rugby clubs in Australia rose following its hosting of the 2003 Rugby World Cup. Australia recognised that the Rugby World Cup was a unique opportunity to increase participation as domestic rugby was experiencing commercial growth at the time, allowing it to fund the leveraging plans. In addition, the timing of the tournament took place just before the start of the domestic rugby season, allowing the media exposure that the rugby received to boost recruitment drives (Frawley and Cush, 2011). These key features supported the EdRugby school-based programme, which resulted in a significant increase in junior rugby players. It should be noted that the Australian rugby team performed well during the 2003 Rugby World Cup, and this may have had as much of an influence as the hosting of the event itself. In addition, Australian rugby was already in a recruitment drive, and so it is not



known how much of the impact could be attributed to the Rugby World Cup alone (Veal et al., 2012).

Whereas the Rugby World Cup is a single sports event, Rogerson (2016) details the tactics used by Glasgow to leverage the 2014 Commonwealth Games. These tactics mitigated the problems identified by Chalip et al. (2016). Glasgow sought to take advantage of the oft-mentioned 'pregnancy period' by ensuring that the new sporting venues constructed were available to be used in the build-up to the Games (Rogerson, 2016). Further, while these new venues were not available during the period of the Games themselves, Glasgow also ensured that the previously existing facilities were upgraded to enable any new sports participants to be captured. This contributed to a significant growth in users; from fewer than 11,000 in 2005 to 37,000 by 2014 (Rogerson, 2016).

It is clear from these two examples that the leveraging strategies were part of a wider strategy to enhance sport participation within the city. This was not the case with London 2012. In the years following London winning the bid (2005-2012), the UK Physical Education and Sport Strategy for Young People successfully brought together schools and sports clubs (Griffiths and Armour, 2013). However, as the Games approached, this strategy was abandoned in favour of a new policy to introduce competitive sport into schools. This was not as effective and failed to engage schoolchildren in the same way (Griffiths and Armour, 2013). This lack of cohesion in the government's plans is likely to have contributed to the failure of the Games to successfully leverage participation in sport (Grix et al., 2017).

Hayday et al. (2017) similarly investigated the ways in which sport participation was leveraged through the London 2012 Olympic Games and found that there was a real disconnect between sport clubs and policy. Whereas one of the reasons for the 2003 Rugby World Cup in Australia successfully increasing rugby club membership was that the Australian Rugby Union had funds to spend (Frawley and Cush, 2011), the UK was undergoing a period of austerity, and so national governing bodies did not have the resources necessary to engage with all sport clubs and ensure that the proposed policies were implemented. This was particularly an issue with those sports not part of the Olympic Games (and not centrally funded), who felt that they were isolated and disengaged (Hayday et al., 2017).

As has been demonstrated so far, if a host fails to enact policies specifically designed to enhance sport participation, it is unlikely that pre-event promises will be delivered. There has not been any evidence in the literature of an Olympic Games or World Cup being leveraged to enhance sport participation, yet there are lessons that can be learned from other, smaller events. Taks et al. (2013:19) offer a model for sport leveraging, noting that it cannot be the responsibility of just one organisation to deliver sport participation. Instead, it is necessary for the event organising committee to work with both sport and non-sport agencies to utilise knowledge and human and physical resources to enhance sport participation. However, caution is noted; that at the core of this model are sport development goals to be achieved. If these development goals are not aligned across the various stakeholders driving the leveraging, then they are unlikely to be successful (Taks et al., 2013).

In addition to the generic model for participation leverage, Taks et al. (2013) also offer eight specific leveraging tactics. As with Frawley and Cush's (2011) work, it is noted that the involvement of schools is key; before, during and after the event. This should involve providing schoolchildren with the opportunity to play sport and meet with athletes. This should not necessarily just be limited to schoolchildren. Taks et al. (2013) also recognise the importance of involving local sport clubs. As with many leveraging plans, the 'pregnancy period' is a key period, while the enhanced media interest can be leveraged to ensure that the message is properly communicated. Finally, it is also suggested that free transportation should be provided to ensure that those in distant communities can be involved.

This final suggestion is also supported by Weed et al. (2015), who state that leveraging activities are most likely to be successful if the activities are tailored to individual communities. This is of particular importance if a host is seeking to increase participation from those who are currently disengaged from sport and participation (Hamlyn and Hudson, 2005). These groups are unlikely to be reached if a generic sport participation message is conveyed. Indeed, Weed et al. (2012) note that sport participation leveraging tactics will have the greatest effect on those who already partake in sport. Instead, Weed et al. (2012) suggest a different strategy for those who do not currently partake in sport activity. As Chalip et al. (2016) observe, those people who do not currently partake in sport may be daunted by the thought of taking part in competitive sport. Therefore, Weed et al. (2012) suggest that this group should be specifically targeted to enhance physical activity and therapeutic exercise

rather than partaking in actual sport activities; however, thus far there has been very little research into the area of leveraging sport mega-events for physical activity as opposed to actual sport participation.

In addition to a lack of research for enhancing physical activity, there are further areas that have not yet been fully studied. Barrick et al. (2016) perceive this area of research as being dominated by quantitative work, with a distinct lack of empirical research. This argument is supported by Hayday et al. (2017), who further contend that, thus far, there is a lack of empirical research, with many studies discussing theoretical plans rather than exploring how hosts deliver, or fail to deliver, sport participation legacies. There is currently an absence of qualitative studies investigating how leveraging strategies and tactics are received by the residents. This is possibly due to the lack of attention paid to leveraging strategies by hosts and made more difficult by changes in the ways in which data is collected. For example, Australia altered its data collection procedures around the Sydney 2000 Olympics, making it difficult for researchers to truly ascertain the impact of the Games (Veal et al., 2012). Qualitative data collection could contribute to overcoming this difficulty.

Enhanced participation is not the only way that sport can be leveraged through hosting a sport mega-event. Nations are also likely to seek to enhance their own sporting performance as part of hosting (Grix and Houlihan, 2014). There is little doubt that this is effective. As Grix et al. (2017) remark, in the three Olympic Games since London won the bid, Great Britain finished fourth in the 2008 medals table, third in 2012, and second in 2016. Within a year of winning the right to host the 2012 Games, the UK government had invested an

additional £200 million into elite sport development (Grix et al, 2017). The UK is by no means the only nation to enhance elite sport as part of hosting. Figure 2.1 shows the number of medals won by Olympic hosts since 1988. During this period, South Korea, Spain, Australia, Greece, China and Brazil each won the most medals in the Games that they hosted. This is likely to have been due to three reasons. First, the aforementioned feel-good factor may lead to fervent support within a stadium and encourage the home athletes. Second, each nation invests heavily in elite sport (producing elite athletes) in the build-up to the Games and uses the hosting of a Games as an opportunity to secure extra funding. Finally, athletes may find it easier to compete at home Games in comparison to events that require extensive travel, while officiating may also benefit the home nation (Balmer et al., 2003). The two nations that have bucked this trend are Great Britain, whose record medal tally of 65 medals in 2012 was surpassed in Rio 2016, and also the USA, a nation typically at the top of the medal table each Games and thus does not need a home Games boost.




Figure 2.1: Medals won by Olympic host nations, 1988-2016

As can be seen, there is clear evidence that nations that host Olympic Games enhance their sporting success at their event. Yet, there is a distinct lack of research into this; there appears to be an assumption that hosting an event means that nations invest more in their elite sporting development, but there is a lack of empirical research into a) how this occurs, b) how it can be maximised, and c) whether it applies to all states.

### 2.3.3.5 Nation Branding and International Prestige

Elite sport performance is just one of the ways that a nation can gain international prestige. The other is through the hosting of sport mega-events (Grix and Houlihan, 2014). Purely the act of hosting a mega-event will see the host's profile rise globally; for example, the 2014 World Cup was broadcast in 219 territories worldwide, while the Olympics is shown in 170 countries (Bason et al., 2018; Olympic.org, n.d.). This exposure provides host countries with a global reach that is unlikely ever to be achieved again, and therefore provides

the host with the single best opportunity to improve, attempt to change or even create an image in the eyes of the world (Knott et al., 2015).

There are several ways that a host nation can use a mega-event to attempt to leverage a change of image. Knott et al. (2016) suggest that the intense media focus of a host event provides the first opportunity. However, it is important that hosts appreciate that this media opportunity does not always occur and does not always provide positive benefits. It is not the media's job to promote the host. Western media's reporting of the 1996 Cricket World Cup exaggerated Western-held prejudice towards Asian states and carried a predominantly negative image (Dimeo and Kay, 2004), while the emphasis of British newspapers on crime in South Africa in the build-up to the 2010 Football World Cup was viewed as a 'colonial hangover' (Hammett, 2011:70). Thus, to ensure that this opportunity is capitalised upon, hosts should work closely with the media, and indeed provide the media with materials that paint the host in a positive light and allow the host city to be distinguished in the eyes of the world (Green et al., 2003).

The host should also consider the images to be broadcast. The logo of a tournament is likely to be broadcast more often than images of a city and used on official merchandise that will be sold all over the world (Green et al., 2003). Therefore, the host should consider the design of the logo very carefully and ensure that it incorporates images of the city. Further, these city images should be distinguishable from any other city. After all, an image of a city skyline could realistically be representative of many cities across the world (Green et al., 2003).

Finally, hosts should seek to engage the tourists who will visit the city for the event. This is not dissimilar to the tactic identified in Chalip's (2004) model for economic leverage (see Section 2.3.3.1). Knott et al. (2016) discuss the ways that fans and visitors were engaged during the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa. This included both event-specific initiatives (e.g. the 'fan walk' from the fan park to the stadium in Cape Town), and non-event related initiatives, such as utilising the unique tourist attractions in the region. The use of media and experiences of visitors are typical of the research that has been conducted into image management (Knott et al., 2016).

A tactic for image management that has been further explored is 'soft power', a term coined by Joseph Nye (1991) to mean the co-opting of people to want the same outcomes as you rather than using hard (i.e. military) power. Nye (2004) identifies three primary ways in which soft power can be cultivated: culture, political values and foreign policy. First, hosts often demonstrate culture during opening ceremonies. The opening ceremony of the London 2012 Olympic Games was famously directed by Danny Boyle and featured Daniel Craig as James Bond together with several prominent British musicians. Second, the political values of a nation can also influence soft power; for example, the domestic policies of Qatar have been spotlighted since it was chosen to host the 2022 Football World Cup, as the global media focuses on its human rights record (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014). Conversely, South Africa used hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup to demonstrate that it was now a united nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Finally, foreign policy can affect soft power, with Russia's soft power likely to have



fallen as it annexed the Crimean region of the Ukraine after it hosted the 2014 Winter Olympic Games. However, the focus on Russia's domestic policy in the build-up to the event and, in particular, its laws on homosexuality, indicate that it is unlikely Russia viewed hosting as a pure soft power strategy (Grix and Kramareva, 2017).

Soft power cannot be created purely through marketing or self-promotion; there needs to be substance behind the actions to ensure that the message conveyed is credible (Grix and Brannagan, 2016). Grix and Brannagan (2016) offer five key leverageable resources: culture, tourism, branding, diplomacy, and trade, and demonstrate the ways in which Germany and Qatar sought to use the 2006 and 2022 Football World Cups respectively to alter perceptions of the nation. Germany saw the 2006 World Cup as an opportunity to move the perception of the nation away from associations of Nazism, with visions of World War II still dominating Germany's image abroad (Grix and Houlihan, 2014). Thus, Germany put in place a long-term strategy to leverage soft power, by cultivating interest in their nation centring upon campaigns to make Germany more appealing to visitors. For example, as far back as 1994, strategies were in place to promote 'Destination Germany' (Grix, 2012). 'Destination Germany' was later augmented by the 'Land of Ideas' campaign, designed to promote Germany internationally with the attempt to increase tourism and foreign investment. Germany also sought to leverage the liminality created by the event. First, the festival-like nature was enhanced through the training of those in the service industry to be more hospitable to foreign visitors, and the festival nature was then captured with the creation of fan

parks. This had the specific aim of capturing those tourists who may not normally be interested in football or its World Cup, but who may be impacted by the carnival-like atmosphere created (Grix, 2012).

While Grix's (2012) work focuses on the strategies that were put in place rather than the outcomes, it is still acknowledged that these tactics were successful. The 'Land of Ideas' campaign was deemed to be successful enough that it is still running today. Further, Grix notes that Germany's position on the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index improved from seventh place in 2004 to first place in 2007. In addition, the Football World Cup is likely to have played a pivotal role in Germany shedding its century-old image of warmongering. Following the tournament, even British newspapers, hitherto stalwarts of the anti-German rhetoric, started to move away from the lazy, German stereotypes of World War II (Grix, 2012).

Grix (2012) uses his study of Germany's 2006 Football World Cup leveraging to develop Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage to include an 'outcomes' section. Grix (2012) identifies that each of Chalip's methods to entice increased visitor spending were also used by Germany's leveraging strategy; and finds that these methods can also contribute towards improving both the volume of tourists and their perceptions of Germany, thus contributing to Germany's soft power.

However, while Germany's attempts to leverage the 2006 Football World Cup to improve its image were clearly successful, simply because a nation seeks to change its image does not mean that it will automatically be successful. Qatar is currently seeking to leverage the 2022 Football World Cup for soft

power benefits, with the particular goal of distinguishing itself from other states in the Middle East and removing stereotypical views of Arabs as being lazy and undeveloped (Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016). Grix and Brannagan (2016) identify that Qatar has set up a number of ancillary activities to leverage the Football World Cup; for example, Qatar has invested heavily in European football. Qatar Airways became the first non-charitable firm to sponsor FC Barcelona before Qatar Sports Investments purchased Paris Saint-Germain (PSG). PSG was funded to the extent that, in 2017, the world transfer record was broken for the transfer of Neymar from Barcelona to PSG. Further, the Doha GOALS Forum has developed to be one of the most prestigious gatherings of sport academics and practitioners. This forum has the aim of embedding the idea of sport into the image of Qatar and moving away from the typical images of Middle Eastern states (Grix, 2012).

However, this has not necessarily been successful. From the moment Qatar was controversially announced as the host of the 2022 Football World Cup, global media perception has been heavily focused on Qatar, amid ultimately proven allegations of bribery and backhanders (Blake and Calvert, 2015). Unfortunate media attention is exacerbated by the very long run-in to the event. Qatar was awarded the World Cup in 2010, 12 years before the event will take place. This intense scrutiny has moved beyond the bid process to discussions of Qatar's suitability to host the World Cup and, most pertinently, gay rights and Qatar's human rights record for workers (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014). Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) term this 'soft disempowerment': that is, the spotlight on Qatar's domestic issues has

resulted in a loss of international prestige. Qatar is not the only nation which has struggled to improve its international prestige. Manzenreiter (2010) notes how China has also struggled to improve its global image as a result of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

#### **2.3.4 Leveraging Issues**

It is not the purpose of this literature review to frame leverage as a perfect concept. In each of the areas of leverage discussed, concerns regarding leverage have been identified. This section will now build upon these criticisms to further critique the concept.

First, as with legacy, it has been argued that leverage is merely a way for hosts and organisers (i.e. the IOC or FIFA) to justify the large costs of hosting sport mega-events (Smith, 2014). The costs required to host a mega-event are substantial; Flyvbjerg (2014) estimates that for an event to even qualify as a mega-project, a budget of one billion dollars is required. Given the financial requirements needed to host an Olympic Games, it is unsurprising that every host since Barcelona in 1992 has spent in excess of this sum, with the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games both costing in excess of \$40 billion (Zimbalist, 2016). Table 2.1 below shows the costs required to host a sport mega-event.

Table 2.1: Cost of Staging Sport Mega-Events, 2000-2018

Event	Type	Cost	Reference
Russia 2018	Football World Cup	\$14 billion	The Moscow Times, 2018
PyeongChang 2018	Winter Olympic Games	\$12.9 billion	Forbes, 2018
Rio de Janeiro 2016	Summer Olympic Games	\$13.1 billion	NBC Sports, 2017
Brazil 2014	Football World Cup	\$11.6 billion	Forbes, 2014
Sochi 2014	Winter Olympic Games	\$51 billion	The Guardian, 2013
London 2012	Summer Olympic Games	\$18 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
South Africa 2010	Football World Cup	\$3 billion	The Telegraph, 2010
Vancouver 2010	Winter Olympic Games	\$7.6 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
Beijing 2008	Summer Olympic Games	\$44 billion	Pravda, 2008
Germany 2006	Football World Cup	\$4.9 billion	DW.com, 2006
Turin 2006	Winter Olympic Games	\$4.5 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
Athens 2004	Summer Olympic Games	\$16 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
Japan/South Korea 2002	Football World Cup	\$7 billion	The Washington Post, 2002
Salt Lake City 2002	Winter Olympic Games	\$2.5 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
Sydney 2000	Summer Olympic Games	\$6.9 billion	Council on Foreign Relations, 2018

Given the costs involved, Smith (2014) argues that leverage is often an afterthought that hosts consider once they see that pre-event promises will not be realised. If this idea suggests a certain naivety in hosts, Ziakas (2015) offers a more cynical view, claiming that many of these expenses serve only the elite. The problem of mega-events disadvantaging the worst off in society is highlighted by Müller (2017), who includes this under the umbrella term of

'event seizure', detailing the ways in which the owners of an event (such as the IOC or FIFA) are able to dictate terms to the host that serve their own interests. For example, the building of the new Cape Town Stadium for the 2010 Football World Cup was initiated by FIFA, not the South African Organising Committee which wished to use the existing Athlone Stadium (Bob and Swart, 2009). Dowse and Fletcher (2018) argue that developing nations, such as South Africa are more likely to be exploited by event owners. A lack of control can be further exacerbated by 'legal seizure' (Müller, 2017) which occurs when the likes of FIFA and the IOC enforce rules on a host region (James and Osborn, 2016).

Müller (2017) also identifies 'infrastructural seizure', as infrastructure is built for the event at the expense of infrastructural development needed elsewhere in the city. Infrastructure is often discussed in terms of legacy but, as yet, there has been little attention as to how hosts can leverage infrastructural development. This is likely to be because infrastructure needs to be built in order to host an Olympic Games or World Cup event. For example, hosts of the Football World Cup need one stadium with 80,000 seats, two with 60,000 seats, and seven stadia with a capacity of 40,000 (Alm, 2012). Having the required facilities for the Olympic Games is arguably even more onerous given the wide number of sports. If a host does not meet these requirements with existing stadia, then new ones need to be built. It is for this reason that investment in sports stadia is often a major part of a host's spending (Szymanski, 2002). The one mega-event that has managed to avoid this cost is the Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games 1984, which built only two new

venues and relied on existing stadia. LA 1984 is widely recognised as one of the most economically sustainable Olympic Games (Preuss, 2004; Matheson, 2006). However, the costs do not end once the mega-event is over; if the facilities are not passed on to private companies, it is likely that the host will need to continue to spend on maintenance or see the facilities fall into a state of disrepair (Searle, 2002; Hiller, 2006).

It is not just sporting infrastructure that is required to host a sport mega-event. As has already been discussed, sport mega-events are often used to develop underprivileged areas of cities. This often means that these areas do not have the capacity to deal with the influx of visitors that arrive for the event, and new infrastructure is needed to cope with the increased number of visitors. This will often include transport upgrades. Even a well-developed nation such as the UK felt the need to build a new rail service and upgrade airport facilities. Furthermore, the IOC specifies that any host must have 40,000 hotel rooms available during the Games (IOC, 2017a:42). However, Ferreira and Boshoff (2014) found that these regulations actually lead to an oversupply of hotel rooms within host cities.

If the costs needed to host are ever-growing, they are only likely to increase further as leveraging plans are piled on top. While Smith (2014) asserts that leveraging costs are small compared to the overall costs needed to host, this has been disputed. VanWynsberghe (2016) found that Vancouver's costs rose from \$2.5 billion to \$6.2 billion once leveraging plans had been taken into account. If this had been viewed as taking the event over budget, the leveraging plans would probably have been the first to be discarded (Smith,

2014). If the leveraging plans are successful, then it is likely that the increased investment will be viewed as a positive investment; however, if the leveraging strategies fail, this could contribute to the reluctance of nations to host mega-events, as detailed in Chapter 1. Smith (2014) argues that to counteract these added costs, event organisers should seek to reduce event-related expenditure. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, often infrastructural development is a basic requirement to get hosts up to the requisite standards. If the IOC and FIFA restrict hosting only to those nations that already have the levels of infrastructure needed, this will severely reduce the number of potential hosts. A further alternative could be to involve sponsors in the leveraging strategies, perhaps through CSR-based initiatives (Smith, 2014). However, this may be difficult if sponsors are not involved from the outset, as sponsors will often have fixed budgets that they are prepared to invest in the sponsorship and may not have the capability to invest further in leveraging strategies (O'Brien, 2006).

This is not the only issue with sponsorship and leveraging. Several authors have noted the effects that the IOC and FIFA's strict regulations regarding ambush marketing have had on leveraging plans. Both FIFA and the IOC rely on sponsorship revenue and are therefore very diligent about preventing other, non-event sponsors from using any trademarks associated with the Football World Cup or Olympic Games (Schmidt et al., 2018). While it may be reasonable to protect Coca-Cola and Visa from Pepsi and Mastercard, this potentially causes leveraging issues. Businesses, or even sport clubs who are not official sponsors, cannot use the FIFA or IOC brand as part of their



leveraging campaigns. This issue was highlighted during London 2012 when small businesses were targeted by the IOC. For example, it was reported that small businesses such as cafes and butchers were sent warnings for infringing the IOC copyright (Wagg, 2015). While an argument for the hosting of the Olympic Games and Football World Cup is that it will bring business to the local area, the zealousness of the ambush marketing legislation makes it difficult for organisations to capitalise on this. It can therefore be argued that if the host ability to leverage is to be maximised, the event owners need to relinquish some of their tight grip on event logos and intellectual property.

#### **2.3.4.1 Research Issues**

The final issue with leveraging that it seems prudent to discuss is research into leveraging itself. This is still a research area very much in its infancy, especially compared to the far more developed research into legacy. As hosts are putting together much more complex leveraging strategies, more studies are needed to investigate the techniques that are used (Grix, 2013). This has one obvious problem. Studies into legacy can often be undertaken ex-ante and do not necessarily require access to decision makers; after all, these studies are looking at the legacy impact post-event. However, leveraging is more concerned with the strategies put in place rather than the outcomes themselves (Chalip, 2004). This creates problems for researchers, as the full detail of these strategies will often not be made publicly available, and therefore researchers require access to direct stakeholders.

A further issue with research into leveraging is the 'one size fits all' approach. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter and beyond, a wide range of cities

and nations host sport mega-events, and so it is unlikely that all approaches to leveraging will be the same. For example, the last four Football World Cups have been hosted in Germany, South Africa, Brazil and Russia, while the next will take place in Qatar. It is very unlikely that these nations will all employ the same leveraging plans, and the extent to which they could learn from the current literature is questionable. The case studies that have dominated this literature review are the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 Olympic Games, the 2010 South Africa Football World Cup, and the 2011 Rugby World Cup in New Zealand. It is debatable to what extent states such as Qatar or China could learn from these examples (Ziakas, 2015).

Further, there has been a uniform approach to the events themselves, a trap that this literature review has fallen into. First, there is a marked difference in approach between the Olympic Games (which mostly take place in one city, but with other venues around the country being used) and the Football World Cup (which covers an entire country, with the 2002 World Cup being shared between Japan and South Korea). Even with the Olympic Games, the spatial effects can differ from region to region, as the hosting of an event can positively or negatively impact remote areas. For example, trickle-down effects could boost the local economy of an area that is not directly focused in hosting an event, or services and funding could be withdrawn from this area to provide for the event itself (Cornelissen et al., 2011).

The differences between legacy and leverage cloak a further issue with leveraging research. Mega-events have such an impact on the host region that it is unlikely that researchers will be able to separate the outcomes of the

Carefully-planned leveraging strategies from the impacts of events that occur automatically (Smith, 2014). Similarly, as yet little research has been conducted into the way that these event impacts can be leveraged further. For example, Chalip (2014) notes that while it is clear that liminality occurs at mega-events, there is little understanding of how it can be directed for leveraging strategies. Finally, the very definition of leveraging means that it is something that has been planned and is therefore beneficial to at least one stakeholder group. Aside from the discussions regarding the uneven distribution of benefits (see Section 2.3.3.2), there has been little research into considering the ways that leveraging tactics might actually harm a host region.

## **2.4 Conceptual Framework**

This literature review of research into the leveraging of sport mega-events has identified a number of potential models with which this research may be underpinned; however, this study will be framed around Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage (Figure 2.2).




Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of event leverage (Chalip, 2004)

This model has already been discussed in relation to economic leveraging of mega-events (see Section 2.3.3.1 on page 29), but it is worth going into some detail regarding how the model works. First, there is a *leverageable resource*; in the case of Chalip’s work, it is a portfolio of events. This should be the start point for leveraging, as hosts identify what it is that is going to be leveraged. Next are the *opportunities* that the leverageable resource provides. In the case of the above example, Chalip identifies that a portfolio of events presents a host with visitors to the region, and media presence; these provide the host with the opportunity to achieve the *strategic objective*. These are the end results that the host wishes to accomplish. Chien et al. (2018) argue that the

strategic objectives should be identified first. In Chalip's model, the host should be seeking to optimise trade and improve the image of the region. Finally, and most crucially for leverage, are the *means* by which these strategic objectives will be achieved. This is the fundamental difference between research into legacy and leverage. Studies considering legacy will have the most interest in the strategic objectives and measuring whether they were achieved, whereas, conversely, research into leveraging will have a greater focus on the means; that is, analysis of the tactics that were put in place to achieve the goals.

Chalip's model has been modified four times; first by O'Brien (2007), then by Grix (2012), VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) and finally Kirby et al. (2018). First, O'Brien (2007) incorporated subculture into the model to demonstrate the importance of this factor. O'Brien's study found that a surfing festival relied heavily on subculture to achieve the economic goals; however, a surfing festival is likely to attract participants and attendees with a specific interest in surfing. It is likely to be the aim of an Olympic bid to attract as wide a population as possible, and so subculture is unlikely to play as large a role. Following this, Grix (2012) also modified the model to demonstrate how the means necessary to achieve economic gains also could help modify a host's image. VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) turned the model towards the environmental leveraging of Vancouver's 2010 Winter Olympic Games, and in particular moved away from the leverageable resource being a portfolio of events. This led to VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) arguing that Vancouver has a range of leverageable resources available, not just the hosting of an event.

Perhaps of most relevance to the present study, Kirby et al. (2018) modified the model to consider leveraging business opportunities in three distinct periods; the bid, the planning phase before the event, and then the event and handover period. However, while the bid period is considered in this model, there is no consideration as to failed bids. The study only considers bids that went on to be successful (London 2012, Glasgow Commonwealth Games 2014 and Gold Coast Commonwealth Games 2018). The paper assumes that the strategies put in place during the bid phase will continue into the planning phase; there is little consideration as to whether these strategies would still be valid for a failed bid.

## **2.5 Chapter Summary**

This literature review has sought to set out the literature surrounding the leveraging of hosting sport mega-events. While this research is investigating the leveraging of bids for mega-events, there is a distinct lack of research in this area. Nevertheless, the literature review has played an important role in this study. The academic framework that will be used to support the results has been identified. This research will seek to adapt Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage to demonstrate the strategies and tactics that are available for Olympic bidding cities. In addition to the identification of an academic framework, the literature review has also extrapolated five key lessons that, for leveraging, are consistent throughout the literature:

- 1) One size does not fit all; leveraging strategies need to be tailored to individual communities.

- 2) Leveraging is unlikely to solve a problem on its own, if it is not integrated into wider planning within the city.
- 3) A separate delivery organisation may be required.
- 4) The delivery organisation should aim to work with a range of stakeholders to maximise benefits across different social groups.
- 5) There is an optimal time at which to deliver leveraging plans. For hosting, this is during the pregnancy period, although some outcomes may be delivered years later.

The next chapter will introduce the literature surrounding bidding for sport mega-events.

## **3 Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events**

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### **3.1 Introduction and Purpose**

The previous chapter introduced the concept of leverage regarding mega-events, and the strategies that may be employed to ensure benefits for a host. As this literature review will demonstrate, as yet, there has been very little discussion as to the ways in which leverage can be applied to the bid process. Rather, much of the literature regarding bidding is in relation to hosting, that is, the ways in which bids translate to the event taking place. The limited scholarly activity regarding failed Olympic bids typically uses legacy, with often little thought as to the strategies put in place to achieve them.

Therefore, this chapter takes the following structure. It shall first provide historical context of Olympic bids (Section 3.2), in order to ascertain the levels of the current bidding problems. Following this, the concept of leverage will be applied to the bidding literature. It will first explore the key elements of a bid that provide opportunities for leverage (Section 3.3), before discussing the potential areas for leverage from a bid. This chapter will finish with a discussion regarding the two case studies utilised in this research; Cape Town and Toronto.

### **3.2 A History of Olympic Bidding**

Given that a key rationale for this research is a decline in cities wishing to bid for an Olympic Games, it is prudent to expand on the information provided in



Chapter 1. In addition, given the case study nature of this thesis, this will also help place the Cape Town and Toronto bids into historical context.

The trends for bidding for the Olympic Games can be broken into five clear periods of time:

*Period 1: 1896 – 1932 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 3.3*

While the first Olympic Games were held in Athens in 1896, it was not until 1904 that there was direct competition to host a Games, as Chicago and St. Louis (both USA) went head-to-head. Three of the first five Games had just one bidder, as Chicago (1904), Berlin and Milan (both 1908) each failed with their bids. The geographical nature of these bids is indicative of the time, with the majority of bid cities being from the USA and Europe. Alexandria in Egypt was the only bidder from outside the USA and Europe to bid for a Games during 1896-1932. Ironically, the Games that Alexandria bid for was the 1916 Games, which ultimately did not take place due to the First World War.

*Period 2: 1936 – 1960 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 8.6*

Following Alexandria's bid for the 1916 Games, two decades later it bid again, for the 1936 Games. A major difference this time was that it was not just competing with European and US cities, but also faced competition from South America, as Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) entered the fray. Although Berlin ultimately hosted the 1936 Games, four years later Tokyo became the first Asian city to bid for, and become the first non-European or US city to be awarded the Games; however, the Games did not take place following the outbreak of World War II. In the aftermath of the War, bidders were again restricted to USA and Europe. It was not until Melbourne, Mexico

City and Buenos Aires bid for the 1956 Games that the Games would be taken outside of the USA and Europe as Melbourne's bid was successful.

While this period was still dominated by USA and European cities (50 out of 58 bidders), it saw bids from countries from Asia, South America and Oceania, and Tokyo and Melbourne being awarded the Games. These additional bid cities from other continents contributed to the 1936-1960 period being the first truly competitive era in terms of bid cities, with there being on average 8.3 cities bidding for each iteration.

*Period 3: 1964 – 1988 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 2.9*

Despite the previous period averaging 8.3 bidders per Games, this figure declined quickly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The 1960 Games had seven bidders, with Rome being successful. It can be argued that it was Rome's hosting of this Games that led to the disinterest of many cities due to its heavy investment (Chalkley and Essex, 1999). Indeed, the levels of spending by Rome even raised questions as to whether the 1964 Games in Tokyo would take place. These worries about cost were further exacerbated following the 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal, which bankrupted the city (Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010). Subsequently, Moscow and Los Angeles were the only two cities competing to host the 1980 and 1984 Games.

*Period 4: 1992 – 2020 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 7.9*

Despite being the only bidder for the 1984 Games, Los Angeles hosting of the Games was financially successful, and this led to renewed interest from bid cities. The 1992 Olympic Games, the first bid process following Los Angeles 1984, had six formal bids, with the number of bidders increasing throughout

the 1990s until 11 cities bid for the 2004 Games. This has proved to be the high watermark for post-war Games, as the number of bidders fell to six for the 2020 Olympic Games. However, this period is epitomised by the distinct variance of the bidders. The 2000 Games were the first to have bidders from four continents, and this continued until the 2016 Olympic Games held in Rio de Janeiro. There has also been a strong Asian flavour to the bids. Of the 57 bids for the Olympic Games taking place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, 12 have come from Asia; a figure which increases to 17 when bids from Istanbul and Moscow are considered. This has coincided with a fall in bids from the USA, partly due to the IOC changing the regulations, banning National Olympic Committees from having more than one bidder. While this period saw an average of eight bidders per Games, this declined from 11 cities bidding for the 2004 Games, to six bidding for 2020.

*Period 5: 2024 – date | Average bids per Olympic Games: 3*

While the number of bids for the 2020 Games was a significant decline on the bids for the 2004 Games, the bids fell even further for the 2024 and 2028 iterations. While five cities formally submitted bids for the 2024 Games; Hamburg, Budapest and Rome did not even reach the voting stage, with each withdrawing part-way through the bid process. With just Paris and Los Angeles in the running for the 2024 Games, and few bids anticipated for the 2028 Games, the IOC decided to award both the 2024 and 2028 Games in 2017 (IOC, 2017b).

### **3.3 The Bid Process**

Much of the research that has been conducted into bids for mega-events is framed around hosting. There is a relatively large amount of research into the bid process and the reasons why cities' bids are successful. While this research is focused on the ways in which Olympic bids can be leveraged, it is worth detailing the bid process in order to explore the opportunities that the process provides for leverage.

#### **3.3.1 The Decision to Bid**

Any Olympic bid starts with a group or individual who first has the idea to bid. The stakeholder responsible for the decision will change from state to state, and this will particularly depend on the political structure. In Western democratic nations, the initial bid suggestion will often come from the private sector rather than from politicians. For example, bids by Los Angeles (Andranovich et al., 2001), Amsterdam (Westerbeek, 2009), Atlanta (Andranovich, et al., 2001), Manchester (Law, 1994), Sydney (Lenskyj, 1996), London (Brown et al., 2012), and New York (Shoval, 2002) are all described as having groups of businessmen at the heart of the initial drive to bid. This instantly raises a question regarding which stakeholders are most likely to benefit from bidding and, ultimately, hosting. If a bid is led by the private sector, it perhaps stands to reason that it is the private sector that will be the ultimate beneficiary, resulting in the type of inequalities from hosting that were discussed in Chapter 2.

Conversely, authoritarian states are more likely to be driven by the ruling governments (Foley et al., 2012). This decision is made simpler by the fact

that many of the stakeholders involved in a bid are not independent (Könecke and de Nooij, 2017). These centralised decisions provide authoritarian states with a further advantage, as Western states will often need to have a pre-bid competition to decide which city will be put forward, and potentially a pre-bid plebiscite (Foley et al., 2012).

Since the bids for the 1960 Olympic Games, each National Olympic Committee (NOC) can put forward only one bid city. Should two cities from the same nation wish to submit a bid, it is the NOC's responsibility to decide which city should submit the formal bid (Burroughs, 1999). Eight American cities submitted proposals for the 2012 Olympic Games, with New York selected by the United States Olympic Committee (Shoval, 2002). At this stage, the NOC will often consider which competing city is the most likely to win. Hamburg was selected by the German Olympic Sports Confederation to bid for the 2024 Olympic Games over Berlin, in part because Hamburg had the support of the German national sport associations as well as public support (Wicker and Coates, 2018). The proposal selection decision may also be guided by the IOC, and it is typically 'global cities' (Tolzmann, 2014) that are put forward at this stage. Indeed, following failed bids from Manchester and Birmingham in the 1990s, the IOC recommended to the British Olympic Association that London should be the only UK city put forward (Febowitz, 2012).

This additional round of bidding potentially provides a wider range of cities with leveraging opportunities. This literature review has found no research considering the domestic battle to be the NOC representative, and the impact this may have on a city. For example, in 2017, there was a high-profile battle

(in the UK media at least) between Liverpool and Birmingham to be the UK bidder for the 2022 Commonwealth Games. While this domestic battle would not be expected to provide an international platform for either of these cities, it is likely that there would have been some impacts on the losing city of Liverpool.

### **3.3.2 Submitting the Bid**

The Olympic bid procedure is currently in a state of flux. The decision to award Los Angeles the 2028 Olympic Games means that there is not likely to be a new Summer Games bid decision until 2025 (seven years before the 2032 Olympic Games). However, there is currently an ongoing candidate process for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games, with the winner expected to be announced in September 2019 (IOC, 2018b). As part of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm recommendations, this now involves a 'dialogue stage' which allows interested cities and NOCs to engage with the IOC prior to formally submitting a bid. The IOC Executive Board will then recommend the cities to make a bid (IOC, 2018b). Given that the first 'dialogue stage' took place in the summer of 2018, this is an element of the bid process on which there has yet been no research.

Those cities invited to bid following the dialogue stage then submit a Candidature File and are visited by the IOC Technical Experts and Evaluation Commission. The IOC publishes its Evaluation Commission Report on each bidder, before each city presents to the IOC Session. Following this, the IOC members vote on the winner of the bid (IOC, 2018b). This stage has been simplified from previous years to reduce the large costs associated simply with

submitting a bid. As far back as 2002, Persson estimated that the average cost for submitting a bid for the Olympic Games totalled \$15 million (Persson, 2002).

### 3.3.2.1 Costs of Bidding

As Table 3.1 shows, the cost of bidding for mega-events is not inconsequential, especially considering that the bidder does not receive any of this investment back if the bid is unsuccessful (Masterman, 2008).

*Table 3.1: Costs of bidding for sport mega-events*

Bidder	Event Bid For	Approx. Cost	Reference
Birmingham, UK	1992 Summer Olympic Games	£5 million	Feddersen et al., 2007
Manchester, UK	1996 Summer Olympic Games	£3 million	Hill, 1994
Manchester, UK	2000 Summer Olympic Games	£5-8 million	Lawson, 2006
Sydney, Australia	2000 Summer Olympic Games	£13 million	White, 2011
Salt Lake City, USA	2002 Winter Olympic Games	£8 million	Andranovich et al., 2001
England	2006 Football World Cup	£10 million	Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002
Toronto, Canada	2008 Summer Olympic Games	£10 million	Tufts, 2004
London, UK	2012 Summer Olympic Games	£30 million	Walters, 2011
Chicago, USA	2016 Summer Olympic Games	£69 million	Rundio and Heere, 2016
England	2018 Football World Cup	£21 million	The Football Association Limited, 2010
Australia	2022 Football World Cup	£22 million	de Nooij, 2014

As with the cost of hosting mega-events, there are issues with analysing the cost of bidding. Bidders may use an Olympic bid to catalyse infrastructural

developments. The extent to which this investment should be included, particularly if the development was planned anyway, is questionable. Indeed, de Nooij (2014) questions these costs, noting that an estimated €190 million cost for an Amsterdam bid includes the construction of accommodation which has a value even if the bid does not win, yet does not include the cost of civil servants working on the bid.

While the IOC has streamlined the bid process, some commentators have argued for an even more efficient bid process in the form of a single auction. Baade and Matheson (2002) argue that the current bid process encourages the IOC to seize economic rents from bidders, an argument supported by Maennig and du Plessis (2009). Both Baade and Matheson (2002) and Mitchell and Stewart (2015), argue that a single sealed bid would be a more economical way of deciding the next host of a mega-event; specifically, much of the spending on lobbying and attempting to gain IOC members' support would be negated. While it could be considered that this may result in rich countries with little event management capability hosting the event, it is argued that this would not be the case. Baade and Matheson (2002) propose that a bidder should include its hosting plans in the bid, while Mitchell and Stewart (2015) argue that the global embarrassment of mismanaging an Olympic Games would ensure that only competent nations would bid.

Sheng (2010) argues that bidding for an Olympic Games is not a simple business transaction as political and social considerations must be taken into account. Therefore, rather than a straight auction, with the highest bidder hosting, Sheng proposes that bidders communicate with each other. In this



process, bidders who place the highest valuation on hosting would be able to negotiate with other bidders to leave the bid race. This form of cooperation would maximise the total welfare of all nations involved; those bidders with high valuations of hosting would ultimately host, while those who do not bid would be adequately compensated for dropping out. While Sheng (2010) argues that politicians who have invested their reputation on a bid may not be easily bought off, it would also allow an easy way out for cities who do not believe they will win, without the embarrassment of losing. This process may also persuade bidders who do not believe they will ultimately be successful to enter a speculative bid, in the knowledge that there will be an escape route before it comes to the final decision.

### **3.3.2.2 Stakeholder Involvement**

While a bid will often initially be driven by the private sector, there will likely be other stakeholders involved. The Candidature Committee (bid team) itself will draw in support from both private and public organisations. Theodoraki (2007) details the structures of Vancouver's and Sochi's Candidature Committees for the 2010 and 2014 Winter Olympic Games, respectively, and notes that the bid committee will likely grow over time. Indeed, Griffiths (2000) argues that the late inclusion of the South African government into Cape Town's Candidature Committee disrupted the team and was a potential reason for Cape Town not being awarded the 2004 Olympic Games.

This is not to say that the government should not be involved; indeed, the IOC requires that the cost of hosting is underwritten by the national or city government (Mackay, 2012). This can often be a bone of contention during

the bid. If a bid is driven by the private sector, which is likely to be the beneficiary, should it be the government and ultimately the taxpayer that bears the brunt of the costs? This is particularly pertinent in the USA, as it is the city rather than the national government which is responsible for underwriting the costs (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014).

This is not the only way in which government support plays a role in the bid process. There is not a great deal of literature surrounding the ways in which government support plays a role in a bid being successful; however, Booth and Tatz (1994) note that both the governing and opposition parties in Australia backed Sydney's successful bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. Other studies have shown that a lack of government support may result in a failed bid; for example, both the Birmingham (Hill, 1994) and India (Bandyopadhyay, 2014) bids for the 1992 Olympic Games were thought to be hindered by a lack of government support, while, more recently, many politicians voiced their concern regarding bids from Berlin (Alberts, 2009), Munich (Coates and Wicker, 2015), and Hamburg (Lauermann and Vogelpohl, 2017) for the 2016, 2018 and 2024 Olympic Games respectively.

Furthermore, government policy may hinder bids. As noted by McKelvey and Longley (2015) and Müller (2017), the IOC requires hosts to change their legislation. Should a government not be prepared to agree to these legislative changes during the bid process, it is unlikely to win the vote. Indeed, Walters (2011) argues that the UK government's reluctance to change tax laws resulted in the Football Association losing the hosting of the 2010 Champions

League Final. Ultimately, the UK government agreed to the changes, with Wembley hosting the Final in both 2011 and 2013.

Government interest in a bid provides a city with a key opportunity that can be leveraged, as an Olympic bid may open up sources of funding that otherwise would not be available. This has not gained a great deal of traction within the literature, but evidence indicates that it is a route for cities to leverage the Olympic bid. For example, Cochrane et al. (1996) write that although Manchester's bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was unsuccessful, it enabled the city to gain public sector funding that otherwise would have been inaccessible. This funded numerous projects within the city, including a velodrome, and also funded clearance of the site that would ultimately become the stadium for the Manchester Commonwealth Games and, latterly, the home of Manchester City Football Club (Hill, 1994). This £5 million investment can be compared to that of Tokyo, whose bid for the 2016 Olympic Games secured \$4.5 billion worth of funding, resulting in a \$1.8 billion investment in new sport facilities (Lauermann, 2015). The availability of public funding for a bid does depend somewhat on the political situation within a nation; for example, public funding is not available for American bidders, as the cities themselves are often the highest level of government responsible for funding a bid (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014).

This demonstrates the importance for a bid team to be backed by politicians. The co-operation between the three levels of government within Brazil is thought to have played a large role in Rio de Janeiro securing the 2016 Olympic Games (Toledo et al., 2015). This is not merely the responsibility of

politicians, as often a public-private coalition will take responsibility for the bid (Kassens-Noor and Lauermann, 2017). This public-private coalition will be made up of different stakeholders with varying interests in the bid process. Some may have an interest in the bid process and wish to be involved, whereas others will be invited to take part as they have expertise that is needed (Hautbois et al., 2012). These stakeholders will be a mixture of government officials, local businesspeople, developers, local elites, and those involved in sport organisations (Kassens-Noor and Lauermann, 2017). Each of these is likely to have their own role to play in the bid. For example, government officials provide a degree of legitimacy to the bid; Lee (2006) details the important role that Tony Blair played in securing IOC votes for London's successful bid. Similarly, many IOC members are often former sportspeople, and therefore may be seduced by those stakeholders from the sport industry (Hautbois et al., 2012).

As has already been discussed, the Olympic bid process now includes a dialogue stage, with communication being encouraged between the bid team and the IOC (but not with individual IOC members). This allows these coalitions and networks to develop further, in particular through exposure to international expertise (Lauermann, 2015). This provides Olympic bidders with a clear opportunity that can be leveraged, through collaborations that may take place once the bid is over (Richards and Marques, 2016). Indeed, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the development of networks is a key facet of leverage. Yet, while some unintentional legacies driven by these networks have been documented, for example, Salisbury et al. (2017) note

that these networks have resulted in urban and transportation development, there is very little evidence that any bidder has sought to purposefully leverage a bid coalition to drive development within a city.

A further, critical member of the bid coalition are consultants who specialise in the development of bids to host sport mega-events (Theodoraki, 2007). Lauermaun (2014a) notes that eight bid consultants have been involved with 13 mega-event bids since the start of the century, with five consulting agencies being used per bid. This consultancy service is of particular importance to first time bidders. A key legacy that has been noted in the literature and will be expanded upon later in this literature review, is that of experience and bid knowhow (Emery, 2002). Cities bidding for the first time will not have this bank of knowledge, and so rely on the consultants' expertise; however, it is possible that these consulting firms take the same knowledge from bid to bid, potentially resulting in similarities from bid to bid and reducing the uniqueness of each city's offering.

Consultancy firms are not the only business likely to be part of the bid coalition; sponsors will often play a large role. Indeed, Chicago's 2016 Candidature File lists three pages of donors (Chicago 2016, 2009), ranging from global conglomerates to local businesses. This, again, echoes the opportunities for business development leverage discussed in the previous chapter, highlighting the opportunities for both the city and domestic firms to learn from international businesses. While some of these organisations may wish to support a bid without an ulterior motive, many wish to benefit from the lucrative contracts that arise from hosting (Alegi, 2001). Firms may also have public

relations motives for being associated with a bid; for example, Anglo American plc, a multinational mining company based in Johannesburg, revealed its support of Cape Town's bid for the 2004 Games during a period in which it was facing widespread criticism for benefiting from apartheid (Cornelissen, 2004a).

A key stakeholder that bidders may wish to engage with further, is the media, as it can impact public opinion (Theodoraki, 2007). Media firms may work with the bid team to offer services in kind, that is, rather than pay cash to be associated with the bid, they will instead offer favourable media coverage. This was a key facet of both Sydney and London's successful bids for the 2000 and 2012 Olympic Games respectively. Booth and Tatz (1994) note the number of media outlets formally involved with Sydney's bid, while Gong (2011) describes the support that the bid received in newspapers; in particular, Australian newspapers repeatedly criticised the human rights record of its rival Beijing (Gong, 2011). While it could be argued that the Australian media were doing this for humanitarian reasons, the fact that criticism was not spotlighted during Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Games suggests that this was not the case (Gong, 2011). On a similar note, the London Olympics Bid Committee worked closely with The Sun newspaper to encourage its readers to 'back the bid' (Mackay, 2012). Media support does not always guarantee a successful bid however, as experienced by Toronto, whose 1996 bid was partnered by two television networks yet still faced mounting public criticism (Lenskyj, 1996).

### 3.3.2.3 Public Support

The reason why bid teams wish to engage with the media is to engage public support for the bid, which is a key factor in the final bid decision (Coates and Wicker, 2015). However, as the previous section demonstrated, the bid team will often be a coalition of government officials and private enterprise, and public opinion is very rarely considered at the start of the bid (Andranovich et al., 2001). It is expected that elected politicians are there to represent the public; therefore, if the government decides to proceed with a bid, it is assumed to be doing so at the behest of its voters (Coates and Wicker, 2015).

The IOC considers public support as part of the bid criteria. Each bidder is required to include data on public support in its Candidature File, while the IOC also conducts its own surveys. Hiller and Wanner (2016) provide a detailed critique of the data collection involved. There is no specific question that cities must ask. Each city words their question differently, with some requiring a yes/no answer and others being on a 5-point scale. Further, there is often scant information regarding the sample; some surveys have seen as few as 500 respondents, and there is no requirement for the sample to be derived from the city itself, the region, or even the country (Hiller and Wanner, 2016). This makes it extremely difficult to compare the results between cities. Indeed, Hiller and Wanner argue that government support is more important to the IOC than public support, despite Maennig and du Plessis's (2009) findings that cities that achieve 66% public support fare better than cities without.

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the impacts of hosting are not necessarily positive. Thus, it is of little surprise, that as the narrative of legacy

has become more prominent, so too has the importance of public support and a rise in protest groups in democratic states. The first protest group to gain widespread coverage was the 'Bread Not Circuses' coalition that was created to protest against Toronto's bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. Their protests are believed to have played a significant role in Toronto's bid being unsuccessful (Whitson, 2004; Oliver, 2011a). Bread Not Circuses reconvened to protest against Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, while a similar group, 'No Games Chicago' swayed the public against Chicago's bid for the 2016 Olympic Games (Rundio and Heere, 2016). These protests are typically based on a lack of public consultation and the opportunity cost of bidding and hosting, with the argument being that the money could be better invested elsewhere (Mowatt and Travis, 2015).

While the IOC seeks to gain figures regarding public support for bids, this has been formalised in recent years, with several bid cities holding a referendum regarding whether to bid. Figure 3.1 shows the results of referenda for Olympic Games since 2000, together with the year the referenda took place.






