

Employee Voice, Equal Opportunities and Workplace Outcomes:
An Analysis of UK Workplaces

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Employee Voice, Equal Opportunities and Workplace Outcomes: An Analysis of UK Workplaces

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ABSTRACT

Equal opportunity ('EO') policy, practice and legislation has existed for a long time in the UK. Diversity Management ('DM'), seeing diverse workforces as a competitive strength, covering everyone in the workforce, being more gender neutral and inclusive of those traditionally excluded from organisations, has also come to the fore. However, discrimination within companies continues. Amongst the groups most affected are women, those from a BME background, and disabled people.

This thesis draws on an analytical framework that enables a holistic approach to studying the links between voice and EO and DM policies. This thesis incorporates four main types of voice workplace – minimal voice, dual voice, direct voice and indirect voice. It also disaggregates two of these four main types of voice workplace. Within the minimal voice category, this thesis distinguishes between the 'bleak house' approach and the 'limited approach' and within the dual voice category, this research differentiates between the 'co-existence approach' and the 'partnership approach'. This enables this thesis to take a fine grained analytical approach of the links between voice and EO and DM policies, as well as the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes, measured by absenteeism and voluntary labour turnover (quits), on the other, within the various types of voice workplace. Voice is relevant to the debate because it hasn't been explored before and they could be an important means to convey employees preferences to employers, and can therefore potentially help to explain variation in the uptake of EO and DM in different workplaces.

To ensure that the results of this research reveal the attitude of workplaces to EO and DM policies this thesis will analyse EO and DM policies at a disaggregated level, covering not only a more diverse set EO and DM policies, but also examining a range of workplaces, not only large organisations, as previous studies have often done. The study focuses on three groups that are commonly discriminated against: women, BME groups and those with a disability. Such discrimination can take direct and indirect forms, therefore, policies monitoring recruitment and selection, and promotions for direct and indirect discrimination, and relative pay rates will be examined, for each of the three groups.

This study draws on data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2011), the largest, most comprehensive study of workplace practices in the UK. The survey covers EO and DM policies in detail, enabling a nuanced analysis of both the voice factors and the workplace outcomes that they may be associated with. The thesis relies on the

management survey in order to capture as many workplaces as possible. The analysis of the data relies on logistic regressions, as the outcome variables in both sets of regressions are dichotomous.

The first key finding from this research is that voice is associated with the greater adoption of EO and DM policies in workplace: the more voice a workplace has the more likely it is to have a range of EO and DM policies. For instance, workplaces with direct voice, indirect voice, and dual voice are more likely to have a range of policies compared to those workplaces with minimal voice. In addition, dual voice workplaces are frequently more likely to adopt EO and DM policies compared to all other types of workplace.

The second key finding of this research is that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicating that, in most instances, EO and DM neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. This suggests that existing theories could be amended.

The third important finding is that any statistically significant associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, depend upon the type of workplace within which the policies operate. For instance, the relationship between policies and outcomes is sometimes positive and statistically significant (albeit often only at the 10-per-cent level) amongst minimal voice workplaces. It is occasionally negative and statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level) amongst dual voice workplaces. This justifies the approach taken here; it also highlights key areas for future research.

The fourth key finding of this research is that there is a connection between high levels of labour turnover, amongst minimal voice workplaces, and the use of EO and DM policies. Again, this highlights areas that future research could examine.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis studies the links between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace outcomes. Despite the presence of legislation and calls for businesses to view diverse workforces favourably, discrimination within companies continues. Amongst the groups most affected are women, black minority ethnic (BME) groups, and disabled people. These are the groups that will be examined in this thesis. All of these groups are at a disadvantage compared to men or to the dominant ethnic group within society, leading not only to lower salaries and worse promotional opportunities for these groups, but also, potentially, to poor performance and a loss, overall, of economic output.

Examining the causes of this discrimination is, therefore, an important issue justifying the two-stage assessment in this thesis of the links between 1) different forms of ‘employee voice’ and equal opportunity (EO) policies, including diversity management (DM), and 2) EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, as measured by absenteeism and quits.

Existing research has shown that voice can influence workplace policies (e.g. Bryson, 2004); however, there are a limited number of existing studies that examine links between voice and EO and DM. In addition, work that assesses the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type of voice (e.g. Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guthrie, 2001). This thesis draws on an analytical framework that enables a more holistic approach to studying the links between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace outcomes. It also, due to the practical difficulties of separating EO and DM policies, combines these two areas, even though, theoretically, they are distinct, as will be shown.

Using a framework that captures a range of voice mechanisms is important for two interrelated reasons. First, existing research in this area tends to focus on unions as voice mechanisms and does not consider other voice mechanisms. Second, as Greene and Kirton (2009) argue, industrial relations research has, on the whole, been conducted by white men who examine white, male union leaders and has focused on structures and systems rather than processes and practices. Together, these result in the general neglect of other stakeholders within companies, such as women and BME groups and disabled people. This thesis seeks to include these often neglected workers by incorporating a range of voice mechanisms into the research. For instance, the thesis include direct-voice mechanisms into the analysis, meaning

that individual workers' opinions are not mediated by unions or other worker representatives. This thesis also incorporates unions and other collective voice mechanisms into the research.

1.2 Employee Voice

This thesis examines the links between various voice mechanisms, EO and DM policies and the effect they have on workplace outcomes, namely labour turnover and absenteeism. This thesis distinguishes between the following voice mechanisms: collective voice, direct voice, dual voice and minimal voice as well as partnership (as a sub-set of dual-voice workplaces) and bleak house approaches (as a sub-set of minimal voice workplaces). It will examine the links between these voice mechanisms and the presence of a range of EO and DM policies in specific areas. In other words, the thesis goes beyond the relatively superficial presence of an overarching EO and DM policy to examine whether or not establishments monitor, for instance, relative pay rates by gender. This thesis analyses EO and DM policies at a disaggregated level, digging deeper to examine whether women, BME groups and disabled people are treated as other groups of workers in workplaces, by examining whether workplaces monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination against these groups, both directly and indirectly. Whether promotions for these groups are monitored both directly and indirectly and finally whether pay rates are monitored on the grounds of sex, ethnicity and disability. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail how and why these groups are treated the way they are, the aim of the research is to examine which voice mechanisms are most likely to be associated with EO and DM policies and the links between these policies and quits and absenteeism in a large scale study. The examination of these three groups and the way that various practices are monitored are examined to this end. This research draws on a large data set to enable this thesis to identify any patterns between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies and quits and absenteeism, on the other.

As is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the notion of voice has been used in many employment-related studies. It can cover direct voice, in which employees themselves convey their views to managers, to indirect voice, in which employee representatives express the concerns of employees to managers, to dual voice, which combines direct and indirect voice. The voice concept enables this thesis to analyse the links between a range of contrasting information-sharing mechanisms and EO and DM measures in a systematic way. In addition, by differentiating between different types of 'voice workplace', this thesis can

undertake a more nuanced assessment of the links between EO and DM, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other. In other words, the voice construct enables an assessment of how varying voice mechanisms may create the conditions for workplaces to lower their levels of absenteeism as well as their quit rates.

Existing studies of the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes are limited in number and do not differentiate between workplaces, potentially downplaying important contingent factors that influence how EO and DM policies shape important outcomes within workplaces. Existing studies find no clear relationship between a relatively limited number of equal opportunity policies and workplace outcomes (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008), suggesting that previous research may have neglected factors that can influence those and related outcomes. In addition, existing studies tend to focus on large organisations (Metcalf and Forth, 2000; Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002), underpinning the need for more representative studies to be undertaken that incorporate a broader range of equal opportunity measures (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). This thesis seeks to meet that need.

1.3 Women, BME and Disabled People

There is much evidence to illustrate how women, BME groups and disabled people experience inferior employment-related outcomes compared to dominant social groups. Full-time male workers earn more than full-time female workers, leading to a full-time gender pay gap in 2012 of 9.6 per cent of hourly earnings (excluding any overtime payments). If overtime is included in the assessment, the pay gap increases to 17.8 per cent of gross weekly earning (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013). The discrepancy in earnings is greater for the weekly figures compared to the hourly data, as men who work full time tend to work longer total paid weekly hours than women (median data: 38.8 hours for men; 37.3, for women). In addition, men tend to receive higher overtime payments compared to women (£64.20 for median earnings for men compared to £33.50 for women) (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013). If mean data are used to calculate the gender pay gap, the discrepancies between earnings for men and women are greater, as 1) some men receive very large remuneration packages and 2) women are often employed in the low paid jobs (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013). Although the gap between the employment situations of men and women has declined, a discrepancy remains (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006; Platt, 2011).

Such data underlines the necessity of examining various aspects of equality between men and women within workplaces. The gender pay gap is likely to be influenced not just by pay rates for men and women within establishments, but also the types of jobs (and the attendant pay) that women and men are recruited for, and the promotional prospects of men and women who carry out similar jobs within establishments. Discrimination may be direct or indirect (direct discrimination is treating someone less favourably because of a particular attribute. Indirect discrimination is when there is a practice, policy or rule that applies to everyone but puts some people at a particular disadvantage). It is for these reasons that this thesis examines whether workplaces monitor recruitment, promotions, and pay for direct and indirect forms of discrimination.

Analysing data from the UK, Berthoud and Blekesaune (2006) found that disadvantages in employment are, in many instances, related to disability and ethnicity. For instance, BME workers are often at a disadvantage in employment compared to white employees. Similarly, disabled employees are paid less than employees without a disability (Bardasi and Jenkins, 2000; Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006). Longhi *et al* (2012) believe that pay differentials between disabled and non-disabled men are strongest at the top of the wage distribution, at 2.3 per cent at the mean and rising to 11.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent at the 75th and 90th percentiles respectively.

Discrimination within workplaces can lead to those from BME groups or disabled employees being disadvantaged in two ways. Firstly, they may not be promoted within the organisation by their current employer, reducing pay levels. Secondly, they may be perceived as lacking skills that enhance their employment prospects with other organisations (Schroeder *et al.*, 2008).

Ethnic penalties exist in employment in Britain. Heath and Cheung (2006) found that BME groups had higher rates of unemployment, more limited promotional opportunities, and lower pay. Carmichael and Woods (2000) and Wood *et al.* (2009) found that recruitment decisions were, at least in part, influenced by discriminatory selection practices among employers (see also Booth *et al.*, 2009; Riach and Rich, 2002).

Collectively, this evidence supports the rationale to examine the policies that firms adopt to monitor recruitment and selection, promotion and relative pay levels for potential discrimination against workers from BME groups. Different voice mechanisms may influence the adoption of such policies in different ways and the policies may help to increase job satisfaction amongst employees, including those from BME groups.

Berthoud (2008) found that the employment rates of disabled people are low compared to those who are not disabled. The overall reduction in the employment rate was found to be 40 percentage points. Berthoud's (2008) analysis confirmed that disability is associated with employment disadvantage, independently of demographic and labour market characteristics, and shows how important the disability penalty is. He also found that this penalty has been increasing over the past three decades.

Bell and Heitmueller (2009) found that the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) has had no impact on the employment rate of disabled people and possibly even worsened it. The potential reasons for this, according to Bell and Heitmueller (2009), are higher uncertainty around litigation costs by employers, low levels of general awareness about the Act among disabled people and employers, and a lack of financial support. Employers will hire or retain an employee if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. Hence, at least theoretically, the DDA may have increased employment costs of disabled people by shifting discrimination and adjustment costs from the employee to the employer. Unless the legislation is fully enforced, this may lead to lower rather than higher employment rates.

For these reasons, it is important to examine whether firms monitor recruitment and selection as well as promotions and pay levels for discrimination. It is important, for instance, to examine whether workplaces monitor pay for indirect discrimination, as it may be an indicator of the perceived contribution that employees are making to the organisation. Lower pay levels for certain groups may not, therefore, just be a signal of their perceived worth to an organisation, but may also indicate the likelihood of those in lower paid work being promoted within the firm or being recruited by another employer. On the issue of organisations recruiting applicants from certain groups - the evidence suggests that although discrimination has declined for those with BME backgrounds, applicants with BME backgrounds are indirectly discriminated against (Esmail 2004; Cook *et al.*, 2003).

Employers may often re-grade specific roles within the organisation to overcome equalities legislation, but do so in a way that indirectly separates highly skilled jobs into those performed largely by men from low skilled ones that are mainly done by women (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990; Snell *et al.*, 1981).

These forms of discrimination have implications not just for the individuals involved, but for the wider economy and society (Platt, 2011). They also, potentially, have consequences for the performance of businesses (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 2001), which is the focus of this thesis. Importantly, the links between EO and DM, on the one hand, and workplace outcomes, on the other, represent a relatively overlooked

factor that could help to explain the performance of different businesses (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008). The number of large quantitative studies is limited (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008). In particular, existing research has tended to downplay the links between EO and DM policies relating to employees from BME groups and disabled people and business performance (Schroeder *et al.*, 2008). Some of the potential benefits to business of enhancing EO and DM within workplaces can be improved supply of labour that does not discriminate against suitable applicants from different groups, improved employment relations, increased employee commitment to the organisation, and a heightened ability to meet diverse market needs (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008).

As analyses often draws a distinction between ‘EO’ and ‘DM’, it is important to set out key positions within the literature and to establish how EO and DM will be interpreted and used in this thesis.

1.4 Equal Opportunity

EO policies are there to ensure that all individuals are treated in the same way. Liff (1999) states that EO policies can be seen as an attempt to eradicate considerations of social differences from organisational decision making through bureaucratic means. The liberal approach advocates the philosophy of ‘sameness’ (Jewson and Mason, 1986). Anti-discrimination legislation has interpreted this as people being judged independently of their gender and focusing instead on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). In practice EOs mean techniques should be developed to ensure that individuals are assessed in the same way and that differences between individuals on characteristics that are not job related should not be considered. EO, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups. EO policies are underpinned by equality law in the UK.

I Equal Opportunity Law

Equality law in the UK says that people should not be treated differently in the workplace and in wider society on the grounds of specified ‘protected’ characteristics. The Equality Act 2010 bans unfair treatment in the workplace and wider society by prohibiting unfair treatment or access to employment as well as private and public services on the ground of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. The Equality Act 2010 largely

‘tidies up’ and, in a few instances, replaces previous legislation, such as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (ACAS, 2014).

However, legislation differs from EO practices within organisations. For instance, the law is not very prescriptive in terms of which areas, such as recruitment, pay and promotional opportunities, need to be legally monitored. For instance Daniels and Macdonald (2005: 126) note that: ‘It is generally considered to be good practice for employers to monitor their recruitment processes in order to promote equality’. Firms and workplaces are not, however, legally obliged to collect this information. In addition, legislation does not currently require firms or workplaces to monitor any area for direct and/or indirect discrimination against those with ‘protected characteristics’ covered by the 2010 Equality Act, such as gender, disability, and ethnicity. Companies will be required to report pay by gender from 2018.

Legislation does, however, enable individual employees to take their employer to a tribunal if that employee feels he or she is being discriminated against on the basis of gender, disability or ethnicity. For instance, an individual can make a case for wage inequality on the basis of, say, gender by comparing his or her pay to a real or ‘imagined’ person in a similar or the same role (ACAS, 2014). In order to reduce the possibility that an individual may take legal action against their employer, companies may initiate policies to monitor policies in a range of areas in order to be able to demonstrate that no discrimination exists against any particular group of employees, such as female employees, disabled people or those from an BME group. Policies within establishments that monitor recruitment, promotion and pay may, then, help companies to reduce the risk of going to a tribunal.

1.5 Diversity Management

In recent years, ‘diversity’ has gained increasing interest from academics and practitioners. Although there is no consensus on what DM is (Kirton *et al.*, 2007), a useful definition comes from Cornelius *et al.* (2000: 67):

Diversity management is concerned with the promotion of equality through valuing difference between individuals and groups, particularly those who have traditionally experienced disadvantage. In addition, good diversity management should seek a strong ‘business case’, which encourages inclusiveness and marshals difference.

The quotation indicates that DM is associated with a positive view of differences within workplaces, that diversity can add value to the workplace and business. The object of EO policies is to treat individuals the same whatever their characteristics, so that individuals or groups of individuals are not treated favourably or unfavourably. The proponents of the EO approach have assumed an operational approach to equality, supported and monitored by EO units, which are staffed by specialists (Mulholland *et al*, 2005).

DM differs in important respects, to EO in a number of ways. Barak (2014: 218) contends that, although EO policies underpinned by EO legislation has been beneficial to individuals and groups of individuals that have, in the past, been discriminated against, such as women, BME workers and disabled people, these groups of individuals have not been given the same treatment as other, more privileged groups of individuals. For instance, they have been able to gain access to jobs that, in the past, they would not have been able to do, and they have also been able to access better paid jobs. They have not, however, been promoted to very senior positions within many firms in representative proportions. Proponents of DM policies would contend that DM policies are designed to overcome this deficit (Barak, 2014).

DM seeks to achieve these objectives on the basis of a 'business case'. For instance, the CIPD (2012) found that the business benefits for a more diverse workforce are: a more engaged and, therefore, productive workforce; a route to fresh thinking, creativity and, hence, market competitiveness and innovation; and the strengthening of corporate reputation, an important aspect of employer brand management (see also, Kreitz, 2008; Orlando, 2000). The CIPD (2012) reported that diversity policies were put into practice by HR professionals, consulting directly with the board or senior executives to scope out objectives and deliverables. The CIPD (2012) also noted that, once support from senior managers was in place, HR professionals embed diversity into the business through specific projects and initiatives aimed at creating an inclusive culture through training and development. The CIPD's (2012) work is underpinned by the notion that it is managers who decide when to implement diversity policies and what form they will take, reflecting a broader shift away from normative notions associated with equal opportunities towards a voluntaristic, business-focused paradigm (Barak, 2014; Cox and Blake, 1991). The DM management paradigm is, therefore, more concerned with individuals and their contribution to the organisation rather than broader employee rights within workplaces (Kirton and Greene, 2000, 2010).

Similarly, Hollinshead, Nichols and Taliby (1999) differentiated between EO that are externally driven, focus on operational issues, potentially cost money, and for which there is

an ethical, moral and social case, on the one hand, and DM policies, on the other, that are internally driven, have a strategic purpose, potentially provide financial benefits to firms rather than cost money, adopt an individualistic approach rather than a group one, and focus on outcomes for which there is a business case. This can have a detrimental impact on gender equality (Kirton and Greene, 2000, 2010; Webb, 1997).

1.6 Differences and Similarities between Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management

An alternative to providing equality involves recognising and building on differences between people. In order to reduce inequalities in outcomes, therefore, certain groups should be treated differently. The radical approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for equality of opportunity, but also the need for equality of outcome.

These differences between EO and DM also reflect contrasting approaches to equality. In a seminal article, Jewson and Mason (1986) distinguish between different approaches to equality that they term 'liberal' and 'radical', even though these two approaches can be difficult to distinguish in practice. The liberal approach is based around the idea that men and women should be treated the same and sex equality is achieved when policies and procedures are identical for both sexes (Cockburn, 1989). Each individual, therefore, should be treated in the same way as any other individual. The basis of the liberal approach is, consequently, the philosophy of 'sameness', the idea that individuals have the right to be treated the same as another person of a different sex in the same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 1996).

The principles that underpin the liberal approach means that policy should relate to fair procedures, equality of opportunity, and the equal treatment of people. However, the principles for a radical approach aim to achieve a fair distribution, the attainment of equal outcomes, and the possibility to treat people differently according to their characteristics. The radical approach to promoting EO was adopted by individuals who held strong political and ethical values and recognized the historical disadvantage that certain groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and disabled persons, experienced in employment (Jewson and Mason 1986), and that EO would not rectify these differences. In the liberal approach, the successful implementation of policies requires a bureaucratic process in which rules are established and followed; in the radical approach, a process of politicisation should accompany or precede the implementation of policies so that employers and employees follow the policies for normative reasons. Consequently, the success of a liberal approach to equality might be measured by the

positive actions that are taken, whereas a radical approach might be measured by a set of beliefs amongst a population (Kirton *et al.*, 2007).

The role of government can also be expected to vary within liberal and radical approaches to equality (Kirton and Greene, 2005). In the liberal approach, policy should promote ‘fair’ competition for jobs, promotion, and financial rewards. An assumption that fair procedures will lead to fair outcomes, demonstrated, for instance, in the provision of subsidised childcare facilities to enable mothers to compete for jobs on an equal basis to men (Kirton and Greene, 2005). By contrast, radical approaches to equality are associated with policies that intervene directly in order to achieve a reduction in outcome inequalities, resulting, for instance, in measures to promote positive discrimination in employment relationships.

Traditionally, the British state has pursued an approach to equality that is more aligned to the liberal perspective than it to the radical one. For instance, policies have been implemented that seek to establish a ‘level playing field’ for all applicants and employees. This approach is clearly illustrated by the Conservative-led coalition between 2010 and 2015. Amongst the measures that the government adopted to prevent discrimination were 1) funding the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and making sure it does its job well, by appointing the board and monitoring its work, and 2) providing information, advice and support on discrimination through the Equality Advisory and Support Service (EASS) (Department for Education, 2013). Both of these measures illustrate the UK government’s desire to create fair procedures by providing information to employers and employees about how discrimination can be overcome; these measures do not impose a strict set of conditions on employers in order to intervene directly in their recruitment, pay and promotion decisions. The then government’s approach adhered more to the liberal than to the radical paradigm of EO.

The ability of both approaches to achieve the desired results has been criticised (Kirton and Greene, 2005). For instance, the liberal approach may be too ‘weak’ to overcome deep-seated prejudices as it does not require firms to make changes to their procedures. By contrast, the radical approach may result in ‘reverse discrimination’ as it requires certain groups to be treated favourably compared to others (Kirton and Greene, 2005). This thesis does not examine these arguments directly, but assesses the links between EO and DM policies together, as defined in the WERS dataset, and various types of voice.

It should not be forgotten that the distinction between EO and DM is not always that great in practice. The conflation of EO policies with DM precepts is illustrated by the following statement from a Department for Education (2013) publication:

We want the UK to be a leader in equality and human rights. At our best, we are defined by our tolerance, freedom and fairness. There is also a strong economic argument for equality. If people are not able to reach their full potential, the economy suffers.

The above quotation helps justify combining EO and DM policies. The focus on equality, is supported by EO laws and regulations, equality based on economics is highlighted in the business case argument for DM policies. The Workplace Employment Relations Survey, which is used in this thesis, has a key question which combines EO and DM. That question asks:

Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity?

As can be seen in this question, the WERS data set combines EO and DM. Liff and Wajcman (1996) acknowledge that initiatives exist which aim for equality despite difference and many policies within organisations combine the two approaches. The two approaches, may be seen as contradictory. However, their interaction may be productive (Ferguson, 1993). This thesis will combined EO and DM policies as the WERS data set does.

In addition, Kirton and Greene (2009) discuss how diversity specialists have, in general, replaced equality officers. They suggest that doing diversity work in the 2000s is a different experience from doing equality work in the 1980s/1990s and that the rise of the business case and relative decline in emphasis on, and resultant de-politicisation of, equality led to an increase in the legitimacy and respectability of DM. This, combined with the changing backgrounds and characteristics of diversity practitioners, means that diversity work usually carries lower costs and potentially offers more opportunities than equality work. However, Kirton and Greene's (2009) study finds that despite DM being a more business-friendly paradigm, some of the potential costs historically associated with equality work, including isolation, stress, marginalisation and career jeopardy remain significant for at least

some practitioners, particularly specialists. Consequently, business-friendly DM might be more fiction than reality (Kirton and Greene, 2009).

This position is also taken by Prasad and Mills (1997) who argue that, despite the rather glossy, upbeat veneer projected by organisational DM statements, some of the changes have actually only been superficial. Similarly, Kirton and Greene (2009) find that the willingness of mainstream managers to champion diversity can be explained by the legitimacy accorded to DM. Most practitioners drew support from the diversity and equality structures within their organisations and wanted to dissociate themselves from the negative image of EO (Kirton and Greene, 2009). DM arguably provides that opportunity with business-friendly objectives and language, making it more legitimate and respectable (Kirton and Greene, 2009).

Combining, in practice, EO and DM enables this thesis to undertake a large-scale study of the links between voice, EO and DM and workplace outcomes. It is the first study to do so, helping to explain why the incidence of EO and DM varies between workplaces and helps to reveal any links that EO and DM have with key workplace outcomes, absenteeism and quits. It is important to analyse the links between voice and EO and DM measures as the EO and DM literature often assumes, as the above discussion shows, that these policies are determined by managers alone. This neglects the possibility that managers respond to the preferences of employees that are expressed via voice mechanisms. As I argue below, the existing literature that examines the links between voice and EO/DM often focuses one type of voice, be it direct or collective voice. This research takes a more holistic view, drawing on an analytical framework that enables four different main types and four further sub-types of voice and their links to EO/DM to be examined.

These two approaches are linked to the rationale for EO and DM – the business case and social justice case, which will now be outlined. The theoretical base upon which to build policy that alleviates inequality and unfair discrimination have two potentially competing solutions, one focuses on equality of opportunity and the other on the management of diversity (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). These solutions are underpinned by two different rationales: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of the organisation (the business case) (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). This is echoed by Miller (1996) who observes that the diversity approach has an emphasis on the ‘business case’ which is in contrast to the ‘equal opportunity’ approach that emphasises social justice and fairness. The moral case suggests that powerful voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces to ensure workers’

rights are protected. By contrast, the business case suggests that managers should be free to decide which, if any, voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces.

1.7 Overview of Data and Methods

This study draws on data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2011), which is the largest most comprehensive study of workplace practices in the UK (Timming, 2009; Whitfield and Hoque, 2008; Whitfield and Huxley, 2007). Importantly, the survey covers EO and DM policies in detail, enabling a nuanced analysis of both the voice factors and the workplace outcomes that they may be associated with. The thesis relies on the management survey in order to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, thereby, contribute to the literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large ones (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). There are 1946 workplaces in the complete samples used in this thesis. If I had used either the employee representative or the employee survey, the sample size would be much lower and those surveys pose a different set of questions that do not address the specifics of EO and DM policies, making the assessment of the links between voice, EO and DM, and workplace outcomes and the use of regression analysis, impossible. I reduced the complete sample in order to examine differences amongst those workplaces that have both direct and indirect forms of voice as well as amongst those workplaces that have no or very low levels of direct voice and no collective voice.

The analysis has two stages. The first examines the links between different types of voice and EO and DM policies. The EO and DM policies concentrate on three categories of discrimination sex, BME and disability. Sex is the protected characteristic outlined in the EqA 2010. Sex relates to the biological differences between men and women, gender is more concerned with sociocultural factors that contribute to sex difference (Unger, 1979). The second assesses the associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other. Both steps rely on the use of logistic regressions as the outcome variables in both sets of regressions are dichotomous.

1.8 Structure of Thesis

The thesis has nine more chapters. The next chapter sets out the analytical framework that will guide the research. That framework distinguishes between different forms of voice and enables a holistic, nuanced analysis of the links between different forms of voice, on the one hand, and various EO and DM policies, on the other. It then goes on to discuss EO and DM in more detail and the different approaches to EO and DM. The chapter then goes onto

examine EO, DM and workplace outcomes followed by a review of the voice and diversity literature.

Chapter 3 details and justifies the data used in this research as well as the methods used in the analysis of that data. The chapter also specifies how key variables, such as direct and indirect, dual (including partnership) and minimal (including bleak house) have been operationalised. Chapter 4 is the first of six empirical chapters. Chapter 4 assesses if there are any differences between the different types of ‘voice workplace’ in terms of the likelihood of them adopting various EO and DM policies. The reference category is the ‘minimalist’ type of voice workplace. Chapter 5 performs the same analysis, but uses ‘direct voice’ workplaces as the reference category in order to examine more closely any differences between direct voice workplaces, on the one hand, and indirect, dual and minimal voice workplaces, on the other. This enables a thorough analysis of key arguments within the theoretical literature. Chapter 6 draws on distinctions between workplaces with a ‘partnership’ approach and those with a ‘co-existence’ model within dual voice workplaces to assess whether the former are more likely than the latter to adopt EO and DM policies. Chapter 7 draws a distinction between ‘bleak house’ and ‘limited’ voice workplaces to examine whether those establishments that have a limited direct voice are more likely than those that have no (or very few) direct voice policies (that is, bleak houses) to adopt the range of EO and DM policies adopted within the workplace.

The second stage of the analysis within this thesis begins in chapter 8. In the second stage of the analysis in this thesis, the links between EO and DM and two key workplace outcomes, absenteeism and quit rates, are examined within each type of ‘voice workplace’. Chapter 8 concentrates on absenteeism, chapter 9, quit rates. The analysis is carried out within each category of ‘voice workplace’ in order to assess how EO and DM policies may influence those outcomes, depending upon the type of ‘voice workplace’ that they are implemented within. If different types of voice differ in their links to EO and DM policies, then it is important to assess whether more (or fewer) EO and DM policies are associated with varying outcomes. For instance, it could be the case that those workplaces with indirect voice are more likely to implement EO and DM policies than those establishments that only have direct voice mechanisms in place. However, this result may be shaped by unions’ desire to recruit more female workers in the establishment; yet these policies may not have any benefits to the workplace itself. It is, therefore, important to understand how the associations between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes may depend upon the type of voice workplace

within which those EO and DM policies are implemented. Finally, chapter 10 concludes the thesis.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on voice, EO and DM policies and performance and their links. There are two main sections to this chapter: voice and EO, and DM.

The first section begins by reviewing the literature on voice, introducing the main themes and perspectives on voice and examines the forms that employee voice takes theoretically and empirically and examines these forms of voice against various workplace outcomes. In addition, it sets out an analytical framework that distinguishes between workplaces that have different voice mechanisms within them and enables this thesis to adopt a nuanced approach to the study of the links between voice and EO and DM policies.

The chapter argues that 1) different forms of voice are associated with varying degrees of power and 2) EO and DM policies can, by increasing employee morale and commitment, help to reduce absenteeism and quits. The chapter also reviews the empirical literature that examines these theoretical arguments. It reviews the major empirical studies in order to assess the importance of voice on EO and DM policies and appraises the evidence with regard to practices effects on key establishment outcomes that are the focus of the current study: absenteeism and labour turnover (quits).

The links between union and other forms of collective voice and various workplace/company outcomes are examined. It is important to examine these links in order to highlight the effect they have on a range of outcomes. It should be noted that 1) that the links between union and other forms of collective voice and equal opportunities and DM policies have been examined extensively before and 2) that this thesis, by assessing the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, within particular types of ‘voice workplace’, overcomes the potential problem of ignoring different forms of voice influencing the outcomes.

The next section examines direct voice both theoretically and empirically; it is then followed by a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on dual voice systems. There is a dearth of empirical work in the area of voice and EO policies, helping to justify the approach adopted in this thesis.

Section 2.6 examines the empirical literature on voice and DM. It reviews a number of empirical studies and explores the effects on different forms of voice on DM policies and the

effects on various groups in a range of empirical settings. This is following by a discussion on EO and DM policies: these are defined and the differences and similarities are explored, the law on Equal Opportunities and how it has evolved to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 is also examined. There is then a discussion of the different approaches to equal opportunities and DM and a discussion on the business case and social justice case for equal opportunities and DM policies. Finally, there is a review on the theoretical and empirical literature on EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes examining the links between various types of diversity and various differing outcomes.

2.2 Voice

Very little work has been done on the link between voice and EO and DM policies (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 2001). Some studies have examined the links between EO and/or DM policies and outcomes. However, there has been no work done on the links between voice, EO and/or DM and outcomes (quits and absenteeism). This thesis will be the first to link these factors together in one study. It is important to do this as it could reveal a neglected influence on firm outcomes and could highlight a role for different voice measures not just in promoting equal opportunities, which may be an ‘end in themselves’, but also in helping companies attain improved outcomes.

The ‘voice’ concept underpins the analysis of several studies on employment relations (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Budd *et al.*, 2010; Dundon *et al.*, 2005; Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Wilkinson and Fay, 2011; Wilkinson *et al.*, forthcoming; Wood *et al.*, 2009). The term ‘voice’ can be traced back to Hirschman (1970), who first used the concept, and who focused mainly on customers within competitive markets and ‘customer-members’ of clubs or club-like organisations. He did not apply the concept to employees within firms. It is important to point this out as the dynamics between customers and firms are different compared to those between employees and employers (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). For instance, power, which is a key issue within the employment literature (Ackers, 2012; Johnstone *et al.*, 2010; Wilkinson *et al.*, forthcoming), is even more important in the relationship between employees and employers than it is between customers and firms. The links between power and the ability of employers and employees to build co-operative workplace relations is of particular importance, as it can create the conditions in which greater trust between employees and employers is established. More specifically, the willingness and

ability of companies to respond to the wishes of their employees is likely to differ to firms' responses to consumer demands for a number of reasons that are set out below.

Employees are firms' key assets (Pfeffer, 1997). They ultimately are the basis upon which firms build their success. Therefore, attracting and retaining appropriately skilled staff is a prerequisite for firm success. Whilst many studies have examined voice and wider HR practices in relation to various workplace outcomes, such as quit rates, absenteeism, and financial performance (Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Hoque, 1999; Wood, 1999; Wright et al., 1999, 2003; Guest et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2006; Wood and de Menezes, 2008), relatively little has been written on the links between voice and equal opportunities or managing diversity as a potential mediating outcome on the links, if any, between voice and outcomes (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 2001).

The evidence that does exist often examines the associations between the use of equal opportunity measures and outcomes, such as share prices (Hersch, 1991; Wright et al., 1995). Equal opportunity measures are not the only influences on such outcomes: share prices can be influenced by a wide array of factors, such as company investments, comparatively poor sales figures, and unexpected events, undermining the strength of the studies' findings (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008). Case studies have focused on outcomes that can be more readily attributed to equal opportunity policies. However, such studies are usually restricted to relatively large organisations (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002; Metcalf and Forth, 2000). There is, therefore, a need to conduct a large-scale representative study of the links between voice, EO and DM, and workplace outcomes. To be sure, quantitative studies exist that examine part of this chain. For example, Forth and Rincon-Aznar (2008) examined the link between equal opportunities and labour productivity and financial performance outcomes. They do not, however, examine the antecedents of equal opportunities. Similarly, in case study research, Metcalf and Forth (2000) have examined EO and performance, but do not assess the reasons for the variation in the adoption of EO measures across establishments.

It is also important to examine these links for practical reasons. The UK's labour force is becoming increasingly diverse. More women are in employment than ever before. Ethnic minorities make up a larger proportion of the workforce (Metcalf and Forth, 2000). Product markets are becoming increasingly diverse, too. Customers come from diverse ethnic backgrounds (Metcalf and Forth, 2000). How to best achieve adequate levels of EO and DM policies is, however, unclear. Whilst unions are less prevalent in the private sector in the UK than they once were, data from WERS 2004 indicates that direct communication has

increased. Just over 82 per cent of workplaces in the private sector had meetings for the whole workforce or held regular team briefings in 1998; in 2004, the figure was 90 per cent (Kersley *et al.*, 2005). Overall, the incidence of regular team briefings more than doubled between 1980 and 2004: some 70 per cent of British workplaces had adopted this practice by 2004 (Bryson *et al.*, 2013). Their links to equal opportunities are, however, unclear. It should be noted at the outset that this study relies on ‘formal’ measures of voice rather than ‘informal’ mechanisms that are in place. For instance, managers may frequently speak to other employees to gain their opinions as part of their general style of management rather than use, say, formal employee surveys (Marchington and Suter, 2013).

This chapter discusses the use of the term ‘voice’ by Hirschman’s (1970) and others in order to arrive at a holistic analytical framework that will guide the research. The framework will also enable this thesis to compare the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, to establish if the relationship between EO and DM policies and these outcomes depend upon the type of workplace within which they operate; previous research has not explored this possibility.

2.3 Hirschman’s Framework

Hirschman’s (1970: 2) aim was to understand how firms could learn about a ‘repairable lapse’ in their performance and mainly focused on consumers and firms in competitive markets. Within such a setting, firms generally will be willing to improve their performance if that repairable lapse in performance is criticised by existing consumers or consumers stop buying products or services. It will be shown that this focus has implications for Hirschman’s general assumptions. Such assumptions are not always valid when the term is transferred to the employment context (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). If firms suffer a loss of customers, companies are likely to try to overcome their shortcomings in order to remain competitive – or, at least, not fall behind their rivals (Hirschman, 1970). Through voice companies may also learn about a deterioration in their performance that they can rectify. This occurs when customers voice their dissatisfaction with a product to the firm. Specifically, Hirschman (1970: 30-31) viewed voice as ‘any attempt at all [by customers or ‘customer-members’] to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs ... through appeal to a higher authority [that is, usually, managers] with the intention of forcing a change.... The initial assumption is a decline in the performance of a firm or organisation, which is remediable provided the attention of management is sufficiently focused on the task.’

As shown below, this definition is quite broad. This thesis maintains the two key elements of Hirschman's voice – information sharing and power (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007) – but refines his definition. For this thesis, voice will be defined as the general ability of employees to influence decisions within a workplace (or company) that better match their preferences. This does not mean, as is discussed in greater detail below, that all of the firm's decisions fully comply with employees' wishes (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Voice can be expressed either individually or collectively.

I Voice and the Exchange of Information

Hirschman (1970) implicitly emphasised the importance of information sharing within his concept of voice. For example, Hirschman (1970: 33) noted that: 'Voice has the function of alerting a firm or organization to its failings ...' In other words, voice helped consumers to share information with managers. More specifically and applying Hirschman's key ideas on voice to the work setting, voice in companies involves the 'upward' communication of information to managers from employees. An assumption is that employers, in this instance, do not have perfect information; in other words, workers within companies have information that managers do not and that voice can help to reduce these information asymmetries, resulting in managers who are better informed and who can then implement appropriate changes within the organisation. Of course, the information that employees have that is useful to the organisation will depend upon the characteristics of the work carried out by the company and the firm's strategic objectives (Brewster *et al.*, 2007; Hotho *et al.*, 2013). This variation is likely to result in lower-level employees being given contrasting 'amounts' of discretion within their work, as well as control over the pace at which they work. In addition, the willingness of workers to share that information with managers will depend upon the employer's commitment to employees and previous responses from managers (Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Whitley, 1999).

For Hirschman (1970: 4, emphasis in the original), one way that management could find out about the company's poor performance was voice. Voice occurred when:

The firm's customers or the organization's members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest address to anyone who cares to listen: this is the *voice option*. As a result, management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible cures of customers and members' dissatisfaction.

The definition of voice used in this thesis differs from those that see voice as ‘two-way communication’ between employees and managers (see, for instance, Willman *et al.*, 2006). Defining voice as two-way communication is problematic because firstly, two-way communication could cover protests as well as, say, legal proceedings – it also assumes that managers enter into a dialogue with employees; however, ‘managerial response’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) may depend upon the power of voice mechanisms, which depends on the form of voice. Secondly, two-way communication assumes that employees will be both willing and able either directly or indirectly to voice their opinions. This may not, however, be true if employees are worried about being punished in some way by managers for doing so; direct voice may not offer workers sufficient protection (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Whitley, 1999).

Finally, defining voice as two-way communication between employers and employees identifies neither the up-wards or down-wards flow of information nor the degree to which employees’ views are taken into consideration. Put differently, managers may tell employees or their representatives that the firm is not prepared to change company policies and practices, even though employees have expressed their disapproval of them. This, arguably, is two-way communication, but not voice. Logically, this suggests that the fundamental issue of power is ignored in definitions of voice as two-way communication. Power will shape the exchange of information, in terms of its level and nature, within the context of employment (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010). As discussed in the next section, the power of any particular voice mechanism is likely to be related to its form.

The emphasis is on workers conveying their opinions to managers and managers then responding to those concerns. Assessing this response is an empirical question. This thesis, therefore, examines patterns in the data to assess whether different forms of voice are more or less likely to be associated with particular EO and DM policies. The main direction of information flow for this thesis is up-wards communication; however, employees’ ability to make high-quality suggestions to employers that are likely to have an impact on workplace decisions will depend upon the information that they receive about the workplace (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010). Workers, therefore, are likely to require information about the workplace’s situation, probably from managers. Consequently, it is important for this research to incorporate flows of information from managers to employees as this can shape the ability of employees to voice their opinions as well as the impact that their views have on workplace decisions (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Information

can flow from managers to employees in a number of ways. Notice boards, the management chain, newsletters, email, and intranet can all be used to share information with employees. In general, such mechanisms do not enable, by themselves, employees to share their opinions with managers. However, employees may become more (or be better) informed about decisions that have been taken and performance is improved as a result. They may also be in a stronger position to contribute in a meaningful way to the organisation.

A more powerful form of voice is direct consultation. It provides a means by which employees can voice their opinions directly to employers. Direct consultation can include attitude surveys, suggestion schemes, and meetings with the workforce. The views of employees can be communicated directly to managers in these ways. Attitude surveys and meetings with the workforce may enable employees to share their views on the general running of the establishment. Suggestion schemes may lead to changes in workplace practices, helping to improve employees' commitment to the organisation and their job satisfaction.

Employees may be able to have more of a direct impact on elements of their work through direct-participation measures. Such measures include partly autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem-solving groups. They involve the sharing of decision-making responsibilities, in certain areas, by employers with employees. Thus, employees can influence certain decisions directly. They are, therefore, a powerful form of voice as they potentially enable employees to shape workplace practices in some areas.

II Power and the Concept of Voice

Hirschman's (1970) term 'voice' is predicated, implicitly, upon a notion of power. See also Butler, 2005; Dundon and Gollan, 2007; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Poole, 1978; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2000; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007; and Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010 for other discussions of power in relation to different voice mechanisms and workers' voice. For instance, Hirschman (1970: 4, 40-1) contended that, once consumers of an organisation had voiced their misgivings, decision makers would, by and large, seek to remedy the situation. Hirschman bases this argument on the assumption that consumers have some degree of influence over the focal organisation and that consumers could expect to 'marshal some influence' (Hirschman, 1970: 41).

Hirschman (1970: 45-46 and 59) did note that there would be times when consumers were unlikely to have any real influence over firms. Importantly, this insight provides an

important starting point for an analysis of the application of the voice concept to the employment relationship. Within the context of employment, power plays an even more important role in influencing how much voice an individual can exercise than it does within the context of consumers purchasing particular products. For example, employees are likely to be in a weaker position than consumers within competitive retail markets (Hyman, 2005; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Power and the assumptions that are made about the ability or inability of employers/employees to enter into a non-conflictual and co-operative relationship is of cardinal significance within a number of studies of, and perspectives on, employment (Ackers, 2012; Ackers *et al.*, 2005; Edwards and Belanger, 2006; Johnstone *et al.*, 2010). However, the argument that companies will, on the whole, seek to react favourably to customers' concerns within competitive markets is, perhaps, more readily accepted. For a contrary view, see Crouch, 2011. This may be especially true if the concerns raised by employees are construed either as irrelevant by managers or as a threat to their authority within organisations that can be seen, in fundamental terms, as hierarchies with enforceable collective rules in which it may not be possible to question either directly or indirectly the authority of managers (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1997; Whitley, 2003).

It is argued, in this thesis, that for a mechanism to be considered to be 'voice', it must, fundamentally, enable employees or their representatives to stay within the firm to make their views known and to influence workplace policies or practices. Logically, then, voice is, in practice, a matter of empirical assessment. If voice were defined in a way that ignored influence, researchers would not be able to differentiate between forums that enable employees to voice their opinions that are then side-lined by managers and mechanisms that lead to some alteration in workplace policies or practices. Different forms of voice must, therefore, be assessed empirically to evaluate which one(s), if any, are linked to particular outcomes. If expressions of employees' preferences do not have any impact on workplace policies or practices, it is unlikely that the firm will be able to reap any of the advantages that, theoretically at least, stem from voice. It should be noted here, however, that this definition of voice does not mean that all workplace practices must be completely in alignment with employees' wishes; they should, however, either have been changed in some notable way or have received extensive explanations as to why changes are not possible. It is difficult to assess influence empirically; this thesis attempts to do so by examining the associations between four main different categories of voice and EO and DM policies. If, for example, dual voice systems are associated with a higher incidence of EO and DM policies, this will suggest that dual voice systems are more influential than other forms of voice on the presence

of EO and DM policies. The analytical approach adopted here cannot prove definitively that different voice mechanisms result in contrasting patterns of EO and DM policies; it can, however, identify important associations between voice and EO and DM policies, helping to shed light on theoretical and empirical debates and identifying areas for future, case study-based research to examine. The methodology chapter and the conclusion discuss the issue of causality in more detail.

This definition of voice may appear to place a highly restrictive condition on what does and what does not constitute voice. Other analysts, however, have defined voice in a similar way. For instance, Marchington (2007: 234) has written that voice provides workers with a ‘direct say’ in how the work they perform is organised. Strauss (1998: 779) has gone a little further; he notes that ‘voice is meaningless if the message is ignored’. This key aspect of voice is also present in Freeman and Medoff’s (1984: 21) writing; they stated that ‘[t]o be effective, voice must be heard’, suggesting not only that managers listen to employees’ views, but also seek to address any concerns that employees may have. See also Bailey, 2009; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Butler, 2005; Hyman, 1997; Kaufman, 2005: 568.

Indeed, this definition of power corresponds to one of the aspects of voice highlighted by Marchington and Wilkinson (2005; see also Poole, 1978; Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010). That framework differentiates between voice in terms of degree, form, level and scope (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). ‘Degree’ refers to the extent to which employees can influence workplace decisions. In some instances, employees may be informed about decisions, whilst, in other situations, they may be the ones actually taking decisions. This is the key empirical question for this study: are different forms of voice able to influence the provision of EO and DM policies and practices to varying degrees. The ‘form’ that voice takes is also a core part of this research. Voice can take many forms. It can be expressed directly by individual employees through a range of channels, such as suggestion schemes, or meetings with managers. Alternatively, it could be expressed indirectly by employee representatives. Unions may represent workers’ views to managers or employees’ preferences may be communicated via joint consultative committees. The different forms of voice are discussed in greater detail below. In the first stage of the analysis, this thesis examines whether these different forms of voice are more or less likely to be associated with EO and DM policies.

Marchington and Wilkinson’s (2005) work also refers to ‘level’, which indicates the position within the company/workplace that voice is exercised. It could range from the task that employees are carrying out to the department, workplace, or the company as a whole. As

is discussed in greater detail below, this research examines the 'workplace' level as well as the 'largest occupational group' level. 'Scope' covers the issues that are the subject of employee voice (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). This can range from the relatively unimportant, such as the quality of workplace meals, to more substantive issues, such as investments relating to strategic objectives (Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010). This research focuses on the scope of employee voice in relation to equal-opportunity policies and practices.

2.4 The Forms that Employee Voice Can Take

Voice can be expressed in various ways: it can be expressed directly by workers themselves or indirectly by employee representatives. Obviously, the two forms of voice are not mutually exclusive (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). The issue of who can or should voice the opinions of employees is a highly important one within the literature. It provides a useful way of distinguishing between different perspectives in the literature, as explicitly or implicitly there is an emphasis on direct voice or indirect voice or a combination of the two in their writings (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

There are some major differences between analysts on the effectiveness of different forms of voice (Benson, 2000; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007; Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005). Arguably, there are two main divisions between analysts in terms of the form of voice (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). The first is between indirect and direct voice; the second is, within indirect voice, between independent channels (trade unions or non-union structures, such as works councils) or 'employer-sponsored structures' (Gollan, 2002: 325), such as joint consultative committees (JCCs). Pluralists argue in favour of union forms of voice, whilst unitarists emphasise direct forms (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Ichniowski *et al.*, 1996; Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005). Unitarists argue that unions may lead to rent-seeking behaviour by employees and/or their representatives. This, in turn, will have an adverse effect on workplace performance (Addison and Belfield, 2004; Siebert, 1997). Pluralists contend that direct forms of voice that are initiated by management are unlikely to have sufficient power to lead to a change in workplace practices (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).

