Defeat, Decline and Disconnect: A Critical Analysis of Attempted Reform in British Tennis during the Inter-war Period

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Abstract

Of all periods in the history of British tennis, arguably the inter-war years were the most significant and tumultuous. Officials recommenced activities with an ultimate goal of restoring British prowess at an international level. This paper aims to assess the long-term effectiveness of the LTA’s efforts in these regards. It was far from straightforward. After several years of lacklustre performances, a group of reformers staged a mutiny that culminated at the turbulent 1922 AGM, where they unseated several incumbent Councillors. Yet they failed to shift significantly the balance of power away from the aging establishment figures they had targeted. Nevertheless, a period of self-reflection followed, and the partially reformed LTA responded by refocusing their efforts on two key areas: the development of coaching-professionals and of tennis in the public schools. However, it was evident that deep-rooted antipathy toward the promotion of a more modern, American-inspired, performance-oriented, “professional” mentality among players, and fears over the concomitant erosion of amateurism, underpinned the LTA’s reluctance to increase access and develop talent among those outside of the upper-middle-class. Fred Perry’s exploits offered a temporary respite from some of the criticism, but ultimately merely proved to mask the LTA’s staunch conservatism during this period.

Keywords

Lawn Tennis Association, amateurism, public schools, Anglo-American relations, Fred Perry
Introduction

An examination of the years immediately preceding the Great War reveals a growing state of discontent in British tennis. The first overseas women’s and men’s Wimbledon winners came in 1905 and 1907 respectively, and from then until the commencement of hostilities British players struggled to regain top honours, except for an unexpected Davis Cup triumph in 1912. While British women, led by Dorothea Lambert Chambers, fared much better, most of the top honours for men at Wimbledon went to, seemingly, better trained Americans and Australasians.

The landscape of British sport was changing; at the start of the new century Britain maintained its secure, and dominant, position, yet in the latter years of the Edwardian era others sought to knock the British from their pedestal. For many, the 1908 London Olympics signalled the start of the decline of British amateurism as, despite the home nation securing three times as many medals as America, it was the latter that defeated the British in the key athletic events, a feat they repeated in 1912. These Olympics were tarnished by the childish bickering that ensued over appropriate attitudes toward competition, as the British excused their athletic defeats by repeatedly criticising the Americans for, in effect, taking sport too seriously and by applying scientific methods to artificially enhance skills, through systematic coaching, talent identification and development.¹ Some, perhaps more boldly, connected imperial decline with defeats in sport. The effect of embarrassing outcomes in the second Boer War, and the gradual loss on an economic and industrial stage to America and Germany supposedly pointed to faults in the British social and cultural “system”, in that Britain’s outdated methods and unwillingness to diversify in industry explained their international economic decline.² Perhaps one of the unintended consequences of the Great War was to open peoples’ minds to alternative ways of thinking about Britain’s (or England’s) renewed global position.

In the years immediately after the war, Britain suffered defeats across a number of sports, again often to teams/athletes from America and Australia.³ In the 1920-21 MCC cricket tour to Australia, the English were whitewashed for the first time, and fared similarly poorly in the return test at home in 1921. In 1920, the rugby league tour to Australia resulted in a 2-1 defeat, while that same year the British lost the Americas Cup 3-2. For some, these defeats were inconsequential; the British were immensely proud of their achievements on the battlefield, and how their methods, practices and ideals led the Allied armies against the Central Powers. Writing for Lawn Tennis & Badminton (LT&B), the official journal of the Lawn Tennis Association (LTA), the governing body formed by representatives of leading clubs in 1888, a correspondent reasoned: ‘So long as we win wars we can afford to lose games’.⁴ Similar sentiments were reflected in early discussions about Britain’s modest achievements in the 1920 Antwerp Olympics.⁵ Moreover, the huge loss of life, particularly of elite upper-class/upper-middle-class gentlemen – the so-called “lost generation” – placed doubt in many peoples’ minds about whether Britain could ever return to its halcyon days of global sporting (and political/economic) dominance.

Accordingly, there was a growing perception that leading tennis officials were not “moving with the times”, and helping to modernise British talent development methods to keep pace with its main rivals. As a consequence of the LTA’s belligerence, and a lack of British success in international competition, a noticeable split emerged within its administration. Championing a controversial reform movement, Arthur Batley, a progressive LTA Councillor from Yorkshire, considered British tennis administration to be split into two polarised camps, divided by their philosophy. One stood for ‘active, energetic and progressive methods, supported by deliberate effort, and keen personal interest’, and included leading players and some incumbent Councillors; the other stood for ‘strict adherence to
methods and practices of a bygone generation, clinging tenaciously to the belief that standing still is the best way to progress’, and was represented by the aging establishment, ‘a small group of obstinate men, deeply and securely dug in’ within the Council. Despite being outnumbered, the latter were well organised and influential. Batley also noted the ‘smug complacency’ of the LTA’s leadership, concluding: ‘A complete change of policy and methods controlled by new people and backed by new energy would create a fresh and invigorating atmosphere of inestimable value to the game and the players’.

Many of the top LTA Councillors were retired seniors, mostly previously top players, but they competed during a markedly different era when amateur competition, and its inherent pressures, was qualitatively different: overseas on-court opposition was much weaker, and the inducements to train more seriously were lesser. Batley among others wondered aloud whether these gentlemen had sufficient ingenuity and imagination to implement successful talent development programmes for the inter-war era. Throughout this period, the LTA were repeatedly tested on this vexed question, and despite efforts at reform, competitive results – especially in the most prestigious male events, which form the focus of this paper – suggested little improvement. Consequently, British tennis in the 1920s progressed through a period of defeat on the court, decline in international influence, and disconnect from the sport’s traditional values and practices, much of which would never fully recover.

Based on a fairly comprehensive analysis of a wide range of sources from this period, including the leading tennis magazines and books that collectively offered perspectives from both the LTA and its chief opponents, the overall aim of this article is to critically examine the attempted reform of British tennis during the inter-war period, and specifically: to consider what opportunities and barriers were present for representatives of British tennis to build their sport, particularly in terms of identifying/developing talent; to test the short- and long-term effectiveness of early efforts to instil a more performance-oriented ideology within the LTA, a sporting institution deeply rooted in amateurism; and, to locate these developments in the context of growing apprehension and scepticism, both at home and abroad, of amateurism as a guiding principle in British sport. This analysis is contextualised within broader societal developments during the inter-war period, notably: shifting class relations and the subsequent democratisation of sport; shifting Anglo-American relations; and, the increasing use of sport to serve nationalistic functions.

