Where there is no path, only the travelling: Psychoanalytic Film Theory after Deleuze

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ABSTRACT

The argument of this thesis is twofold. First that psychoanalysis, more specifically approaches inspired by the teaching of Jacques Lacan, can still be useful in thinking encounters with art and, in particular cinema. At the same time, it is acknowledged that psychoanalysis, in its existing forms has its limitations and it is claimed -this is the second argument – that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it should draw on sources beyond the psychoanalytic tradition, in this case, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.

The thesis falls into two parts. The first considers what psychoanalysis can still contribute. Chapter one assays existing psychoanalytic approaches to cinema, argues that fewer of those theories are outmoded than is currently assumed and seeks to retrieve what is of continuing value. Chapter two is the longest chapter and the heart of the thesis. In support of the contention that the work of Freud and Lacan is still of moment, it explores a series of new psychoanalytic approaches to film and literature which it is claimed do more justice to the event of art.

The second part of the thesis considers how Lacan's teaching could be combined with the philosophy of Deleuze to develop these new approaches. Chapter three outlines the relevant aspects of Deleuze's philosophy to establish a framework for the subsequent discussion. Chapter four examines the degree of convergence between the two thinkers and proposes a division of labour: psychoanalysis for artworks which transform subjectivity and Deleuzean thought for those which depart it. Chapter five considers how Deleuze's cinema books point up the absence of any comparable creativity in psychoanalysis and what psychoanalytic film theory could learn from Deleuze's achievement.

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Coming to my friends, Maxime Lallement began as my comrade, when we were both finding our way in our different doctoral programmes, and became the most supportive of friends when I began to experience rather more difficulties than anticipated.

In regard to Lacan, I owe everything to Peter Buse with whom I have been reading Lacan's seminars on a near weekly basis for almost ten years. It was his exceptionally acute textual insights which first wakened me to the importance and efficacy of Lacan's style and the possibilities its ambiguities and resonances held for thinking about art. More crucially for this thesis, it was through conversations, informed by Peter's sense of humour, that I came to appreciate the truth of Lacan's contention that life is comic not tragic. Although our readings differ, at least in their emphases, mine could not have developed without him.

David Deamer played a similar role *vis a vis* Deleuze. Together we read seven of the most difficult of Deleuze's works. If I never achieved David's command of Deleuze's philosophy it was not for want of patient explanations on his part. More importantly, almost all of the ideas presented in this thesis were first discussed with David in our weekly meetings. We were rarely in agreement and his critiques, hopefully, served to considerably improve my thinking. The fact that our intellectual differences only prompted ever more discussion is a tribute both to the openness of his nature and his peerless generosity of spirit.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Jacques Lacan

E **Écrits** (Lacan, Jacques (1966a) *Écrits.* Translated by Bruce Fink, 2006. New York and London: W. W. Norton.)

T **Télévision**

The Seminars

S.I **Freud's Papers on Technique**

S.II **The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis**

S.III **The Psychoses**

S.V **Formations of the Unconscious**

S.VI **Le Désir et son Interprétation**

S.VII **The Ethics of psychoanalysis**

S.VIII **The Transference**

S.X **Anxiety**

S.XI **The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis**

S.XVII **The Other Side of Psychoanalysis**

S.XX **Encore**

S.XXIII **Joyce and the Sinthome**

Gilles Deleuze

B **Bergsonism**

C1 **Cinema 1: The Movement-Image**

C2 **Cinema 2: The Time-Image**

DI **Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953 – 1974**

DR **Difference and Repetition**

ECC **Essays Critical and Clinical**

F **Foucault**

LS **The Logic of Sense**

NP **Nietzsche and Philosophy**

PS **Proust and Signs**

SP **Spinoza: Practical Philosophy**

TRM **Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995**

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

AO **Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia**

K **Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature**

TP **A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia**

WP **What is Philosophy?**

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet

D **Dialogues**

(Any italicised sections in citations are emphases in the original. Where, in a few instances, the translator from the French is not identified, the translations are the author's.)

INTRODUCTION

The point of departure for this thesis is Deleuze's insistence that *the* question apropos of art is what a work *does* (PS:95). Plainly that question is too large for a single thesis so I shall, for the most part, confine myself to the examination of how selected instances of a particular art form, namely cinema, function and to a consideration of two of the most influential accounts of what film does: the psychoanalytic approaches inspired by the teaching of Jacques Lacan and the philosophy of cinema created by Gilles Deleuze (C1 and C2). The argument is twofold. First, while accepting the possibility mooted by Lacan that in a 'very little time the whole world will be done with psychoanalysis,' it is claimed that, for the moment, there are elements of Lacan's teaching which can still usefully contribute to the task of thinking textual functioning (Lacan, 2010a:12). It is then further argued that, psychoanalytic approaches to film will have more of a future, if they follow Lacan's example and draw on other, extra-psychoanalytic lines of thought. Deleuze and Guattari are proposed as the principal candidates. My claim is that, as there is more consonance between Lacan and Deleuze (both with and without Guattari) than initially appears, an 'aparallel evolution' is possible in which psychoanalysis can be reinvented (TRM:39-40).

Developing Deleuze's insistence that there is no other ethics than to not 'be unworthy of what happens to us,' the argument could be reframed as follows: psychoanalytic criticism has not always been worthy of the event of cinema but, with Deleuze, can be (LS:169). At one level, Deleuze's notion of being worthy of the event straightforwardly belongs to the Stoic tradition. He cites as an exemplar Joe Bousquet, who suffered a terrible war-wound in 1918 'and remained bedridden until his death in 1950' (Dosse, 2010:156). Rather than dwelling on the injustice of what had happened and succumbing to a life-hating *ressentiment*, he fashioned a new form of life by becoming a writer. The argument of this thesis is that, while psychoanalysis has not always been worthy of art created in such a spirit – it has been more comfortable explicating works given over to fantasy – Lacan's teaching affords ample means to do so. The supporting argument takes as its point of departure Christian Fierens's analysis of the ethical status of the unconscious set out by Lacan

in seminar eleven. Recalling that in the ancient world dreams were regarded as messages from the gods, Lacan remarks '*Ils en faisaient quelque chose*' - they made something of them (Lacan, 1973a:45). What counts in psychoanalysis is less the unconscious meaning of dreams or slips than what the analysand makes of them – what meanings are then produced. Fierens underlines the point: 'what matters is not the message [of the gods] but what we make of it in the ethical dimension'. The argument of this thesis is that art can be an instance of this 'movement of making something other of what appears' and thereby can, in Deleuzean terms, be worthy of what happens to us (Fierens, 2010a:42).

Art, as the making something new of what concerns us, takes innumerable forms. Most importantly works can critique realities with a certain currency to bring about political change. This is the achievement of a film like *I, Daniel Blake* (Loach, UK, 2016) which contests the widespread conviction that the benefits system rewards 'skivers' at the expense of 'strivers'. More frequently, cinema has made a difference by (re)manufacturing, with negligible variations, that world of fantasy, which, as *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* (Godard, France/Switzerland, 1988-1998) underline, has been the staple of mainstream cinema: the world where couples are made for one another, where a heroic rescuer is always at hand and the good people always win through. More importantly for this thesis, there are works which, while referring to prevailing conceptions of reality, make something new of the issues, as happens in the works which will be the principal textual examples of this thesis: *Éloge de l'amour* (Godard, France, 2001) and *India Song* (Duras, France, 1975).

It has long been established that psychoanalysis is useful in analysing the operation of films like those of Loach. We are so affected by the desperate hunger which drives Daniel Blake's friend Katie to snatch and eat beans from a can at the food bank because we identify with her in her distress. Even more patently, psychoanalysis has proved valuable in analyzing how, in much mainstream cinema, women are pressed into the service of male narcissism and masculine desires. The contribution of this thesis is to claim psychoanalysis can also be useful when considering films in the third category: films like *Éloge de l'amour* and *India Song* which are worthy of what happens to us in ways which are less reducible to representational content than the work of Ken Loach, that is works where, to use

Lyotard's terms, there is an '*it happens'* which is prior to and in excess of any determination of what is happening, that is, the specifiable content (Lyotard, 1988:90).

What occurs in such work is, I claim, a form of thinking. As Deleuze observes, 'the essence of cinema – which is not the majority of films – has thought as its higher purpose' (C2:168). Similarly, although from a very different perspective, Badiou claims 'art is a thought' which is 'irreducible to philosophy' (Badiou, 1998:9). For Badiou, as Christopher Watkin succinctly puts it, 'art itself thinks' (Watkin, 2011:63). Exploring this line of thought, the claim of the thesis is that, if we develop Fierens' reading of Lacan and conceive of art as a making, psychoanalysis can provide a further approach to the question of thought in art. What is thinking? There are, of course, countless forms but I want to begin with a quotidian form to argue that the thinking which occurs in many artworks is in no way removed from the everyday. To emphasise this ordinariness, I will begin not with philosophers or theorists but with my elder grand-daughter. Isabella at the time was just over two years old. When she was put to bed and everybody else had left the room, she could be heard talking on the baby monitor. Typically, there were recollections – for example, of the 'big bug' which had alighted on her arm that afternoon – reflections – for example, on an altercation at nursery - with, in addition, snatches of stories, songs and nursery rhymes. As my son-in-law put it, she was 'processing her day.' Although she sometimes addressed remarks to her dolls, for the most part she was thinking aloud. My contention is that such thinking is coterminous with and ineliminable from human existence. Older humans may think silently and minus the nursery rhymes but everybody 'processes' their experiences. Thought in this form – where the forms are innumerable – is primordial in that it is prior to and never fully subsumed by more organised discourses such as those around such practices as science, medicine, jurisprudence, business, formal education, historical investigation, journalism and philosophy etc. It is distinguished from these other discourses by the degree to which it constitutes an existential rather than a cognitive undertaking. It considers what has befallen, is befalling and could befall the subject to make a difference; it considers what matters so that it matters differently. The aim is less to determine the nature of things than to lend our concerns a new sense, to arrive at a new evaluation so that

we can proceed differently. It is, to borrow a phrase from Heidegger, a 'way-making' (Heidegger, 1993:418). Coming to the thesis, the claim is that a psychoanalysis worthy of the event of art should conceive of, at least, certain artworks as engaged in similar forms of way-making. While many films may be dedicated to representation and the political struggles around the realities represented, there are films where, although representations occur, the principal purpose is not to limn reality but to alter our attitudes, evaluations and orientations. Wittgenstein famously claimed that philosophy - or at least his philosophy – 'leaves everything as it is' (Wittgenstein, 1953:49, 124). Thinking in art, in contrast, often seeks to transform. As psychoanalysis shares this aim, it possesses a continuing utility in thinking the thinking which occurs in such works.

However, and this brings us to the second argument of this thesis, there is a dimension to the thinking in art which is often absent in other contexts: joy. While, for all too many 'processing their day(s)' can be a miserable experience – we will come back to the current mental health crisis in a moment – 'processing' in the form of art can afford joy. As Deleuze has it, 'the essence of art is a kind of joy, and this is the very point of art' (DI:134). This is widely attested. There is space for only three such testimonies. First Alfred Brendel on Schubert's string quintet: 'It makes you feel glad to be alive' (Brendel, Alfred cited by Roger Graef. *Desert Island Discs.* (2014)). Second Miles Davis: 'It makes me feel good if I compose something and all the fellas like it, y' know that feeling you get when you accomplish something, you can't even buy that - it's better than any drug you know' (Davis, 2017). Finally, the song-writer, Sian Martin, who was diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after the birth of her second baby. The tumours which had spread through her body made it difficult to walk, impossible to sleep lying down and left her in constant pain. To cope with her illness, her children and a 'less than supportive partner,' she turned to art. 'Doing living for somebody like me,' she explained, 'means making stuff.' 'When I'm in that flow,' she continued, 'when I'm making something, it is better than sex, better than childbirth, it's completely sublime' (Martin, Sian *Woman's Hour,* 2016).

Now, to an extent, psychoanalysis does 'get' this. In *Lituraterre,* Lacan acknowledged that, if James Joyce had undertaken an analysis, he 'would not have gained anything from it since' with his writing 'he went straight to the best of what

one can expect of an analysis at its end' (Jacques Lacan cited in Voruz, 2002:116). On Lacan's account, 'Joyce reached the equivalent of the end of an analysis through his writing' (Jacques Lacan cited in Voruz, 2002:115-6). On Véronique Voruz's account, (Voruz, 2002:140) Joyce found in writing what Lacan, in *Télévision*, termed '*jouis-sens*' (Lacan, 2001a:517) a pun combining *jouissance* and *sens*, which has been translated as 'enjoymeant' (T:10). In other words, Lacan recognized that Joyce found intense enjoyment in the creation of his work. More importantly, for present purposes, Lacan announced, 'I am gay' (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2016:40). In making this announcement, Lacan was not coming out of the closet as a gay man for that use of the word 'gay' hardly existed in the France of 1971 (Nobus, 2016:41). Rather his intention was to highlight the tonality of his teaching, which he elsewhere styled a form of '*gay sçavoir*' (Lacan, 2001a:526) – a word-play which combines Nietzsche's notion of a gay science or joyful wisdom (Nietzsche, 1887a) with *savoir* (knowledge) and *ça* the French translation of Freud's id (Nobus, 2016:53). The paradox of Lacan's teaching is that the subject-matter is bleak – the asymmetries of human desire - but the texts are exhilarating. As this is also the paradox of much art - the subject matter of, say *King Lear* (Shakespeare, c1606, reprinted 1963) and *Éloge de l'amour* is equally bleak and the works are similarly exhilarating – the tenor of Lacan's style throws certain art practices into relief.

At the same time, the joy in art makes the case for the second proposition advanced by this thesis - namely that, if psychoanalysis is to be of continuing value, it needs to learn from Deleuze - for the joy to be found in art is, to say the least, under-theorised in the psychoanalytic tradition. Freud's explanation in terms of sublimation, as Laplanche and Pontalis note, remained 'somewhat undeveloped' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967:432). Although others, most notably, Lacan (S.VVII), Zupančič (Zupančič, 2008), and Darian Leader (Leader, 2002) have significantly advanced beyond the 'primitive state,' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967:433) in which Freud bequeathed the concept, I contend that no theory has proved worthy of the event of art. It appears that a vocabulary developed in the clinic to conceive what does not work – symptoms - is unequal to the task of thinking what can - art. Recently Dany Nobus has persuasively suggested that to escape 'the formalistic rigidity of institutionalized psychoanalytic knowledge,' psychoanalysts must 're-engage with

the "dancing" thought of Nietzsche's Zarathustra' (Nobus, 2016:39). In a similar vein, this thesis argues that if psychoanalytic approaches to cinema are to be worthy of the event, they must similarly engage with Nietzsche and his most important twentieth century exponent: Gilles Deleuze. Lacan reportedly once told Deleuze, 'What I need is someone like you' (Jacques Lacan cited in Smith, 2012a:312). This thesis concurs: psychoanalysis needs Deleuze and not least in its thinking about art.

Rationale

The purpose of this section is to explain the *raison d' être* of the thesis, by situating the argument in relation to a number of current debates both within and beyond the academy. Most immediately, it contributes to the debates around the future of psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to cinema. Following the contention of A. J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe in regard to Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou – 'that no one is yet finished with these thinkers,' it argues for the continuing pertinence of Lacan's teaching (Bartlett, et al., 2014:7). While recognising that, as Robert Sinnerbrink noted, psychoanalysis, 'which once ruled the film theory scene,' has come to be treated 'as a superseded or even perverse doctrine,' the thesis, following Sinnerbrink, challenges this estimate (Sinnerbrink, 2011:30). In opposition to the claim of those who, like Teresa Rizzo (Rizzo, 2012:5), believe 'psychoanalytic approaches have exhausted themselves,' the thesis maintains that, in certain respects, psychoanalysis is of continuing value in thinking of how cinema can function. At the same time, it acknowledges the limitations of existing forms of psychoanalysis by arguing that, while forms of psychoanalysis still have interesting things to say about the cinema whose mainspring is fantasmatic make-believe, it can only be worthy of the event of cinemas, which eschew fantasy such as those of Godard and Duras, if it draws on the work of Deleuze.

Consequently, the thesis also intervenes in the burgeoning discussion about the relationship of Lacan and Deleuze. While considering the claim of Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe that 'Lacan provides a decisive impetus' to Deleuze's philosophy an overstatement, it agrees that their relationship is less antipodean than initially appears (Bartlett et al., 2014:4). Following the orientation of the recent landmark

collection (Nedoh and Zevnik, 2017), it argues that a disjunctive synthesis[1] of Lacan and Deleuze can be exceptionally productive. In the directions taken to explore the possibilities created, however, this thesis differs on at least one count with many of the other principal participants in the debate. There is space to mention only three examples. As will become apparent in the subsequent section, this thesis draws upon Aaron Schuster's brilliant book (Schuster, 2016) but ultimately takes a diametrically opposed view. Schuster cites what he terms a 'quip' of Bergson - along with Spinoza and Nietzsche one of the three principal influences on Deleuze - in which Bergson remarked that 'whatever one may say about the pain and horror and stupidity of existence, "humanity holds fast to life, which proves that it is good"' (Henri Bergson cited in Schuster, 2016:7). Where Schuster deplores this view, the thesis upholds it, arguing that otherwise the affirmative nature of art becomes inexplicable. With regard to Peter Hallward, the thesis agrees that Lacan and Deleuze cannot be conflated. Crucially the thesis accepts, that in respect of the key questions of subjectivity and desire, as Peter Hallward puts it 'you can't have it both ways' (Hallward, 2010:33). In chapters four and five, it is argued that, in these areas, choices have to be made. Further the thesis agrees with Hallward's reading of 'the heart of Deleuze's philosophy' (Hallward, 2006:1) as an attempt 'after Bergson and Spinoza to develop ways of thinking and acting,' (Hallward, 2010:35) which liberate 'man from the plane or the level that is proper to him, in order to make him a creator, adequate to the whole movement of creation' (B:111). 'Liberation *from* the human' is Deleuze's goal (Hallward, 2006:139). However, it disagrees with his dismissal of this line of thought as a form of 'mysticism' (Hallward, 2010:36). On the contrary, this

[1] In contrast to Kantian synthesis, a 'disjunctive synthesis' does not unify the manifold and identify items within it (LS:55). As Anne Sauvagnargues puts it 'synthesis, for Deleuze, is not a return to the one, but a disjunctive differentiation which proceeds by bifurcations and transformations, not by fusion and identity of the same' (Sauvagnargues, 2005:17). It has a paradoxical quality for, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle observes, 'it seeks to connect and separate at the same time, to keep together what must remain apart' (Lecercle, 2010:17). The disjunctive synthesis of Lacan and Deleuze does not conflate but rather promotes a productive interaction.

thesis argues that Deleuze's philosophy provides a vocabulary for our 'becoming-other' with certain art-works, for example the possibility with such works of departing egoic forms of neurotic subjectivity.

Finally, the thesis draws heavily upon Slavoj Žižek's reading of Lacan and agrees with his contention that there is a proximity between Lacan and Deleuze – particularly the Deleuze of *The Logic of Sense* most notably in their agreement that there is always a 'minimal difference between a structural place and the element that occupies (fills out) this place' (Žižek, 2006:122). A notion, which will be explicated, shortly in the Theoretical Preliminary and further explored throughout the thesis. At the same time, this thesis takes its distance from Žižek in respect of his readings of both Lacan and Deleuze. Notwithstanding his extraordinary insights into Lacan's teaching, Žižek's reading of Lacan misses what, for the purposes of this thesis, is the crucial dimension of Lacan's teaching. Žižek, as Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe observe, runs Lacanian 'psychoanalysis together with philosophy' and ignores the extent to which 'it injects literary elements into scientific ones' (Bartlett et al., 2014:54 footnote). Against that approach, this thesis subscribes to Lacan's insistence that his work rebels against philosophy - '*Je m'insurge contre la philosophie*' (Jacques Lacan cited in Žižek, 1993:3). His teaching is, as Justin Clemens perceives, an 'antiphilosophy' (Clemens, 2013). Although theoretical propositions can (often usefully) be abstracted from Lacan's seminars and writings, his teaching is more fruitfully viewed as predominantly a series of experiments exploring what language – in both its lexical and mathematical forms - can accomplish. This explains the importance of his work for developing psychoanalytic approaches worthy of the event of art for it demonstrates that words and mathemes can have effects which theoretical discourses can neither explain nor engender. Like art, his work comprises a form of thought irreducible to any other, which is why it is still useful in thinking the thinking which occurs in art.

Coming to Deleuze, this thesis differs from Žižek's reading on several counts. Most of these, virtuality, desire and the body without organs can more usefully be discussed after the theoretical background has been outlined in the latter part of this thesis. For the moment let's consider an issue already (implicitly) in focus: vitalism. Žižek is scathing: he dismisses 'vitalism' as 'the formula of the superego' (Žižek,

2016:330). Contra Žižek, this thesis upholds Deleuze's vitalism. If ultimately ethics, for Deleuze, is being worthy of the event, 'its temporary goal' as Miguel de Beistegui observes, 'is to know how to experience a maximum of joyful passions' (de Beistegui, 2010:114). Vitalism is not an arduous superegoic injunction but the question: 'What must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions?' (Deleuze, 1968a:273) It is the contention of this thesis that artworks in the mode of *bien-dire* can be ways of answering that question in forms which argue against Žižek's dismal claim that 'to live is not a natural and spontaneous *Energeia* but a duty, a superego imperative' (Žižek, 2016:330). Few have taken to the dance floor, when listening to say Tamla Motown or The Stone Roses out of a sense of duty. And dance occurs in other art forms. Recall the wonderful sequence in the film *Frances Ha* (Baumbach, USA 2013) when the eponymous protagonist, runs, skips and dances through the streets of New York to a soundtrack of Bowie's *Modern Love* (Bowie, 1983). A psychoanalytically-inspired thinking about art which begins, like Žižek's, from the clinic will never, in contrast to Deleuze's philosophy, be worthy of the joy in such art encounters.

More important than any points of dispute between this thesis and other commentators on the relationship of Lacan and Deleuze is the new angle from which the thesis approaches that relationship. In part two Deleuze's philosophy will be explored in relation to five foci: process, difference, relationality, composition, the sub-representative, and open-ended systems. These points of emphasis will then be used to at once establish a proximity between Lacan and Deleuze and to cast psychoanalysis in a new light. As Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan's executor, emphasizes, there is 'more than one Lacan' (Miller, J-A, 1997:9). Using the foci listed above, this thesis will create another and, in so doing, will propose psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to cinema and art worthier of the event of art.

A note on methodology

The purpose of this section is to explain the choice of textual examples. Although this thesis is primarily dedicated to cinema, I have included several non-filmic examples,

like the reference to dance in the previous section, for I concur with Deleuze when he maintains that writing on cinema 'is at its worst when it limits itself to cinema as though it were a ghetto' (TRM:284). If there are conjunctures, when it is useful to discuss film as a 'specific signifying practice,' there are others when non-cinematic examples can be useful in pointing up aspects of some films which are often occluded (Heath, 1975:8). As a further example, consider lines of Rimbaud which will be a frequent reference point:

Ô saisons, Ô châteaux,

Quelle âme est sans défauts ?

As Badiou astutely asks: 'what mimetic hallmark might we possibly perceive' in these lines (Badiou, 2014:32)? Thinking here assumes a form, which throws into relief the achievements of montage in cinemas such as those of Godard where 'traditional cinematic story-telling' is abandoned 'in favour of the juxtaposition of disparate images,' in a process creative of a sense beyond representation (McGowan, 2012:111).

For the most part, the filmic and non-filmic examples are modernist. For two reasons. The first, in support of my argument that Lacan's teaching is of continuing interest, is that many modernist texts can usefully be read as responses to what Lacan terms the 'lack in the Other' (E:693). This concept will be explicated at length shortly, for now we can limit ourselves to the aspect alluded to above: the absence of *the* place. To be a social subject is to be assigned a place, a role and an identity in institutions like the family, school, peer group and workplace. Lacan's contention is that the subject never fully coincides with any of these: the real is the impossibility of the subject being at one with the place assigned. Modernism thought this problem in innumerable forms, but frequently, by making something different of the issue. This is the second reason for choosing modernism: the thinking in many modernist works revalues. Two examples. As the discussions of *The Exile of James Joyce* make clear, Joyce's work often thinks what it is to be out of place (Cixous, 1972:76). One response, most notably in *Finnegans Wake*, is to make something new of the language of the Other, the language which, as Lacan notes, is always the command 'Places everyone!' (SXX:33) Joyce refuses this command by transmuting the language of the Other. Ariel's 'Where the bee sucks there suck I' (Shakespeare, The Tempest, act

5, scene 1, line no 88) becomes 'where the bus stops there shop I' (Joyce, 1939:15-16). The novel revalues what the Other has made of issues. Similarly, *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* (Jean-Luc Godard, France/Switzerland 1988-98) implicitly asks: what has cinema made of the twentieth century? Has film always been worthy of the event(s)? Plainly not. As Scott Durham observes *Histoire(s)* foregrounds 'cinema's inadequate response to fascism and the catastrophes of war' (Durham, 2014:448). However, *Histoire(s)* is not solely an indictment of the Hollywood dream factory. As in Joyce, clichéd usages are reworked and made new. 'The paths not taken,' by cinema are indicated but, more importantly, new paths are opened (Durham, 2014:441). Not least by a making something different of the cinematic language of the Other. Godard's citations of say Hitchcock, like Joyce's citations of Shakespeare make something new in which, as Deleuze observes, he doesn't just 'have thoughts on cinema; he starts cinema thinking' (DI:141).

To be clear, the argument is not that such thinking/making is the preserve of modernism for it can also be found in more popular works – think, for example, of The Sex Pistols' *God Save the Queen* - but that it is particularly salient in modernist works. In these works, the problem with which it begins matters – it interests us because it deals with an issue which concerns us – but what matters more is where the work then goes (The Sex Pistols, 1977). Unless an artwork engages with a concern it is, to borrow a phrase from John McDowell, 'a frictionless spinning in a void,' but its achievement is what it then makes of this issue (McDowell, 1996:11). The claim of the thesis is that, if psychoanalytic criticism is to be worthy of the thinking in art, it must focus on the thought's achievement not only its initiating impulse. Modernist examples preponderate because, insofar as they acted upon Ezra Pound's injunction to 'MAKE IT NEW,' their thinking not only represents, but transforms, creates and revalues (Pound, 1964:275).

As indicated above, two modernist texts will serve as reference points throughout. *India Song* and *Éloge de l'amour,* have been selected because both engage in uniquely cinematic forms of thinking, revaluation and creation. *India Song* has been chosen not just because Duras intrigued both Lacan and Deleuze – each wrote about her work – but because the multi-stranded narratives and the separation of the sound track from the image track constitutes a form of thinking

which could occur nowhere else (Lacan, 1965 and C2). Most importantly for our purposes, the actions of enigmatic characters irreducible to psychological categories, establish 'the primacy of the event' foregrounding 'the way it transcends all motive, all explanation' (Josipovici, 2010:112). The narrative concerns a figure and the aftermath of an episode that are the focal points of much of Duras' work. The figure is Anne-Marie Stretter, a character in part inspired by the wife of a colonial administrator in French Indochina, Elizabeth Striedter (Gunther, 2002:4) who fascinated the young Duras not only because of her wealth, 'beauty and elegance' but because of a rumour that a young suitor had 'committed suicide out of love for her' (Gunther, 2002:5). The episode is the ball at which Stretter, the French ambassador's wife, and Michael Richardson fall passionately in love. As a result, Richardson's fiancée, Lola Valerie Stein, is abandoned. This is alluded to in the film - Richardson is present at the embassy reception which occupies the greater part of the narrative and the off-screen voices discuss it – 'What love! What desire!' – but it assumes a different significance for we learn that Stretter, far from being fulfilled by this intense liaison, has become a suicide. In counterpoint, there are two other narratives: that of a beggar woman and the vice-consul. The beggar-woman as a pregnant seventeen-year-old has been thrown out by her mother and in the course of walking from Savannakhet in Laos to Calcutta has lost both her mind and the children born from an existence dependent on prostitution. As for the vice-consul, he has caused a scandal by inexplicably firing at lepers from his balcony at Lahore and, in consequence, has been ordered, in disgrace, to Calcutta. Both feature at the embassy reception. The beggar-woman can be heard laughing or howling somewhere in the night and the vice-consul, after being rebuffed by Stretter, similarly shouts his impossible desires from the darkness.

The second choice, *Éloge de l'amour* concerns Edgar whose project, which may take the form of a novel, a play, a film, or perhaps an opera, is a work about what he believes to be the four stages of love: meeting, sexual passion, separation and reconciliation. These moments are to be played out by three couples who will be representative of the experience of the young, of adults and those in later life. To this end, he holds auditions but the young woman whom he particularly wants to involve, Berthe, refuses to participate. To support herself and her three-year-old she holds

down several jobs including that of a night-cleaner at a rail depot, so she has more immediate concerns. The film is in two parts. The second is a flashback recounting Edgar's trip to Brittany during which he first met Berthe. As part of his researches preparatory to writing a cantata about the Catholic philosopher, Simone Weil, he interviews a couple who had fought together in the resistance. The couple are Berthe's grandparents whom she is trying to dissuade from selling their story to Hollywood producers belonging to Spielberg Associates. Nothing immediately comes of the encounter and later, although he often thinks of her, he decides she is not suitable to participate in his new project. At the hinge of the film Edgar meets Berthe's grandfather and learns she has committed suicide. Pressed to explain what happened, Edgar says, 'Her tone of voice interested me. It often brought ideas to life, but otherwise she was a let-down.' To which the grandfather rejoins: 'You are the let-down.' It is of interest as it is a film about a man who is unworthy of what happens to him, but which is itself not unworthy of a society where one might ask: *Quelle âme est sans défaut?*

Theoretical Preliminaries

Before considering the relevant aspects of the work of Freud and Lacan, I want to make four points which will be crucial for the argument of this thesis. The first two are ground-clearing exercises. I want to begin by clarifying the status of psychoanalysis by emphasising that Lacan's teaching is not a finished body of doctrine. Secondly, I want to underscore the Lacanian emphasis on singularity: just as every patient and every session is unique so is every encounter with an artwork. Hence generalisations about textual functioning must be eschewed. Thirdly, as it is the pivot for much of the psychoanalytic theorising in this thesis, I want to point up certain aspects of what Slavoj Žižek terms 'Lacan's key motif' (Žižek, 2012:477): the 'lack in the Other.' As reference to this notion will be made throughout this and the subsequent chapter, it is important to establish something of its contours and implications from the start. Finally, as a prelude to the extensive discussion of Deleuze and Lacan in part two of this thesis I want to introduce some Deleuzean

concepts to demonstrate how they can contribute to forms of psychoanalytic criticism worthier of the event.

1. The status of psychoanalysis

> 'Should someone get ahead of my discourse to the point of making it outdated, I will finally know that it has not been useless.'
>
> Jacques Lacan (cited in Marini, 1986:28-9)

Why psychoanalysis? Because existence and its world(s) matter to us and how they matter is a function of how we desire. It is desire with its interests, evaluations and orientations which imparts significance to reality. The claim of psychoanalysis upon our attention is that it offers arguably the most complex theoretical framework(s) for thinking the workings of desire. This is not to suggest that psychoanalysis has all the answers. On the contrary, the argument of this thesis is that, if psychoanalysis is to remain pertinent it must constantly renew itself. At its best psychoanalysis is alive to the necessity to innovate. This is the purport of Freud's claim that one is not doing psychoanalysis if one does not learn from every patient (Lafont, 2004:8, Lacan, 1995:6), and Lacan's insistence that each patient is 'a singularity' rather than a particular (T:29). Every patient is unique rather than an instance explicable by a general theory (Harari, 1996:30) and, in consequence, 'analytic science must be called into question in the analysis of each case' (E:296-7). Lacan's awareness of the exigency to invent can usefully be illustrated by an episode, which, thanks to YouTube, has become one of the most celebrated moments of his practice and which will be a point of reference throughout this thesis. In Gérard Miller's film, *Rendez-vous chez Lacan* an analysand, Suzanne Hommel recounts how, in 1974, after telling Lacan of a dream, she informed him that she woke at five every morning before adding 'It's at five o'clock that the Gestapo came to get the Jews in their houses.' At this, Lacan jumped from his armchair, and, without speaking, lightly caressed her cheek. She understood what she termed this 'extraordinarily tender gesture' as '*geste a peau*' – a touching of the skin – instead of 'Gestapo.' The 'surprise,' she continues, 'didn't diminish the pain but it made it something else.' Below it will be

argued that art can similarly, without taking refuge in fantasy, at least on occasion, make something else of suffering (Miller, Gérard, 2011).

For the moment, the key argument is that this thesis takes it as axiomatic that psychoanalysis is, in the phrase of Blanchot made famous by Derrida, always '*to come*' (Derrida, 1993:64). Although Derrida originally employed this formulation in relation to democracy, as Gabriele Schwab has emphasized, it applies equally to psychoanalysis which is also irrevocably open to an unanticipable future (Schwab, 2007:30). A psychoanalysis worthy of the event can never be a finished body of doctrine. As Lacan puts it, 'there is nothing doctrinal about our office,' before continuing: 'we are answerable to no ultimate truth' (Jacque Lacan cited in Julien, 1990a: pp 115-6). So, no defence of an orthodoxy will be mounted here for, at least in principle, there is no orthodoxy. The concept of a lack in the Other which will feature at length is not the 'ultimate truth'. Like all of Lacan's pronouncements, it is a hypothesis with no warrant other than the interest of what its exploration and application produce. Far from taking psychoanalysis as unassailable doctrine, this thesis argues that to remedy its deficiencies psychoanalysis must learn from Deleuze and Guattari. Two of those deficiencies are relevant here. First the gender politics. I shall return to this at greater length in chapter one. For the moment what matters is that in too many cases the gender politics are suspect. For that reason, no gender-specific concepts are deployed in the alternative psychoanalytic approaches proposed. My second claim is that, in many art encounters, existence comes to matter differently to us and that psychoanalysis regarding at least some of these encounters has no very persuasive account of that difference. While psychoanalysis may be enlightening as to artworks which are mere wish-fulfilment – the bulk of Hollywood - it has less to say about works eschewing such evasions of the real. It is as interesting on the pathology of, for example, Hölderlin (Laplanche, 1961) and Joyce (S.XXIII) as it is unconvincing in its accounts of the joy to be taken in their works.

2. Textual Functioning

Here I wish to clarify the status of the textual readings and analyses of texts in this thesis by emphasising that every encounter with an artwork is singular and that the results are often unpredictable and unanticipable. Consequently, just as psychoanalysis is always to come, so is psychoanalytic criticism. That said I want to underline the materiality and hence the efficacy of the text. In conjunction with – in Deleuzean terms *in an assemblage with* (TP:4) – a text we can be transformed in otherwise inaccessible ways. However, such transformation cannot be effected by the text unilaterally – as the 70s psychoanalytic film theory to be discussed in chapter one briefly came close to claiming. Transformation is not in the gift of the text alone. The point can be made through an analogy with that strand of Catholic theology which holds that the gift of grace is not at our command but can only arrive if we are appropriately disposed: as the Catechism has it: 'God's free initiative demands *man's free response*' (Catechism, 1994:485). Similarly, the work of the text makes available otherwise unavailable modes of existence, but only if the reader or spectator is disposed to cooperate in the encounter. Exchanging the theological for the biological, the point could be made as follows: just as changes in milieu can give a living being more options but only if it is disposed to take them up, so a text can afford new potentialities but only if the reader or spectator is inclined to explore them. Lacan holds a similar view. After, in structuralist vein, suggesting that 'language determines the subject' he immediately qualifies this proposal by adding that the process will not occur without the subject 'contributing something of his own to it' (E:31). A text achieves what Colette Soler terms 'a subjective conversion' only if the subject willingly contributes (Soler, 2009:6). Hence the nature of textual encounters is often unforeseeable – so the suggestions in this thesis as to how a text might function are precisely suggestions.

For example, it is a commonplace that much mainstream film is given over to fantasy. Now, while on many occasions, such films may function as diverting, entertaining amusements, on others they may be altogether more pernicious. If a spectator takes refuge from the vicissitudes and 'pain of existing' in identification with idealised characters endowed with superhuman powers and fantasies where

people live in blissful accord, it may ultimately give his own life an even more distressing aspect (Lacan, 1958-9: Session of 8/4/59 p. 9). The fantasies supposed to relieve his condition may start to weigh upon him. He and his life may suffer depressingly by comparison. As Lacan notes many subjects tend to absurdly imagine there is 'someone who is altogether "happier"' who 'lives harmoniously,' who 'doesn't ask any questions…sleeps soundly in his bed and enjoys 'superabundant vitality.' Art propagating this burdensome 'mirage,' can have serious political consequences for, if subjects subscribe to unrealisable ideals, they are then prone to making unrealisable demands on self and others (S.VII:237). Hence the argument in this thesis for art – and critical approaches to art - which are worthy of what happens to us, that is art which has no truck with fantasy or idealisation. We will come back to this. For the moment, the key point is that it is impossible to foretell with certainty what will occur in an art-encounter. 'In psychoanalysis there is no predictability' (Harari, 1996:121).

3. An essential theoretical preliminary: The Lack in the Other



This section of the theoretical preliminary sets out a key conceptual point of reference, the lack in the Other, and introduces a model of textual functioning which will inform much of the rest of the thesis. For Lacan, 'the most primordial relationship of the subject is the relationship to the Other' and the Other is lacking (Lacan, 2013a:439). Like all of Lacan's principal concepts, this notion has different meanings at different times. For present purposes, four are particularly important. First language is the language of the Other. We are more the inheritors than the authors of language and we discover that, in the language of the Other, 'saying it all is literally impossible: words fail' (T:3). Any saying can only be a 'half-saying' (S.XVII:110). When trying to express the truth of self or desire 'one only half-tells (*mi-dire*) it' (S.XX:92). However, as social beings we are compelled to speak even of what cannot be put into words. 'Whereof we cannot speak thereof one cannot stay silent' (Davoine and Gaudillière, 2004). Although, if there is a lack in the Other, not all can be made clear between us, 'saying is necessary' – '*il faut le dire'* (Lacan, 2001a:472). In doing so, while we cannot say it all, we can aspire to speak well. This is the ethics of what Lacan calls '*bien-dire,'* and it gives us a first way of thinking about what art can accomplish (Lacan, 2001:541). Following Badiou's suggestion that some poetry can be thought of as '*bien-dire*', this thesis makes a similar claim for other artworks, and in particular films like *Éloge de l'amour* (Badiou, 2004:235). Here, as elsewhere: 'ethics and aesthetics are one and the same' (Wittgenstein, 1921:71 – 6.421). If, as Deleuze observes, every film entails a 'choice of existence,' *bien-dire* is the choice of a mode worthy of the event (TRM:283). To clarify with a literary example: Proust's novel is as close to being an instance of *bien-dire* as the narrator's obsessive, jealous brooding over his love, Albertine – 'captive' in his apartment - is distant (Proust, 1913-27).

The specifically Lacanian point here is that in speaking well the speaker is transformed – the process of enunciation creates the speaker – there is a becoming. As Christian Fierens notes, for Lacan speech can be 'the act in which the subject comes into being' (*l'acte dans lequel le sujet advient*) (Fierens, 2012a:97). On this account film can, like other art forms, be a way of speaking in which the making something new of an issue is the making something other of the subject. The correlation is crucial. As Kierkegaard observed, *how* one is can alter the significance of *what* is – as he puts it: when the 'How is scrupulously rendered the What is also

given' (Kierkegaard, 1967:351). With a change in the subject, for example, through the surpassing of egoic modes, the real can come to matter differently.

The answer to the unanswerable questions posed by the lack in the Other, is not a formulation but an existential change in the subject. It is the contention of this thesis that artworks can enable such existential transformations. This point has been articulated in lines of thought as diverse as those of Christianity, Sartre and Nietzsche. In its most interesting Christian form the point is made by the notion that a prayer in the appropriate form can be its own answer. The act of praying can produce an existential change in the believer which gives him or her a new outlook that is as close as he or she can get to a solution to the inescapable vicissitudes of life. To anticipate: it will be argued below that certain artworks can similarly be their own answer. This argument was adumbrated by Sartre in his discussion of the marvellous lines of Rimbaud cited above:

> *Ô saisons, Ô châteaux,*
> *Quelle âme est sans défauts ?*

The question, in the second line, Sartre claims 'involves no answer.' Rather, he goes on: 'it is its own answer' (Sartre, 1948:9). Taking Sartre's line of thought in a different direction, my argument is that, insofar as there is an answer to the unanswerable problems of existence, it resides in an existential change in the questioner. It is this point which Nietzsche articulated so powerfully when he claimed that 'The superman is the meaning of the earth,' and continued: 'Let your will say: The Superman *shall be* the meaning of the earth!' (Nietzsche, 1891:42) In other words, the best response to our predicament is a self-overcoming such that problems take on another hue and matters another aspect. While *the* meaning is not disclosed, others become accessible. The terms of existential questions as to the meaning of life interdepend with modes of subjectivity. If the subjective mode changes so can the terms of the question – indeed the question may even disappear. The consonance of this with psychoanalysis should be immediately apparent since the psychoanalytic cure does not consist in the excavation of (supposedly hidden or buried) truths but in processes enabling the emergence of a new subject. In analysis 'what must and can change, is the subject' for, as a result of that transformation, the real can come to matter differently (Silvestre, 1987:306). Equally apparent should be the pertinence of this

notion of becoming for our thinking about art. If signifiers have the capacity to transform the subject in the treatment, it is plausible to argue they possess a similar efficacy in art. The style of the work can alter the style of the subject.

This brings us to the second aspect of the lack in the Other: the difference between the half-saying and the subject's wishes is the index of the difference from which all else derives. Born prematurely, as the Lacanian, Philippe Julien notes, a human infant unlike 'the majority of baby animals, whose mobility and capacity to feed themselves allow them to survive on their own' (Julien, 1990a:30) 'is delivered over, from the start, to the other's goodwill.' Hence, every child is 'condemned to sociality or death' (Julien, 1990b:46). The problem with this ineluctable sociality is that it entails assuming the place assigned by the Other – initially the caregiver(s) – but, as alluded to above, *the* place is absent. Since there is never an exact fit between occupant and place, Lacan writes the subject as barred: $\not{S}$. To take up a position in the languages and institutions of the Other is to know difference and disparity: the structural impossibility of being at one with a socially assigned place. As Žižek puts it, 'the original human condition is of being out of joint' (Žižek, 1999:16). So, in the beginning there is difference. 'The subject begins with the cut' insofar as it cut off from *the* place but there is no subject prior to the cut (Lacan, 1966-67: Session of 16/11/66 p. 5). The subject is not initially a unity and then divided; it is born split: at once included in and excluded from the Other; at the same time, dependent on the language of the Other for its existence and incommensurable with the signifier. Difference is constitutive of the subject. While the body and language are irreducibly heterogeneous, they ceaselessly interact. The subject is 'defined as a cut' (Lacan, 1965-66: Session of 8/12/65 p. 11) because language, by summoning us to identities, roles and places, 'cuts up the body'' and because the subject's body, in its turn, cuts when it seeks to tailor the world to its wishes (Wright, 1999:77).

Any assumption of an assigned identity comes at a cost: a 'pound of flesh' has to be paid (Lacan, 1977:28). Consequently, the individual feels that in becoming a social subject something of life and being has been lost. To be a subject is, therefore, to lack and to desire what is lacking, namely what Lacan terms the object '*a*' (E:4). The subject is a cut in that the condition of possibility of the subject is separation from the object – one reason why it is termed the object *a* is that, as Fierens, following

Pierre Bruno notes, it is *a priori*: it is the condition not only of the subject's existence but 'preliminary to the appearance of every object; no object appears except on the basis of this object *a*' (Fierens, 2010a:12). Further, it is at once, in the real of its absence, the cause of desire and in its imaginary forms the object of desire. Since it is irretrievably lost, desire is unassuageable.

This introduces a further aspect of the lack in the Other for, when a subject seeks to remedy this lack by making demands upon another subject or when another makes a comparable demand upon him or her, the demand is never met in full. As Bob Dylan has it, the man 'wants eleven-dollar bills, you only got ten' (Dylan, 1965). Since every singular subject is in pursuit of a different object *a,* desires are incongruent and asymmetrical. This is particularly evident, Lacan claims, in the absence of reciprocity within sexual relationships. This is the third aspect of the lack in the Other relevant for this thesis and one meaning of Lacan's claim that 'there's no such thing as a sexual relation' (S.XX:34). Not only is there no 'formula' (Bruce Fink, translator's footnote 26 in S.XX:7) or recipe for a sexual relationship – the Other of language is lacking – and hence an exigency to experiment, there is no complementarity – outside of fantasy subjects cannot make each other whole (E:524). The Other who would complete us does not exist hence for heterosexual males *the* woman, - that is, the woman supposedly incarnating the irremediably lost object - whom Lacan terms '*La Femme,*' does not exist (S.XX:73). Compounding the difficulties associated with the incongruity of desires is the further impossibility, mentioned above, of making desire clear: the 'mystery' of 'the nature of… desire' is 'never entirely resolved' (S.VII:237). If there is a lack in the Other (of language), others are as much an enigma to the subject as he or she is to him or herself. The other is no more transparent to the subject than the subject is to himself. 'Subjective opacity' is ineradicable from intersubjectivity (E:689).

This matters in the present context because the overwhelming majority of narratives in literature and film concern the problematic world of conflicting demands and asymmetrical desires. Both of our principal textual examples, *Éloge de l'amour* and *India Song* address this issue. In the former the unmet demands of the vice-consul and the beggar-woman are hurled into the night while the disappointment of Stretter's unspoken desires precipitates her suicide. As for

Godard, if, as he has remarked, he has 'made love stories and stories of couples, those stories have rarely been happy (Jean-Luc Godard cited in Sterritt, 2014:386). Relationships disintegrate in *À bout de souffle* (Godard, France 1960), *Le Mépris* (Godard, France 1963), *Pierrot le fou* (Godard, France1965), *Masculin Féminin* (Godard, France 1966), *Sauve qui Peut* (Godard, France 1980) , and *Prénom Carmen* (Godard, France 1983). In *Éloge de l'amour*, while Edgar may not be directly responsible for Berthe's suicide, his unfeeling, dismissive behaviour could well have contributed. The claim of this thesis is that Lacan is of continuing interest because his teaching can illuminate something of what is at stake in such narratives, but that psychoanalysis has not always taken full account of what art can make of the issue.

Finally, the lack in the Other is Lacan's variant on Nietzsche's claim that God is dead: to say the Other is lacking is to say that *the* Other 'doesn't exist' (E:695). There is no god-like Other who can act as guarantor – no 'Other of the Other' (Lacan, 2013a:441). Therefore, as noted above: 'the way does not exist' (Nietzsche, 1891:213). Consequently, we are ineluctably condemned to experiment. Now, as psychoanalysis attests, the experiment is often botched. As an example, consider one of Freud's most notorious case studies, that of Little Hans - a case which is selected here because it will prove useful in later chapters (Freud, 1905a). Hans, the four-year-old son of a friend of Freud had problems. As always in psychoanalysis, the nature of these is disputed but they seem to have included, an over-anxious mother, an ineffectual father, an awakening sexuality (he had erections) and, finally, the arrival of a sibling rival in the form of a baby sister of whom he was initially very jealous – he was overheard to say 'But I don't *want* a baby sister!' Hans responded to these problems by developing a phobic fear of going out in the street, where he believed a horse would bite him (Freud, 1905a:174). We shall return to Little Hans below when discussing Deleuze's critique of Freud, because Deleuze, as we shall see, is withering in his assessment of Freud's handling of the case (D:80). For the moment, the only point being made is that, as a solution to his situation, Hans's phobia brought as many problems as it solved.

In contrast to the distressed little boy's botched experiment are those which succeed in finding a more vital way of responding to the problems posed by the real. My claim is that art in the mode of *bien-dire* can take the form of an experiment

which is altogether happier than the responses marked by, say, self-indulgence, despair, self-pity, neurosis, phobia or depression or indeed the everyday, petty, small-minded, mean-spirited, peevish, irritable responses to setbacks and disappointments. To be clear, the argument here is not – absurdly – that art is *the* response – innumerable people, who have little or no commerce with art, have found their own equally satisfying solutions. It is just to claim that art can be *a* response and that one answer to the question of what art does is that it can afford a more vital way of answering the real as impossible than many alternatives.

Godard's practice is exemplary here. No film-maker is more aware of the fact that it is as impossible to stay silent as it is to say it all. Every film shouts his pain but rather than mere expressions of suffering they constitute paradigmatic instances of *bien-dire*. In response to the thwarting and frustrating of his projects he produces indictments of corporate capitalism and American cultural imperialism. Out of the wrongs which can no longer be righted – the horrors of the twentieth century - he creates work denying audiences any comfort. In respect of the wrongs which can be righted – for example, in *Éloge de l'amour*, homelessness, the drudgery of low-paid servitude and anti-Semitism – he contributes campaign material. And from his central theme, the asymmetries of desire, he conjures poetry. His films do not merely acknowledge the non-existence of the Other, they respond to the exigencies and opportunities which the absence of *the* way constitutes by opening ways that enable the real to be thought differently. Just as, on occasion, physical and psychical health can be restored in NHS institutions enabling those treated to be more alive, so, on occasion, encounters with the institutions of art (in the modes of *bien-dire*) can enable subjects to enjoy a more vital existence. The theatre director Peter Brook's contention that 'every form of theatre has something in common with a visit to the doctor. On the way out, one should always feel better than on the way in,' should hold for every encounter with art in the mode of *bien-dire* (Peter Brook cited in Billington, 2017:15).

To conclude: the argument of this section is that psychoanalysis, and more specifically experimentation with the hypothesis of the lack in the Other, is of continuing value in thinking the event of art. Consider the graph situated at the beginning of this section and to which reference will be made at later junctures

(E:692). It is of interest as an early attempt by Lacan to diagram some of the effects of the lack in the Other. As not all of these effects are important for our immediate purposes, I will confine the exposition to the immediately relevant. In broad outline, it is a diagram of the act of speaking. The lower vector is that of the signifying chain and the upper that of the drives. On the right-hand side, both encounter the lack in the Other: at the lower level the impossibility, in the absence of the key signifiers, of saying it all: S(O); on the upper level the impossibility of demands being met either by the subject or its others: $ \not\$ \lozenge D$. On the left-hand side, there is what is made of these encounters by 'the barred subject' produced by the act of speaking (E:696). In a retrograde movement from right to left the subject tends to respond to the lack in the Other of language, to the discovery the Other is barred (Lacan, 2013a:441), that is marked by 'inconsistency' and 'incompleteness' (Ø) (Miller, 1995a:36), with an imaginary image of wholeness – the image is designated i(a) and the ego constituted by it: *e*.[2] To make good the lack in the Other which occasions desire (*d*) it tends to respond with a fantasy: $ \not\$ \lozenge a$. In other words, the tendency is to short circuit the effects of the lack in the Other by taking refuge in idealized images or fantasies.

