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Increasing hate crime reporting: narrowing the gap between policy aspiration, victim inclination and agency capability

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to answer the question: can the aspiration for increasing hate crime reporting contained in the United Kingdom Government’s action plan on hate crime (2016-2020) be achieved by local agencies in England and Wales? Drawing on findings from research into the barriers to hate crime reporting and research undertaken by the authors and colleagues in 2012 to 2013 in a county in England, this paper will examine the impact of: victim decision making; and the efficacy of third party hate crime reporting centres on hate crime reporting. It will propose two solutions to facilitate increased reporting in the UK and other jurisdictions: an end to end, criminal justice system, hate crime service framework to more effectively support victims; and a typology of reporting provision which will better enable commissioning agencies to assess the capability and capacity of hate crime services.

Key words: Hate crime reporting, third party reporting centres, racist crime, homophobic crime, religiously motivated offending; disability hate crime, Gypsy and Travellers

INTRODUCTION
This article aims to answer an overarching question: can the policy aspirations for increasing hate crime reporting contained in the United Kingdom Government’s action plan on hate crime (2016-2020) be realistically achieved by local agencies in England and Wales? The under-reporting of bias motivated harassment and violence is both longstanding and urgent.
If it is to be tackled effectively, victims and witnesses need to be willing to report victimisation and agencies need to accurately record it. This in turn requires systematically examining the barriers and drivers to reporting behaviour and to propose approaches to reporting based on these insights.

For this article, hate crime refers both to hate incidents and hate crimes as defined by the College of Policing guidelines (2014:3-4) relating to race, faith, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability, or the perception of these characteristics. Accordingly, "a hate incident is any non-crime incident which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice", and "a hate crime is any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice [...]."

The term 'third party reporting centres' is used throughout this article to refer to any non-police agency which receives reports of hate crime incidents from members of the public as victims of and/or witnesses to such incidents.

This paper will draw on the research evidence around barriers to hate crime reporting. In addition it will also draw on research undertaken between 2012 to 2013 examining hate crime services in Suffolk, a primarily rural county in England. This was a mixed methods study undertaken by the authors and colleagues. It comprised: a literature review and documentary analysis; analysis of reported Hate Crime and estimating unreported Hate Crime; survey of communities vulnerable to Hate Crime; interviews and focus groups with individuals from communities vulnerable to Hate Crime; interviews with representatives from local agencies; and a workshop with representatives from local agencies.

The present paper is structured as follows:

- **Section 1** will examine the policy context in England and Wales within which the aim of increasing hate crime reporting is being located.
- **Section 2** will consider the challenges posed by victim decision making and their likely effect on the Government's priority for increasing the reporting of hate crime.
- **Section 3** will examine the efficacy of third party reporting centres and their likely impact on reporting.
- **Section 4** will offer solutions to enhance the effectiveness of hate crime reporting by proposing that agencies adopt: an end to end, criminal justice system, hate crime service framework to more effectively support victims; and a typology of reporting provision which will enable commissioning agencies in the UK and other jurisdictions to assess the capability and capacity of hate crime services.
- **Section 5** will conclude the paper, making recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of hate crime reporting in the UK.
1. THE UK POLICY CONTEXT
In July 2016 the Conservative Government produced their action plan for hate crime, *Action Against Hate: The UK Government's plan for tackling hate crime*. This is the refreshed successor to the previous Coalition Government’s (2012) plan ‘Challenge it, Report it, Stop it: The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime’ and their (2014) *Hate crime action plan progress report*. The timing of the plan’s release (which had been in preparation for some time) in July 2016 may have been coincidental but also could be seen as an attempt to respond to the rise in recorded hate crimes just before, during and immediately after the UK referendum to leave the European Union (National Police Chiefs Council, 2016).

The 2016 plan, as have previous plans before it, contains an explicit commitment to improving the reporting and recording of hate crimes as well as improving victims’ access to support services. This is the latest iteration of successive government efforts to energise and arguably fulfil the pledges to tackle hate crime that originated in the landmark Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (MacPherson et al 1999);

Hate crime reporting is one of five inter-related areas of activity prioritised in the Government action plan over the next four years (Home Office 2016). In summary, these are:

1. Preventing hate crime by challenging the beliefs and attitudes that underpin it, including a programme to better equip teachers to undertake preventive work in schools;
2. Aiming to reduce hate crime incidents, but now with four particular settings singled out for new measures; ‘vulnerable’ religious sites, public transport, the night time economy and also the online environment;
3. Increasing the reporting of hate crime by improving the reporting process and working with groups likely to under-report, including encouraging *third party reporting*;
4. Improving support for victims and witnesses, and lastly;
5. Improving data capture and data analysis in understanding the nature and pattern of hate crime, to include strengthening networks with academic researchers working in the field.