As noted above, however, different forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: different voice forms can be combined (Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). Moreover, one form of voice may be able to supplement or overcome any deficiencies of the

other form(s) of voice (Gollan, 2000, 2001; Gollan and Markey, 2001; Kim *et al.*, 2010; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Marchington, 2001; Sako, 1998). Different forms of voice may create diverse advantages for firms that help to alleviate asymmetric problems. Combining different voice mechanisms may, therefore, enhance the performance of employees and, hence, firms (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

This research will, as a consequence, not prejudge the influences of any of the voice mechanisms nor will it preclude from the outset the possibility that direct and indirect forms of voice can be combined. To be sure, that combination may be disaggregated further. Such a disaggregation is detailed below. The point here is that research should adopt a holistic view of voice, taking into consideration the various forms that voice can take. This research does that.

2.4.1 Indirect Voice

Freeman and Medoff's (1984) study is a high-profile and early application of Hirschman's (1970) framework to the employment relationship (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming). They chose to focus on unions as voice mechanisms within firms. One of the reasons they did so was because unions, they argued, provided employees with a degree of protection from managers. If employees individually voice their concerns with workplace practices, this could be seen as a criticism of managers. This could result in the individual worker being fired (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 9). By highlighting such concerns that employees may have, they acknowledged that power was a key issue within the employment relationship (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming). For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984: 107, emphasis not in the original) argued that 'one reason for the lower quits under unionism is the *dilution of managerial authority*'.

Freeman and Medoff (1984) did not define explicitly what they meant by power. It is useful to examine their analysis of unions as voice mechanisms in terms of the voice elements noted above. Those are the degree of influence, the form that voice takes, its scope, and the level at which it is raised. For this thesis, the first two elements are the most important, as the scope and level at which voice operates are restricted, respectively, to EO and DM issues and the workplace for the purposes of this thesis. Freeman and Medoff's (1984) perspective rests on the theoretical and empirical arguments that unions will have more influence over certain workplace practices than other forms of voice. They argued that aggregating employees'

concerns would enable individual employees to be protected from any detrimental actions that managers may take. Organisations can be thought of as hierarchies in which managers have a certain degree of authority to enforce their decisions by coercive means (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1997; Whitley, 2003). Consequently, those who are opposed to policies and practices within workplaces could be deemed to be critical of managers, limiting employees' willingness to express their concerns (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). If workers do express their opinions, employers may sanction them in some way (Wilkinson *et al.*, forthcoming). As noted above, dismissal could be one outcome, but it is not the only one. Employees who are critical of workplace policies and practices may be less likely to be promoted, more likely to be given onerous activities, or side-lined (Wilkinson *et al.*, forthcoming). By, in effect, anonymising individual employees' concerns, unions can protect individual workers against negative consequences (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming).

Unions were seen by Freeman and Medoff (1984) both theoretically and empirically as the most effective form of voice. Other forms of indirect voice, such as joint consultative committees, were not discussed. This may, in part, reflect the difficulty of establishing non-union forms of indirect voice in the US. However, some analysts see the emphasis on collective wage bargaining as collective voice in much of the traditional industrial relations literature as excessively narrow and advocate including both union and non-union voice (Budd, 2014). Freeman and Medoff (1984) focused on the US in their research. In that country, non-union forms of collective voice, such as joint consultative committees and works councils, are often not permitted or are limited in scope (Brickley, 1992; Campolieti *et al.*, 2013; Freeman *et al.*, 2007; LeRoy 1997, 2000, 2006). Indeed, even for other countries, Freeman and Medoff (1984: 8) noted:

In modern industrial economies, and particularly in large enterprises, a trade union is the vehicle for collective voice – that is, for providing workers as a group with a means of communicating with management.

In terms of the scope of union voice, Freeman and Medoff (1984) examined the wage-bargaining responsibilities of unions, grievance procedures, and the potential productivity benefits of unions. It is the latter that is particularly important for this study. The logic behind Freeman and Medoff's (1984) arguments is that unions would be able to ensure that workers, collectively, would be able to benefit from any employee suggestion to improve productivity. If that suggestion increased productivity, employees would be protected from dismissal by

unions: if more or the same can be produced with less, employers have an incentive to reduce the headcount (Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010). It is possible to extend this line of reasoning to suggestions that are not directly related to production: employees may put forward suggestions, such as more extensive equal opportunity measures, that help to improve their working conditions, but that may be seen as being costly or irrelevant by the employer. Freeman and Medoff did not explicitly state the level at which they analysed voice; however, their framework can, clearly, incorporate a number of levels into analyses. For instance, measures to improve productivity may take place at the task, departmental, or workplace level. This thesis examines voice within workplaces.

2.4.1.1 Indirect Union Voice and Various Measures of Performance

The effect that unions have on performance is a contentious issue and has been measured in many ways within the empirical literature (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Timming, 2005, 2007; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). First, the literature on the effect of unions on labour turnover and absenteeism will be examined, the performance measures used in this research. The wider literature on the effects of unions on financial performance and productivity will then be examined. The review focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on studies at the workplace level rather than at the corporate or head-office level as the empirical work for this thesis focuses on the former rather than the latter; other studies do, of course, focus on the latter (Timming and Whittall, 2015).

I Unions and Quits and Absenteeism

In general, lower labour turnover and absenteeism can help to increase productivity. For instance, Freeman and Medoff (1984) highlighted lower labour turnover and improved personnel policies as key to increased productivity. This research does not examine productivity, as it is very difficult to compare productivity across different types of industry. Moreover, around 10 per cent of the workplaces in the sample used in this thesis refused to answer the question on productivity or did not know how to estimate the productivity of their workplace compared to others in the industry.

This thesis, instead, focuses on absenteeism and quits, as these relate more to human resource management issues, including the use of equal opportunity measures. They are more

proximal to the policies that this thesis focuses upon. For example, Addison (2005) highlighted the importance of ‘quit behaviour’, outlining how quit behaviour can provide information either inferentially or directly (via exit interviews) on worker preferences or discontent. Information from any exit interviews will not be used here, as they can be affected by problems resulting from employees’ lack of motivation to disclose information when there is no benefit from doing so. Collective voice is expected to reduce exit behaviour, such as absenteeism and quits, resulting in lower hiring and training costs and potentially increased investments in firm-specific human capital (Addison, 2005). Reduced exit behaviour is, potentially, the most tangible source of potential efficiency gain.

Similarly, Allen (1984) points out that one reason absenteeism is an important measure of performance is that absenteeism can reduce productivity as it disrupts production plans and requires an increase in the use of substitute workers who are less efficient. However, absenteeism does not fit neatly into the exit-voice paradigm because absence can result from illness or family problems rather than from job dissatisfaction (Allen, 1984). This is undoubtedly true. Indeed, women may be more likely than men to take unofficial absences from work to deal with a family member’s ill health (Liff and Wajcman, 1996). This research will, therefore, include the percentage of female workers in the establishment’s workforce to capture this aspect. It cannot capture the possibility that absenteeism may result from factors other than job dissatisfaction, as there are no variables in the questionnaire that measure this. Indeed, it is difficult to see how this possibility could be operationalised in a piece of quantitative research that relies on a large sample.

Even when job dissatisfaction is reported to be the cause of absence, uncertainty remains about whether absenteeism is a form of voice or exit behaviour (Allen, 1984). On the one hand, absenteeism caused by job dissatisfaction involves an employee escaping unsatisfactory conditions temporarily rather than trying to change them. Absenteeism can, therefore, be seen as exit rather than voice. On the other hand, if a union member were dissatisfied with his or her job, then that worker would voice their concerns and pressure the union and the employer to change conditions at the workplaces rather than try to escape from them. Allen (1984) examines three data sets, two cross-sectional and one longitudinal and finds that, other things being equal, union members are at least 29 per cent more likely to be absent than workers who do not belong to union. One interpretation is that there is greater job dissatisfaction among union members and that union voice may not be effective in influencing many aspects of the employment relationship. Alternatively, dissatisfied employees may join a union in order to try to remedy the situation, potentially helping to reduce what would be

even higher rates of absenteeism. This research will examine different forms of voice against each other as well as against a 'minimalist' category to assess the associations with absenteeism. By comparing these different voice forms, it will be possible to discern which one(s), if any, are linked to lower levels of absenteeism.

Abraham *et al.* (2005) test the influence of collective voice on workplace outcomes by investigating whether employees who are members of unions have less intention to leave their firms than non-members do. A regression analysis was carried out using data from the national Harris Poll 2001 on employee satisfaction. Their study revealed significant interactions between union membership and job satisfaction and between union membership and organisational commitment. Dissatisfied non-union members are much more likely to intend to leave their jobs than union members, similarly non-union member with low organisational commitment were much more likely to intend to leave their jobs than union members.

Boroff and Lewin (1997) examine employee voice and intent to exit the firm using data from a sample of non-management employees of a large multinational telecommunications firm. They examine whether employees' loyalty and their perception of the grievance procedures influence 1) workers' decisions to voice their concerns and 2) intent to exit the firm. The study concentrated on employees who had reported having been treated unfairly by their employer at some time. Unfortunately, data availability means that questions relating to an employee's intent to leave the workplace are not available in the survey that underpins the research in this thesis. In addition, the intention to leave a workplace is likely to be related to the availability of suitable jobs within the labour market, including the labour market within the vicinity of the employee's current workplace.

Addison and Belfield's (2001) study replicates the work of Fernie and Metcalf (1995). Fernie and Metcalf (1995) used data from the 1990 Workplace Employment Relations Survey and Addison and Belfield (2001) drew on Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 data. Addison and Belfield (2001) find that only the weakest form of unionism (union recognition alone) was associated with a statistically significant reduction in quits. They also found that unions were associated with higher rates of absenteeism, possibly indicating that unions may attract disgruntled employees as well as help to reduce levels of dissatisfaction, as measured by quits, but not when measured by absenteeism. Fernie and Metcalf's previous (1995) study found all union measures reduce quit rates (pre-entry closed shop, post-entry closed shop, management-recommended membership and union recognition only) and were not associated with higher rates of absenteeism.

Although this thesis examines cross-sectional data, it is important to remember that voice within a workplace is likely to change over time, albeit slowly. Using WERS data from 1980 to 2004 from the management survey Willman *et al.* (2008) mapped the presence of different forms of voice within establishments over time. They also analysed the presence of voice types and how they link to outcome measures, including quits. They found that for a decade the relative quit rate between union only and no voice workplaces did not change with a gap of 6 percentage points in 1990 and 6.5 percentage points in 2004, showing that union voice was consistently linked to lower quit rates when compared to ‘no voice’ (Willman *et al.*, 2008).

II Unions and Financial Performance

An area that has been extensively debated in the literature is the effect that trade unions have on financial performance. Trade unions can influence profits by extracting their share of any rents in the form of higher wages. The level of wages unions can extract for their members is dependent on the extent of potential rents within the firm and the union’s ability and strength in bargaining over them. However, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) noted, unions may also increase productivity and, as a result, profitability, by encouraging skilled employees to stay with employers and to increase their skills. This thesis will not examine the links between unions and financial performance, as the financial performance of a workplace can be influenced by a range of factors beyond voice and EO and DM policies. For instance, if a workplace is part of a larger company with several other workplaces, transfer pricing may inflate or deflate the workplace’s financial performance. In addition, workplace-related financial data are often difficult to obtain, as managers are likely to be reluctant to reveal such information. Although managers may give subjective opinions about the financial performance of a workplace, this still does not overcome the distal aspects of financial measures. However, it will be important to review this literature here as it can provide important insights into the broader context within which unions operate.

A large body of literature exists indicating that trade unions are associated with lower profitability or financial performance (Clark, 1984; Freeman, 1983; Karier, 1985; Voos and Mishel, 1986). Although these measures are not included in this thesis, it is important to review this literature in order to highlight its key findings as this will help to inform interpretations of the findings of this research. Machin and Stewart (1990) consider the relationship between unions and financial performance; they conclude that unions are linked

to lower levels of profitability. Using data from the 1980 and 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Machin and Stewart (1990) find that in British establishments, trade unions are associated in a statistically significant way with lower financial performance, particularly in establishments that have a larger share of their market. This result implies that unions are able to secure significant financial gains for their members as a result of the establishment's high market share. In a further study, Machin and Stewart (1996) investigated the relationship between trade unions and financial performance using establishment-level data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The study suggests a rough halving of the overall union effect between 1984 and 1990. They attribute this finding to the decline in traditionally unionised employment and anti-union legislation that placed restrictions on unions. The results suggest that in 1990 only those establishments with a closed shop or where union membership was recommended were associated with lower financial performance. The effect in the remainder of unionised establishments has collapsed completely, leading to the conclusion that stronger unions can still extract a share of the rents, but weaker unions cannot (Machin and Stewart, 1990).

Overall, then, the links between unions and financial performance are weakening, suggesting that unions cannot impose policies against the will of managers. For this research, this finding indicates that unions may not be able to mobilise managers to implement EO and DM policies 'needlessly' or in situations where they benefit union members rather than the establishment. It remains to be seen if this is the case, though. By examining collective voice and equal opportunities as well as the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, within 'collective voice only' workplaces, this research will be able to analyse the possibility that EO and DM policies are introduced where they are 'not warranted', from the perspective of improving workplace performance.

Bryson, Forth and Laroche (2011) compared union performance in Britain and France. Their research found that union bargaining is detrimental to workplace performance in both countries; however, in Britain the effect was confined to a declining proportion of unionised workplaces engaged in active collective bargaining. This, again, illustrates the declining association between unions and financial performance. The effects that unions have on establishment performance should, therefore, be sought elsewhere.

Another area where unions may influence establishment performance is through collective bargaining. Collective bargaining can have a profound effect on workplace outcomes (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001: 3). During the 1990s, there was a major switch away from separate bargaining to joint bargaining in workplaces where collective bargaining was

the dominant form of pay determination (Millward *et. al*, 2000: 203). Bryson and Wilkinson (2001) found no statistically significant association between union recognition and bargaining arrangements, on the one hand, and financial performance, on the other. Again, this strengthens the need to look for any union effects in other areas besides financial performance.

These findings strengthen the argument for further investigation into the effects of unions on EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, in terms of labour turnover and absenteeism. These studies assess the links between indirect voice and financial performance. Financial performance is, however, a difficult output to assess as establishment outcome, as many other factors, such as market conditions, maturity of market, etc., can influence financial performance. Moreover, when looking at performance measures, such as labour turnover and absenteeism, Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that unions can enhance productivity by improving communication between workers and management. By providing a means of ‘voicing’ discontent, unions can indeed reduce labour turnover and absenteeism by removing the need to ‘exit’. This in turn can enhance productivity, as firm specific skills are not being lost. This justifies the choice of performance measures in this study of labour turnover and absenteeism.

III Unions and Productivity

Addison and Hirsch (1989) examined the literature on the union effects on productivity and found a small overall impact. Where these effects were positive, they were attributed to management’s response to decreased profit expectations and from a selection process. Addison and Barnett (1982) found that unions did not necessarily have a negative link to productivity. Freeman and Medoff (1984: 170) emphasised that union effects on productivity vary with respect of the labour relations environment and degree of competition, but they concluded that ‘current empirical evidence offers little support for the assertion that unionisation is associated with lower (or higher) productivity advance’. Empirical studies on unions and productivity have shown positive effects; for example, Brown and Medoff (1978) estimated a union effect on total factor productivity (depending on assumptions regarding capital usage) of either 20-25 per cent or 10-15 per cent. Another example is Clark (1984) who found a union productivity advantage of 6-8 per cent. However, Bryson, Charlwood and Forth (2006) find that managerial responsiveness to worker voice leads to superior productivity, but only in non-union workplaces and that there is little relationship between

formal voice regimes and productivity. Although this research does not examine productivity, the results of studies reviewed here do have implications for this thesis. For instance, if unions are associated with lower levels of productivity, one means by which this may occur is through the imposition of policies that do not help to enhance the overall performance of the workplace. For instance, unions may seek to see the introduction of EO and DM policies that affect women, those from BME groups, and those with a disability in order to boost recruitment from those groups. The introduction of those policies may not, however, improve productivity. Conversely, the presence of unions (and other forms of voice) may help to bring about the implementation of policies that reduce absenteeism and quits and, thereby, increase productivity. This research will be able to examine these possibilities.

2.4.2 Non-Union Indirect Voice

Unions are, of course, not the only form of indirect voice. Other forms include works councils, staff associations, representative forums, and joint consultative committees. Within the UK, there is no legislation to support works councils that are akin to those in Continental Europe. Whilst interest in JCC-type bodies within organisations was at one time growing (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007), their prevalence would appear to be on the wane. The WERS2011 survey indicates that around 13 per cent of workplaces with 10 or more employees have a JCC-type forum. This represents a decline from previous surveys. In WERS2004, the equivalent figure was 14 per cent; in WERS1998, the figure was 20 per cent (Kersley *et al.*, 2005). Despite EU regulations on the information and consultation of employees, employers are not required to establish JCCs, but can use one-to-one meetings or the internet to inform and consult employees. This may explain the decrease in JCC numbers over successive rounds of WERS.

In the UK, the presence of these forms of non-union indirect voice is frequently determined by managers (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007). If one of these forms of indirect voice is present within a firm, it will usually have been established by managers. Consequently, the degree to which these forms of indirect voice can influence decisions and the scope of issues over which they may exert some influence are usually defined by management (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Managers can often unilaterally dissolve them (Bartram and Creegan, 2003). In addition, this form of voice is often associated with the lack of an independent mandate, with managers appointing employee representatives, and with limited or no negotiating powers and restricted agendas for consultation (Cully *et al.*, 1999; Gollan, 2005b; Terry, 2003a;

Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). In other words, it is the employer who will be able to determine the degree of influence and scope of this form of employee voice (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). Indeed, case studies indicate that, for many firms, the primary purpose of these forms of non-union indirect voice is to increase the flow of information and levels of communication within the firm rather than to allow employees a substantive influence over major workplace decisions (Wilkinson *et al.*, 2004). Consequently, within JCCs, staff associations, and representative forums, employees may actively influence decisions in certain areas, respond to proposals by managers, or have no influence at all over certain decisions (Donaghey *et al.*, 2011).

Gollan (2002) examined non-union workplaces and found the degree of influence that non-union voice mechanisms have within firms to be ineffective. Case study research by Gollan (2000, 2001, 2002) and Terry (1999) found that a large number of non-union firms see collective consultation as a way to increase information and communication rather than as a way of negotiating or bargaining (Gollan, 2003), leading to a stress, in general, on 'harmonious' and less 'conflictual' relations in the workforce that do not incorporate unions (Gollan, 2003). Non-union firms view collective non-union consultation as a means of increasing company productivity and efficiency, and promoting an understanding of company policy rather than being an effective forum of collective entity to represent and put forward the interests of employees. The conclusions drawn from the case study research are that non-union collective consultation structures have limited access to resources, such as training, making them unable to effectively evaluate information at meetings and thus represent the views of employees in an effective manner. Most consultation bodies are structured with some elected representatives and some representatives appointed by management and, therefore, were not considered or found to be independent (Gollan, 2003). Managers also frequently structure and control the agenda of meetings, making them susceptible to management influence and liable to management interference. Management has the right to veto decisions made by non-union employee representatives. Few committees have negotiation and bargaining rights and indeed do not have experience in negotiating, therefore, they do not fulfil the role of resolving conflict, negotiating or bargaining; this leads to conclusions that non-union forms of collective voice are relatively weak (Kaufman and Kleiner, 1993).

In contrast to traditional indirect voice mechanisms, such as trade unions or continental-style works councils, management-initiated voluntaristic structures, such as JCCs in the UK, are at best, then, considered as a weak form of indirect involvement and as

management-dominated bodies (Benson, 2000; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Gollan, 2007; Heery and Noon, 2001). To be sure, not all non-union forms of employee representation are the same and there is considerable variation amongst them in terms of the influence that representatives have, the range of issues discussed, and the level that the forum operates at (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005: 284-285; see also Burns 2000 and Grattan, 2003).

In order to address these concerns, this research only includes non-union forms of employee representation as a collective form of voice if both a joint consultative body and a non-union employee representative are present within the workplace. This follows the work of Guest and Conway (1999), Lavelle *et al.*, (2010), and Tüselmann *et al.* (2015). More details on the operationalisation of key measures in this research are provided in the methodology chapter. In this research, it should be noted that non-union employee representation will be examined at the workplace level, not at the firm or the industry level, as different forms of representation may be present at various levels within the same firm.

2.4.2.1 Indirect Joint Consultative Committee Voice and Performance

This research does not just examine unions as collective voice. It also analyses those workplaces that have a joint consultative body and a non-union employee representative present within the workplace as collective voice. This review, therefore, examines those studies that assess joint consultative bodies, such as joint consultative committees. Though a relatively weak form of collective voice, as they generally involve consultation rather than negotiation (Ferne and Metcalf, 1995), their presence can help to improve the industrial relations climate, aid productivity growth, and, overall, have no detrimental effects on workplace performance (Ferne and Metcalf, 1995; Gregg, Machin and Metcalf, 1993). They are, therefore, incorporated into the analysis here.

I Joint Consultative Committees, Quits and Absenteeism

Ferne and Metcalf (1995) found that JCCs had only a weak or a non-significant relationship to quits and absenteeism, matching Tüselmann *et al.*'s (2015) findings of no statistically significant association between JCCs, on the one hand, and quits, on the other, in their surveyed firms. By contrast, Heywood and Mille's (forthcoming) results that are based on WERS 2004 data suggest a positive association between JCCs and absenteeism that is

statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, as do Addison and Belfield (2001) who draw on WERS 1998 data (see also Deery *et al.* 1999). Addison and Belfield (2001) do not, however, find any statistically significant link between JCCs and quit rates.

II Joint Consultative Committees and Productivity

Fernie and Metcalf (1995) found a weak, positive relationship between JCCs and productivity growth. In other words, the presence of a JCC was associated with higher levels of productivity growth. They contended that the existence of a JCC makes it easier to change working practices or introduce new technology leading to faster productivity growth (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995). Tüselmann *et al.* (2015) find a positive association between JCCs and labour productivity that is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level amongst the firms that they analyse. This research does not examine productivity or productivity growth, as it is a distal measure of HRM rather than a proximal one; both can, for instance, be influenced by ‘non-HRM factors’, such as workplace investments. It is, however, interesting to note that JCCs can, in conjunction with unions, be associated with higher levels of workplace investment (Denny and Nickell, 1991).

2.4.3 Direct Voice

Over the last twenty years, research on employee involvement and voice has been a major growth area in employment relations, coinciding with (and perhaps related to) reductions in collective bargaining. Despite the decline in union membership the overall incidence of employee voice has remained consistent over time, which can be attributed to greater emphasis on direct voice and non-union representative channels (Wilkinson *et al.*, 2013).

Important elements of voice can be found within the HRM literature. In particular, the work on high-performance workplace systems – or high-involvement or high-commitment workplace practices, as they are sometimes known (Wall and Wood, 2005; Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010) – incorporates direct voice into their models. To be sure, these models cover more than just voice; however, voice is an indispensable part of them (Becker and Huselid, 1998; Benson and Lawler, 2003; Buchanan, 1987; Edwards and Wright, 2001; Emmott, 2007; Huselid and Becker, 1996; Lawler, 1986; Mueller, 1994; Walton, 1985; Womack *et al.*, 1990). For instance, some of these models stress financial participation and selective hiring in

addition to voice elements. Walton (1985: 79; emphasis added), an early proponent of high-commitment HRM, argued that work enrichment should be a key element of management's approach to their employees:

Jobs are designed to be broader than before, *to combine planning and implementation*, and to include efforts to upgrade operations, not just maintain them. Individual responsibilities are expected to change as conditions change, and *teams, not individuals*, are often the organizational units accountable for performance. With *management hierarchies relatively flat and differences in status minimized*, control and lateral coordination depend on shared goals. Expertise rather than formal position determines influence.

This indirect emphasis, *inter alia*, on employee voice in Walton's (1985) model contrasted with previous paradigms that relied more on bureaucratic forms of control (Wilkinson *et al.*, 1993, 2010; Wood and Wall, 2007; Wright and Gardner, 2003). Such a shift is designed to elicit commitment and trust between employees and employers (Applebaum and Berg, 2000; Bailey *et al.*, 2001; Guest, 1999a; Wood and Albanese, 1995). By doing so, such measures aim to improve HRM and firm-performance outcomes (Wood and Wall, 2007). A key assumption that underpins this emphasis on direct voice mechanisms is often that employees are regarded as key assets by firms (Becker and Huselid, 1998; Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Wood, 1999a). Some research indicates that direct voice forms have replaced more indirect ones (Millward *et al.*, 2000), suggesting that employers prefer direct to indirect voice.

Other models of high-involvement HRM, similarly, rest upon, amongst other things, employee involvement, team working, and work enrichment (Applebaum *et al.*, 2000; Lawler, 1986; see also Benson and Lawler, 2003). In particular, Lawler's (1986) model includes a 'power' dimension that relates to decentralised decision making, employee suggestion schemes, and employee voice. Lawler's (1986) model also includes information sharing from managers to employees. This helps to improve not only the willingness of employees to share their ideas, but also the quality of their contributions (Lawler, 1986; Wood and Wall, 2005). Once again, such policies are argued to lead to increased firm performance, including lower absenteeism rates and lower quit rates (Benson and Lawler, 2003; Lawler, 1991; Patterson *et al.*, 1997; Wood and Wall, 2005; *cf.* Barker, 1993; Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Hutchinson *et al.*, 2000; Legge, 2005).

Such arguments helped to shape ideas that people are companies' most valuable asset (Pfeffer, 1998). Therefore, alongside selective hiring and employment security, companies should implement policies that enable the extensive sharing of financial and performance information throughout the organisation, that decentralise decision making, that create self-managed teams, and that give employees a voice in company decision making (Pfeffer, 1998). Evidence from the USA and the UK suggests that direct-voice mechanisms can help to improve organisational performance (Becker and Huselid, 2009; Huselid, 1995; Patterson *et al.*, 1998; Wood, 1999). Although the evidence is not always clear-cut, findings often show a link between direct-voice practices and superior organisational outcomes (Banker *et al.*, 1996; Batt, 2004; Cordery *et al.*, 1991; Guthrie, 2001; Hunter *et al.*, 2002; Vandenberg *et al.*, 1999).

However, there is a danger that these HRM policies are viewed only in a positive light, and this may not always be the case. For instance, greater employee autonomy and self-management may lead to work intensification, higher levels of stress, and lay-offs (Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Hutchinson *et al.*, 2000; Ramsay *et al.*, 2000; Wilkinson, 2002). They may also only be prevalent in certain 'high-tech' industries with more traditional forms of control common in 'low-tech' industries (Lewin, 2002, 2005b, 2008). Such direct-voice initiatives may, in comparison to union forms of indirect voice, be 'weak on power' (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005: 283; see also Marchington *et al.*, 2001: 24). Several studies have found that many new employee participation initiatives that focus on direct voice measures lack sufficient structure and scope (Gollan, 2007; Gollan and Markey, 2001; Kessler *et al.*, 2000).

Direct voice can operate at a number of levels within an organisation: department level, establishment level, company level; this research will concentrate on voice at the establishment level, as a large-N study at the departmental level across several firms and industries is likely to be impractical. Direct voice measures can have an influence on various parts of the organisation, and this influence may be strong or it may be weak. This research will concentrate on the links between direct, and other forms of voice and EO and DM policies and the strength of these voice mechanisms in influencing these policies. When assessing direct voice measures, the strength of these measures will be determined by category. Information sharing such as the use of notice boards, management chain, newsletters, e-mail and intranet will be categorised as weak direct voice. Stronger forms of voice, in this study, are those that can be described as direct consultation such as attitude surveys, suggestions schemes and meetings with the workforce. The strongest forms of direct voice, in this study, are those that can be categorised as direct participation such as partly autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem solving groups.

Voice also is a significant element of broader and important HR frameworks (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2008; Pfeffer, 1998). These frameworks include a wider range of practices, such as internal labour markets and job security. This research does not include these as they lie beyond its remit. There is paucity of research linking voice, and key HR and industrial relations concepts, to equal opportunities; it is this gap that this research seeks to fill.

Such frameworks form the basis of 'high performance work systems' (HPWS). These systems encompass a wider range of policies than considered here, for instance, they often include, performance-related pay, team work and job security (Applebaum *et al.*, 2000; Black and Lynch, 1997, 2001; Lawler, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998). However, they also include voice related items such as employee attitude surveys and information sharing policies e-mails. This thesis will review the relevant studies that analyse in part the empirical links between these voice related aspects of HPWS and EO and DM policies, below.

2.4.3.1 Direct Voice as a HRM Practice, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism and Quits

Direct voice often forms part of the HPWS. However, there is variation in how voice is operationalised in studies of HPWS. There is, in other words, no consensus on what direct voice looks like in HPWS (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). However, there is agreement within the HRM literature that HPWS will help to improve organisational performance (Applebaum *et al.*, 2000; Black and Lynch, 1997, 2001; Guest *et al.*, 2003; Nolan and O'Donnell, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998; Wood and Wall, 2007). As direct voice, in particular, is a key element within HPWS (Godard, 2004; Lawler, 1987; Walton, 1985), voice should also be associated with superior workplace outcomes (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Marchington, 2001). This section of the literature review focuses on those elements that could be construed as direct voice; however, it is important to note that these often form parts of studies that include a range of other, varying HR practices (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Vandenberg *et al.*, 1999).

Publications on participation emphasise the importance of enabling employees to use their discretion to contribute to the workplace; this is true in both union and non-union settings (Marchington *et al.*, 2001). Union voice is a minority phenomenon with many of the sectors that dominate the economy. Indeed, many sectors of the UK economy do not have a tradition of union representation and demonstrate little immediate prospect of a return to union-centred forms of participation (Dundon *et al.*, 2005). Consequently, direct voice is an

important part of the UK economy, and its influence on the performance of organisations requires scrutiny (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). In addition, despite the broad agreement within the HRM literature on the various benefits of direct voice as part of the HPWS, the emphasis on non-union forms of voice has been criticised by others (Clegg *et al.*, 1978; Kessler and Purcell, 2003; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Marchington *et al.*, 2001).

Although a large number of studies assess the impact of high performance workplace systems on various measures of firm performance, such as labour productivity and financial outcomes, the majority of these examine firms or workplaces in the US (Applebaum and Berg, 2000; Batt, 2002; Black and Lynch, 2001; Freeman *et al.*, 2000; Grant *et al.*, 2002; Kleiner *et al.*, 1999; Wolf and Zwick, 2002a; Wood, 1999a). There is, of course, some evidence available for UK workplaces (Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Peccei *et al.*, 2002; Ramsey *et al.*, 2000; West, 2003; Wood and de Menezes, 1998). There is, however, relatively limited evidence that 1) assesses the links between direct voice and EO and DM policies and 2) examines the links between direct voice as an HRM practice, on the one hand, and quits and absenteeism, on the other. This thesis defines direct voice as measures that cover direct participation, direct consultation, and information sharing. Direct participation encompasses partly autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem-solving groups. Direct consultation covers attitude surveys, suggestion schemes and meetings with the workforce. Information sharing includes the use of notice boards, the management chain, newsletters, emails and the intranet to convey information to employees within a workplace. This thesis, therefore, reviews the major studies that include some of these measures within their analyses.

For instance, the measure of direct voice, here, includes teamwork. A stream within the HRM literature views teams favourably, as they can help to improve communication, workplace trust and innovation (Pfeffer, 1998). However, this perspective is not accepted by all analysts. Teams may also intensify work and increase social control within workplaces (Barker, 1993; Knight and McCabe, 2000; Mueller, 1994). Consequently, there are theoretical reasons to expect teams, which form part of the direct voice measure in this thesis, to have both positive and negative associations with organisational performance.

Only very few studies have examined the links between direct voice and EO policies. There is some evidence to support the link between the use of participation, information and attitude surveys, on the one hand, and lower quit rates, on the other (Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guthrie, 2001). However, these findings reveal an association rather than a causal link from the former to the latter (Guest *et al.*, 2003). Teamwork has also been found to be associated

with lower quit rates (Guthrie *et al.*, 2009; cf. Way, 2002). Moreover, the studies contain a number of other HRM practices, ranging from recruitment and selection to appraisal systems.

On other outcome measures that this thesis does not include, the evidence points to a small, but often insignificant, relationship between high-performance workplace practices, which include direct voice, and productivity (Freeman *et al.*, 2000; Ichniowski *et al.*, 1997; Kleiner *et al.*, 1999; MacDuffie, 1995). A similar pattern emerges for financial performance (Becker and Huselid, 1998; Cappelli and Neumark, 1999; Huselid, 1995; Staw and Epstein, 2000). It should be noted that a major assessment by Cappelli and Neumark (1999) revealed that high-performance workplace systems may be associated with heightened levels of labour productivity, but they are also linked to higher labour costs, resulting in no overall differences in firms' profits. Similarly, UK studies have revealed a mixed set of results for positive associations between high-performance workplace systems and various measures of performance; sometimes these associations are strongly statistically significant and at other times they are only weakly significant or, indeed, are not statistically significant (Ahmad and Schroeder, 2003; Banker *et al.*, 1996; Batt, 1999; Bryson *et al.*, 2005; Datta *et al.*, 2005; Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Guthrie *et al.*, 2009; McNabb and Whitfield, 1997; Wood and de Menezes, 1998). These studies do not, however, examine the associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and labour turnover, on the other, highlighting the need to fill this gap.

2.4.4 Dual-Voice Systems

A dual-voice system is, in effect, a hybrid that combines direct and indirect voice mechanisms. Direct and indirect forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: the use of one form does not rule out the use of the other. Indeed, the use of both forms of voice could lead to 'mutual gains' (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). In other words, one form of voice may complement – or make up for any deficiencies in – the other form of voice. If both forms of voice are used constructively, this is a partnership approach. A partnership approach is defined here as having both forms of voice in place and management having a positive attitude towards unions (*cf.* Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). (The operationalisation of the concept of 'partnership' is discussed below and in the methodology section.) Workplaces that have a partnership approach can be expected to integrate both forms of voice in a meaningful way. In other words, direct forms of voice are not used to undermine or side-line the indirect forms of voice. By contrast, a co-existence approach suggests that direct and indirect forms of voice

operate independently and that there is no meaningful interaction between the two forms of voice (Bryson, 2004). It is, therefore, possible to distinguish between workplaces that operate with a *partnership approach* and those that adopt a '*co-existence*' approach (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015).

2.4.4.1 Dual-Voice Systems, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism and Quits

Recent years have seen the introduction of a wide range of innovative human resource management practices by firms in their attempt to attain and sustain competitive advantage in increasingly complex product markets (McNabb and Whitfield, 1997). This has led to a need to integrate different forms of voice within analytical studies (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). Indeed, workplace representation and innovative workplace practices, such as direct-voice measures, have often been studied separately; however, in recent years, the two have frequently been assessed in an integrated way (Addison, 2005). Although most analyses of worker representation and employee involvement/high performance work practices have been conducted in isolation, whilst sometimes including the other as a control (e.g. Timming, 2007), research is beginning to consider their interaction and how the two forms of voice can be combined and may lead to outcomes different to those associated with the separate forms of voice (Addison, 2005; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015).

There are contrasting views on the presence of unions and their role of inhibiting or supporting the introduction and continued existence of innovative workplace practices. For example, Guest (2011) suggested that the presence of unions within a workplace constrains the ability of management to develop functional flexibility and job redesign. However, Eaton and Voos (1992) see unions as playing a positive role in the successful introduction of new work practices. This thesis differentiates between those workplaces that have both direct and indirect forms of union voice present –and within that group of workplaces – between those in which employers view unions favourably and those in which employers view unions either neutrally or negatively. The former sub-group of workplaces adopt a '*partnership approach*' and the latter pursue a '*co-existence approach*' (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015).

A partnership approach is underpinned by pluralistic rather than unitaristic assumptions, as employers view unions as legitimate and as playing a potentially beneficial role within the workplace (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). In contrast to both direct voice alone and indirect voice alone, a partnership approach can potentially enhance outcomes for employees and employers to an even greater degree (Guest and Peccei, 2001; IPA, 1997; Kochan and

Osterman, 1994). In such a model, employers and employees, both individually and collectively, co-operate extensively to benefit the organisation. Trust, a long-term perspective amongst employers and employees, and a symbiotic relationship are at the centre of a partnership, creating the conditions that can lead to beneficial results for the workplace (Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 1998, 2001, Hollingshead *et al.*, 2003). For instance, the key characteristics of partnerships, the exchange of information and a degree of influence for employee representatives, may help to improve quit rates and absenteeism (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). One mechanism that this might happen through is the implementation of EO or DM policies. For instance, if either individual workers or employee representatives or both raise concerns about potential discrimination within the workplace, the company may respond by implementing various policies to address direct and indirect discrimination in different areas, such as recruitment, pay, and promotion. This may, in turn, lead to an improved working environment for employees, and help to lower absenteeism and quit rates.

The presence of both forms of voice offers particular advantages to firms as they are used, in partnerships, to complement one another (Bryson, 2004; Bryson *et al.*, 2005; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Kessler *et al.*, 2004). By having both direct and indirect voice within a workplace, the issues that can be voiced may be greater than if only one form of voice is available to employees, making it easier for workers to raise concerns about potential discrimination. For instance, indirect voice may be better suited to addressing issues that may be perceived as a threat to the authority of managers within the establishment. This will depend upon managerial response. Employee calls via representatives for measures to enhance EO and DM may be reinforced by individual voice. This process may happen in the same way that the productivity benefits of indirect voice can be enhanced by the productivity advantages associated with direct voice (Bryson, 2004; Dundon *et al.*, 2004). Direct voice may also, however, enable employees to raise other concerns associated with discrimination that are less threatening, such as how to improve recruitment and selection procedures to ensure as wide a range of applicants apply for jobs and are considered for them. Indeed, direct voice may overcome any principal-agent problems connected to unions and their potential to represent the concerns of the ‘median worker’ rather than those of ‘marginal’ employee groups. Unions may, however, help to enhance trust between employees and employers within partnership models (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). Unions can be a source of credible information for workers, helping to allay any concerns that employees may have about the intensification of work as a result of the introduction of direct-voice measures (Edwards and Wright, 2001).

I Dual Voice Systems and Firm Performance

There is only a limited amount of evidence available on the links between dual voice systems and firm performance. Much of the evidence that does exist relates to either financial performance or productivity. For instance, McNabb and Whitfield (1997) found that the joint effect of union presence and flexibility in the assignment of workers and greater team working among employees had a positive effect on financial performance. Unions, therefore, can be regarded as facilitators of the introduction of new work practices (McNabb and Whitfield, 1997).

Bryson *et al* (2005) focus on the economic impact of trade unions, together with the impact of ‘bundles’ of what they label high-involvement management practices (HIM). The data used in the study was WERS 1998. They found that in regression models of workplace productivity and financial performance that HIM has a positive impact on labour productivity; however, this effect is restricted to unionised workplaces and seems more readily explained by concessionary wage bargaining than ‘mutual gains’, given the absence of any association with financial performance Bryson *et al* (2005).

2.4.5 Partnership and ‘Co-Existence’ Approaches within Dual-Voice Systems

Within a dual-voice system, it is possible for unions to be viewed positively or negatively. In order to provide a better understanding of the impact of dual-voice systems on EO and DM policies and practices, this research will disaggregate that system into a ‘partnership’ and a ‘co-existence’ approach. To do this, the employer’s attitude towards unions will be taken into consideration (*cf.* Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). In those workplaces with a dual-voice system, if employers are positive towards unions, this will be treated as a partnership approach. Employers who are indifferent or negative towards unions will be said to pursue a co-existence approach. Employers’ attitudes towards unions will be measured by their response to the statement that ‘unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’. (For alternative definitions of ‘partnership’, see Involvement and Participation Association (IPA), 1997; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002; Taylor and Ramsay, 1998; Trades Union Congress (TUC), 1999; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007.) In general, the literature on partnerships argues that a combination of indirect and direct voice mechanisms provides a better means for employees to convey their ideas to employers

compared to either indirect or direct voice mechanisms individually. Moreover, extensive direct and indirect voice influence employees' commitment to the organisation; this is especially true for indirect voice in firm policy making (Guest and Peccei, 1998; Hyman, 1997; Kochan and Osterman, 1994).

In contrast to more unitaristic assumptions that underpin much of the HRM literature that emphasises direct voice, a pluralistic perspective supports a partnership approach as employers view unions and other forms of collective voice as legitimate and as having a potentially beneficial role to play in the workplace (Bryson, 2004; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005). Partnership approaches, in effect, rely on co-operation and trust between employers and employees (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 1998, 2001, Hollingshead *et al.*, 2003). Within partnership workplaces, direct and indirect voice complement one another, potentially enabling a combination of the two to be more effective in meeting the needs of employees than either individually (Bryson, 2004; Bryson *et al.*, 2005; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Edwards and Wright, 2001; see also Hyman, 1997; Kelly, 2000; Kessler *et al.*, 2004; Waddington, 2003). 'Total voice' increases, therefore, within partnership establishments, and the two voice mechanisms may address different employment-related issues, creating the conditions in which employees' preferences on EO and DM measures are better addressed (Edwards and Wright, 2001). Whilst indirect voice may be better suited to raising broader issues related to employment, such as grievances, dispute resolution, and equal treatment of employees, direct voice may ensure that the heterogeneous concerns of a diverse workforce are heard (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007)

However, direct voice measures may also be used to undermine or side-line unions: direct voice mechanisms can represent 'a significant challenge to the traditional influence of trade unions in the workplace' (Beale 1994: 120; see also Kelly, 1996). Such a situation may arise when a union exists within a workplace and employers do not wish to force the immediate removal of unions, but aim to do so over a longer period of time by using direct voice measures to make unions superfluous.

Within empirical studies, there is no commonly accepted definition or operationalisation of what a 'partnership' is, rendering the interpretation of the results difficult (Guest and Peccei, 2001; Cooke, 1994; Sako, 1998; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, whilst there are several studies that examine the links between partnerships and labour productivity (Batt and Applebaum, 1995; Black and Lynch, 1997; EIRO, 2005; Green and McIntosh, 1998; Pencavel, 2003; Metcalf 2003a) as well as financial performance (Batt and Welbourne, 2002; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Waddington, 2003), there is

very limited evidence on the associations between partnerships, on the one hand, and quits and absenteeism, on the other. The evidence that does exist for the UK suggests that partnerships are associated with higher labour productivity compared to those that recognise unions but that do not have a partnership model; this association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. There is no statistically significant difference between these two groups in terms of their quit rates and levels of absenteeism (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

2.4.6 Minimalist Voice Systems

It is possible to distinguish between workplaces within another voice system (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015), workplaces that have neither indirect nor significant direct forms of voice in place; in other words a minimalist voice system: those workplaces that have a '*limited voice*' approach and those that adopt a '*bleak house*' approach to voice.

2.4.6.1 Limited Voice Approach and 'Bleak Houses'

Workplaces that operate a limited voice approach have some, but a below-mean number of, direct forms of voice. Workplaces that adopt a bleak house approach have no meaningful direct voice forms (Deery *et al.*, 2001; Guest, 1995; Guest and Conway, 1999; Sisson, 1993; *cf.* Wilkinson, 1999). More details on how this distinction is operationalised are provided in the methodology chapter. However, it should be noted here that, for the purposes of this research, a bleak house approach is defined by a workplace falling within the lower quartile of the direct-voice index that is discussed above; no indirect forms of voice are present (Guest and Conway, 1999). An establishment with a bleak house approach does not necessarily, therefore, have no direct-voice mechanisms present; it may have a few. This will, however, be very limited.

These different voice approaches can help to reveal management's emphasis on direct or indirect forms of voice as well as the 'no' voice option. Significantly, even within the minimalist voice system, employers can still decide to stress either 'no voice' or some direct forms of voice. By distinguishing between different approaches to voice within particular voice systems, this research can adopt a detailed study of voice within establishments. This research should, therefore, be able to identify any important differences between voice mechanisms in various workplaces, even when they are subtle. Such differences are often overlooked in other studies. In other words, this research goes beyond defining differences in

voice based solely on the use or ‘non-use’ of different types of voice channels. It also takes into consideration the degree to which certain voice mechanisms are used within particular classifications of workplaces based on the prevalence of direct and indirect forms of voice.

2.5 Employee Voice – Forms, Systems, and Approaches

In order to build up a nuanced picture of voice within UK workplaces, this research draws on the concepts of ‘voice forms’, ‘voice systems’ and ‘voice approaches’ (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). See Figure 2.1, which sets out the different aspects of voice that will guide this analysis.

2.5.1 Voice: the Analytical Framework

Diverse disciplines draw on the concept of employee voice; this has helped to generate an extensive array of research on the issue. It has also resulted in various conceptualisations of ‘voice’. This, in turn, has led to a paucity of integrative theories and frameworks on employee voice (Mowbray *et al.*, 2015). This classification of different aspects of voice within workplaces builds on categorisation used in the literature (Guest and Conway, 1999; Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). In these categorisations, establishments that have *indirect voice forms* are those that either have a recognised trade union or have a JCC and non-union employee representatives. The combination of JCC and non-union representation that is required for non-union indirect voice reflects the weaker voice that is generally associated with management-initiated indirect-voice channels compared to independent ones (Allen and Tüselmann, 2009; Gollan, 2007; Gollan and Markey, 2001; Kessler *et al.*, 2000; Mowbray *et al.*, 2015).

This operationalisation is not adopted by all authors who use the concept of voice, however. Gollan (2007) for instance, distinguishes between employer-provided voice and union-provided voice. This classification clearly distinguishes between forms of voice that are or are not established by the employer, but it does have a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it is not clear how workplaces are treated that have both employer-provided and union-provided forms of indirect voice. The two are not mutually exclusive (Bryson *et al.*, 2013). Secondly, and building on the preceding point, it does not enable assessments to be made about how employer-provided and union-provided voice interact with one another. Therefore, it does not distinguish between different approaches to indirect voice within workplaces. It cannot assess


if employer-provided indirect voice is used to undermine or complement union-provided voice. Finally, it assumes that the presence of different employer-provide voice forms are mutually exclusive. For instance, it does not combine workplaces that have a JCC with those that have non-union employee representatives into one category. Given the different levels of power associated with non-union indirect voice, combining these two within one category is appropriate.

Workplaces with *direct-voice forms* are those that have a high number of direct-voice practices in place. The range of practices included in this research is influenced by those used in previous studies (Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Marginson *et al.*, 2010, see the methodology chapter).

In order to distinguish between those workplaces that have forms of direct voice present, a scoring system is used. Such a system has been drawn on in previous research (Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). This scoring system reflects the power associated with these practices (see the methodology chapter). The average score distinguishes between establishments as follows: those with an above-average score fall into a ‘comprehensive direct-voice channel’ category, and those with a below-average score do not have a comprehensive direct-voice channel in place.

