THE PLANNING, DESIGN AND RECEPTION OF BRITISH HOME FRONT PROPAGANDA POSTERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Volume 1 of 2

REBECCA MARY LEWIS

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
April 2004

This thesis has been completed as a requirement for a higher degree of the University of Southampton
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, WINCHESTER
an accredited college of the
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Doctor of Philosophy

THE PLANNING, DESIGN AND RECESSION OF BRITISH HOME FRONT PROPAGANDA POSTERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by Rebecca Mary Lewis

This thesis has been completed as a requirement for a higher degree of the University of Southampton

This project focuses on propaganda posters produced during the Second World War (1939 to 1945), primarily by the British government, aimed chiefly at their civilian population. The project uses Foucauldian discourse analysis and content analysis to investigate the images and their context, and identify key themes across a wide range of posters, over a long time-frame. This thesis contributes to an historical understanding of the British popular propaganda experience, largely ignored in previous historical research.

Drawing on material from several archives, including the Imperial War Museum (IWM), the Public Record Office (PRO) and Mass-Observation (M-O), the project also uses questionnaires to elicit memories of the posters, and a poster database to collect together material which would otherwise remain dispersed. The thesis sets the posters against a background of contextual material, it identifies key propaganda theories, discerns relevant poster styles and recognises British poster style as one of pragmatic functionalism. The thesis outlines the poster production and distribution processes of the Ministry of Information (MOI) and considers the first (highly criticised) posters before concentrating on four case studies, each of which is structured in three sections: the planning (context), the design, and the reception of the posters.

The first case study examines what people were fighting for, and identifies their ‘imagined community’, by considering urban and rural representations of the UK in the posters. The second case study considers industrial propaganda, emphasises the idea of the island nation, and identifies those involved in the industrial effort. The third case study looks at the ‘enemy within’, and examines who was excluded from, or was considered damaging to, the war effort. The fourth case study explores in detail who was compromising the war effort through their sexual behaviour, putting themselves at risk of venereal disease. The thesis argues that the posters drew heavily on longer term discourses emanating from new and established institutions, although there was often a clear distinction between those that drew on the past and tradition, and those that pushed forward to the future.
## Contents

### Volume One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: Methods and Sources</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: Placing the British Experience of the Propaganda Poster in Context</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: Commissioning, Design &amp; Distribution, with a particular focus on the MOI and the first posters produced.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4: Case Study: Representations of ‘Your Britain’, Urban and Rural</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: Case Study: Industrial Posters</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: Case Study: The ‘Enemy Within’</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7: Case Study: The ‘Problem’ of Venereal Disease in Wartime</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Volume Two: Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Image Files</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Collections Information</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3: Questionnaire</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4: Propaganda Models</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5: Own Propaganda Model</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6: MOI Organisational Charts</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 7: General Division Chart</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 8: Industrial Stoppages</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 9: VD Statistics</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume Two: Part 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Document</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Information</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User Guide</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Reports</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Information</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist Information</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

My thanks are due first to my Director of Studies, Dr Martin Polley, of the School of Education, University of Southampton (formerly of King Alfred’s College of Higher Education, Winchester), and my Second Supervisor, Professor Joyce Goodman, of University College, Winchester, for their guidance, encouragement and enthusiasm for my project over the years. My thanks are also directed at my Academic Advisor, Dr Terence Rodgers, of Bath Spa University College, for advice and comments on particular aspects of the thesis, and to Professor Roger Richardson, University College, Winchester, for his initial help and supervision of the project. I am grateful to Dr Malcolm Smith, of the University of Wales, Lampeter, and Dr Chris Aldous, of University College, Winchester, for their examining input at the upgrade stage.

University College, Winchester also provided a lively research community and I am grateful to other staff and postgraduates for their support and ideas, in particular Dr Stephanie Spencer for allowing me to practise verbally expounding my ideas. King Alfred’s generously funded the initial three years of study, and has subsequently funded attendance at conferences, giving me further opportunities to present my work and discuss issues with established historians. It also funded participation at workshops, including those concerning the digitisation of historical resources. The library, in particular Miranda Nield-Dumper, patiently ordered many inter-library loans, and the ITCS Department ensured that my computer remained in working order, whilst Ian Short (software developer) and Lynne Frost (née Biltcliffe) (IT Trainer) also provided help with the initial development of the project database. I am exceptionally grateful to Dr James Heather, University of Surrey at Guildford, who has spent many hours developing the project database to my requirements, even whilst completing his own PhD.

An extensive amount of time has been spent in archives and record offices, and I thank all the staff for the help and advice given, particularly the following: Michael Moody at the Imperial War Museum; Anna Green and Joy Eldridge of the Mass-Observation Archives; Katrina Royall and others at the Victoria & Albert Museum; the Public Record Office; the British Library, in particular The British Library Newspaper Library, Colindale; Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; the London Transport Museum; the House of Lords Record Office; the Wellcome Institute and the Women’s Library.
I am also indebted to other libraries that allowed me to use their facilities in the course of my research, in particular Winchester School of Art Library, the Hartley Library, University of Southampton; the Institute for Historical Research; St. Peter’s Library, University of Brighton; Templeman Library, University of Kent at Canterbury, and the library at the University of Sussex. I am very appreciative of University College, Winchester who allowed me to attend the ‘Research Methodology’ module from ‘MA in Regional and Local History and Archaeology’, and Winchester School of Art, who allowed me to attend selected lectures from ‘MA: Art and Ideology in Europe 1917-1968’, both free of charge. I also appreciate the University of Kent at Canterbury, who allowed me to attend selected lectures from their ‘MA in Propaganda, Persuasion and History’. I am very grateful to all those who have written to me, particularly those who completed my questionnaire in 1997 and 1998, from which I received much useful information.

Personally, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me throughout the years, financially, practically and with moral support, especially my parents. I am exceptionally grateful to Andrew Frost for providing me with a room at a rate that I could afford to stay in Winchester for a key time. Particular thanks goes to Toby and Nicky Robinson and Justin Wood for providing me with places to stay whilst conducting extensive research in London, and to Dr Justine Cooper, who alongside such practical help, provided beneficial advice arising from her previous experience as a Winchester PhD student. Kate Stephens gave me exceptional moral support, Karen Neal allowed me to practise explaining my thesis, David and Chris Quayle were supportive landlords during the final months of writing, and there are many more whom I could name, including Amanda Henocq and Helen Hobbs, but the list would be absurdly long. I am very grateful to all those who have given me their friendship, put up with my odd hours, and provided me with lifts and practical help.
### Abbreviations

Abbreviations used throughout the text, including within the chronology and appendices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>Army Bureau of Current Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>Alliance Graphique Internationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Artists International Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Air Raid Precautions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Auxiliary Territorial Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIPO</td>
<td>British Institute of Public Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMJ</td>
<td>British Medical Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSHC</td>
<td>British Social Hygiene Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUF</td>
<td>British Union of Fascists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAI</td>
<td>Council for Art and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Commander of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCHE</td>
<td>Central Council for Health Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Committee for Imperial Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Central Office of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General (of MOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Deputy Director General (of MOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>Empire Marketing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENSA</td>
<td>Entertainments’ National Service Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWO</td>
<td>Emergency Works Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPD</td>
<td>General Production Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Home Intelligence Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLRO</td>
<td>House of Lords Records Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPD</td>
<td>Home Publicity Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMEC</td>
<td>Home Morale Emergency Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s Stationary Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPC</td>
<td>Home Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Institute for Propaganda Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWM</td>
<td>Imperial War Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Junior Assistant Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>London City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV</td>
<td>Local Defence Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNER</td>
<td>London and North-Eastern Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPTB</td>
<td>London Passenger Transport Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>London Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTM</td>
<td>London Transport Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACS</td>
<td>Medical Advisory Committee for Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBE</td>
<td>Member of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRIAD</td>
<td>Manchester Institute for Research and Innovation in Art and Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMB</td>
<td>Milk Marketing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCS</td>
<td>Merchant Navy Comforts Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-O</td>
<td>Mass-Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLNS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and National Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWT</td>
<td>Ministry of War Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAL</td>
<td>National Art Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCVD</td>
<td>National Council for Combatting Venereal Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Gallery of Art (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Savings Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPVD</td>
<td>National Society for the Prevention of Venereal Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Office of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWE</td>
<td>Political Warfare Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Royal Academy of Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>Royal Armoured Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAOC</td>
<td>Royal Army Ordnance Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Royal College of Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDI</td>
<td>Royal Designer for Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIO</td>
<td>Regional Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMVP</td>
<td>Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSPA/RSPA</td>
<td>Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSMA</td>
<td>Royal Society of Marine Artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Society of Industrial Artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V&amp;A</td>
<td>Victoria and Albert Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADS</td>
<td>Visual Arts Data Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAAF</td>
<td>Women’s Auxiliary Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLA</td>
<td>Women’s Land Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRNS</td>
<td>Women’s Royal Naval Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSS</td>
<td>Wartime Social Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>Women’s Voluntary Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Using a mixture of content analysis and Foucauldian concepts of discourse analysis, this project investigates the propaganda posters produced by the British government, largely for the British home front, during the years 1939 to 1945, the span of the Second World War. The initial chapters set the context. The first describes the sources and methods used in the project. The second investigates contemporary understandings of propaganda and the design history of the modern pictorial poster. The third considers the process by which posters were commissioned, designed and produced, particularly by the Ministry of Information (MOI). Through four case studies the project then considers the planning decisions taken by the government, the design of the posters themselves, and evidence of the reception of posters. The Introduction chapter details the aims of the project, explains the relevance of the project at this time, and considers current interest in ‘the planning, design and reception of British Home Front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, historical, theoretical and personal. The concepts of ‘propaganda’ and ‘poster’ are considered, as well as reflections on the place of the poster in relation to other media available throughout the war. In the process, the Introduction covers the key literature pertinent to the project. It concludes with an outline of the layout of the thesis.

The project aims to understand the production processes of government home front posters. With the MOI at the centre of this process, the project explores the government’s role in relation to posters, its interaction with other government departments, and relations with external agencies. The case studies use a Foucauldian frame to establish the longer term discourses on which the posters were drawing, discourses which were used because of the common frames of reference, shared with their target audience, on which poster designers drew. The case studies are framed by a knowledge of the general reasons for propaganda, identified by scholars of propaganda, in particular persuasion, education, information, celebration, encouragement, morale boosting, and identification of enemies. The case studies are also informed by a knowledge of the general techniques of propaganda, in particular the appeal to the emotions of hatred, fear, anger, guilt, greed, hope and love. Contemporary models of propaganda are assessed critically in relation to the posters studied. In the conclusion, the project produces a model which demonstrates how the posters fitted in to a larger framework. This enables us to understand where the government ranked posters in relation to other media, and to see where they fitted, for example, in the legislative
structure. The artistic approach to posters is not the key element of the study. Nevertheless it has been deemed important to identify and analyse the influence of trends and technologies from art and design on British posters, particularly official posters. This allows us to see what design styles were available to the government, whether they put them to use, and what discourses the styles used embodied. The project also analyses the reception of the propaganda posters at the time, in so far as this is possible. In particular, it will look at whether they were more positively received at the time than as remembered by a questionnaire respondent:

At the risk of being labelled conceited I would say that thanks to a decent education and being employed in a Government establishment (and with at least a modicum of common-sense) I did not need the messages of the posters. Perhaps this is why I don’t remember them very well.¹

The subject of ‘The planning, design and reception of British Home Front propaganda posters of the Second World War’ is still a pertinent subject of research, nearly seventy years after the war ended, and we have to question why. The scope of historiography widened considerably during the twentieth century from a heavy concentration on political events, to a broader appreciation of economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and psychological aspects. Historians have recognised since the 1960s that ‘history from below’ is as important as studies of the great political figures of history.² Tosh claims that history is ‘collective memory, the storehouse of experience through which people develop a sense of their social identity and their future prospects’.³ Barraclough asserts that the ‘boundary line between contemporary and past society is tenuous, shifting and artificial’,⁴ and Mauro even goes so far as to say that history is ‘the projection of the social sciences

¹ Male, East Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998. Briggs, A., Go To It! Working for Victory of the Home Front 1939-1945, 2000, p.13 notes that the posters provided a colourful change from the monochrome monotony that accompanied much war work.
² Nationmaster, ‘History from below’, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/History-from-below, last updated December 24 2003, accessed January 11 2004, notes: ‘History from below is a form of historical narrative which was developed as a result of the Annales School and popularised in the nineteen-sixties. This form of social history focuses on the perspectives of regular individuals within society as well as individuals and regions that were not previously considered historically important.’ The phrase was first popularised by E.P.Thompson in an article in the Times Literary Supplement in 1966.
³ Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods & New Directions in the Study of Modern History, 1991 (Second Edition), p.1. Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods & New Directions in the Study of Modern History, 2002 (Third Edition, Revised), p.1 rephrases this as: ‘All societies have a collective memory, a storehouse of experience which is drawn on for a sense of identity and a sense of direction’. At first glance this appears to make the same point, but is no longer noting that this is history, making the further point that ‘professional historians commonly deplore the superficiality of popular historical knowledge’.
into the past. He claims that historians have tended to look for a ‘uniqueness’ in their facts, whereas the influence of sociology has led to more interest in understanding the ‘norm’. The links with sociologists have cleared the way to study the ‘underlying framework’ of society, including more of a concern with structural patterns of such issues as the family and social class, rather than simple causal links to specific events.

It has thus been recognised that society is not simply a backdrop, but worth studying for itself. A wide variety of sources are now available in a variety of archives, and digitisation projects are improving public access to previously inaccessible sources. With the face of history changing over the past few decades, particularly with an increase in interest in social and family history, there are now a perplexing number of avenues for the historian to go down, and consequently a wide-ranging and bewildering array of sources. It is our job, as historians, to assess the sources available and consider their relative importance and the methodologies required in order to use them, with the value of a source defined by the topic under consideration. Subjects such as psychology and sociology have influenced historical study for some time, and have changed the way we view the importance of some sources. Take Marwick’s example of a chocolate wrapper: he considers that, to the general historian, this is largely an insignificant source compared with other sources available, yet to the historian of the chocolate industry, or of design, it may be an essential source. We would argue that the value of the chocolate wrapper as a historical source is far more valuable than this: as an ephemeral item, amongst other examples, it gives us evidence of eating habits, consumerism, and health concerns. Unlike a medieval historian who has to scratch around for scraps of information, the contemporary historian is overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information available, and has to make some tough decisions as to how to process the plethora of available material. The use of sources for this project is discussed in the next chapter on Methods and Sources.

5 Ibid., p.63, quoting Frederic Mauro.
6 Ibid., p.53.
7 Ibid., p.54. Tosh, J., op.cit., 2002, p.128 also refers to the ‘social structure’ which social historians now make efforts to understand.
11 For example, the growth of concerns with health led to the placing of calorific and nutritional values of foodstuffs on British food packaging, something that does not occur world-wide.
Despite this growing awareness of different sources, however, the existing historiography has not devoted much time to posters. Amongst an abundance of studies on the Second World War, posters, and propaganda, there is little that focuses on the British propaganda poster effort. The Second World War has assumed a quality of myth, and both academic and nostalgic interest has been attracted.\textsuperscript{12} Posters can make for beautiful illustrations, and there are vast numbers of non-academic books available on the subject.\textsuperscript{13} Some academic texts are also available,\textsuperscript{14} although few of these are on British posters, and are more often on propaganda in general.\textsuperscript{15} British home front posters are often used as illustrations in general texts on the Second World War, although the accuracy of information provided can sometimes be questioned.\textsuperscript{16} Posters have made appearances in various exhibitions, which has stimulated further interest in the subject.\textsuperscript{17} The timing of such exhibitions, in the 1930s,\textsuperscript{18} 1970s,\textsuperscript{19} 1990s,\textsuperscript{20} and into the twenty-first century,\textsuperscript{21} needs to be explored, as we need to question why there was believed to be a market, with commercial returns, for such exhibitions at such times. As an example, the 1998 ‘Power of the Poster’ exhibition at the


\textsuperscript{15} See page 9 for examples of academic studies on propaganda, concentrating on the overseas effort.


\textsuperscript{18} A major poster exhibition was held at the V&A in 1931.

\textsuperscript{19} A major exhibition on war posters was held at the IWM in 1972, as the result of which Darracott, J., and Loftus, B. (eds), \textit{Second World War Posters}, 1972, was published.

\textsuperscript{20} A major poster exhibition, ‘The Power of the Poster’ was held at the V&A in 1998. In the same year, a major touring exhibition, ‘Posters American Style’, was also held in America.

\textsuperscript{21} In 2001, the IWM held a small poster exhibition, ‘Symbols and Stereotypes’. ‘Rene Wanner’s Poster Page’ has kept international Internet visitors up to date with exhibitions since 1997. Details of past exhibitions are
Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) was particularly important at a time when the UK’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was attempting to re-brand the UK as ‘Cool Britannia’. Posters from an earlier era demonstrate some of the ways in which ‘national projection’ was achieved before.²² A major reason for the 1998 V&A exhibition was the revival in the use of posters by advertisers, with seventy-five per cent using posters as a medium in 1998, as opposed to thirty-five per cent in 1991.²³ Alongside these texts there is a growing range of documentation on the internet, of which the quality can sometimes be questionable.²⁴ So long as authors’ credentials for authority on a topic are assessed, useful information and images can be garnered, and a wider range of quality sites is becoming more easily available.²⁵

Often general poster histories cover the history of the poster before and after the Second World War, but pass quickly over the war period itself.²⁶ An exception is the 100 Best Posters of the Century, which awards government posters of the Second World War six entries on merit alone.²⁷ Moody, keen to see an academic study of wartime posters, commented that many have perceived the subject as being ‘too large’ to tackle.²⁸ Rossi is evidence of the truth of this comment, claiming that his general history of posters cannot adequately deal with war posters: being so numerous, they require a separate study.²⁹ Yet

---

²⁶ For example, Rossi, A., op.cit., 1969, appears to consider any wartime posters of very little significance to the development of poster history, and jumps straight from the nineteen-thirties to ‘after the Second World War’.
²⁷ Taylor, T. (ed), The 100 Best Posters of the Century, 1999. The book did not choose the one best poster per year, but chose posters over the whole period on ‘merit’ alone.
²⁸ Moody, M., Research and Information Officer, Department of Art, IWM. Personal Comment, June 1999.
we cannot ignore a subject simply because it is perceived to be too vast: although it may mean that the topic can be tackled only from one angle at a time, there is surely even more of a justification for studying it. Second World War posters have been studied by a few authors, including Zeman\(^{30}\) and Rhodes,\(^{31}\) although even these are contained within more general propaganda histories, with black propaganda considered by Boehm.\(^{32}\) Many general texts that deal with wartime Britain also consider British propaganda including Cantwell, who deals specifically with British posters,\(^{33}\) and Osley,\(^{34}\) Yass\(^{35}\) and Begley,\(^{36}\) who consider posters alongside other propaganda materials produced by the government. Part of the problem is that although the materials have been preserved, accessing them is difficult and a deterrent to would-be users. Attempts have been, and are being, made to use the materials through research projects on the subject of British wartime posters.\(^{37}\)

The popularity of these books, exhibitions and internet sites demonstrates the nostalgic interest the general public has in posters. As ephemeral objects, posters often bring back memories of contemporary commodities, and associations with events around the time that they were produced. As Smith aptly suggests ‘the war permeated our lives, even though we [those born after the 1940s] never saw a bomber or heard a siren’. The Second World War is a part of British cultural history, arising from the ‘mythical’ experience of the ‘people’s war’, a time when it is commonly believed that all ‘pulled together’ in the name of victory.\(^{38}\) The idea of the ‘people’s war’ was a contemporary wartime phrase, a ‘potentially inclusive, democratic sentiment’,\(^{39}\) one that has been popularised amongst post-war

---


\(^{35}\) Yass, M., *This is Your War: Home front Propaganda in the Second World War*, 1983.


generations by Calder’s *The People’s War*.\(^{40}\) Donnelly attributes to wartime propaganda campaigns a major responsibility for establishing this myth.\(^{41}\) During the war, a ‘shared sense of national identity had to be mobilised amongst the people of Britain’. Achieved partly through propaganda posters, more and more people ‘were encouraged to identify themselves as active citizens, as active members of the nation’, a citizenship ‘to be earned by communal and individual service of one’s nation in wartime’.\(^{42}\) With the first ‘national citizen army’,\(^{43}\) in the Second World War, notions of the ‘citizen soldier’, the good citizen who is also courageous, first presented by Aristotle, were used.\(^{44}\) The boundaries between the civilian and the combatant soldier were blurred during the war, with ‘propagandist attempts to personify the entire population as heroic’.\(^{45}\) Social citizenship lectures were presented through the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), considered further in chapter four. This thesis thus also considers posters presented to soldiers on issues that affected them as citizens,\(^{46}\) although it does not address military recruitment campaigns. It is also outside the scope of this project to consider political, electioneering and overseas propaganda produced by the government or by political parties during the war. It concentrates solely on posters aimed at the home front, or those that affected people as citizens.

The myth of the ‘people’s war’ is still ‘sold’ today and boosts the heritage industry, a multi-million pound industry for the UK.\(^{47}\) The posters, along with the general wartime

---


\(^{44}\) Oliver, D., and Heater, D., op.cit., 1994, p.119.


\(^{46}\) Havinghurst, A.F., *Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century*, 1985 (fourth edition), p.289, notes that the distinction between civilian and soldier soon lost meaning ‘for throughout the conflict the man in uniform and the civilian shared to a considerable degree the same experience.’ Walker, M., *Unless I’m Very Much Mistaken: My Autobiography*, 2003, p.59, the Formula 1 commentator who was a soldier during the war, and in the advertising industry after the war, claims: ‘I didn’t find it difficult being a civilian again because I guess I had always been one at heart’.

\(^{47}\) For more information on this, see Vernon, J., ‘University of California, Berkely: History 103C: syllabus’, [http://history.berkeley.edu/faculty/Vernon/History103/h103syl.html](http://history.berkeley.edu/faculty/Vernon/History103/h103syl.html), accessed August 10 2001, and Samuel,
experience, have gained mythical accretions, and most people have a knowledge of many of the wartime posters, as a product of the shared experience. Joke books, although they contain very little factual information, can be useful as they assume a shared experience of the war, of which posters are a part. The Second World War is still regarded as a defining moment in the history of the UK, particularly of the twentieth century. There are countless populist texts written on the Second World War, demonstrating the defining impact the war had on many lives. These can often shed light on the general wartime mood, but as these are often written retrospectively, the influence of nostalgia can often be felt only too clearly. We do have to question whether the Second World War will remain such a defining moment in history. We have now passed what some considered the defining landmark of the new millennium. Those who can personally remember the war are disappearing, and more recent wars and events, such as September 11 2001, have gained significance. As can be seen by the remembrance of past historical events such as the Battle of Hastings in 1066, however, 1939 and 1945 are always likely to remain important dates in British history, taught to new generations, as evidenced on page 241.

The propaganda of the First World War has been well researched by several historians, and there are also several studies of propaganda in inter-war UK. Grant considered the development of domestic government publicity departments, and Taylor and Black.

---


48 Deary, T., *Horrible Histories: The Twentieth Century*, 1996, pp.75-6, for instance, illustrates a spoof war poster with the slogan ‘A Sewing Machine can be as much as weapon of war as a spade,’ and then comments that ‘This may be true but it is harder digging a garden with a sewing machine.’


50 This was probably more relevant for those involved in the computing industry, but others, for instance, Bevis Hillier suggested in 1989 in *The Times* that it was time to start preparing to celebrate the year 2000. Nicolson, A., *Regeneration: The Story of the Dome*, 1999, pp. 25-27 notes that the Government was determined to celebrate the millennium with The Millennium Dome and The London Eye, although in general there was at best ‘unenthusiastic millenarianism’ in the UK. Tosh, J., op.cit. 2002, pp.xii-xiii notes that the new millennium could have provided a ‘convenient vantage point’ to reflect on British history, but that ‘the public celebration of the Millennium in Britain was almost empty of historical content’.


concentrated on the development of the publicity efforts of the Foreign Office to ‘project the national image’ abroad. All considered how peacetime departments fought to retain control of publicity whilst plans for the development of the MOI were in progress. Although the government produced official war histories of many British departments of state in the early post-war years, there were ‘two obvious omissions’, the Board of Education and the MOI. Why the MOI was omitted is not clear: although its perceived failures may have counted against it, these would actually have made very interesting history. The purpose of the official histories was ‘to fund experience for Government use’, a critical series to demonstrate the processes of trial and error. Many other aspects of propaganda from the Second World War have since been studied, although, unsurprisingly, it is the Nazi effort that has attracted most attention, whilst other countries have also received a fair amount of coverage.

The foremost studies on Second World War British propaganda are generally regarded as McLaine’s *The Ministry of Morale* and Balfour’s *Propaganda in War 1939-45*. Both were published in 1979, four years after the bulk of general wartime files were released at the Public Record Office (PRO), and both addressed the government’s wartime information services. Both focused on the MOI but different angles were taken. McLaine concentrated solely on domestic propaganda, whereas Balfour felt that British home front propaganda could not be understood properly without reference to the propaganda

---

produced by the British for German consumption, and German propaganda efforts at home and in the UK. Pelling notes that McLaine covers little of the MOI ‘after Bracken had taken over, perhaps because the author is more interested in its years of travail that in its years of success’. McLaine’s work relies largely on those documents available in the PRO: it does not pay much attention to posters themselves, aside from their use to illustrate a few points, and the obvious references to the first poster, ‘Your courage’ (figure 1). Balfour worked for the MOI, from March 1939 to March 1942, as Temporary Principal in the General Division. From April 1942 until the end of war he was Assistant Director of Intelligence in Political Warfare Executive/Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). He thus gained a good insight into two angles of the propaganda war. Balfour implies that propaganda did not really have a part to play in the outcome of the war anyway, but it must be taken into account that he may be trying to justify his part in the early years of the MOI. The consensus view of the MOI, which has doubtless been emphasised by these works, is that it was essentially a failure for the first two years of the war.

It is not the intention of this project to produce another administrative history of the MOI, as the centre of interest here is more the decision making and attitude of those in authority towards those they governed. This project builds on the works of McLaine and Balfour, but with a concentration specifically on the poster production departments, from which propaganda posters were produced in the belief that they would aid the general welfare of the nation (rather than for profit, as commercial posters are). In 1998, Chapman already set the lead in this field when he published a work based on his PhD thesis, in which he studied the cinema as a propaganda instrument, and its use by the MOI. This thesis took as a model the structure of Chapman’s text, with the first half of the book covering the administrative background to film production, and the second half divided up into several

---

63 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.30-31. The study of this poster was particularly based upon the following files PRO INF 1/300, ‘Minutes of meetings of experts on Home Publicity’, PRO INF 1/316, ‘Minutes of Branch 1 Meeting’, PRO INF 1/723, ‘Copies of Memoranda Home Section: HP (III) 29-HP(IV) 115’, and PRO INF 1/724 ‘Copies of Memoranda Home Section: HP(V) 23-141’.
64 Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.xi.
65 Ibid., p.438.
themes. This, and other works which have also considered the cinema\textsuperscript{68} and radio,\textsuperscript{69} are useful comparative studies as the poster is often seen to have been devalued with the coming of the radio. Although a consideration of the poster in relation to other media is outside the remit of this study, posters were not produced in a vacuum. Such works are important in understanding the links between posters and other propaganda media, in particular the ways in which images from posters were reinforced by other media, and how posters in turn reinforced other media.\textsuperscript{70} Such works give us an idea of how different media work and how posters fitted into the general scheme of things, and can demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of the other media.

Propaganda was one of the most important defining features of the twentieth century, and of its warfare in particular, and posters are one of the media that form the range of propaganda: ‘This century has seen the inexorable rise of the propaganda posters… This is partly because politicians – even those of totalitarian regimes – have never been able to take public support for granted’.\textsuperscript{71} Propaganda, of course, still has an important part to play today, as can be demonstrated by the importance that the Labour Party has attached to its ‘spin doctors’.\textsuperscript{72} However, the term ‘propaganda’ has a confusing history, and it becomes crucial to see how propaganda has been defined in the past, and how it is used within this project, because often what could be considered propaganda is described, and disguised, as the more innocuous ‘education’ or ‘persuasion’. Posters of the Second World War were often not regarded as ‘propaganda’: as one respondent put it, there was ‘nothing like the WW1 propaganda posters’. There was nothing similar to the First World War poster ‘Your Country Needs You’ with Kitchener accusingly pointing to the viewer (figure 2),\textsuperscript{73} first to induce guilt and then speedy enlistment. The nature of the Second World War appeared different from the First World War. With conscription introduced before the war, ‘people


\textsuperscript{70} James, A., \textit{Informing the People}, 1996, looks particularly at leaflets and booklets, and Osley, A., op.cit., 1995, at a variety of information, produced by the MOI during the Second World War.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Midweek: Lifestyle London}, May 18 1998 (Extract, taken from ‘Power of the Poster’ File, V&A).

mostly waited to be called up’, with ‘almost total agreement that the war should be fought’. Comparisons were also made with inter-war propaganda, as people did not appear to associate British government posters with the type of propaganda produced by the Nazis. Some felt that:

there were not any propaganda ones by the British. All of the posters issued by the allied forces were true advice posters warning everybody of the Dangers [sic] that lay ahead. All propaganda came from Nazi Germany but thank God it was never believed by all true British subjects. … and propaganda was not advisable as it costs lives.

With this argument in mind, how exactly do we define propaganda, a subject on which there is wide debate? Since the early twentieth century propaganda has been defined as ‘information, ideas, opinions, etc. propagated as a means of winning support for, or fomenting opposition to, a government, cause, institution, etc.’. With propaganda, it is not just what is said that contributes to the meaning, as ‘omission is just as significant as commission’. The word ‘propaganda’ itself is Latin in origin, meaning ‘to sow’ or ‘to propagate’, and was intended as a neutral term, first used in the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, formed in 1662, meaning ‘the spread of the Roman Catholic faith’. Most tend to see the original use of the word as innocuous, although the word gradually gained more pejorative connotations, and by the end of the First World War ‘propaganda’ truly was regarded as a dirty word, as people deemed enlistment efforts, for example, as

---

73 Male, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
74 Male, West Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998. This is a topic that has been addressed in many general histories: Calder, A. op.cit., 1969 p.25, claims that the Spanish Civil War had broken down many pacifist attitudes within the UK, p.33 claims that there was reluctant relief at the arrival of war. Noakes, L., op.cit., 1998, p.24, notes that there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm to the arrival of war. ‘Chapter 3: The Day War Broke Out’, however, in Longmate, N., op.cit., 1971, pp.24-34, details many different reactions to the outbreak of war, some positive, some negative, probably the most accurate view (largely based upon oral history). Samuel, R., op.cit., 1994, p.23, notes that fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the war effort were headed by Dame Vera Lynn, speaking on behalf of the soldiers, rather than the leadership.
75 Male/Female Couple, Hampshire, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
76 Male, Londonderry, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
77 Room, A., The Cassell Dictionary of Word Histories, 1999 p.490. Taylor, P.M., British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, 1999, p.xii, noted that the Nato definition in the 1990s for propaganda was: ‘any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly’.
78 Taylor, P.M., ibid., p.45.
lies.\textsuperscript{80} Jowett and O’Donnell claim that ‘[p]ropaganda deliberately and systematically seeks to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’;\textsuperscript{81} it is not carried out for the mutual benefit of those involved. This gives rise to an interesting debate, although not tackled in this thesis: was the State interested only in what it could achieve for its own ends, or was the war really a ‘people’s war’? Calder was very sceptical, claiming that the government had found it easier to manipulate the people, having found out what they wanted through public opinion polls.\textsuperscript{82}

The Germans under the Nazi party were prepared to use the title Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (RMVP), the Nazi Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda.\textsuperscript{83} The British, however, were much more circumspect, feeling that the word ‘propaganda’ had so many negative connotations that the title of The Ministry of Information must be used instead.\textsuperscript{84} Although the title ‘Ministry of Information’ was originally not felt to be ‘fully descriptive of the functions of this Ministry’, the titles ‘Ministry of National Publicity’ and ‘Ministry of Propaganda’ were also deemed inappropriate. Crawford, head of an advertising agency, claimed that ‘Propaganda is a drug’, and a ‘Ministry of Propaganda’ was not wanted ‘in this country’, although ‘we might want a Ministry of Information, to give us the facts alone’.\textsuperscript{85} However, contradicting this, Fougasse built on his earlier definition of a poster by defining a \textit{propaganda} poster as ‘everything stuck up with the object of persuading the passer-by for the common good’.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{83} Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.xv.
\textsuperscript{84} PRO CAB 16/128, ‘Committee of Imperial Defence: Sub-Committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information planning sub-Committee. Report, proceedings & memoranda MIC (sub) series’, p.8, noted: ‘We do not consider the title “Ministry of Information” is fully descriptive of the functions of this Ministry. An alternative title “Ministry of National Publicity” has been suggested. It may be thought, however, that this title is a rather provocative one, and might be confused with an existing political organisation. The main function of the proposed Ministry is to deal with National Propaganda, but it is clear that “Ministry of Propaganda” would not be an acceptable title,’ due to the political significance of the name.’
\textsuperscript{85} Anonymous, ‘Propaganda Ministry Not Wanted - Sir William Crawford: But Ministry of Information Might be Welcomed’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 103, No. 1,357, May 25 1939, p.222. A Devon male, who remained in the UK working in agriculture throughout the war, in reply to the questionnaire, April 1998, said that he remembered it ‘chiefly chiefly as the Ministry of Mis-Information’. A male ex-soldier from Worcester, replied to the questionnaire, April, 1998, and remembered referring to it throughout the war as the “Ministry of Lies”, although ‘some years after the conflict ended … I came to feel that the latter description was, maybe, “over the top”!’
\textsuperscript{86} Fougasse, \textit{A School of Purposes}, 1946, p.11.
and others in government were not so hasty. For example, Rawdon-Smith, discussing the use of the word ‘propaganda’ within the British Council, complained that people must be persuaded to recognise that propaganda was a neutral term, or that the word should never be used again.

Propaganda studies became popular in the inter-war years, and this continued into the war years, by when various models of propaganda were available, discussed further in chapter two. The ‘magic bullet theory’, was favoured by Hitler, but the ‘multi-step flow theory’ was recognised by the Second World War. We will see the arguments surrounding the use of propaganda in the Second World War, and whether the government considered propaganda to be a weapon. Jowett and O’Donnell have produced what is considered the key text in the area of propaganda, now in its third edition. As with many works on propaganda, the authors are American, but British interest in the subject is growing all the time, with historians such as Taylor, Welch and Doherty producing works about propaganda. Vast numbers of books have been produced in recent years on the topic: a search on ‘propaganda’ on any of the major bookstores or libraries on the internet will return several hundred entries. These are mostly focussed on the twentieth century when the word became more commonly used, but the term can be applied backwards to, for example, the Spanish Armada. There are several reference books on the subject, with

---

88 During the inter-war years there was an increased interest in propaganda theories, works published include: Bartlett, F.C., Political Propaganda, 1940; Doob, L.W., Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique, 1935; Hargrave, J., Propaganda the Mightiest Weapon of All: Words Win Wars, 1940; Lambert, R.S., Propaganda, 1938; and Russell, B., Free Thought and Official Propaganda, etc., 1922.
90 Ibid., describes this as the limited effects model, which takes in account other factors such as the demographic background of the audience.
Cole producing the most recent reference work, one that contains some inaccuracies.  

Similarly, there is an increasing number of works on advertising theory, which some would argue is a form of propaganda. 

Propaganda was a major feature of the twentieth century, particularly during wartime, and posters were the most visible propaganda device. As we will see below, many other facets of the European and British propaganda efforts in the First and Second World Wars have already been studied, but the posters, which many people still remember, have been considered of little more than picture book interest. Therefore, we must consider what a poster is, and why it can be defined as a source worthy of academic historical study. At first glance, defining a poster seems straightforward; a popular British dictionary apparently summed it all up as a ‘placard in a public place; large printed picture’. However, the exact definition is slightly more problematic, and exactly what is defined as a poster can change with time and culture, although there is a general consensus along the lines of the definition above. Ades defined a poster as something destined for public wall space, the object of mass production (on whatever scale), with a function of promotion, with Fougasse giving a similar definition as ‘anything stuck up on a wall with the object of persuading a passer-by’. Rickards gives the most comprehensive definition:

A poster can be defined as a separate sheet, affixed to an existing surface, which must embody a message, not just a decorative image. It must be publicly displayed and multiply produced.

This does not entirely resolve the issue of determining what is and is not a poster, but it at least excludes such objects as ‘back in 10 minutes’ signs and graffiti. Sontag goes one step further in distinguishing between a poster and a public notice:

98 Allen, R.E., *The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 1984, p.575. I picked this particular edition as this was where I gained my first definition from, and is a likely source for others to turn to first, rather than the more authoritative editions.
99 The Oxford English Dictionary, ‘OED: Poster’, [OED Online, unidentified web address], accessed 11 April 2000, demonstrates that the meaning of the word has changed little since at least 1838. Room, A., *The Cassell Dictionary of Word Histories*, 1999, p.480: Although the original sense was ‘a person who puts up notices’, the current sense evolved in the nineteenth century and has changed little since.
101 Fougasse, op.cit., 1946, p.11.
A public notice aims to inform or command. A poster aims to seduce, to exhort, to sell, to educate, to convince, to appeal. Whereas a public notice distributes information to interested or alert citizens, a poster reaches out to grab those who might otherwise pass it by.\textsuperscript{103}

All these definitions agree that the physicality of the poster is made of a large, paper object, but this definition also encompasses the post-war meaning which includes large sheets containing images which are used as cheap and cheerful wall coverings, particularly for students, often also defined as posters.\textsuperscript{104} Such images are limited to the private sphere. Although we recognise that such images are often from public events such as art exhibitions, within a bedroom they have lost their function as promotion. For the purposes of this project, we cannot separate the physical properties of posters from their function as promotional items, displayed in the public sphere, and we now delve deeper into a discussion of the functions of the poster.

Villani viewed the poster as a ‘paper siren’, whilst Cassandre perceived it as a ‘publicity telegram’,\textsuperscript{105} an idea on which Green enlarged, describing the pictorial poster as a ‘visual telegram, a concise means of conveying a message through a simple combination of words and images’.\textsuperscript{106} The poster essentially operates in the public domain and in essence is ‘a product of communication between an active force and a re-active one’: the originator has a message to sell, whilst the target audience must be persuaded to buy the message.\textsuperscript{107} Fougasse, one of the most prolific and influential writers on the purposes and technique of poster design in the wartime era,\textsuperscript{108} believed that the poster must be accessible to as many people as possible or it will not achieve its object, that of passing on the message.
Writing shortly after the war, he identified three obstacles that the poster needed to overcome: ‘a general aversion to reading notices of any sort’; ‘a general disinclination to believe that any notice, even if read, can possibly be addressed to oneself’; and ‘a general unwillingness, even so, to remember the message long enough to do anything about it.’

Poster historian Metzl determined five limitations within which a poster must work: the first was that the design and message must be simple; the second that everything on the poster must contribute to the single message it contains. The third was that the poster must be aimed at the ‘artistically insensitive’ as its success will not be judged on the value of the poster as art; the fourth that it must convince the buyer to accept the product without question; and finally it must sell fast. Barnicoat restates this idea, claiming that there is a constant battle between the simplicity of a design and the need to attract notice, for if the design is too straightforward it may be too dull to engage attention. Technical brilliance is not important, but the clarity of the message to a popular audience is.

There are references to ‘poster art’ throughout this thesis, although many have questioned whether poster designs can be considered art at all, as ‘the layers of meaning which make the study of a work of fine art so rich and rewarding are not normally a feature of effective propaganda’. There was criticism during the war of those who assessed the war poster simply in terms of design and colour. Even if posters do produce aesthetic satisfaction, they have a greater purpose beyond that. Their ultimate purpose is commercial, or, in the case of Second World War posters, political. The war poster had a function beyond that of persuading the viewer to part with small change: ‘it must inspire the harassed and uneducated citizen to give five years or more of his life to make history … Posters, however clever, are a waste of paper unless they kill Germans.’ However, design elements are important as ‘good posters influence the viewer in spite of himself’, they ‘do not have to be liked by the individual, but they must be noticed by all’. A well-designed poster will have attracted the attention before the viewer has had time to think about it. A good design will ensure not only that the poster is noticed, but that the poster is displayed

109 Fougasse, op.cit., 1946, p.43.
110 Ibid., p.11.
115 Koshatzky, K., Ornamental Posters of the Vienna Secession, 1974, p.11.
in the first place. In wartime, this was an important consideration in a democracy, as there was not that element of fear or legislation that forces the display of posters in totalitarian states.\(^{117}\)

Fougasse believed that the poster had three functions. The first was to attract the attention of the passer-by, which meant that the poster must stand out from its surroundings.\(^{118}\) The second was to persuade the viewer, not by trying to prove a point, but by suggesting the desirability of a course of action.\(^{119}\) The third was to keep the viewer persuaded for long enough to take action, which meant that the poster must contain only a single message, and be simple enough for the viewer to re-describe to others.\(^{120}\) Fougasse continually stressed the need to ensure that the viewer had a hand in decoding the poster by making the message only ninety per cent obvious, giving the viewer an incentive to work out the other ten per cent.\(^{121}\) This would flatter the intelligence of the reader, as, having taken part in deciphering the conclusion to the message, a sustained interest would be acquired in that particular message.\(^{122}\) As Timmers aptly summarises it, the poster must be a ‘dynamic force for change’.\(^{123}\)

Obviously, Fougasse followed his own advice, as his designs still tend to be immediately recognisable, and we can deduce that he was successful, at least in making his designs memorable. This was demonstrated by the questionnaires distributed as a part of this project: few artists were remembered, but Fougasse invariably was the name mentioned if any were remembered at all, and it was claimed: ‘How carelessly we should have talked during the war but for Fougasse’.\(^{124}\) In February 1940, some of the best remembered posters of the war, the series of eight Fougasse ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ (figures 3 to 10) posters, were produced by the MOI. It must be questioned as to how we define an effective and successful poster: the posters designed by Fougasse may be memorable, but can we describe them as successful, or effective? We ideally define the poster as a success if it achieves its purpose of getting the message across, achieving its target whilst acting as

\(^{117}\) Fougasse, op.cit., 1946, p.43.
\(^{118}\) Ibid., p.14. Fougasse therefore believed that the poster must be tested in its true surroundings, rather than in the design studio.
\(^{119}\) Ibid., p.22.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., p.27.
\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.19.
\(^{122}\) Ibid., p.27.
\(^{124}\) Princess Elizabeth, quoted by Hauser, E., ‘The British Think It’s Funny’, *Saturday Evening Post*, January 28 1950, p.27.
a ‘paper bullet’. However, as the range of books available on the topic demonstrates, defining changes in public opinion and attitude can be hard, with changes in behaviour easier to define, but pinning any of this down to the poster is even harder. The only concrete evidence that a poster was deemed especially successful in the Second World War is if there was a demand for copies for display, or a necessity for reprinting. This thesis, therefore, does not look to measure the effectiveness of war posters, merely reactions to specific posters (and accompanying material), as available.

The poster artist must always remember that his or her product is being developed for their present age, not for a museum, and must constantly keep in touch with contemporary life. Popular appeal is therefore essential, although this does not mean that aesthetic considerations can be disregarded. Continuing Cassandre’s definition of the poster as a telegraph, the poster artist is the telegrapher who dispenses the message given: s/he does not initiate the message. As we have seen, the artist needs to remember that the poster was not to be used for self-expression as so much art is, but to perform a purpose, that of the manufacturer, or government in this case, who has a product to sell, or an idea to propagate. It was the job of the artist to produce an image that would be remembered by the public. Heyman claims that ‘[d]esigners adapt quickly to changes in the social landscape to keep their posters a fresh and vital means of communication’, as if the product or idea being sold has been on the market for some time, then it must be re-

---


128 Again, this returns us to the question of ‘What is art?’, as not all ‘art’ is self-expression. Art is often expected to have a functionalist purpose as demonstrated by a wide range of literature, including Bloch, E., The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, 1988; Gombrich, E.H., The Uses of Images: Studies in the Social Function of Art and Visual Communication, 1999; Makerjee, R., The Social Function of Art, 1948; and Willats, S., Art and Social Function: Three Projects, 1976. It is a fairly modern idea that art is all self-expression. Bürger, P., ‘On the Problem of Autonomy of Art in Bourgeois Society’, in Frascina, F. and Harris, J. (eds), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, 1992, p.57, for example, notes that artists have been commissioned in the past for court portraiture, which must convey the power of the leader. For more on this issue see Balschmann, O., The Artist in the Modern World: The Conflict Between Market and Self-expression, 1997.

presented in a ‘new and desirable’ light. However, there needs to be a balance between the element of surprise that a new idea can generate, and the use of a totally incomprehensible symbol, because if the meaning is obscured the poster loses its point. The well-known Soviet poster of 1920 by El Lissitsky, ‘Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge’ (figure 11) must appear clever, but very abstract, to most people. The meaning may have been clear only to those who understood the ideology behind it, and may explain why Soviet realist propaganda evolved soon afterwards. This is also true of many modern day campaigns, such as those produced by Benson and Hedges and Silk Cut. Legislation may prevent the depiction of the cigarette brand name, but the public is already so aware of the branding that this is not a problem: the black and gold, or the purple silk, are so recognisable already (figure 12). Such brand imaging is now fairly standard for most companies, promoting the name and desired associated image: supermarkets are a particularly good example of this, with advertising campaigns in 2000 associating Tesco with good value, and Waitrose with quality goods. Brand marketing was a fairly new concept in the Second World War, prior to which the focus was largely on the actual products sold.

The conditions under which the poster is to be displayed must be fully taken into account by the artist: it is rarely seen alone, but tends to be in competition with other posters. By the turn of the century the following criteria had been established within the industry for a poster that would work in ‘hurried modern metropolitan life’, where people are bombarded by hundreds of different images. Posters must overcome this barrage to excite the attention of the passer-by, and communicate the message directly and unequivocally, whilst still influencing and persuading the viewer. In the 1990s, these ideas still held: ‘the most powerful and seductive posters continue to be those that create a strong, unified impression, not dependent on careful perusal but to be taken in quickly by people hurrying past or stopping briefly’. Different posters have different purposes, and so require different handling. A poster that is designed for the road needs to be extremely bold and

---

133 Foster, J.K., op.cit., 1964, p.17.
simple, whilst there are other places, such as bus stops, where the viewer has more leisure to study the poster, for which the technique can be quite different. The London Underground is a special case in point. In the tunnels between lines, and on the escalators, a single poster may often be repeated many times, as people are expected to hurry past, rather than stop to look. Yet on the platforms several posters are very text heavy as the viewing publics have the leisure to observe posters in detail (for example, figure 13). In chapter two on commissioning we will assess whether the government, or the artists employed by them, appeared to have understood this distinction. Eckersley, who established his reputation as a graphic designer in the Second World War, felt that it was important for the poster designer to recognise the different needs and limitations of a poster, and try to make the best of the circumstances.138

By the 1940s, advertising professionals expected that a successful poster would contain at least some of the following features: continuity; flexibility; simplicity; appropriateness to subject; and the inclusion of a symbolic element.139 Pick, later involved in the MOI, was the key figure in the development of London Transport corporate advertising. He accepted that in situations where there is leisure to peruse a poster, it is possible to use additional text, although it should not form a distraction from the main design.140 Generally, though, as the poster has developed, symbols and slogans, a form of shorthand requiring an easily shared idiom based on cultural understandings, have become the staples of the poster.141 This is why each poster needs to be understood in the context in which it was used. It is unfair to judge contemporary poster designs by the standards of past posters, as each would probably not have been successful if produced in a different age.142 Benjamin dismissed the ‘power’ of many of the posters in the V&A exhibition, but accepted that she was viewing earlier posters with a jaded modern eye, where one is so accustomed to poster language that only ‘retinal shock’ will attract attention.143 A deeper appreciation of posters is gained through semiotics, in which the images and the subconscious messages that they provide about the attitudes of those that produce and view them, are analysed.

---

142 Foster, J.K., op.cit., 1964, p.20.
The poster is a product of the mechanical age, and was the most conspicuous, accessible and familiar form of pictorial production until the First World War. As the age developed, other mechanical objects, such as radio, eroded its importance. After the First World War there was the development of popular film and illustrated weekly papers, some of which had been in circulation prior to the war, including *The Sketch* (1893-1959), and *The Tatler* (1901-1965). By the Second World War, the chief point of public contact was the wireless, with the poster largely surviving as a support service, although it still played an important role, and further improvements in technique and usage had made it a more effective means of influence. The vast majority of advertising budgets were spent on press advertising which had a certain prestige attached to it, although the poster could often be seen to achieve a definite result with a small expenditure. In 1938, a total of £59 million was spent on advertising in Great Britain, of which only 8.3% was spent on posters, although part of the appeal of posters is that they are a cheap medium. The poster had a great advantage over newspapers, the radio and cinema, where there is an element of choice about participation: however, it is very hard to ignore a large, well-designed poster. Foster would echo this, claiming that far from losing its place in the field of mass visual perception, the poster has had a profound effect on other media. For example, press adverts at the turn of the century were little more than textual announcements, but the popularity of graphic design in the poster led to the use of the ‘display advertisement’, which, when seen alone, can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from a poster. Extensive use was made of the press in 1939 and 1940: with a host of new regulations coming out, the public needed to be informed about several different points every day. By 1942, the public had got used to most of the changes in their lifestyle, and with more restrictions on newspaper space, far more use was made of posters, with some campaigns even depending on them

---

145 Nicholas, S., op.cit., 1996, p.12 notes that the BBC estimated its audience figures to be 34 million out of a total population of 48 million.
149 Foster, J.K., op.cit., 1964, p.9.
entirely. Broadcasting and films were limited by the possibility of technical interference and the information would not be retained as the written word would be. Radio sets were still expensive, and spare parts, including batteries, were not easily obtainable under wartime conditions. Getting the message across also relied on someone turning the radio on. Active decisions were also necessary for cinema audiences, where people were paying to attend the film.

Overall, this project adds to the discussion of issues in social history, still of concern in the current climate. It takes its place amongst the wide-ranging historiography of both propaganda and the Second World War, contributing to a greater understanding of the experience of the British Home Front in the war. In the following chapter we examine the theoretical approaches that underpin the project, Foucauldian and content analyses, and explain how they are used in the project. The chapter considers how the identified archives and sources have been used in the research. The chapter reflects on the new sources produced for the project, including questionnaires, a database containing digital images of wartime posters and related information, and the use of the website www.ww2poster.co.uk, produced as a result of the project. In the second chapter, the British wartime poster as a tool of propaganda is set against the context of general world-wide poster developments. The chapter considers the graphic influences on the poster, identifying and analysing trends and technologies from both world-wide and British art and design that may have influenced British wartime artists. It considers whether there was a clear British style evident throughout the war, and whether graphic styles were imposed by the government. The chapter looks at the use of the poster by commercial firms, which may have worked as exemplars for the government. It also reflects on the use of posters by the state in the pre-war years to see the experience the government may have drawn on.

In the third chapter an understanding of the government’s commissioning and distribution policies will shed light on their grasp of developments in the poster industry after the First

---

151 Anonymous, ‘Govt. Finds More Scope for Posters Than Ever Before: Some New Campaigns Depend Entirely on this Medium’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 188, No. 1542, December 10 1942, pp.244-5. See also McLellan, G.L., ‘Poster’s Part in the National Advertiser’s Campaigns’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 121, No. 1,573, p.83. McLellan argues that the increased use of the poster was not simply down to a shortage of press space, but that advertisers were increasingly recognising the effectiveness of poster advertising, partly as a result of the use of posters made by the MOI so far in the war.


World War. The MOI was the lead government department for propaganda, and this chapter looks at the work of the various departments within the MOI with responsibility for commissioning, designing, producing and distributing the wartime posters. We consider the process, from initiation to distribution, and whether outside agencies were involved at any stage. We question whether the location of posters was deemed important, whether distribution plans were made on a national or a local level, and whether it was voluntary or compulsory to display them. Through a consideration of the planning processes for the first poster produced by the MOI, ‘Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution, will bring us victory’ (figure 1), we achieve some answers to the above questions. This first poster has generally been considered a failure, and we consider how accurate this view was, and whether it was a self-perpetuating failure achieved through, for example, a bad press. If the first posters were produced in a hurry, then the fact that they were deemed ‘failures’ could be understandable, but the government had been planning these posters for a long time before war broke out. We trace how these first posters show how the government initially attempted to deal with the wartime public through propaganda, and demonstrate how they expected the public to behave in wartime. Having looked at the first posters that the government produced, the thesis continues with four case studies: urban and rural representations; industrial propaganda; fighting the ‘enemy within’; and dealing with the ‘problem’ of venereal disease (VD). The case studies skim many different posters, using approximately sixty to seventy per case study, aside from the VD case study, which uses twenty-five images. These illustrate the wide-range of discourses that the posters draw on, with the VD case study allowing more in-depth analysis.

In the fourth chapter, the first case study, we reflect on the depiction of, and appeal to, the rural and urban elements of the UK population. If people were being asked, as a duty of citizenship, to fight, we have to question what they were being asked to fight for. The population has been heavily urbanised since the mid-nineteenth century, but the notion of ‘England’s green and pleasant land’, expounded in songs such as Jerusalem, invariably appears to hold sway throughout the UK. The land is always central to national

---

156 PRO INF 1/300, op.cit., follows the development of the first wartime posters from at least April 1939. These posters will be discussed further in Chapter 4 (Commissioning).
identification in times of crisis, including war, and such rural images were used in wartime posters, including the series ‘Your Britain, Fight for it Now’ (figures 14 to 20). We have to question how far this was depicting the Britain people knew, or whether it was a Southern English phenomenon, and whether such images hold deeper meanings, harking back to perceived idyllic rural lifestyles. The ‘Your Britain’ series depicted not only the rural idyll, but hinted that the industrialised urban process was one of progress, something which in the post-modern age we now possibly disregard. The case study briefly considers the Beveridge Report, which formed the basis of the Welfare State, and how visions of a more socialistic future were depicted. It questions whether such images were nation-wide, or whether they were aimed towards particular regions.

In the second case study we consider posters aimed at those working in industry, where the ‘Battle for Production’ was going on behind the obvious military fronts. Those working in the factories needed convincing that the work that they were doing was as important as that on the front line. There is a considerable body of material available on industrial campaigns for the later years of the war, unlike many campaigns where there is either only early information or none at all. There is access to a wide spread of industrial posters, with Shaw providing a lot of information on how campaigns were initiated, implemented and received. The chapter considers how industrial workers were perceived, and tactics that were used to improve production when every part produced was essential. This includes a consideration of the use of Soviet posters that could be considered ‘atrocity’ posters, (figure 21) efforts to get women to work in industry, and men into the mines. In the third case study, the importance of ‘the other’ is evident as we look at how the ‘enemy within’ on the home front was depicted within the posters. We consider the history of the spy and the growth of intelligence services in the UK as concerns about the danger of the spy, largely linked to improved communications, grew in the early years of the twentieth century. The chapter largely focuses on the careless talk campaigns, which ran throughout

---


158 Relevant PRO files on the Beveridge Report are PRO PIN 8 ‘Ministry of National Insurance and predecessors: Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services Committee (Beveridge Committee), correspondence, papers and registered files (NI 99 series)’; and PRO CAB 87 ‘War Cabinet and Cabinet: Committees on Reconstruction, Supply and other matters: Minutes and Papers (RP, SLAO and other Series)’.


the war, considering how spies were identified, class and gender were represented, and whether humour was a suitable medium for the subject.

In the fourth case study we will look at the campaigns produced by the government in an attempt to deal with the increased problem of VD in wartime, when the rate of infection rose.\footnote{161} We have to question how far attitudes to sexually transmitted diseases have roots in the past. The project challenges the idea that supposed Victorian moral attitudes and prudery still held sway in the Second World War,\footnote{162} and questions what popular attitudes to VD actually were. It was the first time that the issue of VD was publicised in posters, rather than simply in discreet literature in public conveniences. Through the fairly comprehensive range of VD posters from the Second World War, we can study different guises that the campaign took over the course of the war, and the feeling about what was appropriate for different media. There was much reaction to the big VD campaigns hosted by the MOI on behalf of the Ministry of Health, providing much information on public sentiment on the issue.\footnote{163} The conclusion draws together the analysis of the project’s overarching themes, highlights the discourses that run through the study, and illustrates ways in which poster content and style worked together, drawing on longer term discourses, for a cohesive propaganda message.


\footnote{163} There are several M-O File Reports, files from the Wellcome Institute and the Public Record Office, and newspaper reports, all of which deal with reaction to the VD campaigns.
Chapter 1: Methods and Sources

This project uses Foucauldian notions of discourse analysis1 as a theoretical and methodological framework, and content analysis as a secondary method. This chapter describes the key concepts and benefits of such an approach, and maps the project in the light of the methodological approach. The chapter then investigates the sources used for the project, examining the poster collections available, and considering the impact of digitisation. Digitisation facilitated access to a wider range of sources that would otherwise have been accessible, and, in the form of a database, was used within this project. The chapter explores the primary sources available for establishing the contextual background, particularly the administrative records of the Ministry of Information (MOI). Finally, it considers the sources available for monitoring reactions to posters, and the steps taken to establish attitudes and reactions to the posters.

‘Discourse’ is a postmodern construct that Foucault defined as ‘the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation’.2 It is a term used to indicate that ‘language is not a neutral way of describing the world and objects which exist in it’, but that such objects, and our understanding of them, exist only through the categories and concepts we use to describe them.3 Of key importance to this thesis is the recognition that the visual should be considered an element of language and discourse; and that access to images, and familiarity with them, are culturally based. Foucault maintained that rules of discourse are applied within historically defined periods and socially specific groups. These define and produce ideas of ‘truth’ and knowledge which govern, at any given time, ‘what is valid, sayable and possible’.4 Such rules are associated with institutions, which, structured themselves by discourses, also play a key part in the regulation of populations through discourse. For example, medical discourses are associated with hospitals, legal discourses with law courts, and religious discourses with churches. Discourse is different from ideology. Ideology questions ‘whose truth’ is being presented, constantly looking for the ‘hidden’ power that constructs knowledge, with such knowledge legitimising unequal power relations. As Hall argues, Foucault rejected Marxist ideology on the grounds that

---

1 The key theorist for discourse analysis is Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Key works for this project include The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1969 (1972), The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction, 1976 (1978), and Discipline and Punish, 1975 (1977).
Marx always reduced everything to an economic basis, and to class struggles. Hall claims, however, that Gramscian hegemony, where a group gains predominance through consent and negotiation rather than force, was closer to Foucault’s position.\(^5\)

Discourses tend to be perceived as ‘binary’, where meanings are oppositional, generally defined by the ‘other’. To illustrate: masculinity is often constructed in opposition to femininity; scientific medicine versus quackery; modernity (and industry) is often opposed to tradition (and nature); collectivism is often set against individualism. Unpacking binaries requires the investigation of relational terms. There can be, for instance, several masculinities, and femininities, and other influences, for example the notion of ‘domestic femininities’ and ‘industrial femininities’. Rather than proceeding on the basis of dominant and dominated discourses, analysis unpacks the interplay of different discourses.\(^6\) This project identifies and investigates areas where boundaries were blurred, for example the use of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ art within graphic design.

Discursive formulations emphasise the concealment of difference. A key element for working with discourse analysis is to identify the traces of what is not seen. Within a discourse, what is characterised as normal will define who/what belongs, and who/what is excluded. Discourse analysis views ‘silences’, made invisible by those with the power to define ‘what is’. Foucault viewed discourses as historically specific. In the 1930s, discourse would have defined the working woman as feckless, and as guilty of abandoning her husband and children. Working women now tend to be depicted as hard working, displaying admired traits, which are implicitly deemed ‘normative’. Researching what is rendered invisible can make explicit that the opposite, a non-working woman, is often presented as having undesirable traits, a work-shy non-contributor. During wartime, these identities were blurred as the government attempted to present women in both the home and the workplace.

Within a Foucauldian frame identities are often represented as contested and competing, but there is usually one dominant identity that emerges, with one view presented as a certainty, as absolute truth. This ‘truth’ tends to emerge from socially powerful institutions, their power diffused through subjects self-regulation. These institutions depend on assumptions that the claims that they have made about their knowledge are true. This

highly visible discourse ‘infuses itself into reality such that it becomes unremarkable and even passed off as common sense’. For example, in wartime the most visible discourse was citizenship, which defined those who did not contribute in expected ways as not truly belonging. Myths, such as the spirit of the Blitz, may partially emerge from discourses of ‘citizenship’ sustained through posters and other propaganda produced by a government that needed people to work for victory.

Foucault believed that within society, governementality works to produce people who are docile, useful and functional, as ‘the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body’. He argued that ‘the body’ could be altered or subjected through power relations in society that could impose ‘constraints, prohibitions, or obligations’ on the body. Foucault declared that power relations could write on the body: ‘they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs’. Particular traits within or external to the body would identify particular types, for example, the homosexual. Homosexuality was considered socially unacceptable in wartime Britain, remaining largely hidden, unspoken, invisible, and indeed illegal until 1967. Foucault was concerned with issues of sexuality, a term that he argued was developed from the dominant scientific and biological discourses of the nineteenth century. Finding support within ‘religious, judicial, pedagogical, and medical institutions’, new norms and values changed the way ‘individuals were led to assign meaning and value to their conduct, their duties, their pleasures, their feelings and sensations, their dreams’.

Foucault explained that knowledge creates subjects as we make sense of ourselves, and so regulate our behaviour, by referring back to various bodies of knowledge. This knowledge is produced within discourse and appears to be ‘the only’ correct way of doing things. For example, medical knowledge presents itself as having the singular power to heal, derived

---

from ‘its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects’.\textsuperscript{14} Foucault did not see power as simply a negative force, as a ‘mode of subjugation’ or domination.\textsuperscript{15} For Foucault, discourse creates subjects as well as objects, it both constrains and produces, and is a constellation of knowledge and power, which is not possessed by groups or individuals, but is exercised.\textsuperscript{16} It is something that produces both positive and negative effects, working in the face of resistance. It is all-pervasive, not imposed from the top down,\textsuperscript{17} and the existence of power and knowledge presuppose and produce each other.\textsuperscript{18} Discourse ‘subjects’ speakers to its regulatory power, whilst offering them a ‘subject position’ from which to make sense of the world.\textsuperscript{19} In his early work Foucault argued that an author could not be defined as a creator, but as the provider of a label for a group of statements.\textsuperscript{20} The author does not hold the power of knowledge, but is the subject of discourse. Foucault’s later work re-introduced the idea of reflexive subjects with a possibility of resistance and change, and he demonstrated that subjects can be ‘authored’ by themselves, rather that simply being ‘powerless victims’.\textsuperscript{21}

Within a Foucauldian frame, as discourses are historically specific, so also are their subjects, displaying certain attributes consistent with the construction of knowledge at that time.\textsuperscript{22} Discursive formulations mediate the construction of identities, disciplining their subjects into a particular way of thinking and acting, promoting a specialist language, defining what knowledge and practices are, and are not, appropriate for ‘subjects’.\textsuperscript{23} Foucault believed that subjects would regulate themselves, encouraged by society to fit in the discursively defined concepts of what is ‘normal’. For example, within wartime society, ideals of citizenship defined what was ‘normal’: it would be unusual not to want to be fit, healthy and prepared to die for your country. Technologies of normalisation create, classify and control irregularities in the social body. They isolate and correct anomalies

\textsuperscript{17} Foucault, M., op.cit., 1976 (1978), pp.92-95.
\textsuperscript{18} Foucault, M., op.cit., 1975 (1977), p.27.
\textsuperscript{22} Hall, S., op.cit., 1997, p.45-46.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p.6.
‘through corrective or therapeutic procedures’, that look like they are ‘impartial techniques for dealing with dangerous social deviations’.\textsuperscript{24} For example, VD is presented as a ‘dangerous disease’, as different from other diseases, but this can largely be seen as a result of religious discourse. Behavioural changes need to be made by subjects in order not to put themselves ‘at risk’. Subjects become ‘masters of their own slavery’ as they exercise ‘self-surveillance’,\textsuperscript{25} requiring them to act upon themselves, ‘to monitor, test, improve, and transform’ themselves.\textsuperscript{26}

Discourses are located within epistemes, which Foucault described as ‘something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge’. Within a period of history a certain coherence runs through theories of knowledge, united by common norms and assumptions, uniting discursive practices, and informing our thought practices unconsciously.\textsuperscript{27} Such epistemes appear and disappear suddenly and arbitrarily, superseding each other with no sense of progress, or expectation of the evolution of a higher level of reason. The notions of the modern episteme inform the wartime experience; an age when, rather than everything being determined by God or nature, ‘man’ is responsible for knowledge and thus can determine his/her own behaviour.

Foucault’s earlier work has been described as ‘archaeology’, with his later thinking termed as ‘genealogy’.\textsuperscript{28} Foucault described archaeology as ‘a pure description of discursive events’.\textsuperscript{29} Investigating the archive, archaeology is non-interpretative, seeking ‘to describe rather than interpret’, searching for the rules that dictate discourse. Foucault believed that texts need to be investigated for their surface meanings, demonstrating the ‘chance emergence of events’, rather than showing the ‘progress’ of history.\textsuperscript{30} Such texts do not just exist or survive: the organisation of such documents through the archive is key.