Figure 3.1: Referenda results for Olympic Games, 2000-2018<sup>3</sup>

As can be seen, the recent trend is for the public to vote against continuing a bid for the Games. It should also be noted that referenda only occur in democratic states. In nations governed by authoritarian regimes, it is highly unlikely that the population will be given an opportunity to have any say in the decision-making process. Once an authoritarian nation has submitted a bid, it will progress until the IOC makes its final decision (Könecke and de Nooij, 2017). In contrast, bids made by democratic nations can end at any point. Even a positive referendum result does not guarantee that a bid will reach fruition; for example, Oslo withdrew its bid despite securing over 54% public support (Seippel et al., 2016).

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from Maennig (2017)

Given the recent trends of protest groups and referenda, it is clear that bid committees should seek to understand the views of the public on the hosting of mega-events. Studies have been conducted on referenda in Munich (Coates and Wicker, 2015) and Hamburg (Maennig, 2017; Scheu and Preuss, 2018). Coates and Wicker (2015) found that young males were more likely to support a bid, while areas of low employment also voted yes, suggesting that the rhetoric regarding an Olympic Games providing jobs had found an audience. However, this contrasted with Maennig's (2017) findings in Hamburg, where deprived areas were more likely to oppose the bid, suggesting that gentrification and displacement were a concern. The research by Coates and Wicker (2015) also highlighted the importance of government support, with voters likely to follow the views of the political party that they would typically support.

These findings demonstrate that the public's view of legacy was a key factor in their referendum voting decision and, in particular, the economic and social impacts of an event (Streicher et al., 2016). Scheu and Preuss (2018) found that 77% of the public based their vote on whether they believed hosting would leave positive or negative legacies. While this may indicate that bidders should do their best to promote the positive legacies accrued by hosting, it may also have an adverse impact if voters believe that promises are being embellished. Coates and Wicker (2015) found that voters had little trust in either the IOC or cities and national governments. Further, voters are often risk averse; if they believe that benefits are being exaggerated, they may wish to avoid the risk of any negative impacts on the region (Scheu and Preuss, 2018).

While criticism of bids from the likes of Chicago, Boston, Munich and Hamburg have focused upon the negative aspects, this does not mean that the public are always in opposition to an Olympic Games. As discussed in the previous section, many bidders use the media to build support for a bid (Mackay, 2012). Should this tactic be successful, it may provide cities with an opportunity that can be leveraged. Newman (2007) reports that over one million Londoners had 'backed the bid' online, with 11,000 people congregating in Trafalgar Square to view the bid decision. This echoes the feeling of pride that Manchester's bid for the 2000 Olympic Games exuded in Mancunians (Law, 1994). These feelings are not unlike the festival-like nature identified as an opportunity to leverage the hosting of events.

This use of feelings created during a bid is not without issue, however. If a city attempts to leverage positive feelings when there is a generally negative opinion of the bid, then it is likely to backfire. Furthermore, there is a strict timeframe on these feelings. Should a bid be successful, then leveraging plans will be dictated by hosting rather than the bid itself; however, if the bid is unsuccessful, it is unlikely the positive feelings will continue. If residents believe that the failed outcome was the wrong decision, then the feelings of pride may be replaced by anger towards the mega-event owner (McGillivray and Turner, 2017). Alternatively, citizens may focus their ire towards the bid and the city itself. Strohmayer (2013:197) reports that the defeat of Paris to its fiercest rivals was 'the nail in the coffin for French ambition and self-esteem'. Either way, it is likely that the positive bubble will be burst following the bid

decision, highlighting the importance of leveraging the positive sentiments before the bid finishes.

### 3.3.2.4 The Candidature File

As has already been mentioned, bid cities submit a Candidature File to the IOC, outlining their plans for hosting the Games (although, as Theodoraki (2009) noted, Greece provided very little information regarding the legacy of Athens 2004 during the bid phase). Despite the Candidature File being a binding contract with the IOC, there is often criticism for the disparity between the promises made during the bid and actual outcomes post-event (Bellas and Oliver, 2016). This is often the case regarding costs, as seen in Table 3.2 below

*Table 3.2: Disparities between Bid Projections and Actual Costs*

Bidder	Pre-Games promise	Actual Cost	Change	Reference
South Africa 2010	Stadia cost = R1bn	Stadia cost = R8.4bn	740%	Davies, 2009
London 2012	Total cost = £2.4bn	Total cost = £8.9bn	271%	New Statesman, 2012
Brazil 2014	Stadia cost = \$1.1bn	Stadia cost = \$4.4bn	300%	Müller, 2017
Sochi 2018	Stadia cost = \$2.8bn	Stadia cost = \$6.6bn	136%	Müller, 2017

It is not just costs that may differ between the bid phase and the event itself. For example, in Atlanta's bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, it was promised that the Games would be used to reduce poverty within the city, yet 15,000 Atlanta residents were displaced (Stewart and Rayner, 2015). Similarly, London's bid for the 2012 Olympic Games painted the city as a

smorgasbord of cultures, and open and welcoming, yet at the time of the Games this was not necessarily the case (Bulley and Lisle, 2012). This is partly due to the bid process itself, with cities producing information designed to attract support for the bid, potentially leading to an overpromise of benefits (Stewart and Rayner, 2015) but underbidding to secure the event (Zehndorfer and Mackintosh, 2017).

The cost promises made in the bid are designed to ensure that the bid is successful and are often designed by the aforementioned consultants. Crucially, these consultants are then not responsible for delivering the promises. Indeed, Müller discusses the environmental planning of Sochi's bid for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, with bid promises labelled as 'science fiction' (Müller, 2015b:9). The promises made were never feasible for Sochi to achieve. This adds to the argument put forward in Section 3.3 that a public-facing bid process is not the most efficient solution and, instead, a single, sealed auction may result in better outcomes for the event.

While it is possible that bidders may underbid and overpromise in order to secure support, this is not the only reason for discrepancies made in a bid and what actually occurs. The bid process typically takes place seven years before the event occurs. Over this long period, it is possible that circumstances will change, and assumptions given in the bid will not actually come to pass (Müller, 2015b). In addition, it may be that the event owner (e.g. IOC/FIFA) requests changes once the bid has been won. For example, in South Africa's bid for the 2010 Football World Cup, Newlands and Athlone were identified as the stadia to be used in Cape Town. After South Africa was elected host, FIFA

requested that a new stadium be built in the more picturesque Green Point (Bob and Swart, 2009), resulting in a R4.4 billion stadium being built in place of the R14 million redevelopment promised during the bid (Davies, 2009).

### **3.3.3 The Final Decision**

Assuming a bid is not withdrawn beforehand, the final decision as to who will host is made at an IOC session. For the current bid process, Candidate Cities for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games will have the opportunity to present their bids at the IOC Session in Milan in September 2019 (IOC, 2018b). At this session, IOC members will then vote for the city that they want to host the Games. After each round, the city with the fewest votes is eliminated, until there is just one, winning city remaining. This city will then have seven years to prepare for hosting.

Since the turn of the century, there have been several studies examining the reasons why IOC members vote in the way that they do. It should be noted that, in the meantime, there have been changes to the bid process, following the Salt Lake City bidding scandal. The Salt Lake City bid team had a \$400,000 'humanitarian assistance fund' which was used to grant scholarships to IOC members' families, as well as a raft of other bribes (Wenn and Martyn, 2006). While there was considerable attention on Salt Lake City, it was by no means the only bidder to use such tactics. Indeed, in 1994, Booth and Tatz (1994) detailed how Sydney lobbied IOC members with scholarships and offers of employment for members of their family. Poast (2007) subsequently found that corruption has only an insignificant impact on the bid process. Thus,

if IOC members are no longer being paid for votes, it is worth considering the other factors contributing to whether a bid is successful or not.

The first criteria are the bid city and the nation itself. In recent years, there has been a clear commitment to taking the Olympic Games to as many different regions of the world as possible. This was a key facet of Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, as it presented Beijing as a new location, and indeed one with issues that could be helped by the Olympic movement (Haugen, 2005). The need to take mega-events to new areas of the world was highlighted by FIFA, who put in place a plan to take the Football World Cup to each confederation in turn. While this plan has since been watered down (the World Cup will now take place in a confederation that did not host either of the two previous events), this has resulted in the past three Football World Cups being held in Africa, South America and Europe, with the 2022 edition to take place in the Middle East. With Mexico, USA and Canada hosting the 2026 tournament, five successive Football World Cups will take place on different continents.

In addition, the economic status of a nation would appear equally important. A study by Maennig and Vierhaus (2016) found that cities with over 2.5 million inhabitants, located in nations with strong recent GDP growth, are more likely to be voted to host. This supported earlier work by Poast (2007), who also found that population and GDP are important factors. This perhaps suggests that the IOC is concerned with the economic impact of the Games, as a host city with a large population and high GDP per capita is likely to be able to sell a large number of tickets for the event. Along similar lines, Preuss (2000) also

argued that the IOC is concerned with the time zone in which Games take place, in order to maximise TV viewers and satisfy sponsors. However, this was disputed by Poast (2007), who found that there is no statistical bias for Olympic Games to be hosted in either North America or Europe.

The geographic location and economic status may be used as an initial filter, but this is clearly not the only factor. Several studies have argued that the primary consideration is the city's ability to host a mega-event (Emery, 2002; Westerbeek et al. 2002). This information is communicated to the IOC members via the Candidature File and the Evaluation Commission's support (Preuss, 2000), but, as was seen in Section 3.3, the promises made during the bid may not be wholly realistic. Therefore, it is important for bid cities to prove their mega-event hosting capability, often through the hosting beforehand of other events such as World Championships (Maennig and Vierhaus, 2016; Westerbeek et al., 2002). If a city has not previously hosted a large-scale event, then voters prefer that cities already have a strong sporting infrastructure, as this both raises the credibility of the bid and also suggests that the city will be able to utilise the new sport facilities once the event is over (Maennig and Vierhaus, 2016; Persson, 2002). This infrastructure does not include just stadia. The Olympic Village is also important, in particular, its location. Feddersen et al. (2007) found that a short distance between the Olympic Village and the competition venues was a positive factor.

As has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, public and government support for a bid play a role in swaying votes. Maennig and Vierhaus (2016) find that having 66% public support for a bid boosts the chance of success.



Political support is likely to be more crucial, and may go beyond what the event owner would expect. Indeed, governments may have a significant role in securing votes. This was demonstrated during FIFA's voting for the 2006 World Cup, when Charlie Dempsey ignored instruction from the Oceania Football Confederation to vote for South Africa, and instead abstained from the vote (Griffiths, 2000). At the same time, Germany struck an arms deal with Saudi Arabia in exchange for votes (Gibson, 2015). These two separate incidents had a clear impact on the final decision as Germany defeated South Africa by 12 votes to 11.

This example shows that, while the event itself is important, IOC members are individuals and may consider other criteria when casting their votes. Preuss (2000) notes that members may support, or vote against, nations with certain political systems or religions. While direct lobbying for votes has been banned, many bidders still seek to target their bid directly to IOC members (Westerbeek et al. 2002). For example, the successful bids by Beijing and Vancouver for the 2008 Summer and 2010 Winter Olympic Games respectively, targeted their bid narrative at IOC members (Preuss, 2006; Sant and Mason, 2015). Similarly, IOC members may be influenced by recent trends in hosting. Voters for the Sydney 2000 Summer Olympic Games were likely to have been swayed by the environmental issues of the 1992 Albertville Winter Games, and this may have played a part in Sydney's 'Green Games' vision being selected (McGillivray and Turner, 2017; Preuss, 2000).

### **3.3.4 Section Review**

This section has acknowledged the three stages of a bid and attempted to recognise the opportunities these provide for leveraging opportunities. The initial idea to bid often comes from private enterprise. Simply to submit a bid, a public-private coalition is often formed, including stakeholders from national governing bodies and the government. A stakeholder often not considered is the general public, and this has led to numerous bids being beset by criticism and protest groups. The general public as stakeholder is crucial for a bidder, as the level of public support is deemed one of the factors determining whether a bid is likely to be successful or not.

### **3.4 Post-Decision: Impacts of the Bid**

The previous section detailed the process of an Olympic bid, with a focus on identifying the key stages and the opportunities to leverage. The potential of benefiting from a bid was identified by Torres (2012) who was one of the first to truly notice the opportunity that a bid provides. Torres goes so far as to recognise bidders with little intention to host the Olympic Games, who instead wish to use the bid process for the sort of benefits detailed in the previous section. Torres terms these 'utilitarian' bidders, with 'legitimate' bidders being those who truly want to win the bid.

This section now details the legacies that have emanated from Olympic bids. As will be seen, the idea of legacy is far more prevalent in the bid literature than leverage. These legacies may be intentional, and so align to the strategic

objectives in Chalip's (2004) model. Where possible, the opportunities and means that lead to these outcomes are identified.

As with the previous chapter, this is structured using the key areas identified in the literature: economic, social, sport and branding.

### **3.4.1 Economic**

Of all the impacts of a bid that will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, the area with most coverage in the literature is that of the economic benefits of bidding. It should be noted, however, that much of this research is not directly aiming to measure the economic benefits of bidding; rather, cities and nations with failed Olympic bids are often used as the control group to measure the actual impacts of hosting an event. The result of this approach is that there is a breadth of research providing information on the economic benefits of an Olympic bid. Given the nature of the economic data available to researchers, this has typically been directed towards the macroeconomic benefits, as it is rare for researchers to have specific economic information on individual cities.

The key, and most discussed paper regarding the economic impacts of Olympic bids is that written by Rose and Spiegel (2011). This research argued that bidding to host an Olympic Games acts as a 'costly signal' to other nations that a country is liberalising, and therefore open and willing to trade. The Olympic bid is appropriate to this, as the costs involved in bidding, and indeed in potentially hosting, are large enough to deter governments who are not liberalising from bidding. Rose and Spiegel found that cities involved in an Olympic bid saw exports rise significantly, and for a sustained period of time.

Indeed, Rose and Spiegel observed that the exports of all bidders increased, whether the bid was successful or not, and argued that it is the bid process that leads to increased exports, and not the hosting.

These results were supported by Demir et al. (2015), whose study found that failed bidders saw an increase in exports at a similar rate to hosts. However, Rose and Spiegel's findings have been contested by Maennig and Richter (2012), and Matheson (2012), who argue that the results derive from selection bias. This is due to the fact that those nations who bid for Olympic Games are typically larger nations who are already leading exporters and are likely to experience trade growth anyway (Matheson, 2012). When Maennig and Richter (2012) controlled for this factor, they found that bid nations, no matter their economic state, typically did not experience an increase in exports.

Gains in trade are not the only economic benefit that can be gained from a failed Olympic bid. Brückner and Pappa (2011) found that a number of economic indicators all improve during the bid period, including output, private investment, and private consumption; however, this economic improvement did not continue once the bid had been lost. These initial economic gains are likely to have come about due to the private investment that a bid receives, which is then lost when the bid is unsuccessful (Brückner and Pappa, 2011). A second study by Brückner and Pappa (2015) further investigated the impact that bidding for an Olympic Games has on an economy. Again, it was found that an Olympic bid has a significant impact upon an economy, as output and investment rises dramatically. However, as with the first study, Brückner and

Pappa found that there was little lasting impact on the economy. These results have been questioned by Langer et al. (2018), again due to selection bias.

While Brückner and Pappa (2011; 2015) found that there is little economic impact following a bid decision, research has investigated the impact of the decision itself. Mirman and Sharma (2010) studied the reaction of the stock market following Olympic host announcements. It was found that there is a stock market growth for all countries involved in the bid, whether the country wins the bid or not. However, Martins and Serra (2011) found that the day after the host was announced, there was a positive stock market reaction to the winner but a negative reaction to losing bidders. A similar study was conducted by Charles and Darné (2016), but this time the study investigated stock market reactions to World Cup host announcements. In this research, it was found that the stock market reacted negatively to losing bids in Morocco and Egypt. It should be noted that these are two developing African nations, reinforcing Cornelissen's (2004b) assertion that developing nations need to take particular care when considering whether a decision to bid is correct or not. Indeed, Dowse and Fletcher (2018) take this further, questioning whether event owners have an ethical obligation not to award mega-events to developing nations.

The literature regarding the macroeconomic benefits of an Olympic bid have largely suggested that there may be benefits during the bid period itself, yet these dissipate once the bid is over. This echoes the idea of a 'pregnancy period', as discussed in Chapter 2; if a nation wishes to benefit economically from an Olympic bid, it needs to act during the bid process itself.

As demonstrated, much of the research regarding the economic benefits of an Olympic bid have been on a macro level. Kirby et al. (2018) do consider the bid phase in their study of how a mega-event can be leveraged to benefit micro and small businesses (MSBs). Drawing on Chalip's (2004) model of event-leverage, Kirby et al. (2018) include a 'bidding and selection phase' during which MSBs should seek involvement from the start as this increases the opportunities of being a stakeholder in the event itself. However, it is recognised that MSBs may play a role in generating support for the bid, and therefore the bid committee should seek the engagement of MSBs at the earliest opportunity (Kirby et al., 2018). This could be accomplished through the creation of business networks, in a similar way to that identified by O'Brien (2006).

Much of the research has typically only considered the legacies of Olympic bids, and many of these impacts appear to be unplanned. Aside from the study of Kirby et al. (2018), no other papers have directly considered how bidders can actively leverage an Olympic bid for economic benefits (and the study by Kirby et al. does not consider the bid as an entity in itself; many of the managerial implications assume that the bid will be successful). It is entirely plausible, that if a nation sought to employ strategies specifically designed to use a bid to boost an economy, that the economic benefits may be felt beyond the period of the bid itself, regardless of its success.

### **3.4.2 Social**

While there is a wide literature regarding the ways in which Olympic bids can be leveraged for social benefits, and even more regarding the positive and

negative social legacies of an event, there is a paucity of information regarding the social impact of a bid (Richards and Marques, 2016). There has already been discussion in Section 3.3.2.3 regarding the ways in which a bid can promote a feeling of pride and goodwill, with evidence showing that citizens in Cape Town (Swart and Bob, 2004), Manchester (Law, 1994) and London (Falcous and Silk, 2010) reported positive post-bid attitudes. However, there is little evidence to show that this feeling of euphoria has ever been leveraged for positive outcomes.

The bid process itself may result in positive benefits from a bid. Section 3.3.3 detailed the factors that influence whether a bid is successful or not, one of which is the political and economic status of the country. If a nation wishes to host an Olympic Games, it may believe that it needs to comply with Western norms and modify its society accordingly; in the build-up to Beijing's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games, Theodoraki (2004) wrote of sport contributing to the liberalising of China's international trade policies. Foley et al. (2012) detail how bidding for the Olympic Games resulted in a degree of social change within Qatar. Most obviously, the Olympic Games is an event for both male and female competitors, and, in order to comply with this, Qatar established the Women's Sport Committee as part of a number of development policies designed to advance women's sport in the state. While Foley et al. (2012) argue that this was a pragmatic move, entirely with the intention of securing the event, this perhaps should not matter. Any progressive social movement within a state could be seen as a positive, whatever the reasons for the policy

change, providing the state does not revert back to its old ways, and bidding for an Olympic Games can be viewed as a driver for this change.

However, this does not mean that cities have not sought to leverage an Olympic bid previously for social benefits. One of the most prominent vehicles for leveraging social benefits is Vancouver's 'Legacies Now' programme, believed to be the first time a bid city created a separate organisation to deliver benefits regardless of the outcomes of the bid (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). Legacies Now was developed in 2000, three years before Vancouver was ultimately awarded the 2010 Winter Olympic Games (Sant and Mason, 2015). By the time of the bid decision, Legacies Now had run 192 social outreach events across British Columbia, estimating that over 500,000 British Columbians were reached (Weiler and Mohan, 2009). It is perhaps unfortunate that Vancouver's bid was successful, as this limits research into the way the bid was leveraged. Following the 2010 Winter Olympics, Legacies Now became LIFT Philanthropy Partners, and continues to ensure that the Games provides a positive social impact (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). While this is obviously a positive for British Columbia, from a research perspective, it makes it difficult to separate the impact of the bid from the hosting of the Winter Games themselves.

The discussion regarding social leverage included consideration of leveraging environmental benefits. Aside from a fleeting mention by Torres (2012) of Sion's Olympic bid promoting sustainability awareness, there is no real information in the literature regarding the ways that an Olympic bid may be environmentally friendly. This is perhaps because, unlike the hosting of an



event, a bid itself may not have large negative impacts on the environment, and so there is little need for a bid to attempt to offset these. That is not to say that environmental impacts are not considered at the bid stage, but these relate to the actual event rather than the bid itself.

### **3.4.3 Sport**

Legacies Now did not just have a mandate for social benefits within British Columbia; in fact, its primary aim involved the development of sport, having four principal objectives (Sant and Mason, 2015). First, Legacies Now had a responsibility to promote sport and physical activity within the area, working in partnership with the Vancouver 2010 Sport Plan to develop the Olympic Youth Fund (Weiler and Mohan, 2009). Legacies Now also provided a platform for a partnership between Health, Sport and Education within the state to actively promote sport to the youth of Canada (ibid). In addition, Legacies Now developed elite sport and athletes within British Columbia (Sant and Mason, 2015), running clinics for 2,000 winter sport athletes, promoting winter sport to the youth in the region and putting CA\$8 million of leveraged funds into the Canadian sport system. This was deemed to be successful, with many of the athlete beneficiaries going on to compete at an elite level (Weiler and Mohan, 2009). It is believed that Legacies Now also played a role in enhancing awareness of sport in the region, leading to support for the Vancouver bid. The drawback to this, is that it is impossible to separate the impacts of Legacies Now from those of the 2010 Winter Games themselves.

Similar to Legacies Now, and perhaps inspired by its success in helping Vancouver secure the 2010 Winter Games, Chicago developed a similar

organisation, 'World Sport Chicago' (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014), a programme designed to increase youth involvement in sport and raise the profile of the Olympic and Paralympic movements within the city (Chicago 2016, 2009:21). World Sport Chicago used money raised by the bid committee that was not needed as part of the bid to promote sport in the region. Given Chicago's already well-developed elite sport infrastructure (it is one of only 10 US cities to have professional baseball, NFL, basketball, ice hockey and football teams), World Sport Chicago instead focused on promoting low level sport and enhancing physical activity (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014). However, as Salisbury et al. (2017) discuss, the ambitious initial plans have since been downgraded, with a new programme called 'SCORE!' taking precedence in the city.

While these are two clear examples of cities attempting to use an Olympic bid to leverage sport, there are other ways in which a bid indirectly impacts sport within a city. An Olympic bid focuses attention on sport within a city. Post-bid, both Manchester and Istanbul increased investment in sport within the cities and focused their sport strategies (Salisbury et al., 2017). Similarly, Tokyo's bid for the 2016 Olympic Games, and the necessary government guarantees as part of a bid, resulted in the realisation that new legislation was needed to define the position of the government in developing sport within the country (Yuan, 2013). This directly led to the new Basic Sport Law, which formalised the Japanese government's role in enhancing sport participation and guaranteeing the funding necessary to bid for and host such events (Yamamoto, 2012)

#### **3.4.4 Infrastructure**

A prominent legacy of hosting mega-events that is not evident in the leveraging literature, is that of the infrastructure left behind following an event. While no studies explicitly state the fact, the inference is that the bid is seen as an opportunity for a city to leverage development. Rather than use the word leverage, the bid is often described as a 'catalyst' for urban regeneration. Indeed, Oliver (2011a) argues that an Olympic bid is an opportunity for a city to activate urban development strategies that are already in place, with the bid providing the impetus for the development to begin.

Oliver and Lauermann (2017) have extensively researched the impact that bids may have on the infrastructure of a city and are one of the few authors to use the term leverage to describe a city's strategies. Lauermann (2016a) specifically notes that cities are likely to have pre-existing urban development plans, and an Olympic bid can be used to catalyse these. Lauermann specifically notes two aspects of a bid that provide the opportunity for this. First, a city may have access to bid-related sources of finance that it would not normally have, based on the potential revenues to be secured from hosting. Second, an Olympic bid provides a city with access to global networks whose experience can be utilised (Lauermann 2014b). In addition, an Olympic bid, with its finite deadlines, can provide an impetus for development that a city may not otherwise have (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Indeed, a study by Lauermann (2015), across bids from 1991 to 2012, found that over 30% of planned use takes place regardless of the success of the bid. This study only considered urban transformation. Had it also included transport development,

it is likely that the figure of 30% would have been much higher. However, it is possible that bidders include urban development plans already in place in their bid documentation that would take place even if a city was not bidding. It is unclear the extent to which plans such as these should be considered as being an impact of a bid.

Lauermann is one of the few authors to consider urban development on a macro scale, as much of the research focuses on individual case studies. Moss (2011) outlines the numerous improvements to the various areas of New York following its defeat in bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games. The bid deliberately pushed through a number of initiatives, aware that any impetus would die along with the bid (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Thus, nine different regeneration projects in areas of New York were started as part of the bid, and then continued despite the fact the bid was ultimately unsuccessful. This was not the case during Chicago's bid, which had little impact on the urban development of the city (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014). The bid from Chicago had no plans for urban development even if the bid had been successful. Even though Chicago's transportation networks were in need of upgrade, the bid committee did not believe it would be able to secure funding for the development (ibid).

Had Chicago sought to upgrade its transportation network via the bid, this would not have been atypical. As far back as the 1960s, Lyon used its bid for the 1968 Olympic Games to improve its road, rail and air infrastructure (Lindau et al., 2016). More recently, London, Rio and Vancouver all committed to transportation upgrades regardless of whether the outcome of the bid was

successful or not (Brown et al., 2012; Lindau et al., 2016; Sant and Mason, 2015). The fact that all these bids were successful, potentially indicates that this commitment to infrastructural improvements within the cities did not go unnoticed by the IOC. Indeed, Rio's 2016 bid significantly altered its transportation plans from its two previously unsuccessful bids (Lindau et al., 2016).

Given the nature of the Olympic Games, it should be of no surprise that sporting infrastructure has also been developed as part of a bid, with the same opportunities (funding, short deadlines and access to global networks) all similarly playing a role (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Table 3.3 provides a summary of the facilities built by states who lost Olympic bids identified in the literature.

The use of an Olympic bid to develop sport infrastructure dates back to Lyon's bids for the 1920 and 1924 Olympic Games, as the Stade de Gerland stadium was built even though Lyon's bids failed, and then upgraded as part of Lyon's unsuccessful bid for the 1968 Olympic Games (Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010). New York's urban development as part of its bid for the 2012 Games has already been discussed, but the city also constructed the Citi Field and Yankee Stadium baseball venues as part of its unsuccessful bid for the 2012 Olympic Games (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Similarly, Berlin saw the city use its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to accelerate its already existing plans for sport facility development (Alberts, 2009). At the time, Berlin's sporting infrastructure was not sufficiently developed to deal with the everyday needs of its citizens. The Berlin bid segregated its venue plans into two areas; bid-

dependent and non-dependent projects. As a result, while these venues were developed, other projects, including the Olympic Village, were abandoned following the bid decision (Alberts, 2009).

*Table 3.3: Facilities Development as Part of Losing Olympic Bids*

City	Event bid for	Sporting Facility	Bid Impact	Reference
Lyon	1920/1924 Olympic Games	Stade de Gerland	Built (1926)	Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010
Rome	1936/1940 Olympic Games	Stadio Olimpico	Built (1937)	Bolz, 2015
Lyon	1968 Olympic Games	Stade de Gerland	Enlarged	Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010
Birmingham	1992 Olympic Games	NIA	Built (1991)	Smith, 2005
Berlin	2000 Olympic Games	Olympic Stadium	Enhanced	Alberts, 2009
Berlin	2000 Olympic Games	Max Schmeling Boxing Hall	Built (1996)	Alberts, 2009
Berlin	2000 Olympic Games	Velodrome	Built (1997)	Alberts, 2009
Berlin	2000 Olympic Games	Swimming Hall	Built	Alberts, 2009
Manchester	2000 Olympic Games	Velodrome	Built (1994)	Lawson, 2006
Manchester	2000 Olympic Games	Ice Hockey arena	Built (2007)	Lawson, 2006
Manchester	2000 Olympic Games	MEN Arena	Built (1995)	Smith, 2005
Istanbul	2008 Olympic Games	Atatürk Olympic Stadium	Built (2002)	Bilsel and Zelef, 2011
New York	2012 Olympic Games	Citi Field	Built (2009)	Oliver and Laueremann, 2017
New York	2012 Olympic Games	Yankee Stadium	Built (2009)	Oliver and Laueremann, 2017

A key facet of both Berlin and New York's sport facility development was that the bid was used to catalyse sporting infrastructure that had previously been identified as being necessary and so was already being planned. Istanbul, however, did not do this, and instead built the Atatürk Olympic Stadium in anticipation of hosting the Games (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011). There was little long-term planning regarding the stadium, which was built 20 kilometres from the city centre in an area that was to be developed via the Games itself and, as a result, is somewhat disconnected from the city. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the stadium is not used on a regular basis. Istanbul has three major football teams (Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray) but each already has their own stadium which is regularly used for other events. The Atatürk Stadium was included in Turkey's unsuccessful bid for the 2024 UEFA European Football Championship, but would have needed to undergo a further overhaul (The Architects' Journal, 2018).

#### **3.4.5 Global Attention and Image**

The work by Smith (2001) explored the ways in which Manchester used the Olympic bid, and the sport facilities built as part of the bid, to develop its image as a sporting city. Indeed, Smith found that the association the city had with sport was able to improve negative perceptions of the city. However, this was not the case with Birmingham, with only 16% of those surveyed associating Birmingham with sport despite the city's 1992 Olympic bid (Smith, 2005). This may in part be due to the non-Olympic sporting links to the city. Manchester United, and more latterly Manchester City, broadcast the name Manchester around the world, providing a strong association with sport. In comparison,

Birmingham's most recognisable team, Aston Villa, does not have a name that is instantly associated with the city, while Birmingham City, the football club that bears the city name, is somewhat less successful. This perhaps suggests that while an Olympic bid may contribute to a change in image for a city, it will not do so on its own and, rather like urban development, needs to be part of a cohesive strategic plan.

However, the changes in image and reputation sought by Manchester and Birmingham were large-scale changes that perhaps were unrealistic. It is more likely, that if a city attempts to augment its position within a nation, building on an image and reputation it already has, it is more likely to be successful. Indeed, Cochrane et al. (1996) believe that Manchester's reputation was improved, but only at the expense of other cities within the UK. Similarly, Lyon's bid for the 1968 Olympic Games allowed the city to secure its position as the second city within France, heading off the challenge from Marseilles (Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010; Dauncey, 2010). The cases of Birmingham, Manchester and Lyon do raise an interesting counterpoint; none are what could be described as truly global cities. It is questionable whether the likes of London, Paris or New York (who all competed for the 2012 Olympic Games) would see a failed bid as benefiting the city's domestic image (Shoval, 2002). Therefore, it is possible that more global cities may wish to leverage a bid to improve image on a more global scale. There is often an assumption in the literature that the mere act of entering a bid will result in a city receiving international attention (see, for example, brief mentions in papers by Agha et al. (2012), Andranovich et al. (2001), Cornelissen (2008), Haugen (2005)



Kassens-Noor (2016), and Tolzmann (2014)). However, the only empirical evidence to suggest that this might be the case is the study by Rose and Spiegel (2011), who argued that bidding for an Olympic Games signals to the world that the country is liberalising and is open to trade. However, as was discussed in Section 2.3.3.1, the methodology employed by Rose and Spiegel has been questioned, with Maennig and Richter (2012) disputing these results. Indeed, as Solberg and Preuss (2007) note, the IOC places extremely strict regulations on the levels of international promotion from a city, severely limiting the opportunities for leverage. As such, it appears that cities may largely benefit after the bid process if they manage to compete against better known cities. For example, Law (1994) claims that Manchester coming third in a race that included global cities such as Beijing, Sydney and Berlin saw the city's global reputation rise. Similarly, the fact that South Africa took a sporting and economic behemoth such as Germany all the way in the race for the 2006 Football World Cup, losing by just one controversial vote, proved to the world that many of the stereotypical views of Africa as being a continent ravaged by disease and poverty are untrue (Alegi, 2001).

Again, this sort of international promotion is unlikely to be felt by the larger cities in the world. Had Charlie Dempsey voted in the 2006 Football World Cup vote, and South Africa beaten Germany to host the event, it is extremely unlikely that the bid would have enhanced Germany's reputation. Similarly, Paris was beginning to develop a reputation as being a serial loser of bids and struggling to stave off competition from cities from the East (Strohmayer, 2013). Indeed, this perhaps demonstrates that an Olympic bid may actually

produce negative impacts if it is not successful. India's withdrawal from the 1992 bid blemished its reputation, particularly in the sporting world (Bandyopadhyay, 2014). Similarly, as Beijing and Sydney were in direct competition for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, the Australian media had no hesitation in highlighting China's questionable human rights record (Booth and Tatz, 1994). It is noticeable that during Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Games, in which no Australian city was competing, and in a period where Australia and China were developing trade links, the Australian media were far less vocal (Gong, 2011).

#### **3.4.6 Experience**

This literature review has thus far sought to identify the opportunities that arise as part of the bid process, and the areas that cities can leverage. This literature review has found one further opportunity; the entirety of the bid process itself, which provides bidders with knowledge and experience from the bid process. Being involved in an Olympic bidding process not only provides bid cities with exposure to international networks and levels of expertise that can benefit infrastructural development (Lauermann, 2014b), it also provides bidders with access to the IOC itself, and those members who vote for hosts. It is partly for this reason that Emery (2002) writes of an unwritten rule within the IOC that initial bids should be viewed only as a precursor for future bids. Figure 3.2 shows how hosts will often have submitted a bid in the previous Olympic cycles. It is not since Barcelona 1992, that a nation has been awarded an Olympic Games without having at least one bid in the three previous cycles. Indeed, since Stockholm hosted the Summer Games in 1912, Korea is the

only first-time bidder to successfully bid for a Summer Olympic Games (Seoul 1988).

	20 <sup>th</sup> Century														21 <sup>st</sup> Century							
	'48	'52	'56	'60	'64	'68	'72	'76	'80	'84	'88	'92	'96	'00	'04	'08	'12	'16	'20	'24	'28	
Argentina			B			B									B							
Australia			H								B	B	H									
Brazil														B	B		B	H				
Canada			B				B	H				B					B					
China														B		H						
Finland		H																				
France						B					B				B	B	B				H	
Greece		B										B			H							
Italy				H										B	B					B		
Japan				B	H					B						B		B	H			
Mexico			B	B		H																
South Korea										H												
Soviet Union								B	H													
Spain							B					H			B	B	B	B	B			
UK	H											B	B	B			H					
USA	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	H			H				B	B		B	H	
West Germany							H															

Key      H Hosted      B Unsuccessful Bid

Figure 3.2: Summer Olympic Games Hosts, 1948-2028

Numerous authors have discussed how the lessons learned from a failed bid were then incorporated into an ultimately successful bid (e.g. Sydney 2000 (Burroughs, 1999), Rio 2016 (Lindau et al., 2016), PyeongChang 2018 (Merkel and Kim, 2011), Tokyo 2020 (Yuan, 2013)). Cities are likely to be aware of this prerequisite; Amsterdam’s bid for the 1992 Olympic Games, which was decided in 1986, was viewed as a precursor to a bid for the 2028 Games (Westerbeek, 2009). This is an extreme example, and it is unclear how relevant the IOC would view a bid made in the mid-1980s to an event held over 40 years later. This could be further exacerbated due to the likelihood of personnel changes, both within the Amsterdam bidding committee and the IOC. Given the 40-year gap between the bids, it is perhaps likely that there

may be few people with any involvement in the 1992 bid who would still be decision makers for a 2028 bid. The human element is clearly important here. As Lauermann (2016b) notes, there are well-established networks involved in the bid process, with sport federations and consultancies involved with each bid. Entering the bid process may enable a National Olympic Committee (NOC) access to these networks for the first time.

This is not limited to hosting future Olympic Games, and it might be that after an Olympic bid, a city or nation uses the knowledge gained to bid for other events. For example, it became clear that Manchester was unlikely to be chosen to host an Olympic Games, and so the city instead turned its attention to the Commonwealth Games which it hosted successfully in 2002. There is a clear link between the failed Olympic bids and successful Commonwealth Games bid, as businessman Bob Scott led all of these bids (Cook and Ward, 2011). Similarly, Doha's bid for the 2016 Olympic Games laid the groundwork in making event organisers aware of the city's event hosting capabilities, ahead of its successful bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Foley et al., 2012).

The aforementioned bid consultants can play a role here to mitigate a city's lack of bid experience. Manchester employed management consultants Arthur Young & Co (a later merger saw them become Ernst & Young), who worked on Los Angeles' successful bid for the 1984 Summer Olympic Games (Cook and Ward, 2011). This indicates that the knowledge gained within a bid is not embedded into the city or nation that bids; rather, it is the individuals involved in the bid who then carry that knowledge forward. For example, it is individuals and not the NOC as a whole who build up relations with IOC members

(Westerbeek et al., 2002). For example, Dempsey and Zimbalist (2017) note the career of Terrence Burns, who worked on the bids for Beijing 2008, Vancouver 2010, Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018, in addition to Los Angeles' bid for the 2024 Games. However, this causes a further issue, as the knowledge and experience of these consultants would probably stay with the individuals and not remain with the bidder. Indeed, this is likely to be one of four key times when this knowledge is lost:

- A bid team disperses after a bid is lost;
- The bid is successful, but a new organising committee replaces members of the bid team;
- The bid is successful, and the bid team continues to the organising committee, but moves on to other projects once the event is over;
- Bid consultants move on to other projects following the culmination of the bid, whether the bid was successful or not.

This perhaps suggests that cities or nations who wish to bid until they are awarded an Olympic Games should seek to put in place specific event-bidding organisations to retain knowledge and experience for future bids. Turkey and Qatar can be viewed as 'high frequency bidders', which Lauermaun (2015) defines as coalitions who bid for a minimum of three sport mega-events within a 10-year period. Both of these nations have created specialist bid teams, with varying degrees of success (Lauermaun, 2015).

While much of the discussion suggests collecting this information at a national level, it may also be beneficial for the IOC to disseminate information. If a potential bidder is aware that it needs to bid at least twice to be able to host,

then costs increase dramatically and need to be budgeted. While this may deter some potential bidders, it would be prudent for the IOC to make available as much information as possible. The IOC has previously introduced a Manual for Candidate Cities, the Transfer of Knowledge Programme, and the Olympic Games Knowledge Services as ways for potential bidders to gain the information they require. Lauermann (2014b) further recognises the knowledge transfer programmes such as the Olympic Observer Programme and seminars for applicant and candidate cities. This has since been augmented with the New Norm.

This is clearly an issue that the IOC has recognised. The very first point, in Recommendation 1 in Agenda 2020 states that the IOC will 'introduce an assistance phase during which cities considering a bid will be advised by the IOC about bid procedures, core Games requirements, and how previous cities have ensured positive bid and Games legacies' (IOC, 2014a:9). It is not known how successful this has been. In 2017, the IOC released the Olympic Agenda 2020: Half-Time Status report, detailing the progress made; however, the specific IOC Recommendation 1 in Agenda 2020 was not directly discussed. Following the Half-Time Status report, the IOC released its New Norm plans to enhance the communication that takes place between teams and the IOC.

There is one clear issue with this. Why should cities with failed bids pass information on to other bidders who may be rivals in the future? If a city is bidding currently to gain experience as a precursor to a future, successful bid, it has little incentive to provide information that could potentially help future rivals. The secrecy needed during a bid actually played a part in the issues

faced during Boston's bid for the 2024 Summer Olympic Games. The Boston bid was at pains not to give away any information that might help its rivals, yet this secrecy led to a lack of transparency in the bid and contributed to the growing anti-Olympic sentiment within the city (Kassens-Noor and Lauermann, 2017). Nunkoo et al. (2018) argue that greater transparency within the bid process would alleviate this lack of trust, but fail to recognise that it may also provide rival bids with information.

### **3.4.7 Section Review**

This section has outlined the key areas that can be leveraged by bid cities. However, the extant literature focuses on the legacy of the bid, will little consideration as to the ways in which bid teams, cities or nations put in place strategies to benefit from the bid. For example, Section 3.4.3 details the ways that Olympic bids have led to cities developing their sporting infrastructure, but the literature does not consider the processes that allowed this to happen.

If, as Torres (2012) argues, utilitarian bidders do enter the Olympic bid process to bring benefits to a city without hosting, then this appears to be a large gap in the literature. Identification of the opportunities that the bid brings and the means by which these opportunities can be leveraged would be useful for utilitarian bidders (Chalip, 2004; Torres, 2012). Further, there appears to have been a proliferation of utilitarian bidders towards the start of the century. Foley et al. (2012) notes that Qatar's gender politics meant that it was never seriously considered as a host, while cities such as Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan, and San Juan, capital of Puerto Rico, do not realistically have the base level of infrastructure needed to ever be thought of as Olympic cities. It

is perhaps surprising that, as yet, there has been little attempt by scholars to investigate the reasons for these unrealistic bids and the extent to which they achieved their objectives.

### **3.5 Cape Town 2004 and Toronto 2008**

Having introduced the literature surrounding bids in general, this section will now introduce the two case studies that will be utilised in this research and provide an overview of the academic literature that has already been produced. The two cases are the Cape Town and Toronto bids for the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games respectively (the rationale for the selection of these cases is found in Section 4.4.2). For consistency, each case is presented using the following structure. First, the historical context is provided, before the political and economic status of the cities and nations involved are discussed. Following this, the demographics of the regions are presented, and finally there is a discussion of each bid. This takes the form of a descriptive overview of the bid process for each city before the academic literature surrounding each bid is discussed.

#### **3.5.1 Cape Town 2004**

The race to host the 2004 Summer Olympic Games was as tightly fought as any of the competitions within the stadium. Eleven cities formally submitted bids to host the Games, with five progressing to the candidate stage: Athens, Rome, Cape Town, Stockholm and Buenos Aires. While Cape Town was by no means the most unlikely bidder, as San Juan also reached the applicant stage, it is the unique context surrounding Cape Town and South Africa as a



whole that needs to be appreciated. Three South African cities had initially been interested in submitting bids, as Cape Town fought off Durban and Johannesburg to be the South African candidate. However, this was the first Games that South Africa could even have considered hosting for several decades given that South Africa had been excluded from the Olympic movement for nearly 30 years (Honey, 2000). South Africa was only readmitted to the Olympic movement in 1991, with 94 South African athletes competing at Barcelona 1992; the first since 55 South African athletes took part at the Rome Games in 1960. Yet, just five years after readmission, Cape Town submitted a bid to host the Olympic Games.

This first section will discuss the specific context of South Africa's bid, initially considering the 46 years of racial discrimination in the country and the subsequent impact this had on the nation's global sporting participation. Given that many of Cape Town's leveraging plans sought to mend the wounds that apartheid caused, it is important that the background to this is covered in detail. Following the end of apartheid, South Africa underwent a significant period of change. This will be covered through analysis of the newly established political systems and the nation's demographics and national statistics.

### **3.5.1.1 South Africa and Apartheid**

As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, South Africa's policy of apartheid in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and subsequent exclusion from international sport, played a considerable role in both the Olympic bid itself and the leveraging plans that consequently emanated. Thus, this section will

first explain the policy of apartheid and the impact this had on South African sport.

The 1948 South African general election saw the National Party elected as government, narrowly beating the United party by five seats despite winning 122,396 fewer votes (Heard, 1974). The National Party introduced a series of laws formalising apartheid in South Africa. First, the Population Registration Act (1950) was enacted, requiring that all South Africans were categorised into four population groups; Black, White, Coloured<sup>4</sup> (mixed race) and Indian (Parliament of South Africa, 1950). Following this Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act was introduced in 1953, which separated the facilities and services available to each of the population groups. This included sport facilities, and resulted in mixed sport being forbidden (Espy, 1979).

This segregation did not go unnoticed by the sporting world, with racial discrimination being firmly against the Olympic Charter. Initially, the IOC was appeased by the South Africa National Olympic Committee (SANOC) argument that any South African could participate at the Olympic Games, but it was only recently that 'coloured' athletes had shown any interest in competing. However, this ignored the fact that the very nature of apartheid ensured that it was white athletes who had access to the better sporting facilities, with the lack of access to sporting facilities playing a large role in black and coloured athletes not developing to elite level. This segregation impacted a number of other sporting events, with a Brazilian football team

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<sup>4</sup> While this phrase is not deemed acceptable in UK society, it is a term still used in common parlance in South Africa

containing three black players not being allowed to compete in South Africa. Despite this, the IOC allowed South Africa to compete at the 1960 Summer Olympic Games in Rome (Espy, 1979).

Following these Games, the IOC felt that the assurances given by SANOC were not being implemented and, in 1962, warned SANOC that South Africa would be suspended if its apartheid policies were not amended. The IOC was coming under increased pressure from other nations, with other African nations threatening to boycott any Olympic sessions at which South Africa was present. The 1963 session was initially due to be held in Nairobi, but the Kenyan government refused to allow South African delegates into the country. The IOC ultimately moved the session to West Germany (Hill, 1996). The IOC then issued an ultimatum to SANOC; amend the policy of apartheid and acquiesce to the Olympic Charter or do not compete at the 1964 Summer Games in Tokyo. SANOC failed to apply the modifications, and so the invitation to compete at the Games was withdrawn (Hill, 1996).

The Tokyo Games passed without South Africa competing, and SANOC made a number of concessions including the proposed sending of a mixed team to the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. However, while the IOC viewed this as progress, 25 nations, including the majority of African countries and the top American black athletes, declared that they would boycott the Olympic Games if South Africa was allowed to enter (Espy, 1979). With the legitimacy of the Games being in jeopardy, on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1968, South Africa was excluded from the Mexico City Olympic Games (IOC, 1968:9). The following year, the IOC put eight charges to SANOC; seven of these involved racial discrimination and

one involving the illegal use of Olympic insignia. In 1970, a vote of 35 to 28 (with three abstentions) resulted in South Africa being expelled from the Olympic movement (IOC, 1970).

The Olympic Games was not the only sport in which apartheid limited South Africa's participation. Eight years after it was expelled from the IOC, FIFA suspended South Africa from World Football (FIFA, 2004). This also caught the attention of political leaders. The United Nations (UN) repeatedly advised nations not to engage with South Africa in sporting contests and, in 1977, Commonwealth Heads of State agreed the Gleneagles Agreement. This obliged Commonwealth nations to reduce sporting interaction with South Africa (Payne, 1991). This arguably hurt South Africa more than the IOC suspension; rugby and cricket were very important sports to South Africa and played almost exclusively by Commonwealth nations. With South Africa unable to enter the Olympic Games, or compete in international football, cricket or rugby matches, South Africa was cast into the sporting wilderness. However, as Keech and Houlihan (1999) note, South Africa was not entirely excluded; the British Lions rugby union team toured South Africa in 1974 and 1980, while a number of international cricket teams visited South Africa on 'rebel tours' (Payne, 1991).

In 1989, due to the ill health of incumbent president P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk became president and embarked on negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa. The following year, in 1990, at the Stockholm International Conference against Apartheid in Sport, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch offered South Africa the opportunity to compete at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic

Games (Hill, 1996). Following de Klerk's announcement that apartheid would be repealed, an IOC commission visited South Africa and, in 1991, laid down a number of conditions for South Africa's re-entry into the Olympic movement:

1. The abolition of apartheid
2. Work towards a new National Olympic Committee
3. Agreement with the Olympic Charter
4. Non-racial governing bodies (Honey, 2000)

On 9<sup>th</sup> July 1991, the IOC recognised the Interim National Olympic Committee of South Africa (INOCOSA) and South Africa re-joined the Olympic movement (Hill, 1996).

Negotiations to end apartheid continued and, in 1994, South Africa had its first free election with universal suffrage. The African National Congress (ANC), led by Nelson Mandela who had been freed as a political prisoner in 1990, won 252 of the 400 seats, and 63% of the popular vote (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996). This victory was a crucial factor in Cape Town bidding for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games; the ANC had long held the opinion that sport could be used as a tool for political and social change (Keech, 2000). As such, when the ANC came to power, South Africa strived to re-establish itself on the global sporting stage. Two medals were won at the 1992 Olympic Games and, in the same year, the One Day International Cricket team reached the semi-finals of the Cricket World Cup. The National Sports Congress noted the role that sport could play within the new South Africa, utilising the social benefits of sport, extending from youth appeal to international prestige, and

encouraging citizens towards 'socially desirable and acceptable activities' (National Sports Congress, 1993:5).

In 1992, South Africa was awarded the hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup (Black and Nauright, 1998). This was the first time that such an event had taken place in the African continent and kick-started South Africa's plans to host a series of international sporting events. The following year, South Africa hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations, before formally submitting its bid for the 2004 Olympic Games in 1997.

### **3.5.1.2 South African Political Systems**

Given the intense political change that occurred in South Africa in the early 1990s, it is worth considering the new political system in place. The 1994 general elections were not only the first elections with universal suffrage but were also the elections in which a new constitution was initiated. The case study in Chapter 6 shows how understanding these systems is key to appreciating the context surrounding Cape Town's leveraging plans.

#### *3.5.1.2.1 Parliament*

For the 1994 general election, South Africa adopted a bicameral system of parliament, which consists of a National Assembly and Senate. In this system, voters elect members to the National Assembly with proportional representation, and parties are awarded seats based on the number of votes gained across South Africa. The President of South Africa is not directly elected by the people, but instead it is the 400 members of the National Assembly who elect a president and pass laws (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, n.d.). The upper house of the parliament is the Senate. This was

replaced in 1997 by the National Council of Provinces. The Senate consisted of 90 senators, with each of the nine provinces represented by 10 senators. The current National Council of Provinces has the power to modify, recommend amendments or reject legislation, and focuses on national issues (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, n.d.).

The 1994 elections were the first with universal suffrage, and the first that the National Party had not won since 1948. The African National Congress (ANC) won both the most seats and the popular vote, and elected Nelson Mandela as president (Johnson, 1996).

