

University of  
**Salford**  
MANCHESTER



**Evaluation of the North West Resettlement Consortium:  
Final report**

November 2012

**Neal Hazel, Sam Wright, Mark Liddle, Judy Renshaw and Paul Gray**

Centre for Social Research, University of Salford  
and ARCS UK

## Contents

---

Acknowledgements	
PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	5
1 The North West Resettlement Consortium	5
Introduction and background to the North West Resettlement Consortium	5
Aims and Objectives	5
Structure and implementation of the NWRC	6
2 The Evaluation	7
Aims and Objectives	7
Design, timing of data-collection	8
Quantitative methods	8
Qualitative methods	12
3 What is known about resettlement – a brief literature review	14
PART 2: THE ORGANISATIONAL EXPERIENCE/PROCESS EVALUATION	24
4 Establishing the consortium	24
Local interpretation of the purpose of the consortium	24
Setting-up the partnership	25
The NWRC model	25
Governance and senior level buy-in	26
The role of the project manager	27
5 Implementing the Consortium	28
The timetable	28
Partnership working between custody and community agencies	28
Partnership working across areas	30
Partnership working across community agencies	31
Influencing working practices	36
The legacy	43
6 Who were the young people?	44
Numbers receiving the enhanced offer	44
Gender, age and ethnicity	46
Care history	47
Education, training and employment background	48
Offending behaviour and criminal justice background	49
Current offences	51
The needs of the young people	52
Summary	55
7 Receiving the enhanced offer	57
Custody and preparation for release	57
Transition in addressing offending behaviour	58
Tackling needs	59
Planned and actual agency involvement	61
Housing	64
Education, training and employment	67
Risk of Reoffending: ASSET Scores	74

Summary.....	75
8 Compliance during supervision – breaching and reoffending .....	77
Breaching .....	77
Reoffending.....	81
Reconvictions and returned to custody .....	85
Respondent perceptions of the impact on young people.....	87
Case studies .....	92
Summary.....	99
PART 4: IMPLICATIONS.....	100
9 Cost-benefit analysis .....	100
10 Reflections, lessons and recommendations.....	110
11 References.....	117

## Acknowledgements

---

We are grateful to a range of people for the help and support they have provided to us during the course of this project. Our thanks go to Manchester City Council and Consortium Local Authority partners for funding the evaluation. In particular, we were aided by the advice of Nigel Waddington at Manchester City Council. We would also like to thank the Youth Justice Board, for full engagement. In particular we would like to acknowledge the help of Helen Mercer, YJB Resettlement Programme Manager.

The authors would like to acknowledge the involvement of Professor Mike Maguire, University of Glamorgan. We would like to thank him for his contributions from beginning to end, including reviewing this report.

We could not have undertaken the project without the very regular assistance of Louise Higginbotham, the NWRC Manager, and the full cooperation of all the NWRC partners at all times. We are also grateful to Stefania Dalman (Manchester) for her help identifying and sorting data. There are particular people from the Consortium areas and agencies that require individual mention for their contribution methodologically and organisationally. These are: Peter Taylor, Samiya Karim, Marie McLaughlin, Sarah Henry (Manchester); Sarah Kelly (Stockport); Lisa Williams (Wigan); Robert Smyth, Yvonne James (Rochdale); Liane Sharples (HMYOI Hindley); Margaret McMaster, Vicky Ingram (The Manchester College); and Samantha Tonner (Careers Solutions).

We are grateful to the 23 stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed in depth as part of this study, and to all those professionals in Youth Offending Teams who helped in distributing and collecting questionnaires. Finally, our thanks go of course to the young people involved for sharing their views and information about themselves, including in particular those who gave their time to be interviewed in depth.

We do not underestimate the trouble that people took to find time to talk to us and invest in the evaluation in challenging and busy times. We are pleased that parties locally and nationally have recognised the importance of research informed policy and practice in resettlement and have already started feeding in early findings from this evaluation.

Neal Hazel, Sam Wright, Mark Liddle, Judy Renshaw and Paul Gray

November 2012

# **PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

## **1 The North West Resettlement Consortium**

---

### **Introduction and background to the North West Resettlement Consortium**

In 2009, in response to the Youth Crime Action Plan<sup>1</sup>, the YJB commenced working with stakeholders to develop two regionally led consortia pilots: one in the North West and one in the South West of England. The overarching aims of the consortia were to develop positive links between the secure estate, youth offending teams (YOTs) and local authorities in order to improve resettlement outcomes for young people released from custody. Children's services and housing were identified as key local authority departments to engage with, and improving the provision of, and access to both mainstream and specialist services was a prime aim. Funded for two years, the resettlement consortia were envisaged as being critical to the delivery of the YJB target to reduce reoffending by children and young people<sup>2</sup>. For the North West, the project was designed to target young people from Manchester, Rochdale, Wigan or Stockport local authority areas sentenced to a Detention and Training Order (DTO) at HMYOI Hindley.

### **Aims and Objectives**

The national objectives for resettlement consortia were to bring about:

- Increased collaboration between partners and with local authorities;
- Improved links between the secure estate, Youth Offending Teams, children's services and local authorities;
- Improved resettlement experiences for young people leaving custody; and
- Improved access to mainstream and specialist services for young people.

In addition, the North West Consortium set itself a target of achieving the following outcomes and outputs:

1. To reduce the reoffending of those young people in the consortium cohort;
2. To increase collaboration between partners responsible for the resettlement of young people;

---

<sup>1</sup> HM Government (2008)

<sup>2</sup> The YJB Resettlement Programme comprises not only the Resettlement Consortia, but also IRS and other projects across England and Wales.

