Peace, Security and Deterrence: Part I: Greece

1. Peace

A modern reader might be forgiven for thinking that the Greeks and their neighbours were addicted to war. Their histories, and indeed much of their other literature, revolves around conflict, and yet, the impression is misleading: they greatly appreciated peace, and the distressing ubiquity of war is less the result of human choice, and more a reflection of harsh geo-political necessity.

1.1. The Possibility of Peace

The Greeks valued peace. In Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (488-93; cf. 778-85: trans. Coleridge, adapted), the Theban herald describes peace as 'the Muses' dearest friend' and the 'enemy of Sorrow'. He goes on to exclaim 'how much better peace is for mankind than war', a proposition he justifies by association with concrete 'blessings', namely the 'glad throngs of children' and 'delight in prosperity.' Other evidence corroborates this view. A proverb in Plutarch's *Life of Nicias* (9.5; cf. Polybius 12.26.1), contrasts peace, when men wake to the sound of the cock crowing, with war, when they are roused by the raucous sound of the salpinx. Aristophanes, naturally, goes further: the endings of his 'peace plays' *Lysistrata*, *Peace* and *Acharnians* associate peace with even more fundamental aspects of the good life, namely eating, drinking and sex.

War, conversely, was feared. Herodotus (1.87.4: trans Godley) has Croesus lament how 'foolish' it is to 'choose war over peace. In peace sons bury their fathers, in war fathers bury their sons.' Similarly, Thucydides has the Athenian statesman Pericles declare (2.61.1: trans. Crawley) during the Peloponnesian War that an unnecessary fight is 'the greatest of follies'. Even more strikingly, as that war escalated, he made the Syracusan, Hermocrates, not only proclaim (4.59.2) that 'war is an evil', but also that this 'proposition' was so normative

'it would be tedious to develop it.' However, if the Greeks valued peace and feared war, why did they so readily engage in armed conflict?

1.2. The Certainty of War

The ubiquity of war is explained by three mutually-reinforcing factors. The first is a geo-political environment characterised by cultural unity and political fragmentation. According to Herodotus (8.144.2), the Greeks felt a common kinship, yet, their panhellenic sentiment was undercut by a more immediate attachment to their individual city-states (*poleis*), a feeling forcefully expressed in Pericles' funeral oration, delivered during the first year of the Peloponnesian War. This speech, reported, or perhaps recreated, by Thucydides (2.35-46), celebrates the patriotic zeal of the Athenians, especially its highest manifestation: the willingness to fight to the death for Athens (Crowley 2012; Loraux 2006).

The Greeks, then, were subject to the competing demands of panhellenism and *polis* particularism, but the strength of these forces was by no means equal, as their response to Xerxes' invasion reveals (Lazenby 1993; Mitchell 2007). This is often imagined as the Greeks' finest hour, during which they collectively defeated an overwhelming Persian force, but the truth is that the Greeks did not unite, they looked instead to their own interests. Some, like Argos (Hdt. 7.148.1-153.3) stayed neutral, others, such as Thebes, sided with the Persians (7.132.1, 157.1-63.2, 205.2-206.1, 233.1-2, 9.2, 40.1), and a very small minority, only thirty-one, formed the Hellenic League and resisted (Lazenby 1993). Worse still, the Hellenic League was so infected by *polis* particularism that its collective aims were continually undermined by its leading states. Sparta, for instance, was willing to sacrifice all the northern and central Greek *poleis*, including Athens, as long as she herself was safe in the Peloponnese, whilst the Athenians threatened repeatedly to leave the League unless coalition forces were committed north of the isthmus of Corinth (Hdt. 8.60.1-62.1; Lazenby 1993). The

Greeks might, therefore, have shared a common identity, but this identity was much weaker than the attachment they felt for their individual *poleis*.