Archaeology involves the intrinsic description of a document:

\begin{quote}
The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and fundamentally memory: history is one way in which society recognises and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] Foucault, M., op.cit., 1984 (1985), p.28
\item[29] Foucault, M., op.cit., 1969 (1972), p.27.
\item[31] Foucault, M., op.cit., 1969 (1972), p.7 (emphasis in original).
\end{footnotes}
There are two principles of archaeological research. The first is that it seeks to ‘provide no more than a description of regularities, differences, transformations, and so on’. The second is that archaeology eschews ‘the search for authors’ and concentrates ‘instead on statements (and visibilities)’ and is thus non-anthropological.\textsuperscript{32}

From the early 1970s, Foucault defined his work as genealogy, emerging as a ‘history of the present’, growing from the methods of archaeology,\textsuperscript{33} rather than a complete rejection of his earlier ideas. Genealogy is interested in the relation between past and present, and ‘interrogates the past from the vantage point of the needs and perplexities of the present situation’,\textsuperscript{34} rather than being purely descriptive. Following the ideas of Nietzsche, Foucault claimed that no facts exist, there are solely ‘interpretations of facts’. We must take into account how political interests have influenced our understanding of ‘facts’ and knowledge as ‘[t]here is no act of ‘knowledge’ which is not also an act of power.’\textsuperscript{35} For example, myths such as “we all pulled together during the war” can lead to calls for a return to a time when “everything was better and people were nicer”, and provide nostalgia which fuels the heritage industry. This project is largely archaeological as it seeks to describe the posters, and the institutions that produced them, within appropriate contexts.

This project is heavily grounded in available source material, and as a result it could have been simple to write empirically. Empiricism can be seen as a discourse that emphasises the discovery of the visible, especially within the humanities where the desire for ‘proof’ emphasises what can be substantiated by visible (scientific) evidence. We must recognise, however, that many sources are available only from powerful institutions. In this chapter, we will investigate the archives used, recognising that they are not neutral. Foucault describes the archive as ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements’.\textsuperscript{36} The archive involves the organisation of information, ‘representing and signifying [the ideas of] the episteme in which it was generated’.\textsuperscript{37} History
organises the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unities, [and] describes relations.\textsuperscript{38}

Documents are accumulated and serialised or classified according to the concerns, or agenda, of those organising the information. This provides a system of categorisation that both determines and is determined by what is ‘normal’.\textsuperscript{39} In Appendix 2 we consider the sources used for the project, and reflect on the establishment and collection policies of the archives. Collection and categorisation policies contain implicit assumptions about what should be presented and how, which have an impact on what is available now, how it can be found, and the materials available for researchers. We will see, for example, how the Imperial War Museum (IWM) have highlighted or made available particular images and posters for artistic or other reasons, possibly making such images more significant than they were at the time of their production, when they may have been insignificant objects for the viewer.\textsuperscript{40}

Building on this Foucauldian frame, discourse analyses underpins the methodology of the thesis. Discourse analysis is defined as

the social and linguistic description of norms governing [the production of discourses], and may include [a] focus upon the social and political determinants of the form discourse takes; for instance, the hidden presuppositions that the persons addressed are of a certain class, race or gender.\textsuperscript{41}

Discourse analysis does not question why power works, it focuses on how power works. It looks to how structures and knowledge are implicated in each other. Discourse analysis focuses on the details, questioning assumptions that are made, what is perceived as normal, as ‘the every-day’. It questions how texts and images construct specific views of the social world and what the elements of these are. It focuses on how these are constructed as real, truthful and persuasive, whilst bearing in mind that images suggest, but never show, particular assumptions about the audience. This frame underlies the analysis in this thesis of the MOI which was a powerful wartime institution with an assumed audience. An investigation of this institution and its credentials for propagating knowledge regarding propaganda posters, their contents, and advertising in general is key.

\textsuperscript{38} Foucault, M., op.cit., 1969 (1972), p.7
\textsuperscript{40} See Rose, G., \textit{Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials}, 2001, pp.170-184, for an idea of how museums construct the visitor experience.
Discourse analysis aims to challenge taken-for-granted statements and meanings, and disturb claims to objectivity. Through an analysis of archival systems, discourse analysis investigates the production of knowledge. It pays clear attention to images, and the context in which they are embedded. There is a central concern with the production of social difference through visuals, as we investigate how a discourse constructs blame and responsibility, stake and accountability; how it categorises and particularises; how it constructs social difference; and how it produces its claims to truth, and what does not fit into this picture of ‘truth’. In producing this thesis, we must recognise that we are involved in our own discursive formulation. Within a Foucauldian frame, it can be argued that this thesis does not produce ‘truths’, only more arguments. As this project has done, Rose maintains that the researcher must immerse him/herself in the sources in order to identify the key themes in words and images, and should not focus simply on one or two privileged images. Rather, there should be a focus on how specific meanings are given, on clusters of information, looking for associations and within, and connections between, clusters.

No method can completely deal with an analysis of visual images. Discourse analysis largely ignores the technological aspects of the production of images, although Rennie investigates this through a study of the printing of posters. The difficulty with discourse analysis is that it can be difficult to know where to stop setting the context. Links can become rather tenuous, and as Rose claims, it can be difficult to allow connections to be empirically grounded in social practices. Within this project it has, at times, been necessary to set boundaries for the context. Rose criticises the lack of ascription of causality in discourse analysis, feeling that the method is too ‘descriptive’, as it focuses on the how rather than the why of happenings. At times, the relation between discourse and its context can be unclear. An over-focus on the institutional production of the image can lead to ignoring the image itself, something that this thesis has taken care to avoid by ensuring that all contextual material is related to the posters themselves. Rose claims that discourse analysis tends not to be concerned with conflicts within institutions. It is clear, however,

---

43 Ibid., p.160.
44 Ibid., pp.150-151.
that this is not the case, both from previous discussions of discourse, and from within this thesis, where the difficulties within the MOI are considered.\footnote{Rose, G., op.cit., 2001, p.161.}

Within this thesis, content analysis is used to ensure a focus on elements within images. Content analysis is defined as counting what the viewer thinks he/she sees. It was originally developed to analyse written and spoken texts.\footnote{Rose, G., op.cit., 2001, p.161.} It often generates statistical, numerical and quantitative data, particularly for computer-aided projects. This project uses content analysis as a secondary method, in a qualitative manner. It is used in conjunction within a database to identify the key themes, words and images used within the posters. Content analysis is methodologically explicit, with rules and procedures to be followed, although this project does not necessarily use all steps specified by Rose. The process is documented throughout so that the viewer’s own ‘way of seeing’ is made obvious.

Defining the set of images to be used for this thesis was fairly simple: those available in archives, books and on the internet which fell within the limits of the thesis title. Ideally the set of images should be complete, otherwise it is difficult to claim that arguments and conclusions apply to all posters, a requirement that was problematic for this project. As with much historical data, posters were widely scattered, and in many cases unavailable. For this reason, we cannot argue that conclusions will necessarily apply to all posters.

From this available set of posters, appropriate cluster samples were defined. The early (first) posters are selected by date. The industrial and ‘enemy within’ posters were selected in relation to the strongest available thematic, contextual and reception material. The VD case study appeared to provide a near complete documented set of posters produced for the VD campaign. The rural and urban case study was selected through reasonably clearly defined search terms. Sampling methods are usually expressed in scientific terms, but in this project the source availability and the research question defined the sample.

Categorisation and coding of the images are crucial to content analysis. Categories should be ‘exhaustive, exclusive and enlightening’, and analytically interesting. Information can be defined in a descriptive manner, listing what is ‘there’, or in an interpretative manner, using analytical categories. The database for this project largely uses descriptive terms, although it is recognised these can be subjective, but the categories used service the purposes of the project, because the project’s research questions structured the definition of categories. Rose suggests that text also needs coding, but in this case text is placed in a
separate field. Language is interpreted and analysed in terms of discourse when required. In order for data entry to be consistent, an explicit description of codes is made available to make the working clear (see Volume 2: Part 2).

Results from content analysis are often statistical, as elements are counted, although it is not necessary to count every component just for the sake of it. Again, research questions define the queries that run through the database. The database necessarily limits the research, able only to look at what is in an image, although a lack of something may be even more significant. Content analysis and discourse analysis work together because this enables to the project to look for the gaps, silences, and contested identities. For this project, discourses are identified in case studies through the use of key words from database images. This was a two way process. Firstly, contextual research provided a pre-knowledge of discourses to identify through keywords. Secondly, keywords were identified through the database as words, phrases and images were repeated, thus formulating rules. This enabled an interplay between extant knowledge and a more ‘grounded’ approach from the images themselves.

The main benefit of content analysis is its ability to deal with large numbers of images with some consistency, and demonstrate the emergence of patterns. However, there are a significant number of weaknesses to content analysis. Content analysis by its nature focuses only on the compositional elements of an image, but in this thesis this is complemented by discourse analysis which considers the production and audiencing of the image. Content analysis reduces rich visual material to a series of codes, although we can qualify this with the careful selection of categories. Content analysis does not distinguish between strong and weak examples of a category, it does not address the interconnections between elements of an image, and the overall impression or emotion of the image is lost.\textsuperscript{48}

Having defined the methodological approaches used in the project, we will now map how the thesis draws on them. The project is deemed to be largely archaeological, with descriptive analysis of what was available to the government in terms of propaganda and the poster at the outbreak of war. The institution of the MOI is analysed: how posters were commissioned, designed and distributed. Within the case studies ‘rules’ are formulated as we identify the repeatability of statements for VD and ‘enemy within’ campaigns and those

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p.54.
using or appealing to urban, industrial, or rural populations. The project is driven by some genealogical concerns. For example, myths about the spirit of the blitz, the perceived incompetence of the MOI, and the supposed complete failure of the first poster, are challenged.

The project is set within a modern episteme, where science, professionalism and communication are emphasised. For many, God no longer controlled ‘destiny’; people thus had the power to change events. Propaganda in a democracy was essentially about getting people to change their own behaviour without compulsion, in the knowledge that it was for their mutual benefit. The terms ‘propaganda’ and ‘poster’ have been influenced by different groups, and have meant different things to different people at different times. Discourse analysis enables the project to demonstrate that the activity to which propaganda referred existed before the term ‘propaganda’ did. Within the case studies, the project considers how issues that made their way into poster campaigns had earlier been defined as ‘problems’ that needed addressing. We will look at those institutions that gained the power to influence the ‘problem’, the ‘solution’, or the design of the poster providing the ‘solution’. Foucault’s particular interest in the body and sexuality in particular made the VD case study a pertinent choice.

This chapter continues with an investigation of the sources and archives used for this project, bearing in mind Foucault’s claims that the organisation of the archive is a reflection of the concerns of those arranging the information. We reflect on how the archives have been formed, with past and current collection, categorisation and access policies that have determined what is available (or not) for the project. We consider how the database is constructed, how it is used to identify discourses, including within the visual form and function of the posters, looking for strands that overlap and invisibilities and silences.

Within the multitude of national and local archives and museums, there are many different sources of posters relevant to the project, ranging from small displays within local museums,49 to the national museum of war, the IWM. As this project is intended to

---

48 Summarised from Ibid., pp.54-67.
49 For instance, Serle’s House on Southgate Street in Winchester is the home of the museum of the Royal Hampshire Regiment. When visited in 1998, the museum contained a small display on the Home Front, which included a few posters.
consider the national case presented in wartime to the people of the UK, national archives have been ranked above the local. There is the danger that such use of sources will make the project rather London-centric, but care has been taken to consider sources referring to nationalised campaigns. Posters are collected and stored for a variety of reasons, according to the way in which archivists may expect them to be studied. For example, in 1972 the IWM stated that its collections were available to students of art, history, psychology and sociology.\(^50\) The Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) is a major art and design museum, and it was questioned in 1998 why, as such, it was holding an exhibition of posters. Some critics felt that posters could not be described as ‘art’, but were a product of business activity.\(^51\) This leads into a debate on the nature of art, which is entirely a subject in its own right. Although considered briefly in the next chapter, this is not the central concern of this thesis. It does, however, illustrate the diversity of ways in which the study of posters can be approached. Posters can be examined as artistic objects, discussed with reference to the artistic movements of the age that produced them,\(^52\) or admired simply for their illustrations. They are often, for example, used as convenient visual depictions for relevant wartime topics.\(^53\) Although the majority of posters appear to have been collected for their artistic value, sometimes they are collected for their historical characteristics. This was the case with the posters produced in the 1980s under apartheid by the South African Poster Collective. They were assembled by men who risked prison to produce and gather good examples. The Collective decided that the criteria of selection for their book had to include whether a poster accurately reflected the times, and whether it captured in its words, images, its design, shape or colours, a significant moment in our struggle.\(^54\)

In this thesis posters are largely treated as historical documents or artefacts, important items of cultural history, to be studied within the context of the political and social age of warfare in which they were produced. While it would be possible to write a history of the poster that uses only the posters themselves, the aim of this project is to see posters in

\(^{51}\) Fletcher, W., ‘Why ‘advertising as art’ sells both disciplines short’, Marketing, 28 May 1998, unknown page, taken from collection of press cuttings at the V&A.
\(^{52}\) For example, Bayer, P., Art Deco Source Book, 1988, pp.172-185, considers graphic design, particularly posters, resulting from the art deco movement of the 1920s and 1930s.
\(^{53}\) For example, Davies, J., The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45, 1993; Briggs, S., Keep Smiling Through, 1975; and Minns, R., Bombers and Mash, 1980, are all general wartime histories that use posters as key illustrations.
context, to assess their planning and reception, as well as their design. This requires a wider research base. For this reason, this project rests on a variety of sources including the posters themselves, MOI administrative records, newspapers, and Mass-Observation (M-O) research. This wider research is needed as we cannot, for example, gauge planning from the poster alone, or see design in an MOI memo. In any study, a decision has to be made as to whether the historian will allow the sources to dictate the flow of the project, or whether s/he will search out particular sources to answer a set of pre-determined questions. In this project, there was a balance between these strategies. Direction was given to the search for sources by outlining a series of questions at the start of the project, but sources can and did sometimes throw up new and unexpected avenues to follow. Conversely, limitations may also be imposed by the way archives are maintained and categorised, the perceived importance (or otherwise) of collections, and policies of access.

Expected sources, such as the full IWM collection of posters, were difficult to access, which inevitably affected the direction of the project, and led to the investigation of other specialist collections where they were available, discussed further in Appendix 2. This project required access to as many posters as possible to ensure that any conclusions about patterns of, say, poster production, could readily be assumed to be accurate. This was important in order to avoid the kind of criticisms made by such commentators as Darracott and Loftus, who have noted that many general statements about posters and poster histories are ill-founded due to the sheer number of posters in existence. It is very rare for the historian to be able to construct a full history of any series of posters, as demonstrated by Mace, who wished to follow the development and use of trade union posters. Mace discovered that despite the prominence of posters in rallies, it was the exception rather than the rule for posters to be allocated storage space.

Posters have always been designed to meet a need of the moment. They were never intended as unique or precious objects, and as such they fit the Ephemera Society’s definition of ephemera: a ‘transient minor document of everyday life’. The survival of

51 Mace, R., British Trade Union Posters, 1999, p.12.
such objects is erratic, with collectors generally preferring the unique to anything produced in multiple copies. The uniqueness of a particular poster affects its price. The posters which fetch the highest prices are those which are scarcest, although ‘rarity’ can fluctuate with dramatic effect on prices.\(^5\) Originally art museums excluded art with a commercial purpose, but many new forms of art, including photography, are now routinely collected by certain institutions,\(^6\) such as the V&A. Posters were always designed for public spaces. We need to question how much the archives that store them have recognised this. Posters are often printed on cheap paper, and are extremely large and fragile, with the exception of some posters produced at the start of the twentieth century which were intended to be collector’s items, and were consequently printed on heavier paper than was usual in order to aid their survival.\(^6\) This can make the display and handling of such objects difficult, and posters tend to remain in museum drawers, rather than on public display.\(^6\) As Koshatzky maintains, it is only a happy chance when a poster survives its purpose as a selling tool: by rights it should be obsolete once it has fulfilled its advertising purpose. Yet the poster often influences later ages as a historical document, as a reflection of its time,\(^6\) directly mirroring social and cultural change whilst disseminating the ideas and images that characterised modern periods.\(^6\) As Hensher noted:

> [E]very historical event and social movement sooner or later finds some kind of reflection on the hoardings, and even a trivial and ephemeral poster advertising a play, film or chocolate drink can tell us more about society than volumes of historical analysis.\(^6\)

In 1972, Darracott and Loftus noted that there was no international survey of holdings of posters. Due to their unwieldy nature, and the sheer mass available, it was impractical.\(^6\) As technology has continued to develop, however, the problems of access are being dealt with through the digitising of images. Digitising has made images widely accessible through

---


projects such as the Visual Arts Data Service (VADS), established in March 1997, now known as AHDS: Visual Arts. The VADS project was an indicator of the level of credibility that visual sources have gained in the humanities in recent decades. Many Second World War posters have survived in a variety of archives throughout the country, although again, there is no survey of holdings. My project attempts to start to remedy this by producing a database, discussed below on page 46.

Collection policies have fluctuated over time in response to changing demands, internal and external. As the need to account for public funds grows, general museum policies, and specific collection policies, have all become much more defined. In Appendix 2 we identify the rationales for the existence of each archive and museum used in the project, along with specific policies for the poster collection, both at the time of collection, and at the time of writing. We consider the benefits and limitations of the sources used, as many museums and archives have a very defined focus, and do not intend to have all encompassing collections. Each archive aims to have an ‘awareness’ of appropriate sources, rather than over-lapping with similar collections. Archives work together to ensure that a wide range of sources can be stored between them.

The background to the involvement of the state in propaganda is largely established through a study of the administrative records of the MOI held at the PRO. The strivings of government can be seen, particularly its attempts to set up a new propaganda department,


intended to echo other departments already in existence.\textsuperscript{71} A detailed study of the records relating to the General and Home Publicity Divisions, the departments in charge of planning and producing posters, enables an understanding of the contextual background to the posters.\textsuperscript{72} In Appendix 2, we provide a brief history of the PRO, explaining some of its record selection processes. Often the fruition of plans for individual posters cannot be tracked through the records, although whether this is because they do not exist as the records were not considered important enough to retain, or whether it is due to the filing system, has not been determined for this project. In order to choose the most useful files from the many available, original classes were selected from those mentioned in the key texts, such as McLaine,\textsuperscript{73} and by utilising Cantwell’s guide to PRO wartime records.\textsuperscript{74} The introduction of an online catalogue in 1998 facilitated easier and more transparent searching than using paper files.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Hansard}, the record of parliamentary debates, adds another dimension to the administrative picture. It demonstrates those issues regarding the MOI that were so important that they took up scarce wartime parliamentary debating time and identifies those who were involved in the issues. An index search revealed many debates with a bearing on the MOI. Of particular interest are the occasions on which a poster caused such a public or political furore that it was awarded parliamentary time. For instance, in May 1941 Dr Edith Summerskill criticised the ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ campaigns for their depictions of women in posters.\textsuperscript{76} Autobiographies produced by some of those involved with the MOI provide insights to the viewpoint of those who were intimately involved with the events under study and give us an awareness of how they perceived their role.\textsuperscript{77} When using biographies, we must take into

\textsuperscript{71} This information can be gained from PRO INF 1: ‘Ministry of Information: Files of Correspondence 1936-1950’.
\textsuperscript{72} References to the General Division can be found particularly in PRO INF 1/116, ‘Re-organisation of the Communications and General Division’, and references to the Home Publicity Division in PRO INF 1/294 through to PRO INF 1/328.
\textsuperscript{75} The National Archives, ‘PROCAT: Reader’, \url{http://catalogue.pro.gov.uk/}, accessed July 17 1999. The introduction of an online catalogue simplifies accessed to the wide range of PRO records. This, however, is still based on the original filing system, established over decades, there is no guarantee that the indexer will have thought that searches on topics such as this would be required.
\textsuperscript{76} Hansard: 371 H.C. Deb 5S. May 7 1941, Cols 838-9.
consideration what information was made available to the author, what the author’s particular interest in the subject was, and what co-operation, or otherwise, was gained from the subject, or the family.\footnote{Tosh, J., op.cit., 2002, pp.36; 98-9; and Marwick, A., The Nature of History, 1989, pp.165-6; p.200.} Even more significant for this project are biographies of poster artists, and a collection of this information can be found in Volume 2, Part 2. This is an area where the internet has been key,\footnote{Not only did Internet sites provide much information, but information was also received from friends and family of some of the wartime artists through means of my site: Lewis, R., ‘Second World War Posters’, \url{http://www.ww2poster.co.uk}, first built 1997.} as there are few biographies of wartime artists, with those best-documented including Abram Games,\footnote{Games, A., Abram Games: 60 Years of Design, 1990; Moriarty, C., Rose, J, and Games, N., Abram Games: Graphic Designer – Maximum Meaning, Minimum Means, 2003.} Hans Schleger,\footnote{Rand, P., Schleger, P., and MacCarthy, F., Zero: Hans Schleger – A Life of Design, 2001.} Fougasse (Kenneth Bird),\footnote{Fougasse, A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45, 1946.} and Kauffer,\footnote{Haworth-Booth, M., E.McKnight-Kauffer: A Designer and His Public, 1979.} although this information can often concentrate more on their post-war work.

The government was interested in monitoring reactions to their campaigns, and often turned to surveys, particularly those deemed ‘scientific’. These were seen to offer proof because of their quantitative nature, although this masks the fact that categories are a social construct. Mass-Observation provides a key source for historians interested in human responses to events in the war. The MOI asked M-O to help determine public opinion during the first years of the war. Several career civil servants felt that M-O was too much ‘on the left’,\footnote{McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.52. McLaine does not specify who the ‘career civil servants’ were.} and not a sufficiently disinterested enough source, so it set up its own Home Intelligence Division (HI) in May 1940. For the first few years of the war, M-O provides a set of rich resources. During the time that M-O was involved with the MOI it monitored the response to the first government posters, ‘Your Courage’, (figure 1), and ‘Freedom is in Peril’ (figure 22).\footnote{M-O FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939.} M-O produced a report for the Advertising Services Guild on the government’s domestic propaganda in 1941.\footnote{M-O, Change No. 2, Home Propaganda, 1941.} It is important to establish how the public pulse about posters was taken. The reservations that the government had about using M-O need to be considered along with the question of whether it has any implications for the records available now. The collecting methods of M-O need to be understood in order to assess how the information it provides can be analysed,\footnote{Abrams, M., Social Surveys and Social Action, 1951, and Bulmer, M., The Social Survey in Historical Perspective 1880-1940, 1991 give us an idea of where Mass-Observation fits into the general history of} and these are discussed in Appendix 2.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Fougasse, A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45, 1946.
\item Haworth-Booth, M., E.McKnight-Kauffer: A Designer and His Public, 1979.
\item McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.52. McLaine does not specify who the ‘career civil servants’ were.
\item M-O FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939.
\item M-O, Change No. 2, Home Propaganda, 1941.
\item Abrams, M., Social Surveys and Social Action, 1951, and Bulmer, M., The Social Survey in Historical Perspective 1880-1940, 1991 give us an idea of where Mass-Observation fits into the general history of
\end{thebibliography}
Mass-Observation believed that their work was of a more ‘revealing quality, different from the bald replies obtained by ordinary market research interviewing techniques’.\textsuperscript{88} It was violently attacked in 1951, however, by the social scientist Abrams, for its qualitative stance.\textsuperscript{89} This was possibly because their sample questioning was derived from only two places: Bolton and Finchley. It is unclear how far they correlated results with research in other areas. Despite these possible drawbacks, the information provided within M-O file reports and topic collections has provided much material on reactions about which it would be impossible to find data elsewhere. Electronic search catalogues were used, searching within document titles only, using terms taken from posters already seen, and recommendations from M-O staff. Quantitative results were provided by the British Institute for Public Opinion (BIPO), which originated from the Gallup poll successful in the USA since 1935. These were used by the MOI alongside M-O’s qualitative results, although it is unclear how often. Many of BIPO findings, both from the war and afterwards, have been published. These demonstrate that the questions were largely concerned with gathering general opinions, which may have impacted on plans for posters campaigns, although there are no specific questions about posters.\textsuperscript{90}

Contemporary newspapers provide some official views of reactions to some posters, although we cannot assume that they reflect the viewpoints of the general population. The inclusion of articles discussing posters in wartime newspapers, in which space was very scarce, indicates that the editor felt that there was public interest in the subject, and therefore that they had some impact on public life. Some of the press coverage simply heralded the arrival of campaigns, often with little more than an image,\textsuperscript{91} although articles

---

\textsuperscript{89} Abrams, M., op.cit., 1951.
\textsuperscript{90} Gallup, G., \textit{The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937-1975}, Vol. 1, 1937-1964, 1976, pp.13-123, covers January 1939 to December 1945. Page 24, for example, contains a question, asked in August 1942, whether people were in favour of venereal disease information being distributed.
\textsuperscript{91} For example the ‘Careless Talk’ posters of February 1940 were heralded in many newspapers, including Anonymous, ‘Should they put a laugh in the ‘Don’t-Talk’ Drive’, \textit{Daily Mail}, February 7 1940, Embleton Scrapbook; Anonymous, ‘War Declared on Gossip: Sir J Reith’s Drive to Stop Dangerous Talk’, Unknown source, Embleton Scrapbook; Anonymous, ‘2,500,000 Anti-Gossip Posters’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 107, No. 1,394, February 8 1940, p.98.
were more likely to be critical.\textsuperscript{92} A thorough study of several contemporary wartime journals, such as the trade journal \textit{Advertiser's Weekly}\textsuperscript{93} and \textit{Art and Industry},\textsuperscript{94} was made. These commented, both positively and negatively, on some of the government strategies for propaganda, and on specific posters that the government produced. \textit{Advertiser's Weekly} has, in particular, provided much information which has aided the dating of some poster campaigns, as have the other journals to a lesser extent. The articles help to set the posters in the context of other government and commercial advertising, demonstrating the extent to which commercial businesses supported the MOI through the donation of funding, staff expertise, poster sites, and the repetition of slogans in their own advertising. The journals also provide some information about poster designers of the era, although they still focus, unsurprisingly, on the major artists. Selected extracts from these and other newspapers can be found in two scrapbooks containing various newspaper and journal clippings, held in the IWM. These were collected by the Secretary of Edwin Embleton, who was the Studio Manager at the MOI for the duration of the war.\textsuperscript{95} Embleton was responsible for the design, poster and visualising group for both the general and overseas production divisions. These files indicate the type of praise and criticisms to which he reacted.\textsuperscript{96} Unfortunately, many of these clippings are unsourced and undated for no thought was given to preservation until they were obtained by the IWM.\textsuperscript{97} To identify the source of most of these would require a search through every wartime newspaper, looking for the smallest scraps of information, well outside the scope of this project.

This chapter now continues to examine the new sources produced as a part of this project. London Transport posters are contained within a searchable database. It was an aim of this project to produce something similar for Second World War government posters. Although the IWM is now digitising a substantial portion of their collection of posters,\textsuperscript{98} at the outset of this project they appeared to be concentrating more on fine art works, rather than wartime posters. Initially, a paper database was used, but this did not provide a flexible


\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Advertiser's Weekly}, 1938-1946. British Library, Colindale.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Art and Industry}, 1939-1958, St Peter’s House Library, University of Brighton.


\textsuperscript{96} Scrapbook entitled ‘Ministry of Information, E. Embleton, 1939-1946’.

\textsuperscript{97} Information was gathered from conversations with IWM staff, 1998.

\textsuperscript{98} ‘Posters of Conflict Digitisation Project’, commenced 2003, with a joint bid by the IWM and Manchester Metropolitan University. ‘Re: Poster Collection’, E-mail from Kathleen Palmer, Documentation Manager, Art Department, IWM, October 8 2002.
enough solution, and with user-friendly software on the market, a computerised database was employed (see Volume 2, Part 2). Historical researchers have used computerised databases since the 1960s, although at that point it was possible only to ‘number crunch’ quantitative information such as census returns. This was still the key use of computerised databases at the start of this project. Developments in software have enabled wider use, and by 1994, databases of visual sources had already been developed.  

Data must be standardised as much as possible to work within a database. This is difficult as historians tend towards non-standardised data in historical material, and thus no database is ideal for historical data, even specific historical databases such as Kleio. For financial reasons the only affordable database package for this project was *Microsoft Access*. Fitting in the data required some compromises with the source, as *Access* is largely intended for real-life data, which rarely includes informed assumptions. Posters are largely unstructured sources. Slogans are often reused within posters and this can be standardised but they are often accompanied by ‘complementary text’ which required an extra field. Images can be standardised to a certain extent: for example ‘woman’ can be an image entry. This, however, loses any nuances as to the type of woman, so describing the poster image requires some thought. We may recognise something as the same - say, ‘London’ and ‘Ldn’ from the context of the document - but the computer will not recognise even marginal changes. In this case a decision was made to allow several different variations of the same item, rather than to alter the data to fit the standardisation.  

Particular problems that have been identified with databases for historians include organisational renaming, a noticeable problem in the Second World War, for instance in 1941 the National Safety First Organisation became the Royal Society for the Prevention  

100 There are other problems involved in using Kleio. Firstly, it is command driven ‘language’, which needs to be learnt, rather like learning a programming language. Secondly, the author was German, and the package’s English translation has not been very effective. For example, one error message read: ‘An ambiguous group identifier has been disambiguated’. Thirdly, if still available, it does not operate well within Windows, and potentially does not even work within the Windows XP operating system. ‘Re: Kleio’, E-mail from Mark Allen, History Department, University College, Winchester, March 29 2004. See Allen, M., ‘A Railway Revolution? A census-based analysis of the economic, social and topographical effects of the coming of the railway upon the city of Winchester c. 1830 - c. 1890’, Unpublished PhD: King Alfred’s College, 1999. For more information see Geschichte at Göttingen, ‘Kleio Tutorial’, [http://www.lib.uni-miskolc.hu/lib/archive/kapcsolat/kleio/konyv/welcome.htm](http://www.lib.uni-miskolc.hu/lib/archive/kapcsolat/kleio/konyv/welcome.htm), translated to online form 1993, accessed March 29 2004. (Original source: Woollard, M. and Denley, P. (ed.), *Source-Oriented Data Processing for Historians: A Tutorial for kleio*, 1993), and Woollard, M., and Denley, P. (ed.), *The Sorcerers Apprentice: Kleio Case Studies*, 1996.
of Accidents (ROSPA). Temporal change has been identified as another problem, although within this thesis we do not have the problem of identifying dates in a particular calendar, with poster production we do have a problem identifying dates at all. The solution here was to designate four separate fields - earliest, latest, best guess, and reasoning - simply to date the posters. It is not possible to set up a detailed chronology of different poster campaigns and their relation to the timing of other propaganda campaigns because this was recognised as outside the scope of the project. A third problem that has been identified is a linguistic problem: we must be particularly careful of anachronisms within the data.  

Databases allow flexible access points to the data, for instance, accessing the poster through queries for either the artist or slogan, or both. It was anticipated that such a database would produce a detailed chronology of different poster campaigns and their relation to the timings of other propaganda campaigns. The lack of such information, however, prevented this being as comprehensive as expected, and computers can make use only of information that is available and explicitly recorded.  

Databases can help organise information, although the expected end result will affect the structure. In this project it was hoped to search for information on, for example, all posters designed by a certain artist, should the information be available. In many cases several of the facts, including information as to artist, date and print run, were simply not available, even after a thorough study of the records held at the primary archives discussed above. This was a constraint, as it is difficult to argue, for example, that poster design improved over time without knowing the chronological range of the posters. To overcome this, various strategies were employed in attempting to determine the date of the posters, the majority of which are undated. Their reproduction in a contemporary magazine might indicate that that is the latest possible date at which they were produced, as they are unlikely to appear before they were produced. In some cases, however, Advertiser’s Weekly and other newspapers heralded a forthcoming campaign, in which case the date was sometimes available. The next tactic was to consider the text: for example, dates, legislative measures or particular military campaigns mentioned were dated within a brief wartime chronology. Images were also examined to see if there are any clues in the items pictured. For example,

---

a particular make of bomber would preclude a poster from having been designed before its introduction. This is all rather speculative and requires general knowledge about wartime equipment. This has been deemed largely another project in its own right.

For this project, questionnaires were deemed a cost effective method of gaining some insights from those who remembered the war, and this is discussed in more detail in Appendix 3. The questionnaires were originally intended to provide the basis for interviews, but other sources were deemed more worthwhile within the time available. Tosh argues that public records give too much prominence to administrative considerations, and there is a need to turn to other sources to know more about the political pressures to which those in power responded, in particular, first hand oral evidence for recent history. The PRO contains many documents that deal largely with administrative issues, which provide much information on governmental involvement but little on the thoughts of the populace, a gap which M-O goes a long way towards filling. As noted earlier, all such information will have been through selection processes, and what remains does not necessarily answer the questions in which the project is particularly interested. A questionnaire provided the chance to ask questions relevant to this particular study, and also to assemble a new archive for future historians, although problems of storage, access and dissemination (including data protection issues) needed to be taken into account. However much material the historian manages to accumulate, definitive answers will remain elusive but the more sources that are available, the more confidence the historian can have in information when it is corroborated by other sources.

The effect of time on memory when using answers from the questionnaires needs to be considered, as ‘small events that have less impact are more likely to be forgotten than significant events. Recent events are reported better than events that occurred in the more distant past’, although not necessarily as people get older. The ‘collective’ histories of society, from which myths arise also need to be taken into account. There are many of us who did not live through the war who also know many of the poster slogans, probably

---

105 All questionnaire respondents were asked to sign a form at the end of the questionnaire indicating how they were happy for their information to be used. See appendix 3.
taken from populist books. The credibility of answers can be affected by nostalgia, and by hindsight: British people were among the victors in the war, and that may affect the way things are remembered. The “voice of the past” is inescapably the voice of the present too.\textsuperscript{108} The term ‘myth of the blitz’, for example, is still disputed by some of those who remember the war years:

> Despite modern attempts at “de-bunking”, wartime spirits were mostly high.
> Certainly, we did not walk about with permanent smiles, in addition to the usual horrors of war … times were hard, and there were invasion fears, bombs, V-1s and V-2s. However, there was never any thought of surrendering…: we always thought we’d win the war; and posters - like other official forms of propaganda - played an important part in keeping-up morale.\textsuperscript{109}

Having discussed the methodology of the project and sources available, the following chapter will discuss the place of propaganda in British history and the place of the poster in British history.

\textsuperscript{108} Tosh, J., op.cit., 2002, p.302 referring to Thompson, P., \textit{The Voice of the Past}, 1978, (methodologies of oral history), considers how communities discover their social identity through history, and (p.308), promote this to promote the present.

\textsuperscript{109} Male (Historian), reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
Chapter 2: Placing the British Experience of the Propaganda Poster in Context

This chapter builds on the conceptual aspects of propaganda and the poster discussed in the introduction, to foreground the British experience of propaganda. In particular, it compares the democratic experience of propaganda to the totalitarian experience. This chapter then continues by contextualising the British experience of the poster in the years leading up to the Second World War. This necessitates a brief investigation of the development of the poster world-wide, with a particular focus on European and avant-garde designs, which may have impacted on British designers. The poster is considered as both a commercial tool, and as a weapon in the government armoury, alongside other methods of communication and mass-media.

Propaganda is as old as history and several studies investigate propaganda through the ages.\(^1\) In many minds propaganda is associated first and foremost with the Nazis,\(^2\) then the Soviets,\(^3\) and certainly with totalitarian states.\(^4\) As we saw in the Introduction, propaganda was not only a tool of the totalitarian states. Propaganda itself is neutral, it is how it is used that is significant. The British had certainly used propaganda in the past, although whether it had been labelled as such is a different matter. Propaganda is not only transmitted


through the medium of print, but through rituals, pageantry, symbolism, flags, music and parades, to name but some forms. Bartlett claims that it ‘has been customary for democratic countries to neglect official political propaganda until they are faced by some serious crisis’, and that this therefore makes it extremely difficult for those who are called on to direct propaganda in times of crisis. With the changed nature of war, mass war, in the First World War, propaganda obtained a new significance. It still took three years in the First World War before a Department for Information was formed in 1917, and it did not become a Ministry of Information (MOI) until 1918. Previously there was a variety of ‘agencies which - constantly merging and splitting - discharged the various functions related to morale, news, censorship and propaganda’. The MOI was formed to instil some order into the chaos, and had been intended to control and influence opinion at home, and in allied, neutral and enemy countries. The Nazis believed that the British experience of propaganda in the First World War was so good that Goebbels took it as his model for Nazi propaganda.

Whereas totalitarian propaganda is often backed by violence, democracies need, at the very least, to give the impression that viewers have a choice. The population had to be cajoled, encouraged and persuaded rather than being forced. The state needed co-operation from its populace. Jackall describes the era from the Great War to the Cold War as ‘the axial age of propaganda’. Throughout this age state propaganda machines developed as major powers competed ‘for the allegiance and good will of their own civilian populations’. Democratic states needed civilian morale in order that ‘the vast industrial apparatus that

10 Bartlett, F.C., op.cit., 1940, p.133.
produced ships, weapons and bombs and thus made total war possible’ could function. Historians have argued that the disbanding of the MOI at the end of the First World War showed a distaste by the British for state propaganda, but discussions were still held in 1918-19 regarding the possible formation of information machinery to serve the whole of Whitehall. Departmental publicity machinery grew in the interwar years. By 1939, virtually every Whitehall department possessed ‘some form of established information or publicity machinery’. The Government recognised the need to use propaganda as ‘the service departments were under some pressure to maintain a good public image and satisfactory recruiting levels’. There was a recognition of the need for ‘effective advertising’, covering areas such as health education, road safety and telephones, in order to inform the public about new regulations, encourage them to take advantage of new services, and instruct them how to use them correctly.

Although Lt. Commander D.S.E. Thompson wrote that ‘Propaganda is not properly understood in this country outside the ranks of the 5th Columnists and subversive organisations’, in the inter-war years the advertising industry had increased in professionalism. Studies increased knowledge of theories and methods of propaganda, although Grant would argue that most began with the assumption that it was dangerous, and therefore concentrated on providing remedies and antidotes to its power, rather than in trying to discover means of utilising it. There was a fear that individual political parties would use propaganda for their own advancement, and therefore it was felt that the state should not participate in national propaganda. Investigations in persuasion were particularly focused upon attitude research in the 1920s and 1930s: ‘Emphasis was placed on conceptually defining attitudes and operationally measuring them’. Propaganda has been studied as history, political science, psychology, sociology, and as a study of

---

13 Grant, M., *Propaganda and the Role of State in Inter-War Britain* 1994, p.35.
14 Ibid., p.46.
ideology. Propaganda was, and is, used for a variety of reasons, in particular persuasion, education, information, celebration, encouragement, morale boosting, and identification of enemies. A variety of techniques of propaganda are used, in particular appeals to the emotions of hatred, fear, anger, guilt, greed, hope and love, and the appeal to the intellect. Theoretical models were developed in the interwar years, and we discuss two of them here, the ‘magic bullet’ or ‘hypodermic needle’ model, and the ‘socially-mediated’ model.

In the 1920s the ‘magic bullet’ theory appeared to be popular (Model 1, Appendix 4), although O’Donnell claims that it was not as widely accepted by scholars as many academic studies indicate. The theory viewed human responses to the media as uniform and immediate, with E.D.Martin claiming that propaganda was offering ‘ready-made opinions’ to an ‘unthinking herd’. The theory was not based on empirical research, but on scientific discourses, which assumed that people were uniformly controlled by biologically based ‘instincts’, reacting more or less uniformly to ‘stimuli’. Foucault ‘maintains that there is no unmediated access for the human mind to a genuinely knowable original and truthful reality’. Research in the 1920s established that audience variables, such as the demographic background of the audience, influenced the way that people behaved. In the 1930s Aldous Huxley recognised that propaganda ‘canalises an already existing stream’; it is only effective on those already in tune with the ideas expressed. Propaganda encourages its audience further along the direction that they are already moving, and reinforces partly formed ideas. Brown echoes this, claiming that nobody can create emotions which are not already there. The propagandist ‘is limited to evoking or stimulating those attitudes suited to his purpose out of the total spectrum existing in his audience, attitudes which may be innate but are more usually socially-acquired’. Propaganda can be successful if it does not concern deeply rooted convictions. If it does not affect the audience too much, they do...
not care so much about the issues involved, although they need to be made to care deeply about the issues.\textsuperscript{27} In other words, propagandists are drawing on long standing, pre-existing, discourses. In propaganda, suggestion cannot create, it can ‘only arouse, combine and direct tendencies which already exist’, as people will not ‘follow something that is genuinely opposed’ to their character.\textsuperscript{28} In the 1940s, influenced by psychological discourses, these ideas were formalised, by Lazarsfeld (Columbia University), into the multi-step model, which illustrated audience variables (Model 2, Appendix 4).\textsuperscript{29} Having briefly considered some of the propaganda theories, we now move on to consider some of the key propaganda devices identified.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was formed in New York in 1937. Although disbanded in January 1942, soon after Pearl Harbor, it was influential, and its findings are still widely quoted in propaganda texts. Concerned about the threat of propaganda to the democratic way of life, the IPA published a monthly bulletin, in the second issue of which they established the seven common ‘devices’ of propaganda.\textsuperscript{30} The first of these was ‘name calling’, which would give a bad name to items, ‘individuals, groups, nations, races, policies, beliefs and ideals’ (hereafter ‘product’) in the hope that the audience would reject, rather than rationally consider, them.\textsuperscript{31} The second was ‘glittering generalities’, where viewers were expected to associate, without questioning, products with a concept such as ‘democracy’. This would assume that the propagandist understood the term in the same way as the viewer.\textsuperscript{32} The third was ‘transfer’, whether the authority, sanction and prestige of something the audience was likely to respect or revere (such as science or religion) was applied to the product being promoted. This could be used both positively and negatively as, for example, the Nazis racist policies were rationalised by both science and religion.\textsuperscript{33} Bartlett notes that social prestige could be externally conferred onto propaganda from a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Doherty, M., \textit{op.cit.}, 1997.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Bartlett, F.C., \textit{op.cit.}, 1940, p.56.
\end{itemize}

54
‘social institution which is already widely revered in their society, or which has already established some permanent character of unchallenged authority’. Symbolism used in propaganda was largely borrowed from established institutions, rather than being a product of the propaganda itself.

The fourth propaganda device of the IPA was the ‘testimonial’, where a respected or hated person would endorse or refute a product. Often a form of celebrity endorsement, the IPA asked viewers to question what qualifications such celebrities had for giving an endorsement. The fifth was ‘plain folks’, where the propagandist would attempt to convince the audience that their ideas were good because they are just ‘one of the people’. For example, in the Second World War, Churchill, unlike Hitler, generally appeared in public in civilian clothes, rather than a military uniform. The sixth was ‘card stacking’, which involved the selection and use ‘of facts and falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person or product’. The seventh was the ‘band wagon’, which would appeal to the innate desire to ‘follow the crowd’. Viewers, usually within a particular group, would be shown that ‘everyone else is doing it’, and ask why they are not.

Having established some of the debates surrounding the notion of propaganda and some of its key theories at the time of war, we now consider the poster as a tool of propaganda. The poster has an enduring value, as:

34 Bartlett, F.C., op.cit., 1940, p.52.
behind each poster lies two converging lines: the political or cultural development to which it refers, and the aesthetic development it represents. The poster itself is the point at which the two lines meet.\textsuperscript{41}

As Anderson noted, the printed word shaped the past,\textsuperscript{42} and by 1940 the contemporary world was a partially literate society where the printed word had ‘established very nearly everywhere an institutional authority’. Bartlett argues that people generally accepted, without question, what was read in newspapers, articles and books. Published pictorial art, ‘the poster, the photograph, the film’, may have ‘a similar and for the most part unquestioned authority’.\textsuperscript{43} This suits propaganda, where a common trick is to replace all argument by statement, as the audience cannot be allowed to see another side to the argument, they cannot be allowed the possibility of reflection.\textsuperscript{44}

This next section draws on the methodological framework outlined in chapter one to think about aspects of form and style. It sees poster design as an encoding through which ‘truths’ were produced, and form and style as social and political entities through which ‘power’ works. We will analyse the encoding of the visual in terms of the utilitarian, the disruption of traditional ideas, the political, and as a medium for transmitting ideas. Here, we will illustrate ways in which poster design disrupts notions of high art and images produced for the populace. This relates to one ‘contest’ between artists and designers over the power to define the poster and the way it later drew on older traditions of ‘high’ art. Here, we will trace the ‘institutionalisation’ of poster design in terms of groups’ power to produce posters. As the Introduction outlined, there is a wide ranging debate about the purpose of a poster, and indeed what constitutes a poster itself, is. This is partly dependent on the differing views as to what can be considered the predecessors and origins of the poster: ‘[i]n one sense the poster is a modern invention; in another it is as old as history.’ Some have identified forerunners and precedents for the poster. It ‘could be said that any pictorial representation publicly displayed has something of the poster in it, especially if the object is propaganda.’\textsuperscript{45} This has led to diverse identifications such as cave paintings,\textsuperscript{46} biblical

\textsuperscript{43} Bartlett, F.C., op.cit., 1940, p.54.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.70.
precedents,\textsuperscript{47} evidence from the previous ‘industrialised’ nations,\textsuperscript{48} shop signs,\textsuperscript{49} printed notices,\textsuperscript{50} and political cartoons.\textsuperscript{51} Most of these, however, were produced singly. It can be argued that the poster only became a truly modern mass medium in the nineteenth century, having developed as societies and technologies evolved.

It could be conceived as dangerous to impose an artificial unity on the many different contradictory movements that influenced poster design, appearing under the umbrella of modernity or modernism. Nevertheless, there are several key trends and ideas. These include the rejection of tradition; and the superiority of new ideas that stress the importance of novelty, change, immediacy, non-permanence, progress, and the importance of the future, often accompanied by secular and utopian beliefs. Democratisation, industrialisation and urbanisation were significant to modern movements, and in many cases scientific rationality, technology and the machine were at the centre. There are key debates as to whether modernist art should be formalist or functionalist, particularly in the English avant-garde movements. Avant-garde movements were seen as the more radical elements of modernity, with a more obvious social purpose. They encouraged evolutionary ideas, and non-conformity, particularly against the stylistic expectations of the public.

From 1910 onwards the avant-garde was defined as a rejection of the past and the cult of the new.\textsuperscript{52}

The work of political British art movements, such as the Artists International Associated (AIA) and the medieval modernists, are often ignored in favour of more radical Continental movements. This gives the impression that the British absorbed trends from international movements of graphic design without thought for the political movements

\textsuperscript{47} Hillier, B., \textit{Posters}, 1969, p.11, and Metzl, E., \textit{The Poster: Its History and Its Art}, 1962, p.25, note that these include Belshazzer’s feast where God wrote upon the wall, and the Ten Commandments inscribed on stone.

\textsuperscript{48} Metzl, E., op.cit., 1963, p.26, notes that Ancient Greece and Rome had buildings with facades divided into spaces much as a modern billboard would be, decorated with commercial and electioneering advertising, discovered in Pompeii. See also Hillier, B., op.cit., 1969, p.11.

\textsuperscript{49} Laver, J. ‘Introduction’, op.cit., 1949, p.12 notes that the shop sign, which used symbolic signage to indicate merchants’ wares to a non-literate population, has been suggested as a more modern antecedent of the poster. Orders were made to paste the signage flat as there was a dangerous accumulation of such signs, thus in many ways these became posters.


from which they had arisen. Jobling and Crowley, and Saler make it clear that the continental movements did have a significant impact on British graphic design but the British did have their own way of doing things. unlike the Continental movements that emphasised radical revolution, the British emphasised slow, evolutionary change, following a long tradition of pragmatism in which modernist thought was allied with non-threatening Protestant values and commercial structures. Modernity created not only new technology, but also a new set of conditions, rising from the French Revolution, which included a recognition that working people needed to be taken into account and catered for. In the UK, industrialisation and urbanisation both created the need, and provided the audience, for methods of mass communication. More consumer goods were produced, which needed to be sold, and advertising developed to target the new condensed urban market. Within a frame of modernity the modern poster is little more than one hundred years old, the product of a mass market for consumer goods and services. As a tool of mass communication, the poster targeted, and still targets, large audiences with common experiences.

Early posters, from the fifteenth century until the 1870s, were largely typographical. Illustrations, if used at all, were largely woodcuts. By 1900 the pictorial poster was well established, heavily influenced by developments in the 1820s when illustrated books were promoted by posters ‘created by artists of recognised talent who brought to [them] at once effectiveness and prestige’. Technological changes, notably the discovery of the lithographic process by Alois Senefelder in the eighteenth century, made illustration simpler. This process became quicker, cheaper and easier, until the cost was reduced to a commercially acceptable level by 1866, when Cherét perfected the process and set up a printing establishment in Paris, an establishment that had a key place ‘reserved’ for the poster design artist. Many regard Cherét as the ‘father of the poster’. The first to design a truly ‘modern’ poster, he was largely responsible for introducing the simplification of
elements to draw attention to the message; for giving vitality to the main figures; and for losing distracting backgrounds and thus focusing the eye on the main figures. The lettering was also perceived to be important, with a need to fit in with the overall design, whilst being clear and legible from a distance, as seen in figure 23.63 Cherét, however, was not the first serious artist to turn his hand to poster design. British artist Frederick Walker designed *The Woman in White* in 1861,64 (figure 24), a poster which was shocking to many, as it was the first in which the image took over from the text.65 It was also the first time that a Royal Academician had designed a piece of artwork specifically for advertising; many did not believe that his talents could be lent to such a low branch of ‘art’. Royal Academy work had apparently been used in posters before, but such works had had a primary purpose as art works; their use as poster art being only secondary.66

Metzl blamed the ‘excessive’ concern for propriety in the Victorian age, combined with a feeling that only established authority could dictate taste, for inhibiting the self-expression of artists and stifling development of British poster design until the First World War.67 In Victorian art and design, ‘decoration was a virtue that symbolised the comfortable Victorian life’.68 The Arts and Crafts movement, founded in the 1850s, remained largely consistent with the Victorian desire for ornamentation, but in a more simplified form, creating a ‘total work of art’ (see example, figure 25).69 William Morris and John Ruskin, influential figures in this movement, supported the idea of an ‘English art for England’, and of ‘fitness of purpose’, ideas that were later espoused by many of the Continental avant-garde movements.70 Morris’s prejudices against industry dominated English design from this point until the turn of the century.71 Symbolist art became important in the nineteenth century, reintroducing iconography as a pictorial element. Symbols, such as mythological figures from the past, could sum up feelings such as patriotism, which could

---

67 Ibid., 1962, p.51.
69 Ibid., p.31.
71 Ibid., p.73.
not be depicted realistically,\textsuperscript{72} such as ‘John Bull’ (figure 26), used in the First World War to induce patriotic feelings.

Art Nouveau, which arose in the 1880s, was of global influence. It set aside nineteenth century historicism and contributed to the early concepts of modernism.\textsuperscript{73} Perceived as something ‘completely new’, it had borrowed heavily from the oriental arts, as demonstrated by Toulouse-Lautrec (figure 27), an important figure in poster design. He introduced the concept of economy of line and detail in the 1890s. Inspired by Japanese woodcuts, which involved ‘the startling use of perspective in selected areas of the composition, the absence of shadow, [and] the dominant role of bright colours’,\textsuperscript{74} after Toulouse-Lautrec the poster was used with increasing frequency and was accepted as a design form worthy of exhibits and critique.\textsuperscript{75} The primary purpose of a poster is communication, but it appears that most posters gained critical approval for their aesthetic appeal, rather than any appraisal of their value as publicity. Also inspired by Japanese design, the Beggarstaffs\textsuperscript{76} simplified designs to the essential elements, using flat blocks of colour, leaving it to the imagination of the viewer to fill in the details (figure 28).\textsuperscript{77} The Beggarstaffs dispensed with the British obsession for placing poster designs within a frame,\textsuperscript{78} where a picture was usually used as a poster, with the printers (‘the experts’) adding the lettering later, rather than the text being an integral part of the design.\textsuperscript{79} Between 1895 and 1906, ‘the history of poster art changed from an intriguing, exotic, historical and often introspective style, to one that marked the beginnings of the rational, functional, dynamic and eclectic approaches to modern design’.\textsuperscript{80} Manufacturers did not appear to care about good design, either wanting ‘recognised art’ to sell their products, or simply concerned with ‘selling their products in the most convenient and often the most garish manner’.\textsuperscript{81} The Beggarstaffs were not particularly popular with manufacturers, as

\textsuperscript{72} Barnicoat, J., op.cit., 1972, p.48.
\textsuperscript{73} Livingston, A., and Livingston, I., Dictionary of Graphic Design and Designer, 1992, p.17.
\textsuperscript{75} Foster, J.K., The Posters of Picasso, 1964, pp.9-11.
\textsuperscript{77} Metzl, E., op.cit., 1963, p.59.
\textsuperscript{78} This became the norm by wartime, excepting the odd Shell poster, as seen in figure 29.
\textsuperscript{81} Heller, S. and Chwast, S., op.cit., 1988, p.73.
they refused to depict the product itself, but they had a significant impact on British poster design in the 1890s.\(^{82}\)

By 1900 the ‘flower of Art Nouveau began to wither’, and there was a more functional use of design, with Charles Rennie Mackintosh reviving the use of the cube in his posters.\(^{83}\) There was increasing professionalism in what was now regarded as an industry. The poster had become very popular, there was more standardisation in the format of the poster, and collectors’ magazines such as *The Poster* were being produced.\(^{84}\) Manufacturers had begun to appreciate the importance of advertising, although most still believed that the printers could be relied upon to produce clear designs. The title ‘commercial artist’ now existed, although the artists themselves claimed that there was limited room for manoeuvre in poster design as manufacturers continued to insist on a realistic depiction of their product. With the concept of brand packaging still fairly new, companies needed to promote their packaging and, later, the development of brand characters.\(^{85}\)

Prior to the First World War, John Hassall was influential, bringing the bold colour style of Cherét to the UK. Although many would have considered his artwork inferior, characterised by a ‘lack of sensitivity’, this can be considered a bonus for poster design.\(^{86}\) Hassall’s essentials for a successful poster were simplicity and bold colours to ‘hit the passer-by right in the eyeball’ in ‘England’s misty climate’, evidence of which can be seen in figure 30.\(^{87}\) Hassall was likely to have been influenced by the German *Plakatstil* (poster style), of which Ludwig Hohlwein was a major proponent (see figure 31). The hallmarks of *Plakatstil* were ‘bold lettering, a simple central image, and distinctive eye-catching colours’ competing for attention amongst other items in the street.\(^{88}\) By 1914, the poster was accepted as a valid tool for propaganda, being cheap and easy to disseminate, and ‘Europeans’ were used to seeing posters everywhere. The fundamental elements of design

\(^{82}\) Metzl, E., op.cit., 1963, p.59.
\(^{83}\) Heller, S. and Chwast, S., op.cit., 1988, p.73.
\(^{88}\) Heller, S., and Chwast, S., op.cit., 1988, p.76.
- concise text and simple illustration - had been acquired.\textsuperscript{89} This may have been true for the majority of posters, but there were still poor examples around. It is likely that the more interesting designs attracted attention and so were remembered and kept, rather than the poorer specimens.

Art and graphic design have influenced each other, although different primary functions are defined for each: art as creation; graphic design as communication.\textsuperscript{90} During the inter-war period, several important movements influenced poster design, particularly the typographical elements.\textsuperscript{91} Defining the movements clearly is difficult, as they tended to influence each other, and it is rare for ‘pure’ forms to survive. With rapid reaction and change, due to the speed of communication within Europe, many of these movements were short-lived.\textsuperscript{92} The abandonment of figurative design in favour of an abstract approach to space and form had a great impact on the course of art and design. Such movements were also influential in demanding an art that could contribute to a better society.\textsuperscript{93} In post-revolutionary Russia and post-war Europe, there was a search for a new social order, resulting in idealistic movements in both politics and the arts: the ‘rise of the common man required a universal language of symbols expressive of the newly articulated goals of the utopian society’.\textsuperscript{94} Pictorial posters and films were important for disseminating the Communist message across the country, requiring only low levels of literacy, and with little chance of local interference with the central message. Pictures were believed to be the best medium to get the message across, with seventy-five per cent of the society unschooled.\textsuperscript{95} The Orthodox Church had recognised this for centuries, successfully putting its message across through the means of religious icons, as seen in figure 32.\textsuperscript{96} Never intended as mere aesthetic objects, these worked within the framework of belief and worship to which they belonged.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{90} Barnicoat, J., op.cit., 1972, p.7.
\textsuperscript{94} Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, p.10.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., pp.44-5.
Before the imposition of Socialist Realism in the artistic and literary movements in the Soviet Union in 1932, there had been many important revolutionary avant-garde developments, which emphasised the excitement of the new. Suprematism, developed in 1913, (figure 33), was a purely abstract form of art utilising simple geometric shapes in the belief that figurative realism was little more than a copy of existing reality, whilst the painted surface was a living reality itself. Malevich, creator of the movement, is quoted as saying:

[T]he simplest geometric forms - a square, a triangle, a circle, and intersecting lines - composed into dynamic arrangements on the flat surface of the canvas or into spatial constructions… are to express the sensation of speed, flight and rhythm. Constructivism replaced Suprematism by 1918, becoming popular in the 1920s. This rejected such purely artistic and spiritual intentions, concerned with applying art for constructive purposes, as the artist was a worker with responsibilities. The Constructivist movement demonstrated that ‘visual elements such as line, colour, shape and texture possess their own expressive qualities’. Although it was banned from the USSR by 1925, the movement had world-wide influence, as international exhibitions were held, publications were produced, and several of its leading theorists, including Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, taught at the Bauhaus (figure 34), in Germany in 1919.

The Bauhaus was set up as a school to teach good design, along the line of William Morris’s Arts and Crafts workshops, although with more emphasis on the machine. The Bauhaus encouraged simplicity in graphic design, utilising blank space whilst pursuing the goal of absolute legibility, and photography and montage largely replacing realistic drawings as illustration. Prior to the Bauhaus gothic typefaces were still widely used in the German speaking world. Under the influence of Moholy-Nagy, a new typeface (‘New Typography’) was designed, consisting of a single alphabet, clear, legible, and

98 Fer, B. et. al., Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism: Art Between the Wars, 1993, p.264.
100 McQuiston, L., Graphic Agitation, 1993, p.17.
lower case, which enabled cheaper printing with only a single set of typesets needed. It was stressed that letters should not be forced into shapes to suit the aesthetics of the poster, but that their functionality was more important. Many Bauhaus theorists were so convinced of the strong visual impact of such typography, that the text was felt to take on the function of the image, especially when combined with the possibilities of setting text at bizarre angles. The dismissal of the upper case has always been considered too radical to be widely applied in the UK, but London Transport was ahead of the Bauhaus, producing the functional Johnston typeface (figure 35) in 1915. Banished from Germany in 1933, along with all other abstract movements, by the Nazis who favoured realist designs, ‘art that could easily be understood and whose depictions of men and women exemplified the Germanic race’, this enabled the movement to have a far-reaching international influence, as the artists enamoured of its ideas spread round the globe. Moholy-Nagy, for example, sought asylum in England in 1935, and spent two years as a successful commercial, graphic and exhibition designer, before moving on to the USA.

The De Stijl movement (also known as neo-plasticism), formed in the Netherlands in 1917 by Theo Van Doesburg, was a major influence on the Bauhaus movement, partly due to the influence of El Lissitsky on Moholy-Nagy. All representational components were eliminated from paintings, reduced to their elements: straight lines, plane surfaces, rectangles, and the primary colours (red, yellow, and blue) combined with neutrals (black, grey, and white), the work was to be understood entirely on its own terms (figure 36). The Bauhaus and De Stijl movements produced posters largely for their own use, rather than for advertisers, but their influence is still felt in the modern poster. Concentrating on the function of the poster as communication, they abandoned the ornamentation of Art Nouveau. Cubism (1907-1914), illustrated in figure 37, radically altered the treatment and perception of form and space. Although mainly concerned with fine art, most of the members of later avant-garde movements had been influenced by Cubism at some stage.

110 See below, p.73.
111 Barron, S., Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany, 1991, p.25.
Artists ceased to depend on direct observations from nature, with geometrical compositions taken from natural forms. This expressed the idea of the object rather than its pure physical form, which Ashley Havinden felt was important to poster design, where the designer wished to do more than simply show the subject. Cubism allowed for the object to be reduced to something that could be seen at speed.

Futurism, begun in Italy in 1909, exalted the speed, ‘power, force and motion of machinery’, glorified violence and was opposed to harmonious composition. Italy, as a new country, vigorously protected its past heritage, legitimising itself with the previous heritage of Rome and the Renaissance. This revolutionary movement, which wanted to free itself from the shackles of history, was a shock. The Futurists found posters a suitable medium as, unlike so much ‘traditional’ art shut away in museums, posters were in the public sphere. Futurist typography ‘sought to disrupt traditional notions of harmony, space and composition on the printed page’. Unlike the Bauhaus, which used a single typographical alphabet for clarity, futurists used as many different colours and typefaces as were necessary were used to get emotions across, see figure 38. For example, a bold and ragged typeface would suggest a scream, whilst still maintaining clarity. Often allied with Mussolini’s Fascist movement, the Futurists wished to put the spectator ‘in the centre of the picture’, and get the viewer to engage with the image, in much the same way that a poster designer would wish. The Vorticist movement, an offshoot of Cubism, began in England in 1914. Vorticism was in favour of the energy and mechanisation that the Futurists demonstrated, but criticised them for showing machines as ‘moving blurs’, rather than the cold, angular objects they were. Vorticism was the first organised movement towards abstraction in English art, and subsequently had considerable influence on the development of British modernism. McKnight Kauffer, who created many

---

119 Hutchinson, H.F., op.cit., 1968, p.88
designs for the London Underground, is often allied with the Vorticist movement, and one of his designs can be seen in figure 39.

Dada arose in Zurich during the First World War, a nihilistic and ‘desperate reaction to the horrors of war’. Dadaists were reacting against ‘norms’, such as the typical layout of the page, and they were intent on disrupting a social order that was capable of ‘wholesale murder’. It reacted with the use of ‘absolute nonsense’, loving the absurd, negating all values regarded as inviolate until that point, including patriotism. As seen in figure 40, in Dada, typographical rules were overturned. Lettering no longer performed simply as text, but made ‘images which formed a sense of their own’. It involved the use of extreme abstraction, and introduced the concept of photomontage. The Russian film director, Eisenstein, claimed that

montage was based on the premise that one image combined with a second produced a conclusion or third image, which bore no relation to either of the first two separately but was the summation of the first two used together.

In figure 42 we see an example of Surrealism, a movement that arose in France in the early 1920s as a new and positive reaction to the negative forces of Dadaism. As with Cubism, it tried to go beyond the surface planes, uniting the ‘conscious and unconscious realms of experience’, embracing ‘the absurd, the accidental and the illogical’. Its influence allowed poster designers to go beyond the physical, realistic depictions of a product, with, for example, manipulations of scale assisting in promoting the message, as seen in figure 43. Symbolism and experimental geometrical shapes, in particular the mechanisation of man, also developed. For example, Cassandre’s ‘Dubo-Dubon-

130 Ibid., p.8.
133 Quoted in Foster, J.K., op.cit., 1964, p.16. For example, in the poster ‘Always in Touch’, seen in figure 41, two separate images, one of the Underground Tube line, and one of a hand, which are legitimate images in their own right, but once combined project a forceful message of man in control of technology. (Hollis, Graphic Design, 1994, p.95) See Taylor, R., The Eisenstein Reader 1998 for more on Eisenstein and his theories of montage as used in the cinema.
Dubonnet’ (figure 44) can be described as ‘simplified realism’ which remained a popular poster art force until the wartime years. Statistical imagery, derived from the Viennese Isotype system, was introduced into the UK in the 1930s, and photographic technique improved. Such images were acceptable to the avant-garde in a way that figurative painting was not. ‘Photography was the perfect medium for reproducing reality and giving the reader a terse, pointed message’. Towards the end of the 1930s, Darracott claimed that international exhibitions and publications had fostered a European style in poster design.

The Continental movements influenced the British, enabling poster designers, for example, to use strange juxtapositions of design, rather than straightforward representations of products. There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which this occurred. Hillier claims that although many traditional artists, such as Wilkinson, Cooper, and Newbould, were still working in the UK, the French influence of Cassandre was strongly felt. Ades claims that in the UK and the USA there was a general failure to adopt modernist design. Similarly Hollis claims that New Typography was only superficially understood in the UK, and although many posters ‘weakly emulated French Cubism’, tradition remained the most powerful influence. Although it was accepted that the poster was adopting a new and important role, generally posters were still dependent on their commercial function. In contrast Paret argues that the poster had been politicised by the Second World War through its ideological use in the inter-war years by the Soviets and Nazis. LeMahieu claims that

[w]hatever their political affiliations, Left or Right, the avant-garde in England retained the moral distance, social detachment, and aesthetic superiority characteristic of traditional elite culture.