This study commences with an examination of the growing body of discontent among British tennis officials, players and correspondents/commentators before the war with Britain’s declining prowess, and progresses through the tumultuous 1920s to examine the main body of opposition to the prevailing structure, and subsequent responses from the establishment. After the Fred Perry-led resurgence in the 1930s, there were renewed calls for change as Britain once again returned to a second-class power. Thus, the interwar period ended similarly to how it began, with commentators asking the LTA important questions: Where would the next batch of top British players be coming from, and what was the governing body doing to support them?

Initial Criticisms amidst the Decline of British Tennis in the Edwardian Era

Britain’s absolute on-court dominance in the 1880s, as reflected in the exploits of the Renshaw brothers and others, was matched by an inveterate belief in their invincibility. Underpinned by a broader ‘anxiety that [they] were physically inferior to their English contemporaries’, Americans initially agreed with this estimation. ‘The number of good players is continually increasing’, wrote one American in Pastime; ‘When I say good players,
British dominance was short-lived, however, and by the mid/late 1890s when top British men began entering tournaments along the Eastern seaboard, evidently the tables were beginning to turn. The LTA’s inertia in promoting the international character of the game was evident. Despite repeated invites from the USNLTA to instigate international competition, they refused to sanction official tours. The LTA’s Secretary, W.H. Collins, declined an invitation in 1897 because the American’s offer of paying players’ “expenses” contravened amateur ideals. This forced the players themselves – those with the requisite time, finances and motivation to travel – to lead attempts at international collaboration and competition. In an “unofficial” tour later that year, Harold Mahony, Harold Nisbet and Wilberforce Eaves played a series of competitions against the best Americans, Bob Wrenn and William Larned. Mahony and Eaves were considered the second and third best players in Britain at the time, but were sufficiently outplayed, with only Eaves making an impression by winning the All-Comers competition of the U.S. National Championships, before narrowly losing to Wrenn in the Challenge Round. Tennis writer J. Parmly Paret summarised American feelings, proclaiming they had ‘won the greatest international victory in the annals of the sport’. Sensationalist reporting exaggerated the apparent deficiencies of the Americans, and when defeated the British made excuses. In 1897, the British players ‘complained constantly that our grass courts were too soft for them’; Eaves preferred ‘the court as hard as nails… so the ball will jump up in front of [him]’. Similarly, in the first Davis Cup contest won 3-0 by the Americans, in 1900, the British player Herbert Roper Barrett claimed the grounds at Longwood Cricket Club in Boston ‘were abominable. The grass was long, … The net was a disgrace to civilized lawn tennis, held up by guy ropes that were continually sagging. … [The balls] were awful – soft and motherly’.

Some Americans claimed “sour grapes”, yet James Dwight, writing in 1894, made similar comments, suggesting the ‘differences in the balls and courts from those in England… places another point in favour of our own players’. While standards were certainly narrowing between the British and Americans, it is interesting how the former sustained the belief in their own superiority. This was indicative of Britain’s ‘robustly parochial and ethnocentric view of sport’, according to Llewellyn; ‘They believed that sports were their sole property’. One consequence was to blind themselves to their own athletic or tactical deficiencies and prevent them from accepting that their dominance could only be sustained by adopting a progressive mind-set and exhibiting creativity and ingenuity in the design and implementation of talent identification/development programmes. The Davis Cup defeat in the inaugural challenge match, while a blow to the home nation’s notion of supremacy, failed to act as the catalyst for the emergence of America as Britain’s dominant rival. However, it was a warning sign of the forthcoming “foreign” assault, firstly led by the Australasians, in the form of Norman Brookes and Anthony Wilding, then later, in the post-war period, by the Americans, Bill Tilden and Bill Johnson, and the “Four Musketeers” from France: Jean Borotra, Henri Cochet, René Lacoste and Jacques Brugnon.

While British tennis maintained a degree of strength up to the Great War, and British players, particularly the women – or at least one woman, Dorothea Lambert Chambers – still dominated at Wimbledon, not all at home viewed their superiority as guaranteed. Nor were the concerns of the state of British tennis at the end of the Edwardian era new. Upon returning from America in 1897, Eaves highlighted the ensuing problem: ‘where I think the Americans hold an advantage over us is the promising young material they possess. … They form the nucleus the like of which is wanting here’. Tennis journalist, A. Wallis Myers, was equally concerned. Writing in 1903, he observed a dearth of up-and-coming players:
It seems to me to be merely a matter of time before the Championship passes into the hands of American players or foreigners. No young players of any ability are coming to the front, and as soon as the present exponents of first-class play retire, there would seem to be no-one to take their place. ... The numbers of the first-class are sadly shrunken.\(^\text{18}\)

In terms of the LTA’s lack of focus on player development, he suggested that ‘it is not the case on the Continent, it is not the case in America, nor is it the case in the Colonies’.\(^\text{19}\) Within two years, Myers’ predictions came true; the American May Sutton became the first overseas winner of the Ladies Singles Championship at Wimbledon, and two years later Norman Brookes from Australia was the first overseas male to do the equivalent. Tennis critic and writer, P.A. Vaile was equally concerned about the apparent decline of British prowess. Writing in 1911, he bemoaned that, ‘England, with her population of over 40,000,000 people, has not, since H. L. Doherty’s win to 1911, produced a champion. Australasia, with almost an eighth of this population, has produced two.’\(^\text{20}\)

F.W. Payn, a leading tournament player, criticised the elitist tennis authorities in Britain for promoting ‘every conceivable private interest except that of the game’. The consequence, for him, has been the development of an “oligarchy” both of talent and management, so that the number of first-class players in Great Britain outside of London can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and the public interest in the game – except in certain large towns – has been almost stationery for ten years.