The extent to which the overarching themes within the action plan supports more effective hate crime reporting is considered in the rest of this section.

**Hate crime reporting: sharing 'best practice'**

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1 Our emphasis.
The action plan is intended to be underpinned by two central 'themes': partnership working with communities; and more joined up work across the hate crime strands to ensure 'best practice' in tackling hate crime is developed and deployed.

This commitment is to be welcomed. However, without suitable incentives, for example, tied to funding, the likelihood of agencies adopting such practice, and thereby changing what they are doing, would appear to be remote. Crucially, the action plan lacks detail about how these desired transformations will occur.

**Targeting resources**

The plan recognizes groups which are likely to under report hate crime, such as disabled people, Muslim women, the Charedi community, transgender people, Gypsy, Traveller and Roma communities, and new refugee communities. This carries the strong implication that resources should be targeted at encouraging these groups to report hate crime. However, the plan perhaps does not go far enough in its analysis of which victims from among these groups (based on their likely propensity to report and/or the type of victimisation that they experience) agencies should target to encourage reporting (Christmann and Wong 2010).

**Understanding causation**

Whilst the plan acknowledges that national events can drive hate crime, there is no recognition that government policy (including foreign policy) and rhetoric can heighten tensions and drive prejudice and hate, as in the case of the recent EU referendum and attendant upsurge in hate incidents (National Police Chiefs Council 2016). The political debate over (at least) the next two years as the UK negotiates to leave the EU, with migration being a central theme, is only likely to perpetuate the tension and anxiety that the referendum has already generated. A nuanced analysis of the increase in hate crime reporting around the referendum given by Paul Giannasi, the Head of the Cross Government Hate Crime Programme) at a recent seminar suggested a range of contributory factors, including:

- Acts of hatred and the public expression of negative sentiments against immigrant communities;
- A backlash against anti-immigration sentiments leading to a greater reporting of incidents of intolerance and/or abuse; and,
- Tensions and anxieties within vulnerable communities leading to individuals from those communities being more willing to report incidents, which if those incidents had occurred in less anxious times, they would not have reported them.

Whilst the latest action plan does explicitly cite the need to increase reporting for 'new refugee communities' it studiously ignores successive government policies that have done

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2 Hate Crime Reporting - Narrowing the gap, hosted by the Hallam Centre for Community Justice, Sheffield Hallam University on the 12th October 2016.
much to criminalise asylum seekers (those who have applied for asylum and are waiting for a
decision) and asylum seeking men from Islamic countries who are frequently denied asylum,
in part because they are seen as constituting a threat (Bhatia 2015).

While these tensions and the acts that arise from them are a cause for concern, the
potential for more people to report hate crime might provide an opportunity for local
agencies. If victims and witnesses receive a positive experience from local services this could
go some way to dispelling some of the apprehension that they may have about reporting
hate crime. This could in turn lead to positive word of mouth messages about the process,
encouraging other people to report, itself driving further increases in reporting.

2. THE CHALLENGE OF VICTIM DECISION MAKING
This section examines the challenges posed by the victim decision making process to
increasing hate crime reporting.

Victims’ perceptions of the police
Contained within the recent Government Action Plan (Home Office 2016) is an
acknowledgement that victims’ perceptions of the police may inhibit reporting, specifically
because they may feel that the police will not take the issue seriously. While such an
acknowledgement is welcome, it falls short of recognising the complexity of victims’ view of
the police. This was better articulated in the Coalition Government’s 2012 action plan:

“Fear of being further victimised by going to the police;
Concern that the police will not be able to do anything, so they just accept it as part
of their day to day lives;
Concern that the police will not do anything because they are prejudiced and/or
unsympathetic;”

(Challenge it, Report it, Stop it – The Government’s Plan to tackle Hate crime: 15-16)