Plainly this is the strategy which prevails in mainstream contracted cinema and of which psychoanalysis provides a persuasive account. The argument of this thesis is that psychoanalysis can be equally useful in our thinking the event of *bien-*

[2] Henceforth the designation of the barred Other will be left untranslated: $ \not A$. This is to avoid the confusion that might arise from usage of the English equivalent Ø. That symbol, which customarily denotes the contents of the empty set, is employed by Lacan to relate the barred subject to the number zero. For Frege, as Anthony Kenny usefully points out, '[s]ince each thing is identical with itself, nothing falls under the concept *not identical with itself* (Kenny, 1995:92). Hence, in the number order, Frege considers zero – that is nothing – is best thought of as the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' (Gottlob Frege cited in Kenny, 1995:92). In an echo of Sartre's claim that the for-itself – the most important philosophical precursor of the Lacanian subject - is 'the being which is what it is not and is not what it is' (Sartre, 1943:57-8), Lacan claims that, if the Other is barred ($ \not A$) the subject is not self-identical and is therefore also barred: ($ \not\$$). (S.XI:226, Miller, 1977-78:32).

dire. The graph supports my contention that it can because it emphasizes that subjectivity is a matter of vectors and trajectories. In Deleuzean terms: lines (TP:8-9). Lacan described his style as 'a thought in motion' (SI:1), and this is equally apt as a description of art in the manner of *bien-dire* which proceeds in the knowledge that 'where there is no path' – where the path does not exist – 'there is only the travelling'[3]. Art can be a mode of that travelling. 'What,' Jacques-Alain Miller asks 'is [the] graph?' and answers: 'it is a set of pathways' (Miller, J-A., 1998:21). The claim of this thesis is that many artworks can similarly be usefully thought of as a set of pathways. The merit of the graph is to bring out something of the nature of those pathways: they can be multi-stranded, multi-levelled and multi-directional. Further the movement forward is accompanied by a retrograde movement and the perpetually renewed movement is punctuated by moments of stability. Thinking is a way-making which assumes forms far from common-sense notions of a unitary, linear progress. It responds to the cut that is the lack in the Other with a play of lines, cuts, points and, as we shall see, knots. It makes of the problems posed by the barred Other ($\not{A}$) not an imaginary whole but pathways. My claim is that the thinking in the event of art in the mode of *bien-dire* is a proceeding on these pathways.

Psychoanalysis is of continuing value for, as Lacan adamantly insisted, it is not a psychology (E:673, 681, S.XX:83). As the graph insists, the subject is not a unitary being. It is a relationship; more precisely it is shifting relationships. Stephen Heath, at his most astute, discerned this when he fastened on Lacan's earlier description of the subject as 'pulled to the four corners' (Heath, 1976-77:51) of schema L:

[3] This phrase, the title of the thesis derives from the epigraph to Luigi Nono's *No hay caminos, hay que caminar* which was taken from an inscription on the wall of a thirteenth century cloister in Toledo: 'Pilgrim, there is no pathway only travelling itself.'



Lacan explains: the S designates the subject's 'ineffable and stupid existence,' that is, the Freudian id (in German *Es*). The *a* designates 'his objects' – the world of objects organised around and centred on *a*' 'his ego,' that is, his narcissistically invested image (as given in the mirror). Hence Lacan's claim that the 'form' of his identification is 'reflected in his objects' (E:459). Finally, A as 'the locus from which the question of his existence may arise for him' is at once the language of the Other, where he is summoned to an assigned place from which, as there is no exact fit, he is perpetually displaced and the unconscious – the discourse of the Other – which calls in question his narcissistic self-image (E:459). In light of this Heath emphasises that the psychoanalytic subject 'is not any thing, is defined topologically and not punctually, is the action of a structure' (Heath, 1976-77:50). On this account, the subject is in movement and to use a Deleuzean term which will recur in this thesis 'between' (TP:25), in this case, 'the four corners' (E:459). If, as the later Lacan held, the Other is barred, the subject is *between* the real of its being, (while dependent on signifiers it is never at one with them), and its symbolic identity (which assigns a place which is never *the* place). The 'function of the subject is in the between-the-two' (Jacques Lacan cited in Pluth, 2007:15).

Analysis ends not with the analysand obtaining 'the complete picture' but with an alteration of relationships such that the real matters differently. In support of my contention that psychoanalysis is of continuing interest, I argue that this gives a useful way of considering the thinking which occurs in those artworks where the priority is not the representation or critique of a reality with an existing currency but

an alteration of the relationships constitutive of the subject such that the real assumes another aspect. Where for the neurotic, the Ⱥ is the occasion for despair, for the artist it is the opportunity for path-breaking. Just as some believers find a prayer is its own answer, so artists in the register of *bien-dire* find that creation is its own justification for the thinking which then occurs – in contrast to burdensome neurotic brooding – unburdens.

a. Cinema as bien-dire

As an example of the cinema of *bien-dire* let's consider *L'Amour Fou* (Rivette, France 1969) a film about the disintegration of the marriage of an actor (Claire) and a theatre director (Sebastien). He is directing her in the role of Hermione in *Andromaque* when, in rehearsal, she objects to his manner, complains she cannot work in the circumstances – (a film-maker has been invited to make a 'fly-on-the-wall' documentary of the production) – and walks out. The remainder of the film – some four hours – charts the ensuing collapse of their marriage, a crisis in the theatrical production and the mental breakdown of first Claire and then Sebastien. If, as Rivette has acknowledged, it has 'some autobiographic aspects' – claiming he chose Jean-Pierre Kalfon to play the director 'because he didn't resemble me at all' - it is a good example of *bien-dire* as a being worthy of the event (Jacques Rivette cited in Wiles, 2012:140). The unremarkable content underlines the extent to which what counts is less what is represented than the way in which it is enunciated. *Bien-dire* in this instance resides in the clarity and freedom of a style which bespeaks a choice of existence, and which, in making something new of the issue, enables Rivette to become other.

b. Textual functioning and the lack in the other

'Poetry is not the thing said, but a way of saying it.'
A.E. Housman (A. E. Housman cited in Hamburger, 1972:24)

Housman's remark suggests an approach to thinking forms of textual functioning not only for poetry but for certain forms of cinema. On this model, an artwork is a response to the real as impossible where the real is the impossibility of, for example, finding *the* way. Rather than an illustration or representation of this lack – what purpose would that serve? - it is a way of proceeding. If there is a lack in the Other, 'the subject's primary position' is, as Colette Soler remarks, 'a problem' (Soler, 1996:254). More precisely, we confront problems without solutions for the subject is, as Aaron Schuster puts it, '*a question without an answer*' (Schuster, 2016:165). Adopting a phrase of the English philosopher, R. G. Collingwood, Guy le Gaufey argues we should view Lacan's teaching in terms of '"question-answer-complexes"' (le Gaufey, 2016:36). This thesis argues that a psychoanalysis to come should consider certain artworks in a similar perspective, that is, as ways of responding to problems without answer which yet answer in forms worthy of what happens to us.

On this account, art begins with a problem which, more often than not, exists prior to the work. It is this problem which gives the work its initial interest and explains why it matters to its audience, why we *care*. Problems assume countless forms. Some admit of an immediate solution: for example, the injustices of the current benefit system, as portrayed in *I Daniel Blake*, could be removed at a stroke by legislation and better provision. Others like the problems between Claire and Sebastian appear more intractable. In the present conjuncture it seems the only answer to problems in the latter category is at the level of style. This then gives us a means of distinguishing between different modes of cinematic *bien-dire*. All involve both – to adopt Housman's and, as we shall see, Lacan's terms - a saying and a said, that is a style bespeaking an attitude and an abstractable representational content which can be extracted from the work and taken up in extra-cinematic discussion as has happened with *I, Daniel Blake* (Question Time, BBC 1, 2016). However, there is a difference in emphasis. In the latter, the work is largely at the level of what is represented while in the former the style must undertake more of the work. Psychoanalysis is of continuing interest as it can contribute to consideration of both forms of cinematic thinking for libidinal investments are always in play. The ideological burden of films at the pole of content/representation is subtended by the workings of desire. If we are moved and outraged when Daniel Blake's friend Katie is

driven by hunger to steal at the food bank, it is because we care. However, since the importance of libidinal investments has been convincingly established - not least, as we shall see, by Žižek - the focus of this thesis will be on the second pole, that is, works whose style of *bien-dire* alters the subject and thereby how the real matters.

The achievement of such films is thrown into relief by contrasting them with films which peddle easy solutions. If there is a lack in the Other, the terms in which the problem is posed are not given: there is latitude as to the mode of figuration. If, for example, the problem is structural, say the impossibility of being at one or the impossibility of finding *the* place, the real as impossible does not dictate how it will be figured. Decisions must be made. These choices in respect of figuration at the inception of the work are decisive for its future because they determine the 'solutions' which will be available. At its starkest, there are works where the real is no problem at all, for the hero or superhero is more than equal to whatever challenges he or she confronts – whatever the odds, he or she prevails. *Mission Impossible* (De Palma, USA 1996) is mission all too possible if Ethan Hunt – the clichéd action hero played by Tom Cruise - is on the case. Similarly, there might appear to be a serious problem if a U.S. naval vessel with nuclear weapons is seized by deranged terrorists, but the solution is child's play if the ship's cook has a background in Special Forces (*Under Siege,* Davis, USA 1992). On the other hand, there are works which eschew fantasmatic solutions. Thus, two poles could be distinguished in cinema. At one pole would be texts which set up a problem in terms susceptible of easy solutions where, for example, Wayne has only to swing his fist or Eastwood to gun down a battalion of villains for all to come right. The *raison d'être* of such films is the simplification of our situation in terms which permit the rehearsal of the usual erotic and sadistic fantasies. *Django Unchained* (Tarantino, USA 2012) can serve as an example. Django, a slave, is separated from his wife Broomhilda and suffers appallingly. The solution is plain: freedom from the abomination of slavery and reunion with the beloved Broomhilda. As Django becomes peerless in both gunplay and the setting of explosives, this proves to be well within his compass and the film becomes just another opportunity for audiences to feast upon the sadistic pleasures of watching Django take his revenge upon the cruel slave-owners and their vicious cohorts. At the other pole are artworks and films which set up a problem in terms

which debar any final resolution and where, in consequence, the best that can be achieved is an answering in the mode of *bien-dire*. Obvious literary examples include *Hamlet* (Shakespeare, c1600, reprinted 2016a) where the son is called upon to perform the impossible task of putting right what has gone wrong in his parents' generation, *Ulysses* (Joyce, 1922), which addresses - among many other issues - the impossibility of any son being *the* son or any father *the* father, and *The Trial* (Kafka, 1925) which is a response to the impossibility – outside delusion – of achieving accord in judgments informed by desire. Comparable examples in cinema are those at the centre of this thesis: the films of Godard as responses to the impossibility (at least in capitalist modernity) of intimate relationships being free of non-reciprocity and those of Duras where it is impossible to overcome or circumvent the opacity of the Other.

I shall term films close to the first pole: contracted cinema. They begin by responding to the real as impossible. How could they not? While we may prefer to forget the real as impossible, it will not forget us. However, they replace questions without answer with resolvable problems. The strategy is to contract irresolvable issues to problems susceptible of easy resolution. Works of contracted cinema have a specified goal – the telos of the narrative – and typically a paragon, whose proficiency and moral superiority guarantee its attainment. Any questions which arise – for example, who committed the crime? will the hero save the day? can the villain be brought to book? - have ready-made answers. The only question becomes when and how the narrative goal will be attained. Everything contracts to a single question: what will happen next? And the answer is at hand.

In contrast, films around the second pole which I term – with apologies to Gene Youngblood who coined the term for very different purposes (Youngblood, 1970) – expanded cinema, that is films which, unflinchingly accept that, if the Other is marked by incompleteness and inconsistency, there can be neither final significations in relation to such concerns as identity, desire and death nor a defined and ordained *telos*. Instead there are only modes of *bien-dire*, ways of being and becoming in relation to the exigencies of the real. Eschewing idealization and fantasy, this cinema expands our sense of what of life and joy are possible. This is not to argue that contracted cinema can never be an instance of *bien-dire*. *The Tree of Wooden*

Clogs (Olmi, Italy 1978) is exemplary in this regard. The 'minimal narrative' concerns Batisti, a peasant farmer in nineteenth century Lombardy, whose priest persuades him that his gifted son should be educated (Landy, 2000:161-2). On his long daily journey to school the boy breaks one of his clogs so Batisti, who is too impoverished to have any other resource, fells one of the landowner's trees to manufacture a replacement. When the landowner discovers this 'crime', he evicts Batisti. In the final scene, the other subjugated peasants watch silently as the family load their cart and set off into a future of 'starvation and squalor' (Landy, 2000:164). Olmi's film is an instance of contracted cinema for it has a telos, namely the indictment of the 'base cruelty' of exploitative landowners but, as one of the most powerful arguments for socialism in the history of cinema, it is also a paradigmatic instance of *bien-dire* (Bondanella, 2009:257). Nor is it to argue that a particular text necessarily belongs in its entirety to a single category. Many films straddle both. *India Song* is close to the pole of contracted cinema when addressing the evils of colonialism and closer to expanded cinema when dealing with the opacities associated with desire and identity. Similarly, *Éloge de l'amour* is in the mode of contracted cinema when indicting society's treatment of the homeless but switches to more expanded forms when speaking of what is wanting in Edgar.

The argument is only that if psychoanalytic approaches are to be of continuing interest they must go beyond the critique of fantasy-ridden forms of contracted cinema and become worthy of the event of expanded cinema. And further that psychoanalysis has the capacity to develop in this direction insofar as it is similarly committed to effecting a change in the spectator such that the real comes to matter differently.

a. Two objections

Two charges might be laid against this approach. First that, in its concern with a real which resists representation, it fails to recognise the overriding importance of the politics of representation. Second, that the thesis is no more than a hymn to aestheticisation. Both misconceive the purport of my argument. Let's consider the objections in turn.

The first objection is rebutted by the tribute paid to *The Tree of Wooden Clogs,* but two points are worth adding to clarify my argument. First, a consideration of cinema as a response to the real as impossible is to the exclusion of neither history nor politics. There is no reason to hold forms of the real as impossible to be ahistorical invariants. Although, at present, the (Lacanian) hypothesis that, in certain areas of human existence, *the* place does not exist seems persuasive, this does not prove that such modes of the real as impossible will always obtain. On what grounds could that be established? Nor does the hazarded hypothesis deny the possibility of amelioration. Psychoanalysis, like progressive politics, is engaged in the construction of happier, more hospitable and more enabling places. And contracted cinema with a determinate, realisable telos, like Olmi's film, can play a role in promoting just such changes in the larger social sphere and thereby be worthy of the event. This is the achievement of two recent examples: *A Touch of Sin (*Jia Zhangke, China 2013*)* and *Leviathan (*Zvyagintsev, Russia 2014*)*. The former, as Mark Kermode notes, is a 'state of the nation document' whose representation of the 'purgatorial pain' of life in contemporary China as provoking insurrectional acts of violence against the venal and brutal power structure, by social isolates and outsiders prompted the party to delay its release (Kermode, 2014:27). *Leviathan* is a similarly scathing indictment of the self-interested, corrupt and oppressive nature of local government in Putin's Russia. If *bien-dire* is being worthy of what happens to us, then, in many circumstances *bien-dire* will take the form of such films and progressive interventions in the debates around their veracity and ideological effectivity.

My argument – the second point - is only, while not denying the legitimacy, exigency and urgency of the political struggles around representation, that certain works are more than the sum of their representations. Here Lacan and Deleuze are agreed. 'Of course,' Lacan acknowledges, 'works of art imitate the objects they represent, but,' he continues, 'their end is certainly not to represent them,' for 'in offering the imitation of an object, they make something different out of that object' (S.VII:141). More pithily, Deleuze insists, 'no art is imitative' (TP:304). *Ulysses* and *India Song* represent the effects of colonial oppression and exploitation but the work

of the work in both cases also achieves something else, which, on occasion, may be of moment. But before exploring the nature of that 'something else' let's consider the second objection.

I. Aestheticisation

A further charge could be that psychoanalysis has no future if, rather than being worthy of the event, it becomes complicit with and an apologia for the evasions which are the supposed hallmark of 'aestheticisation'. However, this charge is wide of the mark on two counts. First, this thesis is concerned not with aesthetics but health. It extends Deleuze's claim that literature is 'an enterprise of health' to all artforms (ECC:3). In this perspective, art is viewed as a vital form of thought which contrasts with more baleful modes. We are in the middle of a mental health crisis. According to the charity Mind 'approximately 1 in 4 people in the UK will experience a mental health problem each year' and during these episodes patients are afflicted by incapacitating, tormenting and painful forms of thought (Mind, 2017). It is against this background that the thinking which occurs in art should be viewed. That thinking should be measured not against some ideal of say heroic, stoical, steadfastness but against (often unhappy) actually existing modes. This is not to claim – ridiculously and offensively - that art is *the* answer. If the Other is barred (Ⱥ), *the* answer does not exist. It is only to argue that art can be one of the sites – there are innumerable others – where life-enhancing as opposed to life-sapping forms of thought may occur.

India Song can again serve as an example. Duras described the photograph of the dead Stretter, surrounded by roses situated on the piano in the reception scene, as 'the altar of pain – of my pain,' before adding, 'the source of the film lay there' (Duras, 1980:46). My argument is that, if suffering was Duras's point of departure it was no more than that. The work of the film is not reducible to the expression of pre-existing affects. On the contrary, by making something new and creating another response to the problem(s) which occasioned such anguish, it leaves pain in its wake. As even Allen Ginsberg would surely have allowed, a poem is not a howl. No more is *India Song*.

The second reason this thesis is not open to a charge of aestheticism is that it is located in the post-aesthetic era inaugurated by Heidegger's '*The Origin of the Work of Art*' (Heidegger, 2002) in which, as Miguel de Beistegui notes, Heidegger seeks 'to begin to think of art outside aesthetics' (de Beistegui, 2005:130). In Heideggerian vein, artworks, like *Éloge de l'amour*, will be thought of as events rather than as objects of disinterested aesthetic contemplation and as 'the happening of truth' rather than as vehicles for pre-existing ideologies (Heidegger, 2002:33). As in Heidegger, the emphasis will be on the 'work-being' of the works not their 'object-being' (Heidegger, 2002:20). This is not to say that this thesis is Heideggerian for the Lacanian components turn on the notion of the subject which Heidegger eschewed as metaphysical (Heidegger, 2002:49). More generally, Heidegger's ontology is too unpeopled to be of much use in our thinking of cinematic narratives whether *Avatar* or *India Song*. Where Heidegger claimed art to be born of the strife (Heidegger, 2002:26) between *world* - roughly, the horizon of intelligibility - and *earth* – roughly the materiality which resists signification (Heidegger, 2002:27) – this thesis will present art as, more frequently, better conceived as a form of thought occasioned by the strife between the symbolic (roughly societal imperatives) and the real – here, the 'vital immanence' of the body and its impulses (Lacan, 1961-62: Session of 20/12/61 p. 2). So, although Heideggerian claims such as 'the truth that opens itself in the work can never be verified or derived from what went before' (Heidegger, 2002:47) and that 'as a work, the work holds open the open of a world' (Heidegger, 2002:23), will find an echo in this thesis, the terms of the post-aesthetic here will be predominantly Lacanian (in part one) and Deleuzean (in part two).

To conclude - if the barred Other ($\not{A}$) is functioning, the real has to be thought by a thinking without resting place. We are, of necessity, always already under way. Famously Diane Vreeland remarked 'the eye must travel' and so must thought (Vreeland, 2011). As Beckett's Unnamable insists we 'must go on' (Beckett, 1959:418). Art as *bien-dire* can be a less troublesome and more vital way of doing so. If 'the poem', as Paul Celan wrote is 'underway' so are films like *Éloge de l'amour* and that is their chance of creating new senses and values (Paul Celan cited in Lacoue-Labarthe, 1986:32).

4. Lessons from Deleuze

In the interests of clarity, extended discussion of Deleuze is postponed until part two. However, to relegate his philosophy entirely to the latter stages of this thesis would be to miss too many opportunities in the first part to demonstrate how a psychoanalysis which aspires to be worthy of the event of art could call his thought in aid. For that reason, I want to set out five concepts which will be taken up to the advantage of psychoanalysis in every chapter. Let's begin with Deleuze's claim at the beginning of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that 'Nietzsche's most general project is the introduction of the concepts of sense and value into philosophy' (NP:1). 'Living,' Nietzsche wrote, 'mean[s] evaluating' (Nietzsche, 1886:8). 'No people could live without evaluating' (Nietzsche, 1891:84). This is the import of the episode with my elder grand-daughter: her thinking, on the occasion described, was less representation and determination than, in Deleuze's Nietzschean phrase, a 'transmutation of values' (NP:180). Developing this line of thought, it will be argued that psychoanalytic theory could, on occasion, think of artworks less as the expression of pre-given meanings and the representation of realities with an existing currency than as (r)evaluation. A further Nietzschean point will prove useful in explaining how this can be achieved. Deleuze writes:

> 'It is not certain that the question *what is this*? is a good question, for discovering the essence or the Idea. It may be that questions such as *who? how much? how? where? when?* are better' (DI:94).

Translating this notion into our thinking of what can happen in the event of art, this thesis will argue that art's construction of spaces, times and styles of existence can be more important than representational content when addressing the real as impossible. *Where*, *when and how* the spectator is can alter *who* he or she is such that new senses and values come into existence. In consequence, although the spectator cannot find *the* answer he or she can find a happier way of answering.

There is a further reason why the question 'what is this?' is not always useful, namely that identities are provisional rather than fixed once and for all, because what something is depends on the relationships in which it is involved. On this account, we should think not in terms of immutable essences but in terms of capacities to affect

and be affected. Hence, on many occasions, it is useful to focus not on identities but on relations of conjunction and disjunction. Hence the importance, in many contexts of Deleuze's injunction to think in terms of the conjunction 'AND' rather than the copula 'IS' (D:57).

It will be argued below that this is a characteristic of modes of thinking unique to certain artworks which, rather than claiming *this is the case*, *this is the essence of the situation*, articulate heterogeneous elements and processes. Thus, throughout Duras' and Godard's work there are conjunctions of images, words and music which are irreducible to each other and which are never subsumed in a single proposition. Just as in Beethoven's late piano sonatas, where there is a perpetual oscillation between violence and lyricism, and where the sense is in the interplay, not in some supposed essence to be located in either of the components, so in Duras and Godard the sense is not in a determinate content but in the play. What matters are less things than compositions but - and this brings us to the fourth Deleuzean concept namely *agencements*:[4] assemblages or compositions which are not static arrangements but dynamic processes. To adopt an earlier Deleuzean formulation, each *agencement* is 'a "conditioning-conditioned" structure,' for its elements interact in a process of reciprocal transformation - while also relating to the outside (LS:266).

This brings us to the final nexus of concepts: territorialisation/deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation. As a first approach to these concepts, let's consider what Ronald Bogue proposes as 'a paradigmatic instance' of this 'process of becoming-other,' namely Olivier Messiaen's use of birdsong (Bogue, 2007:36). On Deleuze's account, 'Messiaen's musical rendering of the bird's refrain,' as Bogue succinctly puts it, 'deterritorialises that refrain, extracts it from its territorial function, and then incorporates it within a musical composition that unfolds along its own lines of development' (Bogue, 2007:36). Following this, I argue that

[4] '*Agencement*' as Martin Joughin notes, is customarily translated as 'assemblage', 'structure' or 'arrangement' but, following Nick Nesbitt, I will leave it untranslated 'to preserve the sense of an ongoing active construction that is lost in the more passive English "assemblage."' (Nesbitt, 2010:161 footnote 9).

psychoanalytic criticism should be more aware of how artworks through figuration and articulation can deterritorialise the words and images in existing representations and imaginaries and then reterritorialize them in a new composition – Godard's citations of Chateaubriand, Simone Weil and Georges Bataille in *Éloge de l'amour* and Duras's deterritorialisation of the fourteenth of Beethoven's Diabelli Variations and reterritorialisation of it in *India Song* are powerful examples. In both cases the effect is to create new values and senses not least because the territorialisation of these elements within the text 'is inseparable from vectors of deterritorialisation working [the text] from within' (TP:509). In other words, the reterritorialisation of the deterritorialised elements in the text has the effect of opening the text to a beyond. Paradoxically capture gives rise to the liberation of what Deleuze calls a 'line of flight' (TP:509). Such lines of flight are not to be conceived as an escapist retreat. As Deleuze puts it: 'to flee is not to renounce action: nothing is more active than a flight' for here to flee is also 'to put a system to flight' (D:36). This thesis will argue that a model of textual functioning as territorialisation/deterritorialisation, capture/liberation is implicit in psychoanalysis and if rendered explicit would enable psychoanalysis to become worthier of the event of art. However, before that let's, in the first chapter, survey existing psychoanalytic approaches to cinema.

PART ONE

The central argument of this part of the thesis is that psychoanalysis has not always been worthy of the event of art but can be. In chapter one I assess what is of continuing value in existing approaches. In chapter two I explore different pathways.

CHAPTER ONE: PSYCHOANALYTIC FILM THEORY

Introduction

Confessing his 'embarrassment where art – an element in which Freud did not bathe without mishap - is concerned,' Lacan famously cautioned against the use of psychoanalysis when considering matters relating to art (S.XI:ix). This chapter constitutes a survey of the most important writers who, disregarding Lacan's advice, adopted psychoanalytic approaches to explore what happens in cinema. It is argued that, in many instances, these approaches were unworthy of the event of art insofar as they missed, or were unconcerned with, much of what can happen in encounters with at least some filmic texts. However, it is far from being an outright condemnation. For two reasons. Firstly, if psychoanalytic criticism was unworthy of those aspects of the event of art, which are the focus of this thesis, it was because it was striving to be worthy of immediate, urgent, and altogether more important political events: most obviously post -'68 radicalism and more particularly second wave feminism and the other social movements of the time. As an example, consider the work of the most influential theorist, Laura Mulvey (Mulvey, 1975). An artist herself, Mulvey is alive to what art can achieve but she recognised that, at certain junctures, there were more pressing political tasks to be undertaken. Hence her powerful critique of the modes of visual pleasure in narrative cinema. This chapter has no criticisms to make of such interventions. Its argument is simply that the focus lent by particular political concerns occluded what certain forms of art and cinema can achieve. This brings me to the second reason why this chapter is far from being outright critique, namely that much of the work done is less reductionist than might initially appear. Amidst the ideas which now seem superannuated, there are concepts of continuing value so it is worth sifting material which in many respects now appears *démodé* and discredited.

The chapter falls into three principal sections. First, an examination and discussion of the two principal modes of psychoanalytic criticism, namely those based on content analyses and those whose focus was rather textual structures and mechanisms. Second, a consideration of feminist interventions in psychoanalytic

criticism, which at once demonstrates the efficacy of certain forms of psychoanalytic criticism in emancipatory politics and the overall limitations of existing forms of psychoanalysis. Third, a consideration of Slavoj Žižek, whose work, while inspiring many of the lines of thought below, this thesis, as indicated above, will seek to take in a different direction.

Section 1: Content Analyses

The argument of this section is that, when engaged in psychobiography and content analyses, psychoanalysis has often been unworthy of the event of art. Rooted in the clinic, the tendency in psychoanalytic approaches has been to diagnose and the result merely, 'the tedious listing of unconscious themes in a work' (Laplanche, 1961:4). While such an approach can be useful in determining the issues, it tends to undervalue what Gerald L. Bruns termed 'the work of the work of art': the thinking which can occur in the event of art (Bruns, 1997:13).

Psychobiography

'I am one thing; my writings are another matter.'
Friedrich Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1908:259)

Psychobiographical approaches to art, inspired by Freud's study of Leonardo, analyse texts as the expression of the author's desires and libidinal disposition (Freud, 1910). The argument of this section is that the poverty of such approaches is instructive, insofar as it suggests the need to explore other ways of conceiving the thinking which occurs in art. Bruce Springsteen can serve as an example. Reportedly, he once said that, like every artist, he had been told by someone he was 'not worth dirt' – in his case, his father - and been viewed by someone else - in his case, his mother - as 'the second coming of the baby Jesus' (Desert Island Discs, 2016). In a more recent interview, he elaborated on his relationship with his father 'When my dad looked at me, he didn't see what he needed to see,' and continued 'He loved me but he couldn't stand me' (Desert Island Discs, 2016). Now, while it could be argued that

these Oedipal concerns mark songs like *Born to Run,* they explain neither its achievement nor the joy to be found in it (Springsteen, 1975). This is instructive, for it suggests that psychoanalysis can miss the extent to which the subject, with art in the mode of *bien-dire,* can become other.

Returning to cinema, the same argument holds for the work of Bernardo Bertolucci, who is open about the Oedipal rivalry he felt for his father, owning that the son killing the father is the story of most of his films (Tonetti, 1995:193). Certainly, *The Conformist* (Bertolucci, Italy 1970) can be read in this light. The protagonist, Marcello Clerici, is driven 'to achieve "normality"' by conforming to the existing socio-political in order to overcome his crushing sense of being unacceptably different (Restivo, 2010:166). He has good reason to feel an outsider. His deranged father is in a lunatic asylum, his morphine-addicted mother is keeping her chauffeur as a lover and Marcello has 'undergone a traumatic homosexual experience' with another chauffeur, Lino (Vighi, 2006:97). Imprisoned in Lino's room, Marcello resists Lino's sexual advances by picking up and firing the chauffeur's pistol. Believing wrongly that Lino has been killed by a ricocheting bullet, and that he is a murderer, Marcello escapes the room but not the sense that he is abnormal. To overcome his sense of difference, Marcello becomes intent upon integrating and becoming as normal as he imagines others to be. Conformity requires first, a bourgeois marriage to a woman, Giulia, who – as he puts it - thinks only of 'kitchen and bed' and – as he is troubled to the point of delusion – enlistment in a state-sponsored secret organisation which carries the war to Mussolini's enemies. His first mission is, using his honeymoon in Paris as a cover, to make contact with his former philosophy tutor, Professor Quadri, win his trust and obtain information about the activities of Mussolini's exiled opponents. *En route* to Paris, Clerici is instructed to break off his journey and go to a brothel in Ventimiglia to receive new orders and is instructed to assassinate Quadri. The Oedipal motifs are now foregrounded for Marcello falls in love with the wife of this father-figure whom he then assassinates. And they are further underscored by the script ascribing to Quadri the telephone number of Godard, Bertolucci's erstwhile mentor, the cinematic father against whom he had come to politically and stylistically rebel (Wood, 1980:126).

Now, the problem for a psychoanalysis, which seeks to be worthy of the event of art, is that such analyses, while not without interest, always ultimately appear threadbare. To focus on diagnosis is to run the danger of missing the work of the work: the forms of thinking which are unique to the event of art. As an example, consider the Ventimiglia sequence. At the brothel he finds Manganiello – the fascist thug accompanying him on his mission – with a prostitute. As he enters, she rises to her feet and announces with a bewildered sadness 'I'm crazy'. With romantic music surging on the soundtrack, he ardently takes her in his arms, but the embrace is almost immediately interrupted by a summons to the office of his superior, Raoul. The latter informs him that the mission has changed; he is given a gun and instructed to 'eliminate' his former professor. Taking up the proffered gun, Marcello responds to the injunction that he be 'swift and decisive' by – rather ridiculously - striking the postures of a killer, before putting the gun to his own head and then breaking off in perplexity to exclaim, 'My hat. I've lost my hat. Where is it?' In the sequence Marcello has successively been the lover of a woman as mad and lost as himself, a murderer, a suicide and a wretched bourgeois consumed by petty anxieties. As such there is a thinking of the costs of conforming to himself and others, and of the relations of madness to both order and desire. Such thinking takes the form not of propositions but of interlacing lines. In Trintignant's singular characterisation of Marcello, there is at once a brittleness, a meekness and extreme violence. Clerici is correct, uncertain, despairing and (to a degree, unconsciously) intent on devastation. Further it is a thinking of ambivalence: when Marcello embraces the prostitute, he is at once awkward – this is what he presumes a man is supposed to do in this situation (he himself may have homosexual desires) – and unburdened for, in her 'madness', she is what in Lacanian terminology is his *semblable* (that is, another misrecognized as the self) (SX:325). Finally, it is a thinking of issues recalcitrant to discursive understanding – 'Raoul's office is, absurdly, awash in walnuts – disorganised piles of walnuts on the desk, walnuts neatly line up along the mantle' (Restivo, 2010:166).

In other words, a thinking occurs in the work of the work which is not the mere expression of Bertolucci's Oedipal impulses. This thinking, rather than seeking to define, takes into account the ambiguities and contradictions of psychical functioning: Marcello, in a world which defies comprehension – what is happening

with the walnuts? - is at once an anxiety-ridden conformist and an insane outsider, a murderer and a suicide. AND not IS. Like the ruminations of my grand-daughter, it seeks, albeit in a much more elaborately structured fashion, not to fix and arrest things but to make something new of what has happened. Expanded cinema at such moments, however, advances on my grand-daughter's pre-discursive thinking for, rather than seeking a beyond, in Deleuzean terms, it is that beyond, a line of flight.

When Freud, in *Creative Writers and Daydreaming,* claims writers temper fantasies, he is unworthy of the event of art which attains the status of *bien-dire*. For Freud the pleasure we take in literature derives from the satisfaction of desires in fantasies. Such fantasies, in the form of, say, daydreams, occasion shame if exposed to the gaze of others. 'As a rule,' an adult 'would rather confess his misdeeds than tell anyone his phantasies' (Freud, 1908:133). To render them acceptable, the writer 'softens' their character 'by altering and disguising' them and by bribing us with a 'purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies' (Freud, 1908:141). This '*incentive bonus* or *fore-pleasure*' enables both the writer and his or her audience to enjoy the fantasies 'without self-reproach or shame' (Freud, 1908:141). While this is undoubtedly true of works given over to fantasy (much of contracted cinema) it signally misses the achievement of other artworks and, more deplorably does less than justice to what Nietzsche terms the 'fearlessness'[5] of certain artists (Nietzsche, 1889:82). In *bien-dire* there is always a taking of courage for there is the refusal of the consolations and solace of fantasy and a rupturing of existing imaginaries. Instead of the – relatively – passive endurance of debilitating afflictions, there is the making something new of the issue of concern. Reading a biography of James Joyce, it is remarkable to discover the extent to which he drew on episodes from his life but even more remarkable is what he made of the material. While the issues he confronted, such as the sense of exile which impelled him to seek physical exile on the continent, give the work its interest, the achievement resides in what he made of it in a style of writing which was also - to borrow a phrase from Merleau-Ponty – 'a certain style of being'

[5] I owe this reference and, as the acknowledgements make plain, much else to David Deamer.

(Merleau-Ponty, 1945:183). Similarly, as we saw above, Rivette's *L'amour fou* does not merely chronicle an episode from his autobiography; it is *bien-dire* as the making something new of what happened and something new of the artist. Psychobiographical studies fall flat to the extent that they have missed this process of co-creation. The Joyce, who sponged so abominably from his brother Stanislaus, was not the Joyce who wrote *Ulysses*. If a Godard made the appalling anti-Semitic remark reported by Jean-Pierre Gorin, another Godard made *Éloge de l' amour* (Brody, 2008:364). As argued above, in the event of art, there can be a 'becoming-other' (C2:276). At such moments of 'the author's becoming,' new modes of existence can be achieved rendering new truths available (C2:275-6). But nothing is settled once and for all. Drawing on and adapting Paul Celan's claim that 'reality is not, but has to be sought and won' (Paul Celan cited in Geuss, 2010:119) this thesis holds that there are modes of truths which must be similarly won and then won again in a new form, for here truth, as in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 'is always new' (E:157).

Textual Analyses

This brings us to the second form of content analyses: those which, while similarly committed to the excavation of the supposedly latent content of texts, make less overt reference to the psychobiography of the director. Like the psychobiographical approaches, these readings are instructive for, in their comparable poverty, they point to the existence in the event of art of forms of thought irreducible to such analyses. For example, many studies, taking as their point of departure Roland Barthes' claim that every narrative leads back to Oedipus, have located Oedipal trajectories throughout mainstream cinema (Barthes, 1973:47). Most famously, Raymond Bellour in his canonical analysis of Hitchcock's *North by Northwest* (Hitchcock, USA 1959) described the narrative as the movement of the hero Roger Thornhill from domination by his mother through a series of castration ordeals to discover a substitute love object: Eve Kendall who becomes the new 'Mrs Thornhill' (Bellour, 1975). Even today this approach has not wholly disappeared. As Žižek observes, 'in a typical Hollywood product, everything from the fate of the knights of

the Round Table through the October Revolution up to asteroids hitting the Earth, is transposed into an Oedipal narrative' (Žižek, 2008:52).

This approach, is of continuing interest for two reasons. First it can be useful in determining the issue(s) at stake. With any artwork, which has a representational dimension, the question immediately arises: why is this of interest? To what concern does it speak? One of the lessons of the Hommel episode is that an intervention is effective only if it engages with an issue. Art as intervention works only if it engages with an issue which matters. Otherwise it is as inconsequential as a Wittgensteinian wheel which spins pointlessly, turning no other (Wittgenstein, 1953:95, 271). Content counts and psychoanalytic approaches can help determine the issue which is figured by the work.

Psychoanalytic approaches can also explicate what many works make of the inaugural problem figured by the work. Since, in most instances, the problem has been figured in terms which will allow the rehearsal of the usual fantasies, this is often straightforward. For example, to return to Oedipus, Lacan has persuasively argued that Oedipal fantasies are designed to mask structural impossibilities as contingent. On Lacan's reading of what he terms 'Freud's dream' Oedipal scenarios are imaginarisations designed to disguise the fact that, if the Other is barred, the complete satisfaction of desire is structurally impossible (S.XVII:117). Rather than accept the impossibility of complete satisfaction, some male subjects take refuge in the fantasy that, but for a contingent barrier, desire could be fulfilled (Evans, 1996:130). Oedipal fantasies are merely a variant of this form: they suggest that but for an obstacle – a figure or factor figuring the role of the father in the Freudian scenario – the subject could have the (mythical) woman who is *the* answer to their (neurotic) demands. From *Casablanca* (Curtiz, USA 1942) to *Titanic* (Cameron, USA 1997), the fantasy that, but for a contingent obstacle, desire would have been fulfilled has been a commonplace of Hollywood cinema.

Where such psychoanalytic approaches are not always worthy of the event of art is in relation to artworks where there are no pre-ordained fantasmatic solutions. *The Conformist* can again serve as an example. The purport of *The Conformist* is plain: the assumption of the identity assigned by a fascist symbolic order is catastrophic for both self and other. 'Beware,' wrote Deleuze (striking a Lacanian note), 'of the

dreams of others, because if you are caught in their dream, you are done for' (TRM:318). Anna is caught up in the Marcello's dream of normalcy and barbarously murdered. However, beyond the uncontentious indictment of fascist regimes, there is a thinking of issues relating to identification and desire unconfined to the subjects of Mussolini. There is space for only one example. Dominique Sanda appears in three roles. She appears first in a scene where she is lying across the desk of a fascist bigwig. Later she appears as the apparently 'crazy' whore embraced by Marcello at Ventimiglia. Finally, she takes the role of Anna, the wife of Quadri. Now a Lacanian elucidation immediately proposes itself: Marcello desires a series of women insofar as they seem to embody the object *a*. First the veiled woman in a situation which has echoes of the primal scene, the coitus between the mother and the father. Then she is the prostitute misrecognised as his *semblable*. And, finally, Anna represents all of the life which he has repressed in acceding to a brutal symbolic, social order. Now this is of interest but it misses the work of the work. Instead of reducing the three appearances to illustrations of a Lacanian notion, they could be viewed as an instance of serial thought. Serial thought is a way of thinking what cannot be thought but which must be thought: here the problems associated with certain forms of desire. If the Other is barred, *the* way of thinking the issue does not exist. Serial thinking constitutes a series of approaches. Of course, if the Other is characterised by a 'fundamental incompleteness', they cannot add up to an encompassing whole but this does not signify the failure of such thinking for its aim is not to establish a determinate essence but to engage with the issues such that they matter differently (Le Gaufey, 2016:41). Although the three series resonate they are irreducible to each other. The three figures played by Sanda do not coincide. The veiled woman lying on the desk looks back at Marcello in an assured and collected fashion which is far from the 'madness' of the prostitute. Whereas the prostitute, is in a financial sense, available to him the veiled woman is not. Nor is Anna, for she desires Giulia more than her husband. In a scene bathed in the warmest colours to occur in a predominantly wintry film, she dances with Giulia with a vivacity and grace which prompts everybody in the hall, except Marcello and Manganiello –fascists don't dance - to join in a communal celebration of life. These three lines of thought are then contextualised by two further series. The first relates to Giulia who is at once

the same as Marcello and Anna and on a very different path. Like Marcello she has suffered the advances of an older man while a child but unlike him does not herself turn into a predator using others. She is different from Anna in that she does not chafe at bourgeois conventionality, but the same in that she too is a victim of Marcello. Finally, there is the series beginning with the chauffeur Pasqualino in which Marcello begins as the prey and then becomes a predator intent on the satisfaction of his own desires without regard to others. Like Lino he may well have homosexual desires – like Anna he may seek same-sex relationships – but at the same time he is her cowardly killer and he tries to set the anti-fascist demonstrators on Lino as the man responsible for his own crimes (Restivo, 2010:178). Thinking occurs in the mode of AND not IS.

As with psychobiography, the poverty of content analyses is instructive. It is the index of the existence in art of modes of truth other than those of common-sensical correspondence theories where truths are measured in terms of their adequacy and correctness. Truths, claiming validation through the protocols of correspondence, do exist in art forms such as cinema. They ground debates around the veracity of the representations: is *I, Daniel Blake* an accurate depiction of what happens in job centres? However, other modes of truth can appear in art, truths which are singular, unrepeatable events in which the real comes to matter differently. As these truths are contingent upon times and places in films, it is impossible to assay them from some putative external position. They appear only to the subjects who are co-constitutive in the event of art and are indiscernible from a place apart. Such truths are an argument for the continuing relevance of psychoanalysis for this is the status of the truths which occur in the treatment where, Lacan observes, it is impossible to tell the 'truth about truth' (E:737). As access to such truths is contingent upon *where*, *when* and *how* the subject happens, that is, who the subject becomes, 'there is no metalanguage' (E:688).

Section 2: Apparatus theory

This section considers the second principal mode of psychoanalytic criticism which, while not disregarding content, focused on the structurations effected by the

cinematic apparatus and more particularly on how cinematic structures at once constituted subjectivity and masked the process of that constitution. It is significant for this thesis because, despite the extravagance of some of its claims, apparatus theory is of continuing interest insofar as it is an important precursor of some of the approaches under exploration – notably those concerned with the *where*, *when* and *how* of the spectator.

Richard Rushton has aptly summarised the gist of the thesis as the claim that spectators are 'hoodwinked, deceived and manipulated by the cinematic apparatus' (Rushton, 2011:21). On the basis of a reading of Lacan's path-breaking paper on the Mirror Stage, the apparatus theorists conceived the fulcrum of ideological operations to be misrecognition (E:75-81). According to Lacan, the '*specific prematurity of birth*' in humans - prompts every child somewhere between six and eighteen months to seek security by identifying with the ideal that he or she presumes the parent or caregiver loves (E:78). Classically this occurs when the child identifies with the image of wholeness and mastery it perceives in a mirror. In the arms of a parent saying, 'That's you' the child identifies with the apparently ideal self in the mirror but the child's, 'That's me!' is a misrecognition for no human being can achieve the unity perceived in the specular image or incarnate the supposed ideal. The child imagines it has discovered its true self but the specular image with which it identifies is a fictive construction constituted by its narcissistic desire.

Lacan's conception arrived in film theory via Althusser's theory of ideological functioning (Althusser, 1968:121-173). Drawing on Lacan, Althusser held that to be a social being is to be interpellated, that is, summoned to occupy an assigned role or place. A child, for example is assigned the role of good little boy or girl and later well-behaved, diligent school pupil. To the extent that an individual accepts such an assignment, he or she engages in a misrecognition for there is always a measure of disparity between the individual and the place assigned. Concomitant with this misrecognition of self is an ideological misperception of the nature of social reality. Ideology, therefore, operates not by duping and gulling pre-given individuals but by constituting individuals in structures as subjects in such a way that they accept ideological fabrications as self-evident truths. Applied to film theory, this became the notion that if the spectator was placed in the cinematic structure – the darkened

auditorium and illuminated screen - then filmic images like the specular image had the power to spawn misrecognitions. In two canonical articles Jean-Louis Baudry (Baudry, 1970 and 1975) sought to shift the focus from the ideological content of film texts – what he termed 'the field of the signified' – to the structure of the cinematographic apparatus (Baudry, 1970:533). This structure, he claimed, created an 'impression of reality' which deluded the subject (Baudry, 1970:539). Developing a parallel foreshadowed by Lacan he likened the cinema spectator to a denizen of Plato's cave (S.VIII:33). Imagining him or herself to be in the location 'of a god' (Baudry, 1970:540), and consequently able to discern the truth, the spectator like, 'Plato's prisoner,' is in reality 'the victim of an illusion of reality' (Baudry, 1975:209). Crucially, 'it is the apparatus that creates the illusion and not the degree of fidelity with the real' for the apparatus produces a subject (Baudry, 1975:211). Baudry writes, 'if this apparatus really produces images, it first of all produces an effect of specific subjects – to the extent that a subject is intrinsically part of the apparatus' (Baudry, 1975:212-13). Following Baudry, Christian Metz similarly claimed that the spectator imagined himself in a god-like position and 'as a kind of transcendental subject' (Metz, 1975:49). In consequence, he concluded, the cinematic spectator is a 'radically deluded subject' (Metz, 1975:52). Translated to England, apparatus theory became the notorious concept of subject positioning associated with the journal *Screen*. As important as 'the multiple processes of signification at work in film' Stephen Heath claimed, were 'the positions of the subject they decide' (Heath, 1973:12).

Plainly any such thesis was and is preposterous, which is why *Screen* toyed with it only briefly – Heath chose not to republish the piece cited above in *Questions of Cinema* (Heath, 1981). If psychoanalysis holds any lesson, it is that each of us is singular - we all see films slightly differently. Furthermore, if the Other is barred, subject positions cannot be ascertained with any certainty for, as Lacan observed, 'It is always a question of the subject qua indeterminate' (S.XI:26). Ethnographic studies bear this out (Prince, 1996:77-79): different audiences perceive in (often unpredictably) different ways – recall as a particularly powerful example Jackie Stacey's *Star Gazing* (Stacey, 1994). Further, as the cognitivists persuasively contend, if a text is to be intelligible, the spectator must actively engage in the construction of

sense. David Bordwell powerfully makes this case in relation to the distinction drawn by the Russian formalists between the syuzhet and the fabula (Bordwell, 1985:49-57). For present purposes, the term 'fabula' can be taken to signify the story of the narrative in chronological order, while the syuzhet is the mode in which the narrative is presented which may, for instance, be non-chronological. The fabula – what happened – has to be inferred from the syuzhet and this process requires an active subject (Bordwell, 1985:57). In *Éloge de l'amour*, for example, there is an underlying story about Edgar's parents, which has to be inferred from the elliptical narrative, and the story of Edgar's relationship with Berthe has to be constructed by the spectator from the syuzhet, in which what happened between them in Brittany is subsequent to the Parisian episodes which occurred two years later. Now, if the spectator is active, his or her making sense cannot be unilaterally determined by textual structure, there is a latitude as each spectator brings different competences, knowledges, interests and value systems to bear.

Considering this, it might appear that apparatus theory is to be dismissed in its entirety but that would be a mistake for there was a valuable insight: namely that a social being is an 'evanescent subject' and that *how* a subject is constituted at a particular place and moment determines, in part at least, what weighs with him or her and the manner in which it weighs (Lafont, 2004:19). The pivotal notion, namely that the subject is not a given and therefore can be constituted otherwise in the event of art can usefully be retrieved. This thesis leaves open the question of whether or not individuals have, on occasion, been constituted by processes of interpellation as subjects of particular ideologies and instead proposes the possibility that art in the mode of *bien-dire* succeeds to the extent that the subject is constituted differently. Crucial to that process of subjective constitution is *where* and *when* 'instances of the subject' occur (Lacan, 2001a:251). This point is clearly made by the syuzhet/fabula distinction. In certain modes of cinema, the questions posed by the real are contracted to an easily answered question, say, whodunnit? The syuzhet is the problem, the fabula the solution: the syuzhet asks a question – say, who committed the crime? – and the fabula gives us the answer (*Murder on the Orient Express*, Lumet, UK 1974). In instances of expanded cinema which address problems with no such easy solutions, the unfolding of the fabula is no longer the resolution. Here the

syuzhet functions not as a problem to be surmounted but as a form of thinking, which goes beyond puzzling over how to construct the fabula, to search for truths irreducible to knowledge. In *Éloge de l'amour*, the non-chronological syuzhet, in which the events in Paris precede the flashback to Edgar's first encounter with Berthe in Brittany constitute two series which revalue each other. Neither is a metalanguage for here it is impossible to tell the truth about the truth. Truths in this register are evental, that is they are momentary flashes between the series which have the effect of revaluing the significance of what occurs in each. Similarly, in *The Conformist*, the flashbacks, in which Marcello, while on his way to the assassination, considers the developments which have brought him to the pass of murdering his 'father' and the latter's wife, the woman Marcello desires, constitutes not only an ordering of time but a unique mode of thinking. The flashback structure becomes a form of montage which, as with the juxtaposition of images in the lines by Rimbaud, creates a sense which had no prior existence. In both cases, the sense created is contingent on the position of the subject within the organisation of the syuzhet. In other words, while there is no necessity for a spectator to occupy the positions made available, position counts: it can enable the subject to become other. Consider, for example, the moment when, after Manganiello has made it plain that no witnesses can be allowed to survive, and that Anna must be murdered, Marcello gets out of the car and walks alone until Manganiello persuades him to return to the vehicle. This is intercut with the sequence in which Marcello, the schoolboy, to escape a gang of bullies, flags down the car chauffeured by Lino and gets in. There is no equivalence or identity between the scenes. In the first, Marcello, in full knowledge, commits himself to cowardly complicity in murder while in the second he is unknowingly on his way to Lino's room where, he is initially a victim and later imagines himself a killer. Again, there is no metalanguage – neither sequence is the truth of the other. They occupy the same plane and reciprocally revalue each other. In both cases, the sense created is contingent on the position of the subject within the organisation of the syuzhet.

So, although, as David Bordwell has noted 'the subject-position view' of 70s film theory has 'collapsed' (Bordwell, 1996:8), psychoanalytic approaches to questions of position are of continuing interest because, as Fierens observes, psychoanalysis exists not to find meanings but to change structures (Fierens,

2010b:66). The treatment does not seek to discover *the* meaning of what is said for, if the Other is incomplete and inconsistent, that is impossible. Rather the aim is to alter the structures which have come to prevail. If, for example, a male obsessional elects a woman to the status of 'the exalted object' and if for some reason she falls from this elevated position, he will almost certainly find a substitute (S.X:322). Only if the structure in which he is positioned relative to an idealised woman - a crucial component of the structure of his neurosis - is relinquished can the cure proceed. Now, while an artwork is extremely unlikely to have as radical repercussions as the treatment, it can, at least for the duration, enable a restructuring of *where, when* and *how* the subject happens and, concomitantly, *who* the subject is. Thinking in the event of art is often less a matter of changing the content of representations than of changing the structures of time and space in which those representations occur. Whereas in much contracted cinema the structuration of time and space is in the service of the narrative with its fore-ordained resolution, in the expanded cinema of *India Song* and *Éloge de L'amour* the syuzhet's creation of times and spaces enables the spectator to perceive truths which, while not resolving the irresolvable, reorient the spectator such that the real as impossible matters differently. 'We have the truths that we deserve,' wrote Deleuze, 'depending on the place we are carrying our existence to, the hour we watch over and the element that we frequent' (NP:102). Psychoanalytic theories of the positions of the subject enable us to conceive of certain artworks as not just representing but as creating an element in which these truths could occur. If as Deleuze claims, 'we only find truths where they are, at their time and in their element,' art - this thesis argues – can, by restructuring time and place, enable us to find them (NP:102).

