On the graphic in writing-drawing practice

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Abstract

This study puts into practice a form of critical thinking that promotes the intricate and inseparable entwining of the graphic processes of drawing and writing. It does so by examining the graphic marks of collocated drawing and writing in order to disturb any neat separation of 'the verbal' and 'the pictural'. The graphic mark that is structural to both the practice of writing and drawing is shown to displace and deconstitute the dichotomous and often hierarchical assignation of word and image, intelligible and sensuous, and conceptual and material. The study is positioned at the junction of practice-led enquiry and philosophical art history, and explores drawings by Raymond Pettibon and Michaël Borremans.

It engages the processes, materials, forms and institutions that shape the relations between drawing and writing as graphic practices through the development of a philosophical discourse that draws on post-structuralist French thought, German media philosophy, Anglo-Saxon art writing and practice reflections. Imbedded in a millennia-old discourse on the relations of images and texts, the thesis works against the persistent conflations of writing and language, and drawing and image that routinely separate writing from its graphic instantiation and reading from seeing. It draws on Jacques Derrida's iterability and Jean-François Lyotard's figure to demonstrate how the medial capacity of the line repeats itself differently in the drawn and written mark yet is indivisible between them. An examination of the material, gestural and iconic characteristics common to both drawing and writing identifies the affordances and exigencies of the graphic mark of both practices and shows how they facilitate yet exceed notions of signification. The thesis does neither propose a unified word-image theory, nor aims to offer the graphic as a centre through which new boundaries concerning the inside and outside of drawing and writing can be established. Rather, it recognises its own entanglement in the subject as an artefact of critical thinking produced in the intervolved practices of the graphic mark and maintains their mutability and resistance to closure. It thus responds self-reflexively to the conventions of academic discourse that are inadequate for the subject and a priori impose on and limit the recognition of the picture in writing and writing in the picture by traversing these divides.

Keywords

graphic, writing, drawing, Jacques Derrida, iterability, line, material, Jean-François Lyotard, Raymond Pettibon, Michaël Borremans

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Exergue

> Polonius: […] —What do you read, my lord?
> Hamlet: Words, words, words.
> Polonius: What is the matter, my lord?
> Hamlet: Between who?
> Polonius: I mean, the matter that you read, my lord.
> Hamlet: Slanders, sir; […]
>
> ——*Hamlet*, II. ii. 1295-1300

In a letter to his friend and secretary Heinrich Köselitz dating from the end of February 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote from Genoa: 'YOU ARE RIGHT—OUR WRITING TOOLS TAKE PART IN THE FORMING OF OUR THOUGHTS. WHEN WILL I BRING MY FINGERS TO PRINT A LONG SENTENCE!'[1] Nietzsche was writing on a Malling Hansen writing ball, a mechanical typewriter he had received only weeks earlier. Despite his enthusiasm for the device, the vicissitudes imposed by the machine's constant need for repair frustrated him.[2] Nietzsche's particular turn of phrase in the original German is noteworthy, and a more awkward but also more revealing translation is possible. In the writing ball's capitals-only script he notes that our 'Schreibzeug arbeitet mit an unseren Gedanken', our equipment 'co-works on our thoughts'. Though 'mitarbeiten' may be translated as 'work with', Nietzsche does in fact not write 'arbeitet mit *uns* an unseren Gedanken', 'works with *us* on our thoughts.' The tool is here already a co-worker, not merely a support for the work done by someone else. And equally the philosopher's fingers are invoked, as though apart from the rest of the body, as tools that require persuasion and coaxing to mediate the flow from thought to word and head to paper. Nietzsche, who had adopted the typewriter because of his failing vision and difficulty to produce legible copy without headaches, incidentally misprints precisely the word 'Gedanken' as if it were another way to highlight the direction and potency of the proposition. There are 17 further typographic errors in this one-page letter,[3] many of which Nietzsche attends to with nib and ink. His correction on the word 'thoughts' seems to confuse things further, seemingly inserting the missing letter in the wrong space. Below the farewell that he adds by hand:

In the serendipitous typo of 'Gedanken' Leander Scholz recognises that it 'reads, at least from the current vantage point, like the menetekel of a media philosophy to come'.[5] He notes that like speaking and writing, pressing the buttons of a machine is a learnt act that already indicates the ruptured relations between thought and its notation or enunciation. Scholz's simile works on two levels. Firstly, menetekel identifies an ominous warning, an idiomatic use that is more common

in German than in English. Nietzsche's *lapsus clavis* is for Scholz prophetic of a discipline's laden future. Secondly however, the term's use is particularly potent for the linkages it creates—seemingly in passing—to the ominous 'writing on the wall' at Belshazzar's feast, as recounted in chapter 5 of the biblical Book of Daniel. As the Babylonians drink and feast, a bodiless hand appears and writes a message on the palace's plaster. Neither the alarmed king nor his wise men can read the handwriting on the wall and thus Daniel is sent for to make sense of it. Daniel recounts how God deposed Belshazzar's father, Nebuchadnezzar, when he had become arrogant and proud. Having desecrated sacred vessels during the feast and proven his lack of humility, Belshazzar's fate has been inscribed on the wall. Daniel reads the 'MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN' on the wall for Belshazzar, pronouncing the end of his reign and the division of his kingdom. Interpreting 'TEKEL' as '[t]hou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting', Daniel proclaims God's verdict which is ostensibly enacted when the king is slain during the night.[6] As Nietzsche's excorporate fingers have to be brought to type out a long sentence, so God's message, too, does not merely appear but has to be written by fingers onto a substrate. Even God's words have a body and are the product of *Schreibzeug*. That Belshazzar's wise men are unable to decipher the inscription is, however, commonly explained as a failure to make sense of the words, rather than to read them.[7] The unity of the menetekel is thus preserved, and God's word remains the self-communicating divine presence of logos. Yet it is precisely the presumption of the creative and originary power of God's word that leads Sonja Neef to recognise the menetekel's logocentrism.[8] The menetekel is on the one hand an image that can be seen not read, and on the other, it purports to be the word as unitary language that cannot be misunderstood. Neef therefore returns the menetekel to Jacques Derrida's examination of writing in the 'Western tradition' which considers the inscription 'as the body and matter external to the spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos.'[9] What is found wanting in the writing of the menetekel is its reduction to language in a procedure that seemingly disregards or externalises its graphic inscription.

If Nietzsche's typo is the 'writing on the wall' for media philosophy, this thesis pursues the menetekel through writing's intervolution, its intricate and inseparable entwining, with drawing. It is the result of a practice-led enquiry into the relationship characteristics of collocated drawing and writing practices. Faced with a sheet of paper, my pen's marks fluently meander between writing and drawing. In fact, the repetition of a mark may shift it from word to picture or vice versa. This repetition in alteration structurally underlies the procession of all aspects of the research. It is not only applied to the graphic mark but is also used as the link of description and depiction. As both drawing and writing cannot escape notions of representation, it is also a useful device to consider their translatory relations as one of *giving again*, if however, *differently*. Derrida's writing on iterability explores exactly this idea of an identity that shifts yet remains *identifiable*. I pursue the implications of this repetition in alteration through the differential lines (chapter 'On lines'), materials and gestures (chapter 'On paper'), and picturality[10] and iconicity (chapter 'On iconicity')

shared by drawing and writing. The thesis therefore seeks to address the two practices not from an a priori oppositional perspective of word-image binarisms but through their shared graphic marks. It thus hearkens to the etymological root of *graphic* in its aim to recognise the indivisibility of depiction and description, drawing and writing. In describing the practices as 'drawing' and 'writing', it does of course already confirm the commonplace differentiation of the picture and the word. Yet, rather than use difference as a distinction, the thesis seeks to highlight the shared affordances and exigencies of a common graphic practice. This means in particular that the thesis examines the convergences of the two practices from a medial, material and practical perspective of a drawing writer and writing drawer.

Scholz notes that more than a century after Nietzsche circumscribed the extraordinary scope of a media philosophy he never knew, that the same thoughts remain doggedly 'marginal or fashionable' as philosophical themes, without being able to attain a 'systematic place in the disciplinary field of philosophy'.[11] Similarly, half a century after Derrida's *De la grammatologie* (1967) the relations between speech and writing may have been repositioned, yet the distinction between the outside and the inside, the body and the essence of the letter still appear irreconcilably drawn. As will become apparent in what follows, this thesis does not aim to find or even look for a systematic place or single position within a discrete discipline, rather it pursues the practices of drawing and writing through their persistent overlap which cannot belong to image or language only. The reluctance to assign a centre is therefore developed as a necessary response not to limit or determine a differential practice. As a consequence, the research is unapologetically and purposefully situated at the junction of art history, critical theory, artistic research, art philosophy, media philosophy, *Medienwissenschaften* and literature studies. If the diversity of scholars involved in the *International Association for Word and Image Studies* (IAWIS) may provide an indication, there is no need for narrow disciplinary restrictions, as the pleasure and complexity of the word-image field spans across such stiff limitations. The literature that supports this study is therefore drawn from the aforementioned areas, with a particular emphasis on French philosophy, German *Medienphilosophie/-wissenschaften* and Anglo-American art writing.

At the outset of the research, I identified three overlapping but definable sub-areas of enquiry which appeared pertinent in order to be able to address drawing and writing as practices in their convergence and difference. Distinguishing 'material', 'sequence' and 'composition/form', I intended to structure the project according to isolable aspects that could be explored in practice, as well as with recourse to art historical and philosophical material. As my previous drawing and print work had for some time been a combination of drawing and writing, the pinpointing of specific aspects that afford and support such a practice was to provide a focus and the methodologically necessary bridge between thinking about the relationships in practice and thinking about them when confronted with finito work. Early on, I had identified Raymond Pettibon's (*1957) and Michaël Borremans' (*1963) graphic work as particularly relevant to this

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enquiry as its critical discussion is almost entirely caught up, structured and thus fundamentally limited by word-image oppositionality and reductionism. Borremans' and Pettibon's work provided the basis on which divergent art-historical, literary and philosophical approaches to writing and drawing could be exercised from the outside. In parallel, pursuing my own drawing-writing practice and attempting to emulate the styles of Borremans and Pettibon, I was seeking to explore material, sequential and formal aspects processually, i.e. from the inside. Keeping a work diary, which recorded and reflected on my production of drawing-writings, I noted processual observations, sometimes line by line, sometimes returning to the work after a period of non-engagement. These diaristic entries were gradually situated in a wider art-historical and philosophical context and eventually morphed into the chapters that follow. It will become apparent why it is also of relevance that the entries and most early drafts were handwritten.

In the course of writing about the relationship of drawing and writing, it became inescapable that the very texts written were also necessarily partaking in the practice of combining images and words, and could not justifiably adopt an external position to the phenomenon. In theory, I had been cognisant of this from the beginning but it only became meaningful when, in practice, it meant either appealing to academic convention and deliberately ignoring the convergence of subject and object, or self-reflexively trying to accommodate the verbo-pictural in itself. This thesis is a result of the latter and thus also the inescapable admission and assertion that the practice of drawing-writing is part of and continues in the practice of writing *about* it.

Though the original tripartite distinction was useful as a tool to structure and focus the research, it has been superseded in the organisation of the contents of this text. Similarly, the distinction between drawing-writing practice and writing about it has necessarily been sublated in order to instantiate that the practice of this research is not divorceable from the thesis as its product. The thesis does not take the traditional form of the exegetical commentary to a work that took place elsewhere, presumably under different conditions and foreign to the writing it spurred. This is not out of lack of validity for such reports but because the aims of this particular project required it. This thesis does not provide a statement for a finished artefact, explaining how it came about, what it means or tries to achieve. Rather, the drawing-writing that was undertaken was a process to think drawing-writing in practice, a process of making, not a process facilitating the making of an artefact outside of this thesis. The thesis is a result, an artefact, of the process of drawing and writing. The separation of writing from drawing-writing, as well as the separation of writing a report from writing as a creative, illimitable practice are part of an impossible distinction between practice and theory (upheld on both sides) that is inimical to the practice-led research of this project.

Implicitly, an exegetical commentary provides a separation of the making from the thinking of the making, offering a *proper* context and intention *for* the work. If this thesis is still exegetical to some degree, it seeks to draw on the *knowledge of practicing*, not on the *knowledge of making an*

artefact, nor does it want to provide the *proper context and intention for a work*. The underlying perspective valuable for the research is what the practice of writing-drawing can offer, not what does the finished work offer from the perspective of its maker. What practice offers to the pursuit of any project is of course at the crux of artistic research in any of its guises, whether practice-led, practice-based or *through* practice.[12] The struggle to pinpoint the precise and declared difference stems partly from an expectation to compare what occurred with what did not. In this particular case, drawing-writing is of course a practice that anybody who uses a pen is familiar with, though the attention is not commonly directed at the specific utilities, exigencies and affordances that the activity provides. If the reflection *on* the process itself is rare, the reflection *in* the process is perhaps more so.[13] My own glaring blindness is a point in case. Despite my cognisance that the writing of the thesis itself merely carried on a drawing-writing process that was previously begun under the banner of artistic practice, it took time to recognise the enormous import that this statement entails. It was only when I began to see that the laborious process of 'writing the thesis' drew on the same interactions between gestures, materials, signs, marks et cetera, that I could frame the experience of drawing-writing itself. I do not facilely mean that it occurred to me that materials and motions were shared, rather that the cognitive work of shaping the thesis drew on the availability of the drawn and written marks that themselves had been made in order to write the thesis. Dispersed on the sheet of paper, phrases, fragments, lines, structures and marks provide both the necessary body and sense that can be beheld and moved around, in order to think about them. As will be shown in greater detail, it is therefore wrong of me to suggest that the writing of the thesis is merely the product of cognitive work, at least if such work is thought to exclude any sensuous entanglement.

To return briefly to the material trajectory of Nietzsche's suggestion that our *Schreibzeug* co-works on our thoughts in order to indicate the scope of the research. Our *Schreibzeug* is often also our *Zeichenzeug* which is of twofold interest for this project. On the one hand, *Zeichenzeug* denotes merely drawing materials and thus at once contributes the paraphernalia of the picture and also makes the considerable overlap between the graphic equipment, tools and substrates that are shared between drawing and writing more apparent. On the other hand, *Zeichenzeug* may homonymically point towards the symbols, signs and conventions that structure our conceptions of visual and verbal reading. This *sign stuff* has been crucial in the semiotic differentiation of images and texts with repeated and persistent attempts to establish clear categories for both. The chapters 'On lines' and 'On iconicity' however demonstrate how the repeatability of the mark that is crucial for the construction of the sign is never pure, nor is it reducible to any merely semiotic notion of the sign. There is no pretension in this thesis that writing and drawing can be differentiated, however it is proposed that the line that draws the letter and the one that circumscribes the figure cannot be split. There is not one unified line of drawing *and* writing but neither are there two lines that afford a differentiation along the lines of the common tropes of

Dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from the red, fleshly lusts which war against the soul and befall the sins of men and beasts. As one thing befalleth them, one dieth, so the other dieth. Yea, they have one breath, so that man has no preeminence above beast: for all is vanity.

That I must in the final analysis remain part of the world that is external to and other from Lenore Beadsman is to me a source of profound grief. That others may dwell deep, deep within the ones they love, drink from the soft cup at the creamy lake at the centre of the object of passion, while I am fated forever only to intuit the presence of deep recesses while I poke my nose, as it were, merely into the foyer of the Great House of Love, agitate briefly, and make a small mess on the doormat, pisses me off to no small degree. But that Lenore finds such tiny frenzies, such conversations just inside the Screen Door of Union, to be not only pleasant and briefly diverting but somehow apparently right, fulfilling, significant, in some sense wonderful, quite simply and not at all surprisingly makes me feel the same way, enlarges my sense of it and me, sends me hurrying up the walk to that screen door in my best jacket and flower in lapel as excited as any schoolboy, time after time, brings me dragging to the cave entrance in leopard-skin shirt, avec club, bellowing for admittance and promising general kickings of ass if I am impeded in any way.

you didn't know of the burning chimney
Stacks, you didn't know of the smell
of smouldering rubble, you could see saw
the birch wood without seeing the
the chimneystacks, you could read
the poem without the cineraire's
distraction. Rejoice. Those here. Abide.

with froggy-soft skin, huge skull
and gooey drool ~~of~~ the empty
mask,
and we observed that
" when the enfants perdus of the as-yet
invisible Horde enter once again
upon the battlefield, which has
changed yet stayed the same,
a new General Ludd will be at
their head - leading them this time
on an onslaught on the machinery
of permitted consumption."
Saint Jusbin writes in his book on
Similitudes, they are not even able to
remove from the eye a worm that
gnaws it. [Joyce]

How is one to not feel sad! How can one
see all this and not feel sad?
that is to say, we sometimes passed
entire days in meditation, absorbed,
engulfed, like a visionary, in the mute
voluptuousness of ecstasy and inward
radiance

that is to say, he sometimes travelled
incessantly in her splendor, some-
times days passed as if in meditation, absorbed, buried, engulfed,
like a visionary, auguring and
drinking imbibing her mute voluptuous-
ness in ecstacy and inward
radiance [bits of Hugo les Mis]

The man that operates the joy carride.
The sadness of the rain is within me and
it shall not bring forth the spring grass.

When the magnolia blossoms in spring
I rush to the other side of the road to
picture it instantly. I'll add, thousands
come the day we sell this place.

that is to say, I travelled incessantly in
your splendor, sometimes entire days passed
as if in meditation, absorbed, ~~engulfed~~
buried, engulfed, like a visionary,
auguring and imbibing your mute
voluptuousness in ecstasy and
radiance

there are other more conquests ambushed
in the hair of Delilah than that of Samsons
[D. Halévy]

She was making imperceptible at the edge
of stale ideas as if his sturdy egotism
no longer nourished his peremptory heart.
[F.S. Fitzgerald Gatsby]

She was making her nibble at the edge of stale ideas as if her sturdy egotism no longer nourished her peremptory heart

you are scaring me, my beautiful, I do not recognize your voice, I do not recognize what you are saying. you could have claimed me all for yourself, ~~and~~ and now you want to turn your back. your rashness frightens me.

Why would you ~~not~~ want to forget the magnolia petals that were new eyelids?

I saw it fall and it iridescent before me, it seemed to throb and grow under its own growth and so my heart began to palpitate with the same rhythm.

By the time you get to the final aspiration of this first and sole sentence you will know me much better than anyone ever was and probably ever will.

By the time you draw in the final aspiration of this ~~sentence~~ first and final sentence you will know me much better than anyone ever wanted to.

By the time you draw in the final aspiration of this first and last sentence you will wonder and regret that you know me much better than anyone would have ever dared to.

By the time you draw in the final aspiration of this first and last sentence you will know me much better and recognize yourself as if in a glass darkly.

Insert only internally
For internal use only
Internal use only
Love me

This is the piece of paper here.

This piece This paper here.

I shan't forget you. I shan't think of anyone else everyday. I shan't be able to forget that!

In this paper here and in the hair of Delilah, there are often more conquests and battles than it that of Samson.

sensory-intelligible, material-immaterial, analogue-digital et cetera.

If the thesis as a whole does not function as an exegesis, this exergue is a manifest exception. It pursues a different methodological approach in its offering of a linearity and categorisation that is out of sync with both the subject matter and the chapters that follow. In this way, the exergue simulates a certain transparency of writing (in both what it says and how it says it) that is at once at odds with the research and yet offers a possible summary and outline that is institutionally necessary. Perhaps the most notable difference of these prolegomenous comments in contrast to the following chapters is that its performance of the processual entanglements that make the verbo-pictural practice of writing possible is limited. In the following chapters, 'to read' and 'to see' are not exclusive practices, and writing is treated as the verbal, visual and sensuous material that it is in its graphic conception. The writing therefore responds to itself as a graphic mark through the repetition, juxtaposition and transformation of syllables, words or phrases. It aims to draw attention to its graphic characteristics through reversals of meaning, double meanings, parenthetical and homonymic play, and so on. Words command more words, seemingly in a response to their (ortho-/typo-/para- and so on) graphic disposition. The sense is of a text that tussles and arouses itself in order to interrogate its own illimitable gap of *how* to say *what,* through the indistinguishable graphic line between word and picture. In this self-interrogation the thesis performs itself, it slows reading processes and trips up those that do not account for the graphic. In parts, it forces a rereading that encourages a look at the text itself until the marks begin to blur. The thesis explores the responsiveness of writing onto itself: words and phrases question themselves about their own reading though not in any pure category of verbality that is as such detached from the line's graphic inscription. Kiff Bamford notes in the conclusion to his thesis on Jean-François Lyotard's *figure* and performance art, a book that is itself 'not altogether within traditional academic convention', that his writing was 'a cautious attempt to respond to [his subjects] rather than just write about them'.[14] This text similarly does not conceive itself external to what it discusses and cannot help but make the exploration of its own self-referentiality apparent. Its engagement with its topic and ideas make it methodologically necessary that it deliberately broaches separations of style and content. Were it not so ominous to evoke the *traditional* in view of Derrida, it could be said that this thesis is ultimately deeply embedded in a tradition of writing that also turns to itself in order to respond to its subject because it does not presume its own transparency in the enquiry. The following chapters therefore do not offer any discursive conceit—at least not in a way that is different from any other conceit in writing—they merely deliberately point to their own verbo-pictural construction which this preliminary statement, with its summary character and detached verbal unity, purports to escape to a degree.

From the outset, the formatting of the thesis equally seeks to signal that it does not conform with commonplace constraints, not because they are unfamiliar, but because, despite their putative detachment and impartiality, they impose and sustain a particular and restricted understanding

of writing and its relations to other graphic marks. As the 'On writing' chapter will develop, institutional expectations of writing are particularly protective of its verbal transparency and graphic neutrality though both are inimical to the writing process. There is immense disciplinary pressure to typologise and axiomatise, to develop distinct ontological categories and definitions that reinforce a predetermined borderline between drawing and writing. This research does not contribute to such typologies—though they are explored in the 'Framework' section—instead it outlines why it is necessary to withstand them and exposes the inevitable gap between the plenitude of any subject and the discursive limitation brought to bear on it. This thesis is as inhibited by such disciplinary pressures as it is by similar restrictions and conventions of language. Nevertheless, it aims to indicate, deconstitute and displace both, not in an attempt to overcome them but to respond to its subject and attend to the restrictions of the response.

It will appear in the vein of apophatic theology to explore the limits of this research and the thesis as its product through what they are not, yet I only do so in order to emphasise what decisions were made in order to arrive at this point. To facilitate a reading and viewing of the thesis that is practicable but does not immediately disregard the research itself, the figures are not captioned yet details can easily be coordinated via the page number and the 'List of illustrations'. Referral between figure and text is similarly limited, yet adjacency is highly crucial without imposing the pointed finger that seeks to limit the possibility of the graphic at work. This particular and perhaps unconventional method is followed to preserve the possibility to see and read pictures without curtailing them with a constraining statement. All figures are reproductions of artistic works or other graphic marks on paper. Reproductions of other people's work, including that of Pettibon and Borremans, are always shown full frontal. Occasionally, an oblique photographic angle is used for illustrations of my own work to show material characteristics, approach the spatial engagement that a viewer may have with the work in front them or disturb the scientistic appeal that conventional reproduction emulates. The 'On writing' chapter functions largely as a methodological exploration that underpins the writing in the thesis and addresses the difficulties that writing faces in view of artistic work (and vice versa), as well as in relation to itself (and its own style).

In order to facilitate the collocation of particular images and texts, and to ensure that the graphic capacity of writing and drawing is drawn out, the thesis engages certain institutional restrictions concerning presentation and layout. It is expressly produced in response to the double requirement and potential of digital and hardcopy submission and therefore does not merely reproduce stipulations developed for the typewriter in digital form. The ratio of the study's pages has been adjusted to ensure that pictures may encompass the entire frame of the paper and to ameliorate the textual bias that the usual format affords. Endnotes are used to promote the collocation of particular images and texts without the need to accommodate citational and additional material (visually) in footnoted form. The rationale that arrived at the present appearance sought to ne-

1 ! Initially, there was an intention for this thesis to present a report of a project: setting out what was done to find out ~~about what~~ about art, and concluding where it had been successful and ~~where it fell short~~ where it had not. ~~There would have been~~ Its structure would have been predetermined by the logic of experiments and their outcomes or categories that seek to sift and divide the logic of experiments into workable frameworks that function in division as effectively as in integration.

However, I never arrived there.

A number of factors intervened. Writing about writing became a difficult if not resolvable issue in itself. Drawing became forever distinguishable from writing which never took up the drawn mark. Writing about writing in drawing that was clearly not writing while was itself drawn became evermore drawn out, as well as out of an urge to find and forget the mark that irrevocably belonged only to one.

Because such was the impression of the divide

the honour what or why of

sentence

addressed in itself. Writing inseparably re-inserted it as external alterity in its own ground. Hence whether in itself or in verbalization as drawing. of verbalization because the work material/subject

21 of word and image and the countless studies of it. A dividet once categorically imposed and then mildly attenuated,* in order to reinstate the category once more. Still, no proposition will abolish a ~~the~~ distinction, ~~except this thesis will~~ ~~that abolish the distinction to resurrect it from~~ ~~itself~~ that falters in its resurrection.

The writing of the thesis itself quickly became a practice onto itself. Less report (as the possibility of "the report" became evermore impossible), less evidence of another practice (as the possibility of this writing being fundamentally opposed to the ~~other~~ writing in the drawing became untenable), less ~~abstracted~~ removed from thinking about drawing and writing (as ~~a~~ writing itself became a necessary way of thinking), the thesis ~~took on~~ extended the (il)logic of the studio, taking on the studio and being taken in by it. This was ~~what~~ neither a deliberate strategy (destinerrance) nor obvious until undertaken, but the effect of the practice of the graphic work that didn't stop at the threshold of the studio [with? hadrweyed?]. This is in no way to suggest

gotiate the at times conflicting requirements to produce a highly legible (digital and hardcopy) document that is recognisable as an academic text, yet also recognises that the study produced an artefact that needs to be responsive to the findings of the study in view of picto-textual relations, as well as the illimitability of writing and pictures to mere verbal and non-verbal categories, respectively. In order to draw the reader's attention to the graphic qualities of writing early on, I opened this exergue with the only typographic exultation in this thesis by rendering Nietzsche's 'Devil! Can you actually read this?!' in a typographic Kurrent that sought to match his.[15] There are no other typographic *extravagances* in what follows, though not because this is not a valid strategy to engage with the topic. Rather, for the purposes of this project, any perception of *overt* use of typographic (or other graphic) *ostentations* would be perceived as a further deviation and anomaly to any *common* use of the graphics of writing. The point is to show and characterise how the graphic and its connection to drawing already underwrites all writing without any requirement to promote it. The insertion of photographic documentation of early drafts emphasises similarly how the writing of the thesis also already began as a drawing process in which the categorical distinction between verbal and pictural graphic marks breaks down. Though the study is explicitly concerned with handwriting in drawing-writing practices, the research offers a clear trajectory how this is symptomatic for a wider conception of writing. The effect that the study has had on the writing of the thesis itself is a point in case. Similarly, the project is not concerned with ideographic or pictographic writing systems, which sustain particular relations between language's 'content' and writing's 'form'. These relations are not considered incomparable to the present study, there was however no attempt to compare the different practices.

Through its intimate integration of methodological concerns (that arose in the research process itself) and its subject matter, the thesis seeks to offer an original contribution to the wider field of word-and-image studies. It initiates a sustained discussion of the graphic mark across drawing and writing without reducing it to either image or text, or seeking to provide a unified centre for its differential characteristics. It resists institutional forces that promote an oppositional perspective of word-image relations and acts on the implications of its own graphic- and discursiveness. In so doing, it breaks with the implicit separation of intelligibility and sensuality in the practices of writing and drawing. Finally, it demonstrates and strongly advocates the necessity to interrogate the conventions and restriction of institutional writing. Here it exemplifies the particular need to deconstitute the promotion of putatively dichotomous and exclusionary differentiations, as well as the perception of language's transparency. The study therefore performs critical thinking through the indivisible graphic practices of drawing and writing.

The original tripartite structure of the research has been dissolved into five separate but highly interlinked chapters that seek not to impose a word-image oppositionality that the research strongly works against. There are therefore no chapters that axiomatically characterise drawing, writing, seeing, reading et cetera. Though the characteristics of the graphic iterability of writing

and drawing are sustaining the study, the *graphic* itself is not conceived as a centre of the enquiry. The intention is to provide an account that is rigorous but non-divisionary, and the proposition of a new centre would automatically render other aspects marginal, producing in effect merely the perpetuation of a *system* that hinges itself on metaphysical notions of inside and outside. There is therefore a flow through all chapters which allows for aspects of the discourse to be continuously engaged. For example, the discussion concerning translatability—both intersemiotic and interlingual—that is most explicitly developed in the 'Framework' chapter has already been invoked in this exergue and is used throughout the text in order to draw out how the processions and conventions of verbal thought and their underpinning by specific linguistic exigencies. The thesis continually utilises an 'untranslatable' French and German vocabulary to supplement the propositions made in English and to work against any notion of universal linguistic transparency. The interconnections that this flow seeks to provide throughout the chapters is also fundamental to the strategy of seeking a discursive approach that promotes difference without insisting on categorisations. Whilst this opening account assumes a methodological approach that permits a summary concision that leaves the contingencies of particular descriptions largely untouched, the following chapters persistently disturb their own articulation without offering the reduction of the synopsis. To facilitate the reading and to close, I will therefore briefly outline key avenues of the following chapters and indicate their contribution to the study as a whole.

The 'Framework' chapter explores and summarises the historical and theoretical context through three interlinked approaches. Firstly, a historical gloss situates the study within a wider field of interarts scholarship crossing the disciplines of art history, literature and semiotics. Though comprehensive, the gloss is not intended to provide an exhaustive account, rather, it extrapolates dominant trajectories of word-image discourses that help position the thesis and frame its territory. In subsequent chapters, the observations drawn out of the historical context are explored further through specific vantage points. The particular discursive territory encountered in the gloss is marked by a millennia-old word-image debate that oscillates in and perpetuates a polarised relational net of verbo-pictural comparability, rivalry, incompatibility, sorority, equivalence, incommensurability and so on. Importantly for this study, the literature evidences an enthusiastic zealousness to conflate writing and language, as well as a reluctance to differentiate writing practices (longhand, typing, texting; print, cursive; analogue, digital, by material et cetera). Polarisation and conflation propagate a discursive field that often reinforces established categories in accord with particular disciplinary models. Concomitantly and perhaps unsurprisingly, there is considerable dominance of linguistic and literary terminology in the framing of the relations of pictures and writing. The abundance of terms from a specific field may, of course, limit and anticipate the scope and direction of its findings. This becomes also evident in the persistence of an understanding of writing itself that is detached from its own material, gestural and sensory instantiation. Language and writing are conflated in a way that even the

3/ that the thickness of the drawn mark is that of the written, not that the discursive significations of the verbal is found in the picture. However it is to suggest that the thickness of the mark extends to writing and pictures, both in their plasticity and as figures,* and that ~~the difficulty of limiting the~~ the effect of the graphic trait ~~does not not but before the~~ may not be limited to ~~grand~~ restraint ~~that~~ this decision as the paper of the report and the pages of the thesis. If in the 'limited' setting of the studio, the stroke ~~extends~~ is unlimited to either drawing or writing, and writing transgresses the orders of fiction and report without a trace, ...

In the way that this thesis aims to characterise ~~the~~ writing and drawing ~~as~~ ~~it~~ as collocative practice it cannot extract itself from its own status of

word-ill stratification particular relation-
image and aspects of that practice
ships Initially, the objectives were to
4 investigate the material constituents
, formal and compositional
parameters, as well as the impact
of sequence on the interrelation-
ship of writing and drawing.
Some of these aspects have evolved into
chapters in this thesis, others have
proven less fruitful as themes
and
. are were dissolved
into separate chapters.
Despite already
broadening the of the practice
(s) of 'writing" for the thesis' and
'writing' as part of the writing-
drawing of the studies, and much
like the (im) possible
distinction b/w the drawn and the written
stroke, the distinction at least supports
precised above
itself, and also particular
regulations
words and , for instance in

writer of words about the relationship of writing and pictures adheres to canonical modes of different media and recognises the inky marks on the page without seeing them. The historical gloss thus develops the case of the graphic intervolution of writing and drawing as insufficiently accommodated in a context that establishes and maintains impossible borderlines.

To exemplify the consequences of categorising tendencies of unifying concepts and essentialised ideas, the second avenue of the 'Framework' chapter encounters one of Pettibon's works through the disciplinary focus of iconotexts and ekphrasis. The section develops and questions the oppositionality between the verbal and the sensuous (especially visual) that is at the heart of many common ekphrasis definitions. Whether in the germinal definitions of James Heffernan, Murray Krieger or Leo Spitzer, the conception of ekphrasis itself is regularly premised on an a priori binary exclusion that extrapolates the opposition verbal-visual from the relations of writing and the picture. That this deduction is erroneous is shown through the irreducibility of legibility and visibility in the verbal texts in Pettibon's work. The section demonstrates how Pettibon introduces textual fragmentation and non-linearity, through his complex responding and paraphrasing of ekphrastic authors, which open up writing to the contingencies usually associated with drawing. Pettibon's texts are surveyed for typographic, orthographic and chirographic characteristics which emphasise writing's bilateral status as simultaneously visual and verbal. The artist's texts thus appear as though they have been written twice (picturally and verbally), marking them both inside and outside of language. This trangressive power of the graphic in writing is traced through Derrida's *trait*, that stroke or feature crucially linked to the gaze, that marks the space between the visible and invisible, and makes Pettibon's writing reducible to neither the discourse of language nor that of the image. Finally, the drawn elements of the work are considered as a form of proto-writing: a drawing that bears traces of the hieroglyphic and ideogrammatic. Contrary to Nelson Goodman's assertions about the syntactic and semantic differences between writing and drawing, these examples highlight their proximity, if not commonality. The ductus of pen- and brushwork allows the written letter to advance to the exit of linguistic confinement, whilst drawing may approach the non-semic realm of the letter. This is also the place that reasserts the inexorable affinity and close proximity between the verbal and the visual, and identifies the restrictions of disciplinary categorisation.

The second section also stages reading and writing between languages performatively as a way to draw on other tongues to write and think differently in English. The subsequent section, 'On translation', formalises this undertaking and relinks translatory practices between languages to the translatory assumptions underlying ekphrasis. It asks straightforwardly, what is translated when a picture becomes writing or when text is turned into an image? What is identical between the two for us to recognise that a translation has taken place? The divergence yet translatability between writing and pictures is therefore employed to question the markers of identity that lead to the attestation of divergence in the first place. Practically, Valerio Adami's re-writing/re-

drawing of letters Derrida had written in *Glas* (subsequently re-re-written by Derrida in a new text) are used to lay out what it means to repeat and alter not just alphabetic letterforms in the name of writing, but also in the process of interlingual and intersemiotic translation. Following Derrida, the notion of difference with itself is understood to structure identity and thus used to diffract the constitution of identity proper as single or homogeneous. Positioning the identity of words and images in relation to Derrida's four laws of translation, the section applies assertions about the (im)possibility of translation to the complex re-drawings/re-writings undertaken by Adami. The text thus discusses debt (to the other), correspondence (between unequals), exter/internality (the signifier/the signified) and property (both: what is proper and what belongs) as shared operating structures dividing writing and drawing. Drawing on the multiple identities in which words and images partake, the discussion finally disrupts the neat division commonly erected between the two graphic marks without however aiming to consolidate them in their difference and translatability. Rather, as for the transfer between languages so for intersemiotic transpositions: the division between form and content, the possibility to externalise a language from its discourse or writing from its form, is held in an abeyance that does not permit such distinctions.

Letter, picture and writing, which are already under translation, already involved in a process of repetition in alteration, thus do not belong to themselves but withdraw (*retrait*) from themselves. The previously recognised trait is here redrawn to link practices of translation with the instantiation of language in writing and the mark of drawing. Deeply engaged in a technical discourse of semiotic relations, the section demonstrates the limitations of such a system and narrow disciplinary enterprise. It asserts that translatability, though laden with the difference that is shared between picture and writing, cannot account for it in the categorical way in which it is employed.

The theme of repetition in alteration in the practices of writing and drawing is subsequently focalised in the chapter 'On lines'. Setting off from the signature, which is even administratively recognised as a pictural inscription, writing's and drawing's marks as lines are here pursued as a shared medium. Like calligraphy, the signature broaches the reading of the written text as the mere repetition of letterforms to achieve recognisable characters with drawing's potential of the stroke. Or inversely, the line of drawing finds its verbality in the line of even typewritten text. Though the line always sinuates between drawing and writing, and is irreducible to neither, its medial capacity is usually only considered in the case of writing by hand. However, by proposing it as an iterable unit shared between drawing and writing, graphic verbal marks tout court may be opened up to its sensuous and intelligible production.

The chapter accordingly uses Derrida's iterability to show how Neef's positioning of handwriting between imprint and trace, is not only illimitable to writing by hand but also the result of instituting a dichotomous sameness-otherness divide as its centre. Neef's split of the

5 | the way you are encountering this very [redacted] aspect in the formatted and cleaned up conversation that is the thesis typescript. However, if there are indeed two practices, [redacted] both concerned w the self-same inquiry and through the self-same graphic marks, for both holds that [redacted] for the purposes of the project they function as means of -inquiry rather than means -to-an -end. The practice(s) function(s) [redacted] does) not produce an object of immanent enquiry (the historically available material is much more suited to this effect) rather to enable a reflection on the processual possibilities. constraints and structures of writing and drawing. The drawing or thesis as "work" do not present the resolution of a problem but provide sufficient friction to (having thought) drawing-writing thinking

6/ from the point of practice. Each in R.P.'s and N.B.'s work has been doubly instructive (again, in the 'expanded' sense of practice) as it provided on the one hand the written-drawn precedent that can be drawn upon as the substrate of a writing that is interested in the external artefact ~~[illegible]~~ unknown in its making.

their own ways have become ~~[illegible]~~ about writing practices, practices that - as finite objects, precisely because of the practice of a practice of the practice of writing - are ~~[illegible]~~ to the practice of writing. That is, writing as a style + a ~~[illegible]~~ valued in the reading / viewing / re-writing / re-drawing of them - felt that practice belongs to another, a viewer / reader / writer / drawer

line however, permits us to recognise that no gradual empiricism that continues to polarise the graphic marks of writing and drawing will avoid the institution of what is presumed proper for any graphic practice. That the line may be read and seen is therefore subsequently traced through Lyotard's figure, which produces a thickness or opacity in the reading and viewing of literature and art that results in an excess of signification and irreducible meaning. The figure promotes an understanding of the line that exceeds both the vision of the picture as mere material artefact and the legibility of writing as the transparent transference of communication. Rather, the figure is found in a line that incommensurably partakes in both, thus vacillating between sensuousness and intelligibility. The point of the chapter is not to propose a graphology that suggests that the graphic qualities of writing drive its sensuous appeal or that they facilitate Lyotard's figural in writing. In fact, it asserts that the limitation of writing's figure to a verbal category cannot account for what must thus always be rendered the marginal cases of the signature and calligraphy. The line as structural necessity and shared trait of both drawing and writing, however, accommodates the bothersome case of writing by hand by providing a frame that permits both images and texts to be read and seen whilst being irreducible to either. The line emerges as a repeatable mark, in which the verbal and pictural of writing become inseparably assigned to both legibility and sensuous perception. The line thus possesses medial qualities of its own, which write (history) picturally and verbally, sensuously and intelligibly, without that differentiation to constitute a distinction or result in division.

The following chapter, 'On writing', explores the potential of art-historical writing to address and engage with graphic works that combine images and texts. Both, the artists' work and the writing about it, partake in a shared verbo-pictural practice that inscribes one in the other. Yet, art-historical writing about such works commonly disregards its intervolution with its subject. If part of the scholarly reading of such graphic works involves the characteristics of writing and pictures, how is one to write about them and employ images without also taking up—and perhaps necessarily betraying—the verbo-pictural aspects under discussion? The chapter therefore offers a methodological approach that articulates art-history writing as a creative practice that is not external to the work it elaborates, yet whose language can also never capture its object even within the literary space that it codetermines. Returning to the discussion of ekphrasis, the chapter demonstrates the fictional qualities of art writing that, rather then rendering the discipline illegitimate and being in opposition to the notion of 'fact', reinforce the affordances of multiple interpretative scenarios granted in writing's potential to promote a variety of analytical, narrative, lyrical et cetera responses.

The possibility to offer a unified, homogeneous and linear perspective in writing is shown to be premised on a conception of the practice that predetermines language as a transparent means of communication. Drawing on Derrida's writing on writing and Lyotard's discussion of the figure in discourse, writing is not only shown to instantiate rather than reproduce meaning and sense,

it is also irreducible to any particular writer's intent and exceeds notions of signification and designation. Writing enacts itself in the indivisible space of intelligible and sensuous practice that does not permit a categorical distinction between writing's style, content and form. The particular phrasing of an idea or choice of words are not ultimately translatable into a higher-order content that renders its stylistic and formal constituents merely ornamental. The chapter therefore also insist that the graphic exigencies of writing—which are partly recognised even in the most conservative conceptions of language (i.e. in the acknowledgement of headlines, italics, tables and so one)—must be taken into account, not least because they expressly change the perception of alterity between written texts and the pictures dispersed in it. That certain institutional requirements impose particular relations between image and text, through implicit understandings of writing as univocal and transparent, and of images as mysterious and in need of containment, is challenged in the recognition of multiple figures and pictures in the written text. The chapter therefore functions self-reflexively in its exploration and justification of the methodological decisions made regarding the picto-textual relations this thesis seeks to engage. The methodology is thus also shown as generated from within the concerns of the study rather than belonging to a putatively abstractable concept.

That philosophical writing about art as a graphic practice also partakes in the material, gestural and corporeal strictures of drawing is subsequently addressed in the chapter 'On paper'. Though paper is drawing's and writing's shared substrate, the anchorage of the drawn mark to the sheet, its instantiation as a stroke bound to its ground, is considered different from the detachability of writing's inscription. This chapter pursues the power of writing and drawing practices as indissociable from their material affordances. Setting out from the phrase 'this paper here' and a short line of text in one of Borremans' drawings, it follows a trail of assumptions about paper that render it impossibly blank and infinitely inscribable. The discourse that is developed links the (previous chapter's) possibility to write *about something* with the necessary material inscription of the written mark *as something*. In a self-reflexive movement, the written mark is shown to be unable to refer to itself exclusively, yet concomitantly cannot be detached from its ground either.

With reference to Vilém Flusser's conception of writing and his phenomenological understanding of gestures, the chapter asserts that narrow medial limitations are placed on the understanding of the graphic practices of drawing and writing when they are perceived through the affordances of particular and limited implements and materials. The chapter thus advocates a consideration of the practices that accounts for material characteristics without the imposition of putatively proper uses gleaned from other interactions. Such a consideration is necessarily without a determined border. In particular in view of the graphic mark's relationship to the bodies and implements that produce and sustain it, the section argues that writing's power is not found in a content that is isolable from its material inscription. It follows Derrida's writing on the inseparability of paper from its 'acts' and discusses drawing's blind spots vis-à-vis its material instantiation to show

both practices as irreducible to material objecthood or transcendent discursivity. In showing the intimate connections between drawing and writing acts on paper, the interrelations of gestures, bodies and materials in intellectual, cognitive and affective graphic work is emphasised. As in the foregoing and subsequent chapters, the text continually refers also to itself in order to instantiate that it, too, is deeply involved in the relations and characteristics it explores. The figures similarly, do not merely act as illustrations but demonstrate how the interactions of material, gestural and bodily affordances co-constitute the graphic marks of drawing-writing.

The final chapter, 'On iconicity', zooms out from the close proximity of the mark as medial, material and gestural trace, to consider the relations of drawing and writing to notions of form and meaning. Traditionally, iconicity is understood as the convergence of a sign's meaning and its form, establishing a 'resemblance' or 'similarity' between the two. The graphs of alphabetic writing however, have a conventional relationship to any signified and only very limited aspects of language are regarded as iconic. Considering a letter that refuses to be a mere letter in one of Pettibon's works, the chapter asserts that the lack of iconic 'motivation' of alphabetic characters does not prevent them from harbouring further meanings that are indissociable from their form. The chapter questions the persistent legibility-visibility dichotomy in which writing's letter is trapped between mere allograph, whose graphic appearance beyond readability is irrelevant, and sign, whose semantic value is constituted multiply through its verbal and pictural qualities. Instead, this binary logic is displaced through the development of iconicity as writing's and drawing's capacity to point beyond themselves and yet refer to their own form.

The illegible writing in one of Borremans' drawings is explored as an iconic referral to the form of writing itself by drawing on Winfried Nöth's notion of endophoric iconicity. Writing's repetition in alteration, from the close-up detail of letterforms to the distance of intertextual flows, therefore becomes recognisable as an iconicity that promotes an understanding of writing that is responsive to itself and other writings. Writing like drawing, weaves a pattern that responds to its own graphic mark in which visuality and verbality cannot be divided. Iconicity is thus shown to provide a further vantage point from which to recognise the convergence of drawing and writing. The relations that both share with regard to their repetitive marks and their common capacity to point beyond themselves incommensurably encourages the recognition of writing's form and drawing's conventions. The writing of the chapter, in keeping with those that preceded it, continuously engages with its own inextricable entanglement in the issues discussed. The iconic responsiveness that generates the procession of the chapter is indicated to show how even its textuality is indivisible from the formal aspect of its graphic marks. In discussing iconicity, the chapter also returns to the iconotextual relations that opened the thesis in the 'Framework'.

Framework

In his discussion of Edmund Burke, W.J.T. Mitchell notes that the distinction between wit and judgement can be mapped onto images and words respectively.[1] Wit is considered as the recognition of similarities and resemblances in things, whilst judgement is invoked to tease out differences. In surveying the literature for this project, this dichotomy seems to prevail, fostering two dominant approaches to the engagement with letters and lines, texts and images, the verbal and the picture. On the one hand, the difference between writing and drawing becomes an oppositionality that entrenches, above all, disciplinary boundaries. On the other hand, divergences may be subsumed by an appeal to similarity that cannot account for historical distinctions and establishes its common ground with reference to difference. In broad terms, four branches of academic scholarship that discuss the *issues at stake,* each with its more-or-less distinct methodo- and terminological approaches, and its own form of border patrol, may be distinguished. *Literary studies* (especially comparatists and ekphrastics) are often concerned with an a priori word-image oppositionality that is negotiated in the combination of verbal text and pictures or that oscillates with a text's potential to conjure images. Similarly, *art history* and *visual culture studies* usually take a verbo-pictural difference for granted, considering words a noticeable intrusion into images and ascribing a limitedness, determination and definiteness to the verbal that is lacking in pictures. However, the prolific work of Mitchell and James Elkins in particular, presents a powerful corrective that continuously seeks to disturb categorisations between text and image.[2] *Semiotic* and *linguistic* approaches to the relations of pictures and writing distinguish between them particularly as distinct modes of representation and are commonly rather divisive and structural(ist), especially through a conflation of writing, speech and language. The final and fourth contributor to the debate may partake in any of the other areas of scholarship but usually interrogates the issue with epistemological and/or poststructuralist concerns that seek to acknowledge the structuring and differential power of discourse and implicit metaphysical assumptions at the same time. The present study is guided by this final approach but cannot forswear its fixture in art history and practice, its debt to the critical writing of literary studies concerned with the intervolution of images and texts, and the fertile friction provided by the scientistic categorisations of semiotics.

In the following, an ekphrastic reading is undertaken in order to demonstrate the self-limiting scope of this commonplace literary approach to the relations of words and images. Opening up the tautology at the heart of many definitions of ekphrasis, this disruptive engagement seeks to provide a typically hermeneutic approach to a drawing that contains writing, but also strives to exemplify how implicit assumptions about writing and pictures frame the (possibilities of the) developing discourse at the outset. Though ekphrasis is an effective frame through which the confluence of images and words may be considered, it nevertheless fails structurally to account for its own graphic inscription whilst, paradoxically, at times relying on it. As the ekphrastic approach at least tacitly relies on an assumed translatibility, the relationship of words and images

is subsequently recast through the semiotic premise of verbo-pictural comparability. Translation and its connections to identity are continuously engaged throughout the thesis and are thus here developed in relation and contradistinction to semiotics. The way in which both, the literary and semiotic approach, are engaged has a disruptive element which seeks not only to speak to the entanglement of drawing and writing, but also circumscribes the limitations of disciplinary boundaries.

To begin with, however, a brief historical overview of the general literature is used to accentuate three interlinked observations that can be drawn across the above fields of study and which provide anchorage for the necessary investigations in the following chapters. Firstly, the specific relationship between (literary) writing and drawing is under-explored and usually subsumed into a generalised analysis of word-image studies. The root of this reduction is based on an understanding that differentiates the verbal from the pictural either semiotically, as the linguistic from the non-linguistic sign, or sensorially, the vocative from the haptic, with its extension as the sensuous from the intelligible. The genealogy of the verbo-pictural distinction may be employed to demonstrate its pervasiveness and can be traced from (sixth century BCE) Simonides of Coes in Plutarch's *De Gloria Atheniensium,* to Plato's *Cratylus*, Aristotle's *Poetics*, Horace's *Ars Poetica*, Leonardo's *paragone* up to the present day.[3] It appears that two trains of thought (with a few intermediaries) have developed within this distinction, on the one hand emphasising the sibling rivalry, on the other, the reciprocity between the *sister arts*. The former problematises—and thus, perpetuates—the perception of a cultural struggle for representational superiority, immediacy, vibrance and permanence between two sign systems. The balance of power fluctuates between word and image throughout the centuries; nevertheless, it appears as though the modern understanding is heavily influenced by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's 1836 'Laokoon' essay.[4] Lessing privileges literature over the visual arts (pointing to the limitations of the artist to depict only single-point-of-view events at one moment in time) and establishes the dogma of the temporal character of literature and the spatial character of painting (deduced from the formal order of painting's marks in space and poetry's consecutive sounds in time). Mitchell has demonstrated how Lessing's assertions are a conflation of formal and functional qualities, as well as an ideologically driven preference of the (man-made, masculine, eloquent, Germanic) verbal sign over the (natural, feminine, silent, French) pictural one.[5]

The Horatian *ut pictura poesis* dictum finds its extension today in writers who emphasise the reciprocity and similarities between word and image, and warn against the strident policing and exaggeration of perceived borderlines based on disciplinary segregation.[6] Conversely, scholars such as Shahar Bram and Ernest B. Gilman have cautioned that an understanding of text and image unified in codified representation to regulate all perceivable differences and perpetuate a debate ad infinitum is equally undesirable.[7] What is however noticeable throughout scholarship is the obstinacy of the ossified remains of Lessing's word-image debate. Even scholars who

vocally repudiate the distinctions of the 'Laokoon' regularly employ a short-hand characterisation of either verbal or pictural texts that emulates Lessing (esp. regarding spatiality/temporality, natural/arbitrary signs).[8]

It is therefore not only problematic that the drawing-writing relationship is so widely reduced to that of two different sign systems but also that the discourse is latently anachronistic. A similar observation may be made regarding the critical reception of the two contemporary drawing-writing practitioners on whose work this project repeatedly draws. Aside from the hagiographic character of (gallery-commissioned) publications, they similarly tend to reduce Raymond Pettibon's and Michaël Borremans' drawing-writings to an innate violence and oppositionality between words and images. Pettibon's work especially is often framed through an inalienable incompatibility of verbal and pictural signs which may be flaccidly mapped onto notions of high art (the literary) and low art (the pictural).[9] These ascriptions are, of course, congruent with and redolent of Lessing's preference. Borremans' writing-drawings currently lack thorough critical examination, having only been tentatively explored by Jeffrey D. Grove, but, on the whole, reduced to biographical gallery propaganda.[10] There are no book-length art-historical publications that specifically engage with drawing and writing, however a number of wider word-image surveys exist. By necessity these overviews also conflate any writing (print, type, longhand and so on) to a mere instantiation of language and do not seek to address graphic contingencies between written and drawn marks.[11] They are also on the whole invested in a particular scholarly pursuit that proceeds through typologies and chronologies, and is thus less interested in philosophical disturbances that seriously broach categorisation attempts, especially with regard to writing's own visual capacity.