Saler challenges this with the claim that ‘visual modernism in England during the interwar period tended to be interpreted within a utilitarian and moral framework.’

---

139 Hollis, R., op.cit., 1994, p.95.
140 Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, p.64.
141 Heller, S., and Chwast, S., op.cit., 1988, p.120.
146 Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, p.64.
did produce some adventurous designs, such as Kauffer’s Vorticist designs (figure 39) - but the work tended to remain largely detailed and nationalistic. Rickards, however, lays this fault at the feet of the clients, such as Shell and London Transport, rather than the artists.\textsuperscript{150}

Saler argues that the English avant-garde was the most successful in Europe in the interwar period, in terms of breaking down the distinctions between art and life, with the public the most accepting of the idea that non-representational forms conveyed moral messages.\textsuperscript{151} The English did link art with politics, with many in the modern movements desiring a better social democratic order, but they tended not to go to the extremes visible on the Continent and so were less threatening. The:

\begin{quote}
English avant-garde promoted a very “English,” gradualist vision of social change, in which art, allied to commerce, would permeate life, subtly transforming society into an organic and harmonious community.\textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

Careful to emphasise the utilitarian values, and thus economic function, of modern design, important in a country whose dominant values underscored industry and practicality,\textsuperscript{153} British art discussions were not politicised in the way that those on the Continent were. Unlike German Dadaism and French surrealism, movements oppositional to the dominant culture, the English intellectuals were as much a part of the Establishment as they were critical of it.\textsuperscript{154} Barnicoat claims that the ‘posters produced during the Second World War did not add anything to the achievements already established in the development of poster design generally’.\textsuperscript{155} Ades goes further, arguing that the outbreak of war ‘brought to an abrupt end experimental graphic design’ and ‘a conservative realism’, such as that employed by Frank Newbould, once again gained dominance in posters.\textsuperscript{156} The influences of the inter-war art movements can be clearly seen in many designs, however, such as those by Abram Games, who utilised modern graphic techniques in his wartime posters.

The poster had come under attack in the early years after the First World War, seen as a part of the system of propaganda believed to have fed atrocity lies to the population, when

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Saler, M.T., op.cit., 1999, p.182.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Rickards, M., op.cit., 1971, p.49.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Saler, M.T., op.cit., 1999, p.8.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p.9.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p.12.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p.16.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Barnicoat, J., op.cit., 1972, p.242.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, pp.24-5.
\end{footnotes}
many believed they had been tricked into signing up. As seen earlier, British design had been deeply committed to Victorian decorativism for almost a century, but in the post-war era there was a reaction against this, and the country embraced a functionalism consistent with the needs of modern industry. Art Deco arose in the UK after the First World War, acceptable to the middle classes, it was an unthreatening alternative to the increasingly abstract styles growing on the Continent (figure 45). It took styles from many of the modern art movements, presenting them in an acceptable form that was particularly suitable for advertising.

In the First World War the chief communications media for the British state were the poster and the newspaper. Weill claims that until 1914, the state had made no official use of the illustrated poster. Official posters had been used, but these were strictly typographic, and did not use the general techniques of commercial advertising: they ‘contented themselves with proclaiming the law from their specially reserved places’. As the government ‘played virtually no role in commerce or industry, its duty stopped there’. In the First World War, the letterpress poster and the press were still used to impart detailed instructions to the public, but the government also made much more use of the pictorial poster. Hutchinson claimed that prior to the First World War, the first ‘total war’, posters had appealed to little more than the commercial common denominator, and that the war pressed it into serious service, as a weapon, for the first time. McQuistion, however, demonstrates that the women’s suffrage movement was probably the first to use ‘the styles and techniques of commercial advertising posters to service a distinct political cause or anti-establishment viewpoint’. The art nouveau styles prevalent in the early years of the century softened the ‘ugly suffragette’ theory (see figure 46). Posters produced by the Labour Party prior to the First World War had served a political cause before the suffragettes utilised them, although many appear to be little more than enlarged cartoons, as we see in figure 47. There were others that were much more hard-hitting, summarising

160 Ibid., p.127.
the main issue in a single word: ‘Workless’ (figure 48). An author in *Art and Industry* in 1940 claimed that First World War posters could be perceived in a romantic light compared to the ‘typographical go-to-it injunctions’ (figure 49), influenced by modern design, of the Second World War. The First World War seemed to be ‘a struggle between men and men, and machines scarcely appeared at all’. The economic background appeared ‘non-existent’, although there are some spectacular examples of posters dealing with savings, including the clever use of money transforming into bullets (figure 50). Machinery also made its appearance in some posters, although, as the first war of the machine age, the propaganda style of previous wars was still used in the *Boy’s Own* tradition (figure 51) and it does appear to be quite rare.

In the First World War the poster had developed, not only to sell the idea of the war to the public, but also to sustain it despite the massive drain on life and money. Commercial artists were approached to sell the ideas, as conscription was not introduced until 1916, before which British men were to be shamed into volunteering with implications of cowardice and loss of honour, with posters designed in a similar vein to the white feathers handed out to ‘cowards’. Alternatively, through atrocity propaganda, they were to be scared into what the Germans would do to their friends and families. Metzl argues that many First World War posters failed as, although they were very dramatic and shocking, they left nothing to the viewer’s imagination: they were too literal. Circulating atrocity stories, such as those regarding the bayoneting of babies, do not appear to have shown themselves much in British posters. British efforts at atrocity posters were very weak, (figure 52), when compared to the vicious American creations, such as figure 53, but even then they were only a fraction of the posters produced, most of which were more mundane. Graphic realism, demonstrated in the posters of Brangwyn (figure 54), was also not very common, as ‘[d]eath was to be sold like Bovril, with nice, healthy, cheerful placards’. The belief in the cheerful, public school atmosphere of life in the army was continued as censorship kept the realities of trench warfare away from the public. As we see in figure

---

169 Hillier, B., op.cit., 1969, p.224, and Paret, P., Lewis, B. I., Paret, P., op.cit., 1992, p.20, for instance describe British First World War posters as atrocity posters, although it has actually been quite difficult to find examples of British propaganda posters in an atrocity style. Well known atrocity posters are largely American.
55, the First World War was presented as a sports match between the British and the Germans, and glamorised in posters which used allegorical-heroic approaches, for instance through the images that likened the activities of the soldiers to those of George and the Dragon (figure 56). Even realist images were romanticised: for example, men copied images (the bandwagon effect) of soldiers going into battle with arms raised in salute, an attitude in which they were unlikely to remain alive for long.\textsuperscript{170}

Bernstein regards the years from 1932 to 1939 as the high point of British commercial art with Shell-Mex, headed by Jack Beddington,\textsuperscript{171} and London Transport, headed by Frank Pick,\textsuperscript{172} two of the major influences on poster design in the UK in the inter-war period. Posters are often described as the ‘art gallery of the street’,\textsuperscript{173} and both organisations went to some lengths to ensure that not only were serious artists, such as Eric Kennington, employed, but lesser-known artists were also given a chance. Pick, noting that industry had driven the artist out of his traditional role, felt that it could build a new role for the artist as a poster designer. With posters inexpensive to produce, this was not a huge financial risk.\textsuperscript{174} Freeman compares the patronage given by Shell-Mex and London Transport with that of the Medicis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,\textsuperscript{175} while Saler describes Pick as a ‘medieval modernist’, part of Britain’s long-standing association of art with everyday life.\textsuperscript{176} A reputation was gained, particularly by London Transport, for producing experimental and esoteric aesthetics: presenting works by artists such as Kauffer, in a style Hollis describes as ‘vulgarised Cubism’.\textsuperscript{177} Although this reputation was deserved for some designs, for every experimental design there were about a dozen ‘conservative’ designs to cater for more general public tastes.\textsuperscript{178} Many good pieces of ‘high art’ do not really work as poster design, but such images were still used by both companies, with the image

\textsuperscript{170} Hillier, B., op.cit., 1969, p.231.
\textsuperscript{173} This was a sentiment Pick expressed. Barnicoat, J., op.cit., 1972, p.102, and Saler, M.T., op.cit., 1999, p.ix. Saler, p.102, noted that in 1929, London Transport posters were so popular that there was an exhibition, but Pick did not want the purpose of the poster to be forgotten, and at the entrance was the sign: “There is no catalogue. A good Poster explains itself.”
\textsuperscript{174} Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, p.66.
\textsuperscript{176} Saler, M.T., op.cit., 1999, p.4.
\textsuperscript{177} Hollis, R., op.cit., 1994, p.92.
presented as though in a frame, (figure 29), and the message not integrated into the design but rather added as a title.\textsuperscript{179}

Both companies were concerned with selling their corporate image, selling their products only incidentally,\textsuperscript{180} then a fairly new concept. Shell made no visual reference to their product, instead linking the word ‘Shell’ with a series of ‘professional types’ who would use the product, indicative of the type of branding with which we are familiar today.\textsuperscript{181} The functional Johnston typeface was designed specifically for use by London Transport to distinguish company information from other information, including on posters, which were seen as part of a means of producing a positive corporate image.\textsuperscript{182} Roger Fry, of the Bloomsbury movement, felt, in 1926, that such corporate advertising was designed to detract attention from the inferior quality of service provided for increasing amounts of money, although this was a minority view.\textsuperscript{183} Many believe that Pick’s efforts to use modern art on the Underground familiarised the public with modern art, and thus facilitated public understanding of such art movements.\textsuperscript{184} Pick himself did not object to art being baffling on the first encounter, providing that it did not lack ‘meaning and direction’, but felt that many modern art works demonstrated a ‘moral laxity’ on the part of artists. He was interested only in those works of art that were fit for their purpose, utilitarian and universally acceptable.\textsuperscript{185} Mass-Observation showed various art works in a northern town, and found that modern art works provoked the most reaction, even if they were not liked.\textsuperscript{186} In respect of advertising, the aim is to get the message remembered, and thus this could be viewed as a bonus.

It was not until the 1920s that the profession of ‘graphic designer’ became known and respected, partly through the efforts of Beddington and Pick. Previously, the title ‘commercial artist’ had occasionally been used, but generally, art other than for ‘art’s sake’ was dismissed as a ‘weak’ branch of the arts. Bernstein claims that this title of ‘commercial art’ was appropriate as it separated the poster from ‘pure art’ and reminded the poster

\textsuperscript{178} Hutchinson, H., op.cit., 1963, p.12.
\textsuperscript{179} Bernstein, D., op.cit., 1993, p.2.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p.1.
\textsuperscript{181} Hollis, R., op.cit., 1994, p.93.
\textsuperscript{182} Green, O., op.cit., 1990, pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{183} Ades, D., op.cit., 1984, p.66.
\textsuperscript{184} For example, Heller, S., and Chwast, S., op.cit., 1988, p.152, and Haworth-Booth, M., \textit{E. McKnight Kauffer: A Designer and His Public}, p.66
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., p.47.
designer of the poster’s purpose,\textsuperscript{187} although C.R.W. Nevinson claimed that the portrait painter who accepts a commission to enhance drawing-rooms is as much a ‘commercial artist’.\textsuperscript{188} Pick found it difficult to persuade ‘fine artists’ to engage in commercial design, and it was not until after the war started that art became less exclusive, was redefined as design and thus became a respectable career option.\textsuperscript{189} Schools aided the integration of ‘designer’ with ‘artist’, demonstrating a more integrated curriculum, which blurred distinctions:\textsuperscript{190}

Art and Handicraft should no longer be considered as separate subjects with different outlooks - “they should properly be regarded as part and parcel of one important branch of teaching”.\textsuperscript{191}

In 1935, the government formed the Council for Art and Industry (CAI), to which Pick was appointed Chairman. Their first project was to conceptualise art education in schools, using ideas that Pick and others had been expressing for many years. Calling for the integration of art with every activity in schools, they now had the authority of the government.\textsuperscript{192} After 1936, Pick changed his mind, and re-imposed distinctions between the ‘hedonistic artist’ and the ‘professional designer’. He claimed that modern art was immoral and degenerate and called for the old romantic style of narrative illustration to be used in posters. These ideas permeated government departments and by the end of the war the distinction between fine and commercial art was re-imposed.\textsuperscript{193}

The freelance designer was generally considered by contemporary advertisers, purchasing the services, to produce better work, and had more prestige than the advertising agency. By the end of the 1930s, however, advertising agencies were taking most of the work, and advertising was subsequently criticised for too much standardisation and lack of imagination.\textsuperscript{194} The designer (generally) lost status as agencies often took the credit for any designs produced, with freelancers simply employed in order to complete the work that the

\textsuperscript{188} Quoted in Saler, M.T., op.cit., 1999, p.28.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p.43.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p.72.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., pp.138-9.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., pp.154-157.
\textsuperscript{194} Freeman, J., op.cit., 1990, p.33.
agencies required. Consequently many designs are un-accredited and un-signed,\textsuperscript{195} a habit that remains for the many posters produced in the Second World War.\textsuperscript{196}

The increasing professionalism of the industry meant that campaigns tended to have more specific targets, with success measured by sales results.\textsuperscript{197} During the interwar period, many were keen to emphasise in the inter-war period that ‘propaganda … required assessment not by aesthetic standards but by effects’.\textsuperscript{198} With no market research in the 1920s, the effects of posters could not be quantified. Even now, however, we cannot assume that everyone involved in the production of the poster, or those who viewed it, felt the same, ‘and the extent to which a poster expresses either a general opinion or an idiosyncratic view cannot always be sorted out’. The origins of a poster remain difficult to trace, and information about such facts as production runs and distribution are not easy to obtain, making any poster’s effectiveness very difficult to determine.\textsuperscript{199} This is a universal problem in the study of posters, where it is difficult to measure the effect that a poster can have, as it rarely stands alone, but is one of many media used to promote a message.

Previously we noted the early use of posters by the Labour Party, dismissing them as little more than cartoons. In the inter-war period, party-political posters were developed and were much more hard hitting, a tradition which has continued to the present day. Some of the posters produced by the parties, the Labour Party in particular, such as \textit{Workless}, (figure 48) are still very memorable. They reflected the industrial developments of the day, depicting the wireless (figure 57), emphasising that they were in touch with the modern world. As a party in opposition, for all except nine months in 1924, the party could make more hard-hitting statements through their posters, influenced also by their more ideological agenda, than the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{200} The latter were concerned with maintaining the status quo, (figure 58), and emphasised individual effort.\textsuperscript{201} Political advertising is very adversarial, unlike brand marketing, where there is a wide range of competition. Elections are generally a two-horse race, and thus attacking the other side is a

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p.32.  \\
\textsuperscript{196} See Hollis, R. op.cit., 1994, p.96, for a brief explanation of how agencies worked.  \\
\textsuperscript{199} Paret, P., Lewis, B. I., and Paret, P., op.cit., 1992, p.ix.  \\
\textsuperscript{200} See Wring, D., \textit{Political Marketing and Organisational Development: The Case of the Labour Party in Britain}, 1995, pp.1-8, which considers the development of Labour Party propaganda from 1918 to 1950.  \\
\end{flushleft}
feasible strategy: the ‘evil plans’ (name-calling) of the other side make better propaganda than the positive plans of the party.\textsuperscript{202}

There were state-sponsored propaganda schemes during the inter-war period, although they were largely concerned with overseas, rather than home, issues. The Empire Marketing Board (EMB) produced many posters,\textsuperscript{203} with designs purposely sober and restrained, in the traditional style, designed to make the populace aware of the products of the Empire (figure 59).\textsuperscript{204} A large new campaign to foster ‘telephone mind[edness]’ was instigated for the General Post Office (GPO) in April 1931 by Clement Attlee, Postmaster General.\textsuperscript{205} Once again this was ‘dignified’, and attracted criticism from Crawford, head of an advertising agency, amongst others, for its lack of modern design.\textsuperscript{206} Attlee wanted to show that the state was using publicity, although he did not particularly care if it was a success or a failure, believing that it would demonstrate the ‘fallacy’ of publicity.\textsuperscript{207} In 1933 the GPO employed Stephen Tallents, author of The Projection of England,\textsuperscript{208} a man who was later to have an important role in promoting the UK abroad, as Public Relations Director.\textsuperscript{209} In 1935 he left the GPO, highly critical of the posters used so far. He felt that the artists who designed the posters did not have enough practical knowledge of the GPO’s activities, and had mistakenly assumed that GPO would want ‘conventional’ designs, and therefore were not able to promote the activities of the GPO fully.\textsuperscript{210} It was a very different story for the EMB and GPO film units, headed by John Grierson, who insisted on ideological freedom for the films produced. Grierson believed that the government of the day could be separated from the state itself, resulting in a social democratic agenda produced in the face of a laissez-faire Tory government.\textsuperscript{211} Both the EMB and the GPO, whose film units later

\textsuperscript{203} See Constantine, S., Buy and Build: The Advertising Posters of the Empire Marketing Board, 1986; and Mackenzie, J., Propaganda and Empire, The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960, 1984, for details of these posters.
\textsuperscript{205} Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.99.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., p.109 This was the second phase of the same campaign, which included the use of publicity on moving vehicles.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p.99.
\textsuperscript{208} Tallents, S., The Projection of England, 1932.
\textsuperscript{210} Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.121.
formed the basis of the Crown Film Unit under the MOI Film Division, had commercial gains to be made from publicity, but the same could not necessarily be said of health propaganda. The British government in the inter-war period practised health promotion due to public service responsibilities, although Grant claims that the financial outlay here was very low compared with that in some other countries. It had been stressed in 1924 that health propaganda should follow best commercial practices but many of the posters employed at the time in health campaigns were ‘aesthetically unappealing and overcrowded with information’ and therefore ‘unsuited to capture the attention of the mass audience’, see figure 60. In chapter seven, we will focus on the VD posters in the Second World War, and consider if these criticisms still applied.

Wainwright, having visited an exhibition of First World War posters, claimed that the ‘gulf between those vulgar, absurd and gaudy bludgeonings of the last war, and the posters of this, is almost as great a difference between the two wars themselves’. The MOI produced a wide variety of works and styles, with few restrictive measures placed on poster designs submitted. Freeman claims that the MOI recognised the value of posters and ‘in accordance with the established working procedure they enlisted the services of many freelance designers’. These included Fitton, Henrion, Lewitt-Him, and Fougasse, and many of the foreign designers who had arrived in the UK in the 1930s, fleeing European totalitarian movements. While many went on to the United States, they impacted on British design, leading to wider experimentation, which continued during the Second World War. The commissioning of artists is discussed further in the next chapter. After the inauspicious start of the ‘Your Courage…’ poster (figure 1), considered further in chapter three, posters relied on information over persuasion, promises rather than threats, and rational appeals over fear. Metzl claims that in the Second World War there was no need for the war to be sold in the same way as had been necessary in the First World War, as people were conscripted in for most activities. As a result, the poster had a different role to play: ‘[i]t may even be that the function of many posters was simply to be seen, to contribute to an atmosphere of involvement in the war effort’.

---

213 Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.158. Grant does not provide qualifying statistics.
214 Ibid., p.153.
216 Freeman, J., op.cit., 1990, p.34.
218 Metzl, E., op.cit., 1963, p.86.
Democratic propaganda had a different role to play, than that of totalitarian states. Using a range of propaganda techniques, British posters did not appear to have a ‘clear ideological purpose’, unlike those in Germany.\(^{220}\) In Germany, the Nazi government took complete control of art, an ‘area of society that was economically, politically and militaristically unthreatening’. The only other country to elevate art to such a status was the Soviet Union.\(^{221}\) It is still not clear what state involvement there was in dictating art movements in the UK, as there is little information that has survived. Alternatively there may have been nothing to survive, if the British government did not care about ideological biases. As a result, we tend to assume that a design style was used simply because it worked, with scant regard for the ideological movements that had produced the techniques, although Saler has disproved this view to some extent. It is even more difficult, if not impossible, to establish what the British public thought of graphic design at any time but we can establish what the government thought the people would accept.

With a great diversity of design styles, it can difficult to identify a particular British wartime poster ‘brand’. Here we must beware of sweeping statements, as wartime posters were both traditional and modern, often within the same campaign. The likelihood is that it was the interesting designs that were kept and commented on. British posters were functional and pragmatic, and although many retained traditional elements, modern traits were evident. This included simpler, bolder, less crowded designs using cleaner lines. There was a more integrated, concise, graphic, and creative use of text. Representational rather than realistic designs were possible, as abstracted elements, scale manipulations, and photography were used. More standardisation in technique and sizing was evident as a result of the increasing professionalisation of the industry.

As we can see, the poster at the start of the Second World War was not the product of any one institution. Throughout this chapter we have seen boundaries blurred between high and commercial art, and artists often had dual roles. Their high art methods influenced their commercial roles and vice versa, although artists did not necessarily use the same signature for both types of work. Various art movements had questioned the moral, ideological and functional purposes of art and communication, as had manufacturers and the government who used the poster medium. Education had impacted, with decisions on the separation or

inclusion of high and commercial art within courses. Science had provided technological advancements which improved the ability of the poster to be a mass communication medium.

Working within a modern episteme, where science, professionalisation and communication for the benefit of all concerned was emphasised, the languages of the artistic styles outlines in this chapter contribute to these meanings of modernity. The message was more important than the style, but the style contributed to the message, and the form of the message supported the posters’ function as a meaningful form of communication. Avant-garde poster artists in particular looked to art to contribute to a better society, and used art to disrupt existing traditions, and approved of the poster as a less exclusive, more accessible form of art. In contrast to the more traditional, ultra-realistic, artistic styles, modern designs, particularly abstract designs, even if not liked, provoked reactions, which reinforced the posters’ function. Having discussed the artistic contexts of poster design the thesis moves on to consider the administrative history of the MOI, with an emphasis on how posters fitted in to the organisation’s structure, and on how the poster’s role was determined in the Second World War.

Chapter 3: Commissioning, Design & Distribution, with a particular focus on the MOI and the first posters produced

This chapter focuses on the production and distribution of government publicity in the Second World War. The Ministry of Information (MOI) was expected to be the central governmental publicity machine, an institution that sought to regulate its population through discourse. In this chapter we briefly consider its formation and role, including how it drew on previous experience, and gained the power to influence British propaganda, but concentrate more explicitly on the publicity producing divisions. Within this chapter, we reflect upon how the MOI looked to promote self-regulation amongst British subjects, providing them with information, in order to produce what Foucault would term ‘docile’, ‘useful’, ‘functional’ and ‘productive’ bodies contributing to the British war effort. Having seen how the MOI generally worked, and the place of the poster division within that, we will move on to consider how the division commissioned, produced, distributed and displayed posters throughout the war, focusing particularly on the posters produced in the first few weeks of the war.

Most historians dealing with the subject of the wartime MOI have started from the premise that the MOI was a shambolic and disorganised division, unprepared for the start of war.\(^1\) Like any wartime creation, the MOI underwent many changes, and it is certainly difficult to define the structure of the MOI, even just one portion of it, as it continued to reorganise in the face of press criticism. Early on in the preparation stages the planners recognised that the public needed ‘a definite conviction that the whole question of Government Information’ would be ‘in firm and efficient hands’. Tying in with the ‘magic bullet’ theory outlined on page 53, it was believed that the citizen would need to be ‘clearly and swiftly told what he is to do, where he is to do it, how he is to do it and what he should not do’.\(^2\) The Fleet Street Press, however, threatened by the possibility of state regulation and censorship, aggressively targeted the MOI, although news and censorship were no longer functions of the MOI after October 3 1940.\(^3\) Local newspapers looked to the MOI as

---


3. See PRO INF 1/261, ‘Memorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red posters’, October 1939, p.5: ‘If the Ministry could be free from such criticism for a few weeks its posters would undoubtedly
“helpers” rather than “oppressors”, and thus the reputation was higher in the provinces. With many ‘how-to’ books produced during the inter-war years, suggesting that anyone with a measure of common sense and intelligence could be successful in advertising, the “average man” also believed that, although he could not criticise the service departments, he could criticise the MOI. Historians, including Chapman, are now challenging the idea that the MOI was a dysfunctional failure. Chapman used the Films Divisions of the MOI as a reference point to demonstrate how “a democratic state created a workable and efficient propaganda organisation almost from scratch… one which played its full part in achieving eventual victory.” Controversy and failure always create more interest for historians, but more attention should be paid to the achievements that the MOI actually made.

Planning for the establishment of the Ministry of Information in a time of war started on October 14 1935, with the formation of a sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID). The formation of the MOI has been well documented in several texts, but we consider here some issues that are central to this thesis. Several disparate agencies had been involved in propaganda in the First World War, with home propaganda the responsibility of the National War Aims Committee, established to combat “war weariness”. There was no Ministry of Information until 1918, an unpopular organisation with the British governing élite who found its work distasteful and ‘un-English’. Despite Beaverbrook’s desire for the MOI to have a post-war function, the MOI was disbanded almost immediately the war ended. Interwar developments in physical communication methods and theories of propaganda suggested that for any future large scale war, the

efficient conduct of propaganda activities, for which the MOI would be key, ‘might prove to be scarcely less important than those of the fighting services’. The new MOI planners wished to profit from their example, but the records were unable to be found, either destroyed or lost in transit during the intervening decades, although some information was collated.

Enthusiastic volunteers planned the MOI alongside full-time work. Sir John Reith proposed that the home front took ‘clear precedence’ over foreign fronts, but his suggestions were rejected in favour of a paper by Leeper of the Foreign Office. Leeper stressed a similar set up to governmental publicity prior to 1917. He did not appear to have assimilated the fact that the MOI would be aiming at an entirely different audience to that of the First World War, more directly concerned with the Home Front rather than simply recruitment. As Campbell-Stuart noted when he resigned from the MOI in 1940, ‘what had done very well for the Kaiser’s war would not do for the Führer’s’. Robertson noted a comprehensive propaganda policy, using the most up to date publicity, would be required immediately on the outbreak of war. The MOI could not take up where it had left off in the last war, as there had been enormous developments, including the advent of broadcasting, a ‘great and enormous channel’ and film had progressed greatly. Leslie, of the Gas, Light and Coke Company, had been involved in the shadow organisation for the MOI. He had got the impression ‘that the plans were ambitious… in their evident intention to include within the Ministry every possible channel of communication between the Government and the people’.

---

16 PRO INF 4/1A, Unspecified file, ‘Aims of Home Publicity During the Great War’, undated but 1938. PRO CAB 21/1069, Robertson, C.P., ‘Memorandum on the Creation of a Ministry of Information in War’, 12 September 1935 noted that one official even had to resort to the Encyclopaedia Britannica in order to obtain a definition of ‘propaganda’. Captain Peter Chalmers Mitchell, who had been on the Staff of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and later served with the Department of Enemy Propaganda, wrote the entry in question.
17 PRO INF 1/1, ‘Letter from Hildred to Tallents’, January 8 1938, complained that planners were risking both their health and their jobs working long hours at the MOI.
20 PRO CAB 16/129, ‘Memo of creation of MOI in event of war prepared by Mr CP Robertson of Press Section of Air Ministry’, September 12 1935.
During the inter-war years, information activities had become an accepted function of government. After the Post Office established a public relations division in 1933, practically all government departments had established a press liaison section. Grant cites the existence of these various agencies as a major problem in the formation of a centralised propaganda department in the Second World War. Each department wanted to conduct propaganda in their own way and objected to centralisation. They felt that those responsible for designing propaganda policy needed to have control over its production as well. From the variety of these agencies arose the idea for national agency, with increased inter-departmental workings forming the basis for the MOI. Tallents and Reith called for a centralised department, particularly with regard to posters and films, which were ‘of a highly technical character’, and required ‘expert staff’. Pre-war, the Ministry of Labour, the Armed Forces and the ARP all ran ‘overlapping and wasteful’ campaigns that competed for recruits, with each department explaining the campaign only from angle of their interest. The MOI expected to ‘be regarded in principle as the centre for all Government publicity concerning the war’, undertaking publicity for wartime departments. Peace-time departments with publicity organisations were expected, at least initially, to continue their own work. The publicity work of government departments was considered by the Select Committee, specifically: the Admiralty, the War Office, the Post Office, the Board of Education (which included the National Fitness Council), and the Ministry of Labour. Although often the objective and type of publicity used were the same, the methods used were fundamentally different. Experts in the United Kingdom were also consulted, particularly the Post Office (GPO), and it was even suggested that their poster production machinery would be taken over. Note had also been made of peace time activities of agencies such as the British Council, and a wide range of commercial companies and agencies, including LPTB, Shell-Mex, Imperial Airways, and Kodak.

23 Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.46.
Much of the Ministry’s planning was done in secret as the government were fearful of public reactions when seen to be using ‘propaganda’, as seen in the previous chapter, a word which had received many negative connotations since the First World War. In January 1938 a progress report established that a lot of work had been done, although when the MOI was mobilised for two days over the Munich crisis in September 1938, it was shown that there was still much to be done. Although a false alarm, this raised the question of whether the MOI could be left unformed until war had already begun, or whether it could form prior to war. There were problems with either decision, the former leading to confusion due to a lack of preparation, the second ‘essentially meant war, and the Government could not allow the impression to form that it had resigned itself to such a probability’. A plan presented by Sir Stephen Tallents, a senior civil servant with a lot of previous publicity experience, to avoid the unpreparedness of the MOI shown at the Munich crisis, was rejected as it involved some take-over of the work of the peace-time departments. Blamed for the Ministry’s problems, Tallents was dismissed, replaced ‘by a man with no prior experience of propaganda’.

It was known that the next war would be fought by the civil population, and it was expected to be a war of nerves, where maintaining public morale was to be of ‘primary importance’. The government would have ‘to go far beyond anything that has been done in the past’, using ‘every existing and conceivable type of advertising publicity and showmanship’, which would have to ‘be utilised and co-ordinated’, producing the argument for a central controlling office for information. Lord Macmillan claimed that not many people felt ‘the urgency and importance of this fourth armament’ or recognised ‘the severe and practical preparation which its effective use involve.’ Cooper conceived

---

33 PRO INF 1/712, ‘Publicity in the United Kingdom’, undated.
35 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.16.
37 PRO CAB 16/127, ‘Fifth Meeting of the CID sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information in a time of war’, 14 December 1938.
of the MOI as one of the fighting services: Goebbels propaganda machine was successful because he fought with a vast army at his back, unlimited expenditure, and no opponents in the field.\textsuperscript{41} The government could not ‘afford to have the British public less united and less enthusiastic than the German public’. The Home Publicity Division (HPD) complained that they had to ‘compete with an enemy machine, costing millions a year, which touches and influences every phase of the national life and which has taken years to build up’.\textsuperscript{42}

The MOI was not formed until the outbreak of war, with Lord Macmillan appointed as Minister of Information on September 4 1939,\textsuperscript{43} at which point the MOI was composed of an Executive and an Advisory Council. See Appendix 6 for the layout of the Executive Council on September 8 1939, comprised of thirteen Directorates, composed of four major groups.\textsuperscript{44} The MOI went through several Ministers in quick succession. Macmillan, with a Tory seat in the House of Lords, was criticised as he was unable to defend the position of the MOI in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{45} On January 5 1940 he was replaced by Reith, previously director-general of the BBC.\textsuperscript{46} Reith looked to Chamberlain for support in standing up to the Service departments,\textsuperscript{47} and fought to achieve War Cabinet rank for the MOI.\textsuperscript{48} He complained that the MOI had no real authority,\textsuperscript{49} and could not properly function without access to all the relevant information.\textsuperscript{50} On May 12 1940, Churchill replaced Reith with Duff Cooper, providing the place on the War Cabinet that Reith had coveted.\textsuperscript{51} Criticised, particularly for the quality and quantity of MOI staff,\textsuperscript{52} Cooper noted that there was plenty of advertising talent within the MOI, but that it was an uncontrollable ‘monster’.\textsuperscript{53} He blamed many failures of the MOI on Churchill, who he believed was not interested in the subject.\textsuperscript{54} On July 20 1941, Brendan Bracken was appointed Minister of Information. Unlike his predecessors, Bracken, a close associate of Churchill’s throughout

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{41} PRO INF 1/78, \textit{The Times}, February 7 1941 (Cutting).
\bibitem{42} PRO INF 1/302, ‘Home Publicity Functions’, early-October 1939.
\bibitem{44} PRO INF 1/23, ‘Organisation of the Ministry of Information’, September 8 1939.
\bibitem{46} Ibid., p.235.
\bibitem{47} Ibid., p.236.
\bibitem{48} Ibid., p.247.
\bibitem{49} Reith, J., \textit{Into the Wind}, 1949, p.353.
\bibitem{52} Cooper, D., op.cit., 1953, p.285.
\end{thebibliography}
the 1930s,\textsuperscript{55} could get the press\textsuperscript{56} and the Prime Minister to listen to his ideas, was confident in tackling the Ministry’s adversaries, and scorned ‘the exhortation of the British public’.\textsuperscript{57}

As the MOI underwent many changes, there were very few divisions that remained in place from the beginning to the end of the war. It was planned that the MOI would be developed in two stages, with Publicity and Collecting Divisions to be established later, but as soon as possible after war was declared.\textsuperscript{58} In 1935, it was expected that the Publicity Division would ensure that the national cause was properly presented to the public both at home and abroad. Government and enemy actions were to be explained, examined, and criticised. Its role would be ‘to watch for subjects in which publicity is required’; ‘to prepare material’; and ‘to arrange the distribution of such material through the appropriate channels’. It was expected that there would be separate sections dealing with each type of propaganda medium. The head of each section would advise whether the topic was suitable for his medium, and suggest topics for which it was suited. It was anticipated that there would be a general section to determine all policy and allot media in consultation with heads of sections.\textsuperscript{59} In November 1937, preparatory work began,\textsuperscript{60} and in July 1938 the planning of the HPD was begun in earnest.\textsuperscript{61} Geographical departments would plan and guide publicity, whilst the technical departments would execute, in consultation, the plans.\textsuperscript{62} Publicity producing and publicity using divisions, although separate, needed to be ‘thought of as complementary to, rather than independent of’ each other. Producer divisions, with their expert knowledge, were able to give valuable advice as to the form which the material could best take, and could suggest fruitful lines of policy. They could not, however, turn out material that had not been sanctioned by the publicity division for

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.288.
\textsuperscript{55} Lysaght, C.E., Brendan Bracken: A Biography, 1979, pp.190-191.
\textsuperscript{56} HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Beaverbrook Papers, C/56, ‘Letter from Beaverbrook to Bracken’, July 21 1941, Beaverbrook, a key figure in the press, congratulated Bracken on his new position, and offered support.\textsuperscript{57} McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.7. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 270, Davidson Papers, ‘Home Morale Emergency Committee: Report to Policy Committee’, June 4 1940, makes it clear that Bracken was not the first to recognise that the public wanted instructions rather than exhortations, and command rather than comfort, as Cooper was Minister at this point.\textsuperscript{58} See PRO INF 1/1, ‘Progress Report’, op.cit., February 1938, p.24 for further details.\textsuperscript{59} PRO CAB 16/128, ‘Sub-Committee Appointed by Committee of Imperial Defence on October 14 1935’, undated, p.17.
\textsuperscript{60} PRO INF 1/1, ‘Progress Report’, op.cit., February 1938, p.24.
\textsuperscript{61} Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.241.
\textsuperscript{62} PRO CAB 16/127, ‘Progress Report for Period ending March 31, 1938, by Standing Sub-Committee on the Scheme for a Ministry of Information in Time of War’, October 1938, p.11. The geographical departments were divided into the ‘the Home Country, the Empire overseas, allied countries, neutral countries, and enemy countries’.
whose use it was intended, being mainly executive agents of the users. The HPD did all publicity work, including leaflets, exhibitions, press advertising, posters, pictures, photographs and documentary films. It was deemed ‘very desirable’ to all the various media under one Controller, to ensure that their use could be balanced within ‘any particular publicity campaign’. The HPD was expected to use outside agencies, both at home and overseas, some specialised, and would be ‘directly dependent’ on the ‘guidance of the Collecting Division, both in deciding its policy and in assessing its results’.

The MOI undertook three main types of campaigns. There were campaigns initiated within, and conducted entirely by, the MOI. There were campaigns undertaken by the Ministry at the request of other Government Departments, including evacuation for the Ministry of Health, salvage for the Ministry of Supply and ‘Dig for Victory’ for the Ministry of Agriculture. There were also campaigns initiated locally by the Regional Information Officer (RIO) on behalf of the MOI, or at the specific request of the Regional Commissioner for Civil Defence or of Regional officers of other government departments. The MOI queried whether the campaign was essential, and, if so, whether legislative or administrative action was necessary, with publicity providing the explanation. If legislative action was necessary, but refused, propaganda campaigns were rejected as propaganda campaigns were not a suitable substitute. Once a campaign was agreed on, decisions needed to be made as to whether the campaign should consist of explanation or a persuasive emotional appeal. Inadequate explanation was deemed pointless, but emotional appeals were considered to have been overused. Any resistance to government requests needed to be understood, whether material or mental factors.

Before undertaking work originating from other departments, the MOI required an official letter asking them to undertake responsibility, and ‘explaining precisely what their policy is and what they want us to do’. The HPD would then decide, in consultation with the

---

67 PRO INF 1/251, ‘Home Intelligence, Home Front Propaganda’, undated.
68 PRO INF 1/340, ‘Notes of Discussion between D.G., D.D.G., A.D.G., Mr Hilton and Mr Surrey Dane on the Allocation of Responsibility for Publicity Campaigns’, undated but probably 1940.
General Production Division (GPD), after submission to the Director-General, whether to accept the campaign. The GPD would consider the conditions leading up to the request; whether the conditions are such that publicity can be effective; what kind of publicity can be effective; the extent of the publicity necessary; the effect of the proposed campaign on other campaigns.  

If accepted, the Directors of HPD and GPD would then consult with representatives of the requesting department to get ideas and greater detail, although the MOI was not committed to using the ideas suggested. The HPD would then meet with the GPD, Editorial, Films and Radio Relations where everyone could pool their ideas and draw up a rough outline of the campaign, allocating responsibilities to each producing division. Each would then work out the detail of their share of the campaign, and reconvene to settle the order, before submitting to the Director-General for approval. The GPD would take responsibility for posters, undertaking technical work that would be displayed on voluntary sites, and instructing advertising agents to do work on a commission basis where necessary. The HPD would direct and co-ordinate the general working out of the campaign and for work (such as a letter from the Queen to evacuees parents) outside of the technical production divisions. Treasury sanction would then be sought. Once agreement had been reached between the MOI and requesting department, the GPD had a responsibility to see that the plan was carried out, consulting an agreed panel of experts if necessary, and keeping the originating department informed.

By 1940 the HPD was part of the General Division, its duties distributed between the three functional divisions, the Regional Administration Division and RIOs. The Home Morale Emergency Committee (HMEC) was formed in May 1940, essentially an ad hoc committee that made detailed recommendations in order to deal with public morale. Deciding that exhortations were pointless, they decided that people wanted direction and concrete orders. By mid-1940, the HPD had broken down, and the HMEC expanded to

---

69 PRO INF 1/86, ‘Memo from Vaughan to DDG: Normal Procedure in the handling of Advertising Campaigns for MOI for other Government Departments’, August 16 1941.
70 PRO INF 1/340, ‘Notes of Discussion’, op.cit., undated but probably 1940.
71 PRO INF 1/340, ‘Memorandum on Allocation of Responsibility Between Home Publicity and General Production’, January 23 1940.
72 PRO INF 1/3, ‘General Division – Progress Report from January 1 to February 21 1940’, February 1940.
75 PRO INF 1/250, ‘Report to Policy Committee’, June 4 1940.
76 PRO INF 1/250, ‘24th Meeting of the Policy Committee’, undated, and PRO INF 1/251, ‘Notes for the Long-term policy of the Ministry’, August 24 1940.
become the Home Planning Committee (HPC). The HPC felt that their role could only work if they had financial control, and if all important proposals for campaigns were discussed at weekly meetings, achieving their goal on August 26 1940, when no fresh financial commitments could be made without the HPC’s approval. The HPC met daily after the Policy Committee, when it discussed the measures required to carry out policies which had been decided on, referring back to the Policy Committee for further guidance, if necessary.

The Treasury ruling passed in 1940 required that all government advertising, other than that issued by the National Savings Committee, should be issued through the MOI. The MOI never gained actual control over the publicity of the Ministry of Food, or the National Savings movement, whilst other departments appear to have used the MOI only as a formality. There is evidence that, initially at least, the Ministry of Food was prepared to work with the MOI. It understood that the role of the MOI was ‘the defence of the home front’, in which food was an important ‘object of attack’. To assist the MOI to carry out its publicity functions the Ministry of Food supplied ‘information and notes as the basis of argument’. They then worked in close consultation, but it was the ‘affair’ of the MOI ‘to prepare the statement of the case based on our notes and to “put it over”’. The division of responsibility was explained in December 1940 as: ‘most changes in habits (good or bad) are promoted by other Ministries, e.g. rationing, curfew, … changes in beliefs, e.g. belief in official communiqués, are the direct concern of this Ministry’. The financial responsibility was unclear as there was no scheme for the partial allocation of expense, such as the production by one Ministry and distribution by another. For example, if there were to be a general campaign against waste, anti-food-wastage posters would be part of the general scheme, and their cost would be borne by the Ministry of Information, or the Stationary Office Vote. On the other hand, should the Ministry of Food decide to persuade

---

77 PRO INF 1/71, ‘Extract: Planning Committee: Wednesday, August 21 1940: Composition and Functions’, August 1940. Frank Pick was the head of the HPC.
78 PRO INF 1/249, ‘Functions of the Planning Committee, note to Walter Monckton from M. Balfour’, December 1940.
79 PRO INF 1/253, ‘Memo from Sir Kenneth Clark to DDG: Home Planning Committee’, undated but probably August 1940.
80 PRO INF 1/252, ‘Copies to P.S. and Lord Davidson from Sir Kenneth Clark’, April 10 1941.
81 PRO INF 1/3, ‘General Division – Progress Report from January 1 to February 21 1940’, February 1940.
82 Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.61.
84 PRO INF 1/343, ‘Letter from the Ministry of Food to Sir Findlater Stewart at the MOI’, October 31 1939.
85 PRO INF 1/251, ‘Ministry of Information, Plan for Home Publicity’, [December 1940], (emphasis in original).
the public not to waste certain special food commodities, the publicity would have to be financed by the department.\textsuperscript{86} Waterfield regarded financial responsibility as an important issue as it determined whether the MOI was regarded as the ‘mere servant’ of other departments, or whether it should be regarded as a ‘responsible department’.\textsuperscript{87} The danger was that if departments had asked for a campaign to be given coverage and the MOI did not oblige, they would ‘run campaigns themselves’, when the MOI had felt that ‘the absorptive capacity’ of the public had been exceeded.\textsuperscript{88}

In July 1940, the MOI appeared unsure as to who exercised control over posters, particularly Government and trade posters.\textsuperscript{89} The MOI did not have the power to change the wording of anything that passed through the department, and, in June 1931, Cooper was driven to asking that the Ministry of Information be given more power, or that it be disbanded altogether.\textsuperscript{90} In 1942, there was still lack of control, as it had been agreed to comply with Churchill’s decision not to promote post-war aims, but the ABCA posters ‘Your Britain, Fight for It Now’ (figures 18 to 20) were still produced through the MOI.\textsuperscript{91}

It is unclear when the Campaigns Division formed, but it was in place by the end of the war. Exercising central control, it ensured that every campaign was given its ‘proper relative importance’ amongst all government campaigns, avoiding possible conflicts. Each campaign was planned to make proper use of all suitable media, with associated commercial and government groups protected from uncoordinated demands. Available advertising agencies were used ‘with due regard for the proper spread of Government patronage’.\textsuperscript{92} The Campaigns Division, also responsible for press advertising, was ‘directly and technically responsible for the production and distribution of millions of leaflets and posters’, and spent ‘over half-a-million ponds per annum on poster site hire’.\textsuperscript{93}

At the outbreak of war, it was expected that £250,000 would be spent in the first two months of war, including £185,000 on propaganda,\textsuperscript{94} of which £50,000 was expected to be

\textsuperscript{86} PRO INF 1/343, ‘Memo from CCA [unreadable] to Mr R.W. Harris’, November 9 1939.
\textsuperscript{87} PRO INF 1/341, ‘Letter to Hale, Treasury from Waterfield, MOI’, December 5 1939, pp.1-2.
\textsuperscript{88} PRO INF 1/238, ‘Memo from DDG to Mr EHT Wiltshire’, April 20 1942.
\textsuperscript{89} PRO INF 1/63, Mr Bamford, ‘Select Committee on National Expenditure: Sub Committee on Home Defence Services Meeting on July 17 1940’, July 1940.
\textsuperscript{90} Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.64.
\textsuperscript{91} McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.183.
\textsuperscript{92} PRO INF 1/942, ‘Campaigns Division: Post-War Position’, July 20 1945.
\textsuperscript{93} PRO INF 1/954, ‘Memo to DDG from Mr Buxton’, undated but 1945.
\textsuperscript{94} PRO INF 1/54, ‘Letter from D.B. Woodburn to ECW, Secretary of the Treasury’, September 2 1939.
spent on posters.\textsuperscript{95} In the first six months of war, £27,036 was spent on posters, including the costs of design roughs, artist’s fees, site hire, distribution and other costs.\textsuperscript{96} In 1942, £4,000,000 was spent on publicity (a 33\% increase on the previous year), of which £120,000 was spent on posters, art and exhibitions, with the MOI working as an agency for eighteen government departments.\textsuperscript{97} In 1942, probably within the last quarter, £1,009 was spent on art work for posters, £25,306 on site hire, distribution and other costs.\textsuperscript{98} In what was probably the first quarter of 1943 £1,724 was spent on art work, and £37,455 on site hire, distribution and other costs.\textsuperscript{99} By 1943, 10\% of the entire MOI publicity budget was spent on the home front, out of which 4.32\% was composed of expenditure on posters.\textsuperscript{100}

By May 1939, planning staff had been employed in the GPD, including a General Production Manager to co-ordinate technical planning, an assistant with a specialised knowledge of outdoor publicity, copywriters, research workers and a part-time artist to execute roughs (see Appendix 7).\textsuperscript{101} By mid-June the register of artists and collected samples of their work was ready, and the first poster-roughs complete.\textsuperscript{102} In normal commercial practice, three months was considered usual from ‘the decision to start the production of a poster and its appearance on hoardings’. After consultation with HMSO, it was hoped that it could be possible to effect the production of a poster in a fortnight, and once war had started, possibly in one week.\textsuperscript{103} In some cases this was achieved, with a campaign on behalf of the Ministry of Home Security printed and distributed within ten days of financial authority.\textsuperscript{104} The GPD remained in place throughout the war.\textsuperscript{105} With an

\textsuperscript{95} PRO INF 1/54, ‘Letter to Mr Waterfield: Finance’, September 7 1939.
\textsuperscript{96} PRO INF 1/60, ‘Payments made September 3 1939 to March 31 1940’, April 8 1940.
\textsuperscript{97} PRO INF 1/75, ‘Parliamentary Debates on MOI’, 1943. The MOI did work for: Admiralty; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries/Department of Agriculture for Scotland; Air Ministry; Board of Education; Ministry of Food (Poster Campaigns); Ministry of Fuel & Power; General Post Office; Ministry of Health; Home Office and Ministry of Home Security; Board of Inland Revenue; Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Pensions; Ministry of Production; Ministry of Supply; Board of Trade; Ministry of War Transport; Ministry of Works & Planning; and the War Office.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., ‘Statement of Ministry of Information Expenditure and Estimate of Commitments’, January 22 1943.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., ‘Statement of Ministry of Information Expenditure and Estimate of Commitments’, April 23 1943.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., ‘Estimate of the Vote for the Salaries and Expenses of the Ministry of Information for the year ending March 31 1944’, April 1943.
\textsuperscript{101} PRO INF 1/720, ‘Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measures’, May 18 1939.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., June 8 1939.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., undated, but June-August 1939. In 1931, a ‘Buy British’ campaign had been achieved in six weeks, but this was only under extreme pressure and in peacetime. In rare cases posters had been got out ten days after the design had been agreed on. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 270, Davidson Papers, ‘Policy Committee’, June 7 1940, discussed the speed at which the Prime Minister’s speech could appear as a poster. It was agreed that within a long-term campaign it would take two-three weeks, but if speed, rather than quality, was of the essence, then one-two days was possible.
\textsuperscript{104} PRO INF 1/4, ‘General Division, Progress Report for April’, May 1940.
\textsuperscript{105} PRO INF 1/942, ‘General Production Division’, December 31 1944.
administrative and technical staff of 30, it was ‘responsible for the writing and production of all printed matter’, including articles, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and posters, ‘to meet the requirements of the four primary Divisions’. The GPD could, and did, call ‘to its aid professional advertising firms which specialise in the form of publicity which it is decided to employ’.\(^\text{106}\) For posters, newspapers and other publicity, the Department acted as ‘advertising agent to other Ministries’ and was ‘responsible for the preparation and execution of campaigns of varying character and extent’ to meet requirements. The work undertaken in the Ministry was intended to be in the ‘nature of review and control’, as it was not intended to ‘undertake production direct’ except in the absence of ‘suitable external facilities’.\(^\text{107}\) In November 1940, discussions were under way as to whether to rename the General Production Department, the Poster and Publicity Division. This would be comprised of five sections: ordering, execution and checking of work; distribution of publicity material; management of campaigns and general administration; publication of periodicals, copy and ideas; design, layout and lettering in the studio.\(^\text{108}\) Vaughan complained that this title was ‘hardly descriptive of the work we do’, and suggested that Publicity Division alone was appropriate if renaming was necessary.\(^\text{109}\) The DG said that he preferred the old title of GPD and ordered that it continued to be used.\(^\text{110}\) The GPD included the understaffed Outdoor Publicity Department where ‘the poster requirements of 19 Government Departments are at present being negotiated and handled by only 2 seniors, 3 J.A.S. and 6 juniors’. Few campaigns operated ‘without poster publicity’, but posters were handled by ‘understaffed juniors’, and £300,000 worth of paid-for posters sites, and voluntary sites were ready for use, but not being professionally maintained.\(^\text{111}\)

Edwin Embleton, Studio Manager for the GPD, was responsible for preparing contracts and ensuring that work was fulfilled by artists and copywriters on time.\(^\text{112}\) On occasions it was difficult to recruit\(^\text{113}\) and retain workers. Advertising specialists, although they ‘wished to remain patriotic’, were earning half of what they could earn commercially, and as a result Embleton was losing skilled men, particularly as civil service rules did not allow for

\(^{106}\) PRO CAB 21/1069, ‘Home Division’, undated but pre-war, p.8.
\(^{107}\) PRO INF 1/78, ‘Ministry of Information: Organisation’, probably November 1940.
\(^{108}\) PRO INF 1/86, ‘OEPEC Paper No 572, Poster and Publicity Division’, November 14 1940.
\(^{109}\) Ibid., ‘Memo from Vaughan to DG’, December 6 1940.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., ‘Memo from Woodburn to Vaughan’, January 29 1941.
\(^{111}\) PRO INF 1/638, See the variety in ‘Contracts with Artists: War Artists and Illustrators. 24 November 1939 – October 1941’.
\(^{112}\) PRO INF 1/638, ‘OEPEC Paper No 1951, General Production Division: Regrading of Staff’, undated but probably January 1943.
workers to take moonlight work. The GPD was often over-stretched, but Woodburn believed that this called for better quality, rather than quantity, officers, which cost-cutting measures did not allow for. Reginald Mount worked full time for the MOI throughout the war, and Eileen Evans and Austin Cooper joined later. Outside the MOI other freelancers were used, including Tom Eckersley in the Air Force, Pat Keely at the GPO, Abram Games the only ‘Official War Office Poster Artist’, with Frank Newbould his assistant. The artists all maintained their identity as freelancers in a large design organisation ‘which appears to have positively nurtured creative work’. Designers recall it as a happy working time, designing for a serious purpose, and working largely without restriction. Freeman comments that ‘perhaps because the MOI was new and its policies were evolving it was receptive to innovative design ideas.’ Outside agencies were employed on creative production by the GPD as much as possible, but practical limits were imposed by the necessity for close co-operation with user divisions, the need for secrecy and confidentiality with certain material, the need for speed and cost. By March 1941, with a larger staff, the studio was able to contract out less work. Straightforward work such as the ‘finishing up of lettering’ was still given to outside studios, releasing studio artists to concentrate on fresh creative work. It is unclear whether artists were commissioned or offered their services in every case, although how poster artists had been selected pre-war by other government departments were considered. The MOI desired to be a centre with which writers and artists desiring to use their talents in the national cause can be in touch with a view to securing information, advice and such other facilities as it may be possible to give them. The MOI was expected to get the best value, and to obtain quotations from artists as non-competitive tenders always ‘attract criticism’, although later it was said that competitive tendering was expected to increase the cost.

114 Ibid., ‘Letter from National Register of Industrial Designers to Embleton’, May 13 1942 (with handwritten notes by Embleton).
115 Ibid., ‘Mr Woodburn: Views on Staffing’, January 1943.
118 PRO INF 1/86, ‘General Production Division, Staff and Functions’, August 26 1940.
119 PRO INF 1/87, ‘Mr Embleton to Mr Judd: Art Contracts outside the Ministry’, March 29 1941.
120 PRO MAF 39/05, ‘Report from the Select Committee on Estimates: Advertising and Publicity by Government Departments’, [1938], p.3. The Admiralty employed artists known to and selected by themselves, The War Office allowed their agents to select artists. The National Fitness Council employed both a full time designer on staff and outside artists. The Post Office and the Ministry of Labour each selected artists from lists which they respectively maintained.
Dame Laura Knight, an established classically trained artist, was asked, in October 1939, whether she was ‘interested in the possibility of producing a Pictorial poster to be used in Government publicity?’ Later, a ‘preliminary sketch’ was requested, common practice in government departments, for which ten guineas would be paid. A further sixty guineas would be paid for the finished design, processed only if the design was passed. Knight complained that she never made preliminary sketches as size ‘makes so much difference to composition’. After debate it was noted that exceptions for any artist, however distinguished, could not be made as it would be unfair to other artists who had to work under the conditions. Knight was given ten to twelve days to produce a rough picture, allowing 8” for wording, and signed a formal contract giving up the right to copyright. The wording, in some cases at least, was not considered an integral part of the design, with five guineas paid for the ‘lettering for a 20 x 15 poster’. Kenneth Clark was given £100, expected to last six months, to pay artists who produced roughs that were not used as posters, for which payment would not normally exceed five guineas. This was the figure offered to Harold Pym, contacted through the War Artists and Illustrators, for a rough design depicting an ‘aerial dog fight’, double crown size, for display in the Middle East, with the MOI ‘under no obligation’ to accept the rough. Publicity artists were not in a reserved occupation. In February 1941, the War Office was asked to allow Harold Pym an extra fortnight’s leave to complete poster work he was preparing for the MOI, after he was called into Service at short notice. In July 1941, having already handled poster work for the MOI, the War Artists and Illustrators wanted to present further specimens of their artists work to the MOI. Despite complaints that there was a lack of skilled poster artists, Harrington, who had ‘considerable experience in poster design and advertising layout including lettering’, was told there were no vacancies in the Studio. He was an artist.
who had experience of industrial publicity, and had ideas for amplifying the ‘Go to it’ slogan. McKnight Kauffer offered his services to the MOI, but as an ‘alien’ he was paid on a fee rather than a salary basis, and found himself doing ‘hack work’, and thus left for America in late 1939. He did not feel that the best use was being made of his skills, and had he felt he was indispensable at the MOI he would have stayed on. By June 1942 the seriousness of the situation was recognised and a series of letters was sent out to skilled men in the forces, asking whether they were happy to have their name put forward to be released from the forces to work for the MOI.

Finished poster designs would be forwarded to His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) ‘together with specifications of quantities for printing and distribution’. In planning to use HMSO, it was questioned whether it could continue to provide the required service at ‘a very much accelerated rate’. The HMSO normally took about three weeks to produce about 30,000 coloured posters, which were also more expensive and time consuming, but more effective. Lord Davidson suggested that speed could be improved by employing printers direct, without going through HMSO. Vaughan, however, noted that HMSO had the best machinery ‘for ascertaining at any time the state of availability of the print trade’, and urgent work could still be placed with printing firms nationwide who were able to take it when necessary. Posters were to be produced using HMSO stock copy, with a high standard to be maintained as work would be associated with the department. Proofs were provided to printers to check the accuracy of type-setting. Writers were to be prevented from regarding them as an opportunity to alter the original subject matter, which would cost more time and money. Before sending to the printer, all proofs were signed by the author, reader and production assistant.

136 Ibid., ‘Letter to Director of Production from G.W. Harrington’, February 4 1941.
137 Haworth-Booth, M., E. McKnight Kauffer: a Designer and his Public, 1979, p.82. ‘Edward McKnight Kauffer’, Poster Database, LTM, accessed February 2000, quoting Riddell, J., By Underground to Kew: London Transport Posters, 1908-Present, 1994, notes that Kauffer had designed posters for Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. This fact may not have worked in his favour.
138 Ibid., p.84.
139 PRO INF 1/86, ‘Series of Letters from Embleton’, June 3 1942. The list comprised of H.G. Smith; C.W. Bacon; B. Chubb; J.W. Bird; F. Cramer; H.A. Seabright; Cuneo; F. Reeves; Laban; J.R. Brinkley; and H.E. Jones.
142 PRO INF 1/343, ‘Posters’, October 31 1939.
143 PRO INF 1/849, ‘Policy Committee: Lord Davidson’s Proposals’, June 6 1940.
144 PRO INF 1/226, ‘Production and Printing Report’, undated but likely to be summer 1939.
The control of paper was important, particularly once paper was rationed on February 12 1940, with paper more important to the MOI than any other department. It was not anticipated the printers would have any difficulty finding paper at the start of the war, although paper for colour printing required time to mature, and delays would occur if sufficient stock did not exist. The GPD was responsible for the MOI ration, and corresponded with HMSO, the Paper Control and individual printers. With 26.5 tons of paper used for posters by December 1940, decisions had to be made as to whether the stocks of the MOI or the requesting department were used. It was anticipated that printing stocks would come from the HMSO, or from commercial firms hired at MOI instigation. With shrinking newspapers, more use was being made of posters on commercial sites by late 1941, with an average poster display using seventeen tons for a thirteen week campaign. The MOI had handled eighteen major campaigns in the preceding twelve months, and assuming similar figures in the future, it was expected that 306 tons per annum would be used, possibly with increased demand. A letter to the DDG noted that paper controls should not be allowed to interfere with campaigns. If campaigns had been deemed necessary and Treasury sanction had been given, Royds would need only to ensure that ‘quantities of printed material involved are absolutely indispensable to the success of the campaign’, and whether reductions could be made that would not ‘fatally’ impair it.

Standard commercial sizes, particularly Demy and Crown were to be used to ensure speed of production, unless circumstances dictated differently. Posters of a hoarding size were to be prepared only for long-term campaigns, with posters of a shop-size to be distributed in anticipation of, for example, food campaigns. The government needed to ensure that it was not seen infringing the law, and the size of posters was limited to a maximum size of four-sheets (60” x 40”) under ‘Paper Order No. 16 of May 25 1940’. In June 1940 there were ‘home morale’ campaigns for which the government wished to publish 16 and 48 sheet posters, which were in excess of the maximum permitted size, so a special licence to print was required. Vaughan suggested that the government should be allowed to do so, in the same way that Military Authorities were allowed to ignore speed limits and use

145 PRO INF 1/238, ‘Memo from M.L.G. Balfour to Mr Bamford’, May 3 1940.
146 Ibid., ‘MOI Memo on Paper Requirements’, May 27 1940.
150 Ibid., ‘Memo from Mr Judd to Mr Vaughan’, September 16 1941.
unlimited petrol despite public rationing.\textsuperscript{154} Government departments were not bound by the law prohibiting large-scale posters, but bill-posters were ‘inclined to complain on the score of wasting paper’, and this was deemed a ‘valid interjection’.\textsuperscript{155} Advertiser’s complained at the size restrictions. They recognised the need to conserve paper, but felt that this could be better achieved by giving rations to companies to use as required, rather than by limiting the size of posters. It was argued that filled hoardings added colour to life and by covering bombed buildings would improve morale. The MOI was felt to be setting a bad example by fly-posting,\textsuperscript{156} as the public was cajoled by the press to save paper, but every week there was ‘some unnecessary publication’ by the government.\textsuperscript{157} In November 1941, legislation was introduced forbidding the use of similar posters near each other.\textsuperscript{158}

The distribution of posters was thus vitally important, as Vaughan noted to Woodburn, when there was a threat to the use of Mr Scarborough, who had worked unpaid for the MOI for the first five weeks of war. Scarborough was ‘completely familiar with the whole detail of the distribution of the Ministry’s posters’. This included distribution to factories, mills, banks, chain stores, licensed houses, hotels and restaurants, local authorities, employment exchanges, schools, post offices; and bulk distribution through the regional offices of the National Savings Association, the British Legion and the Boy Scouts Association.

Scarborough’s work involved the controlled despatch of posters to ‘ensure even coverage of the country’; the minimisation of waste through the despatch of ‘precise quantities and sizes’ requested by exhibitors of posters; and ensuring that exhibitors were not sent more posters than they could show.\textsuperscript{159} Whether this plea was successful is unknown, but by August 1940 the Distribution Section within the GPD was responsible for the ‘distribution of all material produced or bought by the Ministry’,\textsuperscript{160} and the distribution of posters was generally centralised at Headquarters. Mailings were made direct from the HMSO to firms or organisations nation-wide who undertook to display posters either on commercial or free

\textsuperscript{153} PRO INF 1/343, ‘Food Publicity’, November 2 1939.
\textsuperscript{154} PRO INF 1/238, ‘Letter from Vaughan to Waterfield’, June 28 1940.
\textsuperscript{155} PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee – Agenda & Minutes’, January 30 1941. See also PRO INF 1/251, ‘W.G.V. Vaughan: Home Planning Committee: Ministry of Information Billposting Campaign’, December 17 1940. A similar point is made in PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee – Agenda & Minutes’, October 23 1940.
\textsuperscript{156} Anonymous, ‘4-Sheet Deadline is Bad Business - says Poster Trade’ \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, September 4 1941, Vol. 113, No. 1,476, p.179.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., ‘Memo from Miss de Mouilpied, Films Division to Miss Maxwell’, November 19 1941.
\textsuperscript{158} PRO INF 1/238, ‘Letter from G.W. Barley, Glasgow to MOI’, April 10 1943.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., ‘Note attached to memo from Vaughan to Woodburn’, 1 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{160} PRO INF 1/86, ‘General Production Division, Staff and Functions’, August 26 1940.
sites. Distribution through local committees was deemed practicable only in the following cases: where a poster was only to be displayed in 'certain areas' or 'on a particular type of site', when voluntary bodies were expected to co-operate. In certain emergency cases locally held poster stocks could be distributed, with general stocks of posters with space for over-printing of urgent messages prepared. MOI posters could be obtained by applying to RIOs, and could be displayed at exhibitions, in the course of relevant campaigns, and on freely offered private sites. The MOI was responsible for distributing not only its own posters, but those produced on behalf of other departments. The dangers of a central printing and distribution system were recognised in a war where aerial bombardment was a certainty and Regional and Local Organisations were to be allowed autonomous control if communications were cut with central headquarters. Invitations, signed by the Minister, were potentially to be sent to local Advertising Agents and newspapers 'to hold themselves in readiness to produce any material, hand-bills, etc. within a few hours if necessary'.