A dual voice workplace has both direct and indirect forms of voice. Partnership workplaces have both direct and indirect voice mechanisms in place and managers view unions favourably. Bleak house workplaces do not have any indirect voice mechanisms in place and are in the bottom quartile of workplaces on the direct voice index.

Figure 2.1: Forms of Voice



Source: Tüselmann *et al.* (2015)

2.6 Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management

2.6.1 Introduction

The UK's workforce has never been as diverse as it is today; there are more women, ethnic minorities, and disabled people working than ever before (Kandola, 2006). In the first stage of the analysis, this thesis will examine the links between different forms of voice, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies in workplaces, on the other. It is, therefore, important to define what is meant by EO and DM and identify similarities and differences.

An Equal Opportunities policy can be defined as 'a commitment to engage in employment practices and procedures which do not discriminate, and which provide equality between individuals of different groups or sex to achieve full, productive and freely chosen employment' (Lean Lim, 1996: 34). A DM policy is based around the fact that the workforce consists of a diverse population of people. The diversity consists of visible and non-visible differences which will include factors such as sex, age, background, race, disability, personality and workstyle. It is founded on the premise that harnessing these differences will create a productive environment in which everyone feels valued, where their talents are being fully utilised and in which organisational goals are met' (Kandola and Fullerton, 1998: 7). However, both the definitions and the merits of these approaches are contested, as will be discussed in this thesis.

More specifically, this research will examine whether firms have an EO or DM policy and whether they have policies in place to monitor recruitment and selection for gender discrimination, monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination by disability. The thesis does not differentiate, in terms of the empirical analysis, between EO and DM for reasons that are outlined in section 2.6.4 and the research methods section. This research examines the links between voice, EO and DM policies, and measures of establishment outcomes, which has not been done before, using a large sample in order to draw conclusions about these links in workplaces more generally. The research will also examine the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination, the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination on the ground of disability. It will also seek to establish whether workplaces monitor pay and promotions for discrimination on the grounds of gender, disability and ethnicity.

2.6.2 Equal Opportunity Policies

Equal opportunity policies can be seen as an attempt to eradicate considerations of social differences from organisational decision making through bureaucratic means (Liff, 1999). In other words, an individual should be treated in the same way as another individual - the liberal approach advocates the philosophy of 'sameness'. Anti-discrimination legislation has interpreted this as people being judged independently of their gender and focusing instead on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). In practice EOs mean techniques should be developed to ensure that individuals are assessed in the same way. Differences between individuals on characteristics that are not job related are not considered. Equal opportunities, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups.

The law that deals with equality in the UK is the Equality Act 2010; this act legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society. Before the Act came into force, there were several pieces of legislation to cover discrimination, including the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Government Equalities Office, 2013). This legislation is translated into action within firms through equal opportunities policies. The protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 are: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. This research will concentrate on three of these characteristics, sex, disability and race (ethnicity), as these are common causes of workplace discrimination. It examines whether or not establishments have introduced policies to monitor direct and indirect discrimination along gender, ethnicity, and disability grounds in the areas of recruitment and selection, pay rates, and promotion.

It is important to examine potential discrimination against women for a number of reasons. Most notably, full-time male workers earn more than full-time female workers, leading to a full-time gender pay gap in 2012 of 9.6 per cent of hourly earnings (excluding any overtime payments). Although this difference has declined over time, a discrepancy remains (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006; Platt, 2011), highlighting the need to examine various aspects of gender inequality in workplaces. The gender pay gap is likely to be influenced not just by pay rates for men and women within workplaces, but also the types of jobs that they are recruited into as well as the practices within the establishment that relate to promotions (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990; Snell *et al.*, 1981). Similarly, those with a disability or those from BME groups are, in general, at a disadvantage to those without a

disability or those who are not from BME groups (Bardasi and Jenkins, 2000; Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006). These disadvantages may result from direct or indirect discrimination that decreases promotional prospects within their current establishment, creating the requirement to examine whether firms monitor recruitment and selection as well as promotions and pay levels for discrimination. Such discrimination can take direct and indirect forms (Esmail 2004; Cook *et al.*, 2003). These forms of potential discrimination have implications not just for the individuals involved, but for the wider economy and society (Platt, 2011). They may also have consequences for firm performance (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 2001; Schroeder *et al.*, 2008) or workplace-level outcomes, such as absenteeism and quits.

2.6.3 Diversity Management

As discussed above, EO policies have a long history in the UK. Traditional EO policies, such as gender, disability and ethnicity, cannot be viewed separately from the broader issues within DM, such as individual and cultural differences (Kirton and Greene, 2000), because the two will influence one another. However, the rationale for EO and DM policies differs. Whereas EO policies reflect ‘a moral concern for social justice’ (Kirton and Greene, 2002) and an attempt to eliminate social group-based discrimination through legislation, the diversity approach is based on the belief that heterogeneity in organisations brings business benefits, increased performance and indeed competitive advantage to organisations (Boxenbaum, 2006; Kelly and Dobbin, 1998; Robinson and Dechant, 1997; Özbilgin and Tatli, 2011). The benefits that DM brings in terms of quit rates and absenteeism will be the focus of this thesis. Johnston and Packer (1987) first used the term ‘managing diversity’ in their influential report *Workforce 2000*. The report revealed increasing heterogeneity in the American workforce with white male employees being in the minority of new entrants into the labour force. The report encouraged policy makers and organisations in the US to address this phenomenon if the US were to maintain its economic position in the twenty-first century, portraying difference amongst the workforce as a strategic asset.

Definitions of diversity abound (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013; Gardenswartz and Row, 1994; Harrison and Klein, 2007). Kandola and Fullerton (1998) note that managing diversity means different things to different people. They highlight that the basic concept of managing diversity accepts that the workforce consists of a diverse population of people and that diversity consists of visible and non-visible differences,

including factors such as sex, age, background, race, disability and work style (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Mannix and Neale (2005) have put differences into categories and types of diversity: social-category differences, differences in knowledge or skills, differences in values or beliefs, personality differences, organisational or community-status differences and differences in social and network ties. There are, then, many ways to categorise diversity within workplaces.

Kandola and Fullerton (1998) note that managing diversity will create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued, where ‘talents’ are fully utilised and in which organisational goals are met. A corollary of this argument is that employees will be more committed to the organisation, resulting in lower rates of absenteeism and lower quit rates. This thesis will test whether, indeed, such benefits can be obtained from EO and DM policies by looking at their effect on quit rates and absenteeism.

DM, therefore, potentially covers a wide range of demographic, employee and attitudinal characteristics. This thesis will focus on a selection of some of the demographic qualities of a workforce; gender, ethnicity and disability. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, covering all of the variables listed within equal opportunity legislation and some diversity-management frameworks would not be feasible. Secondly, key demographic variables, such as gender, ethnicity and physical ability, are at the core of many of EO and DM frameworks (Gardenswartz and Rowe, 1994; Mannix and Neale, 2005; Kandola and Fullerton, 1998). Finally and most importantly, this is the first piece of research that systematically examines the links between employee voice, EO and DM and workplace outcomes. It, therefore, seeks to shed light on some of the potential link mechanisms between voice and workplace performance. To date, EO and DM policies have been overlooked in the extant research on voice and performance, yet different forms of voice may help to promote EO and DM policies within workplaces.

2.6.4 Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management

This research analyses the associations between various voice mechanisms, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies, on the other, within workplaces. Examining EO and DM policies together is supported by Ford (1996), who suggests that equality and diversity need to be seen as interdependent for them to be successful. Moreover, whilst DM capitalises on the different skills, qualities and viewpoints that a diverse workforce has to offer and equal opportunities are based on a legal framework (Cornelius *et al.*, 2000, 2001; Gooch and Todd,

2000; Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Foster and Harris, 2005; Maxwell, 2004), both approaches have to find solutions to the same types of problems (Liff, 1997). Indeed, within many UK workplaces, equal opportunity policies are subsumed within DM policies, and establishments sometimes use the terms EO and DM policies synonymously (Kirton, 2002; *cf.* Noon, 2007).

The legal framework stresses the importance of treating people the same, irrespective of the protected characteristics outlined in the Act. The objective is that individuals are treated the same whatever their characteristics, so that individuals or groups of individuals are not treated favourably or unfavourably. The proponents of the equal opportunities management approach have assumed an operational approach to equality, supported and monitored by equal opportunity units, which are staffed by specialists (Mulholland *et al.*, 2005).

In contrast, DM policies have moved away from the social justice and legal case for equality, towards individualised and performance-driven business case arguments. However, both approaches have to find a way of assessing individuals fairly. They also need to address how structures and cultures within organisations favour some and disadvantage others and how this can be changed. Diversity complements equal opportunity initiatives because ethical and ‘fair practice’ arguments can be combined with the recognition and valuing of difference for business benefit (Mulholland *et al.*, 2005).

The benefits associated with a DM policy in organisations were highlighted by Cox and Blake (1991) who proposed six main business benefits to having a diverse workforce. The first benefit rests on the cost argument: a DM policy enables organisation to integrate workers effectively, reducing the operating costs within firms and workplaces. Second, firms can benefit as a result of enhanced ‘resource acquisition’: employers with a favourable reputation amongst women workers and minority groups will have an improved chance of attracting the best employees across all groups within society compared to those workplaces that do not have a strong reputation. The third potential benefit to employers arises from stronger marketing: cultural sensitivity can be gained by employing workers with links to other cultures and countries, enabling firms to improve marketing. Fourth, firms can benefit from improved DM policies as they can lead to enhanced creativity, as the presence of a diverse set of perspectives within a workplace should improve creativity. The fifth potential benefit to firms arises from a heightened ability to solve problems: heterogeneous groups can lead to better decisions being made and improved problem-solving capabilities within firms and establishments due to a wider range of range of viewpoints and experiences being incorporated into discussion. Finally, there is the potential for benefits from DM that arise

from 'system flexibility' advantages. Working systems within workplaces with DM policies in place are less standardised and, therefore, more fluid, enabling workplaces to respond more suitably and quickly to environmental changes (Cox and Blake, 1991).

Subeliani and Tsogas (2005) support this view on the potential benefits of DM policies within firms and workplaces; they suggest that managing diversity can lead to a superior understanding of local markets and customers, an increased ability to attract and retain the best staff, better creativity and problem solving, and greater flexibility for the organisation. However, Kirton and Greene (2010) and Noon (2007) argue that the emphasis on DM can detract from, and, indeed, undermine, traditional EO measures. They argue that the notion of EO is underpinned by a concern for social justice, whereas DM is based upon a focus on the individual and his or her contribution to the organisation, potentially downplaying the desire to treat everyone the same.

In spite of these concerns, this thesis, which is based upon a large-scale study of UK workplaces, does not differentiate between EO and DM policies. The reasons for this are fourfold. First, as noted above, in practice many managers do not distinguish between the two and some have argued that it is not useful to distinguish between the two (Malvin and Girling, 2000). Second, it is difficult to separate the management of diversity within workplaces from the provision of equal opportunities both conceptually and theoretically, as the largely legislation-based equal opportunities influence how firms manage diversity (Monks, 2007). Third, the aim of this thesis is to examine if various voice mechanisms are associated with policies that seek to reduce different forms of discrimination against a diversity of groups within establishments. Finally, the research then examines if these have an association with important workplace outcomes, regardless of whether they come under the rubric of EO or DM.

2.6.5 Equal Opportunity, Diversity Management and the Law

I The Origins of Anti-Discrimination Law

Equality law in the UK states that people should not be treated differently in the UK workplace and in wider society because of their characteristics. The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) came into force on 1 October 2010 and brought together over 116 separate pieces of legislation into one single Act. The purpose of the EqA is to provide a legal framework to protect the rights of individuals and advance equality of opportunity (Equality and Human

Rights Commission, 2016). The Equality Act 2010 largely ‘tidies up’ and, in a few instances, replaces previous legislation, such as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (ACAS, 2014).

According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2016), the nine main pieces of legislation that the EqA combines are:

- the Equal Pay Act 1970
- the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
- the Race Relations Act 1976
- the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
- the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
- the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
- the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006
- the Equality Act 2006, Part 2
- the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007

The Equality Act 2010 covers everyone in Britain and protects people from discrimination, harassment and/or victimisation. The Equality Act 2010 prohibits unfair treatment in the workplace; when using public services, such as health care or education; when using businesses and organisations that provide services and goods, such as shops; when using transport; when joining a club or association and when you have contact with public bodies, such as the local council or government departments. There are nine protected characteristics under the EqA: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation.

The Equality Act 2010 is part of the fifth generation of equality legislation in Britain (Hepple, 2010). Hepple (2010) describes the first generation of legislation as one based on the notion of ‘formal equality’. The Labour Government’s attempt to address overt discrimination against recent immigrants from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent was the Race Relations Act 1965; it was viewed as part of a package along with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. The latter Act restricted the ability of Black and Asian immigrants to enter the UK. It covered direct racial discrimination, but was limited to places of ‘public resort’, such as public houses and hotels (Hepple, 2010).

The second generation, the Race Relations Act 1968, was also a measure of ‘formal equality’. It extended coverage to employment, housing, goods and services. Once again, a

piece of legislation that aimed to reduce discrimination was accompanied by another Act that tried to restrict the number of immigrants coming to the UK (the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968) (Hepple, 2010).

The third generation of equality legislation focused on discrimination on the grounds of sex (Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA)). Trade unions, feminists and the Labour and Liberal parties had campaigned for several years for this piece of legislation. This had long been fought for by them. The unique features of the SDA 1975 were the introduction of indirect or adverse effects discrimination and conditions that permit positive action. These two acts signal the beginning of a transition from formal to substantive equality. The acts also enabled individuals to claim compensation for unlawful discrimination in industrial (later called employment) tribunals and courts. The then government created the Equal Opportunities Commission to undertake strategic enforcement and to assist individuals. This model was followed in a new Race Relations Act 1976; the government deliberately introduced the RRA after the SDA because women's rights were more popular than those of BME groups (Hepple, 2010).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the implementation of the Race Directive and Framework Employment Directives that covered discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, religion or belief, and sexual orientation and the subsequent Equal Treatment Directive, covering sex discrimination, led to the fourth generation of equality legislation. These Directives which were ultimately transposed into UK law were, in part, a response to growing pressures within Britain and elsewhere for an extension of anti-discrimination legislation from LGBT groups, religious groups and those concerned with age discrimination (Hepple, 2010).

The fifth generation continues the move towards comprehensive equality and started with a period of *transformative equality* that Kirton and Greene (2016) define as equality focused on systemic change rather than on simply formal equality, and equality focused on outcomes rather than merely processes. This thesis examines processes within organisations on equality and diversity issues; it examines the links between practices within organisations to monitor the recruitment and promotion of employees by gender, age and ethnicity.

II The Equality Act 2010

The then Labour government passed the Equality Act in 2010. The Act aims to harmonise, simplify and modernise existing equality law and to improve the existing anti-

discrimination legislation that some saw as out-dated, inconsistent, disjointed, inadequate and, in places, incomprehensible (Hepple, 2010). The Equality Act 2010 also mirrors broader developments in several developed countries, as governments in Australian, Canadian, Irish, New Zealand and the US undertook similar initiatives to up-date equality legislation (Kirton and Greene, 2016).

Several principles underpin the Equality Act 2010; in particular, the Act highlights all human beings' right to equality, equal protection from discrimination regardless of the grounds concerned, and a duty on the part of the state in all its activities to provide 'full effect' to the right to equality (Hepple, 2010). Moreover, Hepple (2010) points out that there must be no hierarchy of equality. The same rule should be applied to all areas of possible discrimination. The only exception can be if there is a cogent rationale for not enforcing all areas of anti-discrimination equally. Hepple (2010) contends that to a large extent, the EqA achieves its aims. This means that there are numerous areas that equality can cover. For practical reasons, this thesis focuses on discrimination based on gender, ethnic and disability characteristics.

III Benefits and Weaknesses of the Equality Act 2010

Hepple (2010) argues that some exceptions remain in particular areas of equality and these exceptions are allowed by the EqA; for example, the Act has retained a mandatory default retirement age of 65. The Act also excludes some decision on immigrants and limits the protection afforded to individuals from discrimination in employment on the grounds of religion, belief and sexual orientation.

Similarly, the EqA established the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), covering all areas of potential discrimination and not just those included in different pieces of previous legislation (gender, ethnicity, and disability) (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Private sector workplaces are under no obligation to establish an equality duty.

Principle 11 of the EqA underpins the PSED, and requires the state to 'take the steps necessary to give full effect to the right to equality in all the activities of the State', in particular, to 'promote equality in all relevant policies and programmes', and to 'take all appropriate measures to ensure that all public authorities and institutions act in conformity with the right to equality' (Hepple, 2010: 19). One of the key elements of the PSED is to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by the Act. Another is that the PSED should advance equality of opportunity between persons

who share a relevant characteristic and persons who do not share it (Hepple, 2010: 18). As the PSED only applies to public sector workplaces, they are more likely to monitor practices for potential discrimination. For this reason, this thesis expects equal opportunity practices to differ between private and public sector workplaces. For this reason, the thesis controls for these two types of workplace.

Kirton and Greene (2016) point out that the PSED is innovative as it extends beyond providing additional rights against discrimination; instead, it places the responsibility for how organisations can promote equality with public sector officials. In addition, Hepple (2011) highlights the power given to the Minister to impose specific duties on the listed authorities for the purpose of enabling the better performance of the general duty. It was expected that there would be a duty to have arrangements to engage with employees, service users and their representatives and other stakeholders. This requirement of consultation and involvement was described in the Labour Government's *Discrimination Law Review* consultation paper as one of 'the key principles which underpin the effective performance of public sector equality duties' (Hepple, 2011: 318).

The EqA extended protection to individuals in some groups who had never received protection before; moreover, there was additional protection for some groups, such as disabled people (Kirton and Greene, 2016). The EqA prohibited pre-employment health checks, preventing employers asking applicants about their health before deciding whether to employ them. This removed a key element of disproportionate disadvantage for disabled people (Lawson, 2011 cited in Kirton and Greene, 2016). Lawson (2011) also discusses harmonization within the EqA that means elements of law usually only applied to disabled people have the potential to benefit other protected characteristics. The importance placed on disabled workers in the legislation justifies the inclusion of these employees in this thesis.

Kirton and Greene (2011) found the trade unions were able to use the legal requirements for an equality impact assessment in redundancy plans to help any BME workers, who may have been disproportionately affected by the proposals, being discriminated against. Firms viewed the PSED, in general, as less of a burden than preceding equality requirement because of the consistent treatment across all groups and the reduction in prescribed processes (Arthur et al., 2013 cited in Kirton and Greene, 2016). Other benefits of the PSED found by Arthur et al. (2013) were the enhanced status of equalities work and improved awareness of equalities issues.

Critics of the EqA argue that the legislation does not go far enough; in particular, it has failed to impose any positive duties to advance equality on the private sector (Hepple,

2011). Critics of the Act have also argued that protection offered for different protected characteristics is not enough (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Hepple (2010: 16) highlights numerous other criticisms that have been raised. For example, the EqA does not mention descent (although ethnic descent is included in 'ethnic origins'). In addition, the Government refused to give specific protection to carers on the basis that being a carer was not a 'status' and is better protected by other legislation. The EqA addresses the issue of 'multiple discrimination', discrimination on more than one characteristic, only to a limited extent. For instance, the EqA allows claims where because of a combination of two relevant protected characteristics a person treats another less favourably than they treat or would treat a person who does not share either of those characteristics. However, claims can only be made on two potential characteristic, but no more than two. The limitation to two grounds was a compromise struck between the Equality ministers in the Government and the business lobby, who were supported by business minister. In addition, both of these claims must be made on the basis of direct discrimination; claims cannot combine one on the basis of indirect discrimination and one of the grounds of direct discrimination.

Criticisms have also been raised about the definition of disability within the EqA. The EqA defines disability in a way that focuses on impairments that are of a chronic and significant nature. This definition, arguably, reflects a welfarist and medical approach to disability rather than a social model of disability (Kirton and Greene, 2016). This empirical research within this thesis, because the research seeks to identify patterns, if any, in the associations between voice, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, cannot capture these different perspectives.

2.6.6 Different Approaches to Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management

Jewson and Mason (1986) put forward two approaches to equality policy. They termed these approaches the liberal and the radical approach. These approaches have become influential in analysing and evaluating equality strategies in organisations (Greene and Kirton 2006). They also have implications for the approach adopted in this thesis and raise important issues for the implementation of policies within workplaces.

I The Liberal Approach/Sameness/Individuals

The liberal approach focuses on the individual. According to Jewson and Mason (1986) within the liberal approach, equality exists when all individuals are enabled freely and equally to compete for social rewards (Jewson and Mason, 1986: 307). The liberal approach is based around the idea that men and women should be treated the same and sex equality is achieved when policies and procedures are identical for both sexes (Cockburn, 1989).

Each individual, therefore, should be treated in the same way as any other individual. The basis of the liberal approach is, consequently, the philosophy of 'sameness', the idea that individuals have the right to be treated the same as another person of a different sex in the same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 1996). Anti-discrimination legislation has interpreted treating 'like as like' is that people should be judged independently of their gender and focusing instead on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). What this means in practice is the development of techniques to ensure that women and men are assessed in the same way. These include reviews of recruitment and selection tests, awareness training for selectors and appraisers and reviews of payment structures (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). If individuals should be treated the same, there is no room or justification to change policies and practices for individuals or groups who may be disadvantaged in some way.

However, others argue that formulating identical policies and procedures for both sexes conceals and even institutionalises inequalities (Ferguson, 1984; Acker, 1990; Witz and Savage, 1992). Liff and Wajcman (1996) highlight the fact that sameness/equal treatment requires women to deny, or attempt to minimize, differences between themselves and men as the price of equality; they further argue that this is neither feasible nor desirable. Webb (1997), when discussing the debate within feminism on equal opportunities, highlights how the critique of equal rights contributed to the growth in interest of a parity agenda. Webb (1997) argues that the parity approach overlooks the fact that women can never really work in the same way as men and ignoring this can have detrimental effects for women, as, for instance, women typically have primary responsibility for the domestic sphere. Treating men and women the same can never adequately take account of problems arising from, say, women's domestic responsibilities or their educational disadvantage, which was, at the time that Webb was writing, apparent. Nor does it take into consideration how those who want to spend time with their children can do so without this reducing their career prospects (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). Treating everyone 'the same', therefore, may have implications for the

morale, turnover, and productivity of those workers who are at a disadvantage to the dominant group(s) in society.

Consequently, Schwartz (1992) points out that CEOs and senior managers should support female employees by acknowledging the fundamental difference between women and men – the biological fact of maternity. In practical terms this means allowing flexibility for women and men who need it, providing training that takes advantage of women's leadership potential, and eliminating the corrosive atmosphere and barriers that exist for women in the workplace. By accepting their responsibility to women and working parents, Schwartz (1992) predicts that companies will gain tremendous financial benefits. In order to overcome inequalities within employment, disadvantaged groups may need to be treated differently. Diversity should, in this perspective, therefore, be managed.

A corollary of the individual approach to DM is that direct/individual voice would be favoured. By contrast, as focus on sameness suggests that individual preferences should be aggregated, and employee representatives should convey employees' thoughts to managers.

II The Radical Approach/Difference/Groups

Employment practices that focus on EO accept unequal outcomes for individuals, as job selection is done on the basis only of those characteristics that are relevant to performing the job well, such as experience, education qualifications, commitment etc. and excludes characteristics such as race or gender from consideration. This results in a lack of representation of groups, as it is only individuals that matter, and all individuals are treated the same. Differences between individuals on other, non-job related characteristics are not considered. Equal opportunities, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups.

An alternative to providing equality involves recognising and building on differences between people. In order to reduce inequalities in outcomes, therefore, certain groups should be treated differently. The *radical approach* to promoting equal opportunities was adopted by individuals who held strong political and ethical values and recognized the historical disadvantage that certain groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and disabled persons, experienced in employment (Jewson and Mason 1986), and that equal opportunities would not rectify these differences. The radical approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for equality of opportunity, but also the need for equality of outcome.

The objective of the radical approach is to ensure that there is fair distribution of rewards by introducing targets or quotas for underrepresented groups, as systemic

discrimination is identified at the group level (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Ensuring that all groups are representative of all the groups available to it would mean that being a member of an underrepresented group would be a deciding or even primary factor over considerations of merit (Kaler, 2001). This is in contrast to the liberal approach where selection is purely on the basis of merit. Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss how negative value judgements and stereotypes are attached to minorities by dominant groups; making minorities less likely to be appointed on merit – making discrimination a distortion of the free labour market and a socially constructed feature of the market process. The radical approach advocates policies that will result in fair distribution of disadvantaged groups in the workplace (Jewson and Mason, 1986).

Özbilgin (2000) cites criticisms levelled at the radical approach. Firstly, members of each disadvantaged group experience varying degrees of discrimination due to their membership of other disadvantaged groups. Therefore, improving one group's position through radical action does not necessarily provide equal opportunities for all members of the same group. Secondly that affirmative action, aimed at promoting the career prospects of a disadvantaged group, is 'reform tokenism', something that delayed real change towards equality. Similarly, Cockburn (1989: 217) asserted that the radical approach was 'retrogressive in further dividing the already divided powerless groups'. She also pointed out, that, although the use of a radical approach could promote the relative position of one disadvantaged group, it did not promise any improvement in the structures that perpetuate inequalities at work. Again, the radical approach would appear to indicate that either that individual workers or employee representatives for particular groups should voice employee concerns.

2.6.7 The Business Case and Social Justice

The theoretical base upon which to build policy that alleviates inequality and unfair discrimination have two potentially competing solutions, one focuses on equality of opportunity and the other on the management of diversity (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). According to Noon and Ogbonna (2001) these solutions are underpinned by two different rationales: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of the organisation (the business case). This is echoed by Miller (1996) who observes that the diversity approach has an emphasis on the 'business case' which is in contrast to the 'equal opportunity' approach that emphasises social justice and fairness. The moral case suggests that powerful voice

mechanisms should be present in workplaces to ensure workers' rights are protected. By contrast, the business case suggests that managers should be free to decide which, if any, voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces.

Some see DM as having evolved from the area of equal opportunities (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001). Dickens (1999) points out one of the strategies of those getting employers to see equality as in the interests of business is to highlight the organisational benefits. The debate moved away from equality arguments based primarily on appeals to social justice or morality, backed by the need for compliance with anti-discrimination legislation, to arguments based on pragmatic business self-interest as a rationale for equality action.

Many organisations now claim to have adopted a diversity approach (Kirton and Greene, 2016). The shift to 'diversity' according to Johnston and Teicher (2010), was seen as attractive for three reasons: firstly, as a way of moving beyond the narrower terms of affirmative action because it could cover everyone in the workforce – women, men, of all ages and all races; secondly, because 'managing diversity' was seen to be more gender neutral and popular (because it was a more encompassing term); and thirdly because the business case argument for diversity programmes drove the need to implement diversity initiatives rather than the moral emphasis that permeated affirmative action and equality programmes.

The concept of diversity was originally created to justify more inclusion of people who were traditionally excluded from organisations (Herring, 2009). Herring (2009) found that diversity was linked to positive outcomes, in business organizations and that diversity was related to business success because it allowed companies to 'think outside the box' by bringing previously excluded groups inside the box. He found that the process enhanced an organization's creativity, problem-solving, and performance (Herring, 2009). Proponents of the 'business case for diversity' claim that diversity pays (Hubbard, 2004). Foster and Harris (2005) point out potential benefits to employers such as reduction in costs associated with staff turnover and reduction in absenteeism as a result of increased employee commitment.

In addition, some proponents of this approach argue that businesses are limiting themselves by continuing to employ only people in same image as those already in place. Women and ethnic minorities, it is argued, can bring new strengths to a workforce and help organizations maintain their competitive edge. Rather than being rejected, difference should be managed effectively and should be seen as a strength (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 83).

This approach sees difference as an asset (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Gagnon and Cornelius, 2000). For instance, mixed work teams will understand a wider range of

customer needs and hence help the organization to be more competitive (Gordon et al., 1991; Greenslade, 1991). The business case discourse highlights the question of social justice by linking it to improved company performance (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). Cox and Blake (1991) support the view if the ‘business case’ and proposed six main business benefits to having a diverse workforce, these are discussed above. Lorbiecki and Jack (2000) summarised the main arguments from the practitioner literature of the business case for DM. They have separated these into an economic rationale and a morale rationale; however, they acknowledge that the economic arguments dominate.

The economic rationale for DM that Lorbiecki and Jack (2000) have identified by looking at the practitioner literature is: an improvement in productivity and the encouragement of more innovative solutions. Enhancing the understanding of a greater number of customer needs increases the customer base and turnover. In addition, it enhances corporate competitiveness and continued survival, helps to lower the likelihood of litigation. The moral rationale for DM is that it: promotes interaction between ethnic groups, helps to foster culture change within the organisation, facilitates attitude adjustment and thus counters prejudice, increases attitudinal commitment especially amongst women, helps organisational harmony, and is socially just and morally desirable. Cornelius, Gooch and Todd (2001) list four business advantages for a diverse organisation: (1) taking advantage of diversity in the labour market (2) maximising employee potential. (3) managing across borders and culture and (4) creating business opportunities and enhancing creativity.

The business case argument for DM; however, can be problematic if there is no ‘complementary recourse to a broader social justice or moral case beyond direct and quantifiable organisational benefits’ (Kirton and Greene, 2016: 131). Critics of the ‘business case’, according to Kirton and Greene (2016), warn that the diversity paradigm may ignore deep-seated societal discrimination and patterns of disadvantage. Dickens (1994) observed that appreciation of the business case can stimulate employer action on equality, but this is likely to be partial and contingent and can risk ‘fair weather’ equality. Greene and Kirton (2011) highlight a key criticism of the business case: DM is purely voluntary and employer led. Despite the changed political context post-1997, Dickens and Hall (2006) still support a view stated seven years earlier that the business case is “contingent, variable, selective and partial” (Dickens, 1999, p. 10; see also Greene and Kirton, 2011). Consequently, diverse management may only arise when there is a business case for doing so. Indeed, DM may only be implemented in areas that are easy to tackle. In addition, there is always the danger that a business case can be articulated against DM (e.g. that action is too costly or workforce

diversity will not add value). Similarly, Kaler (2001) contends that there will all too often be instances in which it will not pay business to promote diversity or pursue equal opportunity policies: ‘All in all, it can be considered that whether applied to equal opportunity, diversity or anything else, business case arguments are going to rest on somewhat shaky foundations. They might well apply in particular instances under particular circumstances, but not generally and not always (Kaler, 2001 cited in Noon and Ogbonna (2001: 61). Criticising the ‘business case’, Webb (1997) warned that ‘unfortunately the market model of “diversity” may have more to do with corporate image-building than with the kind of interventions designed to facilitate more egalitarian work organisation and increased inclusion of women. ... Diversity is valued only if it offers the employer more efficient, committed labour’. This criticism also raises the issue of pluralism and unitarism. The business case is based on a unitaristic perspective that assumes that workers and managers share an interest in the success of the firm. DM recognises that workers have different perspectives but ultimately managers can overcome these differences to enhance business performance. The pluralistic perspective emphasises differences between workers and managers. These differences may not always be overcome, but policies should be implemented that recognise those differences and that may not always lead to improved workplace outcomes.

Noon (2007) argues that ‘the moral case based on the human rights of all employees and job seekers must not be abandoned for the current fashion of diversity and the business case. (Noon, 2007: 781). Noon (2007) disputes the hypothesis that organisations failing to employ a diverse range of people are missing valuable human resources and losing opportunities to appeal to a broader range of customers as an alluring argument. Noon (2007) asserts that this argument has prompted the call for managing diversity to replace the traditional policies of equal opportunities, and a business case rationale to replace arguments for social justice. However, Noon (2007) argues that such a policy shift has potentially fatal flaws which can undermine equality outcomes and might ultimately prove to be dangerous for social justice. One of the problems identified by Noon (2007) is that diversity is essentially a concept that marginalizes the importance of equality and suppresses the significance of ethnicity in the workplace. Noon (2007) argues that business case arguments are high-risk because they provide an economic-based rationale for discrimination in certain contexts.

Other criticisms of the business case for diversity within workplaces are that it incurs significant potential costs (Jehn et al. 1999; Pelled 1996; Pelled et al. 1999). Racial and ethnic diversity has been linked with conflict, especially emotional conflict among co-workers, undermining the business case (Skerry, 2002). Foster and Harris (2005) discuss the view that

managing a more diverse team is more difficult and too much diversity could be divisive and have a negative impact on team cohesiveness. Tsui et al. (1992) suggest that diversity diminishes group cohesiveness and, as a result, employee absenteeism and turnover increase. In addition, diversity has been associated with lower quality because DM can lead to positions being filled by workers who are not qualified to do the job; (Rothman et al. 2003; Williams and O'Reilly 1998) again undermining the business case argument. The diversity approach has its roots in the USA, but it is clear from the global diversity literature that it has now taken hold in Britain, mainland Europe, Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Kirton *et al*, 2007). This thesis examines the possibilities that direct and/or indirect voice may can influence workplace outcomes.

Existing research has tended to present EO and DM policies as being in opposition to one another and perhaps even incompatible because of the differing reasons for which they are pursued (Lorbiecki and Jack, 1999; Webb, 1995). As Dickens (1999) points out, although business case arguments may have a social justice/compliance dimension, in practice these approaches were often counter-posed.

However, it has also been contended, that in some organisations DM is no more than EO re-labelled (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001). In addition, Noon and Ogbonna (2001) make the observation that in practice, if not in theory, there may be occasions where both an EO approach and a DM approach might be pursued with equal vigour and with some complementarity; the social justice and business cases coincide rather than collide (Kirton and Greene, 2016). In short, the distinction and dualism between EO and DM that much of the existing research presents may not be stark in reality. This research, therefore, combines rather than separates EO and DM. This is, indeed, what the WERS dataset does. This thesis draws on that data in its empirical analysis.

2.6.8 Equal Opportunity, Diversity Management Policies and Workplace Outcomes

When looking at the effect of EO and DM on performance, there are likely to be costs associated with such policies (Dex, 1986; Riley, Metcalf and Forth, 2007). However, the focus here will be on any potential benefits of such policies, as the links between voice, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes have not previously been addressed in this way. Therefore, it is first necessary to see if there are any potential benefits that arise from different EO and DM policies, and, if there are, the types of 'voice workplace' within which these benefits arise. This thesis will concentrate on two measures of workplace outcome; namely,

absenteeism and voluntary labour turnover (quits). As noted above, these proximal measures provide a stronger indication of the benefits of different EO and DM measures than more distal ones, such as financial performance or productivity, that are likely to depend on a range of factors within the establishment, the organisation, more generally; and the economy within which the establishment and firm are located.

EO practices include a range of measures. For instance, they can cover a relatively general statement about non-discrimination with company policy through to a comprehensive set of measures that 1) monitor potential discrimination against employees from certain disadvantaged groups, 2) identify and 3) remedy sources of discrimination and improve the opportunities offered to employees from disadvantaged groups. These measures may be facilitated through plans that involve extensive training and reorganisation in issues such as recruitment, performance appraisal procedures, management evaluation, promotion, benefits and grievance procedures (see Hodges-Aeberhard and Raskin, 1997). This thesis examines the role of policies that monitor for potential direct and indirect discrimination in the areas of recruitment and selection, relative pay rates, and promotions. As noted above, these are key areas in efforts to reduce workplace discrimination against women, those from BME groups and workers with a disability.

There are several potential benefits that may arise from anti-discrimination policies (Cox and Blake, 1991; Litvin, 1997; Subeliani and Tsogas, 2005; Swann *et al.*, 2004; Urwin *et al.*, 2006; White *et al.*, 2004). For instance, ensuring that pay does not lead to discrimination for or against certain groups could result in productivity growth (Pérotin and Robinson, 2000). EO and DM policies may also increase productive efficiency by allocating labour more efficiently. In addition, checking for direct and/or indirect discrimination in recruitment procedures may lead a larger pool of suitably qualified applicants coming forward, which may result in higher levels of human capital within the workplace (Metcalf and Forth, 2000; Welsh *et al.*, 1994). It also may reduce the number of disputes between managers and employees, if this were to happen it may help to boost morale and encourage knowledge sharing within establishments (Metcalf and Forth, 2000).

Most importantly for this thesis, increased levels of fairness within the workplace may also enhance motivation and effort (Metcalf and Forth, 2000), resulting in lower levels of absenteeism and quits (Cox and Blake, 1991; Monks, 2007; Shen *et al.*, 2009). This thesis focuses on employee morale and retention, as measured by absenteeism and quits, respectively. In addition, checking for discrimination in recruitment, pay, and promotion procedures can lead to an improved match between individuals and jobs, again, enhancing

workplace morale and reducing labour turnover (Blau *et al.* 1998; Holzer and Neumark 2000). Schotter and Wigelt (1992) suggest that improved career prospects for discriminated groups improve their incentives to stay with the organisation, helping to reduce absenteeism and quits. The motivation they have, due to increased morale (Metcalf and Forth, 2000), may spill over to non-discriminated group members who may then compete harder in internal labour markets. This, too, may help to reduce absenteeism and reduce employee turnover.

2.6.8.1 Empirical Studies on Equal Opportunities, Diversity Management and Workplace Outcomes

The empirical studies that examine the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and different workplace outcomes, on the other, will now be examined.

There is a limited amount of empirical evidence on the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and different workplace outcomes, on the other (BIS, 2013). Some evidence from the UK suggests that the lack of EO policies is associated with higher labour turnover and lower morale (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007), and that discrimination within workplaces is linked with higher levels of absenteeism (Commission for Racial Equality, 1995, cited in BIS, 2013).

However, using econometric analysis, Riley *et al.* (2008) find that there was no definitive link between EO and company performance. If there was a positive association, this tended to be in larger organisations (Riley *et al.*, 2008). Armstrong *et al.* (2010: 978), similarly, do not detect strong evidence in favour of a link between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and performance on the other:

Concrete evidence that demonstrates the bottom-line effects of diversity and equality management ... is much less evident and, when tentative evidence has been found, it has tended to be context specific ... Relatively little hard data supports the claim that diversity and equality initiatives influence firm performance.

However, it should be noted that these studies did not find any evidence of a cost to workplaces of implementing EO and DM policies.

There is some wider data to suggest that EO policies are linked to higher productivity levels in Dutch and UK workplaces (Pérotin and Robinson, 2000; Subeliani and Tsogas, 2005) as well as higher levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment in Irish establishments (O'Connell and Russell, 2005). Evidence from the US indicates that perceived discrimination is associated with lower organisational commitment and job satisfaction

(Sanchez and Brock, 1996). Policies that aim to reduce any discrimination within workplaces may lessen perceived levels of bias, leading to increased organisational commitment and, hence, lower labour turnover and absenteeism.

Studies that examine the links between diversity and workplace performance will now be examined. The literature in this area examines various types of diversity and its effects on a range of different performance measures. Using a novel and very large German data set, Backes-Gellner and Veen (2013) looked at the effects of age diversity on company productivity. They argued 1) that the balance between costs and benefits of diversity determines the effect of age diversity on company productivity, and 2) that the type of task performed acts as a moderator. They found that a more age-diverse workforce provides a larger knowledge pool, and can therefore find more creative solutions. However, a more age-diverse workgroup may also be faced with increasing communication or social integration problems. In a company with only standardised tasks, the balance of benefits and costs will not be positive. But, a company with innovative tasks, with new and different problems every day will gain from a more age-diverse workforce with a broader knowledge pool. Page (2007) and Backes-Gellner and Tuor (2010) find a positive link between age-diverse workforces and outcomes. However, other studies indicate a negative relationship (Cleveland and Lim, 2007); yet other studies find no consistent effects for age diversity (Leonard and Levine, 2006). Backes-Gellner and Veen (2013) argue that these inconsistent results are partly due to moderators that may differ from study to study, one of the most important moderators being *task requirements*. Although this thesis does not examine age, this thesis builds on this literature and examines how employee involvement in determining the speed at which employees work and how the work is performed influence voice and workplace outcomes.

Kochan et al. (2003) conducted a multi-firm study, examining the relationships between race and gender diversity and business performance. The study was carried out using data from four large firms. Each firm had its own particular way of collecting and storing human resource data and three of four firms indicated a strong preference for using their own internal survey measures to capture the variables in the model. Therefore, each study draws on different kinds of qualitative and quantitative data to address common questions about the links between diversity and organizational performance. Kochan et al. (2003) found that there were few direct effects of diversity on performance; either positive or negative. However, they point out that context is crucial in determining the nature of diversity's impact on performance. They found, for instance, that conditions that exacerbated racial diversity's negative effects on performance included a highly competitive context among teams. They

also found evidence to suggest that, under certain conditions, racial diversity may enhance performance, namely when organisations foster an environment that promotes learning from diversity. This research draws on this literature and includes measures of workforce diversity as controls within the analysis.

Armstrong et al. (2010) examine the effect of a diversity and equality management system on firm performance beyond the effects of a traditional high-performance work system consisting of bundles of work practices and policies. Diversity and equality management systems include diversity training and monitoring recruitment, pay and promotion across minority or other disadvantaged groups. Armstrong et al. (2010) carried out a quantitative analysis on indigenous and foreign-owned organisations in Ireland in the service and manufacturing sectors. They found that high-performance work system practices are associated with positive business performance and specifically that diversity and equality management system practices are positively associated with higher labour productivity (sales revenue and number of employees), workforce innovation (percentage of sales derived from recently introduced products and services) and lower voluntary employee turnover. Armstrong et al. (2010) advise that high-performance management practices should be thought of in a more expansive way and suggest that companies may find competitive advantage through more effective approaches to managing employee diversity and equality. This thesis extends this analysis to the UK. The thesis adopts subjective measures of workplace performance measures, as other measures, such as sales per employee and the percentage of sales that is derived from new products, may result from a range of other factors that may not be incorporated into the analysis, such as industry-specific shocks and remuneration incentives.

Like Armstrong et al. (2010), Richard (2000) uses productivity to measure the influence of diversity on firm performance and return on equity, and market performance. Richard (2000) uses quantitative techniques to examine the relationships between racial diversity, business strategy, and firm performance in the banking industry in the US. His sample consisted of 63 banks from California, Kentucky, and North Carolina. The results of Richard's (2000) study suggest that racial diversity is not positively associated with firm performance. However, deeper analysis reveals that, within the proper context, racial diversity does in fact add value and contribute to competitive advantage. Similarly, Ng and Tung (1998) carried out field research in North America, this time Canada. They examined the relationship between ethno-cultural diversity and attitudinal and non-attitudinal measures of organizational performance. Like Richard (2000) Ng and Tung's (1998) research was carried

out in the banking industry. They collected data from ninety-eight respondents in seven branches of a leading Canadian bank and compared culturally homogeneous branches to culturally heterogeneous branches. They found that culturally heterogeneous branches experienced lower levels of absenteeism and achieved higher productivity and financial profitability despite their lower scores on job satisfaction, organizational commitment and workplace coherence, and higher rates of turnover. These relationships were moderated by age, job tenure, organizational position, children's ages, location of education and previous employment, birthplace and education level. This thesis complements this research by examining absenteeism as a measure of employee morale and examines how organisational practices and characteristics have a direct effect on voice and workplace outcomes.

In her examination of eight multinational corporations with headquarters in the US, Wentling (2004) highlighted the importance of corporate strategy. She attempted to identify and provide information on the factors that assist and barriers that hinder the success of diversity initiatives in multinational corporations. Her study revealed that having a strategic plan for diversity initiatives, integrating diversity initiatives into the corporation's strategic plan, recognizing that diversity is a business imperative, having a culture that values diversity and having top management support were the factors most likely to assist in the success of diversity initiatives. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews with diversity managers/directors and document analysis were used to collect the data. The study also disclosed that people do not always understand the value of diversity, have competing agendas, and the size and complexity of the corporation and economic changes were the barriers most likely to hinder the success of diversity initiatives in multinational corporations. Similarly, this thesis examines how organisational practices that can be related to strategic objectives influence voice and workplace outcomes. Unlike Wentling (2004), this thesis relies on quantitative data in order to attempt to provide evidence on the links between organisational characteristics, voice mechanisms and workplace outcomes.

Using US data from the 1996 to 1997 National Organisations Survey, a national sample of profit making business organisations, Herring (2009) examines whether a diverse workforce, relative to a homogeneous one, is generally beneficial for business. Herring (2009) includes, amongst other measures of business performance, corporate profits and earnings. This is in contrast to other accounts that view diversity as either non-consequential to business success or actually detrimental by creating conflict, undermining cohesion, and thus decreasing productivity. Herring (2009) tests eight hypotheses derived from the value-in-diversity thesis. The results support seven of the eight hypotheses: racial diversity is

associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, greater market share, and greater relative profits. Gender diversity is associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, and greater relative profits. This thesis builds on this work. This research takes the percentage of workers from a black and minority ethnic background into consideration. It extends Herring's (2009) work by incorporating voice into the analysis. As the literature review on voice demonstrates, different voice mechanisms are likely to be able to convey employees' opinions to managers to different degrees. The thesis adopts subjective workplace outcomes, as other indicators, such as profits, corporate earnings, and market share, relate to the organisation as a whole rather than individual establishments within the company. EO and DM practices may differ between workplaces in companies. Similarly, some measures, such as market share, may be more readily applied to some workplaces in a firm than other ones within the same company.

In contrast to Kochan et al.'s (2003) study, Herring's (2009) results are consistent with arguments that a diverse workforce benefits business, offering a direct return on investment and promising greater corporate profits and earnings. Critics assert that diversity is linked with conflict, lower group cohesiveness, increased employee absenteeism and turnover, and lower quality and performance. However, Herring's (2009) results show a positive relationship between the racial and gender diversity of establishments and their business functioning. Therefore, it is likely that diversity produces positive outcomes over homogeneity because growth and innovation depend on people from various backgrounds working together and capitalising on their differences. Herring (2000) points out that these differences may lead to communication barriers and group conflict; however, these tensions may result in opportunities for creativity and enhance the quality of group work. This thesis incorporates measures of ethnic and gender diversity into its analysis.

A strand of the diversity literature examines board diversity and its relationship to various performance measures. For example, Miller and Triana (2009) investigate mediators that explain how board diversity is related to firm performance. Looking at a sample of Fortune 500 firms, they found that reputation and innovation both partially mediate the relationship between board gender and racial diversity and firm performance. They found a positive relationship between board racial diversity and both firm reputation and innovation and found a positive relationship between board gender diversity and innovation. The impact of share price has been used to assess the impact of diversity at senior manager/board level. For instance, Cook and Glass (2009) assess the impact of the announcement of BME groups and Caucasian men into senior management positions. Change in share price following the

announcement was used as the dependent variable. Market reaction to the naming of racial/ethnic minorities into corporate leadership positions was significant and negative, while the market's reaction to the naming of Caucasians was significant and positive. However, the negative market reaction to the appointment of racial/ethnic minorities into top management positions was mitigated in those firms that had explicitly incorporated diversity into their strategic growth plan. Their findings suggest that to successfully introduce diversity into upper management, firm decision makers must first signal the importance of diversity to market actors.