In summary, he attributed Britain’s ‘inferior position chiefly to the paltry spirit which has pervaded its management’.\(^\text{21}\)

The lack of instruction from coaching-professionals was considered a key disadvantage for British players, noted Payn.\(^\text{22}\) Myers agreed, writing that a British player ‘seldom gets any coaching when starting the game, so that his style will, to a great extent, be a matter of chance’.\(^\text{23}\) In a similar sentiment, Percy Vaile decried the lack of ‘true science’ being applied to the British game, which was a nod to developing technical aspects of play through coaching which were appreciated more in American and Australasia.\(^\text{24}\)

Writing in 1898, Eaves expressed admiration for the American interscholastic movement and its role in developing young talent, but bemoaned: ‘Of course, [British] public schools do not encourage lawn tennis in any way; rather the reverse, indeed’.\(^\text{25}\) The lack of tennis in the public schools was a problem expressed by numerous others.\(^\text{26}\) Despite the LTA appointing a Special Committee in 1905 to investigate the issue – which found that headmasters were concerned primarily about: interference with cricket and other team games; its inferiority in building character due to its supposedly effeminate play; and, laughably, the ‘lopsided growth’ that tennis offered – the LTA can be accused of lacking imagination and willingness to explore other talent development avenues, e.g. for non-public-school children.\(^\text{27}\) Certainly, the Association were laissez-faire in their overall approach to developing the sport, as evidenced by their poor communication to the British tennis community and inept policy-making. Leading officials, in what became recognised as standard LTA behaviour, rarely spoke-out – public correspondence through LT&B typically came but once a year, when the AGM minutes were published – and when pushed they seemed to spend more time lamenting British demise than creatively constructing policies to affect change. Inevitably, in the inter-war period, these problems resurfaced.

**Early Inter-war Criticisms**

In 1919, Britain reached the Challenge Round of a severely depleted Davis Cup, losing to Australasia 4-1, which was a nice boost for them but did little to ignite a programme for
talent identification/development. Adjudged by players and commentators, the lack of coaching-professionals to instruct young players in proper stroke-production and the absence of lawn tennis in public schools remained the two most important factors limiting British success.

Like others before him, author and all-round sportsman, J.C. Parke, connected the two issues. Referencing the public schools, he blamed the ‘slower moving authorities’ in England for ‘refusing to recognise the claims of lawn tennis, and... remaining wilfully blind and deaf to [its] merits and fascinations’, and declared: ‘If only our public schools would admit the game, and provide professional teachers as they do for cricket, there would be no more outcry about our being left behind by the other countries’. They had their work cut out for them. In 1920, at the 28th AGM of the Incorporated Association of Headmasters, a speaker urged his associates to ‘protect against’ the encroachment of tennis on public school education, to which the Head of Clifton School remarked: ‘the evil was growing, and the association should do all possible to reduce the evil’. Such strong words, and the cheers that followed, suggest inveterate resistance to lawn tennis in the public schools, which only new blood and perhaps a change of tack by the LTA would remedy.

Making international comparisons, the long-standing Wimbledon referee F.R. Burrow wrote of the ‘dearth among home players at the present time’:

Other countries are producing outstanding players... mainly because [they] begin to play at a much earlier age than ours do. ... In America, Australia, France and many other countries, boys play lawn tennis while still at school, and not only play it but learn it. They have had... at the very least five or six years’ start of the English boy. Almost exactly the same point was echoed by Parke, leading tennis official George Hillyard and Queen’s Club coaching-professional Charles Hierons; for England to recover its lost supremacy and compete against its overseas rivals, players needed to learn the game in their youth. Leading female players Suzanne Lenglen and Kitty McKane clarified that fourteen years-of-age was appropriate to commence training/coaching, but four years after this assessment, Kitty Godfree née McKane reduced this to twelve, while Doeg and Danzig recommended, for a young boy, ‘the earlier the better... as soon as he is able to hold a racquet’.

Players abroad were also more likely to access professional instruction. Parke lamented:

It is a tremendous drawback that at the present time there are very few professional teachers in England. ... Professional teaching could be obtained much more easily on the continent before the war, with the result that the French and German boys learned how to produce all the strokes properly, and as a natural consequence their improvement was extremely rapid.

Lenglen agreed, adding that young Americans are shown ‘slow motion pictures of the strokes executed by the best exponents of the game’. Highlighting the rapid advances across the Atlantic since 1900, Bill Tilden described how the game in America and Britain progressed in different directions:

American tennis has passed through a series of revolutionary stages that have changed the complex of the game. English tennis has merely followed its natural development, unaffected by external influences or internal upheaval, so that the game today is a refined product of the game of twenty years ago. Refined but not vitalised. Summarising, Tilden’s prospects for England to regain its position as an ‘advanced tennis-playing country’ were hampered because ‘her whole atmosphere is one of conservatism in sport’. Many others agreed, and this approach arguably underpinned the reluctance of public schools to introduce tennis and employ coaching-professionals, and of the leading
officials to institute the necessary changes to secure its future success, which for some even included replacing grass for hard courts.\textsuperscript{37}

For \textit{Daily Express} correspondent and author, S. Powell Blackmore, the decline of Britain ‘to the rank of a third-class power’ was an ‘inevitable harvest’: ‘Today we are gathering in what has been sown and we are crying out about the lack of international talent’.\textsuperscript{38} In his typically outspoken view, the problems were much deeper than a poor coaching infrastructure, the lack of tennis in public schools, and even weak LTA leadership. He made particular mention of the LTA’s self-serving actions that were underpinned by deep-rooted elitism: ‘The game is misgoverned by the LTA’, described as ‘an autocratic power wielded by a relatively small circle largely comprising players of the past out of touch with the modern spirit’.\textsuperscript{39}

This assessment is evidenced by the LTA’s unwillingness seemingly to engage in public discussions on these issues. Indeed, Blackmore’s key recommendation was for a more transparent reporting of discussions in LTA meetings, alongside: an acknowledgement of the Councillors various vested interests, which biased their decision-making about tournament sanctioning and date-setting; a more equitable promotion of tennis across Britain, particularly in the North; greater encouragement for players to compete in tournaments, and better treatment of the rank-and-file within them; and, most fundamentally, fresh blood within the LTA Council. To make this final plea, he made reference to the change of British government – and the sacking of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith – during the war that facilitated an Allied victory:

Before we could win the war the Whitehall dug-outs had to be torn from the key position; before we shall recapture the International Trophy there will have to be a clean sweep in the circles of the Lawn Tennis Association.\textsuperscript{40}

Though many of Blackmore’s more specific points were sadly overlooked, his overall assessment of the need for change – however vaguely that was presented from then on – received considerable support. Burrow agreed the LTA was ‘out of touch with the players of today and their requirements’, and seemed to spend more time regulating the management of tournaments behind-the-scenes than designing and implementing talent identification/development programmes.\textsuperscript{41}