The current plan does not appear to fully acknowledge or respond to this complexity and by
default absolving the government of a need to encourage police services to address these
problems. This is not to say that police services of their own volition are not addressing this
through their hate crime scrutiny panels. A comprehensive account of victim’s perceptions
of the police and why they might inhibit the reporting of hate crime is provided in Table 1
below. This combines: national findings from Smith and colleagues (2012) based on two
sweeps of the Crime Survey England and Wales (CESW) but at a more disaggregated level
than the earlier original published data; with the results from a small scale survey

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3 Data disaggregated to a finer level than the original Smith et al (2012) report was supplied by the author Lader,
D, personal correspondence.
undertaken in Suffolk of individuals vulnerable to hate crime (Wong, Christmann et al 2013). However victims’ reasons for not reporting hate crime need to be viewed in the context of reasons for not reporting any crime. The analysis shows that nearly half (67/140) of all the reasons given for not reporting hate crime can be broadly attributed to victims’ perceptions of the police which is comparable to just over half for not reporting all crime (65/125). The exception here is the higher numbers of respondents in Suffolk who thought the hate crime incident too trivial to report than comparable CSEW respondents (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Reasons for not Reporting Hate Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for not reporting (%)</th>
<th>All hate crime CSEW (2009/10 and 2010/11)</th>
<th>All CSEW crime (2009/10 and 2010/11)</th>
<th>Suffolk hate crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTIONS OF REPORTING AGENCY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police could have done nothing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police would have not been bothered/not interested</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconvenient/too much trouble</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike/fear of police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous bad experience of the police/courts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not know who to speak to</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER REASONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too trivial/not worth reporting</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private matter/dealt with ourselves</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common occurrence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of reprisal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to other authorities (eg superiors, company security staff, etc)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140*</td>
<td>125*</td>
<td>162*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/c: no discernible category.

*Figures may sum to more than 100 as more than one reason could be given.

The reasons for non-reporting (based on their views of the police) includes victims’ perception that the police 'could not have done anything', in addition to the more damning belief that they 'would not have done anything' as well as having poor experiences from previous contact (prominent in the Suffolk survey). The response of 'police could have done nothing' is open to some interpretation as it invariably includes incident specific factors such as victims considering the facts of the case such as the ability to recall suspect descriptions (Skogan, 1984; Sparks et al, 1977). Nevertheless this remains a judgement about the police and the victims' perception of the resources which are likely to be marshalled to detect and apprehend perpetrators. As such this could be considered to be a 'vote of no confidence' in the police as it is rare that a person can recall no details of evidential value to an investigation, or that other methods cannot assist, such as CCTV, or identifying other witnesses.
The greatest divergence in CSEW data for reasons to not report hate crime (6 of 140) compared to all crime (1 of 125) is where victims report that they dislike and fear of the police. This is the raison d’être for offering third party reporting services, to overcome this barrier.

**Victim satisfaction of the police**

There appears to be a central contradiction in the recent Government action plan (Home Office 2016). There is an acceptance that hate crime victims express lower levels of satisfaction with the police response (than do other types of victims), whilst simultaneously stating that police forces now have a better understanding of the impact hate crime can have on communities. This begs the question that if the police improvement has indeed occurred, why has this not been replicated incrementally in higher victim satisfaction post contact with the police?

Corcoran and colleagues (2015) analysed three sweeps of the CSEW and found hate crime victims far more likely to be 'very dissatisfied' with the police's handling of the matter than for other crimes (35% compared to 14%). This confirms other research which found high levels of victim dissatisfaction with the police, notably with LGBT victims (Leicester Hate Crime Project, 2014; Home Office 2013; Stonewall, 2013; Paterson et al., 2008; Jarman & Tennant, 2003). Higher levels of dissatisfaction was also substantiated by more in-depth qualitative research which found that over three-quarters of respondents were unhappy with the police response compared to one fifth describing positive experiences (Victim Support 2005:65/6). There are a wide range of reasons for victim dissatisfaction which stem from how victims are treated by the police (the experience of the contact, including the degree of respect and concern shown by police to victims) as well as how the police and wider criminal justice system perform (the outcome of any investigation, detection and disposal). Those who do report may not get redress because, as with other types of crime, the police do not 'clear up' or detect all hate crimes. Figures from 2012/13 show that the police detected 46 percent of racially or religiously aggravated hate crime (which is a subset of all hate crime, so not all hate crime) with 80 percent of these leading to a charge or summons, compared with 58 per cent for non-aggravated offences (Home Office 2013:8).