Secondly, and to return to the observations of the wider literature, the critical engagement with verbo-pictural relationships appears to be dominated by literary theory and linguistics. It is perhaps also evident from the aforegoing gloss of the critical development of word-image studies that the dominant concepts and nomenclature is derived from these two disciplines. A number of scholars—incidentally also from within these disciplines—have highlighted this 'discursive hegemony' or 'linguistic imperialism'.[12] Particularly problematic are attempts to apply language-based systems and concept, such as *syntax*, *grammar*, *seme* and *articulation* to images, as well as discursive notions of *explaining images*. These practices re-in*scribe* language's superiority, rendering images *mute,* mere proxies of linguistics acts.[13]

Similarly problematic is a semiotic approach, even though its attempt may be to capture images and language in a unified and seemingly neutral system of signs. Within this cohesive system of codified representation different signs are relatable and translation between verbal and non-verbal signs, i.e. intersemiotic transposition, is possible. A thorough examination of this supposition follows, however, a few problematic assumptions may be précised here. The comparison with interlingual translation already betrays the underlying imperious hypothesis that any graphic mark

may be reduced to a sign or code which can be treated as language. The presumption is that any mark is reducible to a signifying content that is limited, univocal, self-identical and unmisrepresentable. Furthermore, it seems that the dilemma of how to relate the verbal and non-verbal has merely been delayed and re*interpret*ed as one of translatability, which itself may be described as impossible, but necessary, and inherently utopian. Translation becomes another unifying concept of differential phenomena, presupposing and insisting on systematic comparability rather than pursuing relations beyond consolidated adversity. Moreover, intersemiotic transposition is generally oriented on a Peircean division of signs which itself returns us to a problematic characterisation akin to Lessing's. Peirce separates signs according to their ontological relation to their referents into categories of firstness (icon), secondness (index) and thirdness (symbol).[14] These match relations of similarity, contiguity and law. In the first place, icons (such as images) require only one element because they are participating in characteristics of their referents (resemblance). In the second instance, indices (such as animal spoors) require two elements as they have a causal or existential connexion. Finally, symbols (such as verbal signs) require three elements, because they refer due to habit, law or convention. Such a hierarchical understanding is reminiscent of a Platonic systematisation which *naturalises* some signs and *conventionalises* others and thus establishes a prioritisation premised on perceived origin(ality). Similarly, Nelson Goodman has thoroughly repudiated notions of iconic resemblance or similarity demonstrating that they are insufficient conditions for representation and that knowledge of cultural conventions and codes is similarly necessary to *read* any image.[15]

The third observation reviewing the wider literature of the field concerns the apparent scope of the scholarship of verbo-pictural relations. The majority of intermedial research from language-based disciplines concentrates on the *verbal* representation of pictural, sculptural or architectural works (e.g. ekphrases or iconotexts). Similarly, common art-historical approaches are largely focused on the graphic or painterly *depictions* of literary themes (e.g. Erwin Panofky's iconography and iconology[16]). Usually both disciplines—in line with their a priori acceptance of the strict categorical difference between text and image—do not consider writing as already pictural or drawing as potentially discursive, as they do not recognise the figure in writing and verbality in drawing. Although important and valid aspects of intermedial inquiry, such studies therefore encounter artistic works as essentially monomedial. Mitchell asserts that there are no monomedial texts, because from the vantage point of their mode they are already contaminated and may be visual, textual, kinetic et cetera at once.[17] Yet the overlap of reading and seeing, and the verbal and the visual is commonly disregarded in literary or art-historical accounts. Intermediality is here predominantly a hermeneutic or genetic phenomenon. The unintended consequence of enshrining the perceived separation and incompatibility of verbo-pictural texts will become apparent in the following discussion of ekphrasis.

In the following sections and chapters, the three critical observations drawn out in this brief

review of the literature provide the basis through which a destabilisation of their underlying premises is undertaken. The thesis will thus deliberately work against a conflation of writing and language, and seeks to offer *an image* of writing without a unified centre. Wherever *language* is used as a term in the following, it seeks to refer to a process of signification and designation whilst *writing* is characterised by making sense, that is, by producing sense in the incommensurable overlap of sensuous intelligibility and intelligible sensorium. The graphic intervolution of drawing and writing provides a friction point through which other aspects of word-and-image relations can be engaged. The thesis seeks to deconstitute and displace the verbo-imperialist nomenclature that it inherits through a responsive discourse that refers to something outside of language but must acknowledge its embeddedness in the strictures of language. The offering that is made is therefore not a reinforcement of paradigms and canons but the continuous opening of the uncontainable and divergent practice of drawing-writing.

Ekphrasis

Ekphrastic discourse is commonly posited on an underlying, rarely questioned supposition, that of a categorical difference between verbal and—so-called—sensuous representation. Ekphrasis, whether in James Heffernan's oft-quoted dictum 'the verbal representation of a visual representation', John B. Bender's 'literary descriptions of real or imagined works of visual art', Leo Spitzer's 'the reproduction, through the medium of words, of sensuously perceptible *objets d'art* (*ut pictura poesis*)' or Murray Krieger's 'the imitation in literature of a work of plastic art', appears to imply an oppositionality between language and sensuous perceptibility and especially language and visuality/visibility.[18] Implicitly, any of these definitions makes writing a purely intellectual matter, forgoing the necessity of sensory perception: to hear words being spoken, to read—viz. to see—sentences being written or to feel the embossing of Braille cells. Literature and language in this sense are removed from any necessity for material (aural/visual/tactile) dissemination and function as transcendent thought or inviolable logos. Or perhaps conversely, if language is used to communicate via any of these means, they must be characterised by a presumed transparency which permits unmitigated, even unmediated access to some lingual core, presumably somewhere beyond them, behind them or in them.

Although other framings of ekphrasis exist—for examples those by George Sainsbury or Wendy Steiner which emphasise the particular vividness with which a subject matter is invoked and thus share a more direct link with the understanding of the term in classical literature[19]—what is the scope of ekphrasis when, by definition, it frequently and a priori declares itself as beyond the sensuous and in particular beyond the visible? The graphic character of verbal texts cannot be dis*regard*ed (except under the mantle of a transcendent logos) particularly in a culture, in which ekphrastic poetry and prose is commonly encountered as written text, in contrast to ancient oral traditions.[20] In considering the ekphrastic encounter between writing and pictures not as one

ALL THE WINDOWS TEND TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. A WRACK STAINED HEAVENLY BLUE.

BUT LET ME PLACE YOU ONCE MORE WHERE WE STOOD FOR A WHILE. (A LITTLE MORE FACE TO FACE.)

AND CONSCIOUS, TOO, OF LIGHTS BY THE WAY. AND LIGHTING OUR SHARE -- STAYING TAPER-SQUARE ALWAY.

OH! A WAYFARING MAN MAY BREAK HIS FAST: FIRE IS HALF BREAD! (FULL OF MOTHER MARY.) (LEAVENED LIGHT.) (HARD AS CRUST, LIGHT AS AIR) (WHITE!) (AND BLUE FLAME).

VAST ILLUMINATIONS. (WHICH HAVE VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATED FOR ME.) NOT NEEDING ANY BOOK. (IT IS TO MARY I WRITE.) TO HER.

'FOREVER YOURS' AS SURELY AS HAMMER AND CHISEL ALLOW: I GRAVED YOUR TRUTH IN STONE TO SHOW HOW: I'VE BEEN SHOWING (STANDING STILL) THESE 600 YEARS.

THE DIVIDING LINES MAKE US THINK OF A RETICLE.

ABUNDANCE OF WAXLIGHTS. (BETWEEN THEM THEY KEEP THE THING GOING.)

THE CHAIN MILLENIUM...

(CONNECTING THE DOTS OF LIGHT (10,000 POINTS OF LIGHT ON THE HEAD MAKE A HALO) AND HALF WHAT YOU SEE ARE THE WATTAGE I PAID FOR (A CHUMP SUM OF CHANCE STACKED TO THE LOOSE END OF MY TETHER I'LL HOPE STEEPLE-STEEP AND SPIRE-HIGHER) - THE HALF-WATTS IN ME ADD UP TO A RAY OF LIGHT SO HALF-LIT IT MAKES MY PINHEAD SPINWHEEL LIKE A HEAD COUNT OF ANGELS ON WHEELS -- BUT THAT CAN'T BE ME - I'M AFRAID OF MY SELF (GRAB SOME ASS HANDLEHOLD AND LEAN BACK ON MY SISSY BAR) -- I WASN'T AN ANGEL IN 1903.

AND THEN THERE IS THE WINDOW IN THE REAR WALL AND THAT WINDOW, TOO, IS DIVIDED GEOMETRICALLY, INTO FOUR PERFECTLY IDENTICAL SQUARES.

THE SCRIBE'S HAND HAD STRAYED HERE INTO MAZY BORDERS.

AND FROM FACTS TO LUMINOUS DOCTRINE. (SUCH THINGS WERE NEARLY ALWAYS SHAPES.)

LET US GO DOWN AND GET A LITTLE MORE SUNSHINE.

(SOME OF THE COMPANY DECLARED THE MOONLIGHT TO BE RESPLENDENT.)

WITH THAT UNERRING PROPORTION OF LIGHT AND SHADOW, EMPHASIS AND OMISSION, REMEMBRANCE AND OBLIVION, WHICH CONSCIOUS MEMORY AND OBSERVATION WILL NEVER KNOW. I KNOW TOO WELL HOW EASILY THE PICTURES LEFT BY THE MIND CAN BE EFFACED BY THE MIND.

AS YET WE ARE ONLY IN 1311.

that occurs between distinct rubrics of verbal and visual representation but as an encounter that is promoted in the shared space of visibility, this section aims to reposition writing and drawing within a shared graphic dimension in blatant contrast to much literary criticism. Raymond Pettibon's untitled (*All the windows …*)—a drawing with large sections of verbal script or, alternatively, a piece of writing with pictural elements—will be used to explore the graphic encounter between ekphrastic writing and drawing and between ekphrastic writing and the 'object' of its ekphrasis. The collocation of writing and drawing would usually promulgate a discussion of the supposed oppositionality or reciprocity of word-image relations and expound the characteristics of two different symbol systems. In contrast, the following study will propose the encounter as an opportunity to (re-)introduce the *graphic* as a *trait* (shared) between writing and drawing. In accord with Richard Meek and David Kennedy's understanding, ekphrasis is here approached neither as a site of antagonism nor as a convergence of the sisterly arts, but rather as a locus of a productive encounter.[21]

Whilst Pettibon's early drawings (1978-1981) included only short sentences, brief utterances that functioned as one-liners, his verbal texts have over time become longer or have included an accumulation of short utterances.[22] Pettibon's drawing-writings of the 1980s to late 1990s often contain large sections of writing that paraphrase, quote or respond to canonical, especially nineteenth-century, writers. Usually, there are no explicit references to specific authors or sources, but Pettibon draws repeatedly on an eclectic literary mix including Henry James, Mickey Spillane, John Ruskin, Saint Augustine, Charles Baudelaire and Art Clokey.[23] The verbal elements of Pettibon's work, however, whether traceable to an intertextual referent or not, never provide a caption to the drawn parts, and neither are the drawings illustrations to the writing. Writing and drawing, rather, encounter each other in a fluid and complex entanglement of meanings that are irreducible to single narratives or internal clarity. Pettibon's own professed interest in the aforementioned writers and their work is equally not for narrative or story, but for prose and the form their writing takes.[24] Although all of Pettibon's work seems concerned with the relationship of writing and image-making, only a number of his drawings appear to address the encounter of collocated verbo-pictural representation directly by juxtaposing images and text that seem to depict and describe similar spaces, objects and actions.

The image in the centre of Pettibon's untitled 1990 ink-and-tempera writing-drawing depicts through its negative space the arching forms of windows or gates. Surrounding these are verbal fragments which seem to describe either an architectural space or the visual representation of such a space:

> ALL THE WINDOWS TEND TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. A WRACK STAINED HEAVENLY BLUE.
> BUT LET ME PLACE YOU ONCE MORE WHERE WE STOOD FOR A WHILE. (A LITTLE MORE FACE TO FACE.)

AND CONSCIOUS, TOO, OF LIGHTS BY THE WAY. AND LIGHTING OUR SHARE
– STAYING TAPER-SQUARE ALWAY.
VAST ILLUMINATIONS.
THE DIVIDING LINES MAKE US THINK OF A RETICLE.
ABUNDANCE OF WAXLIGHTS. (BETWEEN THEM THEY KEEP THE THING GOING.)
THE CHAIN MILLENNIUM … CONNECTING THE DOTS OF LIGHT
BELL ROPE STEEPLE-STEEP AND SPIRE-HIGHER
AND THEN THERE IS THE WINDOW IN THE REAR WALL AND THAT WINDOW, TOO, IS DIVIDED GEOMETRICALLY, INTO FOUR PERFECTLY IDENTICAL SQUARES.
WITH THAT UNERRING PROPORTION OF LIGHT AND SHADOW, EMPHASIS AND OMISSION, REMEMBRANCE AND OBLIVION, WHI ● H CONSCIOUS MEMORY AND OBSERVATION WILL NEVER KNOW. I KNOW TOO WELL HOW EASILY THE PICTURE LEFT BY THE MIND CAN BE EFFACED BY THE MIND.

The assembled sentences are fragmented, even fractured, allowing only selective glimpses rather than a panoptic surveillance of a space. The spasmodic character of these glances is furthermore emphasised as these (parts of) images or architectural structures do not appear in one continuous text block, but are themselves fitfully distributed across the cardboard backdrop and interrupted intermittently by other dissonant voices and the central pictural element. The fractions moreover do not constitute segmentation as they do not seem to follow pre-existing lines of division or construction of a building. How can we then talk of iconotexts or even ekphrasis?

In *Poetics of the Iconotext*, Liliane Louvel distinguishes a number of features that contribute to determining the pictorial qualities of a text.[25] Louvel uses these features to understand how verbal texts construct images or architectural spaces. The presence of certain technical vocabulary such as colours ('stained heavenly blue'), perspective ('dividing lines', 'divided geometrically', 'unerring proportion', 'reticle'), lines and forms ('taper-square', 'identical squares') may therefore be taken as initially affirmative markers of iconotextual or ekphrastic writing. Furthermore, the two phrases 'but let me place you once more where we stood for a while' and '(A little more face to face.)' can be identified as 'the staging of the opening […] operators of pictorial description'.[26] Such operators may function on a number of levels: visually, for example through typographic marks or blanks; grammatically, for instance in a particular use of punctuation or repetitive word/phrase structures; or literarily, through narrative frames. It is noteworthy that this staging occurs at the top of the work, and thus at the beginning of a linear reading, making the remainder contingent on this information. This particular spatial placement therefore seems to affirm a reading sequence associated with writing on the page rather than drawing on sheets. Although this is certainly not at odds with the all-overness of marks in drawing, it does, however, emphasise and draw attention to the remainder of the verbal text which is disjointedly distributed and cannot

therefore be read along the same lines, i.e. along a straight line. The graphic scatteredness of the other paragraphs all over this drawing finds its small-scale counterpart in the stress on visual clues contained in discrete typographic elements.

Although the place in question is not explicitly named, there are certain erratic utterances that place us in a vast church or cathedral. In reading the verbal text, we constantly meander between seeing and not seeing, visibility and invisibility, catching a glimpse and being blind in the space. The 'abundance of waxlights' which 'between them […] keep the thing going' points at the dimensions of the space, whilst 'steeple' and 'spire' restrict the type of building further. Multiple occurrences of Mother Mary, as well as the accumulation of terms more commonplace in ecclesial contexts (e.g. 'taper', 'angel', 'waxlights', 'halo', 'leavened light') underlines this notion. The reader-viewer of this drawing catches only occasional glances of a space that is seemingly mediated by the flickering candles in the gloom.

The intermittent peeks into the space are redoubled in Pettibon's use of typographical framing effects that effectively capture glimpses of the eye emblematically. The parenthesising in '(Full of Mother Mary.)', '(White!)', '(And blue flame)', '(Such things were nearly always shapes.)' becomes the blinking of an eye, drifting from merely distinguishable object to object in a candle-lit space. This (typo)graphical operator is twofold. Firstly, it is the opening of the eyelid, abbreviated to a parenthesis (framing the object together with the closing of the eyelid, concluded by a parenthesis). Secondly, this operator functions on a pictural level, as well:

(O)

the *o*bject caught in the eye.

The fragmentary dissipation of paragraphs, sentences, phrases and occasionally single words in the drawing is, however, also indicative of Pettibon's own reading habits. Pettibon has repeatedly stated that he is not interested in reading for narrative or plot, but that his

> reading has become more microscopic, more about dissecting the work. It may start on the level of the novel, then go down to theme or style, then to a paragraph and finally a sentence. Or the sentence itself becomes about structure, or the words in it. […] Every text becomes related to another one, even in a different language, down to each individual word, which then becomes a clue into the etymology of the word, and then that etymological tree.[27]

As if dissected from a greater corpus, Pettibon's drawing presents textual fragments to the viewer that may or may not share a common source and that may or may not contribute to the formation of a cohesive structure. It is as if Pettibon's interest in the associative potential of fragments is put to the test when he (re)combines them in a single drawing. The artist himself and some of his critics, such as Christa-Maria Lerm Hayes and Ann Temkin, have commented on the relatedness of Pettibon's own reading habits and those provoked by James Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.[28] As a reader, Pettibon is drawn to narrative interruption or inconsistency, as a writer/drawer he similarly seeks to prevent singular meanings and wants to retain the openness of verbo-pictural associations.

In the untitled drawing, Pettibon's disruption of continuity and cohesion is, however, not limited to paragraphs, sentences or phrases. Orthographic deviations are also observable. Pettibon's ink splotches act as extra-alphabetic characters that revise the spelling of verbal text. Orthography breaks down in 'A wayfaring man may brea■ his fast'. A potential 'k' is replaced or blotted out by an un-utterable spot. Considering a drawing by Valerio Adami, Jacques Derrida describes this kind of obstinate sign, one that seemingly belongs to language but refuses to be legible, as a mark which no 'glottic thrust of reading [...] snatches […] from the surface'.[29] Snatched from the discourse of language, the unpronounceable character draws forth its own orthography of a word whose meaning is irrevocably altered. It perhaps captures breaking visually by breaking the k. Or, near the bottom of the cardboard, the circular blot that seems to counter the abundance of round unfilled Os around it and also acts as a black hole which sucks in all the 'light and shadow, emphasis and omission', which will therefore remain forever unobserved and unknown, according to the speaker. How semantically important such marks and their interrelations are, depends on whether they are approached as belonging to the study of drawing or writing. In drawing, the smallest mark may be semantically significant and is contingent on all marks around it. In writing, letterform deviation is permissible but semantically meaningless as long as the mark remains identifiable as a particular expression of one character. Pettibon's writing not only includes graphic characters that are beyond the standard alphabet, but it also displays contingencies of marks associated with drawing. Trying to read Pettibon's text therefore challenges certain conventions of writing. In the untitled drawing, reading either breaks down (because characters cannot be identified) or the reader accepts a modified orthography or new kind of lexicon. This lexicon, however, is open to reading, not as vocabulary, as it is precisely not vocal, but as graphism.

Louvel points out how the *incipit* of A.S. Byatt's prologue to *The Virgin in the Garden* 'constitutes an emblematic example of the reader's entrance into the story and […] form[s] a typographic portico, at the top of the steps of the Prologue'.

Prologue
The National Gallery
1968[30]

The parameters that allow Louvel to describe the incipit as an entrance and portico are not accessible in language as transcendent thought, but are embedded in the visibility of writing. Here writing's visual aspects display their semantic value which makes it difficult to describe them only in terms of supposed ornamental (i.e. semantically irrelevant) qualities. Leading, centring, font, and capitalisation are the typo- and orthographic parameters that determine the (emblematic) reading of the text. Pettibon similarly employs his handwriting *chirographically* as an operator of and for vision. It is still common today to speak of someone's *hand* when referring to the idiosyncratic style of his or her writing. Handwriting thus claims graphic qualities that are shared with drawing and exceed mere linguistics. The dual position between writing and

drawing is preserved in the term chirography which at once describes the *drawing* and the *writing* (graphein) of the *hand* (cheiro).

The 'wrack' we are trying to picture crumbles further under Pettibon's lopsided, irregular hand, with each uneven text block contributing a crooked wall. Pettibon's writing is at once drawn and written. As he *draws* and *pulls* the inked nib across the paper, Pettibon's ductus—the graphic quality of his lines—changes flexibly and deliberately. The German word *Schriftzug* draws out some of the versatility of Pettibon's script. Contextually often translated as lettering, it actually describes the 'pull/draw of script(ing)', accentuating the physicality and materiality of writing and the particular visibility that each different pull or draw of the pen brings with it. In the untitled drawing, Pettibon utilises a griffonage of irregular capitals as though to build this edifice as a mason not a bricklayer. Just as the paragraphic fragments appear scattered, so individual letters skip on an invisible baseline which at times trails upwards and downwards. Toward the centre of the image, the text compacts to a niggle, a small cramped hand, that adds dense compression to the whole structure's appearance of imbalance and ill-planning. The iconotextual or ekphrastic cathedral of Pettibon's drawn and written text is constructed partly by the visual appearance of its very own *script*orial de*script*ion. Hans Rudolf Reust's observation about Pettibon's drawings of individual letters can therefore be applied to the untitled drawing, as well. The artist's drawing shows 'writing without restricting [itself] to a linguistic analysis or calligraphic approach.'[31] Letters are here neither reducible to a conventional understanding of writing as one of multiple interchangeable expressions of language, nor can they be contained as non-verbal pictures only. Reust suggests that Pettibon, as an artist, cannot help but apply the pictural qualities of drawing to writing. His work is thus characterised by a 'heterotopic self-reflection'[32] that applies the principles of one graphic mode to the other. Pettibon's writing exceeds fundamental restrictions of the alphabet because it is also already drawing.

It becomes apparent that Pettibon's writing exceeds any merely allographic function. The infinite number of glyphs of his lettering are not variant forms (allographs) reducible to an underlying letter or grapheme; rather, the reading of each of his letters is irreducibly bound up in its graphic qualities and contingent on its surrounding. Similarly, the break, leading and line length of a paragraph are not so much constituted by the pragmatics of writing as noted language but rather are constitutive of particular readings and viewings of this writing. Peter Schjedahl has previously commented how Pettibon's work has the capacity to shift reading processes based on the absence of simple punctuation. He notes how the absence of a comma creates a semantic shift that can only be explained by something that is missing.[33] In Pettibon's writing, the blank is thus not a meaningless void but part of a structural framework for reading. The communicative semantic value of the text is embedded in its materially graphic form and therefore produces a setting in which writing cannot be reduced to a placeholder value of speech. When the graphic of Pettibon's para*graphic*, chiro*graphic* and ortho*graphic Schriftzüge* comes to the fore, writing's

structural necessity and iconic potential as materially inscribed mark is emphasised.

Differentiating verbal sign systems from drawing, musical transcription and other symbol systems, Nelson Goodman explains in his germinal book *Languages of Art* that notational systems fulfil five characteristics. Though Goodman's analysis may have lost traction with some sections of art historians, his detailed comparisons of writing systems and visual artefacts remain particularly valuable to word-image scholars interested in *notational iconicity* and *Bildgrammatik*.[34] In brief, he proposes that notational systems are syntactically disjointed with each mark only belonging to one character and all characters being in principle interchangeable because they form the same equivalence class. As an additional syntactical feature, these systems are finitely differentiated (articulate), the reader can assign to which character a mark belongs. Semantically, characters of notational systems are unequivocally consigned to one 'compliance class' of reference, no matter what context.[35] Still semantically, for a system to qualify as notational it has to be disjoint, i.e. what it refers to may not overlap with the reference of another character. Finally, a true notational system is (semantically) finitely differentiated: it is unambiguously clear to which symbol an item in the field of reference conforms.[36] Natural languages have notational qualities as they generally fulfil the syntactical requirements, but fall short semantically because they comprise homonyms (i.e. both homophones and homographs), which are ambiguous, and are insufficiently disjointed, as certain referents overlap (e.g. writer, parent and woman). Pictures fail both syntactically and semantically. In particular, Goodman describes pictures as 'dense': not only does the smallest difference between two marks (syntactically) produce two different characters (potentially within different equivalence classes), but two minutely different characters may (semantically) also have different referents.[37]

Goodman's observations with regard to semantic as well as syntactic characteristics of writing appear to jar with the foregoing reading of Pettibon's texts, whose graphics were indissolubly linked with its reading yet also incommensurable with any attempt to limit their semantic and syntactic scope. Pettibon not only expands, saturates and overlaps the fields of reference in his writing but also further dissolves writing's semantic differentiation. If letters, phrases or even paragraphs were isolated it would increase the lack of clarity towards what field of reference they are directed. Only in the contingency of the remainder of the work can they be directed towards a referent. Moreover, every forced ligature, every suppressed dot, every squeezed, mangled, unidentifiable letter also chips away at syntactic differentiation: it becomes increasingly difficult to tell which mark constitutes which letter and an excess of extra-alphabetic characters are introduced. As with the drawn element of this work, the writing (and its reading) becomes more obviously discontinuous, incongruous, contingent on everything around it. Reading individual elements relies exceedingly on the capturing of the surrounding components. The non-linearity of the reading – so commonplace in reading of drawing – is doubly heightened, firstly, through the disjointed distribution of the text itself, and secondly through the seemingly irreverent and

erratic dispersion of voices and references. If, as previously observed, Pettibon is a reader and writer of fragments, these fragments do not have to follow the rules of left-to right, top-to-bottom linearity of writing in Latin script. Pettibon describes his own reading as 'swimming in words and letters.'[38] His reading is non-consecutive and non-linear. It progresses by linking disparate elements through the associative potential inherent in writing. And yet, this kind of reading is closely linked to viewing the all-overness of graphic marks in drawing. Pettibon's own writing has thus taken on some of the syntactic and semantic qualities Goodman would have associated with drawing. In fact, it is as if the letters, syllables, words, clauses, sentences are written and drawn upon with multiple hands. Derrida's observation regarding Adami's drawing in '+R (into the bargain)' reverberates here: 'Each letter, bit, or piece of a word is written with two hands, on each page, twice two hands: formal writing, discursive writing, picto-ideo-phonogram for a single concerto, dominated by a single instrument.'[39]

In the instrument that *marks* both writing and drawing, that re-*marks* every letter inside and outside of language without limiting it to either, we *re*-cognise the trait. The *trait* that is at once mark, trace, drawn line, brushstroke and the feature (trait) common to both writing and drawing. It is the ductus that is shared, yet dissimilar, between the line drawn and the line written, both issuing from their common *graphein*, their shared debt and gift.[40] Irreducible to either form or content, the *trait* marks the space between writing and drawing by connecting and separating the two, and yet it is not the originary difference between the two, because it neither arrives ahead of its two neighbours, nor is it without them. As Derrida proposes, in being nothing but the 'gap, opening, differentiality, trace, border, traction, effraction [it is] structurally in withdrawal',[41] it is on the *retreat*, *withdrawing* itself; only marked in the two neighbours that it, in turn, marks. Removal and effacement are therefore structural traits of the *trait*, the *trait* is always already *retrait* (withdrawal/retreat). And in withdrawing, the trait re-marks itself, re-traces (*retrait*) itself, is at once 'withdrawn/re/drawn'.[42] And although the common trait of both writing and drawing 'is never common, nor even one, with and without itself. Its divisibility founds text, traces and remains.'[43]

Doubly marked, stroke by stroke—*trait pour trait*, *Zug um Zug*—carrying the traits of drawing but also writing, is also the centralised cavernous black frame that seemingly silhouettes Gothic windows, glimpsed from varying perspectives. The drawing is crude and seemingly reduces the depicted architecture to a giant chop mark, a character stamp or hieroglyphic trace. It is itself a stylised picture abstracted into shorthand. What separates it from the discourse of language is that we do not know its pronunciation, and neither does it admit to being an extra-alphabetic character. In its negative space, or differently: in its absence and withdrawal is drawn the side elevation of a cathedral space with multiple parenthetically shaped entrances. It is a graphic reflexion of the multiplicity of assembled fragments and entrances of the space described and pictorialised by the paragraphs encircling it. This is therefore not an illuminated manuscript in which pictures surround words but rather the work of Pettibon as glossographer. The framing paragraphs act as

glosses for a text drawn in the mystical tongue of the image. The drawing-writing returns itself to its ecclesial home by retracing itself in the image of the medieval gloss of the unexplained text, God's unrepresentability, his words unfolded in marginalia. Yet, it is not only God's logos, but also one that tries to contain the mysterious power of the image. This logos wants to take hold of the image, to control and contain it. And lastly, the logos that reduces writing to be a stand-in of speech; a logos that finds in each letter the allograph for an unspoken phoneme.

Pettibon's graphic sketch is however also the floor plan-cum-side elevation that navigates the cathedral space through its windows. It shows, perspectivally, the ground floor aisle windows (or perhaps clerestory) either side of the nave, the central ones of the chancel, and, below, the smaller ones of the narthex. What it withholds is merely the transept set crosswise to the nave. In this church, nothing separates the nave from the chancel; it remains a church without a cross.

The writing and drawing in Pettibon's work has thus also *drawn* together Derrida's two German lines and translations of the *trait* 'toward where the two "families" cross – that of *Riss* [...] and that of *Zug*'.[44] Derrida uses the *trait* to mark the connection that is also the separation between what is supposedly antithetical, such as drawing and writing. The German translations of *trait*, which Derrida uses to think about the irreducible difference yet shared path of Heidegger's *Dichten und Denken* (poetry and thought),[45] are especially fruitful for the word-image discussion promoted by Pettibon's untitled drawing. On the one hand, there is the *trait* of *ziehen*, which retreats (re*trait*, zurück*ziehen*) and withdraws (re*trait,* ent*ziehen,* ver*ziehen*): the 'withdrawal, unappearance, and effacement of the mark of language',[46] but also the one to whom both drawing and writing are attracted (an*ziehen*) and which draws them together (zusammen*ziehen*). The materiality of language is drawn forth and out (heraus*ziehen*) in Pettibon's Schrift*zug*, which both writes and draws. Or differently, Pettibon's drawing of a line (Linien*zug*) marks the hyphenation (*trait* d'union) of the compounds word-image and writing-drawing. It belongs to both and neither. And, on the other hand, there is the *trait* of *reißen*, the *trait* that cuts (*reißen*, *Riss*) both graphic neigbours, writing the graphics of drawing into writing and the graphics of writing into drawing, inscribing the one in the other. The trait that traces the lines (*Risse*) of the cathedral's sketch (Um*riss*), its side elevation (Auf*riss*), its navigational floor plan (Grund*riss*, Ab*riss*), its abstracted representation (Ab*riss*), and finally its fragmented downfall (Ab*riss*).

Thomas Mießgang perhaps imagines this kind of reading of Pettibon's work when he claims that 'the French school' and 'deconstructive terms [such] as "dissemination," "trace," and "différance" appear [...] to fit the proliferation of ideas and the polystylistic expressive joy of [Pettibon's] drawings as snug as a glove.'[47] He does not offer any detailed consideration of his own, but the richness provided by the untitled drawing and Derrida's trait hints at the dense net of readings that may be undertaken. Pettibon's drawn writing or written drawing exploits and explores written language through its inky materiality. It shows the impotence of a desire that wants writing's meaning to be a contained, higher content that is allographically located outside the visibility of script. To read

the untitled drawing allographically is to transliterate it into a state of amorphous insubstantiality that is semantically irrelevant. This shapeless conception of writing looks for textual meaning outside its form and material and would, therefore, not only need to object to Louvel's portico example in A.S. Byatt, but also reject any other (typo-/chiro-/ortho-/para-)graphic form, from italics, to capitalisation, to line breaks et cetera. This implicitly also refutes any possibility of a successful transcription of Pettibon's verbal text unless it reproduces the *graphic* characteristics of his writing. The foregoing 'quotation' from Pettibon's untitled drawing-writing is therefore, at best, a mere allographic transcription that, in separating form from content, already reinstates the false divisibility of writing and its visuality. In re-drawing and re-tracing Pettibon's words in an-other graphic (allo-graphic), the transcribed quotation also withdraws his writing from itself, and forces a retreat of writing into an allographic language of infinitely homologous and substitutable graphics. However, far from suggesting a recuperation of graphology, the morphology of script and type is rather a necessary consideration in the discourse about writing which is irreducible to and not to be confused with the discourse of language. Thus, the *scope*, in both senses, of writing lies (also) in the way it is written.

Bryan Wolf similarly uses an inverse form-weight analogy to describe how language is 'reified into objects [with] weight and heft of its own' when textual semantics are also graphic.[48] This objecthood '"desublimates" language back to a physical state and empowers words by rendering them visual things'.[49] This observation, however, appears biased or, at least, seems to betray an implicit expectation. The emergent power attributed to the new objecthood of language is the same usually attributed to images. Wolf recognises that a conflict within Western tradition arises with the idea that words can manage and harness (the mysterious danger of) images but have to relinquish that selfsame control when they are de-sublimated to the same state. This is precisely at the crux of the expectational bias: language can only be *lowered* in its state if it had previously been raised up (*sublimare*). The expectant belief in the transcendental character of logos must precede any observation of language's climb-down. This is the place where the amorphous insubstantiality of allographic reading coincides with the belief in a transcendent logos, allowing for unmediated access to truth, while implicitly advocating either a transparency or an invisibility of the material under scrutiny.

To return one last time to Louvel's markers for the pictorial in literary texts, it is useful to identify the general 'immobility and absence of movement' in the verbal text.[50] Overall, it is characterised by a dearth of verbs and most of those used revolve around (re)cognition ('know', 'think', 'see'), stasis ('place', 'stood', 'staying') or are auxiliary ('can', 'will', 'make'). The choice of verbs presents a glossal stasis that broaches Lessing's insistence for language to de*scribe* actions rather than de*pict* objects and spaces.[51] The rejection of this notion in Pettibon's work is perhaps further emphasised by tracing the provenance of an earlier line of this untitled drawing to the oft-ekphrastic writer Walter Pater. 'But let me place you once more where we stood for a while', taken from Pater's

'Vézelay' (1894), inaugurated the iconotextual character of this piece (as noted above) and Pater's own subsequent pictorial description constructs an ecclesial space comparable to Pettibon's. As Pater's narrator crosses the church's aisle, perspectives shift and the gaze is constantly drawn from one detail to the next.[52] Architectural features are presented in quick succession, seemingly only guided by the eyes' erratic movement through the space. Pettibon excerpts 'But let me place you once more where we stood for a while', thus announcing the description to follow, and then exploits the material space of the cardboard substrate to capture the unsettled gaze of the reader as viewer and the viewer as reader.

Pettibon, a voracious reader, is clearly aware of the ekphrastic nature of Pater's text[53] and, in responding and answering to it, he also manages to translate and transpose it into his own *picto-ideo-phonogrammic* way. To describe Pettibon's process as translation or transposition however, only further complicates the relationship between writing and drawing, as will be explored below. Furthermore, as if to celebrate his own verbo-picto-architectural construction, Pettibon takes his leave with another quotation, ripped out of context, but part of a text that is exemplary in expressing how place and material encourage sensory perception and engage the body to trigger involuntary memory. Near the bottom of the work, Pettibon quotes from Proust's *Time Regained* (1927):

> And here too was the proof of the trueness of the whole picture formed out of those contemporaneous impressions which the first sensation brings back in its train, with those unerring proportions of light and shade, emphasis and omission, memory and forgetfulness to which conscious recollection and conscious observation will never know how to attain.[54]

The trueness of Pettibon's whole picture, then, is that he has created a text, both visually and verbally—though never separate—that engages the memory and imagination in a way that (re) constructs a place out of seemingly erratic scraps, which are dispersed and co-mingled. His construction occurs through a complex verbo-pictural interweaving in which words and pictures share visibility and visuality. Pettibon's work emphasises how writing is graphic and *pictural* in order for it to function *pictorially*.

In considering the diverse graphic qualities of writing, we can consider the ekphrastic encounter of pictures and words through their shared common graphic qualities. Applying Louvel's markers for iconotextal and ekphrastic texts to the reading of Pettibon's untitled work, demonstrates that the pictorial qualities of writing are irreducible to an sublimated understanding of writing as transcendent logos, but are, rather, bound up in the complex interlocking of verbal and pictural characteristics of writing itself. Writing irrepressibly remains a graphic trace, funambulating the *trait* common to pictures and scriptorial language. Ekphrasis in this way is thus irreconcilable with any notion that categorically seeks to differentiate writing and literature from visibility or sensuous perceptibility. To oppose verbal and visual representation is, therefore, to forget that the rubric of writing is not identical with the one of language.

Pettibon exemplifies how writing in general possesses pictural qualities which are syntactically and semantically significant for its signification. The complexity opened up by the volatile effect

that graphic considerations introduce to the reading of written texts—a process that is always bound to be insufficient and perpetually to-be-continued—should, however, not encourage a conflation of writing and speech into a general allographic linguistics that dis*regard*s and is *deaf* to the traits of the very (written and oral) verbal texts under scrutiny. The intricate operation of reading will not become easier or more containable—quite the opposite, in fact—but the plurality of graphic traits proposes a rich encounter between words and images.

In intermedial literature that encounters the image in the text, for example as ekphrasis or concrete poetry, as a matter of semiotic exchange—there is a noticeable absence of semiotic literature addressing the text in the image—their connection is commonly framed as one of translation. It is, however, as if denominating a process or action alone already implied the partial unknitting of the verbo-pictural text.

Translation

'+R (into the bargain)', one of Derrida's essays that perhaps most explicitly grapples with the graphic confluences of the verbal and the pictural, reproduces two 'Studies for a drawing after *Glas*' by Adami.[55] These studies themselves are purportedly (and as their title suggests) works that Adami made in response to or dialogue with Derrida's *Glas*. In appropriating Derrida's text and signature, Adami provides a pictural reading of Derrida's work, which Derrida returns through '+R' by (re-)reading his own earlier text through Adami's studies. The challenges of these readings en abyme—the 'convertibility' of image and text, the distinction between the verbal letter and the pictural mark, and the instability of meaning of both writing and pictures—arising in the exchange between writer and artist, can however be recognised as concentrated versions of broader interdisciplinary phenomena.

In order to characterise semiotically what is 'carried across' from image to text or text to image, the exchange between writing and pictures will, in the following, be considered as one of translation. How may we *identi*fy the picture in writing and writing in the picture? What is the picture's identity in writing and writing's identity in the picture? To facilitate this analysis, Derrida's impossible law of translation is tested on transpositions between pictures and writing. In contrast to existing intersemiotic literature, the application of Derrida's law seeks to find the image in the text or the text in the image through divergences rather than semiotic conflations. To begin with however, we need to determine what marks the identity of an image in writing, or differently, what is it, that makes the image identifiable in writing?

Any assumption of transfer between picture and writing that permits the recognition of the one in the other will need to balance that selfsame recognition with the necessary difference incurred in the passage. Derrida proposes in *The Other Heading* that those markers we attribute to constitute identity are in themselves not immutable and constant but full of difference. To be something is perhaps primarily not to be something else. Furthermore, to claim the identity of



Study for a Drawing after Glass.

but *en abyme. Ich* plunged back in ("the consonant plunged back in") at the very moment of the catch and the baptism, in a bottomless element. Does the Christic phallus come out of the sea? No shore, no more edge, certainly, but the edge is named: "the angle is always for me the edge of a tomb."

My signature—who will attest to its authenticity in this reproduction of a reproduction? and what if Adami had imitated it, like my writing? and what if I had forged his on the left? —my signature is also cut off, before the *da.* What is detached—falls

something (nationality, culture, class) or *some thing* (that which is *proper* to the thing) is to claim to be *one* (when one is not), is to claim that one is static and homogeneous (when one is not). As with the enormous variance in such notions as the nation state, ideology and language, the structure of identity is found precisely in the difference to itself. Identity is thus not self-identity but 'self-difference', not 'gathering' but 'divergence'.[56] What is therefore proper to the image in writing is not bound up with immutability and invariance but rather in a mutable invariance or invariant mutability.

Recurrent in this structure of identity is then also the 'concept' of iterability. Derrida employs iterability to mark that a repetition is by necessity an alteration. Repetition, however perfect in relation to a notional original, at least adds another to the *one*, another that is *not* the *one*. To repeat is thus always: to produce (a) difference.[57] And even the *one*, in its supposed singularity and ideality, is already structured by iterability, because were there is the *one*, there is always potentiality for another. The possibility of repetition in general, the condition of something being open to repetition, a repetition that is always a difference and an alteration, undermines any concept of the *one's* 'pure self-identity': iterability is therefore not 'repeatability of the same, but rather alterability of this same idealized in the singularity of the event'.[58] Iterability highlights not only the necessary alteration incurred in repetition and concomitantly the disavowal of any absolute form or ideality of identity, but it is also witness to the always-becoming of such an absolute form. Identity is conditioned by iterability rather than iterability being a potential of identity.

Such a reading of Derrida suggests that when he and Adami exchange words for images and images for words—*one* graphic *for another*—what may be identified in this transfer will not be singular, unchanging tokens of absolute *form and content* but rather heterogeneous self-difference in alteration. Of course, this kind of unwieldy statement smacks of prolix inapplicability. How can this be relevant to an art history that iconologically discerns passages of the Bible in painted oil on board? Or differently, how can this be relevant to literary studies that witness the dynamic production of vivid images out of letters?

Claus Clüver relates in the introduction to his influential article 'On intersemiotic transposition' the past practice in Chinese painting academies of having prospective students sit exams, one of which would involve transforming the line of a poem into a painting.[59] Painting and writing need to be perceived as essentially relatable symbol systems that share certain topological features, in order to describe this process as translation. George Steiner explains this topology on the example of a triangle that has been traced onto a rubber sheet, which is then bent in space into a cone or sphere. Certain invariant characteristics of this triangle remain; the study of these constants and the relations, which persist in this transformation, is topology.[60] Looking at the translation of a poem into an image or an image into a poem one may therefore look at the 'invariance within [this] transformation'.[61] This topology—although never with this word—is also at work when Goodman approaches the difference between verbal and non-verbal events as one of degree not

kind. As explored above, pictural marks may, for him, differ syntactically and semantically from verbal ones, however both share the status of codified representation. By way of this topological premise, the relation of words and images—of Adami and Derrida, as well as of artistic history and the literary canon—may, for the sake of this argument, be henceforth regarded as one of translation.

Roman Jakobson has furthermore, established a triadic split of translation that has been widely appropriated. He differentiates *intralingual translation*, rewording of verbal signs into other verbal signs of the same language, from *interlingual translation*, interpretation of verbal signs into another language, and *intersemiotic translation/transposition* (*transmutation*), 'interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal systems'.[62] With the demarcation of different translations arrives also the possibility to contrast them with one another in an attempt to ascertain con- and divergences.[63] How can intersemiotic transposition be related to interlinguistic translation? What can be observed about *translation proper* that is relevant or applicable for intersemiotic transposition? Daniella Aguiar and João Queiroz observe that there is a general lack of conceptual modelling for verbal–non-verbal translations, although the practice is widespread.[64] Additionally, it seems important to recognise, that not only the artistic and authorial activities under consideration by both literary and arts scholarship are practices of translation, but that the very scholarship itself *practises* (intersemiotic) translation. The processes of iconological and (reverse) ekphrastic research hinge on the persistent possibility of the transfer between the pictural and the verbal. Derrida has written extensively about and through translation, and his impossible law of translation can be utilised to affect a comparison between different kinds of translation.

Across much translational literature there exists a weary and cheerful acknowledgment that translation is concurrently impossible and possible. Derrida observes that: 'I don't believe that anything can ever be untranslatable—or, moreover, translatable'.[65] Similarly, Steiner notes that the untranslatability of texts hinges on historic, practical and theoretical obstacles that inherently question what it is that needs to be translated.[66] Mitchell infamously proclaimed that 'ekphrasis is impossible' because no amount of verbal description would ever amount to depiction: 'Words can "cite," but never "sight" their objects.'[67] However, the same book is of course abundant in rich examples of ekphrastic writing and the joy of its examination. Jean-Luc Nancy likewise identifies exactly the impossibility of the work as its munificent appeal, noting 'that there is never any homothety between languages, and precisely this lack gives to the task of translation its pleasurable and disturbing character.'[68] Equally, J. Hillis Miller describes the inexorable impossibility of translation: no two sentences will ever mean the same, no two pictures will ever mean the same, no picture will ever mean the same as a sentence.

> Only the same can mean the same. Neither the meaning of a picture nor the meaning of a sentence is by any means translatable. The picture means itself. The sentence means itself. The two can never meet, not even at some vanishing-point where the sun has set. [69]

Despite the persistent evocation of an impossible task, all would agree that translation is both as necessary and possible as it is impossible. Derrida enlists four reasons for translation's im/possible law. Three (and a half) of which have applicability for intersemiotic transposition. The four reasons for the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of translation are therefore here related with a focus on intersemiotic transposition.

Firstly, 'translation implies an insolvent indebtedness and an oath of fidelity to a given original'.[70] Adami's oath is to Derrida's *Glas*, which is an oath and a debt that are impossibly complied with, make the relationship between debtor and creditor asymmetrical. The debtor, who is the translator, is bound to become a perjurer. Steiner seems to observe a similar impossible indebtedness as the basis for the 'dynamic traditionality' that characterises Western art, which is driven by intersemiotic transposition.[71] He asserts that the continually recurring transformation and re/decoding of texts by artists is fundamentally a translational process. Pettibon draws on Pater who draws on numerous mediaeval architects who draw on their schools and masters. This process, which Steiner calls *interanimation*, is characterised by the multiplication of structures, presences, formal arrangements and marks. This 'transfer of souls' (interanimation) draws on precedents and thus shields the artists from the solitude and void of the white canvas or *blank* sheet of paper. Nevertheless, it also exerts the pressure of the antecedent—or rival—to repay the debt and match the expectations and promise.[72] Moreover, the impossible oath of fidelity may be evidenced by returning to Miller's observation on illustration. He notes that any illustration and text 'juxtaposed will always have different meanings or logoi. They will conflict irreconcilably with one another, since they are different signs'.[73] Hence, any translation perjures itself and is an indebted witness to it. A poem that ekphrastically engages with a painting, even if it does not set out to 'translate' it, is still obliged—at least for its maker—to its creditor, similarly it is bound to forswear in its view. Adami's 'drawing' on Derrida and Derrida's rewriting of Adami only represent a condensed version of this circle of debt and perjury en abyme. And similarly Pettibon's continual recycling of canonical 19th-century literature and 20th-century pop-culture imagery perpetuate borrowing and loaning of texts with redress.

In fact, in re-reading Walter Benjamin's 'Task of the translator' Derrida notes that at the heart of Benjamin's translation is restitution of meaning.[74] Again, this is an insolvent attempt to give back (*wiedergeben*) what has been given before. That restitution already fails in the notion of *restitution* itself becomes more obvious when we note that Benjamin variously uses the terms 'Wiedergabe des Sinnes', 'Sinnwiedergabe', 'Sinneswiedergabe' or 'sinngemäße[…] Wiedergabe' for the singular translation, first into French, now into English.[75] What costs are incurred and what liabilities issued when we reword—intralingual translation—in our language in order to say the same again differently? How do we balance the books between books of different tongues? However, this restitution also links with Derrida's challenge to Heidegger and Schapiro who had tried—through words—to restore van Gogh's (painting of) shoes to different owners.[76] Theirs

was also an attempt at giving back and paying a debt to different owners of painted shoes. That Heidegger and Schapiro were merely appropriating via a detour, is what follows.

Derrida highlights that the second reason for the impossible law of translation relates the untranslatable to the translatable through the economy of translation. This economy is marked by two elements: property and quantity. The law of property describes translation's power of appropriation,

> that aims to transport home, in its language, in the most appropriate way possible, in the most relevant way possible, the most proper meaning of the original text, even if this is the proper meaning of a figure, metaphor, metonymy, catachresis or undecidable impropriety […].[77]

The law of quantity, moreover, is concerned with quantitative, countable, calculable appropriation. Derrida notes that intersemiotic transposition is exempt from the principles of economy, principally because it is not ruled by the unit of the word. Neither the transposition of a book into a drawing, nor the reap*propriat*ion of a drawing is measured by words.[78] What kind of quantitative relation could there possibly be between the unit of the letter and the stroke of drawing? We may however propose, that the law of property, as a subset to the law of economy, does find application. Here as well, a particular sign systems essays to appropriate as best as possible, to harness and carry across, to make its own, to change (*mutare*) into its most appropriate. It is a reciprocal appropriation by the writer, who aims to make writing fit and proper for what is perceived in drawing, and the artist, who transfers the verbal text to make it the property of drawing.

Thirdly, 'an incalculable equivalence, an impossible but incessantly alleged correspondence' is at the heart of translation, one that purports to equate two things that are impossibly equal.[79] Derrida, in a self-reflexive appropriation of images and texts, continues by providing the example of the impossible, yet supposed correlation of a pound of flesh and a sum of money in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*. This translation, as transaction, professes to know the equivalence between two unequals: money and flesh. Yet, the perhaps hyperbolic character of Derrida's comparison (of translation in relation to Shylock and Antonio's transaction) is chosen precisely to highlight what is at risk in any comparison. What is it that is compared in the supposed correlation or equivalence that is at the heart of any translational attempt? Of course, in translation theory this is the hotly debated crux. Especially theorists of intersemiotic transposition like Aguiar and Queiroz, as well as Clüver seem to object to this lack of equivalence, with regards to both interlinguistic and intersemiotic translation.

On the one hand, Aguiar and Queiroz suggest that intersemiotic transposition is different from interlinguistic translation because the latter can directly related certain organisational layers, e.g. rhythm, phonetics, morphology, across languages. For them, intersemiotic transposition is a special case of translation in its lack of a system of corresponding 'semiotic layers'. They exemplify this with the necessity of recreating certain aspects of literature, e.g. rhythm, prosody, syntax, by translating them 'into [the] dynamic layers of movement, organization in space, lighting design, costumes, scenography, etc.' of dance.[80]

Clüver, on the other hand, suggests that both intersemiotic transposition and interlinguistic translation are related by being 'translation that looks for equivalence'.[81] Giving the example of transposing a picturial tree into a verbal one, he suggests that equivalence can be achieved when translation is approached as a literary rather than a linguistic problem. The word 'tree' is not equivalent to the image of a tree but a literary text may be.