Section 3: Feminist Film Theory

This section continues the survey of the literature with a consideration of the work of psychoanalytically-inspired feminist theorists. Again, the theses are twofold. On the one hand, it is suggested that psychoanalysis is not yet exhausted and can still usefully contribute to at least some aspects of the questions around women and film. On the other hand, the evident limitations of Freud and Lacan's theories of female

desire are one of, if not *the*, strongest argument for the reinvention of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis has proved indisputably useful to some feminist theorists. The most influential article in film theory of the last fifty years, Laura Mulvey's, *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,* drew extensively and effectively on Freud and Lacan (Mulvey, 1975). This thesis contends that in diagnoses of male cinematic pathologies more can still be taken from the latter. There is space for only one example. Fetishisation is puzzling for the Freudian explanation, in terms of a female anatomical lack, is far from convincing. 'What is blindingly obvious,' Lacan remarks 'is that the woman lacks nothing' (S.X:181). And yet, as Mulvey demonstrates, fetishism does exist. Perhaps a comment made by Lacan in another context, namely that 'the eye' tends to 'misrecognise how beneath the *desirable* there is the *desirer*,' can assist (S.X:271). In this perspective, fetishism is the pretence that the fetishized woman has no desires at variance with the man who desires her. Psychoanalysis's concern is the unconscious, the fact that as Lacan put it at the beginning of *Encore:*

> 'With the passage of time, I learned that I could say a little more about it. And then I realized that what constituted my course was a sort of "I don't want to know anything about it"' (S.XX:1).

On this account, fetishisation is, in at least one of its dimensions, a strategy of those men who don't want to know that women are not content to be used.

However, while psychoanalysis may still serve in certain areas, its limitations are patent. Freud and Lacan's accounts of female sexuality are, at best, less persuasive than their accounts of some heterosexual males. When Lacan tells us that 'man knows nothing of woman and woman knows nothing of man,' the question arises of how much *he* knew (Lacan, 2001a:412). Was he an exception? Recall that believing oneself an exception is often the hallmark of narcissistic misrecognition. Of course, many women have found aspects of Freud and Lacan useful – and made telling and important contributions: within Lacanian psychoanalysis, Colette Soler (Soler, 2011), Marie-Hélene Brousse (Brousse, 1995, 1996), and Véronique Voruz (Voruz, 2002), and in film theory, Elizabeth Cowie (Cowie, 1997), and Joan Copjec (Copjec, 1994), immediately come to mind. However, it is even more apparent that for every woman who finds Freud and Lacan useful there are many more who do not.

Given the masculinist cast and heterosexist presumption of so much of the work of Freud and Lacan this is unsurprising. Freud's failings in this respect are so well-known as to need no rehearsal here. Suffice to say the absence of any plausible account of the female Oedipal trajectory is telling evidence of the limitations of his work. In film studies the unavailing attempts to develop, using his ideas, a theory of female spectatorship commanding a consensus comparable to that around Mulvey's account of the male spectator are further testimony. As for Lacan, he made little secret of his heterosexism. On his own account, what brought him from medicine to psychoanalysis was the 'suspicion that relations between men and women played a determinant role in the symptoms of human beings, and he terms 'the true truth' the fact that, 'between man and woman it does not work' (Lacan, 1976:16). Worse, he said of Plato's Symposium: 'Homosexuality still was what it is, a perversion' (S.VIII:31). And worse still said of homosexuals: 'they are absolutely curable' (S.V :190). Nietzsche famously observed that every philosophy is disguised autobiography and this is patently also the case with psychoanalysts (Nietzsche, 1886:6). Writing of his *Écrits,* Lacan said, either 'one takes what they formulate or one leaves them' (Lacan, 1970a:vii). Until psychoanalysis reinvents itself and addresses the diversity and variety of desires, it is probable increasing numbers will leave them.

Section 4: Slavoj Žižek

In support of the argument that psychoanalytic film theory remains useful - and continuing the survey of existing approaches - this section considers the writing of Slavoj Žižek, the most significant recent innovator in psychoanalytic film theory. As lines of thought inspired by his reading of Lacan are central to this thesis, it is worth exploring them in some detail.

His starting point is ours: the lack in the Other: 'what comes first is the lack' (Žižek, 2012:376). For Žižek, '[t]he subject,' as stressed above, 'is in the most radical sense "out of joint"' for 'it constitutively lacks its own place' (Žižek, 1993:12). The impossibility of a subject finding its own place like the impossibility of 'desire, which

is lack' (E:638) attaining its (lost) object is 'structural'. The absence of *the* place is the condition of the subject just as a 'fundamental gap' is the condition of desire (Žižek, 2001:83). Developing Žižek's conception of the real as structural impossibility in a new direction, this thesis claims that with artworks like *Éloge de l'amour* and *India Song* the thinking addresses not just realities with a certain currency but the real of structural impossibilities. The work of the work, in such instances is not just the representation of those realities but the finding of a way of being towards them. With cinema, the first task is to decide how to figure the problem posed by the real as impossible, for, if the key signifiers are missing from the Other, *the* mode of figuration does not exist: the problem is not given in itself it has always already been figured in *a* way. In some forms of the visual arts figuration is the primary mode of the work of the work for it is itself a revaluation. Consider, as an example, what is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of *bien-dire* in the visual arts of the twentieth century: Marcel Duchamp's *The Bride stripped bare by her bachelors even*, (also known as *The Large Glass*). Here Duchamp figures the 'impossible desire' of the bachelors for the bride with two panels (de Duve, 1996:185). In the lower, the bachelors are busy with their thing – each, as Duchamp famously explained, *'grinds his chocolate himself'* (Duchamp, 1934:68). In the upper, the bride, who 'basically is a motor,' appears as a rather tattered apparatus floating free of the endeavours of the bachelors – the pipe connecting them is severed (Duchamp, 1934:42). The two apparatuses fail to conjoin in a smoothly functioning machine. Here the work of the work resides in the playful inventiveness of the figuration which, makes something new of the absence of a sexual rapport, and thereby revalues it. While the machines depicted do not function, the artwork does, creating a tonality that is as profound as it is hilarious.

In other art forms, for example cinema, figuration is only the inaugural move. Its function is to render further moves and revaluations possible. In contracted cinema, the figuration lays out a path to what becomes the fore-ordained narrative resolution. In expanded cinema, it launches a trajectory or series of trajectories where the positionings and happenings made available are creative of sense. Žižek's theories can contribute to our thinking of the thinking which occurs in both forms. In respect of contracted cinema, he has brilliantly elaborated narrative models as responses to the real of structural impossibilities discussed above. The most

important is developed on the basis of Lacan's analysis of courtly love. According to Lacan, courtly love is 'the only way to elegantly pull off the absence of the sexual relationship' (S.XX:69). His argument is that some men, rather than accept the fact that no sexual partner embodies the object *a,* and that, consequently, they will never be at one in a sexual union, choose an unattainable person as their love object. In this way, they can imagine that, if the barrier rendering the other unattainable was removed, they could be as one. Žižek's astute insight is that a similar strategy of libidinal investment underpins certain ideological operations. His celebrated and persuasive example is Nazi ideology which, to mask the structural antagonisms of Weimar Germany, peddled the fantasy that all the problems, instability and conflicts were attributable to the activities of the Jews. Just as a subject engaging in courtly love can imagine that the removal of a barrier would bring a blissful *jouissance*, so Nazis could imagine that the Jews were the only obstacle separating Germany from social harmony (Žižek, 1989:125). In both cases the real of a structural impossibility – in love the impossibility of sexual rapport, in politics the impossibility of harmony in a class society – is disguised as contingent upon the functioning of a surmountable impediment. Coming back to cinema, Žižek discerns a similar operation. In much contracted cinema, the bulk of classic Hollywood, the narrative addresses the real as impossible by claiming that, if only an obstacle was removed, all will be well. If the barrier is overcome, the lovers can be happy, if the villains are overcome, social harmony can be restored and so on.

This is very convincing. The question is: can psychoanalysis contribute to our thinking of textual operations which have not opted for such easy solutions? Žižek demonstrates it can. The argument of this thesis is that art in the mode of *bien-dire* can address the real without evasion by transforming the subject, by altering *how, where* and *when* the subject happens. Whether or not *Žižek* would approve of this line of argument, his reading of Lacan can contribute at every turn. Following Lacan, *Žižek* gives the notion of the mutability of the subject a radical cast:

> 'the subject (of desire) is not a substance – not a thing which persists in time, but an entirely non-substantial evental entity which disappears even before it appears, which appears in /through its very disappearance, as the result of its very failure to be' (Žižek, 2014:322).

Now, while it seems unlikely that any artwork can effectuate changes as far-reaching as those sought in the cure, the argument of this thesis is that, at least for the duration of the art encounter, the subject can be transformed.

In respect of space and time – the *where* and *when* of the subject – Žižek can make an even more decisive contribution. If there is a lack in the Other, there are situations in which issues arising from the real of structural impossibility cannot be seen as a whole. As a result, we have what Žižek terms a 'parallax view', that is a 'constantly shifting perspective between two points between which no synthesis or mediation is possible' (Žižek, 2006:4). The argument here is that art in expanded cinema can be conceived as not merely registering this 'confrontation of two closely linked perspectives between which no neutral common ground is possible,' but as responding to it. Montage in *Éloge de l'amour* and *India Song* does not illustrate the parallax – what would that achieve? – nor does it circumvent the parallax to give us the whole for, if the crucial signifiers are missing from the Other, the '*parallax gap*' is 'insurmountable,' but it can free us from existing perspectives and enable us to think differently (Žižek, 2006:4).

Further, Žižek's reading of Lacan emphasises that space is organised, not just by structures such as the existence of a cleft, an 'internal limit' which prevents it being envisioned as a whole, but by significance (Žižek, 2000:29). On the psychoanalytically-inspired approaches explored in this thesis, subjects take their bearings from what they believe matters. The point can be made by Žižek's joke about the 'fool' who 'thought he was a grain of corn' (Žižek, 1989:35).

> 'After some time in a mental hospital, he was finally cured: now he knew he was not a grain but a man. So, they let him out; but soon afterwards he came running back, saying: "I met a hen and I was afraid she would eat me." The doctors tried to calm him: "But what are you afraid of? Now you know that you are not a grain but a man." The fool answered: "Yes, of course, I know that, but does the hen know that I am no longer a grain?"' (Žižek, 1989:35).

Žižek's point is that our thoughts are informed by libidinal investments. While on a conscious level one may know one is not a grain of corn, unless the libidinal investment in this belief is shifted, the delusion will persist. Consequently, space is as libidinal as it is geometric. Space is populated and the perception of space is informed

by *who* the subject takes himself, and the other denizens, to be. Little Hans, with his perception of his familial situation, inhabits a space organized around his phobic fear that the horse in the street will bite him. An SS officer perceives the space of Germany as disrupted by what he imagines is a Jewish conspiracy. This is important, for this notion of space as libidinally organised provides further grounds for my claim that psychoanalysis is of continuing interest. Let's take Kafka as an example, for *The Trial* can be read as a thinking of ways in which space can become libidinally charged.

'*The Other,'* as Laurent de Sutter so brilliantly puts it*, 'is a (practical) joke (une farce),* and it is hilarious that we continue to act as if it were not the case' (Sutter, 2017:38). Lacan, following Freud, recognised that 'the artist always precedes' the psychoanalyst (Lacan:124). In respect of *the* Other, Kafka certainly paved the way for Lacan for *The Trial* is an even more hilarious account of *the* Other's law than Lacan's teaching. Josef K, like the madman in Žižek's joke, inhabits a space organized around the supposed existence of *the* Other. He knows perfectly well he is not a grain of corn – K knows he is innocent - but fears that the Other does not know and hence tries to establish his innocence in the court system of the Other. Despite all the proof to the contrary, for example the law books, which are works of pornography, he comically persists in his belief that *the* Other does exist.

To be clear, this is not to argue that works in the mode of *bien-dire* must organise space in such a fashion. Welles' adaptation of the novel (Welles, France/Italy/Germany 1962), which constructs a cinematic space to indict the horrors of judicial systems in totalitarian regimes has an equal claim to the title '*bien-dire*'. The use of Albinoni's *Adagio* on the soundtrack may turn Kafka's comedy into a tragedy but in conjunctures where, say, oppression takes more overt forms than neurotic belief in *the* Other, that shift in tonality, like the alterations in spatial organisation, may be a more useful move. The argument is only that - developing Žižek's insights - spatial organisation can be a crucial component of the thinking which can occur in art. In much contracted cinema space is structured in forms which also prevail outside cinema, for example the fantasies subtending courtly love and fascism: but for a contingent obstacle… In expanded cinema, in contrast, spatial organisations – both geometric and libidinal - which have no anterior existence can enable forms of thought possible nowhere else. In *India Song,* for example*,* a space

is constructed by the external shots of the derelict building and the voices off that enables a thinking, which rather than delineating familiar realities, creates structures within which the issues assume a different valency.

Žižek's thinking on time is equally useful. As he emphasizes, the cure is a process. The analysand cannot reach the conclusion in one go: 'We cannot go directly for the truth' (Žižek, 1989:63). The analysand must, in the transference, imagine that the analyst is *the* Other so that at the end he can realise that *the* Other does not exist. 'We cannot bypass…the illusion proper to the transference' that the analyst is the Other who knows the truth if we are to realise there is no such god-like Other (Žižek, 1989:57). Žižek typically makes the point with a joke:

> 'Rabinovitch wants to emigrate from the Soviet Union for two reasons: "First, I fear that, if the socialist order disintegrates, all the blame for the communist crimes will be put on us, the Jews." To the state bureaucrat's objection: "But nothing will ever change in the Soviet Union! Socialism is here to stay forever!" Rabinovitch calmly answers: "This is my second reason"' (Žižek, 2012:242).

Žižek explains the purport of his example: 'The true (second) reason can be enunciated only insofar as it is produced as a reaction to the bureaucrat's rejection of the first reason' (Žižek, 2012:242). Developing Žižek's line of thought, this thesis argues that in an artwork one similarly cannot get there in one go. Indeed, in the majority of artworks there are series of 'gos'. It is these series which, at least in expanded cinema, are productive of sense and the element in which truths can appear. As in the treatment, the temporalization creates moments in which what happens acquires a new weight, force and significance. In *Éloge de l'amour* perhaps the most powerful and affecting element is the music of David Darling and Ketil Bjørnstad which, as James S. Williams remarks, provides 'its very rhythm and backbone' (Williams, 2016:149). In particular, there is a 'gentle, sparse and elegaic 25 second segment' which

> 'is heard in truncated form at the very beginning of the film and then reproduced close to twenty times in different forms, tones and volumes, sometimes interrupted or suspended, but always there and always reappearing as if new' (Williams, 2016:149).'

The argument of this thesis is that a crucial component of the work of the work of *Éloge de l'amour* is the construction of places and moments, in whose element the little phrase can occur in such a way that it revalues and is, in turn, revalued by the context.

Where, in its attempt to develop a psychoanalysis worthy of the event, this thesis goes beyond Žižek is in claiming that some artworks do not operate within existing spatio-temporal coordinates. Ordinarily, as argued above, in many social practices space is constructed by the significance of what appears and as significance alters so does the nature of the space. What matters orientates the viewer determining the points of focus, the coordinates, and the relations of figure and ground. In artworks like expanded cinema that priority can be reversed. By constructing new spaces and articulating new temporalities, art can revalue and create new forms of significance. Art as creation, not the representation or expression of the pre-existent. We shall discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.

Finally, this thesis more radically departs from Žižek in its estimate of Deleuze. As indicated in the rationale, part two argues that Deleuze is much closer to Lacan than Žižek allows, and that reading Lacan in the light of Deleuze can give us not only another Lacan but other ways of thinking the event of art. For example, in relation to the foregoing discussion of cinematic space and time, instead of thinking in terms of structures, we could usefully use the concept of *agencement*, not only because it is more dynamic and less static than the notion of structure but because it foregrounds the interaction of heterogeneous elements in reciprocally transformative ways which characterises much expanded cinema. To return to the earlier example of the musical phrase in *Éloge de l'amour*, it does not have a fixed sense or value. Instead, with each appearance, it revalues and is revalued by the narrative, the images, the citations and the other elements of the montage. Insofar as it affects and is affected by the other components of the *agencement,* it constitutes an exemplar of the forms of thought which can occur in the event(s) of expanded cinema and nowhere else.

Even more importantly, this thesis will take its distance from Žižek's unquestioned acceptance of Lacan's notion of desire as lack by asking the Nietzschean question implicit in Deleuze's thinking of desire: who desires in this

manner? Who craves wholeness and, therefore, desires an irrevocably lost object? Who yearns to be at one when being at one would be the obliteration of difference and the arrest of life? In part two of this thesis it will be argued that we will never be worthy of the events of art in the mode of *bien-dire* until we expand our conception of the range of desires in play.

Conclusion

This chapter has assayed what have been historically the most significant psychoanalytic approaches in film theory to retrieve what is of continuing value. It has argued, in relation to content-based analyses that, while they are useful in highlighting what is at issue and what gives the film its 'point', their poverty attests to the importance of the work of the work. If the Other is conceived as Ⱥ, it is impossible to tell the truth about the truths which occur in art in the mode of *bien-dire* for they are dependent upon the work of the work. Consequently, psychoanalytic approaches – like other critical approaches in this area - can, in relation to such truths, only show, not tell. However, this chapter has further demonstrated that, if the subject is '"out of joint"' (Žižek, 1999:157) and if, therefore, *the* place and *the* time do not exist, then psychoanalysis can be useful in thinking how artworks can create places and times constitutive of an element in which new truths can occur.

CHAPTER TWO: CINEMA, ANOTHER FREUD, AND 'THE LACAN EVENT'

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the possible alternatives to existing psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to film theory. To that end, it explores the prospects for a psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the event of art, taking its points of departure from the work of Freud and the 'Lacan event' (Balmès, 1999:5). Its contention is that there are resources in both which have not yet been exhausted and which suggest new directions for psychoanalytic film criticism. The chapter falls into two sections. In the first, Freud is revisited to highlight those aspects of his work which can contribute to a thinking of art as an instance of *bien-dire*. Subsequently there is an exploration of those moments from Lacan's teaching which, it is argued, are still of value in thinking about what art does – this constitutes the bulk of the chapter.

Section 1: Another Freud

This section reconsiders Freudian concepts which can still usefully orientate our thinking in regard to certain modes of textual functioning. Freud suggests that we are constantly thinking of what matters to us, for example our afflictions, losses and disappointments. Secondly, we often think of these matters in forms inimical to translation and signification. Thirdly, these styles of thought have as their affective concomitants modes of enjoyment – *jouissance* - to be found nowhere else. I argue that these ideas give us an initial approach to thinking the functioning of certain artworks as instances of *bien-dire*. Viewed in this light, art as *bien-dire* would be a way of thinking of what matters to us in forms whose sense is irreducible to signification and in styles productive of new modes of *jouissance*. The three Freudian theses cited above derive respectively from the 'canonical' books on slips, dreams and jokes (E:434). I will consider how each can contribute to the development of a psychoanalytic film criticism worthier of the event of film.

Slips

In the celebrated, opening chapter of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life,* Freud recounts how in a conversation he found he had forgotten the name of the painter of the frescoes of 'The Four Last Things' in Orvieto cathedral: Signorelli (Freud, 1901). After reconstructing the context of the lapsus, he concluded that it was derived from a desire to repress thoughts about sex and death – amongst other factors, a patient troubled by his sexual orientation had just committed suicide (Freud, 1901:39-40). In the present context the details of Freud's analysis do not concern us. Our focus is the matter of his unconscious thoughts. As Žižek has observed, Freud's analysis arrived not at a single, hidden, clear-cut meaning which was subsequently reworked in the form of the substitute names but at a 'complex rhizomatic texture' of 'associations and displacements' woven around the themes of love and death (Žižek, 2012:456). The slip did not represent a pre-given meaning but rather it was an attempt to think what cannot finally be thought through: our relation to desire and mortality. The importance of this is that it suggests that the starting point of some art works is not a pre-given thought – which criticism could unearth – but something altogether more inchoate. There is a sense in which we are always thinking about desire and death to the extent that we are always taking up an attitude to both even in our evasions and attempted forgettings. In this perspective, art is one mode of such thinking.

Dreams

Dreams provide a telling example of the continuing interest of psychoanalysis. It might appear that *The Interpretation of Dreams* has long since been exhausted by film theory (Freud, 1899). Its central thesis, namely that '*a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish*' has given rise to innumerable analyses claiming to unmask the latent meaning of texts (Freud, 1899:244). In most instances, these have diminished the text: as we shall see, *Hamlet* is not just the articulation of Oedipal desires famously identified by Freud (Freud, 1899:364). However, I argue that Freud's masterwork remains useful insofar as its claim that the dream-work,

with its mechanisms of condensation and displacement constitutes 'a particular form of thinking,' highlights the fact that thought can take many forms (Freud, 1899:650). Thinking can have objectives other than cognition and assume modes other than the propositional. My argument is not that the dream-work is similar to the art-work. As dreams like fantasies 'have always been dead-ends in cinema' they are a poor guide to the thinking which can occur in art (TRM:283). My claim is only that there are some similarities. Two are important for this thesis. As Christian Fierens has perspicaciously noted, 'essentially the dream is more movement and work than content or material,' and I will argue that the same holds for many instances of art as *bien-dire* which are more *way-making* than signification (Fierens, 2008:92). Secondly, in art, as in dreams, the thinking, to a significant degree, does not concern 'what are usually called thoughts, since what is involved is always desire' (S.1:45).

Jokes

'We have to laugh a little from time to time.'

Jacques Lacan (S.XXIII: 14)

Since jokes are central to the discussion of art elsewhere in this thesis, they will be discussed at greater length. Before coming to Freud, it is worth emphasizing that *bien-dire* in the majority of cases exists not to enable us to endure but to enjoy. Since 'the human drama is not tragedy, but comedy,' its most frequent form is that of jokes (S.X:332). As an example, consider Linda Smith's joke 'I was so happy. I had just bought this CD of whale songs. Then I got it home and found it was a dolphin tribute band' (Smith, 2018). It is impossible to live without making investments – in their absence life is pointless – but investments often turn out badly. Taking as an issue the real of the impossibility of living without disappointments, Linda Smith is worthy of the event by making something new: a joke in the form of *bien-dire*.

Bien-dire - for Lacan and this thesis - is far removed – and this cannot be emphasized too much – from any long-faced, sententious, gloomy sermonising. Cinema boasts nothing quite so witty as Duchamp's *Large Glass*, but as an example of cinematic *bien-dire* in a predominantly humorous vein let's consider the portrayal

of Falstaff in Welles's version of the battle of Shrewsbury in *Chimes at Midnight* (Welles, Spain/Switzerland 1966) which draws on *Henry IV Part One* (Shakespeare, c1597, reprinted 2002) and *Henry IV Part Two* (Shakespeare, c1597, reprinted 2016b) and *Henry V* (Shakespeare, c1597, reprinted 1995). Described on its release as the 'the most brutally sombre battle ever filmed,' (Pauline Kael, 1971:141) the sequence – in what Joseph McBride termed 'a stroke of genius' - interlaces 'the cataclysm of destruction' with shots of the 'breathtakingly funny' Falstaff – his mountainous, elderly form encased in an enormous, cumbersome suit of armour - as he waddles around intent primarily on saving his own skin but with an eye to any opportunities to filch others' glory (McBride, 1972:158). As *bien-dire*, the film addresses amongst other issues: the pain of existence – figured here by the agonies attendant on medieval warfare – and the impossibility, if the Other is barred, of finding *the* place. In the film, all of the protagonists are, to a degree out of place: Bolingbroke is troubled by his usurpation, and Hal, sowing his wild oats with Falstaff, knows duty summons him elsewhere. This theme is then taken up in the battle scene: tragically in the case of the levies encountering the unimaginable horrors of combat and comically in the case of Falstaff's fish out of water. Crucially for our concern with the role of *jouissance* in *bien-dire* the thinking is cinematic. The film does not simply represent and thereby impart knowledge about medieval warfare and the problematic nature of socially assigned roles, rather it constitutes a form of cinematic thinking. Through the figuration, for example Welles's performance in the preposterously large, ill-fitting suit of armour and the creation of moments and places by the montage, that cinematic thinking is elaborated on two lines: one tragic the other comic. AND not IS. Each is what Welles makes of the real. Welles does not discover the humour in the issues but rather creates it through a form of thought unique to cinema.

The claim of psychoanalysis to be of continuing interest in this regard rests on Freud's *Jokes and their Relation with the Unconscious* for it is as useful in thinking the nature of art as of humour (Freud, 1905b). Ernst Gombrich famously suggested it is the most important work of Freud for aesthetic theory (Ernst Gombrich cited in Van Haute and Geyskens, 2012:68) and more recently Philippe Van Haute and Tomas Geyskens have similarly argued that Freud's text 'is *the* book on sublimation and

Freudian aesthetics' (Van Haute and Geyskens, 2012:68). This thesis concurs, arguing that the text is of continuing interest but at the same time, argues that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must take account of the book's limitations. Freud famously distinguished two principal forms of jokes: firstly, the playful, such as puns and secondly the tendentious. In the latter case, jokes like slips and dreams constituted compromise formations whose form allowed the expression in a socially acceptable fashion of aggressive and transgressive erotic impulses. A joke – in the majority of instances – he wrote 'is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defence) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure)' (Freud, 1905b:140).

In every instance form is crucial. Jokes succeed because of what Freud terms the "'joke-work"' (Freud, 1905b:91). Consider, as an example, a joke related by Simon Hoggart:

> 'an ageing actor is 'taking a melancholy drink with an eager young newcomer. "I've had some terrible times in the theatre," he says, "Take the night we played *Goodnight Vienna* in Accrington. There were three people in the audience: the heroine's mother, the local paper reviewer, and a tramp who'd come in to keep warm."
>
> "Gosh, sir," says the newcomer. "Was that the worst night you've ever spent in the theatre?"
>
> "No. That was when we played *Goodnight Accrington* in Vienna."' (Hoggart, 2011:5).

As Freud pointed out, there is nothing inherently amusing in the content of jokes such as Hoggart's. It could be summarised as follows: the actor told the young man that the Viennese audience for *Goodbye Accrington* had been even less appreciative than the Accrington audience for *Goodbye Vienna*. While the joke is amusing, the summary is not. Although the propositional content of the joke and the summary are the same, the effect is very different – the former is amusing the latter is not. Something is achieved by the work of the work – which in this case makes the joke an instance of *bien-dire*.

The argument of this thesis is that psychoanalysis is of continuing interest in this regard not simply because of Freud's focus on form – the notion that form is

central to art is a commonplace – but because Freud's work brings out the interdependence of form and what is usually called 'content' but which here is conceived as the issue(s). While 'technique' is indispensable – as Deleuze observed, 'there is no imagination outside of technique'- unless connected to an issue, it achieves no more than the Wittgensteinian wheel discussed above (TP:345). Further Lacanian psychoanalysis (implicitly) rethinks the form/content distinction. If there is a lack in the Other, if there are issues which we must address and, therefore, have addressed, form in art does not impose itself on pre-existing content. Rather it rethinks an issue which has already been thought but in a more joyful form.

Of course, this is not to say that psychoanalysis is the last word. On the contrary, the second argument of this thesis is that art points up the limitations of psychoanalysis and Freud's work on jokes, for all its brilliance is a good example. For Freud's focus on the erotic and aggressive wellsprings of tendentious jokes, and his thesis that such jokes are pleasurable because their forms disguise their intent to the extent that the energy normally expended in repression is released as a form of satisfaction, has missed the achievement of style in the jokes – and, by implication, the artworks - which are instances of *bien-dire*.

Art after Freud

'It must puzzle us to know what thinking is,
if Shakespeare and Dante did not do it.'
Lionel Trilling (Trilling,1950:286)

Bringing the three texts of Freud together, a model of certain modes of aesthetic functioning as instances of *bien-dire* emerges. On this model, as Freud's slip reminds us, the artwork begins from our dilemmas, predicaments, and plight, that is from the existence of issues to which we cannot remain indifferent. As *bien-dire*, art answers not with a formula or precept but with an evaluation. Old age can serve as an example. The elderly, of necessity must adopt an attitude to growing infirmity and decrepitude. Art in the form of *bien-dire* is one of the innumerable ways of forming such an attitude. The obvious extra-cinematic examples are the self-portraits

produced by Rembrandt in his old age. They function not to depict old age – what purpose would that serve? – but to find a way of thinking it without evasion. A cinematic example of *bien-dire* as a thinking of the self-same issue is *Amour* (Haneke, France/Germany/Austria 2012). The film concerns an octogenarian Parisian couple, Anne and Georges. After Anne suffers a stroke she is hospitalised. The experience is so horrible she persuades her husband to promise that she will never return. Consequently, as her condition deteriorates, as she becomes increasingly paralysed, incontinent and demented, Georges must assume the entire burden of nursing her. Finally, as her suffering and distress become insupportable, he accedes to the wish she had expressed while still lucid, that in such circumstances she be allowed to die. Hence the title: love is not the romantic couple in one another's arms but a pillow over the face of a beloved partner in an unendurable situation. Although the film is 'unflinching' (D. Calhoun cited in Grønstad, 2013:187) it is not depressing for it affirms the fact that love, contra Lacan, is not merely giving what one 'does not have' (E:580).

In respect of dreams, the argument is that as a unique form of thought they indicate the existence of others which, similarly accomplish something which can be accomplished nowhere else: for example, art. As an example, consider the role of paradox, a topic usefully explored by Jacques-Alain Miller. He takes as his point of departure the thesis of Ricardo Piglia that at the centre of any story is a paradox. (Miller, J-A., 2006:11). For example, a Chekhovian story could have as its 'nucleus': 'A man goes to the casino at Monte Carlo, wins a million, returns to his place and commits suicide' (Miller, J-A., 2006:11-12). Such a narrative 'always tells two stories at the same time' (Miller, J-A., 2006:12). In narratives of this kind, the elements and events 'are inscribed in two narrative registers which are at the same time distinct, simultaneous, and antagonistic' (Miller, J-A., 2006:12). For our purposes what matters is that the forms of thinking in certain artworks, while illogical by everyday standards, have a logic of their own, where the sense is in the relationship between two contradictory positions. Better, I want to argue, that certain artworks hinge on the ultimately undefinable relationship between determinate elements, in which a logic unique to narrative operates. As a literary example consider Isabel Archer in Henry James' *Portrait of a Lady* (James, 1881). She has every reason not to go back

to her repellent husband Gilbert Osmond, for in deceiving and betraying her he has revealed himself to be a calculating and loathsome creature, yet she returns. Psychologically this is implausible and commentators have struggled to come up with an explanation. Paradoxically, it is the absence of a persuasive account of her motivation which lends the text its force. The impossibility of our fathoming her decision is the possibility of the text figuring/thinking what can be thought in no other form, for example, what Lacan terms 'the love/hate ambivalence' (S.VIII:89) which characterizes so many of the sexual relationships of subjects who are never wholly at one with either self or other (S.VIII:89). This is equally evident in a cinematic example: *The Searchers* (Ford, USA, 1956). The narrative centres on Ethan Edwards whose determination, to avenge the murder of the woman he loved by a Comanche war party, extends to the ambition to murder his niece Debbie, as she has been abducted by the Comanche and raised as one of their own. But, when the opportunity finally presents itself, he has a psychologically implausible change of heart and, lifting her in his arms says 'Let's go home Debbie.' While as psychologically unconvincing as Isabel's choice, this reversal has a similar narrative force. Again, a paradoxical truth arises from ambivalence – while the subject may desire *the* place as the end of a supposed exile, its very existence depends on its absence, that is, on the difference between any place and *the* place. The work of the work is not to represent this truth but to make something new of it, that is, a sense, by finding a passage through the impasse. The truth is not a thesis but the passage enabled by the work of the work and the life this process allows. *Bien-dire* in such art forms furnishes not truths to live by but truths to live for – truths which are lost as soon as found and which consequently must be perpetually rethought to be regained (differently).

This brings us to jokes. The argument is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art, it could, in many instances, usefully take as its point of departure Freud's joke book. The claim is not that jokes and artworks, when *bien-dire*, are one and the same – they cannot be conflated – but that the study of jokes can point up certain forms of textual functioning, which, not least because they are in plain sight, tend to be ignored. The first is that if a joke works it is because it makes something new of an issue which concerns us. A joke begins by figuring the issue either in

existing terms or a new form created by the joke. Staying with the Accrington example above, the joke matters to us because to be a social being is to be a performer. As Orson Welles reportedly observed, 'everyone acts all the time' – 'in each and every conversation we're busy performing ourselves' (Orson Welles cited Newton, 2015:14). And this is not without mishap: many of us, while playing Vienna, have, unhappily, performed *Goodbye Accrington*. A second example, a Barry Cryer joke, can underline the point:

> 'A man became increasingly annoyed by his parrot which would not stop swearing. Finally, he said to the bird, "If you don't stop swearing I'll put you in the fridge for 5 minutes." As the parrot persisted, the man lost his temper and placed the parrot in the fridge. After five minutes, he opened the fridge door and said "Do you promise to stop swearing?" The parrot nodded his assent so the man let him out. As he exited, the parrot asked "What did he do?" indicating the frozen chicken on the shelf behind.' (Cryer, 2016).

In this instance, the issue is the opacity of the Other. If there is a lack in the Other and, in consequence, we are not transparent to one another, then, interpretations based on our own limited experience, like that of the parrot, can seriously mislead. The joke displaces previous figurations of the issue – for example, Lear's question to the homeless Edgar: 'Didst thou give all to thy daughters?' - so that we can relate to the question differently (Shakespeare, King Lear, act 3, scene 4, line no 48). Crucially, the figuration is only the initial move for the figuration does not just revalue the issue, it constructs spaces and temporalities in which we can make further moves creative of further relationships. The punchline of a joke is not inherently amusing. The humour is contingent upon the hour and the place. Hence the frequent comment when somebody relates a joke which now seems rather flat: 'You had to be there.' Reputedly during the Apollo 11 mission, when Armstrong and Aldrin returned from the lunar surface and docked with the command module, Collins the commander of the module asked, 'Who's there?' Now plainly there is nothing inherently amusing in that question - in many contexts, for example the opening of *Hamlet*, it is bereft of humour (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 1, line no 1) but, in those circumstances, it was undeniably witty (and a fine illustration of the fact that *bien-dire* is ultimately nothing less than a way of being as alive as circumstances allow). For present

purposes, the key point is that a specific temporal context is essential to the success of many jokes and that the *when* and *where* of a joke can be constructed. Collins' witticism was a response to a pre-existing situation but, in much comedy, the space and time is created by, say, a stand-up comedian, who establishes a certain identity *vis à vis* her audience, and positions the audience at a moment and place such that her final utterance becomes a punchline. To summarise: the work of a joke consists in the figuration of an issue and the construction of a space and moment in which the style of the joke can impart a new sense and import to the real occasioning the joy of laughter.

A psychoanalytic criticism seeking to be worthy of the event of art, when *bien-dire*, should take account of the form assumed by the thinking in jokes. Such artworks, like jokes, begin by figuring an issue of concern – without which the work holds no interest. The figuration makes something new of the issue by speaking of it in a particular style. If, for example, the issue of the opacity of the Other and the perils of (mis)interpretation is treated comically – as in the balcony scene in *Annie Hall* (Allen, USA 1977) where the subtitles to the conversation between Woody and Annie reveal the misrecognitions of self and other in play – or tragically – as in *Chinatown (*Polanski, USA 1974*)* where the detective thinks he knows what is going on and this leads to the death of his lover – different evaluations come into play. The work of the work can *achieve* more than the representation of realities with an existing currency or the reiteration of truths with a pre-existing valency; it can be a form of thinking creative of new truths, senses, attitudes, evaluations and orientations. Integral to this making new is the construction of times and places in which elements, at moments constituted within this textual operation, like the punchlines of jokes, can take on a significance which subsists nowhere else. In other words, jokes remind us that in certain artworks while the issue – the *what* – counts, *who* the subject becomes as a function of *how*, *where* and *when* he or she happens also determine how that issue matters. In both cases, a sense can be created which had no anterior existence and which largely dissipates after the duration of the work.

'Sense' in this context is to be distinguished from meaning. Where meaning is a product of signifying systems, sense is a function of a particular form or style of life, in psychoanalytic terms of particular libidinal dispositions. While meaning is

always available to and transmissible between competent language-users, sense is not. If overtaken by circumstances, a subject may find sense has disappeared. Consider the following clinical vignette from Darian Leader:

> 'When she was fourteen, her father had died of cancer, yet no one in the family had told her either what he was suffering from or that it would prove fatal. She knew that he was unwell, yet the news of his death came as a dreadful and unpredicted shock. She had assumed all along that she would see him soon, yet when she was led out of the classroom at school to receive the bad news, it was as if, she said, "nothing made sense anymore"' (Leader, 2009:23).

As this episode demonstrates, sense is not a given; it can be lost. Without libidinal investments existence is bereft of significance or point: it is libidinal investments which colour what would otherwise be the world's blank canvas. The corollary of this is that when libidinally invested hopes, projects and activities do not turn out as intended, when there are setbacks, losses and disappointments, sense can vanish. Libidinal investments then become difficult to sustain and existence can appear futile. Sense is dependent on a form of life so, when that form of life becomes impossible, sense can drain from the world – the fate, as we shall discuss later in this chapter of Hamlet (Freud, 1917:255).

Developing Lacan's notion of a 'difference' (Lacan, 2001a:479), even an 'antinomy' (Lacan, 2001a:480) between sense and signification, the argument of this section of the thesis is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the thinking which occurs in the event of art, it should recognize that art can be one of the forms of life in which sense is created or recreated. While it would be absurd and, indeed offensive, to suggest that art is *the* way to deal with the real when sense has been lost – there are innumerable ways - I contend that for certain individuals in certain circumstances art in the form of *bien-dire* can be a way of thinking the real in which a new sense can be won. Just as laughter takes innumerable forms, so does sense. In some instances, the sense created by an artwork may dispel the affliction of senselessness but more usually the sense created displaces an existing sense which has come to impede, hobble and impair. Psychoanalysis for Lacan entails 'the subversion of sense,' that is, it undermines the sense the analysand has made of

things, self and other so that the analysand has the chance of finding another path. In translating this approach to thinking about art the danger is of undervaluing the sense(s) which can be created by artworks (Lacan, 2010a:13). Sense can be a prison. As a stark example, consider John Musgrave a veteran of Vietnam. After a near-fatal wound, he was invalided out of the Marine Corps, became a university student and began to read books about the war. When he concluded that he could no longer defend the US presence in Vietnam, this realisation, compounded with survivor guilt, triggered an overwhelming depression. He constantly contemplated suicide for, as he said, 'at the time it just made so much sense' (John Musgrave cited in *The Vietnam War,* 2017). If that sense stands at one pole, at the other can be found the sense which can be created by art, say a late Beethoven quartet. The sense symptomatic of Musgrave's dreadful depression is to be distinguished from that which can be produced in the event of art (and, of course, myriad other activities - for example, in Musgrave's case, his eventual commitment to, and participation in the anti-war movement may have helped him overcome his illness). Sense viewed through the optic of the treatment may be suspect but elsewhere, far from blocking progress, it may occasion it. Outside the cure, sense can unburden as well as burden. As we shall explore in chapter five, sense can be the counterpart of what Deleuze terms belief 'in this world' (C2:171-2). The paradox is that, if there is a lack in the Other, components of that sense, in art works like *The Portrait of a Lady*, *The Searchers*, and *Éloge de l'amour,* will be opaque and enigmatic.

To conclude: this section has made the case for the continuing importance of psychoanalysis by arguing that jokes in the style of *bien-dire* are often the most useful starting-point for thinking about artworks in that register. Such jokes revalue – make something different of – an issue, produce, however briefly, a new sense with a correlative, again often transient, transformation of subjectivity and, most importantly, create joy in the form of laughter. Similarly, the work of the work in art, such as Godard's, does not merely acknowledge, register, reflect or represent an issue but makes something new of it. The further argument of this section – and of the thesis – is that psychoanalysis lacks concepts worthy of the sense(s) and joy(s) created by this process and must, therefore, learn from Deleuze.

Section 2. Cinema and 'the Lacan event.'

'Take my honey such as I offer it to you
and try to put it to some use.'
Jacques Lacan (S.III:150)

This section grounds the claim that Lacan's work is of continuing importance by showing how his 'honey' can be put to use in thinking about art and more particularly cinema. As always with psychoanalysis, the emphasis is on singularities so no general methodology is proposed. Instead the chapter considers approaches from different moments of his teaching. It begins with the most important feature of his teaching, his style, before examining how the 'essential registers of human reality: the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real' could be used to develop a thinking worthier of the event of cinema (Lacan, 2005a:4).

Lacan's Style

The argument of this section is that a psychoanalytic thinking which seeks to be worthy of the event of art should begin not from any particular psychoanalytic theory but from the style of Lacan's teaching. The importance of Lacan's statement: 'I don't have a "conception of the world," but I have a style,' (Lacan 2013b:13) at least in the context of psychoanalytic thinking on art, cannot be exaggerated (Lacan 2013b:13). Lacan's teaching is notoriously 'opaque' (Porge, 2000:7). As he himself acknowledged, his 'books are called incomprehensible' (Lacan, 2015:16). Responding to this 'legendary difficulty' by imagining that the supposed obfuscation can be set aside to reveal a clear and systematic set of theories is the biggest mistake a reader of Lacan can make (Lee, 1990:8). While it is possible, and indeed necessary to abstract the theories, pronouncements, precepts, mathemes, hypotheses which are the stuff of all the handbooks, to read Lacan solely for his theories is rather like going to opera for the plot. While the plot matters, rather more is going on than a plot outline would suggest. Similarly, with Lacan's teaching, although theories are advanced, more is happening.

Three aspects of the Lacan event are particularly relevant. First, Lacan cited his own 'practice' as an instance of *bien-dire*: 'the ethic of the Well-Spoken' (T:41). Although it begins from the – frequently unimaginable - pain and horror disclosed in the clinic, it does not capitulate to the misery disclosed therein. Like Sophoclean tragedy in the face of suffering, he finds a way of speaking which is ultimately exhilarating and affirmative. 'If psychoanalysis is a source of truth,' he insisted, 'it is also a source of wisdom' and 'all wisdom is a gay *savoir*. It is being opened up, it subverts, it sings, it instructs, it laughs' (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2016:47). As such – and this is the second point – he does not merely claim that signifiers can have an effect which surpasses what can be understood, he demonstrates it. Lacan's teaching is not 'altogether easy' because it is premised on the assumption that signifiers can engage in such work only if they are freed from existing meanings (Lacan, 2013b:13). In this context, there is the danger that meaning can short circuit thinking. To avoid that risk, Lacan's style is pitted, as Bruce Fink underlines, 'against understanding' (Fink, 2014). While there are innumerable activities where the precise transmission and communication of information and knowledge is an essential and indispensable part of social existence, in the psychoanalytic treatment, existing meanings and, more importantly, the significance with which they have been endowed, are part of the problem. If the sense the analysand has ascribed to his or her existence and world was working, he or she would not be in analysis. 'Something that you understand nothing about,' Lacan observed, 'is full of hope.' He explained: 'it is fortunate if you have understood nothing, because you can only ever understand what is already in your head' (Lacan, 2013c:23). 'The Gay Science,' on his account is 'not understanding, not a diving at the meaning' but rather 'a flying over' the signifiers in question 'as low as possible without the meaning gumming up' the process (T:22). To enable his analysands to break with what was already in their heads, Lacan would, for example, make an equivocal remark or end the session thereby giving a new sense, value, and force to whatever the analysand had just enunciated. To ensure that the audiences at his seminar could not assimilate his teaching to existing forms of knowledge, he constantly wrong-footed them by departing in unexpected directions. Surprise was as much a feature of his seminars as it is of jokes and artworks which are similarly instances of *bien-dire*.

Placing Lacan's teaching in a Nietzschean perspective, it becomes apparent that being-active is an indispensable feature of his teaching. In contrast to the neurotics and phobics confined to travelling in physical and psychical areas as circumscribed as those of Little Hans, Lacan is always underway differently, always making something new of psychoanalysis. Where the truths in many disciplines possess a measure of permanence and persist, at least for a period, the truths of analysis are 'always new.' 'Analytic discourse implies a promise: to promote a novelty' (T:28). Such truths are of moment only in the moment: they have to be perpetually won again, and in a new form. Similarly, there are truths in art which depend upon the work of the work and which must be perpetually recreated. In respect of such truths, psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the event must recognise the impossibility of a metalanguage. As with the truths in analysis, '*il n'y a pas de vrai sur le vrai*' [there is no truth about the truth] (Lacan, 2007:14). Hence in relation to the event of art, we can, as emphasised above, only show not tell.

The Imaginary

In support of the claim that psychoanalysis is not yet exhausted, this section considers the pivotal notion of his conception of the imaginary, the mirror stage, and argues that even this, the most familiar of Lacan's concepts, can still be put to innovative use in thinking the thinking which occurs in the event of art. If there is a lack in the Other, neither the signifier nor the image to represent the subject exist. 'The subject (of desire)' is as we have seen 'a question without an answer' (Schuster, 2016:165). To answer that question – who am I (for the Other)? - the neonate typically resorts to an identification with an idealised, unified image. As, for Lacan, 'there is no One but in mathematics', this is a misrecognition (Jacques Lacan cited in Chiesa, 2005:163). When the child looking at its image in the mirror says 'that's me' it has not discovered its true self but constituted a narcissistic fiction. 'Once things are structured in a certain imaginary intuition, they seem to have been there from the beginning, but that is a mirage' (S.2:312). There are no identities in Lacan's teaching, only identifications. Importantly for what follows, the relationship elucidated in the mirror stage is not dyadic. Desire is desire of the Other insofar as

the child seeks to secure the love of the Other and fashions its narcissistic self-image in the terms he or she presumes will secure that love. According to Lacan, this explains why, after identifying with the specular image, the child turns to the adult supporting him or her 'and who here represents the big Other, to ratify the value of this image' (S.X:32).

The import of this for cinema is clear. The *raison d'être* for the majority of cinema is to afford spectators the opportunity to respond to the real as impossible by identifying with an idealised figure. Typically, this figure is as invincible in the face of his or her foes as the spectator's narcissism becomes in the course of the narrative. By itself, this is an argument for the continuing importance of psychoanalysis in thinking about cinema, for identification with an idealised figure is the fulcrum of textual functioning in the majority of films. In support of the contention that psychoanalysis is not exhausted this section seeks to go beyond this commonplace. The mirror stage hinges on the constitutive nature of desire. As we have seen, the child imagines it has discovered its real self but the image is a fiction constituted by narcissistic desire. For 70s theorists such desires were productive only of illusions, however there is nothing in principle to prevent desire constituting selves and realities other than those proposed by some putative dominant ideology. A psychoanalysis worthy of the event of art should recognize that art, when *bien-dire*, can create and displace both existing subjectivities and prevailing realities. Indeed, the notion of art as *bien-dire* hinges on the claim the subject can become other. If *bien-dire*, in say *India Song* works, it is by transforming the spectator.

Correlatively in *bien-dire* the reality inhabited by the subject may be transformed. 'The real,' Lacan taught, 'is to be distinguished from reality' (Lacan, 2001a:408). 'The little we know about the real,' he said, 'shows its antinomy to all verisimilitude' (S.XI:ix). Any 'reality system, however far it is developed, leaves an essential part of what belongs to the real a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure principle' (S.XI:55). In other words, desire, in some measure, informs any perception of reality. This is a matter of everyday observation. Recall, for example, Saint Loup's overvaluation of Rachel in *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu*. When introduced to her, the narrator recognises a prostitute he had encountered in a brothel who charged 40 francs. This reality escapes Saint Loup who knows nothing of her past. In his

infatuation he considers her 'worth more than a million' beyond price; his desire colours his perception (Proust, 1920:213). The significance of this commonplace is its suggestion that, if an artwork can inaugurate desires – and this thesis claims it can – it is not limited to the exhibition of some pre-given reality: it can open on to new realities.

This is not to argue that film as *bien-dire* cannot or should not deal in selves and realities with an existing currency. Being worthy of what happens to us often requires exactly that kind of intervention. The fundamental lesson of the Hommel episode is that each subject and every situation is different and that interventions should be fashioned accordingly. What is useful depends on circumstances. In many, if not most conjunctures, *bien-dire* will present recognizable subjects and realities. Nor is it to argue that identification may serve no useful function. Politically it may be important for a social stratum to have images in which they can 'recognize' themselves. Films which encourage identifications with protagonists who are the victims of oppression like *I, Daniel Blake* can be politically progressive. Just as identification with an ideal may enhance performance in music, sports and drama so identification with an ideal may inspire politically. As Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge, the establishment of identities can be politically indispensable (TP:276).

Similarly, just as identifications can be useful, so essentialisations – the positing of essences - may be indispensable. Indeed, many films seek to achieve closure not with a 'That's me' but with a 'That's it': the sense that's how things ultimately stand. *The Conformist* ends with just such a summative shot. As we have seen, Marcello's craving for normality is motivated, in large part, by his belief that he has murdered the chauffeur. Pasqualino. At the end of the film, in July 1943, when Mussolini has been overthrown, Marcello encounters Pasqualino trying to pick up a boy and denounces him to anti-fascist demonstrators as responsible for the murder of Professor Quadri. He then sits down behind a row of bars in the shadows cast by a fire before turning to look at the camera. Earlier in the film, Marcello, while recalling Quadri's lectures on Plato, had re-enacted the allegory of the cave by closing the shutters of the professor's study thereby, through the *mise en scène*, turning the room into a cave and himself into an evanescent shadow. Now, in the final shot, the

trope is repeated. Trapped like Plato's enchained prisoners and with a fire the sole light source he is depicted as seeing 'only the "shadows of things"' (Restivo, 2010:174). So, the final shot essentialises: the central truth of the narrative is that Marcello is still imprisoned by illusion.

In considering the value of this strategy, as always with psychoanalysis, one must proceed case by case. The conclusion of *Tree of the Wooden Clogs* essentialises – the truth about the quasi-feudal society is injustice – but is a paradigmatic instance of *bien-dire*. In contrast, the summative shot of *The Conformist*, by comparison with the modes of thought operative elsewhere in the text, seems trite. And this makes my argument, namely that while, on occasion, identifications with idealized figures and the determination of 'essences' can be useful, elsewhere it can put thinking into a stall. In films like *Éloge de l'amour* and *India Song* while some modes of thought determine (essentialise) in relation to questions around capitalism and imperialism, other, non-propositional modes of thinking can open, in the *agencement* of the art-encounter, on to a becoming-other untrammelled by identifications.

The symbolic

This section considers the value of Lacan's concept of the symbolic, that is, the laws and value systems, the prescriptions and proscriptions, in which one is situated in any social setting; the norms, values and ideals which, in whatever historically specific form, always obtain. Earlier it was suggested that art could be seen as the strife, not as in Heidegger between earth and world, but between the real and the symbolic where the real is that of the body and the symbolic is language insofar as it subjects. On this account, it might appear that art is an insurrection driven by the difference between the subject and the place assigned. The argument here is that psychoanalysis, in this regard, has a continuing claim upon our attention because of its capacity to go beyond such simplistic thinking.