Haslam et al. (2010) also used stock-based measures to assess the impact of diversity at board level. This time the relationship between women on company boards of directors and performance was investigated. In addition to stock based measures, accountancy-based measures of company performance were also used. They examined FTSE 100 companies in the period 2001–2005, focusing on the relationship between the presence of women on company boards and both accountancy-based and stock-based measures of company performance. No relationship between women's presence on boards and 'objective' accountancy-based measures of performance (return on assets, return on equity) were found. However, a negative relationship between women's presence on boards and 'subjective' stock-based measures of performance were found. Companies with male-only boards enjoyed a valuation premium of 37 per cent relative to firms with a woman on their board. The results support claims that women are found on the boards of companies that are perceived to be performing poorly and that their presence on boards can lead to the devaluation of companies by investors. However, the reality is that company performance does not support this view.

Analyses of the links between board composition and various firm outcomes are important; however, this thesis focuses on how EO and DM policies within workplaces influence workers. It, therefore, tackles an equally important area. By doing so, this thesis can also examine a greater range of organisations, such as public sector ones, that do not necessarily have to publish information about the composition of their boards. This thesis can also incorporate measures that relate to employee morale; it does not rely on purely financial outcomes.

2.7 Voice and Diversity

Employee voice is the means by which employees communicate their views on employment and organisational issues to their employers. Voice can be expressed in various ways: workers themselves can voice their opinion or employee representatives can do so on behalf of individual workers (indirect voice).

According to Bell et al. (2011), changes in contemporary workforces render traditional voice mechanisms ineffective in capturing the demands of workers from diverse backgrounds (see also Syed, 2014). In a study of voice and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) workers in organisations, Bell et al. (2011) argue that there is a need to introduce new and transformed mechanisms of voice that use systems and structures relevant to both new forms of work and increasingly diverse groups of actual and potential workers. Bell et al. (2011) contend that employers should go beyond the legal requirements in terms of voice; managers should be proactive and implement policies and practices that support equality and that include voice. Bell et al. (2011) argue that policies that are enacted without a legal requirement to do so will be more meaningful to employees and, hence, effective. Such policies will signal the firm's level of commitment to equality to employees. For instance, an obvious expression of commitment to sexual orientation equality is a widely communicated non-discrimination policy. In taking a proactive stance for inclusion, leaders can draw on a rich repertoire of specific voice techniques from the literature to support EO (Bell et al., 2011). As workplaces in the UK do not, legally, have to have specific voice mechanisms in place, this research will examine a wide array of voluntary voice structures that employers may create.

Syed (2014) reports that traditional voice mechanisms, if they are not supported by inclusive policies by managers or employer-promoted LGBT networks, can lead to LGBT workers remaining silent rather than voicing their opinions and grievances. LGBT workers are particularly likely to think that managers will not take their opinions into consideration or that voicing their views is risky if there is a climate of 'heterosexist' normality within organizations; in other words, if a heterosexual orientation is the only one to have (Colgan and McKearney, 2013; Syed, 2014). By extension, workers with disabilities may be more or less likely to express their views depending on the culture of the workplace. As the existing literature does not indicate if direct or indirect voice mechanisms are likely to encourage

workers with a disability to voice their opinions, this research incorporates a wide array of voice mechanisms.

Similarly, traditional voice mechanisms may result in women remaining silent about their situations and about the ideas that they have to increase efficiency in organizations. In many developed economies, women represent at least a half of all employees, yet their roles as senior decision makers in firms is limited (Syed, 2014). Their willingness to voice their opinions also differs to that for men (Harlos, 2010). Women are more likely than men to voice their views to an internal mediator in order to overcome a disadvantageous situation (Harlos, 2010); however, women's willingness to do this is moderated by power relationships. In other words, women are less likely than men to voice their concerns when the person who is potential in the wrong is a supervisor (Harlos, 2010). Unions, as an important collective voice mechanism, could help to alter this situation. However, unions have not been able to draw on women's insights within work to the full extent that is possible (Roberts, 2012). If unions were able to represent the views of women to a greater extent, businesses could benefit (Syed, 2014).

The voice of black and BME workers has also not been heard via unions (Perrett and Lucio Martinez, 2006). In a survey of BME employees in voluntary organisations in the UK, Perrett and Lucio-Martinez (2006) found that many BME workers had never been contacted by their union for advice and that most of them would not go to the union for employment-related advice. Similarly, Holgate et al. (2008) found that unions often ignored or downplayed the concerns and grievances of BME workers. This reinforces the view of unions, from earlier research, as organisations that actively marginalised the views of BME employees (Phizacklea and Miles, 1987).

The research on collective voice, on the one hand, and women and BME workers, on the other, indicates that there is a need to incorporate a range of voice mechanisms into research in order to capture the possible influence that those voice mechanisms afford to different types of workers. If research were to include union voice only, it may implicitly downplay the preferences of women and BME workers. This may lead to unreliable results about the relationship between voice and workplace policies towards women and BME employees.

In their paper, Bell et al. (2011) draw on and extend Dundon et al.'s (2005) voice typology that has four categories. First, voice is an *articulation of individual dissatisfaction* (such as complaints to line managers, grievance procedures, speak-up programmes). Bell et al. (2011) argue that multiple mechanisms should exist for both LGBT employees to raise

complaints about discrimination, harassment, and exclusion. These mechanisms may be real or virtual, anonymous or open. Second, voice can be the *expression of collective organization* (such as union recognition, and collective bargaining). Bell et al. (2011) contend that organizations can legitimate the voice of LGBT employee networks in trade unions, works councils, and other collective institutions. Third, voice can *contribute to management decision making* (such as upward problem-solving groups, quality circles, suggestion programmes, attitude surveys, and self-managed teams); this form of voice is particularly important because management decision making plays a key role in behaviours at work. Managers can clearly articulate that LGBT employees contribute to organizational success, and that ‘heterosexism’ is not tolerated (Waldo, 1999). Fourth, voice as a form of *mutuality* (such as partnership agreements, joint consultative committees, and works councils, which are common in Western Europe) could mean bringing in representatives of LGBT internal and external networks to build effective ties with the organization. Bell et al. (2011) stress that what matters in applying these mechanisms to promote voice is introducing methods that allow workers whose voices have previously not been heard to participate. How voice mechanisms operate within the context of particular organizations is important, therefore. This thesis builds on this research to incorporate different voice forms in a holistic way into the analysis in order to identify possible patterns between forms of voice and EO and DM policies.

However, it should be noted that how operational managers interpret the management of diversity in practice is likely to have an important influence over how DM policies are implemented. Foster and Harris (2005) conducted in-depth interviews with managers, HR specialists and employees in a case study of a long-established major UK retailer. They found that while the business benefits attributed to DM are appealing to employers, the concept of ‘diversity management’ lacks clarity for line managers. Line managers are familiar with the established approach to equality of opportunity; the consistent application of employment procedures designed to provide ‘sameness’ of treatment. In other words, line managers adopt a liberal approach (Jewson and Mason, 1986) to DM and adhere, de facto, to principles that underpin equal opportunities both in terms of what it is and how it should be implemented within the anti-discrimination legal framework. Line managers, familiar with the value of demonstrating a common approach in their decision making as the key means of defence against claims of discrimination, regarded a DM agenda concerned with recognising and responding to individual differences as more likely to lead to feelings of unfairness and claims of unequal treatment.

Three main issues emerge from Foster and Harris's (2005) research. These findings are relevant for the practical application of DM. The findings are: managers can hold different understandings about the meaning of DM. Managers have great concerns about legal compliance and potential litigation resulting from DM. Finally, managers are concerned about the confusion that stems from an agenda that appears to require them to deliver sameness of treatment on the one hand, but to recognise and respond to individual difference, on the other. Line managers may well play the pivotal role in implementing diversity initiatives, but as a category of staff, they are also under particular pressure to interpret and apply the practices associated with managing diversity.

Foster and Harris (2005) found the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of 'managing diversity' and the variable mix of contextual influences meant that for many operational managers managing diversity became whatever was deemed to be the most expedient solution at the time. They found that for line managers the conceptual relationship between diversity and equal opportunities is frequently blurred. In practice, this can result in inconsistencies of treatment, which undermine the very policy initiatives intended to promote diversity and fair treatment. Drawing on Foster and Harris's (2005) work, this thesis does not draw a distinction between EO and DM in the empirical analysis.

Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss the role of the line manager in DM and implementing equality and diversity policy. They discuss how having DM at the heart of the line management role and how it overcomes criticisms that were levelled at traditional EO approaches that were seen as specialist in nature and little to do with core business concerns. However, Kirton and Greene (2016) also recognise the problems of devolving DM to line managers, such as lack of buy-in and the potential for them to be scapegoats for problems associated with the implementation of DM policies. Greene and Kirton (2009) list five areas that can lead to the lack of buy-in from line managers. Kirton and Greene (2016) attempt to unpick the reasons for these problems: (1) Line managers do not clearly understand what concepts of equality and diversity actually mean and how this translates into meaningful roles for them in DM implementation.

A lack of understanding of what it means to take responsibility of DM contributes to difficulties in interpretation of policy and inconsistency of practices, hence, a lack of effective implementation across organisations (Foster and Harris, 2005; Greene and Kirton, 2009). In addition, according to the CIPD (2012: 10) there is a significant lack of understanding around equality and diversity issues and their link to performance. (2) Line managers are not adequately trained for taking on DM responsibilities and (3) line managers are not held

accountable for their own DM practice. Kirton and Green (2016) cite the CIPD's 2012 survey that indicates that a substantial proportion of line managers are confident when discussing equality and diversity and that line managers only received limited support for DM activity and a lack of training that reinforces line managers' lack of understanding and buy-in (Greene and Kirton, 2009). (4) Line managers are not often involved in the development of DM policy. Indeed, a lack of ownership and a feeling that DM is someone else's problem is evident in organisations (Greene and Kirton, 2009; CIPD, 2007). (5) Line managers do not see DM issues as a priority alongside other demands on their time. Foster and Harris (2005) found evidence that line managers saw the implementation of diversity initiatives unattractive. In a US study Schneider and Northcraft (1999) discuss how line managers are reluctant to engage with DM because the costs and disadvantages are immediate and positive benefits take a long time to develop which makes it difficult to see past short-term interests. For these reasons, the distinction between DM and EO is not as great in practice as it is in the theoretical literature. This buttresses the empirical approach taken in this thesis that combines rather than separates the two.

Greene and Kirton (2009) discuss this shift from 'equal opportunities' to DM and its impact on people who 'do' diversity work. Diversity specialists have replaced equality officers and Greene and Kirton (2009) suggest that doing diversity work in the 2000s was a different experience to doing equality work in the 1980s/1990s. Green and Kirton (2009) found the majority of people occupying this post were white women with some BME people involved. They had business and managerial experience or HR expertise, and typically had one or two assistants. DM has greater legitimacy and respectability than 'equal opportunities' with senior managers due to the dominance of the business case argument within the former. This, combined with the changing backgrounds and characteristics of diversity practitioners, means that diversity work usually carries lower costs and potentially offers more opportunities than equality work did. Greene and Kirton (2009) found that despite the business-friendly paradigm of DM, the potential costs historically associated with equality work, including isolation, stress, marginalisation and career jeopardy, remain significant for at least some practitioners. Even champions experienced some stress and frustration in their roles and some felt that being an advocate for diversity could be potentially damaging for mainstream management careers. The implication of this, from an organisational perspective, is that the work carries such potentially high costs suggests that the business-friendly DM may be fictional. Indeed, Greene and Kirton (2009) had difficulty gaining participants from private-sector companies, potentially indicating that DM is often only 'window-dressing'.

Once again, this evidence supports the approach adopted in this thesis to combine rather than separate EO and DM.

The primacy of the business case has also created new opportunities for at least some diversity specialists and champions. The opportunities existed in different combinations and to different extents, but for specialists opportunities included horizontal and vertical career development and the chance to have greater influence and autonomy. Both specialists and champions benefited from the opportunity their roles provided to become more influential within the organisation. For some senior champions, there was the halo effect of being seen as an organisational hero. Several policy implications emanate from the opportunities associated with diversity work. Placing DM centre-stage means diversity specialists enjoy higher status, compared with the generally lower status of equality officers in the 1980s. Senior diversity specialists seemed protected against many potential costs experience by people doing the same kind of work at a lower level. Another positive consequence is that they had credibility and authority in the organisation and they gained greater respectability and legitimacy allowing mainstream managers to champion diversity. Most of the specialists, and all of the champions, indicated that they had senior management support and most drew support from diversity and equality structures within their organisations. All of these effects are positive for the organisation and suggest that diversity champions may gain the consent and commitment of line managers. This thesis recognises that the growing influence of diversity specialists may signal the growing adoption of DM policies within firms compared to equal opportunities. However, overall, the evidence suggests that distinctions between DM and EO are not that great in practice. This thesis does not, therefore, differentiate between the two in the empirical analysis.

There is a further reason for not differentiating between DM and EO in the empirical analysis. Some HR managers may present some of their work as DM rather than as the provision of EO (Greene and Kirton, 2009). The reasons for this are twofold. First, DM is likely to be seen as pro-business as it rests on the argument that managing a diverse workforce effectively has benefits for the business. Second and consequently, DM is likely to have a positive image amongst senior managers, whereas as equal opportunities is likely to have negative connotations for senior managers (Greene and Kirton, 2009). HR managers may present themselves as managers of diversity rather than as promoters of equal opportunities in order to support and increase their positions within companies, as the former has greater respect and legitimacy within firms than the later (Greene and Kirton, 2009). Such behaviour

makes the distinction between DM and EO less clear in practice than it is in theory, supporting the analytical approach adopted within this thesis.

In a qualitative case study, Greene and Kirton (2011) explore what happened in one public service organisation to organisational DM policies when managers had to reduce workforce numbers significantly. The case study organisation provides an example of how the three mutually supporting equality strategies outlined by Dickens (1999) (business case, legal regulation and social (joint) regulation) interact with, and mediate, each other so that together they potentially provide a much stronger foundation for the DM agenda within the context of a downsizing process. Union representatives were positive about the level of involvement they had in the DM policy arena and this was confirmed by post-restructuring documents also that demonstrate the continued involvement of unions and the employee groups and some evidence of the impact they had in terms of contributing to fairer sets of criteria in the downsizing exercise. However, there was a representation gap, alluded to by non-managerial employees. Whilst the post-restructuring demographic data at the organisation indicates that there had been no adverse changes in overall levels of BME, women or disabled staff (in fact ratios had increased from 2006), the reliability and scope of these monitoring data (particularly on ethnicity) were acknowledged as weak in some areas to begin with. The cuts in absolute numbers of staff may take years to redress, may have diversity implications, and will require commitment and resourcing to ensure that progression and promotion will continue in the future. Interviews with line managers indicated that the restructuring exercise could potentially have meant that diversity issues were pushed even further down their list of priorities. Certainly, this was the fear of the union representatives and the majority of the non-management employees at the time that matches with Dickens's (1999) view of the business case being an insecure foundation for equality action. The context of individual organizations will, therefore, have an important influence on outcomes associated with DM. This thesis examines general patterns between organizational characteristics, forms of voice, and workplace outcomes in order, in part, to identify groups of companies that raise interesting empirical and theoretical issues that future research can explore.

Greene (2015) placed diversity concerns at the forefront of an analysis of employee voice and contends that increasing levels of diversity within the contemporary workforce are not reflected in the mainstream voice literature which tends to assume that employees are homogeneous (Shapiro 2000; Bell et al. 2011; Syed 2014). Building on this critique of the extant literature, Greene (2015) examines the what, who, and how of conventional employee voice mechanisms within the mainstream Anglo-American industrial relations literature. In

looking at the ‘what’, Greene (2015: 73) observes that WERS 2011 data indicates that the most common issues raised by union and non-union employee representatives are discipline and grievances, health and safety, and rates of pay. Moreover, there does not appear to be any significant increase in the incidence of diversity-related issues, despite the fact that WERS 2011 also indicates an increase in the status of formal EO/DM policies within workplaces. Further observations of the WERS 2011 data referred to by Greene (2015) are that it indicates a decline in the extent to which employees in the UK feel they can have an influence over decision-making. Evidence from the Employee Outlook Report (CIPD 2013), which shows a serious deterioration in employee satisfaction regarding their ability to feed views upwards, supports this finding. This thesis complements this research by examining the links between a broad array of voice mechanisms, including employee representatives and direct voice measures, and EO and DM policies. Incorporating a multitude of voice mechanisms into the research also enables this study to examine how different mechanisms might influence policies to varying degrees.

The characteristics of ‘who’ is a typical trade union member have clearly changed over time. Greene (2015) points out that in the UK in the 1970s, trade union membership was at its peak and typical trade union members were male, full-time, manual workers in the production sector. Today, however, the typical trade union member is slightly more likely to be female than male, a non-manual rather than manual worker, to work in the service rather than in the manufacturing sector, and to be a highly qualified worker in the public sector (Kirton and Greene 2010). The relevance of ‘who’ is a union member has an effect on what topics union representatives are likely to try to place on the agenda within workplaces. Who stands as a representative is also important. Having proportional representation of different diversity strands with regard to the bargaining unit/organizational grouping/workforce population is important (Greene, 2010), as it may help to put the voices of those who are not usually heard forward. This argument also suggests that research, as this thesis does, should incorporate other forms of voice that may enable a range of voices to be heard.

Finally, Greene (2015) highlighted ‘how’ people participate as being important within the voice mechanism. The process of participation needs to be inclusive. The time, place, and nature of conventional voice mechanisms favour the standard, archetypical worker. To be more inclusive and to incorporate a diverse group of representatives, it is important to think about the location and nature of participation. For example, can some virtual interactions using social technology be utilized rather than relying on meetings that require a physical presence? Thought should be given to ensuring that meetings and interactions take place at

locations and times that are as inclusive as they can be with regard to diversity characteristics, including around non-standard hours of work (Greene, 2015). Greene (2015) highlights the need for much future work to be done in terms of the importance of research on employee voice that explicitly includes diversity concerns.

In a study of 14 organisations across eight European Union Members States, Shapiro (2000) found that, despite the rhetoric highlighting the importance of employee involvement, several company quality and improvement programmes had failed or had not reached their full potential. This, Shapiro (2000) speculates, may be due, in part, to problems in gaining and sustaining employee involvement. Shapiro (2000) discusses how recent literature has begun to link these problems with the tendency for organisations to value, train or communicate with some groups of employees more than others and the failure to recognise the various factors that will motivate diverse employees to become involved. For example, Shapiro (2000) points out that part-time workers, administrative or shift staff often receive less training and communication on company performance levels than full-time permanent, professional or senior staff.

Shapiro (2000) argues that high and sustainable levels of employee involvement depend on creating an organisational environment that values, develops and motivates all employees. Thus, valuing, developing and motivating different individuals or groups of staff to varying degrees appears in contradiction to, and may lead to difficulties in achieving, involvement objectives. Shapiro (2000) refers to such difficulties as leaving an ‘involvement gap’. Shapiro (2000) found that despite the increased exposure of employee diversity that employee involvement programmes can lead to, firms have been slow to develop the skills and capabilities to manage diversity in a positive way, which supports the achievement of employee involvement and improvement objectives. In order to positively manage diversity and to ensure all employees are able to use their full skills and abilities, Shapiro (2000) argues that a change in the approach of management needs to occur, so that the current trend is reversed and employees know that they can and should bring their outside skills and identities into the workplace. Different voice mechanisms may enable that to take place to different degrees.

Although in the past it was not always the case, the contemporary union policy position is for unions to support advocating and bargain for equality of marginalised groups (Kirton and Greene, 2016). The TUC recommends a model equality clause to its affiliates which over half have adopted. The model advocates the promotion of equality for all (Kirton and Greene, 2016). The way the TUC (2011) advocate this should be achieved is:

- a. through:
 - i. collective bargaining, publicity material and campaigning, representation, union organisation and structures, education and training, organising and recruitment, the provision of all other services and benefits and all other activities;
 - ii. the union's own employment practices.
- b. To oppose actively all forms of harassment, prejudice and unfair discrimination whether on the grounds of sex, race, ethnic or national origin, religion, colour, class, caring responsibility, marital status, sexuality, disability, age, or other status on personal characteristics.

(TUC, 2011) (cited in Kirton and Greene 2016)

The TUC's model highlights, amongst other characteristics, sex, ethnic or national origin, and disability, these are the characteristics used to assess direct and indirect discrimination of various kinds in this research. This model suggests that indirect voice through unions is influential. This thesis will examine this possibility. Kirton and Greene (2016) also highlight that fact that special union equality representatives are receiving more attention as a means for unions to influence positively employer DM and EO policies as well as assisting members who experience discrimination. Union voice should have an impact on EO and DM policies within workplaces and establishment outcomes. This research will also examine this possibility.

Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss how the diversity paradigm poses theoretical challenges for unions, which could result in there being less room for union involvement in equality and diversity policy making. The key features which threaten to marginalise unions and their concern from the processes and content of organisational EO and DM policies are the business case, the focus on the individual and the positioning that makes diversity a top-down managerial activity. As far as the business case is concerned, unions are suspicious and sometimes hostile towards it. However, some union officers were found to believe it was possible to still push 'old' equality issues from within the diversity paradigm (Greene and Kirton, 2009; Kirton and Greene, 2006). Kirton and Greene (2016) point out that discrimination and harassment have a clear, detrimental impact on business. The focus on the individual is also a problem for unions who favour collective bargaining and standardised treatment of employees through common terms and condition. Issues, such as low pay and the position in the organisation of women and BME groups, is a long-standing concern for unions

who feel these issues can be solved through EO rather than DM (Kirton and Greene, 2016). If unions voice these concerns, union presence will lead workplaces to adopt EO and DM policies to a greater degree than would be the case in the absence of unions. This research examines this possibility.

2.8 Chapter Conclusion

This literature review began by introducing the voice framework by firstly discussing Hirschman's framework, the exchange of information and voice and power and the concept of voice. The concept of voice and the forms that employee voice can take were then discussed, followed by a review of the empirical studies on different forms of voice and various performance measures. It then went on to set out an analytical framework that distinguishes between workplaces that have different voice mechanisms within them to enable the thesis to adopt a nuanced approach to the study of the links between voice and EO and DM policies. There is then a discussion on EO and DM policies and the similarities and differences between the two. The law, the Equal Opportunities Act 2010, that governs such policies is then discussed along with its potential benefits and weaknesses. The chapter then discussed the different approaches to EO and DM. The liberal approach focuses on the individual and sees equality existing when all individuals are enabled freely and equally to compete for social rewards (Jewson and Mason, 1986: 307). This approach sees sex equality being achieved when policies and procedures are identical for men and women. This approach sees 'sameness' as being the correct approach; the idea that individuals have the right to be treated the same as another person of a different sex in the same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 1996). The chapter then discussed the alternative to the liberal approach, the radical approach. In order to reduce inequalities, this approach involves recognising and building on differences between people, consequently, certain groups should be treated differently. The radical approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for EO, but also the need for equality of outcome.

The theoretical base upon which to build policy that alleviates inequality and unfair discrimination was then discussed: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of the organisation (the business case). The chapter examined the different arguments that have been put forward in the existing literature to support these two contrasting ways of approaching fairness for employees.

The discussion of the theoretical links between EO and DM policies and workplace performance was followed by a review of the empirical literature on EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. The empirical literature on DM policies and workplace performance was reviewed. Finally, the chapter provided a review of the empirical studies on the links between voice and DM.

This chapter has demonstrated that there is a further need to examine the links between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM and workplace outcomes, on the other. Although much of the current research on voice concentrates on direct or indirect voice, this chapter, building on existing theoretical and empirical work, has shown that voice mechanisms should be viewed holistically and a range of them should be incorporated into the analysis (Bell *et al.*, 2011; Greene, 2015; Holgate *et al.*, 2008; Syed, 2014; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

This thesis incorporates four main types of voice workplace – minimal voice, dual voice, direct voice and indirect voice. It also disaggregates two of these four main types of voice workplace. Within the minimal voice category, this thesis distinguishes between the ‘bleak house’ approach and the ‘limited approach’ and within the dual voice category, this research differentiates between the ‘co-existence approach’ and the ‘partnership approach’ (see chapter 3, for how these have been operationalised). This enables this thesis to take a fine grained analytical approach of the links between voice and EO and DM policies, as well as the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes within the various types of voice. This is important as existing theoretical and empirical work suggests that voice may influence outcomes in workplaces with relatively low levels of direct voice compared to those with no (or next to no) direct voice mechanisms (Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Mowbray *et al.*, 2015; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Similarly, how direct and indirect voice mechanisms are combined (either as substitutes or complements) can shape workplace outcomes (Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Mowbray *et al.*, 2015; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

The first stage of the analysis in this thesis examines the links between voice and EO and DM; the second stage of the analysis assesses the associations between the EO and DM policies and absenteeism and quits. By taking this approach, this thesis is able to draw on the largest data set of UK establishments and enables this thesis to build on recent developments in the literature that examine these links. This approach also enables this research to examine the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes within different types of voice workplace. The existing literature has not explored the potential for voice mechanisms to moderate these links between policies and outcomes. This research could, therefore, help to

specify the conditions under which EO and DM policies are linked to lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates and, thereby, potentially help to explain why different studies have revealed contrasting links between these policies and workplace outcomes (Armstrong *et al.*, 2010; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Riley *et al.*, 2008; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007). The data and research methods employed in this thesis will now be outlined.

Chapter 3 - Data and Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the data that the thesis draws on, how the various variables have been operationalised and how the data has been analysed. It draws on the WERS 2011 management survey; the series of WERS surveys represent the largest, most comprehensive studies of workplaces in the UK (Timming, 2009; Whitfield and Hoque, 2008; Whitfield and Huxley, 2007). In addition to questions about establishment characteristics, the survey also covers various aspects of EO and DM policies that are detailed below, making it a highly appropriate dataset to draw on for the purposes of this thesis. The WERS dataset, therefore, represents the largest, representative sample for UK establishments. It covers a range of issues that are pertinent to this thesis. It enables different measures of voice, establishment characteristics, and EO/DM policies to be combined within the same analysis. Self-collected data would not be as comprehensive or result in as large a sample as the WERS dataset. As the WERS survey covers a range of topics, common method bias is unlikely to arise, as the independent and dependent variables are separated in the questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Avoiding such a bias is important in research in which respondents may wish to appear consistent in their behaviour on sensitive issues, such as EO and DM (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964; Johns, 1994).

The analysis of the data is performed in two stages. The first stage covers the links between the various forms of voice and EO and DM policies; the second, examines the associations, if any, between the presence of EO and DM policies and two establishment outcomes, absenteeism and quits, amongst the four distinct voice categories. In the first part of the analysis, all of the questions in the survey about EO and DM policies seek to find out if a particular policy, say, monitoring recruitment and selection for a gender bias, is present or absent; therefore, this thesis uses logistic regressions to analyse the data. In the second stage of the analysis, absenteeism and quits have been dichotomised in order to run single regressions of each of the EO/DM policies to avoid problems associated with multicollinearity. The absenteeism levels and quits rates in the sample are not normally distributed, making the use of ordinary least squares regressions problematic. Logistic regressions do not assume a normal distribution.

3.2 The Data: Workplace Employment Relations Study 2011

The Workplace Employment Relations Study 2011 (WERS 2011) relies on data from a survey carried out at the workplace level. The most senior manager who was responsible for employment relations and personnel issues provided the responses in a face-to-face meeting to the survey questions. The interviews for WERS 2011 occurred between March 2011 and June 2012. In total, there were 2,680 interviews, lasting on average 90 minutes (van Wanrooy *et al.*, 2013). Prior to the meeting, the manager completed a questionnaire on the basic characteristics of the workplace's workforce (HM Government, 2013). Workplaces with four or fewer employees were excluded from the sampling frame. Overall, the sample for the WERS 2011 survey is representative of all British establishments with five or more employees, excluding the agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining and quarrying industries. The WERS 2011 population represents 35 per cent of all establishments and 90 per cent of all employees (van Wanrooy *et al.*, 2013).

3.2.1 The Use of WERS 2011 in this Thesis

This thesis includes only those workplaces that answered all of the relevant questions and that have 10 or more employees, as small workplaces are unlikely to have union representation or joint consultative committees. This reduces the sample a little to around 1946 for the regressions that involve the 'full sample'. 'Reduced samples' are used to examine, within dual voice systems and minimalist voice systems, the associations between EO and DM, and higher compared to lower levels of voice.

This thesis relies only on the management questionnaire, to have as large a sample as possible and to identify any associations between voice and EO and DM policies that can be examined in greater detail in future research. By relying solely on managers' responses, a unitaristic bias, discussed in more detail in the conclusion, could enter into the analysis, raising possible questions about the validity of the research. For instance, managers may say a particular policy exists for legitimacy reasons in face-to-face meetings with researchers even when it does not. Lower-level workers may have a different opinion of whether or not a particular policy exists. In addition, how the policy is implemented may also vary significantly, and perspectives may vary between managers and employees. The concept of 'validity' reflects the notion that a variable (or a set of variables) actually measures what it is supposed to be measuring (Bryman and Bell, 2008: 151; see also Timming, 2009 for a

discussion of some of the WERS data, notably the employee questionnaire). The use of managers' responses could result in the research not really capturing the actual EO and DM situation in the establishment. However, the thesis relies on the management survey in order to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, thereby, contribute to the literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large ones (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). There are 1946 workplaces in the complete sample used in this thesis. If I had used either the employee representative or the employee survey, the sample size would be much lower. Those surveys pose a different set of questions that do not address the specifics of EO and DM policies, making the assessment of the links between voice, EO and DM, and workplace outcomes and the use of regression analysis, impossible.

This thesis draws on the management survey and uses it for cross-sectional purposes, enabling this research to explore the relationships between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace outcomes amongst a large data set. Although it would be possible to use part of the WERS dataset as panel data – in which the same workplaces are asked the same questions over a number of years – this was not feasible for two reasons. Firstly, if the WERS data were used as panel data, the sample size would decrease considerably as not all establishments are retained in the survey from one year to the next. Indeed, only a small percentage of the workplaces remain in the survey over two or more iterations. This would potentially bias the results and mean that the results for the sample could not be generalised to the wider population (Field, 2009). Secondly, the number of workplaces that either start or stop any particular EO or DM policy is very small. Consequently, the results of any analysis that examines the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes and that uses WERS as a panel data would be driven by this small number of establishments, which may or may not be representative of the broader population of workplaces (Field, 2009). Similarly, the number of workplaces that change their voice mechanisms over time is also very small, potentially leading to biased results.

The questions relating to EO and DM policy are asked in an 'active' way. In other words, questions are posed that ask about the activities that are carried out within the workplace. They ask if, say, recruitment is monitored for gender discrimination. Questions do not, for example, focus on the presence or absence of a policy to review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination, but instead ask 'Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination', enhancing the validity of the research. In other words, the survey does not ask 'do you have a policy to review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination'. Such policies may exist, but may not be enforced. Conversely, some

workplaces may review their promotion procedures even though a formal policy to do so does not exist.

3.3 Bias

The use of a single respondent to all of the questions used to operationalise key concepts in this research also raises the potential of common method bias (Gerhart, 2007; Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, as the WERS questionnaire is very lengthy – it runs to 111 pages – the likelihood that managers will make connections between the questions and the objectives of this study are unlikely (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition, the objective of this study was not known to the respondents, and the survey focuses on a broad range of issue beyond EO and DM policies, absenteeism and quit rates. It is, therefore, unlikely that respondents may wish to portray their establishment as having EO and DM policies that reduce absenteeism and quits, leading to common method bias.

3.4 Data Set

The following section will outline the details of all of the variables used.

3.4.1 The Dependent Variables

This thesis analyses the data in two stages. The first stage examines the links, if any, between the presence of different voice mechanisms and the likelihood of the establishment having a range of EO and DM policies. A range of policies are used for two main reasons. Firstly, it is likely that many establishments have a general or broad formal written policy on EO and DM. This, as detailed below, can make analysis difficult if there is no (or very little) variation in the outcome variable. Secondly, the presence of a general policy may not signify an adherence in many areas to the principles of equal opportunities (Hoque and Noon, 1999). Therefore, it is necessary to dig a little deeper to assess the presence of policies that affect particular groups of employees (female workers, disabled people, and those from BME groups) in specific areas (recruitment, promotion, and remuneration) (Hoque and Noon, 1999). The details of these policies and their operationalisation are provided below. In the second stage of the analysis, this thesis assesses the associations, if any, between the presence of the EO and DM policies and 1) absenteeism and 2) quit rates (voluntary labour turnover).

Once again, the justification and operationalisation of these variables are provided below. EO and DM policies, therefore, act as the outcome variables in the first stage of the analysis, and as independent variables in the second stage.

3.4.1.1 Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: Operationalisation

As outlined above, in order to avoid the possibility of ‘empty shell’ EO and DM policies (Hoque and Noon, 1999, 2004; Liff and Dale, 1994; Young, 1987), this research draws on a range of EO and DM policies covered in the WERS survey. It, therefore, goes beyond merely examining a broad policy that does not relate to specific groups or operational activities to assess more fine grained areas. There are a number of questions in the WERS data that relate to EO and DM policies. Responses are, in essence, dichotomous. Respondents can also answer ‘do not know’ or refuse to answer. When respondents answered in this way, the workplace was excluded from the analysis. The following questions are the ones that this research draws on in its analysis of EO and DM policies. The ‘overarching’ question on EO and DM within the WERS data set is:

Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity?

As noted above, it is likely that nearly all workplaces have a broad policy on EO and DM; examining differences between workplaces on this policy is unlikely, therefore, to reveal important distinctions between establishments (please note EO and DM policies are examined together, as the WERS dataset puts them together and does not differentiate between them). To examine in more depth the differences between workplaces on EO and DM, this thesis also includes more precise questions. The included questions focus on different types of employees who are covered by the policy (women, BME, disabled people) and they address particular operational areas (recruitment and selection, promotions, relative pay rates). The included questions are also, therefore, used to analyse the links between voice and EO and DM. The thesis examines the three groups outlined above (women, BME, disabled people) in relation to all of the following questions:

1. Do you monitor recruitment and selection by any of the characteristics on this card?
2. Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination by any of these characteristics?
3. Do you monitor promotions by any of these characteristics?
4. Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by any of these characteristics?
5. Do you review relative pay rates by any of these characteristics?

This thesis focuses on three groups - women, BME, disabled people. In the WERS data set, the following terminology is used ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘disability’. These represent very important groups who may be adversely affected by policies within workplaces. The policy areas chosen are also ones that are likely to be prominent potential areas for (would-be) employees. Women, BME and disabled people can face significant discrimination – both direct and indirect – in gaining employment (e.g. Dietz, 2010; Fevre *et al.*, 2013) and in being promoted (e.g. Estevez-Abe, 2005; Heilman, 2012). Substantial pay differences exist between men and women (Chevalier, 2007; Lips, 2013; Manning and Saidi, 2010). That is not to say that other groups are not at a disadvantage. Although the WERS survey lists a number of other ‘characteristics’ that could lead to discrimination, such as religion and belief, age, sexual orientation, the three chosen areas represent the ones most widely discussed in the EO and DM literature (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Jones, 2016; Kirton and Greene, 2005, 2010; Kirton *et al.*, 2007; Riley *et al.*, 2008; cf. Kirton and Greene, 2015).

It is important to note that this set of dependent variables become the independent variables in the second stage of the analysis, as outlined above.

3.4.2 The Independent Variables

The independent variables in the first stage of the analysis are the four voice variables.

3.4.2.1 Voice Variables: Classification and Operationalisation

In order to classify the establishments analysed here into one of the four categories specified in chapter 2, the research had to draw on various responses to questions in the

WERS survey. The details of the questions that were used and how, specifically, the workplaces were categorised is provided below.

I Indirect Voice

As discussed in chapter 2, this study defines collective voice as ‘at least one union recognised for negotiating pay and conditions’ and/or the presence of both a joint consultative committee and a non-union employee representations (see also Benson 2000; Guest and Conway, 1999; Gunnigle *et al.*, 1998). The question on unions is asked, as the EO/DM questions are - in an ‘active’ way. In other words, the questionnaire does not ask if unions are present, but asks if unions are ‘recognised for negotiating pay and conditions’. This study does not consider the presence of JCCs alone to be sufficient for inclusion under the ‘collective voice’ label, as discussed above. They are a comparatively weak form of voice. In addition, they are typically a management-initiated mechanism that frequently lack a clear remit and do not participate in discussions over pay and conditions.

II Direct Voice

This study operationalised direct voice in the following way. Drawing on insights from Edwards and Wright (2001), this research combines a number of individual means of workplace communication to form a direct voice index (see also Ramsay *et al.*, 2000; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). This then determines whether establishments have or do not have ‘direct voice’. The individual means of communication cover ‘information-sharing schemes’, ‘consultation’ and ‘direct participation’. As there is no consensus in the literature on what does and what does not constitute direct voice, this thesis draws on relevant practices that associated studies include (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Gill and Krieger, 2000; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). The questions on wider consultations measures are, as the union representation and EO/DM questions are, posed in an ‘active’ way. The relevant questions in the WERS survey are outlined below.

Information sharing includes the use of notice board, the management chain, newsletters, emails and the intranet to convey information to employees within a workplace. The relevant question from the WERS survey reads:

Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management *communicates* or *consults* with employees at this workplace?

- Notice boards
- Systematic use of management chain/cascading of information
- Regular newsletters distributed to all employees
- Regular use of email to all employees
- Information posted on company intranet, accessible to all employees
- Other ways of communicating (please specify)
- *None of these, no other ways*

Direct consultation covers attitude surveys, suggestion schemes and meetings with the workforce. The relevant questions from the WERS survey read:

Have you or a third party conducted a formal survey of your employees' views or opinions during the past two years? 1) Yes 2) No

Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management *communicates* or *consults* with employees at this workplace?

- Suggestion schemes

Do you have meetings between senior managers and the **whole** workforce (either altogether or group by group)? 1) Yes 2) No

Direct participation encompasses partly autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem-solving groups. The relevant questions from the WERS survey read:

Does the following statement apply to the way that team working operates among [the largest occupational group] at this workplace: teams are given responsibility for specific products or services? 1) Yes 2) No

Do you have groups of non-managerial employees at this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? They are sometimes known as problem-solving groups or continuous improvement groups. 1) Yes 2) No

The practices vary in terms of the potential that employees can put their ideas forward (Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). Indeed, more generally, the ability of workers to communicate with employers increases as the mechanisms change from information exchange through consultation to participation (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). To capture the varying power of these direct voice mechanisms, this thesis uses a composite index. It was calculated as follows. Each participation practice received a score of 5; a consultation practice, a score of 2; an information practice, a score of 1. Consequently, if a workplace has all these direct voice measures in place, it would score 21. In order to differentiate between those workplaces that have direct voice and those that do not, this research uses the arithmetic mean. Those workplaces with an above-average score have direct voice; those with a below-average score do not and are, therefore, considered to be minimal voice workplaces (see section 3.4.1.4 below).

On the basis of this operationalisation, establishments were divided into four voice categories. The theoretical justification for these categories is provided in chapter 2. This typology allows this study to adopt a more nuanced approach compared to some other studies that tend to focus either on just unions (e.g. Freeman and Medoff, 1984) or direct voice alone (e.g. MacDuffie, 1995).

III Dual Voice

As outlined in chapter 2, this research also differentiates within those four categories. Within the dual voice category, a distinction is made between those workplaces that have a ‘partnership approach’. There is no commonly agreed operationalisation of this term in the literature. In contrast to Tüselmann *et al.*’s (2015) distinction that is based on systematic involvement of labour representatives in the introduction and operation of direct employee involvement schemes, this study distinguishes between those workplaces with a favourable attitude towards unions and those that do not. The research operationalises this distinction based on management’s responses to the following statement in the WERS survey:

‘unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’.

Those ‘dual voice’ establishments in which managers either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ were classified for the purposes of this research as having a partnership. Those managers in ‘dual voice’ workplaces in which managers ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ were considered to have a ‘co-existence’ approach.

IV Minimal Voice

As discussed in the direct voice section above, those workplaces with an above-average score on the composite index have direct voice; those with a below-average score do not and are, therefore, considered to be minimal voice workplaces. The minimal voice category, is divided up into sub-categories – ‘limited approach’ and ‘bleak house’. For a workplace within the minimal voice category to have a ‘limited approach’, the mean for those workplaces in this category, was calculated and all those workplaces with an above mean score were put into the ‘limited approach’ category and those with a below mean score were put into the ‘bleak house’ category.

3.4.3 Control Variables

Establishment performance is likely to be influenced by a number of different factors. Several control variables were used in the analysis to capture as many of these factors as possible. The research drew on existing research to select the control variables, including firm size; the percentage of the workforce that was female, had a disability, and that came from an ethnic community; and whether the establishment was in the public or private sector (for instance, Addison and Belfield, 2001; Addison *et al.*, 2003; Guest *et al.*, 2003; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015). The operationalisation of all of the control variables is provided in Table 3.1.

Although some of the control variables could be construed as voice, they are not defined in this thesis as voice, as voice typically (but not always) involves communication between managers and employees that focuses on more strategic and company-wide operational issues than it does on matters that are directly or narrowly related to how employees perform their specific tasks (Addison, 2005; Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Marchington, 2015; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2015; cf. Dundon *et al.*, 2004). This thesis does not, therefore, include the following variables as facets of employee voice: the extent to which workers have

discretion in their work, the extent to which workers have control over the pace of their work, and the extent to which workers are involved in deciding how their work is organised. These variables relate to the specific jobs that employees carry out rather than either the wider strategic activities or the general policies of the workplace.

Table 3.1 Operationalisation of the Control Variables

Variable Description	Operationalisation
Total number of employees	The natural log of the answer to the following question: ‘Currently how many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’
Percentage of the total workplace workforce who are women	Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following two questions: ‘How many male and female employees are in each of the following occupational groups?’ and ‘Currently how many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’
Percentage of the total workplace workforce who have a disability	Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following two questions: ‘Enter estimated percentage of employees who have a long-term disability that affects the amount or type of work they can do?’ [A 'long-term disability' is an illness, health problem or disability that can be expected to last for more than one year]. (WERS2011: question ZDISAB) and ‘Currently how many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’
Percentage of the total workplace workforce who are from an ethnic minority	Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following two questions: ‘Enter estimated percentage of employees who are from a non-white ethnic group’ and ‘Currently how many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’
Private sector workplace	Dummy variable based on responses to the question ‘How would you describe the formal status of this workplace (or the organisation of which it is a part)?’ Workplaces coded 1 if ‘Public Limited Company (PLC)’, ‘private limited company’, ‘company limited by guarantee’, ‘partnership (including Limited Liability Partnership) / Self-proprietorship’ and coded 0 if ‘Trust / Charity’, ‘body established by Royal Charter’, ‘Co-operative / Mutual / Friendly society’, ‘Government-owned limited company / Nationalised industry / Trading Public Corporation’, ‘Public service agency’, ‘Other non-trading public corporation’, ‘Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisation (QUANGO)’, and ‘Local/Central Government (inc. NHS and Local Education Authorities)’.
Do workers have variety in their work? (Dichotomous)	Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have variety in their work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a lot' or 'some', and coded 0 if response was 'little' or 'none'.
Do workers have discretion in their work? (Dichotomous)	Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have discretion over how they do their work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a lot' or 'some', and coded 0 if response was 'little' or 'none'.
Do workers have control over the pace of their work? (Dichotomous)	Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have control over the pace at which they work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a lot' or 'some', and coded 0 if response was 'little' or 'none'.

<p>Are workers involved in deciding how work is organised? (Dichotomous)</p>	<p>Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have involvement in decisions over how their work is organised?’; coded 1 if respondent answered ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, and coded 0 if response was ‘little’ or ‘none’.</p>
<p>Percentage of the workplace’s workforce that is highly skilled</p>	<p>Percentage of total workforce who are employees in the following three categories: ‘managers and senior officials’, ‘professional occupations’, and ‘associate professional and technical occupations’. The other categories of worker in the WERS survey are: ‘administrative and secretarial occupations’, ‘skilled trades occupations’, ‘caring, leisure and other personal service occupations’, ‘sales and customer service occupations’, ‘process, plant and machine operatives and drivers’, and ‘routine occupations’.</p>

This research included the size of the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, to reflect the likelihood that larger workplaces will have more formal HR policies in place, including those on EO and DM (Huselid, 1995; Datta *et al.*, 2005; Guthrie *et al.*, 2009). The presence of EO and DM policies is also likely to be linked to the percentage of the workforce that is female, are disabled, or comes from BME groups. The research, therefore, included these as controls in the analysis. Public-sector organisations have a greater tendency to implement EO and DM policies than private-sector ones, leading to the inclusion of a dummy variable in the regressions to capture this. Establishment strategy and the value of different groups of workers can be expected to lead to variation in HRM policies (Lepak and Snell, 1999). The research focuses on the largest occupational group within the establishment; and does not, therefore, examine the differences in HRM policies for various employee groups within the workplace. The research captures the extent to which strategy is likely to influence the presence of EO and DM policies, using several variables. In broad terms, the variables capture how much the workplace is dependent upon highly skilled employees to achieve its objectives. All of the questions relating to the workplace's strategy refer to the largest occupational group within the establishment, reflecting the main activities carried out in the unit.

More specifically, the WERS 2011 survey asks questions on how much variety, discretion, control and work design that the employees in the largest occupational group have. The variety question is: 'to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have variety in their work?' The responses have been dichotomised. If the respondent answered 'a lot' or 'some', it was coded 1; if respondent answered 'little' or 'none', it was coded 0. Workers who have some discretion over their work are more likely to be highly skilled; consequently, such workers are more likely to be difficult to replace. Hence, the workplace is likely to offer more extensive EO and DM policies to both recruit and retain such workers.

The thesis also draws on the following question: 'to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have discretion over how they do their work?' Responses were coded 1, if the respondent answered 'a lot' or 'some', and were coded 0, if the respondent answered a 'little' or 'none'. Once again, workers with relatively high levels of discretion can be expected to use their judgement by drawing on tacit knowledge or experience-based skills. This implies that the workplace will see it as important to recruit and retain such workers. If workers do not use discretion, it suggests that they have skills that can be learnt relatively easily or do not face much variation in their work.

Consequently, those workplaces that rely on workers to exercise discretion can be expected to implement extensive EO and DM policies to aid retention and to bolster employee morale compared to those establishments in which workers have little or no discretion.

The thesis draws on the following questions to form another control variable ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have control over the pace at which they work?’ The managers’ responses were coded 1, if the answer was ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, and coded 0, if response was ‘little’ or ‘none’. Once again, workers who have no control over the pace at which they work are likely to be performing relatively repetitive tasks that require more limited skills than those workers who have more control over the pace at which they work. The latter can therefore be expected to be more difficult to replace. Workplaces can, as a result, be expected to implement more extensive EO and DM policies in order to maintain employee satisfaction and to reduce absenteeism and quit rates.

A yet further control variable relating to the workplace’s strategy was based on the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have involvement in decisions over how their work is organised?’ Those workers who are involved in how work is organised can be expected to have high skills than those who do not. Consequently, the workplace is more likely to implement extensive EO and DM policies in an attempt to maintain employee morale and to reduce labour turnover. Alternatively, the question could also indicate that workplace managers think that it is important to treat workers fairly and to give them some say over work design. Either way, a variable should be included in the analysis as the responses are likely to be positively associated with the use of EO and DM policies within the workplace.