> The signifying value of *tree* in such a text is determined by all the conventions governing that text as a literary sign. To transpose a painting into a verbal text is to reconstitute its meaning by creating a sign that draws on the codes and conventions of a literary (and not merely linguistic) system equivalent to the pictorial system operative in the painting.[82]

The assumption that there exist corresponding semiotic layers is at the core of Derrida's argument. Indeed, it could be suggested that translation studies' fundamental grapple is with finding and utilising such layers. However, since translation is born out of, not only the heterogeneity of languages or symbol systems, but the necessarily heterogeneous identity of each language or symbol system, difference is already doubly inscribed in translation. The problematic of translation is therefore not *just* one of equivocating two self-identical idealities but rather the impossible correspondence of identities that are not identical to themselves. To recognise the identity of the image in writing, or vice versa, is to recognise the alteration of an ideal identity in iteration.[83]

What is the equivalence between the staccato rhythm in an English poem when translated into the more guttural German? How to account for the melody of Italian in translation? What is it that is corresponding or equivalent when we talk about rhythm in poetry and painting? Considering Adami's studies, how does Derrida identify *Glas* in pictural translation? Considering Pettibon's untitled drawing, how can Pater's wonky cathedral arise as a matter of correspondence or equivalence? The cross-medial ascription of qualities and features reflects an ideality that needs to be questioned rather than exulted. We need to ask precisely how and why certain characteristics may engage each other, not merely name them, if we genuinely believe in the utility and possibility of an ontological response to this question.[84] Translation or transposition of a sentence or few words is possible for Derrida, given that the translator has access to all the conventions and codes of two sign systems and can elaborate them in a tome or lengthy footnote. Presumably, all possible readings can be assembled and conveyed; yet, such a demand underlines the impossibility of the project and thus the assumption of a *concrete*, self-identical *ideality* underlying it. The notion itself expresses the impossible conditions of absolute, unified, homogeneous form. Any footnote, as part of the translation and explaining the translation, is evidence of the failure and success of translation. Finally, it also becomes apparent that the reasons for the im/possible law of translation are interconnected. The translation of a few words that results in a tome or lengthy footnote evokes the reason of impossible economy and the impossible debt and broken promise.

The assumption of translatory equivalence equally does not consider that we never only speak one language.[85] Languages are not hermitic and unitary systems. How do we thus translate multiplicity? Speakers of any language can claim no ownership over 'their' language. By necessity, the

identity of language oscillates in singularity and iterability: to speak for oneself, in the language proper to oneself, is to speak 'the language of the other'.[86] Although forthcoming as a singular utterance, speech as language relies on the singular's structural condition of iterability for it to function as a means of communication. The multiplicity inherent in language can also be recognised in the intersemiotic encounter between Pettibon's and Proust's texts or Adami's and Derrida's. Through the shared graphic space, writing and drawing already occupy each other, and speak the language of the other. As the above considerations of ekphrasis demonstrated, written language already partakes in the graphic visibility of drawing. The stroke of the letter is the stroke on the canvas. The pictural does not exclude the verbal or discursive.[87] Therefore, any intersemiotic transposition is also an intrasemiotic transposition. A structure for equivalence therefore would necessarily need to accommodate intra– and intersemiotic qualities and quantities.

To map the correlations or semiotic layers that lie beneath translated and transposed texts would provide a framework for Clüver's, as well as Aguiar & Queiroz' assertions. Similarly, it could provide an explanation whether transposition is truly more difficult, rather than just different, from translation proper. However, the absence of these correlations reaffirms Benjamin's notion that translation is a historical process, by implication never finished and subject to continual renewal.[88] In fact 'translation will be essayistic, in the strong sense of the word', reaffirming that texts are neither purely untranslatable nor translatable, but a continual attempt at failure.[89]

Lastly and fourthly, Derrida stresses the impossibility of relating the body, which is the letter, which is externality to the sense, which is the spirit, which is interiority.

> This relation of the letter to the spirit, of the body of literalness to the ideal interiority of sense is also the site of the passage of translation, of this conversion that is called translation.[90]

This impossibility to decide what to translate, '"letter" or "spirit", "word" or "sense"'[91], is also at the core of intersemiotic transposition. Although the translation may not avail itself of the same sign system, it still remains the task of the translator to decide what will be translated. Indeed, the unlikely body that enters the scene with translation is that of the translator. The translator signs the work in and through translation. Benjamin's 'Task of the Translator' is decidedly not 'The Task of Translation'.[92] If there is no subject of translation, but only a subject translating, this subject is not a passive conduit, but decides how the text or image that is to be translated survives and lives on (Benjamin's *Fortleben*). As Benjamin points out, translation is important for the survival and post-maturation (*Nachreife*) of a work, it 'transplants the original'.[93]

Focusing this argument on intersemiotic transposition, Clüver proposes that interlinguistic translation *replaces* and *substitutes* that which it translates, but that the effect pertaining to intersemiotic translation is different.[94] A painting that transposes the line of a poem, in Clüver's analysis, does not act as a replacement for the poem; indeed the function of a book illustration is not as a substitute for the verbal text. Yet, both point at a lack, failure or absence in the original, which is thus supplemented by the transposition or translation.[95] By necessity the supplement changes

the text, otherwise it would be redundant. This supplementation consequently causes Clüver to contradict himself. He notes that reading an ekphrastic poem as translation not only evokes the artwork in question, but it evokes it *differently* to what it was before. The poem and image become part of a comparison. Reading a *Bildgedicht* as translation

> we are not likely to use it as we are obliged to use translations of verbal texts from languages we do not know. Rather, an intersemiotic transposition is like the translation of a poem that can be best appreciated by readers who need it least.[96]

This however, is exactly how any translation transplants the original. We might not require the painting of a poem's line in the same way, as we do the translation into a familiar tongue; it nevertheless broadens or narrows, reaffirms or contradicts, signs or crosses any previous reading, 'placing it under' (*substituo*) a new reading, finding a new place for it, placing it again (*re*-place), 'spreading it to different place' (*transplant*). Derrida's translatability touches upon translation as a limitable transfer of 'univocality or of formalizable polysemia' *and* on the 'dissemination' as its uncontainable excess.[97] What can be translated is only a part of what must be translated and yet even that part spreads beyond the intention and scope of the translator. We cannot return to the reading *prior* to the reading of the translation. The translator's subjectivity asserts itself expressly here, where the translated text has affected the afterlife of the text, where the translated text (re-) places the afterlife of the other elsewhere.

The quartet of reasons for the simultaneous translatability and untranslatability of languages and other signs, ultimately returns Adami's studies for a drawing and Derrida's own rewriting of those studies to the notion of topology. The triangle on the rubber sheet bent in space is a possible and impossible translation of the triangle in two, flat dimensions. The flat shape relates to its spatial cousin through an identity that was unbound from a notion of two-dimensionality. Or more precisely, flatness and volume were never structural parameters for their difference but potentialities of their identity. An identity ultimately that was not self-identical to flatness or volume. There are certain invariants of the rubbery triangle, which are its debt and promise to its origin. There is an impossible economy that relates its new three-dimensional shape to the units (coordinates) of the plane. The equivalence or correspondence of the new shape is topologically perceivable yet how can it be described? And finally, in the conversion the shaper or translator—one of the bodies of translation—has made certain impossible decision on what needs to be translated.

To identify Doughty's Arabia in Pettibon's cathedral, *Glas* in Adami's studies or Adami's drawing in '+R' is to recognise the unstable, fluctuating, promiscuous identity of a signified as exactly that: unstable, fluctuating and promiscuous. More broadly, reading the pictorial in a verbal text or tracing a picture iconologically, relies first and foremost on an overt acknowledgment of the picture's and writing's fluid identity. Played out in the afterlife of the picture, it is a *historical process* that witnesses the recognition of the image in the text. This does not have to make iconology a free-for-all, nor does it render any literary text notionally ekphrastic. Quite the opposite, it is

the assured confirmation that notions of 'correspondence', 'equivalence', 'symbolism' and so on are, at best, (temporary) expressions of a historical process, or at worst, fudged parameters of an attempt to determine the absolute form or self-identical ideality of a thing that, as such, never was. In doing so, it reasserts the reader—as another translator, i.e. interpreter—of the text as the subject within this historical process. The transactions between words and picture, like the one between Shylock and Antonio, are premised on their very own impossibility, on equivalences or correspondences that are a priori incalculable and excessive. The negotiation of identity happens in the text only through reading, leaving the translator/viewer/reader in the position of attentive responsibility in which she must recognise her own historical role as part of the text's conversion.

Derrida attempts to answer the titular question of his essay, 'What is a "relevant" translation?', by stating that such translation 'presents itself as the transfer of an intact signified through the inconsequential vehicle of any signifier whatsoever'.[98] Pictures and writing are here inconsequential, as long as they facilitate the transference of that which they represent. This is precisely the shortcoming of the semiotic exercise: pictures and writing are not reducible to vehicles for representation. In their instantiation, they exceed the status of 'standing in for something'. Intersemiotic transposition, observed through the prism of Derrida's im/possible law of translation, relates closely to interlinguistic translation. It proposes to eschew quantitative or symbolic equivalences that are in themselves immeasurable or incomparable, yet impose these idealities on their texts. Although a number of scholars have attempted to distance intersemiotic transposition from interlinguistic translation there persists a common impossibility that draws a close connection. To acknowledge the impossibility yet necessity of translation (between languages or 'semiotic' 'systems') allows us not only to reframe the discourse of writing and drawing, as well as reading and viewing as practices, but also reaffirms the pre-existing connection that writing and drawing share through their graphic *traits*. Finally, an impossible translation also accommodates a comprehension of images of identity and identities of images as flexible, self-different and non-ideal, which is a prerequisite for their recognition in translation.

I beheld, and, lo, in the m
er beasts, and in the midst
d been slain, having seven ha
blessings of man. And the
ir limbs dripping with they
gns pallid and flabby, left
able services.

midst of the verdure and of t
of the elders, she stood, as
uds and seven eyes, which a
gelded elders staring at h
urney of life, their goose flesh
two miles in settlement for



What more did you fill the other seven hundred pa

On Lines

Often and often I have watched
A gossamer line sighing itself along
The air, as it seemed; and so thin, thin and bright,
Looking as woven in a loom of light,
That I have envied it, I have, and followed;—
——Philip James Bailey, *Festus: A Poem*

Reading between the opening lines, they do not only frame a key idea for what follows and indicate a sentiment—one of intrigue in the line and joy in its chase—they are also an act of line-shooting literary pretension, though in this case beyond that which they share with any other use of such inscription. As though not enough to step out of line by ignoring the convention not to address the chapter's dictum in the body text, here the poem as epigraph becomes mere line-bait to get the lines crossed from the start. Far from wanting to bring lines into line, this text seeks to multiply and disturb lines, not toe the line, especially not the ones drawn in the sand as a divide. The poem lines up succinctly what we are in line for, a volant line that has a body both diaphanous and thick, its pellucid trail throws us a line and holds it in order for us to hit off it and follow it, get a line on the line, line by line, all the way down the line.

If any categorical distinction between drawing and handwriting can be drawn, Tim Ingold has repeatedly argued that it may be difficult to locate exactly where such a line of division would separate one practice from the other.[1] In fact, he has frequently emphasised the need to consider linework as coextensive between word and image, and even as the thread running between a whole host of practices, from walking to weaving and observing to story-telling.[2] To invoke a distinction between drawing and writing on the basis of image and text would at any rate be tautological by averting the entire attraction of the problematic in its appeal to snap connections between drawing and image, and writing and language respectively, as though this would simplify the enquiry. Tellingly, such a procedure would isolate the debate from the very instancing line that constitutes and animates both drawing and writing, and thus the possible discourses around them. Rather than following the tortuous bends of a line, the text-image distinction insists ab ovo on two straight lines, arrows that indicate two sides of a split that replicates only itself.

The flow of one line between alphabetic characters and their *unique* pictures of themselves is publicly and testimonially exercised in every signature. It draws together the seeming divergence of allographic characters, whose precise formation only requires that one letter is distinct enough



from another, and their specific autographic inscription evidencing the particularity of every push and pull that gives form to and differentiates this letter from any other form of itself. In the stroke of the signature we can trace the lineage of writing and drawing through their common graphic gesture, as the Latin transmission (*graphicus*) of the Greek root (*γραφικός*) suggests.[3] Furthermore, though not unconnected from the aspect of the letter's form, the signature also inscribes itself only in *this* sheet, its reproducibility is caught up in an economy of administration that both insists on the authenticity of unique strokes and the possibility that they may be duplicated. The philosophical interest that the signature generates lies precisely in its demonstrative and demonstrable insistence that writing in general contradicts any assumption of unique and absolute referral to one context because its functioning relies on the possibility of repetition. Jacques Derrida thus summarises that signatures must be repeatable in order to function in their *pure* singularity:

> Effects of signature are the most common thing in the world. But the condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously […] the condition of their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and its singularity, divides its seal.[4]

The overall effect that Derrida traces, however, is much broader and illimitable to notions of the graphic as a necessary confluence of writing and drawing. Underpinning all writing is iterability, that is, the repeatability of a mark that cites itself (and thus its sameness) in its difference. In order for writing to be readable it has to be iterable, its marks have to remain identifiable although they—and their use, context, identifiability, identity, sender, receiver—have altered.

> Such iterability—(iter again, probably comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties repetition to alterity) structures the mark of writing itself, no matter what particular type of writing is involved (whether pictographical, hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to cite the old categories). A writing that is not structurally readable—iterable—beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing.[5]

Insofar as writing can be said to communicate something between addresser and addressee, it does so because it functions structurally in the absence of both. It is not in view of a deferral (of the presence) of a receiver but in the possibility of an absolute absence of any addressee, that writing's marks have to be repeatable. Iterability allows Derrida to demonstrate that, because it is detachable and detached from its point of production, writing breaks with context and authorial intent. This break is not accidental or surprising, rather, through iterability it is already structurally written into writing. Derrida's aim is here squarely to forestall the injection of presence into writing, that is, as the relation between writer and what is written. As soon as authorial intent or an *actual* context are asserted, the (reading of) writing is already limited to a predetermined

field, withdrawn from the potentiality of what is written and attached to whatever a reader wants to impose on it.

> This allegedly real context includes a certain 'present' of the inscription, the presence of the writer to what he has written, the entire environment and the horizon of his experience, and above all the intention, the wanting-to-say-what-he-means, which animates his inscription at a given moment. But the sign possesses the characteristic of being readable even if the moment of its production is irrevocably lost and even if I do not know what its alleged author-scriptor consciously intended to say at the moment he wrote it, i.e. abandoned it to its essential drift.[6]

The possibility that the signatory of a cheque may change her mind or the author of a text his, does not impede the writings from functioning. Indeed the iterability of the cheque's signature is so powerful that Jonathan Culler suggests that 'it introduces as part of its structure an independence from any signifying intention.'[7] As long as the signature compares favourably to a given model the signatory's intent or presence—for it may be executed with a stamp or by a machine—are irrelevant.

Aside from the possibility of a textual incoherence, a writer may also find herself reading and disagreeing with her own writing. Granting the structural necessity of iterability however, this is perhaps unsurprising because writing is not considered the simple transfer of consciousnesses and meanings. Writing—and for Derrida that also includes speech—grafts itself on other writing, it is the reiterated and reiterable reading of other writing. Detached from its signified, all writing is cut loose from any single moment of production or originary source, and persists as 'the non-present *remainder* of a differential mark'.[8] Continuously drawing on itself, writing is capable to put any sign in speech marks and thus remove *its* context. Thus the possibility of writing is found in the citationality of the mark,

> which is to say in the possibility of its functioning being cut off, at a certain point, from its 'original' desire-to-say-what-one-means and from its participation in a saturable and constraining context. Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be *cited*, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring.[9]

Without this anchorage, writing is the continuous reinscription of its other self elsewhere, the other's ventriloquism in your writing, the trade of language stolen from a thieving writer, who is always secondary to his words.[10] This does not make writing arbitrary but reading difficult and fun. Rather than insisting on a semantic frame, which permits textual decipherment and meanings reducible to truths, Derrida reinstates reading as the necessary and iterative approach to writing.[11] Any claim for the intelligibility of writing—the ascription of the self-presence of the reader or the writer, the notion of *a* context, the limits and possibilities of communication—is reduced to the level of legibility which itself is shaken by the hand that writes or, more narrowly,

the lines drawn forth.

Sonja Neef in particular has explored the utility of Derrida's iterability as a key tenet in her consideration of handwriting and its positioning between the gesture of drawn strokes and the return of normative values.[12] Neef's starting point is to think of handwriting from the vantage of photography 'as icon and index, as imprint and trace'.[13] Handwriting, in contrast to mechanised forms of inscription, is thus both the iconic reproduction of a pre-existing form and the unique line traced in a specific substrate.

> The particularity of handwriting is precisely located in the double logic of this polarity: it is unique every time and still repeats the ideal type of a legible imprint. In a nutshell: it is at once iterable imprint and singular trace: singular iterability and iterable singularity. [14]

Neef's handwriting seeks to oppose the trace's deviation from a norm and its line's variety to the imprint's imposition of strictures and rule-following. As a result, it is the trace that (re)introduces the unique and authentic hand into writing. For Neef, it is through the singular human gesture evidenced in the trace that writing can touch, authenticate and make itself sensorially available. Neef gives the example of Anne Frank's diaries and their capacity to transmit individual and forceful expression. Whilst mechanised writing may inform, it does not perform sensuously.[15] Though it is only in view of the reproducibility of writing—both, the reproducibility of handwriting through the polygraph, copy machine et cetera, and of writing generally, for example through the typewriter, word processor and phone—that the '"aura"' of handwriting becomes apparent. Aligning Nelson Goodman's 'autographic' mark (in which the difference between an original and a copy is significant, e.g. painting, rather than the allographic marks in a book of literature) with Walter Benjamin's aura, Neef asserts that both seek to preserve 'a non-copyable remainder' which even in the most perfect forgery cannot be resurrected.[16] The remainder of Neef's handwriting is thus produced by the trace, since it is the deviating graphic source of writing's sensuous potential. In fact, Neef seemingly positions different kinds of writing according to how freely its trace may be drawn with the effect that some handwriting is less handwritten than others: writing in minuscules offers more potential for gestures than majuscules, the four-line system of cursive Arabic has more potential than the square shape of Hebrew, Uncials and Blackletter is less handwriting as trace than Carolingian, and Gutenberg's 290-glyph bible may share more with handwriting than with other typescripts.[17] Though the vacillation of handwriting between imprint and trace is an effective construct, the insistence to draw a divisive line between them will inevitably lead to the empiricism of scale and magnitude. This conundrum becomes especially acute, though it is already implicit in the distinctions of different hands, when Neef distinguishes between the stroke and the dot in handwriting. As the dot has almost no possibility to depart from normativity, Neef contends that it is difficult to include it in the cursive writing of the trace: it is more imprint than trace. Though pressure, angle and skewing may shape it marginally, the dot 'permits no significant possibility of deviation'.[18] By its very production it is (im)pressed into the paper, unlike the line which is struck across its surface with speed, reversibility and direction.

> The dot in the circle of the zero stands on both sides of the abyss. On the one hand, it supplies the basic requirements for the *currere* of the trace. On the other, it is the effect of a touch—like leaving behind a fingerprint, the impression of a foot or hand, or that of a lettertype, thus of all gestures that eliminate the *performance* of the line, in which the difference between cultural norm and individual deviation is unfolded. The 'cursive dot' is therefore the place in which subjectivity 'presents itself/ceases' [*'einstellt'*]: here it expires, however, not without the promise of continuous renewal. The dot harbours the point of undecidability, it oscillates between imprint and trace, between the hand's arch-writing as a sign of unique psychosomatic presence and the inscription technologies of type-writing, in which it represents disembodiment, repeatability, normativity and indifference.[19]

The subtlety of this description however precisely delineates the indivisibility of imprint and trace of both the line and the dot structuring all writing. Though Derrida's iterability instantiates repetition in alterity, it precisely does not seek to oppose them. Through the opposition of other and same, and its allocation to trace and imprint, line and dot, Neef splits iterability and divides the mark of writing. Through the division, writing receives a centre in the trace-imprint chasm. Handwriting—and in view of iterability all writing—is caught between imprint and trace, however, aiming to determine the *currere* of the trace in opposition to its imprint would become a matter of magnification. Writing with a mechanical typewriter like marking the tittle of an 'i' allows for play in pressure, speed and even angle. The tittle's skew and the typewriter's impression become only the beginning of a nuancing process that may be driven to a subatomic level, in which ever smaller evidence of the running hand's trace is sought. Rather, iterability suspends and preserves—*hebt auf*[20] or *stellt ein*—the difference of imprint and trace in their indivisibility. Writing with a brush in particular opens up the line of writing to show it as the volume and body it already is. The marginal diacritic of a letter confirms itself here not as the blunt impression of a one-trick tool but as an illimitably dynamic line drawn out of repetition of itself differently. The line itself, however, is not a vector superimposed on a placid substrate, rather, as imprint and trace it becomes itself in the convergence of bodies that is the material gesture. The line's drawing in the signature, which is both the trace in the imprint and the imprint in the trace, is therefore not an accident introduced to writing through the necessity of speed or direction, rather it is already structurally constitutive of writing as linework.

The putative distance between writing with a quill and typing on a typewriter can thus not be traced by assigning mechanisation to the latter but not the former. Both are technologies of writing that link inscription and material indexically. Evidently, there are differently flowing hands between the rigid angularity of cuneiform physically impressed into a substrate, the ligature-rich Beneventan and the exuberant curlicues of Roundhand. However, all are repetition of standardised norms (imprint) and their actualisation as characters in alteration (trace). It is, for example, especially the energetically charged Spencerian of the Palmer Method, whose flexion would appear to map easily onto Neef's characterisation of the trace as a continuous and elabo-

rate gestural stroke, that is notoriously restrictive and demonstratively acquired through rote repetition of precise normative values, however fanciful and ornate they are.[21] If, on the other hand, the trace is merely a supposed and underlying possibility for the deviation of the line within the alphabetic, syllabic, ideographic et cetera stricture of any hand, then all forms of line-making must be open to the same. Writing conceived as *absolute* imprint is not writing, because in its sameness to itself, it only instantiates its own self-identity which, rigorously, must forfeit signification. Or conversely, writing that is *mere* trace is not writing because its alterity must then be radically other, unidentifiable even as a sign to itself. A sign that is identical to itself is not a sign, it can only be identical to itself as another sign.

> As soon as a sign emerges, it begins by repeating itself. Without this, it would not be a sign, would not be what it is, that is to say, the non-self-identity which regularly refers to the same. That is to say, to another sign, which itself will be born of having been divided. The grapheme, repeating itself in this fashion, thus has neither natural site nor natural center.[22]

Implicitly, an assumed divisibility of writing through an opposition of trace and imprint also reaffirms the illusion of the transparent intelligibility of writing as text along standard lines of (phono)logocentric critique.[23] Disregarding the impossibility of writing's imprint without trace, in such a text, writing would be reducible to the normative transcription of phonetic values. It would adhere absolutely to a putative ideal shape in order to finally become the transparent vehicle of thought in language. There would be no image of writing to speak of, as it would be content without form. On the other hand, disregarding again the impossibility of writing devoid of imprint, as trace alone, writing becomes the impossible scrivening that is no sign at all, as the sign is already the imprint of another. Rather than drawing, the writing that is only trace, cannot be recognised as any sign.

The hierarchy of handwriting-ness that Neef thus develops based on the perceived greatness of the trace's deviation from a norm is therefore set up to betray itself and writing from the start. As iterability, the interplay of trace and imprint occurs within itself. Trace is the necessary instantiation of imprint and imprint the requirement for its own trace: imprinted trace and traced imprint or, as Neef herself suggested, iterable singularity and singular iterability. Moreover, trace and imprint are not limited to writing by hand because, as the difference in repetition of writing, they constitute the structural character of the sign that is writing as such. The hierarchy is rather one of aesthetics linked to the perception of differing line complexities across scriptures. Neef, for instance, asserts that Hebrew and Latin majuscules do not have 'the aesthetic of handwriting', even though they are handwritten, because of the limitation that writing in a square format or between a baseline and ascender line, yet without recourse to descender length or midline, affords.[24] The route via aesthetics is furthermore problematic in view of the discussion of the performative potential of handwriting. If the sensuous appeal of a piece of writing, the perception of its authenticity or the sense of being touched by it were reducible to writing as graphic inscription, what impact has the particular nature of its handwriting? Or, more poignantly, does it matter if it

"THE WORLD IS FAT
AND FULL OF HOLES!"

In the absence of the cross,
will she be our leader?

Benning/Lee: «plastic» → reading ignores "plastic" values > true > but critique possible incl. D's logocentrism (57)



preliminary 22, 33, 36, 37, 47, 48, 49, 61, 111 n1 (112) 1-23 29-110

standard 104, 114, 122,

normal 22, 77, 94, 104, 106, 116

serious 104

3360 of 5083

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fulfils the requirements of 'the aesthetic of handwriting'? Anne Frank's diary is partly written in a printed hand, thus hardly chasing the *currere* of the trace. Yet the precise style, whether calligraphy or pot-hookery, scarcely affects its impact. Rather, the 'remainder of the hand' as autographic artefact or the written paper as auratic, historical and indexical remainder of a practice impacts the viewer and reader.

Perhaps, the proximity to the line itself however is currently too close and we need to zoom out to regard writing more broadly before descending to the linework at hand again. Writing makes meaning sensorially available because it is visible, Jean-François Lyotard suggests, and the problem of how to account for the hand in writing may be addressed through the difference—not opposition—between seeing and reading. Seeing a painting, is not reading it, but rather to witness the power of seeing itself.[25] Reading conversely, is not interested in graphic—or as Lyotard has it: plastic—signifiers as we look through them. The distinction is deceptively simple, and as Geoffrey Bennington notes, imbued with the 'idealism' of the 'transparency of the signifier' which deconstruct itself as logocentrism.[26] Lyotard, however, goes on to offer an exceedingly rich and complex account that greatly affects the discussion of the line and draws further relevance out of Derrida's iterability and Neef's imprint-trace distinction.

Though writing's marks have 'a dimension of visibility, of sensory spatiality', for Lyotard they facilitate the eyes' scanning of the page in the recognition of particular signals, for example: letters, syllables, words et cetera, in an expediency of communication where '[r]eading is hearing, not seeing.'[27] In as far as writing possesses a sensory and spatial dimension it is as a signifier, not (its) signified, designated or reference. However, Lyotard swiftly interjects that this *conventional* usage does not prevent artists and poets to provide testament that the sensible (of language and writing) may include the sensory. Using Stéphane Mallarmé's *Un coup de dés* (1897) and *Igitur* (1925) as examples, Lyotard demonstrates that the division of language and reference (as it would be when language signifies or designates) can be shaken when words are themselves dispersed on the page to 'make […] visible, […] thereby smuggling the plane (the emblem of contingency) into the sign (the seal of the notion).'[28] However, for Lyotard the intrusion of the sensory rests on the disposition of words not their printed or written form:

> Where does it [the sensory] dwell? Not directly in the 'matter' of words (what would this be, exactly? their written, printed figure? their sound? the 'color' of letters?), but in their disposition. One will counter that the sensible too—signification—depends entirely on the disposition of units. But our understanding of disposition—the poetic dispersal across the page—is a disturbance of the disposition that ensures signification; it upsets communication.[29]

In Mallarmé's poetry Lyotard detects how written words may act as their own visible reference, yet, significantly at this point, he limits their power to dispersal across the page, keeping the closed integrity of the signifying unit. Importantly though, this observation marks the interdependence of writing as signifier and writing as plastic space. Lyotard restricts such usage of writing to artistic practices, because art speaks differently from 'everyday language', in which the 'linguistic signifier'

can 'become completely transparent in favor of the signified'. Conversely, art seeks 'to highlight the signifier', with the consequence that 'linguistic matter' may be 'burdened with sensory value.' Poetry may thus affect 'that the term's natural transparency be clouded […] thanks to the ordering the poet has imposed on verbal matter.' And finally:

> Such artistic manipulation of the utterance constitutes precisely the exception [because] the poem […] eschews language's communicational vocation, dwelling in the border zone between the word and the thing, writing becoming like an object.[30]

It is worth quoting the exact phrasing Lyotard employs in order to show the extent to which he emphasises the separation and intercutting of *ordinary* use and artistic *licence*. The tense pursuit to uphold both, the transparency and unity of the signifier for the sake of communication and the burdensome umbrage imposed on it by art, 'is answered', as Kiff Bamford writes, 'by the inevitable recognition of the figural at the heart of discourse'.[31] For Lyotard, the *figure* works to produce excess or transgression of signification, provoking a thickness or opacity in discourse or art that hints at the limitation of signification, designation and their combination to constrain the play of meaning. The figural partakes in discourse and perception but it is ontologically different from the figurative and the textual, though not in opposition to them. For linguists the figure in (poetic and artistic) discourse effects 'violations of the system's order [that] produce […] meaning-effects that cannot be the result of the normal interplay of semantic and/or syntactic givens'.[32] The violations may occur within linguistic space but cannot be explained by it as they disturb the arbitrariness of language in discourse to impact the body sensorially. The figure is also not inscribed in language because of its material instantiation in writing. The figure is not an elaborate recourse to notions of materiality. Rather, the figural rejects any singular recognition of the material in conceptual representation and the signifier's materiality itself has to remain figural in order to be sensible.[33] Lyotard refuses to dissolve the line that marks the page into a representation or object because both only operate through each other and necessarily bring about the intervolution and complexity of the figure.

That artistic practice already instantiates writing's inherent capacity to violate the supposed systematisation of language and its grammar points not at the failure of art but rather at the shortcomings of the supposed system. As Derrida states frequently in 'Signature event context' (an essay about J.L. Austin's theory of the illocutionary act) and subsequently in 'Limited Inc a b c' (a 'response' to John Searle's 'reply' to his initial essay), the necessity to marginalise and exclude occurrences on the basis of their non-ordinariness indicates, on the contrary, that they carry structural significance.[34] If they are prevalent enough to have to be excluded, they already structure the phenomenon. In fact, in Austin's use of 'ordinary', 'standard', 'normal' or 'serious' we recognise the same pattern of marginalisation as above: placing outside-inside limitations on practices and occurrences.[35] Derrida keenly turns the usage of these terms around and in particular recycles Austin's use of 'parasitic' (which Searle defends as being no moral judgement but indication of 'a relation of logical dependence') in a reversal and displacement of the term.[36] The point is not to


chapter traces the line
1
from signatures →
(Derrida & Weil)
3
writing and drawing between
graphique and graphie (Kyo)
organisers and
disrupts the space
4
to "the figural"
2
iterability
recognisability
articulation
conclusion:
what this chapter does show is the inherent/structural necessity of the "parasitic" plastic in writing and the "parasitic" graphique in drawing not as exception but as always already constitutive
conclusion:
in this "understanding" it doesn't need to be plastic/pictural but in lit. studies
that don't recognise writing as graphic / that emphasize expressis as elevated in the text → the difference

illegitimise the possible distinction of artistic use from an *ordinary* one but to show that concepts of distinction not only carry an 'axiology, in all of its systematic and dogmatic insistence, [which] determines an object' generally, but also necessarily induces 'value-judgements'.[37] Concepts in and of themselves impose structures, often binaries, because by necessity they seek to limit and legitimise: they decide what is inside and outside, what belongs and does not. The limits and distinctions may be necessary and legitimate because they belong to the notion of 'concept'. The differentiation by degree still works within the same framework, oscillating between clearly delimited margins. Derrida does not seek to oppose anything to the concept, least of all another concept, but aims to graft reversal and displacement onto it, to intervene in, supplement and think the concept beyond itself. To think 'an aconceptual concept or another kind of concept, heterogeneous to the philosophical concept of the concept, a "concept" that marks both the possibility and the limit of all idealization and hence of all conceptualization.'[38] Whatever form this kind of thinking takes, it would need to be open to its own formlessness or ductility, in order not to introduce in its own ideality, the pure ideality of concept and its form. In its 'alogical logic', it

> marks the essential and ideal limit of all pure idealization, the ideal concept of the limit of all idealization, and not the concept of nonideality (since it is also the concept of the possibility of ideality).[39]

Thus to focus in again on the line, why does Lyotard limit the sensory space of writing to that of the dispersal of words on the page, strongly opposing other registers and in particular greater magnification? Are we to recognise Neef's hesitance of the minimal deviation necessary to mark the trace in Lyotard's margin? Looking at the lines that constitute writing, whether handwritten or printed, Lyotard detects a bodily difference in contrast to some (not all) lines in art. The lines of writing are recognised, and their decipherment does not engage the reader bodily, because the reader is looking for predetermined differences of signification in a closed system.

> [There is] no connection [...] between the distinctive graphique value of the lines or clusters of lines that form a T or an O, and the plastic value of the figures formed by these letters—the crossing of a vertical and a horizontal line, a circumference. The body is led to adopt certain dispositions depending on whether it encounters an angle or a circle, a vertical or an oblique. When a trace owes its value to this ability to induce bodily resonance, it inscribes itself in a plastic space. But when the trace's function consists exclusively in distinguishing, and hence in rendering recognizable, units that obtain their signification from their relationships in a system entirely independent from bodily synergy, I would claim that the space in which this trace inscribes itself is graphique.[40]

Leaving the French word *graphique* instead of following Antony Hudek's and Mary Lydon's translation of the word as *graphic* seeks to distinguish and emphasise the particular understanding Lyotard brings to the term, in contrast to the rest of this study. Graphique, for Lyotard, is the descriptor for a mark as signifier that can '*induce directly the recognition of what it represents.*'[41] A plastic signifier on the other hand, requires to be seen, slowing the process of looking. The plastic

form of a letter is without value. Tracing the shapes of a plastic signifier induces a bodily resonance, whereas the shapes of letters are entirely meaningless beside referring to their graphique values which have the acute capacity to oppose one letter to another. Encountering the line is here an 'act of recognition' that 'consists precisely in the suppression or forgetting of the trace or line' outside the predetermined and closed limitation of characters whose value is verbal yet which do not refer to themselves but are the transparent vehicles for a concept.[42] In this way, graphique applies to Lyotard's understanding of the written mark but also touches his description of pictures, for instance particular mediaeval paintings (Duccio) or perspectival renderings that can be *read* (even by those who cannot read) but are not seen for their lines' energy.[43] Graphique is thus eminently textual and here differentiated from the use of graphic which seeks to intervolve the textual and the plasticity of linework.

As the graphique sign is arbitrary in relation to the body of the reader, writing is an '*informational* space', in so far as 'the letters' "rhythm," "position," and "sequence" refer to a position occupied by the reader, which serves as reference-point, this calibration owes nothing to the body's aesthetic power.'[44] The body only faces the text to identify the differences, that is to say: oppositions, between a limited number of letters (or more broadly: signs) in a system. Lyotard's appeal to the 'aesthetic' and 'bodily resonance' is critical in describing the sensory as open to information and form. His distinction verges on an opposition between the two and a difference that requires displacement and reversal.[45] Bamford proposes that Lyotard upholds the categorical distinction between the letter's line and drawing's line

> in order that the figural aspect of the line is not enclosed by the letter—that the visible aspect of the line is not written out when it is written about: this is the paradox that is at the heart of Lyotard's writings on art.[46]

Though, in the distinction of reading and seeing there is simultaneously also a protective gesture that attempts to ensure that the legibility of letters is not subsumed or touched by the uncontainable—'mysterious'—power of the image. The real paradox may therefore not be the lack of recognition of the graphic line in the letter, but that poets and artists are capable of disturbing a separation rather than recognising that a non-separation is necessarily already inscribed in writing as a practice. For Lyotard, lines themselves are not limited to the status of graphique signifier but rather torn 'between the highest degree of legibility' and 'the potential energy accumulated and expressed in graphique form as such.'[47] The line of writing oscillates between 'plastic meaning' and 'articulated signification', between 'touch[ing] upon an energetics [and touching] upon writing',[48] between being seen and saying, between graphicness and graphiqueness. The potential energy of the line provides an ambiguous state to resonate with the body gazing at it. But this resonance arrives at the detriment of reading, because legibility 'does not impede the eye's racing', whilst 'with the energetics of the plastic line one must stop at the figure.'[49] Reading only touches upon each line lightly, running across it swiftly, not intent to take in its graphique energetics as plastic and thus graphic. Considering the linework of writing as plastic space requires time, and

"I DIDN'T GO TO

MY GRANDFATHER'S

Lyotard suggests that the slowness that the figural requires is difficult to accept and give when the line is so easily reducible to (its) graphique language. Moreover, even the line of drawing itself may lose itself easily in the rationalism of signification or designation, especially in a culture that 'has rooted out sensitivity to plastic space.'[50] Such a drawn line is for Lyotard a scripted line that can be read (as signifier) and thus graphiquely, or the line that is ruled by geometric optics and the orthogonal space of perspective which result in representation. Like Derrida's trait, Lyotard draws the line, as though strained by multiple hands, on and through itself, though not linearly between poles but curvilinearly, undulating itself. In the desire of the line to connote, to become a signifying language or to make visible, 'the figure submits to language' it becomes open to recognition and writing.[51] The other figural line however, the one that does not translate the sensory into the intelligible, is the line that works on its own accord. This line may be seen as Lyotard wants us to see it, laterally, not focused, its figure never in the centre, never in our vision and yet able to be seen, with eyes and without. Lyotard's line struggles and meanders between its own plasticity and its graphique exigency, between seeing and articulated vision. The line describes the necessary overlap of the discursive and the figural, 'suggesting that a (discursive) principle of readability and a (figural) principle of unreadability shared one in the other.'[52] As Bamford puts it, Lyotard's concern for the line is also a 'desire for unity where there can be none'.[53] And thus Lyotard's line sinuates without unity or centre through an impossible opposition. The line that is integral to the letter is also its end, going beyond the letter, somewhere: 'The line is the letter's life, its rhythm, and at the same time its death, its obliteration, as in a signature.'[54]

The line of the signature, like that of calligraphy, is not exceptional to handwriting or even writing at large, rather, it is merely a marginalised line that nevertheless already structures *ordinary* use. And it is not just the ordinary use of the line of writing, but also itself as the line of drawing. How can the line of drawing not be the *same* line as the one that writes? Or differently, for there are not two, how can the line of drawing not be its *other* in writing? Stretching the tinglish line of the blind sketch continuously along, honing in on itself, finding the line in the space between lines, to inscribe it with a note that barely signifies but does and enacts the missing link of lines, the line becomes its own extension in words or pictures.

> The ambiguity of writing, object of reading and of sight, is present in the initial ambiguity of drawing. An open line, a line closed on itself. The letter is an unvarying closed line; the line is the open moment of a letter that perhaps closes again elsewhere, on the other side. Open the letter, you have the image, the scene, and magic. Close the image, you have the emblem, the symbol, and the letter.[55]

The drawn line is the parasitic disturbance of writing, smuggling its visible figure into the (one of the) discursive whose graphique signs become clouded by their own plasticity, burdened by their own weight. Yet as iterable constituent of writing, as traceable imprint and imprinted trace, the line is already (in) writing. Katrin Ströbel however asserts that verbal signifiers display a greater level of identifiability as meaningful signs in contrast to visual ones because their units

remain recognisable as lexemes whereas units of pictures require each other.[56] Seeing writing is here again a moment of recognition, whilst seeing pictures is one of interpretation.

> Even in special cases, like Dada's type collages, where syntax and semantics is broken up or changed, lexemes as such remain recognisable. With visual signifiers however, there are no comparable processes of identification, rather, interpretation takes place. […] isolated from the context of the picture, the signs lose not only their meaning, but also their status because they do not refer to anything anymore.[57]

Ströbel's line of argument magnifies Lyotard's dispersal on the page by focusing in on the unitary constituents of language in writing, though underlying are at least three assumptions about what we can know about writing and drawing. Firstly, the reduction of writing to the smallest recognisable unit as lexeme (or letter or glyph) already anticipates its own conclusion in the arbitrariness of its scale. Presumably (Dadaist) collages may use cut-ups of writing that are not recognisable as such at all, as the gaucheness or dexterity of the cutter is not limited by the letter's margin. The line has no originary status to drawing or writing, it does not *create*, though its imprinted trace runs in both. Secondly, the recognisability of letters or lexemes is a recognisability of seeing as *seeing-as*. The knowledge of letterforms is also the knowledge of seeing again and again, and of not wanting to see differently. It is recognition despite seeing. Learning a new script, we reread our writing as drawing. Every skit, every stroke, every curve, every loop, is skit and stroke and curve and loop again, before, eventually, they become the minims, lobes and bows of something legible. Until then they move the body with the force of lines that move themselves. And right at that point, they work together, inisolable, the illegible legible telling us not to see but read. They possess Ströbel's status of a mark in search of its recognition. They perform as Lyotard's plastic signifiers unrecognised for their graphiqueness. Seeing is here at the point of inarticulate vision. The third assumption is the repetition of the second in alteration. What is it that we recognise in pictures instead of seeing? Looking at marks on the page, what are they other than smudges of varying length and shade? Yet perhaps even that is too far, where do we draw the line between the line and the paper? Recognition in the face of the picture is not only articulated vision, but, Derrida suggests, an act of appropriation. It is a declaration about what is proper to the work, what can be seen in it appropriately.[58] James Elkins similarly questions the cleavage driven between the picture and its marks and thus laments a reading that knows things are there without seeing them.

> To speak *only* of what must exist in spite of the marks against which it struggles—only of the figure, or the represented thing—is to capitulate to a concept of pictures that imagines there is a gap between marks and signs and that believes the way to come to terms with it is to omit both the gap and everything that comes before it. To elide the crucial moments of darkness, when the picture, in all its incomprehensible, nonlinguistic opacity, confronts us as something *illegible*, is to hope that pictures can deliquesce into sense.[59]

In the potential dissolution of the mark that is its detachment from a background and its reading, the plastic signifier becomes graphique and displaces its figure onto the signified or designated.

Recognising the signifier as *signifier for signification*, thus beyond itself, splits the mark and its *sensory* space from the one that makes *sense* of it. L'expérience *sensorielle* trouve sa résolution dans le *sens* reconnu du dessin. Die *sinnliche* Erfahrung findet ihre Auflösung im erkannten *Sinn* des Zeich(n)ens, d.h. in der Zeichnung als Zeichen. To see and read the mark henceforth as graphic, that is, in its inseperable separability of graphique and plastic space, is also to vacillate with the senses. Bamford recognises that Lyotard, too, seeks to avoid this 'polarization of the intellectual and the affective'.[60] The avoidance of such a binarism is precisely necessary because it otherwise promulgates the split of the line in the ascription of the picture's immediate appeal to the senses and writing's conceptual plea to cognition which imbeds the entire discourse in Lessing's long-standing ideological word-image opposition.[61] The sense of the mark returns to its sense in an iterability of sense itself, as a repetition in alteration. Derrida recognises the need to include the signifier into the discourse of writing when he calls, as the third of four items of literary work necessary after Freud, for the literal of the literary to be analysed, because such

> [a] *becoming-literary of the literal* […] a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of the *originality of the literary signifier* has not yet begun, and this is surely not an accident. Until now, only the analysis of literary *signifieds*, that is *nonliterary* signified meanings, has been undertaken. But such questions refer to the entire history of literary forms themselves, and to the history of everything within them which was destined precisely to authorize this disdain of the signifier.[62]

Derrida is provoking a reading that takes its letters seriously in order to counter the discourse of a signified that is already one step removed from the literary. Is he hence encouraging us to read ad pedem litterae literally? And if so, even the reading of this very phrase has to have a foothold in its letters.

The distain for the signifier is also evident in the marginalisation of signature, calligraphy, handwriting or the graphic capacity of writing in general in the discourse of the literary and writing as a practice. The point is not to propose a new graphology that posits that the plastic qualities of the line are originary to writing's sensorial or intelligible appeal. Neither is it to reinstate a pseudoscience that makes reading a psychoanalytic practice. Nor does it seek to abolish the notion of language and replace it with that of writing thus similarly instituting the putative oppositionality albeit via graphocentrism. Rather, it suggests that limiting writing's figure to a verbal or linguistic category cannot account for what must thus always be rendered as marginal cases of typo– or chirographic violation. The line as structural necessity and shared trait of both drawing and writing however accommodates the bothersome case of writing by hand by providing a graphic frame that permits both images and texts to be read and seen whilst being irreducible to either. The figure in the text, in the line of writing, in the line of every character, is already part of the necessity to recognise the mark as text, writing or character. Or differently, as Bill Readings puts it, 'the transparent recognizability of the alphabet's letters is founded upon an unrecognizable, opaque, plastic function of the line which it attempts to suppress in the interests of its functioning.'[63] A graphique understanding of writing for example, cannot account for the framing capacity and

Ууюъ, Ъоъъ, Ъъъ, Zоъъ, ъъъ, ъъ,

ьіъ, Ъоъ, Ъъ, ъъъ, Zъъ, Ъъъ, ѣъъ, ъъъъъъ,

ъоъѣъ, ъіѣъ, ъъѣъъоъъ, ъъъ, Ъоъъ, ѣъъ

Ъоъъѣъ, ъъъъъѣъ

Ууъъѣоъъ, ъъъѣъъъ, ьіъъъіѣъ

ъъъъѣъъ, Ъъъъъъъ, Ъъъъъъъъ

Ъъъъъъъъ, Ууъъіъъъіѣ, Ъъъъъъъъъ

уи Ъъіѣъъъъъъ, Ууъ Ъъъъъъъъ,

Ууъъіѣъъъіѣъ, Ууъъъъъъъъ,

Ууъѣоѣ ъѣъѣоѣ Ууъъъ, Ууъѣъъ Ъъъъ

Ууъъ Ъъѣ

Ріъъ Ъъъіъъ Ъі

- While "lyrical" introductions to the line, one that seemingly fleets b/w text and image
↓ Segue to these lines' "response"/"responsibility" to JFL's intro - how to write a line/draw a line after/beyond, and how to write one ~~following~~ that doesn't follow lines

Impertinent

Overall: the distinction b/w word- and image and writing/gaud-drawing not only removes a certain binarism of the verbal-vs-the pictured, but also treats writing not as language (but as process as it does in drawing (not as representation/presentational)

(Somewhere further in text) refer back to the diectic "this" of the first line and the diectic "this" of every line that is a line in this place > a line that is/in this place but cannot help its response/responsibility to the other lines

the image never says "this", or differently, the image doesn't ever stop saying "this", precisely b/c it can never say "not this"

— QED: <line>
— drawing "progress" marks?
— ~~if refinement was needed, public and seemingly acceptable~~ - it is in the signature that the alphabetic line is more than letters (as linguistics)
— drawing—writing: 4 translations — 4 post-translation readings-writings ? + one French (?) + one German (?)
↳ the point is that writing is no less / no more precise

idea of a headline because its spatial distribution, size, colour, typeface, relations to other elements et cetera cannot be absorbed into the notion of a *purely* linguistic category. Similarly, any alleged plastic reading is forestalled because it does not read but see. To this extent, the graphic seeing-reading of writing is already partially fundamental—structural—to any textual engagement, except, in the typical manner of detecting a suspect parasitism in a field or discipline, it is first marginalised and then haphazardly discontinued. That the drawer or writer knows or believes that she is *only* drawing or *only* writing does dissolve neither the plastic line's capacity to be read nor the graphique one's to be seen. In the line's radical detachment from sender and receiver, it is 'abandoned to its essential drift' where iterability assures the repetition in alteration of a henceforth uncontainable context or properness and thereby any ultimate authority or absolute responsibility of the writer-drawer. As Derrida puts it, 'for a writing to be a writing it must continue to "act" and be readable' despite the writer's intention or whatever (change of mind, illness, death and so on) befalls him, which means that '[t]he situation of the writer [*du scripteur*] and the signatory [*du souscripteur*] is, concerning the written, basically the same as that of the reader.'[64] Both reader and writer are policyholders (*souscripteurs*) of an insurance with limited liability, underwriters (*souscripteurs*) of a venturous deal and subscribers (*souscripteurs*) of a content they cannot contain. The marks of the signature (*Unterschrift/Unterzeichnung*) are thus also testimony to its drift as sign (*Zeichen*) through the drawing (*unterzeichnen*) and writing below (*unterschreiben*) the line.

To consider the *activity* of the line thus graphically implicates both drawing and writing, and their history. When writing writes its own history it may be noted, as Derrida did in view of the signifier above, that, though it writes it through the line, it is a graphique history, at the exclusion of a broader graphic understanding. With reference to Lorenz Engell and Joseph Vogl's work, Neef stresses that the writing of history is media dependant. History is *made* in a mediated process of sorting, coding and representation, in which media themselves are not reducible to inert objects. Rather they co-determine the sorting, coding and representation that occurs and each medium thus has its 'concept of the historical'.[65] Neef subsequently suggests that linework as the work of the line that mediates history for handwriting is conceivable as the base for its 'concept of the historical':

> For handwriting, understood as a medium—or better: a 'hypermedium', for it is at once 'scriptural' and 'pictural', at once 'cinematic' in the sense of temporal and in motion, and 'photographic' in the sense of duplication processes of print and imprint, finally equally 'litteral' and 'electronic' (at any rate potentially)—the "specific concept of the historical" is founded not least in the graphic line itself.[66]

That a medium can have *a* 'concept of the historical'—unless it is at least an aconceptual concept—in the face of a multitudinous variety of materials (and the time through which they move) is questionable. What is however remarkable, is the proposition that the line may partake in the writing and drawing up of history as such. In so doing, it not only crosses divers media and

materials, but also conversely engages different medial practices in each other. Rather than the marginal border at the edge of writing's tenuous link to drawing, the line's structural necessity supporting a whole host of graphic processes is consequently imaginable. What the signature and calligraphic mark had indicated as *outlying* cases of writing opens up the continuous space between verbal and pictural, graphique and plastic, intelligible and sensory.

None of this makes seeing or reading simpler, but it aims to characterise a view of linework without drawing a line between drawing and writing. Ingold links the disconnection between the two to an increased linearisation, a 'point-to-point or 'joining[-]dots' approach to writing which is promoted by material, temporal and other exigencies, but which make 'the writer of today no longer a scribe but a wordsmith' subject to increased mechanisation which disrupts the obvious link of the two hands' linework.[67] Though the link persists on every post-it note, marginalium, sketched map to the train station, passive-aggressive note left on a windscreen et cetera, perhaps these do not often enough remind us of the interconnections of lineworks. The possibility that any piece of writing may be sequentialised—even linearised—and cleaned up in its (re)writing and editing obscures the spatial dispersion and pictural messiness of writing as a process and practice.

Implicit in the epithet 'Word Processing' is perhaps precisely the inability to consider the (virtual) page as anything other than a word-processing plant in which glyphs and white spaces push each other along an invisibly lined conveyor belt that has to move the final full stop in order to insert a mark further above. The all-overness of writing is more apparent in the manuscript or even in the manually edited typescript, which may belie the expectation of a top-left-to-bottom-right writing process(ion) in Latin script. When the deletions, insertions, connections and amendments of writing as 'work' are drawn into the consideration, the form and formation of a text becomes one of open spatial distribution and self-interrupting sequentiality. In fact, sequentiality itself is under question as highlights, crossings-out, writing sous rature, writing as palimpsestual accumulation and so on instantiate thick graphic marks that are seen and read through each other. Sitting down to write on a sheet of paper, no pulsating cursor indicates the *normal* starting point, no carriage-return lever favours the text to proceed according to set conventions, no margin stop declares parts of the paper off-limit. This is not to suggest that pen and paper themselves do not provide their own opportunities and restrictions—quite the contrary—but illustrates how functional technology and technological functionality as medium and its ideological conceptualisation necessarily rewrite expectations of writing as a mode and the visual as its modality. This is also why Derrida suggests that writing on a computer changes the *economy* of writing, not its *structure*.[68] The expediency of writing as editing, the automated capacities of spell check, citation and word count, font and paragraph styling and so on are not structural changes but temporal affordances of writing.