Once year-round campaigns were to be run, it was hoped to employ an Outdoor Publicity Agent, achieving economic benefits and ensuring that poster sites were used continuously. Vaughan described the three leading British Advertising Agencies equipped to handle Outdoor Advertising as S.H. Benson Ltd., Crawfords Ltd., and the London Press Exchange, of which Bensons was considered to offer the most complete service. Other agencies which had 'less complete facilities for Outdoor Publicity' would be used for press advertising. Other ‘responsible and efficient’ advertising agencies to ‘whom Government business could be entrusted with confidence’, not previously mentioned, were listed, although the list was not intended to be exhaustive. It was possible that billposting firms could be hired, including The Borough Billposting Co, Walter Hill Ltd., and Willings Ltd. The need to provide work to smaller agencies was also considered, although they were not as well-equipped for handling large campaigns, particularly at short notice. Provincial agents were considered ‘difficult to employ’, but

---

162 PRO INF 1/533, ‘Planning Committee on Home Morale’, May 27 1940.
165 PRO INF 1/533, ‘Memorandum on the Home Front’, undated but early war.
166 PRO INF 1/341, ‘Memo to Mr Bamford from Mr Vaughan’, November 19 1939, p.3.
167 Ibid., These were C. Vernon & Son Ltd; Pritchard Wood & Partners Ltd., Mather & Crowther Ltd., C.F. Higham Ltd., Dorland Advertising Ltd., Alfred Pemberton Ltd.
168 Ibid., These were Saward Baker Ltd., G.S. Royds Ltd., T.B. Browne Ltd., C. Mitchell Ltd.
169 Ibid., p.1.
would be used if campaigns were locally limited. With the GPD involved in the selection of agents, campaigns could be worked on by more than one agency, but not more than four.\textsuperscript{170}

Bensons had previously done work for the War Office and had been paid 10\% of the gross plus a service fee of 5\%. This fee covered all the ‘costs of packing, despatching and carriage of posters’. The work involved the selection of suitable sites in agreement with bill-posting contractors, monthly inspections, and recommendations of free sites. The inspections ensured that sites remained clean and in good condition, and the opportunity to improve the site position if other advertisers released a site.\textsuperscript{171} Bensons initially did work for the MOI, but were replaced by a cheaper firm of billposting contractors. Vaughan complained that the new contractors ‘had no system of inspection of sites and no men to carry out such a system’, whilst Benson’s retained 22 men. Uninspected sites could not be used in an emergency, and GPD felt the MOI was being ‘penny wise and pound foolish’ in employing contractors Newton and Walter Hill for a commission of 10\% instead of Bensons at 15\%. The Committee agreed that an inspection service was vital, and just needed to establish in writing that no one else could give the same service as Bensons before they were made sole agents for the MOI.\textsuperscript{172} The Advisory Committee decided that they would not employ billposting firms who were also site owners. Bensons and Outdoor Publicity were to be given responsibility for all government billposting work, but were expected to take in smaller firms to give a fair spread of the work during the war.\textsuperscript{173}

By 1942 posters were expected to be displayed ‘wherever free posting can be obtained and for economy reasons should only be fixed at points where there is a considerable amount of pedestrian traffic or large bodies gathered together’. This would include

- railway stations, cinema and theatre entrances, shopping thoroughfares, schools,
- church notice boards, town halls, women’s institutes, lecture centres of Civil Defence Units and all places where bodies of people are gathered together for special purposes.\textsuperscript{174}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{170}] Ibid., p.2.
  \item[\textsuperscript{171}] Ibid., p.4.
  \item[\textsuperscript{172}] PRO INF 1/250, ‘Minutes of Meeting: Planning Committee’, September 2 1940.
  \item[\textsuperscript{173}] PRO INF 1/341, ‘Minutes from the Thirteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Appointment of Advertising Agents’, July 18 1941.
  \item[\textsuperscript{174}] PRO INF 1/344, ‘Letter from Saward, Baker & Co. (Mr Galliano) to Mr Hornsby, MOI’, June 6 1942.
\end{itemize}
Questionnaire respondents noted that they had seen posters all over railway stations, and many town locations were mentioned. Few mentioned rural locations, with ‘none seen in smaller villages that I remember’. On some occasions, it appears that the distribution process was not careful enough, as appeals to ‘save water’ were regarded as particularly unnecessary near a Scottish loch with an inexhaustible water supply.

The Planning of the First Posters

The Second World War was often perceived as a classless ‘People’s War’ because, regardless of any prevailing inequality and exploitation, ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’. Propaganda was needed to appeal to the masses, including a reasoned appeal that would ‘show the extent to which every man and woman is a participant in the war’, and the importance of a combined team effort. Although it was ‘impossible to foresee’ what conditions would prevail during the first weeks of war, it was felt necessary to prepare for the worst. The MOI was to assume that the public would be subjected to an appalling series of shocks, resulting in shattered nerves, a lack of confidence in ultimate success, and therefore a lack of will to work for victory. It was expected that there would be ‘an imperative need for a copious issue of general reassurance material’, particularly in the early months of the war, which would be the sole responsibility of the MOI. Disregarding Leeper’s conviction that it was impossible to prepare effective propaganda in advance, the government started planning for the first posters in earnest in early 1939. By mid-June 1939 the first poster-roughs were ready for inspection.

In April 1939, members of the HPC were asked to come up with a selection of slogans and motifs from which to build poster designs. The first posters were to ‘stand out strikingly from among the numerous posters which would be issued by other Departments’. Posters were to ‘bear a distinctive uniform device’, making it ‘difficult or impossible for the enemy to print reproductions’. Pictorial distinction was to be achieved by using leading

---

175 Female, West Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998.
176 Male, Glasgow, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
178 PRO INF 1/73, ‘Francis Williams: Theme for Propaganda’, undated but probably 1941.
180 Ibid., p.3.
182 PRO INF 1/300 follows the development of the first wartime posters from at least April 13 1939.
184 Ibid., ‘3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measures’, April 20 1939.
artists whose work would be associated with the MOI; typographical distinction by the use of a ‘special and handsome type’.\textsuperscript{186} Initial designs were to include a message ‘from the King to his people’.\textsuperscript{187} It was decided that the message should ‘go out as far as possible in the form in which the King himself would send it’, but using fine type rather than imitation typescript. Rather than a photograph, a crown would head the poster. Sir William Codling, suggesting a short, single-sheet message, prepared suggestions in a suitable format.\textsuperscript{188} Later in the war, it was recognised that the nation was ‘constituted through shared and anonymous suffering and heroism’, and thus the booklet \textit{Front Line}, produced by the MOI in 1942 contained only one quote from Churchill, and no pictures of royalty.\textsuperscript{189}

The above poster was to be accompanied by a ‘reassurance poster’, which would ‘steady the people and assure them that all necessary measures to defend England’ had been taken.\textsuperscript{190} The aims for the first poster were ambitious. It was agreed that the first poster slogan, supported by the pictorial design, should if possible: ‘attract immediate attention and evoke a spontaneous reaction’; ‘exert a steadying influence’; ‘incite to action’; ‘harmonise with general preconceived ideas among the public’; ‘be short’; and ‘be universal in appeal’.\textsuperscript{191} The initial poster was to stress ‘an attitude of mind’, rather than an aim, as it was assumed that the public would appreciate the issues involved at the start of war. Nicolson advocated that the initial ‘dignified design’ should be supplemented by a poster with a ‘more colloquial appeal’, such as one ‘incorporating a historical progression from the medieval English bowman to the typical modern citizen.’\textsuperscript{192} Posters would also include a ‘statement of the duty of the individual citizen’, which would be non-pictorial and in more than one colour, and a poster warning against enemy propaganda.\textsuperscript{193}

Although experts were consulted for slogans,\textsuperscript{194} the slogan for the first poster was suggested by Waterfield, a career civil servant. Concerned that posters along the lines of ‘Keep Steady’ were uninspiring, and implied that the nation was on the defensive, Waterfield called for ‘a rallying war-cry that will bring out the best in everyone of us and put us in an offensive mood at once’. He suggested three ideas: a play on Kitchener (figure
2), with ‘Your King and Country need you all’, appealing not just to the men to fight, but to ‘every man, woman and child’. Second, he suggested that it was the will of the nation that would win or lose the war, and suggested ‘Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution will Bring us Victory’. Third, he felt there was a need for a reminder that it is the task of the nation to destroy Nazism and everything it stood for. Waterfield did not believe that he had the wording right on any of these, but favoured the last.¹⁹⁵

As production could take a ‘considerable time’, designs were to be printed, and distributed regionally, in advance, ‘so that, when necessary, the posters could be placarded throughout the country with a minimum of delay’.¹⁹⁶ The initial posters were expected to be of ‘an exceptional size’, and to be ‘displayed on more than ordinarily extensive sites’, such as the sides of buildings, such as figure 61. It was planned that HMSO would be responsible for the printing of posters, and that an advertising concern would be called on to arrange for the display of posters after they had been printed. Mr Surrey Dane and Mr Huxley were responsible for work on the first posters, and agreed to secure the services of artists capable of doing quick roughs for poster designs.¹⁹⁷ It was agreed that the poster art-work should be of a high standard, at least equal to, or better than, the highest commercial standard, but that it should make an essentially popular appeal.¹⁹⁸

Posters were expected to be displayed for eight weeks at a time. Original plans were to commission five designs, with expert advisors pressing for immediate printing for all five, a valid ‘insurance premium in view of the immensity of the risk’.¹⁹⁹ The Ministry, concerned that this ‘might involve considerable waste in view of possible changes of policy’,²⁰⁰ was ‘content’ to ask for authority to print from only one design. The proviso was that another four designs were commissioned immediately, rather than waiting for the start of hostilities, as they were unsure ‘how quickly suitable designs’ could be produced under wartime conditions.²⁰¹ As was good commercial practice, the first poster was to be in six colours.²⁰² Anticipated costs for the first poster were £20,600 for printing, packing and

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., ‘Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measures’, May 4 1939.
¹⁹⁷ Ibid., ‘3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measures’, April 20 1939.
¹⁹⁸ Ibid., ‘Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measures’, May 4 1939.
²⁰² Ibid., Appendix B.
storing five million posters, and £225 for the design.\textsuperscript{203} Figures were prepared by Surrey Dane of Odham’s Press, on the Publicity Planning Committee of the Ministry, and were largely accepted by HMSO as reasonable.\textsuperscript{204} Fees to artists for design needed to allow for accepted roughs and finished art work, adaptation to different sizes and proportions, including reproportioning of lettering. Commissioned roughs needed to be paid for even if ‘not accepted for the finished design’.\textsuperscript{205} A significant number of extra posters were required for ‘renewals’ for outdoor display in order to keep sites in good order.\textsuperscript{206}

\textbf{The Distribution of the First Posters}

Surrey Dane worked in consultation with Benson’s preparing estimates for costs, for the nation-wide campaign, to include Wales and Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{207} It was expected that the MOI should pay in the normal way for sites, but seek preferential rates as was usual for large orders.\textsuperscript{208} Estimates were prepared according to traditional commercial costs, although it was anticipated that prices could fall on the outbreak of war. Both voluntary sites and commercial sites were categorised.\textsuperscript{209} The posters, once printed, were ‘parcelled and stored in London ready for immediate dispatch to local distribution centres’ at an appropriate time in the emergency period.\textsuperscript{210} Posters were to be distributed in bulk ready for local distribution: commercial sites through Bensons, railway platform sites, old EMB sites, newsagents boards, Office of Works, Ministry of Labour, local authorities, LPTB Underground and buses and trolley buses, from 15” x 10” to 48-sheet sizes. Smaller amounts, from 15” x 10” to 16-sheet sizes were to be distributed to the GPO, schools, cinemas, works, co-operative societies, hotels, public houses and builders. Posters sized 15” x 10” to double crown, were provided to banks, van sides, shop windows and interiors, places of worship, National Savings Committee, hospitals and clinics, and 50,000 of a special design for display in empty and wrecked houses.\textsuperscript{211} It was calculated that, once the sites were secured, and the finished posters delivered to Benson’s, a nation-wide display could be effected by that firm within twenty-four hours. Voluntary, non-commercial sites were considered important, particularly in rural areas, where commercial sites did not cover. These sites included shops and shop-windows; government and municipal

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p.5.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., ‘Poster Scheme Summary’.
\textsuperscript{207} PRO INF 1/720, ‘Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measures’, undated, but probably June-August 1939.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., ‘3\textsuperscript{rd} Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measures’, April 20 1939.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., ‘12\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measures’, June 21 1939.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., Poster Scheme Summary.
buildings; village halls, women’s institutes and private houses. Posters on these sites would be standardised to crown and double crown sizes. The danger of such sites was the juxtaposition of official publicity posters with other miscellaneous posters, ‘detracting from the effect of the former’. 212 Although in general the largest site was most effective, small posters outside the newsagents’ shops below eye level attracted special notice people were used to reading such placards all the time in order to get news. 213

The poster with a proclamation from the King was to be ‘plastered everywhere in order to drive the contents into everyone’s head’. 214 By August 1939 war was regarded as inevitable, and by 9 August the finished drawings were submitted to Macadam for final approval. Any adaptations to proportions would then be made and the posters printed. 215 By 23 August the proportions to be printed were decided. The percentages were: ‘Freedom is in Peril’ (for remote areas), 12% (figure 22); ‘Keep Calm and Carry on’, 65%; and ‘Your Courage, etc.’, 23% (figure 1). 216 The Treasury had approved costs for a single poster, three designs were produced, exceeding estimates by under £50. “Our Fighting Men Depend on You” for factories, works, docks and harbours, was also printed, for which no allowance had originally been made. 217 By September, ‘Your Courage’ and ‘Freedom is in Peril’ were already being posted throughout the country. ‘Keep Calm and Carry on’ was printed and held in reserve for when the necessity arose, for example, a severe air-raid, although it was never actually displayed. Soon after war was declared, the small poster ‘Don’t Help the Enemy, Careless Talk may give away vital secrets’ (figure 62) was approved by the War Office and was ready to put into production. 58,000 copies had already been distributed by September 17, and 75,000 copies were to be despatched daily from September 26. 218 By the end of September 1939, roughs for further designs had been prepared and approved, including messages from the King and the Queen, designs

---

213 PRO INF 1/261, ‘Memorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red posters’, October 1939.
215 PRO INF 1/266, ‘Memo from Vaughan to Macadam’, August 9 1939.
216 PRO INF 1/226, ‘Letter from W.G.V. Vaughan’, August 23 1939. In the same folder, ‘Demand for Printing Slip for HMSO’, August 31 1939, and ‘Poster Campaign: Distribution’, November 1 1940, give details of the exact quantities ordered on August 31 1939, in a variety of sizes and in both broadside and upright versions, and where distributed. PRO INF 1/302, ‘Summary of Activities of Home Publicity Division’, September 28 1939 notes that all sizes were included, from 20ft. by 10ft. down to 15” x 10”.
specifically for factories and docks, and designs specifically for each branch of the armed services: reassurance, not recruiting, posters.\textsuperscript{219}

**The Reception of the First Posters**

Coverage is extensive in the archives on the first few posters produced by the MOI,\textsuperscript{220} and so also receives much subsequent historical comment, much of it negative.\textsuperscript{221} Mass-Observation (M-O) had been asked by the MOI, on September 26 1939, to ‘report on the red Government Posters and their effects, in general; to report on dissatisfaction with the posters and the reasons for them in particular’. On October 1 1939 MOI said that it could no longer use outside agencies, but M-O decided to complete the work, following the original terms of reference, believing that the work was essential.\textsuperscript{222} Working without financial or official support, M-O observers worked without authority, and ‘against the difficulty of spy-fear’.\textsuperscript{223} The ‘Your Courage’ poster was remembered by several questionnaire respondents, although no other early posters were mentioned. They were seen in the window of the Butcher’s shop in Eastleigh, ‘on the way to school or work in Winchester’,\textsuperscript{224} in the engineering works,\textsuperscript{225} and believed to be the result of a political speech.\textsuperscript{226} The poster was clearly remembered from Barnstaple in Devon, when, as a schoolboy, his ‘home town… blossomed with crimson posters’. He remembered that ‘these posters were much maligned’, although the reason was unclear.\textsuperscript{227}

A journalist from the *Daily Mail* was critical of the ‘Your Courage’ slogan for being too complex, passing the poster six times every day, he was still unable to precisely remember the slogan.\textsuperscript{228} Someone from the Ministry of Health, critical of the HPD as responsible for

\textsuperscript{219} PRO INF 1/302, ‘Summary of Activities of Home Publicity Division’, September 28 1939.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{224} Female, Hampshire, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
\textsuperscript{225} Male, South Shields, reply to questionnaire, March 1998.
\textsuperscript{226} Male, Buckinghamshire/London, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
\textsuperscript{227} Male, Devon, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. In hindsight, this respondent believed that ‘one could argue that the originator had, in fact, identified the three typically British qualities [courage; cheerfulness; resolution] which were to see us through the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.’
\textsuperscript{228} (Untitled), *Daily Mail*, February 7 1940, Embleton Collection, IWM.
the ‘Your Courage’ posters, believed that it was run by people ‘full of vague ideas’, with little ‘practical experience in the conduct of publicity campaigns’. Within the M-O survey, ‘Your Courage’ was the second most-mentioned remembered slogan, and nearly all comment was disparaging. The message had been impacted by sheer repetition but whether it had been remembered in the right spirit was questionable: it still existed everywhere, and was deemed mostly annoying and inappropriate for the wartime situation. The wording of ‘Your Courage… will bring us victory’ was criticised. There was some evidence the combination of ‘your’ and ‘us’ ‘suggested to many people that they were being encouraged to work for someone else’, with the ‘your’ referring to the civilian, the ‘us’ to the Government. It was pointed out that the slogan ‘Your King and Country needs you’ had avoided such a defect and in future, more care should be taken to avoid slogans that disassociated the civilian from the government. ‘Freedom is in Peril’ was also deemed ineffective, blamed on ‘the abstractness of the words, not one of which had any popular appeal’. Even during the planning stages the criticism had been raised that ‘Freedom’ was rather an abstract concept and was ‘likely to be too academic and too alien to the British habit of thought’.

As usual there was little indication as to what the public felt about such exhortations, and little appreciation found its way into print. The Times had described the posters as ‘egregious and unnecessary exhortations’, ‘insipid and patronising invocations’, which were unneeded and wasteful of funds, comparing the posters unfavourably to those produced by the French. The Times leader paved the way for questions about the campaign in the House of Commons, regarding the cost of the current campaign, and expected costs of future campaigns. Grigg defended the cost of the campaign, expected to be no more than £23,000 by its termination in October, most for site rental. The Daily Express header the day after Grigg’s announcement of cost was ‘Waste and Paste’. The exhortations were described as ‘foolish’ as people ‘are prepared to fight’, but when they

231 PRO INF 1/261, ‘Memorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red posters’, October 1939.
232 PRO, INF 1/300, ‘Minutes of meeting held on May 11 1939, of the Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry’, May 16 1939, p.8.
233 Press Advertising and the Trade, September 1939 - September 1940, p.35, noted that this was probably a result of the arguments between Fleet Street and the MOI.
234 351 H.C. DEB. 5s., October 3 1939, Column 1841.
turned up at recruiting offices they were turned away as the government was not ready to accept them.\(^\text{235}\) Brigadier V.M.C. Napier, commented, via a letter to *The Times*:

> Is it wise, to say the least, to placard the countryside with posters calling on the courage and resolution of the individual when no appreciable demands have yet been made on these qualities?\(^\text{236}\)

The MOI had expected the nation to have to deal with immediate bombardment, but this did not happen. Once the Phoney War was over, *Advertiser’s Weekly* noted that the nation had finally arrived at the point of ‘courage, cheerfulness and resolution’. People could finally obey the exhortations of posters that had become all too familiar to ‘us’ over twelve long months.\(^\text{237}\)

Responsibility for the failure of campaigns was placed squarely with the government as it meant that, either the people had not been made to feel the urgency of the message, or that ‘the leaders have not spoken in a language which the people can understand and respond to’.\(^\text{238}\) Beable, the President of London Poster Advertising Association, felt the MOI should be given due credit as well as criticism. They had acted quickly with the posters, working within the necessity for wording and design to be simple for prompt reproduction and quick absorption. The colour scheme (pillar box red and white) was clever in contrast, both attractive and effective. He felt that the poster had succeeded in getting the public ‘war conscious, war energetic, yet war calmly minded’, as it had certainly been noticed by the journalists.\(^\text{239}\)

Possibly reacting to criticism that they had spent too much money on posters, in October 1939, it was decided to cancel the programme of press advertising and the use of commercial poster sites. Steps were taken to give publicity to the material already prepared, through designs suitable to voluntary poster sites.\(^\text{240}\)

Original problems for the MOI can be attributed to the instability in the organisation, primarily the result of press criticism. After the original questioning of its role, it appeared largely unremarkable, at the time, that the MOI should have the power to be the central agency for information. The MOI was thoroughly planned, and built upon extensive

---


\(^{238}\) M-O, *Change No. 2, Home Propaganda*, 1941, p.5.

\(^{239}\) Anonymous, ‘Due Credit to M. of I. For Posters’, *Advertiser’s Weekly*, Vol. 105, No. 1,377, October 12 1939, p.34, quoting letter to *The Times*.  

106
government and commercial experience. Clear administrative and production processes were instituted, and the importance of using suitable people, to produce the right message at the appropriate time, in the best location, became clearer as war continued. Initially, the MOI transferred the authority of royalty to the propaganda messages. As the war progressed, discourses of royalty were subsumed into discourses of the people’s war, tied in with discourses of citizenship, where ‘shared responsibility for the continuity of the nation remained the most important of these duties’. Democratic, governmental and citizenship discourses clearly emanated from the MOI, with the audience not forced, but subject to self-regulation, although subject-positions were assumed by the MOI. Discourses of the ‘public’ were important, as public opinion was sought in planning and reaction to campaigns. Within the MOI, economic discourses, including those of rationing, played an important part in dictating what was possible. Patriotic discourses were called upon to get artists to contribute, with democratic discourses allowing artists near-autonomy in design, building upon notions that they were the ‘experts’. Having looked at the first posters that the government produced, the following section of the thesis contains four case studies: urban and rural representations; industrial propaganda; fighting the ‘enemy within’, and dealing with the ‘problem’ of venereal disease.

Chapter 4: Representations of ‘Your Britain’, Urban and Rural

Macmillan summarised the aims of the Ministry of Information (MOI) to the Cabinet as demonstrating ‘what Britain was fighting for; how Britain was fighting; and the need for sacrifice if the war was to be won’. National identification is always central in wartime, and ‘the land’ (and what is built on it) is always central to such discourse. Initially triggered by the two very different sets of images produced within the ‘Your Britain’ campaign by Games and Newbould in 1942 (figures 14 to 20), this chapter will consider the posters produced by government that were believed to reflect the ‘Britain’ that people were being asked to fight for. The differences in appeal within one campaign are very startling, as both are presented as ‘Your Britain’, as something to be fought for. One appears to appeal to a modernistic, urban vision of the future, whilst the other appeals to a rural, pastoral past. In war, however, ‘or other periods of acute national danger, propaganda machinery is likely to simplify, to make black and white, issues which in fact may have been more complex’. Such symbols of ‘Britishness’ can be addressed for their greater significance, the modernistic vision tying in with the Beveridge Report which was being produced around the same time, the rural vision addressing the significance of the landscape as a part of English heritage. These seven posters, produced at the same time, demonstrate with extensive pictorial coverage the populist view of what the British were fighting for, particularly peaceful towns, villages and pubs, and what they were fighting against from the German people, namely dictatorship. Lloyd, A.L., ‘What we are Fighting For’, Picture Post, July 13 1940, pp.9-21; 24-39. Miles, P., and Smith, M., Cinema, Literature & Society, 1987, p.233. Cull, N.J., Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, 1995, p.138, demonstrates how a similar message was presented through film. Britain at Bay, (known overseas as Britain on Guard), (1940), for example, ‘provided a powerful vision of a war fought both to preserve old values and to build a better world’.

1 Donnelly, M., Britain in the Second World War, 1999, p.70. Picture Post echoed this sentiment, demonstrating with extensive pictorial coverage the populist view of what the British were fighting for, particularly peaceful towns, villages and pubs, and what they were fighting against from the German people, namely dictatorship. Lloyd, A.L., ‘What we are Fighting For’, Picture Post, July 13 1940, pp.9-21; 24-39.

2 Miles, P., and Smith, M., Cinema, Literature & Society, 1987, p.233. Cull, N.J., Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, 1995, p.138, demonstrates how a similar message was presented through film. Britain at Bay, (known overseas as Britain on Guard), (1940), for example, ‘provided a powerful vision of a war fought both to preserve old values and to build a better world’.

3 The terms ‘English’ and ‘British’ are often used interchangeably, as demonstrated by the following authors. Kertesz, M., ‘The Enemy – British Images of the German People during the Second World War’, Unpublished PhD, University of Sussex, 1992, p.12 uses the term ‘British’ so as not to exclude, and reflects governmental policy during the war to reinforce unity by using the term ‘British’. Many traditions appealed to the ‘English’ but the term was used unproblematically to mean British. As Kertesz notes, the debate is too large, and outside the scope of her thesis. The same is true of this thesis, where the term British is used where necessary ‘for expediency’, although English is used where relevant. Mikes, G., quoted in Waite, C., and Nicolson, A., Landscape in Britain, 1984, p.33 notes that ‘[w]hen people say England, they sometimes mean Great Britain, sometimes the United Kingdom, sometimes the British Isles – but never England.’ Matless, D., Landscape and Englishness, 1998, p.19: British is often used a surrogate term for English, there is a common conflation of the two identities. Viewed from abroad the terms are certainly used interchangeably, particularly from the Empire view when Englishness was viewed at the heart of Britishness. Raphael Samuel makes more of a distinction: Samuel, R. Island Stories: Unravelling Britain: Vol. 2: Theatres of Memory, 1998, p.48: ‘English, in its twentieth-century usage, is an altogether more introverted term than “British” and largely associated with images of landscape, beauty and home rather than those of national greatness.’
within the same campaign, by the same organisation, will be examined alongside other posters depicting rural or urban landscapes, and within the context of longer term debates defining British national identities and landscapes. The chapter will discuss a range of discourses which underlay the posters, including: national identity, citizenship, the rural, agriculture, land, heritage, tradition, home, suburbs, reconstruction, the urban, future, science, technology, medicine, health, education, and modernity. How differing poster styles were deployed to represent these discourses will also be considered.

**The Context and Planning of ‘British’ Posters**

National ‘identities are composed of a variety of ingredients, including a sense of community or place, loyalty to particular institutions or ideologies, shared aspects of common experience and culture.’ They are generally regarded as relative concepts ‘always constituted through definitions of Self and Other and always subject to internal differentiation’. Samuel defines the English nation as having self-consciously emerged in the nineteenth century, which ‘on the one hand summoned up the ghosts of the past to shore up threatened values, and on the other prepared a master race for its imperial vocation’. With wider enfranchisement introduced since the First World War, the Second World War was ‘The People’s War’, with a wider number and range of people included in formal citizenship. These citizens were being asked to be model citizens, and some in government thought people needed to know what they were fighting for. As in commercial advertising, people were incentivised to give in return for gains.

This chapter will use Benedict Anderson’s idea of an ‘imagined community’. The British people were fighting together for the imagined community of their nation:

> It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.

Anderson questions what ‘makes people love and die for nations, as well as hate and kill in their name’. He examines how tradition is constructed, invented and appropriated, often

---

4 Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. *Second World War Posters*, 1972 (1981 edition), p.48, note that these posters were produced by the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), ‘whose function was to interest servicemen in political and social questions’.


through symbolism based on false tradition. Anderson’s frame will be used in this chapter to discuss both the ways in which utopian visions of the future were popular in wartime, and how tradition was also appropriated. For example, as the war removed accessibility to large swathes of the countryside, it was mythologised and became an emphasised part of ‘Your Britain’. Both utopian and traditional visions drew on longer term discourses. Often the rural is associated with conservative pastoral idyll images, and the urban with socialistic futures. This chapter will consider whether there was a consistent contrast between the use of such images in posters, whether images of modernity appeared in rural images, and whether there was any harking back to the past in ‘modern’ images.

The rural images tend to include aspects that are unchanging, quiet, idyllic, steadfast, tranquil, and spacious. Images of rural areas are generally of balmy spring or summer days, particularly landscapes, few of which, following art movements such as Romanticism, have human beings in them. As a more recent photographer explains, ‘[people’s] presence in a landscape seems to trivialise and distort it’, when looking for ‘a timelessness and a permanence which the human and the urban cannot convey’. The MOI had no need to invent the theme of ‘Deep England’, as it was ‘rooted in the national consciousness’.

Many in wartime would have been familiar with the work of John Constable, whose famous landscape paintings of the nineteenth century have come to define quintessential Englishness, with human figures deliberately kept distant or indistinct. Through his images, often recruited on the side of tradition, Constable was seeking to portray a solution to the struggle between progress and preservation.

---

9 Ibid., 1991, Back cover (This reference is used as it sums the ideas up most clearly, and there is no comparable reference within the text.).
15 Ibid., p.60.
16 Ibid., p.115.
From the twelfth century when 97% of the United Kingdom population lived in rural areas, there had been many changes in population movements, with about 80% in urban areas by the 1880s. In the nineteenth century, many still felt that their roots were rural, and the countryside still remained physically close. *Country Life* noted that ours was ‘an island race whereof even the town dweller is a country man at heart.’ Town dwellers viewed urban living as a ‘temporary necessity’ and dreamt of the day that he would find a cottage on the green, and ‘real’ values. The dominant image of late nineteenth century England was of an idealised and sentimentalised Arcadia, a term which referred to the unspoilt parts of England where there was a perceived unique, international beauty. The number visiting the countryside during the interwar years demonstrates that the ‘centrality of the countryside to national identity’ was still key. Originally the countryside was seen as a place of function, synonymous with agriculture. With the growth of outdoor pursuits such as hiking and camping in the early years of the twentieth century, particularly the 1930s, it became a place of consumption and (aesthetic) pleasure rather than production. Many would have seen H.V.Morton’s *In Search of England*, first published in 1927, still being republished in 1944, full of photographs that highlighted the old and quiet, lanes and cathedrals. The aspirant suburban middle classes in particular, would also have been brought up on images in magazines such as *Country Life*, which provided ‘assured and immutable’ establishment values, focusing on a celebration of nature through landscape, country houses and sporting pursuits.

With this growth of aesthetic appreciation of the countryside arose a number of preservationist groups, looking for a planned countryside. For example, the CPRE (Council

---

19 Ibid., p.30.
21 Ibid., p.43.
29 Ibid., p.20. Strong notes on p.36: The magazine provided many images which powerfully presented national identity: portraits of long-standing families, ‘ancient manor houses and gardens’, unspoiled landscapes throughout the seasons, ordinary countrymen ‘at their toil’, and ‘the gentry engaged in country pursuits’. 
for the Preservation of Rural England), founded in 1926,\textsuperscript{30} was looking ‘for a tidy, ordered countryside, rather than preserving an unchanging, traditional countryside’.\textsuperscript{31} Commonly preservation is identified with ‘nostalgia and anti-modernity’,\textsuperscript{32} but many preservationist movements were radical, and against the private ownership of significant areas that could be of good to the community. Few leaders of preservationist movements would have regarded their work as a retreat to the past: rather, they were concerned with improving the future.\textsuperscript{33} They constructed ‘specific narratives of history’, which posited ‘a particular relationship between past, present and future’,\textsuperscript{34} using the past to criticise the present in the hope that the future would be better.\textsuperscript{35} Such rural planners wanted a countryside ‘fit for purpose’, not littered with billboards or mock-Tudor houses. Expressing ‘a particular modernism, committed to order and design’, they were not simply protecting the way things were for the sake of tradition,\textsuperscript{36} but was any of this reflected in the wartime posters?

A variety of Acts were passed to protect the countryside, including the first Green Belt formed outside London in 1938,\textsuperscript{37} providing a physical barrier, preserving the distinction between urban and rural areas. There were increased restrictions on advertising and housing developments, and local authorities bought several areas of natural beauty. With the growth of hiking and other countryside pursuits the question of access to private areas of beauty was brought up, bringing town dwellers into conflict with those resident in the country, particularly farmers.\textsuperscript{38} During the interwar years there arose the idea of landscaped citizenship, those visiting needed to be aesthetically educated. The countryside was to be open to all, but those visiting needed to be educated in the body to the ‘correct’ conduct, such as picking up litter.\textsuperscript{39}


\textsuperscript{33} Burchart, J., op.cit., 2002, p.100.

\textsuperscript{34} Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.20.

\textsuperscript{35} Burchart, J., op.cit., 2002, p.100.

\textsuperscript{36} Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.14; p.32. Burchart, J., op.cit., 2002, p.92, notes that particularly problematic for the preservationist were the weekend bungalows and unplanned estates, known as Plotlands, unsuitable for any purposes. These were areas where land was bought by those who could not yet afford to build the house to put on it. Shack housing was developed upon them in the meantime.


\textsuperscript{38} Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.48.

In the Second World War, a machine war, ‘rural England became the touchstone of stability and tranquillity’.\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Country Life} noted that Churchill recognised the value of presenting the war as a struggle between Britain, a humane, old-fashioned rural culture, against Germany, a heartless industrial society run amok.\textsuperscript{41} The myth of ‘Deep England’ was very important during the war, a ‘green and pleasant land with rolling hills, village greens and parish churches’, with an idyllic landscape symbolising ‘order, stability, and tradition, linking the past with the present’, which ‘no amount of German bombs could destroy’.\textsuperscript{42} The land did not simply have an aesthetic purpose during the war, regaining its functional element, with farmers ‘the fourth line of defence’.\textsuperscript{43} Unsurprisingly, it is quite difficult to track down posters addressed to the rural community, as the poster is really a tool of urban areas. One questionnaire respondent makes clear the dependence that farmers had on trade magazines: ‘“Make two blades of grass grow where one grew before”’. This slogan has been identified as a theme that appeared widely in farming circles and in the farming press, \textit{Farmers Weekly}, \textit{Farmer} and \textit{Stockbreeder}.\textsuperscript{44} Such magazines could bring important issues to the attention of rurally-bound farmers faster than any poster, being brought to the farmer, rather than requiring the farmer to be where the message was.\textsuperscript{45}

Most posters were aimed at the urban population, with rural images used to get them to defend England’s mythical ‘green and pleasant land’, or attract them to work in rural areas. With the nation having to be less reliant on food imports, and with men called up into the armed forces, agriculture needed more workers.\textsuperscript{46} The Woman’s Land Army (WLA), formed in June 1939, looked to attract women to work on farms,\textsuperscript{47} for seasonal as well as permanent work, rather than other options such as factories.\textsuperscript{48} Within the WLA campaign, the MOI, working on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, was keen to focus on the effort

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{40}] Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.43.
\item[\textsuperscript{41}] Strong, R., op.cit., 1996, p.128.
\item[\textsuperscript{42}] Donnelly, M., op.cit., 1999, p.84.
\item[\textsuperscript{43}] Female, Sussex, conversation as a result of the questionnaire, April 1998.
\item[\textsuperscript{44}] Female, West Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998. Briggs, A., and Burke, P., \textit{A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet}, 2002, p.213 notes that \textit{Farmers’ Weekly} was formed in 1937 by Edward Hulton.
\item[\textsuperscript{45}] PRO MAF 39/67, ‘Minute No. 862’, Mr Dennis Chapman of the Wartime Social Survey investigated farmers’ reactions to various forms of publicity, and noted approval for practical instructions via the farming papers, broadcasts, field demonstrations, films and leaflets. Unknown date, but probably towards the end of the war. PRO MAF 58/25, ‘Agricultural Machinery Development Board Education and Propaganda Committee Minutes’, September 5 1942, mentions the use of ‘Market Posters’, one place where farmers might be expected to congregate and where posters were of use.
\item[\textsuperscript{47}] Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.176.
\item[\textsuperscript{48}] PRO MAF 59/8, ‘Women’s Land Army: Recruitment of Auxiliary Force for Seasonal Work’, 1940 and 1942.
\end{itemize}
that the women were making, and rejected a design from Laura Knight. The design was rejected on the basis that: ‘the emphasis in your design is so very strongly on the horses and so little on the girl that the message which we wish to convey would not really get to the public’. 49 The new design was altered from an illustration of three girls working a plough, to one depicting just one, entirely replacing the man’s role. 50 In March 1940, a new WLA recruitment campaign was planned, solely for seasonal work. The national campaign was to include posters, handbills, articles in the local press, cinema publicity, and local recruiting meetings and demonstrations, including the use of Employment Exchanges. 51 In 1942 a new campaign was planned, to be organised on the same lines as the 1941 campaign. General recruiting appeals were to be avoided, but efforts were to be made to record spontaneous offers of help. 52

The ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ campaign looked to attract urbanites to use their holidays to work in rural areas. It first went national in 1945, 53 and ran into the post-war years, even running in conjunction with the ‘Holidays at Home’ campaign. 54 People ‘discovered that farm work was a dignified, and notably cheap, way of taking a holiday in wartime’, 55 continuing a long-term trend, where the industrial workforce would help with the annual harvest. Hop picking in Kent was still an annual event for many East End Londoners until well after the Second World War. 56 Within urban areas the ‘Dig For Victory’ campaign began in the early months of the war, initially as a ‘Grow More Food’ campaign. Extensive publicity, including ten million instructional leaflets in 1942 alone, 57 was used by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in a campaign to provide an additional 500,000 allotments in and around urban areas in England and Wales. 58 With an emphasis on idealised rural self-sufficiency, and an increased knowledge of nutrition, the benefits of growing one’s own food were stressed, with fruit and vegetables, important for the health of the nation, only ‘absolutely fresh when grown in a man’s own garden’. 59

49 PRO INF 1/637, ‘Letter from Bevan to Dame Laura Knight’, December 29 1939.
50 Ibid., January 3 1940.
51 PRO MAF 59/8, ‘Recruiting Programme’, [March 1940].
The recurrent binary opposition in interwar British culture had been the belief that rural indicated life, and urban indicated death. Initially the Industrial Revolution appeared to reinvigorate towns and cities, offering ‘handsome public buildings and parks, gracious suburbs and vibrant shopping streets’. However, by the twentieth century the terms more associated with urban areas were crowded, cramped, polluted, poverty, dirty and disease-ridden. Houses had been squeezed into the courtyards and gardens of existing houses, and dark and airless alleyways developed. Diseases, particularly waterborne, became a problem, and in the second half of the nineteenth century action was taken to improve matters, particularly as it started to impact on the rich. During the interwar years travel became cheaper and easier, aiding the growth of suburbia, where new, clean housing, and life outside the city were sold to the ‘respectable’ working classes (see figure 63). The government concentrated on slum clearance programmes, and vast amounts of housing were built on cheap land, developed into suburbs. Such housing was seen as the key to averting working class discontent, although many did not want to move as they feared the loss of warmth and friendliness of their current surroundings. There was also the problem of relatively high rents, as houses were built an average of twelve to an acre as opposed to forty plus per acre prior to the First World War, and the expense of commuting. For those who did move to suburbia, however, this idea of ‘the Englishman’s home is his castle’ was evident, with neo-Georgian and mock-Tudor ‘self-contained, owner-occupied, semi-detached’ houses ‘signifying both the desire for privacy and the desire for status’. The suburbs, with their mock-style housing, attracted derogatory comment. Those moving to the suburbs were seen as attempting to get back to the country, to enjoy ‘rus in urbe’, the benefits of the country in the town. There was an element of fantasy, the suburban man ‘being neither urbane nor exhibiting the qualities of the true-born English countryman’.

---

65 Strong, R., op.cit., 1996, p.97. May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.296 noted that in 1944 the Ministry of Town and Country Planning classified ‘[a]reas with a population density of between 400 and 6,400 per square mile’ as ‘suburban and industrialised rural’.
The pastoral tradition was clear, but vulgarised, in suburbia, judging by the number of streets named, for example, Laburnum Avenue. Garden Cities, designed by Ebenezer Howard, also grew in this period. The countryside came to be regarded with nostalgia and had the allure of ‘paradise lost’. More urban solutions were also presented. The influence of Le Corbusier, for instance, although not fully implemented, could be seen in the concrete blocks of flats built, intended to provide communities surrounded by green space.

Miles and Smith note that many historical texts have concentrated on the perceived divide between the depressed industrial areas of the North, and the new consumer economy in the South. Donald Horne sees the South standing for ‘order and tradition’, defined as ‘romantic, illogical, muddled, divinely lucky, Anglican, aristocratic, traditional, frivolous’; while the North was projected as ‘pragmatic, empirical, calculating, Puritan, bourgeois, enterprising, adventurous, scientific, serious’, believing in ‘struggle’, with similar descriptions from Orwell and Priestley. The landscape, however, needs to be seen as a whole, rather than in binary terms, for example, as highland and lowland, radical and conservative, and ‘to concentrate entirely on these disunities and paradoxes is to miss the significance of the unities’. During the interwar years, as the reality of pastoral England, particularly the South, was being swallowed by suburbia, the associated myth of pastoral England, articulated historically to the myth of the pre-industrial Golden Age, a time of

---

69 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.47. McKay, D., and Cox, A.W., *The Politics of Urban Change*, 1979, p.28 note that the first Garden City was created at Letchworth in 1901, but that the ideal was not realised generally until post-1945.

70 Waite, C., and Nicolson, A., op.cit., 1984, p.69


72 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.40. For example, McKay, D., and Cox, A.W., op.cit., 1979, p.29 appears to promote this idea.


74 Orwell, G., *The Road to Wigan Pier*, 1937 (1962 edition), p.98. The Northerner has ‘grit’, is grim, ‘dour’, plucky, warm-hearted and democratic, whilst the Southerner is snobbish, effeminate and lazy. Priestley, J.B., *English Journey*, 1934, p.10, describes the Winchester man as ‘keen, sensible and energetic, and steadily losing money’, dreaming of new openings to make money, and p.159, describes the Bradford man as sardonic, ‘provincial’, but also ‘fiercely democratic’. Briggs, A., *A Social History of England*, 1983, p.269 notes that Priestley’s Yorkshire voice almost as influential as that of Churchill’s in the Second World War. He also ‘sought consolation in English history and the countryside’, but ‘demanded with equal firmness equality of sacrifice and a new and more equal deal when the War was over…. “We’re not fighting to restore the past… We must plan and create a noble future.”’


76 This was by no means only a Southern phenomenon. For instance, the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, ‘Planned Settlements’, [http://www.apl.ncl.ac.uk/coursecwork/IThompson/planned_settlements.htm](http://www.apl.ncl.ac.uk/coursecwork/IThompson/planned_settlements.htm), accessed March 27 2004 notes that Wythenshawe outside Greater Manchester was begun in 1927. More information can be found on Papillon Graphics’ Virtual Encyclopaedia of Greater Manchester, ‘Wythenshawe: Districts & Suburbs of Manchester’, [http://www.manchester2002-uk.com/districts/wythenshawe.html](http://www.manchester2002-uk.com/districts/wythenshawe.html), accessed March 27 2004.
supposed harmony and progress, became stronger. Powell writes that the war prompted the halt in the divergence between north and south, as it was necessary for them to fight together, but in the media Coventry complained that London received more attention about the bombing. All industrial areas were under threat from bombs, but Southern factories, where consumer factories moved to production of wartime goods, were more within the range.

After the Spanish Civil War bombing was expected to be catastrophic. In the summer of 1939 over 80% of Londoners wanted to evacuate their children in the event of war, and evacuation was meticulously planned to meet these kind of numbers. In the event less than 50% sent their children to safe rural areas, and the plans were thrown into chaos, resulting in a well-publicised disaster. Those in the reception areas were shocked by the state of poor urban children, and although there was increased social mixing, it merely confirmed the prejudices that the middle-classes had ‘about the dirty fecklessness of the working class’. The initial stages of evacuation caused many problems, and the evacuees started to drift back to town. By January 1940, over half of those evacuated had returned home, despite efforts by the government to persuade parents to leave the children in the country. People were getting ‘impatient and irritated at being told to be patient’, at being told ‘that the difficulties are unavoidable, or that they will straighten themselves out in time’, and were looking for more concrete measures from government. There were doubts within Government as to the value of an extra evacuation campaign as it was unclear whether the Government had a settled policy on evacuation, and was sending mixed messages by re-opening schools in dangerous areas.

On November 20 1939, a small photographic poster, described as ‘effective, attractive and simple’: ‘Children are Safer in the Country, Leave them There’, was published. It was hoped that it ‘would serve a dual purpose of restraining

---

77 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.40. Cull, N.J., op.cit., 1995, p.138, however, describes documentaries of Humphrey Jennings. The Heart of Britain (1941), for example, became This is England (1941) with a concentration on the industrial midlands and the north.


79 Buchanan, T., Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 1997, p.190, notes that with the arrival of the Second World War, the British were prepared to learn lessons from the Spanish Civil War.


84 PRO MH 78/230, ‘Letter from John Hilton, MOI to The Secretary, MOH’, November 13 1939.
parents from bringing their children back at Christmas and of serving a long term policy’. 85
When the Blitz began in September 1940 a second wave of evacuation did occur.86

Intellectuals such as Orwell viewed the ‘real’ England as ‘the willow tree by the stream’, but in the meantime campaigned for an ‘English’ revolution, espousing socialist principles but with English decency rather than in a Soviet style.87 As with most periods of English history, ‘the inter-war years revealed a series of tensions, paradoxes and echoes between utopian and arcadian fantasies’.88 The Second World War probably accelerated, rather than was the catalyst for, socialist change, as intervention, rather than laissez-faire had begun in earnest in the 1930s. Rising social and economic standards were accepted as necessary, and such rising demands were strongly influenced by the work of social reformers.89 This was the result of two nineteenth century trends, one a concern with the employment conditions of the working classes, and the other with health, housing and hygiene.90

From about 1940 onwards there were many calls for a publication of peace aims, including large measures of social reconstruction after the war. Themes of ‘never before’ and ‘never again’ emerged well before 1945: ‘never again a return to the poverty and perceived chaos of the 1930s, never again such an opportunity to make a new country’.91 For example, Basil Wright wrote in the Documentary News Letter in June 1940, that ‘a nation fighting desperately to defend the present lacks the inspiration which springs from a vision of the future’. It was ‘necessary to repair past errors and fortify national morale with an articulation of democratic citizenship’, a ‘conservative force’ which could ‘mould the future’.92 This was necessarily a radicalisation of opinion, but the growth of information services in wartime brought many of the intelligentsia concerned with the issues into a position of power.93 The MOI, responding the Home Intelligence (HI) findings, argued for the government to publish peace aims,94 in order to strengthen public morale, and ‘heal the

---

87 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.226-229. Miles and Smith have taken the notion of willow trees by the stream from the novel, Orwell, G., Nineteen-Eighty-Four, 1949 (Chapter 2).
89 Thorns, D.C., The Quest for Community: Social Aspects of Residential Growth, 1976, p.27.
90 Ibid., p.24.
93 Ibid.
94 See PRO INF 292 for Home Intelligence Reports, for instance, No. 23, March 5-12 1941, p.141 and August 19 1943, monthly review, p.10.
ripts left by the interwar experience’. Churchill, however, wanted to postpone discussing future changes until the war was won, not wanting to ‘raise false hopes’. Churchill was too concerned with fighting the war abroad and, after 1942, in co-ordinating with American and Soviet efforts. The Second World War did put the regenerative ideas of ‘real’ British futuristic values in a powerful position. Churchill left the Home Front to Labour or Tory Reform ministers, many of whom believed that war was also being fought against the conditions of the 1930s, allowing ideas of the ‘New Jerusalem’ unaccustomed power and influence.

In December 1942, the Beveridge Report was published. The central recommendations ‘comprised the creation of a unified and universal system of social insurance’, which would protect citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. It was perceived as a struggle against ‘five giants on the road of reconstruction’, defined as Want, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Disease. Reactions to it varied from enthusiastic acceptance, disbelief that it would ever be implemented, as ‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ had never been after the First World War, and a disgust that such an expensive idea should have been mooted. Many believed that it epitomised the more ‘classless’ society that people were fighting for, an idea that gained more prevalence with a large mass electorate. Implementation of the scheme met resistance with the Churchill Cabinet, largely as it would involve a threefold increase in costs over 1941 compared to relative schemes. Churchill wanted to delay questions of social reform until the end of the war, partly to avoid distractions, and partly to avoid expensive post-war commitments. Bracken, as Minister of Information, was

---

96 May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.373, quoting a note circulated by Churchill.
98 May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.301, notes that Beveridge had been influenced by the Toynbee Hall lectures in his younger life.
101 PRO INF 1 292C, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports’, June 1942 to August 1943 and PRO INF 1 292D, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports’, August 1943 to December 1944, provide evidence that the Beveridge proposals were widely discussed. Enthusiasm, disbelief and disgust can be found, although not in equal measures, throughout the Home Intelligence reports. In PIN 8/162, ‘The Beveridge Report: Public Opinion’, December 1942 to February 1943, collected comments expressing (largely) enthusiasm are evident.
103 Healy, S., Town Life, 1968, p.70 noted that a survey in 1936 found that nearly 350,000 families in England and Wales were still living in overcrowded conditions.
particularly keen to prevent Beveridge from making public statements on the subject, expecting that it would attract ‘an immense amount of ballyhoo about the importance of implementing the recommendations without delay’. 106 Public opinion was keenly interested in the proposals, and appeared to look for commitment from the government. Churchill was not keen to devote time to a matter of such importance when the war was still far from won, but in 1943 Lord Woolton was appointed as Minister for Reconstruction, and a year later a white paper was accepted which included many of Beveridge’s ideas. 107

Wars are expensive, particularly the Second World War, which spanned nearly six years and was highly mechanised. This needed to be paid for, and discourses of the ‘people’s war’ suggested that it was the people who should therefore be asked to pay for this. Although income tax rose and reached a wider net of people, further measures were also needed. 108 As people were earning more, and had fewer consumer goods to spend their money on, saving became a ‘national obsession’. The National Savings campaign spent more on advertising than even the Ministry of Food, and many campaigns were targeted at the small saver. The main benefit for the government was to combat inflation. 109

The following section will focus on the ‘Your Britain’ poster series, which contained very different urban and rural representations in the same series. All posters were ultimately depicting either the world that was being fought for, against, or something that could be done to achieve it, some of which were clearly looking forward, others backwards. The section also considers other posters that represent or appeal to the British landscape.

**The Design of ‘British’ Posters**

Starting in November 1942, the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) produced a series of seven pictorial posters on the theme of ‘Your Britain’. 110 This showed the men of

---

the British Army some of the things they were fighting for.\textsuperscript{111} This was ABCA’s first enterprise of this type, as previous efforts had been confined to map reviews in poster form.\textsuperscript{112} Abram Games, a modernist artist, was the official War Office poster artist and Newbould, well known for his pre-war railway posters, his assistant.\textsuperscript{113} Commissioned to do these designs by the War Office, the posters were distributed by ABCA, three by Abram Games,\textsuperscript{114} four by Frank Newbould. Newbould chose ‘views of English country scenes and buildings’ as his subjects, in a style that closely followed ‘his pre-war technique’.\textsuperscript{115} Presenting a Southern England, Newbould’s designs focused on a typical English village (figure 14), Alfriston Fair (figure 15), Salisbury Cathedral (figure 16), and the South Downs (figure 16). The largely rural Southern counties, particularly Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire, were in the ‘front line’ in the ‘Battle of Britain’, so the ‘image of the English village could be related more directly, by juxtaposition and contrast, to German barbarism than could Yorkshire moors or Scottish coalfields’\textsuperscript{116}.

Villages were places with communal functions, small areas with ‘an ancient church with lofty tower’ at the centre,\textsuperscript{117} often mythically constructed tranquil ‘villages in the mind’.\textsuperscript{118} This is the image Newbould presents in figure 14, even without the text, instantly recognisable as an ‘English’ image, in the style of Constable’s ‘quintessential Englishness’, described on page 110. Although most of the UK’s inhabitants had long lived in towns, ‘the idealised rustic village was a potent symbol of national identity, of “England’s Green and Pleasant Land”’.\textsuperscript{119} Miles and Smith explain how ‘[t]ime and again, the village community is represented as a microcosm of the national community.’\textsuperscript{120} Several discourses are evident within the image: discourses of tradition, where something that appears to have existed in a stable and unchanging manner for a long time is to be defended. The viewer is told that this will not last unless ‘you’ fight for it. The discourses of religion and community are presented in the Saxon church (topped with St George’s flag) and the pub (probably traditionally named), central to the image, and thus to village life. Discourses of aesthetic beauty are also clear: a quiet, traditional village, beautiful

\begin{footnotes}
\item[111] Anonymous ‘How Posters are Being Used in Armed Forces’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 120, No. 1,568, June 10 1943, p.316.
\item[114] Discussed on page 125.
\end{footnotes}
buildings, well planted, noticeably with an established English Oak. Bathed in sunlight, the image appears almost timeless, with indistinct signs of human activity.

Figure 15 depicts Alfriston Fair, in Sussex, where there was a long tradition of village fairs. The image, with traditional pink-striped awnings, balloon-sellers, and swing-boats is the type of image that evokes nostalgia now. Discourses of family life are evident in this poster, as children enjoy a simple carefree time on the swings and roundabouts. The flag on top of the roundabout appears to be another St George’s Cross. Once again, the old English Oak and church appear at the centre of the image. The image appeals to what people ‘know’, and follows on from previous traditions, particularly well-known railway posters, where depictions of the English countryside were already popular before the war.  

Religious discourse and the established church is evident in figure 16 which depicts the spired gothic Salisbury Cathedral, bathed in sunlight. This traditional image would have been familiar to many from guidebooks, particularly after the 1937 centenary of Constable, and his significant painting of Salisbury Cathedral. Once again, an established old English Oak is a key part of the image. The only person in the image is an indistinct figure with a horse and cart under the tree.

In August 1943 figure 17 of the South Downs was the latest in the series prepared for ABCA, described by Darracott and Loftus as a ‘traditional vision of an idyllic, pastoral, almost historical Britain’. In 1938 it was believed that ‘[m]ore than any other race in the world are we influenced by the smooth gentle contours of the south-country wolds and downs.’ Roads, and possibly electricity pylons, existed on the downs, but none of this is evident in this picture. Instead there is a timeless sweep of almost hedgeless landscape, and more established English oaks. An old manor or farmhouse nestles among the hills, but there is very little evidence of mechanisation. Tractors ‘were still far from universal, and

---

122 Bishop, P., op.cit., 1995, pp.117-119. Priestley, J.B., op.cit., 1934, p.66, noted that even ‘if the Church ceased to exist tomorrow, we should not allow Salisbury Cathedral to be turned into a filling station’.
[were] outnumbered by farm horses through the interwar years’. An old shepherd in traditional garb is walks across the lush green land with an old English sheepdog, bathed in sunlight. This is reminiscent of a typical image, particularly from nineteenth century photographs, where ‘[s]hepherds and sheepdogs were often almost inseparable’. All four images follow the long tradition of typical horizontally painted ‘landscapes’. Newbould’s posters are typical examples of how pre-war travel poster style was used almost unchanged during the war to arouse patriotic feelings for an idealised pastoral Britain. Such peaceful visions were a relief from the grim realities of war. Despite largely industrialised populations, rural images avoided confrontations with the ‘awkward realities’ of urban living. As Advertiser’s Weekly described it, ‘Newbould... looks back on the peaceful side of British life and presents those landmarks which are inseparably bound up with the spirit of England’.

The same Advertiser’s Weekly article noted that Games had pushed ahead to the future. He produced three surrealist-inspired images for the ‘Your Britain’ campaign, covering three of the subjects dear to socialist hearts: modern variants of health, education and housing. Art and Industry noted that these posters would have been very different without the clear influence of Chirico and Dali, with the images dependent ‘on the extreme of photographic realism that results from the skilful use of perspective and shadows’. Although photographic techniques were available, and Games had been brought up in a photographic studio, Games ‘disliked photography’, finding ‘it too mechanical and neither creative nor personal enough’, finding the airbrush more flexible. All three images depict pioneering, futuristic buildings that already existed: Finsbury Health Centre (figure 18), school in Cambridgeshire (figure 19), and a block of workers’ flats in London (figure 20). These new, clean-lined and geometric, images are superimposed on the unromantic old, presenting ‘the bad old ways of poor living conditions’. They demonstrated ‘how slums can give way to bright, clean houses and how dark, stuffy schoolrooms can be redesigned to admit light and air’. These images demonstrate a belief that the future was to be planned, that collective suffering and heroism deserved a collective and planned future,
and a sense that if a country was worth dying for, it had to be worth living for. A planned society ‘was upheld as offering a new basis for social and political organisation at a time when laissez-faire capitalism was in crisis’.

However, not all were in favour of reconstruction, as some saw planning as ‘non-English’, even Nazi.

Discourses of a healthy future are evident in figure 18, depicting Finsbury Health Centre. Possibly a community health centre, Finsbury, like Peckham, promoted health for families, and looked to re-enable the ‘village gaze’ within an urban setting. Death, disease and rickets are evident in the background – also the past, to be solved by modern healthcare regimes. Discourses of a modern urban future mask the dreary past, and discourses of cleanliness are evident, meshing with discourses of science and modernity. The large concrete structures depicted in the images were believed to offer cleanliness, lightness and freshness. The architecture appears to show the influence of modern architects such as Le Corbusier, with the health centre in an Art Deco style and the buildings alongside in a Bauhaus style. Figure 19 depicts a school in Cambridgeshire ‘where village children are learning to grow up in healthful surroundings’.

In the past there is old style furniture, a lack of equipment, and what there is is tired and broken. Old styles of education with easels, chalk dust, in small dilapidated village schools are to be replaced by bright, modern large schools. It is not clear what age or gender the schoolchildren are, but light, fresh, airy and modern facilities are to be provided. The ideal of universal education, with children ‘our future’, was growing in the interwar years, culminating in the Education Act of 1944.

Figure 20 depicts a block of workers’ flats built in London in 1936, probably a result of various interwar social housing experiments. Although the suburbs were the main areas of interwar development, these are not presented as the future. As with the other images, Games’ future is very much an urban, concrete one. The flats were to be part of the new, planned housing, carefully planned to use less ground space, and built of clean, hygienic fabrics, with balconies to access fresh air. Unlike the established Oak trees evident in all

---

135 Ibid., p.195. On pp.54-61 Matless explains how inter-war planning influenced was by the Nazi development of autobahns.
137 Text on poster, figure 19.
of Newbould’s posters, this poster has the sole tree in Games’ designs, and this tree is still new, not yet established. The old tenement buildings in the background, part of the nineteenth century housing movements, had become overcrowded, uninhabitable and discredited. Such houses were dark and dingy, and generally housed one family per room, the water pump is evident outside. The scruffy poster on the wall claims ‘Carbol Disinfectant kills fleas, bugs, mice, rats’, real problems for urban areas.

McLaine believes that Games was putting forward messages the Government was reluctant to make on its own behalf, but the War Office was behind the posters. The assumptions evident in these posters structured the thinking that made Beveridge acceptable. Although the less obviously ‘English’ view, Games’ was the style taken forward to the 1951 Festival of Britain. Games’ aim was ‘essentially about paring down the message to its simplest and most powerful form’, and every element of his design was a working part. The posters use ‘strongly symbolical colour’, with the past in dark and muted colours, but the future bright and sunny. Games’ designs show a familiarity with surrealism, which allowed poster designers to go beyond the physical, realistic depictions of a subject. Art and Industry noted in 1943 that Games’ posters ‘are interesting as an example of modern design harnessed to an educative and constructive theme.’ Although the two sets of images by Newbould and Games are very different, there are similarities in discourse. For example, discourses of citizenship are evident within the poster series, as the slogan ‘Your Britain’ implies a sense of ownership, something to be defended and fought for, but presented in very different ways, reflecting very different contradictory but, nonetheless, meshing discourses. All posters ask the viewer to ‘Fight for it NOW’, aimed at (citizen) soldiers already fighting, this made the killing appear justified. The rural images suggest that they do their job as soldiers and they will maintain the rural idyll. The urban images provide both a fear, that unless you maintain your role we will be going back to cramped conditions, and they point to a hope that the future will be better.

Rural images are often idealised, unrealistic, but in a style of heightened realism, as with the Women’s Land Army (WLA) posters. Smiling English roses are presented within the sunny rural pastoral idyll, in landscapes (figure 64), near picturesque old farmhouses.

(figure 65), and amongst ‘cute’ animals (figure 66). The women are rarely shown doing the physical work that would have been necessary, and always remain recognisably feminine.\footnote{Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.177.} More of a rarity appears to be ‘That Men May Fight’ (figure 67), which shows more of the real hard physical work the WLA did, with extra realism provided by using photographs and testimonials from actual farmers. The posters by Fougasse (figures 68 and 69), although cartoons, present more realism, with the women doing backbreaking work in the rain. Utilising blank space, the image focuses the eye upon the simplified main character at the centre. These posters, however, were trying to produce sympathy and money for those who had done the work, rather than gain new recruits. Throughout all of these posters there is little sign of mechanisation, most are holding pitchforks or buckets, although Matless believed that machinery feminised farm work as it made labour easier.\footnote{Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.177.} Many of the images from the ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ type campaigns were more of the same, for example figures 70 and 71, although now with a mixed gender audience. Again, the images were over-idealised, depicting smiling men or women, looking distinctly unflustered, set within a ‘traditional’ landscape, as in figure 72. Significantly, unlike in traditional landscapes, the figures of the people are central to the image, not indistinct. The message is that anyone can do this. There is little evidence of modernisation or mechanisation in agriculture, although the straight lines in figure 73 could indicate mechanised ploughing. The focus is on manual work, companionship, and holidays (figure 74), when there would have been few other options for holidays. Those depicted within the posters are happy and healthy specimens, including those in the services (figures 75 and 76), obviously keen for a change, although the clothing is not always the most practical. Particularly symbolic is the rolled up muscled arm (figures 77 and 78), ready for hard physical labour, first launched in July 1943 and expected to become a big feature. These ‘holidays’ were presented as something even the children could manage (figure 79). We can see in this image a distinct contrast between the grey urban and colourful and sunny rural, lifestyles.

The ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign was effectively a rural campaign played out in suburban or urban areas, as allotments were encouraged and schools turned their fields over to growing food. Dig for Victory was a huge campaign, running for much of the war, and thus presents a real choice of images. The phrase is first obvious in figure 80, an obviously local, text-only poster from November 1939. The poster is quite solemn, promoting something that
will help the national effort, but not selling the benefits to the viewer. Also at the same time, figure 81 was produced, with more emphasis on ‘Grow More Food’, before the phrase ‘Dig for Victory’ took on a life of its own. Using natural green colours, the older man is dealing with hard physical labour: ‘the imagery of male and female domestic digging called up an amateur spirit of improvisation’, with ‘muddling agrarianism’ moving ‘from the farm to the urban allotment’. Science if applied to this ‘muddling agrarianism’, with careful planning could get the best from the ground, all year round (figure 82). Such detailed text would probably have been more appropriate in a leaflet, but was possibly provided for reference on allotment sheds. The image uses the logo of the foot on the spade, which first appeared early in the war (figure 83), where the ‘Minister of Agriculture exhorted not only the big man with the plough, but the little man with the spade’. The spade is the tool of the individual, and within this image we have a manly work boot digging with a functional spade into soil that is to be tamed to become fertile in the war effort. The image was ‘cleverly used in all forms of the campaign’, which gave strength to the appeal. Using photography, this image purported to reproduce reality, although only the left leg is visible, the right leg must have been airbrushed from the image – why is unclear.

The benefits of fresh food are sold in a new campaign in September 1941 when the ‘familiar foot-on-spade illustration’ gave way to a traditional still-life full-colour design of a basket of vegetables, (figure 84), directed more noticeably at women (with most men in uniform). The appeal for allotment cultivation was to continue, but home gardens would ‘receive new emphasis’. Such over-heightened colour visions of abundant vegetables, (rarely fruit or salad), good, nutritious food in a time of shortages, would have appealed (figures 85 to 87). There would be no need for coupons, although this is not sold as part of the campaign. Stapledon commented in 1942 that:

The inter-dependability of food and ships can never be sufficiently stressed, and it is a fact that should always be held prominently before the peoples of our small and densely populated island, alike in times of peace and war.

---

144 Ibid., p.176.
145 Ibid., p.179.
149 Stapledon, R.G., op.cit., 1942, p.239.
Games’ certainly demonstrated this within figure 88. Most of the previous images have been very naturalistic, but the benefits of growing one’s own food to yourself (figure 89) and your nation (figure 88) were made clear through Games’ modern montaged images, the spade and the ship together presenting a new message, and Schleger’s clever use of vegetables as text (figure 90), natural forms represented in an unnatural manner. The slogan appears in various guises, which indicates the longevity and adaptable nature of the slogan, including ‘Dig on for Victory’ (figure 91), set within a traditional landscape, and ‘Dig for Plenty’ (figure 92), which again emphasises the benefits. The campaign even gained commercial support, for example from Guinness (figure 93), which was believed to have iron-qualities, which gave the strength to ‘Dig for Victory’. Although people are rarely seen in the images, innocent, Aryan, beautiful children, in a style associated with children’s story books, do appear in figure 94, needing fresh food to keep them healthy. The guilt feeling is even stronger in figure 95 where (in the style of Hassall’s seaside posters) the child is trying to do their bit, when it should be the adults doing this particular job, although children were expected to do their bit elsewhere.

With two different audiences for the evacuation campaign, the children remain the centre of attention. The mothers (the fathers are expected to be away at war) are to be persuaded to send the children away to safe areas; the reception areas are to be persuaded to accept the urban children. Urban areas are shown with all the trappings of war. A child is shown bravely trying to do a man’s work within blitzed areas (figure 96), whilst other clean, cherubic children cower in fear in urban shelters (figure 97). The reception areas are depicted in a similar style to Newbould’s ‘Your Britain’ images, traditional, but with and economy of line and detail, villages with a church at the centre (figure 98), populated by friendly, motherly women. Although the urban areas are shown as dangerous, with barrage balloons indicating the danger of further air raids (figure 99), icons such as the Union Jack (figure 96) and St Paul’s (figure 99) are evident as the nation is not to be cowed.