3. To develop, pilot and monitor locally led solutions to resettlement e.g. processes and practices for approximately 130 – 190 young people from January 2010 – March 2011;
4. To work with local partners to include effective resettlement programmes in their plans and budgets beyond March 2011; and
5. To support the evaluation of the consortium.

### **Structure and implementation of the NWRC**

The NWRC project implementation design included a focus on both on strategic partnerships and operational delivery – with an explicit aim of developing processes, practices and partnership working that could be mainstreamed beyond the life of the project. From the beginning, the Consortium was designed to ensure a consistent and accountable level of service which could continue to be delivered beyond the end of the YJB funding (March 2011).

## 2 The Evaluation

---

### Aims and Objectives

The main aims of the evaluation were to focus on the extent to which the Resettlement Consortium generated:

- *Increased collaboration - between partners and with local authorities;*
- *Improved links between the secure estate, YOTs, Children's services and local authorities;*
- *Improved resettlement experiences for young people leaving custody, and*
- *Improved access to mainstream and specialist services for young people (especially accommodation and education, training and employment).*

The key purpose of the Consortium was to enhance resettlement outcomes for young people through:

- *Better use of resources through information sharing*
- *Potential for innovation*
- *Coherent practitioner development*
- *Dissemination of effective practice across areas of shared interest*
- *Continuity in relationships with the young person*
- *Practical arrangements for ETE and accommodation*
- *A consistent approach to resettlement through an agreed 'enhanced offer'.*

Thus the evaluation also needed to focus on each of these areas and be able to inform the more specific research questions (as listed in the ITT documentation):

1. *What are the key components of the enhanced offer delivered in each area, and how is this different to business-as-usual?*
2. *What are the enablers and barriers to successful implementation of the resettlement offer (and component activities) by the partner agencies?*
3. *What perceptions do young people have of their resettlement experience in the pilot areas?*
4. *Do these young people perceive any connection between their resettlement experience and their reintegration into the community and likelihood of reoffending?*
5. *What aspects or characteristics of their resettlement process (in the pilot areas) do young people identify as most and least valuable?*
6. *What is the estimated overall cost of the resettlement consortia to individual partners? Where possible, this should be broken down into:*

- i. *Constituent elements*
  - ii. *Start-up versus long-term costs*
7. *How do these costs compare to 'business as usual'?*

## **Design, timing of data-collection**

The research team<sup>3</sup> used a variety of data sources and a combination of data collection methods - both qualitative and quantitative - to evaluate the three Regional Resettlement Consortia areas<sup>4</sup>. The tender specification asked that the *'three individual evaluations will as far as possible complement each other through the sharing of instruments, e.g. topic guides, data collection forms and spreadsheets'*. So, whilst implemented as separate evaluation projects that were responsive to local priorities, the overarching design was constructed to ensure consistency and comparability as far as possible across the three research studies. Exactly the same research methods were adopted for the South West and North West Consortia evaluations, and the quantitative dataset and stakeholder interview schedules were common across all three Regional Resettlement Consortia areas.

The evaluation commenced in April 2011 and the data collection/fieldwork period ran from July 2011 to the end of April 2012.

## **Quantitative methods**

### ***Development of the cohort database (for future outcome analysis)***

Although the feasibility study for this evaluation<sup>5</sup> highlighted some of the difficulties involved in assessing outcomes across the three consortia sites (mostly related to small throughput numbers), part of this research team's task was to leave in place a data collection/MIS system that could be used to assess outcomes over the longer term. The aim was to design a system that would allow for the generation of data-sets which could be analysed using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)<sup>6</sup>. PSM allows better matching of the treatment group (in this case RCC cohorts in the three consortia) with a 'control' group using PNC data, and is the current way in which Ministry of Justice carries out reconvictions analysis. Part of our evaluation approach was therefore to ensure that such data are routinely collected to enable reconvictions analysis to take place beyond the life of the evaluation project.

The research team undertook a "data scoping" exercise at the outset of the evaluation, to determine not only any data "gaps" that would need addressing to support future use of PSM, but also to check the quality and consistency of data-sets across all of the YOTs

---

<sup>3</sup> Comprising the University of Salford and ARCS UK, with consultancy input from the University of Glamorgan and other external experts.

<sup>4</sup> The North West, South West and Wessex Regional Resettlement Consortia.

<sup>5</sup> Unpublished feasibility study on evaluating the resettlement consortia, conducted for the Youth Justice Board by IRIS Consulting.

<sup>6</sup> PSM avoids many of the pitfalls identified by the IRIS feasibility report, using different statistical methods and making smaller groups less of a problem in identifying success of an intervention.



involved in the work of the Consortium. Generating a complete dataset that could support PSM required thorough auditing and manipulation of existing data collection systems and negotiating both amendments and additional data collection (including accommodation and ETE and where they related to stakeholders outside the YOT<sup>7</sup>). Much of the data for PSM reoffending analysis was already being collected by YOTs, but a substantial amount of work was required to combine the data in a format that supported the generation of the required statistical outputs. It is this dataset that has provided most of the quantitative data for the results presented in this report.

### ***Cohort and comparison samples (for current outcome analysis)***

The characteristics of the cohort are provided in detail in Chapter 6 (“Who were the young people?”. The cohort consisted of all those who received the “enhanced offer” and were released during the 25 month period from March 2010 to March 2012 (N168).

As noted above, the feasibility study for this evaluation had predicted difficulties in assessing outcomes for any cohort. This was partly because it would not be easy to run a full experimental model with the sample size and impracticalities of a randomised controlled trial. In addition, the time constraints for the evaluation meant that it would not be possible to compare reconviction data for the cohort and one in a different geographical area.