The final control variable that relates to the workplace’s strategy is the total number of highly skilled employees within the workplace. The previous questions that have been used to capture the establishment’s strategy all relate to the largest occupational group. This group is likely to provide a powerful indication of the primary set of activities that the workplace carries out. It was, therefore, important to use questions relating to the largest occupational group. However, the focus on this group may neglect other important activities that are carried out in the workplace by other groups of workplaces. There are no questions on worker discretion etc. for those employees outside the largest occupational group. In order to have an indication of broader activities within the workplace, a proxy based on the total percentage of high skilled workers is used. ‘High skilled workers’ are defined in this thesis as those that fall into the following three WERS categories: ‘managers and senior officials’, ‘professional

occupations', and 'associate professional and technical occupations'. Consequently, those workers within the following categories are not classed as highly skilled: 'skilled trades occupations', 'caring, leisure and other personal service occupations', 'sales and customer service occupations', 'process, plant and machine operatives and drivers', and 'routine occupations'. In reality, of course, some employees in these latter categories will be highly skilled, have tacit knowledge, and learn through workplace experience. They, too, will, therefore, be difficult to recruit and retain. However, in general, it can be expected that employees in the former categories will be more highly skilled than those in the latter ones, increasing the likelihood that employers will implement comprehensive EO and DM policies (in an effort) to reduce absenteeism and quit rates.

3.4.4 Dependent Variables, Second Stage of Analysis: Absenteeism and Labour Turnover Quits

In the second stage of the analysis, this thesis examines the associations between EO and DM policies and two measures of establishment performance. Those two measures are absenteeism and labour turnover (or quits). The selection of these outcomes is a response to concerns expressed about the use of financial measures to capture establishment performance (Guest, 2011; Huselid, 1995; Richard and Johnson, 2001). Using such data also has benefits compared to the use of 'objective' financial measures (Machin and Stewart, 1996; Robinson and Pearce, 1988). For example, these measures relate more closely to HR practices than more 'distal' outcomes, such as profits, that can be affected by a range of factors that are not related to either HRM policies or EO or DM measures, including the establishments' wider organisational context (Godard, 2004). Second, within both the HRM and industrial relations literatures, there is a concern to place worker-related outcomes, such as absenteeism and quits, centre stage (Addison and Belman, 2004; Arthur, 1994; Grund and Schmitt, 2013; Guest and Hoque, 1994; Guest, 2011; Guthrie, 2001; Hoque, 1999; Pfeifer, 2011; Ramsay *et al.*, 2000; cf. Delery and Doty, 1996; Guest *et al.*, 2003; Huselid, 1995; Wright *et al.*, 1999). Finally, workplace profitability may improve when certain HR practices are implemented such HR practices, may not, however, increase the well-being of employees (Peccei, 2004) this may also be true for EO and DM policies. Absenteeism and quits are, therefore, more proximal indicators of the influences of HR policies, including EO and DM practices, on establishment performance.

I Absenteeism

Employee absenteeism refers to ‘a temporary form of escape [by an employee] from a work situation that was viewed as stressful and unpleasant [by that employee]’ (Deery *et al.*, 2002). It can be proxied by the number of days that employees take unauthorised days off (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). Although this measure will also capture days when employees are genuinely ill, it can be expected that those workplaces with less satisfied employees will have higher levels of ‘unwarranted’ absenteeism. In order to measure absenteeism, this research used the responses to the following question with the emphasis as it appears in the original questionnaire:

Over the last 12 months what percentage of work days was lost through **employee sickness or absence** at this workplace [excluding authorised leave of absence, employees away on secondment or courses or days lost through industrial action]?

II Quits or Voluntary Labour Turnover

In line with the recommendations by Shaw *et al.* (1998) and Batt *et al.* (2002), this study distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary labour turnover. Although several factors will influence employee quit rates, such as the opportunities for appropriate work with other organisations, voluntary quits will, all other things being equal, reflect how satisfied employees are with their current employer. The quit rate (expressed as a percentage) was calculated using the responses to two questions from the WERS survey with the emphasis as it appears in the original:

In total, how many employees (full- and part-time) were on the payroll at this workplace 12 months ago?

And how many of these employees **stopped** working here, because they left or resigned voluntarily?

Both the absenteeism variable and the quit rate variable are not normally distributed and are skewed, rendering the use of ordinary least squares inappropriate. This thesis, therefore, dichotomises both variables. It does so by taking the arithmetic mean of both

variables. Those establishments with an 'above mean' absenteeism rate (quit rate) are coded 1; those workplaces with a mean or below mean absenteeism rate (quit rate) are coded 0. This dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as these do not rest on parametric assumption (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in common with the analysis in the first stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. In the second stage of the analysis, in order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between (or the 'non independence' of) the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are run for each EO and DM policy. All of the control variables, outlined above, are included in every one of the regressions.

Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis in this thesis. The descriptive statistics show the variables used in this research. It contains the individual as well as the aggregated measures for direct voice and collective voice.

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Total number of employees within the workplace	10.00	20746.00	418	1141
Total number of employees within the workplace (natural log)	2.30	9.94	4.5	1.6
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.00	100.00	52.4	27.9
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.00	90.48	1.6	4.4
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.00	100.00	8.5	15.2
Percentage of total workforce who are employees in highly skilled roles	.00	100.00	38.9	29.8
To what extent would you say that individual workers in the largest occupational group here have variety in their work? (1 = 'a lot' or 'some'; 0 = 'a little' or 'none')	.00	1.00	.8556	.35159
Extent to which staff in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work (1 = 'a lot' or 'some'; 0 = 'a little' or 'none')	.00	1.00	.7021	.45744
Extent to which staff in largest occupational group have control over their pace of work (1 = 'a lot' or 'some'; 0 = 'a little' or 'none')	.00	1.00	.6322	.48233
Extent to which staff in largest occupational group are involved in work organisation (1 = 'a lot' or 'some'; 0 = 'a little' or 'none')	.00	1.00	.7305	.44379
Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.9212	.26942
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of the grounds Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.8328	.37329
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of the grounds Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.8333	.37285
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of the grounds Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.8158	.38776
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.4479	.49740
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.4513	.49775
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.4290	.49506
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.3641	.48130

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.3621	.48072
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.3561	.47896
Do you monitor promotions by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.2223	.41592
Do you monitor promotions by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.2123	.40905
Do you monitor promotions by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.1978	.39844
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.2245	.41736
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.2175	.41263
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.2059	.40448
Do you review relative pay rates by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.1967	.39759
Do you review relative pay rates by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.1305	.33689
Do you review relative pay rates by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.1189	.32377
Private sector = Public limited company, Private limited company, Company limited by guarantee and partnerships; Public sector = Trust/Charity, Body established by Royal Charter; Co-operative / Mutual / Friendly society, Government-owned limited company/Nationalised industry/Trading Public Corporation; Public service agency, Other non-trading public corporation, Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisation (QUANGO), Local/Central Government (including NHS and Local Education Authorities)	.00	1.00	.5771	.49415
Indirect voice: At least one union recognized for negotiating pay and conditions (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.4914	.50005
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Notice Boards (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.7957	.40453
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Systematic use of management chain/cascading of information (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.7203	.44895

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Regular newsletters distributed to all employees (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.5790	.49384
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Regular use of e-mail to all employees (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.6662	.47169
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Information posted on company intranet (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.5953	.49096
<i>Direct voice component 'information sharing': notice board + management chain + newsletters + email + intranet</i>	.00	5.00	3.3565	1.42910
Attitude Surveys: Have you or a third party conducted a formal survey of your employees' views or opinions during the past two years? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.6425	.47937
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways 3) Suggest Suggestion schemes	.00	1.00	.3831	.48625
Meetings: Do you have meetings between senior managers and the whole workforce (either altogether or group by group)? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.8287	.37690
<i>Direct voice component 'direct consultation': attitude survey + suggestion schemes + meetings</i>	.00	6.00	3.7085	1.74811
Teams are given responsibility for specific products or services YES 1 No 0	.00	1.00	.8031	.39779
Problem Solving Groups: Do you have groups of non-managerial employees at this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.3191	.46623
<i>Direct voice component 'direct participation': partly autonomous teamwork + quality circles/problem solving group</i>	.00	10.00	5.6105	3.26520
<i>Total direct voice measures in place: direct participation + direct consultation + information sharing</i>	.00	21.00	12.6755	4.93550
Direct voice measures - dichotomous variable - 0 below mean - 1 above mean	.00	1.00	.5204	.49971
Preparation for bleak house analysis - only those with below mean DV measures included	.00	12.00	8.5010	3.10645

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Direct voice measures amongst establishments with below-mean direct voice measures - dichotomous variable - 0 below mean - 1 above mean	.00	1.00	.5893	.49221
Are there any committees of managers and employees at this workplace primarily concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation? These committees may be called joint consultative committees, works councils or representative forums (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.3752	.48429
Apart from the union representatives or stewards, and apart from health and safety matters, are there any employees here who act as representatives of other employees in dealings with management? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	.00	1.00	.1659	.37211
Joint consultative committees and non-union employee representation 2 BOTH 1 ONE OR OTHER 0 NEITHER	.00	2.00	.5411	.71518
Non-union collective voice BOTH JCC and Non-union employee rep	.00	1.00	.1315	.33799
Union recognition or non-union collective voice (JCC and non-union employee representation) 2 BOTH or ONE OR OTHER 1 EITHER UNIONS OR NER VOICE 0 NEITHER	.00	2.00	.6228	.63133
Dual voice DICHOTMOUS 1 dual voice 0 no dual voice system in place	.00	1.00	.3781	.48504
Unions help find ways to improve workplace performance 1 strongly agree or agree 0 neither agree nor disagree or disagree or strongly disagree	.00	1.00	.3732	.48378
Partnership approach 1 dual voice and positive towards unions 0 dual voice but negative or indifferent towards unions	.00	1.00	.5781	.49418

Notes: N = 1946. Source: WERS 2011; own calculations.

3.5 Logistic Regressions

This thesis uses logistic regressions in both stages of the analysis. The first stage, examines the links between voice and EO and DM; logistic regressions are necessary, as the responses to the relevant questions in the WERS survey are binary. In other words, respondents can answer yes or no. (Other responses, such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to answer’ have been excluded from the analysis. The majority of respondents answered the relevant questions with either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’; only a few did not.) It is appropriate to use logistic regression, as other regression techniques effectively ignore the fact that the outcome cannot go below zero and above one, making the beta coefficients inaccurate (Field, 2009). As the dependent variable is dichotomous, several assumptions that underpin standard linear regressions will not hold. More specifically, with a binary outcome variable, assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, and normality will not be appropriate, leading to the estimates derived from ordinary least square regression being inefficient (Menard, 2002).

In the second stage of the analysis, which examines the associations between the EO policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, the data are continuous, making the use of ordinary least squares regressions possible. However, an analysis of the absenteeism and quit data using SPSS revealed that both are not normally distributed. As noted above, this makes the use of ordinary least square regressions, which are based on parametric assumptions about the data, inappropriate in these circumstances (Pallant, 2010). The research, therefore, dichotomises these variables, making the use of logistic regressions possible and desirable (Menard, 2002).

Logistic regressions are able to overcome the problems associated with the use of ordinary least square regressions for binary dependent variables. Logistic regressions do not rely on assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity and normality (Field, 2009). However, logistic regressions, in common with other regression techniques, rest on the assumption that the independent variables are independent from one another; that is, that the predictor variables do not suffer from multicollinearity. In order to check for this possibility in this research, tolerance values were checked in both stages of the research for this thesis. Two measures indicate if multicollinearity is a problem; they are tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF). A tolerance value of less than 0.10 and a VIF value of more than 10 indicate that the data suffer from multicollinearity (Pallant, 2010). All of the regressions reported in this thesis are free from multicollinearity. All of the tolerance and VIF values were within acceptable limits. It should, however, be noted that when a logistic regression was run in the

second stage of the analysis that contained all of the EO/DM and control variables, the tolerance and VIF values indicated that multicollinearity was a problem. It was, therefore, decided to run separate logistic regressions in the second stage of the analysis to overcome this problem. By doing so, this analysis will also enable individual practices to be scrutinised, as some EO and DM policies may be more beneficial, in terms of being associated with lower absenteeism rates and labour turnover, than others.

In the first stage of the analysis, the logistic regression is performed as a hierarchical model. In other words, the control variables are entered in a separate regression and then the control variables plus the voice variables were entered, enabling the analysis to examine the differences between the two models. The procedure, therefore, enables an examination of the change in the overall goodness of fit of the model. If the voice variables do not help to explain much more of the variation in the outcome variables, then their links to those outcome variables are marginal. Additionally, if the goodness of fit of the model with the control variables and the voice variables is not significantly improved than the model with just the control variables in it, then the voice variables have relatively limited explanatory power.

This thesis examines the associations between the different voice types and EO and DM policies as well as between EO and DM policies and absenteeism and quits using two models for each regression. The first model contains only the control variables. The second model contains the control variables plus the ‘variables of interest’ (i.e. the voice categories, in the first stage, or the EO/DM policy, in the second stage of the analysis.)

In logistic regressions, the goodness of fit can be measured by Omnibus Chi square tests and the Hosmer Lemeshow test. If the model fits the data well, the Chi squared test statistic should be less than 0.05, and the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic should be greater than 0.05 (Field, 2009). The thesis does not report the results of the Chi square tests, as these reveal if one of the variables that are added in the second model is statistically significant. As this research focuses on all of the variables added in the second model to see if each one is statistically significant, the Chi square measure is redundant.

The amount of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the model is captured by two measures in logistic regressions. These are Cox and Snell R square and Nagelkerke pseudo R square (Pallant, 2010; Field, 2009). The Nagelkerke pseudo R square result is based on the Cox and Snell R square measure; however, unlike the Cox and Snell indicator, the Nagelkerke result can vary along the whole scale of 0 to 1. If a score of 1 were to be obtained in the Nagelkerke pseudo R square measure, the model would explain 100 per

cent of the variation in the outcome variable. Conversely, a figure of 0 would indicate that the model explains none of the variation in the outcome.

To calculate the statistical significance of the individual independent variables, SPSS uses the Wald statistic. There are two possible limitations to this statistic (Cohen *et al.*, 2002). First, if the regression β coefficient is large, the standard error of the coefficient is also usually large. This can result in type II errors (or when the null hypothesis is false, but is not rejected). Second, the Wald statistics can be biased if the data being analysed is 'thin'. The second condition is not present in the analyses in this thesis as it draws on large sample sizes and the variables are always well 'populated'. As will be seen, the first potential problem does not occur either.

For the voice variables, the category 'yes' is always coded 1 – with the exception of the bleak house variable, where the 'workplaces with above-mean direct voice mechanism in the minimalist voice category' have a value of 1. Consequently, in the first stage of the analysis, β coefficients with positive values mean that the voice category is associated with an increased likelihood, compared to workplaces in the reference category, that the establishment will have the relevant EO/DM policy. If it has a negative β coefficient, the workplace is associated with a lower likelihood, when compared to the reference category, that the workplace will have the relevant EO/DM policy. Obviously, the statistical significance of these associations will depend on the Wald statistic. In the second stage of the analysis, positive β coefficients indicate that the EO/DM policies are associated with above-mean absenteeism rates and quit rates.

The β coefficients in logistic regressions cannot be interpreted directly as they can in ordinary least square regressions. In other words, the amount by which the outcome increases when a particular voice category (or EO/DM policy in the second stage of the analysis) cannot be calculated by using the value of the β coefficient. Instead, the β coefficient refers to the change in odds ratio. The ratio indicates the change in odds of being in the higher outcome category (having a particular EO/DM policy in the first stage, and having above-mean absenteeism or quits in the second stage when the value of the predictor is in the higher category (Pallant, 2010; Field, 2009).

Chapter 4 - Voice and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis with Minimal Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the likelihood that workplaces with different voice characteristics (direct voice, collective voice, and dual voice systems) are more likely than those with minimal voice to have different EO and DM policies in place (see Appendix A.1 for summary of results). The reference category is the minimal voice category of workplace. Many of the establishments in the reference group do have some voice mechanisms in place – they are not completely ‘voice free’. They do not, however, have any collective voice mechanisms in place and they have a below-mean score on the direct voice index. Such workplaces may, therefore, have some direct-voice channels in place, including the use of newsletters or the intranet to communicate with employees. As noted above, it can be expected that all workplaces that fall into the direct voice, collective voice, or dual voice categories are more likely than those in the reference category to have EO and DM policies in place. This is because voice enables employees to raise concerns with employers. If workers are concerned about issues surrounding the equal treatment of workers, employees can be expected to raise these concerns using the voice mechanisms that are available to them. Managers, in general, can then be expected to respond to these demands by implementing various EO or DM policies to meet those concerns. Of course, causality may run from EO or DM policies to voice mechanisms. In other words, managers who introduce EO or DM policies within their workplaces may be more likely than those who do not, to introduce various voice mechanisms, such as having a relatively high number of direct voice channels. (It should be noted that the subsequent chapter examines the differences between different types of workplace that above-average levels of direct voice, collective voice, and dual-voice systems by using those establishments with direct voice mechanisms in place as the reference category.)

Of course, the likelihood of any particular workplace having a specific EO and DM policy in place will not just depend upon the type of voice mechanisms that are in place. In particular, larger workplaces, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, are more likely than smaller workplace to have EO and DM policies in place as formal HRM policies in general are more common in such establishments (Budhwar and

Debrah, 2009; Nguyen and Bryant, 2004). Similarly, workplaces with a higher percentage of highly skilled employees can be expected to have a greater chance of having EO and DM policies in place than those workplaces with lower percentages of highly skilled employees, as EO and DM policy may be a way that senior managers can signal to all employees that they wish to treat them fairly.

Please note, this thesis refers to BME employees as workers from an ethnic minority, DM as managing diversity, sex as gender and disabled people/employees as workers with a disability (WERS uses the word ‘disability’ to refer to handicaps, impairments, and long-term illnesses or health problems) in all the empirical chapters as this is the terminology used in the WERS data.

4.2 The Results

Table 4.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is the presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 1779 establishments have such a policy, 157 do not. There is, therefore, relatively little variation in the outcome variable. Model 1 in the Table contains the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variable plus the explanatory voice variables. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models indicates that they are not a good fit for the data. They are both less than 0.05. This is, perhaps, not surprising as the majority of establishments that are analysed have a formal equal opportunities or DM policy. Therefore, there is little variation in the outcome variable to explain. It also suggests that there is a need to examine more specific policies in order to ascertain how ‘embedded’ EO and DM policies are in workplaces: many places may have a generic formal policy, but may not implement more specific ones in key areas. The models do, however, suggest that some of the variation in the outcome variable can be explained by the models: the Cox and Snell R squared (0.102) and the Nagelkerke R squared (0.238) are relatively high for Model 1 and increase to 0.129 and 0.299 respectively for Model 2. The increase in the Nagelkerke R square between the two models of just over six percentage points indicates that the voice variables help to explain a reasonable amount of variation in the outcome variable (the presence of a formal EO and DM policy).

As Model 2 for this particular logistic regression does not fit the data well, the results of the regression should be treated with caution. The analysis from Table 4.1 reveals that those workplaces that have above-mean number of direct-voice measures, that have

collective-voice measures only, and those that have dual-voice systems in place are more likely than those establishments with ‘minimalist voice systems’ in place to be associated with the workplace having a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. The associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level for the three voice categories (above-mean direct voice, collective voice only, dual-voice systems). This is, in many ways, unsurprising: those workplaces that provide minimal voice mechanisms to their employees are more likely to implement policies that do not hinder management’s prerogative. A written policy on equal opportunities or DM may do that. The results are also consistent with the descriptive statistics above: only a relatively small percentage of workplaces do not have a formal policy on equal opportunities or DM. Those that do not have such a policy can be expected to limit the voice that they provide to their employees. The concerns of employees would appear to be downplayed.

What is more surprising, perhaps, is the lack of differences between the three voice categories against which establishments with minimalist voice systems are being compared. To be sure, a more robust comparison of any potential differences between establishments with direct-voice measures in place, on the one hand, and those with either collective voice only or dual-voice systems, on the other, will be carried out in the next chapter. The results here suggest that the presence of any of these voice categories is associated with an increased likelihood of the establishment having a written EO and DM policy in place.

There are three other independent variables that are associated in a statistically significant way with a written equal-opportunity policy. The first is percentage of the establishment’s workforce that is female. It is positively related to the presence of a formal written EO or DM policy; it is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of women in a workplace, the more likely that workplace is to have a written EO or DM policy. This is in-line with expectations. Workplaces with a large percentage of female workers may be keen to ensure their fair treatment. A written policy on equal opportunities may help to achieve this. Alternatively, those workplaces with such policies in place may be a more attractive place to work. The natural log of the total number of employees is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as expected: the larger the workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, including equal opportunities and DM. Another independent variable that is statistically significant is the extent to which employees within the largest occupational group in the establishment have a lot or some discretion over how they work. It is negatively linked to the presence of a written policy. This is a surprising result, even if it is statistically significant at

the ten-per-cent level. In other words, if staff in the largest occupational group have a lot or some discretion, the workplace is less likely to have a formal EO or DM policy in place. This is not as expected. Those workplaces that draw on the ideas and commitment of their employees – in other words, those that provide their workers with a high degree of discretion – can be expected to ensure that staff are treated fairly. It is, however, best to address the overall importance of this variable in explaining the likelihood of an establishment having a formal policy on equal opportunities in place until other more detailed aspects of this policy have been covered. As noted above, only a relatively small percentage of workplaces do not have a written EO or DM policy. It is, consequently, likely to be difficult to detect differences between workplaces that do and do not have EO or DM policies at this level of aggregation. More disaggregated analysis of different EO or DM policy is required.

It is noteworthy that some of the other independent variables in Model 2 are not statistically significant. For instance, the percentage of the workforce that has a long-term disability that affects the amount or type of work that they can do or that comes from a non-white ethnic group are not associated in a statistically significant way to the presence of a formal policy on EO or DM. There would also appear to be no differences between workplaces in the public sector and those in the private sector in terms of the likelihood of having an EO or DM policy. Increasing the amount of discretion that employees have is associated with a decreased likelihood of the workplace having a formal written policy on EO or DM.

Table 4.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.246**	.288	-1.031*	.357
Total number of employees (natural log)	.894***	2.445	.623***	1.864
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.009***	1.009	.009***	1.009
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.097**	1.101	.073	1.076
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	-.001	.999	-.002	.998
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.879***	.415	-.392	.676
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.430*	1.537	.393	1.481
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.429*	.651	-.446*	.640
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.076	.927	-.084	.919
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.475**	1.608	.321	1.379
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.003	1.003	.000	1.000
Direct voice only			2.508***	12.283
Collective voice only			1.182***	3.260
Dual-voice system			1.565***	4.781

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .102, Nagelkerke R Square = .238; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .129, Nagelkerke R Square = .299, '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level; '**', at the 5% level; and '***' at the 1% level.

Table 4.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is the establishment *monitors recruitment and selection by gender*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 847 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender; 1099 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variable plus the voice explanatory variables. Both models fit the data well, as the significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both models.

The Cox and Snell R squared for Model 1 is 0.301; model 1 explains approximately 40 per cent (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variation in the dependent variable. The Cox and Snell R squared for Model 2 increases to 0.314; the Nagelkerke R squared for Model 2 increases to approximately 42 per cent. This is a relatively high figure compared to related results in other studies (e.g. Riley *et al.*, 2008). The change in the chi-squared test for the model coefficients between Model 1 and Model 2 is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that Model 2, which includes the voice variables, is better, in a statistically significant way, at explaining variation in the outcome variable than Model 1, which just contains the control variables. In all of the following regressions, Model 2 is better, in a statistically significant way, than Model 1 at explaining variation in the relevant outcome variable.

Compared to workplaces with minimal voice mechanisms in place, those with direct-voice measures, collective-voice measures or dual-voice systems are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. In all cases, the association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Those workplaces that limit employee voice are more likely to adopt policies that do not constrain or impede management's decision-making in any way. Monitoring recruitment and selection in this way could lead to management's prerogative being restricted. The differences between the levels of statistical significance – if there are any – between the various voice variables and the relevant EO and DM policy will be explored in the next chapter. In that chapter, the same regressions are run; however, the reference category is the direct voice category rather than the minimal voice category. This will enable statistically significant differences between important voice categories to be identified.

In Model 2, the variable that captures the percentage of the female employees in the establishment is statistically significant. This suggests that there is a link between the percentage of female employees in the workplace and the likelihood that the establishment monitors recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. There is also a statistically significant association between the percentage of the workforce that has a disability and monitoring recruitment and selection by gender.

This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The associations are positive. It is not clear why higher percentages of workers with a disability should be associated with this outcome; it could, however, reflect the fact that workplaces that do monitor recruitment and selection by gender are more attractive places to work for those with a disability. It can be expected that these relationships will hold when it comes to monitoring recruitment and selection by disability. These relationships do hold as will be shown in Table 4.4.

In Model 2, the natural log of the total number of employees is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as expected: the larger the workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, including equal opportunities and DM. Private sector establishments are less likely than those in the public sector to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. The link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Those workplaces that have a higher percentage of skilled employees are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. The link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These results can be explained by the fact that such workplaces are likely to rely on committed employees. Treating all employees fairly and being seen to treat all employees fairly is likely to be important. Other independent variables, including those variables that capture some of the key characteristics of how employees within the largest occupation group work are treated, are not statistically significant.

Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Model and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.267***	.038	-3.439***	.032
Total number of employees (natural log)	.591***	1.805	.492***	1.636
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.005**	1.005	.006**	1.006
Percentage of workers with a disability	.055***	1.056	.047***	1.048
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.298***	.273	-1.124***	.325
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.280	1.322	.238	1.268
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.008	.992	.028	1.028
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.093	.911	-.108	.897
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.088	1.092	-.007	.993
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			.951***	2.590
Collective voice only			.561***	1.752
Dual-voice system			.919***	2.507

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.301; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.403; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.314; Nagelkerke R Square = 0.422; '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level; '**', at the 5% level; and '***' at the 1% level.

Table 4.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the independent variable and the workplace *monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 854 monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity; 1092 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2, the control variables and the voice explanatory variables. Both models provide a good fit for the data (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05 for both models). Model 1 can explain a relatively high degree of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals approximately 0.415). Model 2 accounts for 43 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.428), a slight increase in explaining the outcome variable (monitoring recruitment and selection by ethnicity).

Compared to those workplaces with minimal levels of voice, those with direct-voice measures in places, with collective voice and with a dual-voice system are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. For workplaces in the direct-voice category and for those with dual voice, this association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. For establishments in the collective-voice category, the association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This is an interesting finding that will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter. It suggests that we can be more certain about the association between, first, direct voice and the outcome and, second, dual voice and the outcome than we can about the link between collective voice and the monitoring of recruitment and selection by ethnicity within workplaces.

The natural log of the total number of employees is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as expected the larger the workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, including equal opportunities and DM.

The higher the percentage of female workers in the establishment's workforce and the greater the proportion of the workforce who have a disability, the higher the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Both associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Once again, private sector workplaces are less likely than public sector ones to implement such a policy. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within a workplace, the greater the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It can be explained by the fact that those workplaces that rely on highly skilled employees are more likely to wish to retain those employees. Ensuring that recruitment is not biased by ethnicity may help to achieve that objective.

Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection Based on Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.184***	.041	-3.305***	.037
Total number of employees (natural log)	.588***	1.800	.502***	1.652
Percentage of female workers	.005**	1.005	.006***	1.006
Percentage of workers with a disability	.057***	1.059	.050***	1.051
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.373***	.253	-1.222***	.295
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.297*	1.346	.261	1.299
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.088	.915	-.060	.942
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.080	.923	-.092	.912
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.019	1.019	-.062	.939
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Direct voice only			.780***	2.182
Collective voice only			.455**	1.576
Dual-voice system			.772***	2.165

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.310, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.415; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .319, Nagelkerke R Square = .428; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection by disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 809 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability; 1137 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory variables. Both models perform well and provide a good fit for the data (the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic's significance is greater than 0.05 for both models). Model 1 accounts for a comparatively high proportion of the variability in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.409). Model 2 accounts for a higher percentage (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.426). The increase in the Nagelkerke R square between the two models is approximately one-and-a half percentage points, which indicates that the voice variables help to explain some of the variation in the outcome variable (monitors recruitment and selection by disability).

Once again, workplaces with direct-voice measures, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are all more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor recruitment and selection based on disability. All associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These relationships conform to theoretical expectations that granting employees a voice, in whatever form, is likely to lead to policies that reflect employees' preferences in an improved way.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the number of employees, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The greater the percentage of the workforce that is female, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the proportion of workers with a disability within a workplace, the greater the chances of the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection by disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This association may reflect the fact that workplaces with such policies are more attractive places to work or may reflect pressures from workers with a disability within a workplace pushing for such a policy. Once again, private sector organisations are less likely than publicsector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This negative relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Those workplaces where employees within the largest occupational group have a lot of, or some, discretion are more likely than those where staff have little or no discretion to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Similarly, the higher the proportion of employees who are highly skilled within

a workplace, the greater the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection by disability. The association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. These latter two associations may reflect the desire of workplaces that grant their employees some discretion or autonomy over how they carry out their work tasks and that have a high percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled to retain them. Having recruitment procedures in place that aim to ensure that a particular group is not discriminated against may help to achieve that objective. All other independent variables, including the percentage of the workforce with a disability, are not statistically significant.

Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection Based on Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.171***	.042	-3.353***	.035
Total number of employees (natural log)	.527***	1.694	.431***	1.539
Percentage of female workers	.005**	1.005	.005**	1.005
Percentage of workers with a disability	.077***	1.080	.069***	1.071
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.444***	.236	-1.275***	.279
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.436**	1.546	.395**	1.484
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.016	.984	.021	1.021
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.013	.987	-.028	.972
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.103	1.108	.011	1.011
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.011	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			.927***	2.526
Collective voice only			.547***	1.728
Dual-voice system			.916***	2.499

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .304, Nagelkerke R Square = .409; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .317, Nagelkerke R Square = .426; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assess the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection based for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 697 monitors recruitment and selection based for indirect gender discrimination 1249 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .023). Model 2 performs better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 accounts for a comparatively high proportion of the variability in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.314).

Once again, workplaces with direct-voice measures, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are all more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender bias. All associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These relationships conform to theoretical expectations that granting employees a voice, in whatever form, is likely to lead to policies that reflect employees' preferences in an improved way.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the number of employees, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender bias. This is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the proportion of workers with a disability within a workplace, the greater the chances of the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against women. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This association may reflect the fact that workplaces with such policies are more attractive places to work or may reflect pressures from workers with a disability within a workplace pushing for such a policy.

Once again, private-sector organisations are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against women. This negative relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Similarly, the higher the proportion of employees who are highly skilled within a workplace, the greater the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against women. The association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This latter association may reflect the desire of workplaces that have a high percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled to retain them. Having recruitment procedures in place that aim to ensure that a particular group is not discriminated against may help to achieve that objective. All

other independent variables, including the percentage of the workforce with a disability, are not statistically significant.

Table 4.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.940***	.053	-3.146***	.043
Total number of employees (natural log)	.434***	1.543	.336***	1.400
Percentage of female workers	.002	1.002	.003	1.003
Percentage of workers with a disability	.049***	1.050	.043***	1.044
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.924***	.397	-.684***	.505
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.060	1.062	.023	1.023
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.127	1.136	.175	1.191
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.130	.878	-.153	.858
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.154	1.167	.076	1.079
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.011***	1.011
Direct voice only			.605***	1.831
Collective voice only			.514***	1.671
Dual-voice system			.938***	2.554

Notes: N = 1946; Cox & Snell R Square = .217; Nagelkerke R Square = .298; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .229; Nagelkerke R Square = .314; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regression, 694 monitor recruitment and selection in this way; 1252 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). The amount of variation in the outcome variable explained by Model 2 is approximately 32 per cent (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.321). This compares favourably to related studies (Riley *et al.*, 2008).

Those workplaces with direct-voice mechanisms in place, collective voice, and dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. The association between direct voice and the outcome policy, and the link between dual voice and the outcome are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The link between collective voice and the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against ethnic-minority workers is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. These results are in line with expectations: those workplaces that have above-mean scores for direct voice, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely to have policies in place that ensure workers are treated the same as each other, than those establishments that have below-mean scores for direct-voice mechanisms. Employers in workplaces with no collective voice and below-mean scores for direct-voice measures are likely to be free from as many constraints on their decision-making abilities as possible. Consequently, having policies that monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination could act as impediments to their decision making if that information is used to achieve outcomes that they do not prioritise. However, the differences between the levels of statistical significance between, on the one hand, direct voice and dual voice, and collective voice, on the other, suggest that we can be more certain about the link between the former two voice categories and the outcome than we can about the link between collective voice and the outcome. This will be explored in more detail in the next chapter when the direct-voice category is used as the reference group in the logistic regressions.

The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with an ethnic background. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This conforms to previous findings. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is

to implement such a policy. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. There is no statistically significant link between this EO and DM policy and, first, the percentage of the workforce that is female and, second, the percentage of the workforce from an ethnic minority. Again, this is somewhat surprising. It suggests that it is the presence of a higher proportion of workers with a disability rather than those who are female or from an ethnic minority who account for the adoption of this policy. If causality runs in the opposite direction, it could be that workers with a disability are more aware of such policies than are workers from an ethnic minority.

Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than their public-sector counterparts to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against those from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of skilled employees in the workforce, the more likely it is that the establishment will adopt this policy.

Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Discrimination based on Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.993***	.050	-3.193***	.041
Total number of employees (natural log)	.447***	1.564	.352***	1.422
Percentage of female workers	.002	1.002	.003	1.003
Percentage of workers with a disability	.049***	1.050	.042***	1.043
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.940***	.391	-.710***	.492
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.018	1.018	-.020	.981
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.122	1.130	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.126	.882	-.148	.863
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.214	1.239	.136	1.145
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.011***	1.011
Direct voice only			.621***	1.862
Collective voice only			.502**	1.653
Dual-voice system			.925***	2.521

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .222; Nagelkerke R Square = .305; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .233; Nagelkerke R Square = .321; '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level; '**', at the 5% level; and '***' at the 1% level.

Table 4.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 681 monitor recruitment in this way; 1265 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .024). Model 2 performs better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05. Model 2 explains approximately 32 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.319). This compares well to related studies (Riley *et al.*, 2008).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal voice can be expected to emphasise management's prerogative and, therefore, employers will be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers some voice – either direct, collective, or both.

The larger the establishment, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This relationship is not a surprising result as larger workplaces tend to have more formal HRM policies and to implement what might be considered to be 'best practices' (Budwhar and Debrah, 2009; Nguyen and Bryant, 2004). The higher the percentage of women in the establishment's workforce and the higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. The former relationship is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level; the latter, the one-per-cent level. Both of these findings suggest two possible explanations. First, higher percentages of female workers or employees with a disability lead to pressures within firms to implement policies that reflect the views of these groups in an improved way. For example, workplaces with a high percentage of employees with a disability may respond to the concerns of these workers and implement policies that aim to enhance the fair treatment of all employees. Alternatively, workplaces with these policies in place could be more attractive to such employees. The link between workers with a disability and all regressions that examine indirect discrimination suggests either that this group of employees is more able to encourage employers to monitor indirect forms of discrimination or that this group of workers is more aware and 'sensitive' to the

presence or absence of policies to monitor indirect discrimination than either female employees or those from an ethnic minority.

Private sector organisations are, once again, less likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability than their public-sector counterparts. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within a workplace, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest occupational group have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Again, these latter two associations are likely to arise because of the desire of employers who are more reliant on highly skilled employees than those who are not to attract and retain the most appropriately qualified staff. Having such policies in place could be one way to achieve this.

Table 4.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Discrimination based on Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.953***	.052	-3.169***	.042
Total number of employees (natural log)	.413***	1.511	.315***	1.370
Percentage of female workers	.004*	1.004	.005**	1.005
Percentage of workers with a disability	.055***	1.057	.048***	1.049
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.001	1.001	.001	1.001
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.959***	.383	-.726***	.484
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	-.066	.936	-.111	.895
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	.236	1.266	.288*	1.334
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	-.161	.851	-.185	.831
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	.216	1.241	.129	1.138
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.010***	1.011
Direct voice only			.691***	1.995
Collective voice only			.520***	1.682
Dual-voice system			.979***	2.661

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .218; Nagelkerke R Square = .300; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .231; Nagelkerke R Square = .319; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level.

Table 4.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 425 monitor recruitment in this way; 1521 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. The models fit the observed well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains approximately 36 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.357).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal voice can be expected to emphasise management's prerogative and, therefore, employers will be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers some voice – either direct, collective, or both.

The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees in the establishment's workforce, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions in this way. These latter two associations are both statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest organisational group have over their work, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. None of the other variables in Model 2 is statistically significant.

Table 4.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.020***	.018	-4.796***	.008
Total number of employees (natural log)	.498***	1.645	.369***	1.446
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.028**	1.029	.024**	1.025
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.006	1.006
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.099***	.333	-.688***	.503
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.246	1.278	.213	1.237
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.263	1.301	.349*	1.417
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.168	.845	-.220	.803
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.144	1.155	.040	1.041
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Direct voice only			.993***	2.700
Collective voice only			1.108***	3.027
Dual-voice system			1.691***	5.427

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square= .211, Nagelkerke R Square = .325; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .232, Nagelkerke R Square= .357; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 405 monitor recruitment in this way; 1541 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Although Model 1 fits the observed well (the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05), Model 2 does not. Its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it is 0.027). Model 2 does, however, explain approximately 37 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.365). The reason why Model 2 does not fit the data well could be attributed, in part at least, to the relatively low number of workplaces that monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. This suggests that there is a limited amount of variation to explain in the outcome variable, and Model 2 does not fit what variation there is well.

Despite the fact that Model 2 does not fit the data well, workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal voice can be expected to emphasise management's prerogative and, therefore, employers will be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers some voice – either direct, collective, or both.

The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of ethnic-minority workers in an establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for an ethnicity bias. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Public sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees in the establishment's workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions in this way. These latter two associations are both statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more variety that employees in the largest occupational group in the establishment have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for an ethnic bias. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. None of the other variables in Model 2 is statistically significant.

Table 4.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.089***	.017	-4.778***	.008
Total number of employees (natural log)	.475***	1.607	.356***	1.428
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Percentage of workers with a disability	.031**	1.032	.028**	1.028
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.007	1.007	.008*	1.008
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.310***	.270	-.928***	.395
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.456*	1.578	.426*	1.532
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.201	1.223	.274	1.316
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.069	.933	-.112	.894
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.122	1.129	.023	1.023
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.011***	1.011
Direct voice only			.855***	2.350
Collective voice only			.970***	2.637
Dual-voice system			1.556***	4.739

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .216, Nagelkerke R Square = .338; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .365; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 377 monitor recruitment in this way; 1569 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Model 1 and Model 2 fit the observed data well (the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both). Model 2 explains approximately 35 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.348).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal voice can be expected to emphasise management's prerogative and, therefore, employers will be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers some voice – either direct, collective, or both. For instance, employers in establishments with minimal voice are likely to be reluctant to implement policies that may restrict their prerogative. They do not offer employees any voice and they do not wish to implement policies that may inhibit their ability to promote their preferred employees.

The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of ethnic-minority workers in an establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for a bias against disabled workers. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private sector counterparts to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees in the establishment's workforce, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions in this way. These latter two associations are both statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest occupational group in the establishment have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. These latter two links suggest that workers who are highly skilled and who are expected to exercise relatively high amounts of discretion at work may be difficult to

replace. As a result, employers may be keen to ensure that workers are treated fairly and are seen to be treated fairly and adopt a policy to monitor promotions for possible bias. None of the other variables in Model 2 is statistically significant.

Table 4.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Disability Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.889***	.020	-4.537***	.011
Total number of employees (natural log)	.411***	1.508	.302***	1.353
Percentage of female workers	-.003	.997	-.001	.999
Percentage of workers with a disability	.027**	1.027	.023*	1.023
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.006	1.006	.007*	1.007
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.472***	.229	-1.110***	.330
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.340	1.405	.303	1.354
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.309	1.361	.376*	1.457
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.041	.960	-.078	.925
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.232	1.261	.139	1.149
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			.813***	2.254
Collective voice only			.904***	2.470
Dual-voice system			1.472***	4.357

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square = .348; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 434 monitor recruitment in this way; 1512 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a large amount of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.269). This is a relatively high degree of variation (Riley *et al.*, 2008). The change in the chi-squared test for the model coefficients between Model 1 and Model 2 is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Those workplaces that have direct-voice measures, collective voice, or dual-voice systems in place are more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination than those workplaces with minimal voice. All of those associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This is, perhaps, not a surprising result as those workplaces that have minimal voice are likely to wish to maintain management's prerogatives. Policies that may grant others a say in workplace decision making will, consequently, not be welcomed.

The larger the workplace, the more likely it is that the establishment will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This finding confirms earlier ones, and is in line with expectations that larger workplaces are more likely to have a more formalised system of HR policies in place. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Interestingly, the percentage of female employees in the establishment's workforce is not statistically significantly associated with this policy. This suggests that the presence of certain EO and DM policies, in this case monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination, may result from an awareness to treat a wide range of groups the same as each other and not just focus on gender, for instance.

Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than their public-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for indirect gender bias. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of skilled workers within an establishment, the more likely it is that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect gender bias. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This can be explained by the need for workplaces that require highly skilled employees to place a great deal of emphasis on recruiting and retaining employees with the necessary capabilities.

Consequently, they are likely to implement policies that ensure employees are treated fairly and are seen to be treated fairly. All of the other variables (apart from the constant) are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the variables that capture the organisation of work for the largest occupational group (degree of discretion, control, etc.) are not statistically significant. This suggests then that it is not the way that employees work that matters for EO and DM policies, but their skill levels.

Table 4.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.361***	.035	-3.949***	.019
Total number of employees (natural log)	.382***	1.465	.267***	1.306
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.025**	1.026	.021*	1.021
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.921***	.398	-.566***	.568
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.195	1.216	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.210	1.234	.276	1.318
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.049	.952	-.085	.919
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.142	1.152	.050	1.051
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			.911***	2.486
Collective voice only			.934***	2.544
Dual-voice system			1.418***	4.131

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157; Nagelkerke R Square = .240; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .176; Nagelkerke R Square = .269; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 420 monitor promotions for an ethnic bias and 1526 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.267).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor promotions for an indirect bias against ethnic-minority workers. This conforms to theoretical expectations. However, there are some differences in the level of statistical significance between, on the one hand, the voice variable and, on the other, the outcome variable. The association between direct voice and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The links between collective voice and dual voice, on the one hand, and the monitoring of promotions for any discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, on the other, are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. In other words, we can be more certain that a link exist between the latter two forms of voice and the policy than we can between direct voice and the policy. This relationship will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. That chapter will, similarly, analyse the data using logistic regressions; however, the reference category for the voice variables will be direct voice. This will enable us to say with greater certainty if the association between collective voice and dual voice and the policy is statistically significantly different to the link between direct voice and the policy.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect

ethnic discrimination. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant.

Table 4.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.276***	.038	-3.753***	.023
Total number of employees (natural log)	.353***	1.423	.245***	1.278
Percentage of female workers	-.003	.997	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.027**	1.028	.024**	1.024
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.058***	.347	-.712***	.491
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.240	1.271	.212	1.237
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.168	1.182	.226	1.254
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.005	1.005	-.025	.975
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.134	1.143	.051	1.052
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			.645**	1.906
Collective voice only			.768***	2.156
Dual-voice system			1.264***	3.541

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .243; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .267; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability discrimination*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 397 monitor promotions for a disability bias and 1549 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.255).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor promotions for indirect bias against workers with a disability. This conforms to theoretical expectations. However, there are some differences in the level of statistical significance between, on the one hand, the voice variable and, on the other, the outcome variable. The association between direct voice and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability discrimination is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The links between collective voice and dual voice, on the one hand, and the monitoring of promotions for a bias against workers with a disability, on the other, are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. In other words, we can be more certain that a link exists between the latter two forms of voice and the policy than we can about the link between direct voice and the outcome. This relationship will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. That chapter will, similarly, analyse the data using logistic regressions; however, the reference category for the voice variables will be direct voice. This will enable us to say with greater certainty if the association between collective voice and dual voice and the policy is statistically significantly different to the link between direct voice and the policy.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This, too, is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion workers in the largest occupational group have, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is

statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant.

Table 4.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.194***	.041	-3.636***	.026
Total number of employees (natural log)	.319***	1.375	.217***	1.243
Percentage of female workers	-.002	.998	-.001	.999
Percentage of workers with a disability	.023*	1.023	.019	1.019
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.151***	.316	-.820***	.440
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.170	1.186	.139	1.149
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.250	1.284	.307*	1.359
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.019	1.020	-.008	.992
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.219	1.245	.139	1.149
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009***	1.009	.008***	1.008
Direct voice only			.598**	1.818
Collective voice only			.707***	2.028
Dual-voice system			1.201***	3.322

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .149, Nagelkerke R Square = .233; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by gender*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 387 monitor pay rates for a possible gender bias and 1559 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.337).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor pay for a bias against female workers. This conforms to theoretical expectations. All of these associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. Interestingly, the higher the percentage of women in the establishment's workforce, the less likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This could suggest that a bias against female workers exists. Adopting a policy to monitor any possible discrimination against female employees may reveal this discrepancy. Employers may, therefore, be reluctant to adopt a policy to monitor pay rates by gender as this could have far-reaching implications for pay levels in the workplace. By contrast, the higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest occupational group have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by gender. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. Both of these associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. They suggest that workplaces that rely on skilled workers who exercise their judgement over how they work are keen to avoid discrimination against workers who may be difficult to replace. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant.

Table 4.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.901***	.007	-5.477***	.004
Total number of employees (natural log)	.569***	1.767	.492***	1.636
Percentage of female workers	-.007**	.993	-.006**	.994
Percentage of workers with a disability	.032***	1.033	.029**	1.030
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.709***	.492	-.513***	.599
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.319	1.376	.301	1.352
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.474**	1.607	.526***	1.692
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.091	1.095	.056	1.057
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.213	1.237	.139	1.149
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.011***	1.011
Direct voice only			1.131***	3.099
Collective voice only			.847***	2.332
Dual-voice system			1.161***	3.192

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .202, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .213, Nagelkerke R Square = .337; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 256 monitor pay rates for a possible ethnicity bias and 1690 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.320).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor pay for a bias against workers from an ethnic minority. However, there are differences in the levels of statistical significance of the various associations. The likelihood that workplaces with direct voice and will monitor pay rates by ethnicity is, when compared to workplaces with minimal voice, statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with collective voice will monitor pay by ethnicity is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with dual voice will monitor pay in this way is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This raises interesting theoretical issues that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. In that chapter workplaces with direct voice measures in place will be used as the reference category. The results here suggest that we can be more certain that workplaces with dual voice will monitor pay by ethnicity than all other types of workplace, that establishments with direct voice will monitor pay in this way than those with collective voice, and that workplaces with minimal voice will be the least likely to implement such a policy.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers from an ethnic minority in the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay by ethnicity. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. In combination with the preceding result, this suggests that employers may have to implement such policies as a result of pressure from employees. There is no association between the percentage of ethnic-minority workers and the monitoring of pay by gender; there is, however, one – albeit a weak one – between the percentage of ethnic-

minority workers and the monitoring of pay by ethnicity. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It suggests that workplaces that rely on skilled workers may be keen to avoid discrimination against workers who may be difficult to replace. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant.