While the LTA were dawdling, associations abroad were taking action. The ‘systematic and scientific’ training that the top German players received since the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was, according to coaching-professional Charles Haggett, ‘bound to tell in the end’.\textsuperscript{42} Further, in 1917, news reached America that a “school” was established in Germany – likely around 1909/10 – with the specific aim of developing lawn tennis coaches.\textsuperscript{43} Had Germany not been barred from all International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) sanctioned competitions until the mid-1920s, they likely would have enjoyed some success. In 1919, the top French player, William Laurentz, argued for a similarly systematic player development programme.\textsuperscript{44} The following year, despite noting the lack of good courts and small number of clubs in France, alongside a dearth of players outside the big cities, “D’Artagnan”, in \textit{LT&B}, celebrated the work of the Comité Directeur de Lawn Tennis in instituting successful inter-club and inter-regional competitions, and organising international matches.\textsuperscript{45} This was at the start of the tennis renaissance in France, manifested through the successes of Suzanne Lenglen and the Four Musketeers.

Europe was not alone in expressing concerns about player development. In New Zealand, in 1913, after frustration about the dearth of coaching for young players was expressed in numerous national newspapers, the New Zealand LTA considered appointing a national coach to serve affiliated clubs.\textsuperscript{46} Four years later, the USLTA initiated a nationwide system of talent identification/development for under-eighteen boys, which led a correspondent for the \textit{Indianapolis News} to opine that, in working with juniors, ‘the tennis
professional will find his best endeavours rewarded’; the work of coaching-professionals ‘will establish a firm grounding in the principles which make for success in tennis, and with such a start great skill may be built up in this country’. Regardless of what successes ultimately came from these initiatives, they key point is that while other national associations were proactive in establishing coach-education and/or talent-identification/development programmes around the time of the Great War, the LTA did not do so until the mid-late 1940s.

Pertinently, it seems the LTA did not take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the sport’s notable expansion and democratisation during the inter-war period, in terms of significantly enhancing the number of players, courts and clubs available. LTA-affiliated clubs exploded in number, from just over 1,000 in the early 1920s to over 3200 in 1939. Alongside most established clubs relaxing their membership restrictions, particularly for children, many new clubs were comparatively more egalitarian, and the game flourished in public parks, particularly in northern England. Thus, the numbers of keen players increased at an alarming rate, a development aided also by the declining relative cost of tennis equipment, through mass production.

Before the war, children in clubs often suffered from routine marginalisation as the sport remained essentially an adult avocation. Progressive county and clubs administrators nevertheless established a small number of junior tournaments. Yorkshire and Lancashire established the first independent boys and girls tournaments in 1888 and 1895 respectively, and numerous junior events throughout Britain were sandwiched within adult club competitions. Most clubs and county associations commenced these efforts in the inter-war era. The Scottish LTA contemplated holding a Junior Championship in 1910, but this did not materialise until 1921, followed in 1927 by a junior event at the Scottish Hard Court Championships at St. Andrews. Bedfordshire first held a junior tournament in 1924, Sheffield in 1925, Nottinghamshire in 1930, and Warwickshire in 1933. Clubs of various sizes also instituted junior tournaments, for example: Felixstowe LTC in 1923, Radyr LTC in 1926, Edgbaston Priory TC in 1933, Dinas Powis LTC in 1935, Bexley LT & Squash Rackets Club in 1936 and Bowden LTC in 1939. The vast majority of these were instituted independent of central LTA involvement, which remained fairly meagre. In 1922, Burrow mentioned just two LTA-sanctioned junior competitions, both in metropolitan London: ‘two hundred and twelve English school-boys competed at Queen’s Club in the Public School’s Tournament’, initiated in 1919, ‘and nearly a hundred and fifty in the LTA’s Junior Championship at Surbiton’. In this regard, little seemed to have changed since before the war, as F. Gordon Lowe, author, and editor of Lowe’s Lawn Tennis Annual, lamented:

We shall never produce champions capable of holding their own against foreign competition and winning back the Davis Cup until general interest is more widely stimulated in junior lawn tennis. ... [Junior] events are still kept too much in the background. ... The fact remains that for every promising youngster we turn out there are at least a dozen in America, Australia and France.

Indicating their laissez-faire approach, the LTA failed to mention exclusive clubs as an issue in any of their correspondence during this period, so it can be assumed they did little to pressure or incentivise them to improve access for children. Overall, therefore, it seems the LTA were less than proactive with their talent identification/development efforts, despite the much greater numbers of young people now playing the sport and better access to courts. As an organisation, they lacked imagination and initiative even in their efforts to promote tennis in schools and to encourage the employment of coaching-professionals, whereby they focused almost exclusively on the public schools and the largest and most prestigious clubs, particularly in the south-east.
Predictably, it was not long before the excuses of war had worn thin and administrators began to demand radical change. Relatively poor performances at Wimbledon and also in the Davis Cup, particularly in 1922 when the British defaulted to Spain in the semi-finals because they could not guarantee a strong team should they win and have to face the U.S. – a ‘humiliating surrender’ according to A. Wallis Myers – that a mutiny was staged by an activist group calling itself the “Lawn Tennis Reform Committee” (LTRC). These men set out to reform the LTA, culminating in the most turbulent AGM ever staged.

The Lawn Tennis Reform Committee

Little is known about the LTRC’s initially formation in the early 1920s, though evidence suggests it was composed at the time of the 1922 AGM of approximately 36 individuals, spread fairly evenly across the country, who were motivated to inject new blood and fresh ideas into the Association. While the LTRC was composed of numerous younger members, it was personal philosophy rather than age that bound members together. They campaigned to elect 25 new Councillors in the positions of Treasurer (1 seat), Vice-President (4 seats) and regional representative (20 seats), and to return eleven incumbent LTA Councillors to their seats. Previous to the election, they published a list of their favoured candidates and there were public discussions of their proposals in some of the major newspapers. Their ten objectives, published in LT&B, included: ‘to restore the prestige and influence of this country as the leading lawn tennis nation’; and, to ‘train up and encourage by every means consistent with true amateurism British players capable of regaining the Davis Cup and the championships of Wimbledon’. Alongside their main intention to ensure greater competitiveness in international events, they also targeted: giving county associations a greater voice and ensuring stronger financial support for them; reforming tournaments, to improve playing standards; providing support for clubs, by way of removing ‘vexatious restrictions’, whatever this meant; developing lawn tennis in universities, public schools and within public parks; enhancing the LTA’s communication channels; and, improving relations with overseas organisations. With regard to the latter objective, a key target for criticism, from the reformist’s perspective, was the LTA’s “international policy”, which, like twenty-five years previously, was regarded as narrow-minded: defaulting to Spain in the 1922 Davis Cup instead of sending a team of keen youngsters; failing to show “official” interest in a visit by the Harvard and Yale teams earlier in the year; and, the poor treatment of Ireland and a ‘bungling by the LTA’ that prevented a proposed match versus England taking place.