Nevertheless, it was important to try to contextualise any improvements in the cohort who received the enhanced offer. To some extent, improvements could be charted by capturing “distance travelled” – for instance by comparing ASSET scores at the start and end of sentence. But this does not tell us how this compares to how the young people would have done without the enhanced offer. Second, it was possible to compare outcomes with previous cohorts in our resettlement research across England and Wales. These include the England-wide evaluation of the DTO (Hazel et al, 2002) which could be considered a baseline with ‘standard’ resettlement activity, and the RESET evaluation (Hazel et al, 2010) which represents some enhanced resettlement practices. While this was useful, it still would not usually tell us how young people would have done in our consortium area specifically, if the enhanced offer had not been available. We say “usually” because in actuality fact, half of the RESET projects were based in the same North West area as this consortium, but some years ago (2005-2007).

As such, we drew up a comparison group of all those released from custody in the year previous to the cohort receiving the enhanced offer. However, it is still possible that the individuals serving a custodial sentence and seeking resettlement are quite different year to year. Therefore, in deciding whether to use this group to contextualise outcomes for the comparison group, we compared the samples for statistical differences across TEN key variables, seen in the table below. There were some differences, such as the cohort having worse ASSET risk scores and more previous convictions but less convictions per year of

---

<sup>7</sup> Accommodation and ETE data have been explored as possible additional dynamic variables to be added into PSM reoffending outcome analysis. In addition, changes in the proportion of those young people accessing accommodation, education, training and employment have been measured, along with how well these outcomes are sustained.

offending - but these were not statistically significant. The only significant difference between the groups was that the comparison group had more people engaged in ETE before the start of their sentence. As this suggests the possibility that the cohort is a harder to engage group, it would only mean that any improved outcome from our cohort was more meaningful rather than unreliable. Consequently, all those released from custody in the year previous to the introduction of the enhanced offer was seen as a suitable comparison group to contextualise the outcomes for our cohort (N104).

**Table: Comparing the Cohort and Comparison group samples across ten variables**

Area	Cohort Group	Comparison Group	Test and whether statistically significant	Observation
Size	N168	N104		
Housing suitable before	91%	89%	Binomial ✗	No significant difference in housing suitability
ETE prior to custody	44%	54%	Binomial ✓	Comparison group more engaged in ETE, but not significant difference.
ASSET Scores at start	31.33 mean	30.69 mean	Independent samples T-Test ✗	Cohort slightly higher ASSET scores, but not significant (using matched scoring system)
Age at first offence	14 median	14 median	Mann-Whitney ✗ Kolmogorov-Smirnov ✗ Ind sample median ✗	Same median age at first offence
Number of previous convictions	6 median	4 median	Mann-Whitney ✗ Kolmogorov-Smirnov ✗ Ind sample median ✗	Cohort higher median average number of previous convictions, but not significant
Average previous convictions per year of offending	2.70 mean	3.23 mean	Independent samples T-Test ✗	Higher number of convictions per year in the comparison group, but not significant.
DTO total sentence length (months)	8 median	8 median	Mann-Whitney ✗ Kolmogorov-Smirnov ✗ Ind sample median ✗	Same median length of total sentence
Average days in custody	118 median	91 median	Ind sample median ✗	Cohort spent longer in custody, but not a significant difference.
Average days in community	120 median	120 median	Ind sample median ✗	Exactly the same median days in on licence for cohort and comparison group (previous year)
Average days served	239 median	239 median	Ind sample median ✗	Exactly the same median days served over whole sentence for cohort and comparison group (previous year)

Significant = P<0.05

There is an interesting (for researchers) statistical analysis issue when comparing the outcomes between the cohort and comparison group in this study. Strictly speaking, these groups are populations rather than samples – *all* those released in our consortium area in their respective time periods. As such, arguably, it is not necessary or appropriate to use significance testing – because there is no sampling chance to take into account (everyone is included). Thus, every difference reflects what is a real difference the two groups, as long

as we do not try to generalise out to the rest of the country (which may be quite different). However, it was considered that significance testing was still useful to (a) give us some sense of how large or 'important' any difference might be, and (b) whether the difference was large enough that it is likely to be replicated elsewhere (or in future in our consortium area). Consequently, we do report significance here anyway - using both tests of association for disaggregated data, and binomial tests to show difference in the "population groups" as a whole or when comparing with our previous research cohorts.

### ***Collection of feedback from young people***

Additional feedback was collected via structured questionnaire from young offenders at two key periods in the resettlement process: firstly, in the two week period before they were released from custody; and then a follow-up questionnaire completed either at the end of their licence period, or three months post-custody - whichever happened soonest.

These questionnaires contained mixed qualitative and quantitative questions, the team sought to gather this feedback from *all* of the young people who were: (a) in custody during the fieldwork period, and (b) had either completed their licence or spent at least three months back in the community before the end of fieldwork. In order to do so the research team needed to enlist "on the ground" support from custodial institution and YOT workers to assist with implementation of the questionnaires.

### ***Cost-benefit strand***

One of the aims of the evaluation was to deliver an assessment of value for money, and draw some conclusions concerning whether consortia outcomes appear to justify the costs. Thus, the research team also undertook cost-benefit research across all three sites, in order to identify the "added value" effect of the enhanced resettlement approach overall - both by individual consortium and by constituent elements. Although a full-blown cost-benefit analysis (CBA) would have been both too resource-intensive and dependent on forms of data that were unavailable, it has been possible to assess aspects of the project's costs and benefits via something less than a full-blown CBA<sup>8</sup>.

By assessing the direct costs and benefits of outcomes that could be generated by consortium activities (on the basis of existing data and feedback from respondents), and by including full discussion of the direct and indirect cost dimension of a range of both "hard outcomes"<sup>9</sup> and "intermediate outcomes"<sup>10</sup> that the consortium might generate, the research team have been able to provide some careful analysis of the cost-benefit implications of the regional consortium approach. Linkages with the wider literature have been made wherever possible.