Language, as Lacan's teaching in the early 50s emphasizes, is, for the most part, a boon. In contrast to Freud, Lacan sees the initial relationship between mother or care-giver and child as troubled. Where Freud emphasized the experience of satisfaction, Lacan stresses the problematic nature of the situation (Leader, 2011:58-

63). As with Little Hans, the child is tormented by the turmoil produced by its conflicting drives, wishes and impulses and by anxiety-provoking questions as to what the (m)Other wants. If there is a lack in the Other, then the desires of the principal care-giver are opaque – what accounts for his or her absences and what is the nature of his or her desire? For Lacan, as Harari puts it, the child experiences not 'a warm foetal ambiance' but an 'anxiety-provoking threat coming from the desire of an Other who devours' (Harari, 2001:218). To cope with this turbulence, the child requires 'something that maintains a relation, a function, and a distance' (S.III:96). This structure is provided by language which introduces 'a degree of stability in interhuman relationships' (S.III:99). 'The signifier is conciliatory' (Silvestre, 1987:306). Without language, 'we would remain in a world with no mediation between ourselves and the mother' (Leader, 2011:65).

To describe this process, Lacan reworks Freud's conception of the Oedipus complex. On his account, by identifying with the name-of-the-Father, the child is able both to find an answer to the question of what the mother wants beyond him or herself and to secure an anchorage in language (E:230, 464-5, 723). To stave off chaos 'there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father.' He continues: 'The order that prevents the collision and explosion of the situation as a whole is founded on the existence of this name of the father' (S.III:96). At best, where the father cannot fulfil his symbolic role, the child, like Little Hans, 'is completely adrift at the whim of his mother' (Lacan, 1961-62: Session of 20/12/61 p. 3). At worst, if the arch of language is missing its keystone, the name-of-the father, psychosis impends. This gives us a first approach to textual functioning. If the first task of the subject is to stave off psychosis, the first of an artwork is to install sufficient structure to fend off chaos. In other words, prior to any other undertaking, a text establishes a structure in whose absence nothing can be achieved. As we shall see, structuration alone is deadening – to work an artwork has to be coupled with flows which escapes it: lines of flight. However, before coming to that let's consider the problematic nature of language.

If language is a boon it is also a bane for language is the language of the Other. Language is not first an instrument for communication it is a set of injunctions. 'The voice at issue here is the voice as an imperative, a voice that demands obedience or

conviction' (S.X:276). As Lacan puts it 'language with its structure, exists prior to each subject's entry into it' (E:413) and 'everything personal' which happens to a human being is 'located in relation to the law to which he is bound,' that is, the laws implicitly and explicitly set out in language (S.I:197). Every child is born into a situation where a 'place is already inscribed…even if only in the form of his proper name' (E:414). The hopes, fears and expectations around a child's birth inhere in the name ascribed, the place assigned and the ideals held out. 'First of all,' Lacan said the child hears 'a Thou art' (S.X:272). He or she is assigned an identity with which, if the Other of language is missing *the* signifier, there can be no coincidence.

A further consequence of the absence of *the* signifier from the Other is that the 'symbolic universe…is not the same for everyone' (S.I:197). A subject does not encounter *the* symbolic but a singular symbolic. 'Symbolic networks are constantly mutating' (Dean, 2000:59). The symbolic encountered by Stephen Daedalus with his devout mother and alcoholic, spendthrift father is very different from that experienced by Proust's narrator with his over-anxious mother and inconsistent father. As Lacan remarks, 'to use the "the" is always suspect,' *the* symbolic order does not exist: there are only symbolics (Jacques Lacan, 2010a:13). Some are preposterous like the demands of Miranda in *The Devil Wears Prada*, (Frankel, USA 2006) some are cruel like Moran's in Beckett's *Molloy* (Beckett, 1959) and others are deranged like the doctor's restriction of Woyzeck to a diet of peas before, of course, going on to mutton.

As the Other is lacking every social being is subjected to a language which is not *the* language. Hence Lacan writes, 'man is the subject captured and tortured by language' (S.III:243). Fastening on this, Žižek writes that 'Lacan varies Heidegger's motif of language as the house of being' by characterizing 'this house as a torture-house' (Žižek, 2012:870). But this is a foreshortened view – it is always dangerous to take one of Lacan's pronouncements in isolation. To read Lacan in this manner is to ignore the 'gay sçavoir' of his style: Lacan's seminars are no torture-house. As Freud famously observed in *The Question of Lay Analysis*, while 'words can […] cause terrible wounds' they can also 'do unspeakable good.' 'Originally' he continued, 'the word was magic – a magical act; and it has retained much of its ancient power' (Freud, 1926:188). The Other is lacking but it is nevertheless 'the treasure trove of

signifiers' (E: 682). If, on the one hand, there is a lack, insofar as the words to say it all are missing, on the other, there is an excess of signifiers over signifieds, opening up new possibilities. As 'the relationship between signifier and signified is not one to one,' as no signifier is tied to a signified, signifiers have the capacity to enter new compositions and create something new (S.III:119). Indeed, as Fierens remarks, the defining feature of a signifier is the capacity to make 'something other' (Fierens, 2010:139). Reworking Saussure's linguistics, Lévi-Strauss argued that the 'non-equivalence' or 'non-fit' (Lévi-Strauss, 1950:62) between the series of signifiers and signifieds, coupled with the existence within any language system of a floating signifier - that is 'a sign marking the necessity of a supplementary symbolic content over and above that which the signified already contains' - was the possibility of creation (Lévi-Strauss, 1950:64). Consequently, there is what could be termed a degree of 'play' in any system that is 'the disability of all finite thought (but also the surety of all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention)' (Lévi-Strauss, 1950:63). In short, the existence of a lack, an excess and an irreducible difference in the Other of language is the possibility of creation. If words can torture, they can equally free. The citations with which Godard's films brim are, to borrow and adapt a phrase of Joyce, *'not fragments but active elements'* creative of the new (James Joyce cited in Crispi et al., 2007:14). The *bien-dire* of Godard, Joyce and Lacan allows something of the life denied by the words of the Other. In Hemingway's short story *The Light of the World* – a young Nick Adams and his friend Tom become caught up in a conversation in a railway waiting room. What the other passengers say bespeaks egocentricity, self-delusion, pettiness and cruelty. As Nick and Tom make to leave, one of them asks, '"Which way are you boys going?"' and Tom replies: '"The other way to you"' (Hemingway, 1946:363). Art as *bien-dire* can be that way. What is the work of Joyce but his taking an 'other way' from that of Dubliners? In Nietzschean terms: art as '*countermovement*' (Nietzsche, 1911:419).

Deleuze similarly conceives of language as primarily comprising imperatives. He and Guattari claim that 'the elementary unit of language – the statement – is the order-word.' 'Language,' they continue, 'is made not to be believed, but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience' (TP:76) Deleuze also agrees that words can ward off chaos (TP:76). Elaborating on the Joycean notion of an artwork as 'a chaosmos, a

composed chaos,' he insists 'art is not chaos but a composition of chaos' (WP:204). Where, within the perspective of this consonance, he can contribute to a psychoanalysis to come, is in his rendering explicit the pragmatics implicit in every line of Lacan. To understand how language functions it is crucial, he insisted, to take into account the (always) singular circumstances in which an utterance occurs. Instead of merely asking what an enunciation signifies we should have regard to the extra-linguistic context. Consider Deleuze's example: '"I love you."' This phrase, which is, of course, a cinematic commonplace, 'has neither meaning nor subject nor addressee outside of circumstances' (TP:82). Its significance depends on *who* enunciates the words and *where*, *when* and *how* they are uttered. Psychoanalysis is cognisant of this. It recognises that when, for example, the artist Robert Rauschenberg was told 'I never liked you, you son of a bitch,' the force, value and sense of the enunciation derived not just from the signification but from the pragmatics of the situation: the fact that his interlocutor was his father and the words were uttered by the latter on his deathbed (Laing, 2016:16). The argument of this thesis is that psychoanalysis should similarly bear pragmatics in mind when considering the event of art. On occasion, the sense, value and force of signifiers can count more than any signified and those forces are often, in large part, a function of the *who*, *where, when* and *how*.

Even more importantly, Deleuze can contribute the notion of the 'pass-word' (TP:110). Pass-words do not constitute a separate set of words rather they are words which can be extracted from order-words by making order-words function differently. As every word 'undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other' to 'draw out the revolutionary potentiality of the order-word' and to 'transform the compositions of order into components of passage' (TP:110). Now this is precisely how I have argued psychoanalysis should conceive the achievement of art as *bien-dire*: the transformation – albeit probably only for the duration of the work – of impasse into passage. When enunciating order-words, the subject of enunciation, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, 'does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow' (TP:276). As psychoanalysis has it, the signifiers 'mortify' (E:513) and 'petrify' (E:714). But my argument is that, with pass-words, *bien-*

dire can reinvigorate the flow of desire in a becoming creative of new senses and values.

As an indication of how these considerations could shape a psychoanalytic approach, let's consider a text which foregrounds the problems posed by symbolic orders which are further than many from being *the* symbolic: *Woyzeck* (Herzog, Germany 1979). Adapting Büchner's unfinished play, it figures the absence of *the* place through the predicament of Woyzeck, a soldier who is subjected not just to military discipline but to the demands of the captain, and the doctor. To earn extra money for his family he acts as the captain's barber and allows the doctor to use him for his experiments. Both humiliate. At the same time, it deals with a further problem posed by the lack in the Other: the discordance of desires. Woyzeck lives with Marie and their child but Marie is seduced by the drum major. When Woyzeck discovers the affair, he murders Marie and, in trying to hide the evidence of his crime, drowns. This figuration allows the creation of a chaosmos. The cosmos of life in a provincial garrison town is rent by the chaotic passions of Marie and Woyzeck and everyday discourse is shattered by Woyzeck's psychotic episodes when he hears voices and hallucinates in forms which are at once insane and violently poetic. In Herzog's version, the *bien-dire* assumes the form of critique: he indicts the injustice suffered by Woyzeck which he then visits so cruelly on Marie. If there is a lack in the Other, more than one style of *bien-dire* is possible in relation to the issues. In Berg's version, the *bien-dire* takes a very different form (Berg, 1925). Where the Herzog film ends with the official investigation of the crime and the inability of bureaucrats to take the measure of what has happened, at the conclusion of Berg's opera, Marie's son is playing with the other children, when the news arrives that his mother has been murdered. All the others then run off to see what they can of the crime, leaving the boy alone on the stage. However, his opera does not merely register the horror. Following the murder of Marie and the death of Wozzeck there is a musical interlude. As Josipovici, following Kierkegaard, claims, music in opera can take on 'the role of the chorus in ancient Greek drama' and that is the function it assumes here (Josipovici, 2010:145-6). After such dreadful events, it might seem impossible to say anything. Berg's achievement is to create a style of *bien-dire* which speaks of Wozzeck's anguish and Marie's pain but also of the life which the events eclipse and

of which Marie is so horribly deprived. AND not IS. Where suffering and loss can wipe out the world of sense, art in the mode of *bien-dire* can be the reminder that suffering is not the sum of existence.

The signifying chain

> 'I am concerned with a thing's not being what it
> was, with its becoming something other than what it is,
> with any moment in which one identifies a thing precisely,
> and with the slipping away of that moment.'
> Jasper Johns (Jasper Johns cited in Kozloff, 1975:144)

This section argues that Lacan's conception of the signifying chain and, more specifically, his notion that meaning slides, enables us to think how art in the mode of *bien-dire* can transform existing orders of value, sense and force. Contra the doxa, which as François Balmès notes holds that 'structuralism ended long ago,' it is argued that the key structuralist notion, namely the priority of relationality over the elements in play, enables us to conceive the work of the work as a dynamic process of structurations and restructurations in which new perspectives transform the subject and impart a new and correlative significance to what matters for that subject (Balmès, 2011:13). If 'the relationship between signifier and signified is not one to one' (S.III:119), if 'in no case can the signifier signify itself' (Lacan, 1964-65: Session 9/12/64 p. 5), if there is 'an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier' (E:419), there is the possibility of making 'something other.'

Art, as we have seen, is not restricted to mimesis. A signifier by entering into a new composition with other signifiers can create different senses and values. Lacan (S.I:41) underlines this point with a citation from Freud's *The Dynamic of Transference* (Freud, 1912):

> 'If in the course of a battle there is a particularly embittered struggle over the possession of some little church or some individual farm, there is no need to suppose that the church is a national shrine, perhaps, or that the house shelters the army's pay-chest. The value of the object may be a purely tactical

one and may perhaps emerge only in this one battle' (Freud, 1912:104 footnote 1).

The significance and value of something is a function of who perceives and for what purpose in a particular pragmatic and or libidinal context. *Where*, *when* and *how* it is viewed and evaluated can alter what had constituted its presumed identity. Similarly, in a text, elements of an accepted reality can be reconfigured in a new perspective and assume another import.

Such revaluations are an everyday occurrence and cinema reflects this insofar as the narrative often turns on a revaluation within the diegesis. *Lore (Shortland, Australia/Germany 2012)* can serve as an example. It is 1945 and Germany is under allied occupation. Lore's parents are high ranking Nazis. After the father disappears and her mother is raped and imprisoned, Lore and the four younger children set out to walk from the Black Forest to her grandmother's house in Hamburg. During this journey, she learns that much of what she had been taught was false – most significantly, it is the Jew she initially despises, who protects them – and she undergoes a number of ordeals: her brother is shot by the Russians and she is party to a murder. When she reaches Hamburg, she discovers that her relations continue to adhere to their established lifestyle. Her aunt invites her to join in a dance round the kitchen table and her grandmother insists that her starving grandchildren observe strict table manners. Appalled at how little the 'grown-ups' understand, she retreats to her room. There she places her mother's treasured figurine, which she had preserved throughout her hardships and ordeals as a keepsake, under her heel and crushes it. The value previously assigned to the object has, in the context of the horrors endured, become unaccountable. The argument of this thesis is that Lacan's teaching on the signifying chain can enable us to explore how certain artworks do not merely depict such revaluations within the diegesis but effectuate them through recontextualisation.

The importance in our lives of revaluation through recontextualisation is very movingly rendered in the film *Nostalgia for the Light* (Guzman, France/Chile/Germany 2011), a documentary about an observatory in the Catacama desert which is home not only to astronomers but also – somewhere in its barren vastness – the bodies of many of those 'disappeared' during the Pinochet regime.

One of the astronomers interviewed, Valentina Rodriguez tells how, when she was one year old, she and her grandparents were seized by Pinochet's secret police and threatened: if they did not reveal the secret whereabouts of the girl's parents the child would 'disappear'. After unendurable deliberations, the anguished grandparents took the police to the hiding-place and as a result it was the parents who 'disappeared'. Now herself a mother, Valentina tells the interviewer how astronomy has 'somehow helped to give another dimension to the pain, to the absence, to the loss.' For, she explains, 'sometimes when one is alone with that pain' - in moments which she insists are 'necessary' - and the pain becomes 'oppressive' she tells herself it is part of a cycle in which stars must die so that others can be born to 'a new life.' 'In this context,' she continues, 'what happened to my parents takes on…another meaning that frees me a little.' The two points to make here are first that, if there is a lack in the Other, *the* context no more exists than *the* way and second that a context is always operating. In this light one of the functions of art is to recontextualise, that is, art can 'free' by placing issues in a new context. While it seems unlikely that many artworks can be as successful in this as the cosmos is for Valentina, it is possible that some, on occasion, can achieve something analogous. In conclusion two points need to be underlined. First, nothing – not even something as insupportable as this woman's loss – has a value in itself for, as Derrida insists, 'there is nothing outside of context' (Derrida, 1988:136). Its value depends on how it is contextualised and that can be altered. Second, a recontextualisation is not necessarily an evasion. As Derrida observed, 'there are only contexts'. None is *the* context for there is no 'centre of absolute anchoring' (Derrida, 1972:320). If art recontextualises, this need not be escapism for the previous context was not *the* context only *a* context and often one best left.

To return to Lacan, if meaning is context-dependent, if the meaning and value of a signifier depend on its relations to other signifiers and those relations are mobile, then the new is possible. The 'process of differenciation' can be productive (Fierens, 2012:11).

In the lines of Rimbaud cited above:

> Ô saisons, Ô châteaux,
> Quelle âme est sans défauts?

each of the terms – seasons, châteaus, soul and fault – is revalued by the recontextualisation.

Césareé (Duras, France, 1979) can serve as a cinematic example. Like *India Song* this short film is a cinematic thinking of desire, loss, rejection and abandonment. It is composed of a soundtrack in which Duras reads a prose poem reflecting on the city of Cesarea, which became the place of exile of Bérénice, the last Queen of the Jews, and an image-track largely filmed in the Jardins des Tuileries, the Place de la Concorde and from a Seine riverboat, consisting principally of shots of weathered statuary (often under repair and surrounded by scaffolding), a series of bronze female figures sculpted by Aristide Maillol (1861-1944), and a travelling shot of the Seine's banks and bridges (Gunther, 2002:45-47). As images of Paris, the statues and the river unfold, Duras recounts how Bérénice became the lover of the Emperor Vespasian's son, Titus - despite the fact that, as the destroyer of the temple, he was considered 'a criminal' by her people - only to be 'repudiated'. After following him to Rome, she was rejected when, 'for reasons of state', the Senate denounced 'the danger of such a love'. 'Ripped from him, from his desire' she had to retire to Cesarea. For our immediate purposes, what matters is the final line: after speaking of 'the sorrow' and 'the pain of their separation', after 'she was very young, eighteen, thirty, two thousand – he took her' and the analogy between her emotional death and the fate of Pompeii and Herculaneum – 'In the sky, suddenly the ash descends' - she concludes in a very different register: 'In Paris it is a lousy summer. Cold. With mists.' The 'intolerable' exile suffered by Bérénice is replayed in the more minor key of petty irritations and small dissatisfactions. In a manner analogous to the punchline of a joke, the enunciation recontextualises the foregoing and takes off in a new and unexpected direction. As such, it recalls the final line of the first stanza of Eliot's *Waste Land*: 'I read much of the night and go south in the winter.' After the pain of awakening desire in April – 'the cruellest month' - the contrast between the repose afforded by a winter which 'kept us warm' and the delight in the surprises of summer, the erotic intensity of the sledge ride at the Archdukes, the protestation of mistaken identity by the Lithuanian , the anguish and vivid memories at once combine and collide with the quotidian, the habitual and inconsequential – there is a revaluation (Eliot, 1963:63). As in the lines of Rimbaud, the juxtaposition and montage create a

sense beyond determinate meaning, releasing the hold both of habitual, petty concerns and the pain of separation. The signifying chain goes beyond expression and representation of the pre-given to create a sense, which like Lacan's intervention with Suzanne Hommel does not conjure the issues away but does enable the subject to think them differently.

On occasion, (re)contextualization can halt the slide of meaning and, however briefly, anchor signifiers in signifieds but in works of expanded cinema like *Césarée* an altogether more complex operation occurs. Instead of the revelation of some supposed essence, there is the creation of what I shall term 'constellations of sense' which, in the course of the work, are perpetually reconfigured. In these constellations, significations occur but these specifiable meanings are of less importance than the resonance created between those elements and the sub-representational dynamic of the text. As with the style of Lacan's teaching, that dynamic, while as dependent on the signifiers as they, in turn, are dependent on it for their significance, has the capacity to carry us beyond any determinable meaning, thereby launching a line of flight freeing us from the hold of any particular imaginary.

What is evidently missing from the above discussion of the signifying chain is the specifically cinematic. For present purposes, that is best introduced by recalling the importance of the pragmatic. Just as the success of a joke and its punchline depends on *how*, *where* and *when* it is performed, the work of the work of a film (in the mode of *bien-dire*) depends upon a pragmatics. My argument is that cinematic procedures can create temporalities, construct spaces and furnish a style which by altering the *when*, *where* and *how* of the spectator produce new senses and truths. Postponing the discussion of style until the direct consideration of the register of the real, let's focus for the moment on temporalisation and spatialisation. Ordinarily time and space are organized by our concerns. Bérenice, for example, at least by implication, on Duras' account, inhabited a world organized by her (over)valuation of Titus and therefore measured both space and time in terms of the distance separating them. On this model, space is structured by accented points and time by privileged moments. Contracted cinema proceeds on a similar basis. Space and time are structured to generate suspense – can our hero cross Paris in time to save his daughter being trafficked? *Taken (*Morel, France 2008*).* Can Benjamin locate the

church in time to prevent the woman he loves from marrying a man she does not love? *The Graduate* (Nichols, USA 1967*)* etc. etc. Expanded cinema, on the other hand, can turn the tables on existing modes of desire. Rather than tailoring time and space to prevailing forms of fantasy, it can create times and spaces which had no anterior existence and thereby fashion new modes of desire. In contrast to the apparatus theorists who conceived the cinematic creation of time and space as productive only of illusions, I argue that in the cinema of *bien-dire*, spatio-temporal organisations can enable the subject to become other in happier modes than delusion. Duras' achievement in *Césarée*, through the composition of sound and image with each contextualizing the other is precisely to have created new spaces to think the pain of separation. The line, 'In Paris it has been a lousy summer' only works at that moment, and that moment had no existence prior to the work. In contracted cinema, forms such as framing, editing etc. are subordinated to the telos of the narrative drive. They function only to recruit the spectator to the cause of attaining the narrative's goal – by, say, soliciting identifications with idealized but currently imperilled figures thereby heightening the tension. In some forms of expanded cinema, on the other hand, these cinematic forms are liberated to think the real outside fantasy.

The point is powerfully made by the opening sequence of *Une Femme Mariée* (Godard, France 1965) where sense, to an important degree, is manifestly a function of the moments created and the places traversed. At first sight, this text might appear an unlikely candidate for the status of *bien-dire* for the narrative, centring on an adulterous affair, was made at the time when Godard's wife, Anna Karina, was having just such an affair with the actor, Maurice Ronet (Brody, 2008:191). In these circumstances a content analysis could read the work as 'autobiographical' (Brody, 2008:191). However, to see the opening sequence as informed by nothing more than the 'almost vengefully clinical detachment of a scorned ex-lover' is to miss the possibility of its - at least at moments - constituting an instance of *bien-dire* (Brody, 2008:193). Reviewing *Une Femme Mariée* Jean-Louis Comolli wrote 'thinking and filming are one and the same thing for Godard' (Jean-Louis Comolli cited in Brody, 2008:201). Developing this reading, my argument is that spatio-temporal constructions constitute a key component of that cinematic thought. Consider the

temporalisation produced by two moments in the opening sequence. After the announcement that we are watching 'fragments of a film shot in 1964' 'in black and white' there is a series of shots of Charlotte in bed with her lover. Despite the nudity, the sequence is unerotic (French, 1967:74-5) – the censors were troubled by only one shot which was replaced by a shot of the plane piloted by the absent husband - for the focus is not on the physical aspects of love-making but the friction in the relationship (French, 1967:75). Every shot contains an exchange which brings out the distances and tensions between them: he does not want her to shave her armpits, she does; he wants to lift the sheet so that he can look at her, she does not want to be cold. Despite their physical proximity they are apart. This is clear from the very first shot which begins with a blank screen that turns out to be a bed sheet. As she says, 'I don't know,' her naked arm enters the frame as if in search of something. He responds, 'You don't know if you love me?' to which she rejoins: 'Why do you talk so much?' before adding: 'This is so nice.' They are out of step. Meanwhile his arm has entered the frame and seized her by the wrist but, while held fast her fingers still stretch towards something more. Fade-out.

For present purposes, what matters is that the sense of the shot is created by the fade-out. The significance is born of the temporalisation. The fade-out at the end of this and every other shot in the sequence, like a line-ending in poetry or the punctuations of the sections in the *Wandering Rocks* chapter in *Ulysses*, retroactively revalues all that has been said and depicted enabling something to be thought which could be thought nowhere else. There is no conjuring away of the real as impossible: she is as unknowable as she is inappropriable. Like Albertine in *A La Recherche du Temps Perdu* and indeed – if 'Incompleteness inheres in the Other' – every subject (Julien, 1990a:99). Given the terms in which Godard poses the problem, there are no solutions only responses such as a thinking – which is a choice of existence - in the form of the fade-out.

Consider, as a second example, the shot in which she sings. It begins with her naked knees. Then she is heard to sing 'Where have all the flowers gone?' As she does so, her hand enters the frame. His hand then appears, touches hers and withdraws. In response, her own hand also departs the image and the original composition of her knees against a blank background recurs. The moment is at once

pathetic – she is no singer – and affecting insofar as its isolation within this single shot makes it representative of both all that goes unheard in what is spoken and all those performances – think of the Accrington joke – which do not find their desired audience. Her solitariness is further emphasised insofar as she uses the words of an other and the 'words fail' as - given the lack in the Other - to some degree, all words do (T:3). The presentation of solitude, transience and disappointment is unflinching: nothing is wished away – the flowers, if they ever existed outside the imaginary, are not recuperable. And yet the *bien-dire* creates a sense. And it does so cinematically: the work is in the framing, the static camera and the fade-out. In both shots the fade-out functions as, what Lacan termed a '*point de capiton'.* If there is a perpetual sliding of the signified beneath the signifier as new signifiers are added to the chain (E:419), the *point de capiton* is the punctuation of the chain. 'The signified and the signifier are knotted together' calling a halt to the slide and producing a context in which a new sense can emerge (S.III:268).

If cinematic thought creates new temporalities, it equally creates new spaces. If there is a lack in the Other and if, in consequence, *the* way does not exist and the real eludes representation, we inhabit a world where there are only enframings, angles, reframings and perspectives. My argument is that in Godard these procedures enable an aconceptual cinematic form of thinking. For example, at the end of the sequence of single shots concluding with fade-outs there is a series of shots of the lovers talking together in bed. They are plainly rather pleased with themselves and their relationship. In the first, while kissing his hand, Charlotte, in close-up, tells him she loves him and he responds, '*Moi aussi*.' There follows a cut to a close-up of him as she caresses his eyebrows. He too says 'I love you' to which she responds as he had done: '*Moi Aussi*.' The next shot, is again a close-up but of a more serious and questioning expression on Charlotte's face as she asks 'Do you love me?' and we hear him reply '*Oui*'. At this point the sequence becomes more interesting. Instead of a shot of him we get another of her but from an unusual angle above her forehead as she echoes his reply with '*Ah oui*.' and then, turning her head as the camera moves to accommodate her new position, '*Oui*.' The next shot is again a close-up from an unusual angle but this time from below her chin as she repeats '*Oui*' and then, once more turning her head in a moving shot, '*Ah oui*.'

The question is do the angles, reframings and edits count? My argument is that these forms of the work of the work, in such texts, do matter and that psychoanalytic criticism should give them their weight. Where in contracted cinema they are subordinate to the narrative, in expanded cinema they can constitute a non-discursive mode of thought. At this moment she is again beyond his and our ken. Her intonation is at once enraptured, reflective and ironic. It is impossible to know what she is thinking. The achievement of the angle, camera movement and edit is not simply to convey her inscrutability but to take up an attitude to it.

Historically women have been used to figure male fantasies and to either assure heterosexual men of the attainability of their desires, or, where their desires are thwarted, of womens' 'culpability'. As such, they were treated as objects and were denied in their difference: for all too many men wished to know nothing of the discordance of their desires with their own. At least in this moment of *bien-dire* in *Une Femme Mariée*, Godard affirms this difference. And he does so cinematically: it is in the angle, the movement and the cut. At such moments, he ceases to be the jealous, rowing, Godard of the biographies and says 'yes' with her (Brody, 2008:129). Like the Proust who, in writing, abandoned the attempt to appropriate Albertine, Godard here leaves the world of impossible demands upon others in order to allow desire to find other courses. Charlotte ceases to be Godard's symptom as Molly ceases to be Joyce's at the end of *Ulysses*. Molly's repetition of 'Yes' may partake of Joyce's fantasies about Molly and other men but is in excess of that. Molly says yes to more than Leopold Bloom and with her so does Joyce. Equally, Godard with Charlotte says, '*Ah oui*.'

Before leaving this topic, it is worth reiterating the point that *bien-dire* is not the prerogative of modernism. The organisation of time and space can be as indispensable to the work of the work in films where, in contrast to Godard's cinema the devices in play do not foreground spatio-temporal stucturations. *Mia Madre* (Moretti, Italy 2015) can serve as an example. Like *L'amour fou*, the content is unremarkable. The protagonist has problems at work – she is making a film about a sit-in at a factory – and with her family, for her mother is terminally ill. During the narrative, she has difficulties with a self-promoting, leading man who has trouble remembering his lines, she learns that her daughter has not confided her teenage

heartbreak and is told some home truths by her ex-partner. In short, nothing out of the ordinary occurs. Again, like *L'amour fou* there seems to be an autobiographical element. Mark Kermode surmises that the film had its origins in the death of Moretti's own mother 'while he was completing 2011's *Habemus Papam/We Have a Pope*' (Kermode, 2015). The question addressed is therefore: what is one to think/say about the death of one's mother? Of necessity, the answer to that question is always singular and will vary with circumstances. For present purposes what matters is that Moretti's filmic response is, I would submit, as worthy of the event as any in cinema – fully deserving of the eight-minute standing ovation at Cannes (Kemp, 2015:89) - and a key, if unobtrusive, component of the *bien-dire* is the organisation of time and space: the rhythms and tempi of the temporalisation of the translations between locations. Although there are no comparable formal innovations, temporalisation is as indispensable in *Mia Madre* as in *Une Femme Mariée. Bien-dire* in both instances is more event than thesis.

The Real

We come now to the third register: the real. In the preceding section, I considered the importance of the positions and occasions – the *where* and *when* - of the subject – in the work of film. Here the focus is on the style – the *how* of the subject, in particular, the styles of enunciation. I argue that, when *bien-dire*, enunciation can function to transform modes of desire and *jouissance* such that the alterations in libidinal investments revalue and create new senses. Like many Lacanian concepts the real has different meanings at different moments. Even what he once described as 'the best definition that can be given of the real,' (Lacan, 1966b:68) namely, 'the impossible' (E:54) has two principal, though closely related, meanings. We have already encountered the first: structural impossibility. 'Structure,' Lacan writes in *L'Étourdit* 'is the real' (Lacan, 2001a:476), hence, for example, 'the real' is 'the cut itself' (E:487 footnote 14). For the moment I want to focus on another aspect, the claim that 'the real is not what is perceived' (Silvestre, 1987:306). The real is impossible to either image – 'one cannot imagine it' (Lacan, 2005b:76) - or symbolize - it is 'that which subsists outside of symbolization' (E:324). The real is therefore to

be distinguished from reality (Harari, 1996:7). Developing Serge Daney's proclamation of what he termed the '*Cahiers* [*du Cinèma*] axiom', namely, 'the real is not represented – and that's final,' my claim is that cinema can achieve more than the reproduction or reflection of 'reality' (Serge Daney cited in Dudley Andrew, 2010:5). This is not to say – ridiculously – that there are no realities. On the contrary, as the discussion in the preceding sections makes clear, existence is rife with realities without which social existence would be unintelligible, unendurable and impossible. As repeatedly emphasised, cinematic interventions in debates around the nature, valency, currency, epistemic status and ideological effectivity of these realities and their representations can be the most important mode of filmic *bien-dire*. My argument is rather that there are certain artworks whose achievement is importantly at the level of sub-representative instances, principally the subject, desire and *jouissance*. As 'a signifier represents a subject for another signifier' the subject is at once included in and excluded from the signifying chain (S.XVII:180). 'It is represented, undoubtedly, but also it is not represented' (S.XVII:89). 'The subject constitutes himself only by subtracting himself from it' [the signifying chain] 'and by decompleting it' so that 'he must, at one and the same time, count himself here and function only as a lack here' (E:683). Similarly, desire cannot be fully expressed in signifiers. 'Precisely because desire is articulated,' that is, bound up with the signifiers of the Other, 'it is not articulable' (E:681). Equally, the object *a*, 'the cause of desire' (Lacan, 2005a:58) 'resists any assimilation to the function of a signifier' (S.X:174), for it is 'what gets lost in signifierisation' (S.X:174). Hence the truths (of desire) can only be half-spoken. As for *jouissance*, the signifying chain 'cannot signify the *jouissanc*e to which it aspires.' 'The signifier,' Braunstein continues, 'is incommensurable with *jouissance*' (Braunstein, 1992:68). Each of these instances of the real matters for this thesis for art, as *bien-dire*, operates by transformations of the subject entailing alterations in modalities of both desire and *jouissance*. Let's consider each in turn.

The subject

The claim that Lacan's teaching has a continuing claim upon our attention rests, above all on his notion of the subject as 'asubstantial' (Soler, 1995:43-44) and

'evanescent' (Gilson, 1994:18): a process of 'disappearance-apparition' rather than an enduring being (Jacques Lacan cited in Greenshields, 2017:106). As the brilliant Patrice Maniglier puts it, the Lacanian subject has 'the being of an event rather than a thing' (Maniglier, 2012:28). This conception provides the fulcrum for my argument that art, when *bien-dire*, responds to the real as impossible by altering the subject. If, as Verhaeghe astutely notes, the Lacanian subject has 'a mere pre-ontological status' and is only 'a fading, a vacillation, without any substantiality,' it is open to transformation (Verhaeghe, 1998:165).

For Lacan, at least prior to the work on knots, the subject is an indispensable concept. His claim is that the existence of meaning entails a subject: 'Only a subject, can understand a meaning; conversely, every phenomenon of meaning implies a subject' (Lacan, 1996c:9). Hence his insistence that 'subjectivity is not eliminable from our experience as analysts' (Jacques Lacan cited in Chiesa, 2007:36). As such, the subject is only a supposition: 'it is its condition to be only supposable' (Lacan, 1975c:164). That said, he advances a number of hypotheses about the subject. Most importantly, he insists on the mutability of the subject. As we saw above, psychoanalytic practice proceeds on the premise that the subject can change: 'psychoanalysis creates a new subject' (Verhaeghe and Declerq, 2002:64). Although, in a particular individual, habitual responses and (neurotic) patterns of behaviour may persist – perhaps prompting that individual to undergo analysis – there is no self-subsistent, enduring subject. Rather the subject is brought into being by a call – the summons to occupy an assigned place in the symbolic. As there is always a disparity between subject and place, the subject is 'ecstatic' – better, ek-static – never in place (Maniglier, 2012:27). Consequently, it 'is not a being and…is constantly in movement' (Fierens, 2010:181). In Deleuzean terms it is a becoming.

The subject of the enunciation is just such a becoming. 'Lacan's thesis,' as Colette Soler succinctly puts it, 'is the subject is not the agent but rather the effect of speech.' Psychoanalysis, she continues, 'has to do not with the entire person but only with the subject, with the person to the extent that the person is transformed by speech' (Soler, 1996:257). This, in a nutshell, is the theoretical underpinning of the notion of art as *bien-dire*. Changes at the level of the enunciation are as much the condition of the senses, values and forces created as what is said. Style, that is, what

is made of the issue, is the crucial component. In our concern with the nature of the representations propounded by a film, this dimension can be missed. As Lacan's famous pronouncement has it, *'Qu'on dise reste oublié derrière ce qui se dit dans ce qui s'entend?'* (Lacan, 2001a:449), - which Jeanne Lafont renders as 'That one speaks remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard/understood' (Lafont, 2004:6). In many instances of *bien-dire*, whether Lacan's teaching or an artwork, to the extent we forget the style of the saying, we miss the achievement.

In art, which is worthy of the event, the mode of enunciation, can operate to transform the artist and those who later become with the work. Just as there are circumstances – say the need to clarify what is at stake in the clinic – when it is important to attempt to ascertain what is said/enounced in Lacan's teaching (the theories propounded, the precepts advanced etc.) – there are conjunctures when, in considering instances of both contracted and expanded cinema, what takes priority is the interrogation of how representations function in politically. But equally, just as there are circumstances in which, rather than setting Lacan's style aside to read him for his theses, we can usefully attend to what, in his style, is irreducible to what is said. In short, there may be occasions in the happening of art when what matters is the mode of enunciation: the style – the *how* rather than the *what*. In this perspective, style far from being an adornment is the crux of the endeavour – it is the making something new of an issue which can be a making new of the subject. At the level of the enounced *Éloge de l'amour* is the story of failure – Edgar is a let-down - but Godard is not Edgar. Where Edgar fails, Godard succeeds. In the style – above all in the use of music and colour – something is achieved that goes beyond Edgar's failure to be equal to the events of the diegesis. Whereas the case for contracted cinema as *bien-dire* is at the level of the enounced, that for expanded cinema rests primarily on how the work speaks.

The point can be clarified by reference to Pierre Skriabine's discussion of the 'logic' of the neurotic illogicality characteristic of obsessionals (Skriabine, 2001) like Freud's patient, the Rat Man, who feared that, as a result of his thoughts and behaviour, 'something might happen to two people of whom he was very fond' (Freud, 1909:39). As one of these was his father, it was 'with astonishment' that Freud learned 'that the patient's father, with whom his obsessional fears were, after

all, occupied *now*, had died several years previously' (Freud, 1909:43). To bring out the stakes in such behaviour, Skriabine cites what he terms a

> 'well-known British non-sense: a traveller gets off the train feeling unwell because he was not sitting facing the direction of the train. To the friends who came to welcome him, who said that he should have asked a passenger sitting opposite to change places with him, since no-one would have minded, the unhappy man objected that that was exactly the problem since none of the seats facing him was occupied' (Skriabine, 2001:78).

The logic here inevitably recalls Kafka but it is the difference from Kafka that makes my point. Whatever the neurotic sources of Kafka's work, his art does not consist of neurotic outpourings. Instead something with a comic dimension, very different from the plague of neurotic symptoms, is made of his dilemmas. As Deleuze notes, 'Max Brod recalls that when Kafka gave a reading of *The Trial*, everyone present, including Kafka himself, was overcome by laughter' (Deleuze, 1967:85). To reduce his work to a diagnosis of neurosis is to miss the achievement of the enunciation, the comic *bien-dire*. Obsessional neurotics construct labyrinths without exits, for example, as Skriabine notes, 'the Rat Man fabricated for himself a false debt impossible to repay' (Skriabine, 2001:78). In contrast artists – we shall discuss this at greater length in chapter five – can create open-ended structures. Charles Melman remarks that 'the Rat Man, like a good neurotic, has his future behind him' (Melman, 1975:123). The artist, if only – given the anguish which often accompanies the business of creation – momentarily, can have hers squarely before her.

'We use language,' Lacan said, 'in a way that goes far beyond what is in fact said' (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:167). Consequently, we should be alive to what words can do beyond the expression, depiction, representation, reflection and contestation of pre-established realities. When we consider what a particular angle in *Éloge de l'amour* achieves, we may feel that the angle says something, and indeed it does, but what is said is exceeded by the saying. The process of articulation goes beyond what is signified. It will be immediately objected that cinema involves not just words but images, sounds and music and that, in consequence, the notion of enunciation is misleading. Deleuze, following Blanchot and Foucault, insists on 'the irreducibility of the visible' to words: '"speaking is not seeing"' (F:61). As Edgar

remarks in *Éloge de l'amour* 'an image never talks.' Of course. Central to this thesis is the contention that the thinking which occurs in each mode is neither reducible to, nor completely translatable into, any other mode. As we have seen, much of the work of the work – the revaluations and concomitant creations of sense - in *Éloge de l'amour* occurs in the music. While the 'little phrase' assumes, like music in some operas, a choric function, commenting on the action by situating words, images and actions in different perspectives and thereby revaluing them, it is asemantic. However, my argument is that the notion of enunciation is still useful for, in every instance, there is the choice of a style which bespeaks an evaluation, betokens an attitude and indicates an orientation.

Foucault famously concluded his essay '*What Is an Author*?' with a question taken from Beckett: '"What matter who's speaking?"' (Samuel Beckett cited in Foucault, 1997:138). My argument is that, on occasion, in films like *Éloge de L'amour* and *India Song* nothing matters more. For the only response approaching an answer to some questions is a style, which is ultimately, as Deleuze has it, 'a style of life' (N:100). David Bordwell is wary of the notion of enunciation. 'In watching films,' he suggests 'we are seldom aware of being told something by an entity resembling a human being.' It is only rarely that, as he puts it, 'a text's narration may emit cues that suggest a narrator' (Bordwell, 1985:62). Indeed, but not in those modes of expanded cinema where the style of enunciation is the achievement. If in the majority of mainstream instances of contracted cinema, where the styles are indistinguishable, the mode of enunciation hardly matters, since it is only a more or less efficient delivery system for the prevalent ideologies and the usual fantasies, in expanded cinema it is crucial. In films like *Éloge de l'amour*, style is, to resume the citation from Deleuze, the inventing of 'a possibility of life, a way of existing' (N:100). And nothing is more fundamental. In this context, *who* is *how*. Writing of *Dasein* – that is, Heidegger's notion of the human being as the being for whom 'in its very being, that being is an issue for it' (Heidegger, 1927:32) – François Raffoul astutely observes that 'because *Dasein* is a way of being, a "how" and not a "what", it can modify or modalise itself' (Raffoul, 2016:292). The Lacanian subject is similarly a 'how' and not a 'what' and, in the art of *bien-dire,* can modalise itself differently.

Art is decisions. 'Choice is the main thing' (Marcel Duchamp cited in de Duve, 1996:162). This is not to say that the artist or author is in a position of mastery. Rather, as the subject is not a given, he or she can be transformed in the process of creation. In this process, as Julia Kristeva observed, the subject, caught up in language and other signifying systems, 'makes and unmakes himself' (Kristeva, 1989:272). In contracted cinema, a producer might coolly decide to maximize revenues by turning a box-office success into a franchise and a director might, with similar detachment, calculate how best to manipulate the audience – think of how Hitchcock refined his techniques for generating suspense. In contrast, in expanded cinema the director often does not know where the process will lead – to borrow a phrase from the B-movies: he or she does not know what he or she 'is getting into.' After the inaugural initiative, the decision as to the terms in which the selected problem is to be posed, the artist is caught up in a process larger than him or herself. In that process, the artist at once shapes and is shaped by material which resists and enables, transports and transforms. As the poet Liz Lochhead recently observed, in the artistic process 'you're not in control' (Desert Island Discs, 2017). Creation, at such moments, is an instance of what Catherine Malabou terms 'plasticity', which in her canonical formulation is defined as the 'capacity' to at once 'give form' and 'receive form'. In making of an issue a work of art in the mode of *bien-dire*, artists testify in favour of Malabou's claim that the brain is 'something modifiable, "formable," and formative at the same time' (Malabou, 2008:5). In conceiving this process, we can usefully develop the psychoanalytic distinction between an action which is programmed to achieve an identified aim – for example the commercial film-making that constitutes the bulk of contracted cinema – and an act. In an act there is no specifiable end in view at the outset and something unforeseen can arrive and be relaunched 'without one knowing whence it comes or where it goes' (Fierens, 2012a:51).

For Lacan, the subject is at once constituted – it is 'defined as the effect of the signifier' (S.XI:207) - and constitutive, insofar as 'the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier' (S.XI:126). If one's 'cause is the signifier, without which there would be no subject in the real' (E:708), it is equally the case that 'one is always responsible for one's position as a subject' (E:729). Hence, 'the "subject" exists' in 'psychoanalytic formalization' in Jeanne Lafont's phrase 'as a place of freedom, a

place of desire, a place of activity' (Lafont, 2004:6). As Nietzsche put it: 'in man there is united both creature and creator' (Nietzsche, 1886:151). When constructing art in the mode of *bien-dire*, the artist is both. Creation is, as Derek Attridge has usefully pointed out, both an act and an event (Attridge, 2004a:9). In the terms proposed by this thesis, it is an act in that the creator decides to think an issue in a certain style and make something new of it. There is, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze, a 'becoming active' (NP:179). If an artwork in the mode of *bien-dire* is, like the poetry described by Celan, 'a step' its initial movement is a getting on to the front foot (Celan, 1999:3). But this act is not that of a master for it derives from what Lacan, in Sartrean vein, termed 'an unfathomable decision of being' and the inaugurating impulses which motivate the taking up of that position are not at the artist's conscious command (Jacques Lacan cited in Braunstein, 2015:87). In the act, subjects are transformed and as de Sutter astutely notes they possess 'no mastery of their own becoming' (de Sutter, 2017:39). The work happens as much as it is made. As Lacan in another vein puts it: 'an event has chosen' (E:213). In the act of creation, subjects, who have taken 'the unfathomable decision to pass to an act,' must also let an unmasterable event occur (Laurent, 2006:242). What Deleuze termed 'the time of a becoming-active' (NP:180), is also in Derek Attridge's phrase a '*letting something happen*' (Attridge, 2004b:3). The work happens as much as it is made. In the to and fro of this event of creation, modes of desire and subjectivity are constituted, which in turn constitute the text, which then deconstitutes the existing form of the subject with a view to a different constitution. In short, creation is the construction of an *agencement* where desire, subjectivity, and reality are constituted, undone and remade.

To conclude: the analogy between works of art which are instances of *bien-dire* and jokes with a similar status usefully points up something of what can be at stake. Both begin with a problem – which gives the joke or the work its initial interest. Something is then made of the issue, which is generative of new senses, revaluations and truths which, like the laughter occasioned by a joke, do not (completely) outlive the moment. Although the said has an afterlife – representations and meanings circulate – the senses, evaluations and truths return (differently) only if the work is resumed in another enunciation. Discussion of the subject of enunciation brings us

immediately to the second aspect of the real under consideration, namely desire for to an extent 'the subject is desire' (S.VI:438). Will Greenshields' observation, following Malcolm Bowie, that the subject is 'the subject qua desire, since this desire is all that he [sic] is', while something of a simplification – there are also the drives and the subject is always part of an *agencement* – a telling insight (Greenshields, 2017:24). If 'The subject' is 'determined by being, that is to say, by desire, speech is impelled by desire' (Lacan, 1975c:166). 'Whatever animates, that which any enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire' (S.XI:141). Deleuze claims 'The question "who?" does not refer to persons, but to forces and wills' (ECC:99). Psychoanalysis would agree but substitute 'desires' for 'wills' so let us now turn to the question of desire.

Desire

'Desire itself is movement.'

T. S. Eliot (Eliot, 1944:13)

The continuing claim of psychoanalytic film theory upon our attention rests not least upon the observation that the most salient feature of the history of cinema is the preponderance of works wedded to idealization and fantasy and the evident aptness of psychoanalysis for their theorization. However, in this section, I will argue that Lacan-inspired approaches are useful not only in the analysis of the 'dream factory' but in thinking the cinema of *bien-dire* as the launching of new desires as lines of flight (Powdermaker,1951).

For Lacan – 'desire is in itself identical to lack' (SVIII:63). If the Other is barred, the subject experiences occupation of any socially assigned place as a separation from something of life, as a 'want-to-be' (*manque à être*) (E:549). Desire is born of difference - namely the difference between the place and its occupant – and is the encounter with difference. To assuage the *manque à être,* many subjects seek the lost object- the object *a* - which they believe will make good the lack. Typically, they demand that an other incarnate the object *a* only to encounter an ineradicable difference between the demanded and the obtained. Intersubjectivity is the

experience of disparity, non-reciprocity and incommensurability. In much contracted cinema this problem is posed in terms which can be addressed by what Lacan termed 'the three fundamental passions': 'love, hatred and ignorance' (S.XVII:136). Each is associated with the imaginary and its correlate, the subject's wish 'to know nothing' about 'its being' (S.XX:121). The passion for ignorance is the wish not to know, that is, the wish to know nothing of the unconscious desires of oneself and others. In contracted cinema difficult and ultimately unanswerable questions about identity and desire are occluded by the positing of all too answerable questions. Who is Jason Bourne? Although not immediately apparent, the question has an answer – David Webb - and our hero the wherewithal to find it (*The Bourne Identity*, Liman, USA/Germany 2002; *The Bourne Supremacy*, Greengrass, USA/Germany 2004; *The Bourne Ultimatum*, Greengrass, USA/Germany 2007). Equally love is a way of not knowing the real of either one's own or the other's desire. 'Analysis,' according to Lacan, 'demonstrates that love, in its essence, is narcissistic' (S.XX:6). Love is the subject's projection of a narcissistic ideal upon the other in the hope that other will then love that self-same ideal in the subject. This fantasy, prevalent in much contracted cinema, serves to 'obfuscate the enigma of the other's desire' (Žižek, 2012:750 footnote 13). As for hatred, it is the concomitant of love. To the degree that love is a way of knowing nothing of the Other's desire, 'there is no love without hate' (S.XX:89). Both love and hate seek 'to negate the other's being,' that is, negate the other's lack and desire (E:525). The strategy of movies like *Avatar* (Cameron, United States, 2009) is to demonise certain others and thereby mask the real of antagonisms unconfined to fiends. In such modes of contracted cinema, the telos is the imaginary annulment of difference as a way of not knowing that 'desire is the desire of the Other' (Lacan, 2005c:40).

In contrast, difference in expanded cinema is at once the problem and the answer. Desire gives existence its point for desire *is* sense: 'the only sense is the sense of desire' (S.XVII:61). As Miller notes, in Lacan's teaching 'desire is conceived as meaning' - [that is, what I term 'sense'] – 'running underneath the signifying articulation without ever appearing as such' (Miller, J-A 2011:16). As all perception is libidinally invested, 'desire,' as Lacan said, 'is interpretation itself' (S.XI:176). Without desire the world would be a blank. To desire is to evaluate and as Nietzsche observed

‘only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow.’ (Nietzsche, 1891:85). In respect of sexual desire, the point is brilliantly made by the psychoanalyst Jacques Hassoun in his recounting of an episode from the poet Marina Tsvetayeva’s journals. She was, Hassoun informs us,

> ‘deeply in love with a man, but then she lost all interest in him and barely recognized him when their paths crossed. When he asked what had happened, she replied that when a woman loves a man she sees him as god created him, when she doesn’t love him she sees him as his parents created him, and when she no longer loves him she sees a table or chair instead of him’ (Jacques Hassoun in Feher-Gurewich et al., 1996:242-3).

The purpose of the treatment is to free desire where it has become snagged on captivating images and fixated by fantasy so that the subject can experiment anew. This is possible because the real of desire does not exist outside compositions with the symbolic and imaginary. When something new is made of existing signifiers and imaginaries, new desires can emerge and with them new senses and values. The end of the treatment is not the discovery of a pre-given meaning but a new mode of desiring. As Antonio Quinet so aptly puts it: ‘this is what the analyst gives the analysand: a ticket to board that streetcar named desire’ (Quinet, 2017:112). My argument is that an analogous movement can occur with the event of art where the birth of new desires can be accompanied by the emergence of new senses. Whereas much contracted cinema merely rehearses pre-existing fantasies, expanded cinema can produce new desires and senses. Just as, in *India Song*, the style of the enunciation is irreducible to what is enounced, so the style of desiring is irreducible to the modes of desire represented. The desire which speaks in the enunciation differs from those of Stretter, the vice-consul and the beggar-woman. In instances of contracted cinema, like *Speed* (de Bont, USA 1994), success is achieved by desire’s attainment of its goal in fantasy: Jack and Annie get together and the murderous sadist is despatched. Paradoxically in certain modes of expanded cinema, failure can be the condition of success for the failure sustains desire and hence sense. As Harari so perspicaciously observes: ‘the subject must fail necessarily, so that its desire is not suffocated’ (Harari, 2001:99). Instead of closure in fantasy, desire is relaunched in a

movement of way-making – what Lacan terms 'un parcours' – 'for' as he continues, 'c'est lá le sens' - literally: that is where the sense is (Lacan, 1966b:795).

The question is whether Lacan's conceptions of desire as opposed to his style are worthy of such events in art and this brings us to the argument of the second part of this thesis namely that Lacan's teaching has to be supplemented by Deleuze's philosophy. Although Lacan affirms desire – 'we do not believe in the [imaginary] object, but we affirm desire'– his teaching lacks concepts worthy of the desires correlative with *bien-dire* (Lacan, 1975-76: Session 9/12/75 p. x). At moments, *Éloge de l'amour* and *India So*ng attain that condition of poetry in which as René Char has it: '*The poem is the realised love of desire that has remained desire*' (René Char cited in Blanchot, 1969:47). Now, while Lacan's style bespeaks just such desires, his theories do not. A similar limitation obtains in relation to his conception of *jouissance* to which we now turn.