Martine Reid notes that historically numerous writers have commented on the gulf between

their manuscripts and the resultant books—shaped additionally through editors and publishers—as printed artefacts.[69] The author's lack of recognition of her own work, on the one hand, describes an embarrassed pride for an object that bestows more honour than its rough counterpart led on. On the other, it is the effect of a text that has become too legible and illegible at once. Paul Valéry remarks that the voice of the work as printed book is unrecognisable as it is clearer and more definite than his own. Especially the author's perceived shortcomings take on the form of even graver errors in which every failure 'speaks out too loudly and too clearly.'[70] Reid attests that the 'affective' bond between author and manuscript is under threat when the personal draft becomes the printed book for a public.[71] Even Gustave 'Flaubert is no longer Flaubert in the eyes of Flaubert himself' when he complains that the typeset version of *Madame Bovary* is flat and illegible because '"[e]verything is so black."'[72] The transition from manuscript to fair copy is thus less the cleaning up of a shabby rough to reveal hidden qualities, rather, it is the double trading of one legibility for another and one illegibility for another.

The existence of a field of manuscript studies in itself is testament to the different legibilities and illegibilities of manuscript and printed book. To (re)turn to the manuscript in order to (re)read the printed text, to have the fair copy's (il)legibility made more (il)legible by regarding its unfair self, is also to acknowledge the shift between reading and seeing writing beyond notions of alphabetic legibility. Reid summarises poignantly that the conversion of manuscript to print 'renews the age-old division and repeats the tautology [… that u]nless it has a precise and significant pictorial dimension, a text is a text, that is to say that it exists to be read.'[73] However, we might add that the tautology necessarily works paradoxically, for a text needs to have a precise pictorial, that is pictural, dimension *as text* in order to be read as such. As with signatures, its legibility hinges on the recognition of its textuality picturally. The significance of the picture of the text, that is of the pictural qualities of the text as text, opens the marks to be read (as graphique signifiers and thus) as verbal signification.

Whether on the typewriter, phone or word processor, writing's smallest incremental unit is here always a fully formed glyph. As alphabetic characters, punctuation marks, diacritics et cetera, writing is a priori based on a linguist's limited selection of differential marks. Handwriting, on the other hand, writes not only with the line and the dot, it also models the space of writing as a field in which interventions are limited only by scale and opacity. Sequence and linearity themselves are easily decoupled, even dropped. As the pen can overlay another finer or bolder script or superimpose another colour that draws letters and marks across existing ones, to look at handwriting requires the combined seeing-reading of articulate shapes and their pictural relations. Though this too, is only an economic expediency of the hand. The poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé, Guillaume Appolinaire, e. e. cummings and many more, as well as concrete poetry as a field exemplify that the typewriter, typesetting and word-processors are no structural hindrances to the recognition of the line's picture in writing. As the word-processor facilitates particular

actions in the course of the sequentialisation of writing it disregards other, though these may still be elicited. Whether with a swan quill or a digital stylus, the line draws across drawing and writing.

He had been a man of great
valour in their war against the romans, but
was now drawn through the middle of the
city, and, as he went, he frequently cried out
and showed the scars of his wounds; and when
he was thrown out of the gates, and despaired of his
preservation, he besought them to grant him a burial.

On Writing

Right from the outset of the project to characterise the relations between drawing and writing, it was evident that the writing of the thesis itself would be a process that could not be external to the object that the written text responded to. Object and subject, once again, overlapped and the subject was used to scrutinise itself and was found to do so already. Nevertheless, the thesis was not envisaged to take this form. Early on, writing still appeared to possess an irrecoverable innocence, though never transparence, that sought the impossible separation between writing *this here* and *the other* writing, the writing in the drawing. The banality of the observation that writing is also a practice became the gravity of a blindness to notice that there are not two kinds of writing (in two practices). Surely there is not a singular writing, in the way that writing cannot take on a singular, uniterable form whose borders are without parasites. But neither are there multiple writings that do not already partake in and contaminate each other.

In pursuing a practice-led project that, on the one hand, is a graphic activity with the materials of artistic production and, on the other, considers writing—writing discursively about art or writing art history—a necessary constituent, there are thus not two practices at stake. Rather, it becomes necessary to take up the task of writing to address (itself as) a graphic practice. Conversely, this does not mean that the explicit engagement with the writing *of this* thesis performs just such a severance of two practices, on the contrary, it merely instantiates their codependent supplementarity because it recognises the urgency not to separate the graphic mark-making *talked about* from the graphic mark-making *talking about* it. If a particular significance may be assigned to drawing-writing whilst writing about drawing-writing it is in the recognition that the two activities already overlapped unseen. To write (art-historically, theoretically, discursively et cetera) about the work of Raymond Pettibon and Michaël Borremans requires the recognition that writer and artist already partake in a shared space. This cohabitation becomes perhaps more evident if the writer also draws and writes, though the collocation of these activities are not uniquely privileging in this way.

Writing about an artist's work (especially if it is a graphic oeuvre already heavily inscribed with writing), manifests the necessity to avow the imbroglio of drawing and writing (or drawing-writing and writing) methodologically. Not only are verbal (graphique) and plastic marks coextensive supplements of each other as lines, but their collocation is also played out in practice. Conventionally, art-historical writing about Pettibon's and Borreman's work produces verbo-pictural texts about their verbo-pictural works without indicating the confluence of the two activities.[1] If the artists' particular and intricate ways of negotiating the relations of writing and drawing in their work is picto-discursively explored, perhaps suggesting a kind of mutual verbo-pictural graphism or hinting at the irreconcilable gap between the verbal and the picture, the artists' careful equipoise and the author's reflection thereof are, all the while, subsumed into the dictate of convention. A convention that is persistent despite the proliferation of writing that elaborates its

conventionality and which undermines the very possibility of interpretive art-historical practice by showing itself as governed by rules absolutely external to those it addresses. It is therefore an incumbent necessity to take on an implicit form-content separation that prevails in the writing of art history or visual culture. (As in the rest of the thesis, what is here called form is not categorically divorced from substance or matter. Rather than adhering to the Aristotelean hylomorphism that supports an agental intent impressing itself on matter, the 'processes of formation as against their final products', as Tim Ingold has argued, are here more important.[2]) This separation operates on multiple levels and abounds, despite having been made explicit and revoked. It is a separation that has subsumed its revocation into and through the very separation at the heart of the revoke.

If writing is one of the practices of art history—though decidedly not the only, unless we assume that artists *write* art history in different ways, that is, they merely *write* in different ways—what are the relations between art and its history, and art-history writing? What is art history prior to the writing of art history? *Is* art history before the writing of art history? Is art *history* before the writing of art history?

To follow Jacques Derrida in *Writing and Difference* is to recognise writing as a practice that inscribes itself in a place that is not yet. Meaning is here something that comes about in writing. In order to arise, meaning must be different from itself: it arises in writing, it is neither prior, nor discovered, nor transcendent.

> To write is to know that what has not yet been produced within literality has no other dwelling place, does not await us as prescription in some *topos ouranios*, or some divine understanding. Meaning must await being said or written in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from itself, what it is: meaning.[3]

Derrida goes on to cite Maurice Merleau-Ponty to reinforce the point that meaning, which is here the possibility of art history, does not precede writing 'as part of an a priori of the mind', it is not *given* before it is written, it is not a *given* before writing: 'The writer's thought does not control his language from without; the writer is himself a kind of new idiom, constructing itself.'[4] Elsewhere Merleau-Ponty elaborates his rejection of the conceptualisations of language, which either reduce it to mere representation of thought or make it the bare mechanics of physiognomy, when he notes that 'the process of expression brings the meaning into being or makes it effective, and does not merely translate it.'[5] Language is here not a theoretical construct that is medially used to take on the mantle of pre-existing *truths* or to re-present a thought or meaning that has been had differently elsewhere. In writing, meaning is constituted, *inaugurated*, if, however, in response to an 'already-there'; conversely, 'speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it.'[6] Similarly Jean-Luc Nancy, whose philosophical language does not seek to perform a neutral role in the face of thought, describes the inseparability of form and content in drawing in *The Pleasure in Drawing* and seemingly performs it in the writing.[7] As David Espinet suggests, 'Nancy does not want to write *about* drawing [...] but to answer it appropriately in the

medium of writing', relating the form-content connection of drawing to writing 'by, as it were, writing drawingly.'[8]

This constitutive non-neutrality of language is nothing new, and so it hardly comes as a surprise when Jaś Elsner notes of art history's ekphrastic description of its objects that it creates its own work of art. It adds what is not already there and deletes what it cannot express: 'In other words, description is not merely selective; it is (at its best) a parallel work of art.'[9] For Elsner this statement is not meant to condemn art history for a failure of objectivity, of neutrality or of the application of proper scientific standards, rather he emphasises the inevitability of the 'tendentious' qualities of any descriptive gesture and urges the writer of art history to be cognisant of the 'ekphrastic process' itself.[10] And similarly, the photographic representation that almost by default has to accompany the writing of art history, rather than enabling 'greater objectivity', is also affected by 'partiality and tendentiousness' because it is 'a visual ekphrasis' exhibiting the same bias for particular angles as an essay might, except for reassuring the reader of the '"thereness"' of the external object.[11] The inclusion of photography in art-historical enquiry is often linked to ideas of shedding subjectivity to achieve greater objectivity. Yet as Ralph Lieberman argues, the camera and other devices only appear to offer 'scientific' avenues for humanities disciplines, and in the case of art history led to '*Kunstwissenschaft*, an oxymoron, [being] born.'[12]

Elsner's description of art history's writing as ekphrasis is perhaps unsurprising, does it not already support the planting of the practice firmly in the purview of poetry, literature or fiction, though be it, in his words, 'fiction with footnotes'.[13] However, ekphrasis is an interesting label which to affix to art history perhaps for another reason, for it renders part of art-historical practice as translation (or more precisely intersemiotic transposition) and therefore at once re-inscribes the impossibility, yet also the necessity, of the very process.[14] Again, the correspondences and equivalences between a content and form *out there*, and the form and content of the very practice that wants to address the *out there*, are questioned.

In the idea of art history as fiction,[15] a fiction that creates its own space, rather than occupying a given one, we then also recognise Derrida's beginning of writing. That is, a writing that has stopped to be form for a preconceived idea, that has stopped to function as signifier for a predetermined meaning.

> It is when that which is written is *deceased* as a sign-signal that it is born as language; for then it says what is, thereby referring only to itself, a sign without signification, a game or pure functioning, since it ceased to be *utilized* as natural, biological, or technical information, or as the transition from one existent to another, from a signifier to a signified.[16]

Thus, visual culture studies and art history, far from being ignobled by the fiction tag, are enobled to pursue the multiplicity that they have already displayed but which hitherto sat uneasily with the scientistic (not scientific) pursuit of linearity, resolution and teleological determination. Derrida is particularly interested the 'institution' of fiction because it 'gives *in principle* the power to say everything' (though this may be restricted in view of wider political, social, familial

et cetera contexts).[17] In this permissiveness not to abide by rules however, Derrida detects the possibility to imagine the drawing up of new rules and thus to recognise 'the traditional difference between nature and institution, nature and conventional law, nature and history.'[18] Fiction therefore harbours a juridico-political force in its potential to say everything. It can dream what is not already constituted and appreciate the constitutive forces already at work. Art history's fictions are however, not only discursive but in the literary appeal, which includes their very letters, a graphic writing that transgresses the boundary of image and text is found.

As Boris Groys has argued, theorisation occurs within a space produced by the text. Texts position themselves and other texts, not in relation to reality but a literary space. The writer needs to be aware of this jostling about space as any assumption of reality promotes a position outside of textual production.

> Even if theory claims to describe and interpret reality, it remains literature and situates itself in an artificial, literary space. Now: If the theoretical positions are thus situated in the literary space, the figure of the theoretician remains extra-textual. It is therefore in the space of literature that the oft-described death of the author comes about.[19]

Moreover then, the practice of writing cannot extract itself from its own position of artistic production. The writer who wants to adjudicate from the outside, who considers his own (literary) work to occupy an external space in relation to the object, 'only manifests his inability to reflect on the artistic dimension of his own textual production.'[20] This is also what Hayden White calls the 'lack of linguistic self-consciousness.'[21] Christa-Maria Herm Layes similarly emphasises the propinquity between the work of the art historian and the artist, especially since their roles and practices already overlap more obviously in activities such as curation, as well as critical, interpretative and conceptual engagements.[22] She highlights the 'radical historical insights' that can be brought about when art-history writing suspends the division of theory and practice, not because it does not recognise it, but because the suspension itself is fruitful.[23] Artistic practice ceases to be a realm discrete from its (own) articulation and critique but cannot help but be shaped by the same forces of so-called creative practices.

> Questions of the kind: 'What is an image?' or 'What does this text mean?' etc., cannot be asked and discussed from a meta-artistic perspective, if they deal with modern images and texts, because every theory is for itself already a text—and thus a literary piece. At the same time, as Plato had already noted, every text is also an image—which, in our time, has been made especially clear by conceptual art, which works with the text in the image.[24]

The affordances and exigencies of the literary space thus require the writer not 'to confuse ontology and grammar'.[25] The putative address of an object subsumes it into the rules of the literary text which carries forth itself through the questions posed in it. The attempted instrumentalisation of the literary text in pursuit of an object is inevitably turned into the workings of the text itself, 'all the tortures inflicted upon it, are always transfigured, drained, forgotten by literature, within literature; having become modifications of itself, by itself, in itself, they are mortifications, that is

to say, always, ruses of life.'[26] White is similarly blunt when he stakes that historians who believe they 'deal with "real" [not] "imagined" events' need to reminded that they and novelist deal with a 'problematic and mysterious' scenario in the same way, by shaping it into 'a recognizable, […] familiar form. It does not matter whether the world is conceived to be real or only imagined; the manner of making sense of it is the same.'[27] In art historians' lack of self-recognition as writers however, Paul Barolsky detects the reason why their prose is so often lacking to express the love they (presumably) have for the subject.[28] Though distinguishing between scholarship and style, content and form, Barolsky nevertheless maintains that there must be a strong relationship between how we say what we say.

Catherine Grant draws on a number of these issues, although from a different theoretical base, in her introduction to the themed *Art History* issue 'Creative Writing and Art History'. She suggests that 'all writing is to some extent creative' though seemingly differentiating between art-history writing and creative art-history writing in stating about the latter that it is 'writing that is self-conscious of its own process, foregrounding form as much as content'.[29] A number of issues, whose (dis)entanglement seems crucial, come to the fore in this understanding of writing.

Firstly, the use of 'creative' in 'creative art-history writing' does not only function as a adjectival qualifier that characterises a particular kind of art-history writing, it also has a pejorative, parasitic trajectory—whether intended or not—in distinguishing one kind of writing, in need of qualification, from another which does not demand attributive distinction. In other words, 'creative' art-history writing is decidedly not 'normal' art-history writing or 'proper' art-history writing, whichever it is that must be attributively opposed to the word 'creative'.

Secondly, if creative writing is self-conscious of its own process, proper writing is presumably not. If creative writing foregrounds form as much as content, proper writing presumably does not. It is one thing to claim, as Groys and White do, that the writer is lacking a particular linguistic self-consciousness to understand the constitutive, performative, material, even creative powers of her writing. However, to pin the consciousness or creativity on the writing itself is to propose the possibility of a writing whose form is subordinate to its content. It is to propose the possibility of a neutral kind of writing that can *express* content without the very form that *expresses* it to affect that *expression*. Finally, it is to reassert the distinction between form and content that presupposes meaning before it is realised in writing, articulation or whatever other *form*. Of course it is possible and potentially useful to affix the descriptive labels 'creative', 'poetic', 'lyrical', 'technical' and so on to art writing, though this needs to be seen within a context in which there is no attributeless writing. Art writing without complement positions itself as a default or centre seeking its place inside of content but outside of style. It entertains a naturalisation or neutralisation of form that implicitly disavows its own and renders attributed writing as the *other* writing. If the attributions made in response are the adjectives 'scholarly', 'traditional', 'typical' and so on, we find the illegitimating forces of 'creative' confirmed. There is no inherent opposition between

AS FOR SEX, THE LAST OF THE GREAT WARMTH,
IT WAS JUST A COCKTAIL TERM FOR AN EXCITE-
MENT THAT BUCKED YOU UP FOR A WHILE,
THEN LEFT YOU MORE RAGGY THAN EVER. PRAYER!
IT WAS AS IF THE MATERIAL YOU WERE MADE
OF WAS CHEAP STUFF, AND WAS FRAYING OUT
TO NOTHING.

not tousling but twirling your hair arching your back licking your neck running your tresses tightly wound between my fingers on your waist pushing my lips into your elusive interlocking my tongue with yours scuffling between your legs under your hips caught in the slatty voluptuous space between tonguing your crescent spine with both hands your ass situating undulating thumping thrumming supple rhythmical thrusting inside my hands on up your shoulders brushing the inside of your palms arms pits one surrendering your waist twisting you nape the other sliding from ingenue to hill to willowy valley feeling sumptuous mellow push against my lap craving jostling jousting bedding back cupping your contrasty fervently fervidly hanging my head bounteously supping with hands eyes lips tongue mouth candied silken abundant opulent pushes my head to laugh to bestow freely wildly vigorously daringly deeply holds me hard igneous thrusts me

the authorities, served to their lumps and, soon they realized, that even that quantum from Sylvan Arcadia, was nothing more than a wasteland that neither of them felt was worth filling out the paperwork for and either they never did, again preferring to assure each other with portentous glances that their impetus was sustaining them in being unalone when nothing below was the vestigial, goo-prone, sentimental chaîveté they had deep-sixed so effortlessly

yet I abandoned that thought and framed another supplication. I dreamt of taking off the mask I had worn for years to reveal that underneath, below skin and hair and lies was indeed a real face identical to the false one.

the miracle of seeing the car crash coming and not being ready for impact.

read upon his death, there
was a lamentation made
by all, not such a one as was
to be made in way of flattery
to them, while they did but
counterfeit sorrow, but such as
was real, while everybody at his
death, as if they had lost one
that was near to them.



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MANAGEMENT

NAME: DIANNE SHUFFLEBOTTOM

DEPT: 3D DESIGN

LOCATION: ALL SAINTS

NAME:

DEPT: CHRISTOPHER RICKROYD

LOCATION: HISTORY OF ART

RIGHTON.

NAME: IORNA WILLIAMS

DEPT:

LOCATION: PLUS LOIN

NAME:

'poetic' and 'scholarly', yet in the act of application, the indivisible difference between giving a name and its involution in discourse surfaces. On the one hand, there is 'nomination', the giving of a 'proper name [as] the asemantic limit of the semantic gesture', through which Nancy for example characterises Gilles Deleuze's philosophy.[30] On the other hand, there are the semantic operations of discourse that relate word and world in a play of illimitable meanings. However, the evocation of a possible discursivity should already question any immutable relation between truth, fact and fiction. To limit the connections between them, especially by asserting a simple correlation between truth and fact, and asserting a pellucid translatability into language also manifests particular socio-cultural beliefs. As White asserts, the association of truth with fact—rather than with a multitude of possibly verifiable interpretations—is a historical occurrence.

> In the early nineteenth century, however, it became conventional, at least among historians, to identify truth with fact and to regard fiction as the opposite of truth, hence as a hindrance to the understanding of reality rather than as a way of apprehending it.[31]

Art history's particular and probably unrequited love affair with fact is possibly most succinctly exemplified in the kind of 'text' that is permitted to remain closest to the work, when all 'interpretative' panels have been left behind. As though the tiny wall or page label with name, date of birth and death, perhaps place, title, date of creation and medium are irrefutable, they finally assure that the bewildering interpretability before us can be boiled down, explained, classified and subsumed into an unimpeachable catalogue of facts; far removed from the conflicting, mutually exclusive and yet individually justified interpretative fictions around the work.

As this account, however, more than hints at, the fact presumed to be *in* the formal value 'is *in fact* not the object's own object-hood and existence as matter but that ekphrastic transformation which has rendered it into a stylistic terminology.'[32] This also applies to the broader picture of the work's history or the artist's story which equally may not be separated from the fictional business of interpretation. Story and thus history, White remarks, should not be confused with life: 'We do not live stories, even if we give our lives meaning by retrospectively casting them in the form of stories. And so too with nations or whole cultures.'[33] The telling of the story itself, its relations between fact, truth and fiction, is moreover already structured by the particular nomenclature chosen. Through it and in it, the engagement with the work, the artist or the phenomenon is framed and positioned in view of other discourses. In the adherence to or contamination of disciplinary approaches the story is already foretold. Whether biographical, historical, technical, theoretical, critical or of another kind, in the allegiance to genre a unified, consistent and distinctly categorisable discourse, i.e. one that responds to its own call, is affected. Theory too, which seeks claims beyond the historical or critical, is equally prone to pursue its own self-determination. As Jean-François Lyotard argues:

> Theory is in effect a genre, a tough genre. Modern logic has elaborated the rules for this genre: consistency, completeness, decidability of the system of axioms, and independence of the axioms.[34]

In the (self-)identification with a genre writing already forfeits the possibility not to axiomatise as per the law of the genre. Derrida reminds us that theory in the classical sense sets limits on its concerns but paradoxically seeks to address *its* object totally. It necessarily develops hierarchies and 'oppositional values' that betray an 'intrinsic ethics and teleology' that are incongruent with the putatively descriptive and abstracting relationship it has to *its* object.[35] The aim is therefore not to develop a self-enclosed, limited and conclusive theory—whether of *the* graphic, drawing or writing—but to draw on 'another discourse, another "logic" that accounts for the impossibility of concluding such a "general theory."'[36] Such a discourse endorses its own volatility, its impossible boundedness by a margin it does not exclude, its own processes and practices of production (including those that seemingly transgress its *proper* form), as well as its identity as other. Genres depend on telos, the telos of 'do' and 'do not' that seeks to uphold 'the essential purity of their identity.'[37] This identity of the genre is only an identity onto itself. It proposes an outside to itself that already supplements it. Neither unity, nor consistency, nor completeness is pure and absolute, because the iterability of writing breaks with the unity of the centre. Though necessary for the law of genre, purity is contaminated in the instantiation of genre, when the generic begets and bears its kin(d), the latter cannot be subsumed in the former.

> What if there were, lodged within the heart of the law itself, a law of impurity or a principle of contamination? And suppose the condition for the possibility of the law were the *a priori* of a counterlaw, an axiom of impossibility that would confound its sense, order, and reason?[38]

Not to axiomatise in the moment of undecidability, not to unify in the view of difference without border and not to paper over either is the impossible demand for a writing that tells a story other than its own. Though this story too will inevitably display its own conventions and procedures, just as Jonathan Culler diagnosed with reference to Derrida about the *Tel Quel* group.[39] Any assumption of freedom or emancipation from language and concept is illusory in writing because it is a way to produce meaning and ensure the possibility of *communication*. We can however offer 'resistance' and 'dream of emancipation', knowing that the work of displacement and deconstitution will continue with and in our own writing.[40] The difference between Derrida's and White's writing accentuates an important aspect of language's framing capacity. Derrida is concerned with the displacement of discursive power that already operates in writing. While White's semiological engagement with texts moves *from* authorially conscious, subconscious or even unconscious ideological hues *to* the processes and decisions that appear 'seemingly self-evident, obvious, natural ways of making sense of the world' but are *of* writing and thus inscribe texts with particular, though not necessarily inevitable, logics or mechanisms.[41] The aporia of language as a non-neutral medium for the fiction of non-fiction remains. Different expressions will engender the historical narrative in different ways, and contradictory versions of historical narratives are possible without requiring one of them to be illegitimate.

> This *aporia* or sense of contradiction residing at the heart of language itself is present in *all* of the classic historians. It is this linguistic self-consciousness which distinguishes them from

> their mundane counterparts and followers, who think that language can serve as a perfectly transparent medium of representation and who think that if one can only find the right language for describing events, the meaning of the events will *display itself* to consciousness.[42]

Updating these words from their time and their historical project, which unravelled history and with it art history as ideological, how is the art historian to write forty years later, when a visual and a material turn have also been taken, or rather, at least identified? Can we, not just in name, extol the virtue of historical turns and carry on writing as before?

Any possible response to such a question needs to be seen not with a view of generality, as that would entirely defeat the purpose of the foregoing account, but as implicated within a literary discourse that anticipates and promotes its own maturation, senescence and redundance. Dealing in particular with the relationship of writing and drawing in Pettibon's, Borremans' or one's own work textually and graphically, that is, in a text that itself is constituted by writing and images, cannot disregard that these works deal with similar relationships. To recognise the literary space of this very enquiry is also the recognition of its own graphic intervolution. The literary fiction of art-history writing like literature itself cohabits form and content (if we must continue to divide them). That does not mean that the writing of art history needs to assimilate or simulate the verbo-pictural relations of its subject matter but that, if these relations matter in art, visual culture or historic discourse, then the very text contextualising them is already part of these entanglements and cannot extract itself by appealing to convention. Similarly, if the oft-invoked 'literary hegemony' or 'verbal imperialism' that the discursive arts hold over the visual arts—although we may need to say, as Derrida does, 'les arts que vous appelez visuels'[43] or note via the German 'bildende Kunst' that the English nomination carries a certain scopo-centrism and -phobia—are to be meaningfully addressed, they cannot be appeased by a self-exculpatory gesture towards convention, plus a few externalising words, which seek to formulate the problem as general or even generic, as though that excluded the specificity of this text.

Apart from the reduction of pictures to a unified, that is an 'explained' meaning through writing, some of the boilerplate conventions may be: treating the reproduction as indistinguishable from the work, employing figure numbers to sort unruly images, formatting and labelling images at the convenience of the verbal text, image-text order and treating verbal text as invisible or transparent. This is not to suggest that the figure in the text will give up its illustrational characteristics, rather it promotes the recognition of the *figure in the text* and indicates the latter's relationship to the former as neither static nor of a one-way referral.

Finding the figure *in* discourse and language, Lyotard's approach in *Discourse, figure* similarly revokes certain putative oppositions between art and language.[44] Though he considers, the recognition of the plasticity of the writing's line as writing's death, preferring it to remain verbal or graphique, that is, part of textual space, the figure still partakes in writing and yet is uncontainable by linguistics. Lyotard identifies three types of figures with varying degrees of visibility. The *figure-image* is visible but marks the disturbance of any '"real" space' in the image.[45] This figure

is not figurative, though it may be part of figuration, but rather belongs to the lateral vision of a curved space, refusing the subsumption by perspective, single point-of-view, focus et cetera, thus objecting to becoming readable as signification. The *figure-form* may be visible but is more removed from the line and its construction or the trace itself, rather marking 'the Gestalt of a configuration, the architecture of a picture, the scenography of a performance, the framing of a photograph—in short, the schema.'[46] The *figure-matrix* finally, is neither visible, nor legible, and links discourse, image and form without belonging to either. Rather it is the difference of the plastic (as the space of image and form) and the textual, violating one through the other. In the figure-matrix Lyotard notices the realm of the artist's work, recognisable as the thickness or opacity that renders words inisolable from form and image, or form from words and images, or images from words and form. Though the figure may be a product of vision, Lyotard's recognition of it in discourse hinges on the designation of another object as a point of reference that both share.[47] Speaking particularly of poetry, Lyotard asserts that the figure in discourse does not permit the alternative of a 'deceptive figural space and a textual space where knowledge is produced', the figural is precisely not 'a second discourse in discourse.'[48] Thinking of the figural merely as another discourse would absorb it into textual space, rendering it explainable as, in and through discourse. Rather, the figure in writing partakes in textual space, though without being limited by textual borders. Writing's figure overlaps text, form and image, thus violating linguistic restrictions of the structure and order of language, and 'produc[ing …] meaning-effects that cannot be the result of the normal interplay of semantic and/or syntactic givens'.[49] Though the violations occur within linguistic space they cannot be explained by it as the figure itself exceeds this space. Lyotard's figure in writing finally promotes sensory effects that moves us bodily. The figure disturbs the arbitrariness of language which becomes sensorially available.

> The key property of arbitrariness, which radically distinguishes language from all sign-systems, is precisely what the figure subverts in discourse. Through the figure words begin to induce in our bodies (as would colors) such and such a hint of attitude, posture, or rhythm: yet further proof that discursive space is dealt with as a plastic space, and words as sensory things.[50]

Lyotard's plastic space of writing is not the material ground of inscription or the implication of the gesture in thought, rather the figure beyond signification and designation opens the reader's body to the sensuous of graphique writing. As Daniel Rubinstein points out, Lyotard is however not interested in using this setup to promote sense over logos (or vice versa) but designates them as already partaking in each other through the figural.[51] In doing so, the isolation of sense from thought is pre-empted and the subordination of images by words forestalled. Nevertheless, it would be preposterous to claim linguistic imperialism null and void because the figure and sensorial experience have been written into discourse again. Rather, Lyotard's move emphasises the necessity to acknowledge the figure in language in order to move away from writing that externalises images because it cannot recognise its own. Or differently, the figural demands that the restrictions of traditional forms of discourse are acknowledged and reconsidered. As Kiff

Bamford argues:

> It [the figural] is not a romantic or nostalgic search for that which language is unable to say but rather draws attention to the need to find a mode of presentation for that which has been repressed—an inevitably unending search which confronts the paradox that the unsignifiable aspect of the figure is changed through attempts to make it 'present'. The effect of this attempt, however, displaces the assumed preconditions of the view, disturbs notions of fixed address and resists assimilation to established orders, forms and means of signification.[52]

The task is not to present the figural but to transgress and displace modes of discourse and knowledge that perpetuate the repression of the lateral, the undecidible, the pictural and so on. Lyotard's own texts are often demonstrations of the possibility of such discourses, as they refuse to resolve and dissolve differences and evade the unifying tendencies of focalised, i.e. non-lateral, engagement. Figure and discourse are not opposed, yet discourse that does not recognise its on sensorial appeal, 'implies', as Martin Jay suggests, 'the domination of textuality over perception, conceptual representation over prereflexive presentation, rational coherence over the "other" of reason. It is the realm of logic, concepts, form, speculative reciprocity, and the symbolic.'[53] Such discourse is premised on its own transparency, the self-contained closedness of its language and the possibility of singular contexts and references. Undecidability, diffuse vision and sensing are not opposed to discourse, rather, they are the moment of non-automated decision, 'the lateral in the focal'[54] and the other of intelligibility, all of which are usually repressed in discourse.

Lyotard confirms, too—as Derrida did vis-à-vis the possibility of emancipation from language—that the philosopher as writer will never be able to shake off the 'structuralist unconsciousness' imposed by language as long as she deals with words.[55] Yet, short of 'becom[ing] a painter', the writer can displace and reverse the orders and conventions of discourse, and pursue its form and image, so that '[i]t is not even a question of drawing or painting, but rather of painting and drawing with and in words'.[56] Thus, comparable to Groys's proposition about the interpretive work that seeks to position itself outside of creative production, Lyotard asserts that the interpretation of a poem which positions itself outside of the poem's language (extratextual relations) can only present 'a negative proof'.[57] For an approach that seeks to respond to the work, the writing needs to be situated on the side of the poem's language, generating the poem's language and grammatical structure, however not as a mode of negative comparison to regular language, but through intertextual relations. Bamford outlines polemically why it is a requisite for art history or visual culture, too, to recognise the figure in their discourse and in the texts that they engage: 'It is necessary as it disturbs the complacency of art-historical discourse, which neuters philosophical challenges and fails to reconsider the basis of its engagement.'[58] For Bamford it is indispensible to the engagement with Lyotard's ideas that they are inassimilable to a rationalising and linearising discourse whose language gives up on its constitutive power of the figural in writing. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that the writer is ever in control of the interactions any text may open up and draw upon. For Lyotard, writers do not 'use [...] language like a toolbox', they are not the

anthropocentric players of a '"language game"' that is closed onto itself, because the 'phrases' they employ are already loaded with innumerous past and future intervolutions.[59] Concerning intention in the act of writing (or speech), Lyotard refers to it as merely another 'phrase' that inscribes itself in other phrases which are already multiply inscribed, in a way akin to Derrida's designation of iterability.

The burden and boon of practice-led research however makes it possible for the writer to be a painter or drawer, as well as for the drawer to write, facilitating the recognition of the drawing that writing already performs and the writing that issues through the drawn mark. Notwithstanding the extension of practices, this is not to suggest that the writer's drawing offers an infinitely accessible array of translatable *truths* waiting to be verbalised. However, in the confluence of activities the common conventions and borderless differences of a shared practice can be recovered. Testing material and technological affordances, intervolving gestural and motorsensory processes with intellectual ones and positioning *practice in its product* are aspects that cognisance of the *work of making* offers. These elements and situations are not external to the hermeneutic practice of looking at finito work, however their recognition is facilitated when the act of making is a priori given a position in the formation of the work, as well as in its subsequent itemisation as art history, visual culture, material culture and so on. In this particular case, the practice of writing was already part of the investigation of graphic marks and could not be prevented from perpetually *contaminating* the 'report' on itself. Or perhaps, it could have been excluded on the grounds that one writing is artistic and the other scholarly, one exceptional and the other typical, one parasitic on the conventionality of the other, but in this exaggerated fashion the course of iterability would have also been betrayed. Any such exclusion would have had to follow a different path in which the rigorous adherence to models, categories and genres is as unshakable as it is implausible. Lacking such conviction *writing this* required the (reluctant) acknowledgment that its practice was not outside the one with which it shared a desk, materials, bodies, gestures and which also probed the same questions. Are the cogitation and its deportment of *writing this* and drawing-writing a dead bird identical? No! But neither are they the same for the writing of *this* in pen, pencil, typewriter, word processor, in the first place, in its transcription, in quotation, in quotation as an involuntary intertextual echo, as an example of grammatical construction et cetera. As long as the question aims to establish a self-identity that belies the possibility of repetition in alteration, that is, it belies a non-oppositional difference, it will already anticipate its reply and adjudicate based on metaphysical or empiricist parameters that implicitly constitute the question and are yet also external to it, or differently, that explicitly constitute the question and are already internal to it.

To acknowledge the graphic effects of writing in art-historical practice thus may begin with the cellulosic or digital sheet which presents a material space that is not merely neutral content holder for any inscription. That writing possesses a material and thus also visual, figural, graphic and so on trajectory is already apparent when one considers the enmeshing of 'content and form'

in aspects of writing, such as headlines, content pages, indices, lists, tables, footnotes et cetera, that art history *normally* also abides by.[60] This visual dimension is however highly conventionalised and restricted, repressing the possibility to *see* writing outside of acknowledged parameters. Writing art history or visual culture also partakes in the production of visible and readable artefacts, though ideally we look through them to some transcendent content—logos—beyond. If art-history writing also performs ekphrasis then it needs to come to terms with the tautology implicit in Heffernan's canonical definition and recognise the imbrications of its diagnoses of artefacts in itself. More generally though, a refusal to provide resolutions and establish consistencies to differential phenomena is a necessary response.

Drawing similarly on White, Gavin Parkinson points out that if inconsistencies and gaps structure our understanding of history (as well as our lives at large) and if we intend to avoid the deliverance of a uniform narrative in light of a variety of interpretative situations, art-historical writing cannot continue to proceed without questioning itself.[61] Explicitly, while the annalist may provide an empty record to designate years during which '"nothing happened"', the historian feels obliged to sustain

> narrative strains for the effect of having filled in all the gaps, of having put an image of continuity, coherence, and meaning in place of the fantasies of emptiness, need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares about the destructive power of time.[62]

Parkinson's call for the disruption of the homogenising tendencies to offer 'the consistency, unity, systematism, fixity, coherence, and monism that continue to characterize our ideal of rational communication through writing' extols the necessity to embrace *literary* writers.[63] This means in no way aping the writing of any one person or particular group but ceasing to 'coloniz[e]', 'assimilat[e]' and 'domesticat[e]' language-bound ideas into the 'functional realism of art-historical rationalism' as though this strategy can meaningfully partake in their ideas.[64] The attempt of usurping complex ideas but divorcing them from a use of language that challenges institutional and metaphysical assumptions about writing and knowledge fails to engage and recognise their workings and force. In fact, as Lyotard suggests, it is with violence that writing which deliberately works against the metaphysical desires of closure and difference as opposition is subsumed into the very discourses it seeks to displace: 'Terror through theory only begins when one also claims to axiomatize discourses that assume or even cultivate inconsistency, incompleteness, or indecidability.'[65] Writing that resists totality or refuses the plenitude of telos is neither deficient nor can it be straightened and meaningfully absorbed into the discourses of intent and closure. Rather, it seeks to pose questions that do not already propose—and thereby prepose—their own answers; that do not already limit the answer by way of a teleological trajectory that has been inbuilt into the question.

> A community of the question, therefore, within the fragile moment when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated itself beneath

> the mask of the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already and fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of the question.[66]

The language of the question and the writing still seeks itself, still probes, interrupts and questions itself in order not to predic(a)t(e) the answer. Of course, however probing and self-reflexive such a language may be, it will always fail to contest the presumed coherence of history, philosophy, metaphysics and else through language. There is no language outside language'—no syntax and no lexicon—'that escapes its intervolution in the logic it aims to displace.[67] Yet this is precisely why the inconsistent, incomplete and undecidable are so necessary, because they continuously deconstitute the existing logic and themselves without the proposition of a general theory that merely affirms the possibility of a general theory. The lack of closure however opens the pleasure to do again and return to a language and object that have never been identical to themselves. It is the chance to review, reread and rewrite a response that was already built on iterability. Derrida chides the reader who wants to know in advance what is to be read. The reader in need of certitude like the writer of a language that captures and envelops its object totally and transparently seek to know what is proper to their object through a language that is not their object's. Thus their reading and writing is also an act of appropriation, of wanting to contain and limit what is without borders and not within language.

> Because I still like him, I can foresee the impatience of the *bad* reader: this is the way I name or accuse the fearful reader, the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon deciding (in order to annul, in other words to bring back to oneself, one has to wish to know in advance what to expect, one wishes to expect what has happened, one wishes to expect (oneself)). Now, it is bad and I know no other definition of the bad, it is bad to predestine One's reading, it is always bad to foretell. It is bad, reader, no longer to like retracing one's steps.[68]

Within the literary space of writing art history, the language of art history and its thought cannot be divorced. As Margaret Iversen and Stephen W. Melville have argued, such a separation of idea and language is typical for an understanding of methodology that 'mechanistic[ally]' aims to apply abstract, '"transferable"' methods and as such divides the discipline itself into its 'archive and canon' on the one hand, and its 'method or methods' on the other.[69]

> Whatever their differences, the very idea of a 'methodology' course or book suggests that there is a field of freestanding objects (visual art and architecture) and that certain specialist tools and techniques must be wielded by the art historian in order to study them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that 'method' bears an external relation to both the subjects and the objects of art history.[70]

Instead, they suggest, we need to embrace the *writing* in *writing about art* more comprehensively in order to recognise the (continuing) development of the discipline and not to limit it from itself.

Iversen and Melville's argument makes reference to 'French theory', while Parkinson's is centred on the *Tel Quel* circle and Bamford's addresses in particular Lyotard's writing, yet either's is open to being expanded to accommodate a wider range of different writers. Significant to these



you know, I always judged
myself by the balance I co
strike between the needs
of my body and the demand
of my mind. I am judging
myself now and I cannot
like the sentence. I live
badly like a barbarian.
worse. I am numb. My
body is anaesthetized. M
mind is dazed. I cannot
cry. I cannot laugh. This
life which devours me - I
have known it to be full
and what frightens me
about death is the cer-
tainty it will bring me th
My life has been consu
mated without me. I wi
have lived marginally.

various considerations is that form and content of writing present themselves as inisolable. The difficulty of paraphrasing Derrida's or Lyotard's work and the indulgence in extended quotes that commonly characterise the discussion of it, are testament to intervolution of so-called content and so-called form. As Parkinson noted, the tendency to extricate *a* theory or notion from *its* language is also a taming and naturalisation of its wide-ranging effect which cannot help but reorient it. That Parkinson continues to speak of *style*,[71] as though it were a mode that could be applied to writing, rather than being, as he explicitly states, part of the workings of the writing is curious but also exemplifies how prevalent and language-bound the content-form division is. On the other hand, the persistence of the term also marks that the notions of form and content, or style and substance cannot and should not be simply disabled and replaced with another metaphysical centre that re-inaugurates the same discourse merely differently. Derrida rather advocates the operation of the graft which is attached to a historical concept in order to intervene and displace.

> Deconstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to a neutralization: it must, through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing—put into practice a *reversal* of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes and that is also a field of nondiscursive forces.[72]

For Derrida, the graft assures that the historical concept remains palpable in order for the intervention and transition to proceed through the friction with a discursive order that it does not seek to replace or neutralise but whose permeating force needs to be traced, opposed and displaced. Harald Tesan, who describes Derrida's writing as working against *dualisms*, against linear uniformity of concepts and against wholeness, comments that his writing continuously questions 'the metaphysical character of language' whilst recursively unravelling itself.[73] His thought too, though already bound up in the intricacies of Derrida's language, is inevitably also already structured by the impossible separations of language.

> [Arguments, theses and enquiries] evade the economy of conceivability through language ornament, through metaphor and through linguistic jokes. Derrida creates a kind of allegorical writing, in which the deficient character of the singular image is annulled through variety—as large as possible—of expressive possibilities.[74]

The questions that touch upon the content-form divisions of language concern the kind of division drawn between writing's form and its content. What is ornament in writing? Is there unornamented writing, and if so, what does it look like? What is style in writing? Is the consideration of the graphic a style? And, if it this style structures the argument of writing, how can it be style?

Catherine Soussloff and James Elkins have asked why Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Hélène Cixous and Derrida 'tend to have their texts viewed as sources *for* art history, rather than examples *of* art history.'[75] And as Parkinson points out, perhaps Derrida had already given the answer, when he wrote that within the university language is a neutral tool which will be defended in



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

SHEPHERDS
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that is to say, we revelled incessantly in her
splendor, sometimes days passed as if in meditation
absorbed, buried, engulfed, like a visionary, auguring
and imbibing her mute voluptuousness in ecstasy
and inward radiance

its neutrality: the 'content' of one's writing may be provocative and revolutionary, but we may not touch the neutral integrity of language.[76] Derrida recognises in the university's (as well as in that of other institutions') attempt to preserve an untempered language a 'juridico-political' endeavour that also paradoxically seeks 'the effacement of language'.[77] On the one hand, it is an insistence on ideal translatability of language, which is fundamental to the traditional notion of pedagogy and its forms of communication and knowledge. The institution is here also the place for the transmission of a national language. On the other hand, this translatability however also reassigns the universalism of language and thus the erasure of the singular idiom. Derrida insists that the institution protects both, the national and the universal of language, because they ensure that all other contractual, political, judicial et cetera agreements are upheld.[78] Engaging with the constrictions imposed by the university from a methodological perspective, Iversen and Melville argue similarly that the compartmentalisation of methodology and subject which promotes the former 'ever more [... in] defining the terms of enquiry' restricts the scope of the discipline to something that sees itself external to it.[79] As Derrida identifies a juridico-political drive in the institution, Iversen and Melville comparably detect the exigencies of econometric politics at work, diagnosing that the dubious 'ongoing professionalization of the subject' is overall part 'of the reduction of the world to a stock of available and, as it were, merely denumerable items.'[80]

Insisting on the import of the differential inseparability of form, matter, substance and content does not seek to broaden the 'readable' text or any horizon of 'readability'. Rather, what holds for drawing also holds for writing, and in keeping with Lyotard's figure, which is illimitable to discourse though partakes in it, and Derrida's pursuit of the oppositional even in nondiscursive forces, the aim is to emphasise continuous processes not static objects, as well as transformations not meanings. The intervolution of form and content in writing—as in drawing—cannot be successfully unravelled to excavate or produce another limited and limitable text. Neither does it generate a mysterious, unfathomable force about which nothing can be said.

The diminution of form, material and process or their reduction to another content are part of what Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp call the 'discursivation of (the understanding of) culture'.[81] Lamenting the shift that has made culture and its *products* less connected to their creative and skilful making and turned them into a rarefied intellectual activity *as text*, Krämer and Bredekamp recognise a concomitant fortification of the borderlines between language and image. Not only is writing derogated to being a discursive text but the overall effect of discursivation is a separation of practice from interpretation, material(ity) from symbol(ism), non-verbal from verbal phenomena and more broadly cultural production and art from research and knowledge.[82] Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht has similarly sought to question 'an *institutional* configuration within which the absolute dominance of meaning-related questions had long led to the abandonment of all other types of phenomena and questions.'[83] Though the approaches diverge, what they have in common is a refusal to render writing or images into a fixed text which can be structurally dis-

sected and whose force may be captured or contained.

Conversely however, the recognition of the content in the form does not seek to institute another formalism which dogmatically insists on purely differential or arbitrary reading, writing and drawing. Neither the procession of this chapter, nor the rest of the thesis do in any way advocate a free-for-all for writing or pursue the so-called '*obscurantisme terroriste*'[84] of meaningless writing. Rather, the writing in this thesis is a response to the paradox of writing's fictional nonfiction, its material linguistics, its verbal substance and its formal content. It is an attempt not to limit writing to a verbal activity of speech transcription or imply a transparent legibility of communication. Hence, it seeks to decelerate reading and speed it up, to indicate how language may perform itself in being written, to note the displacement of the inky word from its phoneme, to demonstrate the gap between description and described and so on. How can we address each other without go-between, without deviation when all our attempts are indirect, via couriers, via language that does not reach its destination but arrives. As Derrida writes in a lengthy postcard from 6 June 1977:

> Would like to address myself, in a straight line directly, without *courrier*, only to you, but I do not arrive, and that is the worst of it. A tragedy, my love, of destination. Everything becomes a post card once more, legible for the other, even if he understands nothing about it. And if he understands nothing, certain for the moment of the contrary, it might always arrive for you, for you too, to understand nothing, and therefore for me, and therefore not to arrive, I mean at its destination.[85]

Yet it is not only the courier who runs and stumbles but also the *currere* of the writer's hand and *the message* caught between itself, its language, its sender and its receiver. Derrida's postcard (or the writing of art history and this thesis) may always *not* arrive at its destination. Yet this 'adestination' already structurally underwrites all communication and is part of the *destiny* of the postcards of all writers.[86] But who speaks in writing and whose discourse addresses itself to the image. And if it is not the writer, or not only, what of the message, what does it say?

> That is to say, the *who* and the w*hat*, which burst the walls of that-is-to-say in advance. Who will say the *that-is-to-say* which goes beyond saying when it joins [*articule*] the elements of a discourse with those of visual art? and when it orders grammar and semantics on the laws of the phoneme? when it adjusts the clamour to a graphy of words and things, even a graphy without word and without thing? [87]

In the phrase 'that is to say' Derrida recognises what occurs in all saying and in all writing. To speak of 'that is to say' is to say the impossible, adding another saying onto the said and requiring a further 'that is to say' to say what was to be said. Recursively and ad infinitum, another 'that is to say' piles on the need to say more and say again in a language that can(not) explain itself. Yet what is this 'that is to say' in relation to its phoneme, can we say what is to be said about these two 'that is to says'? And if this 'that is to say' occurs vis-à-vis *visual* art—and here it does not need to say 'that is to say' because it already says so in saying anything—it speaks in view of silence that

does not stop saying. 'That is to say, these silent works are in fact already talkative, full of virtual discourses'[88] which cannot be exhausted by the explanations of any 'that is to say'. In the virtual discursivity we may also recognise why Maurice Blanchot indicates that criticism disappears in the space it allows the work to inhabit.[89] Critical writing permits a literary experience that is in search of what was already silently loud at work in the work. As for Lyotard, Groys, Bamford et al., critical writing is for Blanchot 'an action taken within and in light of creative space.'[90]

Writing about art and artistic production are in this thesis not only practices that occupy a shared creative space, they also partake in each other through the figure and the irreducibility of their discourses. When J.R. Nicholas Davey observes that writing about art animates the work, keeping it 'alive, open and productively unresolved', he refers to a kind of writing that recognises the non-oppositionality of material artefact and discursivity.[91] Not only is the artwork itself an inseparable confluence of sensuous material and ideational content though, writing itself partakes in these realms, too. Though Lyotard does not fully recognise the material, gestural and motor-sensory dimension of writing, he nevertheless affirms the plastic space in writing through the figure's corporeal appeal. The figural is not outside writing because, on the one hand, discourse invokes bodily resonances that are illimitable to the linguistic yet irreducibly part of it. On the other hand, writing is also already a graphic inscription that shares material, deportment and contingencies with other graphic practices, such as drawing. Krämer and Bredekamp are optimistic about a looming discurvisation of culture because they recognise in the increased interest in '"performance" and "performativity"', the strengthened value of '"*tacit*" *procedures of knowledge*', the *'willingness to dehermeneutise "thought" and "sense"'* through the turn to materials, processes and functions, and the acceptance of the knowledge function of '*picturality*' or '*iconicity*' a waning of the trope of culture as text.[92] Through Derrida and Lyotard we are be able to reframe this statement, noting that performance, material, picturality, iconicity and affect are not outside of discourse and that the drawer may also already be a writer, while the latter may write drawingly. Writing is here not a practice *about* something, though it may respond to an already-there, rather it arrives adestinately as literary inauguration, literal instantiation and letteral initiation in the littoral of many practices. Such a wide-ranging understanding of discourse however, is only possible through a non-oppositional difference of form and content. It relies on an institutional framework that permits the complexity and intervolution of disciplines without seeking to reduce and compartmentalise. Recognising the subordination of writing's figure to the transparency of linguistic discourse however, also demands the interrogation of the juridico-political aspirations of the institution, as well as its econometrics, from page numbers to bean counting. Both forces are so potent that they may need to be countered through fiction's power first.

that is to say, I ravished me-saintly in your splendor, sometimes entire days passed as if in meditation, absorbed, buried, engulfed like a visionary, augurring and imbibing your
white voluptuousness in ecstasy and radiance

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

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

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Dear Mr. Dalida and the law of Delida
Please stop sending more contracts published
by Mr. Hall of Bowson.



On Paper

How will this be read? Below the letters' black, what will support a text that seeks to know what cannot be mere backing, yet does not belong to the text? If paper is a body in writing, how does it relate to the other bodies? If this is printed on copy paper, it will not be able to avoid talking about itself. Or again, if this is not printed on copy paper, it will neither be able not to itemise itself as a *type* of paper: now virtual paper, later reading paper, soon scrap paper, then waste paper of the future.

This paper here

Lothar Müller's history of the age of paper[1] forgoes any such solipsistic statements, never navel-gazing at its own material construction, never self-reflexively imagining itself to be on a different kind of paper, instead it gets on with the job of talking paper. Yet, how can we talk of paper through and on paper without also writing an autobiographic entry of these sheets (virtual or otherwise) of paper? Are there then, different kinds of paper being written on and about? To give any historical account of paper is to speak of no sheet and of all sheets. It is to speak of paper in general through specific papers devoid of their specificity. It is to make sense of the fact that all sheets of paper are unique, but only in the way that every sheet is different from any other, as any object is necessarily different from its own duplicate by virtue of coming before it without being originary. Müller's project is therefore decidedly about the generality of paper through and despite of the specific. The following, on the other hand, is about a specificity of paper through and despite of its general notion. Of course, neither of these papers exists.

What is at stake when we talk about general or specific paper comes sharply into focus through paper's usual collocation with *blank*. Blank paper is not only void but also generally blanc (*white*). To demand a blank sheet of paper is not to want a red one, however few marks it has on it.[2] A blank sheet of paper somehow marks itself out as a sheet that has not been written or drawn on. It does not carry inscriptions. Yet it neither denotes a bedraggled piece of scrap, the torn edge of a piece of millboard or the verso of an envelope, however little writing or drawing they carry. Although blankness refers less to a lack of characteristics—it may be lined or chequered— its void is not just the absence of written or drawn characters. Samuel Johnson's dictionary entry is illuminating in this respect. It notes that 'blank' designates '[w]ithout writing; unwritten; empty of all marks'.[3] The final clause is crucial in describing the impossibility of blank paper. Given the necessary characteristics of paper—with lines or without, detergent white or ecru, rag or ground-wood, handmade or machine-made, deckled or cut-edge, long-grained or short-grained—the lack of marks seemingly refers to a rather arbitrary ascription, whether a particular type of characteristic or usage constitutes marks or not. Nonetheless, even the notion of prior usage is misleading here, and merely the result of the implicit, oxymoronic phrase *blank paper*. Blankness describes


How often will I have to write how
in order for you to believe me?
Think back, on this page here. When
I drew you but you pretended
not to listen.