A lower rate of victim satisfaction is a significant issue. Despite barriers to reporting arising from victim perceptions of the police, the police are still the agency of choice for reporting hate crime, the majority of hate crime incidents are reported to the police rather than any other agency (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). When asked to choose the agency that they would prefer to report hate crime incidents to, the majority of survey respondents (62%) (in a recent small scale study) chose the police (Wong, Christmann et al 2013:51). Unless it is addressed, low levels of victim satisfaction experienced by hate crime victims will contribute to lower levels of confidence in the police and affect the reporting of subsequent victimisation. This is the case for police investigatory effort as well as perceptions of fairness.
of treatment (Hickman & Sampson, 2003; Xie et al. 2007) at least for less serious hate crimes, but somewhat counter intuitively, not necessarily outcome (arrest and prosecution). What appears critical to increasing individual satisfaction is the perceived fairness and respectfulness of the process, more so than favourableness of outcome, a point demonstrated by a wealth of findings from procedural justice research (e.g. Lind & Tyler, 1988; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, Boeckman, Smith, & Huo, 1997).

Improving victim satisfaction by the police is more open to manipulation and change to enhance reporting rates than, say, victims stating they prefer to deal with the matter privately or dismissing it as not worth reporting. Large and complex organisations such as the police can, given the will, effect transformative structural and cultural changes to become more customer and here, victim orientated. Whilst the most recent police operational guidance (College of Policing, 2014) recognizes and aims to rectify many of these failings, the latest action plan makes no mention of such difficulties, restricting itself to issues of data capture, recording or ‘training needs’ for officers to improve their understanding and recording of hate crime. In part this may reflect some officer dissatisfaction with current hate crime training provision which is mainly offered online (FRA, 2015; Wiedlitzka, 2016). Nevertheless, omitting to specifically identify the quality of police operational responses as a barrier to reporting; the attendant need to monitor progress by the police in rectifying these deficiencies; and to embed this within the action plan remains a considerable missed opportunity in the push to increase reporting.

**Victims’ perception of the offence**

Non-reporting appears to be heavily influenced by victims either not experiencing the incident as sufficiently serious to report, or believing nothing can be done without providing direct evidence irrespective of whether the incident is distressing (Smith et al., 2012; Blackburn Racial Equality Council 1997, cited in Chahal and Julienne, 1999). This is a robust finding which applies to all crime and is consistent across sixteen other industrialised Western nations (Goudriaan, Lynch and Nieuwbeerta, 2004).

Feeling that the incident is a private matter (to be dealt with by themselves rather than the authorities) is the third most frequent reason for non-reporting (Smith et al., 2012; Goudriaan, Lynch and Nieuwbeerta, 2004) although this was less so for the Suffolk sample (Wong, Christmann et al 2013). Fearing reprisal was another potent reason not to report victimisation, either from the perpetrators or from the wider community. As shown in Table 1 (above), while this concern was identified by Smith and colleagues (2012) for hate crime and all crime (5% and 2% of respondents reported this as a barrier) it was far more

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4 Attitudes towards the police appears to play a limited role when reporting being a victim of the most serious offences (for instance having to seek medical treatment or facing substantial financial loss) at least for volume crime (Skogan, 1984).
pronounced (16%) in Suffolk. This was especially important when the perpetrators lived close by (for instance neighbours) or where the victim feared wider public censure by having to appear in court and reveal their identity - this was the case for some gay victims fearing being 'outed' but also for some transgender victims who could be especially sensitive to threats to their confidentiality (Wong & Christman et al, 2013). This apprehension about being 'outed' and concerns over how the police may use personal information is supported by other research on under-reporting of hate crime amongst LGBT populations (Chakraborti & Hardy, 2015; Stonewall, 2013; Paterson et al 2008; Jarman & Tennant, 2003).

**Differential responses to reporting by vulnerable communities**
Concerns about under reporting can vary very considerably across different victimised groups, providing challenges for public agencies which are aiming to increase the reporting of hate crime.

For those seeking asylum, under-reporting by victims could be due to the criminalisation and marginalisation of this group, combined with: an ongoing fear of the police; the lack of a legitimate 'legal' status, fear of detention and deportation; and all of this set against the context of a highly restrictionist UK immigration policy as noted by Bhatia (2014; 2015) and Lewis, H., Dwyer, P., Hodkinson, S. and Waite, L. (2014);

Other differential responses by victimised groups are considered below based on qualitative and survey data from our Suffolk study (Wong, Christmann et al 2013). These findings should be regarded as illustrative rather than definitive.