Jouissance

This section supports the claim that Lacan's teaching is of continuing interest by arguing that *jouissance* is as important in the constitution of sense as desire. Just as the world without desire would be blank so, 'it is *jouissance* whose absence would make the universe vain' (E:694). At the same time, the section underwrites the second claim, namely that Lacan's teaching has to be supplemented by Deleuze, for it is argued that the notion of *jouissance* is too rooted in the psychoanalytic clinic to be equal to the task of thinking the joy possible in the event of art. As the stress on jokes and the discussion of *The Large Glass* should have made clear, *bien-dire* is rarely solemn and never glum.

Lacan's notion of *jouissance* is useful insofar as it points up two problematic aspects of enjoyment. First, far from being a desired satisfaction, *jouissance* can be experienced as a threat for 'the organism,' as Lacan observed, 'seems made to avoid too much *jouissance*' (Lacan, 1970b:195). On a first approach - reliant on a distinction between inside and outside, which will be problematized in the subsequent discussion of topology – children, like Little Hans, are troubled by the tumult of sensations 'within' and by the opaque *jouissance* of their mother or other care-giver

without. As we saw earlier, the child's only recourse in this situation is language taken up through an identification with the name-of-the-father. Despite the costs associated with this occupation of the place assigned by the law of the father, there is a gain insofar as language orders and stabilizes what would otherwise be an insupportable chaos (Braunstein, 2015:88). On this account, if the failings of the father prevent identification with the name-of-the-father, chaos impends.

The second problem is that *jouissance* can assume toxic forms. *Jouissance* is a function of the drives. As these derive not from a putative biological body but the body cut and carved up by language, no drive is unmarked by the signifier – in Deleuzean terms, no drive operates outside an *agencement.* Consequently*, jouissance* can take innumerable forms. The only constant is that *jouissance* is always in play. As Miller puts it, 'The subject, at some level, is always happy, is always enjoying himself' (Miller, J-A, 1995b:12). Even in symptoms for 'the symptom, in its nature, is *jouissance*' (S.X:125). While in consciousness a symptom occasions 'apparent unhappiness or displeasure, the subject' [at an unconscious level] obtains satisfaction (Miller, J-A, 1995:12).

And this is the problem: some modes of *jouissance* are baleful. In light of this, Lacan reformulated his notion of the treatment as enabling the patient to achieve a *savoir-faire* with his or her symptom. As Žižek with his joke about the man who believed he was a grain of corn reminds us, telling patients the nature of their problem accomplishes nothing. The cure only occurs with a change in the patient's libidinal disposition, in other words, his or her mode of *jouissance*. 'The end of analysis' he proposes is 'knowing how to deal with one's symptom,' that is knowing 'how to manage it, how to handle it' that is knowing how to find a happier mode of *jouissance* (Jacques Lacan cited in Julien, 1990a:189).

This reoriented Lacan's thinking on art. The first task of an artwork is to institute a structure which, like the name-of-the-father, keeps chaos at bay as the necessary condition for the creation of new and more vital forms of *jouissance*. Joyce provided the starting-point for this rethinking. For Lacan, the irresponsible and improvident John Joyce was 'an unworthy father, a deficient father'; hence the paternal metaphor did not function (Lacan, 1975-76: Session 31/1/76 p. 1). Consequently, Lacan asked: why did his son, James, not go mad? why did he remain,

in Darian Leader's phrase, a case of 'non-triggered psychosis?' why was he not, like psychotics, invaded by overwhelming *jouissance*? (Leader and Groves, 1995:167) Typically, as Harari points out, Lacan's response was not just to apply existing notions (Harari, 1996:26) but to rethink the nature of the symptom and create a new concept: the '*sinthome*' a neologism, a 'remaking' (Harari, 1996:23) and piece of Joycean wordplay which in French 'includes references to "sin"' (Cochet, 2002:89) 'symptom', 'saint' and 'Saint Thomas' (Leader and Groves, 1995:167). In response to 'the radical deficiencies of the symbolic order,' Joyce's *sinthome*, that is, his writing, at one and the same time, structured his world and afforded him a satisfying mode of *jouissance* (Le Gaufey, 2016:41).

Art, on this account, becomes 'a practical form of knowledge, a *savoir-faire* of *jouissance*' (Levine, 2008:128). 'What is *savoir-faire*?' Lacan asks and answers, 'it is art, artifice' (S.XXIII:47). Indeed, Miller goes so far as to claim art is 'the supreme form of *savoir-faire*' (Miller, J-A, 2016:67). On this view, while art in the manner of *bien-dire* can contribute to our knowledge - for example, *Nostalgia for the Light* can teach us about the torture, slaughter and suffering visited on Chile by Pinochet – in other instances it is primarily a form of 'know-some-how, which is to say, knowing how to find a way in this world, which is not at all a world of representations' (Lacan, 2010a:11). On this view, art is a form of way-making. 'The way things stand, such as we are moving through them,' Lacan observed, 'always entails picking things up *en route*.' (S.X:180). Art, as argued above, is a way of being *en route*.

Existence for Lacan, as his graphs and mathemes make clear and as emphasised above, is a matter of vectors and trajectories. In the diagram below, for example, the 'insubstantial, fading subject' is patently a process not a stable, fixed being. Impelled by the real of the lack in the symbolic, the subject seeks and fails to find wholeness in the imaginary and is forced back upon the symbolic where, in the absence of *the* place, the circuit incessantly resumes (Greenshields, 2017:41). Being *en route* is the making of this always singular circuit. *En route*, forms of thought emerge available nowhere else. As Shelly Brivic observes, the truth 'develops out of the whole movement of the circuit and could no more exist outside it than a heart outside a body' (Brivic, 2008:89). These truths, as Dany Nobus underlines, are irreducible to knowledge: 'knowledge and *jouissance*/truth are incommensurable'

(Nobus, 2002:32). Here, thinking is less conceptual than affective: 'thought is *jouissance*' (S.XX:70).



The strength of this approach is its insistence on the need in art for a structuration which is the necessary condition for the creation of what escapes structuration: laughter in jokes and joy in art. But this is also its weakness. The emphasis is on art as defence. Lacan describes 'the function of beauty' as the constitution of 'the ultimate barrier that forbids access to a fundamental horror' (E:654). A notion recently echoed by Miller's claim that 'beauty is the last defence against the real' (Miller, J-A, 2015:128). A further weakness is its undervaluation of the joy to be found in art. *Jouissance* in art tends to be viewed by analysts through the prism of the clinic where *'jouissance'* is pleasure in pain (Chiesa, 2005:164), and 'is felt 99 per cent of the time as unbearable suffering' (Leader and Groves, 1995:141). My argument is that psychoanalysis, by approaching art from that angle, can only be unworthy of the event. In many art-events, 'joy needs,' as Scott Wilson maintains 'to be strictly differentiated from *jouissance*' at least as 'conceptualised by Miller and his followers' (Wilson, 2008:5). The focus of psychoanalysis is on what

does not work and this leaves it ill-equipped to deal with art which often does (Lacan, 2015:14). Reflecting on his career Godard remarked: 'I don't think I've succeeded in making any really good films,' but immediately added 'there are moments, scenes, whole movements that sing' (Jean-Luc Godard cited in Dixon, 1997:205). At the end of *Éloge de l'amour* the presence of what Deleuze termed the 'intolerable and unbearable' is palpable (C2:18). As Berthe says every 'problem is defiled by its solution.' And yet, at the same time, in the intensity of the colours of a dashboard against the ground of night and rain, and above all in the final repetition of the musical refrain the film also sings. My claim is that psychoanalysis lacks concepts worthy of the joy to be found in such singing and for that reason should turn to Deleuze.

Paul Celan concludes '*Cello-Entry*':

'all is less, than
it is,
all is more.' (Celan, 1967:69)

A similar paradox informs the modes of *jouissance* of expanded cinema in the mode of *bien-dire*. There is 'less' in that a limit is encountered but whereas in neurosis that 'less' is experienced as a lack in a work like *Éloge de l'amour* the limit gives on to a beyond. At the same time there is 'more', an excess. In neurosis this can take the form of what at a conscious level is experienced as a burdensome symptom but in *bien-dire*, whether an artwork or a joke, the 'more' is an energy carrying the subject beyond limits. The capture by the 'less' is also the liberation of a 'more'.

Topology

'There is no longer a whole man confronting a whole world.'
Ulrich in Robert Musil's *The Man without Qualities* (Musil, 1930:277)

The danger in developing these lines of thought is of collapsing into a simplistic notion of cinema as a series of perspectives in which a subject can view reality from a number of different angles. While, on occasion, a common-sensical 'bipartition between interior and exterior' (Miller, J-A, 1994:75) has its uses – where, for

example, a political intervention like *I, Daniel Blake* contests the 'veracity' of prevalent representations – in other contexts it oversimplifies for, as we have seen, in Lacanian psychoanalysis there are no givens (S.VIII:96). It is not a question of a given subject achieving different perspectives on a pre-given reality, but of the creation of perspectives constitutive of subjects and realities, in spaces and temporalities oriented by a real, which structures, but does not appear in those perspectives. Here space is 'topological' (SX:102) not 'Euclidean' (Jacques Lacan cited in Greenshields, 2017:206). The argument of this section is that Lacan's topological explorations offer a further way of reconceiving the thinking which can occur in the event of art.

In the space available it is possible to consider only two aspects. Let's begin with Lacan's contention - implicit in the notion of the mirror stage - that we do not inhabit space as we imagine. The world is not arrayed before us. It is not just that we are in the midst of things but that, in many instances, it is impossible to clearly distinguish inside and outside. Lacan explored this point at length in seminar seven with his reworking of Freud's notion of *das Ding* as *La Chose*. Like so many of Lacan's concepts, *La Chose*, as Miller observed, 'is worked out enigmatically' and 'wrapped in mystery' (Miller, J-A, 1994:80). 'As the absolute Other of the subject' (S.VII:52), it is 'the primary object' which either 'failed to give satisfaction' (S.VII:53-4) or afforded 'too much pleasure' and is thereby associated with the mother (S.VII:54). As such, it is the precursor of the object *a* (Critchley, 1999:198): 'something missed' (S.VII:52). At once the object of desire's quest and 'the support of an aversion' (S.VII:53). Equally it is both the subject's unconscious desires – the desire of the Other – and, in Alain Juranville's phrase, 'the real of the other subject, encountered when the desire of the one collides with the desire of the other' (Juranville, 1988:215). Hence Lacan claims 'the whole progress of the subject' is oriented 'around the Ding' as 'strange and even hostile on occasion' (SVII:52). It is 'the first outside' but – and this is the topological point - it is a paradoxical outside which is at once within and without (SVII:52). If it is at the core of our being, it is also furthest from us (E:437). 'In and of itself,' in its relation with the subject, Lacan says, the Thing 'is what is closest to him (sic) while escaping him more than anything else' (E:549-550). Therefore, he describes its relation to us as one of 'extimacy,' that is, 'intimate exteriority'

(SVII:139). To exist, on this account, is to be at grips with a Thing which can never be represented and, consequently, never become an object of knowledge. Hence, in a bid to think this process Lacan experimented with topological figures like the torus – which provides 'an intuitive representation' of extimacy, 'insofar as a torus' peripheral exteriority and central exteriority constitute but one single region' (E:264) - and the Klein bottle (S.X:205) which, as Miller notes, 'materializes, mathematically, a relationship between inside and outside which places the outside, if I may use the expression, inside the outside' (Miller, J-A, 1989:31.). See figure 1



Torus

In respect of cinema, the argument is that this provides us with a further way of conceiving the thinking and subject positions, which occur in the expanded cinema of Godard and Duras. The claim is not, of course, that the work of Duras and Godard represents such spaces for they are, precisely unrepresentable in Euclidean space. 'You can have a Klein bottle in front of your eyes, in three dimensions, only in an approximate form' (Miller, J-A, 1989:31). Rather the suggestion is that the thinking takes unique cinematic forms in response to issues which can usefully be thought topologically. Those forms do not reflect topological space rather they engage with it to make something new of the issues arising there.

To think the psychoanalytic process Lacan deployed the three registers. While always imbricated, these are heterotopic (Lacan, 1995:11). If there is a lack in the Other, the real cannot be completely spoken and the imaginarisations invoked to make good this deficiency are holed (Julien, 1990a:158). Analogously, in thinking issues, Godard and Duras create a heterotopic cinema in which the different modes of thinking in the images, words, music, citations and (in the case of Godard) written texts, while always imbricated, occur in zones which cannot be brought together in a unitary space. Instead of an englobing vision there are interlaced lines of thought on different planes which navigate rather than delineate. On the proposed account, perspectives as conceived by common-sense may emerge but always as part of a larger process which exceeds them. The subject – always out of joint - is a movement taking him or her beyond any single perspective. In this light, the films of Godard are a series of perspectives, which inaugurate a break with existing imaginaries and which, by dint of their patent limitations, propel the subject forward. Film thereby enables the subject to be between perspectives differently and this, in turn, enables another form of thinking where the apparently clear distinction of inside and outside, which seems to hold in worlds conceived in terms of the specular image, no longer obtains. In the expanded cinema of Godard there are moments when clarity emerges in the perspectives on say homelessness, where the subject is in a position to determine the crux of the situation: the manifest need for much better provision. But, in respect of other issues, for example the vicissitudes encountered in some intimate relationships, the subject is, 'at an indeterminate place,' for the subject is in process (S.XI:208).

Coming to the second aspect, topology affords different ways of thinking relationality. Brent Adkins makes the point with admirable succinctness:

> 'The primary issue in topology is not the size or shape of the object but the relation of its parts to one another. The classic example of this is the doughnut and the coffee cup. Topologically speaking they are the same. The reason they are the same is that both a doughnut and a coffee cup have exactly one hole, the middle of the doughnut and the handle of the coffee cup. The cup part of the coffee cup can be thought of as a continuous deformation… of one side of the doughnut' (Adkins, 2015:62).

In other words, in this form of topology, manipulations of an object by bending, stretching and distorting are permitted – here, the transformation of a doughnut into a coffee cup - as long as certain rules are observed. One can deform a given figure as long as 'one does not separate points previously connected and, conversely, does not connect points previously separated' (Plotnitsky, 2006:192). Invariants – in this instance the hole – have to be respected. So, staying with the present example, 'spheres and tori cannot be converted into each other' for, as Arkady Plotnitsky reminds us, 'the hole in tori make this impossible' (Plotnitsky, 2006:192). Otherwise any distortion is allowed and this enables the creation of spatial relationships unlike those proposed by Euclidean, metrical geometry. In place of 'the science of stable points and well-defined distances', topology affords a 'science of neighbourhoods' (Smith, 2012b:29). What counts is not metrical distances between fixed points but relationships of proximity and distance effected by the transformations. Daniel W. Smith gives an example:

> 'I can mark out points on a flat piece of paper, but if I crumple or fold the paper, two distinct points may find themselves in the neighbourhood of each other, or even superimposed […] two points that were close can become very distant' (Smith, 2012b:28-9).

This is useful as it offers us a way of conceiving forms of thinking which can occur in expanded cinema where the thinking revalues by creating new relationships such as bringing elements into new neighbourhoods. Like the montage in the lines of Rimbaud, Godard's juxtaposes different elements, revaluing each. Godard's montage is not just the recognition that there are areas of existence which cannot be brought together in a unified vision. Nor is it merely fragments for there was never a whole outside the imaginary. Rather it is a way of thinking and thereby revaluing, in its conjunctions, aspects of issues which cannot all be brought into focus at once, and, in its interstices, the correlative sub-representative elements which cannot be specularised at all. Crucially, in such thinking the style of movement is not merely an encounter with limitations, checks and failures, but the making of a way which is a style of desiring and which, in consequence, can be its own sense. As such, it is not the mere registration of the failure to say or see it all – where is the joy in that? – but an achievement.

To conclude - there are innumerable situations in which it is useful to figure issues in terms, which can be situated in Euclidean space. Just as in many circumstances Einstein's theories can be set aside and thinking proceed on a Newtonian basis so, more often than not, the cinema of *bien-dire* can, for example in the work of Ken Loach, undertake its work in Euclidean spaces. However, where what counts is the sub-representational, where knowledge falls short, and thinking assumes the forms of know-how and way-making, Lacan's topological investigations suggest that such thinking can usefully be conceived as the traversal - punctuated by positionings - of spaces which are resistant to any totalizing envisioning and, therefore, very different from those associated with a common-sense perspectivism.

Conclusion

Using moments from Lacan's teaching this chapter has demonstrated the first of my two arguments: namely that psychoanalytic approaches are not yet entirely spent. Conscious that every encounter with an art work is different, it has proposed no general methodology. Instead it has essayed a series of explorations of what various artforms can do and, in particular, how they can think in forms irreducible to any other.

Before coming to part two of this thesis, I want to make one final point in support of my argument for the continued relevance of psychoanalysis and, at the same time, dispel any impression that there is anything highfalutin or rarefied about the approaches essayed. *Bien-dire* is not confined to difficult modernist texts. One of my purposes in drawing an analogy between the work of the work in jokes and in art – as instances of *bien-dire* - is to argue that artworks do not inhabit an ethereal realm apart. They are as engaged as jokes and like jokes, in the style of *bien*-dire, are as everyday as they are miraculous. Some of the most immediately enjoyable works of popular culture can be instances of *bien-dire*. The distinction between enunciation and the enounced is as useful in thinking about some instances of rock music as it is in considering Godard. In many songs, *Satisfaction* (The Rolling Stones, 1965) and *Jumpin Jack* Flash (The Rolling Stones, 1968) are obvious examples, what is said speaks of the pain of existence while in the saying, in the rhythms and energies of

the music, there is a zest for life. AND not IS. In the temporalities and places created by such moments, life is as glorious as existence is unbearable. 'You don't define jazz,' Miles Davis maintained. 'Jazz is just like an attitude. Music is nothing but styles' (Davis, 2010). On the account offered here, this proposition holds for all art. If there is a lack in the Other, there are only styles, evaluations and attitudes. *Bien-dire* denotes the innumerable styles worthy of the event. The claim of this chapter is that psychoanalysis is still useful when we attempt to think the thinking which happens there.

Postscript: *Hamlet*, serialism and art after Lacan

As a coda to the first part of the thesis, I will put the contention, that psychoanalytic approaches inspired by Lacan's teaching - once amended by Deleuzean concepts - can be worthy of the event of art, to the test by considering a literary text: *Hamlet*. If the approaches explored above have any claim on our attention, they should be capable of contributing to our thinking of works beyond cinema. It is not only in films that art in the mode of *bien-dire* engages with the Other of language, the discordance of desires and the real as impossible. And it is not only in film that the work of the work creates an element in which a unique form of thinking can occur. *Hamlet* has been selected for this experiment for two reasons. First because of the centrality it has historically enjoyed in discussions around literature and art. 'It has,' as the theatre director Peter Brook remarks, 'captured the imagination of the world more than any other' (Brook, 2011). 'This play of genius has never been replaced by a better one' (Lacan, 1958-59: Session 4/3/59 p. 13). And secondly, because it was Darian Leader's exceptionally insightful article on *Hamlet* - to which we will come shortly - that initially convinced me of the continuing value of Lacanian psychoanalysis when thinking the event of art (Leader, 2003). The argument of this section is that Leader's analysis of *Hamlet* can usefully be developed along lines explored earlier to provide new approaches to both *Hamlet* and the cinematic texts which are the focus of this thesis.

Leader's reading of *Hamlet* develops in the context of a larger discussion of Lacan, Lévi-Strauss and myth which he begins with the case of Little Hans. As we have

seen, on Lacan's account, Hans 'was left in the lurch at the age of five by the failings of his symbolic entourage' (E:432) when 'faced with the suddenly actualised enigma to him of his sex and his existence' (E:432). In other words, Hans used his phobia and the myths fashioned around it as a means of situating and orientating himself in a world where he had lost his bearings. The mythic constructions were his answer to the question which 'being raises for the subject,' (E:432) to 'the question of his place between his mother and his father, experienced by him as an impasse' (Leader, 2003:41). The interest of Lacan's approach as developed by Leader, for present purposes, is that it goes beyond the commonplace, that 'myth is a way of treating an impossibility,' (Leader, 2003:39) to argue that myth constitutes a unique mode of thought hinging more upon relationality and composition than the propositional content of representations.

The approach builds on further theses of Levi-Strauss. First that the building blocks of myths should be conceived less as 'isolated elements than as bundles of relations' (Leader, 2003:38). In his analyses, Levi-Strauss prioritised not items of content but the 'relations between terms or sets of terms' (Leader, 2003:37). In myth, '*form* takes precedence over the *content* of the narrative' (Lévi-Strauss, 1958:204). Lévi-Strauss's subsequent move is, as, Leader so astutely perceives, even more important for Lacan – and indeed this thesis. Lévi-Strauss hypothesises 'that what cannot be formulated as a proposition can take the form of a relation' (Leader, 2003:48). This notion informs Lacan's teaching insofar as 'problems involving a real or point of impossibility led him to the construction of relational modes of exposition involving stories, images and fictions caught up with logical and mathematical models' (Leader, 2003:48). Further it orientated his handling of myth. In contrast to Freud, who used a mythic structure, such as the primal father of *Totem and Taboo* 'to account for some contradictory or impossible real,' (Leader, 2003:48) Lacan looked 'to the *relation between* mythic structures' to think this real (Leader, 2003:48). Hence 'his reading not of the Oedipus story or of the *Totem and Taboo* story as separate narratives, but as two oppositional poles of a formula' (Leader, 2003:48). Where, if there is a lack in the Other, the truth can only be half-said then recourse is had to myth. As Lacan puts it: 'half-saying is the internal law of every species of enunciation of the truth, and what incarnates it best is myth' (S.XVII:110).

However, as truth can only be half-said, no myth expresses *the* truth. Instead 'the truth reveals itself in an alternation of strictly opposite things, which have to be made to revolve around one another' (SXVII:110). Composition and relationality are key. The truths at stake here are articulated not in meanings but between meanings. Second, and even more importantly, Lévi-Strauss argued that myth responds to impossibility 'not with a solution but by finding new ways of formulating it' (Leader, 2003:39). The plural is crucial: instead of a single myth, there are series where each response to impossibility 'replies, as it were to another' (Leader, 2003:39). Impasses are not overcome but the terms in which they are figured are recast in different relationships, various permutations are worked through and the thinking occurs between the series (Leader, 2003:39). This inspires Lacan to claim that the myth-making of Little Hans consists of 'all the possible permutations of a limited number of signifiers in the form of a myth around the signifying crystal of his phobia' (E:432). As Leader elaborates, with his new sexual sensations and the arrival of a sibling 'the question of his place between his mother and his father' (Leader, 2003:41) is raised anew. At this juncture, Leader notes the 'Oedipus complex could be elaborated as a myth to allow the child a positioning in the symbolic,' but not in this case (Leader, 2003:42). It is impossible for Little Hans to situate himself and the new, troubling elements within an Oedipal framework for the father – like Joyce's father - fails 'to function in a way appropriate to introduce the Oedipal myth' (Leader, 2003:42). Little Hans is, consequently, at an impasse. His response is to create his own framework in the form of a phobia to set limits - thereby organizing space – and 'mythic constructions,' where he situates himself and others 'in a new symbolic configuration' (Leader, 2003:41). In the manner described by Lévi-Strauss, his 'mythic activity' (Jacques Lacan cited in Leader, 2003:41) takes up and reshuffles a limited number of elements –here the horse, the street, and other children – in a 'proliferation of stories, ideas, dreams and scenarios' (Leader, 2003:41). As with Lévi-Strauss, his myth-making is, in Lacan's formulation, 'the response to an impossible situation by the successive articulation of all the forms of the impossibility of the solution' (Leader, 2003:41).

The importance of this for the present project – namely the development of non-reductive modes of psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the thinking which occurs in

the event of art – should be evident. First it suggests a way of conceiving what certain artworks do. As Leader argues, 'a fiction should not be understood simply as something "false" but as something that can be used to organise disparate and traumatic material' (Leader, 2003:42). Like the mythic constructions of Little Hans, many artworks, which assume a fictional form, can be considered as 'formally equivalent to the process of responding to and elaborating a question' (Leader, 2003:41). If the $\not\exists$ obtains, artists, like Little Hans, have to experiment but, unlike the constructions of that unhappy little boy, theirs afford more joy than the wretched mode of *jouissance* which can be garnered from a phobic symptom. Further, it affords a way of thinking about art as a form of thought irreducible to any other. Here, for example, in modes of thinking where relationality and composition are paramount, where content counts insofar as it gives the work its initial interest – but where, in the course of the work, what matters are the changing relations between elements within a series and the relations between series. A thinking which occurs *between* the different permutations and which is articulable in no other form. An initial content arrives with a particular valency – whether cultural or individual – and is then revalued by the relationships in which it is taken up. The work happens between the variants and, in that work, senses are created which constitute an element in which new truths can be created.

This brings us *to Hamlet* for Leader himself makes the connection to art in relation to the play within the play in *Hamlet*. In the main plot Hamlet, commanded by his murdered father's ghost to avenge his death, famously, hesitates. 'In the midst of his indecision…he hits on the idea of staging a play before his guilty uncle Claudius in which the murder scene is played out' (Leader, 2003:43). As a number of commentators have pointed out, there is a puzzle: in the-play-within-the-play: it is the nephew who is 'the king's murderer, not the brother, as in the main narrative' (Leader, 2003:43-4). To explain the puzzle Leader argues we have to ask 'why was it necessary to add the extra play?', 'what structurally is its function?' and 'what can the double-plot conceit tell us about the nature of this desire itself?' (Leader, 1997:25) Leader's proposal is as much Freudian as Lacanian. He argues that 'the two contradictory plots' (Leader, 2003:44) exist because 'when an unconscious wish is impossible to assume' – for Leader, 'parricidal desire' - 'it will take the form of pieces

of material that cannot be fully superimposed one on the other' (Leader, 1997:25). The 'margin between them' and the 'failure to map the one onto the other' further suggests 'a definition of desire as being exactly this failure' (Leader, 1997:25). The two stories 'cipher an initial point of impossibility, something that cannot be thought because it is so unbearable: that the son is himself in the place of the father's murderer' (Leader, 1997:25). Leader continues 'what the play-within-a-play shows us is that when a wish cannot be expressed as a proposition ("I want to kill daddy"), it will take the form of a relation, a relation in which the "I" is missing' (Leader, 2003:44). Or, as he put it in the earlier piece, the wish in question exists 'simply in the form of a set of contradictions, a group of contradictory and disparate motifs that articulate the point of impossibility, the place where there are no words, no proposition' (Leader, 1997:25).

The importance of Leader's brilliant study is that it, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, provides an example of a form of thinking in art – the serial which depends on position, that is a subject's being between. Its influence on earlier discussions of the serial in *The Conformist* will be apparent. However, as that discussion evidenced, Leader's line of thought opens up possibilities which he himself did not explore. It is to these possibilities we now turn. How does the play appear in light of the approaches set out earlier?

It begins with problems and questions recalcitrant to resolution. At the immediately manifest political level, it is far from clear that Hamlet's 'execution' of Claudius and accession to the throne would put all to rights for he is no saint. A thirty-year old man plunged into melancholy because his mother's desires go elsewhere – the condition of Hamlet before interpellation by his father's ghost – appears unlikely to be the answer to any kingdom's difficulties. It is no accident that his efforts to bring justice result in 'the deaths of Polonius, Ophelia, Gertrude, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Laertes and Hamlet himself' and that 'politically, the consequences are even more disastrous' with the state of Denmark 'annexed by the warlord Fortinbras who steps into the bloody shambles of the final scene to assume "some rights of memory in this kingdom"' (Shaughnessy, 2011:193).

The problems which are the focus of psychoanalysis are even more intractable. For Leader these are pre-eminently Oedipal. Later I will suggest that

there are other issues but for the moment let's concentrate on the Oedipus complex. The key point to always bear in mind in relation to Oedipus is that 'there is no happy definitive resolution of one's Oedipal trials' (Critchley, 2013:128). On a Lacanian account, the mother is more the problem than the solution. Murdering the father is no more of an option: in *Totem and Taboo* when the sons kill the father they find themselves even more effectively debarred from the desired women (Freud, 1913:141-3). So, the choice is a forced choice. As Lacan explains, '*Your money or your life!* If I choose the money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without the money, namely, a life deprived of something' (S.XI:212). There is no alternative to the assumption of a social role. As, if the barred Other is operating, *the* place does not exist, this solution is never wholly satisfactory. The Oedipus complex is an evasion of this fact. It is the pretence there is an alternative. The play therefore addresses what is for psychoanalysis the fundamental problem: the impossibility of being at one with the symbolic order – it is *Other* – and the impossibility – this side of psychosis – of life outside it. In Freudian terms this is the desire to at once kill the father and accede to society and its benefits by identifying with him. In Lacanian terms it is the wish to be both an unbarred subject with unconstrained access to an imaginarised absolute *jouissance* and a barred subject not wholly lost in a chaotic flux of desires, drives and *jouissance*.

For those uneasy with Oedipalism, elements of the problem could be recast in more everyday terms. Hamlet, like many other children, can find a workable place for himself only if he can put right what has gone awry in the previous generation: an impossible task. Like so many children he curses his fate: the task of putting right what is amiss between flawed parents:

> 'The time is out of joint; O cursèd spite
> That ever I was born to set it right!' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, scene 5, line nos 186-187)

And like those children he is haunted by the legacy of that discordance which, in the play is figured by the ghost. In the case of Hamlet – recall that all cases are singular – – the impossible task of putting right what has gone wrong is complicated by the fact that, after mandating his son to revenge him, the ghost continues:

> 'Taint not thy mind nor let thy soul contrive

> Against thy mother aught; leave her to heaven' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1 scene 5, line nos 85-60

If the mother must not be harmed, Hamlet has to confront the question '*Che Vuoi*?' (Lacan, 1977:13), that is, the question what does the Other want. If, in consequence, of the Other's incompleteness, others are opaque, an unanswerable question. 'What hinders' Hamlet, Žižek concludes, is his 'doubt concerning the *desire of the other*.' (Žižek, 1989:120).

As Leader so perspicaciously notes, the thinking of these issues is serial. However, that serialism is not confined to the relationships of the play within the play to the main drama. The play, as has often been observed, falls into two parts separated by the sea voyage (DR:89). On my reading these two parts become two answers to the real of impossibility, that is, two attempts by Hamlet to 'situate himself in desire' (Lacan, 1977:49). Neither could be said to be successful but, in conjunction, they create the most interesting play in western literature. Each is an attempt to find the appropriate distance from the symbolic order. Over-proximity to the signifiers of the Other is mortifying – a form of suicide. On the other hand, too great a distance robs the subject of stability and risks engulfing psychosis. The problem is exacerbated, as indicated above, by the fact that *the* symbolic does not exist – it is only encountered in particular concrete forms. Hamlet encounters two. First the manifestly self-serving imperatives of the new regime to bear allegiance, accompanied by his mother's injunction to 'cast thy nighted colour off' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, scene 2, line no 68) and the criticism by Claudius of his 'unmanly grief' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, scene 2, line no 94). Second, in the mandate from his father's ghost to avenge his death while not harming his mother. His famed hesitation is his refusal of both. This brings a certain *jouissance* – in his wordplay he enjoys eluding the established meanings of the new rulers' discourse and has fun at the expense of courtiers like Osric who have subjugated themselves to the powers that be, but this freedom comes at a cost. Without the stability conferred by the symbolic, madness impends and he is bereft of the capacity to desire. He becomes, as Lacan puts it, 'the man who has lost the way of his desire' (Lacan, 1977:12). In consequence, existence becomes senseless and Ophelia, who had been the object of his desire, is abominably abused. The problem with rejecting the symbolic is most

apparent in the death of Polonius. Like every child, Hamlet is subjected to the gaze of the Other. With a lunge through the arras, Hamlet frees himself from one mode of this subjection but at the cost of turning himself into the brutal murderer of an old man guilty of little more than muddled incomprehension. The subject is not the only casualty of a refusal of the Other's order. In the second series, after the sea voyage, he draws too close to the symbolic. As a result, the threat of madness lifts and desire begins to burn. He accedes to Claudius's request that he fence with Laertes and this leads to his death. In the duel, he obeys first Claudius, and then, after Claudius's treachery becomes patent, his father's call for vengeance and this acceptance of a symbolic mandate is a form of suicide. Significantly, as Lacan points out, one of his first actions after his return is to identify with Ophelia and she is a suicide (S.X:36). *The* answer to his dilemma does not exist. When Hamlet refuses to play the King's game he is unable to desire (Ophelia) and bereft of desire, finds existence valueless and senseless. When he does play the King's game, when he accepts the wager, he discovers that this symbolic is, as figured by the plot of Claudius and Laertes, a fatal trap.

For this reason, the analysis of the play as a case study and the diagnosis of Hamlet's neurotic pathology is to pass up the possibility of forms of thought, which, while analogous to the thinking in myth, are ultimately irreducible to any other. 'Hamlet is not a clinical case.' (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 18) rather the play is a 'myth', that is, a unique mode of thinking the real (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 pp. 2-3). As 'the most enigmatic character in all writing' Hamlet is our chance to engage in modes of *bien-dire* and *savoir-faire* irreducible to the categories of the understanding (Brook, 2011). Existence is, as always, a finding a way between – between, that is, the real of the body and a singular symbolic order. Serial thought is one form – there are innumerable others – of thinking the between from that between. 'Poetic creations,' as Lacan insists, 'engender rather than reflect psychological creations' (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 4/3/59 p. 13).

Creation is first and foremost the creation of a style which makes something different of the issues. This is one of the achievements of the extraordinary poetry remarked upon Lacan:

> ‘There is not a verse of Hamlet, nor one of his replies, which does not have in English a percussive power, a violence of language which makes of it something at which one is at every moment absolutely stupefied. You could believe that it was written yesterday, that one could not write things like that three centuries ago’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 4/3/59 p. 13).

Ultimately the response to the more difficult issues addressed by the play is a style where style is a mode of existential engagement. A crucial component of that style is the poetry, for the poetry is a saying as well as a said. If, as may be the case, Shakespeare, at times speaks through Hamlet it is also the case that, elsewhere, Shakespeare speaks of Hamlet. If at moments he appears to inhabit the perspectives of Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes, he is never identical to any of their points of view. Like every subject he is ek-static to - that is, at once included in and excluded from every position. He is a saying between the lines of what is said – a movement creative of a sense irreducible to any meaning. In psychoanalytic terms – as pointed out by Hanna Segal and subsequently Darian Leader - it is this imputed ‘creator’ with whom (among others, for example, characters in the drama) the spectator identifies (Leader, 2008:86). In Deleuzean terms it is with this figure that the spectator becomes other. On this account, Shakespeare is not merely the empirical being of socio-historical studies, he is also the play or rather the dynamic process of the drama. As such, he is, at once, the ideologies propagated, the dispersed identifications with Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes, and - beyond the representations – the sub-representative movement of saying generative of tonality and evental sense. In this final guise he is the movement(s) of desire which while articulating the text are not themselves articulable. It is with this Shakespeare, above all, that the spectator can find a line of flight.

Shakespeare, as viewed through this optic is as much written as writer and becomes other in unforeseen ways in the writing. ‘Neurotic symptoms,’ Darian Leader writes, ‘are ways of asking a question.’ (Leader, 2008:38). So are many artworks but, on occasion, with this crucial difference: in certain artworks, if as a consequence of the work of the work, the artist becomes other, the question becomes its own answer. However, as we saw above, this answer can only arrive if the artist at once actively makes something new of the issue and allows something

unforeseen, unmasterable and inappropriable to occur. If an answer arrives it is an event not a result which can be formulated, translated or deterritorialised. It is existential rather than propositional and, as such, has to be perpetually re-won.

If such transformations are possible it is because, whatever its other achievements, the style creates an element in which new evental truths can occur. The evental truths of art – as opposed to the (ideological) truth claims of representations - can enable the subject to happen at those moments and sites. Famously Roman Jakobson described literature as an 'organised violence committed on ordinary speech' (Roman Jakobson cited in Eagleton, 1983:2). What this proposition misses is that 'ordinary language', if *the* language does not exist, is itself violent. As emphasised in the discussion of the symbolic, we do not encounter language in itself; we encounter the utterances of others and these utterances are tendentious. 'The signifying relationships, the relationships of value, are given first, and all subjectivity…comes to be inscribed within this signifying dialectic' (Lacan, 1958-9: Session of 15/4/59 p. 8). The speech and writings of others decree, evaluate, and advocate, distinguishing the significant from the insignificant and demarcating the sanctioned from the unsanctioned. Above all, they make of the real, realities and demand we subscribe to these realities. In short, they seek to position subjects in particular perspectives. As we saw in the earlier discussion of art as counter-movement, art can be a way of replying to the words of the Other. Usually by the construction of other realities, but often also by taking a (topological) distance from existing discourses. The poetry, by creating a different element, can afford new positions and concomitant revaluations. This poetic reworking of language, like the reworking of the world of images by the angles, framings and editing in the sequence from *Une Femme Marieé,* enables subjects to situate themselves differently relative to desire.

This brings us to time. In this regard, the gap between mythical thought and the complexity of thinking in art becomes more apparent. Lévi-Strauss, in *The View from Afar*, describes the line from Wagner's *Parsifal*, 'Here, time turns into space,' (Wagner, 1882) as 'probably the most profound definition that anyone has offered for myth (Lévi-Strauss, 1983:219). As will be evident, the emphasis in the psychoanalytically-inspired approaches explored in this thesis is very different. On

my argument, the thinking which occurs in art is creative of and dependent upon temporalities in which revaluations and concomitant evental truths can occur. In *Hamlet* that temporalisation is achieved most tellingly by the 'music' of the text, what Frank Kermode terms the 'the pace of the action and the tune of the language' (Kermode, 2000:104). If the subject, in its multiplicity, is desire(s) and if desire is always in movement, then the sense created by this 'music' is productive of new sense. The play has, as Kermode claims, a 'symphonic' quality and, as in a symphony, there is a perpetual revaluation of the material and, therefore of the issues the material figures (Kermode, 2000:105). However, neither Freud nor Lacan had anything of interest to say about music. So, after pausing to note the limitations of psychoanalytic theories of art, which this failure, in respect of the most powerful and affecting art form, manifests, let's turn to areas where Lacan can contribute to our thinking of temporalisation in the work of the work.

Taking Leader's article as a starting point, this approach to *Hamlet* has drawn parallels between the thinking which can occur in myth and the thinking which can happen in an artwork. However, this can be only a first approach for works, like *Hamlet*, are much more complex than a series of lines responding to a single issue. Not least because such artworks frequently address a number of issues. So, instead of a permutation of lines of thought addressing the one issue, there are multiple lines thinking different issues. This expands the possibilities for the creation of sense, and the happening of truths for, as the lines intersect, converge and diverge they become intricated, imbricated and dissociated and, in consequence, they resonate, recontextualise and, thereby, revalue. Here sense and truth are points on or between the lines; they are of an hour and place. Hence a principal function of what Lacan terms the 'machinery' of the text is the production of temporalities in which these moments can occur (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 3).

Viewed in this light *Hamlet* is not only a series of lines of thought addressing the question of Hamlet's desires in relation to the symbolic. There is space to consider only one other (related) issue: the thinking of the collateral damage which can occur when individuals seek to situate themselves as to desire. The manner in which Gertrude and Claudius set about this task creates a situation, which, while none of Hamlet's making, affects him deeply. Similarly, Ophelia and Laertes in their

different ways find themselves casualties of how Hamlet decides to deal with the problems posed by his mother and uncle. Such problems are, of course, unconfined to Elsinore. The majority of analyses are of analysands who find that past conflicts haunt, undermine and render problematic current relationships. The play is as much a thinking of this issue as of Hamlet's problems with his symbolic mandate imposed by the ghost's interpellation to avenge his father (Žižek, 1989:120).

The Shakespeare constructed with the play thinks this issue serially on the three intersecting lines: Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes. Like Hamlet, Laertes avenges his father's murder at the expense of his own life and like Hamlet, who feigns madness, he dissembles – in his case when plotting Hamlet's murder. So, he is Hamlet to the extent that he is Hamlet's double. If a difference must always be maintained, to meet one's double is lethal. Hence their fatal final encounter. At the same time, he is not Hamlet for the latter is the victim of another's plot while Laertes is the victim of his own. Similarly, Hamlet is and is not Ophelia. Like Ophelia he is bereaved by an act of murder. At the same time, he is her Other and another. He is Other in that he issues commands: 'Get thee to a nunnery!' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 3, scene 1, line no 120) and he is other in that his desires are incommensurate with hers to the extent they drive her to madness and suicide. Serial thinking is this play of sameness and difference. So how does the work of the work create sense in the face of these issues? In the moment. Just as in a joke, the sense produced by the punchline depends on timing so here the sense depends on a mode of temporalisation. To be clear: this is not to diminish the value of the truths which temporalisation renders possible. There are no eternal truths in this area outside pretence. Truths here have to be won and then, as they vanish with the moment, won again. The argument of this thesis is that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it should recognise that art can be one of the innumerable sites where such truths can happen

The senses and truths produced in *Hamlet* depend not only on the relationships between series but on the events created by those shifting relationships. There is space for only one example – Ophelia's madness. In the preceding scene, Hamlet witnessing thousands about to risk being slain for 'a little patch of ground' in Poland (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 4, scene 4, line no 17) because honour (namely, something of symbolic value) is at stake, is inspired to declaim:

> ‘O, from this time forth
> My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 4, scene 4, line nos 64-5).

Ophelia’s affliction changes the drama’s direction, opening a new perspective on Hamlet’s resolution to ‘be bloody’. The descent into madness of the daughter of the man he has slain recontextualises and thereby revalues Hamlet’s actions by making plain the costs. But, while this scene is close to being the final word on Hamlet’s cruelty towards Ophelia, it is far from being the final word on the other issues.

Which brings us to the conclusion. According to Lacan, Hamlet, after realising he is mortally wounded by the ‘envenomed rapier’, discovers, like an existential hero awakening to his finitude and mortality, the capacity to act. More precisely, he finds himself ‘capable of fighting, and capable of killing’. This, Lacan claims ‘is enough to end the play’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 17). However, in light of the preceding chapters, it will be apparent that more is happening. There is a nodal moment: if he kills, he is also killed. Like Marcello in *The Conformist* he is at once murderer and suicide. Now, while this is ‘enough to end the play’ it is not the sum of what is achieved: if something is captured (about the relationship of desire to the Other and the ensuing casualties) something is also liberated. In excess of the said there is a (style of) saying.

If the Other is barred, if there is no final word, then works seeking a final word and complete resolution are in difficulty. How can works addressing the real as impossible find a satisfactory conclusion? It seems all such works are doomed to failure. My argument is that one reason psychoanalysis is of continuing interest is because it has no truck with such simplistic approaches. Lacan’s seminar sessions never pronounce a final word and that is why they succeed rather than fail. Similarly jokes in the mode of *bien-dire* are never more than half-sayings. If something is captured – there is the determination/evaluation of an issue – something is liberated, namely laughter. Equally in art there is a double movement in which the arrangement, in Deleuzean terms, the territorialisation, is accompanied by a deterritorialisation. There is, in *bien-dire*, a going beyond. Of necessity, for we wish and do not wish to be at one. To be at one would be to attain completion but it would also be death. In seminar eleven Lacan famously insisted that any encounter with the

real must be a 'missed encounter' (S.XI:55) for, 'if the encounter was successful' as Michel Silvestre so astutely perceives, it 'could only signify the death of the subject' (Silvestre, 1987:312). To unite with the lost object would be a form of suicide. Hence the art of *bien-dire* is not the making of a whole but the making of a way.

If the play is concerned, like Hamlet himself, to find a way of relating to a symbolic and to the desire(s) any such relationship entails, this requires a resolution which is, at once, 'enough' to end the work and a movement beyond any closure. What goes beyond is a saying/desire which is both affirmative and sense-making. The Shakespeare co-created by the work of the work is not Hamlet. If for Hamlet, existence is senseless, if for him '*all the uses of this world' seem 'weary, stale, flat and unprofitable*' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, scene 2, line nos 133-134) - this is the evaluation of neither the Shakespeare, who emerged in composition with the work, nor the audience members who transport and are transported by the work of the work. As Lacan observes, Hamlet's cry is often taken to be 'Let me be given my desire' (Lacan 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 1). But Hamlet's cry is not Shakespeare's when Shakespeare is constitutive of, and reconstituted by, the bien-dire which is the work of the work. Lacan misses this:

> 'The truth of Hamlet, is a hopeless truth. There is not a trace in the whole of Hamlet of raising up towards something which could be described as the beyond, atonement, redemption' (Lacan 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 7).

While accepting there may be neither atonement nor redemption, this thesis holds there is a beyond opened by the style of saying and desiring. If Lacan fails to perceive this it is because in his theorising – as opposed to the work of his work – he is operating with an unduly circumscribed notion of desire. In this respect, he needs Deleuze. So, let us now, in the second part of this thesis, explore how Deleuze and Lacan might be brought together in a 'disjunctive synthesis' enabling psychoanalysis to be worthier of the event of art.

PART TWO: LACANIAN FILM THEORY AFTER DELEUZE

In part one it was claimed and demonstrated that psychoanalysis can still contribute useful approaches to the work of artworks and particularly cinema. At the same time, it was acknowledged that, to be worthy of the event of art, psychoanalysis would have to draw on other thinkers and Gilles Deleuze was proposed as a leading candidate. Part two explores what a disjunctive synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the philosophy of Deleuze can accomplish. Chapter three sets the scene for the encounter. By outlining key aspects of Deleuze's philosophy it establishes a framework for the discussion of the degree of convergence and divergence between the two. Using that framework, chapter four examines Deleuze and Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis and identifies both a fundamental consonance and significant divergences. On this basis, it argues that, in considering artworks, psychoanalysis is suited for certain purposes and Deleuze others. Chapter five considers Deleuze's cinema books and the lessons they hold for psychoanalytic approaches to art more generally.

CHAPTER THREE: GILLES DELEUZE: A PHILOSOPHER (THEORETICAL PRELIMINARY 2)

Introduction

The principal purpose of this chapter is to establish a framework within which the two subsequent chapters can consider the relationship of Deleuze (and Guattari) to psychoanalysis, and how a psychoanalysis to come could usefully draw upon Deleuze's philosophy in thinking about what cinema does and could do. To that end, the chapter identifies certain crucial points of emphasis in Deleuze and signposts their proximity to Lacan's teaching and usefulness in recasting psychoanalytic criticism. In outline, it is argued that for Deleuze, as for one of his most significant influences, Nietzsche, there is no higher value than life. 'There are never any criteria' for evaluating modes of existence other than 'the tenor of existence:' the degree to which it promotes 'the intensification of life' (WP:74). As such, Deleuze's chief purpose was to free life from its entrapments and augment our capacity to live. Since he considered prevailing modes of subjectivity diminished this capacity, he sought, albeit prudently, to dismantle them. His ontology is constructed to establish the possibility of more vital - often unanticipable - forms of existence. As the cosmos is becoming rather than being, as everything is produced but never in a fixed or final form, in all emergent systems there are 'lines of flight' – which, as we have seen, are lines of liberation from oppressive structures which simultaneously put such structures 'to flight' (D:36). From this perspective, he indicts many psychoanalytic practices as blocking lines of flight and celebrates – as we shall see in chapter five - the creation of lines of flight within art. To approach these topics let's consider the most relevant points of emphasis for present purposes, namely, vitalism, the concern to move beyond the human condition and his processual ontology.

Vitalism

'[L]ife seems to me the essential.'

Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, 2005:7)

Within philosophy the designation of Deleuze as a vitalist is a commonplace. 'Deleuze's philosophical stroke of genius' wrote Eric Alliez was 'to invent a new vitalism' (Eric Alliez cited in Dosse, 2007:317). Fredric Jameson has described Deleuze's 'vitalism' as productive of an 'energising' worldview (Jameson, 2010:2, footnote 2). In *The Adventure of French Philosophy*, Alain Badiou, after distinguishing two distinct orientations - the first, deriving from Bergson 'a philosophy of life and change' and the second a more mathematically based approach to the possibilities 'of thought and of the symbolic'– placed Deleuze in the former tradition (Badiou, 2012:liii).[6] Deleuze was happy with the appellation, commenting: 'everything I have written is vitalist' (N:143). 'The essential thing for me,' he wrote is 'this "vitalism"' (Deleuze, 2005:7). 'Life,' is 'complete power, complete bliss' (Deleuze, 1995:27). Thinking, he held, was 'never just a theoretical matter. It has to do with vital problems. To do with life itself' (N:105). The importance of the vitalist orientation, for chapter four, is that it founds Deleuze's claim that psychoanalysis is life-denying. In response I will argue that while Lacan eschewed vitalist terminology, he shared Deleuze's aim insofar as psychoanalytic practice seeks to enable patients to exist in more vital forms. In chapter five it will be claimed that Deleuze has a vitalist conception of art as augmenting our capacity to live, and it will be argued that a psychoanalytic criticism, worthy of the event of art, should view art, in the mode of *bien-dire,* through a similar prism.

Beyond the Human Condition

'The self is one more thing we ought to dissolve.'
Gilles Deleuze (DI:193)

Vitalism, for Deleuze, is the imperative to go beyond personhood. In *Phantasm and Modern Literature*, Deleuze writes, 'Klossowski's entire work moves toward a single goal: to assure the loss of personal identity and to dissolve the self (LS:324). 'This' he

[6] See also (Ansell-Pearson, 1999:4); (Meillassoux, 2006:37); (Bogue, 2003:2) among many others.

continues, 'is the shining trophy that Klossowski's characters bring back from a voyage to the edge of madness' (LS:324). Deleuze's entire philosophy shares the same goal and carries off the same trophy. For Deleuze, as for Klossowski, 'the dissolution of the self' is not a pathological condition to be avoided but the 'mightiest power, rich in positive and salutary promises' (LS:324). Indeed, Deleuze's works are the delivery on that promise. Explicating - and endorsing - Bergson, Deleuze declares that the aim of philosophy is to 'open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman… to go beyond the human condition' (B:28). This ambition to think beyond 'anthropological predicates' informs all of his philosophy (DR:xxi). 'Life is not something personal' (D:6) so, in order to free life and to become, in Nietzsche's phrase, 'worthier - of living,' we must become inhuman (Nietzsche, 1887b:113). This exigency to break with existing forms of subjectivity is a political task for 'the forces of repression always need a self that can be assigned, they need determinate individuals on which to exercise their power' (DI:138). To escape such repression, we must achieve liberation from such selves for, 'when we become the least bit fluid, when we slip away from the assignable Self, when there is no longer any person on whom God can exercise his power or by whom He can be replaced, the police lose it' (DI:138). Dismantling the self is a political imperative and it is achievable for, as Deleuze's entire philosophy demonstrates, 'singularity is no longer enclosed in an individual life is in excess of any form of selfhood or organism' (DI:138).

Put like that, it might appear that Deleuze advocates a headlong plunge into acephalism, regardless of consequences, but this is far from the case. He constantly urges caution. In *Dialogues*, the injunction 'Experiment,' is immediately followed by the reminder that 'you need a lot of prudence to experiment' (D:61). Later, he and Guattari write: 'As a rule immanent to experimentation: injections of caution' (TP:510). There is 'an art of dosages, since overdose is a danger' (TP:160). You have, they write, 'to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn.' 'Dismantling,' they insist, 'has never meant killing yourself' (TP:160).