Following Blackmore’s more pointed recommendations for change, the LTRC’s list was notable for its vagueness. Yet, the published reply, signed by twenty-one of the most well-established, incumbent LTA Councillors – many of whom were targeted in the reform – was equally lacking in detail and substance. Countering their points, for example, they spoke of their immense ‘prestige and influence’ as an association, their ‘most harmonious and friendly’ relationships with overseas bodies, Britain’s ‘very adequate facilities’, and the ‘great strides’ made in ‘introducing lawn tennis in the public schools’. Subsequently, in true political style, representatives from both sides attacked the other with clichés and platitudes, offering nothing concrete of themselves but willing to fault their opponents’ efforts.

Going into the AGM, it was probably safe to assume that most Councillors felt secure in their positions, which were prestigious, brought kudos and perks, and enhanced the status of the specific clubs/county associations they represented. Burrow described, ironically just months before the meeting: ‘The Council is re-elected, practically en bloc, every year. It is seldom that more than half a dozen new candidates are even nominated for the Council and of these still more seldom are more than one or two elected’. In this case, hitherto unprecedented, there were eighty-eight nominations for thirty-six available seats.
The outcome was claimed as a significant, though far from comprehensive, victory for the reformists.\(^5\) The eleven LTRC-supported incumbents all returned, and ten new LRTC-supported Councillors were elected. Despite these results, almost all of the aging stalwarts remained; the incumbent Treasurer, S.A.E. Hickson, was re-elected – ‘a serious defeat for the Reform Committee’ – and none of the four reformist Vice-President candidates won; thus, according to *The Times*, the LTRC ‘failed in their attack on the more important offices of the Association’.\(^6\) The major swing was at the lowest level on the Council, among those with the least influence. Nevertheless, the result triggered a spate of reflective self-questioning of British attitudes to competition in relation to their deeply-entrenched amateur ethos.

Echoing earlier sentiments, some well-known correspondents opined that American success in lawn tennis had a deleterious influence on British players. Just days before the AGM, *The Times*, in typically moderate style, failed to rationalise the pursuit of winning, and opined: ‘All games – so long as they are games – are best left to the management of experienced men of conservative tendencies rather than to any body of reformers’.\(^6\) And after the result, one *LT&B* correspondent asked, philosophically, ‘why Englishmen should throw over their traditional policy of “the game for the game’s sake”, and subordinate everything to the production of world beaters?’. These sentiments struck the heart of amateurism as expressed through international competition. The growth of the Davis Cup, from an event before the war involving no more than eight nations to 15 in 1922 and a peak of 33 in 1928, certainly played a role. Competition for the Cup itself had become culturally more significant – second only to the Olympic Games as an international sporting spectacle – but was considered:

scarcely suitable for the amateur; for it limits the choice of players to those without business and professional ties, or who are so endowed with this world’s goods that they are able to spend three or six months of the year away from home.\(^6\)

For the British to contest their opponents abroad in this increasingly intense competitive environment, one *LT&B* correspondent suggested its players must ‘take the vows of the monk and the oath of a soldier’.\(^6\) This viewpoint was in stark contrast to the ethically high-minded amateur ideals that had hitherto pervaded British lawn tennis play and administrative ideology.

In the context of shifting Anglo-American relations in broader political and economic terms, British tennis officials were reluctant to depart from their traditional methods and espouse a more American-inspired, performance-oriented, “professional” mentality. However, as the ILTF grew in stature to become a more relevant and powerful organisation, particularly after the U.S. joined in 1924, the British were forced to accept their declining administrative position. Increasingly beholden to other nations’ whims, British leadership in matters on and off-court could no longer be assumed. As such, their decline was matched by the growing, but still far from comprehensive, questioning of their amateur ideals and methods.

Set in these wider contexts, British tennis officials were, throughout much of the 1920s, a rudderless bunch, espousing change but reluctant to question their own philosophies. Some of them remained convinced of Britain’s traditional methods and ideals, rooted in, what came to be considered, ‘excessive voluntarism’ and amateurism’s ‘decaying ideology’.\(^6\) While they acknowledged that the training methods, tactics and competitive ideals of other nations brought results, the British were unwilling to accept defeat in ideological terms. For them, their emphases on voluntarism and amateurism extended beyond simple faith in their practical effectiveness, but were rooted in a belief that the British played sport in the “right” way, i.e. with good grace and sportsmanship, and without undue seriousness. For some of the leading LTA officials, who competed during the era when these values prevailed, off-court ethical and ideological leadership brought just as much prestige. Indeed, despite their
impoverished state after the war, the LTA remained ‘convinced of their moral duty to administratively lead the sport through this new era’. The British proudly claimed that ‘lawn tennis in this country is run on cleaner and honester [sic] lines than anywhere else’, and considered this a responsibility, as Huggins and Williams alluded to across sport in general: ‘The selflessness and concern for others, modesty, honesty, courage and abiding by the rules that were involved with sportsmanship were interpreted as evidence that the English could be trusted’ to exercise control for the benefit of all. Thus, the British claimed their administrative leadership was necessary to preserve amateurism globally and to educate foreign athletes and officials about sportsmanship, which was a position upheld most vigorously by the British Olympic Association and supported by other nations’ officials. \[LT&B\] supported this view given that ‘true sportsmanship’ was considered Britain’s ‘birthright’. Thus, the idea of the LTA as moral leader of international tennis found considerable support, but came ironically during a period when their influence waned through the ILTF’s ascendance.