Gypsy/Traveller respondents overwhelmingly reported that family members had talked them out of reporting hate crimes to the police. Interview data suggested this was due to longstanding mistrust and suspicion of the police. Community censure was also found to operate amongst the Gypsy and Traveller community, which prevented reporting to the police.

The interview data also highlighted previously less well-known community specific cultural and historical barriers to reporting for other groups. For the Chinese community "reporting to police is affected by the potential of losing face by going to a police station. In Chinese culture, 'losing face' means that one has lost their dignity, social standing, honour, and trustworthiness and bring shame on the family.” (Wong & Christmann et al, 2013:29-30)

For communities who were not native English speakers, language difficulties were the main barrier to reporting. Other nationalities had different concerns. From the Polish community, one interviewee commented:

"The biggest barrier is the Polish history of being a communist state for 50 years, Police in Poland not as respected as here in UK. The Police in Poland were an organ of the regime, so we have no trust in the Police"
This throwback, where the police were seen as an organ of state repression could still prove influential in discouraging reporting. Interview data showed that there could be a taboo associated with reporting crimes to the police amongst some Polish respondents, with those reporting to the police being labelled as a ‘snitch’ by the local community.

What these responses underline is the expanding plethora of reasons (cultural, linguistic, personal safety and confidentiality), that different communities which are vulnerable to hate crime can have to not reporting hate crime to the police. For local agencies this makes it more difficult to effectively design their services to promote hate crime reporting due to the range of challenges they face. What it requires is investing in sustained effort to effectively engage these diverse communities in attempting to overcome such barriers.

3. THE EFFICACY OF THIRD PARTY REPORTING CENTRES

The current action plan explicitly endorses third party reporting as a means of improving accessibility to the criminal justice system, providing different opportunities to report (face-to-face, by phone or online) and offering a range of options to report for those reluctant to have contact with the police directly (Home Office 2016). No claims are made within the plan for such centres in driving up reporting rates, itself the raison d’être of third party reporting. Instead there is a tacit acknowledgment about under performance, reflected in a commitment to establish ‘best practice standards’ for all reporting centres.

The ambition to widen the supply of third party reporting centres to groups identified as facing particular barriers to reporting is laudable. However, such efforts risk falling into disrepute without undertaking an impartial and objective appraisal of the efficacy of existing third party reporting provision and crucially, transferring the learning from this to ensure that these groups are effectively served by new and/or expanded services. This is exemplified in Leicester where Chakraborti, Garland and Hardy (2014) found a “worryingly low” number of survey respondents reporting their hate crime victimisation to a third party reporting centre or other mechanism. The most frequently used organisations were Victim Support and the local council (both cited by 3% of respondents; n=28 and 31 respectively). Interestingly, the Police’s True Vision website had even lower usage (n=2).

Third party reporting services originated from Recommendation 15 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report which set out to address the under-reporting of racial hate crime (MacPherson 1999). The Inquiry recognised that some victims were reluctant or unwilling to report to the police due to longstanding perceptions of police racism, or victims fear about being re-victimised by the police. The goal of third party reporting centres then and now is to overcome the barriers experienced by victims by providing an alternative non-police...
reporting avenue, one which encourages reporting, with some also providing or referring victims to a range of support services.\(^5\)

A recent review of hate crime reporting centres undertaken by the National Policing Hate Crime Group’s (NPHCG) found rather damningly that "many" schemes failed to increase reporting and were not delivering "any tangible results" (NPHCG 2014:48-9).

The reasons for this are considered in this section.

3.1 Public accountability, victim and public awareness
There is limited publicly available data and therefore public accountability about how well third party reporting centres operate, although some notable exceptions include: Stop Hate UK\(^6\), TellMAMA\(^7\), and the police sponsored True Vision website.\(^8\) All of these services provide publicly available statistical reports of incidents made to them.\(^9\) They represent the most prominent reporting organisations, two of whom provide services nationally (True Vision and TellMAMA), with Stop Hate UK operating across many Local Authorities in England and Wales. The wider picture of the very many third party reporting centres which operate locally is far more difficult to gauge. In part due to the surprising lack of any data on hate crimes reported to local reporting centres (Wong, Christmann et al 2013, Wong and Christmann 2008, and Monchuck and Santana-Acosta 2006). In one of these studies (Wong, Christmann et al 2013) local statutory agency interviewees indicated that the third party reporting centres (mainly small voluntary and community sector (VCS) agencies) were not even required to collect data on hate crime reporting in order to minimise the administrative burden on them.\(^10\)

The limited research into third party reporting suggests that generally hate crime victims have low awareness of the existence of third party reporting centres. Chakraboti & Hardy (2015) found that few LGBT respondents in Leicestershire were aware of the existence of either larger national or alternative regional third party reporting schemes. Wong and Christmann (2008) found that awareness of third party reporting centres was low to non-

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\(^5\) If the victim consents, the report made at the third party reporting centre will be passed to the police with the victims contact details included, thereby allowing investigating officers to contact them in the course of enquiries.