In chapter four it will be argued that Lacanian psychoanalysis similarly seeks to prudently dismantle existing modes of subjectivity in the interests of a more vital existence but that the consonance is limited insofar as psychoanalysis is more

cautious. While Lacan feared that a too rapid dismantling could tip the patient into psychosis, Deleuze, as we shall see, advocated a non-pathological mode of schizophrenia as a way of going beyond the human condition. In chapter five it will be argued that Deleuze and psychoanalysis share a conception of certain artworks as processes dismantling existing forms of subjectivity while, at the same time, warding off an annihilating chaos.

A processual Ontology

By setting out key aspects of the various ontologies, which underwrite Deleuze's ambition to go beyond the human condition, this section seeks to establish a framework within which we can explore the degree of consonance between Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy and Lacan. With the framework in place, we can ascertain which of their concepts can contribute to the reinvention of psychoanalysis. In line with Deleuze's conception of philosophy as 'the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts' to address singular problems, his ontology took different forms at different times (WP:2). However, there are recurrent points of emphasis which are particularly relevant for present purposes, namely: difference, relationality, composition, the sub-representative, and open-ended systems. As these headings, along with the topics already examined, will orient discussion in chapters four and five, let's briefly consider each in turn.

Process

Deleuze 'is a process philosopher' (Mullarkey, 2006:12). 'Everything is event' (Gilles Deleuze cited in Williams, 2011a:80). The cosmos, for Deleuze, is becoming – 'universal variation' (C2:40). There are not first things which vary from each other but variations (differences) which produce things. Therefore, any thinking which begins from things and more generally from identity is bound to mislead. Things, that is, determinate identifiable entities, exist but they are the outcomes of processes. Consequently, in an echo of Bergson's claim that 'there are no things only actions' (Bergson, 1907:248), Deleuze remarks: 'I have, it's true, spent a lot of time writing

about this notion of the event: you see, I don't believe in things' (N:160). 'Nothing other than the Event subsists, the Event alone' (LS:201). In thinking the event, Deleuze argues for the possibility of going beyond the human condition by insisting on the impermanence of existents including, most notably, subjectivities.

Crucially for this thesis, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze conceives of process in terms of 'the question-problem complex' (DR:195). Problems are the drivers of becoming. Being for Deleuze is 'a being of the problematic, the being of problem and question' (DR:64). As Daniel W. Smith succinctly puts it: for Deleuze, 'Being is a *problem*. Being always presents itself to us under a problematic form, as a series of problematisations' (Smith, 2012a:92). Deleuze explores this notion from many angles but, for our purposes, the most important is his Nietzschean conception of everything deriving from differences: the play between disparate forces produces states of affairs. 'Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned' (DR:222). 'Inequality,' Deleuze writes, 'forms the condition of the world' (DR:222). Being is a problem because of the impossibility of these unequal and disparate forces achieving a resolution which would fully cancel the differences between them. Disequilibrium is never finally resolved in equilibrium.

In thinking this process, Deleuze deploys the Bergsonian concepts of the virtual and actual. Like Lacan, Deleuze uses terms differently in different contexts. As we shall see, the *virtual* has various meanings, for example in *Cinema 2* it refers to a form of the past (C2:54), while in *What is Philosophy?* it is chaos (WP:118). For present purposes, 'the domain of the virtual' as Eugene Holland observes, is 'composed of Problems' (Holland, 2013:12). The virtual is not just 'potential' (Žižek, 2004:4) – unactualized possibilities – for it 'possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions' (DR:212). '"Problematic" and "virtuality," in this sense, are strictly correlative concepts in Deleuze's work' (Smith, 2012a:252). For its part, 'the actual is comprised of a variety of contingent Solutions to those Problems' (Holland, 2013:12). In this perspective, 'the virtual, or the Idea, is a purely differentiated multiplicity that produces actual phenomena' (de Beistegui, 2004:273). The actual, for example, a determinate state of affairs is an attempted resolution but – and this is crucial - no actualization is a complete resolution. There is always a disparity

'between actualised forms and virtual forces' (Sauvagnargues, 2016:179-180). This is not to argue that the virtual grounds the actual. If the cosmos is continuous variation, the virtual cannot be, as Clayton Crockett insists 'a ground in any foundational sense' (Crockett, 2013:46-7). There is no ground other than becoming – everything is in process – so the virtual and the actual are best conceived as 'two sides of the same coin' (Crockett, 2013:47).

In this light, we can recast both Lacan's teaching and psychoanalytic thinking on art. While the terminology is foreign to Lacan, the thinking is not. If there is a lack in the Other, the subject is a response to the virtual problem posed, for example, by the difference between an occupant and the place assigned. On this account, a subject is an actualisation which seeks to resolve a problematic disparity. As the problem is irresolvable, no actualisation is *the* actualisation. The virtuality of the problem persists. And this is the subject's chance. If the virtual is never exhausted in the actual, if an analysand's actualised subjective structure is never *the* subject, then the actual is no guide to what is possible. A subject can go beyond, what from a neurotic perspective might appear unsurpassable, limits and art may be one of the innumerable ways of doing so.

Difference

In conceiving difference, Deleuze takes issue with the Hegelian notion of difference which has informed so much psychoanalytically-inspired theorizing. On this view, difference is conceived in terms of identity: thus, A is A because it is not not-A, *this* is *this* because it is not *that*, night is night because it is not day etc. What such thinking misses, Deleuze points out, is the process which constitutes these items in the first place, that is the genesis of these – to use his own term – 'differenciated' items (DR:211). His argument is that the identifiable items which we distinguish from one another emerge from a process of what he terms 'differen*t*iation,' that is, the differences between unequal and disparate forces (DR:207). 'Difference is what constitutes being' (PS:41). The identities of subjects and objects, as Daniel Smith notes, 'are the effect of more profound relations of difference' (Smith, 2012a:82). At first sight, Deleuze's philosophy in this regard seems utterly at odds with Lacan. The

early Lacan, in Hegelian vein wrote: 'The human being poses the day as such, and the day thereby becomes the presence of the day – against a background that is not a background of concrete nighttime, but of possible absence of daytime' (S.III:148). However, any dismissal, based on such passages, of Lacan as, in opposition to Deleuze, a thinker of identity would be too quick: it would miss the fundamental orientation of Lacan's teaching, namely that, with regard to subjectivity, there are no identities only identifications. After Lacan, as Stuart Hall puts it 'rather than speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of *identification*, and see it as an on-going process' (Hall, 1992:287). Unified subjects are to be found only in the imaginary. The subject is not a given but constituted by differences. For the Lacan of the structural impossibilities tributary to the Ⱥ, the cut, that is difference, is first. Everything begins from the incommensurability of the 'living body' and its 'signifying existence' in the Other, the subsequent non-coincidence of subject and signifier and separation of subject and object – in short from the impossibility of being (at) One (Silvestre, 1987:307). With regard to identity, as Hall maintains: 'there is always something "imaginary" or fantasised about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always "in process", always "being formed"' (Hall, 1992:287). The subject and its world are a function of, and a response to, the differences which constitute the many faces of the disparate.

Relationality

Implicit in the fore-going is the importance of relationality. The given is a function of the forces in play in the processes of differentiation and 'force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces' (F:70). 'Any force is already a relation' (F:70). As such relationality is paramount: 'the relation is prior to what it places in relation' (TP:318). The given is consequently never given once and for all. With different relations different modes of existence can emerge. The importance of this for Deleuze's ambition to go beyond the human condition becomes even more apparent when he recast the notion that there is no essence of the human condition in Spinozist terms. On his reading, Spinoza is the philosopher of AND not IS: 'no one has ever had such an original feeling for the conjunction "and"' (D:59). '*We do not*

even know of what a body is capable' (Deleuze, 1968a:226). What a body is depends on the relations into which it enters; it is defined by its 'capacity for affecting and being affected' (SP:123).

The consonance of this with psychoanalysis is patent. Psychoanalysis turns upon relationships, most importantly those of analysand and analyst, subject and signifier and *jouissance* and the Other. The cure proceeds not by determining some supposedly essential truth about the analysand but by altering relationships such that the subject can affect and be affected otherwise. As the preceding chapters suggested, the event of art is often similarly concerned to alter relationships such that the real assumes a different cast.

Composition

Deleuze's vitalism is no simple-minded faith in a liberatory life-force only awaiting release. His 'philosophy is a constructivism' (WP:35). Difference is at once constitutive of what is actualised and the hallmark of what is thereby constituted. 'Experience itself,' Deleuze insists, 'offers us nothing but composites' (B:22). 'Everything in Nature is just composition' (Deleuze, 1968a:237). In the universal variation that is the cosmos everything interacts. This interaction is equally characteristic of more local arrangements. The defining feature of the machines and assemblages (*agencements*) described in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* is the interactions of the heterogeneous components which constitute them. 'The assemblage [*agencement*] is co-functioning' (D:52). AND not IS. As these arrangements are never established once and for all, beings are not givens but functions of 'the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual' (TP:256). The relevance of this approach for Deleuze's ambition to go beyond the human condition is apparent in his alignment with the work of his friend Michel Foucault. 'Foucault's general principle,' he writes 'is that every form is a compound of relations between forces' (F:124). As mutation is possible the future of 'man' is open. Whether or not the existing 'composition of a Man-form' persists depends on which 'forces from the outside' the 'forces within man' combine (F:124).

The importance of this for my argument is that, as chapter four will demonstrate, psychoanalysis is also a thinking of composition (analysand and analyst; symbolic, imaginary and real etc.) and, perhaps more surprisingly, the outside. Subsequently, in chapter five, we will further explore what psychoanalysis can learn from Deleuze's contention that an artwork is a composition not a unity and as such a way of creating a new relationship with the outside.

The Sub-representative

Deleuze's argument that we can go beyond the human condition is premised on the claim that there are levels and planes other than that inhabited by stable subjects and delimited objects and that the processes on these planes elude representation. Among the many planes, Deleuze and Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, distinguish two in particular. The first is a plane 'of organisation or development:' (TP:266), that is 'a plane of forms, substances and subjects' (TP:261-2). The other is 'a plane of consistency or of composition,' (TP:261-2) where 'there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects' (TP:266). Instead 'unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of movement' (TP:255). On this plane of 'immanence' (TP:266), a play of 'intensities, events and accidents' comes to 'compose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that receive them' (TP:253). Now, as each plane 'continually passes from one to the other' (TP:269) there is the possibility that the 'substantial forms and determined subjects' on the plane of organisation can be dissolved and surpassed (TP:253). The stratification on the plane of organisation – 'forms and subjects, organs and functions, are "strata" or relations between strata' - is always accompanied by a destratification (TP:269). Territorialisation is always part of a larger process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialization. There is a double movement:

> 'The plane of organisation is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of deterritorialisation, weigh them down, restratify them,

> reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely, the plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organisation, causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint of speed or slowness' (TP:270).

On this 'plane of consistency or composition' subjectivity does not intrude upon individuations (TP:266). 'There are only haecceities,' that is 'subjectless individuations' (TP:266). Here, 'nothing subjectifies.' Instead 'haecceities form according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects' (TP:266).

Consequently, not all can be captured by regimes of representation. This is the purport of a further distinction. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, while there is 'the molar realm of representations', a plane of determinate, assignable identities, there is also the molecular level where there are no longer beings only becomings (TP:219). On the molar level there are 'molar subjects,' recognisable objects and entities with defined forms (TP:275), which undergo perceptible changes but on the molecular level there is the 'emission of particles which enter relations of movement and rest' (TP:275). On this level it is a matter of becomings not beings: 'all becomings are molecular' (TP:275).

The importance of this for ensuing chapters should be apparent. As the real in Lacan's teaching is also sub-representative, there is a proximity permitting psychoanalytic thinking on art to take a Deleuzean direction and conceive the work of the work as only partially visible in representations.

Open systems

If we think of being in terms of 'the question-problem complex', (DR:195) and, if the problems are not ultimately susceptible of solution, if the 'irreducible inequality' which 'forms the condition of the world' is never completely cancelled, no system is closed (DR:222). Hence, as Keith Ansell Pearson observes, what motivates all Deleuze's 'thought experiments is a concern with the character of open systems' (Ansell Pearson, 1999:8). If, 'finally, everything is process,' (AO:368) then 'it is an illusion to believe that structure is the earth's last word' (TP:41). In a cosmos characterised by 'universal variation' and 'universal interaction' any emergent

system is open (C1:81). Again, this holds out the possibility of going beyond the human condition. If the virtual is not completely exhausted by any actualisation, then any actual subjectivity can be surpassed. As each plane 'continually passes from one to the other' there is the possibility that the 'substantial forms and determined subjects' on the plane of organisation can be dissolved and surpassed (TP:253).

For Deleuze, as for Bergson, 'there can be no entirely isolated system' (Bergson, 1907:203). Instead there is always 'a thread, however thin, that relates the smallest particle of the world we live in to the whole of the universe' (Bergson, 1907:10-11). For the purposes of this thesis, this thread is better thought of as a line, more precisely what Deleuze terms 'the line Outside' (N:110). From any organization, system or *agencement* there is always a line to the Outside. Thinking is a confrontation with this line. Thinking, Deleuze writes, 'comes from this Outside, and returns to it, it amounts to confronting it' (N:110). In thinking this Outside, to which we are open, we are at risk for while 'we can ride such lines whenever we think bewilderingly enough or live forcefully enough,' they 'go beyond knowledge' (N:110). Caution is required for 'it's the fearsome whaling line, which Melville says - in *Moby Dick* - can carry us off or strangle us as it flies out' (N:110). Consequently, 'we need both to cross the line, and make it endurable, workable, thinkable' (N:111). Our task is 'to find in it as far as possible, and as long as possible, an art of living' (N:111). The overriding question for thought is: 'how can we protect ourselves, survive, while still confronting this line?' (N:111) The importance of this aspect of Deleuze's philosophy for my thesis cannot be overstated. It establishes a fundamental consonance with psychoanalysis. Lacan's chief question is: how can the analysand 'ride' the 'line Outside', that is depart existing neurotic structures without risking psychotic breakdown. And that is also Deleuze's question. Although the terminology is foreign to Lacan, the conception of the Outside is not, for Deleuze defines the Outside topologically: the Outside is at once 'something more distant than any external world' and 'also something closer than any inner world' (N:110). For both Deleuze and Lacan ultimately it is always the same question: 'how far can we unfold this line without falling into a breathless void' (N:113). Art, I will claim, can be just such an unfolding.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to set out key aspects of Deleuze's philosophy in such a way as to lay the groundwork for the argument in the subsequent chapters that there is a greater degree of consonance between Deleuze and Lacan than the polemics suggest and an 'aparallel evolution' is possible. Chapter four will develop the argument that Lacan's teaching similarly emphasises process, difference, relationality, composition, the sub-representative, and open-ended systems. In chapter five the same foci will be employed to examine how Deleuzean concepts could usefully inform psychoanalytic approaches to art and, more particularly, cinema.

As a foretaste, consider Deleuze's Nietzschean notion of 'the powers of the false,' (C2:126) that is, as Daniel Smith succinctly explains 'the production of truths that "*falsify*" established truths' (Smith, 1993:xxvii). If the cosmos is becoming, the danger is that established truths, in claiming to represent the true world, will block the production of new truths; there is a risk that *a* truth will come to be perceived as *the* truth. Now, while in innumerable pragmatic contexts it may be useful to consider truths as relatively stable and permanent, elsewhere life can depend on subscription to what Deleuze terms 'Nietzsche's critique of truth' (C2:137). In this perspective, 'the "true world" does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous' (C2:137). If 'time,' as Deleuze argues, 'has always put the notion of truth into crisis,' (C2:130) this is not merely the ruin of any hope of eternal truths but our chance to break with apparently settled and established truths. Miller concurs – 'Deleuze said it well: "time puts truth in crisis"' (Miller, J-A, 2005:18). Psychoanalysis is as much the ally of the powers of the false as Deleuze. If the Other is in deficit with regard to signifiers, *the* truth no more exists than *the* way. Patients enter analysis because what they take to be established 'truths' – that is, the master-signifiers (S.XVII:188-9), which have come to enjoy an unchallengeable authority such that they order their thinking and orient their behaviour, have become burdensome. Master-signifiers, as Mark Bracher astutely notes, play a key role 'in structuring the subject – specifically, in giving the subject a sense of identity and direction' but, on occasion, the operation of these

signifiers can fixate (Bracher, 1994:112). Hence, Lacan remarks, a master signifier can be identified 'with death' (SXVII:170). In analysis, the truths embodied in master signifiers can cease to appear self-evident – 'truths' such as the existence of '*the* Other' and '*La Femme*' can be subverted - so the analysand has the opportunity to depart identities such as that set out in signifiers like Thom Yorke's 'I'm a creep' (Radiohead, 1992), and to challenge what Simon Critchley describes as 'the lacerating superego that tells you you're a worthless piece of shit' (Critchley, 2010:90). When the master-signifiers such as *the* Other emerge as semblances not lodestars, the analysand can slip anchor for the open sea. To become worthy of the event of art psychoanalysis must realise that the powers of the false can similarly operate in art. Art in the mode of *bien-dire* can, in Edward Said's famous phrase, 'speak the truth to power' (Said, 1996:85) as in say, *Leviathan* but it can also free the 'artistic and creative power' of the false (C2:131).

CHAPTER FOUR: DELEUZE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Introduction

In part one, to enable psychoanalytic criticism to be worthier of the event of art, Deleuzean concepts, such as *agencements*, order-words, territorialisation/deterritorialisation and lines of flight, were introduced. In this chapter, the relationship of Deleuze and psychoanalysis is considered more directly. It will be argued first, that there is more common ground than the vituperative polemics suggest and that many more Deleuzean concepts can be introduced into psychoanalysis without difficulty. Second, it will be claimed that, if there are convergences, there are also conspicuous divergences – particularly with regard to desire and subjectivity. In consequence, it is proposed through the exploration of a range of literary and filmic texts - *Brideshead Revisited* (Jarrold, UK 2008*), Time Regained* (Ruiz, France 1999), and *The Sheltering Sky* (Bertolucci, Italy/United Kingdom 1990) - that psychoanalysis is useful only in respect of certain texts and that in deciding between Lacanian and Deleuzean approaches we must, as always, proceed case by case. More broadly, the ambition of this chapter is to bring psychoanalysis into the vicinity of Deleuze so that we can read both differently, and, more particularly, read Lacan more interestingly than he read himself. If as Klotz reminds us, 'one of the major lessons of Lacan' is that one should go and look for one's 'honey outside what is stamped as "true" psychoanalysis in order to clarify it indirectly,' then the ultimate question for this chapter is what 'honey' psychoanalysis can garner from the thought of Deleuze and Guattari (Klotz, 1994:191). 'If Derrida's thought is to survive,' Michael Naas writes, it will do so only by being 'transformed and transplanted elsewhere.' Derrida 'must always be elsewhere, repeated elsewhere, translated and transformed' (Michael Naas cited in Royle, 2010:126). The same can and will be said of Lacan in this chapter.

Section 1: Situating the critique of psychoanalysis

At the outset, it must be stressed that the contribution of Felix Guattari to the joint publications with Deleuze must not be underestimated; they would have been impossible without him. That said, for present purposes, it is worth noting the continuities with Deleuze's earlier work as a means of situating the critique of psychoanalysis within the general orientation set out in the previous chapter.

Vitalism

'Psychoanalysis,' Deleuze claims, 'needs to address a certain "vitality" in the patient, which the patient has lost' (DI:142). Unfortunately, it is unequal to the task for, as much as the analysand, 'the analyst has lost' his vitality (DI:142). 'Psychoanalysis ought to be a song of life,' but instead 'the most defeated, sad song of death emanates from it' (AO:331). Analysts have become the modern counterparts of the life-denying priesthood so tellingly denounced by Nietzsche. In their *ressentiment*, 'psychoanalysts teach infinite resignation, they are the last priests' (D:81-2). In its 'hatred of life and of all that is free, of all that passes and flows' (AO:268) psychoanalysis 'hates desire,' (TRM:81-2) for as Guattari explains 'we define [desire] as flow' (Guattari, 1996b:205).

'Western philosophy,' Deleuze notes, 'has always consisted of saying…desire is desire for what one does not have; that begins with Plato, it continues with Lacan' (Gilles Deleuze cited in Schuster, 2016:174). Against that tradition, Deleuze and Guattari insist 'desire lacks nothing' (TP:157). 'Desire: who except priests would want to call it "lack"? Nietzsche called it will to power,' (D:91) where Deleuze's claim is not that desire is 'desire for power' but rather that 'it is power itself that is desire' (K:56). Developing Nietzsche's vitalist claims that 'the will to power which is the will to life' (Nietzsche, 1886:202) is 'unexhausted, procreating life-will,' (Nietzsche, 1891:137) and that, consequently, 'life as such is will to power' (Nietzsche, 1886:15), Deleuze describes the will to power as *'essentially creative and giving.'* 'It does not seek' to

possess instead 'it gives' for 'the will itself bestows sense and value' (NP:80). Rather than being 'on the side of acquisition,' (AO:25) 'desire is productive' (AO:26). [7]

This concept of desire is developed in Deleuze's Nietzschean reading of Spinoza, where, as Miguel de Beistegui notes, desire 'is not the expression of an originary, structural lack, but of plenitude, and an ontological potential (*puissance*) that seeks its own expression' (de Beistegui, 2010:114). Desire is conatus, 'the effort by which each thing strives to persevere in its being' (SP:21), more specifically, 'the effort to experience joy, to increase the power of acting…and…an effort to avert sadness' (SP:101). 'When a body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts' (SP:19). Desire, as conatus, seeks to maximise the moments 'when we encounter a body that agrees with our nature, one whose relation compounds with ours,' for then 'the passions that affect us are those of *joy*, and our power of acting is increased or enhanced' (SP:27-8).

[7] On first acquaintance the notion that desire is not, in all instances, lack can seem counter-intuitive. For that reason, it is worth quoting at length Brent Adkins' experience of thinking about the notion that desire is productive: 'This idea did not become clear to me until I had children. I had always assumed that desire was predicated on a lack, that the reason I wanted something was because I didn't have it. Watching my children play, however, showed me that this was not the case. A child with a toy in each hand, who suddenly drops one in order to pick up a new toy, didn't "lack" the new toy. The child is simply interested in making new connections' (Adkins, 2015:105-6). This tallies exactly with my own experience of watching my toddler grandchildren. When something untoward occurs, say a fall, they seek out a parent for comfort. But otherwise they delight in experimenting with their toys. My contention is that, at such moments, they exult in life with a *jouissance* for which psychoanalysis has neither name nor concept.

Beyond the Human Condition

More vital forms of existence are accessible beyond the human condition because desire is originally an impersonal process whose flows run outside 'personological or objectal coordinates' (D:89). It is not linked 'to a given person, to a given object in the framework of representation' (AO:300). Desire is no more 'internal to a subject' than 'it tends towards an object' (D:89). Rather than the attribute of a subject seeking a missing object, desire is an anterior process. 'For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is everything that exists before the opposition between subject and object' (Guattari, 1996b:205). Hence, desire is not, as they claim happens in psychoanalysis, to be narrowly conceived as an affair of desiring subjects and the objects they crave, for desire 'does not take as its object persons or things' (AO:292). As such, desire is irreducible to the Oedipal desires and 'the pitiful little familialist secret' which preoccupy psychoanalysis (AO:292). There are Oedipal desires – 'psychoanalysis does not invent Oedipus' - but there are desires other than the Oedipal (AO:365). *Anti-Oedipus* is a hymn to these anoedipal desires.

In respect of subjectivity, as with desire, it is possible to move beyond the human. Although subjects (and their correlative objects) exist on the plane of organisation there are other planes where subjectivity is swept away. Here 'the plane of consistency' (TP:43), also termed 'the plane of immanence'(TRM:130), namely, the 'unformed, unorganised, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows' is termed the 'Body without Organs' (TP:43). A plane of 'pure intensities, previtals and prephysical free singularities' (TP:43). The body-without-organs 'opposes all strata of organisation, the organism's organisation as well as power organisations,' which seek to stratify (TRM:130). By 'constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire', it is possible to know 'a joy that is immanent to desire' (TP:155). To attain this 'vital body,' (LS:105) Deleuze and Guattari urge us to 'destratify' and 'desubjectify' and thereby 'find your body without organs' (TP:151), but, as always, there is an injunction to proceed cautiously: '[e]very undertaking of destratification (for example, going beyond the organism, plunging into a becoming) must therefore observe concrete rules of extreme caution: a too-sudden

destratification may be suicidal' (TP:503). Not all attempts to 'make the body without organs' succeed – 'you can botch it' (TP:134). Irretrievable breakdown can engulf.

Processual Ontology and Psychoanalysis

In line with Deleuze's other work, the possibility of our attaining a more vital and impersonal mode of existence is underwritten by a processual ontology in which nothing is given once and for all, with the consequence that new and unforeseeable developments are possible. As noted above, the business of philosophy for Deleuze was the creation of concepts to meet the purposes consequent on new encounters. This is particularly evident in his critique of psychoanalysis, where he was collaborating with Guattari and working with many of the latter's concepts. The result is a different ontology. However, the fundamental orientation remains that sketched in the preceding chapter. As before, his approach eschews thinking in terms of things. Desire, 'as opposed to a subjectivity,' they claim 'is an event, not a thing or a person' (TRM:130). First and foremost, it is 'a process as opposed to a structure' (TRM:130). Desire 'produces' (AO:379) in an 'immanent constitutive process' (Alliez, 2004:10). What is produced depends on the relationships, that is, on how we affect and are affected. Further, 'desire is never separable from complex assemblages' (TP:215). Contra Žižek, desire is not simply 'primordial flux' (Žižek, 2012:620) for it always functions in an *agencement*. Far from being 'an undifferentiated instinctual energy' it 'results from a highly engineered setup rich in interactions' (TP:215). As these interactions involve 'molecular energies,' they are largely sub-representative (TP:215). Deleuze's notion of desire is, as Žižek observes 'anti-representationalist' (Žižek, 2012:620). Finally, when 'desire assembles [*agence*] something' it is 'in connection with an Outside', so it is always part of a dynamic open-ended process (D:78). What a body becomes depends upon its encounters with the different, disparate and heterogeneous. If the resulting relationships and compositions augment its capacity to live, joy prevails. If not, sadness.

Section 2: Deleuze as a critic of psychoanalysis

This section advances two arguments. It claims that the proximity of Deleuze to Lacan has been masked by Deleuze's misconstrual of aspects of Lacan's teaching and that, if the misapprehensions are dispelled, Lacanian approaches can be used in conjunction with Deleuze's philosophy to rethink the event of art. There is space to consider only one issue in detail: interpretation, which has been chosen because it enables the further development of lines of thought explored in chapter two. Deleuze and Guattari are damning: psychoanalysis 'understands nothing,' (K:66) 'hears nothing and listens to nobody' (TP:34). It silences its patients for '*all of psychoanalysis is designed to keep people from speaking*' (TRM:84). 'The knowledge to which psychoanalysis lays claim is inseparable from a kind of terrorism' (TRM:62). Everything is forced into an Oedipal framework. In evidence, they cite Melanie Klein's treatment of a troubled four-year-old boy who is known as Little Dick. Klein writes that, when he came to see her, she gave him some toys to play with, including a big train and a smaller one which she called respectively '"Daddy-train" and "Dick train."' (Melanie Klein cited in AO:45). 'Thereupon,' she recounts, 'he picked up the train I called "Dick" and made it roll to the window and said "Station"' (Melanie Klein cited in AO:45). She then 'explained' to the little boy: 'The station is mummy. Dick is going into mummy.' Reading this, it is hard to disagree with Deleuze and Guattari's claim that Klein's conduct, on this occasion, was not so much 'suggestion' as 'terrorism' (Melanie Klein cited in AO:45). However, the question is whether Lacan is similarly guilty. Speaking of the case, he is equally damning: 'She slams the symbolism on him with complete brutality, does Melanie Klein… She hits him with a brutal verbalisation of the Oedipal myth almost as revolting for us as for any reader – *You are the little train, you want to fuck your mother*' (S.I:68).

From a Lacanian perspective such interpretations serve no purpose. As Philip Dravers reminds us, both Freud and Lacan began 'by believing the symptom to be entirely soluble to interpretation while later testifying to its ultimate indissolubility to analysis' (Dravers, 2002:145). Instead of (uselessly) telling the patient the supposed truth about his or her condition, a Lacanian analyst listens – usually for months at a time – before intervening when something is said whose import the

analysand appears not to want to know. By repeating the word or ending the session, the analyst produces an 'interpretation' which 'is an enunciation without an enunciated' (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:80).

The redoubtable Pierre Skriabine provides a clinical *vignette*:

> **'**He used to have a brother, younger than himself who was autistic and handicapped by a cardiac malformation. A very strong bond, both ambiguous and ambivalent, had united him to this brother, going as far as constituting a particular form of communication that puzzles him. This brother, having reached adolescence, had now been dead for two years. The drama had lead the whole family, the patient, his sister and the two parents, to a work of mourning, which would thereby prolong the psychotherapy undertaken by the mother and father during their child's illness.
>
> "After his death, all three of us were really able to speak about it", says the patient.
>
> "All three?", I ask.
>
> "Yes", he says surprised, "my mum, my dad, my sister and…I forgot to count myself!" he adds astonished.
>
> The "There!" that I then pronounce closes the session, by taking note…of this mistake in counting and the enunciation that brings it.' (Skriabine, 2003:136)

No interpretation is proffered, for Skriabine – in Socratic fashion - knows only that he does not know the significance of the slip. If the barred Other is in operation, nobody knows except the analysand and he at once wants and does not want to know. So instead of providing an interpretation, Skriabine makes an intervention to enable the patient to hear his message in inverted form thereby giving him the opportunity to make something else of his brother's death. To Deleuze's injunction: 'experiment, never interpret,' a Lacanian response could be: 'of course' (D:48). If there is a lack in the Other, every interpretation is necessarily an experiment. As Skriabine could not know what would result from his intervention, he was experimenting with a view to helping the patient change. The purport of Lacan's style is precisely that matters are never so simple that they can be tied up and labelled in neat little theoretical packages. 'Analytic interpretation,' Lacan insisted, 'is not designed to be understood

it is designed to make waves' (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:81). Skriabine sought to 'make waves.'

To conclude, I want to broaden out the discussion to consider how this Lacanian notion of interpretation can help us think the thinking which can occur in art. 'Interpretation,' Lacan remarked, 'is not the testing of a truth that would be decided by a yes or a no, it unleashes the truth as such' (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:85). The contention of this thesis is that, while films may contain representations whose truth value can be tested, in expanded cinema the powers of the false can create truths whose aim is not correctness but the making of waves.

Section 3: Lacan with Deleuze: Degrees of Convergence

Developing the argument in the previous section, the claim here is that there is sufficient consonance between Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari for psychoanalysis to be able, with little difficulty, to adopt and deploy many Deleuzean concepts. Before considering the topics set out as points of emphasis in the previous chapter, we need to directly tackle Deleuze's relation to the axial concept in the first part of this thesis: the lack in the Other. No concept with that designation exists in Deleuze's work and at first sight, Lacan's thinking with its stress on invariance – the subject is never at one, never coincides with a signifier, never attains the object *a* etc. etc. – seems at odds with Deleuze's insistence that time is always novel and that, consequently, outside closed systems, the future cannot be foretold – '*We do not even know of what a body is capable*' (Deleuze, 1968a:226). However, there is no unbridgeable gap. Notwithstanding the dogmatic appearance of his pronouncements, Lacan held to no doctrines. Notions like the lack in the Other were, as we saw above, only concepts with which to experiment. His investigations of topological invariants were precisely that: investigations. More importantly for this thesis, the hypotheses resulting from Lacan's researches have their echoes in Deleuze's philosophy. If there is a lack in the Other, *the* way does not exist for *the* Other, that is an Other with the god-like power to ordain such a way does not exist. Consequently, ineluctable problems and questions press upon us. In addressing these problems, we discover that *the* truth does not exist – truths have to be produced. We are condemned, as

we have seen in the foregoing discussion of interpretation, to invention and experiment. Complicating such creations, is the impossibility of fully representing what is at stake – we are called upon to think what cannot be thought. While we cannot but think the real, 'the foundation of the real is that it cannot be thought' (Lacan, 1975-76: Session 16/3/76 p. 10). Now, insofar as Deleuze is a Nietzschean, he accepts much of this viewpoint. Like Lacan he insists, in the absence of *the* way, on the necessity of invention: '[m]an must invent his relation with the other' (ECC:59). In similar vein, he maintains *the* language does not exist: '*there is no Logos; there are only hieroglyphs.* To think is therefore to interpret' (PS:65). As the god-like Other does not exist, any such interpretation cannot call upon a pre-ordained framework which is why Deleuze clarified his earlier position: 'thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting' with 'what's always new' (N:106). Moreover, and crucially for this thesis, he granted, at least in his structuralist phase, that 'there is no structure without the empty square, which makes everything function' (LS:61). Even more importantly, he accepted that *the* place does not exist. Here he explicitly acknowledges his debt to Lacan for his point of departure is what he terms 'Lacan's paradox:', namely the existence in every structure of an 'empty space' and an element lacking its place, that is, in Lacanese, precisely one of the faces of the inconsistent Other (LS:50 footnote 6). 'As in a game, we participate in the combination of the empty place and the perpetual displacement of a piece' (LS:49). Like Lacan, he thinks this disparity in terms of a simultaneous lack and excess: 'that which is in excess in one case is nothing but an extremely mobile empty place; and that which is lacking in another case is a rapidly moving object, an occupant without a place' (LS:48-9). Language comprises two heterogeneous series: signifiers (sounds and marks) and signifieds (meanings) which, in their disparity never finally marry up – there is no one to one relationship of complementarity. In the series of signifiers, 'what is in excess […] is literally an empty square and an always displaced place without an occupant' (LS:59-60). While 'what is lacking in the signified series,' he continues, is 'an unknown, an occupant without a place, or something always displaced' (LS:60). The affinity with, and influence of, Lacan is palpable. To describe 'the paradoxical element' (LS:60) 'by means of which the series communicate without losing their difference,' (LS:60), Deleuze cites the proposition: '*it fails to*

observe its place (elle manque à sa place). 'It fails,' on his account, 'to observe its own identity' (LS:48). Following Lacan, to an extent we will not, Deleuze designates this paradoxical entity the phallus (LS:261). To avoid the obnoxious politics which use of this concept can easily introduce, this thesis proposes an alternative approach. While retaining the crucial notions of structure, seriality, and the empty square, it explores the possibilities for thinking the thinking which occurs in the event of art if we deem the item communicating between the series to be not the phallus, but the object *a*.

What this conjunction of Lacan and Deleuze affords us is a different theoretical perspective on one of the modes of textual functioning explored in chapter two, namely the serialism in *Hamlet*, *L'Amour Fou* and *India Song*. Moreover, it provides concepts with which to further develop Darian Leader's account of *Hamlet*. In chapter two it was argued that Leader's approach could usefully be supplemented by consideration of how the work of the work enabled the subject to move and be moved through the text in a process of reciprocal metamorphosis. Deleuze's structuralism enables us to elaborate that model: what moves through the text is not simply a subject in process. Rather it is a relationship: that between the object *a* and the accompanying subject. Deleuze writes:

> 'if the empty square is not filled by a term, it is nevertheless accompanied without being occupied or filled. And the two, the instance and the place do not cease to lack each other.'

He continues:

> 'The subject is precisely the agency [*instance*] which follows the empty place: as Lacan says, it is less subject than subjected [*assujetti*] – subjected to the empty square, subjected to the phallus and to its displacements' (DI:190).

By substituting the object *a* for the phallus, we create a model of textual functioning in which the movement, transformations and displacements of ultimately sub-representative elements – the object *a* and the barred subject - are as crucial as the images and signifiers in the production of sense. By combining Lacan and Deleuze, we can think the work of the work as an *agencement* in which interacting and interdependent heterogenous elements – ultimately the body and language – are traversed by a subject at once conjoined with and disjoined from the object *a*. We will come back to this approach to the event of art in the next chapter.

For the moment, let's conclude this discussion of the proximity of Deleuze and Lacan in respect of the Ⱥ by considering their shared admiration for Blanchot. In a formulation echoing Lacan, Blanchot wrote of 'this impossibility of thinking which is thought' (Blanchot, 1959:36-7), and this notion was taken up by Deleuze when he claimed that thought finds 'within itself something which it cannot think, something which is both unthinkable and…which must be thought' (DR:192). The echo of Lacan's thinking of the 'excluded interior' (S.VII:101) which constitutes *das Ding*, this 'unthinkable in thought,' that is 'both its source and barrier' is unmistakable (C2:168). The affinity becomes more pronounced when Deleuze's philosophy takes a topological turn. For Deleuze as for Lacan, we exist in a 'relation, and indeed "nonrelation," to an Outside that's further from us than any external world, and thereby closer than any inner world' (N:97). 'An outside,' he writes, 'more distant than any exterior,…"twisted", "folded" and "doubled" by an Inside that is deeper than any interior,' Deleuze maintains, in an echo of Lacan, 'creates the possibility of the derived relation between the interior and the exterior' (F:110). Both the philosopher and the psychoanalyst, therefore, provide materials with which to conceive certain artworks as thinking what is impossible to think but which must be thought by creating spaces which cannot be envisioned within Euclidean terms.

At this juncture, we have already touched on the processual ontology outlined in the previous chapter. If what has to be thought cannot be thought we are caught up in open-ended structures for we face questions which no answer can close down and, if thinking has to think what we cannot think, we have of necessity to deal with the sub-representative in establishing relations with what eludes any relation of mastery or comprehension. Let's now examine in more detail the degree of convergence.

Lacan in the light of Deleuze's processual ontology

The purpose of this section is to consider the proximity of Lacan's teaching to the features of Deleuze's ontology highlighted in chapter three with a view to examining how they might inform our thinking of the thinking which occurs in art. Aspects of the proximity can be dealt with briefly as they should already be apparent. Lacan like

Deleuze was a thinker of process. His teaching was dedicated to thinking the process of analysis in which the cure cannot be achieved in 'one go' but must move through stages. Classically, as we saw above, in the transference, the analysand must imagine the analyst is *the* Other so that at the end of the treatment he can realise *the* Other does not exist, and thereby discover the freedom to experiment. Patently, therefore, the treatment turns on relationality. If there is a lack in the Other, the analysand is never going to discover *the truth*. Rather a space and moment are created in which the analysand can come to relate differently to the Ⱥ. In so doing, the subject changes, both at the level of what can be represented and at the subrepresentative level of the barred subject, the drives and the object a. Other aspects, namely difference, composition and the open-endedness of all structures are worth considering at greater length for in each case the Deleuzean concept suggests ways in which psychoanalysis could usefully rethink its approach to art.

The topic of difference is a good example of how Deleuzean concepts can cast Lacan's teaching in a new light and equip psychoanalysis with the means to be worthier of the event of art. At first sight, it seems difference in Lacan takes the logicist form, which Deleuze considers to be secondary and derivative, where A is A because it is not not-A, where a signifier's identity is determined by its difference from other signifiers. But, as we saw in the preceding chapter, viewed through a Deleuzean lens, which focuses on the genesis of such identities from differences, inequalities and disparity, another picture emerges. It becomes apparent that these identities depend upon processes of differentiation. If *the* place does not exist, every child is born to difference, for it is summoned to occupy a place constituted by the desires of its (always singular) caregivers, desires which, in at least some respects, are at odds with its own. The subject is the response to those differences, it is what is made of them. It might be objected that this is a difference between persons and things and, therefore, far from Deleuze, but there are no persons outside the imaginary - what are involved are the flows of desire, the trajectories of the '*insubstantial* subject' and the movement of the drives as indicated in the *graph complet* (Greenshields, 2017:210). As such, difference is a difference between forces. On a first approach, the difference between, on the one hand, the forces inhabiting the words of Others, which assign places, prescribe roles and enjoin values, and the

forces of the body, which resist the imposition of any such identity by the Other. But this account of the disparate and unequal forces in play is overly simplistic for words are inhabited by multiple forces and the body is similarly the site of multiple – both compatible and conflicting - forces. Even more importantly, no force exists in isolation. On the one hand, desires and drives do not exist independently of signifiers and, on the other, the force, value and significance of signifiers depends, in part, on the weight ascribed to them by desires and drives. Without acts of selection, combination, centring, punctuation, contextualisation, hierarchisation, evaluation and interpretation signifiers cannot function, but equally there are no desires and drives outside *agencements* and their signifiers. In this light, subjects – and, as we shall see in the next chapter, artworks - can be viewed as attempted solutions to the problems posed by the differences between disparate and unequal forces. On this reading, for Lacan as for the Deleuze of *Difference and Repetition* there is no ground other than disparity. In both cases, 'difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing' (DR:57). If this appears something of a stretch, recall that seminar eight now published as *Le Transfert* (Lacan, 2001b) was previously entitled '*Le Transfert dans sa Disparité Subjective*' (Jacques Lacan cited in Marini, 1986:179). It is, therefore unsurprising to find Lacan's executor, Jacques-Alain Miller writing: 'I like this word "disparity" – the lack of parity, heterogeneity, dissonance, disharmony' (Miller, J-A, 1999:103). 'What,' he asks, 'is a disparity? Without doubt it is an opposition, but one in which inequality enters, where there is an asymmetry' (Miller, J-A, 1999:103). Disparity and asymmetry are cornerstones of Lacan's teaching.

This matters for our thinking of art on a number of counts. Most signally at the level of content: all narrative-based art begins from disparity and has disparity as its theme. More importantly it points up the importance of movement. If there is a lack in the Other, there is no point of rest. Difference and disparity launch and impel. We have to go on. Art achieves little by attempting to bring matters to a standstill. Rather the sense produced is a function of the movement which it enables. A movement in which meanings surface but as part of a larger process. In the image of the Borromean knot set out below '*sens*', occupies only a small area outside the real (R) where the symbolic (S) and the imaginary (I) overlap



Let's turn now to composition whose importance Lacan recognises as fully as Deleuze. 'The way in which a work touches us […] in the most profound passion, namely on the level of the unconscious,' he insisted, 'has to do with its composition, its arrangement' (Jacques Lacan cited in Naveau, 2013:49). If the subject is divided, it is at one neither with its self(-image) nor with its objects, the Other's signifiers nor other subjects. In consequence, it is a process in which the above elements in all their heterogeneity engage in a co-functioning. The subject is a composition: an *agencement*. This matters for our thinking of the thinking in art for it provides an insight into how some artworks proceed. For example, when considering the way montage functions in modernist works like *The Waste Land* (Eliot,1963), Pound's *Cantos* (Pound, 1964) or *Éloge de l'amour* an obvious conclusion is that the collagist form reflects and represents a world in which there are only fragments. Now, while I would problematize the notion of fragments insofar as it suggests the existence of an original unity which on a Lacanian view exists only in the imaginary, I accept that this approach has it uses. However, my argument is such works also constitute forms of thinking other than reflection and representation. My question is: who thinks like this? Who thinks in terms of AND not IS? My proposal is a subject in the form of a composition. Writing of one of Freud's most famous patients, Philippe van Haute and Tomas Geyskens note that 'the object of Dora's desire is uncertain' and 'the place from where she desires is far from univocal' (van Haute and Geyskens, 2010:150).

The same holds for many other subjects – the narrator does and does not want Albertine. The equivocity of so much modernism is a function of the heterogeneity and disparity at the heart of every subject. The equivocity in the artwork is not a representation. Rather it is the making something new of issues which have come to be thought in univocal forms of the imaginary.

Finally, open-ended structures. If there is 'a hole in the symbolic order,' then the subject confronts unresolvable questions (Julien, 1990a:141). Consequently, the subject, as the graph makes clear (Harari, 2001:194), is characterised by a constitutive 'openness' [*ouverture*] (Balmès, 1999:57). When in response to the exigencies of the real, the subject creates habitats in the form of structures and systems, through master-signifiers, identifications and fantasies, something always escapes: the object *a*. Always departing, Lacan, in seminar twenty-three, elaborates an ontology of sacks, knots and events. The body is a sack (or pot) (S.XXIII:10) as opposed to a sphere in that it is open to an outside that is at once within and without (S.XXIII:10, Lacan 1975-6: Session of 18/11/75 p. 11). At the same time, the subject is a knot as in the diagram above because for Lacan, as for Deleuze, the impending chaos must be kept at bay by a measure of consistency (S.XXIII:10). As that consistency is never achieved once and for all, any knot is the outcome of an event. As Guillaume Collet observes, 'speech speaks the event' and 'it is the event which does the knotting' (Collet, 2017:118). It might be asked how sacks and knots come together but, while of interest, that question misses the fundamental point that, if the Ⱥ is operating, there can be no all-comprehending theory only experiments.

The importance of this for a psychoanalytic criticism which would be worthy of the event of art is that it suggests that one function of art can be to create open-ended structures. Although all subjects are open-ended *agencements,* they can in neurosis and lesser forms of misery feel themselves confined in an airless trap. Art can enable them to breathe another air. In seminar seven, Lacan claims that the signifier introduces a 'void' and more specifically an 'emptiness and fullness …into the world that by itself knows not of them' (S.VII:120). For the neurotic that emptiness can appear a gaping lack caused by all that is missing but in art that created emptiness can be the space for further creation. If, at the end of analysis, the

analyst's gift is not *the* answer but 'the place he must offer up as vacant to the patient's desire,' expanded cinema offers analogous vacancies (S.X:104-5).

Section 4: Lacan with Deleuze: Divergences

After establishing the considerable degree of consonance, it is important to emphasise that there are also salient divergences: Deleuze and Lacan cannot be conflated. There is a reading of Lacan which would insist that our situation is much bleaker than Deleuze suggests. Where for Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious is a factory, the productive processes of difference, for Lacan it is Freud's 'other scene' (Freud, 1899:112) and, as such it is altogether more troubling. As underlined in chapter one, '"I don't want to know anything about it"' (S.XX:1). Hence Miller insists, 'You are not at home in the Freudian unconscious' – it is 'uncanny' (Miller, J-A, 1987:18). It is 'a knowledge that mucks us up' (Jacques Lacan cited in Julien, 1990a:117). Further, in the psychic apparatus, there is a compulsion to repeat and 'a curse on sex' (T:30). 'Sexuality is always traumatic' (Lacan, 1976:22). Since the desire of the Other (subject) is both opaque and discordant it can be likened to that of a 'giant praying mantis' (S.X:22). As Žižek - on his Hegelian reading of Lacan's teaching - has it, 'man is an animal sick unto death' (Žižek, 1989: 4-5). Human existence is burdened by a troubling excess for 'Civilisation is refuse [*déchet*], cloaca maxima' (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2002:40, footnote2). This catalogue could be expanded but, in the space available, I will concentrate only on the two most important topics for a psychoanalytically-inspired thinking of the event of art: desire and subjectivity. If psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art, it must significantly revise its thinking on both issues.

A divergence: Desire

Although both agree on what Deleuze terms the 'the primacy of desire,' at first glance the divergence is marked (TRM:128). Contrary to the Lacanian contention that 'where there is no lack, there can be no desire' (Fink, 2016:35), Deleuze insists that desire 'gives, instead of lacks' (D:91). On closer examination, however, matters are

more complex. Deleuze and Guattari accept that desire as lack exists: 'If,' they write, 'desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity depends upon an 'essence of lack' that produces the fantasised object.' 'Desire, thus conceived,' they continue, 'has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis' (AO:25). Similarly, as we saw above, they allow for the existence of Oedipal desires (AO:365); their argument is only that Oedipus is not the sum of desire. Thus, they acknowledge that the Kafka who wrote his '*Letter to the Father*' was 'a classic Oedipus of the neurotic sort, where the beloved father is hated, accused, and declared to be guilty' (K:9) to distinguish him from the author of the novels where Oedipus is 'enlarged to the point of absurdity, comedy' (K:10). At the same time, Lacan's teaching has affinities with Deleuze's philosophy. While Lacan does not describe desire as a '"virtue which gives,"' he recognises that desire can be a gift not a bane (D:91). As we saw above, it bestows sense. Further, Lacan similarly wishes to rid us of Oedipal desires – which, as we saw earlier, are, in at least some modes, only variants of the fantasy operative in courtly love, namely that *the* woman exists – in favour of the desires which speak in his '*gay sçavoir*' (T:22). More radically, Lacan insists that in addition to desire there are the drives which, even in the absence of the lost object, obtain *jouissance* and these are 'acephalous' (Žižek, 1999:297). 'The subject,' whom Deleuze and Guattari insist 'is missing in desire,' (AO:26) is equally absent in the 'montage' of Lacan's drives (E:718). Based on this common ground, I argue that neither approach excludes the other. Instead of choosing between them, I propose a division of labour in which artworks are considered case by case: Lacan-inspired approaches for texts which, for the most part, inhabit the plane of organisation, that is, the plane of subject and (missing) object; Deleuzean approaches for texts which attain the plane of consistency. Two filmic adaptations can serve as examples: *Brideshead Revisited* (Jarrold, UK 2008*)* which lends itself to a Lacanian reading insofar as it gives way as to desire and *Time Regained* (Ruiz, France 1999) which is more suited to a Deleuzean approach since it goes beyond the modes of desire informed by the more wretched forms of lack and becomes a 'pure process that fulfils itself, and that never ceases to reach fulfilment as it proceeds' (AO:370-1).

The Implications for Art

'Il faut la distance.'

Jacques Derrida (Derrida, 1976:41)

On first acquaintance, *Brideshead Revisited* (Waugh, 1945) seems a deplorably nostalgic account of an idealised past created to underwrite and legitimate a snobbish contempt for modern society. As our world is freer of many of the oppressions all too evident in the society depicted by the novel, the politics of the text can only be deplored. The world pined for never existed and, to the extent that it did, it is – in Richard Rorty's famous phrase – a 'world well lost' (Rorty, 1982:3). However, dismissal on these grounds would be a mistake for the text is altogether more interesting than this critique suggests. In musical terms, inside a tonal work intent upon returning to its home key - as figured by Brideshead – there is a serial work, for which there is no home only approaches – trying to escape. Insofar as this serial text does not give way as to desire it is an instance of *bien-dire*.

What exactly is *Brideshead*? At first sight the answer seems obvious: it is the family seat of the Marchmain family which functions as the symbol for a particular form of Catholic faith (Heath, 1982:163). For a reader prone to reductionist psychoanalytic readings, it is equally obvious that Brideshead is the voracious mother – whose love Lacan likens to the jaws of a 'crocodile' (S.VII:112). The trouble with these poverty-stricken content analyses is that they miss the work of the work. To understand that work it is useful to recall Lacan's approach to the notion of *La Chose* in seminar seven. Instead of providing a single and final determination, Lacan defines *La Chose* operationally and variously through its effects. Similarly, the work of the work of the novel, prior to its conclusion, establishes the sense of Brideshead operationally and variously through its effects. That work hinges on the tension between the centrifugal and the centripetal movements of the text. The principal characters all take their distance from Brideshead/Catholicism. Sebastian retreats into alcohol and North Africa, Julia marries Rex, and Charles, by giving Sebastian money in contravention of Lady Marchmain's instructions, ensures his banishment. At the same time, they find they are never done with the place and are constantly

drawn to return to either the house or their mother's faith: Sebastian retires to a monastery, Julia rediscovers her faith and Charles finds himself repeatedly back at Brideshead – finally converting to Catholicism. hinges on the tension between the centrifugal and the centripetal movements of the text. The principal characters all take their distance from Brideshead/Catholicism. Sebastian retreats into alcohol and North Africa, Julia marries Rex, and Charles, by giving Sebastian money in contravention of Lady Marchmain's instructions, ensures his banishment. At the same time, they find they are never done with the place and are constantly drawn to return to either the house or their mother's faith: Sebastian retires to a monastery, Julia embraces her Catholic heritage and Charles finds himself repeatedly back at Brideshead – finally converting to Catholicism. Each trajectory is a series and the relations between these series constitute a thinking of the impossibility of finding *the* place and the necessity of doing so. Sense is grounded in nothing beyond the work of the work, specifically, the series, vectors and trajectories in which desire proceeds. But, at the last, Waugh gives way on desire and takes refuge in a mythical authentic Catholic past. The senses generated by the bien-dire of, in this instance, seriality are overtaken and eclipsed by those dependent upon fantasy.