The second factor was their inability to regulate interstate relations. In theory, regulation was provided by a widely accepted set of norms and values underpinned by a sophisticated legal framework and advanced mechanisms for conflict resolution (such as interstate arbitration: Thuc. 5.79.1, also 5.18.4, 79.4; Sheets 1994: 51-73). Such measures reveal a desire to control inter-communal competition, but they failed largely because they could not be enforced (Low 2007: 77-128; cf. Thuc. 5.89.1). Greek *poleis*, consequently, formed a horizontal community of states in which the only vertical authority was provided by the gods (Low 2007: 118-26; Hunt 2010: 215-36).

Diplomacy, as a result, was conducted under the purview of the divine (heralds, for instance, were protected by Hermes: Hdt. 7.133.1-6.2) and interstate treaties were guaranteed by oaths sworn to the gods. These oaths exerted considerable force, since breaking one incurred not just divine wrath, it also risked the gods joining with the wronged party to punish the oath-breaker (Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.11, 5.4.1; Hall 2007: 85-107; Low 2007: 118-26; Raaflaub 2016: 122-57). Avoiding this through interstate arbitration, an obligation enshrined in many Greek treaties was, therefore, compelling (see esp. Thuc. 1.78.4, 85.2, 140.2, 2.2.1-7.1 7.18.1-4). Nevertheless, even if an acceptable arbitrator could be found in the polarised geo-political context of Classical Greece, there was little possibility of forcing any major Greek power to accept an offer of arbitration or of enforcing a subsequent judgement. Consequently, any Greek *polis* which felt its aims could be more effectively obtained through war could refuse an offer of arbitration and abrogate their treaty obligations, and when they did, there was no human agency to compel compliance or punish transgression (Ager 1993: 1-13).

These two factors, furthermore, resulted in a third, namely the way the Greeks felt about war and the warrior. Understandably, given their unstable environment, the Greeks came to accept war as a natural way for a state to resolve disputes and advance or defend its interests (Thuc. 1.76.1-4, 2.64.2-6; Xen. *Cav.* 8.7, *Mem.* 2.1.28). Moreover, since it was men who fought these wars, the Greeks' concept of masculinity became as militarised as the geo-political environment in which they lived (Crowley 2012: 80-104).

Of course, with the exception of the Spartans and serving mercenaries, the Greeks were amateur warriors (Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5, *Ways.* 4.52; cf. Thuc. 5.66.2-4; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 11.4; Trundle 2004), and so their concept of masculinity was not entirely martial (Lys. 7.40-1; Xen. *Ec.* 4.1-25; cf. Thuc. 1.5.1-6.6; Roisman 2005: 26-63). Nevertheless, the Greeks felt that the greatest quality a man could demonstrate, and the one thing that undoubtedly defined him as a man, was his ability to overcome his fear and fight in interpersonal combat (Soph. *Ant.* 640-81; Thuc. 2.42.3; Crowley 2012: 92-6). Naturally, since the Greeks valued words less than deeds, this ability could not be declared, it had to be demonstrated (Xen. *Symp.* 8.43), and this ensured that men, especially young men, felt the need to prove themselves in combat (Crowley 2012: 86-88; Hunt 2010: 51-71, 108-33). Consequently, when interstate disputes escalated, it was easier for men to vote for war, since this confirmed their courage, and harder to vote for peace, because that called their courage into question and exposed them to accusations of cowardice (Roisman 2007: 113-7, also Hunt 2010: 108-33).

2. Security

The Greeks then, were politically fragmented, they lacked an enforceable system of international law, and faced by endless conflict, they normalised war and privileged the role of the warrior. Nevertheless, they were not helpless, and while they could not avoid the danger of war, they developed a range of sophisticated strategies designed to minimise the risks they faced.