London Transport noticeably supported wartime campaigns, and their campaigns, directed at urban commuters, depicted London standing up under the Blitz. ‘The Proud City’ was a series of six in traditional painted style, with the image surrounded by a frame. The series

---

150 Bradshaw, P.V., ‘Years of Goodness in Guinness Advertising’, *Art and Industry*, Vol. 59, No. 350, July 1955, p.39 noted that Guinness first issued ‘Dig for Victory’ in June 1942. Davies, J., *The Book of Guinness Advertising*, 1998, p.67 notes that this was a re-interpretation of the MOI slogan, and was used again in 1945, as figure 93, with ‘Dig for Plenty’ now the message.
focused on historic or significant buildings in the capital, surrounded by, or the victim of, bombing campaigns, but demonstrating resilience or new life coming through (figures 100 to 102). The series was to emphasise that in spite of Hitler such ‘monuments of antiquity’ still stood, and the posters exemplified ‘in material form the proud spirit of the people of London - a spirit that remains as a symbol of Right over Might’. Walter Spradbery, a Royal Academy artist, was looking to ‘convey something intangible, something far beyond an actual pictorial record of the damaged historical buildings of London’. The muted colourings were chosen to demonstrate the ‘indestructible’ nature of light and beauty in the face of the Blitz. Interestingly, the series was also produced in Arabic (figure 103), although it is not clear where these were placed.

The London Transport campaign demonstrated a hope in the future, and the savings campaigns largely push hope for the future as a message too. Essentially savings posters were persuading people to fund the war, but no posters were identified that depict what would actually have been bought with these funds. The emphasis with the slogans is on saving and lending, not on giving. Figure 104 demonstrates, through statistics, the return that will be achieved from investing. Much of the rest of the campaign focuses on what will be gained or protected with the money, particularly improvements to be made in the future. As the likelihood of winning the war increased, the emphasis on the future could become stronger. Eric Fraser’s modern image (figure 105), demonstrating cubist influences, emphasised the modern materials that would be used to construct the future, concrete and steel, with education at the centre of how this will be achieved. Education is also seen as an investment in the future in (figure 106), although in a style with more realism. This realism is also evident in figure 107, where a middle-class woman and child look to the horizon for a brighter future, presumably aimed at the men who had left them behind. In wartime, other than concentrating on the present, people could do little but dream of the future. This is evident in posters, where a glamorous woman dreams of holidays and fashion she can return to in the future (figure 108), and in figure 109 a worker dreams of a good family lifestyle in the suburbs. Despite the important growth of the suburbs in the interwar years, there is largely a silence surrounding them in posters, and this is one of the few images that depicts a suburb. The silence of the suburbs was possibly

because propaganda deals with othering, more difficult to depict in the case of the in-between suburb. Figure 110 was part of a stop-gap campaign to keep people saving after the end of the European war, but was hurriedly withdrawn after the Japanese surrender. Reconstruction in a modern, planned world is evident in the blueprint, where central issues include housing, leisure, health, education, agriculture, roads and buildings.

**The Reception of ‘British’ Posters**

The popularity of posters depicting the English countryside had been demonstrated before the war by well-known railway posters displayed within homes and schoolrooms. During the war the War Office’s series of ‘Your Britain’ posters by Newbould and Games, ‘impressed upon a vital section of the people what Britain is – the heritage of landscape and what men have built upon it’. Games’ posters intentionally had a ‘strong educative component’, and he deliberately did not design to the level of least intelligence. He relied on the more-informed soldiers to help the ‘more humble’ understand his messages. Games believed that the Army did not really understand the quality of the work that it was getting, otherwise they may have stopped his work, believing it to be too advanced for common soldiery. The images shown in Games’ posters were largely in line with the ideas of the Beveridge Report, with emphases on health, housing, education. As Bracken had feared, there was an enthusiastic reaction to the Beveridge report. **Advertiser’s Weekly** wrote that the all of the ‘Your Britain’ series had ‘proved popular; demand far outstrips supply’.

Although the posters may have been popular with the public, Churchill complained that if those fighting the war did not focus on winning the war, there would be no future to fight for as the country would be under the power of the Nazis. Churchill had a particular objection to figure 18, depicting Finsbury Health Centre, believing that it was an attack on

---

157 May, T. op.cit., 1987, p.372 notes that the report sold over 100,000 copies within a month of publication, and a cheap edition circulated the forces. By 1943 sales were 256,000 for the whole report, and 369,000 for the abridged version.
pre-war conservative policies.\textsuperscript{159} Bevin had drawn his attention to the poster, upon which Churchill had become ‘very angry’,\textsuperscript{160} claiming that: ‘The poster is a disgraceful libel on the conditions prevailing in Great Britain before the war.’ On the April 21 1943 Grigg agreed to stop the general issue of poster, which had only been seen by senior education officers so far, although he argued that ‘not intended to represent any of our soldiers’ homes’.\textsuperscript{161} Most copies of the poster were pulped, although a few copies survived, including one in the IWM.\textsuperscript{162} Although Newbould’s images may be seen as more ‘English’, it was Games’ modern style that was used at the Festival of Britain in 1951.\textsuperscript{163}

It is less easy to find direct responses to WLA and ‘Lend A Hand’ poster campaigns, but the results of printing posters that were far more idealistic, glamorous and clean than the reality were clear. Problems were caused for some farmers when the images did not match the realities and, as a consequence, the ‘wrong’ type of person was recruited: ‘Girls turned up dressed as for a picnic and were incapacitated in a matter of hours.’\textsuperscript{164} As the ‘Lend a Hand’ national campaign was launched when the end of the European war was in sight, the public wished to ‘relax and take a normal holiday and the cessation of hostilities made it more difficult to attract volunteers’. In such circumstances, the publicity was believed to play a key role in helping the number of volunteers to reach 107,000, nearly the same as the previous year.\textsuperscript{165} The posters worked in conjunction with national press advertisements, the first batch of which produced ‘thousands of offers’. Holidaymakers ‘experiencing the difficulties of travel and seaside accommodation must have found the suggestion of an agricultural camp a promising prospect for the summer’.\textsuperscript{166} Stapledon noted that there was a ‘large reservoir of intelligent, willing and physically robust “casual” labour of both sexes that can be brought out on to the farms’. Farmers were willing to ‘exercise greater patience with “casual” help, and to take more trouble in training both part-time and whole-time recruits to the land’. He felt that the organisation needed to be strengthened, and the introduction of staggered holidays could help.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{160} Mackenzie, S.P., op.cit., 1992, p.140.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p.141.
\textsuperscript{163} Powell, D., op.cit., 2002, p.174. The Festival combined the futuristic and nostalgic. For instance, the main site was dominated by the ‘Skylon’, but at the opening ceremony ‘Land of Hope and Glory’ was played.
\textsuperscript{165} PRO MAF 102/67, ‘A Report on the Work of Intelligence Branch for the Calendar Year’, 1945. The target was 200,000 volunteers.
\textsuperscript{166} Anonymous, ‘“Lend a Hand on the Land” Campaign Opens’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 128, No. 1,663, April 5 1945, p.39
\textsuperscript{167} Stapledon, R.G., op.cit., 1942, p.258.
In 1944, the Ministry of Agriculture considered all their long-running campaigns, ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’, ‘Grow More Food’ and ‘Dig for Victory’ as successful enough to continue throughout 1945. In 1941, when debating a new angle on the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign (figure 84), an extra half-a-million allotments were credited to the ‘very successful 1940-1 publicity effort’. The 1942 campaign was specifically targeted at women, but women gardeners gained most of their information from friends. The conclusion was that the publicity aimed at them was not nearly as effective as it might have been. In 1943 [p]ress and poster campaigns adjuring the people to “Dig for Victory” have played a vital part … in easing the shipping situation’. The urban dweller was believed to be ‘particularly impressed’ by the posters, with the ‘admirable selection of sites’ a key secret of the campaigns success. However, in a letter to Advertiser’s Weekly in September 1941, Norman Taylor noted an ‘unfortunate association of ideas’ when a small poster bearing the slogan ‘Dig For Victory’ was exhibited next to an undertakers.

‘Digging for Victory’ was a voluntary campaign, and in January 1940 a psychology student wrote to Advertiser’s Weekly, contending that the slogan ‘Dig For Victory’ conveyed ‘the thought of hard work, sweating and thirst’. He suggested a slogan such as ‘Plant for Victory’ would mean the same but remove the ‘psychological impression of hard work’, to a public who ‘will not go to any effort when they really do not have to’. This is borne out by a comment in 1943 to HI, from the Midland Region: ‘It’s all very fine for the Government to tell us to grow out own vegetables – we haven’t time to do more’. Mass-Observation (M-O) investigated the 1943 ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign where many claimed that they would willingly dig, but were unable to access any land to dig on, and called for areas such as Hyde Park to be used. Those who had dug up half their lawn for vegetables, had done it partly in response to the government campaign, but also due to fears of price rises in food and as a leisure interest. Despite these complaints, in 1943, allotment

---

170 PRO RG 23/26, ‘Inquiry by Wartime Social Survey for Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, August & September 1942, into how far the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign had been successful’, 1942, p.51.
‘numbers had almost doubled to 1,400,000’. The general background and sheer scale of the campaign was more significant than any one part of the campaign. Statistics provided by the Wartime Social Survey in 1942 demonstrate the largest percentages had taken wartime allotments because of ‘Dig for Victory’ publicity (14.9%), the desire for fresh vegetables (14.1%), and as a hobby (23.9%). The Survey claimed ‘that the desire for fresh vegetables and the wish to help in the national food situation – “are in themselves a reflection of the message conveyed in the ‘Dig for Victory’ publicity and should, therefore be attributed directly to the campaign”’. The campaign continued into 1944, and although the peak year for allotments was 1942, ‘interest in the campaign generally appeared to be undiminished’. The campaign no longer called for extra allotments, and was ‘directed almost entirely to greater efficiency in vegetable production’. The slogan had caught on, and aside from the ‘immediate purpose of helping out the supplies of green vegetables’ it gave ‘many a new feeling (or revived an old one) about the soil and working outdoors’. Both the Dig for Victory and evacuation campaigns effected a mixing of town and country.

Despite widespread evacuation campaigns in many different media, by June 1940 ‘only about a quarter of mothers in danger areas have registered their children for evacuation’. In 1944 the evacuation campaign still continued, although such publicity was not expected to ‘have any substantial effect on registrations under present conditions’, as not only were people unlikely to go, they started to drift back as they become more optimistic about the progress of the war. People would not evacuate without good reason, and posters and press campaigns were not getting the support of ‘authoritative statement from the Government’. In a democratic society, if the leaders had decided that it was in the best interest of the state, and the people, that children should be evacuated, a failure to persuade them to do was, was ‘a definite failure on the part of leadership’. It meant that ‘either the people do not believe in their leaders, or … the leaders have not spoken in a language which the people can understand and respond to’. London Transport had a lot of experience in publicity, and certainly spoke in a language people could understand and

181 PRO HLG 7/93, ‘Mr Barter, from TTC’, August 27 1944.
respond to. Posters they produce are often popular for reproduction, and despite Spradbery’s fears that ‘The Proud City’ series would be one of the grimmest ever produced, his posters attracted considerable attention and thousands of copies were distributed throughout the world, including in Arabic.\footnote{Ibid., pp.8-9.}

In October 1939, the National Savings Committee (NSC) proposed to put St George and the Dragon on their forthcoming posters. M-O were asked to do an advance test on this and found that many ‘condemned this symbol as too old-fashioned or remote’, as were the ‘whole tone of the red Government posters’.\footnote{Darracott, J., and Loftus, B., op.cit., 1972 (1981 edition), p.54.} ‘Candidus’ of the \textit{Daily Sketch} enquired in March 1942 as to why one of the slogans used as ‘lend to defend’, reminiscent of the ‘Maginot mentality’ and suggested that ‘give to attack’ would be a more appropriate message. A series under the slogan ‘hit the enemy with your savings’ had disappeared, and Candidus was glad to see the back of it as

‘[h]e felt that forgoing the use of one’s money could not be compared with the fighting man’s sacrifices, and that the stress on the merits of war savings as an investment contrasted badly with self-denial in other countries.\footnote{M-O FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime: Effectiveness of Posters’, October 1939.}’

Throughout December 1942, praise for advertising was reported, though the ‘ghastly picture of the Savings family’ was criticised: ‘The posters are regarded, on the whole, as “the best advertisements issued by any Government Department.”’\footnote{Anonymous, ‘Wrong Angle is Used in Savings Publicity’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 115, No. 1,503, March 12 1942, p.193, quoting Candidus.} At the same time, the editor of \textit{War Savings}, the NSC journal, discovered that there was a clear desire for horrific, meaning realistic, posters.\footnote{PRO INF 1/292C, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports No. 113’, November 24 - December 1 1942, p.296.}

Whatever image or slogan was used on the posters, if the government was not producing a consistent message, it was not going to be a success, as with one hand it promoted a NSC campaign, and with the other made ‘arrangements for the resumption of football pools. On Monday we are urged to keep trade alive. On Tuesday we are told to reduce expenditure even upon necessities’.\footnote{Anonymous, ‘Clear Majority Preference for Horrific Posters’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 118, No. 1,532, October 1 1942, p.16.} Savings increased following good war news but there was a reluctance, particularly in rural areas, as people did not believe that government would be able to meet its debts after the war. Workers also disliked tying up their money, believing
that if a slump set in after war they would be required to use their savings. They particularly disliked paying up at work, as employers would say that there was no need for pay rises if they could afford certificates. During February 1943 people were holding back from buying Savings Certificates because of ‘lack of faith in the Government’s post-war standing’. Builders were not joining saving groups as they were observing a ‘wastage of material’ on aerodrome sites. In August 1943, savings campaigns were still attracting a great deal of response, much of it negative, including the belief that the more they paid into savings the longer the war would last. In November, there was still a lot of comment and opinion was ‘divided as to their effectiveness. Some appreciate the publicity; others “deplore its fatuous tone”’. Some felt that campaigns increased interest in savings; others that ‘the expense is not justified because much of the money “saved” was really only transferred, and therefore did not represent an extra saving.’

Poster sites in London were carefully chosen so that the message could be absorbed easily, ‘without shocking the viewer’. In March 1944, however, there were calls for War Savings posters to be removed from Nelson’s Column as foreign visitors might ‘think it strange that a national monument be used in this way’. The type of images presented in figures 108 and 109 caused ‘a strong divergence of opinion’ in Lambeth for several months. Mr T. Hobson, of the NSC headquarters, was worried that a poster with the slogan ‘Save for a Sunny Day’ was illustrated with ‘fur coats, silk stockings, boxes of chocolates and all the other things which are in short supply’. Hobson contended that the poster would ‘induce the public to rush out and buy these luxurious goods’. The posters were turned down by the NSC headquarters because ‘advertising experts said they would encourage the public to believe that luxuries would be available as soon as the war was over’. In August 1945 a thanksgiving campaign was planned, to be the biggest ever campaign. In order to be topical, there had to be some hurried changes, figure 110, urging the public to ‘finish the Japs’ had to be hurriedly withdrawn. The theme for an incentive to save was now to ‘be focussed entirely upon reconstruction’. A lot of debate occurred over the slogan, with Advertiser’s Weekly’s prediction that it would be ‘Great Things To Do…’, a slogan

190 PRO INF 1/292C, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports, No 125’, February 16-23 1943, p.211.
191 Ibid., August 19 1943, p.18.
formerly used, but adapted for the new campaign.\textsuperscript{195} In September 1945 the NSC released figures which showed that for ‘every £1 spent on advertising, £10,000 came back from the British public’. Commercially speaking, this was ‘a microscopic cost’.\textsuperscript{196}

Propaganda, making the issue more black and white, presented two Englands throughout the war, of which the rural, pastoral England\textsuperscript{197} was ‘often deemed more English’ than the urban.\textsuperscript{198} The divisions are often not clear cut:

Defining England, or at least isolating any single version of ‘Englishness’, remained problematic. This was partly because of the size and diversity of England itself, and the number of its internal regional and social divisions.\textsuperscript{199}

In a democracy, propaganda could not ‘short-circuit reason, as the dictator propaganda does’. As an educative process, it ‘knows that the stability of a social order does not depend upon everybody’s saying the same things, holding the same opinions, feeling the same feelings, but upon a freely achieved unity’ which recognises and accepts differences.\textsuperscript{200} Both traditional and utopian visions drew on longer term discourses, stylistically, as well as in subject matter, whilst also looking forward to a more promising future. The rural in particular drew on the landscape tradition, with realistic drawings which appear to have forgotten all the lessons of modern design, although the designs were focused upon the functional message, with highly readable typography. The modern socialistic message was more tied with the abstract, graphical messages. This was not cut and dried: the London Transport series, for example, depicted urban images in a very traditional style. Various IPA techniques were drawn on, the ‘glittering generalities’ of democracy, and the transfer of authority from both conservative and socialist movements ensured that the war was deemed a good fight. Card stacking was used, to ensure that only selected facts were presented, appropriate to the message, and the bandwagon effect, where everyone should contribute to the fight, as everybody else is. Having examined what people were fighting for, identifying their ‘imagined community’, we move onto the

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Anonymous, ‘Savings Poster Dispute’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 128, No. 1,666, April 26 1945, p.108.
\item Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.179.
\item Bartlett, F.C., \textit{Political Propaganda} 1940, p.153.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
second case study which emphasises the idea of the island nation, and identifies those involved in the industrial effort.
Chapter 5: Industrial Posters

The Second World War was fought in a more businesslike way than the First World War, although there ‘was no longer the feeling that production came first, and people a long way second’. In the early years of the war, those in the UK’s factories were encouraged to believe that they were playing a major part in aiding the nation’s survival. This chapter explores the posters used to maximise the industrial effort, identifying the longer-term discourses that they drew on. It discerns a range of discourses that were important to industry in the Second World War, including discourses of industrialisation; mechanisation; science and technology; health; protection; cleanliness; femininity and masculinity; and scientific management and psychology, with moral discourses largely absent. A varied range of posters styles, as with most poster campaigns, was used to get the message across, including technical diagrams, Soviet-influenced designs and homegrown designs.

The Context and Planning of Industrial Posters

In the First World War, men had been presented with white feathers if not seen in uniform. In the Second World War, behind the obvious military fronts was the ‘Battle for Production’, working continuously. Workers, particularly men, needed convincing of the importance of their work: ‘Churchill told war workers that “the Front Line runs through the factories”’, where ‘they were “soldiers with different weapons but with the same courage”’. Civilian contributions to the war effort were of ‘decisive military importance’, with Britain’s armed forces dependant on ‘the industrial and organisational skills of the home population’. Much equipment produced in factories, particularly for the Royal Air Force (RAF), was complicated. A strict control of manpower was needed, as a high proportion of skilled labour needed to be retained in the factories. A profit motive for industrial effort was rarely seen, as the British workforce worked for victory for the nation. Industry was central to the war effort, as it recovered from the poor reputation it had gained through the interwar years, with poor industrial relations and strikes. As seen in the previous chapter, much propaganda focus was on a sentimentalised, rural England. The

---

1 Davies, R., Women and Work 1975, p.95
3 Ibid.
5 Donnelly, M., Britain in the Second World War, 1999, p.70.
urban and industrial England, providing the manpower and materials for the conflict, was often ignored, partly due to the desire of the British to be seen as different from the ‘machine-worshipping’, inhuman Nazis.

In the UK, the technical and manufacturing changes of the mid-eighteenth century created an industrial economy which provided a ‘dominant collective self-image’ of the country as ‘the world’s workshop’. As work and the home became distanced from each other, both mentally and physically, the idea of ‘the worker’ became more prominent. The industrial elite sought to appear gentrified and ‘clean’, to distance themselves from the grimness and ugliness of real industry, of the ‘“satanic mills”’, a problem that discouraged wholehearted commitment to industry. In the popular imagination factories were such as Priestley described, in his seminal 1934 account of the composition and appearance of England: Northern, dirty, and ‘a grim blackened rectangle with a tall chimney at one corner’. As the new consumer industries were created in the South in the 1930s, new ‘decorative little buildings, all glass and concrete’, which seemed merely to be ‘playing at being factories’ were built. As the coal, steel, textile and shipping areas of the North declined, the consumer growth industries of the South, including electrical appliances, synthetic fibres, chemicals, and car manufacture, grew. New (electrical) technological ‘magic’ was ‘clean and bare and glittering’, unlike the old industries. By the Second World War industry was largely associated with the machine, which Priestley described as enslaving some in a monotonous routine, particularly women, although liberating others who enjoyed the possibilities of machine technology, principally men.

---

8 Ibid., p.77.
16 Ibid., p.125.
World War discourses of clean industry, achieved through science and technology, are evident, although mass factories still only employed a minority.\(^{17}\)

British industrial working practices were influenced by those from abroad, including Taylorism from America, which applied scientific method to the details of work processes. It broke tasks down into the smallest possible units, introduced wage-incentive schemes, and rigidly separated jobs that required thinking from those that only required manual operation.\(^{18}\) Joad’s popular text of 1926, *The Babbitt Warren*, depicted America as a ‘machine-ridden, work-and-money-mad land’, with a worship of ‘size, speed, mechanisation and money’.\(^{19}\) There was no longer time for apprenticeships, and mass production intensified the stress on good time keeping, discipline and regularity.\(^{20}\) Lenin was impressed by the methods of Taylorism, feeling that they fitted the Soviet industrial model.\(^{21}\) Essentially an ‘urban creed’, Socialism was bound up with the idea of machine-production.\(^{22}\) Visits to the USSR were quite common in the interwar years, with cultural achievements, such as the works of Eisenstein, celebrated.\(^{23}\) Walter Citrine\(^{24}\) and the Webb\(^{25}\) wrote influentially on the state of Soviet Russia, with the Webb praising the factories, education system and the classlessness.\(^{26}\) Associated particularly with the working classes, the Soviet system took on a symbolic character for the workers, for whom it ‘represented the achievement – real or imagined – of their aspirations’, whilst for the middle classes ‘it stood for all they feared’.\(^{27}\) The dominant attitude of the state until 1939 was anti-communism, rather than anti-fascism.\(^{28}\)


\(^{20}\) Harris, J., op.cit., 1993, p.131.


\(^{24}\) Citrine, W., *I Search for Truth in Russia*, 1936.

\(^{25}\) Webb, S., and Webb, B., *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation*, 1935. This was reprinted in various editions, the last of which was *The Truth About Soviet Russia*, 1944.


\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp.152. See also Benson, J., op.cit., 2003, for an assessment of the working classes in the years leading up to the Second World War, particularly pp.141-173 which includes patriotism amongst the working
The British Communist Party, formed in July 1920, had grown in number and influence in the interwar years. Initially it enthusiastically supported the war, but reversed the policy within a few days. By January 1941 their party paper, the Daily Worker, had been suppressed. With the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, few outside the Communist Party had a good word to say for the USSR. After July 12 1941, when Germany invaded the USSR, few had a bad word to say. The Anglo-Soviet alliance was enthusiastically received as Britain was no longer alone. Pictures of Stalin began to be displayed alongside those of Roosevelt and Churchill in factories and ‘other public places’, whilst munitions factories held ‘tanks for Russia’ weeks, where the entire weeks output was dedicated to the Soviet effort. There were Anglo-Soviet committees everywhere, and Clementine Churchill’s ‘Aid to Russia’ fund raised £8,000,000 of aid. The aims of British propaganda about the USSR were to combat ‘anti-Soviet feeling’ which might ‘jeopardise execution of policy’, and to ‘counteract enemy attempts to split national unity’ regarding the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. Those working in industry needed little convincing, but the government needed to anticipate and ‘curb exuberant pro-Soviet propaganda from the Left’. Appearing to offer a viable alternative to Fascism, there was considerable grass roots support for the Soviet effort. Fearing that this would translate into support for Communism, the government decided to pursue a secret, long-term policy to ‘steal the thunder’ of the left. Churchill vetoed the playing of the Internationale for six months. Stress was laid on cultural
similarities with the ‘Russians’, rather than on the political system of Communism. The BBC believed that the British people recognised the oppressive nature of Communism but were prepared to put up with it:

If the devil out of hell came to fight the Nazis just now, we would cheer him and all his fallen angels, and you needn’t worry that our cheers would mean that we were turning devil worshippers.

Sir Walter Monckton, in 1941, whilst Director General of the MOI, made a special visit to the USSR to ‘exchange information on policy and technique in propaganda with the Soviet Propaganda Ministry and to establish co-ordination’ between the UK and the USSR. Arrangements were made for close co-operation through the exchange of information and material. In 1942, newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook also visited, returning with a collection of original posters, published, with English translations, in factories two days after his return (figures 111 to 114), with the British also providing posters in return (figures 115 to 118). Admiration for the Soviet Union arose largely from a ‘conviction of our inefficiency, resulting in an increasing degree of admiration for efficiency wherever it is found’.

With rising numbers of strikes in the interwar years, including the General Strike, 1926, presented by the government as being political in intent, the government began to fear that British workers would look to the USSR example, and seize ‘power in a revolution’.

---

37 McLaine, I., *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two*, 1979, pp.197-198. Acceptance of the USSR is demonstrated through the production of films such as *The Demi-Paradise* (1943), or *Love on the Dole* (1941), films showing Communists in a positive light.

38 PRO INF 1/676, ‘Letter to Director General, MOI from Mr Ryan, BBC’, September 4 1941.

39 H.C. DEB, 5s, December 3 1941, Cols 1151-2. This would include news, background information, films and photographs.


42 Branson, N., and Heinemann, M., op.cit., 1971, p.83. 85 million work days were lost in 1921, almost twice as many as in the worst pre-war year. Strike activity was heavily regionalised, strongest in the old industrial areas.


Men had returned from the First World War psychologically changed, ‘convinced that they were entitled to fair treatment and were prepared to act to get it’. The pre-war ‘tendency towards deference and humility’ was gone, and the demands for changes set in.\footnote{Morris, M., op.cit., 1973, pp.14-15. See also Wrigley, C., op.cit., 1979, p.2.} Whilst there was a surplus of work, the trade union movement expanded.\footnote{Davis, M. (London Metropolitan University), ‘TUC | History Online’, http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1939_1945.php, accessed December 30 2003, notes that trade union membership expanded from 4.5 million members in 1938, to 7.5 million members by 1946.} The 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act made ‘sympathetic strikes directly and indirectly against the government illegal’,\footnote{Sheldrake, J., op.cit., 1991, p.52.} and from July 1940 all strikes became illegal.\footnote{Longmate, N., \textit{How We Lived Then: A history of everyday life during the Second World War}, 1971, p.340.} On October 3 1940, under Churchill, Ernest Bevin was asked to take office as the Minister of Labour and National Service.\footnote{Laybourn, K., op.cit., 1997, p.159. See Bullock, A., \textit{The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume 2: Minister of Labour 1940-1945}, 1967.} Bevin, a moderate who believed in achieving agreement through ‘reasoned argument’ rather than confrontation,\footnote{Pearce, R., op.cit., 1993, p.72.} even referring to workers he met in factories as ‘mates’,\footnote{Briggs, A., \textit{Go To It! Working for Victory on the Home Front 1939-1945}, 2000, p.26.} was readily accepted. As leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union at the time of the General Strike, he was trusted more than Churchill, whose reputation with the miners was poor after the 1910 Tonypandy massacre.\footnote{BBC, ‘The Tonypandy Massacre’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A701858, accessed December 30 2003. The miners of the Rhondda Valley struck in November 1910 over pay. The actions of Winston Churchill, as the Home Secretary, assumed mythical proportions. Belief is that Churchill sent the troops in to quell the unrest, and many died. The reality was that the police, accompanied by troops, were called in, although not in the quantities believed, and one miner died.} The key figure from the labour movement in the government, Bevin’s responsibility was to achieve the highest possible level of war production, determining the allocation of labour, contain inflationary wage pressures, and avoid industrial trouble.\footnote{Sheldrake, J., op.cit., p1991, .57.} Bevin believed that ‘more hours of work did not necessarily mean more work’, and that to get the best from war workers, fair treatment and relaxation needed to be provided.\footnote{Briggs, A., op.cit., 2000, p.16.} 

Bevin ‘allowed several highly damaging and irresponsible [strikes] to go unpunished, rather than endanger his good relations with the unions’. Building up such trust allowed him to ask for, and get them to accept, the loss of various cherished privileges.\footnote{Longmate, N., op.cit., 1971, p.340.} Able to legislate on behalf of workers, strike levels were initially the lowest they had been since records began, although some legitimate members grievances were ignored. Towards the
end of the war the number of unofficial strikes rose, particularly in the coal industry, losing control of their members to extremists. There was a lot of criticism for the strikers, and comparison with what soldiers had to put up with, with calls from the public for strikers to be tried for treason. Farmers were angry: ‘If we stopped work England would starve’. Towards the end of the war, factory workers felt the need to hold out for better post-war conditions, as advancing mechanisation made their position increasingly unclear. The sense of urgency for industrial war effort had gone, victory appeared certain, and workers felt that if they did not make a stand now, they would never get anything. Workers outside government industries often felt that they were not really doing anything towards the war effort, but simply giving the management profits. Stories of ‘wartime strikes by dockers and miners find little space in the picture of a nation united in a common cause’, but significant numbers of working days were lost to strikes (see appendix 8).

There is no question that the miners were symbolically at the centre of the key inter-war strikes. The heroic narrative, in which the miner appeared both as the symbolic victim of capitalism and as the indomitable survivor, was not peculiar to the UK, but held special resonance. The manufacturing greatness of the country was owed to steam power and machinery, and at its peak the coal industry employed one tenth of the male work-force. Mining was a geographically differentiated industry, but across the board the industry was clearly dangerous and lowly paid. Orwell and Priestley’s important texts provide evocative images of the hardships of the miner’s life, bent double in small spaces, covered

---

56 Laybourn, K., op.cit., 1997, pp.159-161.
57 PRO INF 1/292D, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 156’, September 21-28 1943, p.473. This was not new, as Priestley, J.B. op.cit., 1934, p.339, noted that miners were deemed ‘unpatriotic scoundrels’ if they went on strike because coal was an ‘urgent national necessity’, but if they suggested that being such an ‘urgent national necessity’ it should be managed by the state rather than by private industry they were believed to be the ‘spokemen of Red Russia’.
64 Court, W.H.B., History of the Second World War: Coal, 1951, pp.4-5, note that coal fields produced different types of coal and the richness of their seams varied.
in dirt, breathing foul air, in return for a small wage.\textsuperscript{66} The miner in employment was still considered ‘one of the lucky ones’,\textsuperscript{67} as the increased application of science and technology to coal mining techniques increased coal production, whilst less coal was required.\textsuperscript{68} Inefficient mines were shut down,\textsuperscript{69} and many miners were unemployed or on short hours. The Victorian work ethic was still evident,\textsuperscript{70} and most were ashamed of being unemployed, opinions that had percolated down to the working classes from the middle classes, talking about ‘lazy idle loafers on the dole’, who could ‘find work if they wanted to’.\textsuperscript{71} The middle classes had their own visions of the life of the worker, believing that they were accustomed to the hardships and ugliness of their surroundings.\textsuperscript{72} Walter Greenwood’s 1933 novel \textit{Love on the Dole} tackled issues of unemployment, but a film version was not produced until 1941, and withheld until 1943. Orwell viewed the lot of the working classes as a dismal one, with the best they could hope for that industry would be stimulated by, for instance, rearmament, providing more work.\textsuperscript{73} May Day procession floats of the 1920s, however, were decorated by socialists with slogans such as ‘The Burden of Armaments Crushes Social Progress’.\textsuperscript{74}

With the outbreak of the Second World War, having contracted so much, the mining industry had difficulty in ‘recruiting and retaining’ labour in order to fulfil wartime requirements. As with other strategically important industries, plans for state involvement in a time of war had been drawn up as early as 1936, although the government was wary about potential unrest in the industry. During the war, local campaigns were significant. For instance, figure 119 appealed to Derbyshire’s miners, one-third of whom had been out of work in 1931-3.\textsuperscript{75} Many of the unemployed would have joined the forces, and announcements were made at the pits when the local regiment distinguished itself. The Derbyshire Yeomanry were the first to enter Tunis, and this poster was rushed out for the local mines.\textsuperscript{76} Figure 120, similarly, was rushed out for the Durham area, immediately after

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Branson, N., and Heinemann, M., op.cit., 1971, p.99.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Court, W.H.B., op.cit., p1951, p.15.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid., pp.24-25.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Harris, J., op.cit., 1993, p.129.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Orwell, G. op.cit., 1937 (1962 Edition), pp.76-78, notes the shock of the middle classes that those who were unemployed were still marrying and having children, but viewed it as a positive sign that the unemployed had not lost their humanity.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Priestley, J.B., op.cit., 1934, pp.327-328.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Orwell, G., op.cit., 1937 (1962 Edition), p.149.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Weinbren, D., \textit{Generating Socialism: Recollections of Life in the Labour Party}, 1997, p.74, (Image).
\item \textsuperscript{75} Black, J.A., \textit{A History of the British Isles}, 1997, p.258.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Anonymous, ‘National Publicity Programme Fighting Big Drop in Coal Output’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 121, No. 1,579, June 17 1943, p.325
\end{itemize}
the Durham Light Brigade captured the Primo Sold bridgehead south of Catania. In May 1941, it became obvious that there would be a severe shortage of coal if the current rate of production continued, and the state had to get more involved. Mining work required training, but miners were free to choose to join the forces, and unemployed miners had even been directed to the armed forces and munitions factories, rather than back into the mines. Being a miner was not an attractive career at the outbreak of war, with an ‘unenviable record of unemployment, poor labour relations and relatively low pay’. With an ageing coalmining population, (40% aged forty or over by 1941), young men, known as ‘Bevin Boys’ were directed into the coalmines after 1943. Absenteeism was a problem, particularly by the younger miners, and with the increasing technical nature of mining, the loss of a few key workers had a serious impact.

Orwell complained that capitalism had slowed down mechanised progress as the profit principle, the driving force for capitalist industry, ensured that inventions which threatened to reduce profits were suppressed. During the war British capitalism was enlisted ‘for the duration’ only, the profit principle abandoned, and most, if not all, factories turned over to war work. Mass-production methods ensured that workers were ‘completely divorced from the product and the means of production’. In April 1941, it was suggested that factory workers did not ‘thoroughly’ understand the importance of their role, and that this should be addressed. Workers in the factories needed to be kept involved as ‘fighters’, as, ‘except in the assembling works, few workers appreciate the full significance of the parts’ on which they worked. Those manufacturing small parts for which the purpose was not obvious, or non-military equipment, needed convincing of the importance of what they were producing. Time induced war-weariness and frayed nerves, particularly when workers were doing unspectacular work, ‘out of the limelight and monotonous’, was

---

79 Court, W.H.B., op.cit., 1951, p.27.
80 Kirby, M.W., op.cit., 1977, p.171. The last ‘Bevin Boys’ were sent down in 1948.
81 Pelling, H., op.cit., 1960, p.158.
86 PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda. 7th Meeting’, April 23 1941.
87 PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Note by Mr J.L. Henderson (Ministry of Supply), Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda’, March 27 1941.
exacerbated by uncertainties about the future. Such uncertainties increased as victory became more certain.\textsuperscript{88}

Blatchford, in 1894, had described the factory system as ‘evil’, and declared that England needed to choose between the ‘quality of men and the quality of production’.\textsuperscript{89} Welfare took on an increasing concern in factories, and certain early philanthropic employers provided medical and leisure schemes for their workers.\textsuperscript{90} Finding Taylorism inhuman, some maintained that English business was founded on values of ‘humanity’, ‘honour’ and ‘craftsmanship’. In the 1930s, with more focus on social obligations to its workers, working conditions improved.\textsuperscript{91} Between 1914 and 1950 the chances of a worker sustaining a fatal injury at work more than halved. New technology improved the risk from some hazards, although it introduced new ones,\textsuperscript{92} with machine work more monotonous, inculcating a belief that such work was safer, thus less attention was paid to the task in hand.\textsuperscript{93} Increased discourses of protection (physical, rather than moral as had been the concern in the past),\textsuperscript{94} led to the formation of the ‘National Safety First Association’ in 1918. This aimed to tackle workplace safety on a national scale,\textsuperscript{95} becoming The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA) in 1941.\textsuperscript{96} ROSPA produced many accident prevention posters throughout the war, initially with little support from industry or the government, despite the economic benefits of less accidents. In summer 1940, however, the government took ROSPA over ‘lock, stock and barrel for the duration’.\textsuperscript{97} ROSPA and the MOLNS combined to produce a bigger variety of posters than any other Ministry, with posters displayed for a week, fortnight or month, then turned over with new

\textsuperscript{90} Priestley, J.B., op.cit., 1934. Priestley’s examples included, on pp.33-4, Wills of Bristol (tobacco), and, on pp.89-95, Cadbury’s of Bourneville (chocolate). See also Donkin, R., op.cit., 2001, p.188.
\textsuperscript{92} McIvor, A.J., \textit{A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950}, 2001, p.132. Orwell, G. op.cit., 1937 (1962 Edition), p.171, also noted how machinery evolved to become more and more foolproof, and thus more and more safe.
\textsuperscript{93} Benson, J., op.cit., 2003, p.15.
\textsuperscript{94} Beynon, H., and Austrin, T., op.cit., 1994, pp.160-161, describes how girls in domestic service experienced the moral supervision of the ruling classes, although there was little concern for their physical welfare, so long as the work was completed.
\textsuperscript{97} M-O, \textit{People in Production}, 1942, p.209.
designs printed on the reverse to economise on paper.98 The Factories Act 1937 provided the first safety legislation, requiring, for example, safety guards on dangerous machines,99 evidence of the growth of state concern with, and intervention in, working conditions. With more recognition of the ‘interconnections between general standards of health and occupational problems’, there were improvements in real wages and living standards, and the Holidays with Pay Act was passed in 1937, although not enforced until after the war.100 The Emergency Works Order (EWO), March 1941, laid an obligation on employers to provide for the welfare of their workers, with canteens, crèches, and ‘music while you work’.101 An increased number of nurses, doctors and welfare officers on the shop floor, and more works canteens, were the result.102

The EWO was indicative of the extent to which the imperatives of total war legitimised state power, in a way which would have been inconceivable in the 1930s.103 The state had avoided intervention in industry where possible, with Baldwin ‘believing that management was the task of the employer, not the state’,104 although in 1935 he declared that laissez-faire was dead.105 In the initial stages of the war unemployment rose as industries laid off their workforces,106 but the importance of manpower to the war production effort was soon recognised, with the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MOLNS) formed, and a series of Acts passed.107 Under the EWO, men and women were forced to register for possible industrial service,108 and employers required to obtain workers through employment exchanges or approved trade unions.109 The EWO was initially unpopular for

98 Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, pp.389-390
106 Davies, R., op.cit., 1975, p.93.
107 Havinghurst, A.F., op.cit., 1985, p.316 notes that The Emergency Powers Act, May 22 1940, gave the Minister of Labour and National Service ‘the control and use of all labour’; the Man Power Requirements Committee was formed in June 1940; The Essential Works Order for passed in March 1941. Kirby, M.W. op.cit., 1977, p.178, notes that the Ministry of Fuel and Power was formed in 1942. Branson, N. and Heinemann, M. op.cit., 1971, p.325 notes that Joint Production Committees (JPD) were formed to secure co-operation between managers and workers to increase output. These were set up by ‘innumerable workers’, who with improved self-confidence in the inter-war years, set them up, believing that they could not do any worse than the management structure that had developed since the First World War.
some workers. Unable to leave work for more lucrative industries, the EWO lowered worker morale and impacted negatively on production.\textsuperscript{110} The EWO caused problems for employers as, with a combination of higher wages and fears of dismissal removed, absenteeism increased.\textsuperscript{111} In 1942, the EWO was amended so that habitual absentees could be prosecuted but these powers were rarely used, with a steady rate of about 6-8\% for men and 12-15\% for women from 1943 to the end of the war.\textsuperscript{112} The government attempted to assess the factors causing absenteeism in industry, particularly those which might be remedied by propaganda. Absenteeism was particularly notable amongst married women, who would not otherwise be working in factories. Some absenteeism was accepted as a natural safety-value, avoiding longer-term involuntary sickness created by stress, with few holidays and increased overtime.\textsuperscript{113} Working hours inevitably had to increase in a time of war, from the pre-war average of a 48 hour week.\textsuperscript{114} Unpunctuality and slowness in starting work were considered almost as important as absenteeism in causing loss of production.\textsuperscript{115}

Outside of wartime, industry is ‘built around a wide margin of inefficiency’. With a surplus labour force there was ‘no serious occasion to consider the best possible use of every worker every working hour’.\textsuperscript{116} In wartime, production crises made headline news, and the question of productivity was key, particularly in 1941 and 1942. As it became obvious that the economy was fully mobilised for war production, ‘further growth in outputs would be possible only by the rationalisation and streamlining of manufacturing processes’.\textsuperscript{117} Key in improving the situation was the creation of a new Ministry of Production in February 1942, designed to mobilise resources for war production as ‘fully and efficiently as possible’. Production needed to be increased without extra support from abroad, and without asking for longer hours and more sacrifices from already over stretched

\textsuperscript{110} Kirby, M.W., op.cit., 1977, p.174.
\textsuperscript{111} PRO INF 1/292A, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 31’, April 30-May 7 1941, p.102.
\textsuperscript{113} PRO INF 1/292A, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 33’, May 14-21 1941, p.88. M-O, op.cit., 1942, pp.196-197 identified factors leading to absenteeism, including: domestic responsibilities, including time for children and to see husbands and boyfriends on leave. Other factors accounting for absenteeism included illness, sickness, long hours and fatigue, lack of official weekends, high earnings, income tax, oversleeping, transport difficulties, the weather and a slackness in following up absenteeism.
\textsuperscript{114} McIvor, A.J., op.cit., 2001, pp.114-115. In the 1890s, nominal working hours ranged from 43 to 96 hours per week, until William Mather had demonstrated the efficiency of an average 48 hour week, which had become common in 1919.
\textsuperscript{115} PRO INF 1/292A, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 33’, May 14-21 1941, p.88. See also M-O, op.cit., 1942, p.188.
\textsuperscript{116} M-O, op.cit., 1942, p.x (emphasis in original).
Calls for increased effort had to compete against hostility from the public, who believed that workers in industry were slacking and time wasting, and bitterness within industry at time spent stood down. One report speaks of ‘deep resentment’ among many war workers at repeated appeals to ‘increase output and stay at their jobs’. There was no question of workers ‘wanting to slack, but shortage of material and bad internal organisation make it impossible for them to do otherwise’. The importance of the industrial effort was stressed through the campaign ‘It all depends on me’ (figures 121 and 122). The slogan, originating in the Hoover factory, was intended to develop a ‘spirit of personal responsibility’ in ‘every worker in industry’, symbolising the ‘importance of the individual in the national effort’. The Production Executive for Industrial Propaganda examined the best methods of ‘educative propaganda’ for arms workers, where interest needed to be stimulated in munitions production in general, and in the product of that factory in particular. A variety of posters were produced to demonstrate to the worker where their part was used, and how it contributed to the war effort.

After the First World War, when women had taken war work, particularly in the factories, a ‘barrage of propaganda’ had been aimed at women to ‘remind them of their primary responsibilities as mothers and homemakers’, provided for by her husband. Advertisements in women’s journals continued to present the nineteenth century ideal of the ‘lady of leisure’, with women a living testimony to her husband’s wealth, managing both appearance and the housework. Women were forced to resign from white-collar collar occupations on marriage, although the legal bars had been removed by the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919. Single girls who took jobs not really required were regarded as selfish, having done so at the expense of someone else. Work roles were assigned in a gendered manner, based on assumptions that such inequality was ‘a

---

120 Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, pp.105-106.
121 PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Note by Mr J.L. Henderson (Ministry of Supply), Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda’, March 27 1941.
123 Myrdal, A., and Klein, V., Women’s Two Roles: Home and Work 1956, p.5. See Beddoe, D., Back to the Home and Duty: Women Between the Wars 1918-1939, 1989, p.8, where the consistent inter-war image in the media was that of the woman as housewife and mother; and Giles, J., Women, Identity and private life in Britain, 1900-50, 1995.
dispensation of providence’, that by working a woman was somehow being ‘untrue to the higher functions of wife and mother’. Working class women could not afford to absorb such middle class views in full, needing to work, with housework a secondary consideration. Women had previously done economically productive work at home, fusing it with their roles of raising a family. The need to go to work changed this. The numbers of working women grew in the interwar years, particularly in the civil service. In 1939, outside of government service, women’s employment was still concentrated in ‘specific trades such as hosiery, laundering and dressmaking’, although ‘new engineering, light metal and electrical industries’ provided semi-skilled employment, concurrent with the decline in domestic service work. The war accelerated this trend, with 7,000 women employed in government ordnance factories in 1939, 260,000 by October 1944, although in the early months of the war, unemployment rose.

As men ‘served their nation in arms’, women were encouraged to take on extra work in the factories, the fields, and the armed forces support services. Alongside the patriotic impulse there was also an economic incentive for paid work. Wartime work constructed as ‘feminine’ was ‘routine and repetitive’, ‘portrayed as clean and light’, requiring no formal training, but dependant on ‘dexterity, concentration and the ability to tolerate monotony’. The ‘male/female, public/private dichotomy’ needed to be

128 Davies, R. op.cit., 1975, pp.29-30, notes that after the Industrial Revolution working class women had worked in the mill, at the pit, on the farm, including heavy work, and not until 1844 were their working hours limited in any way. See Bruley, S., op.cit., 1999, pp.18-19 for descriptions of some of the work roles undertaken by women in the early years of the twentieth century.
134 Bruley, S. (ed.), Working for Victory: A Diary of Life in a Second World War Factory, 2001, p.xxii notes in the introduction that munitions work was a ‘visible expression’ of patriotism. This patriotic impulse was demonstrated in Priestley, J.B., British Women Go to War, 1942.
preserved, with men in the armed forces doing their duty, rather ‘than simply giving free
rein to supposedly masculine impulses of aggression’. The government went some way
towards trying to accommodate women in their joint roles, pioneering the use of nurseries,
and using ‘schemes whereby two married women could ‘share’ the same job, each putting
in a half shift’. Women who had been out of work, those who had been divorced or
widowed, and particularly those over 40, also felt that ‘they ought to place their past
experience at the service of their country’, whether that had professional training or not.
Women often worked long hours, with those employed in munitions factories commonly
working thirty-six hour shifts to complete rush jobs. This was bad both for the health of the
people concerned, and for production, as following each spurt of effort, production would
lapse, with increased absenteeism and spoil work.

Initially, Bevin had hoped that enough women would be persuaded to come forward
voluntarily for work, with no need for compulsion. In February 1941, a meeting was
held to discuss publicity for the Ministry of Labour, which was looking to recruit half a
million women to essential war industries, replacing men in non-essential jobs. Employers
needed to be convinced that they should employ women, as they disliked spending time
and money training women when they were then unable to compel them to stay at work.
The campaign was to start with a national ‘background’ campaign, consisting of an
‘indirect appeal’. This was to be followed soon after by ‘publicity of a similar style applied
regionally, allied with a direct appeal to certain classes for specific jobs’. In March 1941
vacancies for women existed only in a few districts and welfare arrangements such as
nurseries, to enable married women to take on work ‘were still more of an aspiration than a
fact’. Consequently plans for a nation-wide appeal on recruitment were considered

hosiery factory in 1933, watching the ‘girls’ keeping up with ‘relentless’ machines, which he believed to be a
truly monotonous job. Yet the manager insisted that having learnt the routine, the women were free to think
about other things whilst working.

Morale During the Second World War’, Gender and History, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 1998, pp.278-293,
which makes a similar argument. Hall, L.A., op.cit., 2000, pp.142-143, explains how the gendered roles were
carefully demarcated. The government looked to women to release men for combat, although the women did
not become combatants themselves.

Davies, R., op.cit., 1975, p.93. See Priestley, J.B., op.cit., 1934, depicting factory women unencumbered
by childcare and shopping responsibilities.


Davies, R., op.cit., 1975, p.93. In June 1940, working hours for women were limited to sixty a week.

Ibid., p.94.


PRO INF 1/250, ‘Planning Committee – Minutes of Occasional Meetings, and reports’, February 10 1941,
p.73.
dangerous, and the appeal to women workers was de-emphasised,\textsuperscript{144} with confusion caused when Bevin stressed the call for women in a broadcast on March 16.\textsuperscript{145} All the problems envisaged by the General Division resulted,\textsuperscript{146} with women turned away after answering appeals, ‘because there was nothing for them to do’. The results were still evident later in the year, with women happy to wait for conscription, rather than volunteering.\textsuperscript{147}

Conscription for all single women between twenty and thirty was introduced in the form of the National Service (No 2) Act in December 1941.\textsuperscript{148} The UK went further than any other nation, further than Stalin’s USSR and far further than Hitler’s Germany, where women’s roles were to ‘breed and succour the master race’, which restricted the use that could be made of them.\textsuperscript{149}

The projection of the UK as a shipping nation, an island people, who ‘owe nearly everything to the sea’, was belied by the condition of the docks visited by Priestley in the 1930s, full of ‘gloom, emptiness and decay’.\textsuperscript{150} Although geographically false, the image of Britain as an island has powerful roots in the national imagination, suggesting a ‘small, clearly bounded and defined place, which is separate but not disconnected from the world, restful yet dynamic when the need arises’.\textsuperscript{151} Increased production resulted when this image was threatened by fears of invasion. As the fear of invasion was removed, discipline was gradually relaxed and the production rate declined.\textsuperscript{152} In December 1943 final victory over Germany was anticipated for 1944, although much of this depended on other events in the war, and the supply of equipment. There was a need for full industrial output but rather than ‘going to it’, the public was conscious only of delays, and industrial absenteeism and unrest reached new levels. The government responded with reallocation, and by mid-1944

\textsuperscript{144} PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee – Agenda & Minutes’, March 13 1941, p.223.
\textsuperscript{145} M-O FR 615, ‘Why appeal to women?: Criticism of Bevin’s appeal to women to contribute to the war effort’, March 20 1941, p.4.
\textsuperscript{146} PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee – Agenda & Minutes’, March 27 1941, p.231.
\textsuperscript{147} PRO INF 1/251, ‘Home Planning Committee – Notes on the Government proposals for the conscription of women’, November 1941, p.629-30.
\textsuperscript{148} Davies, R., op.cit., 1975, p.94.
\textsuperscript{150} Briggs, A., op.cit., 2000, p.29 notes that the number of women in the ‘German workforce remained higher than that of Britain throughout the war’, but such a statement is true concerning their depiction in the media.
\textsuperscript{151} Priestley, J.B., op.cit., 1934, pp.244-245.
43% of the working population was engaged in the war industry. Initially the industrial war effort limited by the need to still produce goods for export, so as to pay for at least some of raw materials and equipment bought from America and elsewhere. The export market, for coal at least, collapsed with the fall of France in mid-1940. From March, 1941, the ‘cash and carry’ system was replaced with ‘lend-lease’, to be repaid after the war. If Lend-Lease from the USA and Mutual Aid from Canada had not been received, the UK could not have devoted its resources to war as fully as it did. Industry did not really have to cater for consumer needs, as demand was cut by purchase taxes, quota schemes allocated materials to manufacturers, ‘utility’ standards were established in 1941, and points rationing on food and clothing was introduced. With this context in place, the following section will focus on the posters produced, both within and external to the government, to maximise industrial production in the Second World War.

**The Design of Industrial Posters**

Shaw, an industrial propaganda critic, described figures 111 to 114 as ‘grim’ cartoons, of a type not yet exploited in industrial work in the UK. These posters were original Soviet posters brought back by Lord Beaverbrook. With a ‘fundamental difference’ in temperament, he felt it doubtful that the British race would ‘ever be attracted towards the “horrific” cartoon’. Figures 123 and 124, in a ‘horrific cartoon’ series, however, were distributed to every Royal Ordnance Factory and over 10,000 Ministry of Supply contractors. British poster artists were not slow to ‘copy the Russian style’, with a ‘gory Hitler… scurrying away from a concentration of Waltzing Matilda’s tanks with blazing guns’, where the images exalt in speed and the machine. The Soviets, originally the subject of ‘name-calling’, were now being called on to name-call Hitler. Admired by the workers, the prestige of Soviet style was transferred to the British poster. Soviet-style posters are defined by strong graphics, colours and message, a focus on the worker, whether manual (figure 116), or technical (figures 117 and 118).

152 Kirby, M.W., op.cit., 1977, p.192. Although this applied specifically to the mining industry, there is no reason to think that this did not apply elsewhere.
158 Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, p.78.
The British supported the Soviet effort with their own more refined designs, for example, figure 125. Very much in the British tradition, it plays on the heritage of the UK as a shipbuilding and seafaring nation, working with the modern industrial Soviet nation. As with figure 126, the emphasis was constantly on the association with Russia, with rare references to the Soviets. The British also produced posters for the Soviets in return, including the series designed by Reginald Mount (see example in figure 115). This presumably was only for export as there is no English translation, unlike figures 116 to 118, designed by the very proletarian sounding ‘British Artists’, which indicates they were also used for display in British factories. Figures 117 and 118 used photographic images, a technical medium, appropriate for messages regarding technical equipment. British workers were encouraged to look to their Russian counterparts as an example, (see figure 127), but the stress was laid on cultural similarities and the shared danger from the Nazis (figure 128), rather than on ideological similarities. The Communist Party, as feared by the government, did (initially) try to turn the issue into an ideological one. It called for the ban on the *Daily Worker* to be lifted (figure 129), and for British workers to ally themselves with the Russian effort (figures 130 and 131), with an end to ‘corporate mismanagement and waste’.

Even more important than stressing solidarity with the Russians, was the need to stress a shared bond with the soldiers, and to emphasise that the ‘industrial front’ was as important as any other front in the war. An extensive series utilising three different slogans was regularly produced throughout the war, demonstrating the machinery and goods produced in the factories in use at points of victory. Illustrated in figures 132 to 134, this series used a detailed, British nationalistic style, depicting detailed heroic battle scenes without death, little more than pictures in a frame, unlike figure 129, a design where the text and image were integrated. Figure 133, produced in 1944, was described as continuing ‘the appeal to workers to back up the offensive now being intensified in the heart of Germany’.

Comparisons and interactions with members of the armed forces were used to illustrate the unity of the war effort (figures 135 and 136). In figure 135, the image is slightly surreal, with a loss of detail, and the juxtaposition of the worker in industry, and the fighter on the front, impossible without acceptance of techniques of montage, is key to the message.

---

160 Written on Figures 116 to 118: ‘This is one of a series of posters produced in Britain for use in the USSR in return for the posters the British used’.
Figure 136, part of a series of three, one from each of the Services, appealed to ‘the men who will give them the armaments and material of war’, using photographs of real service personnel. As evident in figure 137, the message sometimes went the other way.

The importance of individual effort, and the sense of being a link in a large chain is explicitly demonstrated in several posters in the ‘It all depends on me’ campaign (figures 121 and 122), with the ‘ME’ in figure 121 deliberately vaguely illustrated. In heavy industry, so reliant on technology, workers had to take care of themselves or they would weaken the whole chain (figure 138). Technology made industry reliant on a single worker more than before, if one was missing, work further along the line could be held up (figure 139). Both artists, within these images, were unafraid to use modern non-realistic graphic techniques, including abstraction, geometric shapes (both angles and pure circles), demonstrating a clear economy of line, combining the text with the image. Other posters made the individual ‘a cog in the great machine that grinds forward to victory’, evident in figure 140. This, and figure 141, highlight problems of absenteeism, figure 141 in more of a cartoon manner, demonstrating the concrete loss made. Figure 49 illustrates the ‘Go to it’ campaign produced by the MOI in June 1940, the first major campaign to use commercial sites after the ‘Your Courage…’ campaign. Handled by S.H.Benson, the campaign was based on a speech made by Herbert Morrison to factory workers calling for increased production. Over 200,000 posters were released, many in a large billboard size, although the blackout had reduced their effective viewing time. With the idea of the ‘nation’ explicit within the words, the red lettering and bold, inventive typography gave a sense of urgency and an indication of speed.

---

168 PRO INF 1/5, ‘General Division: Progress Report for May 1940’, p.17. About 10,000 16-sheet and 48-sheet commercial sites were to be taken, and in addition some 200,000 smaller posters were to be distributed through factories and Voluntary Societies.
Those in the hand tool industry, like many who produced non-military equipment, found it difficult to maintain ‘the enthusiasm of their workers’, with the work not felt to be ‘of sufficient importance to the war effort’. The MOI therefore produced a poster for the Ministry of Supply to issue to the workers, to ‘tell them how important to the nation is their work’ under the slogan ‘Let’s stick to our jobs and deliver the hand tools’. A photograph showing the wide range of hand tools produced, ‘from spanners to hack-saws’, was illustrated above sketches ‘of the tanks, ships, planes and guns which hand tools are needed to build, maintain and repair’. Figure 142 used a ‘skillful photomontage’ which linked the worker directly with the final product. Figures 143 and 144 used adaptations of nursery rhymes to show how important a small part could be in the final issue. Many parts were quite dull in themselves, and it was a challenge to poster artists to produce interesting designs. Shaw feels that this was successfully done in figures 145 and 146, where artists opted to show the final product in use, with figure 146 opting for photography to represent this as reality. Able to appeal to a specialised audience, detailed technical diagrams were suitable for use in factories, with figures 147 and 148 prepared by the works relationship office of a manufacturing office. Shaw was keen to point out how easy it was for all factories to produced similar drawings ‘for the general interest and enlightenment of the workers’. Some companies were content to do no more than display posters received from elsewhere, and the Ministries of Supply and Production had to cater for this. Figure 149 is one of a series of posters ‘intended for smaller firms and sub-contractors’, with space provided for the factory to ‘illustrate the particular element the factory is making’. Outside the factory the object of propaganda was ‘to create and foster the belief that it is a privilege to be engaged on war work’, thus stimulating recruitment. In a recruitment campaign aimed at suburban women, posters entitled ‘Vacancies’ contained lists of occupations vacant in local factories, placed near roadways to allow for detailed study. Recruitment of women was a particular issue, to which this chapter makes reference (see figures 150 and 151). The applicability of domestic skills to factory life (figure 152) was emphasised, and women in industry became an accepted feature of wartime life, depicted

172 Ibid., p.52. Bartlett, F.C., Political Propaganda 1940, p.18 noted that more technical advertisements required ‘a higher standard of specialised knowledge’.
175 PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Note by Mr J.L. Henderson (Ministry of Supply), Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda’, March 27 1941
in other wartime propaganda campaigns (figure 153), but this chapter is more concerned with increasing production for those already in industry. The war ended with large numbers of women in employment; in the Forces, in industry, in the public service and in all sorts of other occupations. In 1942, it was believed that most women would wish to return to home life, although a significant proportion did want to continue working after the war.\textsuperscript{178}

Most industrial propaganda was aimed at the entire work force, both men and women, with evidence that women were less interested in production figures.\textsuperscript{179} Campaigns directed specifically at women appear to be largely concerned with appearance, particularly the conflict between appearing fashionable and glamorous and being dressed correctly for the job. Though uniforms still had an ‘undeniable femininity’, ‘traditional notions of what it was proper for women to wear inevitably retreated in the face of the requirements of their new jobs’. Trousers and shorts, worn pre-war only for holiday or sports, were suitable for industrial work, and regularly worn,\textsuperscript{180} as illustrated in figure 154, designed in the style of a pattern book or women’s magazine article. Posters in figures 155 and 156 illustrate clothes that were perfectly acceptable to wear outside the factory, at least until the introduction of utility clothing, but totally unsuitable in factories, near running machinery.\textsuperscript{181}

Many health and safety posters were produced by the government aimed at factory workers, a campaign to which there appeared to be an infinite number of angles,\textsuperscript{182} with few ‘cross references to morale or to the war effort’. Many ROSPA posters were in a modern graphic style, including figures 138, and 157 to 159. When the causes of factory accidents were analysed, it was deemed that untidiness was the main cause, but telling workers to be more tidy was believed to be ‘about as helpful as telling a worrying woman not to worry’. The artist could, however, depict various aspects of untidiness, and explain

\textsuperscript{176} LAB 8/107, ‘Women’s organisations: recruitment of women for war work, planning campaign to commence October 13 1941’. Undated, but pre-October 1941.
\textsuperscript{177} PRO CAB 117/151, ‘From Wm. A Jowitt, Office of the Paymaster General to Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal’ October 9 1942.
\textsuperscript{178} PRO INF 1/289, ‘Wartime Social Survey Reports: Regional Surveys’, pp.10-16, noted that a minimum of 55%, a maximum 80%, wanted to continue working.
\textsuperscript{180} Calder, A., op.cit., 1969, pp.334-335.
\textsuperscript{181} Shaw, C.K. op.cit., 1944, pp.372-394, devoted an entire chapter to ‘Accidents: Safety’.
\textsuperscript{182} Briggs., A., op.cit., 2000, p.93
how tidiness improved ‘general efficiency’, for example humorously in figures 160 to 162, depicting the ‘British buffoon’.\textsuperscript{184} Shaw believed that general exhortations to avoid accidents were pointless, as it was ‘doubtful if an accident poster’ could achieve much unless it was ‘specific and confined to a definite aspect or example of accident prevention’. Being wise before the event was more important than admonitions after the event,\textsuperscript{185} as in the following specific examples, which all focused on ensuring guards were kept on eyes (figure 163), hands (figure 157), and machines in general (figures 158 and 159). In factories where there had been no recent accidents, there was no need for such propaganda, but familiarity with machinery rapidly bred contempt, and posters needed to get across to workers the risks they were running by being careless.\textsuperscript{186} There was debate as to whether humour, as in figure 158, was appropriate for such a serious subject. Shaw felt that it was ‘a useful approach to an unpleasant subject’, but that ‘grim and gruesome’ subjects, such as figure 157, ‘arrests the attention while the frivolous cartoon dispels it’.\textsuperscript{187} Keely (figure 157) and Rapier’s (figure 159) designs were modern, graphic and abstract, and may not have been appreciated by those who looked for realistic images. Any controversy, however, ensured that such images would be noticed, important to achieve the function of the message.

ROSPA was particularly concerned about accidents caused by women who failed to cover their hair. Sir Wilfred Garrett, Chief Inspector of Factories, reported in 1941 that 179 accidents had been caused by women’s hair getting entangled in moving machinery. He noted that: ‘the modern style of hairdressing does not lend itself to the hair being carefully covered, and the fluffy curl still protrudes’, as evident in figure 164, which deliberately echoed the style of Fougasse. Even after a minor ‘scalping’ accident, the same girl would be found again without a cap as she ‘preferred to have an accident rather than look a fright’. Many were putting ‘pride before safety’, and thus stressing a fashionable angle for wearing a cap, rather than how many accidents it would prevent, as attempted in figure 165, seemed key.\textsuperscript{188} Publicity was therefore ‘directed especially to this aspect of industrial safety’.\textsuperscript{189} The only solution to the problem appeared to lie in ‘persuading the fair sex that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, pp.389-390
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p.381.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Ibid., p.387.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p.376.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Anonymous, ‘Thousands of Posters Help to Win War on Accidents’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 118, No. 1,534, October 15 1942, p.56 and p.62. Bruley, S., op.cit., 1999, p.70 notes that after the First World War, new hairstyles were simpler and had more freedom of movement, indicative of a new, freer, mood.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Anonymous, Image Caption, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 122, No. 1,588, October 28 1943, p.75.
\end{itemize}
they are in the fashion if they cover their hair’, as evident in figures 166 to 169, using a
combination of stylistic techniques including photomontage, depicting ordinary, but
glamourous, women.\textsuperscript{190} As with other aspects of industry, Russian women were
‘continually held up as examples for their British sisters to emulate’, as in figure 170,\textsuperscript{191}
which ‘Russian visitors to the “Britain at War” exhibition at the House of Scientists in
Moscow were greatly pleased’ to see on display.\textsuperscript{192} Figure 171 was a locally produced
design in the series, using photographs of the ‘girls in our own works wearing the caps as
they should be worn’, accompanied by the music from an old nursery rhyme. The designer
wanted to satisfy the ‘girls’ at the works that the caps could still look ‘quite attractive’
when worn by ‘some of their own number’.\textsuperscript{193}

In the early years of the war ‘Britain relied, as usual, upon the protection of the seas and
her naval power’, with early losses a shock to public opinion.\textsuperscript{194} Heavy industry had been
hit badly by the Depression years. For example, the Tyne launched 238,000 tons of
shipping in 1913, but less than 7,000 in 1933.\textsuperscript{195} Output from shipbuilding yards needed to
be increased, and modern montage posters such as figure 172 were produced in
response.\textsuperscript{196} In May 1941, the Production Executive of the Industrial Committee was
shown designs of posters under consideration by the Admiralty to stimulate shipyard
workers. Commander Cross suggested that ‘the earliest posters should stress the Sailor’s
appreciation of the high quality of British shipbuilding’. Discussing figure 173, the
Chairman and Mr Henderson

\begin{center}
\begin{quote}
were of the opinion that Shipyard workers already possessed sufficient confidence
in their own skilled craftsmanship, and ought rather to be reminded of the urgency
of the present situation in any poster that might be issued.\textsuperscript{197}
\end{quote}
\end{center}

The Committee also considered designs by the Mines Department, to stimulate coal
production. Campaigns, such as figure 174, stressed the importance of careful use of fuel,
using statements of facts, fuel was equated with wartime products. Production, however,
was the key, and a similar comparison was made in figure 175, aimed at coal-miners.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{190} Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, p.381.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Anonymous, ‘How Government Uses Posters to Ease Strain on Transport’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 119, No. 1,547, January 14 1943, p.42.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Havinghurst, A.F., op.cit., 1985, p.293.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Anonymous, ‘“Gingering Up” the Men in the Shipyards’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 121, No. 1,579, August 26 1943, p.270.
\item \textsuperscript{197} PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda. 8\textsuperscript{th} Meeting’, May 7 1941.
\end{itemize}
National campaigns for coal production were impossible, as the psychology of the men in different pits and areas varied so widely. The government appeared to try, with a variety of styles in figures 176 to 178, including a cartoon illustrating the miners digging coal so frantically it hits Hitler as a bomb, with local campaigns also significant. The unsophisticated style of figures 119 and 120 was appropriate for local mining area campaigns. Although largely realistic, the posters incorporated modern techniques, including simplified images, the use of central figures, and montage. As with industrial campaigns, in a combination of the style in figures 135 and 172, figure 179 was produced by the Communist Party, showing a clear link between the miners and the soldiers. Despite complaints that the mining population was ageing, a cross-section of ages is shown in the mining posters, although this was potentially to tempt younger men to be recruited, rather than being representative.