---

<sup>8</sup> Both CBA and cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) require that data-collection systems be in place to gather consistent (and time-linked) information concerning all project inputs and outcomes, and full-blown exercises also require either the costing of a range of intervention alternatives (as in full CEA), or the utilization of a range of costing models for estimating values around some of the less tangible benefits (as in full CBA), because of the controversy surrounding how some of these benefits should be quantified.

<sup>9</sup> Such as apparent reductions in re-offending.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. positive impact on educational achievement or accommodation problems.

## **Qualitative methods**

### ***Ongoing literature/practice review***

The review of the available research, policy, and practice literature concerning the resettlement of young offenders, and the “anchoring” of our research findings in this literature is an important strand of this evaluation - not least because this area of policy and practice is currently in a state of flux (partly due to the impact of the Green Paper, and other developments such as the move toward “payment by results”).

### ***Semi-structured interviews with young people***

Interviews with young people constitute another key strand of data for the evaluation - providing detailed insight into their experience of the resettlement project and its impact upon their lives back in the community. The research team undertook a mix of interviews both “on the inside” and in the community with a diverse range of young people – including both those who have been “resettled” effectively, and those who have had less positive outcomes (including those who have gone on to re-offend, for example).

Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on young people’s involvement with the project and the background to their participation, their experiences of assessment of the programme, and their perceptions of the effectiveness of methods and approaches used in relation to their assessed needs. All interviews were digitally recorded and partially transcribed at the time of interview (after gaining the respondents’ permission).

### ***Construction of individual case studies***

In order to add some depth to the results from the other research strands, the research team designed and developed a set of carefully chosen case studies. These case studies enabled us to identify complex causal chains and the contexts within which they might be related to specific outcome patterns. Case studies were drawn from across the local authority areas where the consortium operates, and have been used to highlight key types of participation or “pathways” through the project that were taken by particular types of participant. This sample of case studies was drawn purposively, based on initial assessment of the available data concerning the characteristics and circumstances of young people focused on by the consortium (and reflecting the range of key sub-groups of these young people).

### ***Interviews with key staff and other agency stakeholders***

Another major strand of qualitative data collected during the research was the stakeholder consultation. Feedback from key participants having had some involvement with the consortium and/or direct involvement with issues concerning the resettlement of young offenders provides a rich supplement to the documentary material and official data referred to elsewhere.

In terms of particular agencies/sectors, the team aimed to gather feedback from as wide a range of respondents across all the organisations/groups involved in the Consortium. As is the case for many partnerships focusing on issues of this kind, the number of organisations involved in resettlement was substantial and in many cases it was necessary to consult multiple representatives from particular agencies<sup>11</sup>. A mix of methods was therefore used to consult key stakeholders, and across this range of respondents, the research team focused on finding out:

- What their involvement was with the work of the consortium;
- What their interest was in relation to issues concerning the resettlement of young offenders;
- What they saw as the key factors that facilitate or impede effective partnership work to address resettlement issues;
- What they saw as being the key contributions of specific partners (both ideally, and in practice);
- What their perceptions were in terms of effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) of SWRCYP-style approaches;
- What shape they thought that future work in this area should take (and why);
- The extent to which SWRCYP-style approaches are “transferable” from one area to another, and
- How efforts to address resettlement issues for young offenders should be prioritised alongside the range of other responsibilities that agencies have.

The research team conducted one to one interviews with key stakeholders from the resettlement consortium (with some on more than one occasion), targeting those individuals who had the most direct involvement. In addition, given that there was inevitably a larger pool of potential respondents than the team could canvas on a one-to-one basis, in order to allow the maximum number of stakeholders to share their views and experiences with the research team, a brief questionnaire was developed so that stakeholders who could not be interviewed also had the opportunity to provide their input. Direct interviews were digitally recorded, and partially transcribed (manually, at the time of interview). The research partnership used the same research instrument across all three consortia sites.

---

<sup>11</sup> A single local authority might have representatives from a range of separate departments involved for example, and is also involved both at strategic level and in implementation work.

### 3 What is known about resettlement – a brief literature review

---

#### Introduction

A robust body of theoretical, research and development work exists on the factors within adult resettlement that promote desistance from crime<sup>12</sup>. In contrast, the evidence base on the resettlement of young offenders is less developed. Despite the Youth Justice Board noting that the successful resettlement of young people leaving custody is a 'significant challenge'<sup>13</sup>, and the widely acknowledged fact that resettling young offenders requires 'multiple solutions'<sup>14</sup>, services provided for them are often inadequate and/or poorly coordinated. Although there are some exceptions - for example, highly structured, long-term programmes are known to be able to reduce re-offending, even among persistent young offenders for whom other interventions have been unsuccessful<sup>15</sup> - the majority of provision across England continues to be relatively ineffective. For example, in terms of re-offending, research has shown that levels of re-offending following release from custody are higher for young people than for adults, with over 70 per cent of young people re-offending within 12 months of release<sup>16</sup>, and over 80 per cent within two years<sup>17</sup>. Added to this, re-offending often occurs soon after release, with about a third of young people re-offending within one month of release<sup>18</sup>.

Before moving on to look at the support needs of young offenders in more depth, it is worth briefly highlighting what constitutes 'effective' practice in the field of adult resettlement. The growing body of research in this field has demonstrated that the provision of social and practical support to both short and long-term adult offenders can be an effective means of reducing re-offending. Indeed, in terms of reducing re-offending, 'rehabilitative' interventions are more likely to be successful than deterrence-based interventions<sup>19</sup>. Research has found that those interventions that appear to be most effective display the following characteristics<sup>20</sup>:

- **Multi-modal** – taking a more 'holistic' approach, rather than delivering one dimension of work<sup>21</sup>.
- **Targeted** – allocating resources to those most at risk and most in need of services, rather than low-risk/need offenders<sup>22</sup>.