2.1. Neutrality

Some *poleis* pursued a policy of neutrality, hoping to avoid the wars of others, but, as Bauslaugh (1990) demonstrates, this strategy entailed significant risks. The concept of neutrality was, for the Greeks, not just indistinct, but also contentious and contested. Consequently, *poleis* wishing to remain neutral had to perform a precarious balancing act, seeking *philia* (friendship, see Mitchell 1997: 28-44, also Hall 2007: 85-107) with potential belligerents whilst avoiding entangling obligations. Non-alignment, however, could easily become isolation, as Corcyra discovered immediately prior to the Peloponnesian War, when she found herself alone, threatened by Corinth, with no allies to come to her aid (Thuc. 1.31.1-32.5). Moreover, this risk was exacerbated by the suspicion neutrality attracted: the action-orientated Greeks tend to associate neutrality with selfishness and cowardice, and since belligerents often considered conflict a zero sum game, neutrality could easily be construed as aiding the enemy (Bauslaugh 1990: 70-83, also Hall 2007: 85-107). The Athenians, for instance, took this view of Melian neutrality during the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides describes (5.84.1-116.4), they demanded Melos side with them against the Spartans, and when she refused, they violated her neutrality, crushed her militarily, executed her men and andrapodised her surviving populace.

Neutrality, then, was fragile, and evidence of success is scant. This may, as Bauslaugh observes (1990: 21-35), simply reflect the nature of the extant evidence which makes neutrality most visible only at the point of failure. Argos, admittedly a relatively powerful *polis*, was able remain neutral during some of conflicts that marred the 5th and 4th Centuries (Hdt. 7.148.1-15.3; Thuc. 5.14.4; Bauslaugh 1990: 91-9, 109-41, 197-241). Nevertheless, it seems clear that neutrality, for the powerful, was a position they violated or upheld as it suited, whereas, for the weak, it was a risky strategy that entailed isolation and the placement of trust in those who often sought to prey upon them.

2.5. Subordination

The alternative, for weaker states, especially those in close proximity to more powerful neighbours was, to use the terminology of Walt (1987), to bandwagon. This involved trading some or all external freedom (*eleuthereria*) for guarantees of external security and internal sovereignty (*autonomia*), an exchange which allowed powerful *poleis* to establish themselves as hegemons (Thuc. 1.8.3, 15.2; Karavites 1982: 145-62; Hall 2010: 72-107; Hunt 2010: 154-84). After the Persian Wars, for instance, many Greek states collectivised their security under the leadership of Athens in order to protect themselves from Persia (Thuc. 1.89.1-118.3). Hegemonies, however, exist for the benefit of hegemons, and whilst subject states might sometimes manipulate them for their own interests (see esp. Thuc. 1.67.1-88.1), their initial sacrifice of *eleutheria* might lead to further loss of *autonomia*. Democratic Athens, for example, seems to have encouraged and sometimes imposed democracies on allies (Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.10-11; ML 40; Thuc. 1.115.3), and oligarchic Sparta acted similarly amongst those *poleis* she enrolled in the Peloponnesian League, which she controlled, in part, by supporting their own oligarchic regimes (Thuc. 1.19.1, 67.1-86.5, 144.2).

Even these profound compromises, however, did not necessarily entail escape from war, since dependents were often led into wars aimed squarely at their hegemon's aggrandizement. For instance, during the First Peloponnesian War (461-446 BC: Thuc. 1.102.1-115.1), Athens not only led her allies into battle in order to establish a land empire in central Greece, she also led them to disaster in North Africa during the Egyptian expedition (c.459-54 BC: Thuc. 1.104.1-2, 109.1-110.4).

2.2. Independence

Neutrality and subordination, then, guaranteed neither peace nor security, and it is unsurprising that Greek states sought to maintain their own capacity for defence. As Gomme

and Grundy recognised (1945: 10-24; 1911: 240-52), a glance at a map suggests that, for some states, the terrain itself, augmented with judicious use of fortifications, could have been used to deny hostile forces access to friendly territory. This potential, of course, had been actualised by the Greeks during the Persian Wars, when they used the pass at Thermopylae and its rudimentary fortifications to good effect against the invading Persians in 480 BC (Hdt. 7.176.2-5, 208.2, 223.2, 225.1-3; cf, 7.139-1-6, 207.1, 8.40.1-2, 71.1-2).