Local campaigns were important, as those in industry did not want to be ‘preached’ to by those who did not understand their situation. The use of individually designed posters promoted awareness, and a feeling of pride in involvement. Figure 180 was produced by full time poster artist employed by a firm of scientific instrument manufacturers. The symbolic figure ‘ME’, ‘represents a typical worker’, consistently used in the ‘It all depends on ME’ campaign. All posters utilising the symbol attracted particular attention in the factory ‘because every worker knows that the figure is personal to his own factory; the poster therefore embodies a more personal message’. Some factories could not afford a full-time poster designer, but poster competitions were an effective means of producing potent messages, even if the design quality was not there. One Midlands firm had operated a ‘suggestion scheme’ for over forty years, using approximately 30% of the suggestions. They found that in a time of war the quality of suggestions improved and in 1941 they used over 50% of suggestions made. Figure 181 is a poster demonstrating such ‘hidden talent’, ‘drawn by a worker on his own initiative and afterwards shown to the

management’, using a cartoon style typical of *Punch*. In a competition run by the Standard Telephone Company, figure 182 illustrates the winning entry, using a gothic Germanic typeface, with figure 183, with the characters depicted reminiscent of British political cartoons, the second prize design. Stylistically, the range of posters produced both by the government, and within factories, was widely varied. Traditional paintings, cartoons, and Soviet-inspired designs, mostly espousing modern, scientific discourses, and unafraid to use political comment, were all used, although the British concentrated more on pragmatic, instructional messages. Soviet posters were issued directly by the government, unthinkable even a year before the war.

**The Reception of Industrial Posters**

On August 11 1941, there were still 22,234 vacancies for men, and 26,405 for women in the munitions industry. There were complaints that propaganda campaigns, including figures 150 to 152, had failed to recruit women. *Advertiser’s Weekly* took issue with this and claimed that the campaigns had achieved what they were meant to do, get women to attend Labour Exchanges. The failure lay with the labour exchanges which did not capitalise on this, and ‘sell the final product’. The demand for unskilled labour was still increasing, although a Treasury Sanction for a joint campaign to obtain workers had expired. The MOLNS wished the campaign to continue, although short term results were only ‘modest’, as such propaganda could not ‘be judged purely on short term results’. The MOLNS looked to increase the effectiveness of local drives, to be launched with maximum ‘punch’, containing as much ‘concrete’ and ‘informative matter’ as possible. The first job of any recruiting drive in 1942 was to clear up some of the psychological muddle engendered by the ‘contradictory propaganda with which Government and commercial advertisements between them’ had bombarded the public for the previous two years. Pelling noted that by 1942 the country’s economy was fully mobilised, with little slack that could be taken up. In June 1944, out of every nine members of the potential labour force, two were in the armed forces, three in war production, maintained for three years, more than any other country. Women were heavily influenced by feminine concerns, such as fashion. When asked why women did not respond more readily to appeals to join

---

203 Ibid., p.99.
208 Pelling, H., op.cit., 1960, p.158.
the A.T.S. appeal, one was: “It’s the horrible skirts!” ‘Contact’ was horrified, with Russian women fighting on the front line, and the enemy approaching fast, that a skirt was preventing women from taking their part in the war effort: ‘Fashion at the front and glamour in the glory’.210

The USSR was a ‘powerful stimulus’ to industry in 1942,211 and ‘Aid to Russia’ weeks were carried out in various regions in 1943, supported by posters, photographs and flags.212 Exhibitions such as ‘The USSR at War’ were popular, with visitors commenting how the images brought home to them how much the ‘Russians’ were enduring. Women were most interested in pictures of hospitals. Cartoons attracted the most attention, but were studied seriously – they did not seem to be causing any sudden grins.213 There was intense interest in the USSR involvement in the war, a ‘desire to assist’, and more demand for information about the ‘Russians’ than all the other Allies together. Copies of posters were demanded,214 with ‘Russian’ cartoons much admired in the UK and America ‘for their drive and appeal’.215 Posters were one of the brightest features in the streets of the Russian capital, and were deemed the most effective method of bringing the issues of war home to the people. USSR posters were more brutal than the British, depicting the Germans as ‘thick’ Nazi thugs, as they did not have any illusions about treatment they would receive in German hands. The British featured in only one poster, shaking hands over Berlin with USSR pilots as bombs rain down, translated for use in the UK (figure 184).216

A positive reaction was given to USSR posters reproduced for display in the UK. Soviet style posters appeared to be popular and to ‘achieve the best results’. Advertiser’s Weekly was amazed that ‘the forceful and elemental proletarian technique of the Soviet should bring such an astonishing response from factory workers’, and found it ‘an interesting guide to the wage-earners’ psychology.217 Milner described them as ‘brilliantly clever’,

209 Ibid., p.159.

163
and called for them to be widely circulated in the country. He believed that British artists could learn from them, and it was not too late to ‘start training our puerile propagandists in the real art of poster propaganda’. The British efforts in industry contrasted unfavourably with the Soviet 100% effort, and the American organisational drives. American examples of propaganda do not appear to have made the impact that Soviet propaganda did, and a ‘considerable body of the public’ regarded ‘Russian propaganda as a model which this country should follow more closely’. Managers and men alike were said to emphasise that appeals to workers for greater productivity were frequently ineffectual because of perceived ‘all round mismanagement’. It was suggested that a more positive kind of propaganda might counter stories of muddle and inefficiency. As the USSR did, the British planned to give wide publicity to particularly good pieces of work, as much as security would allow. Figures 127 and 170 illustrate how ‘Russian soldiers and citizens were constantly held up as embodiments of various wartime virtues’. Even ‘in posters in which no reference was made to the Soviet Union there was injected more than a dash of heroic soviet realism’. This is evident in figures 123, 124 and 151, which all show signs of the Soviet influence. Shaw spoke positively of figure 124, where ‘the impressive absence of wording’ and lack of ‘verbose exhortations’, combined with a sky full for aeroplanes, gave the poster most of its appeal. The poster stood out from other cluttered designs, and was ‘widely circulated in the early stages of the war, when it was realised that the end of the war would depend ultimately upon air power’. Figure 170 was regarded as a ‘masterpiece of achievement’, as it ‘was brought out at a time when it was fashionable to do everything that they did in Russia’. Once it was ‘realised that the Russian girl in the factory tied up her hair, there was then no need for any further argument, or for stricter factory rules bearing on the matter’.

Both figures 129 and 131, produced by the Communist Party, called for the lifting of the ban on the *Daily Worker*, suppressed, along with other communist publications, between January 1941 and August 1943. The MOI protested, as it deemed that communist publications were ‘entitled to as much freedom as other sections of the press’ with regard

---

221 Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, p.43.
222 Ibid., p.106.
to expressed opinion.224 The government recognised that in appealing to a diverse audience, there was a need to use propaganda that supported the Soviets. They believed that the ‘Russians are realists and they know that any assistance they get from Great Britain is due to the existence of the Capitalistic system’.225 The MOI refused to issue posters to Communist Party influenced groups, for fear that they would be seen to have government sanction. By 1944, the anonymous author of this memorandum is calling against such discrimination as he believed that however government propaganda was disseminated, it was achieving the government purpose, and the government could otherwise justly be accused of unfair discrimination.226

Despite posters aimed at the miners, production of coal declined from 231 million tons in 1939 to 183 million tons in 1945, and absenteeism showed a ‘marked increase’, with average output per manshift falling by about 10%.227 Fuel was never rationed in the Second World War, but propaganda was successful in reducing consumption by voluntary economy,228 although miners’ strikes had an adverse effect on fuel economy campaigns, with a peak of 2.5 million working days lost in 1944.229 The public wanted to know why they should bother conserving fuel, when miners were continually on strike. They believed that if the ‘fuel economy really mattered, something would be done about the stoppage at the mines’.230 Complaints came not only from those affected by fuel shortages, but especially from those with relatives in the forces. There was a feeling that whilst their grievances might be genuine, timing was not good with the second front imminent.231 The Times criticised excessive concerns about the future in industrial concerns, they felt that ‘the war and production for the war are surely all that matters for the present’.232 The miner may have been isolated by the circumstances of his industry, but there was no reason to think that he was any less patriotic than the rest of the nation,233 and production increased considerably in the two weeks following the production of figure 119.234

---

224 Ibid., p.186.
226 Ibid., ‘Letter to Mr Dowden: Co-operation with Communist Organisations’, 1944.
228 Pelling, H., op.cit., 1960, p.158.
231 Ibid., p.295.
233 Court, W.H.B., op.cit., 1951, p.27.
When it was recognised that difficulties in production could be resolved by propaganda the Production Executive of the Industrial Publicity Committee swung into action. Published figures of production were believed to have led to complacency in the factories, leading to apathy with no fear of crisis. There was recognised to be a need for a ‘consistent set of statistics which both congratulates people and makes them realise the need for continued work’. The chief function of the MOI was expected to be information, not exhortations, which were ‘generally resented’, although a back-patting campaign, ‘free from patronage’ was desirable. Exhortations to hard work and sacrifice, such as the ‘Go to It’ campaign (figure 49) had produced as much as they could, and needed to be relaxed, so that if needed later in the war, they would still be effective. ‘Skilful advertising’ had made the ‘Go to it’ phrase famous, and impressed it ‘upon the nation’s consciousness’ through such large posters. Advertisers showed their approval by parodying the phrase within commercial advertisements. Surrey Brook, however, questioned what the ‘cryptic words’ ‘Go to it’ meant, deeming them ‘futile, meaningless, and costly’, a ‘mystery’, and uninformative, whilst ‘What is it?’ was scrawled on posters. Prior to the campaign being released, John Rodgers, a propagandist, complained that the campaign would be futile, a waste of taxpayers money, as taken from the original context of the speech, the slogan would be meaningless. Other advertising men criticised the slogan as ‘weak’, ‘uninspiring and uninspired’, ‘lacking in force and salesmanship’, but the Americans, considered the masters in the art of the slogan, approved, as they believed that if the British put their minds to something they really go for it. The Ministry of Supply, releasing a similar poster ‘Keep At It’ (figure 185), praised ‘managements and workers alike’ for having ‘Gone to it’ without sparing themselves. Workers had shown themselves ‘fully worthy of our armed forces and of the cause for which we fight’, with ‘resolution and staying power’ which had ‘daunted our enemies and encouraged our friends’.

235 PRO CAB 21/1562, ‘Production Executive: Industrial Publicity’, [unknown date].
236 PRO INF 1/252, ‘Planning Committee: Miscellaneous Papers’, August 1940, p.77.
240 PRO INF 1/857, ‘Parliamentary Debates. Mr White, MP (Birkenhead East)’, July 3 1941, p.1561.
242 Anonymous, ‘If you don’t like “Go to it!”’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 109, No. 1,416, July 11 1940, p.22.
were worried that continual calls for effort were problematic in the long run, as the normal human mind was not ‘attuned to peak-to-peak effort’. A ‘steady optimum’ was preferable, as otherwise each ‘peak of furious endeavour’ was followed by a ‘plateau’, leading to increased absenteeism. Repeated propaganda campaigns stressing the importance of time-keeping and individual effort, such as figure 186, which focused ‘attention immediately upon the ten black minutes that are sometimes wasted every day in factories of every denomination and size’. Figure 121 became one of the most famous posters of the war, earning ‘widespread application as the symbol of the importance of the individual unit to the combined effort of the whole’. Writing in 1944, Shaw felt that the importance and function of each individual work in relation to the whole, ‘could not be better expressed than by the now familiar link in the chain analogy which applies without exception to every form of industrial activity’. The concept expressed in the poster was so successful, that it was applied to other posters, replacing the female with a male worker, illustrating John Bull linking up the USA and the USSR, and equating management with male and female workers and a symbolic ‘ME’.

The technical diagram in figure 149 was held to be an ‘excellent example of the type of poster which gives technical information in a simple and direct manner’. Aimed specifically at the worker who ‘may be engaged upon a comparatively small part of the engine or air frame’, but is anxious to know more about the completed aircraft. Shaw noted that such posters were a ‘delight to anyone who ha[d] a thirst for knowledge’, giving concise details of a modern aeroplane. Such drawings could only ‘be prepared only by experts of the highest skill, and the most profitable method of producing such a poster is to get permission to use one of the many drawings available through the technical press’. After seeing the collection of images in figure 146 Shaw felt there could be ‘no doubt in any worker’s mind about the importance of his own job’. In figure 145, widely used in factories making ropes and cables, Shaw shows that there was still room for the ‘beautiful’ and ‘aesthetic’ in industrial posters, despite the ‘apparently lifeless and uninteresting article’ that was featured in the poster. Hempen rope needed to be ‘charged with romantic vigour in the minds of the workers’, which Shaw believed had been achieved. In such

244 M-O, op.cit., 1942, p.55.
245 Ibid., 1942, pp.196-197.
246 Shaw, C.K., op.cit., p.85
247 Ibid., p.340.
248 Ibid., p.70.
249 Ibid., p.29 and p.142.
trades, where the atmosphere allows little space for beauty or refinement, beautiful posters would be particularly successful, by virtue of the contrast to their surroundings.\textsuperscript{250}

The use of ROSPA by the government ensured that leaflets and other publicity material about accidents were no longer out of date, but M-O considered that ‘the actual propaganda material is still largely amateur and old-fashioned’.\textsuperscript{251} On the general question of effective publicity the Production Committee was unanimous in believing that publicity should be conducted as far as possible on a local basis.\textsuperscript{252} Some local posters were so successful that they became national. The factory employing the worker who designed the safety poster in figure 181 were so pleased with the design that they not only printed the poster, they issued copies to other firms and government departments for wider distribution.\textsuperscript{253} The Minister of Labour was asked in the House of Commons whether industrial propaganda was being checked for effectiveness, whether it was stimulating production, or checking absenteeism. Bevin responded that he was aware of the ‘regard’ paid to such propaganda, and that the effectiveness of such methods, and the possibility of further extension throughout the war industries, was ‘under constant review by a committee set up for that purpose’.\textsuperscript{254} M-O considered that whatever was being done with propaganda inside industry, it had to be set against the ‘total propaganda of events’, which would ‘relate each and every individual to the total effort’.\textsuperscript{255}

Industrial relations in wartime were heavily influenced by the interwar years. Bevin’s position of power was significant, his interwar experiences allowed him to claim to be ‘one of the people’, and thus more in tune with industrial workers than others may have been. The miners were key figures in interwar industrial discourses, but within the Second World War, the propaganda focus was largely on the factory effort, clean, modern factories, rather than dirty smokestacks. Within a campaign dealing with the industrial effort, the propagandists were unafraid to use modern stylistic techniques, including photography, appropriate for a modern campaign, although other styles, including cartoons and realistic drawings, were also used. Several propaganda techniques were clearly at play: testimonials were provided by those who would benefit from the parts provided; ‘card-stacking’ was

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p.29.
\textsuperscript{251} M-O, op.cit., 1942, p.209. They did not specify why they deemed the material ‘amateur and old-fashioned’.
\textsuperscript{252} PRO CAB 21/156, ‘Production Executive, Industrial Propaganda. 7\textsuperscript{th} Meeting’, April 23 1941.
\textsuperscript{253} Shaw, C.K., op.cit., 1944, p.99.
\textsuperscript{254} 378 H.C. DEB. 5s, March 24 1942, Col 1825.
evident as the worst case-scenario for lack of parts was presented (figure 144); ‘name-calling’ was applied to poor effort; and all were called to jump on the ‘band-wagon’, as everyone else was doing their bit, and so should they. Most evident was the transfer of authority from the Soviet effort to the British effort, as the British were called to emulate their Soviet comrades. Anglo-Soviet relations were key, played on in style and subject, often to great effect, although the emphasis was always on ‘Russians’ rather than on Soviets or Communism. The Soviet style is evident in figure 187, for a nation that needed a fit, productive workforce, working to full capacity, whatever the gender. Throughout this chapter we have seen the significance of the civilian effort, within the ‘People’s War’, both the individual and the team effort were key, specifically within the mechanised mass industry. In the next chapter this theme continues, with every individual needing to ensure the future of the nation by being aware of the ‘enemy within’.

Chapter 6: The ‘Enemy Within’

The dangers of carelessness were a constant theme throughout wartime posters: the dangers of throwing away unlit cigarettes (figure 188); thoughtless fuel consumption (figure 189); and wastage of scarce goods (figure 190). The biggest campaign, however, addressed in many different ways and styles throughout the war by the government, was the campaign against rumour and ‘careless talk’. Although a phrase largely associated with the Cold War and thereafter applied to more recent events, particularly terrorist campaigns, this chapter focuses on the idea of the ‘enemy within’. The concept is clearly evident in government careless talk and anti-rumour campaigns which ran throughout the war, with strong fears of a ‘Fifth Column’ to be fought by a ‘Silent Column’. This chapter discusses a range of discourses which underlay the ‘careless talk’ posters, including: carelessness, ‘the other’, ‘the enemy’, visibility, psychology, education, citizenship, family, nation, protectionism, friendship, personal responsibility, and death and humour.

As we have seen with the previous two case studies, a wide range of stylistic techniques was used in the ‘careless talk’ campaigns.

The Context and Planning of ‘Enemy Within’ Poster Campaign

Duff Cooper of the Ministry of Information (MOI) defined three types of ‘careless talk’ that were of danger. Each had different consequences, although all could damage the war effort. He considered the most dangerous ‘the talk that is depressing’. Cooper believed that:

Those who spread gloom and despondency do definite harm; they are hurting the cause; they are delaying the victory. They are enemies; unintentional enemies probably – but enemies of our side.

Other problems were the spreading of rumours: ‘false information which may hinder ourselves’, and, more obviously, the danger of passing on ‘true information’ that was of

---


value to the enemy, which could prolong the war, whether intentionally as a spy, or unintentionally in the course of conversation. 3 Whether directly visible or not, the existence of ‘the other’ was assumed to be a fact, something that needed to be fought.

Fears of the enemy drew on longstanding discourses about spies - ‘person sent secretly’ into enemy territory, ‘to inspect his works, ascertain his strength, movements, or designs, and to communicate such intelligence’. 4 Boyle (and Knightley) describe espionage as ‘the second-oldest and arguably the least honourable of the professions’, with a long history. 5 Spies can variously be described as eavesdroppers, peepers, inside man, shadows, observers, and go-betweens. 6 Spies were defined as a threat to the nation, but the government needed to make it appear that espionage was under control. 7 Surrounded in mystique, the secret world of intelligence, and the very nature of espionage make it a difficult subject to research at the best of times, with a further layer of secrecy added in wartime. 8 It arguably would have been useless to address spies or their go-betweens through posters. Therefore posters needed to focus on those who could aid spies in their information gathering campaigns by talking ‘carelessly’.

Many spy stereotypes were based upon spy fiction, popular from the 1880s onwards, several of which were transferred to film in the 1930s, to popular acclaim. 9 Reflecting the time in which it was written, between 1880 and 1920, the ‘enemy outside’ theme in spy

---


7 Look for example, at Farnsworth, E. interviews Rosenblatt, R.: “Online NewsHour: The Dreyfus Affair”, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/essays/january98/rosenblatt_1-13.html, written January 13 1998, accessed January 3 2004, the Dreyfus Affair of 1898 in France. This was discussed one-hundred years after Emile Zola wrote his later famous ‘J’accuse’ which brought the case to public attention. Zola wrote to the President of France to complain about the imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus for treason, on the basis of shaky evidence. Dreyfus, a Jewish Alsatian with possible access to the appropriate material, was accused, tried, striped of his military honours and incarcerated on the basis of a handwritten note that was falsely believed to be in his handwriting. Despite the real culprit being discovered two years later, the army covered up, more concerned with their image than justice. See Zola, E., Pages, A. (ed.), Leviux, E. (Translator), The Dreyfus Affair: “J’accuse” and Other Writings, 1996 for original texts.


thrillers concurrently served to facilitate the transition from the assertive, confident, and expansionist themes of adventure fiction to the increasingly insular, even paranoid, espionage genre that stressed vigilance and protection against invasion. From the Edwardian era spy thrillers focused on a battle between good and evil, with an emphasis on action and adventure, in British schoolboy adventure style. In the spy thriller the hero is a competitive individual, fighting against a conspiracy which threatens both the hero and the values he (sic) stands for. Usually set against an international political context, plots focus on betrayal, disguise and double-cross. William Le Queux, amateur spy and popular novelist, was popular either side of the First World War. His spies were obsessed with fast automobiles, gave themselves away by swearing in German, worked in telecommunications or the barbers shop, and were heavy drinkers.

Le Queux’s spies were always German, following earlier traditions, including *The Spies of Wight* (1899) by Headon Hill, which revolved ‘around the sinister machinations of German spies against Britain’, the first of a spate of fictional anticipations of a future Anglo-German war. Erskine Childers ‘famous yarn’ *The Riddle of the Sands* (1903) soon followed, where heroes Carruthers and Davies expose German plans. The German nation was constructed as one of Prussian militarism, and by the mid-1900s, Germany was the principle threat to the British, involved in a race for naval supremacy. The enmity engendered by this ship-building race was exacerbated by the Northcliffe press, stirring up anti-German feeling among their readers, which warned that there was a ‘secret army’ of trained German soldiers in the UK. Employed as waiters, tailors, etc., this ‘army’ would be ‘ready to act when the German army, guarded by its fleet, fell on British shores’. Anti-

---

Lady Vanishes, The Return of Bulldog Drummond, Bulldog Drummond at Bay, Sexton Blake and the Hooded Terror, Q-Planes and The Four Just Men.


172
German feeling was evidenced in several clear ways. Daschunds were mistreated, and the German Shepherd Dog was renamed the Alsatian, because of their German connections. In 1915 The Royal Family replaced the German-sounding title Saxe-Coburg-Gotha with that of Anglo-Saxon Windsor.

Intelligence collecting activities were common for all nations by the outbreak of the Second World War. Le Queux is credited with helping to create the ‘spy fever’ that led to the formation of the British intelligence service. In March 1906 the London Daily Mail began serialising Le Queux’s *The Invasion of 1910*, a plot with a successful German invasion of Britain, then converted into a play that ran for eighteen months. In 1909, Le Queux published *Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England*. Despite a lack of real evidence, an enthusiastic public responded with their own stories of spies and Germans misbehaving in the UK, information which was passed onto the government. In February 1915, Le Queux’s *German Spies in England: An Exposure* was published, which fabricated a system of German espionage that ranged from German prostitutes around Piccadilly Circus to ‘naturalised’ businessmen of the highest social standing. This could all have been dismissed as ‘harmless nonsense’, but it influenced Haldane’s subcommittee planning the UK’s secret service. Haldane recommended defence plans to protect vital installations against sabotage, the tightening of the Official Secrets Act, and the establishment of a regular secret service bureau. When war broke out in 1914, only twenty-one German spies were arrested, rather than the thousands of Le Queux’s

---

21 Ibid., pp.11-24.
26 Spartacus Schoolnet, ‘Military Intelligence: MI5’, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWm5.htm, accessed January 3 2004, noted that foreigners were collecting information about Britain’s ships, factories and harbours, but this was not illegal until the Official Secrets Act was changed.
imagination.

Intelligence operations continued in the interwar years, but a spy’s chance of surviving was higher if they were at the ‘upper end of the political and social spectrum’. English spies were deemed men of honour, but heavy sentences imposed by the British were a deterrent to other spies, who were characterised as ‘social misfits, criminals, adventurers, vagabonds, romantics’.

Until the Second World War, due to a long tradition of civil liberties, British citizens carried no official means of identification, unlike most countries in Europe. Character references from a self-nominated person are usually considered adequate for a job, and ‘too close an inquiry into anyone’s personal affairs… is resented’. Much of the Civil Service was like a club: ‘entry to it automatically meant that you were assumed to be totally loyal and the most important virtue was keeping the club together’. In October 1939 John King, a cypher clerk in the Foreign Office, was arrested and convicted of passing information to the Soviet government. Knightley commented that the notion that ‘the threat might come from within never occurred to anyone until the King case’, although it was believed to be so out of the ordinary that attitudes still did not change. There was shock that the upper middle class could betray their country. King was believed to have given into financial temptation: it was not believed that he could be ‘ideologically inspired’. Churchill, however, is described by Stafford as having an ‘exaggerated obsession with German spies before the First World War, fed by a xenophobic MI5’. His ‘widely shared obsession with an internal Fifth Column’ saw him ‘opt for a drastic curtailment of civil liberties unwarranted by the evidence.’

The British certainly put out their own spies and saboteurs, both men and women, and would expect the Germans to do the same in case of

---

30 Ibid., p.41.
31 Ibid., p.179. Longmate, N., How We Lived Then: A History of Everyday Life During the Second World War, 1979, p.97: On September 29 1939, a National Registration Census compiled details of every citizen, and this was followed by the issue of a National Identity Card, expected to be carried at all times.
34 There is extensive literature on the Special Operations Executive (SOE), particularly heroic narratives: West, N., Counterfeit Spies: Genuine or Bogus? An Astonishing Investigation into Secret Agents of the
Part of the challenge was to present the German spies as ‘evil’, whilst presenting British espionage activities, when acknowledged, as positive.

The Spanish Civil War had given rise to the expression ‘fifth column’: ‘a subversive group that supports the enemy and engages in espionage or sabotage; an enemy in your midst’. Nationalist General Emilio Mola, explaining to the Press in October 1936 how he was going to take Madrid, said that ‘he would attack with four columns stationed outside the capital, and a fifth stationed within, by which he meant the sympathisers trapped behind enemy lines’. Since then the term ‘fifth column’, ‘torn from its forgotten context’, has described the activities of various spies, saboteurs and terrorists, who support aggressors in attacked countries. A characteristic of the ‘fifth column’ is ‘to apply falsehood and provocation, and to recruit traitors and renegades among the military and civilians of attacked countries’. The idea was not entirely new, in Homer’s Iliad, the Greeks gave a giant wooden horse to their foes, the Trojans, ostensibly as a peace offering’. However, once the horse was inside the city walls, ‘soldiers sneaked out of the horse’s hollow belly and open the city gates, allowing their compatriots to pour in and capture Troy’. The Trojan Horse hid spies in preparation for attack, a fifth column was largely reliant on friendly natives.
Many of those in the highest circles took it for granted that a fifth column existed. Churchill spoke of ‘this malignancy in our midst’ in his Dunkirk speech ‘as though it were a well known fact of important dimensions’. Scare stories in the press appeared. The Sunday Express claimed in January 1940 that Germans living in the UK were blackmailed into spying, with their families threatened. The British were told that their job was to be actively looking for and reporting fifth columnists. The collapse of Britain’s allies in 1940 was believed to be partly the result to infiltration by fifth column, with enemy agents penetrating the system, and traitors sympathetic to Germany involved. There were fears that the same would happen in the UK, fears fuelled by the press. Knightley described the ‘Fifth Column’ as a myth created by British ‘spy masters’ to explain its own intelligence failures. McLaine claimed that the MOI blamed the collapse of many European nations on a fifth column as it ‘shielded the believer from the unpalatable fact that the Germans had won because of superior tactics and greater strength’.

In the summer of 1940 there was widespread internment. Churchill had urged his Cabinet that British Communists, fascists and aliens ‘should be put in protective or preventative internment, including the leaders’. Internment was not new in the Second World War. In the nineteenth century, there were larger movements of populations, immigration rose, and along with that rose a fear of aliens. Refugees from Czarist persecution, Russian and Polish Jews, trickled into England after 1875. There was an illusory fear that they were in competition with British workmen for jobs, and legislation followed: the Aliens Act of 1905, which set the precedent for future immigration laws in the UK. Although this was unique legislation, the Jews were not the first to attract hostility from the British. Thousands of Irish arrived in the UK, particularly in the early nineteenth century, and became associated with poverty, squalor and ignorance. Discrimination was caused by

---

44 Childs, D., Britain Since 1939: Progress and Decline, 1995, p.47.
46 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.75.

176
fears of pressure on work, housing, and social status, and was applied to the Irish in their
time, and the Jews in their time.\(^{49}\) In wartime, others became the targets for discrimination,
not because of social conditions, but for fears of the ‘enemy within’. In the First World
War, 30,000 foreigners were interned, but chaos and suffering ensued. In 1939, the
government announced that the action would not be repeated.\(^{50}\)

In September 1939 there were approximately 60,000 German and Austrian refugees in the
UK, as well as 15-20,000 nationals living in UK before the war. Those who were pro-Nazi
were quickly interned, with the rest classified by special tribunals: ‘Category A were
deemed the most suspect and also interned, B were restricted in their movements, and C
were left alone’.\(^{51}\) As the government ‘lacked both the time and the machinery for
effectively discriminating’, a policy of ‘intern the lot’ soon followed.\(^{52}\) On 10 May 1940,
after German attacks on the Low Countries and France, all male aliens living in coastal
areas liable to invasion were immediately interned. Within the next week all B class aliens,
many refugees from the Nazis, were rounded up and taken to the Isle of Man.\(^{53}\) On May 22
1940, Defence Regulation 18B was passed, giving the Home Secretary ‘the right to
imprison anybody he believed likely to endanger the safety of the realm’. A ‘good number’
were imprisoned under this Act.\(^{54}\) In June 1940, Italy entered the war, so all Italians were
rounded up. By late June 1940, C class alien males under 70 were also interned, and all
others had heavily restricted movements.\(^{55}\) The conditions of internment varied from
‘inconvenient’ to ‘atrocious’,\(^ {56}\) and when the Arandora Star carrying deportees was
torpedoed on 2 July 1940 by a German submarine, public outcry was caused, and the
policy was changed.\(^{57}\)

Before the war, many thousands of refugees from Nazi oppression had been given asylum
in England, and it was believed that this ‘influx might, in part, have been used by the

\(^{50}\) Gillman, P., and Gillman, L., “Collar the lot!”: How Britain Interned and Expelled its Wartime Refugees,
1983, p.5.
of internment in the Second World War, and Cesarani, D., and Kushner, T. (eds), The Internment of Aliens in
Twentieth Century Britain, 1993 for a more general history of British internment.
\(^{54}\) Calder, A., op.cit., 1969, p.133.
\(^{56}\) McGuffin, J., ‘English Internment 1916-1945’,
Germans as a sort of Trojan Horse’. In the Second World War the Nazis expected the British to follow similar, successful, counter-intelligence tactics as they had in the First World War. The Nazis planned a scheme to succeed despite such measures, with two spy layers, one ‘not too well hidden’, to be deliberately sacrificed to London counter-intelligence, whilst the second ‘deeply buried, would lie concealed until the authorities were relaxed, and then go quietly into operation’. Initially they believed that all had gone as anticipated, but the second layer was swiftly swept up, and some 35 key agents and 400 sub-agents were apprehended within the first forty-eight hours of war. Fleming, Longmate and Orwell give examples of how German spies were discovered, mostly through elementary errors: lack of the English language; lack of knowledge of pub laws; strong foreign accents; writing 7 with a stroke through it, and carrying German sausages. Knightley disagrees that all were found, and claimed that there was evidence for at least one who survived.

Traditionally the British feared seaborne invasion, but technology had improved and the ‘airborne bogey’ became feared. By July 1940, unproven parachutist landings were so widely reported that an official denial was deemed necessary. Technology had changed the way wars were fought, with the wireless transmitter, the aeroplane and the ‘trained parachutist’, greatly reinforcing the potential for a traitor, and allowing more opportunities for sabotage. The importance of communications was more evident in the Second World War than in any previous war. Rather than risk stealing documents, it was often safer and more profitable for the spy to keep his ears and eyes open. Fragments of information could be collated quickly into a meaningful whole (figure 191):

Troop and ship movements, the position of power stations and munition plants, the state of public morale … plenty of data useful to the enemy can be pieced together from a few scraps of gossip, innocent in themselves but fatal in bulk.

58 Ibid., p.55.
62 Fleming, P., op.cit., 1958, p.49. Bennett, R., op.cit., p.xv notes that the revolution in intelligence began in December 1901, when Marconi demonstrated that wireless communication could work over long distances, providing immediate transmission.
By 1939 71% of the population held radio licences, and various underground radio stations existed to undermine the war effort. The most famous ‘Fifth Columnist’ was probably William Joyce who appropriated the title ‘Lord Haw Haw’. He caused anxieties for British officials who worried how many were listening to him, particularly with stories of his accuracy regarding, for example, stopped clocks.

When not all the facts can be published, it is natural that people will try and guess. During the first few months of war, particularly the first few days, rumours were rife. Rumours included exaggerated numbers who died in bombings, the lack of wood resultant from the number of coffins made in preparation, and on bombings that were believed to have been hushed-up. Urging others not to spread rumours became a popular occupation as ‘[n]ewspapers harangued their readers, clergy their congregations, headmasters their pupils’. The public was told not to believe or spread rumours, to double check orders, to keep watch and report suspicious activity to the Police. They were, however, also warned not to be over-suspicious, wasting Police time, as many foreigners hated Hitler. Spies were a popular topic for discussion and rumour. With the era of ‘false whiskers and secret rays’ over, the successful spy could be ‘masquerading as a pedlar, a domestic servant, a journalist, or a commercial traveller’. Balfour describes the difference between careless talk and rumour mongering, with the latter implying an element of falsity, the first only dangerous if true. The speaker either does not realise that the matter talked about could help the enemy, or wishes to appear ‘better informed and thus more important than the next man’. Anyone with a more sinister motive was ‘unlikely to be checked by official publicity’.

---

information could be sent from source to Berlin. Despite the commercial success of the film in Britain, there were difficulties in exporting the film to America, as the British soldiers in the film appeared stupid, careless and inept, guaranteed to increase the fears of American mothers, whose sons would die because of British incompetence.

67 Henderson, D., ‘The Alleged British ‘Fifth Column’ – Scotland’, op.cit. Radio Caledonia was a ‘black propaganda’ radio station that ran from July 1940 to August 1942. It was set up by the German Foreign Ministry to support a possible Scottish Fifth Column, and purported to report from within Scotland. See Bergmeier, H.J.P., and Lotz, R.E., Hitler’s Airwaves: The Inside Story of Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda, 1997 for more information on Nazi inside propaganda.
68 See Doherty, M., op.cit., 2000, for detailed coverage of this subject.
70 Longmate, N., op.cit., 1971, p.95.
71 PRO INF 1/257, ‘Efforts to combat defeatism and Fifth Column activities’, 1940.
72 M-O T/C 42 3-C, The Star, February 10 1940.
In the winter of 1941, the Cabinet raised subject of the dangers of rumour. Home Intelligence (HI) felt that rumour and gossip were to some extent a healthy system of society, aiding the relief of anxiety. Rumours were useful pointers as to what was worrying people, and the best way to deal with them was to find publishable information which would make the rumours less convincing and sinister. A careful watch was kept on rumours and steps were taken to make sure that explanations or denials were either put out through newspapers, or counter-rumours were circulated. The MOI recognised the need to give the public more facts and news to stop them fabricating their own news, but were frustrated that the government would not act. Mass-Observation (M-O) investigated this later in the war, in 1944, and found that a lack of information was not a major gripe any more as people did not feel that any major issues were being concealed except those necessary for security measures.

A problem arose when rumour or gossip became, or appeared to become, defeatism: it is a British habit to make jocular remarks and facetious remarks which, if reported secondhand or taken at their face value without an exact record of the actual tone in which they were made, might often seem subversive or defeatist.

Following Regulation 18B, some were prosecuted for defeatist talk, although it was agreed that ‘prosecutions should only be made in a few glaring cases, to which as much publicity as possible should be given so that they could act as a warning’. In a war fought to protect freedom democracy against a totalitarian state, care needed to be taken with prosecutions. Prosecution could arouse hostile feelings, although:

---

73 Balfour, M., Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, 1979, p.191.
74 Ibid.
75 PRO INF 1/76, ‘Letter to Parliamentary Secretary from Dr Taylor, Home Intelligence Division’, March 31 1944, p.216.
76 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.79.
79 PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee - agenda and minutes’, July 17 1940, p.42. Weale, A., op.cit., 1994, p.33 note that in the spring of 1940, in the hysteria that surrounded invasion scares, two prosecutions were made (a civil servant in Mansfield and a Birmingham businessman) concerning rumours about Lord Haw-Haw.
People do not resent restriction in wartime, so long as they know where they are and what it all means, and so long as the basic elements of freedom do not appear to be overwhelmingly involved.\textsuperscript{80}

The prosecutions for defeatist talk were themselves a topic of conversation, as many had been affected by rumours, fears and criticisms. There was ‘a growing feeling’ that too many campaigns took ‘the form of unconstructive prohibitions’, too many do nots: don’t talk; don’t listen.\textsuperscript{81} The poster ‘If you must talk, talk victory’ (figure 192), using dynamic typography, tried to be more positive, and, at the same time, people were told that they could grumble.\textsuperscript{82}

The ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ campaign that started in early 1940 was ‘aimed at preventing the exchange of information of possible value to the enemy rather than preventing the spreading of supposedly depressing stories’.\textsuperscript{83} The campaign was focused on ‘the gossip who likes to talk big and air his knowledge’. According to the authorities, women were not the worst offenders in this respect.\textsuperscript{84} The talker who ‘deliberately shows off is perhaps the less dangerous of the two types’ as they ‘talk a lot of nonsense to which the enemy is more than welcome’. The modest man was more dangerous as:

he may find it hard to believe that such as he can know anything about matters; or he may give truthful answers to indiscreet questions merely because he is anxious not to show off with any claim to specialist knowledge.\textsuperscript{85}

Valuable information could be given away by ‘casually mentioning that John Smith rejoins his regiment on Saturday afternoon or that Mary Jones can’t get home for lunch because the shadow factory where she works has recently moved to ---’.\textsuperscript{86} The government believed people needed to be made to realise that they did have information of value to the enemy. A 55-year old female questioned by M-O claimed: ‘I think it’s ridiculous what does anyone know that they have to keep secret? It’s only Government officials that can give anything away.’\textsuperscript{87} Some of those questioned felt that the examples of bad talk given were

\textsuperscript{80} M-O FR 286, ‘Prediction, restriction and jurisdiction: Enemy propaganda, control of rumour, restriction of civilian activity and reaction of public to new military-civil courts’, July 1940, p.28.
\textsuperscript{81} PRO INF 1/264, ‘Morale - summaries of daily reports’, July 26 1940, p.82.
\textsuperscript{82} PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee - agenda and minutes’ July 15 1940, p.39.
\textsuperscript{83} McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.82.
\textsuperscript{84} M-O T/C 42 3-C, \textit{The Star}, February 10 1940.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{The Times}, February 7 1940, p.7.
\textsuperscript{86} M-O T/C 42 3-C, \textit{The Star}, February 10, 1940.
\textsuperscript{87} M-O FR 442, ‘Slogan: ’Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’": Reactions’, October 1940.
so vague that they might have said such things at any time, and thus it would be ‘exceedingly difficult to avoid saying such things’.  

In 1942, a new campaign was issued by the MOI, for the attention of all ranks. Having covered public house talk, wayside conversations with strangers, and ‘harmless chat’ with friends when on leave, the government believed they had identified ‘the major problem’ at last. The campaign was to make a direct appeal along the lines of ‘Cherchez la femme’, as a reminder that ‘when in the company of a beautiful woman, remember that beauty may conceal brains’. Service personnel seemed particularly ready to disclose their station and line of work. People did not regard comments made about local military events to people they trust, for example down the pub, as ‘careless talk’, although people did not appear to need to know the person. Writing to Advertiser’s Weekly, a reader claimed that in a pub where he was a ‘complete stranger’ he had:

been informed by a garrulous Home Guard N.C.O. of the training, numbers and armament of the local Home Guard and of the exact location of the important and secret military headquarters in the district.

Police stations and military headquarters were inundated with reports of suspicious activities, although this was not proof that there was a problem, just evidence that ‘spy fever’ had gripped the country. M-O collected a number of ‘overheards’ during the week of March 15 1943, of which several referred to careless talk. There were examples of people volunteering information, enough to establish where a large camp was stationed. A young female noted that she had heard workers on the bus talking about the output of their factories. The bus conductress had said ‘Hush, careless talk’, but one of them replied ‘What does it matter? The Germans can find out if they want to’. Attempts to find examples of where careless talk had actually cost lives proved in vain. Having embarked on publicity against rumour and careless talk, the MOI could not stop it without creating impression that it did not matter. In June 1941 ‘it had been agreed that there was little evidence of careless talk and less evidence that it was being put to good use by the enemy’.

---

91 Reader’s Letter from ‘L.B.’, Picture Post, June 7 1941, p.5.
93 M-O FR 1630, ‘Various indirects collected during the week of 15 March 1943: Reports of informal conversations on Russia, General Giraud and General de Caudille, careless talk in hairdressers’ shops’, March 22 1943.
It was suggested, however, ‘that it would be as well to continue for the present the inexpensive propaganda on specialised lines that was already being done’.\footnote{PRO INF 1/73, ‘Minutes of the meetings of the Executive Board’, 27 June 1941, p.87.}

At the end of July 1940, the Planning Committee agreed that ‘the Anti-Rumour campaign should not be abandoned’, although all reference to the ‘silent column’ was to be abandoned. The campaign was also to ‘revert to its original form in concentrating on gossip rather than rumour’.\footnote{PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee - agenda and minutes’, July 23 1940, p.49.} From early July 1940, the ‘Silent Column’ campaign, devised by Crawfords, had run, largely in the Press,\footnote{Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.190.} supported by a poster campaign, the result of a direct order from Churchill.\footnote{McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.81-82.} The idea was that keeping silent was the best way of countering the ‘Fifth Column’.\footnote{Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.190.} The Silent Campaign showed ‘photographs of typical but dangerous British citizens’, (figure 193) who were to be rebuked and told to: ‘Join Britain’s Silent Column – the great body of sensible men and women who have pledged themselves not to talk rumour and gossip and to stop others doing it.’\footnote{Calder, A., op.cit., 1969, p.136.} The Silent Column had been the latest in a series of campaigns ‘based on the assumption that the best way of controlling rumour, etc. is by urging people not to talk about things’. No attempt had been ‘made to deal with the subject constructively or positively’.\footnote{M-O FR 286, ‘Prediction, restriction and jurisdiction: Enemy propaganda, control of rumour, restriction of civilian activity and reaction of public to new military-civil courts’, July 1940, pp.11-12.} Sir Kenneth Clark wanted people to be given more information, and propaganda campaigns to concentrate on the ‘positive contribution’ citizens were making ‘to the defence of the country’ rather than ‘passively refraining from something which would hinder it’.\footnote{PRO INF 1/849, ‘Ministry of Information Policy committee: minutes and papers’, July 8 1940, p.41.}

Public Record Office INF files are crammed with planning meetings for ‘careless talk’ campaigns throughout the war years. The location of posters was given a lot of attention, and was largely focused on social meeting places and areas of travel. Designs were planned to be ‘especially suitable’ for public houses,\footnote{PRO INF 1/6, ‘Progress reports 3 Sept.-11 Dec.1939’, October 1939.} railway carriages,\footnote{PRO INF 1/849, ‘Ministry of Information Policy committee: minutes and papers’, July 8 1940, p.41.} transport cafes,\footnote{PRO INF 1/6, ‘Progress reports 3 Sept.-11 Dec.1939’, October 1939.} lorry snack-bars,\footnote{Ibid., January 1 1941, p.175.} and factories, docks and munition works.\footnote{Ibid., September 30 1940, p.101.} After complaints about the cost of the first government poster campaign, voluntary sites only were used for the anti-gossip...
campaign. Posters were deliberately designed to appeal in order to be voluntarily displayed, and were kept to small sizes so as to be suitable for factories and pubs.\textsuperscript{108} Including Fougasse’s posters, the series distributed in February 1940 consisted of 2,500,000 posters, ‘for exhibition by local authorities, Government offices, banks, docks, barber’s shops, hotels and public-houses’.\textsuperscript{109} In the next section, we consider the varied designs produced by the government in their attempts to deal with careless talk, rumours and the ‘enemy within’.

**The Design of ‘Enemy Within’ Posters**

The Prime Minister had ‘stressed the importance of putting out a lot of anti-gossip material, and had recommended variety and the use of pictures’.\textsuperscript{110} Variety was important to ensure a lack of boredom,\textsuperscript{111} and many different poster designers and graphic techniques were used in the campaign against careless talk. Both Scotland and Wales were to have distinctive posters, including posters in the Welsh language.\textsuperscript{112} Soon after war commenced, a small poster, ‘Don’t help the Enemy, Careless talk may give away vital secrets’ (figure 62) was approved by the War Office, ready to be put into production immediately.\textsuperscript{113} The first full anti-gossip poster drive was prepared by the MOI in December 1939. A wide variety of posters, in a variety of sizes, pictorial as well as letter designs, were prepared on the theme. The first was ‘Warning’ (figure 194), which looked rather like a death notice, with other posters following shortly afterwards. Unlike the MOI’s first big poster campaign, as discussed in chapter three, the new scheme was prepared and distributed by the Ministry’s own production department.\textsuperscript{114}

Talking about the posters chronologically is difficult due to problems dating the posters, and thus it is difficult to follow how they changed, or assess whether they ‘improved’. To deal with this difficulty, we shall discuss the posters thematically. The term ‘fifth column’ may never have appeared officially in British posters, although the term ‘Silent Column’ is used, but the posters are clearly part of a campaign to warn the population against fifth


\textsuperscript{109} Anonymous, ‘2,500,000 Anti-Gossip Posters’, *Advertiser’s Weekly*, Vol. 107, No. 1,394, February 8 1940, p.98.

\textsuperscript{110} PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee - agenda and minutes’, February 27 1941, p.213.


\textsuperscript{113} PRO INF 1/6, ‘Progress reports 3 Sept.-11 Dec.1939’, September 17 1939.

columnists. Very few make specific reference to countering rumours, excepting figure 195, one of many cartoon posters in the anti-rumour campaigns, as the concentration in posters was more on careless and thoughtless talk. The slogan was key to the message, and as we see on page 195, the slogan ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ outlived any other. A reader of Advertiser’s Weekly suggested in February 1940 that airmen (who appeared to have spare time to fill) should be consulted regarding slogans. Some had invented ‘security slogans’ such as ‘Tittle-tattle lost the battle’; ‘Why not be as dumb as you look?’; and ‘They met, he told, she sold’, suggestive of the female spy of fiction. The phrase ‘the Fifth Column’ had directed vigilance ‘not to suspicious characters but to those not outwardly suspicious’. Suspicion switched from strangers or those on the fringes of society, to those at the backbone. Ironside, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces noted in 1940: ‘My experience is that the gentlemen who are the best behaved and the most sleek are those who are doing the mischief. We cannot be too sure of anybody.’ Unlike in the spy novels, most of the ‘spies’ or ‘enemies within’ illustrated in home front posters are invisible. We would almost expect to see someone hovering in the background, or having furtive meetings in dark shadowy places such as alleyways, similar to places that the ‘oldest profession’, prostitution, took place. Alternatively we may expect to see ‘intrigue in high places’. These do have their place, for example in figure 196, but more commonly ‘the enemy’ is not visible, or if it is, it is frequently Hitler, an ‘identifiable individual who personified, and could be blamed for, all that the Nazis stood for’. This is most clearly shown in figures 197 and 198 where Hitler and the Swastika are presented as one and the same, the ‘Furtive Fritz’. Other recognisable Nazis, such as Goering (figures 5 and 10) Goebbels (figure 199, which used a Kitchener style appeal, and a disembodied head), more

115 Chapman, J., The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-45, 1998, p.227, notes that the idea of the ‘fifth columnist’ did make its way into film. In Went the Day Well?, (1942), the local squire and pillar of the community is exposed as a fifth columnist, aiding the advance guard of the German invasion forces. Aldgate, A., and Richards, J., op.cit., 1994, p.98, notes that in Traitor Spy, (1939), the storyline focuses on the ‘unmasking of a worker at a vital armaments factory as a saboteur and spy’. 116 PRO INF 1/250, ‘Meetings and reports of Home Morale Emergency Committee’, possibly February 1941, p.79. 117 Anonymous, ‘Should the M. of I. Learn to Fly’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 107, No. 1,395, February 15 1940, p.113, quoting Peterborough, Daily Telegraph columnist, in previous Saturday’s issue. 118 Fleming, P., op.cit., 1958, p.54. 119 Ibid., quoting Ironside, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, addressing LDV Commanders, 5 June 1940. 120 Kertesz, M., ‘The Enemy – British Images of the German People during the Second World War’, Unpublished PhD, University of Sussex, 1992, p.63 (p.25 onwards deals with stereotypes). HLRO, Hist. Coll. 271, Davidson Papers, ‘Policy Committee: It’s the Same Old Hun’, January 23 1941, noted that many had felt that the Germans were barbarians as in the First World War. This ‘may be justified by history’ but was disastrous for propaganda. There was a need to stress the differences from the First World War, to emphasise that the German is not incurable, that once the war has been fought, the cultural elements could return.
rarely make an appearance, whilst other enemies such as the Japanese or Italian are rarely, if ever, visible.\textsuperscript{121}

As a MOI pamphlet in 1940 noted, the job of the Fifth Column was to make people think that it did not exist, so that people would stop looking for it. It did not only consist of foreigners.\textsuperscript{122} Probably the closest to a stereotypical spy is evident in figure 200 where the man is faceless, and in disguise. In most cases the spy is represented as indistinguishable, as is evident when \textit{The Star} announced on February 10 1940, when the Fougasse campaign (figures 3 to 10) was launched: ‘Watch Your Step for SPIES! AND THEY WILL NOT BE WEARING FALSE WIGS OR USING SECRET RAYS.’\textsuperscript{123} The very ordinariness of the people in the images was designed to show how careful people needed to be in every circumstance. No clear ‘other’ is depicted or recognisable in posters but the assumption that they exist is there. In the ‘This Happened’ series (figures 201 to 205), we see, ‘in each case a “spy” listening to indiscreet talk, and in each case the ‘spy’ is an entirely normal looking British citizen’. In most of this series one character does look fairly ‘shifty’, but in figure 202 it ‘is impossible to be certain which person is the ‘spy’ in the picture’. The ‘campaign represents the ‘spy’ as a normal looking citizen.’\textsuperscript{124} The campaign was unafraid to use photographs, juxtapositing the original careless situation against the possible, but imprecise, consequences, lit by surreal, muted lighting.

Fougasse, already an established cartoonist, offered his services free to the government. He suggested that humour was an ‘ideal vehicle’ for propaganda,\textsuperscript{125} offering a ‘unifying quality, where the common understanding of a joke creates a bond, and persuades without causing resentment. He believed that humour can spotlight the ridiculousness or foolishness of actions and irresponsible behaviour without offence. Isolating his posters from surrounding images by the use of white space, he engages the viewer by deliberate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Kertesz, M., op.cit., 1992, p.5, noted that although the Germans were not the only enemy, they were the most significant for the British. The Italians were largely viewed as ‘harmless ice-cream sellers’, fit only for ridicule. The Japanese were regarded as a more serious threat, but the Asia-Pacific war was considered peripheral except for those with family directly involved. Childs, D., op.cit., 1995, p.57 notes that many British and Americans saw the Japanese as ‘racially inferior beings who could scarcely be regarded as a match for European forces’, with Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, referring to the Japanese in his diary as ‘beastly little monkeys’ and \textit{Punch} in January 1942 depicting Japanese troops swinging from the trees in the jungle.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Aldgate, A., and Richards, J., op.cit., 1994, p.96.
\item \textsuperscript{123} M-O T/C 42 3-C, \textit{The Star}, February 10, 1940, (emphasis in original).
\end{itemize}
intrigue. Each cartoon is drawn in characteristic style, depicting an everyday situation with which everyone could identify.\textsuperscript{126} Shapes, colours and the main slogan could be seen from a distance, but in order to enjoy the joke, the viewer was forced to come near enough to read the small caption and then make his/her own conclusions about the situation. This personal involvement was the key to remembering and ‘actioning’ the message.\textsuperscript{127} Bartlett was wary about the use of humour, which he labelled a ‘dangerous tool’, only really effective within the artist’s own population. The sense of humour needed to be known ‘intimately’ and ‘sympathetically’.\textsuperscript{128} Fougasse, a British artist appealing to a British audience, fitted this criteria, and his cartoons marked ‘a fundamental change from the earlier sober government posters against careless talk’. Depicting scenes from everyday life, Fougasses accurately illustrated ‘human nature’, enabling ‘every viewer to identify with the characters’\textsuperscript{129} Fougasse ‘tried to convey the concept that no place was safe, and that information, once divulged, was beyond control in a compelling spiral of risk to the national security’.\textsuperscript{130} For Fougasse, Hitler stands for the enemy, he is ‘ever-present’.\textsuperscript{131} Other artists appeared to agree with Fougasse’s notion that Hitler was ever-present, presenting the message both with humour (figure 206), and in a more serious manner. Lacoste’s ‘Beware’ (figures 207 and 208), depicting Hitler ‘with an ear stretched out to hear careless talk’, already used with success with the Army in France, was re-printed for the Home Front.\textsuperscript{132} Despite the extreme simplification, economy of line and lack of detail used in figures 206 to 208, it is clear with those few pencil marks on paper that Hitler is represented.

In the early days of the war, the Government was told the only real way to bring home to the public the real danger of careless talk was by ‘pictures which hurt’, but the scheme was turned down as ‘too tough and too realistic for the British public’.\textsuperscript{133} Norman Wilkinson’s realistic design (figure 209), showing the end result of careless talk, was produced at the same time as the Fougasse campaign, and the Press picked up on the contrasting use of

\textsuperscript{127} Fougasse, A School of Purposes, 1946, p.27.
\textsuperscript{128} Bartlett, F.C., Political Propaganda, 1940, p.87.
\textsuperscript{130} Caption at the Power of the Poster exhibition at the Victoria & Albert Museum, 1998.
\textsuperscript{131} Press, Advertising and the Trade, September 1939 - September 1940, p.37.
\textsuperscript{132} Anonymous, ‘2,500,000 Anti-Gossip Posters’, op.cit., February 8 1940.
realism and humour.\textsuperscript{134} Figures 209 to 211 in some ways play upon the familiarity with marine landscapes, subverting the tradition, depicting destruction, rather than the magnificence of shipping. It was often difficult to be too realistic, as graphic images of death would not necessarily have been well received. The victim is rarely visible in posters, or if he is, it is the risk of death that is posed (figure 211), rather than the reality. Where the reality is shown, the human cost is rarely visible, rather a ship is seen sinking (figures 209 and 210), or a plane is crashed (figure 202). The only exceptions found were army posters: ‘A Maiden Loved’ (figure 212) shows the ‘grave’ consequences, and Abram Games’ modern designs. Games, as usual, was unafraid to subvert the realism of the image, and use abstract graphic techniques to provide visual links between ‘careless talk’ and the victim (figure 213 and 214). Drawing on psychological discourses, this was aimed directly at the soldiers, who were presumed to live with death on a far closer basis than civilians, and images could therefore be much harsher and more direct. In 1945, however, a campaign aimed at soldiers returning from the fighting fronts was deliberately designed to be humorous (figure 215), with the figure depicted in the bed deliberately drawn in a non-realistic manner, symbolic of the men who ‘shoot their mouth off’. It ‘was not policy to produce starkly realistic posters for men who already knew so much of reality’.\textsuperscript{135}

The same places as the posters were to be located were often visibly depicted in the posters. Care was required with conversations, represented as dangerous when located in a social arena such as the pub (figures 216 and 217), particularly associated with the working classes, or the hairdressers (figure 218), particularly associated with women. Both staged photographs and traditional pen and ink drawings were used within these campaigns, with the location depicted in detail, whilst other campaigns, particularly those by Fougasse, used cartoons, with minimal detail. Figure 219, in some ways reminiscent of the French style of figure 44, as does figure 5, depicts places of travel, such as the train, both inside and outside, which offered risk. On trains, with a clever play on words, and use of extreme abstract techniques, passengers were warned to ‘guard’ their conversation (figures 220 and 221). A similar concept was used by Games in figure 222. As with the industrial production posters, one weak link in the chain, in this case one thoughtless comment, could endanger the nation. Figure 191 clearly demonstrated how many innocuous conversations

\textsuperscript{134} Anonymous, ‘2,500,000 Anti-Gossip Posters’, op.cit., February 8 1940; ‘Hush Hush’, \textit{The Times}, February 7 1940, p.9; ‘Government Printing 2,500,000 Anti-Gossip Posters’, op.cit., February 8 1940; ‘Drawings are Coming But Their Meanings Are Serious’, \textit{News Chronicle}, February 7 1940, p.3.

could aid the German intelligence effort, although this would have been suitable for viewing only in locations where there was an opportunity to study the detail. The dangers of modern communication devices were made clear, through evidence of use of equipment such as the wireless (figure 223\textsuperscript{136}) and the telephone (figures 224 and 225), particularly significant as they ran through manual exchanges. Hitler is often visible in these situations, overhearing scraps of information that may be of use (figure 4). People in certain occupations, including in telephone exchanges (figure 226), on the docks (figure 227), in the services (figure 228\textsuperscript{137}) or in the factories (figure 229) needed to take particular care, and needed convincing that their knowledge, of location and production, was of value to the enemy.

The campaigns appear to be cross-class and cross-gender, both in audience appeal and representations, with a wide-range of everyday locations evident. The campaign needed to make everyone realise that ‘You’ meant them. Everyone had the potential to know information of importance, and thus the capacity to be dangerous to the nation. It was likely that the upper classes would have access to more knowledge, although the working classes were deemed more likely to give away scraps of information without realising the significance. Personified by the cloth cap, the working classes are visible in various posters, chatting away in the pub (figure 216), stoically keeping silent (figure 230), with a head full of technical knowledge (figure 231), depicted in many styles from extreme realism, to extreme modernism. The middle classes do not escape, they are clearly visible in other posters, businessmen commuting (figure 232), the woman in pearls passing on information (figure 233). The ‘They Talked’ and Fougasse series cover a wide range of locations, from the pub (figure 3), the third-class train carriage (figure 5), to the gentleman’s club (figure 8), via a variety of cross-class locations such as a restaurant (figure 205). The ‘Keep it under your hat’ series (figures 234 to 237), as with many careless talk posters, focused on the head areas, indicating whatever knowledge was in your head, it needed to be kept to yourself. The campaign covered a wide cross-section of society: a warden’s helmet, a safari hat (adventurer types), the civilian business man, and the woman’s hat, feminine but not too frivolous. The message was more explicitly, but less succinctly spelt out in figure 238.


\textsuperscript{137} This issue still appears to be important post-war, as figure 228, dealing with careless talk, was not published until 1946.
Other than when stoically keeping information to his or herself, both men and women could be represented as gossips or spies. Several earlier campaigns were aimed at men, requesting them to careful what information they imparted to women. In 1941 it was agreed that a new appeal ‘should be to women not to tell things to men instead of always being the other way round’.  

Denault claims that the government treated women as children in propaganda campaigns, and ‘[j]ust as women’s work was seen as fundamentally less valuable in the public sphere, women were judged incapable of controlling themselves on a personal level’. She deems that women ‘in particular were constructed as potentially dangerous to the safety of the state through posters identifying gossip and female spies’ (figure 10).  

Author A.A.Milne’s speech for Queen Elizabeth, which would no doubt have been reflected in posters, was never made public. Echoing early poster campaigns calling on discourses of the monarchy, the speech would have had the Queen ordering the women of Britain “to remember, when you are tempted to spread these rumours, or these ugly thoughts of hatred, just to say to yourself, ‘The Queen asked me herself not to. She asked me’”.  

Families, particularly women, were reminded of their responsibility to their family, calling on discourses of protection for their men overseas, with a need to avoid discussing information that could be of use to the enemy, including sailing dates (figures 239 and 240).

The ‘Cherchez la femme’ campaign referred to on page 182, issued in 1942, was designed by Harold Forster. Forster was truly a ‘chocolate box’ artist, having previously created ‘Black Magic’s alluring ladies’, produced figure 241, which Advertiser’s Weekly described as ‘the most striking of the series’. The image features officers from each of the three services, surrounding ‘their glamorous but dangerous guest’, which the journal christened Olga.  

The Star noted the Mata Hari, the conventional glamour spy, was as ‘out of date as the aspidistra’, but ‘Olga’ is presented as the seductive spy, or intermediary, a role unique

---

138 PRO INF 1/249, ‘Planning Committee - agenda and minutes’, February 24 1941, p.211.
to women.\textsuperscript{142} ‘Olga’ makes eye contact directly with the viewer, which, in a ‘western culture where women rarely stare at men… can be perceived as having “bedroom eyes”’.\textsuperscript{143} The idea of the prostitute as spy was common, and there was also a need for ‘expendable intermediaries’ to disguise dealings between spies and the secret service.\textsuperscript{144} The prostitute, drawing on Victorian imagery, was represented as elusive, merging with the surrounding communities, an invisible danger, transgressing the established social and class boundaries, carrying disease, dirt and death, and undermining the health of the social body.\textsuperscript{145} ‘Olga’ was reserved for display in places where commissioned ranks met, such as officers’ messes, where men with significant operational knowledge met. Other realistic, fashionable designs were also produced (figures 242 to 244) for other ranks. Each service man is ‘in the company of a beautiful girl, but (such is the wisdom that comes with non-commissioned status) each is looking determined to keep mum’.\textsuperscript{146} Having seen the variety of posters used in the ‘careless talk’ campaign, we consider how the message was received.

The Reception of ‘Enemy Within’ Posters

The Silent Column campaign (figure 193), as we saw on page 183, was not a success. The relationship between the campaign and prosecutions for defeatist talk was considered ‘sinister’.\textsuperscript{147} It had created the impression that the authorities ‘regarded almost any exchange of information or opinion on the war as unpatriotic and dangerous’.\textsuperscript{148} The timing of the campaign was not good, as, around the same time, Cooper mentioned that press censorship might become compulsory, and thus the press, nervous, kicked up a fuss.\textsuperscript{149} The Silent Talk campaign was launched without a clear outline of ‘how and why defeatist talk did harm, nor exactly what was defeatist talk’, and M-O felt that ‘campaigns launched without a background are much more easily opened to misrepresentation and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} M-O T/C 42 3-C, \textit{The Star}, February 10, 1940. Knightley, P., op.cit., 2003, pp.47-50, gives details of Mata Hari, the epitome of a dedicated spy: ‘the beautiful girl who, for money and thrills, wormed out of her lovers the most important secrets of state’. Surrounded by myth and legend. ‘[h]er story seems to have all the elements traditionally associated with spying – deception, excitement, high living, power, money and, in the end, amazing bravery’. She was reputed to be a high class exotic dancer and prostitute using clients for secrets.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Anonymous, “Olga” is Mascot in Anti-Rumour Campaign for Services’, op.cit., May 29 1941, p.146.
\item \textsuperscript{146} PRO INF 1/264, ‘Morale - summaries of daily reports’, July 22 1940, p.94.
\item \textsuperscript{147} McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.83.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.190; McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.83.
\end{itemize}
The campaign was quickly curtailed and then dropped altogether as ‘the public was, if anything, too well aware of the need for security and that people were being encouraged to distrust one another at a time when it was important for them to pull together’. The government noted that the campaign should not necessarily be considered unsuccessful:

People had reacted strongly and had been encouraged to think about the subject.

The fact that they criticised the methods adopted did not necessarily mean that they would not take the lesson to heart. M-O, however, noted that ‘the virulent press campaign against the Silent Column, which worked on already existing private opinion in favour of further talking, has had an effect antagonistic to any new discretion campaign’. At about the same time, figure 202 was produced. M-O noted that in this poster ‘the point is not at all clear’, ‘for the dangerous remark quoted’ spoken by what appears to be the father with his pilot son, is: ‘Cheerio, old lad, good luck tomorrow’. M-O could not see ‘anything sufficiently specific’ in this remark ‘to lead to a shot down plane pictured on the lower half of the poster’.