For many critics in the early-1920s, Britain’s position as administrative leader but second-class competitor was unacceptable. To underline Britain’s embarrassing regression to a nation of participants rather than champions, the British Davis Cup player, Gordon Crole-Rees, proposed: if a match was arranged ‘between the first 2000 players in this country and the first 2000 in any other, England would win by an overwhelming margin’. Conversely, other critics attempted to inspire change through vague statements. Arthur Batley published a long series of scathing attacks on the LTA’s weak leadership throughout 1923 and ‘24. Suggesting there were fundamental flaws in Britain’s sporting ‘mentality’, Batley speculated that for a typical young Englishman,

lawn tennis is a game, and not one of the serious activities of life. ... Exercise and pleasure are its true objects and greatness merely one of the attractive incidences of it. ... He may take a few lessons if he can get them, and practice a little occasionally, but the regular dogged practice which makes perfect is rarely indulged in. An ‘overseas player’, by comparison, ‘takes the game more seriously than we do, and goes in search of greatness, while we are inclined to wait for it to come to us’. Though full of passionate pleas and battle metaphors, what Batley essentially spoke were sketchy, groundless clichés. He wrote, for example, that Britain needed to create ‘an atmosphere charged with enthusiasm and ambition to succeed by deliberate methods’, and to ‘dispense active encouragement, help and inspiration to the players’. The 4-1 loss to the French in the 1924 Davis Cup semi-final – coming after the second-round defeat by Spain the previous year – helped ignite the passionate flames of nationalism. Batley urged his fellow Councillors at the LTA’s AGM to approach the goal of recapturing major championships like Wimbledon and the Davis Cup – ‘to win back that which has been taken from us’ – with a resolute spirit that ‘we have always had in our history, and it is the spirit that manifested itself in the Great War’. He advised his countrymen there present to respond openly, rather than defensively, to considerations of other nations’ more specialised and determined methods of talent development. British approaches, by comparison, were ‘haphazard, spasmodic, purely individual’, and so his radical recommendation overall was to ‘scrap the old machine’.

Exactly what he meant by any of this is anybody’s guess. Indeed, what was the new “machine” to look like and how would it function differently? Such nationalist desires to recapture British glory were not limited to tennis in this period, and can be found in numerous other sports where British dominance was previously considered unquestionable, such as cricket, rowing and athletics.

*British Responses to Reform in the Inter-War Period*
It was evident that the results of the 1922 LTA AGM and the reformists’ endeavours triggered anxieties about the erosion of amateurism. *The Field* remarked that the LTRC insist on the principles of amateurism in good faith, but, like most reformers, they are loosing [sic] forces which they cannot control. They are being carried towards the establishment of an elaborate international organisation constructed on the lines of the Football League. In such an organisation the distinctive character of English amateurism will be lost.\textsuperscript{75}

Evidently, exponents believed the LTRC were pushing the sport toward professionalism. The Football League comparison was meant as an insult, given the arrogant belief that lawn tennis was above professionalism and the regular training and intense competitiveness that league competitions engendered.

The LTA responded by pushing forward with their two key projects: developing coaching and public-schools tennis. For too long, many of the best British coaching-professionals relocated abroad for better wages, working conditions and social status.\textsuperscript{76} Not only did coaching-professionals in the pre-war era earn ‘notoriously low’ wages, but their disparaging label as “professional” assumed a working-class background and “servant” status within the British club hierarchy.\textsuperscript{77} On the Continent and in America, master-servant relations were less pronounced, if evident at all, and top clubs in Germany, France, Austria, and Sweden courted many coaching-professionals. Especially in America, they were rewarded handsomely; George Agutter was reportedly paid a £10,000 salary as resident “professor” at West Side Tennis Club (New York), in 1913.\textsuperscript{78}

The loss of coaching-professionals from Britain was problematic, but one way of helping to retain them, and of improving coaching standards more specifically, was to provide coaches more competitive match-play opportunities for prize-money. The most enlightened officials realised that amateur players would improve if coaches had relevant competitive knowledge and experience that could be passed on. In the late-1890s, amateur-versus-professional exhibition matches were arranged along the French Riviera, but such matches were slow to receive LTA sanction. After the war, the LTA failed to reinstate such contests until 1924, when leading amateurs faced coaching-professionals in a three-match series at Queen’s Club. Won 3-0 by the amateurs, the exhibition generated such interest that five other clubs across Britain expressed interest in hosting similar events. Over the next few years, amateur-versus-professional matches grew in popularity.

It is possible that the personnel changes stemming from the 1922 AGM tipped the balance toward the favourable institution of such competitions, but in the developments that followed it is more likely an increasingly determined coaching contingent, led by Dan Maskell, that inspired such change.\textsuperscript{79} Maskell emerged as a player and coach of promise in the early-mid 1920s, and in time became a well-respected figure among amateur administrators and players.\textsuperscript{80} Both he and Charles Hierons lobbied the LTA for more match-play opportunities, which culminated in the British Professional Championships staged at Queen’s. Maskell won in 1928 and a further fifteen times.

A number of LTA Councillors were sufficiently inspired by these developments to propose before the March 1930 ILTF AGM a tournament open to the world’s leading amateurs and professionals, held under ILTF sanction. Though the proposal was not wholeheartedly supported by the British at the preceding LTA AGM in December 1929, Councillor H.H. Monckton admitted candidly that while he, himself, did not support the idea ‘heart and soul’, he nevertheless felt the British ‘must advance with the times’.\textsuperscript{81} The LTA felt pressured to be seen leading international tennis, even if all its Councillors were not sold on the direction they were going; a position expressed by C.N. Hyem:
We have always been looked to for a lead in matters connected with the game. Well, let us continue to lead, but do not let us be put into the invidious position of coming in long after other countries have made up their minds. Ultimately, it seemed that growing anxieties among other ILTF nations over professional “contamination” prevented open competitions from being instituted. Supported only by America, the British proposal was ‘a complete “flop”’ according to LT&B; the main opposition was that ‘lawn tennis had its own public, which had been built and grown up round it. Democratic though the game was, this public was particular. The “open” championship would make it general’. Regarding open tournaments, ‘what more certain way could be devised to tempt young amateurs from the true path?’ The British and Americans proposed the open-tournament idea several more times over the coming years, but were defeated comprehensively each time. Of key concern to the Swiss Chairman of the ILTF Committee on Amateurism, Charles Barde, was to protect players from the ‘bad features of sham amateurism’:

Most of the trouble has been brought about by the competition between clubs and other promoters of lawn tennis tournaments for the presence of amateurs of high skill, who have responded only too readily to the lures dangled in front of them. ... The game has ceased to be a game... and has become a business, with enticing possibilities of profits for all concerned.