Mr J Rekia
Mail/messenger
Customer Services
Loxford Tower Building

Paper changes b/w active operative and acted/operated on.
It is at once the available open ground walked upon, the potential for a path, the possibility of the spoor, that which explicates the step

Paper changes Paper changes b/w active operative and acted/operated on. It is at once the available open ground walked upon, the poten-
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

an impossible ideal precisely because it evokes certain characteristics without allowing them to constitute (its own) demarcations of specificity. Blank paper is seemingly different from other paper because it is marked by certain qualities which, however, do not mark it in return. All paper is prior paper. All paper has marks on it. There is no unmarked paper. There is no paper that does not carry the marks of itself as a singular bit of paper, with particular dimensions, colour, texture, tooth and so on. There is no 'pure white paper', no paper whose possibilities are entirely open, which is the proverbial blank canvas or tabula rasa that may be marked without restriction. Yet, in contradistinction to the actual use and encounter of paper, the ideal (blankness) of paper permeates our understanding of it. This ideal sheet however, is not really paper as material but rather paper as materiality, of the kind that Tim Ingold has ironically said to seemingly describe 'what makes things "thingly"'.[4] It is a kind of materiality that, unhelpfully, says little about materials.

So, what then of this paper here or of this one sheet? What can be said of its material? What paper addresses you directly; wants you to know what it is? What, or which one, is *this* paper? And when the page turns and we see the other side of this sheet, did we momentarily gaze at the depth of writing? What does it mean to read *here* this paper? What does it want there? Does *it* interrogate *its* own—this—support, rhetoric, discourse? Is this (anaphoric) *it*, which reiterates but doesn't explain, the foregoing *this paper, here*? Like the store of heres, theres, thises and thats—the store of expressions that depend on the context of usage—is *this paper here* just a (deictic) reminder, like its *it*, that wants to show itself as cellulose surface, inky alphabetic symbols, phosphorescent (virtual) white or discursivity yet to come? And if every single one of these is analysed, which ones belong to the text. Can this paper, here, as empirical, tangible, desirable support ever be (endophoric,) inside the discourse, or will it forever remain outside, excluded, always the other, always external to the text. For if we did not print this paper, or if we had printed it on a different sheet, will it have been this paper, here? It will only have been *this paper* if—self-reflexively—it was never anything but its own discourse, an ideal discourse written onto ideal paper prior to this discourse on paper, written in a virtuality that submits it to any base without ever belonging to it, the transcendental support for a transcendental logos. Yet, it is this paper, here, which requires itself to be tearupable, scrunchable, deletable, overwritable, divisible to make it this paper, here. When Michaël Borremans notes in *one* of his drawings 'TWO DRAWINGS / ON ONE SHEET', does he mean the one drawing on the one sheet, or does he anticipate their separation in the future? A separation that preserves their sheet as one, yet irrevocably disunites the drawing(s) in two. It is a drawing, or two, that recognise(s) drawing's insoluble bind to its materials, yet in asking the question in writing demonstrates the gap between the text's pointed finger and the object pointed at. Borremans' drawing points putatively at itself to say that it is two drawings that in the process of pointing must be one by drawing them together through a pointer that speaks in both. It is a pointer that points at itself though without ever being able to only point one way. Language as the pointed finger speaks of itself *as one*, though it can never be just one, or else it

would not be able to point at all. To write 'Two drawings / on one sheet' unites *two drawings on one sheet* in one drawing that was previously divisible. Moreover, the phrase exceeds and doubles itself *on one sheet*, by belonging to *two drawings*.

What is it then that is meant *here* by *this paper*? Is it the desirable physical object, or the rhetorical idea and ideal, wrested from the encumbrance of empirical body? Or is it the ideal of any backing that could be inscribed (*ideally*) like paper?

> It is to be feared (but is this a threat? isn't it also a resource?) that these three 'uses' of the noun paper, the word *paper*, are superimposed or overprinted on each other in the most equivocal way—at every moment. And thus overwritten on each other right from the figuration of the relation between the signifier and signified 'paper.'[5]

To read thus the words *this paper, here*, or 'on one sheet', in reminding us of the support of these words, we are encountering both ideal and material. As Christina Lupton puts it, to write *this paper here* is to complicate the relationship between pointing and the thing.[6] Through this simple phrase, we face the ideal and the material of writing, and the necessary forgetting of the page and the symbol as material to which we subscribe in order to get on with reading: this paper here. In the double negative of Paul de Man 'the definitive erasure of a forgetting that leaves no trace' that is taking place in the writing of *this paper here*,[7] draws on the duplicity—both treacherous and doubled—of the material and materiality of writing. Or differently, to forget that you are reading literally, letter by letter, is a precondition of reading.

And yet it needs to be written in order for it to be writing and in order to be writing, it needs to exceed the singular mark, it needs to be (virtually) multiple, repeatable, iterable. There is then 'the obvious opposition[…] between the singularity of writing acts and the reproducibility of the written',[8] a contest between writing *here and now* and the necessary repeatability that is key to language. Writing incorporates, in the sense that it both 'forms' a corpus and 'embodies'. That is, it forms 'a body' *and* takes on the body of another. In this double incorporation, writing is the mark's body, without being limited to it, and the ideal of the mark that must be repeated in alterity. Similarly then for *this paper here,* which needs to be there for writing to occur, it needs to deliver up its body for writing to have a body, but it will not unequivocally claim to be the text's body. Or differently, in order for *this* 'one sheet' to refer exclusively to *this paper here*, we require a writing outside of iterable language. A writing that does not repeat is, however, not a legible sign at all, because it does not offer itself up to re-cognition in and despite of its difference from notional self-identity.[9]

G.W.F. Hegel attributes the difficulty of talking about *this paper here* to the divergence between the sensory intricacy of this particular sheet and the generality that may be consciously approached through language.

> [For instance,] they [those who speak of a reality of sensory objects] mean this piece of paper, on which I am writing, or better, have already written, this; but they do not say what they mean. If they really intend to speak of this piece of paper that they mean, and they do intend so, it is

Two drawings / on one sheet
popular MUSIC

> impossible to do so, for the sensory This that is meant, is unattainable by language, which belongs to consciousness, that is to the intrinsically universal. In the midst of their very attempt to say it, that This would molder […][10]

For Hegel, the attempt to claim the *reality* of this sheet of paper, to identify it (as itself) in language, is an infinite task that exceeds our capacity. Rather, the sheet of paper itself would alter, continue its material senescence, which would consequently establishes a discord with any previous description of it. What may therefore be said of this sheet of paper is not a *reality* or *truth* but what is 'meant'. The reference to any *real* thing or *external* object itself is, for Hegel, merely to describe it as universal, because designating a unique object—*This*—makes the singular itself universal by flattening difference—everything can be *This*.

The difference Hegel draws between the thing, its sensory perception and the possibility of language to account for either comes into focus in the act of pointing. As the hand can point to an object so can language, yet the point of touch separates how something is *laid hold of* immediately or mediately.

> But if I want to help out language, which possesses the divine nature of subverting meaning directly, transform it and thus hindering it to verbalise at all, by pointing this piece of paper out, I experience in this way what the truth of sensory certainty in fact is; I point it out as a Here, a Here of other Heres, or in itself a simple togetherness of many Heres, i.e. [I point it out] as a universal, I *receive* it just as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate I *perceive* it.[11]

Leander Scholz argues that Hegel's choice to illustrate his point through a piece of paper is significant in view of the larger project of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The sheet of paper allows Hegel not only to move between sensory thing and medium but also to address the 'transfer of subject-object relation to one between subjects'.[12] Thus he can introduce an ontological framework in which things are unattainable and already medially exceeded in the processes of reading and writing, which make things 'mere signifieds of signifiers written onto an empty sheet.'[13] In this way, the writing subject himself comes face to face with his own disappearance and writing shows itself less a seamless transition from thought to verbal utterance than a medial challenge to the discussion of itself.

On the other hand, as Jacques Derrida may describe it, in the very act of pointing to *this sheet here*, the repeatability of the sign in its alteration—iterability—shows itself as structurally necessary for the possibility of pointing but also a fortiori as the impossibility to limit pointing to *one* thing.[14] Or differently again, Jean-François Lyotard identifies two meanings attached to the same sheet of paper as a sign. Building on Émile Benveniste's and his own reading of Saussure he differentiates signification as a concept or meaning that is quasi-merged with the signifier (sound, inscriptions etc) from designation, which takes the sign as a whole to refer to an actual or imagined object:

> [...] the Hegelian difficulty [is in] the opposition between exteriority and interiority—in other words, on exactly what we referred to as the two definitions of meaning: meaning in interiority, which is signification (*Sinn*); and meaning in exteriority, namely designation (*Bedeutung*).[15]

Neither signification, nor designation, nor their combination sufficiently wear out Lyotard's meaning, rather they introduce additional difficulty into discourse because the first also brings with it comparative *value* and the second *thickness*, an opacity that hinders clear identification and limits the perception and understanding of a sign.[16] And equally, neither signification, nor designation, nor their combination may be interrogated to absolutely exhaust the figural of writing, because the figure already unsettles both discourse and perception. Though the signification-designation distinction appears useful in order to grapple with this 'one sheet', Lyotard, in drawing on Gottlob Frege, is also very quick to point out that we cannot stop at signification alone, for we hardly refer to the 'sense' (*Sinn*) of something without also referring to its 'reference' (*Bedeutung*).[17]

The attraction of the various philosophical approaches to the relations between the deictic phrase and any *actual* paper lies not only in the richness of the complications they uncover at the heart of language. It is also in the shared indication that the difficulty to write about and describe this 'one sheet' is illimitable to notions of polysemy in language. Instead of seeking to disentangle the divergent readings of the phrase—in order *perhaps* to homogenise a discourse—it is here rather important to note that they all question a putatively transparent communication through language even prior to interrogating any particular utterance. Whether in Hegel's universalising language, Derrida's illimitable context or Lyotard's sense and reference, the notion that the written mark may be stabilised if only the multiplicity of its meanings could be arrested is displaced. Writing and the contiguity of *its* meaning are rather found to proceed hand in hand. The autographic inscription of any particular sheet of paper, which displays the indexical trail of a gesture unless the link is digital, here merely exacerbates the problem by highlighting the line's connection between verbal and pictural mark. And yet, the written mark may point ardently at its own physical and material constituents without ever belonging to them. In pointing to its substrate it never ceases to be already detachable, virtually belonging to no sheet and all sheets.

Nevertheless, handwriting in particular has acquired connotations that strongly link it to its writer and the very substrate of its mark by reinscribing notions of hic et nunc[18] into the process of writing as such. In this way, the gesture of Borremans' hand is perceived as establishing an affective, bodily and meaningful relation between writer and reader of a given sheet.[19] However, as Müller points out, the notion of the handwritten word as coming from the inside, i.e. as having an indexical relation to the one who draws it, comes about in an age dominated by printed texts. He notes how the ancient (Western) world associated speech with the esoteric, coming from the inside, considering writing exoteric, coming from the outside.[20]

To speak therefore of this paper here, is to acknowledge that this sheet is beset with the multiplicity of being the thing, the name, the pointer and the pointed-at. Whilst we may attempt

to cleave clear distinctions between discourse, substrate, ideality of the substrate and discourse *on* the (ideal) substrate—Which one? The one written physically/virtually onto it or the one written about it?—the layering is already irreversibly part of the very expression chosen. Iterability marks the very possibility of writing as a practice of stolen and borrowed words.[21] They arrive and are animated with the burden and pleasure of their former and coming use. Failing to acknowledge the pre-scriptiveness that language use brings to writing, its objects of reference or the mechanisms of 'communication' would thus be to write off the distinction between the description of the phenomenon and the phenomenon.

Writing thus partakes in a number of non-exclusive spaces that overlap each other. On the one hand, it is shaped by any other language use and shapes it in return, and, on the other it positions itself in the literary spaces of the discourses it partakes in. Aside from these linguistic and literary spaces however, writing must leave its written mark somewhere. Again, it needs to be written in order for it to be writing. The jostling about the spaces writing inscribes itself in therefore returns to the page, whether cellulosic or virtual. How does the space of writing's mark engage with writing's other spaces? The contention here is that the sheet of paper is never a merely acquiescent ground on which inscriptive acts are performed. Rather, material characteristics of paper and implement inform the gestures of their own inscription. This interdependency of material and gesture is not merely an aesthetic phenomenon that affords affective relations, but also regulates the cognition of both writer-drawer and reader-viewer. The sheet of paper as sensory space is not closed and external to its inscription.

Blancness

The idea of the suppliant surface conceding all marks but somehow separable from them is linked to a perception of writing's substrate as an unmarked and immaculate territory. The notion of blank paper as a limitless resource open for conquest or exploitation has seemingly wide appeal, however unfaithful this supposed blankness is toward any actual sheet of paper.

> Observe the maiden, innocently sweet,
> She's fair *white paper*, an unsullied sheet;
> On which the happy man, whom fate ordains,
> May write his name, and take her for his pains.[22]

Unsurprisingly, the complex characteristics of paper are commonly explored via analogy which metaphorises the experience of writing and drawing on paper through other observations or practices. Yet in carrying the (mis)conceptions of one thing to another, the metaphor also manifests particular cultural, societal and individual mores. Among the favoured tropes to describe paper are forms of spatial perambulation (exploration or construction on a surface) and linkages to the human body (touching or using paper like another body).[23] In 'Paper: a poem' attributed to Benjamin Franklin from which the above stanza is taken—Müller introduces it as 'humorous'[24]—nine different types of paper (e.g. gilt, brown, sinking, touch) are mapped onto characteristics

of different kinds of people (e.g. fop, wretch, miser, squabbler). The crass sexism of the virgin sheet and the virgin body—because she is clearly not a person here, but some*thing* that requires d(en)omination—alone would merit a longer analysis, as would the implication of sullage of the non-virgin body, but the focus shall remain on the white sheet rather than the necessary readings this poem should undergo in view of a politics of the body. Franklin's poem is interesting from a paper perspective, in the way that it is symptomatic for a seeming engagement with the material of paper without however saying much about the material at all. Paper is also conceived as an ideality that a priori determines what it should be.

> Mechanics, servants, farmers, and so forth,
> Are *copy paper* of inferior worth;
> Less prized, more useful, for your desk decreed;
> Free to all pens, and prompt at every need. [25]

Although copy paper is here one of Franklin's nine different kinds of paper, it merely describes another impossible white paper. It is open to all marks and implements, though materially—not just nominally—it is quite different from the foolscap (politician) described elsewhere. Franklin's, albeit farcical, description of paper classifies types rather than develop characteristics.

Naming and apparent use are more relevant for the poem's description of paper than any sensory approach to the material. However, Franklin's portrayal is not exceptional because our engagement with paper is already structured by a longing to encounter a particular kind of material, especially one that may stand in contrast to any *actual* experience of it. As Derrida describes it, we anticipate paper with a 'nostalgia' that makes it 'both sensitive and impassive, both friendly and resistant, both very much on its own and coupled to our bodies, not only with every mechanical impression, but before any impression not reproducible by my hand.'[26] Our hands' touch of paper does not arrive via impossible neutrality between subject and object. Rather, it is the confluence of bodies that already share an intimate history of caresses and blandishments.

> It is nostalgia for the proffered page on which a virtually inimitable handwriting creates a path for itself with the pen—a pen which, not so long ago, I still used to dip in ink at the end of a pen holder; a nostalgia for the color or weight, the thickness and the resistance of a sheet—its folds, the back of its recto-verso, *the fantasies* of contact, of caress, of intimacy, proximity, resistance, or promise: the infinite desire of the copyist, the cult of calligraphy, an ambiguous love for the scarcity of writing, a fascination for the word incorporated in paper. These are certainly *fantasies*.[27]

Perhaps Derrida's characterisation appears overdrawn because not every sticky note is recognisable immediately for its swooning allure but the act of marking the page is not limited to a disinterested physical deposition of one matter on another. If this were the case, writing would not be readable and images could not be seen. Rather Derrida's description of paper points towards the inseparability of paper's senso-cognitive appeal and the transmission of power and affection through papers. Though the intricately folded poulet sent between lovers,

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Read me some wordsworth, mon cher!

State of feeling produced by the foregoing narrative — A belief in a Superintending Providence the only adequate support under affliction — wordsworth's character — Acknowledges the difficulty of a lonely life — Hears unwelcome sorrow — Fortitude — how acquired — Wordsworth applies his observation to that other cause of dejection in the Solitary's mind.


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
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the parliamentary scroll determining obligations or the duplicate of the gas-repair bill are not bound to their singular substrate, they nonetheless partake in the economy of paper and spread not only their own message but also instantiate their power and affect *in* paper. The fantasies of paper, the intimacy it may offer and the power it may promise are not only on the paper but also part of it. The perambulatory gesture that explores paper or the intimacy between the nib's tines and paper's surface are consequently not only allegories of an extremely close physical scrutiny of a material but also already epiphenomenal to the wider effects of the uses of paper.

Freud's description of writing as a forbidden sexual act may be a point in case. On the one hand, it metaphorises writing as the sexual conjunction of pen and paper, and the other it cannot avoid eliciting that any actual copulation may be the result of a courtship by letter.

> As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a piece of white paper assumes the symbolic signification of coitus, or as soon as walking becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual act.[28]

The writing analogy implicitly rehearses the shared etymology of pencil and penis but more importantly also represents a description of putative power relations between genders. Read in conjunction with the subsequent walking analogy, sex is here not only strictly heterosexual but also something done to a suppliant receiver. The comparisons drawn are precisely not reducible to close observation transferred between referents, rather they reiterate other conventions and cannot be limited to any singular context. Curiously, given the pithy nature of the description one adjective jumps out again. That the sheet of paper has to be 'white' comes as no surprise, for it seeks to typify the same *ob*ject sought by Franklin.

Of the same class of typification, however in a reversal of the analogical direction, is also John Locke's oft-evoked trope regarding the intellectual pliability a child's mind offers to morality. 'White paper receives any Characters'[29] is not only interesting for what it professes to know about the human mind but also in its assumption about white paper. Müller, although writing about paper, is more fascinated with Locke's metaphorical description of the impressionability of the mind and its power to capture material than with the analogical implications for the sheet of paper.[30] Franklin's, Freud's and Locke's en-passant descriptions are indicative of a perception of paper that purportedly speaks to material experience but is incongruous with it. Read through Ingold, they speak of materiality rather than material, which would subsequently require them to animate their 'stifled and stilled' ideal papers through the notion of agency.[31] Of course, any paper has some potential to be marked, but material contingencies and affordances predominate the interaction. Make a pencil note on a heavily sized paper; use a fountain pen on unsized paper; write with a biro on an single 'uncushioned' sheet of copy paper atop a hardwood table; draw an energetic horizontal with a crisp italic on paper that is not hot-pressed; write with anything other than a waterproof pen on wax paper; draw on bible paper with a gushy pen and consider the verso; scribble small marks on laid paper with a fine-nibbed fountain pen; do a thick up-stroke

with a sharp, pointed nib on any paper; take a crisp new sheet from a pad, halve it, leave one half on top of your desk, the other between the pages of a heavy book, after a week, write on both…

If such observations seem trivial and insubstantial then having and handling paper is trivial and insubstantial for the discussion of paper. Maryanne Dever reminds us that the intimate practice of dealing with paper, whether as an archivist or another practitioner engaged in paperwork, 'suggests how it may be paper's emergent capacities—what it can *do*—more than its basic properties that we seek to hold onto.'[32] Though it is easy to reduce paper to mere pliant ground beneath each stroke and between all letters, paper as a base is perhaps even more basic, has even more fundamental properties for the marks on it.

> When it is not associated—like a leaf, moreover, or a silk paper—with a veil or canvas, writing's *blank white*, spacing, gaps, the 'blanks which become what is important,' always open up onto a base of paper. Basically, paper often remains for us the *basis of the basis*, the base figure on the basis of which figures and letters are separated out. The indeterminate 'base' of paper, the basis of the basis *en abyme*, when it is also surface, support, and substance (*hypokeimenon*), material substratum, formless matter and force in force (*dynamis*), virtual or dynamic power of virtuality—see how it appeals to an interminable genealogy of these great philosophemes.[33]

Derrida's paper cannot be separated into paper as mere ground and the groundwork—that is: paperwork—supporting, authorising and legitimising power structures from bureaucracies to parliament and businesses to border controls. Paper is basic in the way that it is the base for writing, the potential of its force, the material sanctioning the acts inscribed on it and so on en abyme.

> [T]his fundamental or basic chain of the 'base' (support, substratum, matter, virtuality, power) cannot possibly be dissociated, in what we call 'paper,' from the apparently antinomic chain of the act, the formality of 'acts,' and the force of law, which are all just as constitutive.[34]

Despite the active force of paper, Michael O'Driscoll points out that it 'is also curiously self-abnegating […] as paper withdraws from view as the signs and markings command our focus'.[35] This retreat of paper to become mere ground may however also be apparent in our own markings of it. Returning to the sheet long after having abandoned it, both writing and drawing adopt a solidity and plainness that they did not possess previously. As if the marks belonged to someone else or were never anything but the original scores of the paper, their clumsiness or elegance is still more anchored and less tentative. When the identification of marks is replaced by the faint recognition of their underlying gestures, both drawer and writer accept a blindness at their origin. A blindness that is also an acceptance that to (re)turn to the sheet is always a (re)turn to a sheet that was never blank, void or empty. It is a sheet that had been written on before, prescribed, and thus prescriptive for what was to come. It is prescriptive not only as a text that comes before the text, but a prescription, a normative grammar that directs and instructs, that marks the passage and maps the way. And, on the other hand, it is a prescription that is the script for the composition of a treatment, the treatment of a (pre)text, *eine Vorschrift für eine Behandlung*,



Little Josephine, you seem to write under the crack but how did you fill the other seven hundred pages?

Wrongful Flavious
Josephus, Ant, IX, II, 1

Now it happened that she, as she was coming down from the top, fell down from it, and in her sickness sent to him, who was the God of Ekron, for that was this God's name, to inquire about her recovery. Whereupon the other, who already other, accepting of my discreet words and courteous behaviour, came down and followed her. And when he came to her, he propesied to her, and told her, as he had been told, - 'Since thou hast despised him as not being him, and so unable to foretell the truth about thy distemper, but hast sent to the God of Ekron to inquire of him what will be the end of this thy distemper



,know this, that thou shalt die.'

a prescript(ion) for a particular kind of 'handling'. At once, its is a text that calls upon feet and hands to carry on and carry out the script.

Borremans' 'one sheet', like all others, has never been merely just white ground, open and acquiescent. As substrate, it is neither indifferent nor compliant. It is not open to receive all possible marks. It is neither neutral surface to be drawn upon, nor a skin or membrane that permits all inscriptions. Its surface as topography and matter as geology mediate the wandering pen. Topographically, it has *dimensions* that arbitrate its traversal. Crossing and composition happen within and without this space, negotiated by this space, in it and against it. The exploration of this space occurs within it and despite of it. To mark the sheet is also to react and act on and upon it. The paper's size and ratio already anticipate its immanent and contingent composition. The sheet seems thereby to be landscape and map of itself at once.[36] It is traversed and provides the route of its traversal. The tip of the pencil encounters it in proximity, dragging its graphite heel, and yet the territory is also seen from above, overseen, surveilled at great distance and surveyed in its own map. It is walked upon and through, creating new paths and routes, which are also charting their own inscription. Marks and inscriptions—as if already pre-empted—are negotiated according to the paper's topography. These marks themselves then become part of the landscape and its contingency, already anticipating future marks. Every crease, watermark and splotch is another furrow, bog and tarn navigated by composition, construction and wayfaring. In texture and fibre, paper finds its geology: terrain and stratification. Both confer how to access and travel the territory.

The weathered book cover and its hinged flyleaf greedily drink up brushed ink until saturated. Their surface resists the navigation of the nib, which scratches, stumbles, skips and often bleeds. Railroading tines cut into the paper, excavating short, friable fibres. They will draw up any liquid nearby, leading it into its channel, feathering its edge with a fringe. The surface seems to resist or subvert the pencil by emphasising its own texture. It becomes increasingly cratered and rugged. Only prolonged traversal levels it into an arid metallic trough.

On the other hand, like a terrene plain, the smooth hot-pressed sheet is deceptively easily crossed with any medium, yet, its traversal is seemingly inerasable, its surface so homogeneous that any trace appears infinitely visible. Its face is often so dense that it resists liquid which stays superficial, runs into pools, awaiting dispersion and evaporation, making it buckle.

On paper, ink from a nib appears liminal. It permeates, but sits on top; it is deeply anchored, but raises the surface. In inscribing itself, it engraves the groove that moors it and deposits itself in it and on it. It is both furrow and ridge. Is this seeming permanence its authority? In contrast, brushed ink seems subliminal. It penetrates and permeates. Its remains visible on the surface but cannot be felt. With pencil all depends on pressure. A fleeting step remains superliminal, it hardly engraves, smears graphene superficially. A heavy trudge troughs the paper, making it more than just surface, leaving a leaded furrow. Neither the written nor the drawn mark are two-dimensional, flat traces on paper, rather they possess a volume and body that disturbs any notion

of their modality as merely visible.

To recognise (this) paper therefore as shifting between submissive substrate and controlling dominium is to acknowledge it as one of the phenomena of Derrida's *subjectile*.[37] A double, the subjectile is neither and both. It is, at once, a membrane whose subservient surface—mere ground—is energised by being acted upon, by being traversed, engraved, inscribed and penetrated. But it is also resolute resistance to the attempts to traverse it; it has to be tackled and its own characteristics assert themselves. It returns to a binary discourse, which wants to move beyond binarity, because the subjectile moves

> between the intransitivity of jacere and the transitivity of jacere, in what I will call the conjecture of both. In the first case, jaceo, I am stretched out, lying down, gisant, in my bed, brought down, brought low, without life, I am where I have been thrown […] thrown beneath. In the second case, jacio, I throw something, a projectile, thus, stones, a firebrand, seed (ejaculated), or dice—or I cast a line. […] because I have thrown something, I can have raised it or founded it.[38]

Without ever belonging to either, paper moves between active operative and acted/operated on. It is at once the available open ground walked upon, the potential for a path, the possibility of the spoor, that which expedites the step, bidding to be marked and traced. But it is also the resistance to every step, it defies exploration and impedes free traversal. While setting feet free, it also shackles them. If then, both the line of drawing and writing are inseparable from their papery support, what of the substrate? It is a substrate that is no longer *sub-*, beneath, that is no longer mere backing, but must be found to constitute what is, both as act and inscription. And if it is a stratum at all, a stratum super stratum, it is the merger of two homonymous verbs, not merely a blanket that is 'spread out' and 'scattered' over another ground but also the force that 'knocks down', 'lays low' and 'overthrows'.[39] And equally the implement, whose tip is bearer of a mark that it partly comes to compose, leaves itself behind in the mark, even when it itself has left. The graphite trace becomes the non-originary remainder of a gesture that itself continues to act.

The question of the interactions on the page returns to the hand whose *traitement* of the sheet opens the abyssal gap that reaches beyond alphabet and mimesis, beyond the verbal and pictural of chirography. It is in the (con)fluence of hand, implement and paper that the body and landscape of the graphic shape themselves. Through the hand, graphic *traits* are incurred in the prescribed composition of the treatment of the prescriptive (pre)text. It executes *eine Behandlung* that draws lines blind to the distinction of text and image. They are differential lines of a ductus that follows both, the pull of script, *Schriftzug*, and the attraction, *Anziehung*, of drawing.

Yet, to speak of one hand is to speak against the gesture of drawing and writing. Who draws with one hand? How can one hand write? Surely, one neither writes nor draws with a hand only. Initially, there is (often) another hand, the other hand,[40] which, though not marking the paper with an implement, still supports it and the drawer, accommodating the body of the drawer in the complex relation between substrate, implement and drawer.

The drawer does not merely hover ethereally above the substrate, but occupies an infinite number of possible spatial relations to the other material. Moreover, the many advantages of paper—flexibility, portability, malleability—also require it, in the words of Hana Gründler, Toni Hildebrandt and Wolfram Pichler, to 'borrow another body' that can prop it up, acquire it as detachable surface or skin.[41]

Even in a very narrow understanding of the idea of gesture, the hand or arm movement leading to a mark on paper, writing and drawing cannot be categorically distinguished. Neither writing nor drawing is limited to one particular position or grip of the pen or to one particular restricted form of muscular movement that guides it. Though writing may sustain a particular grip along the section longer, because repeated marks tend to be of more uniform size, the implements and what is to be written shape the way the pen is held and its movement across the page. Or conversely, the grip and movement co-determine how something may be written. Especially writing with ballpoints and other hard tools requires an exertion of pressure close to the writing surface in order to facilitate the flow or rasp of matter onto the page. The resultant wrist or even just fingertip movement usually brings with it a reduction in writing scale. This is however not to suggest that drawing necessarily involves more of the body. Muscular-movement writing, for example, requires the writer to use the arm's musculature to guide the pen, often with wrist and forearm touching the writing surface and finger movement scorned upon. According to William Henning the method dates back to at least the Renaissance, though Ewan Clayton traces its origins to Joseph Carstairs in early nineteenth-century London.[42] We may now consider muscular writing as entirely atypical, neverthless it became a standard American writing technique in the early 19th century when it was adopted in the correspondence and business-writing manuals of Benjamin Foster, Platt Rogers Spencer and eventually Austin Palmer, whose popular simplified Spencerian explicitly required the writer to use the muscular action of a rigid arm 'from the shoulder'—with the little finger making contact with the writing surface—to achieve a light, untiring motion across the page.[43]

As Vilém Flusser observes in relation to the gesture of painting, we are used to dissecting the body of the artist and her gestures into separable body parts and aspects of movement, which are the parts and aspects that make the work.[44] (Though painting is not drawing or writing the comparison still holds as Flusser's explanation does not hinge on the oft-evoked differences—use of colour, surface coverage, potential for spatial dimension et cetera—between the processes.) He further suggests that there is a metaphysical exclusivity underlying these aims to 'fill' gestures with body parts, as though the two existed separately.

> The first thing we must do, in order to see the gesture of painting, is to forgo the whole catalogue of bodies moving inside of gesture. Such a catalogue is 'metaphysical', in the sense that it presupposes bodies which are somewhere outside the gesture and only later move within it.[45]

The gesture is here irreducible to a body part, material or particular part of movement. Flusser seeks the description and explanation for this kind of gesture in its directedness towards a final

object: an object to come. Any explanation of the gesture that brings it about therefore needs to address all movements in relation to their future, even 'the future of the gesture'.[46] Consequently, any attempt to describe the gesture at work should not be a conjunction of materials and creative subject synthesised into the work, but has to give up the division of material, support, maker, movement and so on. Flusser's phenomenology is above all interested in overcoming the predetermination of, what is for him typical of, occidental thought: abstraction and distance from concrete, observable experience.

> Were there a general gesture theory, a semiological discipline that would allow us to decipher gesture, art criticism would not be, as it is today, a thing of empiricism or 'intuition' or causal explaining-away of aesthetic phenomena, but an exact analysis of gestures frozen into paintings. Lacking such a 'choreographology', it is perhaps a better strategy to observe the gesture itself, in the way it concretely occurs in front of us and thus in us: as an example of freedom.[47]

Of course, Flusser is perhaps the first to avoid exactly such a gesture analysis where it is urgently needed and particularly easily foregone. What speaks against a choreographologic conception of writing? For Flusser, the answer is at once self-contradictory and straightforward: writing is typing. Writing by hand is for him too closely related to calligraphy and thus drawing. The availability of different writing implements (other than the typewriter) 'speaks against the being of writing and recalls drawing'.[48] The typewriter is his ideal writing instrument because it does not restrict the gesture of writing but makes the rules of the available material more obvious. If an 'expressible virtuality' finds its 'expression' in writing (rather than music or painting) it still encounters the resistance of its material: words.[49] Writing is for Flusser a notation of speech that records terms not ideas; it progresses in a linear and sequential manner; and its signs are read, i.e. recognised and picked out, from a clearly demarcated and univocal set.

The typewriter however, is not only for Flusser a tool that shapes the conceptions of what is proper for writing in general. Walter Benjamin proposes that the typewriter may only replace the fountain pen were it to permit writers to engage directly and accurately with the conception of their books.[50] For Martin Heidegger similarly, the connection between word and hand is much more intimate. The typewriter constitutes for him a breach between writing and the word, because the word is one of handwriting. Tearing the hand from writing, degrades the word itself in its reduction 'to "typed stuff"'.[51] As Derrida indicates in relation to Heidegger's indictment of the mechanisation of writing through the typewriter, handwriting ensures a closer relation to speech and the body, as well as gathering letters together which, for Heidegger, was strongly linked to the gathering gesture of reading (*lesen*).[52] Friedrich Kittler, on the other hand, emphasises that the typewriter brought an end to the 'metaphysics of handwriting' that had animated centuries of written philosophy.[53] While Michel Foucault acknowledges the material base of notation and the production, transmission and archivisation of knowledge, his analysis remains premised on the internal structures of discourse, returning to structural formations, types and genres.[54] Kittler goes further: any notion of the construction of knowledge needs be considered not only in

its situatedness in time and place but also as determined by medial contingencies that structure the mechanism of its formation, retention and dissemination.[55] The typewriter is only one of a number of technological changes (phono*graphy*, photo*graphy*, cinemato*graphy*) that reorient notions of referentiality and the understanding of the written signifier. As Marshall McLuhan points out, it is precisely through the occurrence of a new medium that the characteristics of the foregoing one, as well as of the practice at large, receives further focus.[56] Different media however, do not replace each other, with older ones necessarily disappearing. Rather, as Wolfgang Riepl already described in 1913, they find 'different areas of use and application.'[57]

Conversely, in a possible reverse inscription that imposes the typewriter on writing, we may see Flusser recognising the idea of gathering in the act of reading (*lesen*), though his gathering has the deliberation and selectivity of collecting, which allows him to read for particular recognisable characteristics of writing.[58] Flusser's gesture of writing is thus already removed from any necessary graphic qualities of the written word—not to mention the letter—and more concerned with the combinatorics of clearly defined and limited significatory units. The desire to recognise may however also circumscribe the inability to see, as well as to be open to the marks' indivisibility of affect and intellect. A choreographology of writing's gesture would merely encounter the graphiqueness of words that is already separate from their plastic, i.e. written, instantiation. Given the aforementioned insistence of the danger of 'explaining away' actual phenomena, Flusser's logocentric—and Lessing-inspired—perspective is doubly puzzling. On the one hand, he deliberately seems to avoid the observational analysis of gesture as he encourages it elsewhere, on the other, he foregrounds physical, material, gestural and environmental aspects of (type)writing. For example, he part-bemoans and part-endorses that literary criticism is only interested in 'das Himmlische, nicht das Irdische' of writing.[59] Its interest is in 'the heavenly, not the earthly', which carries the ambiguous connotations of 'the transcendental, not the physical' and 'the elevated, not the profane'. But then he adds that, though the writer is more than fingertips, his body has no place to be mentioned, except in extreme cases, like the writing in Gulags. He is demanding the context of the material gesture of writing to be taken into account, a context whose instantiation he, however, rescinds. Finally perhaps, much of Flusser's writing on writing often reads like a love letter to a typewriter whose shortcomings he has come to adore and require. In relation to the advent of computers on desks, he wonders if we perhaps need the dumb equipment of the past, in contrast to the unencumbered writing of the future, in order to be able to write.[60]

As Franklin's absurd paper people are more concerned with paper types rather than character, so Flusser is more concerned with the type-ical of writing rather than its characteristics. Not only does he prefer to recognise writing in type, but writing as 'printed matter is a typical matter and not a characteristic, incomparable, unique one'.[61] Writing for Flusser, like paper for Franklin and others, are interchangeable types that are devoid of idiosyncratic characteristics. The body of paper and the body of writing follow clear typologies. The former is flat, blank and open to any

mark, its characteristics are background to the inscriptions they serve. The latter is clearly defined and limited; its graphique body appears indistinguishable from its verbality and signification.

Paper blind

A consideration of the gesture and material of writing and drawing thus seemingly extends the understanding of the substrate *in action* and moves beyond the manual—and with it beyond any maniera—to evaluate the corporeality of the drawer-writer as only one of the acting subjects.[62] The materials and subjects of writing and drawing exceed narrowly operational parameters, instead engaging the environmental and corporeal of both drawer and writer, and drawing and writing. As Gründler, Hildebrandt and Pichler stress: 'No drawing is made by a human hand alone, but always includes the surface of the substrate and often also the invisible counter-support that was removed after the drawing process.'[63] And yet again, whilst recognising and requiring the invisible support, we will continue to speak of someone's writing hand, and seek the hand in the drawing and the drawing in the hand, in the 'reciprocal relationship of hand and graphy'.[64] So, what is the point of such bradylexic creeping across the landscape and body of writing and drawing? Is this the pendulum swinging the other way, away from a generalised notion of *the materiality* of paper to one that indulges in the idiosyncratic detail of every single sheet, microscopically questioning every perceivable and imaginable characteristic of highly individualised substances? Or differently, is this a shift toward an inability to see the paper for its piddling minutiae? Propositionally and to intercept any quick responses, perhaps there is something to be gained in the kind of writing about art, pictures, images, visual perception and, above all, the practice of drawing and writing, that is highly vigilant in the observance of the materials and bodies involved. Though art history, critical theory and visual culture discourses profess a deep-seated interest in the material, James Elkins still asserts that they are fearful and superficial in the manner in which they engage with it. He identifies three problems in particular: *'the fear of materiality* and the *slowness of the studio'*, as well as a broader issue, touching on the two others, 'the limit of phenomenological detail'.[65] The first problem is grounded in a perceived incompatibility between close physical encounter with an object and its contextual framing (historical, theoretical, social and so on), as well as the potential derogation, vis-à-vis class consciousness, of what may be perceived as the detritus of manual labour. Secondly, the interaction and engagement with bodies, materials and gestures is inherently slow in comparison to cogitation that eschews them. And finally, though phenomenology provides perhaps the best possibility for an affective/effective attempt to come to terms with the experience of things, its scope within discourse remains questionable.

In the indexical gesture of the graphic mark, both drawer and writer scrutinise the landscape and body on the ground. Examining it thoroughly and closely as if by touch, they also survey it from the distance as a correlated map that constantly changes as a new path is drawn by the graphite-footed prowling on its territory. This shift between proximity and distance also reiterates the

blindnesses of the drawer. The pen's eye—the wayfarer's boot—obscures the vision of the drawer. As pen and boot traverse, they persistently blind the one spot of crucial importance. They always shadow the spot that they—in that moment—inscribe and describe. By necessity, the surveyor's inscription blinds the surveyor in the moment of inscription.

But the pen's shadow and body are not the only impediments to seeing drawing. Derrida differentiates three types of blindness in view of drawing. Firstly, he remarks on 'the *aperspective of the graphic act*', the umbrage given by the implement and the gap traced by the trait, which 'must proceed in the night' and which is at once said to be a stand-in—mimetic or representative—for the figure but does not form part of the figure's 'spectacle'.[66] Again, doubly so, the trait is tracing itself before it shows and sees itself, but also shares no aspect of the figure it apparently traces through itself. And the one who draws, doubly blind to the drawing and the figure, can only see the one or the other: marking the impossibility not only of the trace—the trace of what?: the trace of that which is not seen or the unseen trace—but also of tracing—tracing what?: tracing what is not there. Deanna Petherbridge's observation that the '[l]ine is a representational convention' that does not find a match 'in the observable world',[67] chimes with Derrida's, though she approaches drawing's trace quite differently. Derrida invokes the night a second time to characterise the gap between the figure and the stroke that traces it, noting that '[t]he heterogeneity between the thing drawn and the drawing *trait* remains abyssal'.[68] The nocturnal depth of this abyss returns to the immeasurable distance and infinite proximity between what drawing sees and shows. Drawing is a process that happens on paper but is not limitable to it. Borremans' double drawing is not only smudges of pencil and watercolour on paper. It also purports to be partly a model 'for a sculpture' and therefore already partakes in the ideational realm of construction. But it is also a figurative, representational composition that may be abstracted from picture to image. Moreover, every art-historical glance may want to inscribe a reading that renders the drawing into a text subservient, yet irrepressible, to the writer's desire to envelop the marks. The gesture of drawing begins prior to and continues beyond the graphic mark on the page though the force and affect of that mark are testament to the act beyond itself. As Derrida describes anecdotally, writing may similarly proceed blindly. When waking in the night or driving a car, we may write with eyes wide open in complete darkness or looking elsewhere. As in the drawing act, the 'hand of the blind [writer] ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory of signs and supplementing sight.'[69] Writing is guided by the pen's ferrule reading the paper's surface and the hand's rehearsed response to the touch of the page.

And yet the nocturnal tides all drawing not just the one called figurative. The pleasure in drawing, which is the same as its pain, is its lateral procession at night. Drawing as a process aims to determine its own indeterminacy, and as artefact presents its indeterminate determination. To draw is to eliminate, stroke by stroke, many drawings in order to arrive at one, not one previously

determined, but one that in its drawing drew itself out of infinitely many. And as each confident slick and probing dash erases another drawing, the one that reluctantly urges ahead knows not itself but negotiates itself in every mark, especially those it does not make but which are still made and constitute it in return. It is precisely here then that the gesture neither fills the body nor imposes itself on a substrate, for without body and material there would be no such gesture. There would be no such strokes without the confluence of bodies, no such confluence of bodies without the gesture. In this erasure of drawings, drawing, as process, draws itself forth in order to draw itself out as consequence. It is a consequence of strokes that neither intended *it*, nor are reducible to *it*. Drawing's necessary inseparability from its *background* shows itself in the void space that is not void, that is just as drawn as the drawn space without carrying the pen's marks. Its marks are gestures of an implement that draws undrawingly.

Nevertheless the intention of drawing remains, although it is not one that is ever fulfilled. Nanne Meyer describes the beginning of her drawings as guided by a 'more or less clear *intention* [*Ab-Sicht*], which may be *imageless*, a specific kind of premonition, a something, which I can *drawingly* push off from.'[70] The specific vocabulary, hyphenation and capitalisation are in*sight*ful here. *Absicht*, the commonplace German for *intention*, *purpose*, *aim* or *design*, becomes a scopic intent (a *fore-sight*, a *fore-seeing*) that in translation cycles etymologically through the nightly depth that the obsolete *fore-wit* has to offer, from wit's *wissen*, to *know*, to *vidēre*, to *see*; and thus perhaps properly 'I have seen, hence, I know' (*wát* , *wást* , *witon*).[71] Notwithstanding, this fore-wit is without image, a vision that does not see. The scope of its intent feels its way nocturnally through the strictures of drawing. Drawing's frictions, offered and arising through the materials, supports and bodies in action, propel drawing in itself from its intent. Drawing pushes against intent, paper, graphite stick and self to arrive at itself. However, this pushing *off from* or pushing *against* is not a contrarian push, not a push that intends to overthrow the other. As in the prefix *ab-*, common to *Ab-Sicht* and *abstossen*, this push is but a frictional desire of facing another, of rubbing against another, an attrition arising in attraction that gives rise because and despite of the drawer's intention. In this push against and within paper, representation, intention and gesture, we however also recognise Derrida's push of language against silence. It is similarly a push 'against' an opposition and adversary who is also a counterpart and ground on which to stand. It provides the support and friction that propels the mark (visual, verbal, phonic).

> [S]ilence plays the irreducible role of that which bears and haunts language, outside and *against* which alone language can emerge—'against' here simultaneously designating the content from which form takes off by force, and the adversary against whom I assure and reassure myself by force.[72]

The paper that *supports* each letter becomes constitutive of the crisp *blanc* mark *between* letters. A mark whose shining (*blanko-z*) radiance is the power of spacing[73] that prevents letters from charging the text in all black. The disposition of writing shows itself here as a paper (between letters and lines) that is not 'stifled and stilled' but animate and abundant. To disturb the notion of

'against' as merely antagonistic by demonstrating its supplementation and dependency on what it pushes off from is particularly meaningful because it addresses both material and medial aspects of drawing and writing practices. The art school bromide of 'working against the material' is here a point in case because it suggests an opposition *to* something that is not oppositional.[74] If we take Ingold's assertion of material flux and transformation seriously,[75] then there is nothing that can be done *to* matter that is not already a potential within the material itself. Burning a sheet of paper does not work against the material but shows it as combustible. This idea extends similarly to the contention of working against a certain medium. Gottfried Boehm argues '[t]hat a particular group of artists do not optimise media according to their immanent logic, but work against the grain, using them *inversely*.'[76] Exemplarising Cy Twombly's and Stéphane Mallarmé's work, he notes that the former moves the trace of painting from its identifiable sphere into one of uncertainty, as well as releasing writing from the 'logic of *succession*', while the latter shows writing's material characteristics.[77] Boehm's asserts that particular artists invert medial uses in order to expose and explore the rules governing them. This argumentation, though entirely plausible, is however also tautological. If the 'immanent logic' of a medium or practice can be inverted, this inversion is already part of the 'immanent logic' and thus not its inversion. The paradox returns to the assumption that there may be an optimal use of a medium, one that works optimally by not working against its grain. Consequently, the notion of 'working against' shows itself as the incapacity of a category to describe its own object. The importance of the substrate or the affect and power of handwriting are only marginal or 'parasitic' in a closed system of writing that is a priori a phonocentric, auxiliary, secondary, representative combinatorics of speech and which thus considers 'the body of the written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or excrement.'[78]

However, in the use of Derrida and Meyer materials are not optimally shaped into a preconceived notion of a medium or practice. Rather, material and gesture are constitutive of medial effects. The form of drawing does not arrive preformed, does not replicate that which is (not) there or that which is (not) imagined. In Jean-Luc Nancy's words, '[d]rawing is the opening [*l'ouverture*] of form', inseparable from its '[*m*]*atter*', which

> […] is the name of form's resistance to its deformation. It is not a formless 'content' that form comes to mold or model but rather the thickness, texture, and force of form itself.[79]

Properly, as David Espinet reminds us, '"*l'ouverture*"' needs to be read multiply as well: drawing as the beginning of form, the '*opening*' of the possibility of form but also drawing's 'persistent *openness*' which is never comprehensive or complete, always illimitably undetermined.[80] What (form) drawing shows is thus neither reducible to some referential thing, nor to the ideal of that thing, instead, it is the idea (ideated not ideal) of the thing offered as a (trans)formation in its unique and determinate stricture as drawing. Does that sound too much like hedging or tautology? If so, then the options Nancy offers are stark: on the one hand, an account—often art historical—that

determines drawing as fixed information, drawing as note taking, its sensing, limited to sensory capacities, merely 'the simple perception of data'; on the other hand, drawing is persistently in formation, it also '*notes*' but only to enable a sensing that 'exhausts and exceeds' 'sensoriality or sensibility', '*sensing*, [as] a faculty of making sense, or of letting it be formed.'[81] Hence, drawing as the opening of form, requires a differentiation between drawing as immanent, formative force, a will to form (*Formungswille*), a form-generative momentum, and drawing as fully formed, settled and complete object, sensed retrospectively as a modality of the image: *forma formans* as opposed to *forma formata*.[82] For Nancy, the pleasure in drawing arises exactly in the persistent nascence that invents, forms, makes up, makes sense and in-forms. Drawing does not come to rest in a papery coffin, rather it continues to unsettle itself in and beyond the paper, uncontainable by any gaze that aims to arrest it, on paper but not of it, determined but not determinable.

If the nocturnal advance of drawing and seeing drawing describes the first of Derrida's aspects of the powerlessness of the eye, then the second is named 'the *withdrawal* {*retrait*} *or the eclipse, the differential inappearance of the trait*'.[83] Derrida asks, once the tracing of the trait has occurred, what is this trait? It describes what is not there, an outline that demarcates the line outside no thing, it is situated between inside and outside of the figure. And even as it relates to itself, is a re-trait of a trait, it divides itself, disrupting (in its divisibility) all identification of itself:

> [O]nly the surroundings of the trait appear—that which the trait spaces by delimiting and which thus does not belong to the trait. Nothing belongs to the trait, and thus, to drawing and to the thought of drawing, not even its own 'trace.'[84]

The withdrawal of the trait (*le retrait du trait*) is a retreat that accompanies the recognition of its mark as the limitation of the spaces that it inscribes. The trait is never itself, but the difference between spaces marked outside themselves. Drawing and seeing drawing become subject to 'the law of the inter-view', it draws together the spaces between the lines, 'a *jalousie* (a blind) of *traits* cutting up the horizon.'[85] This kind of drawing circumscribes an interlinear vision that differs and defers from its own traits. Its spaces are not marked and its constituent marks do not inscribe themselves. Drawing hovers and shimmers between the marks it makes and the spaces it leaves unmarked. Or differently, as James Elkins reads it, to consider an individual mark of a drawing detaches it from the rest of the picture. The mark will sink into the surface it marks and its own edges will take on the force and potential of marks themselves, until '*that* half-imaginary mark will begin to "wear itself out"', and so on.[86] This same process of repetitive and ever-recursive deferral and difference recognises again the drawing of the blind.

As a potential effect of the withdrawal of the trait, Derrida notes the '*third aspect* [of drawing's blindness]: *the rhetoric of the trait*'.[87] The cession of the trait sees the emergence of the discursive, for Derrida provocatively poses the possibility that the imperialist rule of rhetoric over images is granted, rather than imposed, by the retreat, deferral and diffraction of the line that marks drawing. Though Elkins argues that 'Derrida's is a repressive reading',[88] what comes into view throughout is Derrida's profound reluctance to delimit drawing and the viewing of drawing ver-

bally. In fact, the scope of Derrida's blindness is circumscribed by what can be seen and said with certainty about drawing. Both Derrida's and Elkins' projects, albeit in different ways, seem to recognise the potential usurption of drawing by vision and words. Derrida, in considering the blindness of drawing, hence speaks of the powerlessness of the eye, not as an insufficiency but to mark 'the experience of drawing [as a] quasi-transcendental resource.'[89] The power of drawing arises here in the eye's powerlessness to see drawing. A blindness that requires the blind to return to the drawing again and again, in order to see and be blind again, to see differently and yet still be unable to see totally.

Borremans' phrase 'on one sheet', as written inscription, averts exclusively pointing at its substrate, while his drawing(s) cannot be entirely detached from it. Even when drawing seemingly acts graphiquely by approaching the *transparency* of writing, for example in architectural plans, typographic designs, medical illustrations, sculptural model et cetera,[90] its line also always belongs to paper, though it never absolutely belongs to anything, not even itself. Drawing's line traces a boundary that cannot absolutely exclude its paper, whereas writing cannot entirely include it. The phrasing may be reversed to show that writing also occurs on a substrate and drawing in a space illimitable to one singular sheet, though that is not to say that the result of the reversal makes the two practices the same. Rather, while writing can never truly belong to the paper and drawing never truly be separated from it, their shared graphic traits ensure that the vacillation and thus their intervolution cannot be arrested.