#### *3.5.1.2.2 Provincial Government*

The second layer of government in South Africa is formed of the provincial governments, governing the nine provinces. Each province elects its own government, in provincial elections that often take place at the same time as national elections. As a result, the governing party of a province is not necessarily the same as the national elections, a fate that fell upon the Western Cape and impacted Cape Town's bid. Provincial governments have both legislative and provincial power alongside the national government, relating to matters such as education, healthcare and police services (South African Government, n.d.). The nine provinces established for the 1994 General Election are shown in Table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4: Provincial Legislature Results 1994

Province	Capital City	1994 Provincial Legislature Results
Eastern Cape	Bhisho	African National Congress
Free State	Bloemfontein	African National Congress
Gauteng	Johannesburg	African National Congress
KwaZulu-Natal	Pietermaritzburg	Inkatha Freedom Party
Northern Province (now Limpopo)	Polokwane	African National Congress
Mpumalanga	Nelspruit	African National Congress
North West	Mafikeng	African National Congress
Northern Cape	Kimberley	African National Congress
Western Cape	Cape Town	National Party

As Table 3.4 shows, the Western Cape, of which Cape Town is the capital city, was the only province to re-elect the National Party as provincial government. This would prove to be key in Cape Town's leveraging plans.

#### 3.5.1.2.3 Local Government

The final layer of government involves the local government, with each province divided into municipalities. Following the end of apartheid, there were 1,263 local governments in South Africa. This was reduced to 843 and renamed 'municipalities' for the 1994/95 local elections (Municipal Demarcation Boards, n.d.). The municipalities are responsible for a number of issues governing the everyday lives of citizens, such as transport, education, and housing (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993).

#### 3.5.1.3 South African National Statistics

Having provided the political context surrounding Cape Town's Olympic bid, this next section will discuss the national statistics of the nation from 1990 to 2004. The full data can be seen in Table 10.1 on page 401.



As Figure 3.3 shows, it is clear that the value of the South African economy grew dramatically as South Africa ended apartheid, becoming the 63<sup>rd</sup> largest economy in the world in 1994. However, in the years following, the economy shrank to be the 77<sup>th</sup> largest in 2001. Unsurprisingly during this time, the GDP per capita also fell to 89<sup>th</sup> in the world in 2004. As the South African economy fell, unemployment rose. For 11 of the 14 years in question, South Africa ranked in the top 10 countries worldwide for unemployment, demonstrating the issues facing the South African government. It is noticeable that tourism figures grew during this period, as it became socially acceptable for foreign tourists to visit South Africa following the end of apartheid. Tourism continued to grow during the period, demonstrating the growing acceptance for the newly democratic South Africa.




Figure 3.3: South Africa GDP, 1990-2004<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The World Bank (2018a)

#### **3.5.1.4 South Africa Demographics**

This next section will focus on the demographics of South Africa during the time of the bid process. All data is taken from the 1991 and 1996 censuses, and, where possible, includes the data for Cape Town, the Western Cape (known as the Cape Province in 1991 with slightly different boundaries), and South Africa as a whole. The full dataset can be seen in Table 10.2 on page 402.

As the capital of the province, it is unsurprising that Cape Town has similar characteristics to the Western Province. However, these are in stark contrast to the rest of South Africa. Whereas the general South African populace was 70% African (black) in 1991, and 77% African in 1996, Cape Town's African residents made up just 25% of the population in 1996. Conversely, nearly half of Cape Town's residents were 'coloured' in 1996 compared to just 9% of South Africans in total. Indeed, in 1996, 60% of all 'coloured' South African residents resided in the Western Cape, and 34% in Cape Town itself.

In terms of language spoken, 46% of those within the Western Cape spoke Afrikaans as a first language compared to 14% of South Africans. In fact, 39% of all South Africans with Afrikaans as a first language resided in the Western Cape. The dominant language in South Africa was IsiZulu (Zulu), which nearly 25% of South Africans spoke as a first language. However, in Cape Town, fewer than 4,000 of the 2.5 million population spoke IsiZulu as a first language. Finally, in both Cape Town and South Africa, the dominant religion was Christianity. In contrast, nearly half of all Muslims in South Africa in 1996 resided in the Western Cape.

### 3.5.1.5 Cape Town's Bid

In total, 11 cities submitted bids for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games by the deadline of 10<sup>th</sup> January 1996 (Independent, 1996). These applicant cities then had to submit their bid books by 15<sup>th</sup> August 1996. Following this, members of the Evaluation Commission visited each city and studied their application files, before meeting from 16<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> January 1997 to decide which of the cities would be put through to the Candidature stage (IOC Evaluation Commission, 1997). Ultimately, five cities progressed; Athens, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Rome and Stockholm (Independent, 1997).

The key dates can be seen in Table 3.5.

*Table 3.5: Key Dates in the 2004 Olympic Bid Process*

Date	Event
30th January 1993	Cape Town elected as South Africa's representative
11th January 1996	Deadline to submit initial bid
15th August 1996	Submission of Bid Book
15th September 1996 – 25th January 1997	IOC Evaluation Commission site visits
6th – 9th December 1996	IOC Evaluation Commission visit to Cape Town
7th March 1997	Five candidate cities selected
2nd – 6th September 1997	106th IOC Session in Lausanne
5th September 1997	Final selection of host

The decision as to who would host the 2004 Olympic Games was made at the 106<sup>th</sup> IOC session in Lausanne. Cape Town was almost eliminated in the first round, finishing with Buenos Aires as the city with the lowest votes. Cape Town

and Buenos Aires went to a run-off, which Cape Town won 62 to 44. Stockholm was the next city eliminated, leaving Cape Town, Athens and Rome in the running. In Round 4, Cape Town secured 20 votes (two fewer than it received in the previous round), and so was eliminated. In the final round, Athens defeated Rome, having won the most votes in each round.

Cape Town's bid was unique, in that it planned to add a new pillar to the Olympic Games, which highlighted the transformative nature of the planned Olympic Games (Hiller, 2000). This pillar was set to be 'human' development, with the bid planning to use the Games to contribute towards the ongoing strategic development of the city (ibid). Indeed, one of the actors within the bid coalition was from the Planning Department of the city, to ensure that these plans were utilised (ibid).

Swart and Bob (2004) offered a retrospective view as to why the bid was not successful, offering several reasons why IOC voters may have preferred Athens. First, Cape Town did not fit all the criteria necessary for a bid to be successful. It did not have the type of infrastructure already in place that would be expected of an Olympic city and had little experience in hosting or even bidding for such events. There were further concerns regarding crime levels, while the low levels of GDP per capita in the country may also have led to concerns regarding the economic success of the event. Unfortunately, it is possible that the bid's developmental focus had highlighted these issues.

There was also doubt as to the level of government support that would be available. As Table 3.4 on page 123 demonstrates, the widespread political changes that had occurred in South Africa following the end of apartheid had

not taken place in Cape Town, which was still governed by the National Party. It was also clear that South Africa did not have the support of the African IOC members, who may have been expected to support taking the Olympic Games to the African continent for the first time; an issue that also beset the South Africa bid for the 2006 Football World Cup (Swart and Bob, 2004). Nelson Mandela spoke to the IOC members at the IOC session. Yet, the speech was changed at the last minute, and lacked the sort of warmth that would be needed to persuade IOC members to change their vote (Griffiths, 2000).

However, beyond reflection on the bid itself and discussion of the planned event, there has been little research into the impact that Cape Town's bid had on either the City of Cape Town or South Africa.

### **3.5.2 Toronto 2008**

Whereas Cape Town was always considered an outsider to host the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, Toronto entered the race to host the 2008 Games as one of the favourites. This was not the first time that a Canadian city had bid to host an Olympic Games; Montreal hosted the 1976 Summer Games, while the 1988 and 2010 Winter Games were held in Calgary and Vancouver respectively. Indeed, Black (2017) terms Canada a 'serial user of mega-events'. Table 3.6 below shows the bids by Canadian cities since the Olympics resumed after the Second World War. In total, Canadian cities have bid 17 times for Summer and Winter Olympic Games, as seen in Table 3.6. Only the USA (56) and Italy (18) have bid more often.

Table 3.6: Canadian Bids for Olympic Games, 1956-2010

City	Year	Games Type	Success?
Montreal	1956	Summer	9 <sup>th</sup> in vote
Montreal	1956	Winter	2 <sup>nd</sup> in vote
Calgary	1964	Winter	2 <sup>nd</sup> in vote
Calgary	1968	Winter	2 <sup>nd</sup> in vote
Montreal	1972	Summer	3 <sup>rd</sup> in vote
Banff	1972	Winter	2 <sup>nd</sup> in vote
Montreal	1976	Summer	Hosted
Vancouver-Garibaldi	1976	Winter	4 <sup>th</sup> in vote
Calgary	1988	Winter	Hosted
Toronto	1996	Summer	3 <sup>rd</sup> in vote
Quebec City	2002	Winter	4 <sup>th</sup> in vote
Toronto	2008	Summer	2 <sup>nd</sup> in vote
Vancouver	2010	Winter	Hosted

Yet, while Canada has a clear history with the Olympic Games, this has not always been wholly successful. The 1976 Games are seen as one of the least successful in history (at least in terms of finance), taking until 2006 to pay off the debts accrued (Alberts, 2009). Further, as will be detailed in the next section, Toronto had previously bid for the 1996 Games.

Given the proximity of the two failed bids, the bid for the 1996 Games will be discussed in some detail.

### 3.5.2.1 Toronto's bid for the 1996 Olympic Games

Given the problems faced by Montreal following the hosting of the 1976 Olympic Games, it may have been expected that no Canadian city would wish to host the Summer Games again. However, after the economic success of the 1984 Games in Los Angeles, the following year, the city of Toronto decided to bid for the Olympic Games for the first time (Lenskyj, 1996). Seeing the financial success of Los Angeles 1984 encouraged the bid organisers to

provide a debt-free Games, and so sought to find private businesses to invest in the bid (Bradburn, 2015). Bid leader Paul Henderson secured sponsorship from 72 private corporations, with each paying CA\$35,000 every six months, or the equivalent sum with services in kind (Henderson, 2010).

The aim of the bid was to host a Games that would leave a positive legacy in the Greater Toronto Area, including improving sport facilities, developing the waterfront area, creating 80,000 jobs, building social housing, and improving the transport system (Henderson, 2010). The need for this investment was exacerbated by the global recession throughout the early 1990s, started by Black Monday in 1987. The political landscape in the Greater Toronto Area was also changing, with feelings rising that investment was now necessary elsewhere. Kidd (1992:157) writes of the city having 150,000 living homeless, with a further 80,000 being reliant on foodbanks. Further, a new economic projection in 1990 factored in new indirect costs, leading to expected losses of CA\$90 million (Bradburn, 2015). This changing context provided the platform for the anti-Olympic coalition 'Bread not Circuses' (BNC), a group that vocally opposed the Olympic bid. BNC published an 'anti-Olympic people's bid book', stating the reasons why an Olympic bid was not right for the city of Toronto and encouraging Torontonians to oppose the bid (The Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 1990). Specifically, BNC believed that hosting the Games would draw finance and key resources away from other areas that should be the priority, including 'housing, good jobs, day care, a safe and clean city, [and] community-based sport' (The Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 1990:1).

The BNC were an active group, even going so far as to travel to Tokyo in September 1990 where the final hosting decision would be made (Henderson, 2010). In addition to this, 12 days before the final vote, a new Social Democratic government was elected within Ontario. While Kidd (1992) notes that this new government automatically backed the bid, this is disputed by Henderson (2010) who claims that the new Premier of Ontario, Bob Rae, was influenced by BNC and sent representatives to the Tokyo IOC Session who were less than supportive of the bid. Many Torontonians believed that their bid would be successful, with thousands assembling at the newly developed SkyDome in Downtown Toronto to watch the final decision (Bradburn, 2015). Toronto was competing against five other cities; Atlanta, Athens, Belgrade, Manchester and Melbourne. Toronto was ultimately placed third in the voting, with many Toronto voters then switching their vote to Atlanta, the ultimate hosts.

While the 1996 bid is not the focus for this case study, there are clear crossovers between the 1996 and 2008 Toronto bids. The 1996 bid leader, Paul Henderson, went on to consult for the 2008 Summer Games bid as well as the successful Canadian bids for the 2010 Winter Games and the 2015 Pan American Games held in Vancouver and Toronto respectively. There were further staff crossovers. John Bitove Jr, who was on the advisory board for the 1996 Toronto bid, then led the bid for the 2008 Games. Similarly, David Crombie was on the board of directors for both bids.



### **3.5.2.2 The Canadian Political System**

As mentioned in the previous section, the political environment in the late 1980s played a crucial role in Toronto's bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. Thus, as with the Cape Town case study, the political context that existed during Toronto's bid for the 2008 Games will now be considered.

The Canadian political system is made up of three levels of government; federal, provincial and municipal. These will now be discussed in turn.

#### *3.5.2.2.1 Federal Government*

The Canadian Federal Government encompasses three levels. First, Queen Elizabeth II is 'Queen of Canada' and Head of State (Parliament of Canada, n.d.). However, in reality, the Queen has little direct involvement in the running of the country. Rather, the Prime Minister heads the House of Commons which is made up of 338 elected members of parliament (Marleau and Montpetit, 2000). This is the lower house of parliament. Any laws put forward by the House of Commons then also have to be passed by the upper house; the Senate. The Senate is comprised of 105 senators, who are chosen by the Prime Minister and are representatives of Canada's provinces. Part of the Senate's role is to represent social groups that are often underrepresented in the House of Commons.

#### *3.5.2.2.2 Provincial Government*

The next layer of government is the Provincial Government. Canada is divided into ten provinces and three territories, as shown in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Provinces and Capital Cities of Canada

Province	Capital City
Alberta	Edmonton
British Columbia	Vancouver
Manitoba	Winnipeg
New Brunswick and Labrador	Fredericton
Newfoundland and Labrador	St. John's
Nova Scotia	Halifax
Ontario	Toronto
Prince Edward Island	Charlottetown
Quebec	Montreal
Saskatchewan	Regina
Northwest Territories (territory)	Yellowknife
Nunavut (territory)	Iqaluit
Yukon (territory)	Whitehorse

Each province has its own government, which has powers and is responsible for legislation within the provincial boundaries. These responsibilities include the provision of services such as schooling, health services and highways. The Canadian Constitution states that the federal government overrules provincial decisions, although this does not apply to the three territories shown in Table 3.7. The Government of Ontario is responsible for the Ontario province.

#### 3.5.2.2.3 Municipal Government

Finally, a number of cities and towns across Canada have Municipal Governments, which are responsible for services within the smaller regional areas, such as libraries and parks. The authority for these responsibilities comes from provincial government. Within the Ontario province, municipality governments are required to provide social services (Sancton, 2014).

A summary of the governments in place at the time of the bid for the 2008 Games can be seen in Table 3.8.

*Table 3.8: Political Parties in Power, Canada 2001*

<b>Position</b>	<b>Leader</b>	<b>Political Party</b>
Prime Minister of Canada	Jean Chrétien	Liberal Party of Canada
Premier of Ontario	Mike Harris	Progressive Conservative Party of Canada
Mayor of Toronto	Mel Lastman	Progressive Conservative Party of Canada

### **3.5.2.3 Canadian National Statistics**

This section will now look at the Canadian national statistics from 1995-2008, in order to show the time prior to, during, and after the bid.

As Table 10.3 on page 403 shows, the period in which Toronto was bidding for the Olympic Games was a relatively stable period. Both GDP and GDP per capita grew steadily, with Canadians being the 24<sup>th</sup> richest nation in the world. It should be noted Table 10.3 only shows the average income of Canadians and does not consider the distribution of wealth. Over the same period, unemployment fell from 9% in 1995 to 6% in 2008, perhaps indicating a better off society. However, in 2008, 79 other nations had lower unemployment levels than Canada, down from 37 in 1995.

However, while these domestic statistics indicate a healthy economy, the data shows that the number of foreign visitors to Canada fell from nearly 50 million in 1999, to below 30 million in 2008. More specifically, foreign visitors to the Ontario region also fell from over two million in 1995, 1996 and 1997, to 1.25 million visitors in 2003.

#### **3.5.2.4 Canadian Demographics**

In comparison to the Cape Town case study, Toronto has little difference to the rest of Canada. One area of differentiation is the multicultural make-up of the city. Torontonians are 45% immigrants, compared to 19% of the rest of Canada. This has resulted in Toronto being an extremely multicultural city, with 209 different ethnic origins. This is further demonstrated as there are 99 different home languages within the city. While 59% of Torontonians speak English (the same percentage as the rest of Canada), the second most widely spoken mother tongue is Italian, yet this accounts for only 4% of the population. This is in stark contrast to the rest of Canada, where 22% speak French as a first language, meaning that only 10% of the Canadian population does not speak French or English as a first language. Comparatively, just 1% of Torontonians have French as a first language, with 41% of Torontonians speaking a language other than English or French. The data can be seen in Table 10.4 on page 404.

#### **3.5.2.5 Toronto's Bid**

Toronto was competing against 10 other cities to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, including Paris and Beijing. Each bid was evaluated by the IOC commission, with five cities remaining as candidate cities; Beijing, Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, and Toronto (BBC, 2000). These candidate cities were visited by the Evaluation Commission in February and March 2001, and Beijing, Paris and Toronto were identified as "excellent candidates" (Polumbaum, 2003:61). The full bid process can be seen in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9: Key Dates in the 2008 Olympic Bid Process

Date	Event
10 November 1999	Toronto declares intention to bid
20 June 2000	Applicant File submitted to IOC
28 August 2001	Candidate Cities Announced
17 January 2001	Candidate File submitted to IOC
21 February - 29 March 2001	IOC Evaluation Commission site visits
8 - 11 March 2001	IOC Evaluation Commission visit to Toronto
May 2001	Evaluation reports published
13 - 16 July 2001	112th IOC Session in Moscow
13 July 2001	Final selection of host

The final vote was conducted at the IOC's 112<sup>th</sup> session in Moscow in July 2001. Each candidate city presented to the IOC officials on the morning of 13<sup>th</sup> July, followed by the Evaluation Committee presenting their findings. After this, the voting for the host of the 2008 Olympic Games began. 13 IOC members from Canada, China, France, Japan and Turkey were not eligible to vote as their NOCs had competing cities. In the first round of voting, Osaka was eliminated, with Beijing having twice the number of votes as Toronto in second place. In the second round, Beijing won 56 votes, with the remaining three cities gaining 49 votes collectively. As Beijing won more than 50% of the votes, it was awarded the 2008 Games. Toronto finished in second place with 22 votes (The Guardian, 2001).

In comparison to Cape Town's bid, more literature has focused on Toronto's bid for the Olympic Games. In particular, Oliver (2011a; 2011b; 2014) has published extensively regarding the legacy of the bid and the subsequent development of the waterfront region. Kipfer and Keil (2002), in a paper written before the bid decision was made, detail the planned development of the

waterfront area should Toronto's bid have been successful, with the formation of the Waterfront Revitalisation Task Force. The formation of this task force, and its impact on the bid, will be discussed more during the Toronto case study chapter.

Oliver's (2011a; 2011b; 2014) work on Toronto's Olympic bids focuses primarily on the development of its waterfront area. The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation was created as part of the bid for the 2008 Games, ensuring that the waterfront on Lake Ontario would be developed as part of the bid (Oliver, 2017), which compensated for a lack of urban development elsewhere in the city (Kipfer and Keil, 2002). Indeed, Oliver goes so far as to argue that the primary driver for the Olympic bid was not actually a real desire to host the Olympic Games, but rather was a way in which a coalition could be formed to drive the waterfront development. Indeed, Oliver (2011a) argues that the partnerships formed as part of the bid directly led to the success of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalisation Corporation, and the ultimate development of the waterfront is a key benefit of the Olympic bid.

Oliver (2014) also discusses the sporting legacy, or lack thereof, from the bid. Oliver argues that one criticism of the bid, and perhaps a reason for its failure, was the lack of sport development within the city and the Ontario region. Despite this, the IOC Evaluation Commission noted that the "bid has a well-constructed sports concept", and "Canada has an excellent tradition in sport" (IOC, 2001:57-58). Post-bid, the Toronto Sports Council was developed, with the remit to promote community sport and general physical activity. However,

Oliver argues that this intended legacy was not a success, with sport investment remaining low on the list for government funding (Oliver, 2014).

The issue of sport was not the only negative to come out of the Olympic bid. The 'Bread Not Circuses' coalition, formed to such good effect for the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games, reformed to similarly protest the 2008 bid. Much of the literature regarding Bread Not Circuses has primarily focused on the 1996 Olympic bid, but Oliver (2011a) provides some commentary; most notably, that the Toronto bid was shrouded in the sort of secrecy that beset Boston's 2024 bid, with the bid committee being reluctant to provide rival bidders with information. Thus, the bid book was submitted to the IOC without ever having been shown to the Toronto public. Unsurprisingly, Bread Not Circuses criticised this, with it being suggested that the 2008 bid committee had failed to heed the lessons from the previous 1996 bid (Tufts, 2004).

### **3.5.3 Section Review**

This section is designed to provide the context for the case studies that will follow. As has been evidenced, the Toronto and Cape Town bids started from different places. South Africa as a nation was seeking to regain a place in the global context, both in terms of sport and international relations. In comparison, Canada was well established in the sporting world, having previously hosted the 1976 Olympic Games, and having bid 13 times for the Summer or Winter Olympic Games, including hosting on three occasions. This is perhaps reflected in the disparities in literature available for the two cases. There is little scholarly information available regarding the Cape Town Olympic

bid, as it appears to have been superseded by the legacy of South Africa hosting the 2010 Football World Cup.

Comparatively, aside from Toronto hosting the 2015 Pan American Games, the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games (which culminated in 2001) was Toronto's only flirtation with a mega-event since the turn of the century. However, much of this research has been conducted by one author and concentrates primarily on one aspect of the bid's legacy; the waterfront development. The work of Oliver focuses primarily on the legacy of the bid, with less attention paid as to the strategies put in place for the leveraging to occur.

### **3.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has set out the key elements of a bid process, and the opportunities that arise to be leveraged. As this literature review has established, it is possible for both legitimate and utilitarian bidders to leverage an Olympic bid, although logic dictates that the plans by utilitarian bidders will be more successful as this is the primary aim of the bid. Indeed, those nations who wish to host an Olympic Games are perhaps less likely to be able to leverage the bid, as the majority of the focus will be in making sure that the city is ready to secure the IOC votes. As with the previous chapter, where it was realised that organising committees are often too busy in making sure that the event takes place to properly establish leveraging plans, this is similarly the case with bidders; winning a bid is difficult enough without also needing to think about leveraging strategies as well.



Having established, first the opportunities in the bid process, and second, the areas for leverage, the next chapter will provide in detail the methodological process that this research involved.

## 4 Methodology

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### 4.1 Introduction and Purpose

This chapter outlines the methodological processes used in this study. To reiterate, the research seeks to answer the overarching research question, **in what ways have bids for the Olympic Games been leveraged for positive outcomes?**

This chapter follows the process suggested by Grix (2010a), who advances that researchers need to be clear about the foundations of their research and how the choices made at the foundational level lead on and impact the subsequent research process. First, the research philosophy underpinning the research is introduced (Section 4.2), and this comprises the ontological and epistemological approaches. Section 4.3 then discusses the project's methodological approach (a qualitative analysis) before the specific methods that are employed are discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, ethics and research quality are considered in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.

The key methodological decisions can be seen in Table 4.1 below, and are elaborated on further throughout this chapter.

*Table 4.1: Key Methodological Decisions*

Ontology	Constructivist
Epistemology	Hard-interpretivist
Methodology	Qualitative research strategy
Research Methods	Content analysis and multiple case study
Data Collection	Interviews, document analysis

## 4.2 Research Philosophy

This first section establishes the ‘foundations’ (Grix, 2010a) of the research; that is, the ontological and epistemological basis upon which this research rests. As Grix (2010a) advises, this will consider the ontological approach, followed by the epistemology. Considering them in this order makes logical sense; it is important to understand what it is that we think we know about the world before we can consider what exactly we can know and how we can set about finding out about it.

### 4.2.1 Ontological Approach

Crotty (1998:98) provides a detailed definition, stating that ontology is concerned with ‘what is the nature of existence, with the structure of reality’. A researcher’s ontological approach will, in part, determine the research question to be answered and the way that the research will be carried out (Bryman, 2012).

In answering the question as to ‘*what exists?*’ in the social world, there have traditionally been two schools of thought at opposite ends of the spectrum. First, positivists (and realists) assert that ‘objects have an independent existence and are not dependent for it on the knower’ (Cohen et al., 2011:6); that is, objects exist independently from the researcher. Positivists view the environment objectively with the structures which make up the world being able to be perceived and studied. Positivists believe that there is one truth, and once this truth has been determined it can be applied to a range of different contexts.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are constructivists (or relativists), who contend that 'social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors' (Bryman, 2012:33). For constructivists, objects are not independent from researchers, but rather are socially constructed. Thus, 'social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision' (Bryman, 2012:33). Therefore, the constructivist ontological position believes that the social world of the research is indeed a construct, with different researchers viewing different social realities. Therefore, there is not one sole truth, and rather the perception of what is true evolves over time and changes from actor to actor.

A key facet of ontology is the structure-agency debate. Thus, it is prudent to discuss the terms and their relationship before progressing. *Structure* refers to hierarchies and arrangements within society which provide the context in which social activities take place (Lewis, 2002). This is a position that lends itself naturally to scientific studies (for example, the law of gravity would be seen as a structure that exists), but Hay (2002) argues that structures have less pertinence in the social sciences; while there are indeed structures (for example, the social and political context), these are not fixed in the same way. Typically, a positivist would maintain that these social structures do exist and, as they construct the social world, should be the focus of social sciences (Hay, 2002). Conversely, *agency* concerns the ability of agents within society to make decisions for themselves. Thus, the critical tenet of the structure-agency problem is this; does society provide a context to influence the behaviour of individuals, or do individuals make their own decisions and thus create the

context in which they exist? At either end of this debate are the structuralist and intentionalist positions (Hay, 2002). Structuralists argue that structure determines agency, and therefore exclusively informs events. Conversely, the intentionalist position focuses purely on the actions of the individuals involved, with the agency determining structure. As the intentionalist position does not believe that structure plays a role, every event is based purely on agency, and therefore every event must be unique. These two positions are at the extremes, and it is very rare to come across pure forms of either structuralism or intentionalism. Indeed, a key criticism of these two positions is that each is reduced to the other with little consideration as to how they interact.

In recent years, authors have considered the ways in which agents are influenced by the structures in which they exist, while also recognising that the actions of agents over time determine these structures (Hay, 2002). For example, Giddens (1981) argued that structure and agency are a 'duality', with both being different sides of the same coin. However, Hay (2002:127) later took this metaphor further, arguing that structure and agency are rather 'metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged', and therefore should not be studied separately.

Lewis (2002:19) makes the point that is critical in this research: social structures are a key component of researching international agency. While social structures may assist agency, they may also impede it. A significant facet of mega-events is their international nature, yet different nations have structures beyond those of international borders. Recent Olympic Games have taken place in China, UK and Brazil, three nations with differing languages,

writing systems, customs and much more. These structures may well impede the ability of bidders and hosts of mega-events to gain the international agency that is desired. While the IOC dictates that all bid documentation is to be presented in both English and French, less than 7% of the world's population speak one of these two languages (Ethnologue, 2018). Indeed, the IOC uses the words 'legacy' in English and 'héritage' in French. These two words could have different meanings; the word legacy implies looking forward, yet the word heritage infers looking backwards in time (Girginov, 2018). This difference emphasises the ways in which social structures can impact agents, highlighting the potential causality between the agent and structure (for example, an agent who chooses to learn a language due to the social structures in place) (Marsh, 1999; Lewis, 2002). The concept of causality is of particular note for this research, which utilises a multiple case study approach across two different nations, and thus needs to be considered.

Given the research question of this study and the researcher's own philosophical views, this research will take a **constructivist** ontological position. This research is seeking to investigate the strategies put in place in order to leverage unsuccessful Olympic bids. While structure will obviously play a role, and in particular the political and social contexts of the bids considered, as the literature review demonstrated, the gains from bidding is as yet an underdeveloped area. While the IOC has put in place some assistance to support bid leveraging, there are as yet no formal guidelines; therefore, the decision to leverage a bid, and the plans put in place are more likely to be a result of agency rather than structure.

### 4.2.2 Epistemological Approach

Once the ontological approach has been considered, the epistemological position can now be discussed. Put simply, if ontology looks at '*what exists?*', epistemology considers '*what can we know?*' about a topic, and what methods can be used to examine it (Bryman, 2012). While understanding the epistemology of research is vital (Grix, 2018), Weed (2005) notes that much of the research into sport lacks clearly defined epistemologies.

Rather like ontology, there are two umbrella terms detailing opposing epistemological positions. First, foundationalism suggests that 'true knowledge must rest upon a set of firm, unquestionable set of indisputable truths from which our beliefs may be logically deduced, so retaining the truth value of the foundational premises from which they follow' (Hughes and Sharrock, 2014:4-5). Put more succinctly, foundationalists believe that knowledge is independent of reality itself and they will typically use the scientific approaches to research that are utilised within the natural sciences. The extreme foundationalist approach is that of positivism. This research is often deductive, with many researchers seeking to prove theories (Grix, 2002).

In contrast, anti-foundationalists (or constructivists) believe that knowledge is dependent on human practices, with human agents constructing the social reality in which they exist and there is nothing that is not constructed in the human mind (Grix, 2010a). Therefore, anti-foundationalist studies generally involve researchers interacting with the research and are typically led by a constructivist ontology. Interpretivism is viewed as being an extreme anti-foundational position. However, as Grix (2018) notes, it is rare for a piece of

research to fit perfectly into one of the two umbrella epistemologies, with most research being in the 'grey areas', where epistemologies overlap. For example, economic studies may appear to suit a positivist, foundationalist approach, yet as far back as the early 1980s it was noted that economic studies had progressed beyond this limitation (Caldwell, 1982). This project takes a 'hard' interpretivist approach (Grix, 2010b), which is at the 'harder' end of interpretivism, and thus is nearer to critical realist approaches than traditional interpretivism and allows researchers to account for nuances between different research paradigms (critical realism will be discussed in more detail in the next section). Goodwin and Grix (2011:541) further clarify hard interpretivism as being a position that places 'emphasis on structures and institutions' but remains 'committed to incorporating meaning and interpretation into explanations'. This position provides researchers with the opportunity to place greater value on the role played by structure in the research, while still incorporating the value of agency. Thus, research from a hard interpretivism perspective provides researchers with the opportunity to gain a 'thick' description (Andrew et al., 2010:123) of the issues of agency within a research setting, while still allowing for the impact of structure (Goodwin and Grix, 2011).

As has been noted, the lack of formal guidance for cities leveraging bids means that agency plays a large role. However, the plans put in place are shaped by the external context in which the agents exist (see for example, the discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the unique political climate from which Cape Town's bid emerged).



### 4.2.3 Research Paradigms

As was noted earlier, there are three key research paradigms which encompass the ontological and epistemological positions discussed already. These are positivism, interpretivism and critical realism. Table 4.2 below provides a brief outline of these three paradigms. This table is only intended to be a summary; in reality, the nuances of each paradigm are far greater than can be shown in a simple table.

*Table 4.2: A Summary of the Key Research Paradigms<sup>6</sup>*

	<b>Positivism</b>	<b>Critical Realism</b>	<b>Interpretivism</b>
Ontological position	Objectivism	Realism	Constructivism
Epistemological position	Foundationalist	Foundationalist	Anti-foundationalist
View	The world exists beyond our knowledge of it	The world exists beyond our knowledge of it	The world is constructed through agent interaction
Methodology	Explaining relationships	Not only to understand, but also explain	Emphasis on understanding
Methods	Utilises scientific methods e.g. surveys, observation tools, structured interviews	May use scientific methods, but also utilises an interpretivist understanding	Believes social sciences are distinct from natural sciences and may use different methods e.g. interviews, focus groups

Positivism tends to relate to the scientific methods epitomised by an objective ontology and foundationalist epistemology. Hollis (1999:41) defines this as ‘any approach which applies scientific method to human affairs conceived as belonging to a natural order open to objective enquiry’. This definition sums

<sup>6</sup> Information taken from Bryman (2012) and Grix (2018)

up the key research decisions taken by a positivist. Crucially, the positivist position suggests that researchers should attempt to stay objective and separate from the area of study so as not to influence the findings. This often leads to methods used in the study of the natural sciences (Bryman, 2012). Further, positivist research seeks generalisation, that is, the results from a particular study may be applied to other cases (Blaikie, 2007). The paradigm of positivism is an extremely broad church that covers a wide range of approaches. Halfpenny (1982) identified at least 12 different positivist approaches to research, whereas Blaikie (2007) reduces this to three. While some details of these approaches differ, they all seek to apply methods traditionally used in the natural sciences to social science research.

The second approach, and one that is often viewed as a mirror image of positivism, is that of interpretivism. Again, this is a broad term that incorporates a wide number of similar, but differing, research approaches. Interpretivism developed in response to the large number of studies employing a positivist approach, and generally takes a diametrically opposite position to that of positivism (Grix, 2018). Table 4.2 provides a key summary of the key interpretivist position.

Whereas positivists seek to replicate natural science approaches to research, interpretivists view the social sciences as being a distinct research area and so utilise a different approach, with an emphasis on understanding rather than explanation (Grix, 2010a). This approach means that researchers will often conduct the research from within the area of study. Thus, research cannot be wholly objective, and instead may be influenced by the researchers

themselves. Interpretivist research will further consider the double hermeneutic, which states that researchers are not only seeking to understand the agents involved in the research, but the way the agents themselves view the natural world needs to be considered (Blaikie, 2007).

The third key research paradigm is that of critical realism. If positivism and interpretivism can be seen as opposites, critical realism can be seen as sitting between the two of them, seeking to combine the understanding of interpretivism with the explanation of positivism. Critical realism will typically take a foundationalist epistemology (as does positivism) but has a distinctly different view of the agency and structure debate. Whereas positivists have a focus on structure rather than agency, critical realism argues that there are 'deep structures which cannot be directly observed' (Marsh et al., 1999:12). It is this distinction of the agency and structure debate that defines critical realism, which argues that structure constrains rather than determines outcomes. It is not only that agency is impacted by structure, but also that agency will in return affect structure (Hay, 2002).

Due to the relatively recent development of critical realism, much of the research into events generally, and sport mega-events more specifically, have typically taken either a positivist or an interpretivist approach (Girginov and Hills, 2009; Getz, 2012), although more recently, work by Byers (2013), Girginov (2016) and Hayday et al. (2017) have applied a critical realist approach to event management research. Girginov and Hills (2009:170) argue that the IOC utilises both positivist and interpretivist approaches. First, there has been a desire for 'objective scientific knowledge' (ibid) with the intention

of informing policy and endorsing the notion of the positive impacts that the Games can deliver. This is supported by Bladen (2008) who argues that stakeholders may prefer the sort of tangible data that a positivist approach may provide. Comparatively, the interpretivist approach may be more likely to favour research into the social impacts of sport mega-events. While it could be viewed from a positivist perspective (for example, to examine the structures in place that generate such impacts), researchers may favour an interpretivist point of view that focuses on the impact that such events have on individuals. However, this is not to say that such a study could not be taken from a positivist point of view. The paradigm does not necessitate that a certain research method should or should not be used; however, it may help to support these decisions.

As should be clear from the ontological and epistemological stances already discussed, this research is approached from an *interpretivist* point of view. The reasons for this are as follows: first and foremost, this is the approach that is most in line with the researcher's philosophical stance. The concept of leverage perhaps lends itself more naturally to an interpretivist position. Girginov and Hills (2009:164) argue that an interpretivist study will likely 'focus less on outcomes such as the number of jobs, facilities and participants created, and more on the question of what processes, mechanisms and actors were or will be responsible for them'. This corresponds to the original argument for studying mega-event leverage, which views the processes employed rather than the outcome (Chalip, 2006). Therefore, the concept of leverage as a whole is perhaps better suited to an interpretive approach than a positivist one;

this has resulted in several leveraging studies taking an interpretivist stance (Mackintosh et al., 2016; Gaudette et al., 2017; Knott et al., 2017; Mhanna et al., 2017). Gaudette et al. (2017) specifically note that a constructivist epistemology allows the researcher to gain a more in-depth understanding of the strategies and processes employed for leveraging purposes.

This is not to say that research into leverage must take an interpretive stance. Indeed, the interpretive approach may be limited by practical restrictions. The methods associated with the interpretive approach often involve the researcher ensconcing themselves within the area of study. If an event organising committee does not have the time to manage a leveraging strategy (Chalip and Heere, 2014), then it is unlikely to have time to work with a researcher (Bladen, 2008).

### **4.3 Methodology**

Having set the ontological and epistemological parameters of the research, the methodology of the current study can now be considered. This research is qualitative in nature, which marries with the constructivist approach of the study (Holloway, Brown, and Shipway, 2010). As Grix (2002) notes, the methods used by qualitative researchers tend to be adaptable and allow the researcher to consider the differing social context of the study, hence the natural fit with a constructivist approach. The main purpose of a qualitative study is to allow the researcher to analyse the object of the study in their natural environment (Grix, 2002), often with the intention of developing theory or providing a clear picture of a certain 'object' of study. This object could be

an event, a geographical location, or an issue (Andrew et al., 2010; Grix, 2018). The methods of analysis for this particular research are discussed in Section 4.4.

Creswell (2013) identified five key types of qualitative research. First, a *narrative study* involves the researcher gleaning stories from individuals and fashioning these into a narrative. This research primarily involves interviewing the participants, but narratives can be gathered through observation and document analysis. There are four types of narrative research; biographical, autoethnography, life history, and oral history. Riessman (2008) identifies three steps in analysing the data: (1) draw out the themes of the narrative, (2) the way in which the story was told, and (3) who the story is targeted towards. While this research will, in some way, seek to frame a narrative regarding the bids for the Olympic Games, time constraints and access to the information has resulted in a narrative study being rejected.

The second type of qualitative research identified by Creswell (2013) is *phenomenological*, where research is conducted on a particular phenomenon that has occurred. This will often comprise interviewing participants who were involved with, or lived through the phenomenon in question, with other secondary sources of data often adding to the depth of the research. The data will then, typically, be analysed moving from the smallest units of analysis to larger units and will consider what the participants experienced and how they experienced it (Moustakas, 1994). As with a narrative study, phenomenology was considered, with the view that the phenomenon in question is the bid process. However, phenomenological studies have often focused on the

experiences of the people involved, which is not wholly suitable for this research.

Creswell's (2013) third type of qualitative research is *grounded theory*, where researchers generate theories seeking to find a 'unified theoretical explanation' for a particular process or action (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:107). This approach will usually see a researcher interviewing participants in the process, resulting in the development of a theory that is 'grounded' in these responses (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). As the interviews occur over time, the researcher will be developing theory; thus, it is important that all ideas are noted as the research progresses. Grounded theory is a methodological process that could have been applied to this study; however, given the different contexts that each bidding nation operates in, it is questionable whether Corbin and Strauss' 'unified theoretical explanation' would be revealed (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:107).

*Ethnographic* research, the fourth type of qualitative study, relies on the researcher studying a group of a particular culture; this will typically be a large cultural group that consists of many interacting people. The researcher will attempt to make sense of the social norms and interaction of the group and will often be immersed in the group itself. This approach allows the researcher to observe the participants within the social group and to conduct interviews and build an understanding of how this social group operates (Creswell, 2013). While ethnography may be a useful methodology, as with the narrative study, it is impractical due to constraints in information access and time. At the start of the data collection process, there were four cities in the process of bidding

for the 2024 Olympic Games (Rome, Paris, Budapest and Los Angeles). The geographical spread of these cities, together with language issues, means that it was not feasible to employ an ethnographic methodology.

Thus, we come to the fifth type of qualitative research: the *case study*. Case studies involve the researcher selecting a case (or number of cases) to be studied in a real-life setting (Yin, 2009). While a case study may involve interviews, it typically involves gathering data from a number of different sources that include participant observation and data analysis; Creswell (2013:98) is clear that just one source of information is not sufficient to build a case. This data will be analysed to identify themes and issues within the case. Given the large number of cities which have bid for an Olympic Games (274 since the first Olympic Games in 1896), a multiple case study approach is applied in this study and is discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.

## **4.4 Research Methods**

This research utilised a two-part process, involving content analysis and a multiple case study approach focusing on two recent bidders for Olympic Games. This section outlines the research conducted together with justification for all decisions made.

### **4.4.1 Content Analysis**

Content analysis is traditionally viewed as a quantitative research method, particularly when conducted using a deductive approach (Grix, 2010a). However, content analysis can also be used as a qualitative research method. Whereas a quantitative content analysis may focus on counting the number of



times that specific words appear (and thus creating a quantitative dataset), qualitative content analyses will often focus on the language that is used or the contextual meaning of the written content (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Bryman, 2012). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three types of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed and summative. A conventional content analysis will typically be used to describe a particular event; for example, it could be used to describe the emotional responses of citizens to the opening ceremony of an Olympic Games. This method is particularly useful for a phenomenon that has not previously been studied, and thus makes an inductive approach to coding appropriate. The second approach is directed content analysis. This would normally be taken when there is existing theory regarding the event, but this is viewed as incomplete and warrants further study. In this case, a more deductive coding will take place based on the theory. The third approach is summative content analysis. As the name suggests, this tends towards the quantitative approach in that it counts the number of times a particular word is used, but it also considers the interpretation and underlying meanings within the text (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).

This research utilised a directed content analysis and followed the process suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). Elo and Kyngäs (2008) provide information on the initial data gathering, stating that the sample must be representative. Once the data is gathered, it should all be read through to ensure that the researcher absorbs the information provided (Braun and Clarke, 2006). When the researcher is immersed in the data, coding can begin,

and this involves the highlighting of key words and phrases within the text based on pre-determined codes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). It is important at this stage to determine whether the manifest or latent content should be analysed. If the text is taken at face value, then this is a manifest content analysis. Conversely, latent content includes the researcher's interpretation of the words used. Any text that cannot be coded according to these codes should be highlighted to be returned to later and may produce a new code (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). This then allows the already existing theory to be developed further according to this new data.

Content analysis is a regularly used method within sport management. Andrew et al. (2010) found that content analyses of journals, books, newspapers, websites, company documents, adverts and television shows have all been conducted within this industry. Further, content analysis of Olympic bid books has previously been conducted. Silva dos Santos and Alves Medeiros (2015) conducted an analysis of London 2012, Rio 2016, and Madrid 2020 Candidature Files in order to determine the discursive constructions regarding the proposed media operations.

#### **4.4.1.1 Review of Candidature Files**

As already discussed in Chapter 3, as part of the bidding procedure, all Candidate Cities have to respond to the following question in their Candidature File:

What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?

(IOC, 2009:66).

Since this question was introduced during the bidding process for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, it has been answered by the 16 Candidate Cities for Winter and Summer Olympic Games up to 2024. It is important to note that these 16 Candidate Cities are the only bidders to have answered this question; thus, this content analysis contains all of the data available. This point is crucial, as it allows the research to include a wide variety of states, political systems and economic statuses. Each of these factors can be viewed in the data in Table 10.5 on page 405, and these contexts will be considered within Chapter 5.

The answers provided by each of the candidate cities to the question 'What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?' (Question 1.4 for the bidders for the 2016 and 2022 Games; Question 1.3 for the bidders for the 2018 and 2020 Games) were isolated from the rest of the document. It should be noted that for the 2024 Candidature File, this question was combined with legacies for hosting. The legacies pertaining to the bid process were separated from the answers regarding hosting. All data was uploaded to NVivo, a specialist data analysis software.

Table 4.3 provides a summary of the sources used.

Table 4.3: Summary of the Candidature Questionnaires

City	Event Year	Type	Section Heading	Word Count	Reference
Chicago	2016	Summer	Benefits of the Bid	177	Chicago 2016 (2009:21)
Madrid	2016	Summer	Benefits of Bidding	455	Madrid 2016 (2009:19)
Rio	2016	Summer	Benefits of Bidding	216	Rio 2016 (2009:23)
Tokyo	2016	Summer	Welcome benefits from Tokyo's bid	388	Tokyo 2016 (2009:28)
Annecy	2018	Winter	Benefits of the Bid for the City and Territory	405	Annecy 2018 (2011:19)
Munich	2018	Winter	Munich is Delivering Tremendous Benefits from the Bid regardless of the Outcome	293	Munich 2018 (2011:23)
Pyeong-Chang	2018	Winter	Benefits of PyeongChang's bid	384	PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21)
Istanbul	2020	Summer	Benefits of Bidding	175	Istanbul 2020 (2013:21)
Madrid	2020	Summer	Benefits of the Bid	316	Madrid 2020 (2013:17)
Tokyo	2020	Summer	Benefits of bidding	193	Tokyo 2020 (2013:6)
Almaty	2022	Winter	Legacy of bidding for the Games	125	Almaty 2022 (2015:13)
Beijing	2022	Winter	Legacy of the Bid	155	Beijing 2022 (2015:19)
Budapest	2024	Summer	Bidding and Hosting Benefits	307	Budapest 2024 (2017:24)
Los Angeles	2024	Summer	Benefits beyond the Games	640	Los Angeles 2024 (2017:20)
Paris	2024	Summer	Outstanding economic, social, environmental and sport benefits	211	Paris 2024 (2017:39)
Rome	2024	Summer	Long term benefits for city/region/ country	302	Rome 2024 (2017:21)

The 16 answers to the question were coded to identify any evidence of planned leveraging from the bid, according to Chalip's (2004:228) definition that leverage refers to 'those activities which need to be undertaken around the event itself [...] which seek to maximise the long-term benefit from events.' In this respect, it is important to clarify the difference between leverage and legacy. If a bidder details an impact of the bid, but with no consideration of the strategies that will ensure these impacts come about, it is not included in this study. For example, Budapest 2024 (2017:24) states that the bid will bring 'image promotion and awareness raising' but does not offer plans that will be put in place to leverage this benefit. Therefore, this statement is not coded as a leveraging strategy.

The coding was conducted in two steps. First, given the lack of research into the area of leveraging Olympic bids, an inductive coding approach was undertaken to identify the areas in which bid cities seek to leverage the event. This coding identified four specific areas of leverage, consistent with those areas identified in Chapter 3: sport participation, nation and community building, urban development, and global profile. These four areas, together with illustrative examples can be seen in Table 4.4. The 16 sources were then coded a second time in order to identify the four elements of Chalip's (2004) model; the leverageable resource, opportunities, strategic objectives, and the means by which they are achieved (see Section 2.4 on page 62 for more detail on these specific areas).

Table 4.4: Illustrative Examples of Coding

Area for Leverage	Illustrative Example	Reference
Sport Participation	'TMG adopted the "Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports" to improve sporting performance, promote the healthy development, of youth, and encourage lifelong healthy living of citizens.'	Tokyo 2016 (2009:28)
Nation and Community Building	'Launch of the Integrados (Integrated) programme which will reach out to the city's children with disability or at risk of social exclusion.'	Madrid 2016 (2009:19)
Urban Development	'The bid has drawn a sufficient amount of investment from the government and the private sector. The National Speed Skating Oval, the Biathlon Centre, and the Nordic Centre Ski Jumping Venue will be constructed as scheduled. The transport and venue facilities in Beijing and Zhangjiakou will be upgraded in a continuous manner.'	Beijing 2022 (2015:19)
Global Profile	'The bidding process provides excellent opportunities for us to promote Madrid on the world stage, increasing global awareness of our city, our business, and tourism offers.'	Madrid 2016 (2009:19)

This data is then presented in two parts. First, the four areas for leverage identified in Table 4.4 above were taken in turn in order to offer a holistic view of the leveraging opportunities available for bid cities. Second, the bid cities were classified into five categories: 1) Winter or Summer Olympic Games, 2) geographic location, 3) government type, 4) economic status, and 5) bid success. Table 4.5 shows the categorisation.

Table 4.5: Categorising the Bidders<sup>7</sup>

City	Nation	Year of event	Geographic state	Government type	Economic state	Success of the bid
Chicago	USA	2016	Americas	Constitutional federal republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Madrid	Spain	2016	Europe	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Rio	Brazil	2016	Americas	Federal presidential republic	Emerging	Successful
Tokyo	Japan	2016	Asia	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Annecy	France	2018	Europe	Semi-presidential republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Munich	Germany	2018	Europe	Federal parliamentary republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Pyeong-Chang	South Korea	2018	Asia	Presidential Republic	Emerging	Successful
Istanbul	Turkey	2020	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Emerging	Unsuccessful
Madrid	Spain	2020	Europe	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Tokyo	Japan	2020	Asia	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Successful
Almaty	Kazakhstan	2022	Asia	Presidential republic	Emerging	Unsuccessful
Beijing	China	2022	Asia	Communist state	Emerging	Successful
Budapest	Hungary	2024	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Emerging	Withdrawn
Los Angeles	USA	2024	Americas	Constitutional federal republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Paris	France	2024	Europe	Semi-presidential republic	Advanced	Successful
Rome	Italy	2024	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Advanced	Withdrawn

<sup>7</sup> The full dataset (including references for the data) can be found in Table 10.5 on page 405

Categorising the bidders in this way answers one of the issues identified in the literature review. There has been a recent proliferation of studies regarding failed bids that typically use advanced Western nations as the case studies. Including all cities that have progressed to the candidate stage allows a wider range of states to be considered. Breaking the nations down further into the identified categories allows this research to tease out the nuances between nations with different political and economic statuses.

#### **4.4.2 Case Studies**

A case study can be defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are clearly not evident’ (Yin, 2009:18). This emphasis on context is seen as being critical, as it is the contextual factors of the case that will be the reason for selecting the chosen phenomenon as a case study (Grix 2010a). Bryman (2012) notes that the word ‘case’ will often refer to a location, such as a specific community or organisation, that the researcher attempts to comprehensively study.