Balfour, comparing British and German efforts used the example of Fougasse (figures 3 to 10) to ‘suggest that the subject [of careless talk] was not to be taken seriously’. He described German posters as more serious, and some more sinister. In the UK, however, there was not a stark differentiation between the use of humour and of reality. Neither was used in isolation, they were used alongside each other. Princess Elizabeth claimed: ‘How carelessly we should have talked during the war but for Fougasse’, and his posters were generally enthusiastically received, even though some people disapproved of the official use of humour for such a serious subject. Others believed that a sense of humour was the British ‘secret weapon’.

Fougasse himself, in a talk on the BBC a few days after the

---

158 Briggs, S., Keep Smiling Through, 1975, p.64.
publication of the posters, justified his use of humour for such a serious subject. He placed
humour within a British cultural context and:

explained his emotional function of enabling people to deal with the difficult truths
they do not wish to confront. It is precisely their lack of realism than enables
cartoons to communicate powerful ideas in a non-threatening manner.\(^{159}\)

Fougasse exploited humour as a ‘corrective’ device, but his light touch and aesthetic
sophistication concealed a tendency to reinforce the belief that fifth columnists were
everywhere.\(^{160}\) When planning another anti-gossip campaign, the Fougasse posters were
described as ‘partly Haw Haw propaganda’, he said ‘I know everything, see everything,
hear everything’, and this played ‘up the worst Hitler fantasy for the nervous’.\(^{161}\)

*The Times* approved of Fougasse’s campaign, noting that although the target may be made
to look a fool, ‘Fougasse’s touch is as delicate as it is deadly, and his victims laugh even
while they see themselves as Fougasse sees them’. Whether a civilian or in uniform,
Fougasse’s message was for everyone, as the anti-gossip campaign would only become
effective as everyone realised that it was not necessary ‘to be an out-and-out “long-tongued
babbling gossip” to be, potentially, one of the silly asses in the cartoons, jabbering away in
public places’. Although Hitler and Goering may not actually be on the bus, the viewer
was never to know who was listening, and overhearing information of use to Hitler:

> Let Fougasse teach us that there is a Hitler in every hedge, behind every bar, under
every table, and lurking, all ears, by every telephone, ready to snap up any
unconsidered trifles of information which the latent spot of indiscretion in the most
cautious of us may innocently let fall.\(^{162}\)

A twenty-five year old female noted that she thought the ‘careless talk pictures – with
Hitler peeping over telephone booths and out of luggage racks at people’ were
‘excellent’.\(^{163}\)

Ricardo Brook, a ‘well-known humorous artist’,\(^{164}\) wrote that he was all for ‘humour in
advertising’, when the subject was not serious. The Prime Minister, however, had said that
for certain ‘gossip’ the death penalty could be invoked, and then a ‘series of anti-gossip


\(^{160}\) McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.83.

\(^{161}\) INF 1/251, ‘Planning Committee - papers circulated’, January 22 1941, p.300.

\(^{162}\) *The Times*, February 7 1940, p.7.

\(^{163}\) M-O T/C 43 4-B, (F25B), ‘Silent Column overheards’, undated but probably mid-1940.
joke comic posters’ were issued. He felt that ‘pictorial jokes are not likely to stop the
menace’. Victor Morris agreed, and criticised government ‘comic posters’ as ‘popular
vote never yet decided the merit of an advertisement’. The fact that ‘characteristic British
comment has shown approval and even enthusiasm for these posters’ was irrelevant.
Comic advertising had rarely produced ‘useful results’, and in this case had merely brought
‘the whole object of the campaign into contempt’. Advertiser’s Weekly disputed whether
humour was out of place in the anti-gossip campaign, regarding Fougasse as ‘one of the
most subtle interpreters of the British idiom that it has ever known’. ‘[C]haracteristic
British comment’ on the series, almost without exception ‘amounted to approval; indeed,
even to enthusiasm’. Advertiser’s Weekly believed ‘that the humorous Fougasse series has
already drawn more attention to, and observance of, the need to hold one’s tongue than all
the previous printed sermons put together’. A British characteristic was ‘to treat serious
things lightly’, where it is the joke, not the ‘oratorical flourish’, which sees men through to
the end.

Gibbons agreed with Morris that the war was a serious subject, and could not be dealt with
as thought it was a comic subject:

> There is nothing very comic, however, in a ship being sunk by enemy action as the
result of confidential information being spread about by those who imagine that
they gain some social prestige by so doing. The loss of human life and vital
supplies in wartime can best be illustrated by war pictures showing the devastating
results of careless talk.

With stocks of poster designs exhausted, a steady demand for supplies, and a delay before
new designs could be put into production, Wilkinson’s realistic design (figure 209), along
with two others, was considered successful enough by the government to reprint.

Talmadge’s poster design (figure 210) could have been viewed as ‘horrific’, but Art and

---

167 Anonymous, ‘Advertising and the British Tradition’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 107, No.1396, February 22 1940, p.140. Brook had been working on a campaign sponsored by the MOI ‘in an endeavour to curtail the loss of life due to the black-out’, which took ‘its grim subject with all seriousness’.
Industry felt that it imparted ‘its message simply and adequately, the test of any good poster’. The Times noted that anti-gossip campaigns could not ‘insist too strongly that the possible connection between a quiet little talk and a horrible catastrophe is not a fond invention of a heated imagination, but a genuine and pressing danger’. They went on to say that at some point, everyone would have information of value to the enemy, and thus ‘no one is too unimportant to keep a watch on his tongue and remember that careless talk costs lives.’

The slogan ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’, initially not thought to be sufficiently closely connected with the war effort, likely to be revised or superseded, it outlived any other. The phrase was a regular slogan in anti gossip posters and other publicity from early 1940, and ‘was taken up generally by speakers and the press’. It was such a successful slogan, it was parodied in another poster: ‘careless ropemaking’ (figure 245). Shaw, however, complained that this allowed the critic to ask: ‘Does not careless talk any longer costs lives?’ It was also taken over by humorists: ‘What did Father say when Mother told him she was expecting?’ ‘Oh, that careless stork’.

HI requested a report into the slogan ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ (figures 246 and 247). The general reaction that they found was ‘unenthusiastic approval’, whilst a large number, particularly women, puzzled over the meaning. Previous reports into slogans had demonstrated that ‘people were definitely irritated after a time by the official use of slogans’. Many spontaneously compared the slogan to other government slogans: ‘People are now definitely conscious of the Government’s use of slogans to influence them, and some seem to resent it’. This slogan was seen as ‘easy to memorise, with a humorous element’. The investigators got the impression that although many found it humorous, they did not take the message itself seriously. The upper and middle classes were more cynical and critical about the message. Punning was seen as cheap undignified: ‘More educated people are often consciously critical of punning (a thing you have to apologise for doing in middle strata of society).’ They were also more self-conscious than the working classes about addressing their parents publicly as ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’. Furthermore, they were more

---

171 The Times, February 7 1940, p.7.
172 PRO INF 1/250, ‘Meetings and reports of Home Morale Emergency Committee’, possibly February 1941, p.79.
likely to refer to their parents as ‘Mummie’ and ‘Daddie’ or ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’. M-O noted that the message may not have been intended for middle-class people, but ‘its presence conspicuously displayed under official auspices may well lead to adverse comment’ from critical and vocal middle-class citizens.\textsuperscript{176}

M-O observed that the slogan did not necessarily work for the working classes either, as ‘keep’ was an ambiguous term. It appeared that the working classes read ‘no subtle meaning into the word “keep”, that is, they do not have any association in their minds with “kept woman”’. The working classes tended to use ‘elaborate circumlocutions’, rather than particular phrases to describe ‘kept women’, where it did not appear to imply the legal relationship that it did for the upper classes. They certainly did not appear to see the pun in the words straight away, but it appeared that it was the word ‘Mum’ that was obscure, rather than ‘keep’. When the pun was pointed out to them by the investigator, ‘the usual reaction was to brighten up and laugh, fully appreciating the joke’.\textsuperscript{177} M-O found the message to be ‘essentially masculine’, as in general, ‘women showed less association and less interest than men, though usually they are particularly stimulated both by slogan and by joke appeals’. Many women deemed the message ‘obscure’ as ‘[t]hey are quite unable to think of themselves in the situation when they would “Be Like Dad”’, whilst many housewives did not consciously feel that they were kept by their husbands. The message was considered particularly inappropriate for spinsters and widows. The message may have been difficult to understand initially, but M-O concluded that this may actually have worked in its favour ‘so long as the message is not adversely criticised or does not set up hostile reactions among those who do not understand it in the early stages’.\textsuperscript{178} This pre-testing thus gave general approval to the campaign, and it appeared on the hoardings.

Dr Edith Summerskill criticised the ‘Be like Dad, Keep Mum’ poster campaign, and called for it to be withdrawn from the hoardings. She felt that it was ‘offensive to women’, and ‘a source of irritation to housewives, whose work in the home if paid for at current rates would make a substantial addition to the family income’. Summerskill described the posters as being in the ‘worst Victorian music-hall taste’, and thus out of touch with a modern audience. Cooper responded that he liked Victorian music halls, and apologised

\textsuperscript{175} Longmate, N., op.cit., 1971, p.96.
\textsuperscript{176} M-O FR 442, ‘Slogan: “Be Like Dad, Keep Mum”: Reactions’, October 1940.
\textsuperscript{177} M-O T/C 42 4/A, ““Keep”, an Ambiguous Term’, Note by NM/CF, October 9 1940.
\textsuperscript{178} M-O FR 442, ‘Slogan: “Be Like Dad, Keep Mum”: Reactions’, October 1940.
that words ‘intended to amuse should have succeeded in irritating’, although he could not believe that the irritation was ‘very profound or widely spread’.\textsuperscript{179} Described in 1996 as having been ‘a seriously formidable lady’,\textsuperscript{180} Summerskill was an English Labour politician, physician, boxing abolitionist, author and, as a member of the House of Commons (1938-61), an advocate of women’s rights.\textsuperscript{181} Considering Summerskill’s involvement with the Married Women’s Association, which she initiated her in 1938, her objections are unsurprising. The primary objectives of the Association were to promoted legislation that would provide equal rights within the marriage relationship, particularly with regard to parenting rights and financial security.\textsuperscript{182} O’Connor felt that the poster that Summerskill had condemned, and others had said ‘tickles the fancy of the public’ was part of a whole campaign that had ‘failed in its purpose’. He listed various conversations he had overhead which were against the war effort, and noted:

Let anyone try, as I have done, to call these offenders to order. He will only meet with unpleasant rebuffs. He will be told, as I have been told, that this is a free country, and that they (the offenders) were jolly well going to say what they pleased.

O’Connor claimed that such conversations were occurring every day, and that if there was a real desire to put a stop to it, ‘jokes, cartoons and comic pictures will never succeed’. There was a need for more serious warnings, and offenders to be punished.\textsuperscript{183}

Opinion was divided as to whether it was worth spending money on careless talk posters, and whether they would help the problem. In 1943, a forty-year old male barber based in Oxford Street noted that he would be pleased to display a new careless talk posters, as it was awkward when a regular client said things when ‘he had much better keep his mouth shut about’. Another forty-year old male, having said that he did not think careless talk existed, and thus posters were not ‘worth the cost in paper’, wanted police to check up on foreign refugees who could get work in hairdressers and pass on some ‘fine reports’. He did not see any inconsistency in his comments. A young female noted that ‘posters and

\textsuperscript{179} 371 H.C. DEB. 5s, May 7 1941, cols 838-9.
talks won’t have any effect on such people’. Negative comments on posters are numerous. Longmate describes figure 194 as a ‘pompous pronouncement’, typical of MOI at the time. Figure 215 infuriated some British soldiers, who went so far as to tear the posters down. Sending comments to William Hickey of the Daily Express, one soldier objected to the way soldiers are ‘depicted in their beds as screaming and gesticulating lunatics’. Service men and women felt that a ‘dignified and effective request’ could easily have been designed ‘instead of this insulting production which would be hard to beat for lack of psychological insight’. Exception was taken to the message, as ‘men returning from the front wanted to get their experiences “off their chest”,’ which may have had medical benefits but was not good ‘from the military point of view’. Advertiser’s Weekly noted that not many posters were being torn down, but the negative publicity would at least indicate that people had taken notice: ‘Whatever was thought about it, the message had gone home’.

Positive comment is also evident. One of the earliest careless talk campaigns, Keep it dark (figures 248) was described by a M-O interviewee, as a ‘nice little rhyme – something anyone could learn’, although several commented to M-O that it would have been nice for the colouring to be patriotically red, white and blue. Images depicting young, glamorous women, evidently intent on gaining information, such as figures 212 and 249 were popular in many countries, although Lant claims that such images were really only used in the UK before it was realised what a shortage of “manpower” there was going to be. Figure 212 was praised for presenting a ‘complete story in twelve words, full of pep and punch and straight to the point’. McLaine described the campaigns in figures 234 to 237 as clever, as they ‘avoided browbeating the public’, and described figure 191 as ‘heavily didactic’.

187 M-O T/C 42 2/B, (F WC 45), Bar, Brook Green Hotel, 13 October 1939.
188 M-O T/C 42 2/B, (F 40 C), AH & JA questioning at Shepherds Bush, 30 September 1939.
As with the Blitz and the British bombing offensive in Germany, two similar activities had to be presented in different lights.\textsuperscript{193} British spying activities were heroic, whilst the enemy doing the same job needed to be presented as underhand, sly and evil. ‘Careless talk’ campaigns particularly used the IPA technique of ‘name-calling’, with members of enemy nations as ‘bad’, as threats. Every member of the nation needed to jump on the ‘bandwagon’, called to join everyone else in protecting the nation, taking personal responsibility for the effect that they could have on the war effort. The wide range of styles from didactic detailed diagrams, through modern and typographic designs, and a large number of cartoons, ensured that all classes, occupations, and genders, were addressed. All campaigns were noticeably aimed at adults, with children conspicuous by their absence from campaign images. Propaganda campaigns stressed the omnipresence of danger from the ‘enemy within’, despite the lack of evidence as to the existence of any real threat, using ‘card-stacking’ to present facts to the contrary. Cartoons proliferated throughout the campaign, in the hope of disarming the audience, but realistic designs fought possible complacency. Those in the services had access to information that could help the enemy to invade, but as we saw in the previous chapter, the industrial effort was key, and thus locations and production schedules needed to be protected from bombing raids. As the following chapter demonstrates, the VD campaign also depicts the ‘enemy within’, which could harm the British war effort. The health of the nation depended on healthy bodies, needed to fight, to man the war effort on the home front, and to produce a future generation to populate the New Jerusalem.

Chapter 7: The ‘Problem’ of Venereal Disease in Wartime

Statistics on those attending venereal disease (VD) civilian treatment centres during the Second World War initially reveal a drop in figures. After 1941, however, as in the First World War, there was a rapid rise in cases (see appendix 9). In this chapter we discuss how VD was characterised as a ‘problem’ within scientific and religious discourse. We look at how medical, legal, political and religious institutions influenced, and gained the power to deal with, the ‘problem’ within discourses of citizenship. The poster designs are considered, and the truths they produced (and reflected) through their form and function are described. A respondent to the project questionnaire claimed that ‘VD posters were unheard of prior to the war’, but this is clearly not correct. What was significant about the Second World War is that VD posters were placed in open public spaces for the first time, causing great controversy. As we reflect on reactions to the posters, we see how far people recognised the need to fulfil their duties of citizenship through altering their sexual behaviour in order to remain ‘undiseased’, maintaining a healthy body that would fight the war and have the potential to build a new future. Several competing discourses were involved in the construction of VD as a problem in the Second World War. These included discourses based on government, religion, scientific medicine, the law, and education, which collectively addressed questions of gender, nation and citizenship. VD has a long identifiable history, in which Second World War thinking was grounded, particularly drawing on Victorian values.

---

1 Howlett, P., Fighting with Figures: A Statistical Digest of the Second World War, 1995 p.20. Statistics must be used with care however, as increased figures may demonstrate either increased medical examinations, or more willingness to deal with problems, rather than an increase in the number of cases. The drop can possibly partly be attributed to the exclusion of men who went through military systems. Hall, L. ‘War always brings it on’, in Cooter, R., Harrison, M., and Sturdy, S. (eds), Medicine and Moral Warfare, 1999, p.215, notes that the rate for VD was at an ‘all time low’ at the outbreak of war, but by 1942 incidence had ‘risen at an appalling rate’.

2 Female, Northumberland, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.

3 Such controversy has inevitably provided large amounts of information available for historical investigation, stored within a variety of institutions, both political and voluntary.

4 Tannahill, R. Sex in History, 1980, p.65, noted that VD was recognised about four thousand years ago by the Akkadians as ‘copulation sickness’, although as Davidson, R., and Hall, L., Sex, Sin and Suffering: Venereal Disease and European Society Since 1870, 2001, p.5, note, syphilis and gonorrhoea were not recognised as separate illnesses until the 1870s. See Anonymous, ‘Warts and All’, Observer Monthly, November 2003, pp.24-33, for modern campaigns dealing with modern Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs), which continue to look to the past for inspiration.
The Context and Planning of VD Posters

In 1889 the ‘Independent Advertisements Act’ was passed ‘against persons who advertise their specifics against a certain class of disease of a nameless character’. The issue of VD did not suddenly surface in the UK in the mid-nineteenth century, although the key legislative action of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866 and 1869 has focused much attention on this era. As chemical treatments were developed, Hall maintains that their availability led to the abolition of regulatory approaches, and the adoption of a strictly voluntary approach to treatment. Chemical treatments were available to cure VD at the outbreak of the Second World War, however, it was still illegal to promote them as cures for such a disease, or give instructions for use. This was partly because it was felt that those men who ‘behaved irresponsibly’ could not be trusted to treat themselves, and there were also worries that it would lead to a false sense of security, promiscuity, and even a rise in VD.

The Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases reported in 1916, having been established in 1913 in response to calls from prominent medics attacking the ‘conspiracy of silence’, and feminist and social purity groups. It recommended educating the public on the ‘grave evils which exist among us, and their effect on the national life, present and future’, concluding that a consistent effort would need to be made to keep the issue before the public mind. In 1916, The Public Health (Venereal Diseases) Regulations of 1916

---

\(^{5}\) Davenport-Hines, R., *Sex, Death and Punishment: Attitudes to Sex and Sexuality in Britain Since the Renaissance*, 1990, p.199. This act was proposed by the Earl of Meath, a Christian philanthropist who blamed VD problems on urban lifestyles.


\(^{7}\) Davidson, R., and Hall, L., op.cit., 2001, p.7: In 1905, Schaudiin and Hoffmann discovered the causative organism of syphilis, and the Wasserman test was evolved in 1906, proving that the traditional mercurial treatment was ineffective. In 1909 Erlich discovered the ‘magic bullet’ of Salvarsan, although there were problems with dosing and duration of treatment, and problems of access for those at war after 1914.

\(^{8}\) Wellcome SA/PVD, ‘Medicine: Social Puzzle’, *News Review*, December 2 1937, p.33. Such treatments were only effective if applied before the disease reached the tissues.


\(^{11}\) PRO MH 55/1330, ‘Memorandum from Alan Smith, Treasurer BSHC, for the attention of the Minister of Health’, October 26 1938.
required local councils to provide treatment facilities, but allowed them to decide what education and publicity was felt to be desirable, and the National Council for Combatting Venereal Diseases (NCCVD) was established. With an interest in education, publicity and the treatment of VD, this became the British Social Hygiene Council (BSHC) in 1925, when it took on wider issues of health education. There were criticisms, particularly from ex-Army doctors, of the focus on moral prophylaxis by the NCCVD, and in 1919 The National Society for the Prevention of Venereal Diseases (NSPVD) was founded. Largely concerned with encouraging the use of preventative medical prophylactic measures to halt the spread of VD, although the Ministry of Health (MOH) refused to entertain the notion of prophylaxis. The NSPVD dismissed the argument that calling for chastity of all would solve the VD problem, as there would always be ‘rebels’, and that it was usually the ‘absolutely innocent’ who bore ‘the cross of suffering and degradation’.

Initially in the early twentieth century, ‘many men considered their first dose of clap a rite de passage into manhood’. By the Second World War a “manly man” appears to have become one who had the sense and control to take precautions against infection. The First World War had changed attitudes to VD, challenging the clear demarcation between military and civil spheres established by the Victorians. With increased infections, or possibly just more cases brought to attention as men entered the armed forces, VD was a cause for concern. Officers provided lectures on sexual continence, with the stress on

---

12 PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Venereal Disease Treatment Services’, June 1943. (The file is marked as ‘Historical Documents, not to be destroyed’).
14 Towers, B.A., ‘Health Education Policy 1916-1926: Venereal disease and the prophylaxis dilemma’, Medical History, 1980, Vol. 24, p.80. See p.72, where she defines prophylaxis as ‘the preventative treatment of disease’, although in the case of VD it was often applied to methods such as disinfection and ‘the sheath’.
16 Hall, L., ‘Venereal diseases and society in Britain, from the Contagious Diseases Acts to the National Health Service’, Davidson, R., and Hall, L. (eds), op.cit., 2001, p.128. Wellcome SA/PVD, ‘Interim Report for 1937-38’, March 1938 notes that the NSPVD was still complaining in 1938 that the Ministry of Health, amongst other organisations, ‘repeatedly opposed the efforts of this Society to spread a knowledge of the possibility of Prevention amongst the public’.
medical rather than moral messages.\textsuperscript{20} Thinking was influenced by the eugenics and social purity movements that had become significant in both the UK and the USA prior to the First World War. Eugenics, the ‘science of improving the human race by better breeding’, promoted evolutionary ideas.\textsuperscript{21} Eugenicists studied ‘the problems of venereal infection for information, not sensation’. Describing VD as a ‘menace to civilisation’, they regarded the problem as a sanitary and economic one, rather than a ‘God-given plague to keep people from sin’. Eugenicists believed that education about the causes and means of treatment was the key means of dealing with the problem, although prophylactic measures (including treatment) would help halt the spread of the disease.\textsuperscript{22} Eugenicists regarded the man as the main source of infection, and called for VD to be made legally notifiable.\textsuperscript{23}

Health propaganda or publicity in general became more acceptable in the interwar years, although it was often perceived as education,\textsuperscript{24} and many films had been produced on public health subjects, including VD.\textsuperscript{25} By 1935, health weeks had become a normal part of life, and the Central Council for Health Education (CCHE), BSHC, and the NSPVD all dealt with the issue of VD.\textsuperscript{26} By 1938, there were calls for a central body ‘capable of giving expert advice appropriate to local circumstances’, for the ‘difficult subject’ of VD propaganda.\textsuperscript{27} Despite the centrality of the VD issue to health education, and MOH claims that it was ‘fully aware of the importance of education’, there was no compulsion for local

\textsuperscript{20} Hall, L., ‘Venereal diseases and society in Britain, from the Contagious Diseases Acts to the National Health Service’, Davidson, R., and Hall, L. (eds), op.cit., 2001, p.125. There were two opposing viewpoints among officers in the armed forces. As Towers, B.A., ‘Health Education Policy 1916-1926’, op.cit., 1980, p.77, notes, on the one hand it was believed that an outlet for sexual energy was essential for the morale of armed forces, with provision of regulated prostitution, whilst Harrison, M., ‘The British Army and the Problem of Venereal Disease’, op.cit., 1995, p.135, notes that, on the other, good morals demonstrated good discipline, as ‘proven’ by eugenics movements.

\textsuperscript{21} Jefferis, B.G., and Nichols, J.L., \textit{Safe Counsel or Practical Eugenics}, 1938 (Fifth Edition), p.11. Eugenicists called for sex education from an early age: the teaching of self-control; the need for small families; the need for ‘weaker’ and ‘diseased’ individuals to refrain from having children; the importance of clean living and healthy bodies; and of love between men and women through marriage.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp.282-283.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p.301.


\textsuperscript{25} See Boon, T.M., \textit{Films and the Contestation of Public Health in Interwar Britain}, University of London: Unpublished PhD, 1999. Hall, L., ‘Venereal diseases and society in Britain, from the Contagious Diseases Acts to the National Health Service’, Davidson, R., and Hall, L. (eds), op.cit., 2001, pp.128-129 notes that Debates continued in the interwar years, with Lord Trevelthun’s 1923 Committee of Enquiry on Venereal Disease basically advocating the continuation of the status quo. In 1925 a Medical Society for the Study of Venereal Diseases was formed by those working in public treatment centres, as clinics were often placed ‘out of the way’ in inappropriate areas, doctors were often looked down on and nursing staff often appeared sanctimonious.

\textsuperscript{26} Crew, T., \textit{Health Propaganda: Ways and Means (With Illustrations): Covering the Propaganda Services of the National Health Associations and others, Organisation of Health Exhibitions and Health Week Campaigns}, 1935.

\textsuperscript{27} PRO MH 55/1330, ‘Minute Sheet, J.E.C.’, January 27 1938.
authorities to undertake such propaganda,28 and many failed to.29 VD was deemed to be a problem intensified by war, exacerbated by the disruption to normal life and by the movement of peoples and the armed forces.30 In 1939, the NSPVD tried to place adverts in magazines, but the funds were largely returned, as, for example, Odhams Press had a policy to have no adverts relating to sex in their magazines.31 At the same time, the BSHC called for funding to be enforced, arguing that the costs would be offset against the savings in medical costs, time off work, and would be of ‘great and lasting benefit to our young men and women, both morally and physically’.32 The Exchequer did not wish to expend extra funds and hoped that the publicity that had been devoted to the subject in the interwar period ‘would have had the effect of minimising the danger of any widespread trouble during this war’.33 In 1941, the NSPVD complained that the government was still not dealing with the problem of VD. Despite dealing with many requests from Service personnel, both men and women, for information on the issue, funding was not available for NSPVD either.34

In October, 1942 Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer of the MOH gave a press conference in London regarding VD. In his view, the incidence of disease was increasing due to wartime conditions, particularly those that encouraged ‘loose living’. Facilities for diagnosis and treatment were freely available throughout the land, but due to the ‘old tradition of hush-hush’, this knowledge was not being transferred to the general public. Jameson recognised that they were moral aspects of the problem, but they were not for him to deal with. He regarded the problem as ‘just another medical and public health problem’, like diphtheria. He called for a change in attitude, such as had already occurred in the Dominions and the United States, for people to face up to the facts.35

28 Ibid., ‘Mrs Neville-Rolfe meeting with Ministry of Health regarding social hygiene’, February 21 1939.
29 Hall, L., ‘Venereal diseases and society in Britain, from the Contagious Diseases Acts to the National Health Service’, Davidson, R., and Hall, L. (eds), op.cit., 2001, p.129 notes that the 1929 Local Government Act meant that the BSHC lost its generous block grant from national government and had to rely on non-compulsory payment from local authorities, which often failed to appear.
31 Wellcome SA/PVD/5, ‘Reynolds’, Attitude of War Office is Revealed, November 26 1939.
Journal (BMJ) approved of this speech, which gave official backing to a medical approach. The BMJ felt that VD would now simply be regarded as an infectious disease, voluntary methods of control would be rejected, allowing VD to be dealt with properly.\textsuperscript{36}

In 1942, the CCHE took over the educational role of the BSHC, and undertook an intensive and extensive campaign in order to ‘create an informed opinion and to encourage early and continued treatment’.\textsuperscript{37} The MOH believed that that campaign would be much more effective if the national campaign was supported by local publicity.\textsuperscript{38} Central action gave incentive to local action and ‘responsible Authorities’ were urged to take fullest advantage of the facilities the CCHE could offer,\textsuperscript{39} with a leaflet issued, detailing material available for local use. Publicity materials needed to be ordered, but were free of charge,\textsuperscript{40} distributed through the Ministry of Information (MOI). Posters were particularly targeted at indoor and outdoor areas of travel such as railway stations, linked with the intensified movements of people during wartime. With families split up, there was seen to be more danger of immoral behaviour. Despite media reluctance to devote much space to the subject, the campaign was supported by press advertising.\textsuperscript{41} At the end of 1942, Regulation 33B was brought into force, providing for the notification of carriers of VD. In an atmosphere of all-pervasive total war, identifying bodies who were clearly harbourers of the disease, such as prostitutes, helped limit the perceived dangers of VD.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Immoral’ behaviour was defined within the narrow sense of implying sexual misbehaviour.\textsuperscript{43} Foreign bodies were also stigmatised, with the government needing to deal with a perceived ‘problem’ posed by American soldiers.\textsuperscript{44} Women were making it clear that they would welcome advances from the soldiers, but could not be described as ‘common prostitutes’ as they did not accost them.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1943, following nationwide approval of the first wartime VD campaign, the MOH ‘decided that it would be wise to increase the publicity given to the subject’ amongst the

\textsuperscript{36} Wellcome, PP/JRH, ‘Control of Venereal Disease’, British Medical Journal, November 21 1942.
\textsuperscript{37} PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Venereal Disease Treatment Services’, June 1943.
\textsuperscript{38} PRO MH 101/31, ‘Material Available for anti-venereal diseases campaign’, 1945.
\textsuperscript{39} PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Venereal Disease Treatment Services’, June 1943.
\textsuperscript{40} PRO MH 101/31, ‘Material Available for anti-venereal diseases campaign’, 1945.
\textsuperscript{41} PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Minutes from meeting of Joint Committee on Venereal Disease’, 10 August 1943.
\textsuperscript{43} PRO MH 102/1149, ‘Civilian venereal disease Control, Memorandum from Children’s Branch, Home Office’, probably July 1943.
\textsuperscript{44} PRO INF 1/292D, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 162’, November 2-9 1943, pp.426-431.
\textsuperscript{45} PRO MH 102/1149, ‘Minutes of conference held at the Home Office’, April 16 1943.
civilian population. The MOI Campaigns Division ‘stepped up the circulation and display of VD posters’, along with wider publication through newspapers, magazines, radio shows, on screen, as well as through lectures and plays. A widespread educational campaign covered the nature of the diseases, the need for treatment, where to seek treatment, the repression of prostitution, the provision of adequate treatment facilities and the development of methods of case tracing.\footnote{PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Civilian Venereal Disease Control’, July 1943.} The campaign was to break ‘down the secrecy which covers the subject’, demonstrate ‘the need for early treatment’, and ‘the need for continuance of treatment until a cure has been effected’. The campaign also aimed to ‘explain the dangers of quack medicines or self-treatment’, and encouraged people to visit a clinic for proper treatment. Posters had two distinct functions for the campaign. They were to reinforce the press advertising message and emphasise where to go for treatment.\footnote{Anonymous, ‘Education Angle Gets Results – So VD Campaign Planned to Continue’, \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, Vol. 124, No. 1,620, June 8 1944, p.300.} As far as possible, plans were made to work within the existing legal framework, although if ‘desirable and practicable’, it was recognised that changes to the law were possibly needed.\footnote{PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Minutes of the Joint Committee on Venereal Disease’, undated but mid-1943.}

In February 1943, the Medical Advisory Committee for Scotland (MACS) was asked by the Secretary of State for Scotland to advise on how far propaganda would be helpful in halting the rise in incidence of VD. Statistics were collected on the rise of VD in Scotland, particularly the number of new cases. The Committee called for information to be better collated, and for routine tests ‘on a large scale’ in order to identify many who they believed had VD without being aware of it. MACS called for a ‘concerted and persistent effort’ to eradicate the ‘scourge’ of VD from ‘civilised communities’. As the ‘precise aetiology and methods of spread’ of VD was known, with ‘a high standard of enlightened citizenship’, and the ‘moral sanction and active co-operation of the general public’, there was no reason why this should not be achieved. Within the past year attitudes were believed to have changed, with more acceptance of the need for information on VD and its control, and there was a call for ‘courageous leadership’ to deal with ‘almost universal’ bans on even the most elementary publicity.\footnote{PRO MH 71/104, ‘Report on Venereal Diseases by Medical Advisory Committee (Scotland), to the Secretary of State for Scotland’, 1943. A problem was identified in that some patients, particularly seamen, might be identified as ‘new cases’ in more than one clinic.} Figures are given for a campaign for the first six months of 1943, showing that an increased number had come forward for treatment, and an
increased number were found to not be infected. This was taken as a sign of success for the poster and advertising campaign. MACS did question, however, whether those who were ‘not socially conscious’ would have been affected by the campaign. In the report they wrote that it was ‘clearly in the national interest that the family and the home be protected against the ravages of these infections’. Education and propaganda therefore needed to be ‘addressed to the individual as well as to the community as a whole’.  

MACS felt that propaganda was best when presented factually, in an educational manner, and ‘prepared by competent people’ (presumably medical). Propaganda should stress that VD was best avoided, and dealt with quickly through treated if contracted, and commented that official propaganda had slowly moved in that direction in recent months. MACS noted that the overwhelming majority of cases were a result of ‘illicit sexual contact’ with an already infected person. The best method of prevention was ‘personal chastity’, and that this should be taught to ‘young people’ as a part of ‘clean living’. For those who had already ‘run the risk’, it should be made what should be done; that it could be done in confidence; the dangers of delay through ‘self-treatment’; and the effect on a wife and unborn children. Those who gained VD through ‘no fault or responsibility of their own’ were in the minority. MACS considered the possible offence to social and moral codes through the provision of information on prophylaxis. There was a fear that this might engender a false sense of security, although on medical grounds such information should not be withheld. MACS recommended that posters be displayed prominently by local authorities, supported by leaflets. Fear and alarm might be raised but a certain amount of ‘fear’ was healthy. They hoped that the public would come to adopt a similar attitude to venereal infection as to ‘ordinary’ infectious diseases, and hoped that ‘the morbid interest and prejudice’ towards VD would disappear. Education of the young was important, but ‘fraught’ with ‘dangers’, with ‘health education’, rather than sex education, to be taught by both male and female medical practitioners (rather than regular teachers). With the confidence of parents obtained, this was to cover the rules for ‘clean living’, including the ‘moral and physical dangers of promiscuity’. The responsibility for such a campaign was to fall on government departments, and whilst support from voluntary societies was deemed useful, responsibility was not to be delegated.  

---

30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.
With religious views still commonly held during the war, and the problem ‘as much moral as medical’ MACS commented that ‘the Church should be pressed to attack the moral side of the question fearlessly in straightforward, outspoken teaching’. Despite the ‘wages of sin’ being VD, pre-war the Church refused to preach ‘the truth about the evils and dangers to be avoided’. Religious discourses emphasised the moral aspect of the problem, emphasising that ‘fornication’ and ‘illicit’ sex were the main problem, although as others pointed out, pre-marital sex was not illegal. At the other extreme scientific discourse propagated an approach of chemical and mechanical prophylaxis. Between those two views there was a wide difference of opinion, and a wide field of controversy, visible at a conference held in February 1943, attended by representatives of the MOH, the CCHE and the Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury complained that ‘what is primarily a moral problem with a medical aspect is being treated as if it were primarily a medical problem with a moral aspect’, and that ‘there is a great evil and a grave menace to be met’. The most favourably received opinion at the conference was that ‘the prevention of the causes of VD was a moral problem’, whilst ‘the cure… was definitely a medical one’, and that people should not be prevented from coming forward for treatment through shame.

From October 1943 to March 1944 an experimental contact-tracing scheme was carried out in Tyneside, persuading those who were known to be at risk of infection to attend a VD clinic, and establishing patterns in the social background. The idea was to treat both sexes equally, although, due to inexperienced health workers, for the first three months, it was limited to tracing women. The categorisation is interesting. They interviewed married women, some of whom admitted to extramarital relations. They defined the group of women who ‘indulged in sexual relations with a chance acquaintance and on the first occasion’ as ‘promiscuous women’. In contrast, they found it difficult to define ‘promiscuous men’ possibly because they did not contact as many, but identified that men ‘indulged’ in sex relations outside marriage after quarrels, through boredom, or through ‘necessity’. Suggestions for further measures included more control over the activities of

52 Ibid.
54 M-O, T/C 12, Box 1/H, ‘VD Meeting on Friday February 26 1943’, Friends’ Meeting House, Euston Road, WC1, (emphasis in original).
55 PRO MH 71/104, ‘The Social Background of Venereal Disease’. The document details the methodology of the experiment, mid-1944, which followed on from an experimental scheme that had been carried out in the United States.

208
females, particularly in public houses, with excessive drinking a key cause.\textsuperscript{57} The
distribution of prophylactic packets, considered useful for the Services, was deemed not
appropriate for the civilian population, where it would be difficult to give mass instruction,
and would be ‘undesirable’, encouraging ‘a false sense of security’.\textsuperscript{58}

Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer, made a speech in October 1944, which
indicated that the health of the nation was good after five years of war. Although people
were tired, mortality rates from infectious diseases were lower than in the pre-war years.
Influenza was at lower rate than 1937, typhoid fever at all time low, and diphtheria slowly
coming under control; the two black spots were tuberculosis and VD. The rates for syphilis
could be measured most readily, with an increase in 1943 of 139\% over 1939, although
only 7\% more than 1942. This was partly deemed to be the result of a change of attitude,
as:

\begin{quote}
[n]o longer are we shutting our eyes to this social plague, no longer do we refuse to
discuss it, no longer are we withholding from young people information about its
dangers.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

The ‘problem’ of VD had largely been recognised as an urban problem, within a long
‘tradition’ of urban prostitution. With the war-time movement of populations, the Scottish
Council for Health Education believed that it brought the problem into rural areas for the
first time.\textsuperscript{60} By 1944 the previous attitude of secrecy had been overcome sufficiently to
launch a programme of public education through the BBC, the press, films, posters and
leaflets. Believing that such a programme was largely welcome, the government was
encouraged to continue it, with posters displayed nation-wide to draw attention to ‘some of
the features of this social problem’. With government plans for a better post-war world
evident, in return, people needed to take an interest in their own welfare,\textsuperscript{61} with citizenship
rights and duties in respect of healthcare.\textsuperscript{62}

In March 1945, the MOH sent out details of new material available for local use in support
of the national educational campaign against VD. The MOH worked in conjunction with

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{RG 23/56}, ‘The campaign against venereal diseases by P.J. Wilson and V. Barker.’, January 1944.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{PRO MH 55/2325}, ‘Minutes from Joint Committee on Venereal Diseases’, probably September 1943.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{PRO MH 101/33}, ‘The Health of the Nation: Broadcast by Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer,
Ministry of Health’, October 31 1944.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{PRO MH 55/2325}, ‘Joint Committee on Venereal Diseases’, August 1943.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{PRO MH 101/33}, ‘The Health of the Nation. Broadcast by Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer,
Ministry of Health’, October 31 1944.
the MOI, the CCHE, and the Department of Health for Scotland, to produce centrally organised publicity. Largely in the form of detailed publicity such as press advertisements, films, lectures, leaflets, it had been supported by large posters displayed on hoardings nation-wide. In May 1945, a photographic display, designed to be frank and informative, was offered by the MOI to factories. With no compulsory attendance at the display, different (and separate) displays were organised for male and female viewers. For males, the possible reasons for VD were given as boredom, too many drinks, and the ‘easy’ girlfriend; women were given other reasons, but these are not specified in the archival material.

Discussion of the matter of VD reached both Houses of Parliament on several occasions, including in January 1943. Viscountess Astor raised questions in the House of Commons regarding the timing and nature of propaganda campaigns designed to combat the spread of VD. By this point the distribution of the first poster had begun, whilst others were in the process of being printed. The discourses involved in constructing VD as a problem in the Second World War were: government, religion, scientific medicine, legal, education, and questions of gender, nation and citizenship. The following section will examine whether, if, and how these discourses were articulated in the posters through their content and style.

The Design of VD Posters

Although the general chronology for VD campaigns is fairly clear, the same cannot always be said for the posters themselves. Advertiser’s Weekly, for example, obviously did not feel it appropriate to illustrate their discussion of VD campaigns, and in some cases we are reliant on the IWM categorisation system to ‘know’ that posters are British Second World War posters. Some posters are mentioned in other primary sources, which confirms the date of their original display, although not for how long they were displayed, or whether they were reused in later campaigns. Complete coverage of posters even for so small a topic appears impossible, and no details can be found of posters before the 1942 campaign. Posters did exist, but did not attract the controversy that later campaigns did, as they were

---

63 PRO MH 101/31, ‘Memorandum from Ministry of Health to all Local Authorities’, March 2 1945.
64 Ibid., May 24 1945. A miniature illustrated version of the ‘panels’ for the exhibition for males are provided, within the file, explaining where they are different for women, but not how.
65 386 H.C. DEB, 5s, January 28 1943, Column 613. The Viscountess raised the question of loose morals and drink contributing to VD, although she was stopped due to inappropriate timing of the question. 387 H.C. DEB. 5s, February 25 1943, Col. 289. In February 1943 David Adams, concerned that many families considered the subject untouchable, raised the question of whether the propaganda campaign would appeal to parents to instruct children ‘in at least an elementary knowledge of sex and the natural functions of the body.’ The Minister of Health said that at the moment, such action would be left to the initiative of parents.
not displayed on billboards, but limited to places such as public conveniences. In January 1942, blue and white posters, produced by the MOI for the MOH, started appearing on hoardings in anticipation of the major ‘delay is dangerous’ campaign, double-crown posters to be placed in public conveniences.66 In January 1943, railway companies allowed the MOI to display posters for free in railway station toilets, giving details of nearby treatment centres. It was hoped that these would eventually also appear on platforms.67

Wartime posters aimed not to construct social difference, everyone was a part of ‘citizenship’, with an emphasis on similarities. Citizenship, however, involves concepts of social difference, and is a gendered concept itself, publicly articulated as male.68 We will see through images whether the same message is involved when a man or woman is depicted or appealed to, and see cases where there are posters that appear to be ‘genderless’, often with a message solely based on text. In April 1943 a series of posters was released, all clearly marked with MOH logos, designed in duplicate form for specifically gendered audiences. Figures 250 to 252 were directed at those who exposed themselves to risk of infection, whilst figures 253 to 254 were addressed to the public at large. The former were considered more suitable for indoor sites, the latter for outdoor sites, although it was hoped that as a result of the amount of discussion already on the subject, all could be displayed on outdoor sites.69 Figures 250 and 251 each depict a lone civilian, one a woman, one a man, in contrast with many wartime posters which depict men only in uniform. Each walks past a marker displaying a month, indicating the passing of time. The dangers of delay are a recurrent theme throughout wartime VD literature, a time when the nation needed its citizens to be ‘fighting fit’. As in the earlier campaign ‘Diphtheria is Deadly’, the MOH favoured the use of alliteration to get this message across.70 The posters use quasi-traditional imagery, realistic looking without photography, with indistinct faces. As with many VD posters, sombre colours are used, appropriate for a sombre topic, although possibly simply a result of restrictions on paper and ink. As is common in VD posters, the ‘VD’ letters are emphasised. In this case ‘venereal disease’ is also spelt out, possibly because it was expected that people would not know what it stood

68 For more, see Lister, R., Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 1997.
for. In general, VD posters do not appear to spell out the name or nature of the diseases. In figure 252, syphilis and gonorrhoea are named, although the symptoms are not spelt out, information more suited to accompanying leaflets.\textsuperscript{71} The photographed man in the image looks rather wary, as though he is unsure about the, assumedly ‘quack’, pills he is taking. A graphic arrow points away from the ‘quack’ pills, towards the ‘true’ medical solution. With the shame associated with the disease, and doubts about the confidentiality of a consultation with the family doctor, people turned to ‘quack’ medicines. The government needed to emphasise that only proven medical methods would work, and wanted to stop people wasting money and delaying ‘proper’ medical treatment.

In August 1943, the Ministry of War Transport was directed by the MOI to display the montaged figures 253 and 254 on railway sites, including the Underground.\textsuperscript{72} Figure 253, obviously aimed at men, depicts a bride in pure white. At the time women would have been expected to be pure at marriage, although the same standards were not applied to men. She is heading towards grasping, shadowy hands (the concept of shadows is discussed on page 213). It is designed to induce feelings of guilt in a man committing the ‘vile’ moral crime of infecting his wife and the children yet to come. At a time when knowledge of contraception was still limited, the assumption is that there will be children. In figure 254, children are perceived as ‘the future’, as ‘tomorrow’s citizen’. Aimed at future parents of both sexes, the poster follows eugenics ideals; parenthood is something one should be ‘fit’ for, something to be earned. The poster does not specify the symptoms of VD, or the way in which a child would be disabled, as the word ‘handicapped’ alone would probably strike fear. The spotlight shines on a young, innocent looking boy, with the shadow behind of a young man, standing tall and straight: what he should grow up to be if his progress is not hampered by VD.

Designed by Reginald Mount, including the copy, figure 255 has since become a very famous design. It, however, was simply the first of three posters, designed to indicate that VD was not just caught from prostitutes, reflecting worries about ‘amateurs’ who

\textsuperscript{71} For instance, the pamphlet ‘What are the venereal diseases?’ was issued by the Central Council for Health Education in December 1942, and can be found in M-O T/C 12, Box 1/H.

\textsuperscript{72} PRO MH 55/2323, ‘Venereal Disease Treatment Services’, June 1943. PRO RG 23/56, ‘The campaign against venereal diseases by P.J. Wilson and V. Barker’, January 1944: 45,000 Crown Folio posters of figure 253 and 50,000 Crown Folio copies of figure 254 were distributed to Local Authorities for display ‘in public lavatories and elsewhere’. 5,000 larger Double Royals of each were distributed for display in L.T.P.B. underground stations.
harboured the disease. Distribution of the poster was restricted to some 500 copies, and certain port areas, with an obvious male audience intended. The flower on the hat has a certain fleshy ‘unhealthiness’, viewed as a ‘symbol of enticement’. The skull gives an indication of the ‘kiss of death’, smiling as it beckons (emphasised by the text) the man towards the faceless ‘easy’ woman. The veil adds a furtive atmosphere to all this, suggesting that the true nature of the woman cannot be seen, that she is behaving in a ‘shady’ manner, as a prostitute would. The message is consistent with Victorian moral discourses of sexuality: a man has natural sexual urges, whilst a woman should remain a virgin until marriage, otherwise be stigmatised ‘easy’. The diseases are specified, and the medical damage spelt out, although not the emotional damage. The government appeared to be less in favour of religious or particularly emotional messages. Medicine allowed the problem to be dealt with in the present, in a pragmatic way. Religion, however, deals with the hereafter and while redemption is possible, some viewed the hereafter as pre-ordained.

In early 1945 a series of seven posters was offered free to local authorities, consisting of three pictorial designs (figures 256 to 258), and four non-pictorial, designs (figures 259 to 262). Several VD images use the colour red, signifying danger in western cultures, and in the pictorial designs the VD letters are used to graphically reinforce their message with a blood-red shadow falling over lives. The image of a shadow often recurs throughout designs dealing with VD, indicating something that darkens, or lurks, maybe in the background, damaging what it casts its range over. The image would have been familiar from other health campaigns about the ‘shadow on the lung’, tuberculosis (TB). The shadow has long and evocative associations in discourse. It draws on religious ideas of coming out of the dark into the light, enlightenment coming from education, urban living in enclosed and shadowy areas; and criminal activity transacted in furtive, secretive, shadowy areas. The subject for figure 256 is a woman, with VD a threat to her happiness, damaging her potential chances at marriage, thought the key path to happiness for women in the 1940s. For the man, the shadow is on health (figure 257), rather than on happiness. The significance of this unclear, although women were maybe deemed more concerned with ‘emotions’, men with concrete ‘health’. The woman looks apprehensively over her shoulder, although whether she is ‘to blame’ or an ‘innocent victim’ is unclear. The man

has a different gaze that connects with the viewer, possibly to induce feelings of guilt. The use of photographs for these images indicates ‘reality’, ‘real people’ have this problem, and so could the viewer of the poster. The persons used in these images look serious, young and middle class, challenging the traditional conception of VD as a problem of the urban poor.

The poster ‘Shadow on his future’ (figure 258) purveys a similar message, although allowances would have to be made for a slightly different audience. This would have been aimed at both parents, one of whom may be an ‘innocent’ party. No trace can be found of a similar poster dealing with her future. The poster particularly deals with syphilis, an inheritable condition, and stresses the need for clean living to allow the family the best future. Children and babies are often represented as ‘the future’ of a nation, although this appears to be focusing on the child as an individual, to get (future) parents to think about the facts. It does not specify how it will affect the child, with accompanying literature able to give more medical detail. The message is a very emotional, hard-hitting one, aimed at inspiring guilt about the potential to damage future generations.

The remainder of the 1945 campaign used only text, no images (figures 259 to 262), possibly indicating times when it was questioned how to illustrate such a sensitive topic to appropriate audiences, or a wish not to categorise the target audience. Significantly, the text in many posters is serious, grave-like and monumental in style. In figure 259, it was seen as the duty of ‘every citizen’ to know about VD, presumably to aid prevention. The emphasis on ‘clean living’ indicates that those who did contract VD were ‘dirty’ in some way, and treatment almost appears to be offered as an afterthought. In figure 260, ‘evil’ and ‘menace’ are not friendly terms. Such terms were used in the Second World War in relation to VD, demonstrating ideas of the ‘enemy within’. Within these posters particular subjects are not identified, no class or gender divisions appear, although provision of free treatment indicates that it was the poor who were particularly seen as a problem. Although VD is seen as a ‘great’ problem, with ‘grave’ and deathly consequences, there is no stress on speed of treatment as in previous posters (figures 250 to 251). The major emphasis is on prevention, with an emphasis on clean living as the ‘real’ and ‘only’ ‘safeguard’, was consistent with the interwar idea that ‘where there’s dirt there’s danger’ (figure 60).

---

75 TB had long-lasting effects after the first infection, and was never quite shifted for good.  
76 This was later echoed in the AIDS posters of the nineteen-eighties (figure 264).
figure 261, VD is not just a threat to the individual: eugenics ideas surface as it is perceived as a threat to ‘the whole nation and to the future of our race’. Those who run the risk are failing in their moral duties as a citizen by being careless. Figure 262 has space in the centre available for overprinting of times and location of confidential treatment centres. The poster is informational rather than emotional, containing no visuals, aside from an official logo, and an arrow leading to more information. Such posters were a staple part of every campaign, and would have built on those in 1943 that had been widely displayed on hoardings, in public buildings, stations, and were not confined to public lavatories as previous placards were.77 Photographic displays were also used, presumably issued blank, with the message changed according to the location (figure 263).

Henrion, responsible for the photographic designs in the series, used uplighting to make the atmosphere look sinister. Two other posters that look rather like they belong to, or are a continuation of, the same series, although possibly not produced until the late 1940s, are figures 265 and 266. Once again the theme of shadows, and the emphasis on skilled treatment is used. In figure 265, the wording draws attention to parents, throwing equal responsibility onto them for the child as the future. If one parent was irresponsible, the other had to deal with the consequences, and needed to be persuaded to overcome shame, anger at betrayal, and fear of the consequences, to be treated. In figure 266 the faces are unseen, indicating that this could be anyone, although in this case a middle-class male/female couple is depicted. The cinema, often the place for a first date, offers a shadowy atmosphere that may allow for ‘unsavoury’ behaviour. We note throughout that the assumed audience for these posters was a heterosexual one. In wartime homosexuality was illegal, and thus was not officially perceived to exist.78

Figures 267 and 268, not necessarily produced by the MOH as they do not have the logo which the MOH appeared happy to place on its other posters, stress the idea of the damage to the home. At the centre of this discourse lies the idea of the home at the heart of the nation, with its gendered notions of citizenship. Homes had already been split by war, through evacuation, and service overseas, and damage limitation needed to be applied. In figure 267, the use of red could indicate danger, a red light district, or a red traffic light indicating ‘stop’. The poster presents a stark image with a stark message. The letters ‘VD’

77 PRO RG 23/56, op.cit., January 1944.
take over most of the poster, casting a shadow over the whole life. The person, of unclear class, but almost certainly a man, is depicted in the centre of the poster in a very dejected attitude, head bowed in shame. In figure 268, the letters ‘VD’ take on the function of an image, depicted as a V-bomb, arriving fast and unexpectedly, something people would have been very familiar with. The poster depicts structural damage, but it is clear it is the emotional life of the home that will be damaged. There is a very clear graphic message although no people are depicted. The colour red again stands out, and we have to question whether it was chosen for its ‘dangerous’ connotations, or whether it was simply a typical colour for a roof. As we saw on page 68, the public was most accepting of the idea that abstract, non-representational forms, such as those used in figures 267 to 269, conveyed moral messages.

The campaigns aimed at the military have a slightly different tone, ‘construed not so much in religious terms, but in terms of civic responsibility’.79 As we saw on page 202, the armed forces had a long history of dealing with the problem of VD, felt to interfere with the smooth running of warfare. Abram Games, working for the War Office, produced posters for ABCA, providing educational material to the armed forces. Figure 269, ‘Guard against VD’, is one of his modern designs, published in 1941. Stark colours and stark design present the issue as black and white. The outline, with a forage cap, is of an ordinary soldier. Not identified as a particular type, it could be any soldier, in the same way as VD could strike anyone. With a play on words, the soldier must be ‘on guard’ against VD, in the same way he is ‘on guard’ as part of his regular military duties, keeping upright and straight. The incidence of VD is linked with the idea of being drunk, persuading soldiers to ‘keep sober’, although getting drunk was one way out from the fighting and killing. It is not clear however, that it is sending out a moral message. It does not indicate that abstinence is the key; rather, that there is a need to be sober enough to remember to use protection. There are seen to be duties appealing to different emotions: there are appeals to self-interest; appeals to protective instincts towards ‘womenfolk’; appeals to pro-Soviet feelings; and appeals to patriotism. Figure 270 was produced in both blue and brown, both fairly dull colours, although the letters ‘VD’ are in red, raising the question of how much attention the designers wished to attract attention to the poster.

poster is aimed at men in the armed forces, away for a long time and likely to forget the women they had left, designed to make men stop and think. If they were behaving in a two faced manner writing loving letters home whilst sleeping around, they needed to think again, although whether this was through abstinence or prophylaxis is unclear.

It is not clear if figure 271 is even a British image. It looks quite different from all the other images seen, and the uniform looks American, but it is lodged with the British posters at the IWM. There is always the possibility that it was part of the VD campaign for American troops in England mentioned in *Advertiser’s Weekly*. This was to ‘be launched by means of special posters, cartoons and educative talks on the dangers of the disease’. The couple appears to be doing the jitterbug, associated in popular parlance with bad habits. She appears to be dancing seductively and is depicted as a ‘loose woman’, ready to be ‘picked up’, with a short skirt, heels, nylons, and the latest haircut. Behind the happy looking scene, the dangers of VD are clearly spelt out alongside the skull, noted earlier as associated with death. Only three facts are provided to remember, although one would have to be up close to read them; but the fiery orange colour would make the poster stand out from a distance.

Figure 272 is a very different poster from all those previously discussed, very wordy, probably intended for placement in areas like a mess where there would be time to read it properly. Who would wish to be seen looking so closely at the text, attracting a bad reputation, or ribbing from their colleagues must be questioned. The letters ‘VD’ function as image as there are no others, and every sentence begins with a confrontational ‘venereal disease’ highlighted in red. A medical prevention model is evident, with the words ‘entirely preventable’ emboldened. The alliteration plays a rather strained rhyme: ‘venereal disease means victory delayed’. The soldier is damaging *his* (unless this was also displayed in female service areas) duty as a citizen. ‘Your release can be delayed’ (figure 273) was obviously produced near the end of the war, or even early post-war, with demobilisation clothes visible. With the end of the war in sight, and the soldiers returning home, the need to cure VD in soldiers became more urgent. Even without compulsory schooling, there was obviously expected to be recognition of a cell shape, referring to the medical model of understanding. The cell contains calendar dates, indicating the passing of time, promoting the all too familiar idea of the danger of delay, although in this case there is more a fear
that demobilisation will be delayed. In figure 274, the bacterial shape is again evident. At the end of the war, ‘delay’ could mean men missing the chance to get the boat home. The man in the image is rather comic looking, the everlasting fool. The red text is designed to be eye-catching and bold, although there are minimal other colours used.

Irresponsible sexual behaviour did not just affect the individuals involved. It had consequences for the whole nation, for the outcome of the war, and for ‘innocent’ parties affected by others who by implication were ‘bad’. A constant stress is evident throughout the poster campaigns on the availability of ‘free and confidential treatment’. Dealing with the problem appeared to be more important than ‘punishing’ those involved with public pillorying or financial penalties, continuing pre-war thinking that treatment was the key way to deal with the problem. The most important message to get across was to ensure that people knew what facilities were available. Exactly what is at stake, and the damage caused, is generally not spelt out. Often the threats are rather vague and non-medical, playing on emotions of guilt and fear. We have seen an emphasis on ‘duty’, the duty of citizenship, to women, children, the country, the race, the future, rather than any religious or moral messages. Unlike in the past, blame was attributed in a gender-neutral fashion, although we see a protective attitude to women and children emerging, consistent with the idea of building up the nation. The designs used in the VD campaigns draw primarily on scientific discourse, but also moral discourse, to get their message across. Strong graphic design styles, non-realistic elements, and photography were all used in an effort to demonstrate that the issue is one that can be tackled in a modern and scientific way. Stereotypical ‘medical’ staff are featured, and there is constant reference to the need for swift medical treatment, with moral behavioural changes advocated as a secondary message. The message is a difficult one to represent; too much detail would have been resented, and, unlike in the ‘careless talk’ campaigns, there is little humour evident. The statements used within the posters, however, are direct: ‘you will’, rather than ‘you might’ is the message, whether traditionally moral, or modern scientific.

**The Reception of VD Posters**

Within the questionnaires circulated for this project in 1998, respondents were asked if there were any poster campaigns they particularly remembered. The interest in this case study was partly triggered by information received from a respondent:

---

The one that seems very funny to me now but not at the time was VD Kills. In those days such a thing was never mentioned such was the ignorance, but it must have been a very big problem as this was the largest poster of the lot. When you asked about it, a look of horror would come over the person’s face and you would get no explanation. Then one of the schoolboys got the full facts from a soldier at the nearby camp. “You went deaf, and blind and your nose fell off” and you caught this affliction by talking to girls. Needless to say after that you only spoke to boys. I remember averting my eyes every time I passed that poster.81

My research did not identify any posters using the phrase ‘VD Kills’, although VD was certainly viewed as dangerous to society and the individual. The interwar educational efforts of local and central government were believed to have led to widespread knowledge about VD, but the rising incidence after the outbreak of war had led to calls for special measures to check the spread of the disease.82

A small mention of VD campaigns, obviously based on a press release, can first be found in Advertiser’s Weekly on 5 November 1942, giving information on the publicity in preparation by the CCHE for the MOH. It was hoped that support would be given by the press, through editorials, with a ‘realistic attitude’ adopted.83 Press support for the campaign was vital, but in February 1943, Advertiser’s Weekly noted that the press were not allocating the subject space.84 The Daily Mirror devoted a whole page to attacking the ‘humbug and hypocrisy with which the subject of venereal disease has been surrounded’. Under the headline ‘False modesty won’t stop this disease’, they detailed the changes that newspapers had made to original copy supplied by the MOH and attacked the ‘optimistic complacency which is based on the assumption that if only a thing can be kept hidden it will disappear’.85 In December 1942, Mass-Observation (M-O) questioned people about press advertisements. 50% still seemed ignorant about the subject, with only about 10% embarrassed, although some men worried about their womenfolk viewing the subject in the

81 Male, Rotherham, reply to questionnaire, March 1998.
82 PRO MH 55/2325, ‘Central Council for Health Education, VD Publicity Campaign, Medical Advisor’s Correspondence’, September 1942.
84 Anonymous, ‘Newspapers Cause Last-Minute Hitch in V.D. Campaign’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 119, No. 1,553, February 25 1943, p.169. Those newspapers that still refused to print the advertisement were Observer (although they were prepared to print if further changes were made), Daily Express, Dumbarton Herald, Glasgow Citizen, Dundee Courier, Dundee Evening Telegraph, and Yorkshire Evening Press.
papers. Few understood the different venereal diseases, although ‘the pox’ and ‘the clap’ were referred to and in one case the ‘venerable’ disease.\textsuperscript{86}

M-O was responding to a government request to investigate attitudes towards the anti-VD campaign. There was largely approval, both for the campaign and for Regulation 33B, although some felt that it did not go far enough and that regular checks should be made on people for the infection. There was some resistance to Regulation 33B, with fears that it would drive the disease even further underground, but little ‘on the ground that existing treatment facilities were adequate and used by all who needed them’. There was a ‘fear of blackmail’, and worries that ‘it interfered with the liberty of the individual’, as the CD Acts had proved in the 1860s. A great variety of opinion existed as to what people thought constituted the best way of reducing VD, with the need to combat ignorance and superstition through education key. In general there was a tendency for women to be more inhibited about the subject of VD than men and to be more afraid to bring it out in the open.\textsuperscript{87} In January 1943, M-O observed a MOH ‘Fighting Fit’ Exhibition at Charing Cross Station. The last panel of this exhibition was concerned with VD and the need to ‘find out the facts’. Some comments were overheard but none regarding the VD panels, although they observed a woman pick up leaflet, peer at it short-sightedly, look at the title ‘venereal disease’, throw it down in disgust and leave.\textsuperscript{88}

The Minister of Health commented that Home Intelligence (HI) reports were ‘of great help in the development of our general publicity on this delicate subject’, influencing the ‘substance and emphasis’ of publicity.\textsuperscript{89} Fife Clark of the MOH commented that regular reports on the progress of the VD campaign were particularly useful as ‘public feeling on

\textsuperscript{86} M-O, T/C 12, Box 1/A, ‘Impressions from questions regarding press advertisements’, December 14-16 1942.
\textsuperscript{87} M-O, T/C 12, Box 1/A, Report from investigation into attitudes to venereal disease. The survey was limited to London, and M-O recognised that as a cosmopolitan city, the findings could not necessarily be applied nation-wide. The following suggestions were also made: compulsory notification and treatment, the provision of approved brothels, the inspection of prostitutes, medical examinations for the entire population, increased self-discipline, the use of precautions and preventative measures were also suggested. Some women suggested that young girls should take ‘greater care in their choice of friends’. Men tended to suggest most often that the social stigma at present attached to all who suffered from VD should be removed. A minority of women looked on VD as arising essentially from immoral and antisocial behaviour and feared than the lifting of this taboo would result in the spread of immorality.
\textsuperscript{88} M-O, T/C 13, Box 1/A, ‘MS, Observations at ‘Fighting Fit’, Ministry of Health Exhibition, Charing Cross Station’, January 11 1943.
\textsuperscript{89} PRO INF 1/285, ‘Home Intelligence: Special Enquiries into Use of Home Intelligence Reports, Sir William Jameson, Minister of Health’, September 14 1943.
this subject does not express itself through the ordinary channels of opinion’. The first comments on VD in HI reports appeared in October 1942, after Sir Wilson Jameson’s broadcast. Favourable comment was received, although the subject was still felt to be too ‘hush hush’, with a need for more detail on symptoms. By December 1942 there was much of comment on VD, and on the recently introduced Regulation 33B, of which the details were little understood. By March 1943, comment was appearing on the content of advertisements, felt to be readable and human. It was believed that ‘frankness should not be sacrificed to prudery’, and more wanted the consequences to be stressed, rather than the moral tale. The rate of rise of the incidence of VD was lower in 1943 than in previous war years, and it was felt that the new measures of control and the educational campaign were being effective. The wide range of media used in the campaign, produced by the MOH in collaboration with local authorities, the MOI and the CCHE, appeared to be generally welcomed and approved by the public.