The failure to hold the pass, however, highlights one of the three obvious problems with preclusive defence, and that is the fact that no matter how strong a strongpoint is, or how challenging the terrain in which it is located, a determined invader can usually find a way around it (Hdt. 7.213.1-18.3). The second problem is even worse: manmade or natural obstacles are only obstacles as long as they are defended. An effective system of preclusive defence, therefore, requires a standing military force as well as the logistical systems required to support it, and both were beyond the modest resources of the Greeks (Gomme 1945: 10-24; Krentz 2007: 147-85). Finally, even if a system of preclusive defence could be manned and supported, there was no way of avoiding the third problem inherent thereto, namely, any state that adopted it placed all or most of its strength at its extremities. This entails such a dangerous degree of dispersal that a numerically inferior enemy could attain relative superiority by concentrating its forces at given location, and by breaching the defences at that point, render the entire system useless (see esp. McRaven 1995, also Luttwak 1976).

These problems, moreover, could be avoided by allowing a hostile force to violate the integrity of friendly territory, a temporary concession which allowed a state to concentrate all available forces against an invading army in the hope of defeating it in one decisive engagement (Hanson 2000). This strategy also avoided the costs of building, supplying and garrisoning static defences, it allowed the men of the *polis* to remain economically productive

and politically engaged, and it was still an effective security solution, because the Greeks were able to mobilise and deploy impressive field armies.

Typically, such armies formed around a core of heavy infantrymen the Greeks called hoplites. These warriors took their name from the Greek word for kit (*hopla*: Lazenby and Whitehead 1996: 27-33), and a full set of kit (a panoply) included a large round shield with a double grip, body armour, helmet and greaves for protection, a large thrusting spear as a primary weapon, and a short sword for backup (Hanson 1991: 63-84). Naturally, the weight of this entailed a substantial loss of tactical mobility offset by the adoption of a close-order rank and file formation called a phalanx (Schwartz: 2009). Often eight deep, this formation presented the enemy with a shield wall and an intimidating line of spear points, and although it was strong when engaged head-on, it was vulnerable to attack from flank or rear (Crowley 2012: 49-66). Accordingly, these vulnerabilities, where possible, were protected by terrain and the deployment of subordinate forces such as cavalry and light infantry (see esp. the battles of Delium in 424 BC, and Mantineia in 418 BC: Thuc. 4.89.1-101.1, 5.66.1–74.3).

A phalanx, moreover, required only a moderate financial investment. Leaving aside the Spartans, whose professionalism was anomalous, hoplites purchased their own equipment and provided their own rations (Aristoph. *Ach*. 197, 1073-1142, *Peace* 311-2, 1181-2, *Wasps* 243; Hanson 1991: 15-37; cf. Thuc. 1.48.1), and if these were sometimes augmented by expenses provided by their state, the rate provided was modest and more than offset by the savings offered by a main force that required little or no training (see esp. Crowley 2012: 2-3, 25-6, 34, 50, 64, 70, 81, 117, 123-4). This seems, at first, counter-intuitive. Many scholars believe the Greeks' ability to form up into large phalanxes required extensive tactical training (Hunt 2007: 108-46; Pritchett 1974: 208-31; van Wees 2007: 273-99). This belief is bolstered by the Spartans, whose hoplites were highly trained (see esp. Aristot. *Pol.* 8.1338b; Plat.

Lach. 182e-183a; Thuc. 2.39.1-4; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 7.1-6, 11.1-8) and could, consequently, perform more sophisticated tactical manoeuvres than those troops fielded by other states.