\(^6\) Stop Hate UK provides a confidential 24 hour telephone helpline to report all forms of hate crime and provide support for victims.

\(^7\) TellMAMA is a non-governmental organisation proving a confidential reporting service for anti-Muslim incidents.

\(^8\) True Vision is a police website where all forms of hate crime can be reported, the site is run by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and as strictly speaking is not a third party reporting service as the report is made to the police but can be done anonymously.


\(^10\) However, following discussions arising from the research report, this arrangement was reviewed.
existent among both victims and individuals drawn from communities vulnerable to hate crime. This was substantiated by earlier research taking place in the wider region,\textsuperscript{11} which also found low levels of public awareness of reporting centres (Swift, 2005).\textsuperscript{12}

3.2 Knowledge and capability of reporting centre staff
A research review of hate crime reporting procedures for the same police force area found that the reporting arrangements were ‘not fit for purpose’ (JUST West Yorkshire, 2012:1).\textsuperscript{13} The efforts of potential victims to report were frustrated by the lack of basic contact information on hate crime leaflets and websites for the centres being out of date (with one named organisation having been closed down for 3 years). The Swift (2005:8) evaluation found that reporting centre staff were not always aware that their premises were indeed a functioning reporting centre. This was partly due to: the function of the agency - being a reporting centre was not their core business; and high staff turnover with new replacement staff not always being adequately trained. It was found that this could result in some centres existing in which only the manager would be capable of taking reports. These rather simple administrative failings highlighted by the study appear to indicate a gap between the professed priorities of police and local authorities and the actual reality on the ground.

Research in North-West England has found a similar mismatch. Roulstone & Thomas, (2009:15) highlight an unpublished study of two police division evaluations\textsuperscript{14} which showed that many of the third party reporting centres established after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (MacPherson 1999) in this locale were no longer functioning, and of the small number still in place, there was little support or systematic networking with their local Hate Crime Panel.\textsuperscript{15} In one divisional area, 37% of the 32 reporting centres established in 1999 were no longer functioning. Similar to the earlier Swift findings, centres suffered from high staff turnover, including here senior staff with nearly all (98%) of the centres no longer having the same centre coordinator in 2007 from 2000. More worryingly, of those responding to the evaluation, no staff were aware of the principal multiagency report form (‘Form 730D’) and all felt they required further training in their role (Roulstone & Thomas, 2009). Overall, Roulstone & Thomas concluded that the reporting centre system required a

\textsuperscript{11}The research was conducted in a large police force area in the north of England which contained 240 Hate Crime Reporting Centres, a sample of these across 5 of the districts were studied using in-depth interviews across a composition of management at the reporting centres and other personnel with experience of reporting centres in addition to using mystery shoppers to ‘test’ service standards.

\textsuperscript{12}However, activity or productivity measures regards number of reports or advice given were not assessed.

\textsuperscript{13}When the authors ‘tested’ the reporting system, one front line police staff was unable to redirect the caller to any hate crime reporting centre in the force area (as they did not know any and were unable to locate any) and failed to refer the caller to a specialist officer.

\textsuperscript{14}The authors draw on an unpublished report of two police division evaluations: ‘The North West of England force area report’.

\textsuperscript{15}Hate Crime Panels are drawn from the local community and review hate crime cases. They provide advice and suggested areas of improvement to statutory agencies such as the Police.
‘major overhaul’ as well as the need for senior staff buy-in to embed hate crime work in the force area (Ibid, 2009).

This work also highlights the adverse effects of losing professional capacity from career trajectories and staff ‘moving on’, a finding well documented amongst police and local government officers involved in community safety (Pease, 2006). It would seem that third party reporting centres appear particularly susceptible to this difficulty, one which degrades some of the most basic knowledge, understandings and practical competencies of the organisation. The reliance on insecure funding sources no doubt exacerbates at least some of these difficulties. The extent to which funding can be put on a firmer footing from the commissioning of services via Police and Crime Commissioners would in theory allow greater levels of staff retention and training. Whether this occurs will be dependent on local priorities and competing funding pressures of the PCC’s themselves.