Between March and April 1943, the Wartime Social Survey (WSS) carried out a survey, mostly concentrated in urban areas, for the Campaigns Division of the MOI into how the first widespread MOH campaign regarding VD (in the press) was being received by the public. The VD campaign was regarded as different from previous campaigns, as it dealt with a subject that had until recently largely been regarded as taboo. Previously notices had been placed in public lavatories regarding where to obtain treatment, there had been a few films, and a few non-medical books and pamphlets, but the subject had otherwise largely been hidden from public view. The survey was intended to measure the extent of approval for the publicity, whether there should be a ‘plain and frank statement of the facts’, or whether secrecy was believed preferable, and also which advertising media were thought appropriate. The survey opened with general questions regarding MOH publicity, abandoned only if people became too embarrassed once the subject of VD was introduced, which happened in only 3% of cases. It was noted that people often became embarrassed but continued to answer the questions posed. It was realised that some might be reluctant to

---

90 Ibid., September 30 1943.
92 Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 65’, December 22-29 1942. Managements were reported to be worried about giving out information related to VD as the implication would be that the firm was the centre of infection, unless all firms gave out information.
admit that they had read the statement, fearing that as an admission of a personal reason for being interested. Further questions were therefore asked in order to suggest that these were matters in which the public had a right to be interested. 91% of interviewees approved of the use of newspapers and the wireless to remove the secrecy surrounding VD, with 52% deeming this the best way. Only 1% suggested that posters were an appropriate medium.\(^{95}\)

In early April 1943, doctors noted more patients attending clinics in expectation of a cure. HI noted less comment, although the moral approach was described as ‘useless’, with the medical angle, combined with confidentiality, expected to be successful.\(^{96}\) By the end of the month increased interest was noted as films and posters promoted discussion, and helped remove the shame associated with the topic.\(^{97}\) There were worries that increasing figures of infection indicated that the campaign was failing.\(^{98}\) Consternation increased for some, as it was felt it must be a problem for the MOH to give it such publicity.\(^{99}\) In May 1943, there were reports in the north-west that ‘loose living’ posters were being torn down almost immediately after placement. These were described as ‘melodramatic’, and ‘cheap and nasty’.\(^{100}\) In July people complained that the adverts were ‘lifeless and monotonous’ and so were not read ‘by those who need them most’. Suggestions were made that clinics should be provided at ‘ordinary’ times and places, as otherwise other people, particularly those in small towns, would ‘know’ what treatment was being obtained for.\(^{101}\) There were worries that the campaign was being given ‘too much publicity’, which would be nullified by the jokes being told about it.\(^{102}\) By August 1943 comment had declined again. Approval was still being noted, although there were doubts that it was reaching ‘the right people’ and that it was worrying the ignorant unnecessarily.\(^{103}\) In November 1943, approval was noted for the posters and publicity displayed, with desire that they should be even stronger,\(^{104}\) although some found them ‘rather embarrassing’.\(^{105}\)

\(^{95}\) PRO RG 23/38, ‘The campaign against venereal disease: A study of public attitudes to a publicity campaign, for the Ministry of Information’, April 1943. 2,459 people between the ages of fourteen and fifty were interviewed nationwide. 86% of interviewees had seen the adverts. 69% of interviewees knew what the venereal diseases were. 46% correctly knew that they spread only through sexual intercourse, although others believed that lavatory seats and drinking vessels were also possible sources.


\(^{98}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 140’, June 10 1943.


\(^{100}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No.135’, May 6 1943.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No.143’, July 1 1943.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No.146’, July 22 1943.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No.150’, August 18 1943.

\(^{104}\) PRO INF 1/292D, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 166’, November 30 -December 6 1943.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Report, No. 170’, December 29 1943 - January 4 1944.
Early in 1944, the WSS was asked to investigate the second campaign, to find out how effective increased publicity had been. They were also asked to assess public attitudes to posters on display (still only on display on a small scale, but figures 253 to 255 and 262 were available to interviewees on small hand-held cards), the suitability of other media, the state of knowledge about VD, and to make suggestions for improvement for dealing with the issue. Again, the issue of VD was ‘hidden’ within a general survey about MOH publicity, with questions about the ‘Coughs and Sneezes’ and Diphtheria Immunisation campaigns. Only 1% of individuals refused to answer questions.106 Many had seen posters, although the largest proportion (83%) of those interviewed regarded newspapers as their main sources of information, with radio, magazines (particularly for women) and films also influential.107

Figure 253, the ‘Bride’ was noticed most in London and Northern England, and by more men than women. Out of 2,587 people interviewed, 67% made favourable comments about the poster, with comments falling into the following categories: those that thought it would make people ‘look before they leap’ into marriage; agreement that it was a crime (for men) to pass VD onto innocents; that it provided good information stressing confidentiality, and others that the ‘wording and picture catches the eye’. There was some negative comment about the poster. Some felt it was ‘too forceful, outspoken, frightening or crude’, others that it was not suitable for public display, or would not reach the intended audience, while some said that it was horrible, but served as a good warning. Other criticisms fell into the following categories: the poster implied that only men were to blame; the wording would be unclear from a distance; the meaning was unclear; or the poster lacked information. 500 in the sample chose this as the most striking poster, with 25% choosing it because the physical attractiveness of the poster, 35% because they felt it was useful for those about to get married, giving good information. This poster, as with ‘Tomorrow’s Citizen’, had been purposely designed to appeal to people’s sense of responsibility for the young and innocent

106 PRO RG 23/56, op.cit., January 1944. Some managements needed to be approached for permission to question their staff, but only five out of 3-400 managements refused. In only one case was this recorded as not wanting to take responsibility for the subject. The WSS surveyed 2,587 people aged sixteen to sixty from England and Wales. As with the previous survey, all the investigators were women. Investigators were asked to record what they thought the attitude of the person they were interviewing was. They believed more men were shy about the subject (although this was possibly a problem of women interviewers), and several women were ‘supercilious’.
but the poster was felt to appeal more directly to men, and the wording was felt to imply a reproach, and thus was not so constructively suggestive.\textsuperscript{108}

70\% of the sample made favourable comments about figure 254, ‘Tomorrow’s Citizen’. Comments fell into the following categories: its appeal to everyone; emphasising the effect on children; its direct message; and the striking shadow. Some made criticisms of this poster, complaining that the image was not forceful or striking enough; the figure of the boy was insignificant; that the picture was confusing with an unclear message; or that the colour-scheme or general layout would not catch the eye. Others complained that the poster did ‘not tell you anything’; and that ‘the results of VD should be emphasised or shown in the picture’. 905, the largest proportion, in the sample chose this as the most striking poster, few because of its physical attractiveness, most because they felt it would make a special appeal to parents because of the child. Others felt that it depicted the tragedy and suffering of the child, and others felt it had a general appeal to responsibility and decency. This poster was felt to carry a definite message urging all adults to ensure that they ‘do not risk endangering the lives of health of young people, by themselves being carriers of such a dangerous disease’.\textsuperscript{109}

Figure 255, ‘Hello boy friend’ attracted 59\% of favourable comments, falling into the following categories: a ‘good warning to young men, troops, etc’; realistic and to the point; explains the results; and good colour; and this poster was felt to ‘carry a special message to “those girls”’. 20\% made criticisms: some felt that the design was not striking enough, whilst others felt that it was too gruesome, blatant or crude. Some felt that it was horrible, but necessary, whilst others were disgusted at the thought of the poster being displayed at all. Some asked where was the ‘easy boy-friend’; others felt that it should give more detailed information; whilst others felt that it would not reach the ‘right section of the community’; and that the display should be limited to particular areas such as ports and camps. 850 in the sample chose this as the most striking poster, with 33\% choosing it because the physical attractiveness of the poster, and 32\% because they felt it got to the root of the problem. Others felt it gave good information; that it would make a particular impression on young people. Aimed at a fairly small sample, the poster was felt to gain by

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 40\% had seen posters in lavatories (highest proportions by men, in London, who were probably less shy about using such facilities), 28\% outdoors (highest proportions by men), and 15\% on railways and tube stations (highest proportions by men, in London).

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
its unusual presentation, and the clarity of its warning details about the possible results of VD.\textsuperscript{110}

The WSS was interested in the terms people used to describe VD, particularly whether medical or colloquial terms were best used in posters and accompanying literature. Those who had seen MOH publicity seemed better informed, and were more likely to recognise the correct terms than those who had not. The vast majority of those interviewed were aware that there was a need for medical advice, particularly through VD clinics. People did not wish to appear over-curious about the subject, and when asked what else they would like to know about VD, only 35\% said they wished for more information. People were generally in favour of more information on VD, although some were worried about the effects on children, particularly if children ‘were not fully enough informed to understand the real significance of the problem’. The younger age groups were shown to be relatively ignorant about the venereal diseases, and there were calls for sex education to be taught in schools and factories. Explicit knowledge about VD was felt to be essential in regard to gaining swift treatment. The survey concluded that:

\begin{quote}
[I]t is abundantly clear that far from being shocked at VD publicity, people are keen to learn everything they can about the diseases, provided the information is given in a form which they can easily understand.
\end{quote}

It was clear that people wanted knowledge, but although many professed to have no need of services, there was an emphasis on preserving privacy and anonymity of those who attended treatment centres.\textsuperscript{111}

Interviewees were questioned as to which media methods were most appropriate in disseminating knowledge about VD, and roughly 90\% agreed that newspapers, magazines, posters, radio, films and lectures were all suitable mediums, with only 3\% disagreeing with the use of posters. Concerns, proved correct by the questionnaire respondent on page 219,\textsuperscript{109} \textsuperscript{110} \textsuperscript{111}
were that children and young people would get a distorted view of sex, or that parents
would have answer awkward questions. There was a feeling that information should
change frequently, as familiarity would otherwise breed contempt. It was recognised that
newspapers, magazines, radio and lectures could appeal only to certain sections of the
community although radio and lectures were thought to be good if ‘expounded’ by the
‘right people’, such as the medically qualified or the padre. Overall there was definite
approval from 82% of the sample for the publicity on the subject, although just under half
felt there was even more that could be done in the way of publicity.112 In March 1945, the
public seemed generally in support of the campaign, with calls to increase this over the
next twelve months.113

Posters were a highly visible medium for VD campaigns, although newspapers were still
the main source of information. The campaign that was noticed by more people than other
health campaigns, possibly because of its more ‘shocking’ nature.114 People were
interviewed about VD posters with a view to seeing how they would react if they were
displayed more widely. Posters were deemed as successful for a variety of reasons: their
appeal ‘to decency and sense of social responsibility’; their appeal to particular groups in
the community; the ‘colour, design and pictorial qualities’; and the subject matter or
information they contained. The results of the survey were felt to confirm psychological
studies of advertising, which claimed that an interest in the subject in a poster was more
important than any other elements, and that positive, rather than negative suggestions were
more likely to produce desired results.115 WSS investigators checked for posters in railway
stations and public lavatories in the areas they were working. Posters did not appear to be
on display in many areas, although whether this is because there was an aversion to
displaying them, or simply because they were looking in the wrong places, or some other
reason, is not clear. Considering the placement of the posters, the investigators believed
that they would be more effective if placed in a position where the lighting was good, and
in prominent display areas. These included the centre of train platforms, rather than in

112 Ibid. HI report on October 20 1943 noted that there was approval that medical men recognised the moral
angle when a combined radio broadcast was made by a doctor and a padre. PRO INF 1/292D, ‘Home
113 PRO MH 101/31, ‘Memorandum from Ministry of Health to all Local Authorities’, March 2 1945.
114 PRO RG 23/56, op.cit., January 1944. Respondes of the survey were categorised by percentages of
visibility for buses, trains and stations; hoardings and lavatories, with the last being of particular significance
for VD campaigns (the only acceptable place for VD poster display up until the Second World War).
115 Ibid. Bartlett, F.C. Political Propaganda, 1940, p.78 noted that fear was not an affective technique,
although in many departments propaganda tended to emphasise the negative more than the positive.
corridors where people were less likely to stop. Some posters were observed to be defaced, or even torn down, and it was suggested that such posters should be placed high up, and even possibly within a frame to prevent such damage. VD posters tended to be quite small, and were thus overshadowed by large posters that surrounded them, rendering them largely ineffective. Advertiser’s Weekly criticised the colours used in figures 259 to 262, red on a black background, as once the blackout ended, mercury vapour streetlighting would again be used, and the red would fade and become a muddy brown.

Unlike previous campaigns, as a more controversial campaign, the VD campaign used a smaller, more modern, range of stylistic influences, with the main criteria that the message would reach the appropriate audience. Photography, non-representational images, montage, and abstract shapes were all elements of the modern style used, whilst text-only proclamations were also used. Most of the images are very strong, with no wishy-washy, realistic, pen-and-ink drawings as was evident in less controversial campaigns, and cartoons were used exclusively for a wholly male audience, hardened by the rigours of war. Reactions to the poster campaigns are similar to government approaches to dealing with the problem, partly because the government responded to the information gained from surveys and HI. As was seen in attempts to deal with the problem of VD before the war, the sanction of both science and religion was transferred to the campaign, although the cards were stacked more in favour of the medical approach. Moral and medical approaches to the problem of VD were not seen as polar opposites, the transfer of authority of both science and religion was applied to the message, with discourses often intermixed in a medico-moral approach. VD was constituted, or name-called, as ‘bad’ and ‘evil’, and those who ran the risk of contracting it were failing in their duty, as a citizen, to remain healthy and disease free. It was implied that everyone else was doing their duty, and thus all should jump on the ‘band-wagon’ and remain clean. The testimonials of medical and religious experts were provided in support of the campaign, and ‘card-stacking’ of the facts was applied to provide the worst-case scenario if the diseases were contracted. This continued into the war, with medical, religious, government, legal, and educational institutions

PRO RG 23/56, op.cit., January 1944. It was recognised that people might react differently, and more strongly, to a small hand-held poster about which they are being directly questioned, from the way they may view seeing the same poster on a hoarding, or in a railway station. The interviewers were influenced by anthropological studies, and considered not only what people were saying, but their body language.

influencing the campaigns. Having discussed these four case studies, the next chapter draws together the conclusions of the thesis.
Conclusion

Sixty years after the end of the Second World War, there is still a huge amount of historical interest in all aspects of the conflict. Much of it is populist material surrounded by myth, with much academic material debunking those myths. Within this literature and museumisation, propaganda continues to attract interest, and it is within this field that this project is offered. Despite a wide range of studies on propaganda, there has been no serious academic study on British home front posters from the Second World War. Most general poster studies jump the era as though unworthy of consideration. This study claims that they are worthy of consideration. Popularly, people have been interested in the project and have been able to contribute via the questionnaire and website. Academically, posters have proved worthy of deeper consideration, demonstrating that such posters were not produced in a cultural vacuum, but were drawing on longer term discourses. The questionnaire respondents held differing opinions as to the usefulness of wartime posters: a ‘necessity’ that helped people ‘pull together’;¹ a force for ‘positive motivation’ for a boy and his parents;² to just being ‘part of the scenery’.³ Within this project we have clearly demonstrated that the Second World War Home Front propaganda posters were an important part of the home front war effort. The posters visibly drew on longer term discourses, or as Huxley termed it in the 1930s, canalised ‘an existing stream’. This has been achieved using a range of archival sources, and a key theoretical underpinning.

Within the project, we investigated Foucault’s concepts of discourse analysis, which promoted the idea of the visual as a form of language. As with all types of language, the visual draws on the norms and assumptions of an established culture, and this is clearly demonstrated as the posters draw on established traditions, both in style and content. The methodological chapter established that silences and differences are concealed by dominant discourse in a move to present the ‘truth’. Propaganda cannot afford to present competing views, although in a democracy at least the illusion of choice needed to be presented, hence the submergence of legal discourses. Within discourses of citizenship, it was expected that technologies of the self would come into play, with citizens working within self-set restrictions. Texts and images have constructed (historically) specific views of the social world, presented as real and truthful. These revealed assumptions held by the

¹ Male, London, reply to questionnaire, April, 1998.
² Male, Essex, reply to questionnaire, April, 1998.
³ Male, reply to questionnaire, May, 1998.
designers, both government and artists, about (and by) their audience. The thesis demonstrates that poster images were not objective images produced in a vacuum, but produced from certain contexts, or longer term discourses that were drawn on to provide a cohesive picture of national effort. The chapter also discussed content analysis, which is used in the database. This was one of the first databases to be used for visual material, rather than data such as censuses. Visual databases are now gaining credence within the historical field, but at the start of this project were not in existence. The database was of key importance to the thesis, as such collated data did not exist elsewhere, although throughout the course of the project digital archives have increased the possibility of accessing such information.

Foucault’s concepts of discourse provided the framework for the thesis. Discourse analysis focuses on how knowledge is constructed subjectively; how it is produced and structured, largely through institutions; and considers the implicit assumptions underlying knowledge. Identifying different discourses, we can see which is the more dominant, and where discourses compete with and compliment each other. As a history project (rather than an art project) where the context is key, discourse analysis allowed us to investigate both the images and their context. As the site of production is as important, if not more so, than the images themselves, it has been important to tie the discourses to the producing institutions. As Rose outlined, the main weakness of Foucauldian discourse analysis is that it can be difficult to know where to stop setting the context, and at times the image becomes ignored as the context is focused on. Within the case studies, a concerted effort was made to link the contextual planning information to the posters being discussed in the design and reception sections, identifying the aspects of the key discourses.

These weaknesses meant that the method of discourse analysis was not used alone. A combination of the database and discourse analysis allowed key themes to be identified across a wide range of posters, produced over a long time-frame, although definitive conclusions cannot be drawn without access to all of the thousands of posters produced throughout the war. The method allowed not only the identification of strands and clusters of overlapping information, but also missing themes and silences. For instance, urban and

---

5 Throughout this thesis, information technology has contributed in many different ways, allowing access to a wide range of online information, directing attention to sources via online catalogues, and highlighting new texts available.
industrial areas were represented as clean, with dirt and smoke absent, even within bomb
damaged areas; poverty was absent from rural areas; the enemy was usually represented by
Hitler, rather than the Hun evident in the First World War; and VD in posters was always
presented as a matter of health, rather than as a matter of sex. Content analysis does reduce
the rich visual material to a set of codes which cannot distinguish between good and bad
examples of a particular code, and so the overall impression of the image is lost. Within the
case studies, however, having extracted the pertinent images from the database, discourse
analysis is applied and a more complete picture of the images appears. A prominent
methodological approach to images is semiotic analysis, but with such a strong focus on
the composition of the image itself, as a method it scarcely accounts for the historical or
social context. The combination of discourse and content analyses has allowed the
coverage of a wide range of images, fixing them within their historical context.

Before the case studies, two chapters set the context and general understanding of the
posters, through a study of propaganda theories, historical poster styles, and the Ministry of
Information’s (MOI) production processes. In Chapter 2, contemporary models of
propaganda were considered. Having reflected on these, the project’s model of how posters
worked within the British Second World War democratic propaganda effort is illustrated in
Appendix 5. Here we see how the government had to react to events, and the interaction it
had with various outside organisations. In the production of posters the government
worked within restrictions, including the availability of talent, paper, ink and printing
presses. The government made decisions whether to produce posters, and/or use other
propaganda, and whether to use legislation as well or instead. If posters were produced,
they were not working alone. As with the multi-step model, we see some of the influences
on the viewer. The viewer would then make a decision as to whether to take the required
action or not. If not, the government would then have to make decisions as to what further
measures to take, potentially legislation, such as internment to lessen the danger of spying
by foreign nationals to their home nation.

Chapter 2 also studied the various art movements that impacted on the wartime graphic
designers. As evident from the artist biographies in Volume 2, Part 2, British poster
designers used such a wide variety of styles that it can be difficult to identify a distinctive
British poster style. Some artists were members of the Royal Academy, some were trained

7 Ibid, pp.69-99.
graphic designers, some were a combination, and some were neither. What does emerge in this chapter is that the dominant British style was one of pragmatic functionalism.

Tradition was still the dominant style, but modernism, was also clearly evident, influenced by, but never going to the extremes of, European modernism. The two most obvious extremes of this are the very traditional work of Frank Newbould, and the very modern work of Abram Games, both of whom worked for the War Office in the Second World War. Increasing professionalism in the advertising industry meant that not only was there standardisation in poster sizing and display, but standardisation in technique was more common, with cleaner, less crowded designs, with a clear purpose. British graphic design, alongside international graphic design, was discussed on a regular basis in the interwar years in *Advertiser’s Week* and *Art and Industry*, and Chapter 2 highlights the European art movements that influenced British graphic design. With an emphasis on content over style, such knowledge had even filtered into the general populace who designed their own posters for specific purposes within the war.

The conventional wisdom was that posters were exhortations until Bracken was in charge of the MOI. Questionnaire respondents provided a fairly consensual opinion: ‘the posters were necessary common sense directives’, 8 and ‘they were a necessary national effort; nothing whatever to do with the life of a schoolboy’. 9 Throughout the thesis we see an emphasis on the variety of poster styles used to get the message across: the extremes of modernism and tradition in the urban and rural campaigns; the influence of the Soviet style in the industrial posters; the use of both humour and horror in the careless talk campaigns to ensure lack of boredom and achieve the widest audience; and the use of photography in the VD campaigns. When posters were objected to, it appears to be on grounds of the message, rather than the style. 10 Unlike German and Soviet posters, where styles were

---

8 Male, UK/Serving overseas, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
10 For example, Figure 18 was destroyed by order of Churchill who disliked the representation of the child with rickets, believing that it was a slur on Conservative pre-war policies, rather than on the war that the message was projected. Osley, A., *Persuading the People: Government Publicity in the Second World War*, 1995, pp.76-7, notes that figure 275 was rejected on the basis that the people in the image did not appear ‘friendly’ enough, with the image changed, the poster was re-released as figure 276. Darracott, J., and Loftus, B. (eds), *Second World War Posters*, 1972, p.65, alongside many other sources, explained that figure 277 was removed from the hoardings after complaints that the woman depicted was ‘too glamorous’, giving the wrong impression about the ATS. In Anonymous, ‘New A.T.S. Poster Girl Was in Advertising’, *Advertiser’s Weekly*, Vol. 114, No. 1,484, October 30 1941, p.100, we see how figure 278 replaced the ‘glamorous’ poster, this time depicting Private Mary Catherine Roberts, a real member of the ATS. In Anonymous, ‘Big New A.T.S. Recruit Drive Started Yesterday: Exhibitions All Over Country: New Posters’, *Advertiser’s Weekly*, Vol. 114, No. 1,486, November 13 1941, p.132, we see that Abram Games designed another, ‘less glamorous’ poster (figure 279), to accompany the realistic poster, depicting a ‘fresh and smiling girl’.
imposed from above, the British were happy to follow a laissez-faire approach: so long as the message was getting across, any style was acceptable. In a democracy, fighting a ‘people’s war’, those in positions of power had to have confidence that artists already knew the right thing to do, and trust their judgement as to the style used, rather than imposing a recognisable style.

Having recognised the importance of the MOI in the First World War, following the interwar professionalisation of the publicity industry, the MOI reformed immediately on the commencement of the Second World War. As it was not key to the project, the structure of the MOI has not been researched in depth, but it is clear that chaos was caused as departments constantly changed.\(^\text{11}\) Chapter 3 concentrated specifically on the poster producing division which, although also affected by changes within the general MOI structure, was one of the more consistent divisions. There were procedures in place, although the MOI had to both work with, and fight against, other departments that had developed in the interwar years, and specifically with the Treasury. Pragmatically, the MOI at times had to play speed against quality in preparation, and against a lack of freely available artists, at least until some were recalled in June 1942. To understand how posters worked, and to set the scene for the case studies, we examined the production of the first posters produced in the war. Throughout the war there was evidence of stronger co-ordination, more professionalism, faster production, and more cohesion, although there remained a lack of imposition of style from above. Public opinion was important, and complying with government legislation regarding posters was regarded as necessary in order not to affect the effectiveness of the message.

Initial plans were to abandon the MOI the day after Armistice with Germany, but the MOI argued that they had a role to play, at least throughout the war against Japan.\(^\text{12}\) The MOI provided a central organ of government publicity, not only technical but creative. As the Director General put in the latter part of the war, ‘I believe also that no Government after the war will either be able or expected to abandon the use of publicity in its approach to its own citizens’, although whether this would be through a central agency was a different matter.\(^\text{13}\) Bracken was convinced that the MOI should be dissolved as soon as the war


\(^{13}\) PRO INF 1/941, ‘Memo from Director General to The Minister’, undated, but October 1943-May 1944.
ended; it had, after all, been set up as a wartime organisation. A lot of press comment was also unfavourable, but *The Newspaper World* put forward the ‘advantages of preserving certain features’ of the MOI, particularly the ‘projection of Britain’ overseas, and the centralisation of specialised publicity services. Others also felt that there were lessons to be learnt from the First World War, when the MOI had disbanded so quickly: ‘What we learned in the last war, and which our enemies made the most of, we have pooh-poohed and bungled.’ They felt that it still had much to do, including the re-education of Germany, the presentation of the UK’s case abroad, and that the study of propaganda techniques, and their advancement through the study of other methods, was necessary in order to keep democracy alive. In April 1946, the MOI was absorbed into the Central Office of Information (COI):

> envisaged as a common service technical agency, charged with handling contractual questions, booking advertising space, and co-ordinating departmental campaigns. Responsibility for the initiation of publicity schemes, the formulation of policy, and the preparation of materials was assigned to each individual ministry.

The COI remains the central government information agency to this day.

In the mini case study at the end of Chapter 3, we examined the first posters produced by the MOI. In discussions over the first poster, it was expected that the poster would draw heavily on the past, in cases where the British had defended themselves, for instance by depicting medieval bowmen. In the event, the first series of posters was in the style of a proclamation, a ‘dignified’, traditional typographic design that was expected to work with a democratic monarchy. These initial posters called people to patriotically do their part in the war, in the name of the monarchy, similar to the First World War. In the First World War people had been asked (or ordered) to do something by their superiors, whereas in the Second World War people were more clearly subject to self-regulation, both by themselves and by their peers, and it became clear that the message needed to change. Those in the factories were contributing as much as those in the front line and solidarity was stressed, and the ‘enemy within’ needed to be dealt with by pulling together towards the common

---

14 PRO INF 1/76, ‘Notes from Bracken to the Press, 26 June 1944, prior to House of Commons debate on Ministry of Information Civil Estimates, 1944’, 29 June 1944.
16 Unidentified, 27 March 1941, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the IWM.
17 Barmas, J., a letter to *Advertiser’s Weekly*, undated, Ibid.
target. The four main case studies - urban and rural representations of Britain, industrial propaganda, the ‘enemy within’ and VD posters - were examined via the key contradictory and complimentary discourses that became evident in the process of writing. The body and the land are always crucial in war: the land that is being fought for, or defended, and the need for healthy bodies to fight, as other bodies are decimated in the process of war. The first case study examined what people were fighting for, and identified their ‘imagined community’ (in the words of Benedict Anderson). The second case study emphasised the idea of the island nation, and identified those involved in the industrial effort. The third case study examined who was excluded from, or was considered damaging to, the war effort, with the fourth case study exploring in detail who was compromising the effort through their sexual and moral behaviour. This was a people’s war, and throughout the thesis, we see how contributions were expected from all citizens.

Posters are intended for a mass audience and as such were perfectly suited for a people’s war, with a significant style change from the First World War. The Second World War was expected largely to be a ‘war of nerves’, with a lot more strain on, and much wider participation by, the civilian population. Poster propaganda was expected to appeal to comradeship and have a popular appeal. The posters, still remembered many years after the war, were consistent with this construction of the myth of pulling together, which has been questioned by some. Throughout the thesis the notion of ‘the people’s war’, both a contemporary concept, and popularised since the war through Calder’s 1969 book, is a consistent theme. The sources used are consistent with the idea of the people’s war. BIPO looked for the (statistic) collective effort, Mass-Observation investigated the masses but concentrated on individuals within that, and the questionnaire looked for individual remembered responses to the posters.

The idea of responsible citizenship is bound up with the concepts of mass democracy. Citizens had both rights and responsibilities, and propaganda in a democracy had to work in a different way to how it worked within a totalitarian state. Presented as information, advertising looked for conformity with its message, but did not enforce it. There was room for individual effort within the greater picture, as all were still aiming for the same overall

goal. Particularly within the industrial effort, each personal endeavour contributed to the whole. Similarly, lack of individual effort: for example those who risked venereal disease (VD), could damage the health of the nation, both literally and metaphorically. Citizenship, as the most highly visible discourse in the Second World War, looked for people to contribute to the war effort; if they did not contribute then they were stigmatised as ‘not belonging’, they were not ‘normal’. Throughout the case studies we see a series of duties for the ‘good’ citizen to commit to: the first poster was a statement of duty for the individual citizen, from the King; the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) posters appealed to the citizen soldier, looking for sacrifice; strikers within industry were viewed as committing treason; and patriotic citizens needed to ensure that their conversations were of no use to the enemy, and needed to be fit and healthy in order to fight. Along with these duties were certain rights, such as the right to civil liberties: and ID cards were not introduced until the Second World War. The right to strike still existed, and with a loss of pre-war deference, and without fear of imprisonment, these increased. We have noted that there were few legal constraints on wartime citizens, partly through pragmatism, with more emphasis placed on duties rather than restrictions. Voluntarism was key as factories lost their profit motive (although they had little choice in this, needing to take government contracts), poster display sites were offered free, local campaigns supported the national effort, and artists accepted lower pay whilst working for the MOI because they wanted to ‘do their bit’. The posters were important disseminating these messages.

Deciding their strategy for how they were going to deal with particular campaigns, the government looked to that past to see how things had been dealt with in preceding years. The MOI was built upon the ideas used in the First World War, and in dealing with spies, the First World War and the Spanish Civil War were heavily examined, although it appears that spy novels also had a part to play. Posters drew on historical discourses to present their message, not only by drawing on traditions of ‘high art’, but in the messages themselves. Newbould drew on the landscape tradition stylewise, drawing upon previous artists such as Constable, but also subject-wise, depicting the heritage vision of ‘England’s green and pleasant land’, in a similar way to how suburban houses drew on mock Tudor ideals. The rural was clearly associated with the past, and particularly with the Conservatives, and Baldwinism. The countryside was associated with something stable and long-lasting, with life itself as food could be grown, and particularly with the South, with the ‘English village’ giving a sense of community For the urban dweller, the countryside was associated
with holiday labour, essentially manual work. The countryside depicted in posters certainly appears to be unaffected by modern machinery, although preservationist movements popularly associated with tradition were often actually calling for modern methods of land management. Less obviously, churches were central features in images of traditional rural villages, and large churches such as Salisbury Cathedral and – in an urban setting - St Paul’s Cathedral are seen standing, the first amongst lush greenery, the other within the wreckage of a bombed London. Religious and moral discourses are clearly associated with the past and tradition. The war was presented as a case of ‘right over might’: Britain was something that should be saved. One’s own country was something that one should not ‘betray’. Victorian moral values are clearly expressed throughout the case studies, including the protestant work ethic in industry, the secrecy surrounding the subject of VD, and the notion of immoral and antisocial behaviour. The traditional power and authority of the church was transferred to propaganda messages, with religious discourses most clearly evident in the VD campaign, where VD, and the thoughtlessness of those who dared run the risk of transferring it, were evil.

Modernity was presented as a scientific, largely secular belief, and Pick described modern art as ‘morally lax’ when there was no purpose to it. It was associated with the cult of the new, of change, of the importance of the future, rather than the traditions of the past. Modern methods of doing things included increased professionalism, and the idea that things could be planned for. Planning for the MOI started in 1935, and every poster campaign was planned over time, although propaganda was deemed difficult to plan too early as it would be out of date before posted. Although the past was generally associated with the rural effort, and the urban with the future, the industrial revolution was also presented as part of England’s ‘glorious past’, helping to shape the nation. The miner was symbolically central to this effort, who could still, however, be perceived to be making his effort from the land, although his product was largely being used to fuel industrial living. Prostitution and spies were both more closely associated with urban areas than rural areas. Both were activities to be carried out in the shadows, and would have been easier to spot in rural areas. VD was presented as something that should be associated with the Victorian industrial past, not with a bright, clean, new scientific future. Those who risked VD risked the future of their families, constructed as the future of the nation as a whole.
The UK had traditionally been presented as an island nation, with a proud naval tradition. In the Second World War the technologically advanced airborne enemy was to be more feared, and industrially prepared for. The industrial effort was particularly associated with the North, the dirty ‘world’s workshop’, although many of the factories involved in the war effort were consumer factories based in the South. Much of the modern war effort depended on industrial production, and on efficient and professional production, with complicated technological equipment to produce. Modern American interwar studies conducted into time, motion and efficiency were obviously influential, divorcing workers from the final product, and presenting new hazards to be protected from. Other modern ideas, particularly the notion of scientific medicine, were key: the idea of treatment (of VD) rather than simply prevention, which was more of a moral argument. Science and technology were key to the war effort, with key military developments. Not only was the success of the posters judged through ‘scientific’ surveys, particularly through Mass-Observation, but quantified measurement of results was expected. Improvements in photography and communication were down to new technology, and the photographic style gave a realism to messages that the government wanted to get across. Modern propaganda relied on modern methods of communication, which, along with other technology, including the means of travel, had advanced a great deal during the interwar years. The benefits of this were a wide range of communication methods available to government, improvements in graphic design after artists had travelled, professionalisation of the advertising industry and development of the experience of political propaganda, both internally and through external campaigns such as the interwar Empire campaigns. The corollary is that spies, and black propaganda, were also more dangerous as the ‘enemy within’ also had access to these modern communication methods.

Yet the discourses within the thesis are evidently also contradictory. In some eyes urban living was associated with dirt, death and disease, and many saw urban living as a temporary measure before they could return to the ‘real’ Englishman’s home, the rural. Some attempted to recreate rus in urbe, for example in the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaigns.

---

Modern graphic techniques, such as those used by Games, were used to convey the message of a modern future. Dirty heavy industry factories were being replaced in the interwar years by cleaner, more modern factories, and Games’ vision of the old, urban, decaying past to be covered by the progress of the planned urban future developed from this. The future was something to be planned for, urban development was to be properly planned to give everyone a clean, hopeful, fit-for-purpose, future: the ‘New Jerusalem’. Communism, socialism and the Soviets were associated with highly-planned urban economies, Churchill was against planning the post-war world, but by the Second World War, the UK was already a highly planned nation, for example with regular inter-war health promotion campaigns. It is noticeable that if propaganda campaigns were not backed up by well-planned practical arrangements, including recruitment campaigns to industry, those who had responded to the campaigns were annoyed and carried negative associations with the message. In 1945, the Labour Government was elected on a clear manifesto for a planned future, and ‘as usual, the voters showed more signs of reacting against an unpleasant experience in the past than of deliberately embracing a doctrinaire programme for the future.’

Throughout the case studies two key power relations are evident: gender, both masculinity and femininity; and identification of ‘the other’. Within the rural landscape, and even within the industrial setting, women’s work is presented with the potential for glamour: women still retain the aura of femininity. On the land, women are set within picturesque surroundings, encircled by cute animals. In the factories women partake of the lighter work, and many of the posters are more focused on their appearance and dress code than the scope of their work. On both the land and within the factory, the men do the heavy work, although on the land this is largely focused on manual labour, whilst in the factory the men are perceived to deal with the heaviest and most complicated machinery. Within the second pair of case studies, covering the ‘enemy within’ and the anti-VD campaigns, both men and women can be seen in a negative and a positive light. The woman is negatively the gossip, the seducer, full of glamour, although also positively presented as the great mother or the innocent victim of VD. The man is negatively presented as the show-off, the thoughtless carrier of infection, the foolish man, but also positively as the man stolidly (or stoically) keeping his mouth shut, fighting for his country, or wisely keeping clear of infection in order to protect his family.

Throughout the case studies we have seen that the posters sought to identify the good citizen, and thus by default also identified the ‘non-citizen’, ‘the other’ who did not fulfil the criteria of good citizenship. Within an industrial setting the worker who cannot produce the required amount of work, to the required standard, or prevents others from doing the same, is identified as ‘useless’ and outside of normal citizenship. The spy, both internally and externally, is clearly identified, through his or her physical features and behaviour, as ‘the other’, as is the person at danger of passing on VD, particularly the prostitute.

Throughout the thesis, the idea of the ‘professional’ is clearly evident, with the ‘non-professional’ as ‘the other’. There were a lot of complaints in the press that the MOI employed more civil servants than it did advertising professionals, although the general public believed that advertising was something that anyone could do. Those in industry needed to be properly trained for the job: the idea of a professional intelligence service had developed in the interwar years, and medical treatment to cure VD was to be given only by trained doctors, rather than ‘quack’ doctors. The idea of training and education was an important development in wartime, and the posters themselves were a form of informal education. The ABCA movement was all about education, and Abram Games’ ‘Your Britain’ poster for ABCA (figure 19) demonstrated a form of official sanction for social reform, which culminated in the Education Act of 1944. It was not only the modernists who held a vision of the benefits of education, however, as evidenced by inter-war campaigns, some of which continued into the Second World War, educating users to respect the countryside, and educating citizens to prevent and treat VD.

The British have a reputation for possessing a distinct laissez-faire attitude, and throughout this thesis we have seen demonstrations of this from the government which support this argument. The government belief, or that of Churchill at least, was that the future be allowed to take care of itself whilst the war was fought. The government refused to force separate publicity departments into the MOI, and there was no imposition of a poster style on artists, unlike in Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union, a highly planned economy, where the Soviet Realism style was imposed. There was, however, clear evidence of state intervention, and the very fact that the MOI existed demonstrated a government concern with the efforts of their citizens. The MOI gradually became more centralised, becoming the COI at the end of the war, allowing proper balance to be given to campaigns. The state kept a close watch on rumours, issued counter-rumours, and indeed prosecuted people for
rumour-mongering and defeatism, and legislation was also considered in the VD campaign. Planning, clearly not laissez-faire, was also evident in looking towards the future, improving conditions for citizens, with health and education all round, but there was also to be protection of the national heritage. Throughout the case studies the discourse of protection constantly appeared. In the first case study the heritage of the UK was to be protected, while in the industrial case study the workers needed to protect themselves, and thus the overall war effort, by avoiding accidents. In the ‘enemy within’ citizens needed to protect themselves from danger, and in the VD case study, citizens needed to protect themselves from disease.

In drawing together the conclusions of this thesis, we have had to be aware of making sweeping statements. The posters of the Second World War evidently drew heavily on longer term discourses emanating from new and established institutions, although there was often a clear distinction between those that drew on the past and tradition, and those that pushed forward to the future. Such is the significance of the discourses identifiable in wartime posters, that the posters continue to resonate with a modern day audience. Vintage wartime posters sell well, and the IWM has a wide-range of reproduction items that appear popular. Some of these items, including postcards and keyrings, are aimed at the 'pocket-money' market, and wartime posters are a popular subject for study in primary schools. The IWM produces poster packs aimed at Key Stage 2, and both today, and in wartime, posters are something that children enjoy designing themselves. The posters themselves are sometimes re-used in another context, for example, as on the front cover of

---

25 Some designs may only fetch a few pounds, but others can fetch large sums. For instance, a small copy of figure 3 by Fougasse, advertised for sale by www.rennart.co.uk in 2002, for £225-250. Marsh, M. (ed.), Miller’s Price Guide: Collectables 2002/3, 2002, p.237; a double-crown copy of figure 277 by Abram Games, signed by the artist and accompanied by a scrapbook of press-cuttings, was advertised by in Onslow’s Catalogue, September 1989 (Lot. 276), for £1,000-£1,500 (this is now in the IWM); and in Onslow’s Catalogue, April 2002, (Lot 261), a version inscribed ‘to my Poster Girl model herself’, signed by Games in August 1941, was anticipated to fetch £1,500-2,000. See Gleeson, J., Collecting Prints and Posters 1997, pp.92-93 for information on valuation of posters, and factors affecting price, which can include the subject-matter or the artist.

26 These include reproduction double-crown posters, postcards, playing cards, mugs, keyrings, jigsaws and chocolate bars. These items have remained stock items at the IWM Museum shops for many years, and thus it can be assumed that they sell well. IWM Catalogue.


books to attract a new audience.\(^{30}\) In 1999, a wartime *Coughs and Sneezes Spread Diseases* poster was used on the front-cover of a flu jab leaflet aimed at pensioners who were likely to remember that original.\(^{31}\) The Constable-influenced ‘Your Britain’ designs by Newbould (figures 14 to 17) have been re-used in protectionist arguments,\(^{32}\) and the images have been subverted by artists such as Micah Wright. Wright’s images at first glance appear to be the original designs, but on a closer look, the message has been subverted to present an anti-War or an anti-Bush message (see figure 280, subverted from figure 110).\(^{33}\) It is clear that a great deal of nostalgia still surrounds Second World War posters, yet this thesis, anchors these posters firmly back into their historical context.

---


Bibliography

Unpublished Sources

Manuscripts and Archives

Art Department, Imperial War Museum, London

Imperial War Museum Poster Database (Only available locally)
Original posters
Scrapbooks of newspaper cuttings: Abram Games, Artist; ATS Glamour Girl History, 1939-1985; Edwin Embleton, Studio Director, Ministry of Information (1939-1947); F.H.K. Henrion, Artist; Kenneth Bird (Fougasse), Artist

Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge

CHURCHILL, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965), Chartwell Trust Papers, 1874-1945. (CHAR)

House of Lords Record Office, London

Hist. Coll. 184, Beaverbrook Papers
Hist. Coll. 270, Davidson Papers
Hist. Coll. 271, Davidson Papers

London Transport Museum, London

London Transport Poster Database (Only available locally)

Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex

Mass-Observation File Reports:

FR 2: Government Posters in Wartime: Effectiveness of Posters, October, 1939
FR 5: Six Railway Posters: Preferences in Design, October 1939
FR 116: US 16-17: Digging for Victory: War and the Churches; Health and War, May 1940
FR 283: Press Prestige: Distrust of Press, June 1940
FR 286: Prediction, restriction and jurisdiction: Enemy propaganda, control of rumour, restriction of civilian activity and reaction of public to new military-civil courts, p.6 missing, June 1940
FR 306: Testing the Slogan “Go To It!”: Propaganda to assist war production, June 1940
FR 442: Slogan: “Be Like Dad, Keep Mum”: Reactions, October 1940
FR 615: Why appeal to women?: Criticism of Bevin’s appeal to women to contribute to the war effort, March 1941
FR 673: Saturation of Instructions: Efficacy of Government propaganda, April 1941
FR 1536: Have you a mind of your own: Article by Kathleen Raine in Modern Woman about the influence of propaganda, December 1942
FR 1630: Various indirects collected during the week of 15 March 1943: Reports of informal conversations on Russia, General Giraud and General de Cauille, careless talk in hairdressers’ shops, March 1943
FR 1633: VD Publicity and the Press: Reactions to VD advertisements in the newspapers, March 1943
FR 1634: Fortnightly bulletin (4): Gandhi, the Beveridge Debate, Russia and morale, rumours and grumbles, March 1943

Mass-Observation Topic Collections:
TC 12: SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR 1939-50, Box 1
TC 13: HEALTH 1939-49, Box 1
TC 42: POSTERS 1939-47, Boxes 1 to 4
TC 43: PROPAGANDA AND MORALE 1939-44, Boxes 1 to 5
TC 75: INDUSTRY 1939-55, Box 3

National Art Library, Victoria & Albert Museum, London
Power of the Poster Information File, containing newspaper cuttings.

Prints Department, Victoria & Albert Museum, London
Original posters

Public Record Office, London
Public Record Office Classifications:
AVIA 22: Ministry of Supply: Registered Files, 1934-1962
BW 8: British Council: Registered Files, West Africa, 1939-1949
CAB 16: Committee of Imperial Defence, Ad Hoc Sub-Committees: Minutes, Memoranda and Reports, 1905-1939
CAB 21: Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916 to 1965) 1916-1973
CAB 87: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Committees on Reconstruction, Supply and other matters: Minutes and Papers (RP, SLAO and other Series), 1941-1946
CAB 117: War Cabinet: Reconstruction Secretariat: Correspondence and Papers 1940-1945
HLG 7: Ministry of Health: Second World War Special Wartime Functions, Registered Files (LN and other series) and Papers 1925-1954
INF 1: Ministry of Information: Files of Correspondence, 1936-1950
   INF 2: Ministry of Information and Central Office of Information: Guard Books and Related Unregistered Papers, 1939-1978
INF 3: Ministry of Information: Original Art Work, 1939-1946
INF 4: Ministry of Information and Predecessors: War of 1914 to 1918 Information Services, 1915-1943
LAB 8: Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series), 1907-1979
MAF 39: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and predecessors: Establishment and Finance: Correspondence and Papers, 1839-1965
MAF 58: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and predecessors: Agricultural Machinery Correspondence and Papers, 1920-1967
MAF 59: Board of Agriculture and successors: Women’s Land Army, 1916-1985
MAF 102: Ministry of Food: Services Department: Public Relations Group, 1938-1955
MH 55: Ministry of Health: Health Divisions: Public Health Services, Registered Files (93,000 Series) and Other Records, 1853-1970
MH 71: Ministry of Health: Various Committees’ Correspondence, Minutes and Reports, 1916-1958
MH 78: Ministry of Health and predecessors and successor: Establishment and Organization Files, 1862-1985
MH 101: Ministry of Health: War Diaries, Second World War, 1938-1946
MH 102: Home Office: Children’s Department: Registered Files (Six Figure Series), 1850-1971
PIN 8: Ministry of National Insurance and predecessors: Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services Committee (Beveridge Committee), correspondence, papers and registered files (NI 99 series), 1939-1946
PREM 1: Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1916-1940, 1914-1940
T 161: Treasury: Supply Department: Registered Files (S Series), 1905-1961

Wellcome Institute, London

PP-JRH: James Randal Hutchinson (c.1880-1955) and William Henry Bradley (1898-1975) of the Ministry of Health.
SA-PVD: National Society for the Prevention of Venereal Diseases
SA-BSH: British Social Hygiene Council formerly The National Council for Combatting Venereal Diseases (f.1914 name changed 1925)

Theses

Allen, M., ‘A Railway Revolution? A census-based analysis of the economic, social and topographical effects of the coming of the railway upon the city of Winchester c. 1830 - c. 1890’, King Alfred’s College (Southampton University): Unpublished PhD, 1999

Boon, T.M., ‘Films and the contestation of public health in interwar Britain’, University of London (Wellcome Institute): Unpublished PhD, 1999


Lewis, R., ‘Second World War home front propaganda posters: the fourth armament?’ University of Southampton (King Alfred’s, Winchester): Unpublished BA, 1997

Perry, P., ‘(Dis)ordering signs: an inquiry into British recruitment posters of the First World War’, University of Southampton (Winchester School of Art): Unpublished MA, 1995


**Conference Papers and Lecture Notes**


Doherty, M., ‘What is Political Propaganda?’ (Lecture), ‘MA in Propaganda, Persuasion and History’, at University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1997

James, H., History Data Service, ‘Digitisation and its Implications’, AHDS Digitisation Workshop, April 2002


Woollard, M., ‘Databases for Historians Course’, Institute of Historical Research, February 7-11 2000

**Published Sources**

**Printed Sources**

**Parliamentary Papers**

Parliamentary Debates:

*Hansard* (August 1939-June 1945)

**Newspapers and magazines**

Magazines/Journals:

*Advertising Review* (1939-1940)

*Advertiser’s Weekly* (1939-1946)

*Advertising Monthly* (March-December 1939)

*Advertising World* (February 1939-September 1940)

*Art and Industry* (1939-1958)

*Art and Craft Education* (October 1936-August 1940)

*Picture Post* (July 1939-September 1945)

*Press, Advertising and the Trade* (September 1939-September 1940)

Newspapers:

*The Times* (October 1939; February 1940; February 1941; January 1942)

**Articles and Chapters**


248


‘Crown Copyright’, Copyright Act 1911, July 1 1912


----------, ““War” Games – An Undisputed Genius’, IWM: Despatches, December 1996


Wainwright, W., ‘Posters in Wartime’, *Our Time*, June 1943


**Books**


Barron, S., *Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany*, Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1991


---------, *Advertising Outdoor: Watch This Space!*, London: Phaidon, 1997


Buchanan, T., Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997


Clark, J., Heinemann, M., Margolies, D., and Snee, C. (eds), *Culture and Crisis in Britain in the 30s*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979


Cooper, D., *Old Men Forget*, London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953


Crew, T., *Health Propaganda: Ways and Means (With Illustrations): Covering the Propaganda Services of the National Health Associations and others, Organisation of Health Exhibitions and Health Week Campaigns*, London: Central Council for Health Education, 1935 (June)


*--------*, *To Build a New Jerusalem: The Labour Movement from the 1880s to the 1990s*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992


--------, *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, London: Cresset, 1949


Evans, D., and Jenkins, J., *Years of Weimar and the Third Reich*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999


---------, *SOE in the Low Countries*, London: St Ermin’s, 2001


Fougasse (Bird, C. K.), *A School of Purposes*, London: Methuen & Co., 1946


Games, A., *Abram Games: 60 Years of Design*, Cardiff: Faculty of Art and Design, South Glamorgan Institute of H.E., 1990


---------, *Living Through the Blitz*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976


----------, *Nazi Women: Hitler’s Seduction of a Nation*, London: Channel 4, 2001


Haworth-Booth, M., *E. McKnight Kauffer: a Designer and his Public*, London: Gordon Fraser, 1979


Hope, M., *FK Henrion, Five Decades a Designer*, [Staffordshire Polytechnic], 1989


Jeffery, T., *Mass-Observation: A Short History*, University of Sussex: Mass-Observation Archive, 1999


Kerkauf, W., Dada: Monograph of a Movement, London: Academy, 1975


Laib, S.M., Venereal Disease in Britain, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1943


Lynn, V., *We’ll Meet Again: A Personal and Social Memory of World War II*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989


Mace, R., *British Trade Union Posters: An Illustrated History*, Stroud: Sutton, 1999


--------, *People in Production*, London: Advertising Services Guild, 1942


---------, *Remember When: A Nostalgic Trip through the Consumer Era*, London: Miller/Mitchell Beazley, 1999


---------, *Nineteen-Eighty-Four*, London: Secker and Warburg, 1949


Philip Lewis Agencies, *Second World War 1939-1945* (Historic Art Poster Playing Cards) [1990s]


----------, *British Women Go to War*, London: Collins, 1942


--------, *The Rise and Fall of the Poster*, Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1971


278


----------, *Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II*, London: Croom Helm, 1983


----------, *Britain and the Cinema in the Second World War*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988


Tisdall, C., and Bozzolla, A., *Futurism*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1977


Viereck, G.S., *Spreading Germs of Hate*, London: Duckworth, 1931


If You're not a Terrorist, Then Stop Asking Questions!, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004

Wrigley, C. (ed.), The British Labour Movement in the Decade After the First World War, Loughborough: Loughborough University of Technology, Department of Economics, 1979

Wring, D., Political Marketing and Organisational Development: The Case of the Labour Party in Britain, University of Cambridge: Judge Institute of Management Studies, 1995


Yass, M., This is Your War: Home front Propaganda in the Second World War London: HMSO, 1983


Zimmerman, D., Britain’s Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe, Stroud: Sutton, 2001


Other Media


Exhibitions


Catalogues

Onslow’s Auctions, Auction Catalogue: War Posters, including the Great War and E.J. Embleton Collection of Second World War Posters, September 14 1989


------------, Auction Catalogue: PS3103/99, [London], March 31 1999


------------, Miscellaneous Man Catalog 48: Rare Patriotic Posters, USA: New Freedom, >1992

------------, Miscellaneous Man Catalog 62: Rare Posters & Ephemera, USA: New Freedom, >1992

------------, Miscellaneous Man Catalog 67: Rare Posters & Ephemera, New Arrivals, USA: New Freedom, >1992

Internet Sources


AHDS Visual Arts, ‘VADS Search Results’, http://vads.ahds.ac.uk:/ixbin/hixclient.exe?_IXDB_=vads&_IXSESSION_=tTHIeRRnX7N&$+rec+vads+and+((original.analogue)+in+object_type)+and+(poster)+and+((IWM+or+IWMSCW)+in+title_vads_collection_code)+sort+@icase+(title%21%3D%22%3Ftitle%22%3D%22%3Ftitle%3Adescription)=,.&submit-button=SUMMARY, accessed March 19 2004


http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CBandM/message/64, written May 07 2000, accessed October 4 2003


Anonymous, ‘Henry Wellcome and the Sudan’


Antiquarian Book Shop, ‘Rare, Used and Out of Print Books’,

AntiquesIreland.com, ‘Illustrated Books’,


Archer, B., and Powell, C., ‘Selling the Unsellable’ Guardian Unlimited
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4025614,00.html, written 5 June 2000, accessed 13 July 2001

Artcyclopedia, ‘Leopoldo Mendez Online’,


Augustine Funnell Books, ‘Mystery/Suspense/Thrill Paperback R-Z’,
Baker, C., ‘Tide of anger rises at cliffs’,
http://www.thisiseastbourne.co.uk/eastbourne/archive/2000/07/18/NEWS80ZM.html,
written July 18 2000, accessed January 14 2004

Barnes & Noble, ‘Barnes & Noble.com Prints & Poster Products’,
http://posters.barnesandnoble.com/search/Product.asp?userid=50T5TQBOTZ&Source…,
accessed October 3 2003

Bayley, I., ‘1999 Calender’,
http://www.freespace.virgin.net/ian.bayley/Calender/40poster6SMALL.jpg, accessed
February 5 1999

BBC, ‘BBC – History – Advertising and Information Posters Gallery’,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/war_adverts_gallery_06.shtml, accessed

Bearnes Auctioneers, ‘Auction House Lot Detail’,
http://www.thesaurus.co.uk/bearnes/xq/asp/SaleID.1080561/LotNumber.390/qx/lot.htm,
accessed October 3 2003

Beens From Venus, ‘Non-Music Books’, shttp://www.beensfromvenus.demon.co.uk/non-
music%20books.htm, accessed October 3 2003

Berro, M., ‘C.W. Bacon’, http://www.massmedia.com/~mikeb/booktour/c_w_bacon.htm,
accessed 28 August 2003

http://www.asylumnation.com/asylum/_r/showthread/threadid_28356/, written August
2000, accessed January 3 2004

Birkbeck College, ‘Welcome to the School of History of Art, Film and Visual Media’
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/hafvm/, accessed August 2 2001
Boguslawski, A., ‘Icons, Brief History’

Boguslawski, A., ‘Suprematism’,

Books Online,

Brighton School of Art and Design, ‘Archive: David Low’,
http://www.adh.brighton.ac.uk/schoolofdesign/MA.COURSE/01/LIALow.html, accessed October 3 2003

Brighton School of Art and Design, ‘Archive: Tom Eckersley’,
http://www.adh.brighton.ac.uk/schoolofdesign/MA.COURSE/01/LIAEckersley.html, accessed October 3 2003

Brighton School of Art and Design, ‘Archive: Vicky’,
http://www.adh.brighton.ac.uk/schoolofdesign/MA.COURSE/01/LIAWilliamson.html, accessed October 3 2003

Brighton School of Art and Design, ‘Satire’,
http://www.adh.brighton.ac.uk/schoolofdesign/MA.COURSE/09/Lsatire01.html, accessed October 4 2003


Carrothers, B., ‘World War Two Posters’,
Celebrating Somerset, ‘Celebrating Somerset – The Tourism Pages, Events Listing’,
accessed October 3 2003

Center for Applied Microtechnology, ‘Photolithography’,
http://www.engr.washington.edu/~cam/PROCESSES/PDF%20FILES/Photolithography.pd f, accessed June 10 2002

Chapman, G., ‘The Tonypandy Massacre’,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A701858, written February 26 2002, accessed
December 30 2003

http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t5.002789, 

Christian Sanctuary Gallery, ‘Byzantine Iconography - A Brief Overview’,

Churchill Archives Centre, ‘Churchill College: Churchill Archives Centre: Collections

Citrine, G., ‘Christ Church, Birkenhead: A Picture of the Age: Part Three 1899 – 1924’,
http://christchurch.birkenhead.net/pages/history/hi189924.htm, accessed January 03 2004

accessed October 4 2003

Collectors Playing Cards, ‘Playing cards. Named backs, Artist signed and Picture backs’,
http://www.collectorsplayingcards.co.uk/cardsale_namedpic.htm, accessed October 4 2003
Collins Antiques, ‘Roy Nockolds’,
http://www.collinsantiques.co.uk/Paintings/Watercolours/Watercolours_2/Watercolour..., accessed October 6 2003


Consignia, ‘Heritage Collection’,
http://www.consignia.com/heritage/html/transport/left/airmail.htm;

Contendo, W.D., ‘The FictionMags Index’,
http://users.ev1.net/~homeville/fictionmag/t156.htm, accessed October 4 2003

Contendo, W.D., ‘British Juvenile Story Papers and Pocket Libraries Index’,


CPR Heritage, ‘Canadian Pacific to Japan & China’,


Da-Cruz, A., ‘The Joy of Maps’,
Davis, M. (London Metropolitan University), ‘TUC | History Online’,

Delwiche, A., ‘Propaganda Critic: False Connections > Testimonial’,

Delwiche, A., ‘Propaganda Critic: False Connections > Transfer’,

Delwiche, A., ‘Propaganda Critic: Special Appeals > Bandwagon’,

Delwiche, A., ‘Propaganda Critic: Special Appeals > Plain Folks’,


Delwiche, A., ‘Propaganda Critic: Word games > Name calling’

(Originally from History, 295, March 27 1999)

(originally from WordNet 1.6, Princeton University, 1997)


Dr. One Spy, ‘Espionage - Agency - Arcos Ltd.’,


Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica: propaganda’

Farman, J., ‘galleryonthegreen.co.uk’,
http://www.galleryonthegreen.co.uk/mainfiles/sketch/history.htm, accessed October 3 2003

Farnsworth, E. interviews Rosenblatt, R., “Online NewsHour: The Dreyfus Affair’’,


Goldsmith & Bate Ltd., ‘Rowland Hilder’,

Graphic Witness, ‘Graphic Witness: visual art and social commentary’,
http://www.graphicwitness.org/group/mendez.htm, accessed October 3 2003

Guerin, B., ‘Indonesia: The Enemy Within’,

Heller, J. ‘A Virtual Portfolio of Works in Homage to Leopoldo Mendez’,


History Data Service, ‘Digitising History - Section 5.2: Guidelines for documenting a data creation project’ http://hds.essex.ac.uk/g2gp/digitising_history/sect52.asp, written 1999, accessed July 30 2001


Imperial War Museum, ‘Imperial War Museum Concise Art Collection’


Imperial War Museum, ‘Imperial War Museum London - The Collections’

Imperial War Museum, ‘Key Stage 2 Resources – Poster Pack’,
Imperial War Museum, ‘Posters of Conflict Digitisation Project’,

Imperial War Museum, ‘Posters of Conflict’,

Imperial War Museum, ‘The First World War letters and paintings of
Harold Sandys Williamson’, http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/fww_rem/fww-art.htm,
accessed September 21 2003

Imperial War Museum, ‘The First World War letters and paintings of
Harold Sandys Williamson’ (Page 2), http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/fww_rem/fww-
art2.htm, accessed September 21 2003

Imperial War Museum, ‘The First World War letters and paintings of
Harold Sandys Williamson’ (Page 8), http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/fww_rem/fww-
art8.htm, accessed September 21 2003

Imperial War Museum, ‘What was it like in the Second World War: Designing a
Propaganda Poster’, http://www.iwm.org.uk/education/lifeinww2/fight/activities.pdf,
accessed January 14 2004

Joseph Mason Bookseller, ‘Ships and Boatbuilding’,
http://members.aol.com/jcwm/yacht.html, accessed October 4 2003

Jupitermedia, ‘Trojan Horse’, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/Trojan_horse.html,
accessed June 6 2003

Kaelin, J.C., ‘EarthStation1.com - The Poster Prop Page - Pictures of Propaganda Posters
10 2001
http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/1/v1n5_eww.html, accessed June 6 2003

Keith Sheridan Fine Prints, ‘Keith Sheridan Fine Prints – Leopoldo Mendez’,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/news/story/0,11711,861480,00.html, accessed December 17 2002

accessed October 3 2003

Koshevoy, I., ‘Surrealism: 1924-1940’,

Kruml, E., ‘Feminism Under the Third Reich’,


Lampeter University, ‘Visual Representations in History’
http://www.lamp.ac.uk/history/postgrad_study/visual.html, accessed 2 August 2001

Landsberger, S., ‘Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages’,

Learn About Movie Posters, ‘British Posters’,
Lebovic, J., ‘Josef Lebovic Gallery’,
http://www.joseflebovicgallery.com/Catalogue/Archive/Cat-98-2002/Large/0064.jpg
accessed August 27 2003

Lewis, R., ‘Nostalgia and the Visual Image’,
http://www.ww2poster.co.uk/poster/confevents/publichlist.htm, written May 2001,
accessed January 14 2004


Library of Congress, ‘89709883’,

2003

accessed October 4 2003


London Transport Museum, ‘London’s Transport Museum - Collections Policy’
http://www.ltmuseum.co.uk/collect/colpol.html, approved October 1997, accessed July 19
2001

Luxury Liners of the Past, ‘Postcard Artists’,

Mass-Observation Archive, ‘Mass Observation Archive | Take Part’
Mass-Observation Archive, ‘Mass-Observation Archive | Archive | History’


Merchantnavyofficers.com, ‘Kenya and Uganda’,
http://www.merchantnavyofficers.com/KenUg.html, accessed October 4 2003

Michail, E., ‘After the War and After the Wall’,


Minneapolis Public Library, ‘War Posters from the Kittleson Collection’,

Mitrevski, G., ‘Icon: St. Nicholas with Scenes from his life’,

Murphy, S., ‘A Dog by Any Other Name’,


National Art Library, ‘NAL Collection Development Policy - Chapter 1’
(Taken from Van der Wateren, Jan & Rowan Watson, eds. The National Art Library: a policy for the development of the collections. Victoria and Albert Museum, 1993.)

National Art Library, ‘NAL Collection Development Policy - Chapter 2’,


National Maritime Museum, ‘HMS Montrose Arriving at Reykjavik, Iceland’,
http://www.nmm.ac.uk/mag/pages/mnuexplore/PaintingDetail.cfm?letter=h&ID=BH…, accessed October 3 2003

National Maritime Museum, ‘The Passenger Liner ‘Queen Mary’ Arriving at Southampton’,


Oxford University, ‘Art History and Visual Studies in Oxford’
http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/hoa/intro.htm, accessed August 2 2001


P&D, ‘Print and Display Ltd. - Design Den - Outdoor Specs’,


Parliamentary Archives, ‘Parliamentary Archives: House of Lords Record Office’
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/genlinfo.htm#rec accessed August 3 2001

Peck, R.A., ‘Cinderella Bibliography’,


Pictorials Online, ‘Pictorials’,
Pictorialsonline.net, ‘Pictorials – Ellis Silas’,


Portmerion Potteries, ‘Susan Williams-Ellis Received Honorary Degree’,
http://www.portmerion.co.uk/susan-degree.htm, accessed October 3 2003


Prorail.uk, ‘Prorail – Sheffield Auctions’,
http://www.prorail.co.uk/auctions/sra/sra0303b.htm, accessed October 3 2003

Public Record Office, ‘An Acquisition Policy For The Public Record Office’


Public Record Office, ‘Public Record Office | Records Management’

Putkowski, J., ‘Shot at Dawn: Pte. Stevenson & Captain Cosmo Clark’,

Puzzlehistory.com, ‘Artist Works on Jigsaw Puzzles’,


Raven, A., ‘The Development of Naval Camouflage’,


Rennies Vintage Posters, ‘Rennies- Posters of Reginald Mount and Eileen Evans’,
http://www.rennart.co.uk/mountevans.html, accessed August 28 2003

Reviewer from Suffolk, UK, ‘Tin Trunk, The Letters and Drawings 1914-1918,
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0953979903/ref=sr_aps_books_1_1/026…, accessed October 3 2003

Richey, D., ‘Salmon & Trout Books’, 


RoSPA, ‘The History of ROSPA: RoSPA in the Forties’, 

RoSPA, ‘The History of ROSPA; RoSPA in the Early Years’, 

Royaun Booksellers, ‘Stage and Film Décor, by Myerscough-Walker, R.’, 


Scharlau Prints & Maps, ‘John Pimlott’, 
http://www.scharlau.co.uk/dictionaryResults.jsp?artist=p, accessed October 4 2003

School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, ‘Planned Settlements’, 
http://www.apl.ncl.ac.uk/coursework/IThompson/planned_settlements.htm, accessed March 27 2004

Scottish Art, ‘Artist Biography’, 

Smith, D., ‘Constructivism Page’, 

Spartacus Schoolnet, ‘Bert Thomas’,
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ARTthomas.htm, accessed September 21 2003


Spartacus Schoolnet, ‘Henry M. Bateman’,

Spartacus Schoolnet, ‘Military Intelligence: MI5’,
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWm5.htm, accessed January 3 2004


Spartacus Schoolnet, ‘Victor Weisz (Vicky)’,


Terence Cuneo Family, ‘About Terence Cuneo’,
http://www.terencecuneo.co.uk/htm/about_tc.htm, accessed August 28 2003


The Visual Front, ‘The Visual Front – Posters of the Spanish Civil War’,

The Wellcome Trust, ‘The Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine Library -
accessed July 19 2001


Thinkbomb, ‘Sexual eyes paint a thousand intentions’
2003

Thistlefineart.com, ‘Clark, John Cosmo – oil on canvas’,

University of Leicester, ‘Centre for Urban History’, http://www.le.ac.uk/urbanhist/,
accessed May 3 2003

University of Reading, ‘Department of Typography and Graphic Communication’,
http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/Lt/home.html?centres/ephemera_studies/index.html,
accessed January 11 2004

University of Reading, ‘The Rural History Centre’,

University of Toronto Library, ‘Great Britain. Ministry of Information. Home
Intelligence. Home Intelligence Reports on Opinion and Morale, 1940-1944’,
March 22 2004

313
University of Wales, ‘UWS - Wellcome’

University of Washington Libraries Digital Collection, ‘Posters Collection’,


Used Book Central, ‘Author: Ruskin, John’,

Used Book Central, ‘Merchant: Gravity Books’,

USM de Grummond Collection, ‘Alida Malkus Papers’,
http://avatar.lib.usm.edu/~degrum/findaids/malkus.a.htm, accessed October 4 2003

Utopia Britannica, ‘Staithes’,

Vernon. J., ‘University of California, Berkely: History 103C: syllabus’,
http://history.berkeley.edu/faculty/Vernon/History103/h103syl.html, accessed August 10 2001