For him, open competition would ‘encourage a state of professionalism which can be tolerated in some sports, but not in ours’. The contradictions inherent within apparent British support for open competitions are everywhere to be seen. While happy to sanction such events when under their jurisdiction, they overwhelmingly opposed those organised independently. For example, in 1930, when an amateur player sought the LTA’s approval to play a charity match against a coaching-professional, he was refused because it contravened amateur regulations. Thus, it seems that the LTA’s support for open competitions and improving match-play opportunities for coaching-professionals was not based on a progressive philosophy to develop coaches, advance playing standards and promote tennis to new audiences, but rather to retain amateur control over the advancement of British tennis and, crucially, be seen to lead in international tennis matters to massage their ego and retain prestige. The British were happy to lead on this particular issue as, hitherto, problems related to amateurism/professionalism did not exist in Britain as they did elsewhere. While Suzanne Lenglen and other star players joined the professional ranks from 1926 onwards, no leading British player turned professional until 1936, when Fred Perry signed. The absence of ex-amateurs over the years had little effect on Wimbledon’s coffers, and professional tours that might have pulled audiences (and revenue) from British tournaments did not come to England until the autumn of 1934. Indeed, all known “professionals” in Britain were in fact coaches, who instructed amateur players; thus, their work complemented rather than conflicted with the LTA’s objectives to develop talent and improve national playing standards.

Without wholehearted LTA support, coaching-professionals were forced to take matters into their own hands. Throughout the late-1920s and 30s, Maskell was instrumental in helping to enhance the status of the coaching craft by advancing the cause of coaching-professionals and separating them in the minds of amateur officials from ex-amateur touring-professionals. Maskell and Hierons created a union for coaching-professionals in 1925 and the LTA, while happy to support the professional association and even take it under its wing, were unwilling to provide coaching-professionals a Council seat or the opportunity to vote directly on matters pertaining to their welfare. As far as they were concerned, their LTA Council was to remain a bastion of amateur (middle-class) privilege, where, as H.R. McDonald argued in the Evening News, coaching-professionals were kept at arms-length and...
offered half-hearted measures designed to placate rather than make a determined effort to improve their opportunities.\textsuperscript{87}

Maskell was concerned to ensure the highest standards of coaching were being offered across Britain, and in 1927 a coaching “certificate” was recommended, but this did not materialise. Instead, the LTA devised a register to record information about every coach, but this amounted to little more than a list of names, and only in 1934 was it proposed that coaches be tested beforehand to ensure they were suitably qualified.\textsuperscript{88} While these developments imply greater involvement and a stronger commitment from the LTA, in reality the Association was not leading the advancement of coaching-professionals, but reluctantly being dragged along by them.

With their efforts to promote lawn tennis in the public schools, the LTA seemed similarly disinclined to progress from their traditional methods and ideological foundations, which tended to privilege aesthetics and process over outcomes. By the mid-1920s still very few public schools had courts, and of those that did many declined to compete against other schools.\textsuperscript{89} Things improved when the Public Schools Old Boys LTA formed in 1929, which helped to encourage court construction and establish inter-school competitions; by 1933, thirty-two public schools had adopted lawn tennis and twenty-one of those utilised LTA coaching services.\textsuperscript{90} Despite this progress, the LTA still focused on a narrow pool of players, when a more comprehensive and dynamic programme of talent identification/development would have included grammar and state schools. Even the LTA President, the Right Hon. Viscount D’Abernon, proposed in 1927 as a key priority for the Association: ‘a reduction in the cost of playing – opening the game to wider classes and to younger players’.\textsuperscript{91} Internal divisions and weak leadership, however, prevented the LTA from acting on this directive until the late-1940s.

It was certain that Fred Perry’s success – and to a lesser extent Bunny Austin and Dorothy Round – was a boon for British tennis, propelling it to the forefront of international success. Perry won eight major championships, including Wimbledon singles 1934-36 and four Davis Cups 1933-36, but his arrival masked the LTA’s problems in talent development, specifically the lack of opportunities for children beyond the typical middle-class demographic. Indicative of the institutional ignorance in this regard, Davis Cup captain and long-standing LTA Councillor, H.A. Sabelli, remarked of the up-and-coming Perry: ‘It is obvious that you cannot keep a good man down. Any boy or girl, no matter what their social standing, has a chance to climb to the top of the tree if they are keen enough’.\textsuperscript{92} While nobody would deny the importance of being “keen”, others, including the following LT&B correspondent, highlighted the LTA’s blindness to class-based inequities within their “democratic” rhetoric:

If the governing body are sincere in their wish to make lawn tennis really democratic... boys and girls in elementary schools should be given the same opportunity as the children whose parents can afford to send them to public schools.\textsuperscript{93}

Reports also emerged about inadequate talent identification/development opportunities. In some cases, one-off thirty-minute sessions were used to gauge children’s potentials, which over-relied on a coach’s “eye” for spotting talent and was scarcely sufficient to do anything more than ‘sow the seed of enthusiasm’ as a Middlesex LTA representative admitted: ‘The county associations are quite aware of the fact that this scheme probably does not result in the immediate and direct improvement of any one individual’.\textsuperscript{94} Built on a foundation that lacked imagination and forethought, it is unsurprising that the national coaching scheme was heavily criticised; LT&B reported: ‘three quarters of the amount allocated by the LTA for coaching is practically wasted’.\textsuperscript{95}

Britain’s success during Perry’s reign sustained the LTA’s idleness. After he signed a professional contract at the end of 1936 – a move that disqualified him from amateur
competitions – the Austin-led team was thumped 5-0 by America in the 1937 Davis Cup Challenge Round. Aside from Austin’s Wimbledon final appearance in 1938, Britain’s subsequent decline was immediate, underlined by a 5-0 trouncing by Yugoslavia in the 1938 Davis Cup Second Round.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to critically examine the attempted reform of British tennis in the inter-war period. The stir created by the 1922 AGM brought considerable self-reflection and helped the LTA pursue its already-well-established objectives to enhance coaching opportunities and develop public schools’ tennis. In these areas progress was slow but steady. New blood within the LTA Council made it as an organisation slightly more forward-thinking, but not necessarily more enlightened, imaginative or dynamic. Indeed, reformist candidates were elected to relatively minor positions, and hence their influence was probably less than what they expected. Despite growing scepticism of amateurism as a guiding principle of British sport, the LTA remained an elitist, monolithic and rather faceless body, guided by outmoded philosophies yet unwilling to engage publicly with critics.