The way that writing as script, i.e. writing as graphic marks on paper, needs to be turned into language and (inner) speech may be exemplified through Klaus Weimar's contention that reading is a 'languaging [*Versprachlichen*] of writing on the one hand *and* the perception of speech [*Sprache*] on the other, though not in alternation but indivisibly at once.'[91] The German language permits Weimar to funambulate on the line of *Sprache* as *language*, as a shared and codified structure of linguistic patterns (*langue*), in the widest sense even *human speech* (*langage*), and *speech*, as a use of language in an individual utterance (*parole*).[92] His assertion therefore can also not avoid seeking to designate reading as a 'speechifying of writing' with its concomitant 'perception of language', as well as the all the other remaining combinations.[93] What is remarkable about this analysis in any case is that writing is not perceived as language, rather that the reader needs to turn it into language and/or inner speech. This inner speech itself, as Hans Lösener has indicated, is in a precarious position between language and non-language, too, because by definition it does not speak—its sound is not heard—but only rehearses a phoneme—its sound is perceived—silently.[94] 'Reading means to speak to oneself *in another's name* based on writing',[95] which makes the reader both sender and receiver of an impossible translation based on written marks. There is thus no simple and self-evident automatism, mechanism or process that absolutely prescribes and limits how writing is encountered and read.[96] Why, however, would this reading be dissociable from the material constituents of writing? Even outside of the visual arts and in the most

trivial senses we recognise the importance of particular physical characteristics of writing. The proposition to hand out university degrees scribbled with a biro on the back of a fag packet or as a virtual-paper PDFs does not offend because the former is defiled and the latter potentially fraudulent, but because the *acts* of writing are illimitable to a transcendent understanding of text. Writing's power issues as paperwork and paper's work. As the use of words and phrases is culturally, politically, socially, contextually, personally et cetera co-determined and shifting, so the co-importance of material actors needs to be called upon to explore why a word-identical condolence message sent via letter or WhatsApp can be read very differently. Conversely, the assumption that drawing is intimately bound to its singular sheet of paper appears overdrawn for it is quite imaginable that the subsequent one in the pad would have permitted a drawing whose difference is perceivable only in the sense of Nelson Goodman's distinction between the perfect forgery and the original, that is to say, we cannot discriminate between the two works now but we may in the future.[97]

Derrida comments that there are metaphysical conventions of discourse—oppositionality, presence, genre et cetera—which are self-instituting and -legitimising and arrive at the cost of the marginalisation of other phenomena. Instead, he suggests, it is necessary to consider, amongst other things, the impact of temporal and material factors on the economy of writing. Of course, this will disturb the existing graphematic and structural constraints.

> Are we now going to integrate such fringes into the text, and take account of such frames? Are all these parasites to be incorporated into the economy of discourse? Must the surface of the paper, the contents of the time at our disposal, etc. all be integrated into our calculations? If so, what about the ink remaining in my typewriter ribbon? And yet: why not? That is the question.[98]

Moreover then, the analysis of writing's signifiers—not limited to the dot and line (and their pictures and verbosity)—will also need to include the material gesture of writing. 'As concerns the forms of signs, even within phonetic writing, the cathexes of gestures, and of movements, of letters, lines, points, the elements of the writing apparatus (instrument, surface, substance, etc.)', these are elements of an understanding of writing that does not arbitrarily include some graphic aspects while designating others as *parasites* or *excrement*.[99]

Conversely for drawing, which may just as easily be subsumed into a blind materialism as into a legible text constituted by transparent signifiers. It too, is held in the abeyance of a mark that is also a gesture and material, whilst being and making visible. Elkins similarly supports the suspense of drawing in avoiding the reduction of it to either image or material:

> Marks blur and fade into one another, and even the freshest drawing will have uncertain moments where the texture of the paper confounds the sense of a mark, or a group of marks converge into a dark confusion, or a mark moves so lightly across the page that it is not securely visible. No image is composed in any other way.

> What is a figure? A faint webbing of paper fibers and remnants of chalk; a morass of sticky oil.[100]

At least for writing, there now exists a growing amount of cognitive-psychological research that demonstrates how different technologies and materials impact the intellectual capacity of its users. For example, it has been shown that students taking lecture notes longhand have equally good factual recall as those typing along on a computer.[101] However, the handwriters outperformed the typerwriters in conceptual questions even when other computer-based distractions were eliminated. One of the assumptions is that increased ease of note-taking does not facilitate the reformulation and processing of information required for the slower longhand writing.[102] In fact, 'disfluency', reduced transcription fluency, has been linked to enhanced lexical sophistication, sentence complexity and cohesion of the writing, when the essays of skilled typewriters composing with both hands were compared to their one-handed efforts.[103] Though the results are reversed when longhand writers are asked to write in an unfamiliar calligraphy, which also resulted in a less fluent writing process.[104] Similarly, the interrelations between 'better' handwriting and reading proficiency have been experimentally tested and confirmed.[105] The exact disentaglement of temporal, material, gestural and other factors shall not interest us here, what is however important are that ergonomics, 'material affordances and sensorimotor contingencies' are of demonstrable importance to our intellectual history.[106] Moreover, writing itself also appears to feed back into the functions of the brain, reorganising pathways related to vision and hearing in the acquisition of literacy.[107]

Writing and drawing as 'intentional' practices are not merely supported but produced by gestural, material and technological interactions that affect indivisible intellectual and sensuous forces. Neither paper nor the implements of graphic markings are inert tools but active constituents of our intellectual development. The separation of sensory matter and cognitive effect may not be erased but its continuous displacement towards a more integrated approach is required in order to account for the encounters with and practices of writing and drawing. Neither of these can be satisfactorily reduced to mere material scratches on a substrate, inane expressions of bodily force, transparent values of communication or similar reductive principles. However, the consideration of the practices of our inseparably material and cognitive lives demands a willingness to expand any arbitrary limitations we have already pre-imposed based on habit, preference or determination.



NO MAN GOES TO THE GUILLOTINE
WITH GREATER APPREHENSION THAN I SIT
DOWN AT MY DESK.

On Iconicity

> In this *entre-nous* spirit, then, old confidant, before we join the others […] I privately say to you, old friend (unto you, really, I'm afraid), please accept from me this unpretentious bouquet of very early-blooming parentheses: ((((())))).
>
> —— J.D. Salinger, *Seymour: An Introduction*

Raymond Pettibon writes 'I no man goes to the guillotine with greater apprehension than I sit down at my desk.' More accurately, he does not type, he does not print, his hand draws brush and pen across a sheet of paper in a gesture that *leads* a line tracing itself in pictural inscription. Written and drawn, what remains belongs to both the picture and writing yet without a line of division, without a line that splits and divides itself to belong only in parts. And though remaining written, we cannot say that he marks it with a giant lyrical 'I', for he may return and give us the remainders of his list: II No man is more cauterized than I smoothing the page. III No man plunges lower from the gallows than I from the end of my pen. Between the letter 'I' and the Latin numeral 'I' we find the rehearsal of a history of pictures, letters and numbers that is deeply intertwined. The 'I' is here also the iconic notch in the tally stick or the stroke that illustrates that only one finger of the counting hand is extended.[1] Rather than a description or signification, the numerical sign is a depiction and instantiation. Vilém Flusser describes numbers as ideographs—'signs for ideas, for images seen with the "inner eye"'—that promote a 'formal, entirely abstract thought' that is distinct from what he considers the linear progression of the alphabetic one.[2] Flusser's choice of words is of course noteworthy, for he seeks to identify a rivalry at the heart of the alphanumeric system which pulls towards the old foes of image and sound at once. The thought that arises out of the image is formal precisely because it is contingent on the mark's form. Yet it is the formality of the stroke itself that allows it to be an alphabetic, numerical and alphanumerical sign. Moreover, the mark is not exhausted as a multiply readable sign because Pettibon's hefty 'I' offers us also the side-view of the guillotine's priapic post, the beam of a gibbet, the logogrammatic self-portrait of the artist, the homophonic eye looming large and looking at us, hell's double doors opening after the guillotine, the graphic *cut* that separates head from trunk et cetera. The typographic transcription of the mark through a crude capital letter 'I' in 11pt *Arno Pro* has long lost its adequacy as no translation as an alphabetic 'I' can capture the scope of Pettibon's 'I'. Or perhaps it can. What if the viewer and reader of Pettibon's work continues to read 'I' as the letter 'I' without limiting it to any *pure* verbality of the ninth letter of the alphabet? The silent enunciation of 'I' does not preclude the singular stroke from signing itself as letter, numeral, ideograph, personal pronoun, post, homophonic organ, space between doors and so on. 'I' is iconic of 'I' and acts as the deictic, enunciable referral to an illimitable mark. Conversely, it marks

the singular stroke that continues to exceed a reading limited to reading. 'I', its anaphoric substitute, already contaminates every other letter 'I' that may be read elsewhere.

When Tim Ingold observes that writing used to denote 'a practice of inscription' leaving hardly any difference 'between the craft of the draughtsman and that of the scribe',[3] we recognise the author as inscriber, not the typist or wordsmith. Pettibon's pen and brush are not simply tools for neutral transcription of speech—or more specifically: oral signs—into graphic marks of similar or even equivalent *signi*fication. This is not to say, that the pen is boundless or superior to the typewriter, word processor or printer; all remain constitutive of writing. They produce writing whose graphic qualities are incommensurate with notions of mere speech repro*duct*ion. Because alphabetic writing relies on conventional signs, it is understandably straightforward to insist on a clear separation between their legibility and visibility. Jean-Gérard Lapacherie notes that the *visibility* of typography, in other words, to read (*legĕre*) typography as typography, is often seen to spell the end of reading the text.

> A page is meant to be read. It is not meant to be looked at. Printed words on a page are barely noticeable. As soon as reading begins, our perception of typography ends. Typographic artifices force the reader to look at the text. They make it visible as a thing and as a thing endowed with an existence of its own.[4]

From a historical perspective, visibility and legibility of a text are often regarded as irreconcilable oppositions.[5] Lapacherie provides a puzzling 19th-century French example, according to which some psychiatrists had shown an interest in writers who displayed an overenthusiastic use of typographic marks, characterising the authors as '"fous littéraires"' (literary madmen).[6] The particular perception of the relationship between typography and writing, though no longer regarded as a medical issue, extends to contemporary use. Theses are to be submitted according to stipulations that were drawn up for typewriters and that seek to insist on an impossible neutrality between writing and its own form, ironically by highlighting that for academic purposes only one particular visuality-legibility relationship is permitted. Multi-columnar texts with parallel discourses, overwritings, strike-throughs, divergence from typographic uniformity, explorations of different material constituents et cetera remain rather exceptional, especially in scholarly publications. WJT Mitchell sums it up, when he notes that the spatial dimension of script is 'normally backgrounded' and the physical characteristics of a text are usually determined by means of pro*duct*ion, economic considerations or marketing.[7]

That readers may equally and at the same time be viewers who are acutely perceptive of the visibility of script is apparent in graphic design pro*duct*s in which typographic forms are used to enhance messages, produce memorable *Schriftzüge*, create typo-pictographic brand associations, subvert or supplement images and so on. Nonetheless, at other times writing is treated as a transparent text whose individual graphemes have to be subsumed into the singularly definable characteristic of a commercially and administratively efficient Unicode. The typographic experiments of Dada, Futurism, Lettrism, Situationists International, Fluxus and concrete poetry

receive occasional if, however, marginal interest, but Johanna Drucker observes a hesitance amongst contemporary writers and perhaps hostility amongst editors and publishers towards typographically experimental work.[8] Though her observation predates this study, the commercial and administrative limitations on the graphic scope of writing are still pronounced, as is the interpretative criticism that deals with writing in art through an immediate reduction to language. That the commonplace graphic standards of our computerised writing habits are impositions of particular forces and desires is perhaps as easily overlooked as the consequences that they have on our understanding of writing. Lapacherie gives the example of *Champ Fleury*, a 1529 treatise on typography by Geoffroy Tory, which was written to harmonise the use of typefaces, leading and spacing.[9] Though the texts produced subsequently became more standardised, the impositions of these restriction were also perceived to be in contradiction with the demands of some texts. Writer-typographers, like Restif de la Bretonne, worked deliberately against this standardisation and set their texts in a variety of typefaces and sizes: important characters and actions were capitalised or set in a larger font, phonic durations were indicated through spacings or reduced type size in lower-case letters. Lapacherie describes the effect of such work as producing a 'synaesthetic relationship between phonic sensations which are perceived by the ear and visually perceived graphic sensation.'[10] Despite the conventional origins of alphabetic characters, their mimetic, iconic and affective potential as visual instantiations of language is not automatically debarred.

Differentiating texts according to their relationship between visible form and content, Leon Roudiez describes texts which do not point at their own material make-up as readable or *transparent*, and contrasts them with those that are *opaque* and show themselves visibly.[11] This understanding is interwoven with and a deliberate distortion of Roland Barthes's *readable* and *writable* texts. The former are restrictive, authoritarian and closed; they have a determined set of possible, predictable readings. The latter are open and fluctuating, irreducible to a single meaning.[12] Roudiez, adapts this notion to include opacity and fullness, the quality of texts to affirm their own material visibility and audibility, respectively.[13] Roudiez's opacity thus also appears to echo Jean-François Lyotard's use of the term to signal the incommensurable gap between the sign and its meaning, as well as the shift from reading text to seeing in light of *this* uncertainty of meaning. Lyotard himself exploits this visibility-through-opacity dynamic typographically in his 'Veduta' chapter in *Discourse, figure* by using an inverse roman-italic typesetting.[14] In Roudiez's conception, writing's visibility exceeds its necessity for a text's legibility; an understanding that differs strikingly from any transcriptural idea of writing as a form of speech notation.

Perceived as transcribed speech, writing acts as a storage vessel for a language whose chief purpose is vocal articulation and aural perception. Such explicit vocal primacy is consistently reinforced in linguistic scholarship that claims that written words 'have no visual worth [and] reading is generally a visual experience only physiologically'.[15] Underlying such presumption is an assumed

neutrality of the graphic sign, a *transparency* of the mark which allows unmediated access to a signification. The putative meaning or essence of writing is located somewhere behind the text or in it, but not bound up with it. Drucker conjectures that the disregard for typographic exigencies is indicative of a continued belief in a higher linguistic transparency which grants unmediated access to an underlying *truth*. She suggests that employing the visibility of texts pro*duct*ively and experientially works 'toward negating the transcendent character of logos by refusing to allow the linguistic sign to be represented in a supposedly transparent visual mode'.[16] For Drucker written alphabetic characters, though arbitrary, are still capable of embodying meaning in their own right, and have done so in religious, philosophical, scientific and other practices since the 'invention' of the letter.[17] She thus advocates a writing that refuses to neglect the mark that is, after all, a precondition of the writing act. Roudiez pursues the same agenda, when he identifies a double paradox in an understanding of writing as transparent speech transcription.[18] Firstly, this kind of reading of texts must acknowledge the visibility of the sign but equally disavow the selfsame visibility: '[N]o sooner do those black signs become visible, if the text is transparent they almost at once become invisible again, having been replaced with mental images of various kinds'.[19] Secondly, because the purpose of transcriptural texts is a meaning wholly outside of its graphic make-up, their 'materiality could be termed immaterial'.[20] The recognition of writing's visual characteristics in the generation and promotion of meaning, affect and sensation will not be produced however, through instituting another semiotic layer that seeks to dissect and categorise a graphic mark into isolable aspects. The intervolution of iterable graphic traces through material and motorsensory contingencies and affordances forms a differential mark that may be read, seen and interpreted but not absolutely unravelled and reduced to a signifier.

To discuss the formal qualities and iconic potential of the linguistic sign without limiting it, it is necessary to disentangle two different connections that (written and oral) language may have with any imaginable referent. To affirm the conventional—and possibly arbitrary—character of the linguistic signifier to its signified is not the same as (or even a necessary condition for) demanding a unitary, dichotomous relationship between the sign's form and content. Simply because a signifier has an established conventional relationship to a referent does not preclude the selfsame mark from also having or accruing multiple other, even contradictory, reference values or contingencies that exceed notions of univocal, linear signification. A simple example based on the grapheme <x> may illustrate the point. As a character of the Latin alphabetic script, it has a conventional, representative function in relation to a phoneme. Nevertheless, this does not prevent it from maintaining or accumulating supplementary and irrevocably linked values, for instance: Christ (through the nomina sacra: XP, XC, XPC), kiss (verb, noun), cross (verb, noun, adjective), map position, mistake or incorrect answer, indication of a vote, chiasmus, adult-content rating, death or unconsciousness (if replacing eyes), signature of the illiterate, indication of a hybrid, abscissa, the unknown or variable, and so forth.[21] That these relations may be assigned

a syntag- or paradigmatic status only reinforces that the iterable <x> does not preclude the continuous accumulation of such meanings. To read <x> is therefore, to see and read it within an illimitable and contiguous field that includes signifieds and designates, as well as the potential of the sign's *figure* to exceed both. <x>'s relations to other referents and meanings is not merely one of linguistic abbreviation, rather it is one of the indivisible overlap of phonetics, ideographics, iconicity and picturality. Precisely because <x> has a *visually* representative function for a phoneme—without being reducible to that phoneme—it maintains the capacity to be (re)linked and even codified iconically, ideographically, picturally et cetera. Like Pettibon's 'I', <x> operates as a letter irreducible to itself. That Pettibon's 'I' is not yet an <I>, i.e. that we have to *quote a particular* 'I'—disregarding the tautology—rather than a notional grapheme <I> that contains a variety of glyphs that are considered allographic, is an indication that the reading and viewing of 'I' has not been conventialised to the same extent, though Pettibon's work (and this reading) are instances of this process. The possibility to quote the mark at all, to iterate it outside of its proper context and locus, is however already enshrining that the mark may function as a sign whose identity is not identical to itself. Even in this very paragraph, the text relies demonstrably on the reader's ability to see the *silent* markers that indicate that the following is considered either a linguistic grapheme, < >, or a quotation, ‘ ’, and read them through their unutterable form, in their irreducibility of form and content.

If the towering 'I' contains both the notion of the static character of legibility and the variable mark of visibility, how *ductile* is this sign that can be repeated and altered yet identified? How can we reconcile this apparent gap in the graphic of the sign that has form yet also remains free from any particular form? David Scott Armstrong and Patrick Mahon ask this question seemingly also in view of Derridean iterability.

> Is it possible to subtract a materially inscribed mark from its context, from itself? Material language takes place within a field of inscriptions, exchanges and erasures, forever repeating itself—and also always differing from itself. It traces a path between itself and other, between form and formlessness, ultimately offering itself as a site of negotiation and transition between the receiver of language and the world.[22]

Nelson Goodman's analysis of the notational character of different symbol systems provides here again a fruitful point of friction. His structural approach indicates how the above questions arise out of categorical impositions that seek to constitute writing, rather than respond to it. Discussing authenticity in art, Goodman differentiates *autographic* art, in which the distinction between forgery and original is significant, from *allographic* or non-autographic art, in which no copy of a text may be considered a fake and which 'is amenable to notation'.[23] Painting, sculpture, printmaking and others fall into the category of autographic practice, whilst no musical performance, copy of a literary text or poetry, or enactment of a play can be considered a fake (unless it changes the source text) and are therefore allographic. The precise distinction shall not interest us here, what is however relevant is Goodman's terminology. One aim of *Languages of Art* is to delineate the

semantic and syntactic rules governing notation. In very abbreviated form, notational systems are those symbol systems in which each symbol refers to only one characteristic of the world it describes, conversely, every single characteristic belongs to only one symbol in the system.[24] Musical scores are almost full notational systems because every note played may be associated with only one symbol and vice versa. There are however certain aspects, for example, volume, tempo and choice of cadenza, which are imprecise and cannot be captured by a score, which is therefore not fully notational.[25] Crucially for Goodman, poetry and literature are not full notational systems because of certain semantic characteristics of *language*, though they may qualify syntactically. Importantly, Goodman conflates language, speech and writing through its implicit comparison with the musical score. The only time that Goodman comes to consider the *visibility* of writing as distinct from language, he comments on the need for clearly differentiated alphabetic characters.[26] He does not, however, consider writing's marks outside of narrow alphanumerical parameters, for instance in his neglect of extra-alphabetic characters, or the variability of writing's visibility through typefaces, sizes, font styles, styling (italics, bold, underlined) et cetera. These are characteristics, which cannot easily be encircled under the header of *language*—not to mention *speech*—yet are inevitable considerations within *writing*. Their semiological relationship to language is thus not uniform but heterogeneous and exceeds any order that tries to relate signs to each other either via a limitable syntax or through paradigms.

By necessitating the clear syntactic differentiation of alphabetic characters, Goodman manifests that writing is neither transparent nor invisible to him. Yet, how does he arrive at a position in which writing has again lost its visibility? He probably does not arrive there, but sets out from there. In terming literature and poetry allographic, he marks them as linguistic events rather than acts of writing. Sentences, clauses, words and more closely letters are for Goodman units and characters of and in language. Again, writing is legible alphabetic language, not visibly written. Allographs are all possible forms and alternatives (graphs or glyphs) of a character or other grapheme. Hence, all possible graphs of the letter <a> indicate the same undifferentiated signifier and are interchangeable, whether minuscule, majuscule, uncial, cursive, italicised, superscript, subscript, black letter, Gothic, single story, double story, with exit strokes, without, calligraphed, cacographed, drawn, typed, printed and so forth. Goodman observes that in a notational symbol scheme all marks of a character are interchangeable, viz. there is 'character-indifference' between the graphs of a character.[27] Consequently, as long as graphs remain legibly assigned to a specific grapheme, Goodman is *indifferent* to their visibility. To assign writing to the category of allographic art is therefore not a deductive conclusion, but predetermined by Goodman's application of the linguistic principle which is symptomatic not only for the discipline but also for juridico-political forces of control and efficiency. Any possible significance of the graphic qualities of texts, any heterogeneity between language, speech and writing, as well as the participation of verbal texts in an autographic category is thus ruled out a priori. This prearranged *conclusion*



may therefore be abbreviated to its implicit tautology: writing, which is allographic, is also a non-autographic art.

Though technical, this analysis permits us to understand that any approach to writing that disregards the graphic qualities of a text, is not concerned with writing but *allographic writing*. Of course, there is no singular *general* writing—a writing without any attribute—yet the character-indifference of allographics only insufficiently addresses what it *sees* in writing and limits the *scope* of possible writings even further. Recognising texts as mere language events does not account for the visibility and legibility of writing inside and outside of language. To address the multiple motions which Pettibon's writing offers satisfactorily, requires a reading-viewing that considers the graphic visibility of texts beyond an allographic notion of legibility. *Allographic reading*, a seemingly translatory practice that transliterates all corresponding allographs into the unitary value of one resultant grapheme, is visually only concerned with a(llographic) legibility. This should not be misunderstood as advocacy for a revitalisation of mystical graphology or the establishment of a new graphic typology but to acknowledge the irreducibility of writing to linguistics. Similarly, the difficulty of reading and seeing writing, which cannot exclude the contingencies and characteristics of *other graph*ic practices—drawing, for instance—is an inadequate reason to ignore the impact of visible *traits*. In *regard*ing the differential quality of the graphics of writing with indifference, or more precisely, by not *regard*ing the visibility of writing, we are dis*regard*ing not only its *accepted* semantic and syntactic import (headings, paragraphs, pull quotes, emphases et cetera), but blind ourselves entirely to the possibility of love letters, (concrete) poetry, rebuses, ludic writing, syssemantic characters, writing in tables, footnoted texts or any other writing whose iconic or otherwise graphic capacity is considered *sign*ificant.[28] Had Pettibon inscribed his page with a minuscule we would have found him decapitated: i beheaded I, a capital punishment, prone on the ground, a little head a little ahead, the microcephalic toppling the phallic. That such writing is not 'parasitic', 'exceptional' or 'marginal' in view of 'conventional' and 'normal' use becomes apparent when we try to rid even the most 'ordinary' writing of its graphic investment. What writing may absolutely exclude its graphics? Derrida offers a response that exceeds but inculcates the graphic, noting that '[t]he exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general, and […] there is no linguistic sign before writing. Without that exteriority, the very idea of the sign falls into decay.'[29] According to Derrida, any serious graphology, i.e. any attempt to pursue a cultural, historical, ethnographic, sociological, psychological study of writing would need to come to terms with the *graphematics* of writing. Such a study would be required to engage writing's fundamental exigencies:

> as to the articulation of an individual and a collective *graphie*, of the graphic 'discourse' so to speak and the graphic 'code,' considered not from the point of view of the intention of signification or of denotation, but of style and connotation; problems of the articulation of graphic forms and of diverse substances, of the diverse forms of graphic substances (materials: wood, wax, skin, stone, ink, metal, vegetable) or instruments (point, brush, etc., etc.); as to the ar-

> ticulation of the technical, economic, or historical levels (for example, at the moment when a graphic *system* is constituted and at the moment, which is not necessarily the same, when a graphic *style* is fixed); as to the limit and the sense of variations in style within the system; as to all the investitures to which a *graphie*, in form and substance, is submitted.[30]

Derrida himself considers any serious and rigorous pursuit of such a vast and contingent field impossible, nevertheless, he persistently draws on graphematics in order to disturb any facile conflation of writing and language, and the avenues he opens in *Of Grammatology* are still trailed in much later texts, such as *The Post Card* and *Paper Machine*. Juliet Fleming is more optimistic about the possibility that such studies may be 'local and general' as well as 'attentive to the materials, forms, practices, and institutions of writing in the narrow sense', whilst acknowledging the impossibilities of such an address and attention.[31] And in many senses, this very study, too, in its address and attention on those elements identified by both Derrida and Fleming, engages somewhat optimistically in the same process, if however, in view of the collocation of drawing and writing. The result, if we can speak of *one*, of Derrida's, Fleming's and this study is not a(nother) *system* of writing—here one in relation to the shared differences with the graphic marks of drawing—but an adestinate arrival that must open up its own material, form, practice and institutions. That the graphematics of writing are not limited to 'writing in the narrow sense' is one of Derrida's refrains, precisely because writing is not external to any conception of language and therefore always inscribes itself in speech, as well. The aurality or orality of seeing and reading could therefore be similarly investigated. It does not have to be written down in order for the *articulated* practices to be writing.

The complexity of the inherent confluence between the need to read writing and the implicit, overlapping and in part contradictory necessity to see it, is even perceptible in two aforementioned sources, although both authors had themselves drawn attention to the visual qualities of texts. Strictly speaking, Roudiez's notion that some signs can 'point away from the material body of writing that they constitute' whilst others point towards it,[32] cannot be upheld once we accept that writing is constituted both visibly and legibly. Rather than a referral to another place issuing from the sign itself, the institutionalisation of signs—to return to Goodman's term—can promote an indifference to the graphic and promulgate writing as allographic, without however, being able to limit the graphic potential of each instantiation. Similarly, despite Lapacherie's attempt to remain a clinical observer of typographic history, he notes that it requires 'typographic artifices' to awaken the reader to become a viewer.[33] What, however, is a typographic artifice? When does non-artifice typography trail into artifice typography? If there is typographic artifice, whom should psychiatric professionals examine today? Is 'italicisation' more or less of an artifice than *inverted commas*? Arguably, writing as an irreducible instantiation of language as a system of conventional (and arbitrary) signs, can hardly be measured on a scale of artificiality. In effect, such a measure proposes to register the level of naturalism in a system described as artificial. Lapacherie is careful to analyse the chasm between legibility and visibility but even he cannot

avoid wanting to read a text allographically. Notwithstanding, Lapacherie notes that typography possesses the heterogeneity of a system that on the one hand replaces language by a sign, yet on the other exhibits signs that have no—or no clear—referent.

> Capitals A, B, or E, among others, do not have the same design as their corresponding lower cases: a, b, e.... From a semiological point of view, punctuation marks, underlining, numbers, blanks (and other typographic devices) are very different from letters and stand at the opposite pole from the alphabet. They do not replace any unit of language. They have no value (in the sense that they do not stand for a unit), but they signal a meaning, a rupture, a hierarchy, an analysis. As a result, a printed text which retains punctuation marks, blanks, upper cases, etc …, cannot be uniform because it is made up of heterogeneous signs.[34]

To understand graphic qualities as constituents of writing's signs is to recognise the physicality of writing which exists and asserts itself within, without and despite of language. Indeed the graphematics of writing already overlaps with the graphic marks of drawing, after all, we talk of dash, stroke, underline, ellipsis, hash, rule, asterisk, obelus, circumflex, highlight, slash, solidus and so on.[35] The nomenclature suggests writing's investment in the material, gesture, form and iconicity of the practice and work of drawing.

As soon as verbal text enters the rectangular frame of the page, Michel Butor suggest, it is inevitably also constituted as an image.[36] Therefore any difference between legibility and visibility of verbal signs should not be confused with the rigid permanence or impermeability of distinction and category. Drawing and writing, their visibility and legibility, like *Riss und Zug*, and *Dichten und Denken* parallel each other to meet in infinity.

> [They] confirm each other, notch each other and each signs in some way in the body of the other, the one in the place of the other. They sign there the contract without contract of their neighborhood.[37]

The trait that separates and connects the two neighbours is marked with their difference. Yet, rather than just being the cut between two 'adversaries', Derrida recognises in it what 'attracts adversity toward the unity of a contour […], of a frame, of a framework'.[38] The adversity attracted between the legibility and visibility of writing concerns the shape and form—as well as the process of shaping and forming—and the iterability of alphabetic (typographic or chirographic) characters: the *ductus litterarum*. For visibility, the ductus (literally 'leading') is semantically and syntactically significant. For strictly linguistic legibility however, ductus only decides on allographic assignation, ultimately between illegibility and legibility. Indeed, if writing is contingent on the faithful repro*duction* 'of an established set of signs … "sanctioned" … by various authorities, from school on', it always teeters on the edge of illegibility.[39] Language, recognisable as writing, but allographically illegible, leaves visibility alone, redrawing the writing-drawing relation. As Martine Reid asserts:

HE TURNED FIRST IN THIS DIRECTION AND THEN IN THAT, IN HIS EFFORTS TO ESCAPE.


PEOPLE
MUST BE
PUNISHED


- THE SWIMMING POOL -
(Swimming pool plans)
- MMC-G - BEGINNING - SPRING 2001 -
THE HOTEL
N
E
W
S
SWIMMING POOL
POOL
CAFETERIA
CHANGING BOOTHS
The original version
with temperature-
swimming
(menu from the cafeteria)
- WARNING -
* Not in a philosophical sense

> Illegible writing indicates in fact that the sign has been remorsefully eaten away by its own figurative nature, and that it does indeed take almost nothing at all for the figure to resort back to its status as a mere drawing.[40]

It is thus perhaps in writing's interest not only to be legible but also, threatened by illegibility, to impugn its own visibility. As Ingold remarks, ductus in writing, as in drawing, '*describe*[*s*] the movement of a gesture and *inscribe*[*s* it] in the trace it yields', its 'quality, tone and dynamic' becomes part of the semantics and syntax of the *script*.[41] As ever, the choice of words is significant, for ductus draws out that the process of writing writes itself—through the gesture of the pen—into its mark. The navigation of the pen across the page is then the description of its (own) journey along the edge of illegibility as inscription on the page. If *led* too close to the edge, ductus crosses the line to dys-scription, a *bad* writing in which writing has begun the description of its own dis-scription, it works towards an *un*-writing of writing. Crossing the edge to linguistic illegibility, the line however remains as description of a dis-scription of writing's legibility. Many genitives inscribe themselves in the line of writing. It is the line as inscription of its own description, description of its inscription, inscription of its dis-scription, description of its dis-scription, dis-scription of its inscription. However it is not the dis-scription of description. Neither will it ever be completely dis-scribed, for as long as it inscribes itself as dis-scription it will be the rem(a)inder of its own description. The *il*-legibility that cannot assign marks allographically to a particular character is therefore neither a *without*-legibility nor a *not*-legibility. It does not describe a lack of legibility. Rather, it underwrites the excess of too many contingent legibilities that inscribe themselves as a line traced between writing and drawing.

The stroke, which in Pettibon's 'I' refuses to be an <i>, is Derrida's differential trait that neither bridges nor divides writing and drawing, and cannot be contained by either. It breaks the truce of the their co-mingling, their normally easily differentiated nature. Pettibon's I is Derrida's

> rebel to appeased commerce, to the regulated exchange of the two elements (lexical and pictural), close to piercing a hole in the *arthron* of discursive writing and representational painting, is this not a wild, almost unnarratable event?[42]

The rebellious 'I' remains unrepresentable to drawing's picturality because with every new glance the 'glottic thrust of reading'[43] wants to enunciate it, wants to pull it back into discourse, where it cannot remain either, as it already retreats (*retrait*) into the figure of the picture that also belongs to writing. The trait that marks 'I', also marks the attraction (*attrait*) and traction between legibility and visibility. '[T]he trait, it induces, precisely, duction, and even the "ductus"'.[44] The duction that leads and draws (*dūcĕre*) the 'I's production, induction, seduction, conduction sooner or later its inevitable abduction and reduction by this not 'ductile enough' discourse.[45] Notwithstanding, this will not have been the last attempt of discursivity to draw a bead at, draw in and then draw the line under an 'I' that withdraws (*retrait*) from being an <i>. This text, too, as part of the *articulation*, the *joint*, of writing and (its) pictures, tries to show how it pivots the scales in an attempt not to capture the pictural of the I (and other texts) and return it to a discursive

centre, where it can be contained and silenced by speaking for it and about it, but to draw it out, show it, let it be seen without showing it. The desire—administrative, institutional, logocentric, metaphysic—to command and restrain the differential trait that *joints* verbal and pictural links also permeates every mark on this page.

The recognition of the iconic in 'I' or <x> does not suggest that the alphabetic character itself is 'natural' or 'motivated', rather that iconicity is already a structural possibility inscribed in the mark of writing—and more broadly: language—and not an external imposition.[46] Concerning language, iconicity as a linguistic characteristic usually refers to a whole host of phenomena, including sound symbolism, which links a phonic value with a particular meaning and of which onomatopoeia is only a small subcategory,[47] Gestalt iconicity, which connects the spatio-temporal characteristics of language with the structure of events or objects,[48] and other so-called mimetic relations.[49] Iconicity in this conception refers to the correlation of form and meaning, and reinscribes not only the categorical distinction between language's content and form but also the alterity of language to the world through the seeming externalisation of itself from the effects of this mapping. How can we, for example, account for the illegible writing in Michaël Borremans' *The Swimming Pool* through an understanding of a form-meaning mapping? The writing is recognisable as writing but does not mean because it exceeds reading. It means only in so far that it is recognisable as illegible writing. It can be seen to be written, without being readable. Writing mimes itself, not another putative meaning beyond itself, through a form that remains illegible. If iconicity is narrowly defined through a mapping of form onto meaning, Borremans' writing must either be deemed non-iconic or its iconicity as writing would paradoxically have be addressed from the position of a picture that looks like writing.

Goodman has shown how representational notions of imitation, resemblance, mimesis et cetera are not the product of natural correspondences but also arise from the habits, standards and conventions of systematic use: 'Representation is thus disengaged from perverted ideas of it as an idiosyncratic physical process like mirroring, and is recognized as a symbolic relationship that is relative and variable.'[50] The iconic relations that images and words may thus have with any object, like the conventional relations usually ascribed to language, need to be *seen as* iconic in order to be read and interpreted, rather than merely *seen*. Just as the semiotic sign needs to be recognised as a sign, so the sign must be seen to be iconic in order for its iconicity to be meaningful. Reading as letter recognition does not trace the line of the hand because it already professes to know the mark as a legible sign.[51] However, the recognition of the mark *as* something (sign, icon and so on) is also always a form of appropriation that limits the sign unless *seeing* continues as *seeing as* is established. Though the notch in the tally stick marks itself iconically in every 'I' or '1' through its genealogical relation to a notational system, it still requires its referential iconicity to be *seen as* such. However, as 'I' and <x> already demonstrate, genealogy is only one possible identifier of iconic relations.

Winfried Nöth in particular argues that 'iconicity in language goes beyond the principle of "form miming meaning"' to one 'of "form miming form".'[52] Differentiating exophoric from endophoric iconicity, he identifies the former's capacity for language to refer to something beyond itself through resemblance, while the latter marks 'verbal repetition or more generally […] symmetries in language and discourse'.[53] The discussion of exophoric iconicity is long-established but Nöth notes that it sits uncomfortably with the assertion of literature's independence and ability to reflect on itself. Endophoric iconicity, on the other hand, promotes the principle of self-reference and thus permits the conception of a literary field. Nevertheless, it also broadens the idea of iconicity to include the repetition of letter, syllables, phrases and so on, as well as accounting for homonymity (in both homophonic and homographic form), thus a large array of literary and grammatical tropes, from alliteration to rhyme, from recurring plurals to the chiasmus, from metre to assonance et cetera can be encountered as iconic phenomena. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such an extension of the idea has also been heavily criticised. Ludovic De Cuypere discusses the subcategories of Nöth's endophoric iconicity and asserts that both either insufficiently contribute to the meaning of the text or are indeed already exophoric.[54] For De Cuypere, iconic ground, which denotes a mere similarity relation, is to be distinguished from iconicity proper, which contributes '"extra meaning"' through the recognition of 'the sense of an iconically motivated text in discourse.'[55] Nöth differentiates endophoric iconicity along syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes.[56] Syntagmatic iconicity occurs as the result of the sequential, linear or parallel relations of verbal signs in a text. Exemplifying his challenge, De Cuypere consequently argues that the definite article 'the' 'in the phrase "the king of the cats"' would constitute Nöth's syntagmatic iconicity yet contributes no additional meaning to the text and thus marks, for him, mere iconic ground.[57] The notion of 'extra meaning' of course requires sustained and serious unpacking, but it may suffice to indicate its limitations briefly. If 'extra meaning' as a concept were possible, then its determination through iconic motivation merely appears to return the discourse to concerns of intent or the reader's ability to recognise it. Yet, any such argumentation already relies on a communicative model of language that is transparent and self-present to both writer and reader. Even if the definition were unproblematic, the definite article in the phrase in question does contribute meaning precisely because it is there and not an indefinite article. It also establishes a noticeable parallelism in the determination of the possibility of the categories 'kings' and 'cats'. Furthermore problematic is thus the implicit assumption in the phrase 'extra meaning' that there may be something that contributes no meaning by being part of a text or utterance. As though parts of a text may fulfil transparent and exclusive grammatical or syntactic roles of language without in any way determining its reading or writing, 'extra meaning' instantiates a divorce of the form of texts from their content. The proposal to see the sign as a sign 'plus more' thus merely indicates that the mark was already *seen as* a sign, thus merely recognised as a closed, definable and limited gesture, not a graphic mark with a capacity to exceed its pre-inscribed verbal and pictural bound-

aries. The absolute and finite readability of a text—exhaustive of all its meaning for all time to come—is already inscribed in the phrase: 'extra meaning'.

Paradigmatic iconicity, on the other hand, occurs across language as a system and thus, for example, describes the repetition of the plural -s attached to many words in the English language as a form of iconic mapping that replicates itself morphologically throughout the forms of many nouns. De Cuypere counters that such an understanding 'renders the concept of iconicity vacuous' because it merely describes the formal consistency of a rule-based system as iconic.[58] Yet, the establishment of a grammatical or orthographic rule relies on the iterability of existing occurrences which, as *formal* replications, include the iconic value of the letter -s. The resistance to Nöth's endophoric iconicity is for De Cuypere seemingly also the result of an insistence on the apparently irrefutable distinction between the form and content of texts or utterances. Through endophoric iconicity, Nöth however indicates the autonomous and illimitable potential of the sign to refer to itself as a sign and to develop correspondences, parallelism, recurrences and so on throughout texts without requiring the notions of authorial intent or the implication of chance.[59] The idea of intertextual exchanges can moreover be enriched through the notion of iconicity which permits the recognition of a large variety of formal values across and within texts.

Sybille Krämer similarly emphasises the need to acknowledge the convergence of the discursive and the iconic in what she refers to as writing's *notational iconicity*.[60] Krämer asserts that the relation between writing and speech is one of 'intermediality between *phoné* and *graphé*.'[61] It is only the acceptance that the relation is not intramedial that can prevent writing's reduction to discursivity and the result of oral transcription. Once however recognised as visual and iconographic, writing also loses it supposed linearity. Krämer in particular emphasises that writing as a cultural technique can already be performed and function through the principles of its own iconic values without having to refer to external objects or evoke referential signification. The operative writing of higher mathematics, programming language and logic can be executed 'freed from the constraints of interpretation.'[62] This gesture also marks the 'de-semantification' of the sign and, according to Krämer, is premised on the internal logic of writing's notational 'not "pictorial" iconicity'.[63] Despite the recognition of iconicity, Krämer's writing does not partake in the same space as the picture (or, the picture, for her, remains reducible to the image). Though it is not linear and de-semantified, writing's space is strictly two-dimensional and upholds stringent syntactic rules.[64] Krämer's operative writing of computer code, however, marks the trajectory for an understanding of writing whose iconicity exceeds even the operative utility that produces meaning through its performance. Writing here can be seen to function according to rules recognised in itself, in a responsiveness to the procedure and workings that belong to it as writing.

Krämer's and Nöth's iconicity shows us Borremans' illegible hand as writing, because it recognises writing's iconicity to itself. Borremans rightly warns us that 'this is a philosophical drawing' because in it, the displacement of the mark between verbal and pictural sign as the irreducibility

of its graphic gesture is enacted. Borremans' writing however also demonstrates that the notion of endophoric iconicity, though classified (even by name) as 'within language' and denoting 'intra-linguistic resemblance',[65] also exceeds language because its illegibility simultaneously marks it outside of the verbal sign. It is iconic of the alphabetically legible sign without being legible itself. The illegible written mark belongs to the picture which returns it to writing where it cannot be subsumed within a linguistic category. Borremans' line is a response to the line of verbal writing, which follows and pursues without the accountability of a text that can be read. Lyotard similarly addresses the possibility of the line to respond and evokes the responsibility that such a gesture carries.

> It's as if a line were a sentence pursued by other means. A sentence is a demand [demande: desire, question]. Since it has been preceded by other lines (outside and inside the picture, in culture, in the imagination and on paper) which would require [demanderaient] following up, a line is also a kind of response, a comeback, a way of following up on the demand [demande] carried forward by the earlier lines. […] The line bears a responsibility. It takes its cue from other lines; that is how it is responsible, how it tries to discharge its responsibility.[66]

The lines of drawing and writing, as in Krämer's operative writing, do not proceed unresponsive to other lines, but show their desire to answer and extend, to return to and question, and to prepare for future lines and their responsibility towards them. Lyotard's own words already perform such a responsive writing when he returns repeatedly (*demand-*, *respons-*), but in alteration, to the lines he just left behind. Writing, as if generative of itself, propels itself in response to its own reading. Yet, it is a reading that exceeds mere repetition and rephrasing as it picks up words and their fragments, and recovers them through a response that writes them differently. The response thus cannot be merely lexical but sees the word beyond its signification, etymology or homonymy as a graphic mark whose iconicity is suspended between verbal lexicon and pictural line. Derrida, of course, exploits this kind of responsive writing in many of his texts and even indicates that the iconicity of this writing exceeds verbality: 'I remarked just now that following certain typos, certain types, "*devil*" closely resembles "*deuil*" {mourning}.'[67] And this thesis, too, has regularly responded to and generated itself (e.g. *-zug*, *-riss*, *-duct-*, *-scribe/-scription*, *Zeich(n)en*) in the recognition of the iconicity of its writing and thus its intimate intervolution with drawing. Writing creates its own pattern in itself, repeating and altering itself in a practice that interrogates its own production through its production. The threads of its weave run across its texture, pulling it hither and yon at times visible to writer and reader, at other times through the tensions in the fabric itself.

The illegible writing in Borremans' drawing is nevertheless not the only instance of iconic reference. The schemas and diagrams that profess to be models without being models enact the conventions of their *types* in order to be *seen as* the mappings for a future swimming pool and caféteria. They employ the legible characteristics of a drawing whose propositional value is for architecture. The recognition of the drawing as figurative or representational itself relies

on an iconographic reading that already looks beyond the marks towards their values as signs. It is however difficult, if not impossible, to escape the narrowing gaze that limits the mark to its iconography. It requires a seeing that has forgotten what it has seen before: a seeing before sight, whose eyes alone move across the picture without recognition. Derrida desires to have his eyes on the picture in an encounter with the mark that does not know it beforehand, it is

> in order to set eyes on it, no matter if they are blind (even better, for the less I understand the 'true' meaning of this iconography, the less my eyes, the color of my eyes, my eyelids, the mark on one of them and the fluttering of my lashes will be forgettable for you), it is therefore in order to set eyes on it, I am speaking of eyes not of sight [...] For this one must see without understanding, without thinking anything about what lets itself be seen in this excess of evidence.[68]

To have one's eyes on the picture in recognition is always to have one's eyes on the picture in recognition of something that is not there. Iconography is also always the recognition of a false resemblance that appropriates the picture.[69] The graphic trait of drawing does not return a truth to the picture—because the truth of the picture is not given—rather, drawing's truth 'waits for the act, the trait, the stroke of the *graphein*.'[70] The drawing's trait thus abolishes the difference between constituting and restituting a truth (in representation, iconography, mimesis et cetera) because it gives and returns its truth in giving and returning itself. As Jean-Luc Nancy describes it, drawing's gesture pursues itself in the hitherto non-existent line that marks the openness of hand, paper, gesture, intent and knowing:

> The fact remains that 'art' (whose name must also remain problematic, even suspect) never takes place without this moment of 'following,' without this openness to chance or 'happiness' (in the sense in which one says 'bliss of expression' {*bonheur d'expression*})—and consequently, to a pleasure or joy—that constitutes 'the line' itself, its birth between hand and paper, under pencil or pen, in such a way that knowledge and know-how, with all their intentions, also know at the same time how to be led by this line that still does not yet exist, by this form in the process of forming itself.[71]

The practices of drawing and writing are here both responsive to their own marks and the 'already there' of a world that cannot be captured. In drawing, the line iconically redoubles itself in alteration when it builds up the crosshatch that iconographically represents the shadow and shape of a figure that must also remain unrepresentable, except in the desire of drawing itself. Every ink wash responds to its paper, the load of the brush and the agility of the gesture, yet knows itself also beyond its material objecthood when it masks the outline of a body and retreats into the background. In writing, too, no truth external to the text is captured, rather it is inaugurated in a responsive practice. Iterability ensures that every letter, word and phrase is already the altered repetition of past and future use whose miming is not only of an irreducible meaning outside of itself, but also of its own form. A form that is repeated iconically, through the intertextual reading and rewriting of other texts, through the tropes and conventions of literature, and through the

text itself, even where it recognises itself not merely as verbal but in its graphic constitution.

The drawer opens and closes the drawing with every line, even with those she does not draw, because every gesture enables and forestalls the marks to come. This is also the responsiveness and responsibility of drawing: it predicts lines to come and rules them out. Lyotard similarly remarks on the openness of drawing in its 'following':

> The gaze of the drawer halts profusion. It opens the space of a possible work, of a form. Permit me to betray you said the ultimate line to the possible lines. It is a question of a civility (ascesis would be emphatic) that is modest, but arrogant.[72]

The line that asserts itself and promotes other lines, also writes the history of lines that may have been. Its responsibility is thus also to those lines that are not. The line and the word are not merely themselves but responses to lines and words that have been ruled out in their making. They stand not for themselves but are perpetually *not other* lines and words, which equally are not erased but which animate what is given because they are not there. To write one word instead of another weaves the one that is not written into the text in recognition that is not there. Though not legible or to be seen, it is not absent because it is already inscribed in the choice of the other. The texture of the picture and writing is woven not only in the layering of historical and institutional meanings, or in every line that begins as a thread,[73] but also in the lines and textualisations that have seemingly been foregone.

Krämer and Horst Bredekamp emphasise the oft-derogated connection between the sensory and the creation of knowledge by proclaiming that it becomes apparent 'that it is especially the sensual*isa*tion,' the promotion of the perceptibility 'of invisible processes and theoretical objects, which animates the life blood of changing knowledge production.'[74] This exploration of the intervolution of the practices of drawing and writing suggests that sensuality is already at work in the structures of the graphic mark and merely requires lateral recognition, not the convention of disregard. Writing and drawing broach not only the categories of word and image but also the ascription of what is intelligible and what is sensuous. To write and to draw is also always to produce the mark that iconically refers to and exceeds itself. It remarks itself and the other in itself. It constitutes and restitutes itself in the other and the other in itself in a gesture that links the bodies of writing and drawing with the materials it inscribes. Though both practices may point beyond themselves, in the process they also inevitably show themselves as pointing signs whose marks are irreducible to mere signification. The de-semantified workings of the sign turn the pointing finger to the sign as a mark that can only be limited in a process which already knows a priori what it sees or reads. Yet the differential iconicity of the written and drawn mark cannot help but refer to itself and beyond it, in a production of knowledge that does not separate the graphic mark from its ability to point.

In Fine

At the edge of all scholarly fields, Foucault notes, we find the monsters and marvels that threaten and delight the discipline. He writes that '[w]ithin its own limits, each discipline recognises true and false propositions; but it pushes back a whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins.'[1] Rather than '"police the boundaries"' of any particular field or aim to 'keep[...] the marvellous and the monstrous at bay',[2] the present study has continuously sought to encounter the margin, whether through following a traversing line, gesture, material, trait, history, responsibility or by pinpointing that the marginal is never to be found at the margin. Yet this study, too, cannot escape its own imbroglio in a scholarly discourse that perpetuates and reinforces intellectual boundaries, tropes and conventions. On the one hand, it has integrated the writing of art, literature and philosophy in a way that acknowledges their incommensurable overlap and self-reflexively acts on its own findings, on the other however, it has produced a text that still largely conforms to the academic restrictions of discursivity which a priori bear on the relations of the picture and writing. Whilst it has disturbed the divisionary paradigm of drawing and writing, enabling the recognition of the picture in writing and writing in the picture, it has also required the writing and production of the thesis as artefact to approximate the trajectory that would be necessary to render the paradigm unrecognisable. It has employed the notion of an unstable, illimitable graphic to think the shared traits of writing and drawing, yet as a corollary, it may thus provide the shifting ground that others want to make into a unified centre. Finally, though it has brought together the scholarship of a number of related fields that touch upon word-image relations, its discourse is often still predominantly white, male and Eurocentric. The thesis itself has been written and rewritten many times, and remains infinitely rewritable. The foregoing enumeration provides ample evidence of the margins of this very text. The thesis is however also the result that necessarily had to be produced in order to recognise what it keeps at bay.

In her introduction to a special issue of *Yale French Studies* under the theme of 'Boundaries: Writing & Drawing', Martine Reid suggest that '[g]raphic representation is the teratology of literature and' that due to 'the obstinate and obtuse presence of drawing in literature, there is a profusion of forms and figures, a multitude of monsters present in the literary field.'[3] Reid's particular concern relates writing and drawing through manuscript studies and the field's then renewed interest in the graphic mark and material contingencies. This thesis, though arising in a different disciplinary approach, similarly recognises the graphic mark as constitutive of both writing and drawing. Yet, the graphic is the teratology of both practices, for it irreducibly ensures that their differential traits can be assigned to neither the verbal nor the pictural. The graphic does not arrive from the outside or from a position of marginality that parasitically draws on a purer, more ordinary or typical centre. Rather, it ensures the continuity of the *figure* and iconicity in writing, and the palpable lingual urge in drawing. Or differently, it displaces and deconstitutes the precipitate conflation and reduction of writing to a mere verbal category and drawing to mute

depiction.