---

<sup>12</sup> See Lewis *et al.* (2007)

<sup>13</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005a: 5)

<sup>14</sup> Harding (2006: 391)

<sup>15</sup> Buckland G. and Stevens A. (2001)

<sup>16</sup> See for example Youth Justice Board (2005a) and Medhurst and Cunliffe (2007)

<sup>17</sup> See for example Social Exclusion Unit (2002) and Hagell (2004)

<sup>18</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005a) and Hazel *et al.* (2002)

<sup>19</sup> Sherman, L. W. *et al.* (1997)

<sup>20</sup> See especially Lewis *et al.* (2002) and Raynor (2003)

<sup>21</sup> Gaes *et al.* (1999)

<sup>22</sup> For low-risk/need offenders, intensive treatment might even be criminogenic – see for example Andrews *et al.* (1990)

- **Intensive** – delivering interventions that are able to address multiple needs simultaneously<sup>23</sup>.
- **Theoretically sound** – drawing specifically on criminological theory and research concerning criminal etiology and desistance from crime<sup>24</sup>.
- **Desistance-focused** – rather than focusing on ‘factors associated with offending’<sup>25</sup>, working around those factors that research has shown are associated with desistance from crime<sup>26</sup>.
- **Motivational** – recognising the need for offenders to ‘buy in’ to the intervention<sup>27</sup>.

Indeed, it is suggested that any effort to rehabilitate and resettle offenders should be based on the stated needs of those individuals the interventions are meant to be supporting- whenever possible ‘involving program participants directly in program design, administration and evaluation, rather than having decisions concerning peoples’ lives and welfare made entirely by others’<sup>28</sup>. Certainly this appears to be one of the characteristics of those interventions identified as ‘working’ or ‘promising’ by the *Maryland Report*<sup>29</sup>.

The question remains, though, as to why interventions identified as being particularly effective in international research<sup>30</sup> have been less effective when implemented in the UK<sup>31</sup>. It is suggested that this is often because only one of the two basic tenets for resettlement identified by the *Maryland Report* are translated into practice in the UK<sup>32</sup>. For example, the *Maryland Report* suggested that rehabilitation interventions ‘work’ when they:

- Are structured and focused, use multiple treatment components, focus on developing skills, and use behavioural (including cognitive-behavioural) methods; and,
- Provide for substantial, meaningful contact between the treatment personnel and the participant.

However, it would appear that a large proportion of interventions in the UK often adopt a cognitive-behavioural approach, whilst perhaps failing to provide the opportunities for any substantial relationship to develop between the personnel delivering the interventions and those participants ‘receiving’ them. This is in spite of much recent resettlement research focussing on what has been termed the ‘relational’ aspects of the rehabilitative process<sup>33</sup> - in particular, the issue of what characterises an effective working relationship between an offender and their criminal justice worker<sup>34</sup>. There is now an emerging sense from much

<sup>23</sup> Interventions of this nature are the most likely to be effective in assisting offenders to overcome the often multiple disadvantages in their lives - see for example McGuire (2002)

<sup>24</sup> Maruna and Immarigeon (2004)

<sup>25</sup> See for example, Harper and Chitty (2005)

<sup>26</sup> See Farrall (2004) and McNeill (2006)

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, McMurrin (2002)

<sup>28</sup> Harris, 2003

<sup>29</sup> Sherman, L. W. *et al.* (1997) and Maruna *et al.* (2008)

<sup>30</sup> In particular, cognitive behavioural therapy.

<sup>31</sup> See Hollin *et al.* (2008)

<sup>32</sup> Maruna *et al.* (2008)

<sup>33</sup> Robinson and Raynor (2006)

<sup>34</sup> See Batchelor and McNeill (2005)

recent probation research<sup>35</sup> that the quality of the immediate relationship between worker and offender may be the crucial factor in determining whether or not that person desists from further crime. This is certainly nothing new. Until relatively recently, the essence of much resettlement work was to 'provide a supportive relationship, based on the assumption that this relationship would be influential and would facilitate change'<sup>36</sup>. Something which is supported by much older psychotherapeutic research which found that the kind of person the worker is (or at least comes across as being) seemed to be more important for therapeutic success or failure than the particular methods of intervention employed<sup>37</sup>.

## **The support needs of young offenders leaving custody**

The lives of young offenders are far more likely than those of non-offenders to be characterised by the 'risk factors' identified by research<sup>38</sup> concerned with the etiology of offending. These include:

- school absenteeism, truancy, and or exclusion;
- friends involved in offending;
- family conflict;
- unstable living conditions;
- family members involved with the police or criminal justice system;
- poor relationships with either parent;
- aggressive/violent behaviour (during school age years);
- drug and/or alcohol misuse;
- harsh or erratic discipline in the family; and,
- neglect or abuse.

A report by the Prison Reform Trust<sup>39</sup> found that: at least three quarters of the young people in its study had absent fathers and a third absent mothers; more than a quarter had witnessed domestic violence; a similar proportion had experienced local authority care; a fifth were known to have harmed themselves; 11% to have attempted suicide; and more than one in 10 had suffered the untimely death of a parent or sibling.

Added to this, the actual experience of custody itself is, for many young people, a traumatizing event. Research has found that violence is endemic within YOIs with young offenders often reporting that they feel unsafe, that they have been victims of violence and bullying, and that they feel isolated and alone<sup>40</sup>. This had led some to argue that many

---

<sup>35</sup> See for example Rex (1999)

<sup>36</sup> Burnett (2004: 181)

<sup>37</sup> Smith (2006)

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Farrington (2002), Communities that Care (2001) and Social Exclusion Unit (2002)

<sup>39</sup> Jacobson et al (2010)

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, Farrant (2004) and Harvey (2007)



young people in custody are doubly punished - first, through very difficult childhoods characterised by loss and disadvantage, and second by being locked up<sup>41</sup>.