Contrary to the approaches emerging abroad, the LTA continued to oppose a more performance-oriented (professional) ethos. This can be seen clearly at the end of the inter-war period, when even members of their own Council accused them of stifling talent. In 1934, they voted to oppose the adoption of a new rule passed by the ILTF that allowed amateur players to claim up to eight weeks of expenses. Deeming the rule ‘contrary to amateurism’, the consequence was that British players were disadvantaged in relation to those of other nations that adopted the ruling, e.g. France and America. Councillor H.H. Monckton considered this a form of ‘class legislation’, limiting competitive play to all but the ‘gilded youth and the idle rich’, while British Davis Cup doubles specialist, G.P. Hughes, criticised the LTA’s ‘small “Inner Cabinet”’ for continuing to govern ‘with its ultra conservative and old fashioned methods’. The Council’s failure to accept this modification to the amateur rules sustained the positive discrimination that foreigners enjoyed at Wimbledon, and pushed Ted Avory and Harold Lee, both leading LTA Councillors, to resign their positions in protest; ‘[presiding] over an intensely hypocritical administrative system’, argued Lake, the LTA ‘came to appear ostrich-like, feeble and fickle’ in their overall leadership.

Evidently, the more progressive competitive ideologies that drove lawn tennis success in America, Continental Europe and Australasia were not so easily accepted in Britain. Arguably, therefore, the reforms of the 1920s failed to significantly dislodge the LTA’s underlying elitism or their traditional principles of voluntarism and amateurism. Whilst Britain restored some prestige through the Perry-led triumphs of the early/mid-1930s, the institution of talent identification/development schemes was stunted. They consistently failed to find creative solutions to the problems of a comparatively weak coaching infrastructure and the widespread unwillingness of public schools to support the game. The often-voiced rhetoric and clichés certainly inspired a revolutionary mind-set for change but without dynamic thinking, the scope for fundament progress was lacking. Indeed, while the early post-war period witnessed notable signs of progress in coach-education and children’s talent development, the LTA continued to receive criticism from leading figures for sustaining regional/geographical-, gender- and class-based inequities through their efforts. Real progress was seen in the relative declining cost of tennis equipment, the establishment of more egalitarian clubs, and free public-park courts. This helped to improve accessibility for lower-middle-class children across the country, but these developments were not due to the LTA’s actions. For Maskell, much like in the inter-war period, the LTA overlooked
opportunities presented by the sport’s democratisation with sound policy-making and funding distribution:

It was quite apparent... that people felt the LTA were not terribly concerned with the development of the game. Park superintendents felt that they were being neglected, some schools felt much the same and all too often some of the counties were not really trying to spread the game to a new generation of players.\(^1\) The prevalence of such problems into the post-war period reflected the deep-rooted elitism that characterised the LTA’s leadership from its initial formation in 1888.

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6 *Lawn Tennis & Badminton*, 8 November, 1924, 814.
7 *Lawn Tennis & Badminton*, 15 November 1924, 830.
9 Roberta Park. ‘Sport, Gender and Society in a Transatlantic Victorian Perspective’.
11 *Pastime*, 2 June, 1886, 369.
13 J. Parmly Paret, ‘The International Tennis of 1897’, *Outing*, October, 1897, 73.
14 ‘A Chat with the Covered Court and Irish Champion’, *Lawn Tennis*, 11 May 1898.
18 ‘A Chat with the Covered Court and Irish Champion’, *Lawn Tennis*, 11 May 1898.
20 Myers, *Lawn Tennis*, 132.
24 Myers, *Lawn Tennis*, 16.
25 ‘A Chat with the Covered Court and Irish Champion’, Lawn Tennis, 11 May 1898.
27 Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 6 June, 1912, 324.
29 Headmasters and Games, The Times, 2 January, 1920, 15.
33 Parke, How to Play, 91.
36 Tilden, The Art, 117.
38 S. Powell Blackmore. Lawn Tennis Up-To-Date. (London: Methuen, 1921), 179.
39 Blackmore, Lawn Tennis, xvi.
40 Blackmore, Lawn Tennis, 175.
41 Burrow, Lawn Tennis, 204.
42 New York Times, 14 Sept, 1913.
45 ‘The Game in France’, Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 22 May 1920, 67. Previous to the formation of the Fédération Française de Lawn Tennis in October 1920, French tennis officials were represented within the umbrella organisation for French sport, the Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques, which began to disband in 1919.
46 Simon Eaves. ‘Coaching, Physical Training and the Changing Landscape of Lawn Tennis: Australia’s Ascendancy to Dominance in the Pre-Great War era’. In Sport and Leisure on the Eve of the First World War, by Dave Day. (Crewe: Manchester Metropolitan University, 2016), 83; ‘Lawn Tennis’, Dominion, 28 August, 1913, 9.


See: Lake, Social Exclusion; Lake, Social History.


Burrow, Lawn Tennis, 5.

Lowe, Gordon Lowe, 126.

Daily Mail, 9 December, 1922, 11; Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 16 December, 1922, 707.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 2 December, 1922, 667.

Daily Mail, 9 December, 1922, 11.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 2 December, 1922, 667.

Burrow, Lawn Tennis, 204.

‘Narrow Majority’, Daily Mail, 13 December, 1922, 11.

The Times, 12 December, 1922, 14.

The Times, 8 December, 1922, 6.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 30 December, 1922, 743.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 30 December, 1922, 743


Lake, Social History, 100.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 12 September, 1925, 611; Huggins and Williams, Sport and the English, 147.


Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 10 March, 1923, 899.

All Sports Weekly, 7 May, 1927.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 16 February, 1924, 1015.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 23 February, 1924, 1035.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 20 December, 1924, 910.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 20 December, 1924, 910.

Huggins and Williams, Sport and the English.


Lake, Social History, 64. In 1916, even after 26 years of service managing the lawn tennis department at Queen’s Club, Charles Hierons was reputedly paid just five shillings per week. Roy McKelvie, The Queen’s Club Story 1886-1986, (London: Stanley Paul & Co. Ltd., 1986), 91.

Huntington Herald, 6 June, 1913.


Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 14 December, 1929, 1028.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 14 December, 1929, 1029.

Lawn Tennis & Badminton, 29 March, 1930, 1397.
Such programmes included a scheme for teacher-training, a nationwide coaching tour, the establishment of boys’ and girls’ school’s LTAs and expanded junior competitions, and the creation of a winter training school.

Lake, Social History, 197.