In the recent film adaptation, there is no such 'fall from grace" for the text is captive from the first to the fantasy of a mythical loss and, therefore, even more plaintive (a register antinomic to *bien-dire*). Worse, the narrative structure is that lucidly explicated by Žižek and discussed above: but for a contingent obstacle… The work becomes just another story of doomed love: Sebastian's for Charles and Charles's for Julia. More importantly, a trite psychology explains everything. Sebastian's distress is attributed not only to an over-controlling mother but also to his seeing Charles kiss Julia in Venice. Julia's refusal of Charles is explained by her father's deathbed act of contrition but equally by her disillusion with Charles after, as she interpreted it, he lowered himself by engaging in financial bargaining with her husband, Rex, to obtain his consent to their divorce. With enigma dispelled, there is neither the requirement nor the opportunity for a thinking creative of sense. Moreover, with the coordinates of well-established fantasies in place, the thinking which can occur when 'there is only the travelling' is arrested. The novel's prologue becomes the film's coda – Jarrold's adaptation begins on the Atlantic liner where

Charles and Julia initiate their affair so the focus is on their doomed romance. 'Proust's work,' Deleuze and Guattari wrote 'is the complicated path of a road that never stops approaching while moving away' (K:34). While, as we have seen, similar paths are to be found in Waugh's novel even if they are finally closed off, none exist in the film which is rivalled in its failure only by the recent adaptation of Ulysses, *Bloom* (Walsh, Ireland 2003), which parcels up the narrative(s) as a flashback anchored in Molly's monologue!

We come now to the second example, *Time Regained,* where desire assumes forms other than yearning for what, because mythical, is irreparably lost and where Deleuze's philosophy is more valuable. *Time Regained* begins with desire as lack but then launches desires which are, at best, undertheorized by psychoanalysis. Ruiz's film, while visiting episodes from earlier parts of *A La Recherche du Temps Perdu*, concentrates on the wartime Paris of the concluding volume. Uniforms are everywhere, the personnel in the brothel are servicemen and it is a recurrent topic in the prattle of the salons. This quickly establishes the extent to which this society has always been at war: deception, cruelty and viciousness mark almost every relationship. However, if the enounced is disappointment, duplicity and suffering, the mode of enunciation speaks of something beyond the wretched passions on display. The narrator is at once a participant in the social scene and a detached observer. As there is a place without an occupant and an occupant without a place, the empty square circulates more palpably than in texts largely sealed by fantasies and identifications. The gap is the possibility for creation. That creation situates the griefs, betrayals and sufferings associated with the dismal events in the narrative in a space and time which eludes the Euclidean world of representation. The crucial component of that creation is the extraordinarily fluid style. At the level of the enounced, time is often, as in the *bal des têtes*, devastating: the figures whose world the narrator had once aspired to enter have now all aged beyond recognition, but, at the level of the enunciation, time is the possibility of creation and the new. Crucially, what is created by the movement is a sense which is as dependent on temporalisation as a joke upon timing. This sense is not propounded as a thesis at the level of extractable content. Rather it is argued for by a style creative of durations in which this dual process of creation and destruction becomes a line of flight. At this

juncture, Deleuze becomes a more useful reader, for *Time Regained* ends not with a person but with a '*haecceity*' that is, a mode of 'individuality' which is 'different from that of a thing or a subject' (TP:261) – in *Time Regained* it is the sea at Balbec on a grey summer day. At this moment, it is possible to depart the world of subjectivity for the realm of 'the infinitive', where the infinitive designates a process apart from the world of subject and object intrinsic to the other tenses (TP:263). At such moments, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, 'we are not in the world, we become with the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We become universes' (WP:169).

A divergence: subjectivity

Echoing the earlier discussion of desire this section argues that, although there is more common ground than initially appears, the thinking of Deleuze and Lacan, in respect of subjectivity, significantly diverges and then proposes a further division of labour.

As we have seen, there is a profound consonance insofar as Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari are equally dedicated to the dismantling of existing modes of subjectivity - while prudently retaining sufficient structure to avoid collapses into psychosis – in the interests of inventing, other, more vital, modes of existence. Beyond that, however, the gap between Deleuze and Lacan in relation to the notion of the subject might seem unbridgeable. Deleuze, in his concern to go beyond the human condition, repeatedly emphasizes that the role of the subject is more limited than psychoanalysis suggests. In thinking desire, for example, Deleuze and Guattari insist that 'there is no subject of desire, and no object either' (TRM:81). Desire must be thought outside the coordinates of subjectivity: 'the objectivity of desire itself is only its flows' (TRM:81). In contrast, as we saw in chapter two, Lacan claims that 'subjectivity cannot be eliminated from our experience as analysts' (Lacan, 1998:94). Although he insisted that the subject 'is always and only ever a supposition' (Lacan, 2005e:30), he claimed we 'must speak about one if speaking there is,' and experimented with various conceptualisations until the ascendancy of the Borromean knots in the late seminars (S.X:40). At times those experiments bring him

close to Deleuze. For example, as Christian Fierens observes, the 'I' of the subject of the enunciation 'is not a personified "I"' (Fierens, 2008b:25). On occasion, Lacan remarks, an utterance is better conceived of not as speech [*parole*] but as an act of speaking [*un dire*] which is to be thought of as 'an event' (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:14). At such moments, Lacan's use of the infinitive is close to Deleuze when he uses the term to indicate a plane freed from 'personal subjectifications' (TP:263). Further, Lacan stresses 'the fundamentally acephalic character of the subject,' (S.II:170) describing the 'the manifestation of the drive' as 'the mode of a headless subject' (S.XI:181). For Lacan, as Monique David-Ménard observes, no one can say '"*je jouis*"' - *jouissance* is always of the Other (David-Ménard, 1983:178). Finally, Lacan allows that the human condition can be surpassed. He speaks respectfully of mysticism and even suggests his *Écrits* can be numbered among their writings (S.XX:76). It is therefore unsurprising that Lacan declared himself 'flattered' by the attribution '"a-human," to what he had said' (E:701).

But there is nothing as radical as Deleuze's injunction to 'desubjectify consciousness and passion' (TP:134), and no belief comparable to Deleuze's claim that 'a powerful, nonorganic vitality' (ECC:131) is accessible if you 'find your body without organs' (TP:151). For Lacan, the body is indeed organised by, and in insurrection against, the Other but he would consider Artaud's notion - cited by Deleuze (TP:162) – that '"the judgement of God"' makes a body 'an organism, a signification, a subject,' a neurotic misconstrual of the process, a variant on the belief *the* Other exists (TP:159). Lacan aimed to dismantle existing organisations of the body by the Other's signifiers by inducing a state of 'subjective destitution' but only as a prelude to the invention of new and happier forms of subjectivity (Lacan, 1995:8).

However, this divergence, as with that in respect of desire, does not require the choice of one at the expense of the other. On the contrary, it again suggests a division of labour: Lacan-inspired approaches for art encounters where subjectivity, albeit transformed, continues to function; Deleuze for those where it is surpassed. This possibility is allowed by Deleuze's thinking of the subject in relation to the planes of 'organisation' (TP:269) and 'consistency' (TP:269-270) set out in chapter three above. Deleuze's claim is not that subjects do not exist but that 'forms and subjects'

are 'strata' confined to the 'plane of organisation' (TP:269). On the 'the plane of consistency,' (TP:269-270) which is characterised less by 'stratification' (TP:269) than 'destratification,' (TP:270) particles spin off the strata, 'sweeping up…forms and subjects' (TP:271) in 'movements of deterritorialisation' (TP:270). According to this view, there are subjects but they are caught up in the larger process where the plane of consistency 'is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organisation' in the perpetual play of stratification and destratification (TP:270). So Deleuze is far from denying the existence and functioning of subjects. Indeed, in his customary spirit of caution, he suggests 'a minimal subject' may be necessary to stave off 'a regression to the undifferentiatiated' (TP:270). Consequently, the argument is that, on the one hand, Lacan's teaching can be useful when considering films clinging to fantasy and filmic instances of *bien-dire* where the problem at issue, while revalued by a transformation of the subject, remains in view. When, on the other hand, the work sweeps us beyond the human condition and when, in consequence, subjective concerns no longer obtain, Deleuze's orientation may be more useful.

The Implications for Art

Departing the world of subject and object for that of haecceities, is rare in cinema. In *Éloge de l'amour,* it occurs only in counterpoint, that is, on one of the staves, for example, in the sequence where the colours of the dashboard in the night are set against the text. The concerns, which constitute the problem addressed by the film, retain some purchase, and consequently spectators are only briefly without bearings. In *India Song* the step beyond personhood occurs only in the inconclusion of the conclusion. As the problems of desire posed by the film are irresolvable any resolution could only be an encounter with a dead end. The work of the work is a struggle with the undertow that is the impulse, in the face of the suffering, to give way as to desire. It concludes, therefore, with a desire in excess of any fantasy, a desire which while articulated is inarticulable, that is, it concludes with the open: a gap which is not lack but expanse.

The best example of a filmic duration which achieves desubjectification is, as Anna Powell astutely discerned, (Powell, 2007:168) the Stargate sequence of *2001:*

A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, US/UK 1968). As I cannot improve on her brilliant reading, let's consider another example: *The Sheltering Sky* (Bertolucci, Italy/United Kingdom 1990). Based on the Paul Bowles novel, this is the story of three American travellers – they insist they are not tourists – in Morocco just after World War Two: Porter Moresby (known as 'Port') his wife Kit and their boringly, unimaginative, and prosaic, companion, Tunner. In some undefined way, Port and Kit hope to repair their marriage by travelling into an inhospitable and alien environment. Catastrophe ensues. He dies of typhus and she, in a post-traumatic condition, goes off with an Arab caravan, becomes the lover of its leader, Belqassim, and is then attacked by his uncomprehending wives and other members of the tribe. Rescued by the American consulate, she is brought back, mute and withdrawn, to Tangier but rather than a reunion with Tunner she takes flight with no notion of where to go.

On a first approach, the film seems to illustrate the Lacanian thesis that between us and the real we need the protective veil of fantasy, that is the sheltering sky of which Port remarks it is 'so strange' and continues 'it's almost solid as if it were protecting us from what is behind' – namely 'nothing,' 'just night'. In other words, the film takes as its theme the insistence of both Lacan and Deleuze that we must keep enough structure in place to ward of psychotic breakdown. Like *Brideshead Revisited*, it is a film about distances: the necessity of finding the right distance and the difficulty of doing so. Both Port and Kit go beyond the sheltering sky and find a lethal desert. Most notably, in relation to the alien culture of North Africa but much more importantly when they encounter the otherness of others. Port is at once in flight from his wife – they have separate rooms – and in search of something new but unspecifiable. All he discovers is physical discomfort (the heat and the flies), the other's discordant desires (the young Moroccan woman with whom he has sex tries to steal his wallet and an English travelling companion, Eric Lyle, robs him of his passport), a lost object of desire, when too late he falls back in love with Kit, and death. Kit is more interesting. Her voyage into the Other is more in the direction of Port than the Sahara. At the end the choice is Tunner and conventional bourgeois existence or the desert and trauma – she finds another way – she goes into the bar which she and Port visited at the beginning of their journey and Paul Bowles – making a cameo appearance – asks her, 'are you lost?' She replies: 'Yes.' but with a smile

which expresses her satisfaction with her condition – we have left the world of determinacy for that of indeterminacy – this is reinforced by the famous lines of Paul Bowles which end the film: '

> 'Because we don't know when we will die we get to think of life as an inexhaustible wealth but everything happens only a certain number of times and a very small number at that…and yet it all seems limitless.'

Whereas in the novel (Bowles, 1949) these articulate one of the principal thematic concerns, in the film, where there is no such focus on the apparent limitlessness of time they are beside the point. However, the very disparity of the lines with the foregoing narrative underscores the impossibility of the emergence of any whole or the detection of an essence. Instead of concluding with a signification, the film ends with an effect of openness – a sense without need of a subject: a haecceity.

To conclude – the argument of the second part of this thesis is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must learn from Deleuze. In support of that argument this chapter has demonstrated that the degree of convergence between Deleuze's philosophy and the teaching of Lacan renders the incorporation of many Deleuzean concepts into psychoanalysis unproblematic. At the same time, the divergences suggest a division of labour. My claim is that, in many instances, psychoanalysis can continue to perform a useful role in determining the concern(s) and issue(s) which explain why a narrative initially matters to us: it can identify the 'hook'. As we have seen this initial point of interest is no more than that. What counts is what is made of it. The same issue, for example, the lack in the Other, can as easily give rise to a neurotic symptom as to a joke or an artwork. In many instances psychoanalysis can contribute to our thinking of the work of the work, whether that work is a taking refuge in fantasy and idealisation or *bien-dire*.

Where psychoanalysis needs to reinvent itself in light of Deleuze is with respect to texts where desire and *jouissance* do not turn on lack and which depart the human condition. Ultimately, as argued above, the question is Nietzschean: *Who*? *Who* wills, thinks and desires in this manner? From this viewpoint every word, belief and act is symptomatic of a mode or style of existence. For example, if *the* Other does not exist, nor does *the* Woman – there are only singular women - so the question arises what sort of subject believes *the* Other exists and what sort of

heterosexual male searches for *La Femme*? Lacan recognized something of this when he declared 'a woman is a symptom for man' (Lacan, 1976:60) and 'the Oedipus complex, as such, is a symptom' (Lacan, 1975-76: Session of 18/11/75 p. 15). However, in answering the question *who* desires in this or that fashion the tendency of psychoanalytic criticism has been to draw solely on the clinic. Consequently, when considering the event(s) of art it does not allow for the possibility that art encounters can be creative of modes of desire and subjectivity very different from the wretched forms articulated in neurosis. It misses the joy, unique to art, celebrated by Deleuze.

CHAPTER FIVE

Introduction

This chapter is the crux of the thesis for it examines the relationship of the work of Deleuze to psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to cinema and considers what each can bring to the other. Addressing the question posed at the outset as to the future of psychoanalytic criticism after Deleuze it further develops the argument that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must work with Deleuze. The chapter has a similar structure to the preceding one. It begins with an exposition of Deleuze's thinking on art and more particularly cinema. After examining the degree of consonance between his concepts and the psychoanalytic approaches explored in part one, it proposes, a further division of labour, and concludes with a consideration of how the creativity of Deleuze's approach points up the limitations of psychoanalytic theories of art.

Section 1 Deleuze on Art and Cinema

Vitalism

In the cinema books Deleuze most powerfully articulates his Nietzschean contention that there is no higher value than life itself, no 'higher authority' such as 'the good' or 'the true' by which it can be judged (C2:141). Thus, he argues that in the films of Orson Welles 'there is no value superior to life, life is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it has the "innocence of becoming" beyond good and evil' (C2:137). More generally, this line of thought informs Deleuze's vitalist conception and evaluation of art. 'Any work of art,' he claimed, 'finds a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks' (N:143). Of course, Deleuze did not believe life found a way through in all artworks. In film, for example, he distinguished more vital modes from the cinema of cliché. In developing this distinction, Deleuze drew as much upon Bergson as upon Nietzsche. In Bergson's account, much of our commerce with the world is governed by utilitarian concerns. As a result, we focus on what is pertinent to our pragmatic

purposes and ignore everything else. Perception is subtractive (Bergson, 1919:113-114). In a cosmos where, as we shall see, everything perceives, and interacts with, everything else human perception tends to be narrowly selective. Elaborating on this Bergsonian thesis Deleuze claims: 'we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands' (C2:20). This narrowness of focus is particularly evident in what Bergson terms 'sensori-motor' activities (Bergson, 1896:138). Here we perceive a situation, have an affective reaction and respond with an action. As, for the most part, these responses are habitual or automatic, our horizons are circumscribed and we miss much of what is happening and, more importantly, what could happen. In light of this, for Bergson, the role of art was to enlarge perception by enabling us 'to discover in things more qualities and more shades than we naturally perceive' (Bergson, 1919:131). Drawing on this line of thought, Deleuze claimed that the cinema of cliché is in most –although, as we shall see, not all – cases, rooted in sensori-motor schemas. 'A cliché' Deleuze writes, 'is a sensory-motor image of the thing' (C2:20). The majority of mainstream films are of this ilk: a protagonist apprehends a situation, say the villain mistreating the female lead, is affected by righteous fury and reacts by setting about the villain (just about any Bond film). Identifying with the hero, spectators are similarly locked into the predictable and confined world of the sensori-motor. In Nietzschean terms, such films display modes of an 'exhausted and degenerating life' (C2:141). But if there is the 'bad' (C2:172), there is also the 'good': art in which there is

> 'outpouring, ascending life, the kind which knows how to transform itself, to metamorphose itself according to the forces it encounters, and which forms a constantly larger force with them, always increasing the power to live, always opening new "possibilities"' (C2:141).

If there is the cinema which 'has drowned in the nullity of its productions,' (C2:164) there is also a cinema like that of the new wave which, by repudiating the clichés of taken for granted realities, 'deliberately broke with the form of the true to replace them with 'the powers of life' (C2:135).

However, it is, as always, a matter of cases. Life 'finds a way through,' in very different ways in different films (N:143). As David Deamer so admirably demonstrates in his magisterial study (Deamer, 2016), one of the most impressive features of the cinema books is their refusal to reduce the different to the same. Cinema assumes forms as diverse as life. If in the crystal-image, that is an image in which the virtual and the actual cannot be distinguished, (C2:335) we encounter 'the powerful non-organic Life which grips the world' (C2:81), in the films of Dreyer we find the 'spiritual' for films such as *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (Dreyer, Denmark 1928) put us 'into immediate relation with…a fourth and fifth dimension, Time and Spirit' (C1:107).

Two aspects of Deleuze's vitalism are worth reiterating and underlining here as they relate the conception back to the two previous chapters. First, as in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, life is not some simple primordial force or flow to which we must become attuned. Rather vitalism is again a 'machinism,' that is, life is always in play within assemblages of the heterogeneous (C1:59). 'The material universe,' of the cinema books is described as 'the machine assemblage of movement-images' (C1:59). Second, as in *A Thousand Plateaus,* his concern is with 'the vital as potent pre-organic germinality, common to the animate and the inanimate, to a matter which raises itself to the point of life, and to a life which spreads itself through all matter' (C1:51). By way of an example, 'the first principle of Expressionism,' he claims, is 'the non-organic life of things, a frightful life, which is oblivious to the wisdom and limits of the organism' (C1:50-51).

Beyond the Human Condition

A key thread running through Deleuze's works is the contention that more vital modes of existence are possible beyond the human condition. Art, he contends, is one of the areas where this can be achieved.

> 'Art is never an end in itself; it is only a tool for blazing lines, in other words, all of those real becomings that are not produced only in art, and all of those active escapes that do not consist in fleeing into art, taking refuge in art, and all of those positive deterritorialisations that never reterritorialise on art, but

> instead sweep it away with them toward the realm of the asignifying, asubjective, and faceless' (TP:187).

Art can attain a 'celestial state that no longer retains anything of the personal or rational' (ECC:65).

The cinema books similarly eschew what Anna Powell terms 'a psychological model of subjectivity,' and proceed on the premise that we can go beyond the human condition (Powell, 2007:149-150). Their mainspring is what Deleuze perceives to be the Foucauldian ambition: 'to get free of oneself' (F:95-6). As Stephen Zepke astutely observes, 'The trajectory of the cinema books can perhaps be summarized by Deleuze's question: "how can we rid ourselves of ourselves, and demolish ourselves?"' (Zepke, 2005:99) We have already encountered two cinematic modes of surpassing the human condition, namely the 'spiritual life' (TRM:283), that is, 'non-psychological life,' (C1:54) manifested by cinema and 'the powerful non-organic Life which grips the world' (C2:81). Let's now consider the two most prominent forms: first affects and percepts, then durations.

Earlier it was suggested that, in thinking about art, Deleuze's point of departure was Bergson's claim that art expands perception (TRM:296). As Valentine Moulard-Leonard notes,

> 'The central insight animating Deleuze's cinema books is precisely that the cinema does not imitate natural perception; on the contrary, it frees itself from it, thereby presenting us with the means to go beyond everyday experience' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008:106).

However, Deleuze's thinking is altogether more radical than this formulation suggests. In breaking with the utilitarian bias of natural perception, Deleuze does not simply want to expand the horizons of a pre-constituted individual. Rather he wishes to leave behind the personal world of perceptions and, as we shall see even more crucially, affections for the impersonal world of percepts and affects. 'Percepts aren't perceptions, they're packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them.' 'Affects aren't feelings, they're becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else)' (N:137). Hence art, in creating 'nonsubjectified affects' (SP:129) and wresting 'the percept

from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject,' can enable us to go beyond the human (WP:167).

Cinema has the capacity to break with natural perception. 'Cinema,' Deleuze writes, 'lacks a centre of anchorage and horizon' and consequently can depart natural 'centred perception,' which obtains in our pragmatic dealings with the world, and goes 'towards the acentred state of things and get[s] closer to it'(C1:58). In contrast to the cinema of cliché governed by sensori-motor schemas, there are modes of cinema, where vision is no longer that of a human being with a bias toward utility but 'of a non-human eye which would be in things' that is, an eye capable of seeing 'the world before man'. Such a cinema 'constructs' an eye, which, when immersed in the sensory-motor, 'we do not have' (C1:81). In the pre-war French School, for example, there is a 'a more than human perception' (C1:80). Similarly, the work of Dziga-Vertov 'goes beyond human perception toward another perception', that of 'the overman of the future' (C1:83). Finally, and similarly, he writes that experimental cinema 'tends toward a perception as it was before men' (C1:122).

Equally cinema can go beyond the human condition at the level of affects. Just as cinema can depart the world of human perception for the asubjectivity of the percept – that is 'perception in becoming' (ECC:87-8) – so it can create affects which are impersonal (TP:240). Affects 'imply an enterprise of desubjectification' (TP:270): they are 'precisely the *nonhuman becomings of man*' (WP:169). As 'pre-subjective processes,' (Powell, 2007:2) affects, as Guattari claims, exist '"before" the circumscription of identities' (Guattari, 1996a:158). With art we can leave the subjects and molar identities of the plane of organisation for the plane of consistency where 'there are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations' (TP:266).

This brings us to durations. Deleuze's Bergsonian concern 'to open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman' in the form of '*durations* which are inferior and superior to our own' and thereby 'go beyond the human condition' inspires the cinema books (B:28). These 'very different "durations"' can introduce us to 'a reality specific to becoming' (TP:238). As 'becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself,' (TP:238) we then leave the human world of subject and object and are opened up to what Levi Bryant describes as the 'greater and lesser rhythms of time or difference which go beyond our own subject-centred experience' (Bryant, 2008:77). If, in the

cinema of the sensori-motor, time is measured and constructed in terms of the time that elapses between the ascertained original situation and the elicited response, in other cinematic modes we can leave the world of the sensori-motor and go

> 'beyond the human limits of the sensory-motor schema towards a non-human world where movement equals matter, or else in the direction of a super-human world which speaks for a new spirit' (C2:40),

and even, on occasion become with the 'superhuman cosmos' (C2:118).

Deleuze theorises the 'radical plurality of durations' in cinema primarily in terms of the distinction between two modes of cinema: those of the movement-image and the time-image (B:76). In the bulk of the cinema of the movement-image, the sensory-motor preponderates. This is particularly apparent in the matrixial mode of the movement-image: the action-image. Here the durations in play are, for the most part, so familiar as to be clichéd: 'someone on the screen perceives, feels, reacts' (N:123). Typically – and this is the prevalent mode of what I have termed 'contracted cinema' – 'the hero in a given situation, reacts' and 'always knows how to react' (N:123). Shane, in the eponymous film (Stevens, USA 1953), perceiving how the rancher is maltreating the homesteaders, is affected. Impelled by a feeling of solidarity with the good folk and outraged by the wickedness visited upon them, he buckles on his gun belt and puts matters right. In contrast, in the cinema of the time-image, - for example, films like *India Song* and *Éloge de l'amour* - characters typically encountered a situation which 'was beyond them,' that is, a situation which was not immediately intelligible and to which there was no ready-made response (N:123). In such films, a character typically finds himself 'in a situation, however ordinary or extraordinary, that's beyond any possible action, or to which he can't react.' Here, 'he's no longer in a sensory-motor, but in a purely optical and aural situation (N:51). Different durations then obtain. This 'slackening of the sensory-motor connections' enables us to see and hear more (C2:3). If 'our sensory-motor schemata jam or break,' time-images can appear which bring 'out the thing itself' and we can move beyond the human condition (C2:20).

Although – hopefully - clear, Deleuze's thinking on cinema, as set out above, is *Hamlet* without the prince for, at the heart of the cinema books, is an altogether more complex and profound theory of time. On this account: '[s]ubjectivity is never

ours, it is time' (C2:82-3). Becoming is prior to and in excess of any temporalization articulated in terms of subjects and objects. Hence time is (non-psychological) 'spirit' and the 'virtual' which undoes any particular actualization (C2:82-3). For much of its existence philosophy has missed this possibility. From the ancients to Descartes time has been deemed to be the measure of change. Thinking in terms of things not events, philosophers viewed time as measuring the alteration and transformation of things. Only with Nietzsche and, more importantly, Bergson was this subordination of time to movement reversed (C2:xi). Time ceased 'to be derived from …movement' and appeared 'in itself' (C2:xi). No longer the measurement of movement, it was now, in Hamlet's famous phrase, 'out of joint' (C2:xi). 'Hamlet's words,' Deleuze comments, 'signify that time is no longer subordinated to movement' (C2:xi).

Deleuze's distinctive hypothesis is that the history of film repeats this reversal. The subordination of time to movement in the cinema of the movement image 'gave way in the post-war period, to a direct time-image' (C2:xi). In the former, time is measured by the actions on screen - think of those action-image films where, for example, our hero must download the crucial information before the villains can thwart him (*Clear and Present Danger,* Noyce, USA 1994). In this mode, the cinema of the movement image moves from one state of affairs to another giving us only an indirect image of time. In contrast, in the cinema of the time-image, time is given 'in a pure state' (C2:169). With the 'loosening of the sensory-motor linkage,' he claims, 'time ceases to be derived from the movement, it appears in itself' (C2:xi). Instead of an indirect representation of time, the cinema of the time-image gives us time directly.

Put like that, it might appear that the cinema of the movement-image is superior to that of the time-image but Deleuze is insistent this is not the case: 'It cannot be said that one is more important than the other, whether more beautiful or more profound. All that can be said is that the movement-image does not give us a time-image' (C2:270). There is no privileging of time over movement images for two reasons. First, clichéd modes are to be found in the cinema of the time-image just as in movement-image films. If the latter are all too often 'commercial configurations of sex and blood,' the latter are frequently 'overlaid with, "formalist antics"' (C2:157). Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, not all of the

cinema of the movement image is organised by the sensori-motor systems characteristic of the Hollywood factory. The cinema of the movement-image is principally concerned with three types of image: perception-images, affection-images and action-images. Now, while these images can be components of standard multiplex fare they can also assume modes carrying us beyond the human condition. There are, as we saw above, instances where percepts and affects displace perceptions and affections. Furthermore, open-ended systems exist in both cinemas so in each there is the possibility of going beyond the human. Vital sub-representational forces are at work in both when we encounter the unassignable and indeterminate. As we have repeatedly seen, no system is closed – all movement image films are open to the 'cosmic eddying of movement-images' (C1:68). If in the majority of cases this opening is almost indiscernible, in other instances, most notably *Film* (Beckett, USA 1966) cinema can enable us to go beyond personhood and attain 'once more the world before man' (C1:68).

The need for caution

'The problem of philosophy,' Deleuze and Guattari write, 'is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite' (WP:42). A similar approach is evident in Deleuze's thinking on art and existence. In each case it is a matter of keeping the dangers posed by chaos at bay without losing the movement that is life. As Badiou observes, thinking for Deleuze whether in the register of art, philosophy or science involves making 'a section in the chaos', for the aspiration is 'to be as close as possible to chaos, and nonetheless to shelter oneself from it' (Badiou, 2012:339).

Section 2: Deleuze and Ideological Critique

The argument of this section is that Deleuze's approach to cinema is not to the exclusion of others, not even that of ideological critique as set out in chapter one. At first glance, Deleuze and Guattari appear to take their distance. They proclaim that 'there is no ideology and never has been' (TP:4). However, such polemics are misleading insofar as Deleuze's practice like that of 1970s ideological critique, seeks

to enable us to 'unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality' (TP:160). In addition, he has, as we saw earlier, recourse to the notion of ideology. By way of further examples, consider *Anti-Oedipus*, where he and Guattari describe the notion of Oedipus as 'a completely ideological beginning, for the sake of ideology' (AO:101), and the discussion in *Cinema 2* of 'the ideology of the coloniser' (C2:223). Moreover, in thinking of ideology, he and Guattari acknowledge the importance of Althusser's notion of 'interpellation.' 'Althusser' they write, 'clearly brings out this constitution of social individuals,' and 'analyses the "specular doubling" of subjects' at 'the point of subjectification' (TP:130).

Further he, at times, accepts the principal terms of 70s film theory's analysis of cinema as an ideological operation. Cinema, he notes, can produce captivation by the imaginary. It 'is true,' he acknowledges, that bad cinema (and sometimes good) limits itself to a dream state induced in the viewer or – as has been the subject of frequent analysis – to an imaginary participation' (C2:168). A cinema spectator is always 'in danger of becoming the dummy of every kind of propaganda' (C2:157). As such, there is a role for psychoanalysis insofar as such capture relies on fantasies whose production, as we noted above, he acknowledges 'has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis' (AO:25). Finally, despite his concern to go beyond the human condition, Deleuze accepts the need, in certain circumstances, for a politics of the subject. 'You have,' he and Guattari write, 'to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality' (TP:160). Hence, they accept that, while the enterprise may be hedged around with dangers, 'It is, of course indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history their own subjectivity' (TP:276).

To conclude, Deleuze was as persuaded of the centrality of politics as post '68 film theorists: 'politics,' he and Guattari wrote, 'precedes being' (TP:203). Although, for the most part, his political interventions were dedicated to the invention of 'a people to come' (ECC:4) - rather than the analysis of the workings of ideology in specific conjunctures - he was far from discounting the value of such work, and no more averse to its deployment of psychoanalysis in certain circumstances than this thesis.

Section 3: Deleuze, a psychoanalysis to come and the event of art

This section considers the degree of consonance between Deleuze's thinking on art and the psychoanalytic approaches explored earlier with a view to suggesting new directions for the latter. Deleuze's claim that 'something in the world forces us to think' holds as much for thinking in art as elsewhere (DR:139). Art equally occurs in 'the question-problem complex'. 'The question animates works of art as much as philosophical thought' (DR:195). Ultimately the problem impelling thought is that of difference, asymmetry and disparity: heterogeneous forces in disequilibrium. The earlier claim that it is always 'a question of forces' is reprised in *Cinema 2* (TP:155). 'Is this to say,' he asks, 'that, in life, everything is a matter of forces?' and answers 'Yes' (C2:140). Initially this might appear at some remove from psychoanalysis but there is a proximity which this thesis seeks to develop. 'Something essential to our experience,' Lacan wrote, 'forces psychoanalytic thought to be creationist' (E:559). This is not, as he makes clear, to adopt an ignorant, anti-Darwinian stance but to stress the need to create new responses to the new problems presented by each individual patient. In other words, Deleuze and Lacan are at one in their recognition of the exigency to invent in each encounter with singularity. On the psychoanalytic account of art proposed in part one, thinking in art similarly creates in response to singular problems deriving from differences, asymmetries and disparities. Now Lacan would never, like Deleuze, have said 'it has always been a question of forces,' for he was wary of the term force (TP:346). 'Force,' he wrote 'is used to designate a locus of opacity' (S.XI:21). His insistence on 'the primacy of topology over dynamics' derives, as Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe observe, from 'a hostility to privileging forces, energies and powers' (Bartlett et al., 2014:61). However, as we saw earlier, he did use the term elsewhere (S.II:60) for, whether he was conscious of this or not, it is indispensable to his teaching. Lacanian psychoanalysis concerns the 'force' constituted by the object *a* (Lacan, 2011:87), the 'force' exerted by master signifiers (Bracher, 1994:112) and, more generally, the force with which the signifiers of the Other arrive in our lives. The treatment functions to alter existing force-fields so that, for example, certain images cease to captivate and the master-signifiers to enslave (S.XVII:188). In light of this, psychoanalysis should accept that art can be, as Celan

puts it, a 'counterword,' that is words, images and sounds countering prevailing forces (Celan, 1999:3).

In part one, it was argued that art is a response to the problems arising from the real as impossible and, in particular the impossibilities associated with the lack in the Other such as the impossibility of saying it all. Now, while this vocabulary is alien to Deleuze the line of thought is not. Creation, for Deleuze, depends on impossibility:

> 'A creator who isn't grabbed around the throat by a set of impossibilities is no creator. A creator is someone who creates their own impossibilities and thereby creates possibilities.'

He continues: 'You have to work on the wall, because without a set of impossibilities, you won't have the line of flight, the exit that is creation' (N:133). The consonance is even more manifest in respect of my argument that, if there is a lack in the Other, there is no fore-ordained way, for this is precisely the situation of many of the protagonists of the cinema of the time-image. Unable to find their bearings and uncertain how to react to events, these characters are 'struck by something intolerable in the world and confronted by something unthinkable in thought' (C2:168). Like Lacanian subjects addressing the lack in the Other, they have to undertake, as we saw in the previous chapter, the task described by Maurice Blanchot (Blanchot, 1959:36-7) and cited by Deleuze: 'the impossibility of thinking that is thought' (Maurice Blanchot cited in DR:199). What a psychoanalysis to come should learn from Deleuze is that art can be one of the most joyful means of performing this task.

While Deleuze never argued that the truth can only be 'half-said,' (Lacan, 1975-76: Session of 9/12/75 p. 4) and Lacan never spoke of 'the power of the false' (C2:168), they agreed on the underlying contention, namely that matters will never be settled once and for all. As there is no final word, no ultimate truth, both are committed to the view that we need 'to produce something new' (C2:147). This explains why Lacan contributed 'something wholly new at each class' (E:412) of his seminar and why Deleuze asserts 'there is no other truth than the creation of the New' (C2:146-7). For both, there are realms where 'truth is a matter of production, not of adequation' (DR:154), and in Lacan's phrase 'always new' (E:157). The argument of this thesis is, of course, that new truths can also occur in the event of

art, that is, truths which are to be measured not in terms of correctness but according to their power to disclose new horizons, possibilities, orientations, evaluations, and senses. Developing this claim, the present thesis further argues that the work of the work in expanded cinema is the creation of an element in which such truths can happen. Central to this process is the dismantling of existing structures. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is a fundamental consonance between Lacan and Deleuze on this score insofar as they are agreed on the need, while dismantling, for prudence and caution as the *sine qua non* is the fending off of chaos. Artworks according to Deleuze and Guattari, 'crosscut the chaos, …confront it', and construct a 'sectional plane' to keep it at bay (WP:66). As we saw in the discussion of the *sinthome* in chapter two, Lacanian psychoanalysis similarly views artworks as putting in place structures warding off chaos. They further agree on the indispensability of style and 'technique' in the creation of the new (TP:345). As Deleuze and Guattari insist, percepts and affects do not pre-exist the work.

> 'Style is needed – the writer's syntax, the musician's modes and rhythms, the painter's lines and colours – to raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect' (WP:170).

They are equally agreed that the creation of an element, in which new truths can occur, is possible because no element is *the* element: others are possible. Both hold that in any structure or system constitutive of such an element there is an ineradicable gap, hole or space which permits creation. Lacan thinks this in terms of the lack in the Other. As we saw in the previous chapter, while no such concept features in Deleuze's philosophy, the orientation is, at least in places, similar. Writing of art in *Difference and Repetition* he maintains: 'works are developed around or on the basis of a fracture that they never succeed in filling' (DR:195), and this is echoed later when he claims that in modern cinema 'the fissure has become primary' (C2:180). Crucially the fissure renders possible. As we saw in the previous chapter, he holds, that 'there is no structure without an empty square.' In *The Logic of Sense* he claims that it is this gap, this 'empty square, which makes everything function' (LS:61). The gap is the possibility of the new. The consonance with psychoanalysis is evident. Lacanian psychoanalysis is premised on this gap: it is because both Other and subject are barred and, therefore, incomplete, that the analysand can abandon

the identifications and traverse the fantasies previously employed to make sense of the world and invent anew. Hence, as Lacan insists 'a certain void is always to be preserved' (S.XX:65). Taking up this notion regarding art in seminar seven, Lacan argues 'the existence of the emptiness at the centre of the real that is called the Thing' constitutes the condition for creation. 'The potter' as the representative of every artist, 'creates the vase' emblematic of every artwork 'with his hand around this emptiness.' He 'creates it, just like the mythical creator, ex nihilo, starting with a hole' (S.VII:121). Along similar lines, Deleuze argues that if, as he claims, art is blocs of sensation, these 'blocs need pockets of air and emptiness' for 'all sensation is composed with the void' (WP:165). But, as always, the accent is more affirmative for, he continues, a work 'is only a work of art if, as the Chinese painter says, it nonetheless saves enough empty space for horses to prance in' (WP:165-166). If, for the neurotic, emptiness is a frightful lack and the occasion for despair, for an artist it is the opportunity to create. To be worthy of the event of art, psychoanalysis should recognise that one of the achievements of art like *Éloge de l'amour* is the creation of spaces in which horses can prance.

In the latter part of *Cinema 2* Deleuze explores this line of thought in ways to which psychoanalytic thinking on art could usefully attend. After citing Blanchot's claim that 'what comes first is not the fullness of being, but the crack and the fissure' (Maurice Blanchot cited in C2:310 footnote 22), Deleuze proceeds to distinguish two modes of cinema: 'classical cinema' where '*the whole is the open*', and 'modern cinema' where '*the whole is the outside.*' In the former, which is governed by sensori-motor schemas, perceptions and affections select with a view to action from within the 'changing whole' of the cosmos (C2:179). Like every system, the systems thereby created are 'never absolutely closed;' they open on to 'the Open' (C1:17). In contrast, modern cinema is open not to 'the Open' but to an 'outside beyond the outside world' (C2:181). This is the Outside of Blanchot, encountered in the previous chapter which 'is something more distant than any external world' but 'also something closer than any inner world' (N:110). As such, like the Lacanian real in the form of *das Ding*, if it is to be thought it must be thought topologically but even this can only be an approximation for ultimately the outside remains the 'unthought in thought'

(C2:181). It is, for example, 'the *impossible* of Marguerite Duras, or again what might be called the *incommensurable* of Godard (between two things)' (C2:182).

On Deleuze's account, 'modern cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view' (C2:187-8). Each of these at once chimes with psychoanalytic theories of art premised on the lack in the Other and advances such thinking. First, as sensori-motor schemas have broken down, 'the link between man and the world is broken' (C2:171-2). Consequently, men and women no longer know how to react. The terrain of modern cinema is, therefore, Lacanian insofar as it is a world where, as no god-like Other can act as guarantor, we are condemned to experimentation. Deleuze's contribution in this regard is to emphasise a consequence of this absent Other missed by Lacanian thinking on the arts: namely that 'the reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief.' 'Only belief in the world,' he writes, 'can reconnect man to what sees and hears' (C2:172). This is a Nietzschean affirmation not an argument for religious faith. Nietzsche's achievement, for Deleuze is to have 'torn belief from every faith in order to give it back to rigorous thought' (C2:176). To believe in this world is precisely not to subscribe to the existence of some heavenly elsewhere. Rather it is to affirm existence. And this is not easy: 'it may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task' (WP:75).

Art can assist in this task. According to Deleuze, the vocation of certain artworks, he instances the films of Rossellini (C2:171), is the restoration of our capacity 'to believe in this world' (C2:173). If 'the modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world,' (C2:171) *'we need reasons to believe*' and cinema can provide them. 'Restoring our belief in the world – this,' he writes, 'is the power of cinema (when it stops being bad)' (C2:172). Cinema can give us reasons to believe not 'in another world' – that is, some fantasmatic construction – but 'in this world as it is' (C2:172). This need to believe is under-theorised in Lacanian psychoanalysis. In the clinic, the emphasis is on dispelling a patient's existing beliefs for they are, almost certainly, components of a world-view which is part of the problem. If the subject's beliefs were working, he or she would not have become an analysand. The cure depends upon the patient's abandonment of the sense and significance he or she has previously lent the world. Hence Miller's advice to analysts:

> ‘What we call the real is something that cannot be made sense of. And that is why we use the category of the real. So, beware of making sense’ (Miller, J-A., 2009:159).

Given this focus, psychoanalysis has paid less attention to the subsequent need to forge new beliefs and invent new senses, which, as this thesis has argued, can be an achievement of art. Belief in this world is not absent from psychoanalysis: it is implicit in Lacan’s description of Joyce’s work as a *jouis-sens*, explicit in his tribute to the ‘faith’ displayed by Duras in her celebration of ‘the taciturn wedding of an empty life with an indescribable object,’ and it speaks in every line Lacan wrote but it is not foregrounded (Lacan, 1987:129). So again, a psychoanalytic criticism to come must draw on Deleuze. Specifically, on his notion of choice. The condition of belief is a choice made outside the security of knowledge. ‘It is characteristic of the problem that it is inseparable from a choice’ (C2:176). Belief requires a particular form of decision, ‘a decision on which everything depends, deeper than all the explanations that can be given for it’ (C2:175).

The claim of this thesis is that such decisions rather than being the conscious act of a sovereign master, are unfathomable and that art can contribute to the making of this decision. Every decision occurs in a particular situation and is made on the basis of desires and their concomitant evaluations. One of the achievements of artworks like *Éloge de l’amour* is to create an element which can enable the making of that decision in a more affirmative manner. In composition with such works, authors and audiences can find in art an unfathomable way of responding to ‘an unfathomable problem’ (C2:175). When art creates sense it also creates a belief in this world – for sense just is belief in this world. With that belief we can ‘discover the identity of thought and life’ for thought becomes a mode of *bien-dire* creative of new senses and values (C2:170).

The second point of view from which ‘modern cinema develops new relations with thought’ is – that Lacanian commonplace – the absence of the whole (C2:187-8). On Deleuze’s account, classical cinema ‘works by totalisation’ (C2:213): ‘[t]he whole’ is ‘being continually made’ (C2:179). Images are linked by association and rendered ‘commensurable’ by the montage. Cuts are traversed by and subordinated to this ‘linkage of images’ (C2:213). Montage is a ‘synthesis’ (C2:210-211) integrating

'associated images in an always open totality' (C2:213). In contrast, with modern cinema there is 'the obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favour of an outside which is inserted between them' (C2:188-9). In place of any supposed whole there is 'irreducible difference.' As 'the fissure has become primary,' the gap between images takes on a new status (C2:180). 'What counts' is no longer the principle of 'association' linking images but 'the *interstice* between images, between two images.' (C2:179). In modern cinema the gap between shots becomes 'a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it' (C2:179). Instead of the 'organic process,' (C2:211) characteristic of classical cinema, there is, most notably in Godard, 'constructivism' (C2:179). Without totalisation. 'Each of Godard's films' as Susan Sontag famously observed, 'is a totality that undermines itself, a de-totalised totality (to borrow Sartre's phrase)' (Sontag, 1966:163).

The consonance with Lacan's teaching is apparent. Recall the slogan: 'no whole' (T:133). If in the beginning is 'the cut', *the* One no more exists than *the* Other. Further, as *the* place does not exist, the subject is interstitial. Instead of unified, whole subjects there are compositions of the heterogeneous and disparate: the signifiers, the barred subject and the object a. For Lacan, as for Deleuze, 'the interstice is primary:' the subject is always between (C2:180). The proximity to modern cinema as described by Deleuze is patent. When, summarising Lacan, Miller writes 'before being system, structure is division' and continues 'that is why structure is never synthesis', he could equally be characterising Godard's constructivism (Miller, J-A, 2017:109).

Where Deleuze can contribute to a psychoanalysis, which seeks to be worthy of the event of art, is with his indications of 'the new relations with thought' made possible by such interstices. His exemplar is Godard, for in his cinema, when any image is 'given' another is 'chosen which will induce an interstice *between* the two' (C2:179). By making this choice the interstice becomes part of a process of 'differentiation… which will be productive…of something new' (C2:179-180). Godard's 'method of BETWEEN, "between two images"' dispels 'all cinema of the One.' His 'method of AND "this and then that"' through the deposition of existing identifications and determinations 'does away with all the cinema of Being = is' (C2:180). After 'the whole has ceased to be the One-Being', it mutates, according to

Deleuze, becoming 'the constitutive "and" of things, the constitutive between-two of images.' This merging of the whole 'with what Blanchot calls the force of "dispersal of the Outside"' entails 'the radical calling into question of the image' (C2:180). No image is *the* image. Similarly, in Lacan no formulation is *the* formulation. But equally, as we are always at grips with the real of impossibility, not just any image or formulation will do. The achievement of Deleuze, Lacan and Godard, is the demonstration that, in the absence of *the* way, we can find ways in the form of images and formulations which work. 'The constitutive "and" of things' explicitly proclaimed by Deleuze and implicit in every paragraph of Lacan and every sequence in Godard is not the occasion for despair but our opportunity to create new ways. Godard does not merely put in question and make self-reflexive gestures rather his film-work, like the joke-work, makes something of the issue(s). For example, he constructs ways of being between the series of image, sound, music and citations such that where and when the subject happens can be creative of new senses

Finally, for Deleuze, modern cinema is characterised by 'a free indirect discourse and vision.' (C2:188-189). In both direct speech, where what is said is rendered directly, and in indirect speech, where the utterance is 'reported by a third party,' the identity of the speaker is plain (C2:183). In free indirect discourse, which 'cannot be affixed to any subjectivity' matters are less straightforward (Boljkovac, 2013:23). Deleuze explains: the free indirect style

> 'consists in slipping another expressing subject in a statement which already has an expressing subject. "I realised that she was about to leave. She would take every precaution to ensure she was not followed…" The second 'she' is a new expressing subject emerging in a statement that already has 'I' as its expressing subject. It is almost as if every expressing subject contained others, each of which speaks a diverse language, the one in the other' (TRM:367).

In free indirect discourse[8] there is no monologue and the identity of the speaker becomes indeterminate. This is Deleuze's style in his books on Spinoza, Nietzsche and

[8] Further clarification of the notion of free indirect discourse is usefully provided by Ronald Bogue: 'Linguists have discussed passages from fiction in which a narrative

Bergson, where it is often unclear if the viewpoint expressed is that of Deleuze or his subject, and uncertain where paraphrase ends and innovation begins. What is clear is that those whom Deleuze termed his 'intercessors' (WP:64) and 'mediators' (N:125) – that is, philosophers like Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson – enabled him to speak, write and think in ways which would otherwise have been unavailable.[9] On Deleuze's account, a similar process can occur in modern cinema where 'either the author expresses himself through the intercession of an autonomous, independent character other than the author or any role fixed by the author, or the character acts and speaks himself as if his own gestures and his own words were already reported by a third party' (C2:183). Thus, in Godard, 'the characters express themselves freely in the author's discourse-vision, and the author, indirectly, in that of the characters' (C2:187). This style enables Godard to think the issues at stake in a particular film by adopting a reflexive distance from his characters' responses, words and actions. He thereby 'provides himself with…reflexive types as so many interceders through whom I is always another' (C2:187).

The importance of Deleuze's concept of free indirect discourse for a psychoanalysis to come should be evident. It provides an example of a form of

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voice slides imperceptibly into a character's voice such that one cannot distinguish clearly between "indirect discourse" (As she looked out the train window she thought her loneliness was unbearable) and "direct discourse" (As she looked out of the train window she thought. "This loneliness is unbearable") but must speak of a "free indirect discourse" (She looked out the train window, such loneliness was unbearable). Pasolini, following Bakhtin's analysis, argues this is not a simple mingling of two fully constituted subjective voices, a narrator's and a character's, but, as Deleuze phrases it, "a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system itself heterogeneous" an "assemblage of enunciation [*agencement d'enonciation*], putting into effect at the same time two inseparable acts of subjectivation" (Bogue, 2003b:72).

[9] As Paul Patton noted, his rule with intercessors like Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson 'was to say nothing that the author in question had not in fact said, but to do so in a manner which produced unrecognisable facsimiles' (Patton, 1996:3).

thinking, which is at once consonant with psychoanalysis where language is always the language of the Other and hence when a subject speaks, '*I is an other*', and which is irreducible to any other form (S.II:9). The enunciation does not refer to a pre-given, unitary subject for as Deleuze claims, 'There is no expressing subject, i.e. subject of utterance, but only assemblages in which "processes of subjectivation"" (TRM:201) occur whereby subjects become other (WP:64). In free indirect style, the composition, the *agencement*, of the heterogeneous elements (C1:73) becomes what Deleuze terms 'a heterogenesis', which transforms the *who*, *where*, *when* and *how* of the subject and thereby alters how the real registers (TRM:367). Free indirect style is a reminder that the words of others can liberate as well as alienate. It is one of the innumerable modes in which art, like a joke, can, not merely represent an issue, but make something new of it such that it can be thought otherwise and matter differently.

To recapitulate - the argument of this section is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art, it must draw upon Deleuze's philosophy and that this is possible because of its consonance with strands of Lacan's teaching. For example, both are committed to the perpetual (re)construction of stylistic and spatio-temporal elements in which new truths can emerge. More specifically, Deleuze's characterisation of modern cinema usefully delineates one such element. Modern cinema responds to the problems (apparently) posed by the absence of both a whole and the link with the world by a form of thinking in which the primacy of the interstice and the free indirect style enables the subject to be between differently. In the terms proposed by this thesis *where*, *who* and *how* the subject are thereby altered in ways rendering possible the finding of reasons to believe in this world.

Integral to the formation of elements in which new truths can happen is the construction of new temporalities, durations and spaces. As Deleuze notes 'a work is always the creation of a new space-time', and the cinema books set out, as never before, the extraordinary range of spaces and durations created by film (TRM:289). If psychoanalytic approaches are to be worthy of the event of art, they must conceive such spaces and durations not as frameworks but as dynamisms. 'There is,' Deleuze notes, 'always a trajectory in the work of art' (ECC:66). 'Every work is a voyage, a journey, but one that travels along this or that external path only by virtue of the

internal paths and trajectories that compose it' (ECC:lvi). Psychoanalysis, as the *graph complet* and the diagram with the three vectors cited in chapter four make clear, is similarly concerned with vectors and trajectories rather than merely meanings and significations. As Lacan points out, all of his schemas are or can be 'vectorialised' (Lacan, 1965-66: Session of 8/12/65 p. 5). If psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art when thinking the work of the work, it needs to think in similarly processual terms. 'Poems,' Celan wrote 'are *en route*' (Celan, 1983:35). My argument is that artworks, like *India Song* and *Éloge de l'amour,* are similarly '*en route*' and that the sense(s) –as opposed to the meanings – created are contingent upon that 'way-making' of vectors and trajectories which are in turn dependent upon the creation of new spaces and durations. As always, the subject happens between. Explicating the *graph complet*, Lacan claims that the 'interval' between the vectors of speech and the drives,

> 'constructs for the subject the distance that he (sic) can maintain between the two lines in order to be able to breathe there while he is still alive; and this is what we call desire' (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 9).