Table 4.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.262***	.005	-5.845***	.003
Total number of employees (natural log)	.513***	1.670	.422***	1.525
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.031**	1.031	.029**	1.029
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.008	1.008	.009*	1.009
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.065***	.345	-.807***	.446
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.346	1.413	.321	1.378
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.299	1.349	.354	1.424
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.222	1.249	.189	1.208
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.175	1.191	.061	1.063
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.009***	1.009
Direct voice only			.913**	2.491
Collective voice only			.662*	1.939
Dual-voice system			1.344***	3.836

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .163, Nagelkerke R Square = .302; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 4.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 233 monitor pay rates for a possible disability bias and 1713 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.306).

Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor relative pay rates for any bias against workers with a disability. However, there are differences in the levels of statistical significance of the various associations. The likelihood that workplaces with direct voice and will monitor pay rates by disability is, when compared to workplaces with minimal voice, statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with dual voice will monitor pay in this way is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with collective voice will monitor pay by disability is not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no relationship between collective voice and the monitoring of relative pay rates by disability. This raises interesting theoretical issues that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. In that chapter workplaces with direct-voice measures in place will be used as the reference category. The results here suggest that workplaces with dual voice will monitor pay by disability more than all other types of workplace and that establishments with direct voice are more likely than those with collective voice to monitor pay in this way.

The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay by disability. This relationship is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. In combination with the preceding results, this suggests that employers may have to implement policies to monitor pay rates by gender, ethnicity, and disability as a result of pressure from employees with a disability. Public-sector workplaces

are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest occupational group have over their work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay by disability. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by disability. Both of these latter associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It suggests that workplaces that rely on skilled workers who exercise discretion at work may be keen to avoid discrimination against workers who may be difficult to replace. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant.

Table 4.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.073***	.006	-5.594***	.004
Total number of employees (natural log)	.477***	1.611	.395***	1.485
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Percentage of workers with a disability	.034***	1.035	.032**	1.033
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.006	1.006
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.181***	.307	-.968***	.380
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.200	1.222	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.624**	1.867	.677***	1.968
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.176	1.192	.143	1.154
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.058	1.060	-.060	.941
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009***	1.009	.008***	1.008
Direct voice only			.973**	2.646
Collective voice only			.575	1.778
Dual-voice system			1.266***	3.545

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .289; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .159, Nagelkerke R Square = .306; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

4.3 Chapter Conclusion

The results in this chapter demonstrate that, overall, workplaces in which any form of voice – be it direct voice, indirect voice, or dual voice – is present are more likely than those with minimal voice to have a range of EO and DM policies. The dummy variables for direct voice, indirect voice and dual voice show that these workplaces are, with one exception, statistically significantly different to those with minimal voice. In most instances, this difference is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, indicating a strong association between the voice variables and the EO and DM policy. This relationship holds after controlling for the size and composition of the workforce as well as controlling for how work is organised within the establishment.

The results are consistent with various theories that voice is likely to lead to the adoption of policies within workplaces that reflect employees' preferences in an improved way. In some respects, the results are not surprising, as those workplaces that afford their employees little or no voice (either direct or indirect) are unlikely to adopt policies that may constrain managers' prerogatives. What is, perhaps, of more theoretical and empirical interest are the differences between workplaces with direct voice, those with indirect voice and those with dual voice. The next chapter examines these differences.

Chapter 5 - Voice and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis with Direct Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the links between various voice categories and different EO and DM policies (see Appendix A.2 for summary of results). The models are the same as those in the preceding chapter. This chapter uses direct voice as the reference category. It does so in order to examine any differences between the likelihood of direct voice workplaces, on the one hand, and collective voice workplaces and dual voice establishments, on the other, having particular EO and DM policies in place. This comparison is important as different analysts emphasise the likely advantages of direct, collective, and dual voice to varying degrees. The chapter, therefore, aims to shed light on the type of voice mechanisms that are more likely to lead to EO and DM policies being adopted in workplaces. The previous chapter showed, in effect, that any form of voice was likely to increase the chances of workplaces having EO and DM policies in place. This chapter asks, for instance, are direct voice workplaces more or less likely than collective voice ones to have EO and DM policies in place.

As the regression models in this chapter are – with the exception of the reference category – the same as those in the preceding chapter, the ‘fitness’ of the various models used will not be mentioned, unless they are not a good fit. Similarly, the Nagelkerke R squared will not be commented upon in this chapter as they are the same as those in the preceding chapter. They will, however, be reported in the notes under each regression table. The statistical significance of the control variables will not be discussed, but will be indicated in the tables. This is because these items do not differ to the results in the preceding chapter. This chapter will, however, use the ‘direct voice’ category as the reference category. This will enable comparisons to be made directly between important categories and the likelihood of establishments having particular EO and DM policies in place.

As the differences between workplaces with minimalist voice and those with direct voice, on the one hand, and the likelihood of implementing various EO and DM policies and practices has already been discussed in the preceding chapter, this chapter will focus on the similarities and differences of workplaces with direct voice, collective voice, and dual voice, on the one hand, and the likelihood of having a particular EO and DM policy or practice in place, on the other. For all of the regressions in this chapter, establishments with direct voice

are the reference category. The results in the preceding chapter did not provide a direct examination of any differences between these latter three types of workplace. It is important, however, to examine any differences, as they have important implications for theory. Whilst some focus more on direct voice, others emphasise collective voice, and yet others stress the potential benefits of combining both collective and direct voice in dual systems.

5.2 The Results

Table 5.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is *the presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 1779 establishments have such a policy, 157 do not. There is, therefore, relatively little variation in the outcome variable. Model 1 in the Table contains the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variable plus the explanatory voice variables. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models indicates that they are not a good fit for the data. They are both less than 0.05.

Despite the fact that the model is not a good fit for the data, the table shows that those workplaces with collective voice measures are less likely to have a formal EO or DM policy in place than are those establishments that have adopted direct-voice mechanisms. This can be interpreted in one of two ways. It suggests either that collective-voice mechanisms hinder the adoption of a formal EO or DM policy in some way or that those workplaces that do not have such a formal policy in place encourage the formation of collective voice. In the case of the latter, employees may feel the need to seek union representation. There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with dual-voice systems in terms of the likelihood of adopting a formal policy on equal opportunities and DM.

Table 5.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.246**	.288	1.477*	4.379
Total number of employees (natural log)	.894***	2.445	.623***	1.864
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.009***	1.009	.009***	1.009
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.097**	1.101	.073	1.076
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	-.001	.999	-.002	.998
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.879***	.415	-.392	.676
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.430*	1.537	.393	1.481
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.429*	.651	-.446*	.640
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.076	.927	-.084	.919
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.475**	1.608	.321	1.379
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.003	1.003	.000	1.000
Minimalist voice			-2.508***	.081
Collective voice only			-1.327**	.265
Dual-voice system			-.944	.389

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .102, Nagelkerke R Square = .238; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .129, Nagelkerke R Square = .299, '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is the establishment *monitors recruitment and selection by gender*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 847 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender; 1099 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variable plus the voice explanatory variables. Both models fit the data well, as the significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both models.

Workplaces that have collective voice mechanisms in place are less likely than those with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This suggests either that direct-voice mechanisms are more effective than collective ones in encouraging employers to monitor recruitment and selection in this way or that employees seek union representation rather than direct-voice mechanisms when recruitment and selection are not monitored by gender. There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection by gender.

Table 5.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.267***	.038	-2.488***	.083
Total number of employees (natural log)	.591***	1.805	.492***	1.636
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.005**	1.005	.006**	1.006
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.055***	1.056	.047***	1.048
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.004	1.004	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.298***	.273	-1.124***	.325
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.280	1.322	.238	1.268
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.008	.992	.028	1.028
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.093	.911	-.108	.897
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.088	1.092	-.007	.993
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.010***	1.010
Minimalist voice			-.951***	.386
Collective voice only			-.391**	.676
Dual-voice system			-.032	.968

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.301; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.403; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.314; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.422; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the independent variable and the workplace *monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 854 monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity; 1092 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2, the control variables and the voice explanatory variables. Both models provide a good fit for the data (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05 for both models).

There are no statistically significant differences between the workplaces with direct voice, collective voice, and a dual-voice system in terms of the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity. As noted above, workplaces with any form of voice are more likely than those without any form of voice to monitor recruitment in this way. This suggests that any form of voice promotes this policy more than no (or minimal) voice. Alternatively, employers who do not promote voice within their establishments are less likely to implement a policy to monitor recruitment and selection than those with any form of voice.

Table 5.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.184***	.041	-2.524***	.080
Total number of employees (natural log)	.588***	1.800	.502***	1.652
Percentage of female workers	.005**	1.005	.006***	1.006
Percentage of workers with a disability	.057***	1.059	.050***	1.051
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.373***	.253	-1.222***	.295
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.297*	1.346	.261	1.299
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.088	.915	-.060	.942
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.080	.923	-.092	.912
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.019	1.019	-.062	.939
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Minimalist voice			-.780***	.458
Collective voice only			-.325	.722
Dual-voice system			-.008	.992

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.310, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.415; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .319, Nagelkerke R Square = .428; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection by disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 809 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability; 1137 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory variables. Both models perform well and provide a good fit for the data (the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic's significance is greater than 0.05 for both models).

Those workplaces with collective voice mechanisms in place are less likely than those with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with dual voice and those with direct voice in terms of the likelihood of monitoring recruitment and selection by gender.

Collectively, the results from the preceding three tables (Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4) suggest that there is very little statistically significant difference in those workplaces with some form of meaningful voice in terms of their monitoring of recruitment and selection for different forms of discrimination. What differences there are indicate that those workplaces with collective forms of voice are less likely than those with direct voice and dual-voice systems to monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination. In short, any form of voice is an improvement on none, but workplaces that have direct voice (either alone or as part of a dual-voice system) are more likely than those with collective voice to monitor recruitment and selection for different biases.

Table 5.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.171***	.042	-2.426***	.088
Total number of employees (natural log)	.527***		.431***	1.539
Percentage of female workers	.005**	1.005	.005**	1.005
Percentage of workers with a disability	.077***	1.080	.069***	1.071
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.444***	.236	-1.275***	.279
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.436**	1.546	.395**	1.484
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.016	.984	.021	1.021
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.013	.987	-.028	.972
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.103	1.108	.011	1.011
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.011	.010***	1.010
Direct voice only			-.927***	.396
Collective voice only			-.379*	.684
Dual-voice system			-.010	.990

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .304, Nagelkerke R Square = .409; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .317, Nagelkerke R Square = .426; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 697 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability; 1249 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .023). Model 2 performs better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice, in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination. There is a weakly statistically significant relationship between dual voice and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination, suggesting that dual voice workplaces are more likely than those with direct voice to implement this policy. The relationship is, however, statistically significant at the ten-per-cent level only.

Table 5.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.940***	.053	-2.541***	.079
Total number of employees (natural log)	.434***	1.543	.336***	1.400
Percentage of female workers	.002	1.002	.003	1.003
Percentage of workers with a disability	.049***	1.050	.043***	1.044
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.924***	.397	-.684***	.505
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.060	1.062	.023	1.023
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.127	1.136	.175	1.191
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.130	.878	-.153	.858
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.154	1.167	.076	1.079
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.011***	1.011
Minimalist voice			-.605***	.546
Collective voice only			-.091	.913
Dual-voice system			.333*	1.395

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .217, Nagelkerke R Square = .298; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .229, Nagelkerke R Square = .314; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regression, 694 monitor recruitment and selection in this way; 1252 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice, those with collective voice, in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against (potential) employees from ethnic minorities. There is a statistically significant relationship between dual voice and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination, suggesting that dual voice workplaces are more likely than those with direct voice to implement this policy. The relationship is, however, statistically significant at the ten-per-cent level only.

Table 5.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.993***	.050	-2.572***	.076
Total number of employees (natural log)	.447***	1.564	.352***	1.422
Percentage of female workers	.002	1.002	.003	1.003
Percentage of workers with a disability	.049***	1.050	.042***	1.043
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.940***	.391	-.710***	.492
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.018	1.018	-.020	.981
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.122	1.130	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.126	.882	-.148	.863
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.214	1.239	.136	1.145
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.011***	1.011
Minimalist voice			-.621***	.537
Collective voice only			-.119	.888
Dual-voice system			.303*	1.354

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .222, Nagelkerke R Square = .305; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .233, Nagelkerke R Square = .321; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 681 monitor recruitment in this way; 1265 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .024). Model 2 performs better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05.

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination.

Collectively, the preceding three tables (Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6) suggest that there are no differences between establishments with direct voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment and selection for various forms of indirect discrimination. Any form of voice is an improvement on none. Causality could run 'in either direction'. In other words, all forms of voice are equally effective in encouraging employers to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination. Alternatively, those employers who do not monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination may not wish to countenance any form of voice in their workplaces.

Table 5.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.953***	.052	-2.478***	.084
Total number of employees (natural log)	.413***	1.511	.315***	1.370
Percentage of female workers	.004*	1.004	.005**	1.005
Percentage of workers with a disability	.055***	1.057	.048***	1.049
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.001	1.001	.001	1.001
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.959***	.383	-.726***	.484
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.066	.936	-.111	.895
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.236	1.266	.288*	1.334
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.161	.851	-.185	.831
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.216	1.241	.129	1.138
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.010***	1.011
Minimalist voice			-.691***	.501
Collective voice only			-.170	.843
Dual-voice system			.288	1.334

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square = .300; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .231, Nagelkerke R Square = .319; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 425 monitor recruitment in this way; 1521 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. The models fit the observed data well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

The table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for gender discrimination. However, there is a statistically significant difference between those workplaces with dual-voice systems and those with direct voice measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor promotions for gender discrimination than the latter. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This suggests that it is the combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters to the adoption of this policy amongst workplaces.

Table 5.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.020***	.018	-3.802***	.022
Total number of employees (natural log)	.498***	1.645	.369***	1.446
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.028**	1.029	.024**	1.025
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.006	1.006
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.099***	.333	-.688***	.503
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.246	1.278	.213	1.237
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.263	1.301	.349*	1.417
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.168	.845	-.220	.803
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.144	1.155	.040	1.041
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Minimalist voice			-.993***	.370
Collective voice only			.114	1.121
Dual-voice system			.698***	2.010

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .211, Nagelkerke R Square = .325; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .232, Nagelkerke R Square = .357; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

The Table 5.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 405 monitor recruitment in this way; 1541 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Although Model 1 fits the observed data well (the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05), Model 2 does not. Its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is less than 0.05 (it is 0.027).

The table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. However, there is a statistically significant difference between those workplaces with dual-voice systems and those with direct voice measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination than the latter. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This suggests that it is the combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters to the adoption of this policy amongst workplaces.

Table 5.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.089***	.017	-3.924***	.020
Total number of employees (natural log)	.475***	1.607	.356***	1.428
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Percentage of workers with a disability	.031**	1.032	.028**	1.028
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.007	1.007	.008*	1.008
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.310***	.270	-.928***	.395
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.456*	1.578	.426*	1.532
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.201	1.223	.274	1.316
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.069	.933	-.112	.894
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.122	1.129	.023	1.023
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.011***	1.011
Minimalist voice			-.855***	.425
Collective voice only			.115	1.122
Dual-voice system			.701***	2.016

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .216; Nagelkerke R Square = .338; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .365; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 377 monitor recruitment in this way; 1569 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Model 1 and Model 2 fit the observed data well (the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both).

The Table 5.10 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. However, there is a statistically significant difference between those workplaces with dual-voice systems and those with direct voice measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability than the latter. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This suggests that it is the combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters to the adoption of this policy amongst workplaces.

The likelihood that workplaces will monitor promotions for various forms of discrimination is higher for those establishments with dual-voice systems in place than it is for those with direct voice is consistent across the preceding three tables (Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9). This indicates that it is the combination of direct and collective voice that is associated with the monitoring of promotions for potential discrimination. The two forms of voice may well complement one another. The following chapter examines this relationship in more detail. It assesses whether the attitude towards unions helps to explain such outcomes. In other words, it examines whether or not the association between dual-voice systems and, amongst others, the monitoring of promotions for discriminations depends upon employers having a favourable attitude towards unions.

Table 5.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.889***	.020	-3.724***	.024
Total number of employees (natural log)	.411***	1.508	.302***	1.353
Percentage of female workers	-.003	.997	-.001	.999
Percentage of workers with a disability	.027**	1.027	.023*	1.023
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.006	1.006	.007*	1.007
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.472***	.229	-1.110***	.330
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.340	1.405	.303	1.354
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.309	1.361	.376*	1.457
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.041	.960	-.078	.925
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.232	1.261	.139	1.149
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Minimalist voice			-.813***	.444
Collective voice only			.091	1.096
Dual-voice system			.659***	1.933

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square = .348; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 434 monitor recruitment in this way; 1512 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than the latter to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level.

Table 5.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.361***	.035	-3.038***	.048
Total number of employees (natural log)	.382***	1.465	.267***	1.306
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.025**	1.026	.021*	1.021
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.921***	.398	-.566***	.568
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.195	1.216	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.210	1.234	.276	1.318
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.049	.952	-.085	.919
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.142	1.152	.050	1.051
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Minimalist voice			-.911***	.402
Collective voice only			.023	1.023
Dual-voice system			.508**	1.661

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .240; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .176, Nagelkerke R Square = .269; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 420 monitor promotions for an ethnic bias and 1526 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than the latter to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 5.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.276***	.038	-3.108***	.045
Total number of employees (natural log)	.353***	1.423	.245***	1.278
Percentage of female workers	-.003	.997	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.027**	1.028	.024**	1.024
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.058***	.347	-.712***	.491
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.240	1.271	.212	1.237
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.168	1.182	.226	1.254
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.005	1.005	-.025	.975
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.134	1.143	.051	1.052
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Minimalist voice			-.645**	.525
Collective voice only			.123	1.131
Dual-voice system			.619***	1.858

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .243; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .267; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability discrimination*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 397 monitor promotions for a disability bias and 1549 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than the latter to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Collectively, the preceding three tables indicate that the combination of direct and collective voice within a dual-voice system is more likely to be associated with workplaces monitoring promotions for different forms of indirect discrimination than direct voice alone is. It suggests that it is the combination of the two that is important. Of course, the dual-voice system covers those workplaces that have a favourable attitude towards unions and those that do not. The relationship that has been found here could conceal important differences between those two types of workplace in terms of the likelihood of the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect discrimination. The following chapter will compare these two types of workplace to see if the attitude towards unions alters the likelihood of the workplace monitoring promotions in this way.

Table 5.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.194***	.041	-3.038***	.048
Total number of employees (natural log)	.319***	1.375	.217***	1.243
Percentage of female workers	-.002	.998	-.001	.999
Percentage of workers with a disability	.023*	1.023	.019	1.019
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.151***	.316	-.820***	.440
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.170	1.186	.139	1.149
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.250	1.284	.307*	1.359
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.019	1.020	-.008	.992
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.219	1.245	.139	1.149
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009***	1.009	.008***	1.008
Minimalist voice			-.598**	.550
Collective voice only			.109	1.116
Dual-voice system			.603***	1.828

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .149, Nagelkerke R Square = .233; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by gender*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 387 monitor pay rates for a possible gender bias and 1559 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by gender.

Table 5.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.901***	.007	-4.346***	.013
Total number of employees (natural log)	.569***	1.767	.492***	1.636
Percentage of female workers	-.007**	.993	-.006**	.994
Percentage of workers with a disability	.032***	1.033	.029**	1.030
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.709***	.492	-.513***	.599
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.319	1.376	.301	1.352
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.474**	1.607	.526***	1.692
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.091	1.095	.056	1.057
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.213	1.237	.139	1.149
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.011***	1.011
Minimalist voice			-1.131***	.323
Collective voice only			-.284	.753
Dual-voice system			.030	1.030

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .202, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .213, Nagelkerke R Square = .337; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 256 monitor pay rates for a possible ethnicity bias and 1690 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity.

Table 5.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.262***	.005	-4.932***	.007
Total number of employees (natural log)	.513***	1.670	.422***	1.525
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.002	.998
Percentage of workers with a disability	.031**	1.031	.029**	1.029
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.008	1.008	.009*	1.009
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.065***	.345	-.807***	.446
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.346	1.413	.321	1.378
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.299	1.349	.354	1.424
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.222	1.249	.189	1.208
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.175	1.191	.061	1.063
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.009***	1.009
Minimalist voice			-.913**	.402
Collective voice only			-.250	.778
Dual-voice system			.432	1.540

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .163, Nagelkerke R Square = .302; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

Table 5.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability*. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 233 monitor pay rates for a possible disability bias and 1713 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic's significance is greater than 0.05).

There is no statistically significant difference between those workplaces with direct voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by disability.

The preceding three tables indicate that there is no difference between establishments with some form of meaningful voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor pay rates for biases. In short, any form of voice is an improvement on none. Causality could run 'in either direction'. In other words, all forms of voice are equally effective in encouraging employers to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination. Alternatively, those employers who do not monitor relative pay rates by disability may not wish to countenance any form of voice in their workplaces.

Table 5.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.073***	.006	-4.621***	.010
Total number of employees (natural log)	.477***	1.611	.395***	1.485
Percentage of female workers	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Percentage of workers with a disability	.034***	1.035	.032**	1.033
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.006	1.006
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.181***	.307	-.968***	.380
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.200	1.222	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.624**	1.867	.677***	1.968
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.176	1.192	.143	1.154
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.058	1.060	-.060	.941
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009***	1.009	.008***	1.008
Minimalist voice			-.973**	.378
Collective voice only			-.398	.672
Dual-voice system			.292	1.340

Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .289; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .159, Nagelkerke R Square = .306; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, '**' the 5% level, and '*' the 10% level.

5.3 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has examined those workplaces ‘with voice’ in order to determine if there are any differences amongst them in terms of the likelihood of those workplaces having EO or DM policies in place. Any differences between ‘workplaces with voice’ will have important implications for theory, as analyses often emphasise one form of voice over another.

Overall, the results suggest that there is very little difference in the likelihood of workplaces with direct voice and those with indirect voice having various EO and DM policies in place. In the majority of regression in this chapter, there are no statistically significant differences between these two groups of workplace, suggesting that the two forms of voice can convey the wishes of employees to managers to the same extent. The only statistically significant differences between these two groups arise in terms of the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection by gender and by disability. Establishments with indirect voice are less likely than those with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection in this way, potentially indicating a bias amongst unions to implement policies that benefit their existing members. However, these are the only differences between these two groups of workplace. This, in turn, indicates that unions do not engage in rent-seeking behaviour to promote the interests of their members at the expense of those of the workplace. Similarly, the results suggest that the added degree of protection that unions can, theoretically, afford to employees is not required in terms of workers who call for the implementation of EO and DM policies within their workplaces.

In the majority of regressions in this chapter – except those on the likelihood of the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection as well as the workplace monitoring pay rates – dual voice establishments are more likely than direct voice ones to implement EO and DM policies, suggesting that the presence of direct and indirect voice can complement one another to help promote the adoption of EO and DM policies within establishments. However, this level of aggregation may mask important differences amongst dual voice workplaces between those that view unions favourably and those that do not. The next chapter examines this possibility. Similarly, differences amongst minimal voice workplaces may exist between those that have (within the minimal voice category) above-mean levels of direct voice and those that have below-mean levels of direct voice. Of course, it should not be assumed that the adoption of a greater range of EO and DM policies by a workplace will be associated with superior workplace outcomes, such as absenteeism and quit rates. The associations between EO and DM policies and these outcomes will be examined in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 6 - The Links between ‘Partnership Workplaces’ and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how variation in one of the workplace categories influences the likelihood of workplaces having the EO and DM policies that this thesis examines. More specifically, it examines if those workplaces within the dual voice category that have a positive attitude towards unions, are more likely than those establishments that are also within the dual voice category, but that do not have a positive attitude towards unions, are more likely to have EO and DM policies in place (see Appendix A.3 for summary of results). As noted above, a positive attitude towards unions is measured by surveyed manager’s response to the statement: ‘unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’. Those ‘dual voice’ establishments in which managers either strongly agreed or agreed were classified for the purposes of this research as having a partnership. Those managers in ‘dual voice’ workplaces in which managers ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ were considered to have a ‘co-existence’ approach.

6.2 The Results

Table 6.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is *the presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity*. Of the 717 workplaces in the analysis, 707 have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity, 10 do not. There is, therefore, very little variation in the outcome variable, resulting in very high beta values for the constant in both models. The Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance for Model 1 and Model 2 indicates that both models are not a good fit for the data (Model 2: significance of test statistic = 0.005). Given the limited amount of variation in the outcome variable, this is, perhaps, not surprising. Any model is unlikely to enhance the ability to predict the outcome as there is so little variation to explain. Not one of the independent variables, including the partnership variable, is statistically significant.

Table 6.1 Logistic Regression for ‘Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity’

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	21.273	1733187000.314	20.839	1122661342.449
Total number of employees (natural log)	-.077	.926	-.098	.907
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.001	.999	.000	1.000
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.125	1.133	.129	1.138
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.073	1.076	.078	1.081
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.353	.702	-.189	.828
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	-17.016	.000	-16.995	.000
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	.039	1.040	.083	1.086
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	-.731	.481	-.839	.432
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0)	.312	1.366	.374	1.454
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.863	2.371

Notes: N = 717; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .010, Nagelkerke R Square = .076; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .013, Nagelkerke R Square = .093; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level.

Table 6.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is the establishment *monitors recruitment and selection by gender*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 488 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender, 230 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 the control variables and the dichotomous ‘partnership’ variable. This captures the employer’s attitude towards unions within the establishment. It is measured by the respondent’s answer to the following statement: ‘Unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’. ‘Partnership’ establishments are those where the respondent strongly agreed or agreed with this statement and where a dual voice system operated. Such establishments were given a score of 1. A score of 0 was given to those establishments with a dual-voice system and whose respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Both models provide a good fit for the data. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models indicates that they are a good fit for the data. They are both greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on gender than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection based on gender.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and selection based on gender. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. By contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for a gender bias. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.439***	.087	-2.811***	.060
Total number of employees (natural log)	.465***	1.593	.456***	1.578
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.001	1.001	.002	1.002
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.062**	1.064	.065**	1.067
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.002	1.002	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.272***	.280	-1.156***	.315
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.321	1.378	.314	1.369
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.010	1.010	.030	1.030
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.005	.995	-.064	.938
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.147	1.158	.127	1.135
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.013***	1.013	.013***	1.014
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.576***	1.779

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .284; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .214, Nagelkerke R Square = .299; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the independent variable and the workplace *monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 489 monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity, 229 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous control variable. Both models fit the data well as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05. They are both greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection based on gender.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. By contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for an ethnicity bias. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.516***	.081	-2.788***	.062
Total number of employees (natural log)	.476***	1.610	.469***	1.598
Percentage of female workers	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Percentage of workers with a disability	.058**	1.060	.060**	1.062
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.346***	.260	-1.258***	.284
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.294	1.342	.287	1.332
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.004	.996	.012	1.012
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.027	1.027	-.016	.984
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.088	1.092	.073	1.076
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.013***	1.013	.013***	1.013
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.425**	1.529

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .211, Nagelkerke R Square = .296; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .217, Nagelkerke R Square = .303; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection by disability*.

Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 473 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability, 245 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is not significant for both models.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection based on disability.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log; the higher the percentage of the workforce who have a disability; and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled; the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection based on disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. In contrast to the preceding regressions, then, the variable that measures the percentage of the establishment's workforce who have a disability is statistically significant at a higher level. We can, correspondingly, be more confident that an association exists between this variable and the outcome (monitoring recruitment and selection for a disability bias) when the establishment has more workers with a disability. This conforms to 'common sense' expectations that this relationship is more likely to be present when the establishment has a higher percentage of workers with a disability, highlighting the robustness of the results. If workers in the largest occupational group have 'a lot' or 'some' variety in their work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection for any bias against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It may indicate that workplaces that follow strategies that do not depend upon workers carrying out the same procedures whilst at work wish to ensure that they are recruiting the most suitable candidates compared to workplaces in which many workers have little or no variety in their work. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for a disability bias. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.431***	.088	-2.696***	.067
Total number of employees (natural log)	.401***	1.494	.392***	1.480
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.001	1.001	.002	1.002
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.104***	1.110	.108***	1.114
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.000	1.000	.002	1.002
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.502***	.223	-1.414***	.243
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.526*	1.693	.521*	1.684
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.152	1.164	.168	1.183
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.026	1.027	-.014	.986
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.104	1.110	.090	1.094
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.424**	1.528

Notes: N = 718; Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .239, Nagelkerke R Square = .331; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 412 monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect gender discrimination, 306 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination based on gender.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. By contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.975***	.139	-2.209***	.110
Total number of employees (natural log)	.307***	1.360	.299***	1.348
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.000	1.000	.001	1.001
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.054**	1.056	.057**	1.058
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	-.002	.998	-.001	.999
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.734***	.480	-.651***	.522
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.027	1.027	.020	1.020
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.243	1.275	.256	1.292
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.223	.800	-.261	.771
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.011	1.011	-.003	.997
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.015***	1.015	.015***	1.015
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.384**	1.468

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .148, Nagelkerke R Square = .198; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .154, Nagelkerke R Square = .206; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 412 monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, 306 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 fits the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination based on ethnicity.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.142***	.117	-2.359***	.095
Total number of employees (natural log)	.340***	1.405	.332***	1.394
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.001	.999	.000	1.000
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.051**	1.053	.053**	1.055
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	-.001	.999	.000	1.000
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.853***	.426	-.776***	.460
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.002	1.002	-.005	.995
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.209	1.232	.221	1.247
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.136	.873	-.171	.843
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.076	1.079	.063	1.066
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.015***	1.015	.015***	1.015
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.356**	1.428

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .218; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .167, Nagelkerke R Square = .224; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 405 monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination against workers with a disability, 313 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination against workers with a disability.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.042***	.130	-2.301***	.100
Total number of employees (natural log)	.309***	1.361	.300***	1.350
Percentage of female workers within workforce	.001	1.001	.002	1.002
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.047**	1.048	.049**	1.051
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.000	1.000	.001	1.001
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.946***	.388	-.858***	.424
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.063	.939	-.074	.928
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.346	1.413	.361	1.435
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.203	.816	-.244	.783
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.125	1.133	.111	1.117
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.013***	1.013	.013***	1.013
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.420**	1.521

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .218; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .169, Nagelkerke R Square = .227; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for gender discrimination*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 300 monitor promotions for gender discrimination; 418 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor promotions for gender discrimination than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for gender discrimination.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the workers, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. This contrasts with previous regressions in which the association was not statistically significant, indicating potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and selection. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers in largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the establishment is less likely to monitor promotions for a gender bias. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It suggests that there might be a tension between delegating some decision-making powers to lower-level employees with workplaces and the use of policies that cover all workplace employees.

Table 6.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.093***	.045	-3.347***	.035
Total number of employees (natural log)	.390***	1.477	.383***	1.467
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.005	.995	-.004	.996
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.037*	1.038	.039*	1.039
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.008	1.008	.009	1.010
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.979***	.376	-.896***	.408
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.297	1.346	.291	1.338
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.235	1.266	.244	1.276
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.336*	.715	-.372*	.689
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.023	1.023	.007	1.007
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.015***	1.015	.015***	1.015
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.394**	1.483

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .184, Nagelkerke R Square = .248; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .190, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 289 monitor promotions of discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority; 419 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This relationship is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This contrasts with previous regressions in which the association was not statistically significant, indicating potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and selection. The results suggest that the percentage of workers with a disability in the establishment's workforce is an indicator that the establishment monitors promotions for different kinds of discrimination. If workers in the largest occupational group within the establishment have 'a lot' or 'some' variety in their work, the establishment is more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. This suggests that workplaces that require their employees to carry out a range of activities are likely to implement policies that ensure employees are treated fairly. The link is, however, only weakly significant, and it is not present in the other two regressions that measure the same EO and DM policy. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers

in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the establishment is less likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It suggests that there might be a tension between delegating some decision-making powers to lower-level employees with workplaces and the use of policies that cover all workplace employees.

Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.173***	.042	-3.450***	.032
Total number of employees (natural log)	.369***	1.446	.361***	1.435
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.006	.994	-.005	.995
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.047**	1.049	.049**	1.051
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.010	1.010	.011*	1.011
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.252***	.286	-1.165***	.312
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.565*	1.760	.562*	1.754
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.151	1.163	.155	1.168
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.229	.795	-.266	.767
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.054	.947	-.070	.933
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.015***	1.015	.015***	1.015
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.423**	1.526

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .199, Nagelkerke R Square = .268; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .205, Nagelkerke R Square = .277; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 718 establishments in the analysis, 269 monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability, 449 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

In contrast to previous regressions, the variable that measures the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment is not statistically significant, indicating potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and selection.

Table 6.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.077***	.046	-3.338***	.035
Total number of employees (natural log)	.324***	1.383	.317***	1.373
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.004	.996	-.003	.997
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.032	1.033	.034	1.034
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.009	1.009	.010	1.010
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.572***	.208	-1.493***	.225
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.506	1.659	.501	1.651
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.158	1.171	.158	1.171
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.143	.867	-.175	.839
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.085	1.089	.075	1.078
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.013***	1.013	.013***	1.013
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.401**	1.494

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .198, Nagelkerke R Square = .270; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .277; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 718 establishments in the analysis, 285 monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination, 433 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This relationship is, however, only weakly statistically significant.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Interestingly, the higher the percentage of the establishment's workforce that is female, the less likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It, potentially, indicates that workplaces do not wish to draw attention to potential discrimination if they have a large percentage of female workers.

In contrast to previous regressions, the variable that measures the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment is not statistically significant, indicating potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and selection.

Table 6.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.149***	.117	-2.336***	.097
Total number of employees (natural log)	.260***	1.297	.253***	1.288
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.008**	.992	-.007*	.993
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.031	1.032	.032	1.033
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.003	1.003	.004	1.004
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.804***	.448	-.736***	.479
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.119	1.126	.111	1.118
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.361	1.435	.369	1.446
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.145	.865	-.168	.845
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.096	1.101	.086	1.090
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.304*	1.355

Notes: N = 718; Model1: Cox & Snell R Square = .110, Nagelkerke R Square = .149; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .114, Nagelkerke R Square = .154; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 718 workplaces in the establishment, 278 monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, 440 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are more likely to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination.

Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.061***	.127	-2.284***	.102
Total number of employees (natural log)	.228***	1.256	.220***	1.246
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.007*	.993	-.006	.994
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.034*	1.034	.035*	1.036
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.005	1.005	.006	1.006
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.984***	.374	-.906***	.404
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.199	1.220	.190	1.210
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.283	1.327	.289	1.336
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.078	.925	-.104	.901
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.039	1.039	.027	1.027
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.358**	1.431

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .114, Nagelkerke R Square = .155; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .120, Nagelkerke R Square = .163; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability discrimination*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 263 monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability, 455 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more likely to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability.

A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent and five-per-cent levels, respectively. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.982***	.138	-2.155***	.116
Total number of employees (natural log)	.208***	1.231	.202***	1.223
Percentage of female workers	-.006	.994	-.006	.994
Percentage of workers with a disability	.021	1.021	.022	1.022
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.212***	.298	-1.152***	.316
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.239	1.270	.232	1.261
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.249	1.282	.251	1.285
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.019	.981	-.038	.963
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.159	1.172	.152	1.164
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007**	1.007	.007**	1.007
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.280	1.324

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .111, Nagelkerke R Square = .152; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .114, Nagelkerke R Square = .156; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by gender*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 257 monitor relative pay rates by gender, 461 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more likely to monitor relative pay rates by gender than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by gender.

A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers who have a disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.881***	.021	-3.937***	.020
Total number of employees (natural log)	.457***	1.580	.455***	1.576
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.005	.995	-.005	.995
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.047**	1.049	.048**	1.049
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	-.002	.998	-.002	.998
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-.844***	.430	-.822***	.440
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.483	1.621	.481	1.618
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.294	1.342	.295	1.343
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.250	1.284	.244	1.276
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.289	.749	-.293	.746
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011***	1.011	.011***	1.011
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.096	1.101

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .178, Nagelkerke R Square = .244; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .178, Nagelkerke R Square = .245; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity*. Of the 718 establishments in the analysis, 191 monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity, 527 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more likely to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity.

A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers who have a disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers who come from an ethnic minority within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. This variable was not statistically significant in preceding regressions. Although it is only statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, it does indicate the robustness of the results as establishments with higher percentages of workers from an ethnic minority can be expected to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 6.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.996***	.018	-4.141***	.016
Total number of employees (natural log)	.399***	1.490	.394***	1.483
Percentage of female workers within workforce	-.001	.999	.000	1.000
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce	.038*	1.039	.039**	1.040
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce	.010	1.010	.011*	1.011
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.088***	.337	-1.037***	.355
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.325	1.384	.320	1.377
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.171	1.187	.169	1.184
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.197	1.217	.185	1.203
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.349	.706	-.359	.699
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.010***	1.010	.010***	1.010
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.232	1.261

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .152, Nagelkerke R Square = .221; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .153, Nagelkerke R Square = .224; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 6.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability*. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 173 monitor relative pay rates by disability, 545 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more likely to monitor relative pay rates by disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by disability.

A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor relative pay rates by disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent and five-per-cent levels, respectively. The higher the percentage of workers who have a disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This association highlights the robustness of the results as it can be expected establishments with a higher percentage of workers with a disability are likely to create policies to monitor potential sources of bias against them. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The variable that captures the extent to which the largest occupational group is involved in work design is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It is negatively associated with the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by disability. Although this link is only weakly statistically significant, it suggests a possible tension between providing employees with some decision-making powers and the implementation of broader policies that affect employees. The data do not allow for firm conclusions to be drawn. It would, for instance, be beneficial to know what aspects of 'work design' are delegated to workers in the largest occupational group.

Table 6.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.859***	.021	-4.024***	.018
Total number of employees (natural log)	.378***	1.459	.373***	1.452
Percentage of female workers	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Percentage of workers with a disability	.041**	1.042	.042**	1.043
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.005	1.005
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1)	-1.301***	.272	-1.242***	.289
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.158	1.171	.149	1.161
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.491	1.634	.487	1.628
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.176	1.192	.164	1.178
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.518*	.596	-.528*	.590
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009**	1.009	.009**	1.009
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)			.264	1.302

Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .148, Nagelkerke R Square = .222; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .225; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

6.3 Chapter Conclusion

The results in this chapter reveal that the presence of a partnership within a workplace is associated with a higher likelihood of the workplace having a range of EO and DM policies in place. In other words, a favourable attitude towards unions amongst those workplaces that have both direct and indirect voice measures in place is linked to a higher likelihood of the workplace adopting EO and DM policies. This finding may result from a greater willingness amongst managers who have a favourable attitude towards unions to listen to their concerns. An alternative explanation is that those workplaces that adopt a more extensive range of EO and DM measures in order to promote co-operative employment relations are also those that have a favourable attitude towards unions for the same reasons.

Chapter 7 - The Links between ‘Bleak Houses’ and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how variation in one of the workplace categories influences the likelihood of workplaces having the EO and DM policies that this thesis examines. More specifically, it examines if those workplace within the minimal voice category that have below mean number on the direct voice index ‘bleak houses’ and those that have an above mean ‘limited approach’ towards unions, are more likely to have EO and DM policies in place (see Appendix A.4 for summary of results). Bleak houses are those establishments that do not have collective voice and that have a below-mean score for the direct-voice measure amongst workplaces within ‘minimal’ voice. In other words, they have no indirect voice and fall within the lowest quartile on the direct-voice measure. For ease of interpretation, such workplaces are given a value of ‘0’ on the ‘bleak house’ dummy variable. Those workplaces that also have no collective voice, but that have an above-mean score on the direct-voice measure amongst ‘minimalist’ workplaces have a value of ‘1’. This aids interpretation, as it indicates if some, very limited direct voice is more likely to be associated with EO and DM outcomes than no or ‘next to no’ direct voice.

7.2 The Results

Table 7.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is *the presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 797 have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity, 143 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the ‘bleak house’ dichotomous variable.

The statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow statistics indicates that Model 1 and Model 2 do not provide a good fit for the data; it is less than 0.05 for both models (0.014 for Model 1 and 0.011 for Model 2). This is not surprising given the relatively limited amount of variation on the outcome variable. A model with just a constant in it would already account for much of the variation in the outcome; adding variables does not help to explain that small number of workplaces that do not have a formal written EO or DM policy.

The 'bleak house' dummy variable that differentiates between those minimalist workplaces that have below-mean direct voice (value = 0) and those that have above-mean values of direct voice within the minimalist group of establishments (value = 1) indicates that those with more voice are more likely to have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. This indicates that, even within the minimalist voice category, there is an association between voice and an EO and DM policy. This association is statistically significant at the 1-per-cent level. The model is, however, not a good fit for the data overall.

Several other variables are statistically significant. The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, and the higher the percentage of the female employees within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to have a formal written EO or DM policy. These associations are statistically significant at the 1-per-cent level. Private-sector establishments are less likely to have a formal written EO or DM policy than those in the public sector. This association is statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have 'a lot' or 'some' discretion over how they work, the establishment is less likely to have a formal written policy. This association is statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level. This link suggests that there may be a tension between granting employees discretion over how they work and implementing policies that affect all establishment employees.

Table 7.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.504**	.222	-1.305**	.271
Total number of employees (natural log)	.898***	2.455	.758***	2.134
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.009***	1.010	.009***	1.009
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.077	1.080	.079	1.082
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.005	.995
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.853***	.426	-.761**	.467
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.515**	1.673	.418	1.518
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.504**	.604	-.493**	.611
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.051	1.053	-.050	.952
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.301	1.352	.229	1.257
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.001	1.001	-.001	.999
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			1.052***	2.863

Notes: N = 940; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .120, Nagelkerke R Square = .208; Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .143; Nagelkerke R Square = .249; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is the establishment *monitors recruitment and selection by gender*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 245 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender, 702 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 provides a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05. Model 2 does not, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on gender. It is, however, important to remember that Model 2 does not provide a good fit for the data, overall.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are female, who have a disability, and who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. All three associations are statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. If a workplace has a high number of female employees, the likelihood that recruitment and selection will be monitored in this way could be interpreted as a reflection of pressure on managers to ensure that they are treated fairly. Alternatively, it may indicate that the workplaces that monitor recruitment and selection by gender are more attractive places for women to work, resulting in more women working in the establishment. Similarly, the higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the greater the pressure on managers to ensure that recruitment and selection is ‘fair’. Alternatively, if a workplace monitors recruitment and selection by gender, this could be a signal to those with a disability, that the workplace is an attractive place to work. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This could reflect the fact that finding such

workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.440***	.032	-3.488***	.031
Total number of employees (natural log)	.585***	1.795	.536***	1.710
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.007**	1.007	.007**	1.007
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.057**	1.059	.057**	1.059
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.004	1.004	.004	1.004
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.311***	.270	-1.272***	.280
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.342	1.407	.279	1.321
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.045	1.046	.064	1.066
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.085	.918	-.111	.895
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.161	.851	-.216	.806
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007**	1.007	.006**	1.006
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.535***	1.707

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.211, Nagelkerke R square = 0.309; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.217, Nagelkerke R square = 0.319; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the independent variable and the workplace *monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 255 monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity, 692 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables: Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis has collective voice measures in place. Model 1 provides a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05. Model 2 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity. It is, however, important to remember that Model 2 does not provide a good fit for the data, overall.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, and the higher the percentage of workers who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are female and the higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. The former association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level; the latter, at the five-per-cent level. If a workplace has a high number of female employees, the likelihood that recruitment and selection will be monitored in this way could be interpreted as a reflection of pressure on managers to ensure that all potential employees are treated fairly. Alternatively, it may indicate that the workplaces that monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity are more attractive places for women to work, resulting in more women working in the establishment. This link is, however, only weakly statistically significant. Similarly, the higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the greater the pressure on managers to ensure that recruitment and selection is ‘fair’. Alternatively, if a workplace monitors recruitment and selection by ethnicity, this could be a signal to those with a disability that the workplace is an

attractive place to work. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This could reflect the fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.438***	.032	-3.497***	.030
Total number of employees (natural log)	.601***	1.823	.543***	1.721
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.006**	1.006	.005*	1.005
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.067**	1.069	.067**	1.069
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.005	1.005	.006	1.006
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.341***	.262	-1.299***	.273
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.405	1.499	.331	1.393
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.076	.927	-.055	.947
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.034	.967	-.067	.935
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.226	.798	-.292	.746
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009***	1.009	.009***	1.009
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.638***	1.893

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.226, Nagelkerke R square = 0.328; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.234, Nagelkerke R square = 0.341; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection by disability*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 231 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability, 716 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on disability.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, and the higher the percentage of workers who have a disability, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This could reflect the fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Unlike previous regressions that assess the likelihood that, within minimalist workplaces, establishments will monitor recruitment and selection by gender or ethnicity, the percentage of female employees within the establishment is not statistically associated with the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection by disability.