Holloway et al. (2010) and Andrew et al. (2010) recognise that case studies are particularly important in event and sport research, as events are finite in nature, have a clear start and end point, and take place in a specific geographic location. Andrew et al. (2010) argue that there are numerous reasons for selecting a case-study approach. First, a researcher may wish to gain insight from several viewpoints (Velde et al., 2004) or gain a deeper understanding of an issue or phenomenon that occurs. Further, a case study may be used to verify that a current theory occurs when applied to a real-life



event, to develop new theories, or to investigate a phenomenon that has not been researched before (Ghuari and Gronhaug, 2005; Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). The findings of the case will often be used to assist practitioners dealing with a similar issue or event in the future (Andrew, Pedersen, and McEvoy, 2010).

In addition, there are three differing types of cases (Grix, 2018). First, a *descriptive* case, which often deals with a historical matter and will seek to answer the questions who, what, when and where, rather than how and why (Yin, 2009). Seeking to answer these same questions is the *exploratory* case (ibid), which will attempt to test hypotheses and will often be used as a test case to gauge the appropriateness of this case for further study (Grix, 2018). Finally, an *explanatory* case will attempt to answer the questions how and why (Yin, 2009). Grix (2010a) notes that these are the case studies most applicable to the social sciences, with researchers seeking to find results that can then be generalised across further cases.

#### **4.4.2.1 Single-Case Study vs Multiple-Case Study Approach**

A case study analysis can be carried out using either just one case or a number of cases in a multiple-case study. A single-case study approach sees the researcher selecting just one case study for analysis, which by its nature will be an in-depth analysis. This will often have one unit of analysis, which may be a single organisation (Andrew et al., 2010); however, it is important that the researcher does not immerse themselves in the single-case study to the extent that the wider literature is overlooked. Thus, even when considering

a single case, it is important that the researcher ensures that the work is rooted to the broad research around the subject (Grix, 2010a).

Yin (2009) discusses the different reasons for adopting a single-case study. First, the case may be a *critical* case. This is a case that can be used to test a theory to determine its appropriateness. If the theory does not fit with the case, then new theories may be devised. A case may also be chosen because it is an *extreme* or *unique* case. These cases are likely not to have been studied before, and so the results will add to the body of literature. Similarly, a *revealing* case may previously have been unattainable to researchers and so research into this case will contribute to the academic knowledge. Finally, an *average* case would be studied if the researcher is attempting to investigate a typical situation that may be extrapolated to other instances. An average case may be studied from a longitudinal point of view, where the case is investigated in two different periods of time (Yin, 2009). Yin does go on to acknowledge that a case may change over time; for example, what is deemed to be a unique case at the start of the study may transpire to become an average case in the future.

While a single-case study considers only one case, it can still take an embedded or holistic approach. A holistic approach will study the case from a macro perspective, in that it may look at an investigation as a whole. An embedded approach to case studies is more complicated, as it attempts to study more than one unit of analysis (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). For example, a case study researching an Olympic bid may investigate the different actions of numerous stakeholders within the bid, with differing levels of involvement.

While an embedded case study may appear to be more beneficial, a holistic approach is useful if there are no obvious sub-units to be studied, or if the theory that is underlying the study relies on a holistic approach. However, a holistic approach may cause issues if the researcher fails to recognise sub-units that are present, and which may play a key role in the results. Similarly, an embedded approach may cause issues should the case focus only on the micro level and fail to report on the organisation as a whole.

Conversely, a multiple-case study focuses on two or more case studies and is often viewed as being more substantial than a single-case study. In some ways, the rationale for selecting cases in a multiple-case study approach is likely to have some similarities to that for a single-case study approach. The researcher will still have to determine whether to take a holistic or embedded approach. Should a holistic approach be considered, the researcher will look at a number of organisations as a whole, building up a case study of each. Should an embedded approach be taken, the researcher will consider different sub-units of a number of different organisations (Baxter and Jack, 2008).

However, there will be further considerations when choosing cases in a multiple case study. By definition, there are unlikely to be two or more unique or revelatory cases which can be selected. Seawright and Gerring (2008:297-298) provide seven types of methods for selecting case studies: 1) typical, 2) diverse, 3) extreme, 4) deviant, 5) influential, 6) most similar, and 7) most different. It should be noted that case study selection is different from sampling in a quantitative study. Whereas a sample in a quantitative study will attempt to provide conclusions that can be generalised across all cases, this is not

necessarily applicable to the selection of cases in a multiple-case study. In order to cover each of the possible variables, a researcher would need to study a large number of case studies. While this may be possible, for example with a survey, the nature of case studies and the data collection techniques that are required make this impractical for a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2009). Yin goes on to note that should a sampling approach be required for all research, then a number of studies would not be conducted.

Yet, the number of cases to be selected does need to be considered carefully and is likely to depend upon the degree of confidence that the researcher wishes to have regarding the results; the more case studies, the more accurate the results gained are likely to be. However, it is possible that as more case studies are selected, the depth in which they are investigated becomes shallower. Further, and relevant to this study, the more case studies that are researched, the more resources that are needed (Yin, 2009). For example, should this research attempt to visit each city which has bid for a Summer or Winter Olympic Games, 116 cities would need to be visited. Even if the period was limited to Summer bids since the 2000 Olympic Games, then 39 different cities would still need to be considered. This approach would need resources, both in terms of time and finances, which are beyond the current study.

Given the nature of this research, a single-case study is not appropriate. As already discussed, many different states with different characteristics and cultures bid to host Olympic Games, and therefore the external validity of a single-case study could be questioned. Thus, this research will employ a multiple-case study, which takes a 'diverse' approach to case study selection

(Seawright and Gerring, 2008:297). This is an approach that Barrick et al. (2016) argue is under-utilised for research into leveraging. In particular, it is argued that qualitative case studies can provide the opportunity to explore leveraging initiatives from several different perspectives in order to complement the already existing quantitative studies. The rationale and selection process for these case studies will be discussed in the next section.

#### **4.4.2.2 Case Study Selection**

The first decision to be made in terms of the case study selection is which mega-events to include. As stated in the literature review, this research uses Black's (2008) definition that there exists first order, second order and third order mega-events. However, as this research is not attempting to discover whether bids for different events can be leveraged, it seems sensible to keep the mega-event in question as a constant variable. Thus, this research will focus on losing bids for the Olympic Games. The decision to exclude the World Cup from this research is due to the differing bid processes. Also, the nature of the hosting of a World Cup is different to the Olympics, as a World Cup generally takes place across an entire nation as opposed to a single city. However, the boundaries are becoming less clear; the Football World Cup in Qatar will see all of the matches take place within 65 miles of each other, while the London 2012 Olympic Games saw events take place as far afield as Glasgow and Manchester.

Since the advent of the Modern Olympic Games in 1896, there have been 274 bids to host the Summer and Winter Games, of which 214 were unsuccessful. These bids have then been further reduced for this study using five criteria:

1. Winning bids have been excluded. While there are undoubtedly cities which have successfully leveraged a bid and have gone on to host (for example, Vancouver 2010), it is deemed too difficult to separate the outcome of the bid from the hosting itself.
2. All Winter Games were excluded in order to enhance the validity of the study.
3. Bids for Games pre-2000 were excluded. The idea of legacy did not truly start to enter the Olympic narrative until the 1990s (Leopkey and Parent, 2012), while the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games are viewed as being the first to be leveraged (Chalip, 2002). Similarly, bid processes that were not complete at the time of data collection were excluded. Thus, only the bid processes for the 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 Summer Olympic Games were considered.
4. The linguistic limitations of the researcher determined that predominantly English-speaking nations were chosen. While all official documentation needs to be produced in English and French, it is not guaranteed that all stakeholders would speak English.
5. Due to the 'diverse' case study selection process (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:298), nations of different political, economic and social statuses were sought. This information can be viewed in Table 10.5 on page 405. It should be noted that all the data refers to the *nation* which bid for the Olympic Games as opposed to the *city*.

Once the inclusion and exclusion criteria had been applied, five bid cities remained: Manchester 2000, Cape Town 2004, Toronto 2008, New York 2012

and Chicago 2016. Of these five cities, Cape Town 2004 stood out, as it is from a less developed nation with low levels of wealth. Thus, Cape Town was the first case study selected. Given the similarities between the remaining four cities (see Table 10.5 on page 405), it was decided that only one city would be studied. Each bid has been discussed in the literature (see Chapter 3 for more detail), and so none were excluded on this basis. Thus, the final case was selected on a pragmatic basis; that is, the access that the researcher could gain to the bid teams. As will be discussed further in Section 4.4.2.5, direct contact could be made with a member of the Toronto bid team through personal contacts. Thus, Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was selected as the second case study. A summary of the differences are in Table 4.6.

*Table 4.6: Canadian and South African Contexts<sup>8</sup>*

	South Africa (1997)	Canada (2001)
Population	40,926,063	31,081,900
GDP (US\$)	152 billion	732 billion
GDP per Capita (US\$)	3,728.30	23,573.80
Unemployment	22.9%	7.2%
Economy Type	Developing	Advanced

#### 4.4.2.3 Semi-structured interviews

The first, and perhaps most crucial method of data collection employed in researching the two case studies, is semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders who were involved with the Olympic bids. Differing approaches

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<sup>8</sup> Full details of the economic contexts of the two cases can be found in Table 10.1 on page 401 and Table 10.3 on page 403

to interviews were considered. Saunders et al. (2003) first divide interviews into 'one-to-one' and 'one-to-many'. A 'one-to-many' type interview (i.e. focus group) was discarded due to the difficulties of being able to gather all interviewees together. Thus, once a 'one-to-one' interview format was settled upon, it was then important to determine the style of the interview. Structured interviews were not considered appropriate due to the already mentioned differences between South Africa and Canada, and so a semi-structured interview style was chosen,

A semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to gain a greater understanding and appreciation of the topics discussed by the interviewee, as their looser nature allows the interviewer to follow up with additional questions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). However, an issue with interviews is that interviewees may just answer the questions asked, and therefore the themes identified are derived from the questions. When constructing the interview schedule, it was important that there were not questions about specific leveraging plans; for example, a question on sporting infrastructure would identify sporting infrastructure as a strong theme. Thus, the interview schedule was constructed in a way that allowed the interviewees to discuss the strategies put in place that they viewed as the most important. As a result, the interviews themselves occasionally moved towards being unstructured, with the interviewee talking at length about their experiences (Saunders et al., 2003). The indicative interview schedule used can be seen in the Appendices on page 413.



#### **4.4.2.4 Interviewee population**

The sample for interviewees was limited to those stakeholders who had either worked on an Olympic bid or had worked for an agency that could have been impacted by the bid (e.g. city council or tourist board). This approach was taken in order to triangulate the data. Firstly, those stakeholders who had worked on a bid provided information on the strategies put in place to leverage the bid, and their opinion of the impact. These interviews focused on the leveraging strategies put in place and the reasoning behind them. This information was then corroborated through interviews with the agencies who had dealt with the actual *impact* of the leveraging plans. Finally, further triangulation was sought through document analysis, as detailed in Section 4.4.2.8, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the study.

#### **4.4.2.5 Interviewee sample**

Given the specific criteria needed when identifying potential interviewees (i.e. interviewees were required either to have worked on an Olympic bid or for an agency impacted by the bid), a 'snowball' sampling method was employed (Saunders et al., 2003). This involves finding one suitable interviewee and asking them to put the researcher in contact with others. A snowball sampling technique was chosen due to the difficulty in identifying members of bid teams; while official bid documentation will often list the names of board members, there are very rarely contact details provided, or the names of other members of the bid team.

For the Cape Town case study, initial contact was made through a partner in the CARNIVAL Project, a European Union Framework 7 Marie Curie

International Research Staff Exchange Scheme Programme that seeks to 'investigate what factors impact upon the planned and unplanned legacy outcomes of mega-events and their implications for stakeholders' (CARNIVAL, n.d.). A member of the CARNIVAL project was able to provide contact with a member of the bid team, who then provided the details of other members. A similar approach was taken for the Toronto case study. Personal contacts were used to identify one member of the bid team who then provided the contact details of other members. In both case studies, interviewees provided contact details for further interviewees, leading to 31 interviews in total.

The majority of interviews were conducted as face-to-face meetings at either the interviewee's place of work or in public locations, such as cafes. However, given the global nature of this study, relying on the researcher travelling to Cape Town and Toronto, a face-to-face meeting was not always possible as interviewees were not always available during the short periods of travel. Thus, Skype was used to conduct several interviews (as shown in Table 4.7 on page 175). While Skype is becoming a more accepted vehicle for data collection (Deakin and Wakefield, 2011; Hanna, 2012), it was felt that the Skype interviews lacked the empathy of the face-to-face interviews. For example, during face-to-face interviews, there is often interaction pre- and post-interview as the interviewer and interviewee meet and get ready for the interview, and then later, prepare to leave. This interaction was often lost during the Skype interviews, with both the interviewer and interviewee tending to start the interview straight away and end the call as soon as the interview was finished. However, given the geographical location of the interviewees,

conducting an interview by Skype was viewed as being a better option than not conducting the interview at all.

The interviews took between 30 minutes and two hours; a summary of the interviewees can be found in Table 4.7. One interviewee was not prepared to take part in a full interview; however, they were happy for me to submit my questions via email and they wrote out a reply. While this did not allow for back and forth discussion, the written responses provided were of such detail that back and forth discussion would not have been necessary anyway.

Given the ethical approval sought, and the small numbers of people working for each bid team, it is not possible to list the job roles of the interviewees without disclosing their identities. Therefore, Table 4.7 provides the detail as to whether they were part of the bid team, and the area on which they focused.

Table 4.7: Interviewees

Case	Code	Role	Area	Type of Interview	Interview details	
Cape Town	CT01	Bid team	Architect	Face to face	02/05/2016 (1 hour 48 min)	
	CT02	Bid team	Architect	Face to face	04/05/2016 (59 min)	
	CT03	Bid team	Community	Face to face	05/05/2016 (1 hour 22 min)	
	CT04	Bid team	Sport Federations	Face to face	06/05/2016 (32 min)	
	CT05	Bid team	Technical	Face to face	09/05/2016 (1 hour 3 min)	
	CT06	Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport, Western Cape			Face to face	15/09/2016 (49 min)
	CT07	Municipal Planning, City of Cape Town			Face to face	16/09/2016 (1 hour 8 min)
	CT08	Destination Development, City of Cape Town			Face to face	19/09/2016 (1 hour 3 min)
	CT09	Bid team	Board Member		Face to face	20/09/2016 (1 hour 4 min)
	CT10	Bid team	Environment		Face to face	26/09/2016 (2 hour 7 min)
	CT11	Bid team	Board Member		Written answers	-
	CT12	Western Cape Convention Bureau			Skype	30/11/2016 (25 minutes)
	CT13	Leisure and Tourism, Western Cape			Skype	30/11/2016 (25 minutes)
Toronto	TO01	Bid team	Community	Face to face	08/06/2017 (46 min)	
	TO02	Bid team		Face to face	09/06/2017 (40 min)	
	TO03	IOC Member		Face to face	12/06/2017 (1 hour 28 min)	
	TO04	Bread Not Circuses; social justice academic – (Helen Lenskyj) <sup>9</sup>			Skype	12/06/2017 (31 min)
	TO05	Bread Not Circuses; social housing academic			Face to face	13/06/2017 (1 hour 33 min)
	TO06	Bid team	Sport Federations		Face to face	14/06/2017 (46 min)
	TO07	Bid team and 2015 Pan AM Games organising committee		Board member	Face to face	15/06/2017 (41 min)
	TO08	Bid team	Arts and Culture		Face to face	16/06/2017 (56 min)
	TO09	Bid team and Waterfront Regeneration Project		Security	Face to face	19/06/2017 (60 min)
	TO10	Bid team	Board member		Face to face	22/06/2017 (1 hour 8 min)
	TO11	Bid team	Sport		Face to face	22/06/2017 (58 min)
	TO12	Bid team and 2015 Pan AM Games organising committee		Board member	Face to face	26/06/2017 (1 hour 36 min)
	TO13	Bid team	Shadow Cabinet		Skype	27/06/2017 (34 min)
	TO14	City of Toronto			Skype	18/07/2017 (47 min)
	TO15	Toronto Sports Council			Skype	22/07/2017 (39 min)
TO16	Waterfront Toronto			Skype	27/07/2017 (46 min)	
TO17	Bid team and Canadian Sport Institute			Skype	28/07/2017 (40 min)	
TO18	Tourism Toronto			Skype	23/89/2017 (41 min)	

<sup>9</sup> Helen Lenskyj requested to be named

#### 4.4.2.6 Data Management

All spoken interviews were recorded and later transcribed. While Bryman (2012) notes that recording interviews increases the accuracy of the transcription, Saunders et al. (2003:264) argue that the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages, noting that the presence of a recorder may impact the relationship between the interviewee and interviewer, that there may be technical issues with the recording equipment, and that the time taken to transcribe the interviews is lengthy. Precautions were taken to avoid any technical issues, with interviews being recorded on two devices. However, one early interview took place in a location with a high level of background noise, and the recording was inaudible on both devices. Fortunately, notes had been taken during the interview which were subsequently typed up. This issue could be attributed partly to the researcher's inexperience of conducting interviews, and each subsequent interview therefore took place in a location where background noise was not an issue.

As Saunders et al. (2003:264) noted, the transcribing of interviews is a lengthy process, and so a transcription service was used. To verify the accuracy of the transcriptions, each recording was listened to again while reading the transcription, to ensure that there were no errors. Where the transcription service was unable to decipher a particular word, this was quite clear in the transcript and appropriate correction was made. In order to abide by ethical considerations, the recordings were first modified to remove any details that may have led to the interviewee being recognised.

#### 4.4.2.7 Coding

The coding process again followed the six stages suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). The reading through of the transcript while listening to the actual recording corresponded to the first stage of familiarising oneself with the data. Once the interviews had been transcribed and checked, phase two began and the transcripts were uploaded into NVivo, a specialist coding software. As Sotiriadou et al. (2014) note, there are often contextual, specific and philosophical reasons for a particular choice of analysis software. In terms of this research, it was decided to use a coding software to reduce the levels of manual work required (Hilal and Alabri, 2013) and to increase the rigour of the analysis through the removal of human error (Welsh, 2002). Once a decision had been taken to use data analysis software, NVivo was chosen due to the researcher's access to, and familiarity with the software. As Sotiriadou et al. (2014) recognise, the use of automatic text analysis can lead to researchers being distanced from the data interpretation; therefore, the transcripts were coded manually using the NVivo software.

As evidenced by Sant et al. (2013), practitioners often do not recognise the difference between legacy, leverage and impact. Therefore, the interviews did not specify the word leverage; rather, the interviews sought to identify the *planned* legacies and the strategies that were put in place to achieve them. Thus, the thematic analysis was conducted at a latent level (Braun and Clarke, 2006), that is, the content was not taken at face value; rather, the content analysis interpreted the underlying ideas of the interviews. This is an approach consistent with an interpretivist research paradigm (ibid). Further, as

suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) as part of stage three, it is important to identify as many themes as possible at this stage. This resulted in a large number of different codes across the interviews which were then placed into 11 broad themes (stage four of Braun and Clarke's (2006) coding process):

- 1) Economic
- 2) Environment
- 3) HR Management
- 4) Hosting other events
- 5) Image
- 6) Infrastructure
- 7) Olympism
- 8) Politics
- 9) Social
- 10) Sport
- 11) Context regarding the bid

It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss fully each of these 11 codes, and indeed, some referred to legacies rather than leveraging. Of those outcomes that were purposefully sought (and therefore fit the definition of leverage), infrastructure, sport, and image were the most prevalent across both case studies and played the largest role within the leveraging plans. As will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, both the Cape Town and Toronto bid teams deliberately upgraded infrastructure within the city and sought to develop the organisation of sport. Further, Cape Town sought to improve the image of both the city and the nation of South Africa through the Olympic bid.

The three themes of infrastructure, sport, and image were also prevalent in the Candidature File analysis; therefore, it is these three themes that will be discussed in detail in the two case study analysis chapters.

It should be noted that not all coding occurred at the same time due to the timing of the data collection. The interviews conducted in Cape Town were conducted in two tranches (May and September 2016), and these interviews were coded over the same time period. The Toronto data collection was conducted in June 2017, and the coding commenced after all interviews were completed. First, the transcript for each interview was read through again. Then, in turn, each interview was coded to identify the areas for leverage. As themes developed through each interview, the coding changed in the first interviews compared to the final ones; thus, each interview was coded several times to ensure that the coding was consistent throughout all the interviews.

Once this initial coding had been conducted, each interview was then coded again, to identify the leverageable resource, opportunity, strategic objective, and means, in accordance with Chalip's (2004) model. Figure 4.1 shows an example of the coding that took place using NVivo. While it appears that all of the text is highlighted in the same colour, the right-hand side of the image shows that this part of the text is coded as 'Waterfront', 'Bid process', 'Networks' and 'Government investment'.






Figure 4.1: Coding Process Example

#### 4.4.2.8 Document Analysis

In order to enhance the validity and reliability of this study, a further document analysis was performed. Bryman (2012) notes that organisational documents can provide researchers with crucial background information that does not necessarily emanate from the interviews. Further, given the time periods involved (the Cape Town bid took place in the mid-1990s), contemporary reports have also been examined, both to provide a context and also to triangulate the information gained. All of the documents used are in the public domain, with the majority sourced from libraries. The documents analysed can be found in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9.

Table 4.8: Documents used in Cape Town Analysis

Title	Author	Year	Type
A Vision for the Future of Metropolitan Cape Town	Cape Town City Council	1993	Internal document
The Olympic Games Cape Town 2004 Preliminary Study: Economic Benefits and Opportunities	KPMG/NN Gobodo & Associates	1995	Economic Impact Report
White Paper on National Transport Policy	Department of Transport	1996	White Paper
Cape Town Accommodation Requirements for the 2004 Olympic Games	Cape Town 2004	1996	Report
Strategic Environmental Assessment Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid: Public Finances Analysis for Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid	Dr. Iraj Abedian (UCT) and BDM Consulting	1997	Report
Strategic Environmental Assessment of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid: Sustainability	Kirsten Day	1997	Report
Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid Fact Sheets: A Presentation by the City of Cape Town to host the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad in the Year 2004	Cape Town 2004	1997	Report
Moving Towards 2004: Cape Town Olympic Integrated Transport Plan	Cape Town 2004	1997	Report
Your Guide to Cape Town's Bid for the 2004 Olympic Games	Cape Town 2004	1997	Promotional document
A Sporting Opportunity for South Africa: Cape Town 2004 Olympic Sports Plan	Cape Town Olympic Bid Company	Unknown	Promotional document
Cape Town 2004: An Environmental Perspective	Cape Town Olympic Bid Company	Unknown	Promotional document
Sports Events Strategy	Cape Town 2004	Unknown	Research Document

Table 4.9: Documents used in Toronto Analysis

Title	Author	Year	Type
Interim Report 1989	Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront	1989	Report
Urban Waterfront Industry	Gene Desfor, report of symposium held on November 16, 1989	1989	Symposium Report
Regeneration, Toronto's Waterfront and the sustainable city: final report	Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront	1992	Report
Our Toronto Waterfront: The Wave of the Future	City of Toronto	1999	Report
Toronto 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Games Master Plan	Toronto 2008	1999	Report
Our Toronto Waterfront: Gateway to the New Canada	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Taskforce	2000	Report
Toronto Staff Report: Toronto's Olympic and Paralympic Games Bid	Garrett et al.	2000	Report
A Socio-Economic and Equity Plan for the 2008 Olympic Games: Preliminary Report	The Community Social Planning Council of Toronto	2000	Report
Toronto 2008 Olympic Bid Environmental Assessment	Toronto 2008	2001	Environmental Impact Report
Economic Impact Analysis (2001-2013)	Urban Metrics	2013	Economic Impact Analysis
Annual Reports	Waterfront Toronto	2005 – 2017	Report

## 4.5 Ethical Considerations

In light of the use of interviews in this research project, there were several ethical considerations that needed to be taken into account, and several aspects of the research requiring careful ethical planning. Ethical approval was sought and secured from both Coventry University and the University of Birmingham, and later from Manchester Metropolitan University.

Research involving human participants often needs the most stringent ethical requirements, and this was the case with this research. Given the nature of the interviews, there was a natural selection process. All participants were stakeholders of bid processes that took place a minimum of 15 years ago, so all interviewees were over the age of 18. However, drawing on the work of Edwards and Skinner (2009) and Saunders et al. (2003), there were other ethical considerations and all interviewees were assured that:

- Their participation would be anonymised.
- Participation was entirely voluntary, and they could withdraw their participation at any point before September 2018.

To ensure anonymity, as can be seen in Table 4.7<sup>10</sup>, interviewees were assigned a code based on the case study they are associated with, and all identifying data was removed. Crucially, this was done before the recordings were sent off to be transcribed. Furthermore, recordings were manually edited to remove any identifying features, to ensure anonymity through the transcription process. Finally, in order to ensure that the interviewees were happy with the attribution of their data, the final results chapters and conclusions were sent to each interviewee to read and verify.

## **4.6 Assessment of Research Quality**

Qualitative research has often been criticised in the literature, with Costa (2005:129) noting that positivist quantitative researchers may view qualitative

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<sup>10</sup> One interviewee requested to be named

studies as ‘fluffy’. Thus, it is important that qualitative research can be seen as both reliable and valid, internally and externally and, perhaps most importantly, trustworthy (Bryman, 2012). Table 4.10 below shows the key questions that need to be asked to consider the reliability and validity of a piece of research.

*Table 4.10: Key Questions Regarding Validity and Reliability<sup>11</sup>*

	Reliability	Validity
Internal	Do all researchers involved in the study agree with the results and conclusions?	Can the results be due to something else?
External	Can the study be replicated?	Can the research be generalised across different social settings?

First, careful selection of the case studies (Section 4.4.2.2) was made with the intention of encompassing as many characteristics of differing nations as possible. This selection will contribute towards enhancing both the *external reliability* and *external validity* of the research. The methods employed do not restrict future replication studies. This research considers the leveraging strategies of two very different cities in Cape Town and Toronto, allowing the research to be replicated across a wide range of bidders. However, it should be noted that replicating *this* particular study may be problematic; for example, the Cape Town bid took place over 20 years ago, with many stakeholders having since retired, while memories also change and fade. Further, access to interviewees often came through personal contact, and it is not guaranteed that anyone attempting to replicate the bid would gain the same access. Even if the same access could be guaranteed, a different interviewer might strike up

<sup>11</sup> Adapted from Bryman (2012)

a different rapport with the interviewee (Bryman, 2012). This is perhaps particularly likely when considering the Cape Town case study. The wider context of Cape Town's bid was discussed in Chapter 3, with a particular focus on apartheid and the racial divisions within Cape Town. An interviewer from a different social and racial background may well receive different responses to the same questions.

*External validity* and *external reliability* were enhanced further through the content analysis. This included all 16 Candidate Cities which answered the relevant question, ensuring that the sample size was adequate. The inclusion of all of these different nations, from a wide number of economic and political contexts, enhances the generalisability of the study. This also has a high degree of external reliability, as it would be easy for another researcher to gain access to the Candidate Files in question and replicate the study.

Next, in order to improve the *internal validity* and *internal reliability* of the research, the qualitative interviews were not the only source of data used. Rather, this information was triangulated with secondary data, such as official reports, organisational documents and contemporary news reports. In addition, while the transcripts themselves were not 'member checked' with the interviewee, to ensure that the interviewer's interpretation of the interviews was correct, the completed case studies were sent back to the interviewees for them to confirm the results. Similarly, this research has been presented at academic conferences in front of industry experts and, in some cases, the audience included some of the interviewees. Feedback from these presentations was then used to enhance the research. The fact that many of

the interviewees attend such conferences points to the *external validity* of the work; many of the interviewees have stayed in the industry, and so can view the Olympic bids as part of a wider context and not one-off, special events.

Finally, the research itself was subject to a number of measures designed to enhance the *credibility* and *dependability* of the study. First, ethical approval was sought and gained at three UK universities, setting the ethical path from the outset. As Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest, in order to prove credibility and dependability, an audit trail should be kept. Thus, all emails between the researcher and interviewees have been safely stored on Coventry University's secure servers, and each interview was recorded.

As has been demonstrated, at all stages of the research process, the researcher and supervisory team have sought to ensure the quality of the research, such that it can be considered to be ethical, valid, reliable and trustworthy,

## **4.7 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has set out to clarify the methodological processes undertaken throughout this research. The chapter started by identifying the research philosophy that this study will take: a constructivist ontological approach, and a hard-interpretivist epistemology (Section 4.2). Both lend themselves towards a qualitative research design, which was set out and explained above.

Next, the different qualitative approaches were considered. First, a content analysis of the candidate files from 2009-2016 was conducted, identifying the ways in which bid cities seek to leverage an Olympic bid (Section 4.4.1). This

analysis was then supplemented with a multiple-case study approach selected as the most appropriate for this study (Section 4.4.2). The primary data collection method was 31 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in Cape Town and Toronto's bids for the 2004 and 2008 Olympic bids respectively. These interviews identified the leveraging strategies put in place as part of the bid and evaluated the impact. This information was triangulated with documentary analysis and supported the content analysis. The interviews were transcribed and inductively coded using NVivo software. The chapter concludes with the ethical considerations (Section 4.5) and a self-assessment of the quality of the research undertaken (Section 4.6).

The next three chapters introduce the empirical research, starting with the content analysis of the Candidate Files in Chapter 5.



## 5 Candidate File Analysis

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### 5.1 Introduction and Purpose

This first empirical chapter comprises an analysis of the Candidate Files submitted by applicants for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games 2016-2024. This chapter starts by introducing the 16 bids included in the sample, before offering an overview of the stated leveraging opportunities sought. The candidate files were coded twice; first to identify the areas for leverage. This found that sport participation, community building, urban development and global profile were the four most prevalent across the candidate files. These were then coded a second time, to identify the areas of Chalip's (2004) leveraging model: the leverageable resource, the opportunities provided by a bid, the strategic objective and the means by which these can be identified.

Following this, the bidders are categorised into five sections: 1) Winter or Summer Olympic Games, 2) geographic location, 3) government type, 4) economic status, and 5) bid success.

### 5.2 The Candidates

The bid process for the Olympic Games has already been detailed in Section 3.3. As noted, not all cities that bid for the Olympic Games are required to submit a Candidate File. Only those cities that have successfully progressed from being applicant cities to the candidate stage will complete the candidate file. A summary of the cities that successfully reached this stage from 2016-2024 can be seen in Table 5.1 on page 191. As can be seen, there is a wide-

ranging spread of bid cities, with the majority of bidders from Europe (seven), and a number from North and South America, the Middle East and East Asia. There were no candidate cities from either Australasia or Africa.

When considering the national statistics of the nations involved, there are obvious differences. The four largest countries in the world by GDP (USA, China, Japan and Germany) all submitted bids. The fifth largest country by GDP is the UK, which hosted the 2012 Games and so would not have bid again during this period. In addition, France (sixth largest GDP), Italy (eighth), and Brazil (ninth) all also submitted bids during this period. Conversely, bids were also submitted by Kazakh and Hungarian cities, nations ranked 56<sup>th</sup> and 57<sup>th</sup> respectively in terms of GDP (IOC, n.d.; The World Bank, 2018a).

Given the costs involved in bidding, it is not surprising that no 'Least Developed' country reached the candidate stage, or indeed submitted a bid. However, five of the 16 bid nations are classified as 'Emerging' nations, including Brazil and China whose bids were successful (International Monetary Fund, 2009). One final point to note, is that all candidate cities for the bids for the 2016 and 2018 Games were from nations termed politically 'free' (Freedom House, 2018). It should be recognised that other cities did submit bids, but none made it to the Candidate City stage. For example, Qatar and Azerbaijan were both termed politically 'not free' at the time of their bids for the 2016 Summer Games. Neither Doha nor Baku were successful in making it to the Candidate City stage. However, from 2020, Istanbul, Almaty and Beijing all reached this stage, despite their respective nations being termed either 'partially-free' or 'not free'.

Table 5.1: Summary of Summer and Winter Olympic Bidders 2009-2017<sup>12</sup>

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million)	GDP (US\$ billion)	GDP per Capita (US\$)	Unemployment (% of Labour Force)	Economic Status	Political System	Corruption Index	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Political Status
Chicago	USA	2009	306.77	14,419	47,002	9.4%	Advanced	Constitutional Federal Republic	7.5	1	1	F
Madrid	Spain	2009	46.36	1,499	32,334	18.1%	Advanced	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	6.1	1	1	F
Tokyo	Japan	2009	128.05	5,035	39,323	5.0%	Advanced	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7.7	2	1	F
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	2009	196.70	1,665	8,463	8.3%	Emerging	Federal Presidential Republic	3.7	2	2	F
Annecy	France	2011	65.34	2,863	43,807	8.8%	Advanced	Semi-Presidential Republic	7.3	1	1	F
Munich	Germany	2011	80.27	3,757	46,807	5.8%	Advanced	Federal Parliamentary Republic	7.8	1	1	F
PyeongChang	South Korea	2011	49.78	1,202	24,155	3.7%	Emerging	Presidential Republic	5.1	2	1	F
Tokyo	Japan	2013	127.34	4,920	38,633	4.0%	Advanced	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7.4	1	1	F
Madrid	Spain	2013	46.62	1,369	29,370	26.3%	Advanced	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	5.9	1	1	F
Istanbul	Turkey	2013	75.01	823	10,975	8.7%	Emerging	Parliamentary Republic	5.0	4	3	PF
Almaty	Kazakhstan	2015	17.54	184	8,069	5.0%	Emerging	Presidential Republic	2.1	5	6	NF
Beijing	China	2015	1,371.22	11,065	10,509	No data	Emerging	Communist State	3.5	6	7	NF
Paris	France	2017	67.12	2,583	38,477	9.4%	Advanced	Semi-Presidential Republic	7.0	2	1	F
Rome	Italy	2017	60.55	1,035	31,953	11.2%	Advanced	Parliamentary Republic	5.0	1	1	F
Budapest	Hungary	2017	9.78	131	14,225	4.2%	Emerging	Parliamentary Republic	4.3	2	3	F
Los Angeles	USA	2017	325.72	19,391	59,532	4.4%	Advanced	Constitutional Federal Republic	8.1	1	1	F

<sup>12</sup> The full dataset, complete with references and key is available in Table 10.5 on page 405

### 5.3 Analysis of the Candidate Files

First, it should be noted that the candidate files are not structured in a way that automatically fits Chalip's (2004) model, with candidates focusing on *legacy*, rather than *leverage* (see Chapter 2 for discussion regarding the difference between these two concepts). However, this does not mean that leveraging opportunities, means or strategic outcomes are not discussed, but they are presented in a different way.

In Chalip's (2004) model, the leverageable resource is identified as the portfolio of events that a nation hosts. The key resource to be leveraged is the bid, and the bid process itself. An Olympic bid is a unique resource to which cities will only have access on a limited number of occasions. The UN identified 1,692 cities across the world with at least 300,000 inhabitants (United Nations, 2016). Of these, fewer than 7% (115 cities) have bid for either a Summer or Winter Olympic Games. Of these 115 cities, 55 have bid just once, highlighting the unique nature of an Olympic bid. Moreover, cities are unlikely to know whether they will be able to bid again in the future. While a city may plan for multiple bids, should the first bid prove successful, and the city hosts the Games, it will not be able to bid again in the immediate future.

Several cities identify the positive outcomes that a bid submission will bring. For example, Madrid 2016 (2009) noted how Madrid's previous Olympic bids were used as a catalyst to generate benefits for the city, while Rome 2024 (2017:21) specifically stated that 'the Rome 2024 bid is already serving as a

catalyst for change'. Therefore, the analysis of the bid documents has identified the bid itself to be the resource that can be leveraged.

This research identified four key streams that are consistent across the 16 Olympic bids included in the dataset:

- Sport participation
- Nation and community building
- Image enhancement
- Urban development

These have been identified as the strategic objectives of the bids, that is, the area in which the bid is aiming to bring positive outcomes. These four strategic objectives will now be analysed in turn and, where possible, the opportunity and means behind them will be identified. Table 5.2 shows a summary of the findings.

*Table 5.2: Candidate File Leveraging Summary*

Year	City	Sport Participation	Community Building	Image Enhancement	Urban Development
2016	Chicago	x	x		
2016	Madrid	x	x	x	x
2016	Rio	x	x		x
2016	Tokyo	x			
2018	Annecy				x
2018	Munich	x	x		x
2018	PyeongChang			x	x
2020	Istanbul	x	x		x
2020	Madrid		x	x	x
2020	Tokyo	x	x		x
2022	Almaty		x		
2022	Beijing	x		x	x
2024	Budapest	x	x	x	x
2024	LA				x
2024	Paris		x		x
2024	Rome		x	x	x

### 5.3.1 Sport Participation

The most prominent strategic objective identified by bid cities is that of sport participation, with particular focus on youth sport. Sport participation was identified by half of the bid cities; however, as with the hosting of the Games (see Chapter 2), this was often expected to be a natural by-product of a bid. For example, Budapest 2024 (2017) stated that increasing the promotion and support of already existing programmes will cultivate sport participation within the city, without offering any concrete plans or specific interventions as to how this will be implemented.

However, three bid cities purposefully created plans as part of the bid to drive towards this strategic goal of sport participation. Chicago 2016 (2009:20) created World Sport Chicago, Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) established the Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports, and Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) developed the National Sports Plan. While the opportunity aspect of the event leveraging model is not stated within the bid book, it is clear that Chicago, Tokyo and Istanbul all viewed these bodies as the means by which the strategic outcome of sport participation can be achieved.

A second means through which to enhance sport participation is through the building of sport facilities as part of the bid. Eleven of the 16 bid cities claimed that sport infrastructure will be constructed as part of the bid. While many of the facilities are intended as competition venues for the Games itself, this is not guaranteed. Instead, other cities have sought to use the bid to build sporting facilities for community use. Munich 2018 (2011:23) used the bid to 'accelerate the implementation of barrier-free measures at sport and

recreational facilities', while Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) built 415 new community sports facilities, in addition to the 24 competition venues that are being built.

This is not to say that bidders did not recognise an opportunity as part of the process. The idea of 'Olympism' was prominent, with half of the bid cities mentioning this or 'Olympic Values'. This was particularly prevalent in those cities seeking to maximise youth sport participation. Four of the bidders specifically discussed Olympism as an opportunity to engage schoolchildren in both sport participation and education. For example, Munich 2018 (2011:23) mentioned how the bid has 'provided the impetus for sports and club development and created broad educational initiatives to ensure that schoolchildren are exposed to Olympism'. Similarly, Madrid 2016's (2009) 'Generation 16 initiative' is designed to 'increase participation in sport and to communicate Olympism throughout Madrid schools and colleges'.

As can be seen, the strategic objective of utilising a bid to encourage sport participation is prevalent in many of the bid documents. Further, while not mentioned by all bidders, several identify Olympism and Olympic Values as being the opportunity provided by the bid to encourage participation; however, there is a lack of concrete information regarding how this opportunity will translate into achieving the strategic objective. The means that have been identified for achieving the strategic objective are the building of sport facilities and the creation of public bodies to encourage youth participation. This lack of specific plans is unsurprising given that many hosts have failed to leverage an increase in sport participation (see Section 3.4.3 for further information). However, as seen, while many bid cities have put in place plans to leverage a

bid for sport participation, there has been little empirical research to investigate whether these plans have any impact. This raises a potential direction for future research as sport participation is often a key strategic outcome for Olympic bidders, yet there is currently no evidence as to whether this is a feasible objective.

### **5.3.1.1 Summary of Sport Participation Leveraging Strategies**

- Strategic objective: *Sport participation.*
- Opportunity: *Olympism.*
- Means: *Creation of leveraging vehicle/public body; building of sport facilities; youth engagement.*

### **5.3.2 Community Building**

The second strategic objective that this research has found is that of community building. This links to Chalip's (2006) identification of liminality and *communitas*. Chalip (2006) recognises how event organisers should seek to intensify the feeling of celebration that occurs during the hosting of an event. While this research is focusing on the bid rather than the hosting, 11 of the 16 bid cities identify community building as a potential impact from a bid. However, as with sport participation, there appears to be a belief that the act of submitting an Olympic bid alone will enhance community cohesion. As Section 3.4.3 demonstrates, the literature suggests that this is not the case, and could actually have the opposite effect. Instead, specific plans need to be put in place to foster the feeling of community and togetherness. For example, Paris 2024 (2017:39) stated that the bid will develop 'pride and national unity



around sport and Olympism', but details are scant as to how this objective will be achieved and how the pride and unity will benefit wider society.

Some bidders did provide details regarding the means by which community and nation building will be achieved. One way is through the building of sport facilities and encouraging sport participation, with the intention of using this as a tool to promote community cohesion post-Games. For example, Madrid 2016 (2009) mentioned how the building of new aquatic and tennis centres would enable community use. Rome 2024 (2017) went further than this, detailing a partnership with ActionAid with the intention of using sport as a tool to integrate youths with different cultural backgrounds into society. There has similarly been a keen focus on the integration of disabled people, with Munich 2018, Madrid 2020 and Tokyo 2020 all stating this. For example, Munich 2018 (2011:23) stated that 'the bid has also accelerated the implementation of barrier-free measures at sport and recreational-facilities and helped raise awareness of the need for greater social inclusion for all members of society, including persons with a disability'.

While some bidders have discussed the means through which the strategic goal will be achieved, there is little discussion regarding the opportunity that will allow this to happen. Chicago 2016 (2009:20) stated that 'the prospect of hosting the Games has energized the city and the nation', while Almaty 2022 (2015:13) claimed that purely being part of the bidding process would bring together 'people of different ages, from different disciplines, religions and countries'. This links closely to the idea of Olympism, as discussed in the previous section on sport participation. It would appear the cities intended to

use the excitement generated by an Olympic bid as an opportunity to foster greater social cohesion. This strategic goal is then achieved through the utilisation of community facilities and using the power of sport to integrate two groups of people into wider society, particularly the disabled and those of different cultures and backgrounds.

On a similar note to Olympism, five of the bid cities recognised that an Olympic bid would not just encourage sport participation, it would also enhance the visibility of the Olympic and Paralympic Games within the city. Specifically, Chicago 2016, Istanbul 2020 and Budapest 2024 all believed that the bid would raise the profile of the Paralympic Games, with the formation of World Sport Chicago seeking to 'promote Olympic values and education and elevate the profile of Olympic and Paralympic sport' (Chicago 2016, 2009:20). The bid is recognised as an opportunity for cities to ensure that the disabled are included as part of community building.

This section has recognised that bid cities have the strategic objective to enhance community building. This is similar to Chalip's (2006) detailing of the harnessing of liminality and *communitas* as a leveraging opportunity; however, Chalip discusses this as being part of a specific leveraging plan, but there is little information provided in the bid documents. There is little information provided as to the means or opportunity that will allow cities to create this specific strategic objective. As Section 2.3.3.2 discusses, there is no guarantee that an Olympic bid will lead to a feeling of community. Indeed, as Oliver (2011a) details, Toronto's failure to successfully host the 2008 Olympic Games led to exactly the opposite. Similarly, as an Olympic bid gives a

platform to those who oppose it (Coates and Wicker, 2015), an anti-Olympic feeling may be generated (McGillivray and Jones, 2013). For example, Chicago 2016 believed that an Olympic bid would lead to positive feelings within the city, yet as Rundio and Heere (2016) demonstrate, this did not transpire, with many social groups within the city opposing the bid. Rundio and Heere cited in particular the formation of the group 'No Games Chicago'.

While the bid cities do not detail the ways in which *communitas* will be fostered during the bid, they do strongly link it to sport participation through the construction of facilities. The two strategic objectives of community building and sport participation hinge on the opportunity of Olympism, with the building of sport facilities being the means by which both can be achieved. The construction of sport facilities may help bid cities overcome an issue with *communitas* raised in the literature review, as *communitas* will often only last as long as the event itself. The long-term use of the facilities may foster *communitas* to last longer than the bid itself.

#### **5.3.2.1 Summary of Community Building Leveraging Strategies**

- Strategic objective: *Community building*
- Opportunity: *Olympism; sport visibility*
- Means: *sport facility construction; sport participation*

#### **5.3.3 Urban Development**

The third strategic objective that bid cities hoped to achieve is that of urban development. Of the 16 bidders, 13 discussed the ways in which a bid can lead to urban development such as sport facilities, urban planning, transport, and port and river infrastructure. The two most prevalent forms of urban

development are sport venues and transport infrastructure. While the building of sport venues can be viewed as a strategic objective in its own right, new venues can also be tools to facilitate sport participation and community building. The second most popular form of urban development, transport infrastructure augmentation, was stated by half of bid cities as part of their bid. There are three bids that have urban development as a key part of their plans. PyeongChang 2018, Beijing 2022 and Istanbul 2020. PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022 both detailed the building of Winter sport facilities as part of their bid. PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21) particularly discussed the building of 'improved winter sport facilities, such as venues for cross-country skiing, biathlon and ski-jumping'. Similarly, Beijing 2022 (2015:19) planned to build a biathlon and ski-jumping centre. As mentioned in the section on sport participation, Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) detailed the building of over 415 community venues and 24 elite sport facilities. These three bids all provided further details as to the means through which the strategic objective of urban development would be obtained. Each noted how being part of an Olympic bid has attracted additional government investment into the area. Indeed, Istanbul 2020 specifically disclosed that the Turkish government invested US\$1.77 billion into the region. While it is not explicitly stated in any of the bid documents, the implication from all three bidders is that the regions would not have attracted these levels of government interest were they not bidding for the Olympic Games.

While the strategic objective of urban development is clear, and the means by which it can be achieved is identified as increased levels of government

investment, the candidate files are less clear regarding the opportunity that contributes to this. As discussed in the previous section, while the idea of Olympism may have contributed towards the enhancement of community building and sport participation, this does not necessarily account for why governments chose to invest in other infrastructural development at this stage. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011) noted that the bid 'will drive government investment into the area' but did not detail the reasons. This is perhaps due to the nature of the candidate files as being a crucial part of a city's bid, and so it is unlikely that a candidate file will contain information that does not show the city in a positive light. While Burgo and Cromartie (2018) argue that governments are prepared to invest in a bid to support future growth, this does not necessarily indicate why infrastructural development would occur regardless of the outcome of the bid.

As this section has shown, urban development is a clear strategic objective for cities bidding for the Olympic Games. Thirteen of the 16 bid documents analysed discussed this objective. While the opportunity is not explicitly stated, the means are clear – governments are prepared to invest in an area that is bidding for an Olympic Games. This is an opportunity that has been mentioned in the literature. Lauermaun (2015) in particular, notes the ways in which an Olympic bid can be used to catalyse urban development, with New York being a city that has recently successfully managed this (Moss, 2011). However, while it is clear that urban development is a realistic goal for an Olympic bid (see Section 3.4.4 for more detail), none of the bid documents provide any real

information regarding the reasons why a government is prepared to invest in a city that is bidding for the Olympic Games.

### **5.3.3.1 Summary of Urban Development Leveraging Strategies:**

- Strategic objective: *Urban development.*
- Opportunity: *Political support*
- Means: *Government investment;*

### **5.3.4 Global Profile**

The final strategic objective that bid cities seek to achieve is the raising of their global profile and image enhancement. This was stated as an outcome by six of the 16 bid cities. Several bids noted how being part of a bid would automatically increase their global profile. Madrid 2016 (2009:19) believed that the ‘bidding process provides excellent opportunities for us to promote Madrid on the world stage, increasing global awareness of our city, our business and tourism offers’. While it might be thought that this could be viewed as a legacy rather than a strategic objective, the opportunity is recognised through the global focus on the bid process.

There is limited information provided by bidders as to the means that will contribute to this strategic objective. The most prominent is through an already mentioned strategic objective; the development of infrastructure. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011) discuss how the added investment into sport facilities in the region will develop PyeongChang as a venue for winter sport, and so raise its global profile. The idea that different strategic objectives are linked is discussed further in the next section.

This opportunity does have limitations. The IOC has strict regulations as to when and how a bid city can promote both the bid and city itself. For example, bid cities for the 2024 Games were not allowed to create a website or social media accounts until 15<sup>th</sup> September 2015, the deadline for NOCs to submit their candidate city (IOC, 2015:37). Similarly, the candidate process for 2024 states that while it is possible for bidders to promote their bid domestically at any point, they were not allowed to promote on an international scale until February 2017, the date at which the final part of the candidate file was submitted (IOC, 2015:25). These limitations were recognised by Rome 2024 (2017), who noted that it was not possible to work on profile raising until February 2017. Ironically, Rome's bid did not reach this stage, as the city withdrew from the bid process in October 2016 (BBC News, 2016).

As discussed in Chapter 2, many of the stated legacies from hosting Olympic bids do not come to fruition. One of the few legacies that the literature suggests can be achieved is an increase in global profile (Grix et al., 2015), with more literature covered in Section 3.4.5. However, there has yet been little investigation into the extent to which an Olympic bid can lead to an increased global profile beyond the empirical work of the likes of Rose and Spiegel (2011) and Demir et al. (2015), who measured increases in post-bid trade. However, both of these papers studied the end result; there has been little research discussing the strategies that may be employed as part of a bid to achieve this increase in global profile.

#### **5.3.4.1 Global Profile Leveraging Strategy Summary:**

- Strategic objective: *Global profile*.