In terms of the needs of young offenders leaving custody, an evaluation of the RESET<sup>42</sup> project - aimed at improving the resettlement outcomes of young offenders - identified multiple support needs amongst the young people it engaged with<sup>43</sup>. For example:

- 61% reported needing more constructive activities;
- 50 % reported needing help to address offending behavior;
- 46% reported unemployment problems;
- 39% had low qualifications or skills affecting future employment;
- 39% reported substance misuse problems;
- 35% reported family problems;
- 27% reported needing help with anger management; and,
- 23% were homeless.

Similarly, other research<sup>44</sup> has shown that young offenders leaving custody are often confronted with a wide range of problems - often the same problems that they were experiencing when they went into custody, although for many, the problems have been exacerbated by the custodial sentence. Furthermore, many young people leaving custody are returning to significantly disadvantaged communities where offending is endemic. It thus becomes apparent why the Youth Justice Board concludes that the successful resettlement of young people leaving custody is such a 'significant challenge'<sup>45</sup>.

## **Barriers to effective practice**

It is clear that successfully resettling young offenders requires 'multiple solutions'<sup>46</sup>. Efforts to rehabilitate young offenders need to address not just the behaviour that resulted in conviction, but also the complex dynamic family and personal factors that gave rise to such behaviour. These factors need to be addressed holistically - by a range of providers.

In terms of the secure estate addressing offending behaviour specifically, the degree to which work is undertaken and the methods used vary between Local Authority Secure Units, Youth Offending Institutions and Secure Training Centres. Nonetheless, all the institutions in the secure estate face a number of common challenges, including<sup>47</sup>:

---

<sup>41</sup> Jacobson et al (2010)

<sup>42</sup> Resettlement, Education, Support, Employment and Training (RESET) – a project funded by the European Social Fund and supported by the YJB which aimed to improve the resettlement outcomes of young offenders

<sup>43</sup> Hazel et al. (2010)

<sup>44</sup> see, for example, Farrant (2006) and Gray (2010)

<sup>45</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005a:5)

<sup>46</sup> Harding (2006: 391)

<sup>47</sup> Hobbs & Hook Consulting (2001)

- A lack of age appropriate programmes;
- The opportunities for pro-social modeling not being capitalised upon sufficiently;
- Very limited work undertaken with families (despite acute awareness of this need);
- Little evaluation of impact (apart from Prison Service accredited programmes); and,
- Little experience of costing work.

As mentioned, despite the need for the establishment and maintenance of good family relationships being recognized by practitioners as associated with effective resettlement<sup>48</sup>, it is often not delivered in practice. Yet supporting family contact through mediation and relationship support can be crucial. Not only are young people in custody who maintain contact and receive regular visits from family members more likely to have accommodation arranged on release than those who do not<sup>49</sup>, but also, family mediation with young people can result in accommodation being made available to them - where there had previously been resistance (even if only on an initial and temporary basis)<sup>50</sup>. With the links between severe accommodation problems or homelessness and recidivism being well documented<sup>51</sup>, assessing and responding to any housing needs should be an integral element of resettlement plans. Each young person's accommodation needs should thus be identified early on, with appropriate actions initiated to support them - well before release into the community<sup>52</sup>.

In addition, despite the well established resettlement benefits associated with young people engaging in education, training or employment (ETE), research in 2002 found that around only forty per cent of young people serving Detention and Training Orders (DTOs) were involved in any form of education or training during the community period of their sentence<sup>53</sup>. Indeed, the Youth Justice Board has identified both strategic and operational barriers to facilitating the engagement in ETE for young people leaving custody, including<sup>54</sup>:

- strategic lack of awareness of the scale of the issue;
- professional lack of knowledge about the youth justice system;
- conflicting objectives and targets between agencies;
- confused responsibilities between agencies;
- ineffective and non-existent protocols; and,
- limited and tardy transmission of key information.

Whilst systems and processes are in place to ensure thorough assessment of need in both custodial and community youth justice settings, there is often a discrepancy between the

---

<sup>48</sup> Youth Justice Board (2010a)

<sup>49</sup> Niven and Stewart (2005)

<sup>50</sup> Eagle and Gammampila (2005)

<sup>51</sup> Hagan and McCarthy (1997)

<sup>52</sup> Youth Justice Board (2006a) and Youth Justice Board (2004)

<sup>53</sup> Hazel *et al.* (2002)

<sup>54</sup> Youth Justice Board (2006b)

needs identified and the availability of services to provide support. The RESET evaluation<sup>55</sup> revealed that on average, workers planned to involve four agencies for each young person. However, in practice, the RESET workers managed to involve only half the number of intended agencies. For the young people with highest support need (the 29% for whom the input of at least six stakeholders was required), only seven per cent actually received that level of support.

In terms of which agencies were most commonly involved, the most successful partnerships were with other social support agencies - for example other resettlement projects (79% of cases) and social services (70%). Less success was achieved with other agencies from the state sector - including the local education authority (40%), schools (43%) and training providers (36%). Only low engagement was achieved with the voluntary sector (9%) and local employers (7%).

Those working in the RESET programme experienced substantial problems in engaging other agencies to meet the needs of the young offenders. Whilst substance misuse (46%), offending behaviour (42%) and homelessness (40%) were the issues most commonly tackled, support needs that were addressed in less than a third of intended cases included unemployment (32%), anger management (29%), employability (22%), low qualifications or skills (19%) and mental health issues (10%). Furthermore, according to Asset data, the proportion of young people with housing problems at the end of their involvement with RESET was almost identical as those with housing problems when they first joined the project (23% vs. 24%).