This assumption is, however, false, for three reasons. Firstly, Xenophon states explicitly (*Mem*. 3.12.5, *Ways*. 4.52; Crowley 2012: 49-66) that, until the end of the classical period, even impressive Athenian hoplites received no training whatsoever. Secondly, it is dangerous to assume that Spartan hoplites were highly trained: the *agōgē* (described in Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2.1-4.7) was aimed at social conditioning (Ducat 2006; Hodkinson 2006: 111-62), and whilst it clearly included tactical instruction (cf. Xen. *Mem*. 3.5.15, 12.5), Spartan manoeuvres (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 11.5-10) were only sophisticated in comparison to those of the other Greeks, which suggests that instruction was limited. Thirdly, whilst drill and training does provide men with the ability to adopt large formations efficiently, the Greeks were able to achieve this without either. As Xenophon reveals (*Cyrop*. 2.2.6-9, 3.21, also Asclep. *Tact*. 2.4-5; Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. *Lak. Pol*. 11.4-10), the only thing a hoplite had to do was follow the man in front. In this way, files of men could deploy side by side to form small subunits (sometimes called *lochoi*), which together form intermediate sized units (sometimes called *taxeis*), from which the phalanx as a whole is constructed. With these three levels of tactical subdivision, all based on files of men, all following the man in front, the Greeks were able to deploy their hoplites into column of route, march into proximity with the enemy and then redeploy into line of battle (see esp. Crowley 2012: 49-66). Furthermore, they were able to do this with only the direction of unit commanders, many of who, as members of the elite, could have purchased their own training from *hoplomachoi* (military sophists: Xen. *Mem*. 3.1.9; Wheeler 1982: 223-33), but most likely learned what to do through years of practical experience (cf. Thuc. 6.72.3, also 1.18.3, 6.91.2, 7.61, 63, 76.4; cf. § 6.69.1, 80.1-2).

Such a force, in the event of a serious threat, could deploy *pandēmei* (with all available men: Hdt. 1.62.3; Lys. 3.45; Thuc. 2.31.1, 4.42.3; Xen. *Hell*. 2.2.7) or, to meet more

limited threats it could be mobilised by age groups (as at Sparta: Xen. *Hell*. 5.4.13, 6.4.17, *Lak. Pol.* 11.2) or *katalogos* (Aristoph. *Peace* 1172-85; Thuc. 6.26.2). This method, employed by Athens and other *poleis* (Syracuse for example: Plut. *Nic*. 14.5), involved the handpicking of men by their commanders (a *katalogos* is a list), and whilst it was slow and cumbersome, it enabled a state with an amateur army to mobilise a high quality force containing a high proportion of experienced veterans (Crowley 2012: 22-39).

They, as discussed, did not fight alone, but were generally supported by light infantry and cavalry. In an emergency, those too poor to afford the two indispensable items of the panoply, namely the shield and spear, could serve as light infantry, but because that role required proficiency in weapons and tactics, *ad hoc* bodies of light infantry were of questionable worth (Pritchett 1991: 65-7; van Wees 2004: 61-5, 68-71). Consequently, *poleis* often hired small contingents of professionals: Thrace, for instance, supplied peltasts (javelin-throwing skirmishers), Rhodes was famous for its slingers and Crete for its archers (Thuc. 6.43.1-2, 7.27.1-30.3; Xen. *Anab*. 3.3.16; Best 1969).

Cavalry service was even more demanding: cavalrymen not only required proficiency with weapons (especially the javelin: Xen. *Anab*. 3.2.18, *Cav*. 1.21, *Horse*. 12.11-13), they also had to deploy those weapons from a horse, as well as operate at speed and in formation (Xen. *Cav*. 1.1-9.9, *Horse* 1.1-12.14; Hyland 2013: 512-26). Consequently, effective cavalry forces required a degree of competency which the Athenians, for instance, attained, through state oversight of and financial support for a small cadre of semi-professionals recruited from the horse-owning elite (Bugh 1988; Worley 1994: 70-4, 77-80).

Despite this focus on field armies, however, there was still a role for fortifications. *Poleis* were usually protected by walls, behind which non-combatants could shelter in the event of an invasion (Thuc. 1.5.1, 8.3, 2.5.1-5, 4.104.1-06.4; Laurence 1979; Winter 1971). Some *poleis*, such as Athens and Megara, augmented these defences with *makra teixē* (Thuc.

1.103.4, 107.1, 108.3), 'long walls' that protected a corridor connecting the fortified urban centre with the sea. These walls offered significant advantages, especially in Greece, where siege warfare remained under-developed. The reasons for this are cultural and technical: the Greeks lacked torsion-based artillery and could not defeat enemy walls from a distance, and while they possessed other close-range means of breaching, overtopping and scaling, employing them to assault fortifications was bloody work suited to expendable troops, not citizen warriors (Laurence 1979: 36-66; Krentz 2007: 147-85; Marsden 1969: 5-173; Seaman 2013: 642-56).