On a practical level, the thesis put into practice a form of critical thinking that demonstrates the graphic confluence of writing and drawing. If discursive writing shapes our thinking and thus the making of history, this thesis insists that the graphic practice of writing is already intervolved with the one of drawing. In this way, the graphic, which is shared in the two practices, is constitutive of thinking and its articulation and renders the products of drawing and writing illimitable to pictural or verbal categories. Narrowly, this has the effect that the putative oppositionality of word and image, as well the reducibility of writing and drawing to these common typologies are mere metaphysical and conceptual strategies of a logocentrism that perpetuates the binaries of intellect and affect, and requires continuous deconstitution and reversal. More broadly, the study therefore rejects the discurvisation and semantification of writing and drawing, especially where it seeks to impose a limitation on the graphic mark to be a commensurable and ultimately closed sign. Of course, words remain readable and images can be seen to have iconic and other pictural relations, yet neither a written text nor a drawing is exhaustible to notions of representation, concept, object and so on. The study's promotion of the graphic in the practices of drawing and writing refused to instantiate it as a material, verbal, gestural, pictural or other effect that may function as a nucleus upon which *one* genealogy and thus *one* centre of the practices can be erected. Rather, the graphic, like Jean-François Lyotard's figure in writing, already partakes in and disturbs the mark of the image and the alphabet. It is already repeated in alteration in both, irreducible to an originary trace. And thus finally on a theoretical level, the graphic is part of what excites the mark and its recursive, iterable and incommensurable reading and seeing. What is conclusive about the graphic of drawing and writing is not that it can be 'closed shut' (*con-claudĕre*) but that it promulgates the openness that the mark already had. A conclusion would merely describe an impasse of a concept that references only itself.

The study has been attentive to the institutions, processes, materials and forms of drawing-writing practices. Importantly, it has engaged its own entanglement in the production of a verbo-pictural artefact and demonstrates how this convergence of subject and object can and needs to be addressed formally and stylistically in order to be encountered as content. This concern is consequently irreducible to mere methodology but performs the graphic practice of drawing-writing as constitutive of a form of critical thinking. The study's contribution to the wider field of word-and-image studies is thus also in the demonstrative practice that has produced the thesis. It has not sought to position itself outside of the relations and processes it observes in other word-and-image texts. Rather, it emphasises the continuous intervolution of the discursive and pictural in their instantiation of the graphic mark whilst preserving its differential characteristics. The resistance and challenge to institutional conventions that purport to enshrine academic neutrality yet implicitly perpetuate the metaphysical binaries of sense and intellect, and the transparent, linear and univocal model of communication through language is similarly a noticeable contribution of the study. It thus promotes an interrogative approach to the conventions and restriction that

institutions impose on written works, but also advocates a reconsideration of writing's capacity within scholarly, literary and other works in view of its graphic potential. As a practice-led study, the contributions are also enacted by example, more specifically by writing the graphic mark of the thesis between writing and drawing, by resisting the binarity of word and image, by preventing the closure of the mark and of meaning, by deconstituting and reversing oppositionalities imposed through language, and finally, by responding to the graphic mark of the study in itself.

In asserting the importance of practice in the consideration of writing and drawing, the study deliberately accentuated the processes involved in putting pen to paper and viewing the graphic mark on the page. It insisted on the recognition of lines, materials, gestures, iconicities and motorsensory activities running through the tracing of the verbo-pictural mark on paper. At times, the study presented writing-drawing as one practice, at other occasions it recognised writing and drawing as two. The practice of drawing-writing is one, though without being singular, unified, centred or reducible. Rather, drawing and writing constitute the repetition of graphic marks in alteration. They repeat—*once again*—the graphic mark that is not identical to itself in an alteration—*multiple*—that produces one mark through two practices and two marks through one. This Derridean iterability has animated the study and the thesis as its written product not only in its historico-contextual frame of interarts or -medial scholarship, but occurred again (differently) in the consideration of the work of the line, the import of materials and gestures, as well as in the recognition of picturality and iconicity.

The acknowledgment of the graphic capacity of writing and the effects of conventionalised treatments of images in written works will however encounter a strong resistance. Limitations on the shape and form of writing, as well as its assumed univocity are part of a commercially and administratively expedient system that cannot cope with irreducibility and incommensurability. It is also part of a persistent scholarly drive for typologies, categorisation and oppositionality which produces questions that seek to perpetuate existing canons and research trajectories, however implausible the boundaries they impose. The notion of text-image opposition in intermedial scholarship appears to arise in particular out of a presupposition that *one* has to be integrated in the *other*. Their difference is a priori recognised as a separation which may be measured or accounted for through a translation. This assumption of a division is part of thinking in genres and categories that renders any intervolution as a deviation from the 'pure' singularity of clearly circumscribed borders. Concomitantly, the drawing-writing binarism is further upheld by an attempt to neatly separate material, medium, mode and modality and subsequently impose what is proper for a particular practice. The practice of drawing-writing will continue to renegotiate its intervolutions and alter our conceptions of them, yet as Derrida suggests, these forms, too, impact only the economy of a practice not its structure in which they are already inscribed. The writing on the wall for drawing-writing remains a shared graphic practice that refuses to limit the differential mark left in its trail.

Notes

'Exergue'

* On a pragmatic level, notes in all chapters are almost exclusively used for citational purposes, as well as to point to related or contrasting material. Note numbering begins anew with each chapter. Where my translations are used, the original quote is given in the notes preceded by 'trans. TR'.

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Schreibmaschinentexte: Vollständige Edition, Faksimiles und kritischer Kommentar*, ed. Stephan Günzel and Rüdiger Schmidt-Grépály (Weimar: Bauhaus-Universitätsverlag, 2003), 18; trans. TR: 'SIE HABEN RECHT—UNSER SCHREIBZEUG ARBEITET MIT AN UNSEREN GEDA[N] KEN. WANN WERDE ICH ES UEBER MEINE FINGER BRINGEN, EINEN LANGEN SATZ ZU DRUCKEN!'

2 cf. Monika Disser, 'Friedrich Nietzsche und das "Experiment Schreibmaschine"', *Archiv für Stenografie, Textverarbeitung, Informationstechnologie* 48, no. 2 (2006): 48.

3 Dieter Eberwein, *Nietzsches Schreibkugel: Ein Blick auf Nietzsches Schreibmaschinenzeit durch die Restauration der Schreibkugel*, überarbeitete online edn (Schauenburg: Typoskript Verlag, 2005), 122; for a typological approach to the errors in Nietzsche's writing, see: Christof Windgätter, '"Und dabei kann immer noch etwas verloren gehen!–" Eine Typologie feder- und maschinenschriftlicher Störungen bei Friedrich Nietzsche', in *'SCHREIBKUGEL IST EIN DING GLEICH MIR: VON EISEN'. Schreibszenen im Zeitalter der Typoskripte*, ed. Davide Giuriato, Martin Stingelin, and Sandro Zanetti, Zur Genealogie des Schreibens 2 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2005), 49–74.

4 Nietzsche, *Schreibmaschinentexte*, 18; trans. TR: 'Teufel! Können Sie das auch lesen?!'

5 Leander Scholz, 'Hegel und das leere Blatt Papier', in *Körper des Denkens: Neue Positionen der Medienphilosophie*, ed. Lorenz Engell, Frank Hartmann, and Christine Voss (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013), 155; trans. TR: 'liest sich zumindest aus heutiger Sicht wie das Menetekel einer kommenden Medienphilosophie'.

6 Dan. 5:25–27 KJV.

7 Dan. 5:8; cf. James H. Platt, *The Oxford Companion to the Bible*, ed. Bruce M. (Bruce Manning) Metzger and Michael David Coogan (New York: Oxford UP, 1993); s.v. *Mene, Mene, Tekel, and Parsin*.

8 Sonja Neef, *Kalligramme: zur Medialität einer Schrift: anhand von Paul van Ostaijens 'De feesten van angst en pijn'*, trans. Sonja Neef (Amsterdam: ASCA Press, 2000), 68.

9 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, pbk. edn. (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976), 35.

10 The terms 'pictural' and 'pictorial' are not used interchangeably throughout this thesis. The archaic word 'pictural' is employed to describe pictures as graphic depictions (i.e. literally 'of or relating to pictures'). This usage is in line with the original French versions and most of the English translations of Jacques Derrida's writing, as well as related commentary. 'Pictorial' on the other hand, may additionally refer to verbal images, as is common practice when a verbal text is said to evoke a particular image, picture or graphic quality.

11 Scholz, 'Hegel und das leere Blatt', 155–56; trans. TR: 'immer noch zu den randständigen oder modischen Themen der Philosophie gezählt werden und dementsprechend bislang keinen systematischen Ort im disziplinären Feld der Philosophie gefunden haben.'

12 cf. esp. Mika Hannula, Juha Suoranta, and Tere Vadén, *Artistic Research: Theories, Methods and Practices* (Helsinki; Gothenburg: Academy of Fine Arts and University of Gothenburg, 2005), 19–22, 151–59; Mika Hannula, Juha Suoranta, and Tere Vadén, *Artistic Research Methodology: Narrative, Power and the Public* (Peter Lang, 2014), 3–14; Graeme Sullivan, 'Making Space: The Purpose and Place of Practice-Led Research', in *Practice-Led Research, Research-Led Practice in the Creative Arts*, ed. Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009).

13 Donald A. Schön, *Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions*, Jossey-Bass Higher Education Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990); Donald A. Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*, new edn (London: Ashgate, 1994); cf. Carole Gray and Ian Pirie, '"Artistic" Research Procedure: Research at the Edge of Chaos?', in *Design Interfaces Conference*, vol. 3 (Design Theory Design Education, Salford: The European Academy of Design, University of Salford, 1995), design.osu.edu/carlson/id785/ead.pdf; Steven Scrivener, 'Reflection in and on Action and Practice in Creative-Production Doctoral Projects in Art and Design', *Working Papers in Art and Design* 1 (2000), http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdes_research/papers/wpades/vol1/scrivener2.html; Graeme Sullivan, *Art Practice as Research: Inquiry in the Visual Arts* (London: SAGE, 2005).

14 Kiff Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural *in Performance, Art and Writing*, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London, New York: Continuum, 2012), 171. Lyotard explores the figure most explicitly in *Discours, figure* (1971) about which one of its translators notes that it does not offer a take-away 'methodology', 'useful set of "interpretive tools"', 'theoretical template' or easy application. See: Mary Lydon, 'Veduta on *Discours, Figure*', *Yale French Studies*, Jean-François Lyotard: Time and Judgment, no. 99 (2001): 10. On the same subject, cf. Geoffrey Bennington, 'Go Figure', *Parrhesia*, no. 12 (2011): 39; Antony Hudek, 'Seeing through *Discourse, Figure*', *Parrhesia*, no. 12 (2011): 54; Timothy Murray, 'What's Happening?', *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 108.

15 The rendering of Nietzsche's handwritten note in Kurrent at the beginning of the exergue is debateful for a number of reasons. As the name suggests, Kurrent is a cursive longhand form of writing that matched the Blackletter of print. Consequently, to set the comment in a Kurrent typeface must appear paradoxical. The particular type is furthermore modelled on an 18th-century version of Kurrent, making it anachronistic to Nietzsche's own hand. Typically German writers of Kurrent would render foreign words or phrases as well as proper names in a cursive of the Latin alphabet making this translation into English doubly problematic. Perhaps most importantly however, setting the manuscript note in a presumably related Kurrent type perpetuates the notion of an infinitely replaceable outside of writing that is absolutely detached from any content.

'Framework'

1 W.J.T. Mitchell, *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*, pbk. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 121–29.

2 esp. James Elkins, *The Object Stares Back: On the Nature of Seeing* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997); James Elkins, *On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 1998); James Elkins, *The Domain of Images* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999); Mitchell, *Iconology*; W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*, pbk. (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1995); W.J.T. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images*, pbk. (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

3 Plutarch, *Plutarch's Morals*, trans. William W. Goodwin, 5 vols (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1878) (*De Gloria Atheniensium*, iii, 346f–347c); Plato, *Cratylus. Parmenides. Greater Hippias. Lesser Hippias.*, trans. Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 4 (London: Harvard UP, 1926), 427d–440e; Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Malcolm Heath, Penguin Classics (London; New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 47a13–b23; Horace, 'The art of poetry', in *Classical Literary Criticism*, ed. and trans. T. S Dorsch (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), 91–92 (*Ars Poetica*, 361–365); Leonardo da Vinci, *A Treatise on Painting*, trans. John Francis Rigaud, new rev. edn. (London: George Bell & Sons, 1877), there is no single section that deals with the comparison/competition between poetry and painting, rather the debate is sustained throughout the book.

4 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laokoon oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (Teddington: Echo Library, 2006).

5 Mitchell, *Iconology*, 98–110; also: W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Spatial Form in Literature: Toward a General Theory', *Critical Inquiry* 6, no. 3 (1980): 539–67. A great number of scholars have since supported and build on Mitchell's analysis, see, for example: Antonella Braida and Giuliana Pieri, 'Introduction', in *Image and Word: Reflections of Art and Literature from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. Antonella Braida and Giuliana Pieri (Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre of the University of Oxford, 2003), 10–23; Stephen Cheeke, *Writing for Art: The Aesthetics of Ekphrasis* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2010); John Dixon Hunt, David Lomas, and Michael Corris, *Art, Word and Image: 2000 Years of Visual/Textual Interaction* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010); Liliane Louvel, *Poetics of the Iconotext*, ed. Karen Jacobs, trans. Laurence Petit (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Anne Keefe, 'The Ecstatic Embrace of the Verbal and Visual: Twenty-First Century Lyric beyond the Ekphrastic Paragone', *Word & Image* 27, no. 2 (2011): 135–47; David Kennedy, *The Ekphrastic Encounter in Contemporary British Poetry and Elsewhere* (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2012). An eccentric over-reading of Lessing's ideological binarism can be found in the attempt to affix alphabetic writing to patriarchic hegemony in Leonard Shlain, *The Alphabet Versus the Goddess: The Conflict Between Word and Image* (New York: Penguin, 1999).

6 Horace, 'The art of poetry', 91 (*Ars Poetica*, 361); on medial borders cf. Ernst van Alphen, 'Looking at Drawing: Theoretical Distinctions and Their Usefulness', in *Writing on Drawing: Essays on Drawing Practice and Research*, ed. Steve Garner, Readings in Art and Design Education (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2008), 59–70; Mieke Bal, *Reading Rembrandt: Beyond the Word-Image Opposition* (Amsterdam UP, 2006); Margarete Landwehr, 'Introduction: Literature and the Visual Arts: Questions of Influence and

Intertextuality', *College Literature* 29, no. 3 (2002): 1–16; Keefe, 'The Ecstatic Embrace of the Verbal and Visual: Twenty-First Century Lyric beyond the Ekphrastic Paragone'; Bryan Wolf, 'Confessions of a Closet Ekphrastic: Literature, Painting, and Other Unnatural Relations', *Yale Journal of Criticism* 3, no. 2 (1990): 181–203.

7 Shahar Bram, 'Ekphrasis as a Shield: Ekphrasis and the Mimetic Tradition', *Word & Image* 22, no. 4 (2006): 372–78; Ernest B. Gilman, 'Interart Studies and the "Imperialism" of Language', ed. Wendy Steiner, *Poetics Today*, Art and Literature I, 10, no. 1 (1989): 5–30.

8 See, for example: Claus Clüver, 'On Representation in Concrete and Semiotic Poetry', in *The Pictured Word: Word & Image Interactions 2*, ed. Martin Heusser et al., Word & Image Interactions 2 (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1998), 13–41; Taylor Corse, 'The Ekphrastic Tradition: Literary and Pictorial Narrative in the *Epigrams* of John Elsum, an Eighteenth-Century Connoisseur', *Word & Image* 9, no. 4 (1993): 383–400; Alison Fisch Katz, 'Violent Wisdom: Thomas Hardy and Ekphrastic Discord', *Word & Image* 27, no. 2 (2011): 148–58; Grant F. Scott, 'The Rhetoric of Dilation: Ekphrasis and Ideology', *Word & Image* 7, no. 4 (1991): 301–10; Werner Wolf, 'Narrative and Narrativity: A Narratological Reconceptualization and Its Applicability to the Visual Arts', *Word & Image* 19, no. 3 (2003): 180–97.

9 Despite the number of monographs about Pettibon, critical writing beyond the regurgitation of biographical data, word-image and high art–low art oppositionality is rare. Typical publication are, for example: Gerald Matt and Thomas Mießgang, *Raymond Pettibon: Whatever It Is You're Looking for You Won't Find It Here*, ed. Ilse Lafer, trans. Wolfgang Astelbauer, engl. edn (Nuremberg: Kunsthalle Wien; Verlag für moderne Kunst, 2006); Roberto Ohrt and Raymond Pettibon, *Raymond Pettibon: No Title*, trans. Nicholas Grindell (Berlin: Contemporary Fine Arts, 2005); Hans-Werner Schmidt, ed., *'Traue Deinen Augen' - Otto Dix, Raymond Pettibon* (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2000); Robert Storr, Denis Cooper, and Ulrich Loock, *Raymond Pettibon* (London, New York: Phaidon, 2001). The attitude is also apparent in many of the broader overview publications that include Pettibon, see, for example: Philippe van Cauteren and Martin Germann, eds., *Drawing: The Bottom Line* (Brussel: Mercatorfonds, SMAK, 2015), 56–59; Brad Finger, *50 Contemporary Artists You Should Know* (Munich, New York: Prestel, 2011), 84–85; Jordan Kantor, *Drawing from the Modern: 1975-2005*, ed. Libby Hruska (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005), 120–22. Particularly fertile critical accounts of Pettibon's work include: Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: Return to Disorder and Disfiguration', in *Raymond Pettibon: A Reader*, ed. Ann Temkin and Hamza Walker, illustrated edn (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1998), 225–33; also reproduced in Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: Return to Disorder and Disfiguration', *October*, no. 92 (2000): 37–51; Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: After Laughter', *October*, no. 129 (2009): 13–50; also reproduced in Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: After Laughter', in *Raymond Pettibon: Here's Your Irony Back: Political Works 1975-2013*, ed. Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Raymond Pettibon (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, David Zwirner, Regen Projects, 2013), 7–45; Cary S. Levine, *Pay for Your Pleasures: Mike Kelley, Paul McCarthy, Raymond Pettibon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Maja Naef, 'Zeichnen als Leseverfahren: Überlegungen zu Raymond Pettibon', in *Randgänge der Zeichnung*, ed. Werner Busch, Oliver Jehle, and Carolin Meister (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2007), 343–62.

10 Cf. Michaël Borremans et al., *Michaël Borremans: The Performance* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz

Publishers, 2005); Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: Horse Hunting* (New York: David Zwirner, 2006); Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: Whistling a Happy Tune* (Antwerpen: Ludion, 2008); Jeffrey D. Grove, Anita Haldemann, and Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: Drawings* (Cologne: Walther König, 2005); Jeffrey D. Grove, Michaël Amy, and Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: As Sweet as It Gets* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2014).

11 Leonard Barkan, *Mute Poetry, Speaking Pictures*, Essays in the Arts (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012); Dave Beech et al., *Art and Text*, ed. Aimee Selby, new edn (London: Black Dog, 2009); Julius Bryant, Elizabeth James, and Rowan Watson, *Word & Image: Art, Books and Design from the National Art Library* (London: V&A Publishing, 2014); Hunt, Lomas, and Corris, *Art, Word and Image*; Simon Morley, *Writing on the Wall: Image and Word in Modern Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003); Michael Roth, ed., *Schrift als Bild* (Petersberg: Michael Imhof, 2010).

12 Derrida in Peter Brunette and David Wills, 'The Spatial Arts: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', in *Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture*, ed. Peter Brunette and David Wills (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 1994), 13; W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Word and Image', in *Critical Terms for Art History*, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 60.

13 The notion of painting as mute poetry goes back to Simonedes apud Plutarch, *Plutarch's Morals*, III:459, also II:121. It is however also closely associated with Lessing's characterisation: Lessing, *Laokoon*, 4.

14 Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, 2 vols (Bloomington, IN; London: Indiana UP, 1998); Parmentier's reading of Peircean semiotics offers a succinct, critical destillation: Richard J. Parmentier, *Signs in Society: Studies in Semiotic Anthropology* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1994), 1–44.

15 Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, 2nd edn (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett, 1976), 34–43.

16 Erwin Panofsky, 'Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art', in *The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Donald Preziosi, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 220–35.

17 W.J.T. Mitchell, 'There Are No Visual Media', *Journal of Visual Culture* 4, no. 2 (2005): 257–66. For a critical response to Mitchell that seeks the utility of traditional distinctions, cf. Jan Baetens, 'Monomedial Hybridization in Contemporary Poetry', ed. Marina Grishakova, Lucia Boldrini, and Matthew Reynolds, *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture*, New Work in Comparative Literature in Europe, 15, no. 7 (2013): 1–8. Because of the associations with digital technologies, the term 'multimedial' is only rarely used in intermedial studies to refer to the collocation of verbal and pictural (or other) elements. There seems to be no designated term from within the so-called visual arts. In language-based research such compositions are widely referred to as hybrid texts, a term that bounteously reasserts the aforementioned linguistic supremacy in etymologically connoting the 'mongrel' quality of the 'half-breed […] offspring of a tame sow and wild boar' OED, *OED Online* (Oxford UP, December 2016), http://www.oed.com s.v. *hybrid*, n./adj.

18 James A. W. Heffernan, *Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery* (Chicago;

London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3; John B. Bender, *Spenser and Literary Pictorialism* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972), 51; Leo Spitzer, 'The "Ode on a Grecian Urn", or Content vs. Metagrammar', *Comparative Literature* 7, no. 3 (1955): 207, italics in original; Murray Krieger, 'Ekphrasis and the Still Movement of Poetry; or Laokoön Revisited', in *The Poet as Critic*, ed. Frederick McDowell (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1967), 5.

19 George Sainsbury, *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe: From the Earliest Texts to the Present Day*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh; London: William Blackwood, 1902), 491 s.v. *ἔκφρασις*; Wendy Steiner, ed., *The Colors of Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation between Modern Literature and Painting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 41. For more details on the historical and ideological changes and uses of different ekphrasis definitions, see, for instance: Ruth Webb, 'Ekphrasis Ancient and Modern: The Invention of a Genre', *Word & Image* 15, no. 1 (1999): 7–18; Scott, 'The Rhetoric of Dilation'.

20 For a consideration of the spatiality of poetry and the implicit tautology of Heffernan's ekphrasis definition, see: Bram, 'Ekphrasis as a Shield', 376–77.

21 Richard Meek and David Kennedy, 'Introduction: From Paragone to Encounter', in *Ekphrastic Encounters: New Interdisciplinary Essays on Literature and the Visual Arts*, ed. David Kennedy and Richard Meek (Manchester: Manchester UP, *in press*).

22 Thomas Mießgang, '"My Messiah Will Rise ... to Kill Again"', in *Raymond Pettibon: Whatever It Is You're Looking for You Won't Find It Here*, ed. Ilse Lafer, Thomas Mießgang, and Gerald Matt, trans. Wolfgang Astelbauer, engl. edn (Nuremberg: Kunsthalle Wien; Verlag für moderne Kunst, 2006), 186.

23 For more details, see, for example: Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: After Laughter', 2009, 28; Michael Kimmelman, 'The Underbelly Artist', *The New York Times*, 9 October 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/09/magazine/09pettibon.html; Pettibon in Chrissie Iles, 'Raymond Pettibon Interviewed by Chrissie Iles', in *A Decade in Conversation: A Ten Year Celebration of the Bucksbaum Award, 2000-2010: Interviews with Paul Pfeiffer, Irit Batsry, Raymond Pettibon, Mark Bradford, Omer Fast.*, ed. Chrissie Iles et al. (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 2010), 37.

24 Pettibon in Mike Kelley, 'By Way of Norman Greenbaum: Raymond Pettibon Interviewed by Mike Kelley', in *Raymond Pettibon*, ed. Ralph Rugoff (New York: Rizzoli, 2013), 166; Pettibon in Storr, Cooper, and Loock, *Raymond Pettibon*, 137; Pettibon in Jim Lewis, 'A Conversation with Raymond Pettibon', *Parkett*, no. 47 (1996): 61; However, for a reconsideration of narrative in Pettibon's work, see, for example: Buchloh, 'Raymond Pettibon: Return to Disorder and Disfiguration', 226; Boris Groys, 'Die Rettung der Poesie durch das Bild', *Parkett*, no. 47 (1996): 77.

25 Louvel, *Poetics*, 90.

26 Ibid. As in this case it would be more appropriate to speak of an 'opening operator of architectural description', it is necessary to point out that Louvel's indicators are chiefly concerned with pictorial description, i.e. description of paintings.

27 Pettibon in Grady Turner, 'Raymond Pettibon', *Bomb*, 1999, http://www.bombsite.com/issues/69/articles/2257.

28 Pettibon in ibid.; Christa-Maria Lerm Hayes, *Joyce in Art: Visual Art Inspired by James Joyce* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2004), 291; Ann Temkin, 'What's Better Science than Creating Me?', in *Raymond Pettibon:*

A Reader, ed. Ann Temkin and Hamza Walker, illustrated edition (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1998), 242–43.

29 Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, pbk. edn (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 160.

30 Louvel, *Poetics*, 104–5.

31 Hans Rudolf Reust, 'Shifting between Image and Language', in *Raymond Pettibon: Whatever It Is You're Looking for You Won't Find It Here*, ed. Ilse Lafer, Thomas Mießgang, and Gerald Matt, trans. Wolfgang Astelbauer, engl. edn (Nuremberg: Kunsthalle Wien; Verlag für moderne Kunst, 2006), 199.

32 Ibid.

33 Peter Schjeldahl, 'Rayball', in *Raymond Pettibon: A Reader*, ed. Ann Temkin and Hamza Walker, illustrated edition (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1998), 234.

34 For a pertinent example of art historical use but also critique of Goodman's *Languages of Art* see, for instance: James Elkins, 'Marks, Traces, *Traits*, Contours, *Orli*, and *Splendores*: Nonsemiotic Elements in Pictures', *Critical Inquiry* 21, no. 4 (1995): 827–28; Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, 345–62; German word-image scholarship and Bildwissenschaften in particular draw on Goodman's theoretical structure, see, for example: Klaus Sachs-Hornbach and Klaus Rehkämper, eds., *Bildgrammatik: Interdisziplinäre Forschungen zur Syntax bildhafter Darstellungsformen*, Bildwissenschaft 1 (Magdeburg: Scriptum, 1999); Sybille Krämer, Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum, and Rainer Totzke, eds., *Schriftbildlichkeit: Wahrnehmbarkeit, Materialität und Operativität von Notationen*, Schriftbildlichkeit 1 (Berlin: Akademie, 2012).

35 Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 153.

36 Alessandro Giovannelli, 'Goodman's Aesthetics', ed. Edward N. Zalta, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/goodman-aesthetics/.

37 Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 226–27.

38 Pettibon in Denis Cooper, 'Interview: Dennis Cooper in Conversation with Raymond Pettibon', in *Raymond Pettibon*, ed. Robert Storr, Denis Cooper, and Ulrich Loock (London, New York: Phaidon, 2001), 8.

39 Derrida, *Truth*, 159–60.

40 Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Parti-Pris Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 30.

41 Jacques Derrida, 'The Retrait of Metaphor', in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. Peggy Kamuf, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007), 75.

42 Ibid., 77.

43 Derrida, *Truth*, 11.

44 Ibid., 193, italics in original.

45 Derrida, 'The Retrait of Metaphor', 72–77; Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zu Sprache*, 5th edn (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), 241, 251–52.

46 Derrida, 'The Retrait of Metaphor', 75.

47 Mießgang, '"My Messiah Will Rise"', 188.

48 Wolf, 'Confessions of a Closet Ekphrastic', 182.

49 Ibid., 183.

50 Louvel, *Poetics*, 90.

51 Lessing, *Laokoon*, 80–81, 88–89.

52 Pater's text gives great architectural detail and reflects concerns Pettibon's scribe has, too. The original reads: 'But let me place you once more where we stood for a while, on entering by the doorway in the midst of the long southern aisle. Cross the aisle, and gather now in one view the perspective of the whole. Away on the left hand the eye is drawn upward to the tranquil light of the vaults of the fore-church, seeming doubtless the more spacious because partly concealed from us by the wall of partition below. But on the right hand, towards the east, as if with the set purpose of a striking architectural contrast, an instruction as to the place of this or that manner in the architectural series, the long, tunnel-like, military work of the Romanesque nave opens wide into the exhilarating daylight of choir and transepts, in the sort of Gothic Bernard would have welcomed, with a vault rising now high above the roof-line of the body of the church, sicut lilium excelsum. The simple flowers, the flora, of the early Pointed style, which could never have looked at home as an element in the half-savage decoration of the nave, seem to be growing here upon the sheaves of slender, reedy pillars, as if naturally in the carved stone. Even here indeed, Roman, or Romanesque, taste still lingers proudly in the monolith columns of the chevet. Externally, we may note with what dexterity the Gothic choir has been inserted into its place, below and within the great buttresses of the earlier Romanesque one.' Walter Horatio Pater, 'Vézelay', in *Miscellaneous Studies: A Series of Essays* (London: Library Edition, 1910), 139–40. A second quotation, seemingly taken from Pater's 'Apollo in Picardy', is the line: 'The scribe's hand had strayed here into mazy borders.' Walter Horatio Pater, 'Apollo in Picardy', in *Miscellaneous Studies: A Series of Essays* (London: Library Edition, 1910), 144.

53 Consider, for example, the volume of readings published by Pettibon: Raymond Pettibon, Ann Temkin, and Hamza Walker, *Raymond Pettibon: A Reader*, ed. Ann Temkin, Hamza Walker, and Raymond Pettibon, illustrated edn (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1998).

54 Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past: Time Regained*, trans. Andreas Mayor, vol. 12 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 240; A further identifiable quotation, 'A wayfaring man may break his fast', is probably taken from Charles Montagu Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, digitally printed pbk. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), xix, 517.

55 Derrida, *Truth*, 149–82.

56 Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992), 9–10.

57 Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988).

58 Ibid., 119. As Derrida points out in the same paragraph, this repeatability with alteration also bears on iterability itself. The notion of any concept of iterability suggests an ideality of meaning, a meaning that a concept could have unto itself. In this way, any concept is an ideal concept, but as functioning concept its meaning can necessarily not be limited to itself. Iterability thus demonstrates the failure of

such pure singularity.

59 Claus Clüver, 'On Intersemiotic Transposition', ed. Wendy Steiner, *Poetics Today*, Art and Literature I, 10, no. 1 (1989): 55–56.

60 George Steiner, *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation* (London: Oxford UP, 1975), 425.

61 Ibid., 426.

62 Roman Jakobson, 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation', in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. Lawrence Venuti, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004), 139.

63 Cf. Eve Tavor Bannet, 'The Scene of Translation: After Jakobson, Benjamin, de Man, and Derrida', *New Literary History*, Textual Interrelations, 24, no. 3 (1993): 577–95.

64 Daniella Aguiar and João Queiroz, 'Towards a Model of Intersemiotic Translation', *International Journal of the Arts in Society* 4, no. 4 (2009): 203.

65 Jacques Derrida, 'What Is a "Relevant" Translation?', in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. and trans. Lawrence Venuti, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004), 427.

66 Steiner, *After Babel*, 276.

67 Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, 152.

68 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing*, trans. Philip Armstrong, pbk. edn (New York: Fordham UP, 2013), xii.

69 Joseph Hillis Miller, *Illustration* (London: Reaktion Books, 1992), 95.

70 Derrida, 'What Is a "Relevant" Translation?', 431.

71 Steiner, *After Babel*, 465.

72 Ibid., 453.

73 Miller, *Illustration*, 95.

74 Jacques Derrida, 'Des Tours de Babel', in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. Joseph F. Graham, vol. 1, 2 vols (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007), 191–225.

75 Walter Benjamin, 'Vorwort: Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers', in *Charles Baudelaire Tableaux Parisiens* (Heidelberg: Verlag von Richard Weissbach, 1923), xiv.

76 Derrida, *Truth*, 255–382.

77 Derrida, 'What Is a "Relevant" Translation?', 427.

78 Ibid. n.4, printed p.444.

79 Ibid., 431.

80 Aguiar and Queiroz, 'Towards a Model of Intersemiotic Translation', 204; cf. Daniella Aguiar and João Queiroz, 'Modeling Intersemiotic Translation: Notes toward a Peircean Approach', ed. Daniella Aguiar and João Queiroz, *Applied Semiotics/Semiotique Appliquée* 9, no. 24 (2010), http://french.chass.utoronto.ca/as-sa/ASSA-No24/index.html.

81 Clüver, 'On Intersemiotic Transposition', 83.

82 Ibid., 61.

83 For a less Derridean approach to the necessarily double nature of translation, see Philip E. Lewis,

'The Measure of Translation Effects', in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. Lawrence Venuti, e-book (London: Routledge, 2004), 264–83.

84 Cf. Leonard Diepeveen, 'Shifting Metaphors: Interarts Comparisons and Analogy', *Word & Image* 5, no. 2 (June 1989): 206–13.

85 Derrida, 'Babel', 196–99.

86 Jacques Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other: Or, The Prosthesis of Origin*, trans. Patrick Mensah, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), 25.

87 Derrida in Brunette and Wills, 'The Spatial Arts', 13; cf. Carol Plyley James, 'Reading Art Through Duchamp's *Glass* and Derrida's *Glas*', *SubStance*, The Thing USA: Views of American Objects, 10, no. 2 (1981): 104–28.

88 Benjamin, 'Vorwort: Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers', x–xii.

89 Lewis, 'The Measure of Translation Effects', 273.

90 Derrida, 'What Is a "Relevant" Translation?', 431.

91 Steiner, *After Babel*, 276.

92 Derrida, 'Babel', 202.

93 Walter Benjamin, 'The Task of the Translator: An Introduction to the Translation of Baudelaire's Tableaux Parisiens', in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, Pimlico edn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 76. In the original: 'verpflanzt also das Original', Benjamin, 'Vorwort: Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers', xii.

94 Clüver, 'On Intersemiotic Transposition', 56.

95 Bannet, 'The Scene of Translation', 586.

96 Clüver, 'On Intersemiotic Transposition', 69.

97 Jacques Derrida, 'Living on / BORDER LINES', in *Deconstruction and Criticism*, ed. Harold Bloom et al., trans. James Hulbert (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 93.

98 Derrida, 'What Is a "Relevant" Translation?', 440.

'On lines'

1 Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 3; Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description*, e-book edn (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 181; Tim Ingold, *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 125, 129–31; Tim Ingold, 'In Defence of Handwriting', *Writing Across Boundaries: Writing on Writing*, 2015, https://www.dur.ac.uk/writingacrossboundaries/writingonwriting/timingold/.

2 Ingold, *Being Alive*, 177–226; Ingold, *Making*, 125–41; Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines*, e-book edn (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015), 53–59.

3 OED, *OED Online* (Oxford UP, December 2016), http://www.oed.com; s.v. *graphic* adj./n. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Parti-Pris Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 30; James Elkins, *The*

Domain of Images (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999), 83; Roy Harris, *The Origin of Writing* (LaSalle (IL): Open Court, 1986), 125; Martin Heidegger, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (1949/1957)*, ed. Petra Jaeger, Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe 79 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), 125; Ingold, *Lines*, 136; Christa-Maria Lerm Hayes, *Joyce in Art: Visual Art Inspired by James Joyce* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2004), 63; Joseph Hillis Miller, *Illustration* (London: Reaktion Books, 1992), 75.

4 Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988), 20.

5 Ibid., 7; italics in original.

6 Ibid., 9.

7 Jonathan D. Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca (NY): Cornell UP, 1982), 126.

8 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 10; italics in original.

9 Ibid., 12; italics in original.

10 The underlying discourse that is evoked here revolves around the notion of intertextuality that Julia Kristeva, in particular, explored. In Kristeva's model, texts produce not only a horizontal axis between author and reader, but also a vertical one, between texts themselves. See: Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (New York: Columbia UP, 1980), 69. All writing therefore submits to a field of impositions made by other texts and also contributes to this field. Cf. Jonathan D. Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca (NY): Cornell UP, 1981), 105. Intertextuality thus also indicates problematic notions of authorship and the origination of texts. Roland Barthes has addressed these in his discussion of writers as (re)assemblers of the 'already-written' and when he forcefully indicates that it is the text that speaks, not a singular author. Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 21; Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in *Image, Music, Text*, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), 142–48. Writers may therefore be seen as working with signifiers, whose signifieds are illimitable. Cf. Daniel Chandler, *The Act of Writing: A Media Theory Approach* (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, 1995), 60ff. Gerard Genette subsequently proposed transtextuality as a wider, more accommodating frame for textual relations, and developed a typology of differing textualities (intertextuality, paratextuality, architextuality, metatextuality, hypotextuality). Gérard Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Dabinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

11 These themes are a continuously engaged by Derrida, see esp. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, pbk. edn. (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976); Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981); Derrida, *Limited Inc*; Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2001), esp. the chapters 'La parole soufflée' and 'Ellipsis', 212-245, 371-378.

12 Sonja Neef, Eric Ketelaar, and José Dijck Van, eds., *Sign Here!: Handwriting in the Age of New Media* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006); Sonja Neef, *Abdruck und Spur: Handschrift im Zeitalter ihrer technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2008); For a differentiation of the line of the image and the line of writing that also briefly draws on iterability, cf. Karlheinz Lüdeking, 'Bildlinie / Schriftlinie', in *Randgänge der Zeichnung*, ed. Werner Busch, Oliver Jehle, and Carolin Meister (Munich:

Wilhelm Fink, 2007), 13–27.

13 Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 45; trans. TR: 'als Ikon und Index, als Abdruck und Spur'.

14 Ibid., 89; trans. TR: 'Genau in der Doppellogik dieser Polarität liegt das Besondere von Handschrift: sie ist jedes Mal einzigartig und wiederholt dabei doch die ldealtype des lesbaren Abdrucks. Auf den Punkt gebracht: Sie ist zugleich iterabler Abdruck und singuläre Spur: singuläre Iterabilität; iterable Singularität.'

15 Sonja Neef, 'Authentic Events: The Diaries of Anne Frank and the Alleged Diaries of Adolf Hitler', in *Sign Here!: Handwriting in the Age of New Media*, ed. Eric Ketelaar, José Dijck Van, and Sonja Neef (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006), 23–49; also reproduced in Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 213–57.

16 Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 157; trans. TR: 'einem nicht-kopierbaren Rest'.

17 Ibid., 83–91.

18 Ibid., 197; trans. TR: 'keine signifikanten Möglichkeiten zur Abweichung erlaubt', on the same page is also the description of the dot's capacity to possess 'kaum eine Krümmung oder einen Neigungswinkel'.

19 Ibid., 204; italics in original, trans. TR: 'Der Punkt im Kreis der Null steht auf beiden Seiten des Abgrunds. Einerseits liefert er die Basisbedingung für das *currere* der Spur. Andererseits ist er der Effekt einer Berührung—wie das Setzen eines Fingerabdrucks, eines Fuß- oder Handabdrucks oder auch einer Buchstabentype, also all jener Gesten, die die *Performance* der Linie eliminieren, in der sich der Unterschied zwischen kultureller Norm und individueller Abweichung entfaltet. So gesehen ist der "kursive Punkt" der Ort, wo sich Subjektivität "einstellt": in ihm erlöscht sie, aber nicht, ohne dabei zu versprechen, sie stets aufs Neue hervorzubringen. Der Punkt beherbergt das Moment der Unentscheidbarkeit, er oszilliert zwischen Abdruck und Spur, zwischen der Urschrift der Hand als Zeichen einer unikaten psychosomatischen Präsenz und den lnskriptionstechnologien der Tastschreibweisen, wo er für Entkörperung, Wiederholbarkeit, Normierung und Indifferenz steht.'

20 For the difficulty to translate the German *Aufhebung*, see, for example, Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavy Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), esp. 8-46; Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, esp. the chapter 'From restricted to general economy: a Hegelianism without reserve', 317-350.

21 Cf. Ewan Clayton, 'A History of Learning to Write', in *Handwriting: Everyone's Art (Lettering Today and Tomorrow)*, ed. Timothy Wilcox and Ewan Clayton (Sussex: The Edward Johnston Foundation, Ditchling Museum, 1999), 13–14.

22 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 374.

23 Derrida, *Grammatology*.

24 Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 84; trans. TR: 'die Ästhetik der Handschrift'.

25 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 9, 62–63.

26 Geoffrey Bennington, *Lyotard: Writing the Event* (Manchester UP, 1988), 56–57.

27 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 63, 211.

28 Ibid., 57.

29 Ibid., 68.

30 Ibid., 78.

31 Kiff Bamford, 'Better Lyo*Tard* than Never, I Figure', *Art History* 36, no. 4 (2013): 887.

32 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 283.

33 Ibid., 51; see also: Bill Readings, *Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics*, e-library edn, Critics of the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 16.

34 J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962); Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 1–23, 29–110; John R. Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida', *Glyph* 1 (1977): 198–208.

35 Austin, *How to Do Things*, passim, esp. 104.

36 Ibid., 22, 104; Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 16; Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences', 205.

37 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 92.

38 Ibid., 118.

39 Ibid., 119. On the ideality of letterforms, see also: Armin Schäfer, 'Spur und Symptom: Zur Erforschung der Handschrift in der Psychatrie um 1900', in *Spuren erzeugen: Zeichnen und Schreiben als Verfahren der Selbstaufzeichnung*, ed. Barbara Wittmann, Wissen im Entwurf 2 (Zürich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009), 28.

40 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 206; trans. of *graphic* amended to *graphique* TR.

41 Ibid., 169; italics in original.

42 Readings, *Introducing Lyotard*, 14.

43 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 157–201; Lyotard uses 'graphic' differently when he takes about graphic art, as in 'The Paradox on the Graphic Artist', cf. Jean-François Lyotard, *Postmodern Fables*, trans. Georges van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 33–47.

44 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 208, 207; italics in original.

45 Cf. Peter Dews, 'The Letter and the Line: Discourse and Its Other in Lyotard', *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 43; Bennington, *Writing the Event*, 68–70; Mary Lydon, 'Veduta on *Discours, Figure*', *Yale French Studies*, Jean-François Lyotard: Time and Judgment, no. 99 (2001): 17; Antony Hudek, 'Seeing through *Discourse, Figure*', *Parrhesia*, no. 12 (2011): 11; Kiff Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural *in Performance, Art and Writing*, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London, New York: Continuum, 2012), 62; Bamford, 'Better Lyo*Tard* than Never, I Figure', 887; Jason Helms, '*Discourse, Figure*', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 46, no. 1 (2013): 129.

46 Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural, 62.

47 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 210; trans. amended TR.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 212.

51 Ibid., 213; The possibility for perspective to institute a kind of language is also variously problematised by Derrida, for a succinct discussion see Peter Brunette and David Wills, 'Introduction', in *Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture*, ed. Peter Brunette and David Wills (Cambridge; New York:

Cambridge UP, 1994), 4.

52 Jean-François Lyotard and Georges van den Abbeele, 'Interview: Jean-François Lyotard', trans. Georges van den Abbeele, *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 17.

53 Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural, 49.

54 Jean-François Lyotard, 'It's as If a Line...', trans. Mary Lydon, *Contemporary Literature*, Contemporary Literature and Contemporary Theory, 29, no. 3 (1988): 463.

55 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 264.

56 Katrin Ströbel, *Wortreiche Bilder: zum Verhältnis von Text und Bild in der zeitgenössischen Kunst*, Image 56 (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), 98–99.

57 Ibid., 99–100; trans. TR: 'Selbst wenn in Sonderfällen wie dadaistischen Typocollagen Syntax und Semantik aufgebrochen oder verändert werden, so bleiben die Lexeme doch als solche zu erkennen. Bei visuellen Signifikanten gibt es jedoch keinen vergleichbaren Identifizierungsprozess, sondern es findet immer eine Interpretation statt. [...] verlieren die Zeichen, wenn man sie aus dem Bild-Kontext isoliert, nicht nur ihre konkrete Bedeutung, sondern auch ihren Status, da sie auf nichts mehr verweisen.'

58 Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, pbk. edn (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 255–382.

59 James Elkins, 'Marks, Traces, *Traits*, Contours, *Orli*, and *Splendores*: Nonsemiotic Elements in Pictures', *Critical Inquiry* 21, no. 4 (1995): 834; italics in original.

60 Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural, 72.

61 Mentions of immediacy (*Unmittelbarkeit*) of images, as well as the split between the sensory and the cognitive/conceptual (*sinnlich* and *begrifflich*) can be found throughout the Laocoön: Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laokoon oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (Teddington: Echo Library, 2006).

62 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 290; italics in original.

63 Readings, *Introducing Lyotard*, 15.

64 Jacques Derrida, *Marges* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 376; trans. TR: 'Pour qu'un écrit soit un écrit, il faut qu'il continue à "agir" et être lisible [...] La situation du scripteur et du souscripteur est, quant à l'écrit, foncièrement la même que celle du lecteur.' Cf. Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 8.

65 Engell and Vogl quoted in Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 96; Lorenz Engell and Joseph Vogl, 'Editorial', in *Mediale Historiographien*, ed. Lorenz Engell and Joseph Vogl (Weimar: Universitätsverlag, 2001), 7; trans. TR: 'Konzept des Historischen'.

66 Neef, *Abdruck und Spur*, 96; trans. TR: 'Für Handschrift, als Medium begriffen—oder besser: als >Hypermedium<, nämlich als zugleich >skriptural< und >piktural<, zugleich >filmisch< im Sinne von temporal und bewegt und >fotographisch< im Sinne der Kopierverfahren von Abzug und Abdruck, schließlich ebenso >litteral< [sic] und >elektronisch< (zumindest potenziell)—, liegt das »spezifische Konzept des Historischen« nicht zuletzt in ihrer graphischen Linie selbst begründet.' (I am reproducing Neef's German use of single and double guillemets to retain the differentiation of aspects that are quoted from those that are accentuated.).

67 Ingold, *Lines*, 3.

68 Jacques Derrida, *Paper Machine*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), 26.

69 Martine Reid, 'Editor's Preface: Legible/Visible', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Nigel P. Turner, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 8–12.

70 Ibid., 10.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., 9.

73 Ibid., 10; For the connections between avant-garde art and the recognition of the qualities of writing's lines, esp. those of 'graphocentric literary practices' ('graphozentrischen Literaturpraktiken'), see also: Georg Witte, 'Die Phänominalität der Linie - graphisch und graphematisch', in *Randgänge der Zeichnung*, ed. Werner Busch, Oliver Jehle, and Carolin Meister (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2007), 29; trans. TR.

'On writing'

1 The overlap of the activities is perhaps distantly implied in two publications that engage with Pettibon as a drawing reader: Raymond Pettibon, Ann Temkin, and Hamza Walker, *Raymond Pettibon: A Reader*, ed. Ann Temkin, Hamza Walker, and Raymond Pettibon, illustrated edn (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1998); Maja Naef, 'Zeichnen als Leseverfahren: Überlegungen zu Raymond Pettibon', in *Randgänge der Zeichnung*, ed. Werner Busch, Oliver Jehle, and Carolin Meister (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2007), 343–62. On the whole however, the large monographs about Pettibon do not engage in this subject, thus also preserving their external status to the work: Raymond Pettibon and Roberto Ohrt, *Raymond Pettibon: The Books 1978-1998* (New York: D.A.P. Distributed Art Publishers, 2000); Raymond Pettibon, *Raymond Pettibon*, ed. Ralph Rugoff (New York: Rizzoli, 2013); Robert Storr, Denis Cooper, and Ulrich Loock, *Raymond Pettibon* (London, New York: Phaidon, 2001); Massimiliano Gioni and Gary Carrion-Murayari, *Raymond Pettibon: A Pen of All Work* (London; New York: Phaidon, 2017); Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Raymond Pettibon, eds., *Raymond Pettibon: Here's Your Irony Back: Political Works 1975-2013* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, David Zwirner, Regen Projects, 2013); Ulrich Loock and Harald Falckenberg, eds., *Raymond Pettibon: Homo Americanus: Collected Works* (New York: David Zwirner Books/Deichtorhallen Hamburg-Sammlung Falckenberg, 2016); Raymond Pettibon, *Raymond Pettibon: Looker-Upper* (Berlin: Contemporary Fine Arts, 2011); Hans-Werner Schmidt, ed., *'Traue Deinen Augen' - Otto Dix, Raymond Pettibon* (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2000). Borremans' work has not received much critical scholarly engagement. The large monographs only occasionally touch upon the artist's reading habits: Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: Whistling a Happy Tune* (Antwerpen: Ludion, 2008); Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2009); Jeffrey D. Grove, Michaël Amy, and Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: As Sweet as It Gets* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2014); Jeffrey D. Grove, Anita Haldemann, and Michaël Borremans, *Michaël Borremans: Drawings* (Cologne: Walther König, 2005).

2 Tim Ingold, 'Bringing Things Back to Life: Creative Entanglements in a World of Materials', Working Paper, NCRM Working Paper Series (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, 20 July 2010), 2–3, http://www.manchester.ac.uk/realities/publications/workingpapers/; similarly Tim Ingold, 'An

Ecology of Materials', in *Power of Material/Politics of Materiality*, ed. Susanne Witzgall and Kerstin Stakemeiner, eText edn (Zurich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2014), 61.

3 Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2001), 11; italics in original.

4 Merleau-Ponty cited in ibid.; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'An Unpublished Text: A Prospectus of His Work', in *The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics*, ed. James M. Edie, trans. Arleen B. Dallery (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1964), 8–9.

5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 213.

6 Ibid., 207; also given in Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 12.

7 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing*, trans. Philip Armstrong, pbk. edn (New York: Fordham UP, 2013).

8 David Espinet, 'Skizze einer Ästhetik des Entwerfens', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 167; italics in original, trans. TR: 'Nancy möchte nicht *über* das Zeichnen [...] schreiben, sondern im Medium der Schrift angemessen darauf antworten', 'indem er gleichsam zeichnend schreibt.'

9 Jaś Elsner, 'Art History as Ekphrasis', *Art History* 33, no. 1 (2010): 12.

10 Ibid., 12, 13.

11 Ibid., 13, 24.

12 Ralph Lieberman, 'The Art-Historical Photograph as Fiction: The Pretense of Objectivity', in *Fictions of Art History*, ed. Mark Ledbury, Clark Studies in the Visual Arts (Williamstown, MA: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2013), 118; italics in original.

13 Elsner, 'Art History as Ekphrasis', 24.

14 For a perspective that reverses Elsner's relations between ekphrasis and art history, making 'ekphrasis [...] a subset of art writing', see: Cole Swensen, 'The Ekphrastic O', in *Fictions of Art History*, ed. Mark Ledbury, Clark Studies in the Visual Arts (Williamstown, MA: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2013), 162.

15 For art history and fiction, see: Paul Barolsky, 'Art History as Fiction', *Artibus et Historiae* 17, no. 34 (1996): 9–17; Catherine Grant, '"A Narrative of What It Wishes to Be": An Introduction to "Creative Writing and Art History"', ed. Catherine Grant and Patricia Rubin, *Art History*, Special issue: Creative Writing and Art History, 34, no. 2 (2011): 230–43. For an account that clearly differentiates genres, see H. Perry Chapman, 'Art Fiction', ed. Dana Arnold, *Art History*, Special issue: Art History: Contemporary Perspectives on Method, 32, no. 4 (2009): 785–805.

16 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 13; italics in original.

17 Jacques Derrida, '"This Strange Institution Called Literature": An Interview with Jacques Derrida', in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (London: Routledge, 1992), 37; italics in original.

18 Ibid. On this very aspect and fiction's relation to *its* truth, see Jonathan D. Culler, 'Derrida and the

Singularity of Literature', *Cardozo Law Review* 27, no. 2 (2005): 872.