More recent research in the South West of England (James & Simmons, 2013:254) found something of a ‘post-code lottery’ in third party reporting provision, one which left victims facing either excellent, limited, or non-existent information on practicalities of hate crime reporting from Local Authorities. Whilst there were gaps found in information contained in websites as well as the knowledge of key workers, notably police awareness of local third sector agencies, there were other excellent examples of reporting mechanisms for victims. An earlier study also identified problems in building capacity in dispersed rural areas to support victims of hate crime (Garland & Chakraborti, 2002).

3.4 The orthodoxy of third party reporting centres
The orthodoxy of third party reporting centres as a means of increasing the reporting of hate crime has been reinforced by: the current and past Government hate crime action plans (Home Office 2016, HM Government 2012); and in the recent past, financially through the Ministry of Justice’s Victim and Witness Fund 2011-14 (HM Government 2012). This is understandable, after all, it is in keeping with one of the key recommendations from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (MacPherson et al 1999). However, the very orthodoxy of third party reporting centres reinforced (uncritically) by successive Government action plans may be acting as an inhibitor to improving their efficacy. Despite Government support, there is no firm evidence base for them. Indeed, their continued existence appears more like an act of faith or a measure of the virility for those tasked with tackling hate crime.

A significant body of research has shown that crime prevention cannot be replicated in a mindless ‘cookbook fashion’ but to work effectively must be adjusted to local conditions (Ekblom, 2004). Applying this to third party reporting centres suggests that the underpinning rationale behind local areas adopting third party reporting centres as a means to increase reporting may require rethinking. Being able to claim them for a local area (whether or not they are operating effectively), may act as a projection of community concern, providing a proxy indicator of agency activity and commitment to addressing hate crime. However, the mere presence or number of third party reporting centres is less important than how well
they are functioning on the ground; with an indicator of effective functioning being how well they are linked in and/or integrated into the communities they are designed to serve. Notably, the National Policing Hate Crime Group’s (2014) review of third party reporting centres called for the performance of centres to be monitored and for any identified shortfalls to be addressed.

4. DISCUSSION
Increasing hate crime reporting requires local agencies to understand the challenges to victim reporting as set out above and respond to this in the way in which local services are configured/commissioned and held accountable.

This section proposes that commissioners and public agencies responsible for crime prevention in local areas should assess local hate crime provision using the two frameworks detailed below. While they are drawn from the UK experience, they are applicable to other jurisdictions.

4.1 Integrated hate crime service framework
There are three related problems that local areas may have with their services. The first is in providing an integrated hate crime response given the plethora of local agencies (in particular voluntary and community sector agencies) involved with victims. This complexity of provision has inevitably occurred as the range of different communities vulnerable to hate crime has increased and with it the number of different agencies that work with them and/or claim to represent them. Secondly, different agencies may work with victims at different times, prior to officially reporting hate crimes; then later through the criminal justice system; and after their involvement in the criminal justice system, leading to disjointed provision. The third difficulty concerns a lack of streamlining and co-ordinating of the service provision to victims which make best use of the strengths and operational capabilities of individual agencies.

Responding to these problems, it is proposed that local agencies should adopt the integrated service framework set out in Table 2 below, originally devised for a county area in England by Wong, Christmann et al (2013). This is based on clear service stages providing roles appropriate to the capabilities and specialisms of individual public and voluntary sector agencies. In addition, it proposes sequenced actions before, during and after criminal justice system involvement in order to provide a fully integrated and coordinated approach. This has the advantage of offering a scaled response according to the needs of the victim.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service stages</th>
<th>Key service objective</th>
<th>Key service elements across all the stages</th>
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| Pre-incident         | • Providing targeted information to individuals who may be vulnerable to hate crime  
                      | • Information initiatives targeted at potential perpetrators to deter or prevent Hate crimes occurring                                           | Case co-ordination by a ‘lead professional’ (from a public or VCS agency) who is responsible for managing the individual’s case at each or any of these stages |
| Pre-reporting to the police | • Recording information about Hate crimes from individuals who do not feel comfortable/confident to report this to the police  
                        | • Working with individuals and communities so that they feel able to report incidents to the police                                                   | A risk of victimisation and needs assessment process that is applied to each case                                               |
| Reporting to the police | • Supporting individuals reporting hate crime to the police  
                        | • Managing the expectations of individuals about the types of action that the police can take                                                  | A scaled response to each case based on a red, amber, green (RAG) system of risk of victimisation and need (similar to that adopted for the management of prolific offenders) which ensures that community specific support (where required) is provided |
| Criminal justice System | • Supporting individuals through the criminal justice system, managing their expectations through this process  
                      | • Protecting individuals from reprisals                                                                                                       | A regular case conference and review process (as adopted for the management of prolific offenders) involving all the key criminal justice and voluntary sector agencies |
| Post criminal justice system | • Providing ‘aftercare’ support and protection to individuals whether or not perpetrators are convicted                                                  |                                                                                                                                 |
have greater trust in, regardless of whether or not this is then passed on anonymously to the police.