Accordingly, whilst attempts to defeat fortifications were not unknown (for example during the siege of Plataea, 429-27 BC: Thuc. 2.71.1-78.4, 3.20.1-24.3, 52.1-68.5), the Greeks tend to rely on circumvallation, that is, encircling their target with a siege wall and letting time and starvation do their grisly work (Thuc. 2.78.1, 3.52.1). Long walls, however, were an effective counter-measure, because they allowed a state that was cut off from its own agricultural land to obtain supplies by sea (Thuc. 1.143.3-5, 2.13.1-9, 22.1-24.1, 55.2, 60.1-65.13), and this could prevented only if the attacker went to the additional expense of imposing a naval blockade (Thuc. 6.75.1-7.16.2, 21.1-26.3, 31.1-33.6, 35.1-72.4).

Credible armed forces and strong fortifications (Aristot. *Pol.* 7.1330b-31a; Dem. 14.11), however, only partly satisfied a state's security needs, and most sought additional protection through alliances with others. At the most basic level, *poleis* formalised reciprocal friendship with other states through open-ended *philia* agreements (Bauslaugh 1990: 36-69; Mitchel 1997: 28-44), but since this provided little positive benefit in the event of conflict, they sought alliances that included more concrete obligations. According to Thucydides, (1.44.1, 5.48.2), there were two distinct types of alliance: an *epimachia* was a defensive alliance which only required contracting parties to come to one another's defence if they were attacked by a third, whereas a *symmachia* was a full defensive and offensive alliance which

required the contracting parties to 'have the same friends and enemies'. Actual practice, however, blurred this distinction, but, leaving aside aggressive operations, both types of treaty provided participants with a means of increasing their aggregate power, since once activated, all parties were obligated to provide military assistance to any ally under threat (see esp. *IG* II^2 43, the 'charter' of the Second Athenian League, with Adcock and Mosley 1975: 71-78; Hunt 2010: 104-5).

Such obligations, naturally, were not always faithfully discharged. When faced with the prospect of war, some states offered excuses and avoided their obligations (for examples, see esp. Bauslaugh 1990: 166-96), but such transgressions came with penalties. It was difficult, admittedly, for the Greeks to compel a state to honour its obligations, but, because interstate relations were governed by reciprocity, any state that failed to aid its allies might well find itself left in the lurch when those same allies reciprocated in kind (Hunt 2010: 72-107, 185-214; van Wees 1998: 13-49, 2004: 3-18). Alliances, then, were taken seriously by the Greeks, and they formed an effective way for a state to enhance its own security.

3. Deterrence

The Greeks, then, had various means to enhance their security. Some states remained neutral, but the suspicion and isolation this entailed left them vulnerable. Others surrendered a degree of freedom in order to avoid the aggression of more powerful neighbours and obtain their protection. Those, however, with a realistic chance of maintaining their independence, placed their faith in credible armed forces, fortifications, strong allies, and a good reputation, and the way a state used these resources to respond to the aggression of another could also deter future aggression.

As Hunt observes (2010: 108-33, 185-214), a weak response to aggression encourages further aggression, whereas a forceful response reduces the likelihood of further attacks. This situation encouraged small states to fight back against larger opponents (see, for example,

Thuc. 2.71.1-78.4, 3.20.1-24.3, 52.1-68.5), but a *polis* could also deter aggression by exploiting its military victories to the fullest extent possible. Accordingly, the Greeks pursued beaten enemies mercilessly and those unable to evade risked massacre (Hdt. 6.78.1-81.1; Thuc. 3.94.1-98.5, 4.96.6-8, 7.73.1-85.4; van Wees 2006: 69-110), not simply because this served to deter future aggression from others, but also because a severely damaged rival lost not just the will but also the capacity for further aggression.