There is also a growing body of evidence that reveals the discrepancy between institution-based and community resettlement work. In 2002, an evaluation of the Detention and Training Order also highlighted, among other things, the extent to which there was a lack of continuity across the custody and community phases of youth sentences<sup>56</sup>. In half of the cases (49%) examined under the RESET evaluation<sup>57</sup>, no information on the offending work that had been undertaken in custody was received by resettlement workers. Only in about two of every five cases (38%) did resettlement workers feel that they had enough information to form a continuous programme of support for addressing offending behaviour post-release. More broadly, a separate report by the National Audit Office found that only 6% of YOTs reported that young people were able to continue the educational programme they had started in custody upon release<sup>58</sup>. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Ofsted recommend the development of a national statutory plan - to be completed for each child and young person as they move through the criminal justice system, and that is recognized by all stakeholders - in order to ensure integration between services<sup>59</sup>.

---

<sup>55</sup> Hazel *et al.* (2010)

<sup>56</sup> Hazel *et al.* (2002)

<sup>57</sup> Hazel *et al.* (2010)

<sup>58</sup> National Audit Office (2004)

<sup>59</sup> Ofsted (2010)

## Effective practice and outcomes

In terms of general reducing reoffending interventions, approaches focused on the risk factors for offending among individual offenders have achieved reductions in reoffending - although no single approach has been identified as suitable for all young offenders. In general, the Youth Justice Board recommend that programmes should<sup>60</sup>:

- target high- and medium-risk offenders;
- be well-structured with a clear rationale;
- use an approach that challenges the offender's reasoning and perception;
- address a full range of criminogenic risk factors - including family / environmental factors;
- adhere to agreed objectives and procedures; and,
- be present in a menu for working with young offenders as part of a 'multimodal' package.

There is evidence to suggest that different approaches need to be taken in the community from those adopted in custody however. For young people in custody, programme characteristics – type, length and intensity – play a greater role in influencing the outcome of the intervention than the characteristics of the offender<sup>61</sup>. The opposite is the case in the community, where both the development and implementation of young people's aftercare programmes require awareness of the evidence on effectiveness, *plus* a sound theoretical foundation for behaviour modification<sup>62</sup>.

The RAP evaluation<sup>63</sup> considered five main theoretical approaches to young offender behaviour modification:

- Intensive Aftercare Programme.
- Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Aftercare Programme.
- Holistic Care Programmes.
- Managed Care Model.
- Family Involvement Models.

Despite the mixed evidence about the effectiveness of each of these approaches, whichever approach is chosen, the authors of the evaluation state that the research evidence is clear: staff need to be trained in the theoretical rationale of the approach adopted, and the application of the approach. Without adequate staff training, successful implementation will be compromised.

---

<sup>60</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005b)

<sup>61</sup> Hobbs & Hook Consulting (2001)

<sup>62</sup> Galahad SMS Limited (2010)

<sup>63</sup> Galahad SMS Limited (2010)

Although the RAP evaluation did not focus on young people leaving custody specifically, it is worth reflecting upon the research findings, which revealed that compared to those young people not involved in it, young people participating in the voluntary RAP scheme:

- were more likely to reduce the severity of their substance misuse<sup>64</sup>;
- tended not to drop out of contact with this voluntary scheme<sup>65</sup>;
- had fewer unmet needs<sup>66</sup>; and,
- appeared to value the relationship with their RAP worker - greatly appreciating the brokerage role fulfilled by the scheme in helping them access other services, and the very practical style of assistance provided by RAP workers.

RAP staff believed that the voluntary nature of RAP enhanced the appeal of the scheme to young people – with a reputation as something enjoyable rather than being perceived as a ‘punishment’<sup>67</sup>. Perhaps as a result, both engagement and compliance with court orders was better among young people involved with the scheme.

A 12-month reconviction analysis using Police National Computer (PNC) data<sup>68</sup> suggested that young people on RAP were slightly less likely to reoffend than a matched sample of young people not engaged with the programme – although the difference was small and not statistically significant<sup>69</sup>. The largest observable difference between the two groups was that young people in the non-RAP group were reconvicted for summary offences in much greater numbers than the RAP group - although the sample size was too small for this finding to be statistically significant. In addition, young people on RAP who had less problematic use of alcohol or drugs<sup>70</sup> were significantly less likely to be reconvicted within one year than comparative non-RAP young people. RAP also appeared to have better outcomes than the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme<sup>71</sup> (89% reoffending rate on ISSP as compared to 78% on RAP).

Key recommendations from the RESET evaluation<sup>72</sup> focused on improving the coordination of resources and staff; making local partnerships work effectively; better preparing young

---

<sup>64</sup> The RAP teams under study appeared to be more successful than non-RAP teams in engaging young people who were reluctant to address their substance misuse

<sup>65</sup> Drop-out rates for RAP were less than 25% for the first three quarters of 2007/08

<sup>66</sup> RAP appeared to be more successful in finding, placing and encouraging young people to engage with training and employment than their non-RAP YOT colleagues – with 89% of young people in the RAP sample receiving assistance with employment and training, against 64% of the non-RAP sample

<sup>67</sup> Engagement strategies included: creating informal ‘drop-ins’; unstructured and informal atmosphere; non-judgmental non-authoritative approach; flexibility in engagement ‘terms’; matching young people and RAP workers; and incentives and rewards for attendance

<sup>68</sup> This comprised a sample of 294 young people; 147 of whom were on RAP at the time and 147 who were not

<sup>69</sup> 78% of young people on RAP were reconvicted within one year of their first offence, compared to 86% of those not on RAP

<sup>70</sup> Measured through the AADIS score

<sup>71</sup> ISSP - another programme for high-risk young offenders.