Between the lines of the itinerary of art, the subject, breathing another air and desiring differently, can engage in the co-creation of new senses.

This brings us to difference and relationality. If the first achievement of the cinema books is to set out the durations and spaces of the cinemas of the movement-image and the time-image, the second is their explication in terms of signs. There is not the space here to expound this extraordinarily complex and subtle taxonomy in any detail.[10] For present purposes, what matters is that each sign is a point of view. Cinema, Deleuze writes, 'consists of movements and thought-processes (pre-linguistic images), and of points of view on these movements and processes (pre-signifying signs)' (C2:262). If the Ⱥ functions, if the link between man and world is broken, if 'the fissure has become primary,' (C2:180) if, as in the world of Godard's cinema there is 'irreducible difference' there are only points of view, that is, perspectives (C2:180). This line of thought echoes the apparatus theories discussed in chapter one, where similarly the perspectival relationship is constitutive of both

[10] A brilliant exposition can be found in Deamer (2016).

the reality and the subject, and provides an alternative theoretical means of surpassing any simplistic perspectivism.

First, because the perspectives are no more given than the subjects and realities constituted by them. For Deleuze, as Nathan Widder perspicaciously observes, 'perspectives are not chosen by subjects; rather, they condition the emergence of subjectivities' (Widder, 2012:41). In a cosmos of universal variation, a perspective is 'the condition in which an eventual subject apprehends a variation' (Deleuze, 1988:21). As such, a perspective is 'not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject' (Deleuze, 1988:21). This '"[p]erspectivism"' in the cinema books is therefore 'not defined by variation of external points of view on a supposedly invariable object.' Rather 'the point of view' is 'constant, but always internal to the different objects' which are 'presented as the metamorphosis of one and the same thing in the process of becoming' (C2:143). The perspectives designated by the various signs are constituted within the universal variation, as always in Deleuze, by a process of differentiation. For that reason, every cinematic sign has, at least, three components: 'at least two signs of composition, and at least one sign of genesis for each type of image' (C2:32). Where the sign of genesis manifests the sign's emergence from the 'universal variation,' (C2:81) – that is 'the differential element of movement' (C1:83) - the two signs of composition continue the process in an *agencement* in which, as in every *agencement,* one sign tends toward stratification and the other to destratification (Adkins, 2015:44). Signs are as processual as they are perspectival.

As many films contain a number of signs they are polyperspectival. Rather than envisioning a whole they create a number of pathways on which new perspectives are disclosed. According to the Lacan of seminar eighteen, we inhabit not the universe but '*un désunivers*' (Lacan, 2007:12), that is, a universe which is never one, for as Lacan points out, his neologism, while not equivalent to 'diversity' and 'diversion,' is intended to imply both (Lacan, 1971: Session of 13/1/71 p. 5). In this light, *the* universe no more exists than *the* way. Art through polyperspectivity can be a way of inhabiting that universe otherwise. A film like *Éloge de l'amour* does not merely register the impossibility of attaining *the* perspective it opens a way of

thinking and, therefore, proceeding in the spatio-temporal elements made possible by its absence.

In our consideration of how art can create an element in which new truths can happen, we come now to composition. For Deleuze art is composition. 'The work of art,' he and Guattari write, 'is a block of sensations, that is, a compound…of percepts and affects' (WP:164). Similarly cinema on Deleuze's account is 'a composition of images and signs' (C1:ix). As will be apparent, this notion has informed much of this thesis for it has been argued that, in relation to issues which escape representation, artworks think by creating new compositions which by, for example, recontextualising items through montage create new senses. As we have seen, compositions in *Éloge de l'amour,* juxtaposing music and image, revalue both. If problems, that is differences, force us to think, in the images and signs of expanded cinema we can think by means of differences, that is, with compositions of the heterogeneous.

In the context of psychoanalytic approaches to film, however, even more important than intratextual compositions are those between text and spectator and it is here that Deleuze's philosophy can make a signal contribution. For Deleuze, to exist is to form compositions with the world. Learning to swim is his most famous example. We solve the problem of learning to swim not on land listening to an instructor but by entering the water and forming a composition with the heterogeneity of the water's currents. As Deleuze writes,

> 'The movement of the swimmer does not resemble that of the wave, in particular the movements of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bear no relation to the movements of the wave, which we learn to deal with only by grasping the former in practice' (DR:23).

'Learning to swim,' he writes

> 'means composing the singular points of one's own body…with those of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems'(DR:192).

With this as a point of departure, psychoanalysis could rethink both its notion of art as a form of *savoir-faire* and its concepts of spectatorship. First, *savoir-faire*. On this view, the problem with which every social being is tasked is to form a composition

not with waters of the sea but with the waters of the Other(s). An altogether more problematic task than learning to swim. It is not just that as the work of Proust, Joyce, Kafka, Ozu, Godard and Duras testify, navigating the heterogeneous currents and disparate forces incarnated in the utterances, actions and institutions of Other(s) can be fraught, difficult and painful. The forces encountered in others can deceive, disappoint and hurt. The *savoir-faire* of the artist consists in learning how to make his or her way in composition with those forces. Art as way-making not only representation. Famously Proust thought the betrayals, sufferings and disappointments he had experienced in society in the form of his novel. Equally Godard, when not engaged in the direct critique of the evils of late capitalism, imperialism, neo-liberalism and racism, made out of his disappointment in his intimate relationships, his creative projects and himself a form of cinematic poetry.

Deleuze's notion of art as composition also enables a rethinking of psychoanalytic accounts of spectatorship. As we saw in chapter one, psychoanalytic film theory has tended to conceive the compositions constructed between film and spectator in terms of identifications, fantasies and voyeurism. While apposite in the preponderance of cases, there are occasions where other forms of composition with the text deserve attention. In conjunction with the durations set out in the cinema books, in compositions which exceed the work of identification, the subject can happen differently. In composition, for example, with the extraordinary variety of durations proposed by Deleuze in the cinema books, the subject can be transformed such that new truths can happen.

As we have already touched on the sub-representative several times in this section, consideration of this topic can be briefer. Deleuze thinks of art primarily in terms not of subjects, with their perceptions and affections, but of impersonal affects and percepts. Even if, on the plane of organization, representations obtain, on other levels what counts is the sub-representative. From, as we have seen, a very different *viewpoint*, the Lacanian approaches to art explored above similarly emphasise that the work of the work involves not only representations but the rearrangement in new compositions of such sub-representational elements as the barred subject, the object *a* and *jouissance.*

When thinking problems which occur in a topological space, representations alone do not suffice. As the flows, currents and forces to be negotiated are at once within and without they cannot be arrayed before us. We are dealing with a real which, as Deleuze puts it in his description of the films of Duras, 'involves…an outside more distant than any exterior, and…an inside deeper than any interior' (C2:261). Thinking this real is a matter not of representation but of altering how it matters. Lacan's style demonstrates the existence of this possibility. Although his signifiers and schemas do not capture the real they still affect it and alter its import. Similarly, the work of Godard and Duras, while engaging on one level in political struggles around representation, also functions at the level of the sub-representative. The elliptical structures of *Éloge de l'amour* are not just an acknowledgement that not all can be made clear – what purpose would that serve? Rather, like the enigmas and citations, which are the essence of Lacan's equivocal interpretations, they relaunch desire so that *en route* the *who*, *where*, *when* and *how* of the subject alters. Similarly, in the films of Duras, the composition of what Deleuze describes as 'two dissymmetric, non-totalisable sides…here where a musical speech rises and is torn away, there where the visible is covered over or buried' is not merely the registration of the impossibility of all being represented in a whole (C2:261). More importantly, it is a thinking of the real, which by bringing the disparate into new relationships within the compositions, is creative of sense such that, in some instances, the questions become their own answers.

Finally, open-ended systems. For Deleuze every system, including artworks, is open. As we have seen, in the cinema of the movement-image films - when not almost immured in cliché - are open in vital modes to the Open and the cinema of the time-image is open to the outside. Again, there is a consonance with the Lacanian approaches proposed in part one of this thesis where it was argued that one of the functions of art can be to open pathways such that desire(s) can run in new courses creating new senses and revaluing. So, on a first approach, this thesis aligned itself with Celan. 'Poems,' Celan wrote 'are headed toward.' 'Toward what? Toward something open' (Celan, 1983:35). A claim of this thesis is that artworks, like the films of Duras and Godard, can constitute more open structures than we would otherwise inhabit. However, my further argument is that, in light of Deleuze's philosophy and

Lacan's teaching, this can only be an initial approach to thinking the event of art. On two counts. First thinking in artworks like *Éloge de l'amour* is not merely linear. Rather it is a play in which, while structuration holds chaos at bay, processes of destructuration open every work to events no organisation can capture. Second the open is no more pre-given than the truths to which it gives access. Like such truths, it has to be won by the work of the work and perpetually re-won. The open is indissociable from the senses and truths which depend upon the work of the work. Art here is a making.

Missing from this discussion of how the consonance of Deleuze's philosophy with Lacan's teaching enables the former to contribute psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to the event of art is the notion of *bien-dire*. No such term is to be found in Deleuze's philosophy but, while it is nowhere, it is also everywhere. The practice of *bien-dire* is not only consonant with, but exemplary of, Deleuze's ethics of being worthy of the event. Everything Deleuze wrote aspired to, and achieved, this status. What are the cinema books but instances of *bien-dire* in that they make something new and vital of cinema? On Deleuze's account, one of Proust's achievements was precisely to create the new: 'Combray reappears' in the novel 'not as it was or as it could be, but in a splendour which was never lived' (DR:85). Similarly, Deleuze, in writing of art, reinvents each work in a novel and singular fashion. To point up the limitations of psychoanalysis in comparison, let's consider a specific example: *Last Year at Marienbad* (Resnais, France 1961) – a work which Deleuze discusses at length in *Cinema 2* (C2:117-123).

Section 4: 'It's impossible. I have never been to Frederiksbad': Deleuze, the limits of psychoanalysis and *Last Year at Marienbad*

'Ain't never going to be what it was.'
Unnamed stevedore in The Wire: Series 2, episode 1

Through a consideration of *Last Year at Marienbad* this section examines the limitations of psychoanalysis. It argues that, where being worthy of the event of art is making something new of the work, psychoanalysis cannot match the

achievements of Deleuze. *Last Year at Marienbad* has famously been described by its scriptwriter, Alain Robbe-Grillet as 'the story of a persuading' (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). In the film, a man – unnamed in the film but designated in the script as 'X' - at a German spa approaches a woman, A, and tries to convince her that the previous year – possibly at Marienbad but it may have been at Frederiksbad or Karlstadt - they had had an affair and that she had undertaken, at a future date to go away with him. As that date has arrived, he pleads with her to make good on her promise. Instead she refuses his approaches, challenges his account of their history and denies giving any such undertaking. The situation is complicated by the presence of a third figure, M, who may be her husband, lover, brother or even, possibly, her carer. At the end of the film she seems finally to accede to X's demands. I say 'seems' because very little is certain in this ambiguous text. It is impossible to tell where what counts as 'reality' ends and fantasy and hallucination begin. Even the co-creators differed: while Resnais believed the affair really had occurred the previous year, the script-writer, Alain Robbe-Grillet held that we know only what happens in the minds of the protagonists and nothing of the actuality (C2:103).

What could psychoanalytic approaches achieve? To begin with, they might suggest why a story about an extraordinarily wealthy and privileged social stratum at a very considerable remove from the lives of all but a minute fraction of spectators might matter, and then show how, through the work of the text, it could come to matter differently. An unsurprising Freudian explanation could be that the couple is part of an Oedipal triad: X's object of desire is a woman who belongs to another man from whom he tries to wrest her. The film, therefore, could be conceived as at once the rehearsal of the Oedipal fantasy that complete satisfaction would be possible, if the obstacle, namely the father as figured by M, was removed, and the registration of the impossibility of that move. The father is not so easily circumvented. A recurring motif is a game, Nim, introduced to X by M and which X always loses. In the game which can be played with either cards or matchsticks, each player in turn has to remove an object from one of the rows. The loser is the one who must pick up the last remaining unit. This is invariably X who is left, like every Lacanian subject, with a loss – he is defeated – and a troubling remainder – he must pick up what remains on the table after M's winning move. On this view, an Oedipal logic governs the text: no

existence is possible outside the symbolic order. So, when the couple finally act upon desires transgressive of the law – when they run off – they find themselves 'lost in the night'. The ruin of their future figured by a broken balustrade.

A Lacanian explanation would suggest that the obvious point of interest is the conflict between X and A as to what happened the previous year. At first sight, their dispute might appear so out of the ordinary as to be inexplicable, but in a Lacanian perspective it figures a commonplace. If there is a lack in the Other, every subject constructs a reality – an account of whom he or she is, of their relationships with others and the history of those relationships – and, if that reality is inflected by desire, narcissistic misrecognition and fantasy, then realities clash and the relationship of X and A is far from exceptional. Their community in this respect with others is foreshadowed by both the stage play and the overheard conversations at the outset of the narrative. Few couples do not, at some point, debate the history of their relationship and the nature of the aspirations, demands, desires, and misrecognitions in play. In short, the text is of interest because, as emblematic of disputes within many sexual couples, it pertains to problems unconfined to plutocrats insulated in a spa hotel. On this account, the key to the film is not what happened the previous year but the impossibility of their agreeing as to what happened. The film is not, as it became for many audiences 'a riddle, a parlour game' (Leutrat, 2000:19), where it was believed that spectators had to follow the clues to find out what really happened. Rather it is a way of thinking cinematically the impossibility of reconciling contending realities inflected by conflicting desires. While the film is unintelligible if the spectator does not attempt to establish what happened, the work of the work begins from the real of the impossibility of doing so, for the real addressed by the film is the impossibility, outside a *folie á deux*, of establishing wholly commensurate realities within sexual relations.

If the Ⱥ is functioning, the work of the film is to think what cannot be thought but must be thought, namely the indeterminacies and uncertainties entailed by the enigma of the Other. As almost every text is multi-linear and multi-stranded, a Lacan-inspired approach could then consider other issues consequent upon the real as impossible which explain the text's interest. There is time to mention only three. First, there is the impossibility of demarcating the nature of things and persons from

what we have contributed to their construction through our identifications, desires, fantasies, and anxieties. Resnais, in discussing the film asked, 'can one ever know, in fact, whether one projects one's own fantasies onto the other' (Alain Resnais cited in Wilson, 2006:71). The text suggests we cannot for it is impossible to tell which images in the film are simply X's fantasies or hallucinations. This is taken up most tellingly in relation to the statue of a man and a woman in classical garb which X claims he discussed with A in their first encounter. They could, X tells A 'be you and I' before proffering the interpretation that the man had perceived a danger and 'wanted to keep the young woman from venturing any further' which A counters with the claim that on the contrary it is the woman who has seen something – 'something marvellous' - and is pointing it out to the man. M then arrives to inform them that 'the statue represents Charles III and his wife' that 'the scene is that of the oath before the diet' and that 'the classical costumes are purely conventional'. On one level this settles the question but, on another, the issue is less the statue than the real of the impossibility – on at least some occasions - of reconciling opposed interpretations within sexual relations.

Then there is the absence, if the Other is barred, of *the* place for the subject. Like every Lacanian subject, X is at once in a place and not of it. He is frequently set apart from others most notably when they are immobilised, and he is in motion. In the shooting gallery sequence he is the only tieless man lined up to participate. As he insistently remarks in the voice-over he repeatedly walks the 'same corridors' and 'same empty rooms' 'alone'. Similarly, A is at once included and excluded: she often appears in the company of others but she seems apart and there are recurrent shots in which she alone is moving through groups of transfixed guests. Like X she too does not wholly belong. Plainly the hotel is not *the* place. The question is whether – in terms of this film's problematic - there is another.

We have, of course, met these concerns in earlier textual analyses. And that underscores the argument of this thesis in respect of psychoanalytically-inspired approaches. Such approaches are of continuing value because they can help identify what is at stake in a text. However, the fact that such issues are to be found in innumerable works emphasises the need to go beyond thematic determinations. If the issues descried are found in many texts and not all of those texts are of interest,

it is evident that the presence of such issues is not sufficient to render a text valuable. What counts is not merely the presence of our concerns but what the text does with them. Hence the basis for the further argument of this thesis, namely that if psychoanalytic approaches are to be worthy of the event of art they must attend to the work of the text. As that work is a mode of thinking irreducible to any other, a psychoanalysis worthy of the event of art must show more than tell.

What it can show are forms of cinematic thinking which do not merely register the real as impossible but make something of a particular issue. So, what does the text do with the problems? How are the problems figured and how does the text deal with them? What does the work achieve? The figuration, as we have seen, is in terms of a couple in a baroque hotel. In respect of the couple, the most important component of the figuration is their irreducibility to psychology. 'We know absolutely nothing about them, nothing about their lives' (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). We perceive his passion and her resistance but otherwise they are blank and unfathomable. We learn nothing of their history or backgrounds other than what is debated between them. We do not even know the nature of M's relationship to A. In opposition to much contracted cinema where the obscure exists only to be made clear – we discover, for example, whodunnit – in *Last Year at Marienbad* not everything is determined, explained and settled. On T Jefferson Kline's account, the key to the text is that A is the victim of paternal incest (Kline, 2006:224-5). 'Seen in this light,' he claims, 'her ambivalent behaviour becomes much more understandable' for incest would explain why she is afraid of X 'yet unable to leave him' (Kline, 2006:224). My argument is that there is no such key. The behaviour of X and A cannot be explained away. To reduce it to psychology and hence pre-existent meanings is to stymie the work of a text, conjuring away the very issue the text seeks to think. Only if psychological categorization is jammed and a degree of enigma persists, can the text spring the trap of the imaginary and enable us to go on beyond what we have already thought.

As for what the voice-over describes as this 'dismal baroque hotel' it embodies a number of features of the reality created by the film. 'Overloaded,' as the voice-over has it, 'with a dim, cold, ornamentation of woodwork, stucco, mouldings, marbles, dark mirrors, dim paintings, columns, heavy hangings' it figures

one of the poles between which the film moves, namely petrification as opposed to the mobility, at the other pole, of X's restless desire. The hotel is the stasis in conflict with the kinesis of (X's) desire. As we have seen, for X it is the world of the Other in which he is an outsider as is underlined in the scenes where all the other denizens of the hotel appear in frozen poses and he alone is in motion – desire is movement. It is 'the locus of the Other' (S.X:102) - which he must enter to find the object of his desire, but which threatens the obliteration of individuality for the thick carpets muffle the sound of footsteps and in the 'same conversations the voices are always 'missing'. For the Lacanian subject the Other, that is the social world constructed around language, is the condition of desire – desire is the desire of the Other – but the Other is also what debars the subject from finding the object of his desire. This is X's predicament in the Other of the hotel for its architecture at once holds open the space of desire, excludes the subject from the object of desire and threatens to entomb. As, on a Lacanian account, the Other is always in deficit, in the smoothly functioning world of the spa there is something that does not work. This is figured metaphorically by the shoe without a heel, but this trope is only a counterpoint to X and the recalcitrance of his intentions to the functioning of the hotel's conventional social functions. He is destined by his desires – in the most frequently repeated shots of the film – to resume again and again his advance down 'the same corridors' leading nowhere.

Put like that, the film might appear to be just another modernist narrative about a subject who feels an exile in relation to a social milieu. It is lifted above such commonplaces by the fact that for her he is not simply the longed-for rescuer from a suffocating social order destructive of her individuality. Whatever his self-conception he is also a representative of just such a mortifying order insofar as he is one of those heterosexual males who arrives in a woman's life with a narrative organised around narcissistic misrecognition and a fantasy structured around an idealised female figure which he demands each woman incarnate. 'Why me?' she demands, 'Why does it have to be me?' Why have you decided on me as the one to meet your fantasmatic desires? Time is organized by his desires and space by the place he has assigned for her. A place she can occupy only at the cost of her annihilation. Emma Wilson makes the argument with insight and intelligence.

Drawing on Žižek's Lacanian thesis that in the absence of a universal formula or matrix guaranteeing a 'harmonious sexual relationship with one's partner,' - that is, if there is a lack in the Other – 'every subject has to invent a fantasy of his or her own' (Žižek, 1997:7), she claims that X's approach to A is a demand that she occupy the place reserved for her in his fantasy (Wilson, 2006:71). As Wilson astutely observes, this explains his 'claim that she is familiar' for he knew her in fantasy before their meeting (Wilson, 2006:71). As X has it, 'I was already waiting for you' – he has elected her *the* One. Unsurprisingly, therefore, when confronted with a man who is wedded to a rigid imaginary construction of reality and intent on dictating how she should desire, A, at least initially, recoils. If he enters a setting where he risks becoming as set as the frozen guests it is to set her. He claims to be rescuing her from social pressures where, as he sees it, her 'sparkling conversation seemed forced' but he is equally forcing her. Similarly, she is at once the order to be escaped and his elected escape route: as object of his desire she is set 'apart' from all the others who do not concern him, but she is also part of that world. Her *haute couture* seems to burden her as much as the ornamentation overloads the hotel and her awkward, almost grotesquely rigid poses echo the shots of the guests when transfixed and motionless. She is at once the promise of escape from society's deadening regime and the threat of death: on his account, as she finally came to him she became motionless – like the statue he wishes and does not wish her to be.

In 'a thoroughly unlocatable space' (Kline, 2010:98) the hotel, where 'corridor follows corridor,' also figures the 'perfect labyrinth of false trails, variants, failures and repetitions,' which constitutes the narrative (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). So vast as to be disorientating – it is impossible to get one's bearings – the structure with its 'false doors' and 'deceiving views' seems to be, as X, echoing an unidentified woman, surmises, a place 'there's no way of escaping.' If, X fancies himself Orpheus leading A as Eurydice from the underworld – when she protests she was not waiting for him, he insists that in that case she would have been dead and instead she was alive and waiting for him - he is, at the same time, a Theseus who looks to her as the Ariadne who will guide him from what is 'a kind of limbo' (Leutrat, 2000:28). The problem is that he is both escapee and warder. On the one hand, he wishes to take flight from the hotel and on the other he is the hotel insofar as he is similarly imprisoned by the

past. As for A, he imagines her thread will guide him to the exit, but she is herself a labyrinth: it is impossible to tell where she leads. If, for psychoanalysis, these figurations constitute the terms in which the problem is posed, the next question is where, on a psychoanalytic account, can the text go and what can it do? Given the terms in which they are posed, the problems cannot be overcome in feelgood fashion. 'What do you want?' X asks, 'You know it's impossible.' Hence, as Wilson emphasises: 'the end of the film offers no resolution' (Wilson, 2006:80).

The task of the text therefore is to find a way of thinking which, while not resolving the issue, answers rather better than other responses. Here various forms of thought are in play. While none functions in isolation – they all interact – they can, as an initial step be distinguished. At the level of narrative there is the composition of series. First, there is the performance of the actors in the stage play. Like X, the male actor informs the object of his desire that he has come to find her down endless corridors, through empty salons and past frozen indifferent faces and she replies like A that they 'must still wait' before, again like A relenting and announcing in hollow tones, 'I am yours'. In the screenplay – although less so in the film - the parallel is underlined by a shot of A in 'precisely the position of the actress on the stage' (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:23). Then there is the overheard conversation of a couple framed by a mirror and almost overwhelmed in the shot by the oppressive decor which echoes that of X and A. His reproach, that she confines him in a 'whispering silence worse than death', that they are 'like coffins buried side by side in a frozen garden' and her response: 'Be still. Be still' anticipates the later exchanges between X and A. Further there is the discussion of Frank, who may or may not be X and who tried, the previous year, to enter the room of the young woman who had been placed in his safe-keeping – an action which anticipates X's similar attempt. Much more significantly there is the series which dominates the narrative in which X implores A to leave with him and the final series where - in a paradoxical reversal redolent of those discussed above in *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The Searchers* – she finally accedes to his wishes.

Then there are the more specifically cinematic modes of thought such as the nodal moments in which several thoughts are condensed in a single image. The final shot of the shooting gallery series is a signal example. A line of male guests engaged in pistol-shooting stand facing the camera. Each, in order, turns to fire at the target.

In one of the rare occurrences of an established pattern in the film, shots of the men are intercut with the targets. But when, in the second line of shooters, X turns and levels his gun the cut is not to a target but to a shot of A emerging from the darkness. At that moment she is, at once, his fantasmatic creation, a subject, the real of whose desires he is intent upon annihilating and a being who will never be in the place assigned by him or any other. Such moments occur throughout the film when there is a disjunction between image and soundtrack. The moment when X is again playing against M while describing on the soundtrack the episode in which, while walking in the grounds, she breaks her heel. So, knotted together we have what he recalls as a moment of intimacy, a rebuff – she laughs at his suggestion he carry her back – pain, for as a result of her going with him she has to walk back in stockinged feet on gravel, and failure for, as always, he loses to M. At one and the same time there is a coming together and a separation.

Next this psychoanalytic approach would consider how space and time are organized to allow the advent of the subject otherwise. The diegesis contains compelling illustrations of the thesis advanced in chapter two that space and time are organized by our concerns. X inhabits a space where, apart from the occasional intrusion of M and others, there is only himself and A – it was 'as though in all this garden there were only you and I.' Similarly, time is temporalized by his desires; it is measured by the recollected encounters with A. However, the times and spaces of X are exceeded by the locations available to the spectator. As we have noted, the spectator is between series – no narrative being *the* narrative – and between the strands of nodal moments. Further the spectator is situated between knowledge and non-knowledge. On the one hand knowledge is foreclosed. As Resnais observed, 'one never knows if the images are in the man's head or in the woman's. There is throughout a movement between the two (Alain Resnais cited in Wilson, 2006:76). The opacity of others consequent upon the *A* is undispelled. On the other, the spectator has access to a form of knowledge insofar as he or she can observe the disjunction between what X describes and what is rendered by the images. As he tells her in the voice-over that she was always the same, she is depicted in very different clothes in different situations. In the famous bedroom scene A's every movement contradicts X's account. However, such knowledge brings neither assurance nor

security for the movement of the film exposes any imagined mastery as illusory. The editing repeatedly confounds spectatorial expectation. Although there are instances of conventional cuts to tighter close-ups and shot/countershot procedures for much of the film no shot can be foretold. If there is the repetition of the same – the hotel, the corridors, the grounds - in counterpoint there is the novel and unanticipable. In relation to the real at issue this mode of editing constitutes a form of cinematic thinking which does not merely represent the impasses of the real – no thesis is propounded or illustrated - but through perpetual displacement seeks, as every subject must, to transform impasse into passage.

As importantly the spectator can be identified with camera movements which, as X observes of himself, can find no 'stopping place'. Inexorably proceeding, each camera movement is checked: on occasion after occasion there is a cut which displaces the camera to another site where the Sisyphean progress resumes. This cut/flow pattern does not represent the collision of desire with the impasses of the real rather it is another form of that desiring movement – another (cinematic) way of thinking where thinking is itself always and only a way of being underway. There is something that does not work, that cannot be thought and must be thought. In *Last Year at Marienbad* that task falls as much to the camera movement and editing as to the script.

Coming to the organization of time - the temporalisations – the happenings of the spectator – can be even more complex. They occur in the tension between stasis and kinesis: a repeated shot counterposes X's advance and a schematic peculiarly inert picture of a building. Between those poles of movement and fixity there is a play between the scansions – *points de capiton* - in which movement is momentarily arrested and a meaning emerges which, by revaluing what has gone before, appears to settle matters – for example, when M intervenes in the discussion of X and A as to the meaning of the statue - and the disruptions to the flow which throw into disarray all attempts to unify the events of the narrative into a single, comprehensible history. Complicating this pattern of flow and interruption is the existence of an underlying rhythm which affords what Deleuze would term a 'consistency' to the process. Then, complicating matters still further, within these overall patterns there are different trajectories. These occur, most significantly, in

the long central section during which X repeatedly tries and fails to persuade A of the truth of his account and where she resists, protesting she is not the woman he takes her to be, pleads to be left alone, and, in reply to his proposals, insists 'you know it's impossible.' The violence which ensues is the logical extension of the force with which X has pressed his case and the menace of M's interventions. Both X and M enter A's room. In the case of M, the violence is patent – he shoots at her and she is shown in corpse-like positions in the succeeding series – in the case of X it is more ambiguous, for the rape in Robbe-Grillet's screenplay is replaced by a series of particularly indecipherable shots of her opening her arms to X. What is clear is that a trajectory has run its course. However, as in joke-work, where the taking of a particular direction lends a more powerful sense to the change of direction in the punch-line, so here the failure of the central narrative to resolve the issue has constituted the spectator at a moment where the change of direction – the narrative of her accession to his demands – takes on a particular and more powerful significance. Whether or not this works is an even more open question here than usual. For some spectators it may be that the switch from the circling movement of the narrative - the repetition of social rituals, the game, the shots of X advancing down corridors and, above all his demands upon A – to the linearity of their departure is a line of flight from the enclosed space of the hotel. For others the move may seem too low key to be a counterpoint to the earlier crescendo of violence.

Similar questions arise in relation to the style – the *how* – of the film. The work of the film is primarily in the play between the discourse of X on the soundtrack and the images. The two enunciations are in tension. Crucially what is said by X is revalued by the recontextualisations effected by the images or rather by framing, movement and editing of those images. The scene in which, sharing a bench in the garden, X tells A that she had asked him, possibly as a test, to wait for a year can serve as an example. As he tells her that 'time is unimportant' and that he has now 'come back' for her so that they can go away, the camera 'goes away', rising above the bench until they are left behind, and the screen is filled by a shot of the hotel. This reframing makes a difference which, while eluding signification, is productive of sense. Without reducing elements to any simple meaning, it takes a distance from what X has said, it places his words in the context of the hotel which in its massive

inert presence suggests that escape will not be as straightforward as he claims and further that she may be exchanging one prison for another – whatever they do they will find they have returned to its confines. But the work of the film is far in excess of any such account. The shot is part of a sequence which is inaugurated by the scene in which, while walking with X, her heel breaks and for a moment they touch before turning back to the hotel in a move which prefigures the camera movement under discussion. In response there is a series of shots which can be briefly listed: first of the statue, secondly of X and M in a card-playing group while an unidentified woman, to whom they pay no heed passes, thirdly of X and A dancing in near darkness their parted lips close to kissing, fourthly of A walking alone amongst indifferent guests in a moment which rhymes with the woman ignored in the second shot, and finally a shot of M, who is plainly on edge, almost frenetically dealing cards. This series and the subsequent shot of X and A on a terrace - in which A's 'No…No…No…No. It's impossible' overlaps the cut - enframes X's words on the bench. For present purposes what matters is that the sequence does not merely recapitulate existing concerns: the statue as at once the promise of fixing matters once and for all and the danger of mortification, the game as a society of winners and losers, the dance and the unremarked women as the coexistence of passion for and indifference to the real of others. Rather there is a revaluation in a form which escapes lexical meaning. Further there is the movement of the enunciation which goes beyond what is enunciated and can carry the spectator beyond existing imaginaries. Here, as so often with expanded cinema, the point being made by this form of psychoanalytic criticism requires Deleuzean terminology. The sequence is a process of deterritorialisation. Elements of each shot have their forerunners earlier in the film. These are now removed from their earlier contexts and reterritorialised in the new sequence. As always, this territorialisation is plied by a process of deterritorialisation (TP:334). The film does not merely establish new values it traverses them. Ultimately psychoanalysis should think of enunciation in such instances of expanded cinema as this movement of capture and liberation. The gathering of the elements in a new configuration also involves a release – there is a line of flight. Enunciation, in imparting a new significance to what is enunciated, at the same time goes beyond any fixed

significations, designations or manifestations. In such enunciations desire is relaunched, takes another direction, and creates new senses and truths.

In summary, this psychoanalytic approach conceives of *Last Year at Marienbad* as a paradigmatic instance of a modernist film where, given the terms in which the problem is posed, there can be no easy resolution. This impossibility is the impetus behind the work of the text and the condition of its possibility. If harmony was miraculously conjured out of disharmony, the achievement of that work would be dissipated. Similarly, if the enigma was dispelled – if for example, a reliable witness came forward to inform us what really happened the previous year – the work would collapse. So, what is achieved? In these circumstances the only possible achievement of the work of the work is revaluation through the creation of a certain tonality. Here psychoanalysis advances on Bergson's notion that the function of art is 'precisely to see and to make us see what we do not naturally perceive' (Bergson, 1919:112). Perception, for psychoanalysis is always also an evaluation. Art in the mode of *bien-dire*, is not only 'an extension of the faculties of perceiving' (Bergson, 1919:113) but a means of evaluating differently.

Whether in any particular instance the text functions as *bien-dire* in this manner - as emphasized in the theoretical preliminary – cannot be predicted. *Last Year at Marienbad* may constitute an instance of *bien-dire* for some spectators but not for others. Some may feel that after the extraordinarily inventive opening sequences it finds itself at a loss as to how to proceed. Increasingly a repetition of the same, it becomes as cold as the empty corridors and oppressive decor. As Wilson notes the film has a reputation for 'glacial lifelessness' (Wilson, 2006:77). For some an 'intellectual coldness' overtakes the narrative (Armes, 1981:27). As the characters remain blank, indifference sets in. A comfortable, apparent externality affords the spectator a security so detached the work can no longer work. Other spectators might feel that although the film seems dedicated to deterritorialisation – the couple appear to leave – it is territorialisation which wins out. Paradoxically, the more frenzied the style the more entropic the effect. For such spectators there is the danger that the film in its repetitions of the central impasse becomes as crushingly earthbound as the lugubrious hotel.

In contrast, for others, there may be sufficient narrative dynamic to keep the text moving so that it escapes the inertia which has overtaken most of the guests at the hotel. Such spectators might consider that the enigma keeps open a text which might otherwise collapse into a dismal Oedipalism. If, as Emma Wilson remarks, 'we have no sense of how to categorise any image we see' there is the possibility of the film breaking with *the* existing imaginaries of such spectators (Wilson, 2006:75). For these subjects 'the basic structure of a void or hole' which as Roy Armes notes, 'invades the entire text' (Armes,1981:26) might allow Deleuze's 'empty square' (LS:82) to circulate and through that movement enable them to breathe another air. Further they might feel that the reversal, that is, her acquiescence as to his demands – like the paradoxical reversals in *A Portrait of a Lady* and *The Searchers* discussed in chapter one - sustains the dynamic. In this perspective, the stylistic innovations would constitute a sustained instance of *bien-dire* whose syntax would enable the work to move free of ossifying capture.

The argument of the above section is that, while psychoanalysis can still usefully contribute to our thinking of what happens in artworks like *Last Year at Marienbad* by, for example, identifying, the forms of the real as impossible which form a work's impetus it currently lacks a vocabulary worthy of the ways in which, for the duration, the work transforms impasse into passage. Cinematic thinking is first and foremost a making. To think that making and movement, it needs, as we have seen, Deleuzean concepts. But, as importantly, it needs Deleuze as a reminder of the inventiveness of Lacan's teaching – and the lesson it holds: namely that thinking about cinema can be as creative as cinema itself. This brings us to Deleuze's account of *Last Year at Marienbad*.

Gilles Deleuze on *Last Year at Marienbad*

If we now turn from what psychoanalysis might do with *Last Year at Marienbad* to Deleuze's discussion in *Cinema 2*, it becomes apparent that Deleuze's creative treatment is worthy of the event in ways unequalled by existing modes of psychoanalysis. Singled out in *Difference and Repetition* as a key work of its time (DR:293-4), *Last Year at Marienbad* became, in *Cinema 2*, one of the most important

instances of the time-image where 'time is no longer subordinated to movement, but movement to time' (C2:106). In consequence, we can encounter 'durations which are inferior and superior to man, all coexisting' (C2:118). In *Last Year at Marienbad*, those durations relate to questions of memory and the relationship(s) of past, present and future. In each instance, Deleuze uses Bergson to take us beyond our common-sense notion of chronological time as linear succession. As Deleuze's thinking here is profoundly counter-intuitive - hinging as it does on Bergson's notion 'of a pure past that was never present,' (Rölli, 2003:232) - it may be useful, at least initially, to take as a guiding thread the distinction between the virtual and the actual. In our pragmatic engagement with the world we can easily come to believe that the actual constitutes the limits of the possible. For Deleuze, the importance of films like *Last Year at Marienbad* resides in their capacity to surpass such limits and reveal a beyond of the actual very different from common-sensical notions. With that in mind, let's turn to the ways in which memory and the past function in Resnais' film.

Resnais and the Past

In respect of memory, Resnais' achievement, according to Deleuze, is to carry us beyond the human condition for, 'throughout Resnais' work we plunge into a memory which overflows the conditions of psychology' (C2:119). Instead of memories tributary upon subjectivity there are memories which surpass personhood: 'a world-memory' (C2:98). To think this overcoming of the subjective, Deleuze draws on Bergson's distinction between the past, which is virtual, and 'the mental existence of recollection-images which actualise it in us' (C2:98). On this account, the past is 'the virtual element into which we penetrate to look for the 'pure recollection' which will become actual in a 'recollection-image' (C2:98). Ordinarily in cinema, subjectivity prevails for 'memory is reduced to the recollection-image and flashback' (C2:122), but in Resnais, memory is no longer anchored in a subjective present. In his films, memory is prior to the subject. On Deleuze's account, Resnais draws on Bergson to claim 'memory is not in us' it is already there: we 'move in a Being-memory.' 'Our recollections presuppose' a virtual pre-existent past (C2:98), which Deleuze describes 'as the coexistence of circles which are more or less dilated

or contracted, each one of which contains everything at the same time' (C2:98-99). When we seek a memory, we go to these 'virtual zones of past, to find, choose and bring it back' (C2:110). The crucial point here is 'the coexistence of sheets of past' (C2:101). Beyond the sheet which is actualised there are 'virtual regions of the past' (C2:109). Following Bergson, he distinguishes 'between the pure recollection', which is always virtual, and 'the recollection-image' which makes it actual only in relation to a present' (C2:123-4). Resnais' cinema 'prevents the past from being debased into recollection. Each sheet of past, each age, calls up all the mental functions simultaneously: recollection, but equally forgetting, false recollection, imagination, planning, judgement' (C2:124). In the film X and A are on different sheets of the past: 'In *Last year at Marienbad* we are in a situation for two characters, A and X, such that X settles on a sheet where he is very close to A, whilst A is on a sheet of a different age where she is on the contrary distant and separated from X' (C2:119). This forms a direct time-image since the past into which we plunge is 'not at the mercy of a psychological memory that would give us only an indirect representation, nor at the mercy of a recollection-image that would refer us back to a former present.' Rather it follows 'a deeper memory, a memory of the world directly exploring time, reaching in the past that which conceals itself from memory' (C2:38-9). So, the human condition is surpassed: with the 'coexistence of all the sheets of the past' and 'the topological transformation of these sheets,' there is an 'overtaking of psychological memory towards a world memory' (C2:274).

Robbe-Grillet and the present

On Deleuze's account, Robbe-Grillet's contribution similarly enables us to depart personhood. Robbe-Grillet's practice stands in opposition to traditional realism whose descriptions claim to mirror the external world. Realist description 'presupposes the independence of its object' (C2:7) and, in consequence, its representations can be measured against the pre-existing reality of the supposedly distinct object (C2:68). Description for Robbe-Grillet, in contrast, does not mirror but rather 'tends to replace the thing;' it 'erases' the 'concrete object' (C2:44-5). Since such a description 'constantly both absorbs and creates its own object' there is no

independent reality to serve as a yardstick C2:68). Consequently, in quasi-Nietzschean fashion, there are only descriptions and no description is *the* description. So, descriptions 'are always provisional, always in question' (C2:44-5). It is impossible to disentangle within a description what concrete objects contribute from what 'the imaginary or mental *create* through speech and vision' (C2:7). As Deleuze puts it, in the work of Robbe-Grillet 'the imaginary and the real become indiscernible'. He continues, 'we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask' (C2:7). Put bluntly, we do not know and cannot know what happened last year at Marienbad (or Fredericksbad) and those hung up on this question miss most of what is happening in the film. The undecidability is not a puzzle to be solved. Rather it is a thinking of the event.

Deleuze develops this line of thought through a consideration of Robbe-Grillet's practice. In accordance with his theory of descriptions, Robbe-Grillet's fictions are characterised by discontinuity and achronology. For example, instead of representing an event as if recording a pre-given, unitary reality, Robbe-Grillet frequently produced variations on an event such that, as in *Last Year at Marienbad* 'what really happens' becomes indeterminate. Episodes are presented in multiple and contradictory forms. In Deleuze's examples:

> 'Two people know each other, but already knew each other and do not yet know each other. Betrayal happens, it never happened, and yet has happened and will happen, sometimes one betraying the other and sometimes the other betraying the first – all at the same time' (C2:101).

Characteristically, Deleuze makes something new of this narrative strategy. For Deleuze the variations in the depiction of an event are not just an argument for a mode of solipsism – Deleuze himself remarks that, for Robbe-Grillet everything happens 'in the head' of the character, or, better, of the viewer himself – nor a mere self-reflexive reminder that the order instituted by the work is neither natural nor God-given but an artificial, authorial construct. Rather they constitute a rethinking of the event as more than 'the actual present which is passing' (C2:100).

Again, the virtual/actual distinction can help to explicate what is at stake. As Véronique Bergen reminds us 'the fibre of becoming is made of a virtual thread and

an actual thread' (Bergen, 2006:21 footnote 12). Consequently, in the event there is both the actuality of determinate actions and states of affairs and a virtuality in excess of the actualised. Usually we miss the virtual because we view the present from within our 'pragmatic' concerns, that is, in terms of 'a future, present and past in succession' (C2:100). However, if for this common-sense conception, 'we substitute a vision which is purely optical, vertical' (C2:100), we discover that, as Miguel de Beistegui succinctly puts it, events 'always involve a dimension in excess of mere actuality' (de Beistegui, 2004:255). Beyond the actual present there is an 'implication of presents' (C2:100), what Deleuze terms a 'simultaneity of peaks of present' (C2:101). Just as the virtual past is in excess of any actual recollection, so beyond any actualised present there are other virtual presents. If we treat 'the world or life…as one single event' it is possible to 'break up what is actual' (C2:100). The event is then 'no longer confused with the space which serves as its place, nor with the actual present which is passing' (C2:100). With this de-actualisation 'a time is revealed inside the event which is made from the simultaneity of…implicated presents' (C2:100). Thus, in an event, as opposed to what of the event is actualised in a situation, 'an accident is about to happen, it happens, it has happened; but equally it is at the same time that it will take place, has already taken place and is in the process of taking place; so that, before taking place, it has not taken place, and, taking place, will not take place' (C2:100). This informs Robbe-Grillet's narratives where 'there is never a succession of passing presents, but a simultaneity of a present of past, a present of present and a present of future, which make time frightening and inexplicable' (C2:101). The result is a new mode of narration which, abstracted from 'all successive action,' distributes 'different presents to different characters, so that each forms a combination that is plausible and possible in itself, but where all of them together are "incompossible"' (C2:101). Deleuze takes the notion of incompossibility from Leibniz who envisaged the logical possibility of the same event having very different – incompossible - outcomes in different – incompossible – universes.[11] However, as always, Deleuze uses his sources creatively. So here the

[11] Sean Bowden explains: for Leibniz, while other worlds are possible, 'not all of these possibles can be thought together without contradiction, for what is possible in itself

incompossible relates not to different universes but to a single one. Consequently, in Robbe-Grillet 'the inexplicable' is 'maintained and created' (C2:101). 'In *Last Year*…, it is X who knew A [so A does not remember or is lying], and it is A who does not know X (so X is mistaken or playing a trick on her)' (C2:101).

> 'Ultimately, the three characters correspond to the three different presents, but in such a way as to complicate the "inexplicable" instead of throwing light on it; in such a way as to bring about its existence instead of suppressing it: what X lives in a present of the past, A lives in a present of the future, so that the difference exudes or assumes a present of present [the third, the husband], all implicated in each other. The repetition distributes its variations on the three presents' (C2:101).

Consequently, there is a 'plurality of simultaneous worlds, a simultaneity of presents in different worlds' which on Deleuze's account 'are not subjective [imaginary] points of view in one and the same world, but one and the same event in different objective worlds, all implicated in the event' (C2:103).

So, Robbe-Grillet, like Resnais, can take us beyond the human condition. In the work of both, the actual, whether a recollection-image or a present, is revealed to be an actualisation not *the* actualisation and a time emerges which is no longer subordinate to the movements tributary to sensori-motor schemas. 'It always comes down,' Deleuze writes 'to Blanchot's fine phrase: to release "the part of the event which its accomplishment cannot realise."' (D:73). On Deleuze's account, *Last Year at Marienbad* can release that part and thereby us from the toils of subjectivity.

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is not necessarily 'compossible' with other such possibles.' Bowden elucidates with 'one of Leibniz's preferred examples': 'whilst it can be said that an Adam who does not sin is possible in itself, the concept of such an individual is nevertheless "incompossible" with other possible individuals such as, for example, a Christ who redeems Adam's original sin' (Bowden, 2011:58).

Deleuze, Lacan and creation

Deleuze's achievement is to create a *Last Year at Marienbad* which had no previous existence. He does not, as in the tradition of ideological critique seek to tell *the* truth about the film. Rather he seeks to create new truths. This is, of course, something Lacan achieved with his style, where there is always something new but psychoanalytic criticism has tended to situate texts in existing bodies of (supposed) knowledge rather than produce new truths. Deleuze's final lesson for psychoanalysis therefore is the reminder that an artwork like the cure can become a way of being more alive. Consequently, where the exigencies of the political are not immediate and pressing and where, in consequence, issues around representation and ideology are not paramount, the task of the critic can be to enable the work of the work to function differently.

What psychoanalysis cannot do, if it merely applies supposed Lacanian doctrines, is, in the manner of Deleuze, to make something new of the text. It cannot create new truths irreducible to what is taken – however provisionally – to be psychoanalytic knowledge. In his treatment of texts, Lacan, as Harari (Harari, 1996:1, 26), Fink (Fink, 2011:86), and Hoens (Hoens, 2016:103) have pointed out, always sought to 'learn from' texts and enable the works to 'engender…creations' within psychoanalytic thought (Fink, 2011:86). More importantly I claim, in a characteristic double movement, something is always captured – a thesis is advanced with the promise of understanding – while at the same time something opens on to a topological outside which eludes understanding. With Lacan there is no closure, always a gap between his reading and the text – a space for readers to create. One of his strategies for accomplishing this was to introduce concepts from elsewhere. In seminar seven, for example, when considering art, he introduces notions from Heidegger (S.VII:120). The result is a play of proximity and distance: there is a consonance in that both Heidegger and Lacan conceive of art as organised around a void and at the same time there is disjunction for Heidegger's distaste for psychoanalysis precluded anything comparable to Lacan's thinking of desire, the drives and *jouissance* from his thought. The argument of this thesis is that, one way in which psychoanalysis, at this juncture, could become worthy of the event of art is

to create a similar inclusive disjunction with Deleuze. Like Heidegger, Deleuze's philosophy at once converges with and diverges from forms of psychoanalytic thinking. In this topological space, created by the interplay of closeness and apartness, there is the space to create new truths. Just as sense is in the making, such truths are in the creating. The gift of the text is the construction of the element, in which that making and creating can occur.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that there is a continuing role for psychoanalysis in thinking about cinema insofar as psychoanalysis has useful things to say about cinema, when cinema is the construction of fantasies or the practice of *bien-dire* or, more generally, when cinema is viewed as making something of the problems associated with the real as impossible. It further argued that, as psychoanalysis cannot account for the joy in art which does not depend on fantasy and idealisation, it must learn from Deleuze. To be worthy of the event of art psychoanalysis must, following Deleuze, expand its notion of desire and revise its thinking on the limits of subjectivity.

Chapter one claimed that the poverty of thematic analyses demonstrated the importance for the thinking, which occurs in art, of the work of the work. In conceiving that work, we should often ask not *What*? but *Who*? *When*? *Where*? and *How*? Revisiting 70s film theory, it was argued that its notion of subject positionality was of continuing value insofar as the situation – the *where* - of the subject can revalue the problem(s) addressed by the text. Although, as the subsequent chapter makes clear, the notion of space, framing such theories, was not always sufficiently topological, apparatus theory harboured a profound insight and an argument for the continuing relevance of psychoanalytic approaches.

Chapter two opened up new pathways. A re-reading of Freud explored the analogies between the work of the work in art and the joke-work. In both cases, a sense without antecedent is produced by a style which, by altering *where*, *when* and *how* the subject exists (and *ek-sists*), transforms the subject. The remainder of the chapter developed this approach through Lacan's teaching. Lacan's style was held to be key. In his teaching there is a saying in excess of any said (that is, any abstractable content). This saying bespeaks desires which have no anterior existence and which are constitutive of new senses. In the art of *bien-dire* a similar saying occurs. In their enunciation, *where*, *when* and *how* the subject relates to the real alters, metamorphosing the subject and revaluing the questions posed by existence.

While Lacanian psychoanalysis recognises that desire is constitutive of sense, its conception of desire is too rooted in the clinic to be worthy of the event of art. Consequently, – and this is the second argument of the thesis - it must draw on other

lines of thought, for example, the philosophy of Deleuze. Part two demonstrated that the importation of many Deleuzean concepts, such as *agencement*, is unproblematic. Using the framework established in chapter three, the subsequent chapter demonstrated, both the profound consonance of Lacan and Deleuze in fundamental respects and their divergent views on desire and subjectivity. In light of this, it proposed a division of labour: on the one hand, Lacanian approaches for work which begins from issues associated with desire as lack and which, while revaluing, keep them in view. On the other hand, Deleuzean concepts for works which leave subjectivity and its concerns in their wake. Finally, chapter five pointed up the limitations of psychoanalytically inspired approaches in comparison with Deleuzean readings. While Lacan assiduously makes psychoanalysis new on every page, the application of his thinking can reduce the other to the same – betraying both his teaching and the artwork.

Overall the argument is that psychoanalysis can become worthier of the event of art in a disjunctive synthesis with Deleuze. A final example can further make this case. Consider Deleuze's argument that philosophy should seek to disengage events from states of affairs. 'The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities,' he and Guattari write 'is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give them a new event' (WP:33). No such concept exists (explicitly) in Lacan but it is implicit in (and between) every line of his teaching. When he says 'there is no metalanguage' he does not propound this thesis from a metalinguistic position. Rather, he demonstrates it with a style which finds no resting place and which has effects in excess of any concepts. A psychoanalysis seeking to be worthier of the event of art could usefully think the work of the work in this light. Art in this perspective becomes the extraction of the event from the states of affairs constituted by identifications, fantasies and the realities they subtend. Art as event is the departure of the fixations produced by identifications, the inertial force of fantasy scenarios and the stagnant modes of *jouissance* attendant on both. Here, to adapt a formulation of Nietzsche, 'the form is fluid but the "meaning" [what I term 'sense'] is even more so' (Nietzsche, 1887b:78). In the movement, that is the event of art, sense and life are indissociable.

Reportedly the final words written by Foucault were: 'there is no establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness; the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life (*l'autre monde et de la vie autre*) (Foucault, 2008:356). Deterritorialising Foucault's claim from his discussion of pagan and Christian truth-telling, (Foucault, 2008:325-342) the argument of this thesis is that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of what can happen to us with art, it must recognise that, where art assumes the mode of *bien-dire,* 'the truth is never the same' and consequently cannot be spoken in any other form. No putative metalanguage can tell the truth about the truths of such art. To reduce these truths to the categories of the clinic is to miss the constitution in the event of art of other spaces and time and, therefore, the 'other life' this 'other world' makes possible.

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