Of course, the *poleis* of Greece did not simply adopt a strategic posture and then passively await the evolution of events, they also tried to pre-empt aggression by engaging in a constant process of positioning to ensure that they were best placed to meet existing or emerging threats. As previously discussed, some states bandwagoned with emerging threats, but those who could tended to balance (for which see Walt 1987), that is, ally themselves with other states to counter-balance the threat. For example, the rise of Athens after the Persian Wars was opposed by Sparta and Thebes, the rise of Sparta after the Peloponnesian War was opposed by Athens and Thebes, and the rise of Thebes after the Corinthian War was opposed by Athens and Sparta (Hunt 2010: 154-84; Strauss 1991: 189-210). Greece, then, was a self-balancing system, in which no one state could become predominant, and whilst this did not reduce the prevalence of conflict, it did allow the Greek *poleis* to maintain their independence.

4. The Hellenistic World

This independence, however, came at a price. An acephalous collection of micro-states was, by its very nature, vulnerable to more unified external threats. The Greeks' resistance to Persia was so undermined by particularism that they avoided subordination by the narrowest of margins (Hdt. 8.60.1-62.1; Lazenby 1993), and famously, their response to the rise of Macedon was even worse. Philip isolated his opponents with a mixture of threats

and promises, and although a coalition was eventually formed against him, it was too little, too late. As a result, the Greeks' endless internecine struggles ended in crushing military defeat at Chaeronea in 338 BC (Diod. Sic. 16.85.1-86.6), after which matters of peace, security and deterrence were determined by the overarching authority of Philip of Macedon, and those who came after.

Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire and premature death created a geo-political environment radically different from that which came before. This vast expanse was partitioned between Alexander's senior commanders, who are often referred to as the Diadochi, the Successors, and the super-states that emerged from their competition operated on a distinct dynamic determined by their political evolution. This produced kings whose legitimacy rested primarily upon military success , and whilst a common Macedonian identity, dynastic intermarriage, and incessant diplomacy went some way towards ameliorating conflict, the Hellenistic kings had to fight in order to survive (see Polyb. 15.20; Plut. *Pyrr*. 14.1-8, with Billows 2007: 303-24; Chaniotis 2005: 57-77; Serrati 2007: 461-97).

To do this, the Hellenistic super-states were able to draw on economic resources far beyond those of the traditional Greek powers. Macedonia, of course, was by no means poor, and the conquest of the East provided access to the wealth of Asia as well as agricultural land that could be tithed or settled in exchange for military service (Serrati 2007: 461-97). As a result, the military forces deployed by the Hellenistic monarchs were simply unparalleled (see esp. Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 325-67). On land, they were able to rely on huge armies whose ability to project power was derived not just from their size but also their enhanced professionalism (Roth 2007: 368-98): at the battle of Raphia (217 BC), for instance, around 140, 000 men took the field (Polyb. 5.79.1-13). Hellenistic navies were similarly impressive. As the fleet deployed by Demetrius I Poliorcetes at Salamis in 306 BC reveals (Diod. Sic. 20.49-50), ships were bigger, carried more fighting men and in many

cases deployed artillery for use against other ships and coastal defences (Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 357-67). The advances in artillery which made this possible, particularly the widespread adoption of the torsion spring, also provided the Hellenistic monarchs with an unprecedented ability to attack and take fortified positions (see, for instance, Polyb. 5.99.7, with Roth 2007: 368-98; Sabin and de Souza 2007: 448-60).

Against such power, the *poleis* of Greece could do little. Some, like the twelve states of Achaea in the Peloponnese, were able to pool their sovereignty, and through the revival of the Achaean League, seek a degree of independence (Roy 2003: 81-95). Most, however, accepted their irreversibly changed circumstances and sought security through subordination. Naturally, for the Greeks, given both their history and their culture, this was particularly unpalatable, and they sought to mask their subordination by recasting their successive Macedonian overlords as benefactors whose generosity they celebrated and honoured (Billows 2007: 303-24). This, of course, did nothing to change the reality of the relationship: the Macedonians eclipsed the power of the Greeks and their old enemies, the Persians, but, of course, despite their predatory predominance, even they were unable to check the rise of Rome.

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