- Opportunity: *International exposure*
- Means: *Building of facilities*

### **5.3.5 Linking Strategic Objectives**

A potential weakness of Chalip's (2004) model, is that it treats each of the strategic objectives as being distinct from each other. However, the strategic objectives that have been identified in this data analysis are not separate. Indeed, they are often interlinked; for example, while raising a city's profile is seen as a strategic goal in its own right, there are often links to the other strategic goals discussed. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21) discusses how its investment in sport facilities is the means by which it will achieve the strategic goal of becoming the 'premier winter sports hub of Asia'. This investment from PyeongChang into sport facilities for a change in image for a city, is typical of the strategies that these cities are following. For example, Annecy 2018 (2011:19) notes how 'the bid has made it possible to position Annecy as a global convention and major events city'. As can be seen, these cities are using the investment in the bid to build the facilities that enable a change in image. Therefore, the opportunity is the potential political support that can be achieved through a bid, and the means is the additional investment available to cities to achieve the strategic goal of an image change.

This highlights how the strategic objectives, means and opportunities are not sought in isolation. Rather, for a bid city to successfully leverage an Olympic bid, it needs to recognise that there are limited means and opportunities available. However, these can be used for various strategic objectives. For example, the idea of Olympism within a city can be used to develop both



community development (e.g. Paris 2024 (2017:39) 'developing pride and national unity around sport and Olympism'), and sport participation (e.g. Madrid 2016's (2009:19) 'Generation 16' plan, which aimed to increase 'participation in sport and to communicate Olympism throughout Madrid schools and colleges').

As Figure 5.1 on page 206 illustrates, this can be taken further, with one strategic goal helping to achieve another. For example, the building of sport facilities can be viewed as a strategic goal in its own right. The final benefit of the bid identified by Budapest 2024 (2017:20), is that it will allow for a 'renewal of sport facilities across Hungary'. However, for other bidders, the construction of sport facilities might actually be a way to leverage further strategic goals. For example, the building of sport facilities can contribute to an increase in sport participation (e.g. Madrid 2016 (2009:19): 'development of several large-scale projects such as our new Tennis and Aquatics Centres, both of which provide purpose-built venues for international events as well as facilities for talent development, club and community use'), community building (e.g. Rome 2024 (2017:21): 'Promoting active participation/involvement of local communities in the planning and redevelopment of local areas surrounding Games venues), and image development (e.g. PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21): 'the bid efforts have been the driving force behind attracting governmental investment to the region for the development of PyeongChang as the premier winter sports hub of Asia').

### 5.3.6 Section Summary

This section has reviewed the submissions by 16 bid cities for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, 2016-2024, regarding the ways in which they will attempt to leverage their Olympic bid for positive benefits. This content analysis found that the leverageable resource available to bid cities is the bid process itself, and this provides a number of opportunities for cities to achieve their strategic goals. Furthermore, it is clear that the opportunity, means and strategic objectives do not operate in isolation; rather, they can be combined to enhance the successful outcomes.

Figure 5.1 shows the strategic objectives available to bid cities, together with the opportunities and means.




Figure 5.1: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Candidate Files(adapted from Chalip, 2004)

## 5.4 Categorising the Bids

The previous section (Section 5.3) provides a holistic overview of the ways in which bid cities have sought to leverage Olympic bids. However, this is a generalised view, and does not consider the nuances between the different bidders. First, while the bid cities are all bidding for an Olympic Games, two of the bid cycles are for Winter Olympic Games while three are for Summer Games. These are likely to provide different leveraging opportunities, with cities targeting different strategic outcomes. Similarly, as noted in Section 5.2 there is a range of bid cities involved, with different geographic locations, government types, and economic statuses. Each of these differences is likely to add further nuances towards the targeted outcomes. Table 5.3 shows how the 16 bid cities can be divided into five key categories.

Table 5.3: Categorising the Bidders<sup>13</sup>

City	Nation	Year bid for	Geographic state	Government type	Economic state	Success of the bid
Chicago	USA	S 2016	Americas	Constitutional federal republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Madrid	Spain	S 2016	Europe	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Rio	Brazil	S 2016	Americas	Federal presidential republic	Emerging	Successful
Tokyo	Japan	S 2016	Asia	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Annecy	France	W 2018	Europe	Semi-presidential republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Munich	Germany	W 2018	Europe	Federal parliamentary republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Pyeong-Chang	South Korea	W 2018	Asia	Presidential republic	Emerging	Successful
Istanbul	Turkey	S 2020	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Emerging	Unsuccessful
Madrid	Spain	S 2020	Europe	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Tokyo	Japan	S 2020	Asia	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Advanced	Successful
Almaty	Kazakhstan	W 2022	Asia	Presidential republic	Emerging	Unsuccessful
Beijing	China	W 2022	Asia	Communist state	Emerging	Successful
Budapest	Hungary	S 2024	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Emerging	Withdrawn
Los Angeles	USA	S 2024	Americas	Constitutional federal republic	Advanced	Unsuccessful
Paris	France	S 2024	Europe	Semi-presidential republic	Advanced	Successful
Rome	Italy	S 2024	Europe	Parliamentary republic	Advanced	Withdrawn

<sup>13</sup> The full dataset, complete with references is available in Table 10.5 on page 405

The five categories identified are now taken in turn. First, there is consideration paid as to the nature of the Games bid for i.e. Winter or Summer Games (Section 5.4.1). Second, the geographic location is viewed (Section 5.4.2). Third, the economic and political situations of the regions (Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4) are considered. Finally, the bidders are divided into whether their bid was ultimately successful or not (Section 5.4.5).

#### **5.4.1 Winter or Summer Games**

When the cities are divided into bids for Summer and Winter Games, a clear distinction is shown. All five of the Winter Olympic bidders specified the economic benefits of their bid, whereas only four of the 11 Summer bidders did. Conversely, 10 of the 11 Summer Games bidders sought to gain social benefits, but only two of the Winter Games have this as a focus.

There is a significant focus for Winter Games bidders to leverage their bid for business development. PyeongChang 2018 (2011) and Beijing 2022 (2015) both believed that the bid would draw investment from private investors. While this is not a strategic goal in itself, this investment can be used to fund other strategic goals. Annecy 2018 recognised this opportunity and, significantly, provided information as to how this would be achieved, through the development of the 'Outdoor Sport Valley' (Annecy 2018, 2011:21). This is an organisation that seeks to promote the region's capacity for outdoor sport and provide an opportunity for organisations within the industry to network and work together (Outdoor Sports Valley, n.d.).

Hudson and Cross (2011) identify that Winter Sport tourism is currently in a period of stagnation. This has especially occurred in the traditional winter sport

resorts such as Western Europe and the USA, yet there has been a rise in winter sport participation in Russia and China (Vanat, 2017). This is likely to account for the rise in bidders from Asia for Winter Games. The 2014, 2018 and 2022 Games are being hosted in Russia, South Korea and China respectively, and there has been a further bid from Kazakhstan (2022). While the success of using the Winter Olympic Games for tourism benefits has often had mixed results (Gaudette et al., 2017), it is evident that a Winter Olympic bid is viewed as a way to increase tourism and economic benefits in a way that a Summer Olympic bid is not.

While bidders for Winter Games have a greater focus on economic outcomes, bidders for Summer Games have instead sought to leverage social benefits, with Los Angeles 2024 being the only bidder not to seek social benefits (Los Angeles 2024, 2017). As has already been discussed in Section 5.3.2, many bidders sought to leverage community cohesion from the bid. In addition to this, four of the bidders sought to leverage health benefits, and three of the bidders suggested that increases in sport participation would lead to a healthier population. Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) had already put in place the Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports, a vehicle to ‘promote the healthy development of youth and encourage lifelong healthy living of citizens.’

This focus from bidders for Summer Games is perhaps due to the need to justify the cost of bidding for a Summer Olympics. As Zehndorfer and Mackintosh (2017) note, a key part of a bid for a Summer Olympic Games is the securing of public support. It has been identified that the social impacts

are likely to play a large role in whether an Olympic bid will gain public support (Kim et al., 2015; Sant and Mason, 2015).

#### **5.4.2 Geographic Location**

The 16 bidders can be divided into three clear geographic locations: Europe (France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Turkey), Americas (USA and Brazil), and Asia (China, Japan and Kazakhstan). Across all regions, there was a clear focus on leveraging the bid for infrastructural development. When this is broken down further, it can be seen that different geographic areas targeted different types of infrastructural development. European cities focused on regenerating the city, with Tokyo being the only non-European city to target regeneration. Conversely, cities from Asia and the Americas have focused far more on using the bid to develop transport infrastructure. For example, Los Angeles 2024 noted how the bid would be used to extend the Purple Line to the UCLA campus, in addition to improved transport links from LAX airport to the city (Los Angeles 2024, 2017). Perhaps learning the lessons from previous Games hosted in North America, most notably Montreal 1976 and Los Angeles 1984, neither Chicago 2016 or Los Angeles 2024 had plans to build sport venues as part of the bid.

There is a similar distinction with the targeting of social impacts from region to region. Of the 13 cities within Europe and the Americas, 11 targeted social impacts, with the most prominent being community cohesion; for example, Budapest 2024 (2017:20) noted that the bid will 'unite, integrate and mobilise society'. In addition, European cities typically sought to use Olympism to provide education benefits for schoolchildren. For example, Madrid 2016

(2009:17) had the intention to ‘increase participation in sport and to communicate Olympism throughout Madrid schools and colleges... commenced in 2007 with the creation of our Generation 16 initiative... an educational programme to promote sport and Olympic values that Madrid 16 shares amongst the youth and all ages using educational campaigns in schools, colleges and universities’. This contrasts with bidders from other regions, who had far less interest in leveraging a bid for education. Tokyo (2016 and 2020) and Chicago (2016) are the only two non-European cities to mention this.

This lack of social impact is typical of the Asian bids. Only the two Tokyo bids and the bid from Almaty discuss any sort of social impact, and these are not the main focus of the leveraging strategies; rather, bidders from Asia have focused on leveraging sport participation. As has already been discussed, Tokyo 2016 launched the ‘Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports’, while Beijing 2022 (2015) instigated the ‘300 Million People Winter Sports Plan’, with the intention of encouraging its citizens to participate in winter sport. This is in stark contrast to the cities in Europe, as Madrid 2016, Munich 2018 and Budapest 2024 are the only three European bidders with plans to enhance sport participation.

### **5.4.3 Government Type**

Using information from the CIA World Factbook (2018), each bidding nation has been categorised according its government type, with parliamentary constitutional monarchies, republics and a single communist state all being included. Given that republics encompass a broad range of nations, from



Kazakhstan to the USA, it is unsurprising that there was little consistency between their leveraging plans. While nine of the 11 republics targeted infrastructural development, seven sought to develop their sporting infrastructure and five aimed for transport development.

There is more consistency from the bids from monarchies, although there is a large caveat in the fact that the four bids came from just two nations who each bid twice: Spain and Japan. However, there are synergies between these four bids. Both Madrid and Tokyo sought to leverage their bids to bring about social change and enhance the sporting prowess of the cities. All four of these discussed the educational benefits that would come from the bid process, with Olympism often being the opportunity on which this hinged. For example, Tokyo 2016 (2009) discussed the 'Olympic Reader' series of textbooks that were developed to allow more than one million students to learn about the values of the Olympic Games.

Both the parliamentary constitutional monarchies and the republics had a focus on leveraging their bids to enhance sport participation; however, they differ in that republics had a greater focus on the development of professional sport within the country. The means by which this was to be achieved involved another strategic objective, the building of new sport facilities. While the use of these new facilities to lever greater sport participation was part of the plan, there were also plans to use the new stadia to improve the levels of professional sport. For example, Madrid 2016 (2009) and Madrid 2020 (2013) both discussed how the newly-built tennis, aquatic, and rowing training centres would benefit the development of professional athletes. Of a similar nature,

Tokyo 2016 (2009:6) discussed the \$200 million budget for the 'Fund for Promotion and Exchange in Sport and Culture' to develop future athletes and coaches.

While there are three different types of government included in the analysis, it should be noted that 15 of the 16 bidders are democratic (even though Japan and Spain have monarchies, in both, the duties of the monarch are largely ceremonial), and so the government needs to consider the support of its population. China is the only nation included in the analysis where the government is not beholden to its citizens. This makes real analysis of whether different government types lead to different bid legacies, difficult.

#### **5.4.4 Economic Status**

There was greater distinction between the ways that bids were leveraged when considering the different economic statuses. The 16 bidders were categorised according to the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund, 2009), with there being six bids from emerging economies and 10 bids from advanced nations. While both groupings sought to develop infrastructure, sport participation and community cohesion, in the additional areas there was a clear distinction in their priorities. Advanced economies tended to focus on intangible benefits, such as education and the environment. Comparatively, emerging economies had little interest in education or the environment, and instead focused on the economic benefits.

Emerging economies had a clear focus to ensure that a bid brought economic gains. Four of the six emerging economies targeted this, yet just five of the 10 advanced economies sought economic benefits. This economic benefit is

partly due to the types of increased international business discussed by Rose and Spiegel (2011), achieved through the raising of the profile of the city/nation. Beijing 2022 (2015:19) developed the 'Beijing-Zhangjiakou Sport, Culture and Tourism Belt' as a way to enhance the region's economic development. Similarly, Budapest 2024 (2017) sought to use the bid as a way for the city to access investment from central Europe. As Baade and Matheson (2017) recognise, economic development is likely to be a key aim for emerging nations when deciding to bid for a mega-event, and so it should not be surprising that it is also a goal for a bid; however, Baade and Matheson (2017) also go on to identify that these economic gains rarely actually come to pass. The need for emerging nations to leverage the bid for tangible benefits is further demonstrated by the attention paid to developing infrastructure within the city. Almaty of Kazakhstan was the only bidder from an emerging economy that did not specify infrastructural development as part of the bid. Each of the other five emerging nations indicated that sport facilities would be constructed. Of particular note is Istanbul 2020 (2013:23), which discussed the building of '415 new community sports facilities and 24 stadia, of which 215 projects are already in progress'. There was a similar aim from emerging economies to develop transport infrastructure; for example, Rio 2016 (2009:29) stated that 'an enhanced city-wide high-performance transport system' was being built as part of the bid.

When considering the number of nations in each category, there was far less interest from advanced economies in these tangible benefits. Rather, advanced economies sought intangible outcomes, such as social benefits. As

already discussed in Section 5.3.2, bidders use the bid to bring together their communities; this is evident in both developing and advanced economies. For example, Madrid 2020 (2013:17) planned the 'Integrados' programme, designed to 'reach out to the city's children with disability or at risk of social exclusion'.

Further, eight of the 10 advanced economies noted that the bid will be leveraged to bring about educational benefits. Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) planned to improve education through the development of 'Olympic Reader' textbooks, which were to be distributed to one million students. These educational plans often included elements of increasing environmental awareness; for example, Annecy 2018 developed the Eco-resort research programme. This programme brings together universities, athletes, government agencies and sport organisations, with a focus on researching the impacts that sport activities may have on the surrounding natural environment (Annecy 2018, 2011:19). In comparison, no bidder from emerging states discussed the educational benefits of the bid, and just three mentioned the environmental gains.

#### **5.4.5 Success of the Bid**

The final, and easiest way to distinguish between the 16 bids is whether they were ultimately successful or not. This is a particularly important way to categorise the bids. The answers that have been analysed are all part of the Candidate Files, which are submitted as part of the bids and are considered as part of the ultimate decision as to which bid will be successful. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that unsuccessful bids provided more information regarding their leveraging plans than the successful ones. Both groups

targeted leveraging infrastructural and sporting benefits, but successful bids had few other leveraging plans beyond these. Comparatively, unsuccessful bids had more focus on the social and environmental aspects of the bid.

Ten of the 11 unsuccessful bidders sought to leverage the bid for social benefits, with the already discussed educational benefits being prominent. As discussed in the previous section, these educational benefits are often closely linked to environmental benefits. In addition to Annecy 2018's Eco-Resort, Munich 2018 (2011:23) developed a 'new German Centre for Sustainability'.

However, neither educational nor environmental gains are prominent for successful bidders. Tokyo 2020 (2013) is the only successful bidder to mention the educational benefits of a bid, with their 'Olympic Reader' initiative, which encourages schoolchildren to learn about the value of Olympism, but successful bidders are all consistent in their message regarding sport. All five note the building of sport facilities as part of the bid, compared to just over half of the unsuccessful bidders. For example, Paris 2024 (2017:39) noted the construction of a 'new multi-purpose arena', while Beijing 2022 (2015) discussed the construction of three competition venues regardless of the outcome of the bid.

This is symptomatic of the general theme of the successful bids. They tended to focus the bid on leveraging tangible outcomes; with education, Olympic values, society and the environment being largely ignored by successful bidders. While this research is not aiming to determine factors that lead to successful bids, the difference between the focus of successful and unsuccessful bids is stark.

## 5.5 Conclusions

This chapter analysed the results of a content analysis of the Candidate Files submitted as part of the bid process. 16 bid cities have answered the question 'What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?' (IOC, 2009:66). The answers to this question that have been analysed, coded, and held up against Chalip's (2004) 'schematic representation of event leverage'.

Chalip's model classifies four stages for successful leverage; identification of a *leverageable resource*, which provides an *opportunity* to achieve the *strategic objective*. Finally, the *means* are the strategies utilised to ultimately achieve the strategic objective. While Chalip's model was first applied to a country's portfolio of events, this research has adapted the model to show how an Olympic bid can be used to leverage positive outcomes.

This chapter started by considering the four strategic objectives identified by the coding process:

1. Sport participation
2. Community building
3. Urban development
4. Global profile

Sport participation was the strategic objective that was most prominent within the candidate files, although there was little information included in the bid documentation as to how this increased level of sport participation would be achieved. This raises the question as to how realistic this is as a strategic goal.

If, as discussed in the literature review, the hosting of an Olympic Games does not naturally result in enhanced sport participation (Reis et al. 2017), is it likely it can be achieved through a bid? Four bidders did specify the creation of specific plans to encourage sport participation. This chapter is offering an analysis of the ways in which a bid city will seek to leverage a bid; as such, there has been no attempt to view whether these channels were successful. Given the prevalence for bidders to state that enhanced sport participation will occur, this is an area for research to be conducted in the future.

This research found a second strategic objective, that of community building through the bid. As with the objective of sport participation, there appears to be a general feeling from bid cities that an Olympic bid will automatically unite the populace; however, this is clearly not the case. Both Oliver (2011a) and Coates and Wicker (2015) detail negative feelings that are created by an Olympic bid. Similarly, the number of referenda that have resulted in cities ultimately not bidding shows that the pure act of bidding will not necessarily engender public support (Lauermann, 2016). Indeed, despite Budapest 2024 (2017:20) claiming that the bid would 'unite, integrate and mobilise society', Budapest's candidacy was withdrawn before the vote following a petition against hosting that gained more than 260,000 signatures (BBC Sport, 2017a).

The third strategic objective discovered in this research is that of urban development, and in particular sport and transport infrastructure. This finding corresponds with the literature, suggesting that urban development is one of the primary benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games (Alberts, 2009; Masterman, 2008; Bilsel and Zelef, 2011; Moss, 2011; Oliver, 2017). Further,

three of the bid cities detailed that this development is funded by the government, supporting Lauermann's (2015) contention that an Olympic bid can draw government investment to a region.

Finally, a strategic objective of raising the global profile of a region was identified. Of the four objectives that were identified, this was the least prevalent in the Candidate Files. This might be due to a lack of evidence within the literature that bidding for Olympic Games raises the profile of a city, or indeed a nation. The strategies that could be employed to achieve this objective are worthy of further research.

This chapter offered a more nuanced view of Olympic bids than has previously been covered in the literature. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, aside from one or two quantitative studies, most of the research into failed Olympic bids has used the case study approach. This has resulted in several discrete case studies that do not take into account the political and economic differences between the bidders. Section 5.4 categorised the bids into five distinct areas, allowing a comparison between nations in different situations. For example, this research found that bidders in emerging economies focused their leveraging plans around tangible infrastructure, perhaps because these cities do not already have the levels of infrastructure found in more developed nations. This adds a new dimension to the literature surrounding sport mega-event bids.

The analysis of the Candidate Files also has potential practical implications. It was not until 2009 that bid cities needed to provide an answer to the question investigated in the chapter; therefore, the results from this chapter provide future bid teams with information as to how previous bid cities have sought to



exploit the opportunities provided by their Olympic bid. The categorising of the bidders in Section 5.4 could also assist the IOC. For example, if the IOC wishes to encourage more emerging nations to bid for the Olympic Games, then, using this research, it could provide more assistance for these cities to develop their infrastructure as part of the bid. The current IOC plans (Agenda 2020 and The New Norm) do not appear to offer any sort of differentiation between bid cities. This research may assist the IOC in targeting specific types of cities, or cities from specific nations, to bid for the Olympic Games.

## 6 Cape Town 2004

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### 6.1 Introduction and Purpose

This chapter comprises a case study on Cape Town's bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games, an event ultimately hosted by Athens. This chapter is structured using Chalip's (2004) model. The three opportunities that the Cape Town bid team identified for leveraging are introduced (Section 6.2.1) and, following this, the strategic objectives of Cape Town's leveraging plans are each discussed in turn (Section 6.2.2). The first strategic objective, that of community reintegration (Section 6.2.2.1), is investigated. The plans for community integration used similar means to the plans for sport development, so the latter will be discussed second (Section 6.2.2.2). Third and finally, there was an objective to use the bid for international recognition as Cape Town wished to change its image in the eyes of the world (Section 6.2.2.3). In each of these sections, the strategic objective will be introduced, together with the means employed to achieve it. Each section concludes with an evaluation of the success of the leveraging strategy.

### 6.2 Leveraging the Olympic Bid

This section discusses the leveraging strategies put in place as part of Cape Town's bid for the 2004 Olympic Games, and the impact on the City of Cape Town and South Africa as a whole. From the outset, the bid team (hereafter called CT-Bid) recognised that Cape Town was an outsider in the bid competition and was unlikely to be successful. Therefore, plans to leverage

the bid were put in place from the outset. Indeed, the formal bid charter set out the expectation that the bid would have a positive impact, stating that:

the opportunity of the Bid and hosting the Games (would) promote the political, social and economic development of the people of the region and promote the principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

(Cape Town 2004, 1997a:3-4).

Further, a preliminary study into the economic impacts of hosting, highlighted the need to ensure that the bid brought benefits to the city through the building of facilities and general investment into the bid process (KPMG/NN Gobodo and Associates, 1995).

The data collection found that the Olympic bid provided three clear opportunities for the bid to provide benefits for the city: government funding, global exposure, and access to international expertise. These three opportunities were leveraged by CT-Bid to achieve its three clear strategic objectives: community reintegration, sport development, and image change. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, the same opportunities can be leveraged for different goals. Therefore, this section will first introduce the three opportunities before going on to discuss the strategic objectives and the means by which they were achieved. Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage is then adapted to demonstrate the leveraging strategies employed.

### **6.2.1 Opportunities**

An Olympic bid is a unique resource that provides unique opportunities for a bidding city. First, the ability of Cape Town to gain central government funding

will be reviewed. Following this, Cape Town's access to global media and expertise will be considered.

#### **6.2.1.1 Government Support**

As has been discussed extensively in Chapter 3, Cape Town was singular within South Africa. Its demographics were predominantly coloured and Afrikaans-speaking, in comparison to the rest of South Africa which had a far greater proportion of IsiXhosa- and IsiZulu-speaking Black South Africans. Furthermore, in 1994, the Western Cape was the only province to re-elect the National Party that had embraced apartheid for so long. This caused conflict between the national and provincial governments, which were dominated by two parties with extremely different political views. Consequently, the Western Cape, and therefore Cape Town, was towards the back of the queue when it came to government funding (CT03, 2016).

Thus, the Olympic bid was used to lever government funds that Cape Town would not otherwise have been able to access. The national government had identified sport as a vehicle with which to promote unity, and Cape Town bidding for the Olympic Games tapped into this. Furthermore, the Olympic bid process requires national governmental guarantees, ensuring that the government has to be supportive of the bid from the outset. Thus, Cape Town was able to gain substantial funding resources from the national government (CT06, 2016).

The majority of the funding for Cape Town's bid and subsequent infrastructural projects came from private sponsorship and national funding. The City of Cape

Town itself ultimately invested just R3 million<sup>14</sup> into the bid. CT-Bid was successful in attracting R100 million<sup>15</sup> from private sponsors, in a mixture of cash and services in kind. A similar amount was also secured from the national government for the bid itself, together with R350 million<sup>16</sup> additional funding from the government for investment in the Priority Projects from 1996-1998 (CT09, 2016; CT11, 2016). Given the political environment in which Cape Town's bid took place, it was extremely unlikely that Cape Town would have received this level of government funding had it not been bidding for the Olympic Games.

Interviewees identified several reasons for the government investment into the bid. First, South Africa was very much an outsider in the race, competing with global cities such as Rome and Athens, and had a poor global profile (Alden and le Pere, 2004). CT-Bid believed that South Africa was viewed as a 'third world country with inadequate sporting and accommodation facilities and transport and utilities infrastructure' (CT11, 2016). Therefore, CT-Bid were able to persuade the ANC government that investment was necessary in the city before the IOC Evaluation Commission arrived to view Cape Town. CT-Bid feared that if there was no evidence of investment at the time of the inspection, then the IOC Evaluation Commission would have doubts about the levels of support that Cape Town would receive from the government for the Games themselves (CT11, 2016).

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<sup>14</sup> Approximately £200,000

<sup>15</sup> Approximately £6 million

<sup>16</sup> Approximately £21 million

Second, the bid also gave the government the opportunity to promote itself within the country. The ANC was a new government that was not just 'finding its feet'; it was also needing kudos, and to be seen to be involved in a hugely important international event (CT07, 2016). At the time, the South African government was embarking on its Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, which replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme implemented following the first national elections (Streak, 2004). GEAR sought to grow the South African economy through freeing the private sector from the apartheid policies that had constrained it in the past (Michie and Padayachee, 1998). This highlights the issues that the ANC was facing at the time in working with both the previously disadvantaged and marginalised and those who had prospered during apartheid. While the Cape Town bid had a strong developmental theme, it was still a bid to host the Olympic Games, an event that has long been thought to benefit the elite (Ziakas, 2015).

Therefore, the initial governmental investment in the priority projects was an attempt to help both the white elite and the previously disadvantaged. It demonstrated to the former that South Africa's post-apartheid reformation was going to be evolutionary, and that South Africa was going to be a global player. On the other hand, the government investment was spent on the 'priority projects', which were specifically developed to benefit those who were previously disadvantaged. Thus, the ANC saw this investment as a way of reaching out to two different communities with diametrically opposed needs (CT11, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 3, the ANC viewed sport as a means of bridging this divide, with the National Sport Congress highlighting the

government's responsibility to 'finance and provide facilities and services' (National Sports Congress, 1993). The funding provided by the government to Cape Town in reaction to the bid therefore fitted into the wider national strategy.

It was these arguments that CT-Bid drew upon to secure the funding from the government. At this stage, it should be made clear that while these priority projects benefited the City of Cape Town, it was CT-Bid which was responsible for securing the funding. CT-Bid was able to leverage the national government's need to 'be seen to be as an active partner, not just to the Bid and its private sector donors, but to the various local levels of government that needed to approve the Bid and for whom the spend would kick-start local facilities and transport development projects' (CT11, 2016).

This was supported by another respondent, who noted that the national government's support of the bid allowed it more access into the politics within the Western Cape, with the funding of the bid legitimising the government's involvement within the province (CT01, 2016). Indeed, it was another bid that provided the inspiration for this. Members of CT-Bid worked with stakeholders involved in Manchester's unsuccessful bid for the 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games. The funding that Manchester secured from the UK government (see Chapter 3 for more detail) inspired CT-Bid to seek similar funding from the South African government (CT11, 2016). This emphasises the need for the IOC to ensure that knowledge can be passed from bidder to bidder. It is only because CT-Bid purposefully sought out Manchester's bid team that there was an awareness of this leveraging opportunity.

### 6.2.1.2 Global Exposure

A second opportunity provided for Cape Town was the global exposure that entering a bid process affords a city such as Cape Town. Given that South Africa had been a segregated nation and excluded from the rest of the world less than a decade before the bid submission, it still had a negative image (Alden and le Pere, 2004). Indeed, the primary image of South Africa was still apartheid, and so there was an intention to change this image and demonstrate South Africa and Cape Town's capabilities to the rest of the world. Therefore, the bid and the bid process were seen as an opportunity to leverage a change in image.

Simply being part of the bid process ensured that there was a global focus on Cape Town. A tourism destination manager within the City of Cape Town said, 'I think from day one, when we internally announced that we were going to bid, it started creating an awareness' (CT08, 2016). Similarly, the bid process allowed Capetonian delegates the opportunity to travel the world, promoting Cape Town as a city and a destination. One member of the bid team detailed the opportunity provided:

In 1997, once we were a finalist city and were allowed access to IOC members (and they could visit us), I visited Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guatemala. I have some Spanish, and was able (assisted by a translator, Francisco) to describe the Olympic Plan and projected improvements in Spanish. I used it to present the Olympic Plan to both French- and Spanish-speaking IOC members when they visited Cape Town. I also went to the Continental Assembly of NOCs of Pan America in Winnipeg in July. At



this, I presented our bid, as did Athens, Rome, Stockholm and Buenos Aires.

(CT11, 2016)

Crucially, this media attention provided the city with marketing opportunities it would not otherwise have been able to afford. The same respondent detailed that:

As one example, the value of the international television exposure of Cape Town, when the IOC announced the five Finalist Cities on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1997, has been estimated to be at least R20 million. The equivalent exposure on 5<sup>th</sup> September would be worth even more. From 7<sup>th</sup> March, Cape Town received virtually continuous visits from international television crews, filming the city and its countryside, and documenting its technical preparations and facilities.

(CT11, 2016)

Another noted that mainstream media outlets across the world were featuring Cape Town:

On one occasion, I was sitting in my hotel room watching TV – Euronews – and they had a special feature on Cape Town, and I thought, my goodness, do you know what... we just don't have the money to do that kind of marketing... you know, to sell Cape Town across all the major cities of Europe. Euronews is watched in all the major countries in Europe, and maybe even internationally. There is no way that we can afford that kind of marketing.

(CT07, 2016)

### 6.2.1.3 International Expertise

The final opportunity that was provided to Cape Town, was the exposure to international expertise that came as part of the bid. CT-Bid received support from private sponsors, typically including some of the largest firms in South Africa. Table 6.1 below shows the national and international companies who were stakeholders in Cape Town's bid.

*Table 6.1: Supporters and Suppliers of the Bid*

<b>Supporters of the Bid</b>	<b>Olympic Bid Suppliers</b>
Mercedes-Benz (SA)	IBM
Unifruco	Siemens
Caltex	Eskom
Nedbank	Victoria & Alfred Waterfront
Pick 'n' Pay	Ernst & Young
South African Airways	Primedia Ad Displays
Sun International	Opportuniti Communications
Telkom	SAPSA
	Anglo-American

Not all sponsors contributed financially. Rather, 'in-kind resources, including professional skills in formulating the Bid and addressing other issues raised by it, were provided free or at significant discounts' (KPMG/NN Gobodo and Associates, 1995:38). These professional skills were particularly important for Cape Town, and South Africa as a whole, as South Africa had been excluded from global markets and networks for much of the preceding 50 years.

One of the sponsors to contribute expertise was Mercedes-Benz, who seconded a manager from Daimler-Benz Aerospace to CT-Bid, bringing with him access to the expertise of the German organisation (Cape Town 2004,

1997b). A clear example was given by an architect working on the Candidate File and designing the facilities for the Games:

I went into the building in November 1995, and I started writing instructions or briefs for the buildings, and [manager from Daimler-Benz Aerospace] came to me after a short while and he said to me, 'Do you need help with that? I think I can get you help...' And so I said, 'I can take any help you can give...' And he then phoned up Deutsche Aerospace, assembled in Germany, and got them to talk to a firm in Germany called Weibe Blum, and there's a load of material in there from Weibe Blum, who are... quite a big firm of architects. I think it has disbanded now... but [manager from Daimler-Benz Aerospace] arranged for an architect to come out from Germany and help me write briefs for sporting buildings.

(CT01, 2016)

As can be seen, international expertise fed into the design and construction of the priority projects, to be discussed further in Sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2. The priority projects were not the only strategic objective to benefit from international expertise. Daimler-Benz Aerospace also contributed to Cape Town International Airport, planning its long-term strategy:

When we went to Cape Town International Airport and said, 'Show us your long-term plan, because we have the Olympics, you're going to need to be able to...' they said, 'No, we don't have a long-term plan.' We said, 'But you've an airport, surely you've got, like, a 30-year plan for the airport?' They answered, 'No.' So, what happened then... on the phone to Daimler-Benz, 'Do you have any technicians, whatever, guys that can help with long-range planning of airports?' They said, 'Yes, we'll send you a couple of

Germans.’ Okay, whoosh, and the next thing, there’s a couple of Germans working in our office, working with the airport guys, saying, ‘Listen, guys, you’ve got to build a long-term plan here. When are you going to build a second landing strip? When are you going to build the terminal?’

(CT09, 2016)

This expertise from Daimler-Benz Aerospace directly contributed to the third strategic objective of Cape Town, to change the image of the country and seek to become a global destination. However, while this additional expertise certainly provided an opportunity to enhance Cape Town’s leveraging of the bid, it is also a resource that was not fully capitalised. Following the bid, no post-bid evaluation took place. Many working on the bid were seconded from other organisations and, once Athens was named as host, contracts ended, and workers returned to their normal jobs (CT10, 2016). Those who had gained knowledge while working as part of the bid then took this back with them to their regular jobs, but this did not necessarily benefit the city directly. Indeed, as will be discussed, many of the same issues that beset Cape Town’s Olympic bid also hindered the 2006 Football World Cup bid two years later (CT03, 2016).

#### **6.2.1.4 Summary of Opportunities**

This section has detailed the opportunities provided to Cape Town, in accordance with Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage. The data collection found three clear opportunities brought by an Olympic bid: 1) the national government focuses on the city, 2) the international nature of the bid process provides an opportunity to promote a city on a global scale, and 3) international

sponsors wish to work with the city, and this brings additional expertise. The next section of this chapter is similarly structured around Chalip's (2004) model, as it details the strategic objectives for which these opportunities were leveraged, together with the means by which they were achieved.

## **6.2.2 Strategic Objectives**

It is clear, that entering the Olympic bid provided Cape Town with three clear opportunities: access to central government funding, global exposure, and international expertise. CT-Bid sought to leverage these opportunities to achieve three clear strategic objectives: community reintegration, sport development, and image change. The next section will take these in turn; first discussing the strategies put in place to achieve these objectives, followed by an analysis of the success in the years since.

### **6.2.2.1 Community Reintegration**

At the time of Cape Town's bid in the mid-1990s, there was not the emphasis on legacy that there has been since 2000 (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). Whereas current Candidature Files include specific sections on the vision and legacy of the Games, this was not a requirement for Cape Town. Despite this, Cape Town and South Africa recognised the opportunity for the Games to provide a legacy for the nation, and so pledged a 'developmental' bid and event. In addition to the three existing pillars at the heart of the Olympic Movement Charter (sport, culture and environment), CT-Bid sought to add 'human development' as a fourth pillar (Cape Town 2004, 1996a:6). Bid documentation made specific note of the fact that this should go beyond being

a legacy of hosting the Olympic Games, and that human development be a key part of the bid (Cape Town 2004, 1997a:3).

The primary strategic objective of South Africa's bid for the 2004 Olympic Games was to contribute to Cape Town bonding together a city ripped apart by apartheid. CT-Bid identified a number of 'Priority Projects' were to be built regardless of the outcome of the bid (CT01, 2016). While the building of facilities needed for the Games is certainly not unique to Cape Town, CT-Bid took a more strategic approach, and concentrated on the building of venues that were not necessarily sport venues. Rather, training facilities were built, that, while still necessary if the bid was successful, would be used to benefit communities beyond the bid due to 'lower maintenance costs and wider multi-purpose functionality' (Chittenden Nicks Partnership, 1997:14). Had Cape Town not bid for the Olympics, these facilities would not have been built (CT01, 2016). Table 6.2 shows the community facilities that were constructed as part of the bid, together with the cost of each. As can be seen, these costs were not insignificant, and relied on the government funding that was detailed in Section 6.2.1.1.

Table 6.2: Community Facilities Constructed as Part of the Bid

Area	Use	Cost <sup>17</sup>	Ward Number (1996)	% white population	Prevalent Race
Philippi East	Multipurpose hall	R18 million	80	1.9%	Coloured <sup>18</sup> (87.6%)
Khayelitsha	Boxing/multipurpose hall	R17 million	83	4.3%	Coloured (84.6%)
Belhar	Multipurpose hall	R18.25 million	22	0.1%	Coloured (91.0%)
Langa	Multipurpose hall	R5 million	53	51.7%	White (51.7%)
Scottsdene	Multipurpose hall	R4 million	12	7.4%	Coloured (50.6%)
Culemborg	Transnet Exhibition Centre		55	42.2%	White (42.2%)

On a map, these facilities appear to be located sparsely across the city. For example, Scottsdene is more than 30 kilometres away from Central Cape Town station, and is geographically closer to Stellenbosch than Cape Town (see Figure 6.1). The facilities were constructed in strategic locations. As Table 6.2 shows, these were typically areas of Cape Town with a small percentage of white population. Despite Cape Town having a 21% of white population, many of the wards that received new facilities had a very small white population. It is noticeable, that of the five multi-purpose halls that were built, four of them had white populations of less than 8%, and all had large coloured populations. These were areas that were termed 'previously

<sup>17</sup> Costs are provided by interviewee CT11

<sup>18</sup> While this phrase is not deemed acceptable in UK society, it is a term still used in common parlance in South Africa

disadvantaged<sup>19</sup>. Specifically, Khayelitsha and Philippi were specifically identified as being home to households in the bottom 20% in terms of socio-economic status within the city (Ninham Shand, 1997).




Figure 6.1: Locations of the Priority Projects

One member of CT-Bid specifically noted the way that the Scottsdene facilities (the red marker at the top right in Figure 6.1) were placed in order to benefit the community:

That was the other thing as well, and this is part of our portfolio, looking at locating facilities in a very strategic way, to actually start reintegrating communities. So, for example, the Scottsdene facility was located very strategically on the edge of a particular community but where other communities

<sup>19</sup> 'Previously disadvantaged communities' refers to 'persons or categories of persons who, prior to the new democratic dispensation marked by the coming into force of the new constitution of Republic of South Africa (no 108), were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of their race and includes juristic persons or association owned or controlled by such persons' (Nefcorp, 2005).



could access it as well. And that has become a massive community focus.

(CT03, 2016)

Scottsdene was not the only facility identified in the interviews as being built in a strategic location. A second member of CT-Bid also noted the location of Khayelitsha:

That was one of the important principles from a social and an environmental point of view, to look at land that was under-utilised and in poor condition, and also to look at putting facilities in poorer areas, within communities. So that's why the Khayelitsha multipurpose centre is in Khayelitsha; the idea being that it should benefit those communities directly.

(CT10, 2016)

This planning went beyond providing previously disadvantaged areas of Cape Town with much-needed facilities. A key aspect of apartheid was the spatial planning that occurred, to facilitate urban segregation (Maylam, 1995). This resulted in cities being fragmented, with little connection between the different areas of the city that were typically occupied by different racial groups. As South Africa exited from apartheid, different agencies within the city coordinated to find a way to reunite the different areas of the city (CT11, 2016). This resulted in the document 'A Vision for the Future of Metropolitan Cape Town' being produced (Cape Town City Council, 1993). This report proposed that 'location, timing and character of development' be managed within the city and was then developed further by the newly-formed Cape Metropolitan Council. The Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) was published in April 1996.

Watson (2002) offers a full review of the MSDF and the factors contributing towards it, but the key points are as follows. The MSDF was based on four 'development principles': equality of opportunity, social justice, sustainable development, and openness and accountability (Watson, 2002:110). These principles helped to define the vision of the MSDF, which sought to use the development of nodes, corridors and the metropolitan open space to address the basic needs of all Capetonians and provide opportunities for further progression (Cape Metropolitan Council, 1996). This not only had the intention of breaking down the geographical segregation that was still a legacy of the apartheid policy, but also to provide previously disadvantaged communities with access to transport and job opportunities. This was to be achieved through the development of urban nodes (urban areas with infrastructural connections to other regions), corridors (areas for pedestrian and transit with business, retail and residential integration; corridors are used to link nodes), Metropolitan Open Space System (open spaces within the city, for example parks and nature reserves), and an urban edge (an agreed-upon city boundary to prevent urban sprawl). Watson (2003:58) provides an image of the MSDF plans for Cape Town in Figure 6.2 below. As can be seen, the areas of Claremont and Wynberg, Belville, Philippi and Somerset West were to be urban nodes, with corridors proposed to provide transport links.



Figure 6.2: Cape Town Urban Nodes and Corridors<sup>20</sup>

These plans informed the work by CT-Bid. When Figure 6.1 (showing the location of the priority projects on page 237) is compared to Figure 6.2 above, it is clear that the priority projects were built in the areas identified by the MSDF as in need for urban development. This had a further strategic plan. While these nodes had been identified as areas for urban development, this was not yet forthcoming from private enterprise. The building of priority projects within these regions was seen as being important in providing a lead for private enterprise to follow (Chittenden Nicks Partnership, 1997).

Thus, CT-Bid sought to use these new facilities to bring together these different areas that would previously have had little interaction. It was stated that the position of these venues should ‘contribute to the emergence of more

<sup>20</sup> Image taken from Watson (2003:58)

efficient and supportive urban environments for large numbers of people' (Day, 1997:16). CT-Bid sought external assistance for the plans. Local professors David Dewar and Lucien le Grange argued that the building of sport and community facilities could be used to improve the issues within the City of Cape Town, proposing 'a hierarchy of community sports facilities which is inter-penetrated by Olympic Games-required facilities' (CT11, 2016). In addition, the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was asked to consider the spatial planning that had been a part of the apartheid regime, and the ways in which this could be altered. A member of CT-Bid gave details as to CSIR plans, and how Cape Town built this into the bid plans:

They were working for the Department of Transport, and then various other cities, and they were involved in the project, saying, 'Our cities are so fractured, because of apartheid planning, because of the separation of workplaces to places of living.' So, their task was a simple one, to say, 'Look, map out the traffic flows, people flows across the city, where they come from, where they go to, and start identifying the strategic locations for high end shopping centres, businesses, that can start assisting to reintegrating our cities... We then tacked on to that and said, 'Utilising that same model, identify where the strategic placement of high order sports facilities could be,' so that, for example, they had then identified the Scottsdene facility, in terms of pathways between the railway line and various communities. How you can use the strategic location of that facility to not only integrate, but also for it to become a central meeting place, for these communities?

(CT03, 2016)

The development of the priority projects had a further strategy for supporting those who were previously disadvantaged through 'affirmative tendering procedures' when finding designers and architects. One of the key strategies for this was the development of an 'architectural competition' (CT03, 2016). This is a common event in South Africa, with architects being invited to submit plans which might then be used. Traditionally, entry to the competition would be limited to registered, qualified architects, but this was open to anyone who wished to enter. This action had further social implications, as it made it easier for black and coloured architects to enter the competition and work with the bid team. Indeed, as one of the respondents claimed, the 'real legacy from the bid was the information and knowledge that was passed to the building industry' (CT02, 2016). This resulted in 55% of the contracts being filled by black and local contractors, who would previously not have had the opportunity to work on such a prestigious contract (Cape Argus, 1997a).

The use of previously disadvantaged workers was a clear aim of the games, with bid documentation stating that 'half the money spent by the Olympic Bid on its operations will go to black business in accordance with its economic empowerment policy' (Cape Town 2004, 1997a:30). However, this was not necessarily wholly successful. The Strategic Environmental Assessment notes that 'the black construction industry, which represent SMME (Small, Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises) from this sector (civil engineering), complain that they have not made any impact from this sector' (Merrifield, 1997:16). Indeed, it appears that these decisions were often left up to individual local authorities.

These plans went beyond just the building of community facilities. The plans for city restructuring also required investment in transport infrastructure, in order to develop the 'corridors' needed to link to the urban nodes (CT06, 2016). A government white paper released in 1996 stated that the goal was to provide:

A system which will provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure which will best meet the needs of freight and passenger customers at improving the levels of service and cost in a fashion which supports government strategies for economic and social development whilst being environmentally and economically sustainable.

(Department of Transport, 1996)

Indeed, this extract features in a public CT-Bid document, which goes on to highlight the requirements for transportation during an Olympic Games. Further, it recognises how these transport upgrades would add to the city's developmental goals, stating that 'the meshing of land use with transport is fundamental to the city's planning, as it is only through the integration of these two disciplines that the developmental nature of the plan can be achieved' (Cape Town 2004, 1997c:25). CT-Bid was aware that the city's existing transport infrastructure could not handle an Olympic Games but, perhaps more pertinently, upgrades were needed for a public transport system that was not designed to support previously disadvantaged communities (Cameron, 1997).

As part of the bid, the city managed to secure R250 million<sup>21</sup> of transportation development (Cape Town 2004, 1997a), an amount that was subsequently downgraded to R200 million<sup>22</sup> once the bid had been lost (CT11, 2016). Previously, central funding for transport was around R8 million per year (KPMG/NN Gobodo and Associates, 1995). This additionally leveraged funding was spent on upgrading the rail and road networks in the city, with a focus on developing the corridors and linking the nodes as seen in Figure 6.2 on page 240 (CT03, 2016; CT05, 2016; CT06, 2016).

The transport infrastructural upgrades that came about as part of the bid are detailed in Table 6.3. While the spending did include significant improvements linking the airport to the city centre, the developmental aim of these priority projects is clearly evidenced. The identified urban hubs of Philippi and Bellville both received significant funding for transport upgrades in order to develop the corridors in the plan. Similarly, Lansdowne Road, the N2, and Stock Road were three of the roads that received additional funding. Lansdowne Road can be seen in Figure 6.2 on page 240 as one of the corridors identified by the MSDF; the N2 upgrade (including dedicated public transport) provided better access from Khayelitsha to the city centre, and Stock Road in Philippi is one of the hubs. It is clear to see how these transport infrastructure upgrades contributed to the MSDF.

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<sup>21</sup> Approximately £22 million

<sup>22</sup> Approximately £18 million

Table 6.3: Transport Upgrades<sup>23</sup>

Transport Development	Type	Cost
New transport interchange in Philippi	Rail	R6.3 million
Mowbray interchange upgrade	Rail	R7.7 million
Commuter facility improvement including access and ticket control on the Cape Town to Khayelitsha line	Rail	R27.5 million
Improved taxi facilities in Fish Hoek, Khayelitsha, Koeberg, Langa and Maitland	Rail	R12.1 million
Bellville Transport Interchange upgrade	Rail	R3.9 million
Improvements to transfers at Philippi Station	Rail	R3.5 million
Upgrade to airport links	Road	R16.7 million
Phase one of Bellville-Philippi corridor development	Road	R32.6 million
Road improvements	Road	R28.5 million
Public transport upgrades, including dedicated bus lanes and provision of new stops	Road	R17.7 million

#### 6.2.2.1.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy

Cape Town's bid was specifically leveraged to bring about community integration within the city, through the building of strategically placed community facilities and transport investment. CT-Bid recognised that this was not something that could be achieved just through the bid, and so it built upon the plans put in place by the MSDF. In order to view the success of the leveraging strategy, the success of the MSDF needs to be considered.

Crucially, the MSDF was never formalised, and instead, a redrafted document was instituted within Cape Town in 2001 (City of Cape Town, 2012). In this

<sup>23</sup> Data from Cape Argus (1997b:6)



same year, Turok and Watson (2001:136) wrote that ‘there is a gulf between Cape Town’s impoverished townships and its affluent areas, which appears to be widening in important respects’. In the years since, further changes to Cape Town’s urban development plans have been implemented, resulting in a new spatial development plan being released by the City of Cape Town in 2012 (City of Cape Town, 2012). This was reviewed in 2017, and a new five-year plan introduced, designed to build on the prior work (City of Cape Town, 2017).

Watson’s (2002) work provides an insight into the development of the MSDF and the issues that beset the plans from the outset. The number of plans that have been implemented within the City of Cape Town in the years since, suggests that these plans, at least to date, have not yet been wholly successful. However, there is some evidence that inequality within Cape Town has fallen in the years since.

Statistics South Africa released a report in 2014 entitled ‘Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011’. This details the progress that has been made in the Western Cape between these years:

- The number classified as ‘poor’ fell from 36.9% to 24.7%
- The poverty gap decreased from 13.8% to 8.5%
- The cost to eradicate poverty is estimated at R3.3 billion<sup>24</sup>
- In 2006, one in four households was living in poverty. This fell to one in six by 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2014)

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<sup>24</sup> Approximately £186 million

However, while there is clearly progress, inequality in Cape Town is still prevalent. UN-Habitat (2008) estimated that Cape Town's Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) fell from 0.69 in 2001 to 0.67 in 2005. To put these figures into context, a Gini coefficient of over 0.4 is considered 'unacceptably high' (UN-Habitat, 2008:72). While on a global scale this inequality may seem extreme, the same report noted that South Africa's Gini coefficient was over 0.7, and Cape Town had the most equality of the eight South African cities ranked in the sample. A later UN-Habitat report ranked Cape Town as a city with 'solid prosperity factors' (UN-Habitat, 2013:20). Of the five dimensions that contribute to the UN-Habitat's City Prosperity Index, Cape Town is weakest on equity, and in fact, of the 72 global cities included in the study, only Johannesburg has a lower Equity Index. However, Cape Town scores highly on infrastructural development, being ranked 30<sup>th</sup> of the 72 cities included. This perhaps indicates that the work done following the Olympic bid on urban infrastructure has played a role in developing the city.

However, given the decades of spatial planning, it is unlikely that a single event would be able to restructure a city. Indeed, the Strategic Environmental Assessment stresses that even the *hosting* of an Olympic Games would not fully achieve these goals (Cameron, 1997), and therefore it is inconceivable that purely bidding would change the city. Therefore, the success of Cape Town's leveraging plans should not be judged on whether Cape Town is now a well-integrated city. The leveraging plans implemented by CT-Bid contributed to the planned MSDF and the latterly introduced redrafted plan.