4.2 Assessing the capability of hate crime reporting centres
Given the significant reliance on third party reporting centres by Government and criminal justice agencies such as the police for enhancing hate crime reporting, it is remiss that to date there has been little or no scrutiny about how well they perform. Table 3 (below) sets out a range of operational dimensions for hate crime reporting centres based on currently available research evidence of efficacy considered above. In so doing, it offers a universal framework for assessing the capabilities of reporting centres, enabling local agencies to assess where there may be deficiencies and going some way to holding the centres to account. List A identifies the attributes most likely to be associated with a more effective reporting centre while List B identifies attributes which are likely to be associated with a less effective reporting centre. The attributes in the shaded cells are neutral, i.e. the number of hate crime types dealt with are not indicative of either more or less effective reporting centre.

Table 3: Operational dimensions of hate crime reporting centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating dimension</th>
<th>List A</th>
<th>List B</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational purpose</td>
<td>Hate crime as core business</td>
<td>Hate crime as non-core business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcing</td>
<td>Dedicated funding for Hate crime work</td>
<td>Hate crime work resourced from funding which does not specifically cover hate crime work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity/capability</td>
<td>Reporting, support and signposting for other help Reporting, enforcement, support and signposting for other help Reporting only Reporting and signposting for further help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of hate crime dealt with</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Limited hate crime types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of links to groups vulnerable to hate crime</td>
<td>Well embedded</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of operational and strategic links to police and other key strategic agencies</td>
<td>Good operational links Good strategic links</td>
<td>Limited operational links Limited strategic links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion of client contacts to reports to the police and other public agencies</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION
The underreporting of hate crime across the UK remains a chronic problem despite attempts by government, police and other agencies to address it. This article has presented a number of reasons why these agencies have failed to make much headway in this area. These appear to be due to having a poor understanding of the reasons why victims choose not to report hate crimes, with different barriers varying across the traditional identity characteristic groups, as well as directing resources and effort into third party reporting centres (the most widely adopted approach to increasing reporting) without adequately testing if they work as intended. There is also inadequate attention to development and innovation of existing third party reporting centres in order to optimise their functioning within local neighbourhoods. Another difficulty is a lack of maturity in the development of hate crime services due the continual stream of new (in particular voluntary and community sector) agency entrants who may be working with the criminal justice system for the first time. While these agencies have been brought into the oeuvre of hate crime service provision due to the widening range of communities, groups and individuals affected by bias motive crimes, insufficient consideration has been given to how to make best use of their connections to those communities while at the same time assessing their capacity and capability to work with hate crime victims. Finally there is a reluctance to more effectively join up existing provision combined with a general lack of accountability to ensure that all agencies deliver and perform to a minimum standard.

Good intentions around encouraging hate crime reporting are not enough. In not addressing these fundamental problems, local agencies are arguably failing the individuals and communities that they are professing to help. The frameworks presented in this article provide a more systematic approach to address these problems. Effectively implementing these solutions would provide a way for agencies to more realistically improve hate crime reporting, narrowing the gap between high minded policy aspiration and a more realistically inclined victim inclination.


Home Office (2016) Action Against Hate: Their UK Government's plan for tackling hate crime, OGL.


JUST West Yorkshire (2012). JUST’s Research Findings on Hate Incident Reporting Centre’s in West Yorkshire. JUST.


Wong, K., Christmann, K., Meadows, L., Albertson, K. and Senior, P., (2013) Hate crime in Suffolk: Understanding prevalence and support needs, Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University