19 Boris Groys, 'Versklavte Götter: Kino und Metaphysik', in *Inzenierungen in Schrift und Bild*, ed. Claudia Öhlschläger and Gerhard Neumann, Schrift und Bild in Bewegung 7 (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004), 243; trans. TR: 'Auch wenn die Theorie den Anspruch erhebt, die Realität zu beschrieben und zu interpretieren, bleibt sie doch Literatur und situiert sich in einem künstlichen, literarischen Raum. Nun: Wenn die theoretischen Positionen auf dieser [sic] Weise im literarischen Raum situiert werden, bleibt die Figur des Theoretikers dabei außertextuell. So vollzieht sich im Raum der Literatur der so oft beschriebene Tod des Autors.'

20 Ibid., 242; trans. TR: 'manifestiert er damit bloß seine Unfähigkeit, die künstlerische Dimension seiner eigenen Textproduktion zu reflektieren.'

21 Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978), 95.

22 Christa-Maria Lerm Hayes, 'Writing Art and Creating Back: What Can We Do with Art (History)?', in *Oratiereeks [Inaugural Lecture] 537* (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2015), 17–18.

23 Ibid., 14.

24 Groys, 'Versklavte Götter', 242; trans. TR: 'Die Fragen vom Typ "Was ist ein Bild?", oder "Was ist der Sinn des Textes?" usw. können, wenn es sich um moderne Bilder und Texte handelt, nicht aus einer meta-künstlerischen Perspektive gestellt und diskutiert werden. Denn jede Theorie ist doch ihrerseits vor allem ein Text—und damit auch ein Stück Literatur. Zugleich ist jeder Text, wie schon Plato festgestellt hat, auch ein Bild—und das hat in unserer Zeit die Konzeptkunst, die mit dem Text im Bild arbeitet, besonders deutlich gemacht.'

25 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 95.

26 Ibid.

27 White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 98.

28 Paul Barolsky, 'Writing (and) the History of Art: Writing Art History', *Art Bulletin* 78, no. 3 (1996): 398. On the same subject in the same volume, see also: David Carrier, 'Writing (and) the History of Art: Artcriticism-Writing, Arthistory-Writing, and Artwriting', *Art Bulletin* 78, no. 3 (1996): 401–3; Ivan Gaskell, 'Writing (and) the History of Art: Writing (and) Art History: Against Writing', *Art Bulletin* 78, no. 3 (1996): 403–6; Joseph Kosuth, 'Writing (and) the History of Art: Intention(S)', *Art Bulletin* 78, no. 3 (1996): 407–12; Linda Schele, 'Writing (and) the History of Art: History, Writing, and Image in Maya Art', *Art Bulletin* 78, no. 3 (1996): 412–16.

29 Grant, '"A Narrative of What It Wishes to Be"', 231.

30 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Deleuzian Fold of Thought', in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton, trans. Tom Gibson and Anthony Uhlmann (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 111.

31 White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 123.

32 Elsner, 'Art History as Ekphrasis', 16; italics TR.

33 White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 90; italics in original.

34 Jean-François Lyotard and Georges van den Abbeele, 'Interview: Jean-François Lyotard', trans.

Georges van den Abbeele, *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 19.

35 Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988), 71.

36 Ibid., 117.

37 Jacques Derrida, 'The Law of Genre', trans. Avital Ronell, *Critical Inquiry*, On Narrative, 7, no. 1 (1980): 56.

38 Ibid., 57; italics in original.

39 Jonathan D. Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 252.

40 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 33.

41 Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*, pbk. edn (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1990), 202; for White on ideology and the writing of history, see esp. White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 62–75.

42 White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 130; italics in original.

43 Jacques Derrida, *Artaud le Moma: interjections d'appel*, Collection Écritures, figures (Paris: Galilée, 2002), 19.

44 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

45 Ibid., 275.

46 Ibid., 268.

47 Ibid., 268–80; see also: Mary Lydon, 'Veduta on *Discours, Figure*', *Yale French Studies*, Jean-François Lyotard: Time and Judgment, no. 99 (2001): 14.

48 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 278.

49 Ibid., 283.

50 Ibid.

51 Daniel Rubinstein, 'Discourse in a Coma; a Comment on a Comma in the Title of Jean-François Lyotard's *Discourse, Figure*', *Philosophy of Photography* 4, no. 1 (2013): 106; also see: Bill Readings, *Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics*, e-library edn, Critics of the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 15–16.

52 Kiff Bamford, *Lyotard and the* Figural *in Performance, Art and Writing*, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London, New York: Continuum, 2012), 21.

53 Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 564.

54 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 155, see also: 156, 232. For discussions of laterality in Lyotard's *Discourse, figure*, see also: Geoffrey Bennington, *Lyotard: Writing the Event* (Manchester UP, 1988), 74; Geoffrey Bennington, 'Go Figure', *Parrhesia*, no. 12 (2011): 39; Antony Hudek, 'Seeing through *Discourse, Figure*', *Parrhesia*, no. 12 (2011): 54; Timothy Murray, 'What's Happening?', *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the

Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 108; Lydon, 'Veduta on *Discours, Figure*', 21; Readings, *Introducing Lyotard*, 20.

55 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 51.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 307.

58 Kiff Bamford, 'Better Lyo*Tard* than Never, I Figure', *Art History* 36, no. 4 (2013): 887.

59 Lyotard and van den Abbeele, 'Interview', 17; more elaborately, see also: Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges van den Abbeele (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1988).

60 Mitchell has of course often argued that there are no pure texts or pure images and also noted the picture qualities of titles, narratives, iconology, monograms, signatures, hieroglyphs, ideograms et cetera. W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*, pbk. edn (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 98–99.

61 Gavin Parkinson, '(Blind Summit) Art Writing, Narrative, Middle Voice', ed. Catherine Grant and Patricia Rubin, *Art History*, Special issue: Creative Writing and Art History, 34, no. 2 (2011): 273.

62 White, *The Content of the Form*, 11. Part of the end of the quote is also given in Parkinson, '(Blind Summit)', 273.

63 Parkinson, '(Blind Summit)', 273.

64 Ibid., 271.

65 Lyotard and van den Abbeele, 'Interview', 19.

66 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 98.

67 Ibid., 354.

68 Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 4; italics in original.

69 Margaret Iversen and Stephen W. Melville, *Writing Art History: Disciplinary Departures* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 8.

70 Ibid., 7.

71 Parkinson, '(Blind Summit)', 272.

72 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 21; italics in original.

73 Harald Tesan, 'Form ohne Wissen - Wissen ohne Form: die Schrift, das Bild und die Unmöglichkeit absoluten Denkens. Nebst Überlegungen zur Ordnung der Dinge bei Maciunas, Beuys, Derrida', in *Wissensformen: Sechster Internationaler Barocksommerkurs Stiftung Bibliothek Werner Oechslin, Einsiedeln*, ed. Werner Oechslin (Zurich: gta Verlag, 2007), 297; trans. TR: 'den metaphysischen Charakter der Sprache'.

74 Ibid., 296; trans. TR: 'Durch ein sprachliches Ornament, durch Metaphern und durch Wortwitz entziehen sie ["Argumente, Thesen, Fragestellungen"] sich einer Ökonomie der Erfassbarkeit. Derrida kreierte eine Art von allegorischem Schreiben, in dem der defizitäre Charakter des Einzelbildes durch eine möglichst grosse Bandbreite an verschiedenen Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten annuliert wird.'

75 The quote is Elkins', who asks this question explicitly about Barthes, Derrida, Berger and Cixous:

James Elkins, 'Writing Schedule', *James Elkins*, August 2015, http://www.jameselkins.com/index.php/component/content/article/16-vita/258-writing-schedule; italics in original. Soussloff asks a similar but differently worded question about Foucault: Catherine M. Soussloff, 'Michel Foucault and the Point of Painting', ed. Dana Arnold, *Art History*, Special issue: Art History: Contemporary Perspectives on Method, 32, no. 4 (2009): 734.

76 Parkinson, '(Blind Summit)', 274.

77 Jacques Derrida, 'Living on / BORDER LINES', in *Deconstruction and Criticism*, ed. Harold Bloom et al., trans. James Hulbert (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 95, 93.

78 Ibid., 90–96.

79 Iversen and Melville, *Writing Art History*, 14.

80 Ibid.

81 Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, 'Kultur, Technik, Kulturtechnik: Wider die Diskursivierung der Kultur', in *Bild, Schrift, Zahl*, ed. Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, Kulturtechnik (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 11, 12; trans. TR: 'die Diskursivierung der Kultur', 'Diskursivierung des Kulturverständnisses'.

82 Ibid., 12–13.

83 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, *Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004), 16; italics in original. Interestingly, Gumbrecht remains attached to the hylomorphic model in his investigation of materialities and the nonhermeneutic.

84 Searle claims that Foucault had described Derrida's writing in this way. Apparently, 'obscurantisme' reflected the baffling opacity of the writing which did not allow certitude, while 'terroriste' referred to a perception of unimpeachability of the author who would scold the incomprehensive reader with '*vous êtes idiot*'. John R. Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', *The New York Review of Books* 30, no. 16 (1983): 77; italics in original. The charge is here not repeated to develop any comparison between Derrida's writing and this thesis but to signal that Derrida's ideas (and in the wider sense, what is called 'French theory') used throughout are commonly countered from this perspective.

85 Derrida, *Post Card*, 23; italics in original.

86 Ibid., 29. Like *différance* and *différence*, there is no difference in pronunciation between *l'adestination* and *la destination*. However careful addresser and addressee thus are, adestination already performs itself as nothing can guarantee its certain arrival at its destination.

87 Derrida, *Artaud le Moma*, 17; italics in original, trans. TR: 'C'est-à-dire le *qui* et le *quoi* qui crèvent d'avance les parois du c'est-à-dire. Qui dira le *c'est-à-dire* qui emporte au-delà du dire quand il articule les organs d'un discours à ceux d'un art visuel ? et quand il ordonne la grammaire et la sémantique aux lois du phonème ? quand il ajuste la vocifération à une graphie des mots et des choses, voire à une graphie sans mot et sans chose ?'.

88 Derrida in Peter Brunette and David Wills, 'The Spatial Arts: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', in *Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture*, ed. Peter Brunette and David Wills (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 1994), 13.

89 Maurice Blanchot, *Lautréamont and Sade* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004), 4.

90 Ibid., 6. Derrida similarly notes: '"Good" literary criticism [...] implies an act, a literary signature or counter-signature, an inventive experience of language, *in* language'. Derrida, '"This Strange Institution Called Literature"', 52; italics in original.

91 J. R. Nicholas Davey, 'Writing and the In-Between', *Word & Image* 16, no. 4 (2000): 379.

92 Krämer and Bredekamp, 'Kultur, Technik, Kulturtechnik', 14; italics in original, trans. TR: '"Performanz" und "Performativität"', *'"stummen" Prozeduren des Wissens'*, *'Bereitschaft zu Dehermeneutisierung von "Geist" und "Sinn"'*, *'Erkenntnisdimension der Bildlichkeit'*.

'On paper'

1 Lothar Müller, *White Magic: The Age of Paper*, trans. Jessica Spengler (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).

2 The OED notes under entry 2.a. for 'blank': 'Of paper, etc.: Left white or "fair"; not written upon, free from written or printed characters [...]' OED, *OED Online* (Oxford UP, December 2016), http://www.oed.com s.v. *blank* adj./adv.

3 Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language in Which the Words Are Deduced from Their Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by Examples from the Best Writers: To Which Are Prefixed, a History of the Language, and an English Grammar*, 6th edn, vol. 1, 2 vols (London: J.F. and C. Rivington, 1785), s.v. *blank* adj.

4 Tim Ingold, 'Materials against Materiality', *Archaeological Dialogues* 14, no. 1 (2007): 9. See also 'Material Engagement Theory', which also asserts the non-reduction of things to semiotic concepts or representations: Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew, 'The Cognitive Life of Things: Archaeology, Material Engagement and the Extended Mind', in *The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind*, ed. Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew, McDonald Institute Monographs (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2010), 3.

5 Jacques Derrida, *Paper Machine*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), 52, italics in original.

6 Christina Lupton, 'The Theory of Paper: Skepticism, Common Sense, Poststructuralism', *Modern Language Quarterly* 71, no. 4 (2010): 424.

7 de Man cited in ibid.; Paul de Man, *The Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 42–43.

8 Lupton, 'The Theory of Paper', 410.

9 Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2001), 310.

10 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Georg Lasson, Jubiläumsausgabe, Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 114 (Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1907), 73; trans. TR: 'Sie meinen dieses Stück Papier, worauf ich dies schreibe oder vielmehr geschrieben habe; aber, was sie meinen, sagen sie nicht. Wenn sie wirklich dieses Stück Papier, das sie meinen, sagen wollten, und sie wollten sagen, so ist dies unmöglich, weil das sinnliche Diese, das gemeint wird, der Sprache, die dem Bewußtsein, dem an sich Allgemeinen angehört, unerreichbar ist. Unter dem wirklichen Versuche, es zu sagen, würde es

daher vermodern'.

11 Ibid., 74; italics and trans. TR: 'Will ich aber dem Sprechen, welches die göttliche Natur hat, die Meinung unmittelbar zu verkehren, zu etwas anderem zu machen und so sie gar nicht zum Worte kommen zu lassen, dadurch nachhelfen, daß ich dies Stück Papier aufzeige, so mache ich die Erfahrung, was die Wahrheit der sinnlichen Gewißheit in der Tat ist; ich zeige es auf als ein Hier, das ein Hier anderer Hier, oder an ihm selbst ein einfaches Zusammen vieler Hier, d. h. ein Allgemeines ist, ich nehme so es auf, wie es in Wahrheit ist, und statt ein Unmittelbares zu wissen, nehme ich wahr.'

12 Leander Scholz, 'Hegel und das leere Blatt Papier', in *Körper des Denkens: Neue Positionen der Medienphilosophie*, ed. Lorenz Engell, Frank Hartmann, and Christine Voss (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013), 168; trans. TR: 'wird zugleich der Übergang von einem Subjekt-Objekt-Verhältnis zu einem Verhältnis zwischen Subjekten vollzogen.'

13 Ibid., 169; trans. TR: 'stellen [...] bloß noch Signifikate von Signifikanten dar, die auf ein leeres Blatt Papier geschrieben werden.'

14 Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988), 20.

15 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 41; italics in original; Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Wade Baskin, 3rd. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Émile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, FA: University of Miami Press, 1971).

16 Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 129, 93.

17 Ibid., 105; Gottlob Frege, 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, no. 100 (1892): 31.

18 For a consideration of the separability of the 'here and now' and its mantric connection to phenomenology, see Victor Molchanov, 'Die rämliche Sprache der Erfahrung. Die innere Zeit und der innere Raum', in *Zwischen den Lebenswelten: interkulturelle Profile der Phänomenologie*, ed. Nikolaj Plotnikov, Meike Siegfried, and Jens Bonnemann, Syneidos: Deutsch-russische Studien zur Philosophie und Ideengeschichte 3 (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012), 30–31.

19 cf. Philip Hensher, *The Missing Ink: The Lost Art of Handwriting (and Why It Still Matters)* (London: Macmillan, 2012); John O'Connell, *For the Love of Letters: The Joy of Slow Communication* (London: Short Books, 2012); Liz Williams, *Kind Regards: The Lost Art of Letter Writing* (London: Michael O'Mara, 2012).

20 Müller, *White Magic*, 90–91.

21 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 223–24.

22 Benjamin Franklin, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin, Comprising the Account of the Early Part of His Life, Written by Himself; and a New and Greatly Extended Narrative in Continuation Till His Death: The Whole Illustrated with Literary and Biographical Notes. Also, The Miscellaneous Writings of Franklin*, People's edn (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1838), 64, italics in original.

23 Klee's line notoriously perambulates, see Paul Klee, *Pädagogisches Skizzenbuch*, Bauhausbücher 2

(Munich: Albert Langen, 1925), 6–7; Paul Klee, *Paul Klee: Beiträge zur bildnerischen Formlehre*, ed. Jürgen Glaesemer, Faksimilierte Ausgabe des Originalmanuskripts von Paul Klees erstem Vortragszyklus am staatlichen Bauhaus, Weimar 1921/22. (Basel: Schwabe, 1979), 18. Kandinsky's paper is a space for the line's capacity to construct a plane ('Flächenbildung'): Wassily Kandinsky, *Punkt und Linie zu Fläche*, Bauhausbücher 9 (Munich: Albert Langen, 1926), 54–56. In Ingold's consideration of drawing and writing on paper the connection between space and touch is regularly established: Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 41–70, 74–103; Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description*, e-book edn (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 148–64, 178, 196–208, 210–19; Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines*, e-book edn (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015). Petherbridge often refers to the touch between implement and paper: Deanna Petherbridge, *The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice* (New Haven; London: Yale UP, 2010), 116.

24 Müller also quotes this stanza in his book: Müller, *White Magic*, 170.

25 Franklin, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin*, 63, italics in original.

26 Derrida, *Paper Machine*, 62.

27 Ibid., 62–63; italics in original.

28 Sigmund Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst* (Leipzig; Wien; Zürich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1926), 10; trans. TR: 'Wenn das Schreiben, das darin besteht; aus einem Rohr Flüssigkeit auf ein Stück weißes Papier fließen zu lassen, die symbolische Bedeutung des Koitus angenommen hat, oder wenn das Gehen zum symbolischen Ersatz des Stampfens auf dem Leib der Mutter Erde geworden ist, dann wird beides, Schreiben und Gehen, unterlassen, weil es so ist, als ob man die verbotene sexuelle Handlung ausführen würde.' Neef notes Harry Mulisch's observation that the fountain pen allows the writer to mark the page with a liquid of blood temperature, thus establishing a different somatic connection (blood, semen, spit) with the paper: Sonja Neef, *Abdruck und Spur: Handschrift im Zeitalter ihrer technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2008), 132.

29 John Locke, *The Works of John Locke*, vol. 1, 3 vols (London: John Churchill, 1714), Bk. 1, Ch. 3, 21.

30 Müller, *White Magic*, 177–78. For a consideration of the trope of 'white paper' in Locke, especially in relation to tabula rasa, see: Philip Vogt, *John Locke and the Rhetoric of Modernity* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), 61–63, 79–82. Vogt however, does not question the material premise of the paper analogy either.

31 Ingold, 'Materials against Materiality', 11.

32 Maryanne Dever, 'Photographs and Manuscripts: Working in the Archive', *Archives and Manuscripts* 42, no. 3 (2014): 290; italics in original.

33 Derrida, *Paper Machine*, 53; italics in original. For an exploration of the power of materials and material phenomena in artistic and creative practice, see: Susanne Witzgall and Kerstin Stakemeiner, eds., *Power of Material/Politics of Materiality*, eText edn (Zurich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2014).

34 Derrida, *Paper Machine*, 54.

35 Michael O'Driscoll, 'Envois / En Soi / Encore: Derrida's Little Letter', *Mosaic* 39, no. 3 (2006): 224.

36 cf. 'On Exactitude in Science': Jorge Luis Borges, *Collected Fictions*, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin, 1998), 325.

37 Jacques Derrida, 'Maddening the Subjectile', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Mary Ann Caws, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 154–71.

38 Ibid., 169; italics in original.

39 OED, s.v. *stratum* n.

40 For one of many possible connections between the concept of 'the other' and the (usually) left hand, see Ulrich Richtmeyer, 'Ist Nachzeichnen ein Regelfolgen?', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 110–26.

41 Hana Gründler, Toni Hildebrandt, and Wolfram Pichler, 'Editorial: Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 17; trans. TR: 'Zeichenblätter […] müssen sich sozusagen einen anderen Körper borgen […]'. As the title of the special issue indicates, Gründler et al. are in particular concerned with drawing. I am here extending their argument, where necessary, to include handwriting.

42 William E. Henning, *An Elegant Hand: The Golden Age of American Penmanship and Calligraphy*, ed. Paul Melzer (New Castle, DE: Oak Knoll Press, 2002), 296; Ewan Clayton, 'A History of Learning to Write', in *Handwriting: Everyone's Art (Lettering Today and Tomorrow)*, ed. Timothy Wilcox and Ewan Clayton (Sussex: The Edward Johnston Foundation, Ditchling Museum, 1999), 13 n.10, *18*; cf. Joseph Carstairs, *Lectures on the Art of Writing*, 3rd edn (London: W. Molineux, 1816).

43 Austin N. Palmer, *Palmer's Guide to Business Writing* (Cedar Rapid, IA: Western Penman, 1894), 5. Cf. Benjamin Franklin Foster, *A Concise Treatise on Commercial Book-Keeping: Elucidating the Principles and Practice of Double Entry* (Boston: Perkins & Marvin, 1836); Henry Caleb Spencer and Platt Rogers Spencer, *Spencerian Key to Practical Penmanship* (New York: Ivison, Phinney, Blakeman, 1868).

44 Vilém Flusser, 'Die Geste des Malens', in *Gesten: Versuch einer Phänomenologie*, ungekürzte edn (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994), 88–89.

45 Ibid., 88; trans. TR: 'Das erste, was wir tun müssen, um die Geste des Malens tatsächlich zu sehen, ist auf einen Katalog der sich in der Geste bewegenden Körper zu verzichten. Ein solcher Katalog ist nämlich "metaphysisch" in dem Sinn, Körper vorauszusetzen, die sich irgendwo außerhalb der Geste befinden und sich erst dann in ihr bewegen.'

46 Ibid., 90; trans. TR: 'die Zukunft der Geste'.

47 Ibid., 99; trans. TR: 'Gäbe es eine allgemeine Theorie der Gesten, eine semiologische Disziplin, welche gestatten würde, Gesten zu entziffern, dann wäre Kunstkritik nicht, wie heute, eine Sache der Empirie oder der "Intuition" oder ein kausales Wegerklären der ästhetischen Phänomene, sondern eine exakte Analyse der zu Gemälden erstarrten Gesten. In Ermangelung einer solchen "Choreographologie" ist es vielleicht die bessere Strategie, die Geste selbst zu beobachten, so wie sie sich konkret vor uns, und daher in uns, ereignet: als ein Exempel der Freiheit.'

48 Vilém Flusser, *Die Schrift: Hat Schreiben Zukunft?*, ed. Andreas Müller-Pohle, 5th edn, Edition Flusser 5 (Göttingen: European Photography, 2002), 116; trans. TR: 'widerspricht dem Wesen des Schreibens und erinnert an das Zeichnerische'.

49 Vilém Flusser, 'Die Geste des Schreibens', in *Gesten: Versuch einer Phänomenologie*, ungekürzte edn (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994), 36; trans. TR: 'auszudrückende Virtualität'.

50 Walter Benjamin, *Einbahnstrasse* (Berlin: Ernst Rowohlt Verlag, 1928), 31. For pertinent historical case studies concerning the visual, haptic, corporeal capacity of the written mark in different writing systems, see the volume: Erika Greber, Konrad Ehlich, and Müller, eds., *Materialität und Medialität von Schrift*, Schrift und Bild in Bewegung 1 (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2002).

51 Martin Heidegger, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (1949/1957)*, ed. Petra Jaeger, Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe 79 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), 119; trans. TR: 'zu etwas "Getipptem"'. For the central importance of the hand not only for the development of writing but also the evolution of mankind argues André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, trans. Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1993).

52 Jacques Derrida, '*Geschlecht* II: Heidegger's Hand', in *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida*, ed. John Sallis, trans. John P. Leavy, Jr. (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 178–80.

53 Friedrich A. Kittler, 'Nietzsche, der mechanisierte Philosoph', *kultuRRevolution: Zeitschrift für angewandte Diskurstheorie*, no. 9 (1985): 25; trans. TR: 'metaphysik der handschrift [sic]'; Friedrich Nietzsche, whom Kittler described as 'the first mechanised philosopher', and the material ramifications of his typewriter have also been discussed by Martin Stingelin, 'Kugeläußerungen: Nietzsches Spiel auf der Schreibmaschine', in *Materialität der Kommunikation*, ed. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 326–41; Stephan Günzel, 'Nietzsches Schreibmaschine', in *Schreibmaschinentexte: Vollständige Edition, Faksimiles und kritischer Kommentar*, ed. Stephan Günzel and Rüdiger Schmidt-Grépály (Weimar: Bauhaus-Universitätsverlag, 2002), 8–14; Christof Windgätter, 'Rauschen. Nietzsche und die Materialität der Schrift', ed. Günter Abel, Josef Simon, and Werner Stegmaier, *Nietzsche-Studien* 33, no. 1 (2004): 1–36; Stephan Braun, *Topographien der Leere—Friedrich Nietzsche. Schreiben und Schrift*, Studien zur Kulturpoetik 9 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007).

54 Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse of Language*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 79–131.

55 Friedrich A. Kittler, *Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1985); Friedrich A. Kittler, *Grammophon, Film, Typewriter* (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 1986).

56 Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Me: Lectures and Interviews*, ed. Stephanie McLuhan and David Staines (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005), 35.

57 Wolfgang Riepl, *Das Nachrichtenwesen des Altertums: mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Römer* (Leipzig; Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1913), 5; n. omitted, trans. TR: 'nur daß sie genötigt werden, andere Aufgaben [sic] und Verwertungsgebiete aufzusuchen.'

58 Flusser, *Die Schrift*, 77.

59 Ibid., 125; trans. TR.

60 Ibid., 125–26.

61 Ibid., 52; trans. TR: 'Eine Drucksache ist eine typische Sache und keine charakteristische, unvergleichliche, einzigartige.'

62 For the supplumentary or corrective function of vision and drawing technologies that rescue the

hand from its 'Manier', see: Hole Rössler, 'Mechanische Hand und künstliches Auge', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 50.

63 Gründler, Hildebrandt, and Pichler, 'Editorial: Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung', 18; trans. TR: 'Keine Zeichnung ist allein von Menschenhand gemacht, in jede mischt sich auch die Oberfläche des Bildträgers ein, in viele auch ein unsichtbares, nach dem Zeichnen entferntes Widerlager.'

64 Ibid., 6; trans TR: 'Diese wechselseitige Beziehung von Hand und Graphie'.

65 James Elkins, 'One Some Limits of Materiality in Art History', *31: Das Magazin Des Instituts Für Theorie*, Special issue: Taktilität: Sinneserfahrung als Grenzerfahrung, no. 12/13 (2008): 26; emphasis in original.

66 Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Parti-Pris Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 44–45; italics in original.

67 Petherbridge, *Primacy of Drawing*, 90.

68 Derrida, *Memoirs*, 45.

69 Ibid., 3.

70 Nanne Meyer, 'Wiederholung und Widerstand—Zeichnung als Krisis', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 141; trans. and italics TR: 'Am Anfang steht für mich eine mehr oder weniger deutliche Ab-Sicht [sic], die bildlos sein kann, eine spezifische Art von Ahnung, ein Etwas, von dem ich mich zeichnend abstosse.' On the slowness of academic disciplines to catch up with what artists and makers have long known, see Tim Ingold in: Karianne Fogelberg, Tim Ingold, and Max Lamb, '"Materials Are Constantly Astonishing": In Conversation with Max Lamb and Tim Ingold', in *Power of Material/Politics of Materiality*, ed. Susanne Witzgall and Kerstin Stakemeiner, eText edn (Zurich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2014), 80.

71 OED, s.v. *wit* v.[1].

72 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 65–66; italics in original.

73 cf. Derrida's epigraph to *Writing and Difference* is taken from Mallarmé's preface to *Un coup de dés*: '*Le tout sans nouveauté qu'un espacement de la lecture*' ibid., v; italics in original. The Germanic 'shining' (*blanko-z*), as well as old English 'to shine' (*blícan*) are etymons to the current use of 'blank' OED s.v. *blank* adj./adv.

74 For the confusion of medium and material in art-historical writing (in the case of photography), and their combined impact on the ascription of what is proper for a particular practice, see: Jacques Rancière, 'What Medium Can Mean', trans. Steven Corcoran, *Parrhesia*, no. 11 (2011): 35–43.

75 Ingold, 'Materials against Materiality'.

76 Gottfried Boehm, 'Gegen den Strich: Über die Arbeit mit Schrift und Bild', in *Inzenierungen in Schrift und Bild*, ed. Claudia Öhlschläger and Gerhard Neumann, Schrift und Bild in Bewegung 7 (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004), 109; italics in original, trans. TR: 'Unser *Befund* und damit auch unsere *These* wird sein: Dass eine bestimmte Gruppe von Künstlern Medien nicht gemäß ihrer immanenten Logik optimieren, sondern gegen den Strich bürsten, sie *inversiv* gebrauchen.'

77 Ibid., 112; italics in original, trans TR: 'Logik des *Sukzessiven*'.

78 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 16; Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 248.

79 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing*, trans. Philip Armstrong, pbk. edn (New York: Fordham UP, 2013), 1, 7.

80 David Espinet, 'Skizze einer Ästhetik des Entwerfens', *Rheinsprung 11*, Zur Händigkeit der Zeichnung, no. 3 (2012): 168; italics in original, trans. TR: 'meint dann zweierlei: einmal *Eröffnung* als ein Anfang oder Ursprung der Form, die mit der zeichnerischen Geste entsteht, sodann die stetige *Offenheit* der hingezeichneten Form, die auch als fertige Zeichnung nicht abgeschlossen ist, nicht zur Ruhe kommt.'

81 Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing*, 21; italics in original.

82 Ibid.; cf. Espinet, 'Skizze einer Ästhetik des Entwerfens', 169–70; Meyer, 'Wiederholung und Widerstand', 138–39. For a discussion of the connections of the forma formata/forma formans debate in view of Giorgio Agamben's 'finalità senza fine' and Immanuel Kant's 'Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck', see: Toni Hildebrandt, 'Die tachistische Geste 1951-1970', in *Bild und Geste: Figurationen des Denkens in Philosophie und Kunst*, ed. Ulrich Richtmeyer, Fabian Goppelsröder, and Toni Hildebrandt, Image (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2014), 48–49.

83 Derrida, *Memoirs*, 53; italics in original, curly brackets indicate French original as per translators' parenthetical comment.

84 Ibid., 54; italics in original.

85 Ibid., 55; italics in original.

86 James Elkins, 'Marks, Traces, *Traits*, Contours, *Orli*, and *Splendores*: Nonsemiotic Elements in Pictures', *Critical Inquiry* 21, no. 4 (1995): 837; italics in original. The phrase 'wear itself out' cites Derrida, *Memoirs*, 53.

87 Derrida, *Memoirs*, 56; italics in original.

88 Elkins, 'Marks, Traces, *Traits* ...', 838.

89 Derrida, *Memoirs*, 44.

90 Lyotard establishes parallels between the transparency of certain substrates of paintings, in particular representational works that make legible what is visible, and writing's support: Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, 195–96, 206. For a consideration of the constructional aspects of both writing and drawing, see: Jutta Voorhoeve, ed., *Welten schaffen: Zeichnen und Schreiben als Verfahren der Konstruktion*, Wissen im Entwurf 4 (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2011).

91 Klaus Weimar, 'Lesen: zu sich selbst sprechen in fremdem Namen', in *Literaturwissenschaften: Einführungen in ein Sprachspiel*, ed. Heinrich Bosse and Ursula Renner (Freiburg: Rombach, 1999), 50; italics in original, trans. TR: 'Versprachlichen der Schrift einerseits *und* ein Vernehmen der Sprache andererseits, und zwar nicht abwechslungsweise, sondern stets untrennbar zugleich.'

92 For *parole, langue* and *langage* see: de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 9–10, 13.

93 Considering the wide and narrow sense of *Sprache* und *Sprechen* in Weimar's use, cf. Ursula Renner, 'Lassen sich Gedanken sagen? Mimesis der inneren Rede in Arthur Schnitzlers *Lieutenant Gustl*', in *Die Grenzen des Sagbaren in der Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Sabine M. Schneider (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010), 46.

94 Hans Lösener, *Zwischen Wort und Wort: Interpretation und Textanalyse* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), 49.

95 Weimar, 'Lesen', 56; italics in original, trans. TR: 'Lesen heißt aufgrund von Schrift selbst zu sich selbst sprechen, allerdings *in fremdem Namen*.'

96 In a gesture that appears strangely cautious given the rest of the text, Weimar demurs that there are conventions which regulate fairly tightly how the 'Versprachlichung der Schrift' generally proceeds, cf. Ibid., 59.

97 Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, 2nd edn (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett, 1976), 105–6.

98 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 45.

99 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 290.

100 Elkins, 'Marks, Traces, *Traits* ...', 834. Cf. James Elkins, *The Domain of Images* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999).

101 Pam A. Mueller and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, 'The Pen Is Mightier than the Keyboard: Advantages of Longhand over Laptop Note Taking', *Psychological Science* 25, no. 6 (2014): 1159–68.

102 cf. Pam A. Mueller and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, 'Technology and Note-Taking in the Classroom, Boardroom, Hospital Room, and Courtroom', *Trends in Neuroscience and Education*, Writing in the digital age, 5, no. 3 (2016): 139–45.

103 Srdan Medimorec and Evan F. Risko, 'Effects of Disfluency in Writing', *British Journal of Psychology* 107, no. 4 (2016): 625–50; Srdan Medimorec, Torin P. Young, and Evan F. Risko, 'Disfluency Effects on Lexical Selection', *Cognition* 158 (2017): 28–32.

104 Thierry Olive, Rui Alexandre Alves, and São Luís Castro, 'Cognitive Processes in Writing during Pause and Execution Periods', *European Journal of Cognitive Psychology* 21, no. 5 (2009): 758–85.

105 Paul Gimenez et al., 'Neuroimaging Correlates of Handwriting Quality as Children Learn to Read and Write', *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 8 (2014): 155.

106 Anne Mangen and Lillian Balsvik, 'Pen or Keyboard in Beginning Writing Instruction? Some Perspectives from Embodied Cognition', *Trends in Neuroscience and Education*, Writing in the digital age, 5, no. 3 (2016): 99. See also the 'Extended Mind Hypothesis' and 'Material Engagement Theory' which progress along the convergence of an inseparable cognitive and material life. The theories also provide a necessary bridge (via archaeology) of psychological experimentation and the study of material artefacts, their makers and production: Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew, eds., *The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind*, McDonald Institute Monographs (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2010).

107 Stanislas Dehaene et al., 'Illiterate to Literate: Behavioural and Cerebral Changes Induced by Reading Acquisition', *Nature Reviews. Neuroscience* 16, no. 4 (April 2015): 234–44. There is only limited comparison between the acquisition of different languages, some of it however suggests that convergences in the brain's processing of them exist, see: Jay G. Rueckl et al., 'Universal Brain Signature of Proficient Reading: Evidence from Four Contrasting Languages', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112, no. 50 (15 December 2015): 15510–15. There is however also some evidence that different

writing technologies (pen and paper, computer, typewriter etc.) engage different brain areas during the writing process, thus differentiating the cognitive, motor and spatial requirements through particular material engagements. See: Alfredo Ardila, 'There Is Not Any Specific Brain Area for Writing: From Cave-Paintings to Computers', *International Journal of Psychology* 39, no. 1 (2004): 61–67. The possible implications of the current conception of literacy acquisition is explored by Morais, who proposes that the existing standards are too low to ensure proper democratic engagement and advocates that the level of language skills required needs to be able to deal with language as a highly flexible tool rather than static construct: José Morais, 'Literacy and Democracy', *Language, Cognition and Neuroscience*, 31 March 2017, 1–22.

'On iconicity'

1 The historic convergence of the iconic singular stroke (whether representative of a tally notch, finger or else) and the Latin numeral 'one' in the previously distinct letter 'I' is widely asserted in extant scholarship. The origins of the other Latin numerals are however more controversial with various theories promoting pictographic, acrophonic and other origins. For a succinct summary of the debate see: Paul Keyser, 'The Origin of the Latin Numerals 1 to 1000', *American Journal of Archaeology* 92, no. 4 (1988): 529–46. Mommsen, for example, proposes a mixed theory of origin which relies on unused letterforms in Latin, see: Theodor Mommsen, *Die unteritalischen Dialekte* (Leipzig: G. Wigand, 1850). For a general history of the development of numbers and their signs beyond the Latin see: Georges Ifrah, *The Universal History of Numbers: From Prehistory to the Invention of the Computer*, trans. David Bellos et al. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).

2 Vilém Flusser, *Die Schrift: Hat Schreiben Zukunft?*, ed. Andreas Müller-Pohle, 5th edn, Edition Flusser 5 (Göttingen: European Photography, 2002), 27; trans. TR: 'Zahlen hingegen sind Zeichen für Ideen, für mit dem "inneren Auge" ersehene Bilder'; Vilém Flusser, *Krise der Linearität*, Reihe um 9 (Bern: Benteli, 1988), 24; trans. TR: 'ein formales, völlig abstraktes Denken'.

3 Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 3.

4 Jean-Gérard Lapacherie, 'Typographic Characters: Tension between Text and Drawing', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Anna Lehmann, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 64.

5 Jacques Leenhardt, 'See and Describe: On a Few Drawings by Stendhal', ed. Martine Reid, trans. John Thompson, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 82.

6 Raymond Queneau cited in Lapacherie, 'Typographic Characters', 63. On the exploration of handwriting in psychiatric practice, see: Armin Schäfer, 'Spur und Symptom: Zur Erforschung der Handschrift in der Psychatrie um 1900', in *Spuren erzeugen: Zeichnen und Schreiben als Verfahren der Selbstaufzeichnung*, ed. Barbara Wittmann, Wissen im Entwurf 2 (Zürich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009), 21–38. On graphic representation of psychoanalysis, see in the same volume: Markus Klammer, 'Der Traum und die Urszene: Zur graphischen Repräsentation der Psychoanalysis', in *Spuren erzeugen: Zeichnen und Schreiben als Verfahren der Selbstaufzeichnung*, ed. Barbara Wittmann, Wissen im Entwurf 2 (Zürich; Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009), 69–107.

7 W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Spatial Form in Literature: Toward a General Theory', *Critical Inquiry* 6, no. 3 (1980): 550.

8 Johanna Drucker, 'Typographic Manipulation of the Poetic Text in the Early Twentieth-Century Avant-Garde', ed. Renée Riese Hubert, *Visible Language*, The Artist's Book: The Text and Its Rival, 25, no. 2/3 (1991): 232–33. For a perspective that reconsiders the typographic experiments of avant-garde artists, esp. Ilia Zdanevich, Filippo Marinetti, Guillaume Apollinaire and Tristan Tzara, in view of a one-sided critical reception, see: Johanna Drucker, *The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art, 1909-1923* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

9 Lapacherie, 'Typographic Characters', 66–68.

10 Ibid., 68.

11 Leon S. Roudiez, 'Readable/Writable/Visible', *Visible Language* 12, no. 3 (1978): 232–33.

12 Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 10–12.

13 Roudiez, 'Readable', 233.

14 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 157–201; cf. Mary Lydon, 'Veduta on *Discours, Figure*', *Yale French Studies*, Jean-François Lyotard: Time and Judgment, no. 99 (2001): 17.

15 Carol Plyley James, '"No, Says the Signified": The "Logical Status" of Words in Painting', *Visible Language* 19, no. 4 (1985): 439.

16 Drucker, 'Typographic Manipulation', 254.

17 Johanna Drucker, *The Alphabetic Labyrinth: The Letters in History and Imagination* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1995).

18 Leon S. Roudiez, 'Notes on the Reader as Subject', *Semiotext(e)* 1, no. 3 (1975): 75.

19 Roudiez, 'Readable', 233.

20 Ibid.

21 cf. Jonathon Green, 'X-Rated: What Is so Special about the Letter "X"', *The Independent*, 11 July 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/xrated-what-is-so-special-about-the-letter-x-423333.html.

22 David Scott Armstrong and Patrick Mahon, 'After the Grave: Language and Materiality in Contemporary Art', ed. David Scott Armstron and Patrick Mahon, *Visible Language*, After the Grave: Language and Materiality in Contemporary Art, 42, no. 1 (2008): 12.

23 Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, 2nd edn (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett, 1976), 121.

24 Ibid., 128–30.

25 Alessandro Giovannelli, 'Goodman's Aesthetics', ed. Edward N. Zalta, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/goodman-aesthetics/.

26 Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 148.

27 Ibid., 132.

28 Scholarship of Chinese characters discusses syssematic characters (sometimes also called semantic

or ideographic compounds) in view of conjoined meanings that exceeds any phonetic combination but is part of the continuum of sign creation. Behr says it cannot be strictly differentiated from the combination of pictograms and can be both form- and meaning-conjoining. See: Wolfgang Behr, '"Homosomatic Juxtaposition" and the Problem of "Syssemantic" (*Huìyì*) Characters', in *Ecriture Chinoise: Données, Usages et Représentations*, ed. Françoise Bottéro and Redouane Djamouri (Paris: EHESS/CRLAO, 2006), 75–114; Wolfgang Behr, 'Syssemantic' (eikones Summer School 'Iconicity in writing: practices and constraints', eikones, Basel, 9 July 2016); Imre Galambos, 'Popular Character Forms (*Súzì*) and Semantic Compound (*Huìyì*) Characters in Medieval Chinese Manuscripts', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 131, no. 3 (2011): 395–409.

29 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, pbk. edn (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976), 14.

30 Ibid., 87; italics in original.

31 Juliet Fleming, *Cultural Graphology: Writing after Derrida* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 15. For a comparable approach that is similarly indebted to Derrida's grammatology and particularly interested in developing writing's iconicity as a transdisciplinary field, cf. Birgit Mersmann, *Schriftikonik: Bildphänomene der Schrift in kultur- und medienkomparativer Perspektive*, eikones (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2015). On the uncertain capacity of writing's visuality and the potential for writing in a digital age to be freed from the 'graphemetic dogma', see: Gernot Grube, 'Rückseite der Sichtbarkeit. Zur operativen Revolution der elektronischen Schrift', in *Die Sichtbarkeit der Schrift*, ed. Susanne Strätling and Georg Witte (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), esp.114-118.

32 Roudiez, 'Readable', 232.

33 Lapacherie, 'Typographic Characters', 64.

34 Ibid., 69.

35 Hatch is suggested as etymological origin for hash, circumflex translates the Greek *perispōmenos* 'drawn around'. Notable also is the physicality (although not necessarily related to drawing) that is bound up in letterpress terminology: upper- and lower-case (from the location of typecases facing the typesetter), type (from *tuptein*, 'to strike'), font (from *fondre* 'to melt'), leading (from the chemical element), strike(through) etc. More recent additions to the typographic toolbox display the same attachment to printmaking and drawing: outline type, drop shadow, emboss type, engrave type etc. OED, *OED Online* (Oxford UP, December 2016), http://www.oed.com; s.vv. *hash* n.^{3}, *circumflex* adj./n., *font* n.^{2}/n.^{3}.

36 Michel Butor cited in Martine Reid, 'Bricolage: An Interview with Michel Butor', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Noah Guynn, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 18.

37 Jacques Derrida, 'The Retrait of Metaphor', in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. Peggy Kamuf, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007), 74.

38 Ibid., 78.

39 Martine Reid, 'Editor's Preface: Legible/Visible', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Nigel P. Turner, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 6.

40 Ibid.

41 Ingold, *Lines*, 128; italics in original.

42 Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, pbk. edn (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 160.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 192; italics in original.

45 Ibid., 195.

46 For a refutation of the alleged marginality of iconicity in language, see: Pamela Perniss, Robin L. Thompson, and Gabriella Vigliocco, 'Iconicity as a General Property of Language: Evidence from Spoken and Signed Languages', *Frontiers in Psychology* 1 (2010): 1–15. On iconicity and systematicity as language characteristics that are not arbitrary, see: Mark Dingemanse et al., 'Arbitrariness, Iconicity, and Systematicity in Language', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 19, no. 10 (2015): 603–15.

47 Sound symbolism can encompass the association of particular syllables or consonant clusters with broader concepts, e.g. the combination *wr-* in wrist, wring, wriggle and so on refers to a twisting motion. See: Perniss, Thompson, and Vigliocco, 'Iconicity as a General Property', 2–3. Many more examples in: John Rupert Firth, The Tongues of Men *and* Speech, ed. Peter Strevens, Language and Language Learning 2 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1964).

48 Such iconicity can be found in the morphophonological structure of individual words, for example in the reduplication of letters or syllables that denote a continuation or repetition patterns. On the other hand, it can also describe the convergence of particular syntactic characteristics (word order) and the contiguity or sequence of events. The concept is most often returned to Bühler's description of it as 'a representation that is relationally faithful (or faithful to the Gestalt).' Karl Bühler, *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*, 2nd edn (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1965), 208; trans. TR: 'eine relationstreue (oder gestalttreue) Wiedergabe.' Cf. Mark Dingemanse, 'Ezra Pound Amon the Mawu: Ideophones and Iconicity in Siwu', in *Semblance and Signification*, ed. Pascal Michelucci, Olga Fischer, and Christina Ljungberg, Iconicity in Language and Literature 10 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2011), 47–49.

49 Further subcategorisation of iconicity often distinguishes also between iconicity of contiguity, linguistic proximity, ideophones and so on. For an indication of the breadth of iconic relations, see: Raffaele Simone, ed., *Iconicity in Language*, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 110 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1995); Earl R. Anderson, *A Grammar of Iconism* (Madison; Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 1998).

50 Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 43.

51 cf. 'Seen through the cognitive sciences, reading does not mean that the eye follows the trace of writing's line. Writing's trace is precisely what evades the process of making legible.' Sonja Neef, *Abdruck und Spur: Handschrift im Zeitalter ihrer technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2008), 217; trans. TR: 'Kognitionswissenschaftlich gesehen geht Lesen nicht so, dass man mit den Augen der Spur der Schriftlinie nachfährt. Die Spur ist eben das an der Schrift, was sich der Lesbarmachung entzieht.'

52 Winfried Nöth, 'Semiotic Foundations of Iconicity in Language and Literature', in *The Motivated Sign*,

ed. Olga Fischer and Max Nänny, Iconicity in Language and Literature 2 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001), 18.

53 Ibid., 22; similarly in: Winfried Nöth, 'The Semiotic Potential for Iconicity in Spoken and Written Language', *Kodikas/Code* 13, no. 3/4 (1990): 191–209.

54 Ludovic De Cuypere, *Limiting the Iconic: From the Metatheoretical Foundations to the Creative Possibilities of Iconicity in Language*, Iconicity in Language and Literature 6 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2008), 102–5.

55 Ibid., 253.

56 Nöth, 'Semiotic Foundations of Iconicity', 23.

57 De Cuypere, *Limiting the Iconic*, 103.

58 Ibid., 104.

59 cf. Nöth on the sign's autonomy and self-referentiality Winfried Nöth, 'Instrumentalität, Autonomie und Selbstreferenzialität der Zeichen', *Kodikas/Code* 33, no. 1/2 (2010): esp. 147.

60 Sybille Krämer, 'Writing, Notational Iconicity, Calculus: On Writing as a Cultural Technique', trans. Anita McChesney, *MLN*, German Issue, 118, no. 3 (2003): 518–37; Sybille Krämer, 'Sagen und Zeigen: sechs Perspektiven, in denen das Diskursive und das Ikonische in der Sprache konvergieren', *Zeitschrift für Germanistik* 13, no. 3 (2003): 509–19; Sybille Krämer, '"Schriftbildlichkeit" oder: Über eine (fast) vergessene Dimension der Schrift', in *Bild, Schrift, Zahl*, ed. Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, Kulturtechnik (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 157–76; Sybille Krämer, 'Editorial: Vom Nutzen der Schriftbildlichkeit', ed. Sybille Krämer and Mareike Giertler, *Sprache und Literatur*, Schwerpunkt Schriftbildlichkeit, 42, no. 107 (2011): 1–4.

61 Krämer, 'Writing, Notational Iconicity, Calculus', 520; italics in original, citational note omitted.

62 Ibid., 534; on operative writing, see also: Sybille Krämer, 'Zur Sichtbarkeit der Schrift oder: Die Visualiserung des Unsichtbaren in der operativen Schrift. Zehn Thesen', in *Die Sichtbarkeit der Schrift*, ed. Susanne Strätling and Georg Witte (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), 75–83. On the implications of notational iconicity for interpretation, see: Mark A. Halawa, 'Schriftbildlichkeit—ein Begriff und seine Herausforderungen', ed. Sybille Krämer and Mareike Giertler, *Sprache und Literatur*, Schwerpunkt Schriftbildlichkeit, 42, no. 107 (2011): 5–15.

63 Krämer, 'Writing, Notational Iconicity, Calculus', 534; Krämer, 'Sagen und Zeigen', 516; trans. TR: 'eine Schrift, die jene rudimentäre Form "notationaler" und eben nicht "piktorialer" Ikonizität verkörpert'.

64 cf. the relation of operative and diagrammatic writing: Sybille Krämer, 'Punkt, Strich, Fläche. Von der Schriftbildlichkeit zur Diagrammatik', in *Schriftbildlichkeit: Wahrnehmbarkeit, Materialität und Operativität von Notationen*, ed. Sybille Krämer, Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum, and Rainer Totzke, Schriftbildlichkeit 1 (Berlin: Akademie, 2012), 79–100.

65 Nöth, 'Semiotic Foundations of Iconicity', 22; De Cuypere, *Limiting the Iconic*, 102.

66 Jean-François Lyotard, 'It's as If a Line...', trans. Mary Lydon, *Contemporary Literature*, Contemporary Literature and Contemporary Theory, 29, no. 3 (1988): 457; alternate English translations and original French in brackets from Timothy Murray, 'What's Happening?', *Diacritics*, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 14, no. 3 (1984): 104.

67 Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 228; italics in original, curly brackets indicate French original as per translator's parenthetical comment.

68 Ibid., 34.

69 The consequences of appropriating a picture and the restitutions necessary are addressed in the 'Restitutions' chapter in Derrida, *Truth*, 255–383.

70 Jacques Derrida, *Artaud le Moma: interjections d'appel*, Collection Écritures, figures (Paris: Galilée, 2002), 60; italics in original, trans. TR: 'elle [la vérité] attend l'acte, le trait, le coup du *graphein*.'

71 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing*, trans. Philip Armstrong, pbk. edn (New York: Fordham UP, 2013), 40; curly brackets indicate French original as per translator's parenthetical comment.

72 Lyotard, 'It's as If a Line...', 460.

73 For a consideration of the textures of historico-contextual layers, see: Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study on Memory in Medieval Culture*, pbk. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), 14–15. For a reading of texture through writing's line as a thread, see: Ingold, *Lines*, 61–68. For an alternative view which considers writing process as a form of 'threading' (*fädeln*) and image processing as weaving (*weben*), see the 'Fädeln' chapter in Vilém Flusser, *Lob der Oberflächlichkeit: für eine Phänomenologie der Medien*, Vilém Flusser: Schriften 1 (Bollmann: Bensheim; Düsseldorf, 1993), 23–34.

74 Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, 'Kultur, Technik, Kulturtechnik: Wider die Diskursivierung der Kultur', in *Bild, Schrift, Zahl*, ed. Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, Kulturtechnik (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 15; italics in original, trans. TR: 'so tritt jetzt hervor, dass es gerade die *Ver*sinnlichung, die Aisthetisierung unsichtbarer Prozesse und theoretischer Gegenstände ist, welche das Lebenselixier wissenschaftlichen Wandels ausmacht.' NB: The use of italics in the German original indicate especially the difference of the term from its counterpart 'Entsinnlichung'. Alas only one of these terms carries a prefix in English. 'Aisthetisierung' offers no straightforward translation into English, but describes the possibility to open something to sensorial experience which is absent or has no sense.

'In fine'

1 Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse', in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young, trans. Ian McLeod (Boston; London; Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 60.

2 John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London; New York: Continuum, 2002), 10.

3 Martine Reid, 'Editor's Preface: Legible/Visible', ed. Martine Reid, trans. Nigel P. Turner, *Yale French Studies*, Boundaries: Writing & Drawing, no. 84 (1994): 12.

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