As is clear, Cape Town leveraged the bid to put in place plans that had already been identified as being vital for the future of the city. The placement of the new sport facilities in previously disadvantaged areas necessitated that transport upgrades also occurred in these poor regions of the city; however, much of the work on the road networks, while catalysed by the bid, were not achieved until much more recently (CT11, 2016). Indeed, one of the respondents believed that the lack of road infrastructure resulted in the new facilities being isolated, and initially actually negated the impact of the new facilities within the communities (CT05, 2016). It is clear that Cape Town had two clearly planned infrastructural developments to reintegrate the city: the building of community facilities in previously disadvantaged areas, and the provision of transport infrastructure to bond the two together.

#### **6.2.2.2 Sport Development**

The already discussed building of facilities contributed to Cape Town's second strategic objective of improving sport development. As South Africa had been excluded from global sport for much of the previous 30 years, the nation's passion for playing sport was waning (CT01, 2016). Indeed, the interviewee noted that South Africans do not have a sporting culture, and particularly not for participating in sport. Therefore, Cape Town sought to leverage the bid to improve sport participation.

In addition to the community facilities that were built, detailed in Table 6.2 on page 236, the priority projects also included a number of sporting-specific venues. CT-Bid continued their strategic approach here. The sporting venues that were built were not competition facilities; rather, they were built to Olympic

and competition standard but would have been the *training* venues rather than the actual competition venues. The rationale for this is clear. Given the widespread poverty in Cape Town in the mid-1990s, the building of facilities to be used for elite sport was not the priority. Rather, the intention was to build sporting facilities that could be used by children and amateurs. As one interviewee stated:

You need proper facilities for competition sport, but you do not need them for everyday social use... If you don't build the competition venues, you need to build the training venues. And then, I think that you then are strategic.

(CT01, 2016)

*Table 6.4: Sport-Specific Priority Projects Constructed*

Area	Use	Cost <sup>25</sup>	Ward Number (1996)	% white population	Prevalent Race
Hartleyvale	International Hockey venue <sup>26</sup>	R21 million	55	42.2%	White (42.2%)
Khayelitsha	Boxing/multipurpose hall	R17 million	83	4.3%	Coloured (84.6%)
Bellville	Velodrome <sup>26</sup>	R45 million	7	88.5%	White (88.5%)
Turfhall	Softball facility	R14 million	19	0.3%	Coloured (90.1%)
Grassy Park	Baseball	R2.5 million	66	0.3%	Coloured (77.6%)

Table 6.4 shows the sporting Priority Projects built as part of the bid. In addition to the multi-purpose training halls that were constructed, a number of sport-specific venues were constructed. Again, the softball and baseball facilities

<sup>25</sup> Costs are provided by interviewee CT11

<sup>26</sup> These were existing facilities renovated as part of the bid

were strategically located in previously disadvantaged areas so as to provide the poorer areas of Cape Town with facilities that could be used.

The construction of sporting venues was not the only way that Cape Town leveraged the bid to develop its sporting infrastructure. Both the City of Cape Town, and indeed South Africa as a whole, had little experience of dealing with Olympic Sport Federations. First, the sports with which South Africa is typically associated are not traditional Olympic sports: rugby union, cricket, and football. Furthermore, while there are more traditional Olympic sports played in South Africa, the nation's exclusion from international sporting competition reduced the exposure that South Africa had with these sporting federations. For the first time, Cape Town was dealing with 28 different sport federations and benefiting from the expertise of individuals within these federations. One interviewee, who dealt directly with the sport federations, said that:

I think similarly during the bid, and then becoming exposed to sort of key decision makers in the international sports federations as well. So, in addition to IOC members being exposed to the Cape Town offering, a lot of work was also put into getting to know the international sports federations and getting their role players to visit Cape Town.

(CT04, 2016)

This access to, and communication with sporting federations, allowed Cape Town and South Africa as a whole to accelerate their reintroduction into the sporting world. This will be discussed further in the next section.

#### 6.2.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy

While the building of sport facilities, and the bid itself, allowed South Africa to push sport development within the nation, it was identified by interviewees as not having the full impact that it could have achieved. Cape Town certainly captivated the IOC members. CEO Chris Ball claimed to have received a letter from an IOC member saying that the CT-Bid 'should not be disappointed about not winning. Considering where South Africa came from since 1991, to be placed third was an outstanding achievement... now you must prepare for 2008' (Ball, 1997). However, this second bid failed to materialise, and instead, South Africa quickly re-engaged with its traditional sports, winning the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and 2007, in addition to finishing third in 1999. Similarly, domestic rugby teams were competitive in continental competition, with the Sharks being losing finalists in the first Super Rugby tournament in 1996. Of similar note, the South African cricket team have been competitive globally since re-entry, with the One Day International team reaching four Cricket World Cup semi-finals (having often been the favourite to win the tournament) and the Test team being ranked Number 1 in the world in 1999.

However, these are only two sports, and therefore it can be argued that South Africa did not successfully capitalise on the opportunities afforded by the Games. As one interviewee, of the Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport, said:

But there are, like, 70 other sports; cycling and table tennis and squash, and all of it is not professionalised. And I think there is a missed opportunity there, perhaps, to get a little bit of rigour into many of these sports, which I think we could

have, because we had that opportunity to work with them, we could have taken it, but we didn't because we were so focused on 'You know what? We've actually got to get the physical stuff sorted, because if we don't get the physical stuff sorted, we actually stand no chance'.

(CT06, 2016)

A member of the bid team further recognised this as a missed opportunity, noting that for all the tangible investment in facilities, South Africa did not take the opportunity to cultivate the soft skills needed for sport development:

And we go through the infrastructure benefits, we can go through all sorts of benefits, but the single benefit of sports development, either skills, technical officials... the facilities maybe upgraded, but very little of the soft skills... To be able to say, 'We were able to train a hundred new international standard technical officials, and that's the legacy we leave for sport'. And I think that in terms of sport, they've always been short-changed. Certainly in the bid, but even in the hosting as well. I mean, you can still forgive, in a sense, to say, 'Look, it's not the objective.' But certainly, in terms of hosting, the technical officials, administrative capacity, you know what I mean? A lot of our sports federations are still out of the boot of a car.

(CT03, 2016)




Figure 6.3: South Africa Olympic Medals, 1992-2016

As Figure 6.3 shows, having won three Gold medals in 1996, South Africa won just one in total at the 2000, 2004, and 2008 Olympic Games, finishing 55<sup>th</sup>, 43<sup>rd</sup> and 72<sup>nd</sup> in the medal tables. In the immediate aftermath of the bid, South Africa failed to capitalise on the opportunity of ‘Olympism’ within the city. As can be seen, Olympic performance improved in the 2012 Olympic Games, 15 years on from Cape Town’s bid. While it may be possible that a 10-year-old Capetonian was inspired by the bid and then competed in London 15 years later, it should be noted that none of South Africa’s medallists at the London 2012 Games were from Cape Town. South Africa went on to win 10 medals during the 2016 Games, one of which was the Silver medal in the Rugby Sevens. Of the 13 members of the team, three were from Cape Town and two



from Paarl (a city 40 miles from Cape Town). Comparatively, of the other nine medallists, just one was from Cape Town and one from Paarl. This is significant, as the Western Cape's most successful Olympic sport is rugby, a sport in which South Africa was already experienced.

It should be noted that one of South Africa's medallists at the 2016 Games, Wayde van Niekerk, who won the Men's 400m, is from Cape Town. Furthermore, van Niekerk is from Bellville, one of the areas in which facilities were constructed as part of the bid (Bellville Primary School, 2016). While the facilities may have contributed to van Niekerk's progress as an elite athlete, he moved to Bloemfontein to attend secondary school (Chabalala, 2016). It is more likely that South Africa's progress in the Olympics is due to the nation's natural progression since re-entering the Olympics, rather than being attributed to Cape Town's bid. Indeed, van Niekerk was born in 1992, and so is of the first generation where South Africa competing in the Olympic Games could be viewed as being 'normal'.

### **6.2.2.3 Image Change**

The final strategic objective that South Africa sought as part of the Olympic bid was a change in image. South Africa targeted two distinct areas. First, South Africa and Cape Town wished to become known as a nation and a city that could host sporting events. Second, there was an aim to demonstrate to the world the change that had occurred since the abolition of apartheid, and that South Africa could re-enter the international stage. These two objectives will be taken in turn.

#### 6.2.2.3.1 A Place for Sport

The building of facilities was used to contribute to the previous strategic objectives of community reintegration and sport development, and it also contributed to a further objective; that of hosting additional sporting events.

As Table 6.4 on page 249 shows, Cape Town built a number of sporting venues, with the intention of hosting further sporting events in Cape Town. The South African government had recognised sport as a tool with which to reunite the nation (National Sports Congress, 1993), with Cape Town's Olympic bid following in the footsteps of South Africa hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations. Indeed, President Nelson Mandela was later quoted saying that 'sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire, it has the power to unite people in a way that little else does' (Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2000). Thus, South Africa was embarking on a strategy to host a number of sporting events, and the new stadia that were constructed were the means by which this could be achieved.

Table 6.5 shows the international sporting events hosted following Cape Town's bid. As can be seen, the Bellville Velodrome and Hartleyvale Hockey stadium, which were renovated as part of the bid, have both hosted several international sporting events since. Similarly, Turfhall Stadium which was built as part of the bid, also hosted the Junior Women's Softball World Championship in 2011.

Table 6.5: International Events hosted in Cape Town, 1998-2013

Year	Sport	Event	Location
1998	Sailing	ISAF World Junior Sailing Championships	Simon's Town
Annually since 2000	Canoeing	ICF Canoe Marathon	Cape Town
2003	Cycling	UCI Track Cycling World Cup Classics Round 3	Bellville Velodrome
2004-2010	Sailing	Volvo Ocean Race (one stage)	Cape Town Harbour
Annually since 2004	Cycling	Cape Epic Mountain Bike stage race	Western Cape
2005	Volleyball	Swatch-FIVB World Tour	Camps Bay
2006	Gymnastics	African Gymnastics Championships	Bellville Velodrome
2008	Cycling	2008 UCI Junior World Championships	Bellville Velodrome
2008	Cycling	UCI Junior Track World Championships	Bellville Velodrome
2008	Rope skipping	World Rope Skipping Championships	Good Hope Centre
2009	Hockey	Women's Hockey Champions Challenge	Hartleyvale Hockey Stadium
2010	Karate	African Karate Championships	Bellville Velodrome
2011	Judo	World U20 Championships	International Convention Centre
2011	Softball	Junior Women's Softball World Championship	Turfhall Stadium
2012	Table tennis	ITTF World Junior Table Tennis Championships	Grand Arena
2013	Hockey	Women's FIH Hockey World League Round 2	Hartleyvale Hockey Stadium

In addition to the building of the new stadia, another opportunity that has already been discussed contributed to the hosting of these events, through the building of relationships with the international sporting federations. Given South Africa's absence from the international sporting world during the

apartheid era, they had not kept up with international regulations. Therefore, working with these federations provided Cape Town with the information needed so that the facilities being constructed would be eligible to hold international competitions (CT04, 2016). Indeed, one interviewee who dealt directly with the different sporting federations said that:

International sports federations as well as IOC members who were exposed to South Africa for the first time, then just making the visit to South Africa, to Cape Town. If we didn't bid, we would not have had those key people, decision makers essentially, being exposed to what we could offer.

(CT04, 2016)

The interviewee went on to note the impact that the stadia construction and relationships with the sporting federations had had on the hosting of international events:

The building of some of it, and sporting facilities, certainly led to some of the international sports federations hosting the World Championships in South Africa, and probably for the first time as well.

(CT04, 2016)

These events were chosen strategically, for two reasons. South Africa had long been excluded from the international world of sport, having not competed in an Olympic Games since the 1960 Games in Rome. While South Africa did host the 1995 Rugby World Cup, and the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations, these competitions are different from the needs and requirements of hosting an Olympic Games.

*Table 6.6: Comparison of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 1996 Africa Cup of Nations, and 1996 Olympic Games*

	<b>1995 Rugby World Cup</b>	<b>1996 Africa Cup of Nations</b>	<b>1996 Atlanta Olympic Games</b>
Number of sports	1 (rugby)	1 (football)	26
Number of competing nations	16	16	197
Number of cities used to host	9	4	1
Number of events	32	29	271
Total Attendance	878,616	516,380	8,300,000 <sup>27</sup>

As Table 6.6 above shows, while the hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup and 1996 Africa Cup of Nations showed South Africa's capability to host a second order mega-event, CT-Bid did not believe that they showed the capabilities of Cape Town as a city. First, Cape Town had not been used as a venue for the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations and hosted just four games at the 1995 Rugby World Cup across 24 days. Second, the hosting of rugby and football events was viewed as having little relevance to hosting an Olympic Games, which in 1996 had 26 different sports. While football was one of these events, with women's football being introduced, it is a minor part of the Olympic Games. Thus, Cape Town sought to prove to both the sporting world and the IOC that it was a city capable of hosting an event of the magnitude of the Olympic Games. This had the added advantage of building up support within Cape Town for an event, and sports from which South Africa had been

<sup>27</sup> Guinness World Records (2018)

excluded for the previous 45 years (CT04, 2016). As one interviewee stated, this was recognised as an issue that CT-Bid sought to overcome:

Those were also planned as almost sort of test events, to showcase our capability of hosting world championships, and that was one of the challenges with the bid, that because of isolation during apartheid, we did not have a lot experience with a lot of the Olympic sports, other than non-Olympic sports such as rugby and cricket.

(CT04, 2016)

Thus, Cape Town concentrated on hosting Olympic sports for which South Africa was not well-known, with the intention of showcasing Cape Town's capabilities for hosting numerous sports. One member of the bid team discussed this in detail:

We always knew we needed to show our capability to be able to host international events. So, for example, we then went on a very strategic approach with regards to identifying, for example, gymnastics events; world youth gymnastics or continental gymnastics, plus fencing, swimming, triathlon. So, we targeted very specific events to show our capabilities of hosting events. Obviously, that then leads to facility upgrades and facility development.

(CT03, 2016)

Thus, a 'Sport Events Strategy' was created and put in place (Cape Town 2004, n.d.). This identified sporting events that could be hosted by Cape Town prior to July 1997. Fifteen events across 13 sports were identified and ranked, based on: 1) the importance of the sport to the IOC, 2) financial risk to Cape Town, 3) ability to market Cape Town's bid through the event, 4) extent to

which it would demonstrate Cape Town's hosting capabilities, 5) social benefits, and 6) timing of the event compared to the bid decision (Cape Town 2004, n.d.:3). The events considered included World Championships in weightlifting, handball, modern pentathlon and badminton, together with smaller athletics and cycling events.

There was a further strategic goal for the selection of the events. CT-Bid identified which IOC members had an interest in these sports, and thus aimed to host events that might potentially persuade IOC members to visit Cape Town, providing networking opportunities. For example, in the document, it is noted that Pál Schmitt, the IOC member for Hungary, is a fan of the sport of fencing. It is then suggested, that if Cape Town were to host a fencing event, Mr Schmitt could be invited to Cape Town to attend the event (Cape Town 2004, n.d.:38).

Each event was ranked on the six criteria, with athletics events (World Cross-Country and Africa vs USA competition) scoring highest. While it was concluded that it was financially viable for Cape Town to host all of the identified events, this was deemed to be unlikely, and so, in a period of two years, Cape Town and nearby town Stellenbosch hosted nine international sporting events, as seen in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Sport Events hosted by Cape Town, 1996-1997

Year	Sport	Event	Location
1996	Cross Country	IAAF World Cross-Country Championships	Stellenbosch
1996	Hockey	Atlanta 1996 Olympic Hockey qualifying tournament	Hartleyvale Hockey Stadium
1996	Modern Pentathlon	Modern Pentathlon World Cup Final	Stellenbosch
1996	Golf	World Cup of Golf	Somerset West
1997	Fencing	FIE World Championships	Transnet Exhibition Centre
1997	Mountain Biking	UCI Mountain Bike World Cup	Stellenbosch
1997	Weightlifting	World Junior Weightlifting Championships	Good Hope Centre
1997	Track Cycling	UCI Junior Track World Championships	Bellville Velodrome

Thus, the construction of sport facilities and the exposure to international sporting federations, allowed Cape Town to host a number of sporting events, contributing to the nation's plans to develop its sporting infrastructure. This in turn created further opportunities, as it allowed the City of Cape Town to receive additional funding that it otherwise would not have been eligible for (CT11, 2016). The Department of Sport provided R10 million for the hosting of the fencing, cycling and weightlifting events. This allowed the Transnet Exhibition Centre to receive further development due to the modifications needed to be able to host a world fencing tournament (CT09, 2016).

It was not just Cape Town that sought to host additional events and become a 'sporting city'. South Africa also wanted to be known as a nation that could host the largest sporting mega-events, and so needed to raise its profile on the international sporting stage. Prior to the bid, there was little global



knowledge of South Africa or its sporting capabilities and, as a result, the IOC officials who visited were astonished by what Cape Town could offer (CT02, 2016). Several interviewees felt that Cape Town's bid directly led to South Africa ultimately hosting the 'other' mega-event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup:

I think one can attribute some of it to the fact that we started to put ourselves sort of firmly on the international sports stage during the Olympic bid process; I think that was a major thing.

(CT07, 2016)

Another specifically linked the trajectory from Cape Town's Olympic bid to the 2010 FIFA World Cup:

In hindsight, it also put us in a position, which we didn't know the week after, the year after, or the two years after the bid, that it put us in a great position to bid for the FIFA World Cup many years later, because we based our departure point on the results of the Olympic Games. So future bids might benefit from, and successful bids might benefit from, the groundwork that was done.

(CT08, 2016)

This was mentioned by two further interviewees:

I think that Cape Town 2004 was an important pogo stick for Cape Town bidding to be part of the 2010 Football World Cup.

(CT11, 2016)

The second interviewee also noted that:

The Olympic bid, in my view, provided the core leadership team for the soccer World Cup. Finance, strong finance but

we also, obviously, empowered a lot of people coming out of the... the more technical-based people.

(CT09, 2016)

This can be demonstrated, as one member of the bid team was asked to write a guide for sport organisations who wish to bid for sporting events in the future.

They told me that:

I was then commissioned by the South African Sports Commission to write up the bidding frameworks. It cost me more than they paid me for it, but that's not the point. And then that stimulated chapters in this book as well. Yes, it's actually become an Act of Parliament now.

(CT03, 2016)

This document does not directly mention the Olympic bid, but it is clear that successes from the bid process have been incorporated into it (The South African Sports Commission, 2003). The year after the publication of this document, South Africa was awarded the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

#### *6.2.2.3.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy*

This can be viewed as a missed opportunity. The Olympic bid, and the events hosted by Cape Town in the bid period, did not necessarily then lead to the hosting of large-scale events that might be expected, despite South Africa hosting the 2010 Football World Cup. It should not be forgotten that South Africa lost a bid to host the 2006 Football World Cup. While there are clearly links between the Olympic and 2006 FIFA World Cup bids, it is also obvious that the lessons of the Olympic bid were not necessarily learned. The 2004 Olympic bid assumed that it would receive support from other African nations

and that the Olympic bid was a 'bid for Africa'. Yet, the nature of an Olympic bid makes this assumption difficult and, as a result, it was viewed across Africa purely as a Cape Town bid (CT03, 2016). During the final vote, at least four African IOC members did not vote for Cape Town in the first round of voting (Morris, 1997). This lesson was not heeded, and subsequently South Africa failed to attract the level of support from the African nations that it expected during its bid for the 2006 Football World Cup (Cornelissen, 2004a). A member of the bid team supported this by saying that:

I think there was a lot of assumptions that the African IOC members would bid for Cape Town to support. So, you had the African Union giving their support, but it came down to individual IOC members. And whether we could have changed it, I'm not so sure, but I think there were a lot of assumptions made that they would automatically support the South African bid, African bid. It was supposed to be a lesson learnt but I don't think... again, the 2006 bid was again claimed as a bid for Africa, which should have been a lesson. And probably this is sort of one of the negative aspects of bidding and hosting in South Africa, we tend not to learn as much as we should from one bid to the next. Or the lessons are not applied, possibly because of circumstances in terms of different committees, different people, different time periods, but I think that's the importance of catching the knowledge and the lessons learnt and archiving it and using it for the next bid.

(CT04, 2016)

While some members of the Cape Town bid did go on to work on the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cup bids, there was a clear lack of formal knowledge

transfer. Indeed, one respondent claimed to have offered support to the 2006 World Cup bid, only to be turned down (CT03, 2016). South Africa announced to CAF (Confederation of African Football) in February 1998 that it would be bidding for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. By the deadline for submission of bids, in December 1998, four further African nations (Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and Morocco) had also submitted bids. Egypt, Ghana and Nigeria ultimately withdrew from the race, and Morocco finished fourth in the voting behind Germany, South Africa, and England (Griffiths, 2000). The fact that the federation did not support South Africa, which ultimately proved to be the federation's best chance of hosting, shows the lack of support; an issue that also beset Cape Town's bid.

It appears that South Africa's successful 2010 FIFA World Cup bid owed as much to external factors as it does to Cape Town's Olympic bid. South Africa controversially finished second to Germany for the 2006 Football World Cup, by one vote, after New Zealand delegate Charlie Dempsey abstained from voting in the final round (Alegi, 2001), and Germany secured an arms deal with Saudi Arabia in exchange for votes (Gibson, 2015). These controversies led to a change in FIFA's World Cup hosting regulations and, following the controversy of the 2006 World Cup vote, FIFA introduced a rotation policy, taking the World Cup from continent to continent. The first continent to be awarded a Football World Cup was Africa, meaning that South Africa only had to beat off competition from Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, and a joint bid from Tunisia and Libya, rather than facing more developed nations (FIFA, 2002).

Despite rumours of further Cape Town Olympic Bids in 2008 or 2012, and even a Commonwealth Games 2006 bid, the only other large-scale event that South Africa has successfully bid for was the 2022 Commonwealth Games, awarded to Durban. However, financial constraints meant that the Commonwealth Games Federation removed Durban from hosting just two years after awarding the Games (BBC Sport, 2017b). Despite the guide highlighting the need for government approval, recognising the government as one of five key stakeholders (The South African Sports Commission, 2003:37), it is claimed that the South African government did not sign the host city contract (BBC Sport, 2017b). Indeed, this is just one of a number of controversies relating to South Africa's hosting of sporting events. In April 2016, the South African government banned SA Rugby, Cricket South Africa, Athletics South Africa, and Netball South Africa from bidding to host any future sporting events due to those federations failing to fulfil 'transformation targets' i.e. the number of black players in the sports (Rumsby, 2016).

It should be noted here, that it was Durban and not Cape Town that was put forward to host the Commonwealth Games. This further shows how the base created by Cape Town in the late-1990s did not transpire into the hosting of further events. While several sporting events have been hosted, they lack the prestige of the type of events that a truly sporting city would seek to host. Many of the events hosted are junior tournaments rather than senior international competitions that garner world attention. While it has been discussed that Cape Town may bid for an Olympic Games again in the future, no official bid has yet been submitted. Indeed, South Africa as a nation has not submitted a

bid since 1997. It could be argued that South Africa and Cape Town have been overtaken by the likes of UAE and Qatar; Middle Eastern nations that are now associated with sport to a far greater degree (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014).

#### *6.2.2.3.2 Global Exposure*

While South Africa and Cape Town may not have been able to successfully reimagine themselves as a place for sport, this was not the only aim. South Africa wished to demonstrate to the world that it had moved beyond its colonial and apartheid past and sought to leverage the levels of global exposure that the Olympic bid provided. South Africa was, at the time, known predominantly for the apartheid regime (Alden and le Pere, 2004), and so there was an intention to change this image and demonstrate South Africa and Cape Town's capabilities to the rest of the world. The worldwide media attention on the bid process provided the opportunity to promote Cape Town on a global scale. This was an opportunity that the bid team sought to leverage. One interviewee recalled that:

(This) is just when the international news became important, like CNN and that. So, (respondent CT09) went to New York, and I can't remember who he met with, but the simple objective was to have Cape Town on the weather maps of the international weather reports. We knew that Johannesburg was the finance capital, the business capital of the country, and people would know Johannesburg, but people didn't really know Cape Town. So, part of the idea then was to get it into the international eye as a possible destination of choice. So, when the Cape Town 2004 bid comes up, you know,

‘Okay, ahh.’ So, it’s those little things. And, I don’t want to exaggerate its importance, but it was one of those things that you stumble upon and you say, ‘Ah, let’s take this...’ So, I think CNN still has Cape Town as opposed to Johannesburg.

(CT03, 2016)

As can be seen, Cape Town sought to use the media attention that came as part of the bid to raise the city’s and nation’s profile and change its negative image. In particular, the city sought to show that the apartheid era was gone, and that a new nation was emerging. The local Cape Town newspaper claimed that the bid ‘is the chance of a lifetime, and the hospitality industry dare not be caught by surprise as it was after the 1994 elections’ (Cape Argus, 1997c:13).

A tourism manager working for the City of Cape Town said that:

The city leveraged a lot on the international media to showcase post-apartheid South Africa and the progress that has been made in terms of the recovery of the economy and the social structures, and the progress that the country has made.

(CT08, 2016)

Cape Town also took the opportunity to show that it compared favourably with other bid cities, with Athens, Buenos Aires, Rome and Stockholm all being prominent cities. As Figure 6.4 shows, while South Africa tourism compared favourably with that of Argentina and Sweden, it lagged far behind that of Greece and Italy.




Figure 6.4: Number of International Arrivals, 1995-1997<sup>28</sup>

The very fact that Cape Town was competing with these global cities demonstrated its capabilities. Figure 6.4 shows a rise in visitors to South Africa from 1995 to 1996. It was reported at the time that the winter of 1996/1997 saw a 20% rise in visitors compared to previous years, an increase which Cape Town Tourism put down to the bid (Blignaut, 1997). One interviewee said that:

For one of its major cities to have competed internationally... I can't remember all the other competitors... I think it was Stockholm, and Istanbul, and Athens, I can't remember them all... But, I mean, it quickly occurred to me that, my goodness, we are competing internationally. This was a South African city, and one could say a new South African city, for the first time competing on the international stage.

(CT07, 2016)

<sup>28</sup> Data taken from The World Bank (2018b)



An interview with the department of Leisure and Tourism confirmed this, with the point being made that the bid had a large impact on South Africa even though it was unsuccessful.

The fact that it wasn't a successful bid compared to Athens, I think it's not a bad thing, necessarily, but it played an instrumental role in us becoming really one of the top destinations globally and that our accolades are a constant result of. So, we might have lost one bid, but we've gained on so many other levels and broadened our menu of offerings.

(CT13, 2016)

#### *6.2.2.3.2.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy*

As Figure 6.5 shows, foreign visitors to South Africa have risen steadily since the end of apartheid. This should not be surprising. South Africa's global image was extremely poor at the time, and the end of the apartheid regime and the release of Nelson Mandela from prison altered the global views. At the time, this was viewed as a boom due to the end of apartheid, with South Africa seeking to use the Olympic Games as a way of ensuring that the nation's tourism growth continued. There were fears that the image of South Africa as a Third World nation, beset by crime and poverty, were challenges that needed to be overcome (Cape Town 2004, 1996). At this stage, South Africa's tourism and hospitality industries were still in development. An article in the Cape Argus newspaper, following the bid decision, recognised that South Africa still needed a 'comprehensive plan and strategy to encourage investment' and that '(t)ourism must be recognised as a major sector. It isn't a Mickey Mouse industry and we can't afford to treat it half-heartedly' (Cape Argus, 1997:8).

However, it was certainly believed that the bid contributed to raising Cape Town's global profile. Twelve days after the bid decision, Philip Krawitz, member of CT-Bid and President of SA Chamber and Commerce, claimed that '(o)ur bid video was watched by millions around the globe. Cape Town is now on the map, and will attract increasing attention from tourists, business people and investors' (Krawitz, 1997:10).




Figure 6.5: South Africa Tourism Figures and Projections, 1993-2002<sup>29</sup>

Studying South Africa's tourism figures provides interesting results. Foreign visitors to South Africa actually decreased 0.31% from 1996 to 1997 (the year that the bid was submitted) but rose significantly (14%) from 1997 to 1998. This figure has continued to rise ever since. Comparatively, world tourism rose by 6% from 1996 to 1997, and 5% in the following year.

However, as can be seen, despite overseas tourism being an aim for the bid, 'overseas' arrivals are only a small proportion of total tourist arrivals. The Environmental Assessment Reports published before the Games projected

<sup>29</sup> Actual data provided by Statistics South Africa. Projections are taken from Keyser (1997)

the number of overseas visitors who would arrive in South Africa due to the hosting of the Olympic Games, with a best-case (high projection), and worst-case (low projection) scenarios considered (KPMG/NN Gobodo and Associates, 1995; Keyser, 1997). The actual number of visitors to South Africa is not dissimilar to the worst-case projections should Cape Town's bid have been successful, albeit being significantly worse than the best-case scenarios. However, the actual number of visitors levelled-off in the late-1990s, and actually declined from 2000 to 2001. This is in stark contrast to the projected figures, which anticipated a large increase in foreign visitors to South Africa as the hosting of the Games approached.

Consideration needs to be paid as to the validity of these results. While it is clear that South Africa tourism arrivals increased during the bid period, this occurred at a time when global tourism was approaching maturity (Richards, 2011). Thus, Figure 6.6 shows tourism figures indexed to the year 1995. As can be seen, while South Africa's tourism figures generally rose quicker than the world average, other nations in Sub-Saharan Africa saw their tourism figures rise a similar amount in the years in which Cape Town was bidding. Furthermore, following the climax of the bid, tourism in Sub-Saharan Africa outstripped that of South Africa, suggesting that the increase in tourism in South Africa may well have been due to global trends rather than the Olympic bid.




Figure 6.6: Indexed Tourism Figures, 1995-2006<sup>30</sup>

An increase in tourism is not the only measure when considering whether CT-Bid achieved the goal of changing the image of South Africa. The bid also had the intention of showing that South Africa was a nation worthy of investment.

A member of the Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport said that:

But what it does is, it acts as a beacon to attract... it's like a lighthouse, you know, it attracts people, attracts investment, and it brings people, and people say, 'Do you know what... actually, this place is not so bad. It's actually well-run and maybe worthy of further investment.' That's what we want to demonstrate through that, that actually, investments are quite safe.

(CT06, 2016)

<sup>30</sup> Our World in Data (2017)

As Figure 6.7 below shows, foreign direct investment in South Africa rose dramatically in the early 1990s, as the apartheid regime ended. It is noticeable, that in 1997, the year of the bid submission, foreign direct investment increased by 366% from 1996 levels. While this investment fell the following year, and there have been year-on-year fluctuations since, the general trend has seen foreign direct investment in South Africa increasing steadily. In order to show this dramatic increase, Figure 6.8 shows the year-on-year increase of foreign direct investment into South Africa compared to the global trend. From 1995 to 2005, South Africa's foreign direct investment increased, on average, 173% compared to a world increase of 22% each year. However, it is noticeable that foreign direct investment into South Africa started to rise following the awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in 2004.




Figure 6.7: South Africa Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1992-2016<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> The World Bank (2018c)




Figure 6.8: South Africa and World Foreign Direct Investment, 1995-2005<sup>32</sup>

This is further demonstrated when considering the exports of the nation. As Figure 6.9 shows, South African exports rose steadily during the 1990s, with a significant rise in 1995. Following the bid decision in 1997, exports then fell in 1998. Perhaps more pertinently, aside from a large increase in the mid-1980s, prior to the bid, South Africa's export growth had consistently been below the world average. Exports even declined in South Africa in the early 1990s, while the rest of the world saw year-on-year export growth. During the period of the bid, and then thereafter, South African exports tracked world trends consistently.

<sup>32</sup> The World Bank (2018c)




Figure 6.9: South Africa and World Exports Year on Year Change, 1981-2007<sup>33</sup>

### 6.3 Conclusions

This chapter demonstrates the ways that Cape Town used its bid for the 2004 Olympic Games to leverage positive outcomes, using Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage. This model is adapted to demonstrate Cape Town’s leveraging strategies (Figure 6.10 on page 278).

First, it is important to appreciate that, while Cape Town wanted to host the Games, the international context meant that many involved in the bid recognised that Athens’ bid was more likely to be successful. Thus, Cape Town, and to a lesser degree South Africa, sought to ensure that even if the bid was unsuccessful, it would garner positive outcomes. The Cape Town 2004 Olympic bid had three clear strategic objectives: community

<sup>33</sup> The World Bank (2018d)

reintegration, sport development, and image change. It is clear that the Olympic bid contributed to each of these.

First, being part of an Olympic bid provided Cape Town with the opportunity to access significant funding from the central government that it would not otherwise have had access to. This, combined with the international expertise that was brought to the bid via sponsors, provided a key opportunity for two of these objectives: community reintegration and sport development, supporting the arguments of Lauermaun (2015). These two objectives were achieved by way of the planned priority projects. These projects were community and sporting facilities, strategically located to provide 'previously disadvantaged' communities with access to facilities that they had previously been denied, and also planned transportation improvements to link these new hubs.

Cape Town was not the first bid city to utilise a bid in this way. Cape Town, crucially, avoided the trap into which Istanbul would later fall (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011), in so much as Cape Town focused on constructing non-competition venues that would have community use, and therefore could be utilised on a daily basis. Alberts (2009) gives detail as to how Berlin revamped its sport infrastructure, interestingly as part of the same bid process as Cape Town.

While sport development was a strategic goal in its own right, it was also a means that contributed to Cape Town's third strategic goal; that of changing the image of South Africa and Cape Town, while at the same time raising its profile. This third strategic goal used the development of sport to host a number of sporting events within Cape Town, and also the 2010 FIFA World Cup. While the idea of Olympic bids leading to hosting further events has been



covered (Smith, 2005), there has been little consideration as to how an Olympic bid may lead to the hosting of sporting events during the bid period itself.

This was not the only way in which the image change was achieved. Being part of a bid process put Cape Town in the global spotlight. CT-Bid sought to use the bid opportunity to persuade the world of the development of Cape Town and South Africa, as both a potential tourist destination and a country with which others could do business. However, the impact that this had is unclear; while there were clearly strategies put in place, the data in Section 6.2.2.3 suggests that these strategies were not wholly successful.

Chalip's (2004) model is adapted to demonstrate the leveraging that took place in Cape Town as part of the bid process (Figure 6.10 below).




Figure 6.10: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Cape Town 2004(adapted from Chalip, 2004)

While the contextual factors of Cape Town's bid, and in particular South Africa's emergence from apartheid, may mean that this case lacks external validity, there are clear managerial implications for future Olympic bids. CT-Bid successfully used the Olympic bid to lever central government funding. While this was used in Cape Town to contribute to the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework, other cities could similarly leverage an Olympic bid to secure further funding for their own infrastructural plans. Further, cities in developing nations that do not have large degrees of international expertise may wish to similarly utilise the capabilities of international sponsors. Therefore, it is important for bid cities to consider the sponsors involved from the outset. If these sponsors are local organisations, it may be that they do not offer anything further beyond the capabilities within the bid team itself; therefore, bid teams should seek to work with international sponsors who can provide different expertise to those internal stakeholders already involved in the bid.

A second lesson that other cities could take from this case study is from an opportunity that was missed; that of the latent knowledge that was built up as part of the bid. While it is evident that some of this information was used, as South Africa secured the hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup, much of this information stayed internalised within those who were part of the bid, and no attempt was made to capture this knowledge and use it to benefit Cape Town or South Africa. Cities, or indeed nations who are bidding for multiple events in a short period of time (for example, Istanbul), should attempt to ensure that this knowledge is captured, and therefore can be used in the future.

## 7 Toronto 2008

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### 7.1 Introduction and Purpose

This chapter also offers empirical findings, presenting a case study of Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The format is slightly different to the previous case study on Cape Town. Whereas CT-Bid sought to leverage the opportunities provided by an Olympic bid, Toronto's bid sought two, distinct, strategic objectives for leveraging the Olympic bid: development of the waterfront area of the city, and sport development. These are taken in turn. First, the background to the waterfront development is provided in detail in Section 7.2.1, before the three specific means that were employed to achieve it are presented. Following this, the success of the leveraging will be deliberated (Section 7.2.1.4). The second strategic objective of sport development is then put forth in Section 7.2.2. This takes the same form as the waterfront discussion. First there is consideration of the reasons for the leveraging plan, followed by the means employed to see that it is achieved. The final section is an appraisal of this strategy. Finally, the data in this chapter is collated and applied to an adapted version of Chalip's (2004) model for event leverage (Section 7.3).

### 7.2 Leveraging the Olympic Bid

This section will detail the ways in which Toronto sought to leverage the Olympic bid to generate specific strategic objectives. As will be seen, the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games were always part of the bid plans.

The first paragraph in the Master Plan for the Games stated that ‘the bidding and hosting of the Olympic Games creates two separate additional opportunities for city building and legacy building’ (Toronto 2008, 1999: 1).

This research found that there were two strategic objectives for the Toronto bid: to develop Toronto’s waterfront area, and the development of sport. These strategic objectives will be discussed in detail, together with the opportunities and means that allowed them to happen. Further, just because Toronto sought only to achieve two specific strategic objectives, this does not mean that other opportunities did not arise as part of the bid process. These will then be identified, together with the impact that they have had in the years since.

### **7.2.1 The Waterfront Redevelopment**

As the interviews progressed, it became increasingly clear that Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games could be described as one of Torres’ (2012) utilitarian bids, that is, the primary focus of the bid was not in hosting the Olympic Games. Rather, as will be demonstrated, the key aim of the bid was to leverage government funding to achieve the strategic objective of redevelopment of the waterfront area on Lake Toronto (Figure 7.1).



Figure 7.1: Toronto Waterfront Map<sup>34</sup>

Ironically, considering the name ‘Toronto’ is derived from ‘wood on the water’, the waterfront area was, at the time, severely underdeveloped and played little role within the city (TO09, 2017). Plans to develop the waterfront date back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the Toronto Harbour Commission (THC) being founded in 1911 (City of Toronto, 1999). The THC was regularly in conflict with the City of Toronto, not least THC’s focus on private enterprise taking precedent over the waterfront being a public good (Sanderson and Filion, 2011). This conflict contributed to ‘jurisdictional gridlock’ (Laidley, 2011:207) on the waterfront, and thus a lack of development. One interviewee, who worked on both the Olympic bid and for the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, noted the lack of awareness of the waterfront within Toronto:

Toronto kind of ignored the waterfront. It’s hard to believe now, 20 years later, but at the time, when I left the mayor’s office, I went down to join the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, and the office was in the Queens Quay terminal building, which was south of front, and I mentioned to a number of

<sup>34</sup> Image taken from Waterfront Toronto (2015a)

people that it was difficult, transit-wise, to get down to south of front, and I think people said, 'Why would you go south of front?' My mother was actually wondering where exactly this was, and so people really didn't have any kind of consciousness about the waterfront.

(TO09, 2017)

By the 1980s, the lack of development on the waterfront came onto the city agenda, as the federal government authorised a royal commission to consider developmental opportunities in that area (TO14, 2017). The Olympic Games actually played a part in catalysing this interest, as Barcelona's waterfront area was developed in preparation for the hosting of the 1992 Summer Olympic Games, while other cities such as Shanghai and Boston had similarly invested in waterfront development (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1989).

One member of the bid team provided information on the background to the waterfront development:

Toronto had a Royal Commission on the Future of the Waterfront a while ago, maybe the '70s or '80s. David Crombie led it... David Crombie was the former Mayor of Toronto and then he went on to be a federal cabinet minister, and he is still very active in Toronto. When he did the Royal Commission on the future of the waterfront, he started creating teams of people to think about what the future... to figure out what the future of the waterfront would be.

(TO02, 2017)

The first, interim report identified four key areas to be considered: Toronto Island Airport, Toronto Harbourfront Corporation, Toronto Harbour

Commissioners, and the environmental impact. This interim report made one clear recommendation that would impact the future development of the waterfront; that the THC's mandate should be reduced to only maintain those operations that directly linked to the port operations. THC would retain the land needed to operate the port, with the remainder of the land being pooled and taken control of by the federal and provincial governments, with an environmental analysis to be conducted (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1989). The Royal Commission specified that a new 'Waterfront Trust' be created to manage these lands (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1992:13).

The final report took more of an environmental focus and recommended that an 'eco-system approach' be employed (TO10, 2017). There was a recognition that 'ecosystems are dynamic, interacting, living systems; humans are part of them, not separate' (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1992:32), and the proposals essentially took a triple bottom line approach, seeking to develop the environment, society and the economy. This wide scope ensured that a number of stakeholders were involved. The new waterfront development needed to consider residential living, the interests of industry and private enterprise, the three levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal governments), all the while ensuring that there was minimal negative environmental impact.

This large number of stakeholders caused a further issue. Who would pay for it? There are three levels of Canadian government: federal, provincial and municipal. The Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront was

a *federal* commission, resulting in the strong environmental focus; however, the eco-system approach was not a requirement of the municipality. The difficulties in working with all three levels of government are well-known in Canada. One interviewee, who worked within the government systems, said that there is a commonly known joke about it:

We used to have a joke years ago. A graduate school professor asks his international students to write an essay on the elephant from the point of view of their national characteristic. The British kid wrote his on the empire and the elephant, the American kid wrote his on freedom of the elephant, the French kid wrote his on sex and the elephant, the German kid wrote his on an introduction to a preface for the possible understanding of the elephant, and the Canadian kid wrote his on 'The elephant: a federal or provincial responsibility?'

(TO10, 2017)

A second respondent who was part of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, also discussed the difficulties arising in generating funding from all three levels of the government, noting that:

The Waterfront Regeneration Trust had conceived of its mandate to be the waterfront, broadly speaking. Far to the east and far to the west, the central waterfront in Toronto was by far our most problematic section of the waterfront. There were lots of competing jurisdictions, lots of, there wasn't very much happening there in terms of access from the rest of the city.

(TO09, 2017)



The Waterfront Regeneration Trust was formed in 1988 by David Crombie, who had led the federal commission. This had a prime strategic objective, to focus the attention of the city and various stakeholders onto the potential regeneration of the waterfront area. Indeed, Crombie noted at the time, that successful development of the waterfront relied on ‘the willingness of public authorities and private interests to recognize the needs of others and the value of concerted action’ (Crombie, quoted in Laidley (2011)).

Faced with these issues, the Waterfront Redevelopment Trust sought to find a way to unite the focus on the waterfront area. The Trust realised that, under normal circumstances, the political difficulties would continue; therefore, it needed something exceptional to bring together the political parties and raise funding. At the time that the Royal Commission was being completed, Toronto was in the throes of bidding for the 1996 Olympic Games. The report recognised the potential connection between the hosting of an Olympic Games and the waterfront development. The 1996 bid proposed that the Olympic stadium should be situated in Exhibition Place (see Figure 7.1 on 283), with ‘all major Olympic facilities (placed) into one compact area along the waterfront’ (Toronto 1996, 1989:17). Indeed, the bid documents claim that ‘if members of the International Olympic Committee grant the hosting of the Games to Toronto in 1996, our entire lakefront will become a perpetual Olympic legacy for the city’ (Toronto 1996, 1989:16). The Royal Commission into the waterfront urges the restructuring of the waterfront governance to support the 1996 Olympic and World Fair 2000 bids.

However, neither of these bids proposed waterfront development if the bid was unsuccessful, but sparked the idea of using an Olympic bid to catalyse waterfront development. At the time, each of the three levels of government was hesitant regarding the waterfront (Desfor, 1990), and so an Olympic bid was seen as the ideal catalyst. One respondent, who had been involved in the bid from the outset and was part of the bid for the World Fair, discussed the idea of using an Olympic bid to accelerate the funding that was required to develop the waterfront area:

If you hold a big party, people need to spend money to clean up their house in order to have a big party. When you spend the money to clean up your house then your house is better after. But there is a real cost associated with hosting a big party. So, the idea was, 'couldn't we attract a big party and get a bunch of infrastructural spend on the waterfront faster and accelerate the infrastructure investment in downtown Toronto?'

(TO02, 2017)

A second respondent noted how the Waterfront Regeneration Trust was involved in the Olympic bid from the outset:

In a large city, what's the big thing to focus people's attention? Well, the Olympics came in just in time, so we then... the Waterfront Regeneration Trust became the little organisation that started the bid.

(TO10, 2017)

As can be seen, the initial origins of the Olympic bid were not focused on winning. Rather, an Olympic bid was viewed as the ideal vehicle to catalyse

and accelerate the plans already in place within the city, and thus achieving the strategic objective of developing the waterfront. This was highlighted in a 1999 City of Toronto Report, which stated that:

Our waterfront vision is big enough to embrace the 2008 Summer Olympics. We'll be proud to show our new face to the world. But we intend to realize this vision with or without the Olympics... it's just too important to the people who make Toronto their home, and to the whole of Ontario.

(City of Toronto, 1999:3)

The impact that the Toronto bid had on the waterfront regeneration is clear. Simply looking at the individuals involved in both projects shows the crossover. David Crombie, head of the Waterfront Trust in 1992, became Chair of the Board of Directors for the Toronto 2008 bid team (hereafter TO-bid) (Toronto 2008, 2001a:i), while Robert Fung contributed to the Olympic bid, before becoming head of the Waterfront Taskforce (City of Toronto, 2001). Similarly, documents produced by the Toronto Revitalization Taskforce heavily reinforced the connection. A report published in 2000 mentions the word 'Olympic' on 50 occasions in 50 pages, with the hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games being a key consideration (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Taskforce, 2000a). This demonstrates the strong connections between Toronto's waterfront development and shows the reliance of the waterfront development on the Olympic bid.

As has been demonstrated, the development of the waterfront area in Toronto was clearly a strategic objective for TO-bid and the city of Toronto as a whole. These next sections will now discuss the opportunities provided by the bid and

the means by which this development was made possible: governmental investment that the city would not otherwise have had access to, and also, the way it brought together levels of government to work together.

### **7.2.1.1 Heightened Cooperation Between Levels of Government**

A key issue facing the waterfront development was the number of key stakeholders involved. This section will discuss these stakeholders and demonstrate how the Olympic bid provided an opportunity for TO-bid to overcome these problems.

The key stakeholders involved in the waterfront development were the three levels of the government. As already mentioned, the initial investigation into the redevelopment of the waterfront area was led by the federal government rather than the municipality. Yet, despite the development having a clear impact on the municipality, the Waterfront Redevelopment Team struggled to bring together the multiple stakeholders required to work on such a project. However, as recognised within a TO-Bid report, 'the new plan's implementation is to meet Olympic Bid deadlines, an expedited planning process is essential' (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force, 2000b:9).

This was evident in Toronto, as one interviewee noted:

In the day-to-day work... you have multiple activities going on, and every now and then there's a deadline... When you get an entire organisation focused like that, it's pretty powerful.

(TO06, 2017)

Securing the support of the three levels of government (federal, provincial, and municipal), together with private organisations, was a key aspect of the bid from the outset. One board member said that:

Right from the beginning, the four of us understood that all of this was about making sure we got people focussed; three levels of government, corporations, union groups, all of that stuff, all focussed on the waterfront.

(TO10, 2017)

The three levels of government involved in the Greater Toronto Area were not all from the same political party, causing similar issues to those noted in the case study on Cape Town. Several members of TO-Bid had previous experience in politics and working within government, working for various political parties. This provided the bid team with the opportunity to engage with each of the different political parties involved. One interviewee, who previously worked in politics, spoke of working closely with members of rival political parties, with their contrasting views providing the bid team with various perspectives (TO11, 2017).

As shown, a key success of the TO-Bid was in uniting the different political factions. This culminated in a photo opportunity on the waterfront in October 2000, as Jean Chrétien (Canadian Prime Minister), Mike Harris (Premier of Ontario), and Mel Lastman (Mayor of Toronto) were brought together to announce the formation of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation (Figure 7.2 below). While this may not seem important, it was a significant enough event for the Toronto Star to write a feature, and include the photo, on

the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary in October 2015, with the headline ‘Waterfront Toronto, a model of governmental co-operation’ (Hume, 2015).



*Figure 7.2: ‘The Three Amigos’<sup>35</sup>*

The Olympic bid was a key facet in bringing together three levels of government which previously had shown little appetite in working together on the waterfront. This new cooperation was then crucial in TO-Bid securing the investment needed to make the waterfront development a reality.

### **7.2.1.2 Government Investment**

As was demonstrated in the previous section, an Olympic bid provides an ideal opportunity for different levels of government and different political parties to be united and focused on one objective. Yet, political support on its own would not guarantee the future of the waterfront. Therefore, in addition to the political

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<sup>35</sup> Image taken from Hume (2015). From left to right: Jean Chrétien (Prime Minister), Mike Harris (Ontario Premier) and Mel Lastman (Mayor of Toronto)

support that the bid received, TO-Bid also secured CA\$1.5 billion worth of investment. The bid itself cost CA\$40 million, of which half was secured from private sources (TO13, 2017). Beyond this, the bid managed to acquire CA\$500 million from each of the three levels of government. One member of the bid team detailed this:

We obtained a commitment from all three levels of government for half a billion dollars, CA\$500 million, for waterfront redevelopment, regardless of the IOC's decision. So, CA\$1.5 billion, you could argue that the CA\$500 from the city would always have been there, although given the stinginess of our city fathers and mothers, I would qualify that, but the federal and provincial contributions were clearly outside money. So, one concrete, financial legacy of the Games was CA\$1.5 billion for long-awaited waterfront development.