Table 7.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.367***	.034	-3.429***	.032
Total number of employees (natural log)	.544***	1.722	.497***	1.644
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.006*	1.006	.005	1.005
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.077***	1.080	.076***	1.079
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.411***	.244	-1.374***	.253
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.445*	1.561	.383	1.466
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.022	.978	-.003	.997
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.102	1.108	.079	1.082
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.223	.800	-.276	.759
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007**	1.007	.006**	1.006
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.540***	1.716

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.209, Nagelkerke R square = 0.312; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.216, Nagelkerke = 0.321; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitors recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 202 monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect gender discrimination, 745 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect gender discrimination. This suggests that direct voice can still influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces that have very little direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect gender discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This could reflect the fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.450***	.032	-3.562***	.028
Total number of employees (natural log)	.466***	1.594	.418***	1.519
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.005	1.005	.004	1.004
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.053**	1.055	.054**	1.056
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.001	.999	-.001	.999
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.888***	.412	-.843***	.430
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.338	1.402	.270	1.310
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.019	.981	-.001	.999
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.109	1.115	.085	1.089
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.053	.948	-.113	.894
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.006**	1.006	.006**	1.006
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.629***	1.876

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.133, Nagelkerke R square = 0.206; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.142, Nagelkerke R square = 0.220; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 199 monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, 748 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This suggests that direct voice can still influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces that have very little direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This link, too, is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This association is, as before, statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.427***	.032	-3.533***	.029
Total number of employees (natural log)	.471***	1.601	.424***	1.529
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.055**	1.056	.055**	1.057
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.837***	.433	-.794***	.452
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.263	1.301	.198	1.219
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.016	.985	.001	1.001
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.072	1.074	.049	1.051
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.021	.979	-.080	.923
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007**	1.007	.007**	1.007
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.608***	1.837

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.129, Nagelkerke R square = 0.201; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.138, Nagelkerke R square 0.215; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 193 monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against workers with a disability, 754 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This suggests that direct voice can still influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces that have very little direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace and the higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This link, too, is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.437***	.032	-3.547***	.029
Total number of employees (natural log)	.436***	1.547	.391***	1.478
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.006*	1.006	.005	1.005
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.074***	1.077	.075***	1.077
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.001	.999	-.001	.999
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.811***	.444	-.766***	.465
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.117	1.125	.047	1.049
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.120	1.127	.139	1.149
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.108	1.114	.087	1.091
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.073	.930	-.130	.878
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007**	1.007	.006**	1.006
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.603***	1.828

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.126, Nagelkerke R square = 0.199; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.135, Nagelkerke R square = 0.212; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for gender discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 88 monitor promotions for gender discrimination, 859 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is not associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for gender discrimination compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over how they work, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, indicating potentially that, amongst ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces, those that pursue a strategy based, in part, on granting some employees a degree of decision-making powers are more likely to implement policies that check for gender bias in promotions. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.990***	.007	-5.095***	.006
Total number of employees (natural log)	.547***	1.728	.530***	1.698
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.003	.997	-.003	.997
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.026	1.026	.027	1.027
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.004	.996
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.038***	.354	-1.019***	.361
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.370	1.448	.338	1.402
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.637*	1.890	.643*	1.903
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.055	1.057	.056	1.057
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.027	.973	-.061	.941
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009**	1.009	.008**	1.008
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.351	1.420

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.107, Nagelkerke R square = 0.232; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.108, Nagelkerke = 0.235; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 84 monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination, 863 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant in the logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a 'minimal' level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is not associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination compared to those 'minimalist' workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.081***	.006	-5.221***	.005
Total number of employees (natural log)	.530***	1.699	.511***	1.666
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.004	.996	-.004	.996
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.024	1.024	.025	1.025
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.001	.999	-.001	.999
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.205***	.300	-1.182***	.307
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.626	1.870	.588	1.801
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.501	1.650	.510	1.665
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.225	1.253	.226	1.254
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.027	.973	-.062	.940
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.008*	1.008	.008*	1.008
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.419	1.521

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.109, Nagelkerke R square = 0.243; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.111, Nagelkerke R square = 0.247; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 79 monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability, 868 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for Model 1 and Model 2.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant in the logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is not associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over how they work, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-5.038***	.006	-5.176***	.006
Total number of employees (natural log)	.487***	1.628	.467***	1.596
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.003	.997	-.004	.996
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.026	1.026	.026	1.027
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.004	.996
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-1.201***	.301	-1.180***	.307
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.412	1.510	.372	1.451
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.851**	2.342	.862**	2.367
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.223	1.250	.225	1.253
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.001	.999	-.035	.965
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007	1.007	.007	1.007
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.428	1.534

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.100, Nagelkerke R square = 0.229; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.102, Nagelkerke R square = 0.233; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the workplace *monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 103 monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination, 844 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over how they work, the establishment is more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.575***	.010	-4.765***	.009
Total number of employees (natural log)	.449***	1.566	.417***	1.517
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.003	1.003	.002	1.002
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.022	1.022	.023	1.023
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.001	.999	-.001	.999
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.897***	.408	-.856***	.425
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.546	1.726	.488	1.629
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.144	1.155	.155	1.168
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.266	1.305	.255	1.291
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.136	.873	-.181	.834
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.008**	1.008	.008**	1.008
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.600**	1.823

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.092, Nagelkerke R square = 0.185; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.097, Nagelkerke R square = 0.195; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 103 monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination, 844 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discriminations. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.603***	.010	-4.794***	.008
Total number of employees (natural log)	.450***	1.569	.417***	1.518
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.003	1.003	.003	1.003
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.023	1.023	.024	1.025
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.863***	.422	-.822***	.439
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.573	1.773	.514	1.672
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.049	1.051	.062	1.064
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.351	1.421	.338	1.402
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.122	.885	-.167	.847
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007*	1.007	.007*	1.007
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.608**	1.836

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.089, Nagelkerke R square = 0.178; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.094, Nagelkerke = 0.188; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability discrimination*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 98 monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a disability, 849 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.

The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the establishment will monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a disability compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.

Table 7.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.565***	.010	-4.790***	.008
Total number of employees (natural log)	.403***	1.496	.365***	1.441
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	.004	1.004	.003	1.003
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.024	1.025	.026	1.026
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.001	.999	-.001	.999
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.820***	.441	-.775***	.461
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.367	1.443	.299	1.349
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.327	1.387	.343	1.409
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.317	1.373	.305	1.357
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	-.055	.946	-.105	.900
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.007*	1.007	.007*	1.007
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean = 1)			.694**	2.003

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.079, Nagelkerke = 0.163; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.085, Nagelkerke R square = 0.176; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by gender*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 83 monitor relative pay rates by gender, 864 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor relative pay rates by gender compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce who have a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates in this way. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of female employees within the establishment’s workforce, the less likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, potentially indicating a reluctance on the part of managers to implement such a policy for fear of revealing inconsistencies in the pay system.

Table 7.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-6.447***	.002	-6.509***	.001
Total number of employees (natural log)	.676***	1.965	.661***	1.936
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.008	.992	-.009*	.991
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.032*	1.033	.033*	1.033
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	-.004	.996	-.004	.996
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.597**	.550	-.592**	.553
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.207	1.231	.190	1.209
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	1.099***	3.000	1.101***	3.006
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.170	1.185	.171	1.187
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.504	1.655	.473	1.605
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.012***	1.012	.012***	1.012
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.258	1.295

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.123, Nagelkerke R square = 0.274; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.123, Nagelkerke R square = 0.275; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 44 monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity, 903 do not. As there is relatively little variation in the outcome variable, the results of this particular regression should be treated tentatively. Ideally, at least 10 per cent of the cases should fall into any one category in regressions. For this regression, just under five per cent fall into the category of establishments that monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who have a disability, who are highly skilled, and if employees in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. These links are statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Unlike previous regressions, there is no statistically significant difference between the private-sector and public-sector organisations in terms of the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity.

Table 7.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-8.328***	.000	-8.337***	.000
Total number of employees (natural log)	.600***	1.823	.599***	1.819
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.005	.995	-.005	.995
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.045**	1.046	.045**	1.046
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.007	1.007	.007	1.007
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.616	.540	-.616	.540
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.651	1.918	.649	1.914
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.922	2.515	.923	2.516
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.991**	2.695	.992**	2.696
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.841	2.318	.838	2.312
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.011**	1.011	.011**	1.011
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.035	1.036

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.087, Nagelkerke R square = 0.277; Model 2 Cox and Snell = 0.87, Nagelkerke = 0.277; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

Table 7.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between the independent variables and the *workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability*. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 40 monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without a disability, 907 do not. As there is relatively little variation in the outcome variable, the results of this particular regression should be treated tentatively. Ideally, at least 10 per cent of the cases should fall into any one category in regressions. For this regression, just under five per cent fall into the category of establishments that monitor relative pay rates by disability. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.

The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without a disability compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.

Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the workplace, and if employees in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over how they work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who have a disability, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without a disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees within the establishment’s largest occupational group who have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Taken together, these results indicate that the establishment’s strategy influences the likelihood that the workplace will monitor pay rates in this way: the more discretion and the more control workers in the largest occupational group have, the more likely it is that the establishment will monitor relative pay rates by disability. As noted above, however, the limited variation in the outcome variable means that the results should be treated with caution.

As in the majority of previous the 'bleak house' regressions, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level.

Table 7.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-8.338***	.000	-8.371***	.000
Total number of employees (natural log)	.516***	1.676	.511***	1.667
Percentage of the total workforce who are female	-.007	.993	-.007	.993
Percentage of the total workforce who have a disability	.054**	1.056	.054**	1.056
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an ethnic minority	.007	1.007	.007	1.007
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	-.750*	.472	-.751*	.472
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in their work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.431	1.538	.421	1.523
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion over how they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	1.805**	6.083	1.809**	6.104
Workers in largest occupational group have control over the pace at which they work ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.883*	2.417	.885*	2.422
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in work design ('a lot' or 'some' = 1; 'a little' or 'none' = 0)	.873	2.393	.868	2.382
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	.009	1.009	.009	1.009
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1)			.110	1.116

Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.078, Nagelkerke R square = 0.263; Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.078, Nagelkerke = 0.264; '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. '**' at the 5% level, and '*' at the 10% level.

7.3 Chapter Conclusion

The results of this chapter reveal that, amongst minimal voice workplaces, those with an above-mean level of direct voice are more likely than those with below-mean levels of direct voice to implement EO and DM policies. Even amongst workplaces with limited levels of direct voice, there is an association between workplaces with higher levels of voice compared to those with lower levels of voice. This is based on the finding that in around half of the regressions in this chapter, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups. This difference is often statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, suggesting a strong link between higher levels of voice and some of the EO and DM policies examined here.

This supports the theoretical arguments in favour of direct voice, as, put simply, some direct voice is an improvement on none or very little. The presence of some direct voice mechanisms within workplaces, even if these are relatively few in number or limited in the degree of influence that they have, may enable employees to convey their wishes to managers within the workplace. Of course, an alternative explanation is that, amongst minimal voice workplaces, there may be differences in the degree to which managers seek to establish co-operative employee relations, leading to a greater emphasis on both EO and DM policies and direct voice mechanisms within workplaces.

Chapter 8 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies and Absenteeism: An Empirical Analysis

8.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the links between the various EO and DM policies and absenteeism for the different categories of workplaces (direct, dual, partnership and minimalist) in order to establish if these policies are, in general, associated with an increase or a decrease in absenteeism or if they ‘only’ have links to higher or lower absenteeism rates for different types of workplace. Higher rates of absenteeism are likely to reflect higher levels of employee dissatisfaction within any particular workplaces, as disgruntled employees may be unable or unwilling to leave a firm, but may be prepared to call in sick even though they are not (Deery *et al.*, 2002; Tüselmann *et al.* 2007). In addition, the HRM and industrial relations literatures have emphasized the importance of placing worker-related outcomes, such as absenteeism, at the centre of the analysis (Addison and Belman, 2004; Arthur, 1994; Grund and Schmitt, 2013; Guest and Hoque, 1994; Guest, 2011; Guthrie, 2001; Hoque, 1999; Pfeifer, 2011; Ramsay *et al.*, 2000). The question in the WERS survey asks for the ‘percentage of work days lost through sickness or absence in the last year’; it is, therefore, assumed here that higher levels of absenteeism reflect greater dissatisfaction amongst employees rather than more pronounced levels of sickness amongst a particular workforce (Deery *et al.*, 2002; Tüselmann *et al.* 2007). Other factors will, of course, play a role in shaping absenteeism, including workers’ responsibilities to look after children or elderly relatives and the percentage of the workers who are highly skilled. A greater percentage of highly skilled employees in a workforce is likely to result in more employees having stimulating and interesting jobs, potentially leading to lower levels of absenteeism. Relatedly, greater variation in the work of the largest group of workers as well as employees in the largest occupational group having greater control over their work are likely to lead to lower levels of absenteeism, as employees in that group will have more satisfying jobs.

The absenteeism rates are not normally distributed and are skewed, rendering the use of ordinary least squares inappropriate. This thesis, therefore, dichotomises this variable. It does so by taking the arithmetic mean of the absenteeism rate. Those establishments with an ‘above mean’ absenteeism rate are coded 1; those workplaces with a mean or below mean absenteeism rate are coded 0. This dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as these do not rest on parametric assumptions (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in

common with the analysis in the first stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. In the second stage of the analysis, in order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between (or the ‘non independence’ of) the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are run for each EO and DM policy.

All of the control variables, outlined above, are included in every one of the regressions. The control variables are the size of the workplace (as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees), the percentage of workforce that is female, the percentage of the workforce that has a disability, the percentage of workers from an ethnic minority in the workplace, whether the workplace is in the private or public sector, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion in their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupation group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ say in the design of their work, the total percentage of the workplace that is highly skilled.

Overall, the results for the logistic regressions that examine the links between absenteeism and the individual EO and DM policies within the individual categories of each type of workplace indicate no statistically significant links. In other words, most of the EO and DM policies have no association – either positive or negative – with absenteeism. There are a few exceptions to this general rule that are discussed below.

8.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces

The results for the regressions that examine the links between equal opportunities and absenteeism in Minimal Voice workplaces are shown in Table 8.1. Within this group of workplaces, not one of the equal opportunities policies is statistically significantly related to absenteeism. Equal opportunities do not, therefore, seem to influence absenteeism – either to increase or decrease it. Amongst this group of workplaces, then, attempts to increase EO and DM policies may not result in a decrease in absenteeism. Such workplaces may exhibit other characteristics that limit any influence that such policies may have. For instance, other policies pursued by the workplace, such as how employees are generally treated, their pay, and the amount of effort they must invest in work, may diminish any potentially beneficial effects of EO and DM policies.

Indeed, it is interesting to note that the variable that captures if employees in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work is associated with an increase in absenteeism for all of the EO and DM policies. (Please see Appendix Table B.1 for a summary of the regression results for ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces that also identifies any of the control variables that are statistically different as well as the level at which they are statistically significant.) This link is statistically significant at the 10 per-cent level. One interpretation of this is that enhanced ‘work variety’ within ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces could conceal work intensification, as employees are asked to take on additional responsibilities without any commensurate increase in pay, leading to higher workloads, increased employee dissatisfaction, and greater levels of employee absenteeism. The only other variable that is statistically significant in all of the separate logistic regressions for the EO and DM policies is ‘the percentage of the workforce that is female’. The association in all of the regressions is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. In other words, the higher the percentage of female workers in the workforce, the more likely it is that the absenteeism rate within the workforce will be higher. This could reflect women’s increased likelihood that they will perform child-care responsibilities.

It should also be noted that the Nagelkerke R squared is relatively low for all of the regressions, never exceeding four per cent. This indicates that the model accounts for only a small amount of the variation in the outcome variable, absenteeism. This supports the argument that other factors are likely to influence absenteeism in minimalist voice workplaces. Indeed, one factor that may shape absenteeism in these workplaces is the use of agency staff, who do not have the ability to be absent from work without jeopardizing future work with the agency. Such factors have not been included in this research, as the aim of this research is to trace the links between different forms of voice, equal opportunities, two key organisational outcomes; the aim is not to assess all of the factors that could influence absenteeism and quits within workplaces. However, overall, the findings for the links between equal opportunities policies and absenteeism within minimalist workplaces should assess other possible sources for variation in absenteeism besides equal opportunities.

Table 8.1 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.399	0.034
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.275	0.031
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.466	0.032
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.605	0.034
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.629	0.032
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.056	0.031
Monitor promotions by gender	N	0.076	0.036
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N	0.710	0.036
Monitor promotions by disability	N	0.079	0.035
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.194	0.031
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.077	0.032
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.161	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	0.059	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.214	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.100	0.031

Notes: N = 516.

8.3 Direct Voice Workplaces

The results for the associations between the various EO and DM policies examined in this research and absenteeism for ‘direct voice only’ workplaces show a similar pattern to minimalist voice workplaces. The results are shown in Table 8.2. In none of the regressions is the EO and DM policies related to absenteeism in a statistically significant way. Amongst this group of workplaces, attempts to increase equal opportunities policies may not result in a decrease in absenteeism. Such workplaces may exhibit other characteristics that limit any influence that such policies may have. For instance, other policies pursued by the workplace, such as how employees are generally treated, their pay, and the amount of effort they must invest in work, may diminish any potentially beneficial effects of EO and DM policies.

Unlike minimalist voice workplaces, however, the only variable that is statistically significant in most of the regressions for ‘direct voice’ workplaces is the ‘percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled’. (Please see Appendix Table B.2 for a summary of the statistical significance of the control variables.) The association between this variable and absenteeism is negative and statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It is present in all of the regressions for the ‘direct voice only’ workplaces except for the ‘monitor recruitment and selection by gender’ and ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’ regressions. In other words, in general, the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within the workforce, the lower the absenteeism rate is likely to be; this link is only weakly significant, however. It suggests that more highly skilled employees have more rewarding jobs than those who are less skilled, and are, therefore, less likely to take unofficial absences from work.

Once again, the Nagelkerke R squared is relatively low for all of the regressions, only once slightly exceeding five per cent. This indicates that the model accounts for only a small amount of the variation in the outcome variable, absenteeism. This supports the argument that other factors are likely to influence absenteeism in direct voice only workplaces. In such workplaces, the use of agency staff may be less than it is in minimalist voice workplaces; however, other factors, such as pay and bonus schemes, promotional possibilities, alternative employment opportunities, may play a greater role in shaping absenteeism in these workplaces. Once again, these factors have not been included here, as the purpose of this research is not to assess all of the factors that may influence absenteeism, but to examine the links between different forms of voice, EO and DM policies, and organisational outcomes.

Table 8.2 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.010	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.401	0.045
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.141	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.261	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.260	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.230	0.044
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination	N	0.012	0.044
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination	N	0.020	0.044
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination	N	0.026	0.045
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.021	0.044
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.087	0.046
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.031	0.045
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	0.132	0.051
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.088	0.048
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.102	0.047

Notes: N = 245.

8.4 Indirect Voice Workplaces

The associations between the various EO and DM policies and absenteeism are slightly different amongst workplaces with ‘collective voice only’ compared to minimalist and ‘direct voice only’ workplaces. Table 8.3 shows the results of the regressions for the EO and DM policies and absenteeism amongst ‘collective voice only’ workplaces. Although, once again, the associations between the policies and absenteeism are, in general, not statistically significant, they are in a few cases. For those regressions in which the EO and DM policy is statistically significant, the association is negative. In other words, the presence of the particular (statistically significant) EO and DM policy within collective voice only workplaces is likely to lower the level of absenteeism. This supports the view that unions can help to introduce policies that can be beneficial to the workplace. The lack of any regressions in which the EO and DM policy is statistically significant and positively associated with absenteeism buttresses this view: unions (and other forms of collective voice) do not appear to push for higher levels of equal opportunities in order to promote their own interests at the expense of the performance of the workplace. This is an important finding and serves as a corrective to overly negative portrayals of unions within workplaces. The EO and DM policy that is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level is: ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’. The EO and DM policies that are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level are: ‘monitor promotions by gender’ and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’. Two of these policies relate to gender and the presence of such policies may help to reduce overall absenteeism in the firm.

Some of the control variables are statistically significant in all of the regressions. (Please see Appendix Table B.3 for a summary of the statistical significance of the control variables.) Two of these variables are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. They are: the dummy that captures ‘private sector workplaces’, where private sector establishments equal one and those in the public sector have a value of 0, and the ‘percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled’. Both associations are negative. In other words, public sector workplaces are more likely than private sector ones to have higher levels of absenteeism, and the more highly skilled the workforce, the lower the level of absenteeism is likely to be. The first of these suggests that, within collective voice only workplaces, private sector workplaces may be able to work with unions and other forms of collective voice to lower absenteeism rates than public sector workplaces can. The only other variable that is statistically significant in all of the regressions is the ‘percentage of the workforce that is female’. It is statistically

significant at the 10-per-cent level and the association is positive. In other words, the more women who work within an establishment as a percentage of the workforce, the higher the absenteeism rate is likely to be. This may indicate, as noted above, that women are more likely to take ‘unofficial’ absences for, say, child-care reasons than men are. An alternative interpretation is that women are more likely to be aggrieved by possible discrimination within workplaces, leading to a greater prevalence of absenteeism amongst women compared to men. It is noteworthy that two of the EO and DM policies that are associated with lower levels of absenteeism relate to possible discrimination against women. Having policies to address this possible discrimination may, therefore, help to reduce absenteeism amongst women, but will not eliminate it entirely. There is one other variable that is statistically significant, at the 10-per-cent level, in one of the regressions. The variable is ‘workers in the “largest occupational group” have “a lot” or “some” variety in their work’. It is significant in the regression that assesses whether monitoring ‘promotions for indirect gender discrimination’ is associated with absenteeism.

The performance of the model is improved for the workplaces with collective voice only than for those workplaces with minimalist voice and for those with direct voice only, accounting for more of the variation in the absenteeism rate than it has previously. For all of the regressions, the Nagelkerke R squared is approximately 15 per cent. This is a reasonable percentage. It helps to support the approach taken in this thesis to examine EO and DM policies and organisational outcomes within different types of ‘voice workplace’; however, it indicates that there is likely to be a number of other factors that are not included in the model that help to explain absenteeism rates in workplaces with collective voice only. Once again, those factors could include pay and bonus schemes, other types of workers who are present within workplaces, the availability of other jobs, and the opportunity to be promoted within the establishment.

Table 8.3 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.062	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.052	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.063	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.157	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.349	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.097	0.142
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 10%; negative	0.471	0.159
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 10%; negative	0.296	0.158
Monitor promotions by disability	N	0.099	0.152
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.363	0.152
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.179	0.147
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.289	0.143
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – 5%; negative	0.277	0.171
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.638	0.145
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.329	0.144

Notes: N = 250.

8.5 Dual Voice Workplaces

The dual voice workplaces are relatively distinct from the other type of ‘voice’ workplaces in terms of the number of EO and DM policies that are statistically significantly associated with absenteeism. Table 8.4 shows the results of the regressions that examine the links between the EO and DM policies and absenteeism. Whilst most of the EO and DM policies are not statistically significant, seven policies are statistically significant. Four EO and DM policies are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. They are: ‘monitor promotions by gender’, ‘monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination’, ‘monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’, and ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’. They are all negatively associated with absenteeism. In other words, the presence of any one of these policies is associated with lower levels of absenteeism. One policy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. It is ‘monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination’. The link between the policy and absenteeism is negative. Finally, two policies, ‘monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity’ and ‘monitor relative pay rates by disability’, are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. They, too, are negative linked to absenteeism. Overall, then, EO and DM policies are more frequently associated with lower levels of absenteeism in dual voice workplaces than they are in other types of ‘voice workplace’. This suggests that such workplaces differ in some important way to the other types of workplace. The presence of these policies as a means, potentially, to lower absenteeism indicates that employees in such workplaces are sensitive to issues of ‘equality’ and wish to see policies in place that explicitly address issues of discrimination in various guises.

For most of the regressions for dual voice workplaces, the percentage of the workforce that is female as well as the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled are both statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. (Please see Appendix Table B.4 for summaries of the control variables that are statistically significant in the regressions for individual EO and DM policies and absenteeism.) However, the former is positively related to absenteeism, whilst the latter is negative related to absenteeism. In other words, the higher the percentage of female workers within a workforce, the higher the absentee rate is likely to be. The higher the percentage of highly skilled workers within a workforce, the lower the absentee rate is likely to be. The former suggests that within dual workplaces either that women are, on the whole, more disgruntled than men, or that women are expected to undertake unplanned child-care responsibilities etc. The finding on highly skilled workers

suggests that highly skilled workers have more interesting or intellectually rewarding jobs that means that they are less likely to be absent from work than less skilled employees. Another variable, the total number of employees (as a natural log) is statistically significant too. It is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. It is negatively associated with absenteeism, meaning that the larger the workplace, the lower the absentee rate is likely to be. This could indicate that larger workplaces offer more interesting work; it could also be interpreted to mean that employees in larger workplaces are reluctant to be absent as this may have a more detrimental effect on their future career prospects.

Table 8.4 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.028	0.123
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.180	0.124
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.055	0.122
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.142	0.124
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.056	0.126
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.247	0.123
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 1%, negative	0.002	0.139
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N	0.076	0.129
Monitor promotions by disability	N	0.084	0.127
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	Y – 1%; negative	0.002	0.139
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 1%; negative	0.009	0.137
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	Y – 5%; negative	0.019	0.132
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – 1%; negative	0.149	0.142
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	Y – 10%; negative	0.240	0.129
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	Y – 10%; negative	0.207	0.130

Notes: N = 616.

8.6 Chapter Conclusion

Overall, the results suggest that EO and DM policies are generally not associated with levels of establishment absenteeism. Some of the policies are, however, more likely to be linked with lower levels of absenteeism in workplaces that either have ‘collective voice only’ or that have ‘dual voice’ systems in place. For those ‘collective voice only’ establishments, the finding that some EO and DM policies are associated with lower levels of absenteeism and none is linked to higher levels of absenteeism is, itself, an important finding, indicating that unions (and other forms of collective voice) do not push for EO and DM policies to be implemented within workplaces in order to bolster their own credentials and ability to attract members at the expense of the performance of the workplace.

Other findings from the analysis in this chapter are also important. For instance, in general, the higher the percentage of female workers within any particular workforce, the higher the level of absenteeism is likely to be. A probable explanation for this finding is that women are more likely to have unplanned time off work to care for children and relatives. Another possible explanation is that women suffer discrimination at work, leading to greater levels of dissatisfaction and higher levels of absenteeism. Some of the evidence in this chapter supports this latter explanation. For example, amongst workplaces with ‘collective voice only’ and ‘dual voice’, amongst those EO and DM policies that are statistically significant, all or at least a large proportion relate to potential gender discrimination. These policies are associated with lower levels of absenteeism, suggesting that attempts to address discrimination against women may help to lower levels of dissatisfaction. The finding that higher percentages of the workforce that is female are linked to heightened levels of absenteeism suggests that attempts to address potential discrimination against women by introducing policies that, for instance, monitor promotions for gender discrimination may help to lower absenteeism rates, but not fully overcome dissatisfaction amongst female workers.

Absenteeism is only one important workplace outcome; quit rates are another. The next chapter analyses the links between EO and DM policies and quit rates within each type of ‘voice workplace’. It provides a conclusion to the second stage of the analysis within this thesis.

Chapter 9 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies and Quit Rates: An Empirical Analysis

9.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the links between the various EO and DM policies and quit rates to establish if these policies are, in general, associated with an increase or a decrease in quits or if they ‘only’ have links to higher or lower quit rates for different types of voice workplace. Higher quit rates are likely to reflect higher levels of employee dissatisfaction within any particular workplace, as disgruntled employees are more likely to leave a workplace than those who are satisfied (Tüselmann *et al.* 2007). The question in the WERS survey asks ‘And how many of these employees [who were here one year ago] stopped working here, because they left or resigned voluntarily?’ This is converted into a percentage of the total workforce. This thesis, therefore, assumes that higher quit rates reflect greater dissatisfaction amongst employees rather than, say, greater employment opportunities for workplace employees at other companies. Other factors will, of course, play a role in shaping an establishment’s quit rates, potentially including workers leaving to look after young children as well as the proportion of workforce who are highly skilled, as such workers are likely to have more employment opportunities at other establishments. Similarly, if workers have more varied work, then, they are less likely to quit, leaving for a job elsewhere.

The quit rate is not normally distributed and skewed, rendering the use of ordinary least squares inappropriate. This thesis, therefore, dichotomises this variable. It does so by taking the arithmetic mean of the quit rate. Those establishments with an ‘above mean’ quit rate are coded 1; those workplaces with a mean or below mean quit rate are coded 0. This dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as these do not rest on parametric assumptions (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in common with the analysis in the first stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. In the second stage of the analysis, in order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between (or the ‘non independence’ of) the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are run for each EO and DM policy.

The control variables are the size of the workplace (as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees), the percentage of the workforce that is female, the percentage of the workforce that has a disability, the percentage of workers from an ethnic minority in the workplace, whether the workplace is in the private or public sector, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work, whether or not

workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion in their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupation group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ say in the design of their work, and the total percentage of the workplace that is highly skilled. As noted above, such factors are likely to have an influence over workplace quit rates.

Overall, the results for the logistic regressions that examine the links between quit rates and the individual equal opportunities policies within the individual categories of each type of workplace indicate that a relatively limited number of the EO and DM policies are statistically significantly linked to quit rates. The associations between those equal opportunities that are statistically significant and quit rates are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, indicating a complex situation of the ways in which EO and DM policies are linked to quit rates. The specific associations are discussed below.

9.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces

The logistic regressions for the individual EO and DM policies and the quit rates are shown in Table 9.1. Several of the individual EO and DM policies are statistically significant within the group of workplaces with ‘minimal voice’. When the policy is statistically significantly associated with quits, the relationship is positive. In other words, the presence of the policy is likely to be linked with a higher quit level.

More specifically, the following policies are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level: ‘monitor recruitment and selection by gender’, ‘monitor promotions by disability’, ‘monitor promotions by disability’, ‘monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’, ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’, and ‘monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity’. The following policies are statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level, ‘monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity’, ‘monitor recruitment and selection by disability’, ‘monitor promotions by gender’, and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’. Overall, then, policies relating to the monitoring recruitment and selection, and monitoring promotions are the most likely to be associated with increased levels of quits in workplaces with minimal voice. One interpretation of this is that these policies are likely to increase quit rates. An alternative explanation is that the policies are introduced in an attempt to reduce quit rates in those workplaces with comparatively high labour turnover rates, but have had either a limited or no effect. The minimal levels of voice within this group of workplaces may also mean that policies to tackle

various forms of discrimination do not have the desired effect as a result of insufficient trust by employees of employers.

Other variables in the models are always or frequently statistically significant for the group of ‘minimal voice’ workplaces. (Appendix Table C.1 summarises the results of the individual regressions and shows any statistically significant control variables as well as the level at which they are significant.) The variable for the percentage of the workforce that is female is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level in all of the regressions for workplaces with minimal voice. It is positively associated with quits. In other words, the more employees within an establishment of a particular size who are women, the more likely it is the workplace will have an above-mean quit rate rather than a quit rate that is at or below the mean. This could indicate that women are more likely, in general, to leave jobs in order to care for relatives. The variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled is also statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. However, it is significant in most, not all, regressions, and it is negatively associated with quit rates. In other words, the more highly skilled workers a minimal voice establishment of a given size has, the more likely it is that the workplace will have a quit rate at or below the mean rather than one is above the mean. This is a somewhat surprising finding, as minimal voice workplaces suggest that employees, of all kinds, have limited scope to influence workplace decisions, leading to an expectation that those who are dissatisfied with current practices will tend to leave the organisation (Hirschman, 1970). In addition, highly skilled workers can be expected to have improved job opportunities, in general, than less skilled employees, suggesting that they are more likely to leave the workplace if they are dissatisfied with current policies. However, this is not the case. Indeed, the reverse is true: a higher percentage of highly skilled employees within a workplace, the lower, in general, the quit rate. This could indicate a number of things. First, as already noted, omitted factors, such as remuneration schemes, have not been included in the analysis, as the focus is on the link between EO and DM policies and quits. There may be substantial bonuses for certain groups with these workplaces. Second, the research captures more formal measures of voice within workplaces; it does not capture more informal ones that are likely to be difficult to capture within a large-N study. However, these informal voice measures may provide employees, especially highly skilled ones perhaps, with means by which to raise any concerns they may have. Finally, this research does not examine the ownership, including the shares held by employees. Unfortunately, this is not possible given the limitations of the database; however, if highly skilled employees are encouraged to purchase shares within the firm that the workplace is a part of and if that possibility depends

on job tenure, such employees may be reluctant to leave the establishment in comparison to less skilled employees who do not have such share options.

One variable, the 'private sector' dummy (private-sector workplaces = 1, public-sector ones = 0) is statistically significant in the three regressions that relate to policies that monitor recruitment and selection by gender, ethnicity, and disability. In all three regressions, it is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, indicating that, in some instances, private-sector minimal workplaces are likely to have lower quit rates than public sector ones.

It should, however, be noted that the Nagelkerke R squared value ranges from just under seven to around eight per cent in all of the regressions for minimal workplaces, indicating that much of the variation in the dichotomous outcome variable (above-mean or 'mean or below-mean' quit rates) is not explained by the model for those workplaces with minimal voice. This is a relatively low value and suggests that other factors that are not included in the model may well account for the observed outcomes. As this group of workplaces have minimal voice, it can be expected that pay and general working conditions are likely to play an important role. The workplaces are likely to rely on relatively low skilled staff, as, unlike other workplaces, EO and DM policies do not enable workplaces to lower quit rates, indicating that policies that help to address certain forms of workplace discrimination are ineffectual.

Table 9.1 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	Y – 10%; positive	0.288	0.074
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	Y – 5%; positive	0.173	0.078
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	Y - 5%; positive	0.073	0.080
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.628	0.068
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.733	0.067
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.466	0.070
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 5%; positive	0.021	0.080
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 5%; positive	0.335	0.077
Monitor promotions by disability	Y – 10 pc; positive	0.117	0.074
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.479	0.069
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 10%; positive	0.330	0.073
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.671	0.069
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – 10%; positive	0.065	0.075
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	Y – 10%; positive	0.279	0.075
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.391	0.071

Notes: N = 516.

9.3 Direct Voice Workplaces

Out of all the regressions for those workplaces with direct-voice only, there is only one EO and DM policy that is statistically significant. That policy is the establishment monitors ‘promotions for ethnic discrimination’ and it is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Table 9.2 summarises the results of the logistic regressions for all of the EO and DM policies. It provides details of the level of statistical significance (if any) of the EO and DM policy as well as the significance of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic and the Nagelkerke R-squared figure. (Table C.2 in the Appendix provides details of the statistical significance of the control variables.) The link between the policy and quits is negative. In other words, the presence of the policy is associated with a below-mean quit level within the workplace. Overall, then, there is very limited evidence to indicate that EO and DM policies are associated with above or below mean quit rates amongst workplaces with direct voice mechanisms only. The relative lack of importance of the EO and DM policies is also underlined by other findings from the regressions that are discussed below. Compared to those workplaces with minimal voice, the models fit the data well. The Nagelkerke R squared values range from around 15 per cent up to 17 per cent, indicating that a reasonable amount of the variation in the outcome is explained by the model.

There are several other variables that are statistically significant in many of the logistic regressions for workplaces with direct voice mechanisms in place. For all but one of the EO and DM policies (which is the policy that ‘the establishment monitors recruitment and selection and gender’), the percentage of the workforce that is female is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The association is positive in all cases. In other words, the higher the number of females within a workforce of any given size, the higher the likelihood that the workplace will have an above-average level of quits, suggesting either that women are more dissatisfied than men with their present working conditions or that women leave work more frequently than men to look after children or relatives or that women have greater employment opportunities elsewhere than men.

In the majority of the regressions, the private-sector dummy (private-sector workplaces = 1; public sector = 0) is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The link is positive. In other words, private-sector establishments are more likely than comparable public-sector ones to have above-average quit rates, suggesting either that greater opportunities exist for employees in the private sector or that employees in private-sector

establishments are more disgruntled than those in the public sector, leading to a higher quit rate.

The variable that measures the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in all of the regressions. It is negatively associated, meaning that, in general, workplaces with a high proportion of highly skilled employees will have a lower quit rate than those with fewer highly skilled employees. This finding could reflect the improved treatment of workers who are more highly skilled than those who are less skilled even though, presumably, the former have more employment opportunities, in general, elsewhere than the latter group of employees.

Finally, if workers in the largest occupational group are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or ‘to some extent’, the workplace is likely to have an above-mean quit rate. This association is statistically significant in all of the regressions at the 10-per-cent level, possibly indicating that the workers’ involvement in work design leads to work intensification and decreased employee morale. This finding is in line with other ones in the previous chapter, indicating that a measure that, at face value, appears to be beneficial may have a detrimental effect on employees. An alternative explanation is that causality flows from quit rates to workers’ involvement in work design rather than from workers’ involvement in work design to quit rates, meaning that workplaces with above-mean quit rates may involve workers in work design in an effort to reduce quit rates. These quit rates may have been reduced, but they remain at levels that are higher than the mean for comparable establishments.

Table 9.2 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.236	0.149
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.324	0.153
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.477	0.156
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.981	0.149
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.992	0.150
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.944	0.151
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination	N	0.591	0.159
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination	Y – 10%; negative	0.457	0.167
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination	N	0.806	0.160
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.906	0.150
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.794	0.149
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.881	0.150
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	0.978	0.150
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.997	0.149
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.975	0.148

Notes: N = 245.

9.4 Collective Voice Workplaces

As the results in Table 9.3 show, for those workplaces with collective voice mechanisms only, none of the EO and DM policies in the logistic regressions is statistically significant, indicating that, for this group of workplaces, EO and DM policies do not play a role in either increasing or decreasing quit rates. This, in turn, suggests that unions and other forms of collective representation are not abusing their power to push for EO and DM policies in their own interests at the expense of the establishment's performance. This is an important finding as it suggests that criticisms of unions that focus on a purported ability to influence workplace policies in their favour are not accurate. The finding also indicates that unions that may press for equal opportunities do not help to improve workplace outcomes, raising an important issue for unions. If the presence of forms of collective voice, including unions, are associated with an increased likelihood of the workplace having equal opportunities and if those policies do not help to reduce quit rates, then it suggests that unions may not themselves gain from being associated with those policies.

Some of the other variables in the regressions are, however, statistically significant. Once again, the percentage of the workforce that is female is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level in all of the regressions for the workplaces with collective voice only. It is positively associated with quits. In other words, the more employees within an establishment of a given size who are women, the more likely it is the workplace will have an above-mean quit rate rather than a quit rate that is at or below the mean. This could indicate that women are more likely, in general, to leave jobs in order to care for relatives or for childcare reasons than men or that they have better employment elsewhere than men. In one of the regressions, for the 'monitor recruitment and selection by disability' policy, the private sector dummy variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. It is positively associated with quits, providing a limited amount of evidence to indicate that quit rates are, in general, higher in private-sector workplaces than they are in public-sector ones amongst those workplaces with 'collective voice only'.

By contrast, the variable that measures if workers in the largest occupational group have 'a lot' or 'some' variety in their work is statistically significant in all of the regressions for the collective voice only workplaces. It is significant at the 10-per-cent level and the association with quits is positive, indicating that providing workers with increased variety in their work is linked to higher quit rates rather than lower ones. One explanation for this is that increased variety is a means to intensify work, leading to higher levels of employee

dissatisfaction and quits. An alternative explanation is that causality runs the other way; that is, higher quit rates have led managers to increase the variety of the work for employees in the largest occupational group. Such policies may have helped to reduce quits, but they have remained at above average levels.

The variable that captures the total number of employees (as a natural log) is statistically significant in five of the regressions. It is significant at the 10-per-cent level and is positively associated with quits, meaning larger establishments, in general, have higher quit rates than smaller ones. This is an unexpected finding, as larger workplaces can, in general, offer employees greater employment prospects and employment stability. This relationship is, however, only weakly significant and is not significant in the majority of the regressions. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to be cautious about this finding.

Finally, the variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled is statistically significant in approximately half of the regressions for the workplaces with collective voice mechanisms only. The association is significant at the 10-per-cent level and the link is negative. In other words, the more highly skilled the workforce, the lower, in general, the quit rate is likely to be. Again, this is an unexpected finding as highly skilled employees are likely to have greater employment opportunities compared to those with lower levels of skills. The association could be explained by more highly skilled workers being offered greater remuneration and improved working conditions compared to employees with lower skill levels in order to aid retention of the former.

Overall, the models for the regressions amongst workplaces with collective-voice mechanisms only perform reasonably well and account for approximately 17 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable. This also indicates, however, that a lot of variation in the outcome variable is not explained by the model, highlighting that other factors that are not included in the model are related to the outcome. These other variables could include the overall level of pay and bonus schemes that the workplace has in place. Similarly, the overall prospects for the company may also influence workers' decisions to leave.

Table 9.3 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.141	0.171
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.202	0.170
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.072	0.171
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.506	0.174
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.249	0.172
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.071	0.171
Monitor promotions by gender	N	0.255	0.170
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N	0.002	0.171
Monitor promotions by disability	N	0.008	0.171
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.011	0.172
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.030	0.173
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.029	0.173
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	0.305	0.170
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.304	0.170
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.276	0.170

Notes: N = 250

9.5 Dual Voice Workplaces

Amongst those workplaces with dual voice, five of the equal opportunities policies are, as is shown in Table 9.4, statistically significant. This is a high number compared to the regressions for the other workplace categories. When a particular policy is statistically significant the association is negative, indicating that the presence of the policy is linked to lower quit levels, in general. This suggests that EO and DM policies are particularly important within dual-voice workplaces, potentially reflecting the objective amongst senior managers within such workplaces to lower the quit rate by implementing policies that are likely to ensure the a more equal treatment of all employees. More specifically, workplaces that monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination and those that monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination are likely to have lower quit rates than those that do not. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Those establishments that monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination are also likely to have lower quit rates; this link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Those establishments that monitor promotions by gender and those that do so for ethnicity are also likely to have lower quit rates. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Taken together, these results suggest that the issue of promotions within dual-voice workplaces is a sensitive subject that managers can address by checking for either direct or indirect discrimination. The results do not tell us the outcomes of this monitoring of promotions, but the act itself could be a relatively strong signal to employees that the company wishes to treat all employees the same.

In all of the regressions, the percentage of the workforce that is female and the private-sector status of a workplace are both statistically significant at the 1-per-cent level. In other words, the more female employees within a workplace of any given size and if the workplace is in the private sector, the more likely the establishment is to have an above-mean quit rate. The former suggests that women may have to leave work for child care responsibilities or to look after relatives, for instance, than men. The latter indicates that employees in the private sector either have greater employment opportunities than those in the public sector or that they are, in general, more dissatisfied with their current employer than workers in the public sector. In all of the regressions, the variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that has a disability is statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level. This suggests that employees with a disability are, in general, more dissatisfied with their employers in dual-voice workplaces than those workers without a disability, potentially reflecting a real or perceived

discrimination against this group that the EO and DM policies seek to address, but that do not fully remedy the situation. Similarly, in five of the regressions, the variable that measures the percentage of the workforce that is from an ethnic minority is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level and is positively linked to quits. Again, this could reflect greater dissatisfaction amongst this group and create the conditions for the managers in the workplace to implement policies to target this issue. In one of the regressions, the size of the workforce as measured by the natural log of the total number employees is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level and associated with higher quit levels.

In approximately half of the regressions, the variable that measure the percentage of the workforce that is from an ethnic minority and the (natural log) size of the workforce are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level and are positively associated with higher quit levels. Again, this could help to explain the presence of some EO and DM policies within some of the dual-voice workplaces that seek to address potential dissatisfaction amongst ethnic-minority workers. Whilst some of those policies may help to reduce the quit rate, they may not resolve the issue entirely.

Overall, the model performs reasonably well, explaining around 17 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable. Once again, it also raises the possibility that other factors that are not included in the models here help to explain much of the remaining variation. Those variables could include general pay and conditions as well as the general prospects for the workplace (is the establishment growing, remaining steady, or declining).

Table 9.4 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Hosmer Lemeshow	Nagelkerke R Square
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	0.794	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	0.638	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	0.648	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	0.613	0.166
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	0.558	0.168
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	0.746	0.164
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 10%; negative	0.444	0.170
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 10%; negative	0.422	0.169
Monitor promotions by disability	N	0.430	0.167
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	Y – 1%; negative	0.205	0.180
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 1%; negative	0.584	0.182
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	Y – 5%; negative	0.492	0.174
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	0.301	0.168
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	0.163	0.166
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	0.191	0.164

Notes: N = 616.

9.6 Chapter Conclusion

Overall, the results generally suggest that EO and DM policies are associated neither with higher quit rates nor with lower ones. Although EO and DM policies are associated with higher quit rates amongst workplaces with minimal voice, this link is frequently only weakly significant. In the majority of the logistic regressions for the individual EO and DM policies for the other types of workplace, the policies are generally not statistically significant. The main exceptions to this ‘non significance’ rule are for EO and DM policies amongst dual voice workplaces. For that group of workplaces, five EO and DM policies are statistically significant and all are associated with below-mean quit rates. Two of these (‘monitor promotions by gender’ and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’) are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. One (‘monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination’ is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Two (‘monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination’ and ‘monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’) are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These results suggest that EO and DM policies are particularly important amongst dual-voice workplaces, not only supporting the analytical approach adopted here of differentiation between various types of workplace, but also indicating that policies that address indirect forms of discrimination are especially beneficial for workplaces. Policies that seek to address different forms of indirect discrimination within workplaces may send out a particularly powerful message from the employer to employees that the issue of discrimination is being taken seriously, leading to more satisfied employees and lowering quit rates.

However, the finding that for most of the regressions across direct voice only, collective voice only, and dual voice workplaces that EO and DM policies are not statistically significant suggests that these policies are not adequate predictors of the likelihood of any particular workplace having a below-mean quit rate. In other words, other factors play a more important role in helping to explain variation in quit rates than EO and DM policies do. For instance, the percentage of the workforce that is female and the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled are consistently statistically significant for the individual logistic regression across all types of ‘voice workplace’. Although the statistical significance varies, this is an important finding and helps to relativise the associations between EO and DM policies and quit rates.

Chapter 10 – Conclusion

This thesis has investigated the links between voice, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. It is the first study to do this, filling important gaps in the literature by examining not only the associations of different forms of employee voice with the presence of EO and DM policies within workplaces, but also the associations of EO and DM policies with workplace outcomes, specifically voluntary labour turnover (quits) and absenteeism, within different types of voice workplace. It has applied a novel analytical framework that adopts a holistic approach to voice in order to adopt a nuanced approach to EO and DM policies, leading to important insights. In addition, this research has analysed more EO and DM policies than the existing literature, enabling deeper insights into them and their links to workplace outcomes. More specifically, this research has examined whether firms had a general EO or DM policy and whether they had a number of individual EO and DM policies. These individual policies were monitoring recruitment and selection for gender discrimination, monitoring recruitment and selection for discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and monitoring recruitment and selection for discrimination by disability. The research also examined the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination, the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination on the ground of disability. It also sought to establish whether workplaces monitor pay and promotions for discrimination on the grounds of gender, disability and ethnicity.

The thesis did not differentiate, in terms of the empirical analysis, between EO and DM for reasons that have already been outlined. This research has examined the links between voice, EO and DM policies, and measures of workplace outcomes, namely voluntary labour turnover and absenteeism. This has not been done before. This research used a large sample of 1946 workplaces. Having such a large sample has allowed this thesis to reveal important associations between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies, on the other. Existing research has not examined these relationships using a large dataset. The findings of this thesis have important implications for theory and policy.

10.1 Findings

10.1.1 Voice Mechanisms and EO and DM Policies

Existing research has shown that voice can influence workplace policies (e.g. Bryson, 2004); however, there are a limited number of existing studies that examine links between voice and EO and DM. The first key finding from this research is that voice is associated with EO and DM policy. In short, the more voice a workplace has, the more likely it is to have any one of a range of EO and DM policies. In other words, direct voice workplaces, indirect voice workplaces, and dual voice workplaces are all more likely to have the individual EO and DM policies examined here than workplaces with minimal voice (the type of workplace with the least voice in the analytical framework). Therefore, in general, more voice is associated with a higher likelihood that the workplace will have any one of a range of EO and DM policies. Moreover, dual voice workplaces are more likely, in general, to have any one of a range of EO and DM policies than minimal workplaces. These differences are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Voice, therefore, increases the likelihood that workplaces will have EO and DM policies. The link between voice and EO and DM policies is strongest for dual voice.