(TO01, 2017)

The federal and provincial government contributions are highlighted by the interviewee because they were in the form of cash. The City of Toronto contribution was an in-kind donation of land. Toronto as a city had amalgamated in 1998, with the previous six municipalities being dissolved and replaced by the City of Toronto, a single governing municipality. A City of Toronto director recalled that this ensured the City of Toronto's contribution to the waterfront development was land:

Our finances just after amalgamation were all still kind of very much a work in progress, and everyone was concerned that the bigger the city was through amalgamation, that there was no evidence to suggest that it would actually be any cheaper

to deliver our public services. So, the decision was made that we would contribute via land, because we had land in the central waterfront, as opposed to through funding.

(TO14, 2017)

The support of the three levels of government, and the financial commitments obtained, were identified as being key to achieving the strategic objective of developing the waterfront area. Therefore, it is worth considering the means by which this funding was secured, regardless of the outcomes of the bid.

The bid team recognised that there were two opportunities to leverage the funding. First, and as has already been detailed, Toronto's bid for the 1996 Olympic Games had faced large-scale opposition from the Bread Not Circuses movement, something that TO-Bid was eager to avoid. TO-Bid believed that a way to avoid these levels of opposition was to show Torontonians that even the bid could bring positive benefits (TO10, 2017).

The second opportunity viewed by TO-Bid was the level of funding that Beijing had secured to fund the bid. While Toronto was a bid for a city, Beijing was viewed as being a Chinese bid, with the national government being firmly behind it, whereas the IOC Evaluation Report noted that Toronto's bid had 'considerable support from... Government authorities' (IOC, 2001:57), but does not mention the national government. Comparatively, Beijing's bid is described as having 'very strong support from national and local levels of government' (IOC, 2001:60). Indeed, one interviewee noted that Canada's democracy put Toronto at a significant disadvantage, as Beijing had access to levels of funding that were unavailable to TO-Bid (TO10, 2017).



It should be noted, that while TO-Bid had identified clear strategies (the means in the model of event leverage (Chalip, 2004)) to leverage significant levels of government funding, this was only possible because it tied in with the plans of the Canadian government at the time. As has already been noted, it was a *federal* commission that sparked the waterfront development. Therefore, it is clear the federal government already had an interest in the development of this area. The plans for the waterfront also aligned with government strategy in one further way. As discussed, the Canadian economy had struggled in the 1990s, and a policy of austerity had been implemented. Therefore, none of the levels of government were looking for ongoing investments. The waterfront development provided a unique opportunity for the government to invest a one-off CA\$500 million with no ongoing operating costs. A director within the City of Toronto claimed that:

I think the timing of this was consistent with this idea that, 'If we're going to fund programs, whether they be waterfront redevelopments or something else, even housing, we only want to do it one time, and we want to be done, and we don't want this coming off the ledger 15 or 20 years from now because we made some commitment that we're operating something'. And so, in that respect, I think it played to the politics of austerity in the late 1990s, that had a hard cap on what their contributions were deemed to be.

(TO14, 2017)

Therefore, the means through which TO-Bid secured the funding was based around winning the bid, or, the threat of losing. First, TO-Bid used the prospective threat of organised protests to persuade the government that this

level of investment was needed to generate public support for the bid. Second, TO-Bid was able to show the economic strength of Beijing's bid, and position this as a direct threat to Toronto's bid. However, these strategies were only successful because they were consistent with the government's policies at the time.

### **7.2.1.3 Creation of Waterfront Toronto**

The means by which the strategic objective was achieved was through a new organisation being formed to deliver the projects on the waterfront. The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation was formally passed into law in 2002 with the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002. Waterfront Toronto was formed to proceed with the plans of the bid, and had the following objectives:

1. To implement a plan that enhances the economic, social and cultural value of the land in the designated waterfront area, and creates an accessible and active waterfront for living, working and recreation, and to do so in a fiscally and environmentally responsible manner.
2. To ensure that ongoing development in the designated waterfront area can continue in a financially self-sustaining manner.
3. To promote and encourage the involvement of the private sector in the development of the designated waterfront area.
4. To encourage public input into the development of the designated waterfront area.
5. To engage in such other activities as may be prescribed by regulation (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002:2).

The tri-level agreement resulted in each of the three levels of government sharing responsibility for Waterfront Toronto. The board of directors of Waterfront Toronto was made up of 12 members, with each of the three levels of government appointing four representatives (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002). Waterfront Toronto was answerable to all three levels of government, and this essentially provided each with a veto vote. This was most significantly used in 2004 as the City of Toronto sought to enhance Waterfront Toronto's authority. The original Act stated that 'The Corporation shall not raise revenue unless it has the consent of the federal government, the provincial government and city council' (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002:3). This was a significant restriction that left Waterfront Toronto beholden to the three levels of government for ongoing funding. The City of Toronto sought to grant Waterfront Toronto the ability to raise funds itself, but neither the provincial or federal governments concurred (Eidelman, 2013). A director within the City of Toronto believed that this governance model has since hampered the activities of Waterfront Toronto:

When it came to creating Waterfront Toronto, which, essentially, became the agency in which to deliver the waterfront agenda, that got watered down, and the decision was to leave all the existing agencies in place. So, the structure of Waterfront Toronto and the government's approach to this, in my view, was being compromised, and is not the kind of central lead agency that was originally contemplated and had been recommended by Tony and was also not what the Wave of the Future report had recommended.

(TO14, 2017)

A review into this arrangement was conducted in 2013, to analyse the first decade of Waterfront Toronto, particularly the tri-governmental approach that had been taken. This review found that the approach was ‘moderately effective’, with positive relationships demonstrated with all three levels of government (Eidelman, 2013:19). However, the report highlighted Waterfront Toronto’s lack of revenue-raising capabilities, arguing that the ability to raise funds would ‘make for a more flexible and self-sufficient development corporation’ (Eidelman, 2013:25). The report went on to note that the tri-partite agreement placed restrictions on Waterfront Toronto and ensured a large degree of accountability. A second strategic review stated that the tri-partite model had been a ‘qualified success’, with the funding restraints recognised as being the biggest issue (Ernst & Young LLP, 2015:34).

#### **7.2.1.4 Evaluation of the Waterfront Leveraging Strategy**

The Toronto Olympic bid had one clear strategic goal; to redevelop a waterfront area that was in a state of disuse. This is even prominent in the Candidate City file, submitted as part of the application (Toronto 2008, 2001a), with each of the letters of guarantee from the Canadian Prime Minister, the Premier of Ontario, the Mayor of Toronto, and the Canadian Olympic Association mentioning not only the planned waterfront development but also the CA\$1.5 billion secured from the three different levels of government. This section will now discuss the impact that the strategy had on the City of Toronto.

The strategy to leverage the waterfront development through the Olympic bid was clearly successful in the eyes of TO-Bid. Each of the interviewees was asked, ‘Who do you believe benefited from the Olympic bid the most?’ Five of

the respondents named the waterfront area as being the part of the bid with the greatest positive impact on the City of Toronto:

Well, certainly the people connected to the waterfront.

(TO01, 2017)

I think Toronto benefited from the bid because it got a better waterfront.

(TO07, 2017)

I would say the citizens of Toronto, from the waterfront that we have. It's down to them, but it's been developed to be fairly public space, despite all the wretched condos that are blocking the view of the actual waterfront, but once you get down there, there are some wonderful amenities.

(TO08, 2017)

I think the waterfront, I do. I think the waterfront, absolutely.

(TO09, 2017)

I mean I have to say the people of Toronto really benefitted most, despite the fact they might not realise it, for the simple fact that all the things I mentioned, all that waterfront development, all that stuff happened because we did a bid.

(TO13, 2017)

Table 7.1: Waterfront Regeneration Projects

Project	Status	Reference
Improvements to Cherry Beach	Completed 2005	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2005
York Quay Promenade development	Completed 2006	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2006
Martin Goodman Trail extension (1)	Completed 2006	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2006
Martin Goodman Trail extension (2)	Completed 2006	Waterfront Toronto, 2010
Port Lands Sport Fields	Completed 2007	Waterfront Toronto, 2007
Sugar Beach construction	Completed 2011	Waterfront Toronto, 2011
Sherborne Common Park	Completed 2011	Waterfront Toronto, 2011
Port Union Waterfront Park	Completed 2011	Waterfront Toronto, 2011
Brown College car park construction	Completed 2013	Waterfront Toronto, 2013
Corktown Common park	Completed 2014	Waterfront Toronto, 2014
Underpass Park	Completed 2014	Waterfront Toronto, 2014
Union Station Second Platform	Completed 2015	Waterfront Toronto, 2015a
Pan-AM Athletes Village	Completed 2015	Waterfront Toronto, 2015a
Cherry Street streetcar line	Completed 2016	Global News, 2016
East Bayfront Development	Ongoing	City of Toronto, n.d.
Billy Bishop Toronto City airport noise reduction	Ongoing	City of Toronto, n.d.
Port Lands redevelopment	Ongoing	City of Toronto, n.d.
Gardiner Expressway reconfiguration	Ongoing	City of Toronto, n.d.
Fort York Pedestrian Bridge	Ongoing	City of Toronto, n.d.
Jack Layton Ferry Terminal improvements	Ongoing	Waterfront Toronto, 2017a
Queens Quay East revitalisation	Ongoing	Waterfront Toronto, 2017a

The impact of this initiative has also lasted far beyond the time of the bid itself, with the Waterfront Revitalization Corporation continuing to work today. It should be noted that this is an ongoing process rather than one with a definitive finish point (Toronto City Council, 2003). Since the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation was formed in 2001, a number of projects have taken place, and these can be seen in Table 7.1.

A key aspect of the waterfront regeneration was the CA\$500 million secured from each of the three levels of government. Figure 7.3 shows the government spend on the waterfront in the years 2003-2016.




Figure 7.3: Government Contributions to the Waterfront 2003-2016<sup>36</sup>

An economic impact assessment was conducted in 2013 to determine the returns for this investment (Urban Metrics, 2013). This found that the investment has generated:

<sup>36</sup> All data is taken from the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Annual Accounts

- 16,200 full-time years of employment
- CA\$3.2 billion in economic output to the Canadian economy
- Government revenues totalling CA\$621 million (Urban Metrics, 2013:iii)

Urban Metrics (2013:10) estimate that future developments will create 21,700 permanent jobs, generate an additional CA\$12.9 billion for the Canadian economy, and allow the three levels of government to receive nearly CA\$5 billion in tax revenue (more than three times the investment).

In 2015, a strategic review of the waterfront development was undertaken.

This found the following key points:

- The original mandate was not clear, in particular regarding roles and responsibilities
- The new developments are valued at CA\$2.6 billion
- Construction of waterfront projects has resulted in 23,600 years' worth of employment
- Government revenues have totalled CA\$838 million
- The tri-partite governance structure is a qualified success, and has particularly allowed the triple bottom line focus to be at the fore
- The restrictions placed on Waterfront Toronto raising its own revenue have delayed revitalisation (Ernst & Young LLP, 2015)

Following the report, the City of Toronto recommended that Waterfront Toronto should be given permission to raise funds through borrowing, although this was resisted by the national government. An interviewee working for Waterfront Toronto said that this does not hinder the operations:



It takes time, as any major capital work will take. At least in our context, a billion-dollar investment is always going to be something that we hem and haw over, as long as possible. But the fact that we have had that recent commitment, maybe a couple of years later than we'd hoped, I think it's a sign that, overall, the model functions as it's supposed to. But there's always going to be, at times you always wish that there was a way to expedite the process.

(TO16, 2017)

Indeed, this response suggests that the tri-partite model works for Waterfront Toronto. The respondent went further than this, and suggested that the agreement provides a safety net that other similar organisations may not benefit from:

The city is always in a challenging position when it's trying to balance the needs of industry and the broader policy objectives, as informed by our planning processes, etc. Because industry will say, at the end of the day, it needs to be feasible, and this is our requirement. Otherwise nothing will happen here. So, there's a balancing act that needs to be taken.

It certainly helps to have a broader perspective, or the tri-partite alignment, in terms of what those objectives are. Because it's not as simple as getting the local councillor or the community council district all on side with it.

(TO16, 2017)

However, there have been faults with the system, as, while there is an overarching vision for the waterfront, pockets of land are owned and developed by different levels of government. This, for example, has led to an

open space on the waterfront, with part of it named 'Toronto Square' and part of it 'Canada Square' due to the provincial and municipal governments each owning part of the land (TO18, 2017).

While it is clear that TO-Bid was successful in its leveraging strategy to develop the waterfront area, this does not mean that there were not missed opportunities. It became evident throughout the interviews that, while the waterfront was an unqualified success, other infrastructural development could have been carried out as part of the bid.

#### 7.2.1.4.1 Public Transport

The quality of public transportation is known as being an issue within Toronto. This was noted in the pre-bid evaluations (The Community Social Planning Council of Toronto, 2000) and played a large role in Toronto's planning for the Games. The Master Plan for hosting sought to place host venues in strategic locations. This would enable the development of transport infrastructure between these venues that would then benefit the city beyond the Games (Toronto 2008, 1999). These plans included:

- Building of *Olympic Waterfront East* and *Olympic Waterfront West* GO Transit Rail Stations
- Union Station platform expansion
- High-speed rail network from Toronto Pearson International Airport to Toronto city centre
- GO Rail shuttle to connect the Olympic Waterfront to the rest of the city (Toronto 2008, 2001c:59)

The City of Toronto had recommended that these investments take place (City of Toronto, 2000a), yet, once the bid was lost, many of the investments were shelved. The Union Station upgrade was classed as a 'Planned Non-Olympic Project' in the environmental assessment (Toronto 2008, 2001b:14-4), and after being announced at the same time as the waterfront development, was expected to be completed by 2008; however, work on the station did not commence until 2010. Similarly, the plan to link Union Station to Toronto Pearson International Airport via a new rail network was not constructed until the hosting of the 2015 Pan American Games, despite having been promised in 1999 (City of Toronto, 1999). Given the current issues faced by Toronto in terms of public transportation (for example, The Economist magazine in 2017 featured a piece entitled 'Laggard on the Lake: Toronto's Mayor tries to Improve Transport'), it is unlikely that Toronto would have had the infrastructure to accommodate the numbers of visitors that an Olympic Games naturally brings. Indeed, one member of the bid team, who now works for one of the transport companies within Toronto, said that the transport systems would not have coped, and as a result was pleased that Toronto did not win the bid because of this:

I think the one thing I would say, now that I'm in transportation, that we were clueless. If we had actually won that bid, the transportation we were going to need, it was going to be a real... we were not going to have it. How realistic was the budget? Not so much. It wasn't way off, but I think there were things in there that we were a bit naïve on, and that's another good reason, a good thing we didn't get the bid.

(TO06, 2017)

This is not to say that there was no investment in Toronto's transit systems as part of the bid, but these would have been accelerated further had Toronto hosted the 2008 Olympic Games. One interviewee discussed the plans that would have been in place had Toronto's bid been successful:

Some transit would have probably been accelerated... probably some type of transport. We knew Toronto's downtown couldn't take all the traffic. We had really cool satellite parking locations around the city, where people would stop and take transit downtown, probably bus; we wouldn't have had enough time to have put really heavy infrastructure in. If we had done that, and pulled that off in three weeks, that might have accelerated people's willingness to change their transportation habits. But it is totally speculation. That was the coolest.

(TO02, 2017)

A lack of transport development was named by one member of the bid team, now working for the City of Toronto as a missed opportunity for the city:

I think our biggest miss is around the transit, for example, as you probably already know, there's a real gridlock problem in the city, so big transit issues, and if you're going to bring millions of people to Toronto for the Games, your federal government is going to figure out a way to help you fix that transit problem and that problem would have been better today, for sure. We'd have been further ahead today than it is now, if we'd had the Games. They're trying to build some subways along certain cities and streets and that, but it's all well behind. It's smaller projects now as opposed to bigger ones they envisaged originally. It's all kind of been scaled

back and later, and if we had the Games it would have been probably bigger and faster.

(TO13, 2017)

#### *7.2.1.4.2 The Port Lands*

Similar to the planned transport infrastructure, a second infrastructural missed opportunity is one that would have occurred had Toronto ultimately hosted the Games. Several interviewees discussed that a lack of development in the Port Lands area (see map on page 283), due east of the developed waterfront, was a missed opportunity. The need for development in the Port Lands area was longstanding. A report in 1990 stated that the 'Port Lands will be redeveloped in the near future' (Desfor, 1990:3). The environmental assessment conducted by TO-Bid calculated that 110 hectares (45% of the Port Lands) are vacant, with there being just 13 employees per hectare (Toronto 2008, 2001b:8-54). This area was due to be developed as part of the hosting of the event, with a newly-built Olympic Stadium, Aquatic Centre, Broadcast Centre and Olympic Village to be built there (Toronto 2008, 2001c).

As the Games did not take place, the Port Lands area was not touched as part of the Olympic bid and is an area that has still not been developed (Reiti, 2017). The need for development does not just include urban development of a similar nature to the waterfront district, but there are also environmental concerns. The Don River enters Lake Ontario through the Port Lands area, and there is a need for flood-proofing. This was viewed as a key missed opportunity by one of the interviewees:

Toronto's (next) biggest infrastructure move is the Don Mouth naturalization and flood protection project, which prevents – based on a hundred-year storm – the Port Lands from being one foot under water. That would have been the only thing that I could think of that might have been accelerated significantly.

(TO02, 2017)

However, the hosting of an Olympic Games would likely lead to an accelerated timeline for the development. This may have resulted in the development being rushed, and two interviewees noted that allowing the city to take time to ensure the project is done correctly is seen as an advantage:

We haven't developed the Port Lands, and I would have thought that we'd be further along in developing the Port Lands than we are now, but it's not necessarily a bad thing that we're not doing it because we still have to do it right.

(TO09, 2017)

We didn't get the Port Lands yet, we're still working on that, but it is 1,000 acres. We've chipped away, and we're moving towards it in terms of... you realise though, it'll be a city of 100,000-200,000 people that is five minutes from downtown, still sitting there.

(TO11, 2017)

Yet, alternatively, another interviewee felt that without the external pressures and deadlines created by an Olympic bid, it was unlikely that the Port Lands development would occur any time soon:

There's a lot of things that were sort of, the whole redevelopment of the Port Lands as an opportunity is still not

done, and again, without some kind of a deadline, it's going to be another 20 years. Some would argue, maybe that's the right answer, but we keep talking about how we don't have enough affordable housing, we don't have all this stuff. We never have the conversation about what it would take to bring that on line. It's just too hard without a deadline, which I think is pretty unfortunate.

(TO11, 2017)

In June 2017, it was announced that Waterfront Toronto was to receive CA\$1.25 billion in government funding to instigate the flood protection that has so long been identified as being needed. As with the original funding source, each level of government contributed over CA\$400 million to the project (Waterfront Toronto, 2017b). While this funding was crucial to Waterfront Toronto, it does also highlight the reliance that developments have on receiving government funding that has not always been forthcoming (Horak, 2017). However, an interviewee working for Waterfront Toronto said that this new commitment by the three levels of government proves that Waterfront Toronto, and the governance structure, has been a success:

I would say that the value of Waterfront Toronto in this regard, broadly speaking, is to serve as that kind of tri-governmental liaison. So, really, their role is to articulate a vision that they know that each of the three government partners can get behind. And the fact that each of those partners has made a not insubstantial commitment of funding, as of last year, to support flood protection and move forward, I think that's a sign that it's had some degree of success.

(TO16, 2017)

#### 7.2.1.4.3 Affordable Housing

The failure to develop the Port Lands contributed to a further missed opportunity; that of the development of affordable housing. Toronto, at the time, was suffering from a housing crisis (TO04, 2017; TO05, 2017). Indeed, the initial Royal Commission that catalysed the waterfront development wrote that ‘there are an estimated 20,000 homeless people in Metro Toronto alone; in 1986, nearly 28,000 families, seniors, and single people were on the provincial waiting list for geared-to-income non-profit housing’ (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1992:29).

This position did not improve throughout the decade and, in 1999, an Action Task Force was set up by the City of Toronto to investigate the issue (Mayor's Action Task Force on Homelessness, 1999). This followed the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee's (1998:1) claims that the number of homeless was a ‘community-wide crisis’. A further study found that the macroeconomic issues within Canada in the 1990s hurt Torontonians, with average incomes being lower in 1999 than in 1990, and a further 14,310 children living in poverty (United Way of Greater Toronto and Canadian Council on Social Development, 2002).

Indeed, the need for affordable housing<sup>37</sup> within Toronto was highlighted when considering Toronto's bid. The Environmental Assessment conducted during the bid specifically noted that just 114 units of housing were constructed in Toronto in 1998, and only six units for every 1,000 were available for rent

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<sup>37</sup> Defined by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation as housing that ‘costs less than 30% of a household's before-tax income’ (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2018). This is the definition used by Waterfront Toronto.



(0.6%). The stark details on homelessness in the city were provided: from 1988 to 1998, the number of individuals using emergency shelters increased by 33%. Further, of the 28,800 using emergency shelters, 6,000 were children, an increase of 122% from 1988 (Toronto 2008, 2001b).

This was not the only bid report that raised the issues facing Toronto's poor. The Socio-Economic Impact and Equity Plan detailed that nearly half of Torontonians paid more than 30% of their income on rent, with over 100,000 households paying over half their income in rent. The report recommended that Olympic accommodation should be converted into affordable housing post-Games as part of a city-wide strategy to tackle the housing crisis facing Toronto (The Community Social Planning Council of Toronto, 2000). This was partly adopted into the Toronto 2008 Master Plan, which mentions the need to create a 'legacy of a range and mix of new housing' through 'utilizing under-utilized prime land in the central city to create new neighbourhoods' (Toronto 2008, 1999:3-6). Crucially, these plans do not give a clear indication as to the levels of affordable housing that hosting the Games would provide. TO-Bid's plan, that was submitted to the City of Toronto Economic Development and Parks Committee, stated that the Games plan would result in 4,000 new housing units, of which 800 to 1,000 'will be available to households at affordable rents and purchase prices' (City of Toronto, 2000b:15). This would have contributed to the planned 40,000 new housing units across the central waterfront, including 10,000 affordable housing units proposed by the City of Toronto (City of Toronto, 2000a).

Given the clear need for affordable housing within the city at the time of the bid, the lack of funding towards affordable housing could be viewed as a missed opportunity. The original documents put forward as part of the waterfront development strategy did include the potential for affordable housing. The bid was identified by the City of Toronto (2000b:58) as an 'opportunity, if carefully planned and executed, to enhance social equity opportunities in Toronto'. However, the tri-partite funding in place caused issues with these plans, as affordable housing was not on the agenda of the Province of Ontario, who had previously cancelled plans for 17,000 new affordable housing units. A director within the City of Toronto said that:

On the issue of affordable housing, the former Ontario government under Premier Mike Harris, the Progressive Conservatives, had cancelled in 1995, 17,000 new social housing units province-wide. So, they had no interest, actually a negative interest if you will, in having anything in the platform for the waterfront plan to address or deal with the issue of housing or affordable housing... And so, for me, it was really quite high on the agenda to try to achieve the affordable housing for which we'd expropriated these 80 acres back in 1988. But, meanwhile, you have the new Progressive Conservative government in 1995 actually cancelling 17,000 units province-wide, and running on a campaign, essentially, to pull back social assistance rates by 21.6% and, basically, get rid of, or scale-back programs aimed at helping the poor.

(TO14, 2017)

This was further coupled with issues within the Canadian economy in the 1990s. The decade was bookended by a recession across North America in

the early 1990s and economic crises in Asia and Russia at the end of the decade (Bank of Canada, 2001), which resulted in a tightening of the belt by the provincial governments, with social housing being one of the key areas that were lost.

Indeed, these financial issues led to criticism of the Olympic bid, and a reactivation of the Bread Not Circuses coalition. While there was not the same level of opposition regarding the 2008 Olympic bid as there was with the 1996 bid, Bread Not Circuses published 'The People's Anti-Olympic Bid Book' in 2001 (The Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 2001). Surprisingly, a number of respondents who were part of the bid team reported that there was no opposition to the bid at all, which clearly was not the case. Bread Not Circuses (2001:47-63) argued that the money spent on the bid was being directed away from other areas needed by society, with a lack of social housing being one of these key areas. Bread Not Circuses (2001:98) contended that any housing built as part of the Olympic bid should be '100% affordable and 60% social housing at the end of the Games'. As a member of Bread Not Circuses said, they were not wholly against an Olympic Games but were concerned about the opportunity cost:

We felt that the Olympics, and the Ballet Opera House, and the SkyDome, and the World Expo, the Good Expo Proposal, all represented initiatives that were very costly in terms of public resources.

(TO05, 2017)

Constrained by the approach of the Province of Ontario, Waterfront Toronto was not able to contribute to the affordable housing crisis. The waterfront area

that did receive funding for redevelopment has since been built up with tall condos (TO08, 2017), which typically sell for between CA\$400,000 to CA\$1,000,000<sup>38</sup> (ReMax Condos Plus, 2017). The development of these condos has inadvertently contributed to another potential missed opportunity. A respondent who works for Tourism Toronto noted that these resulted in the waterfront being 'largely built up to support the resident base, much more so than the tourism base; I say to great chagrin as a tourism marketer' (TO18, 2017). The respondent gave the example of the Harbourfront Centre, the building in which Tourism Toronto is situated, that has been taken over by residential needs:

This was a cold-storage building, so it's a big, heavy building. It's now just offices, with some layers of condos built on top about 20 years ago, but I'm mentioning it because, 15, 20 years ago, 30 years ago, when I was coming down here as a teenager... a kid, and a teenager, and young adult... this was a vibrant retail hub. It had lots of interesting craft shops, and tourists... It was more of a tourism hub than it is today, this particular building... It's not that anymore. It's now commercial tenants, banks. Expedia is moving their offices in here, and that. It's offices, and condos above us, and a grocery store on the main floor now, and a bank, and a couple of restaurants back on the water, but this building is not a destination.

(TO18, 2017)

By 2015, Waterfront Toronto claimed that 496 affordable housing units had been built in the West Don Lands, with a further 80 being constructed in East

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<sup>38</sup> Approximately £250,000 - £600,000

Bayfront (Waterfront Toronto, 2015b), a far cry from the 800-1,000 that were planned as part of the Olympic Games planning. Further, this affordable housing is not in the waterfront development, but is in the West Don Lands, an area to the East of the initial waterfront development that was catalysed by the Olympic bid. Waterfront Toronto is seeking to ensure that '20% of units within the West Don Lands will be affordable rental housing upon full build-out of the precinct' (Waterfront Toronto, 2012:64). While it is clear that Waterfront Toronto was catalysed through the Olympic bid, it is questionable the extent to which this social housing can be attributed to the bid. Indeed, Waterfront Toronto specifically notes the impact that the 2015 Pan American Games had, as the Athletes Village was converted into affordable housing units in the West Don Lands. TO-Bid planned to use the Port Lands for the 2008 Games Athletes Village, so there is little connection between the Olympic plans and the resultant Pan American contribution to affordable housing.

Social and affordable housing continues to be an issue for the City of Toronto. The summary of the 2011 National Household Survey says that 'housing affordability continues to be a concern. In 2010, there were 207,097 renter households paying 30% or more of their income for rent. This represents 43.5% of Toronto renter households and 19.8% of all households in the city' (City of Toronto, 2013). In 2009, the City of Toronto adopted a 10-year action plan to assist 257,000 households (Housing Opportunities Toronto, 2009), and approved the Open Door Affordable Housing Program in 2016. As part of this program, there are plans for affordable development housing in East Bayfront and the West Don Lands (City of Toronto, 2016).

### 7.2.2 Sport Development

While the waterfront development was clearly integral to the Olympic bid, TO-Bid also sought a second strategic objective; to raise the profile of sport in the city and increase sport participation levels. Unlike in Cape Town, one of the plans that TO-Bid had for sport infrastructure within the city came to fruition. All the planned training and event venues were only to be built if the bid was successful; however, TO-Bid did put in place plans to develop sport within the city. The means by which this was achieved was the formation of the Toronto Sports Council (hereafter TSC). One member of the bid team noted this as an important legacy of the bid:

One of the important legacies that I think came out of the Olympic bid is something called the Toronto Sports Council... It was to address this specific issue that I just talked about, that we weren't really a sports city.

(TO09, 2017)

The Olympic bid provided two clear opportunities that contributed to the formation of the TSC. The first of these is contextual. As has been alluded to, Toronto went through a period of amalgamation in the years prior to the bid. This provided TO-Bid with the opportunity to develop a Sports Council. A founder member of TSC discussed the opportunity provided by amalgamation:

The City of Toronto was going through an amalgamation, so there were a bunch of regions that were amalgamated. There was a (sports) council in North York, which is part of Toronto now. That already existed, Myself, Curt Harnett and Karen were involved as well, to try and get the sports council up and

running, so I remember we pulled some partners together, some people together who were interested.

(TO17, 2017)

The amalgamation provided the opportunity for a new enterprise to be attempted. The Olympic bid then provided a more direct opportunity. The Olympic bid brought a wide scope of stakeholders together from TO-Bid and the City Council. The same interviewee detailed the contribution of the Olympic bid to the formation of the Toronto City Council:

Toronto (2008) for sure was a catalyst to make that happen, and again, our city is so large, and especially when we amalgamated, then it became really large... I think city council, it's over 50 people... so it was hard to get things done. So it definitely was a catalyst, but there was also a movement, and I don't think it was because of the bid, where our sport councils in Ontario in general, there were many that were started up, but I don't think that can be attributed to the bid at all because the bid was pretty much Toronto-centric.

(TO17, 2017)

It is clear that it was the Olympic bid that provided the impetus needed to bring together a wide number of stakeholders to form the TSC. The mandate for TSC was to be the leveraging vehicle to deliver the ongoing sport development strategies that were part of the bid (Toronto City Council, 2002). It is evident that TO-Bid sought to use the bid to develop sport in the city, with TSC being the vehicle through which this would be delivered.

### 7.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Sport Development Leveraging Strategy

The TSC is still in operation today, indicating a level of success. However, the extent to which TSC can be seen as having achieved its objectives can certainly be questioned. Throughout the interviews, the idea of a sport legacy from the bid was very rarely mentioned. Aside from those interviewees who worked specifically on the sporting aspect of the bid, there was no consideration that the bid left any sporting legacy. The lack of association of TSC with the bid, is possibly due to the fact that TSC was formed in November 2001, four months after Beijing was awarded the 2008 Olympic Games. Two interviewees who have been significantly involved in TSC from the outset, both believed that this hampered the TSC for two reasons (TO11, 2017; TO15, 2017).

First, part of the success of the waterfront development was that the Olympic bid provided strict deadlines that all stakeholders involved needed to meet. This was not the case with TSC, which was not formed until after the bid was lost. This links to the second limitation. TSC was not able to harness the community support that was in evidence at the time of the bid. Council reports after the bid detail the celebrations that took place at the time of the announcement (Toronto City Council, 2002). An event called 'Celebrate '08' took place in the centre of Toronto, with a full day of entertainment leading to the IOC vote in Moscow being shown on big screens. It is estimated that 15,000 people attended, with over 40 media organisations being present. This demonstrates the support engendered by the bid and is not unlike the liminality that is a key part of Chalip's (2004) model for event leverage. TSC was



incorporated four months after Celebrate '08 took place, and so was not able to harness the communitas and celebration provided by the bid.

The third stated objective of the TSC, was the promotion of the Foundation for Athletes and Sport Training (FAST) which had been created in September 2000. FAST was specifically formed to enable elite sport development within Toronto, Ontario and Canada. FAST was created as a charitable foundation, funded from donations, sales of Toronto 2008 merchandise, and 2% of revenue from bid sponsors. The Province of Ontario agreed to match all donations up to a limit of CA\$10 million (Toronto City Council, 2002). However, there is little information available regarding FAST today. The website is no longer operational (FAST, n.d.), while a resource providing information on charities within Canada reports that FAST has no employees and gained revenues of just CA\$900 in 2016 (CHIMP, 2018).

TSC has, though, had some success in the years since. The TSC website lists two current activities with which it is currently involved (Toronto Sports Council, 2017). The first, and largest-scale project, is the Toronto Emerging Athletes Fund, a legacy of the 2012 Summer Ontario Games; an event for which TSC led the bid. Details were provided by an interviewee working for TSC:

We have an organisation called Canadian Tire, a big hardware outlet in Canada, big infrastructure and stores all over the place. They give kids \$150 twice a year to be involved in sport. Well, that doesn't go very far for those who actually start to develop some passion and predisposition for higher-level participation. So, we had a fund which would look

at emerging athletes and try and bridge them, to allow them to continue to participate. This really kind of addresses issues around equity in sport.

(TO15, 2017)

The second, current TSC activity is less lavish. This is a simple project in conjunction with Humber College's sport management program, designed to find placement and internship opportunities with professional sport clubs in Toronto for 120 students. (Toronto Sports Council, 2017). These two, relatively small projects characterise the impact that the TSC has had on the City of Toronto. There are two primary restrictions placed on the TSC. A current worker of TSC believed that one of the opportunities that led to the formation of the TSC has since hampered the organisation. It was argued that the number of stakeholders involved has prevented TSC from engaging with the wider sport groups within Toronto:

Over the years - and here's where I'm going to be a little bit more critical of the Sports Council from my perspective - it has never really changed its governance model from a few people who define their members as the board of directors. And I think that has impaired its credibility over time with the sport groups, who don't feel they have any way to have their voice represented on the Sports Council. I think, as you look at it, it's like what would be a governance problem in the legacy sports council. And at this point, some might be even cynical enough to say it's a self-interest group.

(TO15, 2017)

This demonstrates a first issue faced by the TSC, that of a disconnect between the stakeholders and the TSC. This, in part, was caused by the timing of the

TSC's formation. As has been noted, it was not formed until four months after Toronto had lost the bid to Beijing. As a result, elements of the TSC's formation were rushed through. Furthermore, the TSC has faced funding issues. Ironically, considering both were formed from the bid, TSC suffers from the opposite obstacle to that of Waterfront Toronto. Waterfront Toronto is wholly reliant on government funding, and thus does not have the scope to raise revenue, TSC does not receive government support, and instead relies on funding from grant applications. A TSC worker commented on this frustration:

When I got involved as a city staff person, we put in a request for city funding and never received it. So, the pressure came to second me to serve as executive director, which I did at the time; that was probably around 2006/07. We applied for a grant from what's called the Ontario Trillium Foundation, which is our gambling fund really; the fund that provides money from gaming and lotteries and all of that. We had good funding for a few years, to try and look if we could get a different governance model. Although there was interest, it never really transpired.

(TO15, 2017)

These governance issues have restricted the ability of the TSC to deliver its own projects. It has been more successful when working with other organisations in the city. On a small scale, TSC contributed to the construction of the Cherry Beach Sports Fields. This is particularly pertinent, as this is one of the few developments that Waterfront Toronto has managed to deliver in the Port Lands (Waterfront Toronto, n.d.). Following the culmination of the bid, the Waterfront Regeneration Trust (which latterly became Waterfront Toronto) wished to develop the sport facilities of the city further and worked with TSC

to achieve this (Waterfront Regeneration Trust, 2002). However, two of the three sites identified were on the Port Lands and, as already discussed in detail, the Port Lands development has not yet commenced. The final site was South Cherry St in the West Don Lands. This area of Toronto has seen significant development, but the identified area for sport facilities is currently a car park.

TSC has contributed to the wider scale delivery of sport within Toronto. For example, one of TSC's first projects was to evaluate the number of community sport facilities within the city. A member of the bid team who worked at the Urban Institute was able to map the facilities (TO09, 2017). This project found that, while Toronto had a large number of sports fields and facilities, many of these were managed by the Board of Education and 'were all chained, had fences around them, and they were locked off' (TO09, 2017). More recently, the TSC initiated the introduction of the City of Toronto Sport Plan in 2017 (City of Toronto Sport Plan, 2017). It is currently too early in the plan to recognise its success.

The greatest sporting success from the Olympic bid came over a decade later, as Toronto hosted the 2015 Pan American Games. Toronto still wished to host a major sporting event, believing that this was a 'gap in the CV of the city' (TO12, 2017). It was felt that Vancouver's hosting of the 2010 Winter Games made a Canadian Summer Olympic Games unlikely, and so a successful bid was put together to host the 2015 Pan American Games. The evaluation of sport facilities in Toronto conducted by the TSC following the bid, contributed to the Pan American Games being hosted in Toronto.

After the Olympic bid, in that first decade of the, I don't know, 2002/03/04, somewhere in there, I was involved in a process to map all of our sporting facilities, and for the first time ever brought together the City of Toronto and the two Boards of Education. We have a Catholic Board and a Public Board, and I was surprised to learn, when I convened the first meeting, that this was the first time that these three organisations had ever sat down together, and then we basically brought their Excel sheets together and geo-mapped them, and created kind of these maps of sport facilities in the city.

Shocking to find that you could directly correlate the absence of sporting facilities to the socioeconomic conditions of the population, and I think it was a real eye-opener to a lot of people. We'd begun to build more facilities, and tried to talk about how we manage and open-up these facilities and that kind of stuff, and I think that's directly led to us hosting the Pan Am Games. There's actually more athletes for that than for the Olympics, and it was basically the lessons learned were applied to that, and created the facilities that allowed us to have a pretty good Games in that respect.

(TO09, 2017)

Two of the interviewees worked on both TO-Bid and the 2015 Pan American Games. This enabled the Pan American Games to utilise plans put forward by TO-Bid. The extent to which this can be considered a direct leveraging strategy should be questioned. There were no plans during the Olympic bid to bid for the 2015 Pan American Games. Moreover, while the Pan American Games utilised TO-Bid's plans, there was no formal knowledge transfer from one bid to another. One respondent, who worked on both bids, criticised the independence of the Pan American Games Committee:

I actually helped them with the bid book a little bit, but once they got the Games, they were an island unto themselves which was really unfortunate. I think they could have leveraged, frankly, a lot of the stuff that we did, which was building connections with people much better. They ended up firing half the senior management of the Pan Am Games, but in terms of putting together the bid for the Pan Am Games, first of all, it's much smaller, but secondly, they didn't have time.

(TO11, 2017)

Rather, the ideas that were carried forward were conveyed by those who worked on both bids. An interviewee recalled this.

Well, who carries those ideas? People who disappeared, disappeared. People who had continuity with the Pan Am bid eight years later remembered all of this, and, in establishing the Organising Committee, remembered some of the specific ideas and certainly remembered the concerns. In the historical memory of those who had been involved in Games bids, and so I was one of those and remember, I was involved in the bid for 1996, 2008, and the Commonwealth Games bid for 2010.

(TO01, 2017)

Thus, it is clear that TO-Bid did not leverage the Olympic bid to host the Pan American Games; however, there is still an important lesson that can be carried forward from this example. TO-Bid put in place numerous plans as part of the Olympic bid. A failed Olympic bid did not have the scope to bring all of TO-Bid's plans for the city to fruition, but through the informal knowledge

transfer that occurred, plans such as the rail network linking the airport to the city were completed.

This lack of formal knowledge transfer is all the more surprising when considering the number of bids for events made by Toronto and Canada (see Table 3.6 on page 129). Canada, despite being a serial bidder for mega-events, does not appear to have a clear process of leveraging bids. Indeed, the Canadian Olympic Committee were contacted regarding this research, but declined to take part as ‘the Canadian Olympic Committee doesn’t have an internal department for bidding’ (personal communication, April 2017). Indeed, the email went on to say that the Canadian Olympic Committee had considered bidding for the 2024 Games but did not have information dating back to the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. This further highlights the lack of knowledge transfer, as the Canadian Olympic Committee were not able to use the information and knowledge gleaned from the 2008 Olympic bid when considering a bid for 2024.

### **7.3 Conclusions**

As this chapter has demonstrated, the Olympic bid was seen from the outset as a resource that could be leveraged to bring positive benefits to the City of Toronto. This is not to say that TO-Bid did not want to win, as in each of the interviews there was a perceptible regret that Beijing won the bid, and indeed, Toronto has considered bids for Olympic Games since.




Figure 7.4: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Toronto 2008 (adapted from Chalip, 2004)

Figure 7.4 above shows an adapted version of Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage to demonstrate the leveraging strategies that took place as part of Toronto’s bid. It is clear that the Olympic bid at least originated as a vehicle to achieve a specific strategic objective, utilising the opportunity to catalyse the waterfront development. The Waterfront Revitalization Taskforce recognised that the ‘jurisdictional gridlock’ (Laidley, 2011:207) was unlikely to be resolved in the near future, while only an event like an Olympic bid would provide the opportunity to bring the three levels of government to work together, echoing Law’s (1994) findings regarding Manchester’s 1996 bid. TO-Bid successfully persuaded each of the three levels of government that investment was necessary, and on a more shortened timescale than would normally occur. Thus, Waterfront Toronto was formed with CA\$500 million of funding from each of the three levels of government.

While the idea of an Olympic bid being used to secure government funding is not new (Cochrane et al., 1996; Lauermann, 2015), and indeed works by Oliver (2011a; 2011b; 2014) have detailed the levels of funding that were



secured as part of Toronto's Olympic bid, these studies have only recognised that the funding was secured. This research took the starting position that the funding had been secured, and rather sought to discover the means by which TO-Bid secured the funding.

A crucial managerial implication of Toronto's experience is the way that it was able to secure government funding. TO-Bid was able to persuade three levels of government that the Olympic bid required funding to increase the chances of the bid being successful. First, TO-Bid did not want to be exposed to the levels of criticism regarding costs that occurred in the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games, resulting in the formation of the Bread Not Circuses coalition. Second, TO-Bid were able to demonstrate the large levels of spending by Beijing as part of their bid and convince the government that it would be viewed that the bid did not have political support.

As was seen in Chapter 3, government support for a bid is often a crucial factor in determining which bid will be successful (Maennig and du Plessis, 2009; Hiller and Wanner, 2016). The secured CA\$1.5 billion of funding has clearly supported the revitalisation of the waterfront, which now plays a significant role in Toronto's position as a global city. Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 show the transformation that occurred between 1990 and 2016.



Figure 7.5: Toronto Waterfront in 1990<sup>39</sup>



Figure 7.6: Toronto Waterfront in 2016<sup>40</sup>

The role that the Olympic bid played in the waterfront development can best be seen in the projects that have not progressed since the Olympic bid. The Port Lands area, and the mouth of the Don River, were areas with as much

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<sup>39</sup> Image taken from blogTO (2016)

<sup>40</sup> Image taken from Empty Quarter (2016)

need for redevelopment as the central waterfront. Yet, the development for these areas was identified as being part of the bid only if Toronto actually hosted the Games. As Toronto's bid was ultimately unsuccessful, these areas remain undeveloped, with conversations continuing today as to what should be done with them. This suggests that had Toronto not bid for the Olympic Games, it is likely that the waterfront development would still be stalled in the same way as that of the Port Lands.

As with Cape Town's experience, Toronto secured government funding specifically for one strategic objective; the waterfront development. Therefore, future bid cities can learn from the plans put in place by Toronto to enact similar strategies to generate central government funding for their own projects. However, TO-Bid's strategies to lever this funding relied on the fact that Toronto was facing severe opposition from Beijing; it is therefore unlikely that a city which was already the favourite to win the bid would be able to follow the same strategy. It is also unlikely that a city in the USA, a neighbouring country to Canada, would be able to follow TO-Bid's plans, as American cities would not receive this level of support from the national government (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014).

While the waterfront development was clearly the priority for TO-Bid, it was not the only strategic objective that came from the bid. There was also a focus to develop sport in the city, with the formation of a leveraging organisation, in the Toronto Sports Council (TSC). However, this leveraging strategy clearly did not have the same level of success as that of Waterfront Toronto. First, it was beset by similar governance issues to that of Waterfront Toronto. Second,

the timing of the creation was after the bid was completed, and so missed the opportunities provided by the bid itself. The fact that the TSC was not formed until four months after the conclusion of the bid, suggests that it was bolted-on, supporting the assertion by Smith (2014) that leveraging plans are often only included once it becomes apparent that original promises would not be upheld. When considering the leveraging of events, the pregnancy period (the build-up to the event) is seen as being crucial (Weed et al., 2012; Dickson, 2017). That the waterfront development was able to capitalise on the bid itself, whereas the TSC was not, suggests that the pregnancy period is equally as important when leveraging a bid.

However, Toronto's bid experience suggests that should the pregnancy period be missed, it may be possible to enact plans in the future. TO-Bid put in place many plans for the development of Toronto that hinged on the success of the bid. As Toronto's bid was unsuccessful, this meant that these plans did not occur. Many of these plans were enacted as part of Toronto's hosting of the Pan-American Games in 2015. It is perhaps questionable the extent to which these can be classed as being leveraged from the Olympic bid, but this provides a lesson for future bid cities to plan above and beyond what can be leveraged from a bid. Therefore, should the initial bid be unsuccessful, but another event be hosted in the future, it might be possible that these plans can be resurrected.

Nevertheless, it was not planned that ideas from the Olympic bid would be re-enacted through the Pan American Games. Toronto, and Canada, appear to have little consideration as to how the lessons learned from one bid could be

used to boost future bids. The knowledge that did transfer from the Olympic bid to the Pan American Games, was through the individuals involved rather than through a knowledge transfer tool. Even though Canada has been termed a 'serial user' of mega-events (Black, 2017:220), there was little, if any, formal knowledge transfer from the 2008 Olympic bid. This went as far as the Canadian Olympic Committee revealing that, when planning a potential bid for the 2024 Olympic Games, they had very little information on the 2008 Olympic Games bid. As with Cape Town's bid for 2004, a clear managerial recommendation for future bidders is to ensure that policy is implemented to capture the knowledge that is learned during an Olympic bid. At the very least, the National Olympic Committee should ensure that knowledge can be passed from one Olympic bid to another, while policy on a national level, to incorporate events such as the Commonwealth Games and Pan American Games, would also be beneficial.

## 8 Discussion and Conclusions

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### 8.1 Introduction and Purpose

The previous three chapters have presented the results of this study. First, a content analysis was provided of the Candidate Files of 16 bid cities from 2016-2024. Next, the two case studies of Cape Town and Toronto were introduced and analysed. This chapter first brings the findings of these three chapters together within the discussion section (Section 8.2). Following this, the conclusion section (Section 8.3) demonstrates that the objectives of the study were completed and adapts Chalip's (2004) model to demonstrate how Olympic bids have been leveraged. Following this, the academic and practical contributions of the study are detailed, before the limitations of the research are considered. Finally, areas for future research are presented.

### 8.2 Discussion

Across the content analysis and the two case studies, three key leveraging strategies were enacted. These are summarised in Table 8.1.

*Table 8.1: Leveraging Strategies*

Strategic Objective	Content Analysis	Cape Town	Toronto
Infrastructural Development	✓	✓	✓
Sport Development	✓	✓	✓
Image Change	✓	✓	

Both CT-Bid and TO-Bid had a primary aim: to leverage the bid in order to gain access to levels of central government funding that they would otherwise not have had access to; a strategy that was identified through the content analysis. Similarly, sport development was identified within the content analysis, and was sought by both Cape Town and Toronto. Finally, Cape Town sought to use the global nature of the bid to promote a change in image of both the city and South Africa. Again, this was a leveraging strategy identified within the content analysis, and an obvious objective given South Africa's chequered past.

TO-Bid and CT-Bid employed similar strategies to gain access to government funding. Both cities were reliant on their bid not being the favourite to win; Cape Town and Toronto were second in the running behind odds-on favourites Rome and Beijing respectively (Table 8.2 below). This provided the bid teams with the opportunity to persuade national governments that funding was required to improve the chances of their bids being successful. If Cape Town and Toronto had been the front-runners and favourites to win the bid, then it is unlikely that this strategy would have been successful. This raises the question as to whether a front-runner is able to leverage the bid if it is likely to host the games, and so be able to use the event itself as a leveraging opportunity. While the idea of an Olympic bid seeking to gain central government funding is not new (see for example, Lauermann (2014a)), this is the first research that has sought to investigate the specific strategies employed by bid teams to secure this level of funding.

Table 8.2: Olympic Games Bidding Odds

Event bid for	Pre-vote favourite	Ultimate host	Reference
2004 Summer Games	Rome (odds-on)	Athens (7-2 third favourite)	Corrigan, 1997
2008 Summer Games	Beijing (1-4)	Beijing	Christie, 2001
2012 Summer Games	Paris (1-4)	London (11-4 second favourite)	BBC Sport, 2005
2016 Summer Games	Chicago (8-11)	Rio de Janeiro (11-4 second favourite)	ESPN, 2009
2020 Summer Games	Tokyo (4-6)	Tokyo	Sora News 24, 2013

However, being the favourite to host does not mean that a city will win the bid. As Table 8.2 shows, Rome, Paris and Chicago were all odds-on favourites to be voted host of their Olympic Games, yet none of these bids were successful. It is possible that these cities would have struggled to receive government funding to boost their bids, given that they were strong favourites. There has been little research conducted into these bids with the exception of Weiler and Mohan's (2009) work regarding the World Sport Chicago leveraging vehicle that emanated from Chicago's bid, which provides little information regarding government funding.

Toronto and Cape Town's leveraging strategies had another similarity. Both used the bid to contribute to strategies that were already in place on a local and national scale. At the time of the bid, South Africa was undergoing a drastic period of change as the nation sought to reunite groups of people divided for decades through apartheid. Similarly, the federal government of Canada had demonstrated its interest in Toronto's waterfront area through the Royal Commission established in the 1980s. Therefore, CT-Bid and TO-Bid



were able to secure funds from the central government that contributed to these ongoing plans. Interviews in both case studies argued that this was crucial. Had Cape Town and Toronto been seeking government funding for new strategies that did not align with the national interest, government funding would not have been forthcoming. This supports previous work into bids from New York and Berlin, who successfully used the bid to catalyse plans that were already in place (Alberts, 2009; Moss, 2011).

However, this still enables a city to enact plans that benefit the city in ways that hosts of mega-events do not. As seen in Chapter 2, hosting an Olympic Games, or indeed any other mega-event, will permanently change the urban infrastructure of the host, as the event organisation (e.g. IOC or FIFA) dictates the level of facilities that are constructed (Searle, 2002; Preuss, 2005; Hiller, 2006; Müller 2017). This is not the case with an Olympic bid. Both Cape Town and Toronto were able to fund infrastructural development through the Olympic bid, but, crucially, this was in areas that the city had identified as being needed. Cape Town constructed training facilities in underdeveloped areas of the city that previously had no access to such resources, while Toronto's bid was leveraged for waterfront development that had already been on the city and national agendas for many years.

This finding is supported by the data collected as part of the content analysis. The use of government funding for urban development was prevalent among the 16 candidate files analysed. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011), Beijing 2022 (2015), and Istanbul 2020 (2013) detailed the infrastructural development that would come about due to the bid. All three specifically noted

how the bid had attracted additional government investment; for example, Istanbul 2020 disclosed that the Turkish government had invested US\$1.77 billion into the area. While it is not explicitly stated in any of the bid documents, the implication from all three bidders is that the regions would not have attracted these levels of government interest were they not bidding for the Olympic Games.

While Toronto and Cape Town both clearly benefited from the levels of government funding that they were able to leverage, there are several issues that are raised.

First, it suggests that the strategic objectives a city can seek to attain are highly reliant on the strategies of the national government. This limits the ways in which a city can benefit from an Olympic bid as any benefit needs to be aligned to the national strategy. This means that if the strategies in place are unsuccessful, then the outcomes of the bid leveraging may also be considered unsuccessful. For example, it is clear that Cape Town's Priority Projects contributed to the ongoing Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework in the city; however, it is also clear that this framework was flawed (Watson, 2002). CT-Bid successfully contributed to the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework, but if this framework was unsuccessful, does this mean that the bid leveraging strategy was also unsuccessful?

Second, the need for a city to obtain funding from a national government indicates a degree of tension between the city and national government. In both cases in this research, there was an impression that the national government was seen as an adversary, and the Olympic bid was used as a

way for the cities to manipulate funding from the government. This is unlikely to be a healthy status quo; however, the Toronto case study offered a counter point to this. The tri-partite agreement that came from the Olympic bid ensured that all three levels of government had a stake in the ongoing operations of Waterfront Toronto. While this has caused governance issues within the organisation, it is also a rare example of a successful tri-partite agreement in Canada. Berdahl (2004) argues that tri-partite agreements often have several deficiencies, including limited scope and a failure to successfully involve the municipal government. The fact that each of the three levels of government contributed additional levels of funding in 2017 suggests that this has not been the case with Waterfront Toronto.

The final shortcoming of leveraging federal funds is one that is oft-cited when criticising mega-events; that of the opportunity cost of the resources. This limitation of the strategy was noted in both cases. CT-Bid's public finances section of the Strategic Environmental Assessment said that 'certain programmes or projects will be foregone in order to honour financial commitments. These displaced projects are likely to be predominantly in public works and the transport-related sector' (Abedian & BDM Consulting, 1997:5). This, again, highlights the tension between the development of a bid city and the national interests. While a bid may be leveraged to funnel funding into a city, this may result in other projects in other cities being abandoned.

This leveraging strategy is very much influenced by the case studies included in this research. In democratic states, an Olympic bid often originates from a city itself rather than the national government (Law, 1994; Lenskyj, 1996;

Andranovich et al., 2001; Shoval, 2002; Westerbeek, 2009; Brown et al., 2012). This therefore allows cities to put forward a bid with the intention of leveraging funds from the central government. It is unlikely that non-democratic states would have the same opportunity for this leverage. For states such as Qatar, an absolute monarchy (see Table 10.5 on page 405), the decision to bid is made centrally by the government rather than by a city. Therefore, as Könecke and de Nooij (2017) allude to, there is unlikely to be the same opportunity for a bid city to leverage funding from the centralised government. This is also the case for US cities, as van Dijk and Weitkamp (2014) note. In the USA, it is the cities themselves that are responsible for funding a bid, and often rely on private support for the bid (Andranovich et al., 2001).

This leveraging strategy is also impacted by the nature of the event that is bid for. The term 'mega-event' most often refers to Olympic Games or World Cups, and these two events are used interchangeably within the field of mega-events. This is perhaps not an issue when studying the hosting of a mega-event, given the widespread impacts that the event is likely to have; however, the key leveraging strategy enacted by both CT-Bid and TO-Bid was very much city-based, with the bids being initiated from within the cities themselves.

This provides an interesting question regarding the suitability of this leveraging strategy for other mega-events. This leveraging strategy relies upon a city driving the bid and successfully leveraging funds from a national government; and this may not be achievable if the bid does not originate from the city, and in events that take place across a country such as the FIFA World Cup. The

initial decision to bid for a Football World Cup will likely come from either a national government (for example, Russia's bid for 2018 (Sputnik International, 2009)) or from the national football association (for example, England's 2018 bid). While it may be possible for a city included in the bid to leverage funding, it is not known whether this would be as successful as a city bid for an Olympic Games. This perhaps limits the type of events for which an Olympic bid would benefit an individual city, to those events that wholly take place within the city itself such as an Olympic Games and Commonwealth Games.

The second leveraging strategy that was identified within this research involves sport development. Both Cape Town and Toronto sought different ways to achieve this objective, and it also features heavily in the plans of the bid cities considered in the content analysis. Indeed, half of the 16 candidate files that were analysed believed that the bid would be used to drive sport participation. Three bid cities created leveraging vehicles to develop this strategy: Chicago 2016 created World Sport Chicago (2009), Tokyo 2016 established the Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports (2009), and Istanbul 2020 developed the National Sports Plan (2013). This mirrors the plan of Toronto, which established the Toronto Sports Council (TSC) to deliver the sport development goals of the city; however, there has been little research into the impact that these vehicles have had post-bid. The TSC was hampered from the start and feels like a bolt-on strategy that was never an integral part of the bid in the way that the waterfront development was. This is highlighted

by the fact that the TSC was not created until months after the final bid decision and was not awarded a regular source of funding.

The idea of a 'pregnancy period' is one that is prevalent within the literature surrounding leveraging the hosting of an event. The pregnancy period is the time building up to the event in which awareness of the event is raised and is viewed as the ideal time for leveraging strategies to commence as they can then harness the event itself. In terms of bidding, this is considered to be the time before the bid decision, with the decision itself fostering the liminality described by Chalip (2004). Both Cape Town and Toronto arranged events for the general public at the time of the decision, and this is something that has been seen in more recent Olympic Games decisions as well. For example, thousands of people watched the 2005 Olympic bid decision in different areas of London (The Guardian, 2005), while 2,000 watched Tokyo be awarded the 2020 Games, at Komazawa Olympic Park Gymnasium (The Japan Times, 2013). These were one-off events, with thousands coming together to hopefully celebrate their city succeeding on a global scale. Even if a bid should not be successful, the crowds would likely stay in the area to commiserate. This is an opportunity that neither Cape Town nor Toronto took advantage of. Furthermore, beyond reports in the media about these celebrations, there is no evidence of any Olympic bidder seeking to harness this emotion for leveraging purposes.

This demonstrates the importance of the pregnancy period in the build-up to the bid, and the drop-off in interest following the bid decision. Members of TO-Bid and CT-Bid spoke of the deflation following the bid decision, with both

describing a weekend of partying followed by a return to normality, and the bid just a memory. This is demonstrated in the contemporary newspaper reports from the time; for example, the Cape Argus newspaper featured news about the bid every day for the four weeks leading up to the bid decision, which took place on Friday 5<sup>th</sup> September 1997. By Sunday 7<sup>th</sup> September, the bid decision was displaced on the front page by the death of Princess Diana, whose funeral had taken place the previous day.

The TSC missed out on this opportunity. Rather than a city-wide focus on sport and the Olympic Games, the TSC was instead born into a city whose people Oliver (2011:22) described as feeling 'embarrassed' following the bid decision. While the feel-good factor surrounding the hosting of a Games has been extensively discussed (Malfas et al., 2004; Kellett et al., 2008), Kim and Petrick (2005) found that this enthusiasm waned after three months; however, this still provides hosts with up to three months to enact leveraging strategies with the event still very much in the minds of the populace. Indeed, leveraging strategies may even be able to harness the good memories that people have of the event, but this is unlikely to be the case with a bid, which has a very finite cut-off date. The relative failure of the TSC in the years since, provides an example of how the bid was able to bring together the stakeholders in the first place, but then lacked the traction to deliver the impact that was expected.

The second way in which sport development was identified within the candidate files, was through the construction of new facilities. This echoes the approach taken by CT-Bid, which identified that previously disadvantaged areas sorely lacked the facilities needed to foster sport participation. Thus, the

Priority Projects were identified, which, crucially, bought into the city's MSDF plan. Where this strategy fell down, was a lack of further support for sport participation within the city. The facilities were constructed, but CT-Bid did not put in place plans to improve sport participation. The Olympic bid was the first opportunity for Cape Town to interact with sport federations following the decades of exclusion during the apartheid regime. Yet, Cape Town and South Africa failed to truly engage with the federations and acquire the soft skills necessary to develop sport within the nation, aside from the traditional South African sports in which South Africa already excelled, such as cricket and rugby.

The final leveraging strategy identified within this research is that of international exposure through the Olympic bid. This was prominent in the content analysis and also identified by CT-Bid. There is often an assumption in the literature that the process of submitting an Olympic bid will automatically lead to an increase in media and global attention:

- '... even before an Olympic host is selected, Applicant Cities receive increased media exposure' (Agha et al., 2012:133).
- '(e)ven submitting a bid package to the national Olympic committee is enough to warrant media exposure' (Andranovich et al, 2001:127).
- 'Often, bidding competitions in themselves are sufficient for several states to reach set objectives around profiling, raising international prominence, or transmitting specific messages to the international community' (Cornelissen, 2008:484).



- ‘...bids for the Olympic Games have become place-marketing measures in their own right due to the international exposure during the prolonged bid period’ (Haugen, 2005:217).
- ‘...global visibility has been seen as an opportunity for bidding cities to showcase unique aspects and gain world-city status’ (Kassens-Noor, 2016:46).

It is Tolzmann whose work best fits the findings of this research. Tolzmann (2014:595) recognised that although ‘candidate cities often do receive international attention... these are relatively minor’. As noted in Chapter 5, many of the applicant cities appeared to believe that entering the bid process would automatically lead to increased global exposure, despite there being no empirical evidence to prove that this was the case.

Cape Town sought a specific strategy to generate a change of image, through the development of sporting infrastructure and the subsequent hosting of sporting events. This was viewed as an opportunity for Cape Town to promote itself as a city for sport; however, the sport events hosted by Cape Town were not what would be considered to be of elite level, especially when considering the events hosted by oil rich cities that have subsequently developed an interest in sport investment (Foley et al., 2012). While South Africa later bid for the 2006 Football World Cup, and hosted the 2010 competition, there is little evidence that Cape Town’s bid for the Olympic Games had any impact on either of these World Cup bids.

This was not a finding exclusive to Cape Town. Despite South Africa and Canada each being regular bidders for sport mega-events (since 2000, both

will have bid for a Summer Olympic Games, hosted a Football World Cup, with Canada also hosting the Winter Olympic Games and South Africa being awarded the Commonwealth Games), it seems implausible that there is a lack of policy and knowledge transfer from bid to bid. Emery (2002) suggested that a first Olympic bid is only seen as a precursor for a later, legitimate bid, and is evidenced in numerous cases such as Sydney 2000 (Burroughs, 1999), Rio 2016 (Lindau et al., 2016), and Tokyo 2020 (Yuan, 2013). However, there appears to be less evidence that this knowledge is transferred if the bid is for a different sport event, particularly if the bid is driven by a sport federation rather than the government. Indeed, successful examples of a bid learning from previous bids all occur when the second bid is in the next Olympic cycle. Toronto's experience suggests that if there is a longer time period between Olympic bids, this knowledge transfer is unlikely to occur.

There was also little evidence to show that Cape Town's Olympic bid significantly impacted on the image of South Africa, analysed through consideration of tourism figures, exports, and foreign direct investment. This highlights a limitation of this research, and potentially a limitation of Olympic Games analysis. The Olympic Games themselves are, on the whole, limited to being within one city within a nation. There is often little information available regarding individual cities and their image; much of the data available is regarding the nation itself. Furthermore, the data that is available regarding cities is often more contemporary; therefore, it is difficult to judge the impact that Cape Town's leveraging strategies had on the city itself. This is certainly an area for future research, to measure the impact of a bid within a city

compared to other cities within the same country. For example, it would be interesting to compare Cape Town's progress as a global city to other South African cities such as Johannesburg.

### 8.3 Conclusions

The literature review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that, thus far, there has been little consideration of the ways in which cities seek to leverage bids for mega-events to bring positive benefits. Therefore, this research sought to answer the question, **'in what ways have bids for the Olympic Games been leveraged for positive outcomes?'** This was to be achieved through the following research objectives:

- 1) To examine a range of unsuccessful Olympic bids to identify the leveraging strategies employed, if any.
- 2) To scrutinise two bids in detail to explore the leveraging strategies put in place and the outcomes of these strategies.
- 3) To adapt Chalip's (2004) model of event leverage to view demonstrate leveraging opportunities for bidding cities.

The first objective of this research was to examine a range of Olympic bids to identify the leveraging strategies enacted. Chapter 5 analysed 16 candidate files to view the ways in which these cities sought to leverage Olympic bid, and used these findings to adapt Chalip's (2004) model for event leverage (Figure 5.1 on page 206). This research found four strategic objectives: sport participation, community building, urban development and global profile. Crucially, this research identified that these strategic objectives do not exist in

isolation; the achievement of one strategic objective can contribute to the achieving a second, different strategic objective.

This research had a second objective; to study two cases in detail to view the leveraging strategies put in place and the outcomes (Chapters 6 and 7). This is achieved through two in depth studies of Cape Town and Toronto's bids for the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games respectively. A total of 31 stakeholders were interviewed across both cases, including members of the bid teams to determine the leveraging strategies put in place, and those who dealt with the aftermath to view the impact of these strategies. This information was further corroborated through a documentary analysis.

Cape Town, South Africa and Toronto, Canada are cities and states in very different economic and political positions at the time of their bids. While both states are democracies, Canada is an advanced economy with a rich Olympic Games history, having bid 17 times for Winter and Summer Games, and having hosted the 1976 Summer Olympic Games and the 1988 and 2010 Winter Olympic Games respectively. Comparatively, South Africa is a developing economy with a GDP nearly five times smaller than that of Canada, and a GDP per capita that is just 16% of Canada's (see Table 10.5 on page 405) and had been excluded from the Olympic network for much of the preceding 50 years. Toronto and South Africa are two of the more diverse nations to have bid for the Olympic Games, yet both sought to use the bid for similar reasons. Both bid teams recognised that an Olympic bid is an ideal opportunity to lever funding from the national government

The final objective of this research is to adapt Chalip's (2004) model to demonstrate how Olympic bids have been leveraged. Figure 8.1 shows a model of Olympic Bid Leverage.




Figure 8.1: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage

As seen in Figure 8.1, Olympic bid cities have three clear opportunities for leverage. The first is the bid process itself, which a) provides deadlines which need to be met, and b) brings a vast array of stakeholders together to work together. This can provide bid cities with the impetus to get projects started, supporting the findings of Oliver (2011b) and Lauermann (2014a). These stakeholders are not just within the bid team itself; as demonstrated by Cape Town's experience, the involvement of multi-national firms through sponsorship brings levels of expertise that would not otherwise be found.

Another key stakeholder is the government, and this is the second opportunity; that of political support. It was noted by both CT-Bid and TO-Bid that the Olympic bids fostered central government support into Cape Town and Toronto that it would not otherwise have received. Finally, the third opportunity is the idea that an Olympic bid brings a general focus on sport to the city. This was an opportunity that Cape Town and Toronto particularly sought to utilise, as a general lack of interest in sport (and in particular, Olympic sports) in both cities was thought to have hindered their bids.

These opportunities allow several strategic objectives to be sought; however, the outcome of the leveraging strategy is not as important as the means by which strategic objectives can be sought (Chalip, 2014). The key means was the investment that TO-Bid and CT-Bid secured from their central governments. Both bid cities used this funding for urban development, but CT-Bid also built sporting facilities; in a similar way to that identified by Alberts (2009). While this development could be seen as an outcome in its own right, CT-Bid placed the sporting facilities in disadvantaged areas and saw them as a way of encouraging greater sport participation. The final means is the creation of a leveraging body. CT-Bid did not do this. However, TO-Bid formalised two organisations to deliver the strategic objectives. First, Waterfront Toronto was clearly a success, in that the redevelopment of the waterfront area was identified by most of the interviewees as being the key outcome of the bid. However, the Toronto Sport Committee (TSC) was less successful, in part due to the timing of its creation, missing the crucial pregnancy period that is necessary for leveraging strategies (Minnaert, 2012).

This was also a strategy employed by several of the bid cities in the content analysis, such as Chicago's implementation of World Sport Chicago.

This model crucially makes two changes from Chalip's original model. First, it recognises that opportunities, strategic objectives and means do not occur on their own; often the same opportunity and means can result in different strategic objectives. Similarly, the strategic objective itself is often not the end goal. It was clear that both Cape Town and Toronto sought urban development through their Olympic bids, yet, while this urban development can be identified as being a strategic objective, the urban development itself contributed to further strategic objectives. Cape Town specifically used its urban development to contribute to the city's spatial planning policy, through the strategic placement of priority projects and development of transport infrastructure. Similarly, while Toronto's prime plan for the Olympic bid was to develop the waterfront, this in turn contributed to the city's marketing plans.

The second adjustment to Chalip's model is through recognition that these leveraging strategies do not occur in a vacuum. This was not evident in the content analysis but was manifest in the two case studies. Both CT-Bid and TO-Bid's primary aim from their bids was for urban development that tied into a wider city or national strategy. It is very evident that these two strategies not only received the funding from central government, but were also the strategies that saw the most success. This supports the work conducted by Lauermaann (2016a) and Oliver (2011a), that an Olympic bid can be used to catalyse already existing plans. Where this study takes Oliver and Lauermaann's work further, is through identification that this also provides bid

teams with opportunities to leverage funding from the central government. It was clear throughout this research, that the support of the national government was crucial for these projects to be successful, demonstrated by the fact that similar infrastructural projects that are part of the urban strategy in both cities that a) were not included as part of the bid projects, and b) did not receive central government funding, have still not been completed.

### **8.3.1 Significance and Original Contribution**

While the development of Chalip's leveraging model above can be considered a contribution to the knowledge, this research has made further methodological, theoretical and practical contributions and implications for future research.

This research took a hard-interpretivist approach, utilising a qualitative methodology. This approach was applied to two stages of data collection: 1) a content analysis of Candidature Files, and 2) a multiple-case study comprising interviews and documentary analysis. This is a relatively new methodological approach, and it provides new insights into the impacts of Olympic bids. The current literature available concerns a small number of case studies: Berlin 2000 (Alberts, 2009), Cape Town 2004 (Hiller, 2000; Swart and Bob, 2004), Istanbul 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011), Manchester 2000 (Hill, 1994; Law, 1994; Cochrane et al., 1996; Lawson, 2006; Cook and Ward, 2011), New York 2012 (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011), PyeongChang 2010 and 2014 (Merkel and Kim, 2011; Kim et al., 2015), and Toronto 1996 and 2008 (Oliver 2011a; Oliver, 2011b; Oliver, 2014; Bellas and Oliver, 2016). The current thesis also includes Cape Town and Toronto, but links the strategies



of both cases through Chalip's model of leverage to provide a more rounded discussion of the opportunities and strategies available to potential bidders.

Furthermore, the content analysis of Chapter 5 has added an additional dimension to the literature. There is a paucity of research that compares multiple bids from different states with differing political systems and economic statuses. Those that do (Rose and Spiegel, 2011; Maennig and Richter, 2012; Lauermaun, 2016a) have typically been positivist, quantitative studies that concentrate on the macro impacts of a bid rather than considering the nuances between the different bidders. Given the widescale differences in various national statistics between Olympic bidders (see Table 10.5 on page 405), this is an area that could be explored further. It would be interesting to see, for example, whether cities such as Havana or San Juan have the same leveraging opportunities as global cities such as New York, Toronto and Paris.

Beyond this contribution to the Olympic literature, this is one of the first research to explicitly investigate the way in which an Olympic bid can be leveraged, and the first to consider the bid as a leverageable resource itself, rather than a phase in the hosting process. The previous research into unsuccessful Olympic bids mentioned above has very much focused on legacy. This has resulted in significant discussion regarding the legacies from Olympic bids, but little consideration as to how these legacies are realised. For example, Alberts (2009) and Moss (2011) provide significant detail regarding the outcome of Berlin and New York's bids respectively, but, given that both of these studies concentrate on just the end result, it is not obvious how this was achieved. As Chalip (2014) argued in his advancement of leverage as a

concept, this makes it difficult for future bid cities to replicate this success if there is no information available regarding how these strategies came about.

Thus, this research has furthered the knowledge regarding the ways in which mega-events can be leveraged. The current research regarding leverage has focused explicitly on the events themselves (O'Brien, 2006; Weed, 2014; Perić et al., 2016; Rogerson, 2016; Mhanna et al., 2017; Grix et al., 2017), yet hosting the event is only part of the process. Therefore, this research provides information regarding the way a failed bid can be leveraged, thus supplementing the burgeoning interest into how an event can be leveraged. The next step could be to investigate the ways in which hosts have leveraged a bid, and the extent to which strategies put in place during the bid phase may contribute to successful event leverage.

This thesis has not only identified the strategies that provided these outcomes, it has also sought to evaluate the success of them. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, this is the first study that has considered an Olympic bid from two angles: 1) what were the strategies put in place to leverage the Olympic bid? and, 2) what were the outcomes of these strategies? This provides bidding cities with information not only to the strategies that have been sought in the past, but also the success of them. There are lessons that can be learned from this research, which encompass not only the leveraging strategies that were successful but also those that did not provide the outcomes that were intended.

Indeed, it is evident that this is information that the IOC is seeking. The recent focus from the IOC regarding the impact that bidding can have on a city

demonstrates this; starting with the addition to the Candidature File of the question, 'What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?' (IOC, 2009:66), through to the adoption of Agenda 2020 and the modification through the New Norm. Furthermore, personal correspondence with the IOC has revealed that the IOC is currently in the process of producing marketing material around the impact of unsuccessful Olympic bids to entice potential bid cities. Indeed, research from this study has already contributed to the IOC's plans.

The following are recommendations for cities wishing to leverage a bid for an Olympic Games:

- 1) An Olympic bid allows a city to enhance areas of a city where development is needed. A bidder does not face the same restrictions imposed by event owners (such as the IOC) as does a host.
- 2) An Olympic bid is unlikely to significantly impact upon a nation's global image, and so should be concentrated on domestic policy.
- 3) Securing funding from the central government is key. This is most likely to be secured when facing a strong rival bidder.
- 4) This central government funding is best used in conjunction with already existing plans. The focus of an Olympic bid, and the strict deadlines, can be used to accelerate these plans, or even unlock stalled plans.
- 5) *But*, do not expect the bid to be a panacea for all city-wide issues. An Olympic bid can contribute to a plan but will not deliver the outcomes itself.

- 6) Use of a leveraging vehicle, while useful, does not guarantee success. Ongoing government support may be required to continue the work of the bid.
- 7) The pregnancy period (i.e. in the build-up to the bid decision) is crucial for enacting plans. Without the deadlines that an Olympic bid enforces, the impetus may be lost.
- 8) Olympic bids provide a unique opportunity to gather various stakeholders to work on one project with stringent deadlines. This can contribute to achieving outcomes that would not otherwise be realised.

### **8.3.2 Limitations of the Research**

There are, as always, some limitations to this research. The first is regarding the period of time since the bids took place. It is more than 20 years since Cape Town submitted its bid, and 18 years since the submission of Toronto's bid, and this elapsed time caused issues in collecting the data regarding these two case studies. First, many of the stakeholders who were sought could not be contacted, or, in more extreme cases, had passed away. This was particularly the situation with the Cape Town case study, whose bid team was significantly older than that of Toronto. Many of the Cape Town bid members had long since retired, making it difficult to contact them; however, this did provide an advantage, in that those who were involved in CT-Bid felt no restrictions in relation to their answers as they were no longer part of the system. The make-up of the interviewees is also a limitation. While the author attempted to speak to many different stakeholders, this was not always possible. As a result, most of the stakeholders spoken to were members of

their respective bid teams, so are likely to have provided biased views in favour of the bid and its impacts.

A second issue caused by the passing of time was that people's memories had changed. Many of the respondents mentioned that due to the length of time since the bid, they could not remember full details. This research sought to overcome this limitation in two ways. First, the study aimed to interview as many respondents as possible in order to corroborate the information provided. This included interviews both with those directly involved in the bid, and also those who were outside the bid but dealt with its impact. Second, a document analysis was performed in order to triangulate the information provided.

This leads on to the third limitation of this research, regarding time, and access to documentation. This was particularly the case with the Cape Town bid, which was submitted in 1997. At this point in time in South Africa, there was little access to computer systems or internet infrastructure. Indeed, one respondent spoke about having access to a computer for just five hours from 5.00 a.m. As a result, there is little information available online regarding Cape Town's bid, and so all documents had to be accessed manually. This leads to a further limitation; the geographical location of the cases and access to the documents required. The empirical research for the two case studies, for example, had to be conducted in three visits over a nine-week period in 2016 and 2017.

### 8.3.3 Areas for Future Research

The limitations described in the previous section provide an opportunity for discussion about the areas in which future research could be conducted in this area. As has been noted, the idea of leveraging the bid rather than the hosting of an event is still relatively new in the extant literature, and there are a number of different avenues yet to be explored. It is apparent that there are two clear routes in which this research area could be expanded upon.

The first research avenue is the type of city to be studied. This research used Cape Town and Toronto as the two case studies, but expanded upon this with the content analysis; however, only those cities that reached the Candidate Stage of the Olympic Games bids were considered. As Tolzman's (2014) research demonstrated, those cities that reach this stage are likely to be global cities already, and it would therefore be worth considering those cities who do not have the global profile to be candidate cities. For example, since the turn of the century, cities such as Tashkent, San Juan and Havana have all bid for the Olympic Games. None of these cities reached the IOC vote and could all reasonably be considered utilitarian bidders (Torres, 2012). Research into the reasons why these cities chose to bid initially, and then the extent to which they achieved the goals of their bid, should be considered.

The second research avenue is the type of event being bid for. A key finding of this research is that bid cities can lever additional funding from the national government. Yet, it is not known whether this could be achieved through single city events that do not have the global attention of the Olympic Games, or multi-city events such as the World Cup. This has further implications, in that

cities involved in the hosting of these events do not require the same profile, infrastructure or investment as a city hosting the Olympic Games. Therefore, this would further enable research into the ways in which smaller cities, which realistically would never have the opportunity to host an Olympic Games, can use a bid for city benefits. For example, Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea (a city with a population of 350,000), is considering a bid for the 2026 Commonwealth Games (ABC News, 2015), while Plymouth was a proposed venue in England's bid for the 2018 Football World Cup.

The final avenue for future research is to consider the national benefits. Aside from the economic studies conducted (Brückner and Pappa, 2011; Rose and Spiegel, 2011; Maennig and Richter, 2012), there has thus far been very little consideration as to the benefits that unsuccessful bids can bring to a nation rather than a city. This has become more pertinent in recent years, as nations with authoritarian governments (such as Russia, China and Qatar) have come to the fore in bidding for mega-events, and research should be considered into whether cities under authoritarian governments have the same leveraging opportunities as cities of democratic nations.

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## 10 Appendices

Table 10.1: South Africa National Statistics 1990-2004<sup>41</sup>

Year	Population	GDP (per current £US)		GDP per capita (per current US\$)		Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)		Foreign visitors to South Africa	Corruptions Perception Index	
		(US\$000,000)	Global Rank	US\$	Global Rank	(% of total labour force)	Global Rank		Score (0 = highly corrupt, 10 = very clean)	Global Rank
1990	35,200,000	112,014.84	68 (223)	3,182.24	68 (223)					
1991	35,933,108	120,225.99	66 (223)	3,345.83	69 (223)	25%	4 (219)			
1992	36,690,739	130,513.68	64 (224)	3,557.13	67 (223)	24%	7 (219)	2,891,721		
1993	37,473,796	134,309.81	64 (228)	3,584.10	68 (227)	25%	6 (219)	3,358,193		
1994	38,283,223	139,752.37	63 (230)	3,650.49	74 (229)	20%	14 (219)	3,896,547		
1995	39,120,000	155,460.23	64 (237)	3,973.93	76 (237)	17%	22 (219)	4,684,064	5.62	21 (41)
1996	40,000,247	147,608.05	69 (238)	3,690.18	87 (238)	21%	11 (219)	5,186,221	4.95	33 (52)
1997	40,926,063	152,586.03	68 (237)	3,728.33	87 (237)	23%	7 (219)	5,170,096	5.68	23 (47)
1998	41,899,683	137,774.70	69 (239)	3,288.20	98 (239)	25%	6 (219)	5,898,236	5.20	32 (85)
1999	42,923,485	136,631.88	70 (240)	3,183.15	101 (240)	25%	5 (219)	6,026,086	5.00	34 (99)
2000	44,000,000	136,361.79	70 (244)	3,099.13	104 (244)	27%	4 (219)	6,000,538	5.00	34 (90)
2001	44,909,738	121,515.88	77 (244)	2,705.78	106 (244)	25%	7 (219)	5,908,024	4.80	38 (91)
2002	45,448,096	115,482.30	77 (244)	2,540.97	107 (244)	27%	6 (219)	6,549,916	4.80	36 (102)
2003	46,034,026	175,256.87	69 (244)	3,807.12	94 (244)	27%	7 (219)	6,640,095	4.40	48 (133)
2004	46,641,103	228,593.70	68 (245)	4,901.12	89 (245)	25%	8 (219)		4.60	44 (146)

<sup>41</sup> Please see page 405 for references

Table 10.2: South Africa Demographic Data, 1991-1996

		1991 <sup>42</sup>				1996 <sup>43</sup>					
		Cape Province		South Africa		Cape Town		Western Cape		South Africa	
Population		4,518,403		41,733,424		2,563,612		3,956,875		40,583,573	
Race	African	790,822	18%	21,646,000	70%	644,199	25%	826,691	21%	31,127,631	77%
	Coloured	2,473,050	55%	3,286,000	11%	1,240,072	48%	2,146,109	54%	3,600,446	9%
	Indian	39,579	1%	987,000	3%	37,908	1%	40,376	1%	1,045,596	3%
	White	1,214,952	27%	5,068,000	16%	543,709	21%	821,551	21%	4,434,697	11%
	Other		0%		0%	97,724	4%	122,148	3%	375,204	1%
Gender	Male	2,213,302	49%	15,748,000	50%	1,241,540	48%	1,860,844	49%	19,520,887	48%
	Female	2,305,101	51%	15,507,000	50%	1,321,531	52%	1,974,478	51%	21,062,685	52%
First Home Language (%)	IsiXhosa	575,937	11%			593,558	23%	747,978	19%	7,196,118	18%
	IsiZulu	3,385	0%			3,668	0%	4,344	0%	9,200,144	23%
	Sepedi	2,223	0%			649	0%	1,135	0%	3,695,946	9%
	Sesotho	10,506	0%			9,327	0%	14,677	0%	3,104,197	8%
	Setswana	129,619	3%			2,472	0%	3,312	0%	3,301,774	8%
	Xitsonga	1,315	0%			241	0%	535	0%	1,756,105	4%
	Afrikaans	2,859,383	56%			1,156,928	46%	2,315,067	59%	5,811,547	14%
	English	844,796	17%			743,074	29%	795,212	20%	3,457,467	9%
Other	640,469	13%			20734	1%	29,019	1%	1,687,794	4%	
Employed	Employed					2,056,817	80%	1,374,174	82%	9,113,847	66%
	Unemployed					506,794	20%	299,114	18%	4,671,647	34%
Religion	Christian Churches	2,977,078	66%					2,983,838	78%	30,051,008	75%
	Judaism	15,471	0%					15,193	0%	68,058	0%
	Hinduism	5,527	0%					4,916	0%	537,428	1%
	Islam	142,034	3%					263,911	7%	553,585	1%
	Other	3,693	0%					18,666	0%	193,830	0%
	No religion	23,525	1%					198,997	5%	4,638,897	12%
Refused	1,351,075	30%					349,450	9%	3,746,706	9%	

<sup>42</sup> South Africa Central Statistical Service (1992)

<sup>43</sup> Statistics South Africa (1996)

Table 10.3: Canada National Statistics, 1995-2008<sup>44</sup>

Year	Population	GDP (per current £US)		GDP per capita (per current US\$)		Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)		Foreign visitors to		Corruptions Perception Index	
		(US\$000,000)	Global Rank	US\$	Global Rank	(% of total labour force)	Global Rank	Canada	Ontario	Score (0 = highly corrupt, 10 = very clean)	Global Rank
1995	29,354,000	604,031.62	35 (237)	20,577.49	29 (237)	9%	38 (131)	41,656,912	2,089,660	8.87	5 (41)
1996	29,671,900	628,546.39	35 (238)	21,183.22	31 (238)	10%	50 (140)	43,256,452	2,273,089	8.96	5 (47)
1997	29,987,200	652,825.36	34 (237)	21,770.13	30 (237)	9%	51 (137)	45,076,152	2,043,372	9.1	5 (52)
1998	30,247,900	631,813.28	34 (239)	20,887.84	32 (239)	8%	55 (130)	48,063,740	1,779,791	9.2	6 (85)
1999	30,499,200	676,082.65	32 (240)	22,167.23	30 (240)	8%	75 (129)	49,055,476	1,803,324	9.2	5 (99)
2000	30,769,700	742,293.45	32 (245)	24,124.17	25 (245)	7%	74 (148)	48,637,502	1,934,849	9.2	5 (90)
2001	31,081,900	736,379.78	32 (245)	23,691.59	26 (245)	7%	76 (141)	47,146,628	1,722,048	8.9	7 (91)
2002	31,362,000	757,950.68	33 (249)	24,167.80	32 (249)	8%	76 (139)	44,896,262	1,615,865	9	7 (102)
2003	31,676,000	892,380.99	34 (249)	28,172.15	31 (249)	8%	78 (141)	38,902,630	1,250,808	8.7	11 (133)
2004	31,995,000	1,023,196.00	34 (250)	31,979.87	31 (250)	7%	88 (146)	38,844,670	1,699,009	8.5	12 (146)
2005	32,312,000	1,169,357.98	34 (250)	36,189.59	26 (250)	7%	93 (163)	36,160,104	1,821,490	8.4	12 (54)
2006	32,570,505	1,315,415.20	34 (251)	40,386.70	27 (251)	6%	90 (148)	33,390,210	1,830,816	8.5	14 (137)
2007	32,887,928	1,464,977.19	37 (251)	44,544.53	25 (251)	6%	86 (150)	30,373,466	1,832,626	8.7	9 (134)
2008	33,245,773	1,549,131.21	37 (250)	46,596.34	24 (250)	6%	80 (144)	27,370,102	1,847,352	8.7	9 (137)

<sup>44</sup> Please see page 405 for references

Table 10.4: Canada Demographics 2001<sup>45</sup>

		Toronto		Ontario		Canada	
Population		4,647,955		11,410,045		30,007,095	
Gender	Male	2,241,212	48%	5,577,060	49%	14,706,850	49%
	Female	2,406,743	52%	5,832,985	51%	15,300,245	51%
Number of Immigrants		2,091,095	45%	3,120,690	27%	5,647,125	19%
Mother Tongue	English	2,684,195	58%	7,965,225	70%	17,352,315	58%
	Italian	195,960	4%	295,205	3%	469,485	2%
	Chinese	165,125	4%	202,125	2%	425,080	1%
	Cantonese	145,490	3%	158,040	1%	322,310	1%
	Portuguese	108,935	2%	152,115	1%	213,810	1%
	Punjabi	95,945	2%	110,540	1%	271,220	1%
	Spanish	83,240	2%	118,690	1%	245,495	1%
	Polish	79,875	2%	138,935	1%	208,375	1%
	Tagalog (Pilipino)	77,215	2%	88,870	1%	174,060	1%
	Tamil	72,715	2%	76,810	1%	92,010	0%
	French	57,485	1%	485,630	4%	6,703,330	22%
Ethnic Origins	European origins	1,652,530	36%	3,882,500	34%	8,731,955	29%
	British Isles origins	1,273,500	27%	4,454,010	39%	9,971,615	33%
	North American origins	882,465	19%	3,405,215	30%	11,919,290	40%
	Southern European origins	848,045	18%	1,445,855	13%	2,331,330	8%
	East and Southeast Asian origins	682,045	15%	840,710	7%	1,787,685	6%
	South Asian origins	504,005	11%	592,500	5%	963,190	3%
	Eastern European origins	410,400	9%	980,845	9%	2,520,770	8%
	Western European origins	326,490	7%	1,447,220	13%	3,790,025	13%
	Caribbean origins	281,310	6%	347,865	3%	503,805	2%
	French origins	221,805	5%	1,240,065	11%	4,710,580	16%
	Other European origins	167,270	4%	207,730	2%	379,060	1%

<sup>45</sup> Statistics Canada (n.d.)

Table 10.5: Economic and Political data for bidding nations for the Olympic Games 1993-2017

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Sydney	Australia	1993	17.67	311.95	17,657	Industrial	10.9	Parliamentary Democracy	8.8	1	1	F
Manchester	UK	1993	57.72	1,061.39	18,389	Industrial	10.5	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	8.57	2	1	F
Berlin	Germany	1993	81.16	2,068.56	25,489	Industrial	7.9	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8.14	2	1	F
Milan	Italy	1993	56.83	1,061.83	18,684	Industrial	10.2	Parliamentary Republic	2.99	3	1	F
Brasilia	Brazil	1993	157.81	437.80	2,774	Developing	6.0	Federal Presidential Republic	2.7	4	3	PF
Istanbul	Turkey	1993	56.71	180.17	3,177	Developing	9.0	Parliamentary Republic	4.1	4	4	PF
Beijing	China	1993	1,178.44	442.87	376	Developing	4.3	Communist State	2.16	7	7	NF
Tashkent	Uzbekistan	1993	21.94	13.10	597	Developing	10.9	Presidential Republic		7	7	NF
Stockholm	Sweden	1997	8.85	264.48	29,898	Advanced	10.2	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	9.35	1	1	F

<sup>46</sup> The World Bank (2018e)

<sup>47</sup> The World Bank (2018a)

<sup>48</sup> The World Bank (2018f)

<sup>49</sup> International Monetary Fund (2017)

<sup>50</sup> The World Bank (2018g)

<sup>51</sup> CIA World Factbook (2018)

<sup>52</sup> Transparency International (2018): 1=most corrupt, 10=least corrupt

<sup>53</sup> Freedom House (2018): 1=best, 7=worst

<sup>54</sup> Freedom House (2018): F=Free, PF=Partially Free, NF=Not Free

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Sydney	Australia	1993	17.67	311.95	17,657	Industrial	10.9	Parliamentary Democracy	8.8	1	1	F
Brasilia	Brazil	1993	157.81	437.80	2,774	Developing	6.0	Federal Presidential Republic	2.7	4	3	PF
Beijing	China	1993	1,178.44	442.87	376	Developing	4.3	Communist State	2.16	7	7	NF
Berlin	Germany	1993	81.16	2,068.56	25,489	Advanced	7.9	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8.14	2	1	F
Milan	Italy	1993	56.83	1,061.83	18,684	Advanced	10.2	Parliamentary Republic	2.99	3	1	F
Istanbul	Turkey	1993	56.71	180.17	3,177	Developing	3.6	Parliamentary Republic	4.1	4	4	PF
Manchester	UK	1993	57.72	1,061.39	18,389	Advanced	10.5	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	8.57	2	1	F
Tashkent	Uzbekistan	1993	21.94	13.10	597	Developing	10.9	Presidential Republic		7	7	NF
Quebec City	Canada	1995	29.35	604.03	20,577	Advanced	9.5	Federal Parliamentary Democracy	8.87	1	1	F
Östersund	Sweden	1995	8.83	264.05	29,914	Advanced	8.9	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	8.87	1	1	F
Sion	Switzerland	1995	7.04	341.76	48,541	Advanced	3.3	Federal Republic	8.76	1	1	F
Salt Lake City	USA	1995	266.28	7,664.06	28,782	Advanced	5.6	Constitutional Federal Republic	7.79	1	1	F

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Buenos Aires	Argentina	1997	35.83	292.86	8,173	Developing	14.9	Presidential Republic	2.81	3	2	F
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	1997	167.89	886.33	5,279	Developing	7.7	Federal Presidential Republic	3.56	4	3	PF
Lille	France	1997	59.96	1,460.71	24,359	Advanced	12.6	Semi-Presidential Republic	6.66	2	1	F
Athens	Greece	1997	10.78	143.16	13,284	Advanced	9.6	Parliamentary Republic	5.35	3	1	F
Rome	Italy	1997	56.89	1,239.51	21,788	Advanced	12.0	Parliamentary Republic	5.03	2	1	F
San Juan	Puerto Rico	1997	3.76	48.19	12,818		14.1	Presidential Democracy				
Saint Petersburg	Russia	1997	147.92	404.93	2,738	In Transition	11.8	Semi-Presidential Federation	2.27	4	3	PF
Cape Town	South Africa	1997	40.93	152.59	3,728	Developing	22.9	Parliamentary Republic	4.95	2	1	F
Seville	Spain	1997	39.58	588.69	14,873	Advanced	3.5	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	5.9	2	1	F
Stockholm	Sweden	1997	8.85	264.48	29,898	Advanced	3.4	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	9.35	1	1	F
Istanbul	Turkey	1997	60.39	189.83	3,143	Developing	3.2	Parliamentary Republic	3.21	5	4	PF
Klagenfurt	Austria	1999	7.99	216.73	27,117	Advanced	4.7	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8.7	1	1	F

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Helsinki	Finland	1999	5.17	135.23	26,179	Advanced	11.7	Parliamentary Republic	9.8	1	1	F
Turin	Italy	1999	56.92	1,248.56	21,937	Advanced	11.7	Parliamentary Republic	4.7	2	1	F
Zakopane	Poland	1999	38.66	169.72	4,390	Transition	12.3	Parliamentary Republic	4.2	2	1	F
Poprad-Tatry	Slovakia	1999	5.40	30.42	5,637	Transition	15.9	Parliamentary Republic	3.7	1	1	F
Sion	Switzerland	1999	7.14	289.88	40,577	Advanced	3.7	Federal Republic	8.9	1	1	F
Toronto	Canada	2001	31.08	732.72	23,574	Advanced	7.2	Federal Parliamentary Democracy	8.9	1	1	F
Beijing	China	2001	1,271.85	1,332.23	1,048	Developing	4.5	Communist State	3.5	6	7	NF
Havana	Cuba	2001	11.15	31.68	2,841		4.1	Communist State		7	7	NF
Cairo	Egypt	2001	69.60	97.63	1,403	Developing	9.4	Presidential Republic	3.6	6	6	NF
Paris	France	2001	61.36	1,382.22	22,527	Advanced	8.6	Semi-Presidential Republic	6.7	2	1	F
Osaka	Japan	2001	127.15	4,159.86	32,716	Advanced	5.0	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7.1	2	1	F
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	2001	23.92	92.78	3,879	Developing	3.5	Federal Constitutional Monarchy	5	5	5	PF



City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Seville	Spain	2001	40.76	625.98	15,359	Advanced	3.2	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7	2	1	F
Bangkok	Thailand	2001	63.42	120.30	1,897	Developing	4.2	Constitutional Monarchy	3.2	3	2	F
Istanbul	Turkey	2001	64.18	196.01	3,054	Developing	8.4	Parliamentary Republic	3.6	5	4	PF
Salzburg	Austria	2003	8.12	260.72	32,103	Advanced	4.8	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8	1	1	F
Vancouver	Canada	2003	31.68	892.38	28,172	Advanced	7.6	Federal Parliamentary Democracy	8.7	1	1	F
Pyeongchang	South Korea	2003	47.86	680.52	14,219	Advanced	3.6	Presidential Republic	4.3	2	2	F
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	2005	188.48	892.10	4,733	Developing	9.3	Federal Presidential Republic	3.7	2	2	F
Havana	Cuba	2005	11.26	42.64	3,787		1.9	Communist State	3.8	7	7	NF
Paris	France	2005	63.18	2,203.68	34,880	Advanced	8.9	Semi-Presidential Republic	7.5	1	1	F
Leipzig	Germany	2005	82.47	2,861.41	34,697	Advanced	11.1	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8.2	1	1	F
Moscow	Russia	2005	143.52	764.02	5,324	Emerging	7.1	Semi-Presidential Federation	2.4	5	6	NF

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Madrid	Spain	2005	43.65	1,157.28	26,511	Advanced	3.2	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7	1	1	F
Istanbul	Turkey	2005	67.86	482.98	7,117	Developing	10.6	Parliamentary Republic	3.5	3	3	PF
London	UK	2005	60.40	2,418.94	40,048	Advanced	4.8	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	8.6	1	1	F
New York	USA	2005	295.52	13,093.73	44,308	Advanced	5.2	Constitutional Federal Republic	7.6	1	1	F
Salzburg	Austria	2007	8.30	386.46	46,587	Advanced	4.9	Federal Parliamentary Republic	8.1	1	1	F
Sochi	Russia	2007	142.81	1,299.71	9,101	Emerging	6.1	Semi-Presidential Federation	2.3	5	6	NF
Pyeongchang	South Korea	2007	48.60	1,122.68	23,102	Advanced	3.7	Presidential Republic	5.1	2	1	F
Baku	Azerbaijan	2009	8.95	44.29	4,950	Emerging	5.7	Presidential Republic	2.3	5	6	NF
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	2009	196.70	1,664.59	8,463	Emerging	8.3	Federal Presidential Republic	3.7	2	2	F
Prague	Czech Republic	2009	10.44	205.73	19,699	Advanced	6.7	Parliamentary Republic	4.9	1	1	F
Tokyo	Japan	2009	128.05	5,035.14	39,323	Advanced	5.0	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7.7	2	1	F

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Doha	Qatar	2009	1.59	97.80	61,464	Emerging	0.3	Absolute Monarchy	7	5	6	NF
Madrid	Spain	2009	46.36	1,499.07	32,334	Advanced	3.6	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	6.1	1	1	F
Chicago	USA	2009	306.77	14,418.74	47,002	Advanced	9.4	Constitutional Federal Republic	7.5	1	1	F
Annecey	France	2011	65.34	2,862.50	43,807	Advanced	8.8	Semi-Presidential Republic	7.3	1	1	F
Munich	Germany	2011	80.27	3,757.46	46,807	Advanced	5.8	Federal Parliamentary Republic	7.8	1	1	F
Pyeongchang	South Korea	2011	49.78	1,202.46	24,156	Advanced	3.7	Presidential Republic	5.1	2	1	F
Baku	Azerbaijan	2013	9.42	73.56	7,812	Emerging	5.0	Presidential Republic	2.8	6	6	NF
Rome	Italy	2013	60.23	2,133.54	35,421	Advanced	12.2	Parliamentary Republic	4.3	1	1	F
Tokyo	Japan	2013	127.34	4,919.56	38,634	Advanced	4.0	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	7.4	1	1	F
Doha	Qatar	2013	2.10	201.89	96,077	Emerging	0.3	Absolute Monarchy	6.8	5	6	NF
Madrid	Spain	2013	46.62	1,369.26	29,371	Advanced	3.7	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	5.9	1	1	F
Istanbul	Turkey	2013	75.01	823.24	10,975	Emerging	8.7	Parliamentary Republic	5	4	3	PF

City	Country	Bid Year	Population (million) <sup>46</sup>	GDP (Current US\$ billion) <sup>47</sup>	GDP per Capita (Current US\$) <sup>48</sup>	Economic Status <sup>49</sup>	Unemployment (% of Labour Force) <sup>50</sup>	Political System <sup>51</sup>	Corruption Index <sup>52</sup>	Civil Liberties <sup>53</sup>	Political Rights <sup>53</sup>	Political Status <sup>54</sup>
Beijing	China	2015	1,371.22	11,064.66	8,069	Emerging		Communist State	3.5	6	7	NF
Almaty	Kazakhstan	2015	17.54	184.39	10,510	Emerging	5.0	Presidential Republic	2.1	5	6	NF
Paris	France	2017	325.72	19,391.00	59,531	Advanced	4.3	Constitutional Federal Republic	8.1	1	2	F
Rome	Italy	2017	67.12	2,583.00	38,477	Advanced	9.4	Semi-Presidential Republic	7	1	2	F
Budapest	Hungary	2017	9.78	139.00	14,225	Emerging	4.2	Parliamentary Republic	4.3	2	3	F
Los Angeles	USA	2017	60.55	1,935.00	31,953	Advanced	11.2	Parliamentary Republic	5	1	1	F

### *Indicative Interview Schedule*

- During the bid process, how much consideration was there that the Toronto bid may be ultimately unsuccessful?
- Which legacies from the event did you set out to realize?
- Which strategies were put in place to achieve your desired legacies?
- Were there any legacies built into the bid for the event that the Toronto bid would be unsuccessful?
- If not, do you think that legacies should have been built into the bid should it be unsuccessful?
- If so, what were these legacies, and how successful do you feel that they were?
- How were legacies evaluated post-event?
- Do you feel that the bid brought about any unplanned legacies, whether positive or negative?
- Which of these do you feel is the most important?
- Do you feel that any positives that can be gained from a bid can outweigh the costs?
- How do you think the bid will be remembered within the city?
- Do you feel that there is anything more the Toronto bid could have done to ensure that it left a legacy, despite it being ultimately unsuccessful?
- Who do you feel ultimately benefited the most from the bid?