I Direct Voice Workplaces

Direct voice involves employees expressing their views to managers directly themselves and does not involve employee representatives. High-performance workplace systems – or high-involvement or high-commitment workplace practices, as they are sometimes known (Wall and Wood, 2005; Wilkinson *et al.*, 2010) – incorporate direct voice into their models. This thesis, therefore, incorporated direct voice mechanisms commonly found in high-performance workplace systems studies, into the analysis.

Evidence from the USA and the UK suggests that direct-voice mechanisms can help to improve organisational performance (Becker and Huselid, 2009; Huselid, 1995; Patterson *et al.*, 1998; Wood, 1999) and despite evidence not always being clear-cut, findings often show a link between direct-voice practices and superior organisational outcomes (Banker *et al.*, 1996; Batt, 2004; Cordery *et al.*, 1991; Guthrie, 2001; Hunter *et al.*, 2002; Vandenberg *et al.*, 1999).

The findings of this thesis buttress these findings: direct voice has, compared to minimal voice, a positive and statistically significant association with EO and DM policies. As the regressions show, direct voice workplaces are more likely to have any one of a range of EO and DM policies than workplaces with minimal voice. The differences for individual EO and DM policies are typically statistically significant at the one per-cent level when direct workplaces are compared to minimal workplaces. Direct voice mechanisms may, therefore, be able to offer individual workers the possibility to convey their preferences to managers that are then acted upon by those managers. As is discussed in more detail below, this thesis cannot determine the ‘direction of causality’ because of the statistical technique used to analyse the data. The evidence here is, however, in line with theoretical expectations that direct voice will enable workers to convey ideas to managers (Lawler, 1986; Wood and Wall, 2005). This finding also buttresses the approach adopted here to focus on the links between voice and EO and DM policies. At present, research on these links is relatively scarce, but focusing on these links may help to open up the ‘black box’ of how HRM policies influence workplace performance outcomes.

The findings also show that there are few statistically significant differences between direct voice and indirect voice in their associations with EO and DM policies. This finding suggests that workers may not necessarily feel that they need to join a union to have a voice on EO and DM policies; voicing their concerns or preferences on an individual basis may be as likely to be associated to particular EO and DM policies as doing so through a union. However, as will be discussed below, future research could examine if direct and indirect voice mechanisms can substitute for one another. There may be contexts in which direct (or indirect) voice mechanisms are more likely to associated with EO and DM policies than indirect (or direct) ones. Conversely, because there are few statistically significant differences between direct voice and indirect voice and their associations with EO and DM policies, this finding also suggests that unions, by aggregating the preferences of individual workers, do not ignore the preferences of certain workers. This contradicts expectations in some of the literature that unions will seek to encourage managers to implement policies within workplaces that are in the union’s interests, but that are not, necessarily, beneficial for the company (Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007).

II Indirect Voice Workplaces

Indirect or collective voice is provided through trade unions as well as joint consultative committees and a non-union workplace employee representation. Freeman and Medoff (1984) described collective voice as a vehicle for workers, as a group, to communicate with management. A large body of literature exists on the links between trade unions and various performance outcomes. For example, trade unions are associated with lower profitability (Clark, 1984; Freeman, 1983; Karier, 1985; Voos and Mishel, 1986). The findings on the links between unions and productivity vary: some studies show small negative effects (Addison and Hirsch, 1989), whilst others demonstrate a small positive effect (Brown and Medoff, 1978; Clark, 1984). This thesis found that indirect voice is positively associated with EO and DM policies. The individual associations are typically statistically significant at the one-per-cent level when indirect workplaces are compared to direct workplaces.

As already outlined, both direct and indirect voice are associated with an increased likelihood of the workplace having the individual EO and DM policies analysed here. This implies that employees do not need to join a union to ensure their workplace has the individual EO and DM policies analysed here, as this association is just as likely to be achieved through direct voice. Therefore, as stated above, direct voice workplaces are, in general, no more and no less likely as indirect voice workplaces to have the EO and DM policies assessed here; union recognition may not, therefore, be necessary for workers to convey their preferences to managers and for managers to change policies within the workplace.

However, this finding also demonstrates that a unionised workplace is not a threat to workplace managers: indirect workplaces are not more likely than direct voice workplaces to introduce any one of the individual EO and DM policies assessed here. This suggests that unions are not linked to a greater prevalence of EO and DM policies to increase their membership amongst certain groups.

As discussed in chapter 2, there are some major differences between analysts on the effectiveness of different forms of voice (Benson, 2000; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007; Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005). The first is between indirect and direct voice. In some of the work on unions, there is a theoretical expectation that unions will seek to pursue the interests of union members/the union at the expense of other groups, including non-union members and the company for which the union members work (Hirsch and Addison, 1986).

The findings in this thesis are not consistent with this theoretical expectation. Despite the varying emphases on direct and indirect voice within much of the literature, this research has found that at a broad level there are relatively few differences between workplaces with direct and indirect voice in terms of their adoption of EO and DM policies. In the majority of regressions that compared the incidence of policies between workplaces with direct and indirect voice, there was no statistically significant difference between them in terms of their associations with EO and DM policies. In a few instances, direct voice workplaces were more likely to be associated with a particular EO and DM policy than indirect voice workplaces. Theoretically, this may suggest that direct and indirect voice may act, if used alone, as substitutes for one another: both may be equally likely to convey the preferences of workers on EO and DM to managers and help to shape the adoption of appropriate policies within workplaces.

Importantly, as unions are no more likely to be associated with EO and DM than direct voice mechanisms are, this suggests that unions do not push for the adoption of such measures in order to bolster recruitment amongst women, BME employees or disabled workers in order to boost recruitment amongst these groups. This, in turn, suggests that concerns about unions introducing policies that serve their own interests, should not be of too much concern (Hirsch, 2004).

III Dual Voice Workplaces, including ‘Partnerships’

A dual-voice system combines direct and indirect voice mechanisms. Direct and indirect forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: both can be used within the same workplace and their combined use could lead to ‘mutual gains’ (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). In other words, one form of voice may complement – or make up for any deficiencies in – the other form of voice.

This research has found that dual voice workplaces (those workplace with both direct and indirect voice) are more likely to adopt EO and DM policies compared to all other types of workplace – making dual voice workplaces more likely than any other type of workplace in the analytical framework used in this research to adopt EO and DM policies. To be sure, there are no statistically significant differences between direct voice workplaces and dual workplaces for some of the EO and DM policies; however, for others, there are statistically significant differences that indicate that dual voice workplaces are more likely to be associated with the presence of these policies compared to direct voice workplaces. This

research, therefore, indicates that the type of workplace that is most likely to be associated with EO and DM policies is dual voice workplaces that combine direct and indirect voice. This is an important finding as it suggests that research that focuses on just one form of voice downplay the possibility for direct and indirect voice mechanisms to be present within the same workplace and for these two separate forms of voice to complement one another.

Within this category of workplace, this thesis also distinguishes between partnership workplaces and co-existence workplaces. In the former, senior managers have a positive attitude towards unions; in the latter, they do not. Partnership approaches are more likely to be associated with most, but not all, of the EO and DM policies examined here than are ‘co-existence’ workplaces. These relationships are typically statistically significant at the five-percent level. This suggests that the presence of both forms of voice channel and a positive attitude towards unions increases the chances of a number of EO and DM policies being adopted within workplaces. Much of the existing literature has tended to downplay the possibility that direct and indirect voice mechanisms can be combined within one workplace and, if they are, that managers may vary in their views on unions, resulting in differences in workplace outcomes (Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007). The findings here support a nuanced approach to voice in order to identify key factors that help to shape important workplace outcomes: a positive attitude amongst managers to unions in dual voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the workplace will have EO and DM policies compared to dual voice workplaces in which managers have a neutral or negative view of unions.

IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, including ‘Bleak Houses’

As noted above, workplaces in the minimal voice category are the least likely to adopt any of the EO and DM policies examined here. This is, perhaps, not surprising as the absence of any substantive voice mechanisms may signal a general neglect of HRM policies within such workplaces, leading to the comparable lack of EO and EM policies within these workplaces. Workplaces in the minimal voice category are those workplaces with a below average score on the direct voice index. (Please see chapter 3 for details of how this is calculated.) These workplaces are less likely to be associated with EO and DM policies than any of the other voice workplaces analysed in this thesis.

This thesis extends the analysis within minimal voice workplaces to assess if, within this group of workplaces, the presence of some direct voice mechanisms is likely to increase the chances of workplaces adopting some EO and DM policies, Within the minimal voice

category, bleak house workplaces – which are establishments that fall into the below-average category within the group of minimal voice workplaces – are less likely than those workplaces with above-average voice mechanisms within the minimal voice category (limited voice workplaces) to be associated with approximately half of the EO and DM policies examined here. When these relationships are statistically significant, they are so at the one- or five-per-cent level. This reveals that even when low levels of direct voice are present, some direct voice (limited voice) is more likely to be associated with some EO and DM policies than no or very low levels of direct voice (bleak houses). This is an important finding and highlights how voice may help to shape EO and DM policies even within those workplaces that have few if any direct voice measures in place and no indirect voice mechanisms.

10.1.2 Voice and Workplace Performance

This research has shown that, in general, the more voice a workplace has, whether it be direct, indirect, or dual voice, the more likely it is to have a range of EO and DM policies. Even within the minimal voice category, the more voice, the more likely the workplace is to have any one of the EO and DM policies. EO and DM policies are underpinned by two different rationales. Miller (1996) observes that the diversity approach has an emphasis on the ‘business case’ which is in contrast to the ‘equal opportunity’ approach that emphasises social justice and fairness. The concept of diversity was originally created to justify more inclusion of people who were traditionally excluded from organisations (Herring, 2009). However, it is also linked to positive outcomes, because by bringing previously excluded groups into the organisation it may enhance creativity, problem-solving, and performance (Herring, 2009).

The empirical evidence on different forms of voice and its effect on performance varies. Some types of voice have a positive effect on financial performance and productivity, some have a negative effect. For example, a lot of the evidence that exists on dual voice and firm performance relates to financial performance or productivity and is mostly positive (McNabb and Whitfield, 1997; Bryson *et al*, 2005). The business case argument suggests DM enhances performance. Therefore if, as this research suggests, more voice means workplaces are likely to adopt the EO and DM policies and if the business case for DM policies is correct (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Gagnon and Cornelius, 2000; Liff and Wajeman, 1996; Miller, 1996), we can expect to see a positive association between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace performance, measured by quits and absenteeism.

10.1.2.1 EO and DM Policies and Absenteeism and Quits

The second key finding of this research is that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits. This is an important finding as this potential link has received relatively limited attention in the literature. The existing research that examines the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type of voice (e.g. Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guthrie, 2001). However, this thesis examines various types of voice workplace. This is important, as this research has revealed that there are important nuances between the different types of voice workplace examined here, highlighting the importance of adopting a holistic and nuanced approach to voice as this thesis has done and suggesting areas, that future research could examine. Existing work that assesses the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type of voice (e.g. Guest *et al.*, 2003; Guthrie, 2001). The findings for each type of voice workplace are as follows.

I Direct Voice

None of the EO and DM policies is statistically significantly associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism in direct voice workplaces. The only EO and DM policy that is statistically significantly with quit rates is the monitoring of promotions for ethnicity discrimination. The association is negative and statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. This is a relatively weak association. Overall, EO and DM policies within direct voice workplaces are not linked to the outcomes examined in this thesis. This is an important finding for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it could suggest that EO and DM policies are not implemented in an attempt to reduce these outcomes, but are introduced for normative reasons. Secondly, it could suggest that the way in which these policies are implemented influences how employees will respond to them: even if any particular EO and DM policy is in place, it may not be implemented in a way that encourages employees to stay within an organisation. Finally, it could suggest that ‘stronger’ forms of voice are necessary in order to increase EO and DM policies to a level that is associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates.

II Indirect Voice

Whilst it might be assumed that indirect voice would be associated with lower absenteeism and quit rates, as employees may be more satisfied and, hence, less likely to engage in activities that have a detrimental impact on the workplace (Addison, 2005), this thesis has found only limited evidence to support this potential outcome. For instance, monitoring pay rates by gender is associated in a statistically significant way with lower levels of absenteeism in indirect voice workplaces. Indeed, one the EO and DM policies are associated with higher levels of absenteeism: monitoring promotions by gender and ethnicity amongst indirect voice workplaces is associated with higher levels of absenteeism; however, this association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level only. There are no statistically significant associations between the EO and DM policies and quits in indirect voice workplaces. Once again, the evidence suggests that, overall, there are no statistically significant associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other. As with direct voice workplaces, these findings in indirect workplaces may suggest that the EO and DM policies are not intended to reduce absenteeism and quit rates. Alternatively, it may suggest that the ways in which these policies are implemented may influence these outcomes, or that these policies are only associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quits in other forms of voice workplace.

III Dual Voice Workplaces, including 'Partnerships'

The associations between most of the EO and DM policies examined here and absenteeism within dual voice workplaces are, on the whole, statistically insignificant, suggesting that the presence of these policies within workplaces is neither no more nor no less likely to be associated with lower absenteeism than the absence of these policies. There are only a few relationships that are statistically significant within dual voice workplaces between EO and DM, on the one hand, and lower absenteeism, on the other. The EO and DM policies are: the monitoring of promotions, separately, by gender, and for indirect gender discrimination, and indirect ethnic discrimination; and the monitoring of relative pay rates by gender. All of these links are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level and the relationships are negative. Monitoring promotions for indirect discrimination against disabled workers is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level; again the relationship is negative.

Monitoring relative pay rates by ethnicity and disability are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level; these links are also negative.

Most of the relationships between EO and DM, on the one hand, and quit rates, on the other are also not statistically significant within dual voice workplaces. Five policies in total are statistically significant. Two are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level; they are the monitoring of promotion ‘indirect gender discrimination’ and ‘for indirect ethnic discrimination’. One policy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level; it is the monitoring of ‘promotions for indirect disability discrimination’. Two are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. In all of these statistically significant relationships, the link between the policy and quits is negative. In other words, the policy is linked in a statistically significant way with lower quits.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that there is a relatively small amount of evidence that links EO and DM policies to lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates in dual voice workplaces. There is no evidence to suggest that these policies are associated in a statistically significant way with higher levels of absenteeism or quit rates. This is a relatively surprising result, as the presence of EO and DM policies could, first, reflect the wishes of employees and, second, help to increase employee morale, which is likely to be reflected in lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. Although the majority of EO and DM policies are not statistically significantly associated with either lower levels of absenteeism or quit rates, dual voice workplaces exhibit the greatest number of statistically significant relationships between EO and DM policies and lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates.

These results suggest that a combination of voice mechanisms is needed to enable EO and DM policies to be associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. This not only vindicates the approach taken here to examine the links between EO and DM policies and workplace performance within different types of workplace, but results also suggest that direct and indirect voice mechanisms may be able to complement one another and convey different preferences to managers.

IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, including ‘Bleak Houses’

Within minimal voice workplaces, none of the relationships between the EO and DM policies and absenteeism are statistically significant. In other words, the EO and DM policies neither increase nor decrease absenteeism in a statistically significant way. This is an important

finding as theoretically these policies are expected to improve employee morale and, hence, lower absenteeism.

Within minimal voice workplaces, approximately half of the EO and DM policies examined here are statistically significantly associated with quit rates, and the association is positive. In other words, the presence of these policies is linked to higher quit rates. This is an important finding, as it indicates that the relationship between EO and DM policies and workplace performance is moderated by the type of voice workplace that the policies are implemented within. The relationships between some of EO and DM policies and workplace performance are only positive and statistically significant within minimal voice workplaces. A second important implication of this finding is that the relationship between some EO and DM policies and quit rates within minimal voice workplaces is not as anticipated within EO and DM theories (Deery et al, 2002). One possible explanation for the relationship between these policies and quits is that these policies are introduced to reduce relatively high quit rates within workplaces, but are not able to achieve that.

10.2 Implications

Direct voice workplaces, indirect voice workplaces, and dual voice workplaces are all more likely to have the individual EO and DM policies examined here than workplaces with minimal voice (the type of workplace with the least voice in the analytical framework). Therefore, in general, more voice is associated with a higher likelihood that the workplace will have any one of a range of EO and DM policies. Moreover, dual voice workplaces are more likely, in general, to have any one of the EO and DM policies than the three other types of voice workplace. In addition, ‘partnership’ voice workplaces are, in some instances, more likely than workplaces within which direct and indirect voice ‘co-exist’ to have the EO and DM policies examined in this thesis. In general, therefore, higher levels of voice (dual voice and partnership approaches) increase the likelihood that workplaces will have EO and DM policies and the link between voice and EO and DM policies is strongest for dual voice and partnership workplaces. The finding that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicates that, in most instances, EO and DM policies neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. These findings have implications for theory and practice.

10.2.1 Implications for theory

This research has highlighted important variation in the associations between different types of voice workplace and the presence of a range of EO and DM policies. In general, dual voice workplaces are more likely to have some the EO and DM policies examined here than all three of the other voice workplaces. (They are as likely as direct and indirect voice workplaces to have some of the other policies.) Minimal voice workplaces are the least likely to have the individual EO and DM policies than all of the other three types of voice workplace. This finding underlines the importance of adopting a holistic theoretical approach to voice: voice mechanisms can encompass different forms and can be combined with one another within the same workplace. Some existing studies focus on one form of voice, thereby implicitly assuming that voice can only take one form and cannot be combined with other forms of voice (Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Tüselmann, *et al.*, 2007). Theoretical and analytical frameworks, therefore, need to be able to incorporate a range of voice mechanisms.

Overall, the results from this research offer some tentative evidence that indicates that voice mechanisms are additive. In broad terms, the more mechanisms a workplace has, the more likely it is to have the individual EO and DM policies. Future work could explore this issue theoretically to assess any limits to combining different forms of voice and how workplaces can integrate different voice mechanisms. At present, much of the literature assesses voice mechanisms are alternatives or substitutes for one another (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Benson, 2000; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Ichniowski *et al.*, 1996; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005).

In addition, it is also important to differentiate, as this research has done, within the different types of voice category. For instance, within the minimal voice category, ‘bleak houses’ are less likely than those workplaces with limited direct voice mechanisms in place to adopt EO and DM policies. Within dual voice workplaces, establishments that combine direct and indirect voice mechanisms in a ‘partnership’ approach are more likely than those in which these mechanisms ‘co-exist’ to have some of the EO and DM policies. This demonstrates, firstly, that a theoretical and analytical focus on voice is warranted, and, secondly, that how voice mechanisms are combined matters (Dundon *et al.*, 2004; Kim *et al.*, 2010; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). Managers’ attitudes to unions within dual voice workplaces shape the prevalence of EO and DM policies. Theory should reflect this finding.

The finding that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicates that, in most instances, EO and DM policies neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. This is in line with findings from Riley *et al.* (2008) who found that there was no definitive link between EO and company performance, as measured by managers' assessment of productivity and profitability. If there was a positive association, this tended to be in larger organisations (Riley *et al.*, 2008). In related research, Kochan *et al.* (2003) and Richard (2000) found that there were few direct effects of diversity on performance; either positive or negative. Armstrong *et al.* (2010) do, however, detect some evidence that links EO and DM policies, on the one hand, to workplace performance, as measured by higher productivity and lower quit rates, on the other. In related research, Ng and Tung (1998) found that culturally heterogeneous branches in the banking industry experienced lower levels of absenteeism and achieved higher productivity.

This suggests that the theory linking EO and DM policies to should be re-examined. The results from this research have important theoretical implications in this regard. Firstly, they suggest that the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and higher employee morale and job satisfaction, on the other, are not as strong as some theories anticipate (Forth *et al.*, 2008; Riley *et al.*, 2008): any direct and negative association between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, are very limited. Secondly, this research suggests that the links between EO and DM policies and key workplace outcomes need to be specified in greater detail. In other words, the conditions under which, for instance, a policy to monitor relative pay rates will be associated with lower quit rates needs to be set out.

The second important finding is that any statistically significant associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, depend upon the type of voice workplace within which the policies operate. For instance, the relationship between policies and outcomes is sometimes positive and statistically significant (albeit often only at the 10-per-cent level) amongst minimal voice workplaces. It is occasionally negative and statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level) amongst dual voice workplaces. The relationship is, in nearly all cases, not statistically significant amongst direct and indirect voice workplaces and if it is statistically significant, it is only weakly so. Therefore, if EO and DM policies do influence absenteeism and quits, the nature of that relationship would appear to be contingent upon the type of voice workplace.

This finding highlights a contribution to theory that this thesis has made: by using a novel analytical framework based on voice and that builds on the work of others (Lavelle *et*

al., 2010; Tüselmann *et al.*, 2007), this research has revealed key differences amongst workplaces according to the type of voice mechanisms that are present within the workplace. In other words, the links between the EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and levels of absenteeism and quit rates are moderated by different types of voice workplace. Future research needs to take this into consideration and assess how voice moderates these associations. At present, much of the existing theoretical and empirical work treats voice (if it is incorporated into the analysis of the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and workplace outcomes, on the other) as an independent variable that has a direct link to outcomes rather than as a moderating variable that potentially has a direct and indirect link to outcomes, potentially leading to inaccurate results (Armstrong *et al.*, 2010; Forth *et al.*, 2008; Lavelle *et al.*, 2010; Riley *et al.*, 2008; Tüselmann *et al.* 2007). To be sure, there is an alternative possibility that this thesis has not examined, but that future research could assess; that is, that it is the EO and DM policies that moderate the links between voice mechanisms and absenteeism and quit rates.

The third key finding of this research is that there is a connection between high levels of labour turnover, amongst minimal voice workplaces, and the use of EO and DM policies. It is only in minimal voice workplaces that any of the links between EO and DM and quit rates are positive and statistically significant: when the policies are statistically significant, the policies are linked to higher quit rates. (In other types of voice workplace, when the EO and DM policy is statistically significantly related to quit rates, the relationship is negative; in other words, the presence of the policy is linked to lower quit rates.) This finding underlines the importance of differentiating, as this thesis has done, between types of voice workplace. There are two ways to interpret this finding. Firstly, EO and DM policies may lead to higher quit rates within minimal voice workplaces. Secondly and more plausibly, higher labour turnover may lead managers to implement EO and DM policies, even amongst minimal voice workplaces that are likely to emphasise management's prerogative, to reduce the level of quits, suggesting that rationale for introducing EO and DM policies may depend not just on the type of voice workplace, but also on the immediate objectives of managers. Either way, this research has contributed to the theoretical literature by identifying this variation and highlighting how voice moderates the associations between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. Theory needs, therefore, to take into consideration this potential moderation and to model it as positive (potentially increasing the quit rate) at low levels of voice and negative (possibly reducing the quit rate) at high levels of voice.

Relatedly, the findings from the second stage of analysis in this thesis suggest that existing theoretical frameworks, such as Armstrong *et al.* (2010) and Kandola and Fullerton, (1998), need to be more nuanced. This research has examined absenteeism and quit rates for all employees within the workplace, this may overlook important differences between employee groups; in other words, the findings here may mask important variation amongst different groups within the workforce in terms of their reactions to EO and DM policies. Whilst some groups may view them favourably and stay, others may not and leave. An important contribution of this research has, therefore, been to identify the need for theoretical and empirical work to specify which groups of employees EO and DM policies are likely to influence. Some of the existing literature on the links between EO and DM policies and workplace performance treats employees implicitly as a relatively homogeneous (Armstrong *et al.*, 2010; Riley *et al.*, 2008; cf. Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; William, forthcoming). This research suggests that, for instance, workforce characteristics, such as the percentage of employees who are female, are from a BME background, have a disability, or are highly skilled, need to be incorporated into theoretical and analytical frameworks. For instance, in general, the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within an establishment's workplace, the lower the levels of absenteeism and quit rates are likely to be. These relationships depend, however, on the types of voice mechanisms present within the workplace. This thesis found that the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within a workforce the lower the levels of absenteeism in direct, collective, and dual voice workplaces. The levels of statistical significance vary, but the relationship is always a negative correlation in all of the regressions on the EO and DM policies. The higher the percentage of employees within a workforce, the lower the quit rate in minimal voice workplace and direct voice workplaces for all of the EO and DM regressions.

10.2.2 Implications for Practitioners

This research has important implications for practitioners. The findings here reveal that the presence of EO and DM policies is not associated with lower levels of absenteeism or quit rates, on the whole. One explanation for this may lie in how the policies are implemented. It is interesting to note that the strongest relationships between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes are in dual voice workplace. The presence of both direct and indirect voice could act as complements to one another, potentially providing workers with ample opportunity to express their concerns to managers. It is possible that dual voice workplaces

might also enable managers to establish a more co-operative employment relations climate, enabling them to create a high-trust environment for both employees and employers (Timming, 2012), and enabling information about the outcomes of any ‘monitoring’ policies to be communicated and discussed widely within the workplace. Other workplaces might, therefore, be able to learn from the ways in which dual voice workplaces operate their EO and DM policies.

This has broader implications for practitioners and policy makers. The introduction of ‘Equal Pay Transparency’, making employers with more than 250 employees disclose how much they pay in salaries and bonuses to male and female employees in an attempt to eradicate the gender pay gap, illustrates the political salience of this issue. The findings from this research suggest that this political emphasis on pay and bonuses may not lead to the desired changes in how workplaces treat women, BME workers and disabled employees, and, hence, result in decreased levels of absenteeism and lower quit rates. Monitoring and disclosing pay differentials may not be sufficient to lead to a change in the relative remuneration of men and women within workplaces. Other factors within the workplace are likely to influence how managers respond to pay disparities between men and women. The research here tentatively indicates that the presence of both direct and indirect voice mechanisms within workplace are more likely than any other forms of voice to influence how managers respond to reduce pay differentials between men and women.

The results from the research here suggest, at the very least, then, that future research could examine how managers implement EO and DM policies. For instance, if a workplace does monitor recruitment and selection for a possible gender bias, what happens to the information that is created? Is it shared with employees or employee representatives? Do managers use that information to change recruitment and selection procedures? If the information is not shared and/or if workplace practices do not change (when monitoring reveals a bias in recruitment towards, say, white men), workplace outcomes, such as absenteeism and quit rates, may not change.

This research also has implications for unions and employee representatives. Workplaces that have direct and indirect voice mechanisms in place and in which managers have a positive attitude towards unions are more likely than all of the other types of voice workplace to implement the individual EO and DM policies examined here. These other types of workplace include those establishments in which direct and indirect voice mechanisms ‘co-exist’ with one another and managers do not have a positive attitude towards unions. Research could be conducted to help union officials better understand why some managers view unions

positively, while others do not. Helping union officials understand managers' attitudes and likely response to unions might enable them to increase the prevalence of EO and DM policies within workplaces that might, potentially, improve employees' working conditions.

10.3 Weaknesses and Limitations of this Research

This research has drawn on a larger sample than many previous studies have done and incorporates important employee management practices that the existing literature often neglects. It has, therefore, been able to provide the most comprehensive assessment of the links between various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, on the other. The findings, as noted above, have important theoretical, analytical, and practical implications.

The research suffers, however, from the usual limitations associated with cross-sectional data. As indicated in the reporting of the findings, this thesis cannot say anything about the 'direction of causality'. In other words, it is not possible to say if the different voice mechanisms lead to or cause the differences in EO and DM policies that are observed. Therefore, it is not possible to say with complete certainty that, for instance, dual voice mechanisms are more influential than other forms of voice in increasing the number of EO and DM policies that workplaces adopt. Causality might 'run' in the opposite direction. It is, for instance, equally plausible to argue that those workplaces that adopt a higher number of EO and DM policies, potentially in order to create a co-operative employment relations climate within the workplace, are also likely to be those workplaces that implement direct voice mechanisms or that view indirect voice favourably in order, once again, to foster a collaborative working environment.

Similarly, it is not possible for this thesis to argue definitively that, where relevant associations exist, individual EO and DM policies reduce rates of absenteeism or lower quit rates. Once again, causality could run in the opposite direction. When lower rates of absenteeism or quits are associated with a particular EO and DM policy, lower quits could 'cause' the workplace to implement the policy by, for instance, enabling employees with long tenure to push for the adoption of that practice. Alternatively, lower levels of absenteeism and quits could enable HRM departments to focus on implementing EO and DM policies rather than trying to rectify high rates of absenteeism or recruiting employees to replace those who have left the organisation. By focusing on the cross-sectional element within WERS, this

thesis has, however, been able to draw on a very large sample and to highlight patterns in the association between, firstly, different voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies and, secondly, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes that future research could build upon.

This thesis draws on the management survey; it does not use either the employee representative or employee survey within WERS. This maximises the sample size used in the analysis and also enables an analysis of a greater range of EO and DM policies compared to previous research. Questions in the employee and employee representative surveys do not ask if policies are implemented to monitor recruitment by gender, ethnicity, or disability, etc. It would not, therefore, have been possible to tackle EO and DM policies within workplaces in the same level of detail had this thesis used the employee and/or employee representative surveys.

As mentioned in the introduction, by relying on managers' responses by solely using the management survey, a unitaristic bias could enter into the analysis. Lower-level workers may have a different opinion of whether or not a particular policy exists. Reliance on the management survey alone downplays the views of employees and their representatives. These latter two groups may have very different views to managers about the policies that have been implemented. For example, whilst a policy to monitor relative pay rates by gender may exist, the views of managers and employees about how the policy operates in practice may differ considerably, as the results of the monitoring may not be made known to the workforce and little action may be taken within the firm despite evidence to suggest that, for instance, women are not paid as much as men performing the same or similar roles (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006; Platt, 2011).

However, the use of the management questionnaire is justified on the grounds that the research has helped to reveal areas where such policies do appear to influence outcomes within certain groups of workplace, specifically those that have dual voice. Indeed, the finding that, for most types of workplace and for most of the EO and DM policies examined in this thesis, there is no statistically significant association between policies and outcomes tentatively suggests that these policies do not help to lower absenteeism or quit rates. This, in turn, suggests that future research could focus on understanding why workplaces have these policies, but fail to achieve desirable outcomes with them.

This thesis has used the WERS database in cross-sectional form. As a result, as noted above, it is not possible to say anything about the direction of causality about the relationships between, say, voice and EO and DM policies. Although it is possible to use the WERS database as a panel dataset in which the same establishments are asked the same questions in

each round of the survey, this would not have been an option for this thesis for two reasons. First, only a relatively small percentage of workplaces are retained within the survey from one round to the next. This would have reduced the sample size considerably. Second, the number of workplaces that change either the voice mechanisms or EO and DM policies is relatively small. The results of any analysis would, as a result, be driven by these workplaces, potentially leading to biased findings, as these workplaces may not be representative of the population as a whole. Indeed, the fact that there are only a few workplaces that have changed their voice mechanisms and/or EO and DM policies suggests that they are not typical. The approach adopted in this thesis, therefore, has the advantage of identifying the broad patterns, if any, of the links between 1) voice and EO and DM policies and 2) EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quit rates, on the other, within various types of voice workplace. By doing so, it has highlighted areas that future research could fruitfully examine.

10.4 Future Research

Future research could overcome this shortcoming by adopting a qualitative and longitudinal research design in order to ascertain why certain policies have been implemented and what the effects of adopting a particular EO and DM policy have been. Such research would deepen yet further our understanding of how voice, EO and DM policies and important workplace outcomes are related to one another.

Such research would also help to highlight what the effects of particular EO and DM policies are on groups of employees (Timming, 2015). As a novel, large-scale study, this research has not been able to examine how the various policies that this thesis analyses influence absenteeism and quit rates for the workers who are affected by the policy. For instance, it has not been possible to examine how a policy to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against women, those from an ethnic minority and those with a disability influences absenteeism and quit rates amongst those groups. Importantly, however, this research has clearly demonstrated that, amongst dual voice workplaces, this policy is linked to lower levels of absenteeism and quits. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level for indirect discrimination against women and those from an ethnic minority and at the five-per-cent level for those with a disability. In other types of ‘voice workplace’, there is, by and large, no statistically significant relationship between these policies and absenteeism and quits. This research has, therefore, highlighted where future research to assess the impact of EO and DM policies on particular groups could focus and has highlighted

the importance of differentiating between workplaces according to the type of voice practices that are present. If future research does not disaggregate the data by voice, any links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes may well be masked by a general effect that results in policies not affecting outcomes.

This research combines EO and DM policies, as the WERS dataset, which is the largest survey of UK establishments, combines these two types of policy. However, there are differences between the two types of policy in the literature (Jewson and Mason, 1986). Future research could disaggregate these policies and test them individually rather than together. By disaggregating these policies future research may produce different associations, from this thesis, between, first, various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, individually, and, second, EO and DM policies, individually, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quit rates, on the other. Future research could examine these relationships by drawing on case study work.

Other disadvantaged groups could be examined in future research. The groups this thesis has examined were women, BME workers and disabled people. These three groups were chosen as they represent areas that are highly important in the EO and DM literature (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Jones, 2016; Kirton and Greene, 2005, 2010; Kirton et al., 2007; Riley et al., 2008; cf. Kirton and Greene, 2015). The WERS data also covers potential discrimination on the following grounds: religion and belief, age, sexual orientation. Examining the links between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes (absenteeism and quits), on the other, in these alternative groups, may reveal different associations.

Changing the performance measure should shed further light on the associations between voice workplaces, EO and DM policies and performance. The performance measures used in this thesis are voluntary labour turnover and absenteeism. Using alternative performance measures (e.g. employee satisfaction) may reveal different associations. This thesis reveals that, on the whole, EO and DM policies, are not associated with lower levels of absenteeism and lower quit rates. However, by changing the performance measure to say, employee satisfaction, different associations may potentially be revealed, leading to further insights into the associations between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. The WERS database does not, unfortunately, cover employee satisfaction. Case study research could perhaps focus on minimal and dual workplaces, as this thesis has revealed that there are different associations between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes in these types of workplaces.

The WERS dataset has enabled this thesis to examine relationships between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace outcomes in the largest survey of UK workplaces. As explained above, this thesis uses the WERS dataset in a cross-sectional way. For instance, future research could focus on the factors, including various voice variables that lead to the introduction of EO and DM policies. Future research could examine the views managers, employee representatives, and employees, on what led to the introduction of these policies. This could possibly be done using a case study methodology.

As already mentioned, one of the limitations of this thesis is the use of the management survey alone. This approach is justified, as, by using the management survey alone it enabled this thesis to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, thereby, contributing to the literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large ones (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). Using only the management survey, the complete sample used in this thesis has 1946 workplaces. If the employee representative or the employee survey had been used, the sample size would be much lower. Having such a large sample has allowed this thesis to reveal associations that were not previously known. Moreover, the employee representative and employee surveys do not cover EO and DM policies. However, future research could perhaps gather contributions from employees and employee representatives about the use of EO and DM policies within workplaces. This would result in a much smaller survey, but may reveal more details about how employees feel about the adoption of EO and DM policies and possibly reveal information about why these policies do not appear to result in lower labour turnover and absenteeism.

A longitudinal survey was not used in this research for the reasons already outlined. Relatedly, Guest (2011) acknowledges that the limited amount of research on HRM and performance that is longitudinal may contribute to the lack of understanding of linkages between HRM and performance. Therefore, future research may want to examine, over time, the links between, various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, and EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. This thesis has revealed interesting associations. In particular, the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes vary in minimal and dual voice workplace. Future qualitative research could examine this variation. The collection of data over time may reveal why EO and DM policies are introduced and how these policies are implemented within different types of voice workplaces. This, as already stated, would be difficult using the WERS data; however, other data could be collected overtime to give a more detailed understanding of these links. This would be important as dual voice workplaces are more likely to have individual EO and DM policies and, in some

cases, these policies are associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. Legal changes to force large companies to reveal the remuneration levels of male and female employees highlights the practical salience of this research area. More research needs to be done to assess how those legal changes are likely to influence workplace outcomes.

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APPENDIX A – Summary Tables

A.1 Summary of Minimal Voice as Reference Category

Policy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Statistical Significance*10%; **5%; ***1%		
	Hosmer Lemeshow		Cox and Snell R Square		Nagelkerke R Square		Direct Voice	Collective Voice	Dual Voice
Formal written policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity	Less than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.102	0.129	0.238	0.299	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.301	0.314	0.403	0.422	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.310	0.319	0.415	0.428	1%	5%	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.304	0.317	0.409	0.426	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.217	0.229	0.298	0.314	1%	1%	1%

for Indirect Gender Discrimination									
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.222	0.233	0.305	0.321	1%	5%	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.218	0.231	0.300	0.319	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.211	0.232	0.325	0.357	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.216	0.234	0.338	0.365	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.203	0.218	0.324	0.348	1%	1%	1%

Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.157	0.176	0.240	0.269	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.157	0.173	0.243	0.267	5%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.149	0.162	0.233	0.255	5%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Gender	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.202	0.213	0.320	0.337	1%	1%	1%
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.163	0.173	0.302	0.320	5%	10%	1%
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.150	0.159	0.289	0.306	5%		1%

Number of cases: 1946

A.2 Summary of Direct Voice as Reference Category

Policy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Statistical Significance*10%; **5%; ***1%		
	Hosmer Lemeshow		Cox and Snell R Square		Nagelkerke R Square		Minimalist Voice	Collective Voice	Dual Voice
Formal written policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity	Less than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.102	0.129	0.238	0.299	(1%)	(5%)	
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.301	0.314	0.403	0.422	(1%)	(5%)	
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.310	0.319	0.415	0.428	(1%)		
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.304	0.317	0.409	0.426	(1%)	(10%)	
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.217	0.229	0.298	0.314	(1%)		10%

Gender Discrimination									
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.222	0.233	0.305	0.321	(1%)		10%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.218	0.231	0.300	0.319	(1%)		
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.211	0.232	0.325	0.357	(1%)		1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.216	0.234	0.338	0.365	(1%)		1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.203	0.218	0.324	0.348	(1%)		1%

Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.157	0.176	0.240	0.269	(1%)		5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.157	0.173	0.243	0.267	(5%)		1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.149	0.162	0.233	0.255	(5%)		1%
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Gender	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.202	0.213	0.320	0.337	(1%)		
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.163	0.173	0.302	0.320	(5%)		
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.150	0.159	0.289	0.306	(5%)		

Number of cases: 1946

A.3 Summary of Dual Voice Workplaces

Policy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Statistical Significance*10%; **5%; ***1%
	Hosmer Lemeshow		Cox and Snell R Square		Nagelkerke R Square		Partnership
Formal written policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity	Less than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.010	0.013	0.076	0.093	
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.203	0.214	0.284	0.299	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.211	0.217	0.296	0.303	5%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.234	0.239	0.324	0.331	5%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.148	0.154	0.198	0.206	5%

for Indirect Gender Discrimination							
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.162	0.167	0.218	0.224	5%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.162	0.169	0.218	0.227	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.184	0.190	0.248	0.255	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.199	0.205	0.268	0.277	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.198	0.203	0.270	0.277	5%

Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.110	0.114	0.149	0.154	10%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.114	0.120	0.155	0.163	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.111	0.114	0.152	0.156	
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Gender	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.178	0.178	0.244	0.245	
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.152	0.153	0.221	0.224	
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.148	0.150	0.222	0.225	

Number of cases: 718

A.4 Summary of Minimalist Voice Workplaces

Policy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Statistical Significance*10%; **5%; ***1%
	Hosmer Lemeshow		Cox and Snell R Square		Nagelkerke R Square		Partnership
Formal written policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity	Less than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.120	0.143	0.208	0.249	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias	Greater than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.211	0.217	0.309	0.319	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Less than 0.05	0.226	0.234	0.328	0.341	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.209	0.216	0.312	0.321	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.133	0.142	0.206	0.220	1%

for Indirect Gender Discrimination							
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.129	0.138	0.201	0.215	1%
Workplace Monitors Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.126	0.135	0.199	0.212	1%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Gender Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.107	0.108	0.232	0.235	
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.109	0.111	0.243	0.247	
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.100	0.102	0.229	0.233	

Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.092	0.097	0.185	0.195	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination	Less than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.089	0.094	0.178	0.188	5%
Workplace Monitors Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.079	0.085	0.163	0.176	5%
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Gender	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.123	0.123	0.274	0.275	
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Ethnicity	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.087	0.87	0.277	0.277	
Workplace Monitors Pay Rates by Disability	Greater than 0.05	Greater than 0.05	0.078	0.078	0.263	0.264	

Number of cases: 947

Appendix B

Table B.1 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 'Minimal Voice' Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.399	0.024	0.034
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.275	0.022	0.031
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.466	0.022	0.032
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.605	0.024	0.034
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.629	0.022	0.032

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.056	0.022	0.031
Monitor promotions by gender	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.076	0.025	0.036
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.710	0.025	0.036
Monitor promotions by disability	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.079	0.024	0.035
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.194	0.022	0.031
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	‘A lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.077	0.022	0.032

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.161	0.022	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.059	0.022	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.214	0.022	0.031
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N		Percentage of female workers	'A lot' or 'some' variety in work	0.100	0.022	0.031

Notes: N = 516; variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Table B.2 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 'Direct Voice' Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N				0.010	0.027	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.401	0.028	0.045
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.141	0.027	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.261	0.028	0.044

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.260	0.027	0.044
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.230	0.027	0.044
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.012	0.027	0.044
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.020	0.027	0.044

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.026	0.028	0.045
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.021	0.027	0.044
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.087	0.029	0.046
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.031	0.028	0.045
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N				0.132	0.032	0.051

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.088	0.030	0.048
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N			%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	0.102	0.029	0.047

Notes: N = 245; variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Table B.3 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.062	0.098	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.052	0.098	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.063	0.098	0.142

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.157	0.098	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.349	0.098	0.142
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.097	0.098	0.142

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 10 per cent; negative association	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers; ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.471	0.110	0.159
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 10 per cent; negative association	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers; ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in work	0.296	0.109	0.158
Monitor promotions by disability	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.099	0.105	0.152

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers; workers in the ‘LOG’ have a ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.363	0.105	0.152
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.179	0.101	0.147

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.289	0.099	0.143
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – 5 pc; negative association	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled			0.277	0.118	0.171
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.638	0.100	0.145

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	Private sector workplaces; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled		%age of female workers	0.329	0.099	0.144

Notes: N = 250: variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Table B.4 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 'Dual Voice' Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	Percentage of female workers; percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.028	0.082	0.123
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	Percentage of female workers; percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.180	0.082	0.124

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	Percentage of female workers; percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.055	0.081	0.122
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.142	0.083	0.124
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees ; %age of female workers		0.056	0.084	0.126

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.247	0.082	0.123
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 1 per cent, negative link	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee; %age of female workers		0.002	0.093	0.139
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.076	0.081	0.129

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by disability	N	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employees		0.084	0.084	0.127
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	Y – one per cent; negative association	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee; %age of female workers		0.002	0.093	0.139
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 1 per cent; negative association	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee (natural log); %age of female workers;		0.009	0.091	0.137

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	Yes – 5 per cent; negative association	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee (natural log) ; %age of female workers		0.019	0.088	0.132
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – one per cent; negative	%age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee (natural log) ; %age of female workers		0.149	0.095	0.142
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	Y - 10 percentage; negative	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee (natural log)		0.240	0.086	0.129

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	Y - 10 percentage; negative	%age of female workers; %age of the workforce that is highly skilled	Total number of employee (natural log)		0.207	0.086	0.130

Notes: N = 616: variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Appendix C

Table C.1 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	Y – 10%; positive	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled		Private sector	0.288	0.054	0.074
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	Y – 5%; positive	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled		Private sector	0.173	0.057	0.078
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	Y - 5%; positive	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled		Private sector	0.073	0.058	0.080

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled			0.628	0.050	0.068
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled			0.733	0.049	0.067
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female; %age workforce highly skilled			0.466	0.051	0.070
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 5%; positive	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.021	0.058	0.080

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 5%; positive	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.335	0.056	0.077
Monitor promotions by disability	Y – 10%; positive	%age workforce female;	%age workforce highly skilled		0.117	0.054	0.074
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.479	0.050	0.069
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 10%; positive	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.330	0.053	0.073
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.671	0.050	0.069
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	Y – 10%; positive	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.065	0.054	0.075

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	Y – 10%; positive	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.279	0.054	0.075
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	%age workforce female	%age workforce highly skilled		0.391	0.052	0.071

Notes: N = 516: variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Table C.2 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 'Direct Voice' Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N		%age workforce female; private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design 'a lot' or to 'some' extent			
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design 'a lot' or to 'some' extent	0.324	0.112	0.153

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.477	0.114	0.156
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.981	0.109	0.149
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.992	0.110	0.150

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.944	0.110	0.151
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.591	0.116	0.159
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination	Y – 10 per cent; negative	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.457	0.122	0.167

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.806	0.117	0.160
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.906	0.110	0.150
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.794	0.109	0.149

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.881	0.109	0.150
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.978	0.110	0.150
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.997	0.108	0.149

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	%age workforce female	private sector; %age workforce highly skilled	Workers in LOG are involved in work design ‘a lot’ or to ‘some’ extent	0.975	0.108	0.148

Notes: N = 245: variables in bold indicate a negative association.

Table C.3 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.141	0.123	0.171
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.202	0.122	0.170

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	%age workforce female	Private sector	Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.072	0.123	0.171
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.506	0.125	0.174

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.249	0.123	0.172
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.071	0.123	0.171

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by gender	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.255	0.122	0.170
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Total number employees (natural log); Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.002	0.123	0.171

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by disability	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Total number employees (natural log); Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.008	0.123	0.171
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Total number employees (natural log); Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.011	0.124	0.172

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Total number employees (natural log); Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.030	0.124	0.173
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Total number employees (natural log); Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work	0.029	0.125	0.173

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.305	0.122	0.170
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.304	0.123	0.170

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	%age workforce female; private sector		Workers in LOG have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work; %age workforce highly skilled	0.276	0.122	0.170

Notes: N = 250; variables in bold indicate negative association.

Table C.4 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.794	0.119	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.638	0.120	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.648	0.119	0.164
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.613	0.121	0.166

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	Total number of employee (natural log); %age workforce ethnic minority	0.558	0.123	0.168
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability discrimination	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.746	0.120	0.164
Monitor promotions by gender	Y – 10 per cent; negative association	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability; %age workforce ethnic minority	Total number of employee (natural log)	0.444	0.124	0.170

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions by ethnicity	Y – 10 per cent; negative association	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability; %age workforce ethnic minority	Total number of employee (natural log)	0.422	0.124	0.169
Monitor promotions by disability	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability; %age workforce ethnic minority	Total number of employee (natural log)	0.430	0.122	0.167
Monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination	Y – 1 per cent; negative association	%age workforce female; private sector	Total number of employees (natural log); %age workforce disability; %age workforce ethnic minority		0.205	0.131	0.180

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination	Y – 1 per cent; negative association	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability; %age workforce ethnic minority	Total number of employees (natural log)	0.584	0.132	0.182
Monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination	Y – 5 per cent; negative association	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	Total number of employees (natural log) ; %age workforce ethnic minority	0.492	0.127	0.174
Monitor relative pay rates by gender	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.301	0.122	0.168
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.163	0.121	0.166

Equal Opportunity Policy	Statistical Significance Y/N – Level	Statistically Significant Control Variables			Hosmer Lemeshow	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
		1 Per Cent Level	5 Per Cent Level	10 Per Cent Level			
Monitor relative pay rates by disability	N	%age workforce female; private sector	%age workforce disability	%age workforce ethnic minority	0.191	0.120	0.164

Notes: N = 616; variables in bold indicate a negative association.