<sup>72</sup> Hazel *et al.* (2010)

people for release; and improved communication / information flow between custody and community. The report concluded that successful resettlement requires:

- Widespread partnership coordination to address offenders' multiple needs, and
- Effective cooperation between custodial institutions and community agencies to ensure preparedness for release.

The evaluation also found pockets of very good practice that could be linked to positive resettlement outcomes for young people. The research team identified three different models of working – each with different outcomes:

- A '**case management**' model where the RESET worker(s) became a member of the casework Youth Offending Team, but took on more custody cases than normal. Areas where this model dominated had a reoffending rate of 41%.
- A '**coordinating**' model where the RESET worker took on responsibility for arranging multi-agency resettlement support - developing partnerships with state, voluntary and private stakeholders in order to address the range of needs presented by offenders leaving custody (as identified by case managers). Areas where this model dominated had a reoffending rate of 22%.
- An '**institution based**' model where planning and delivery of resettlement work (including post- release outreach) was primarily coordinated and followed-up by RESET staff within the institution (rather than the local YOTs). This institution-based approach had a reoffending rate of only 5% - although this was a very specific demographic group.

Estimation of the financial costs and benefits of rolling-out the RESET programme of enhanced resettlement support across all custodial placements was conducted. This showed that the RESET package cost £8,074 a year for a young person with a medium level of need. However, when the likely reductions in frequency and seriousness of offending were factored in, there was an annual net saving of at least £12,333 for every offender. Considering that at that point in time, approximately 6,500 young people were given Detention and Training Orders (DTOs) each year in England and Wales, rolling-out enhanced resettlement practice could have brought total annual savings to the public purse of over £80million. Indeed, the RESET evaluation showed the potential cost-effectiveness of youth resettlement:

<i>Annual costs per young person without resettlement support:</i>	<i>£78,040</i>
<i>Annual costs including 9 months of resettlement support:</i>	<i>£65,707</i>
<i>Potential annual savings for <b>all</b> young people on DTOs:</i>	<i>£80,164,500</i>

Evidence of the substantial potential fiscal benefits to be derived from coordinated resettlement work is mounting. In 2011, a Barnardos review of the lack of supported accommodation for young people released from custody showed how it results in a cycle of

homelessness and reoffending<sup>73</sup>. This study identified that stable housing can reduce the risk of reoffending by 20% and showed that supported accommodation on release from custody can produce savings of more than £67,000 over 3 years for each single young person.

## Future directions

It is now commonly accepted that the effective resettlement of young offenders - 'among the most challenging people to reintegrate'<sup>74</sup> - requires 'multiple solutions'<sup>75</sup>, with many things needing to come together in order to create the best opportunities for success. The Youth Justice Board appear to be moving in this direction with the development of a national *Youth Resettlement Framework*<sup>76</sup>, addressing as it does seven areas or 'pathways', including: 'accommodation'; 'education, training and employment'; 'health'; 'substance misuse'; 'families'; and, 'finance, benefits and debt'. There is also an overarching pathway - 'case management and transitions' - intended to improve 'partnership-working and the management of the transition from custody to the community'<sup>77</sup>. Furthermore, the government's *Youth Crime Action Plan*<sup>78</sup> aims to 'expand existing resettlement provision' for young people by: placing a new duty on local authorities to fund and commission the education and training of young offenders in custody; and, developing a more comprehensive package of support for young people leaving custody, that includes ensuring access to suitable accommodation and health services for all as they leave custody.

Also underway is the development of Regional Resettlement Consortia (Refer to each specific consortium in their final evaluation report). Delivered by the Youth Justice Board<sup>79</sup>, these consortia are piloting innovative approaches to resettlement with the aim of encouraging integrated working between the youth justice system, children's services and other types of statutory and non-statutory agencies. The consortia also aim to address concerns regarding continuity and information sharing through the custody–community transition. Young offenders coming out of custody within the consortia areas will receive enhanced resettlement support including mentoring and extra support with accommodation and education, training and employment.

---

<sup>73</sup> Glover and Clewett (2011)

<sup>74</sup> Hagell (2004: 4)

<sup>75</sup> Harding (2006: 391)

<sup>76</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005a)

<sup>77</sup> Youth Justice Board (2005a: 4)

<sup>78</sup> HM Government (2008: 60)

<sup>79</sup> A regional consortium is also being piloted in London by the London Criminal Justice Board (LCJB), although the YJB is assisting with the development of the project and has contributed funding towards the evaluation

## PART 2: THE ORGANISATIONAL EXPERIENCE/PROCESS EVALUATION

### 4 Establishing the consortium

---

Two briefing sessions with Directors of Children's Services were convened to identify the local authorities to be included in the Consortium. Along with Hindley YOI, the four local authorities that formed the consortium were: Manchester, Rochdale, Stockport and Wigan. Three working group meetings were subsequently held to enlist key stakeholders, identify the consortium cohort, and engage senior strategic partners. A Project Manager was recruited by the Youth Justice Board in September 2009, and the Consortium also benefited from an associated accommodation pilot that was delivered by Catch22- the aim of which was to develop resettlement accommodation and support for cohort members.

#### Local interpretation of the purpose of the consortium

In the North West the Enhanced Offer was devised in collaboration with young people in custody and both key-work and governor grade staff at Hindley YOI, YOT managers, casework and IRS staff, training providers, accommodation providers, Government Office North West, service commissioners, strategic housing representatives, Manchester University and other strategic partners. Key features of the project were agreed as:

- A dedicated Project Manager to work strategically and operationally to embed effective and sustainable practices
- Opportunities for reducing costs through shared working
- Staff development opportunities through a designated budget
- Unique training/employment opportunities through Construction Youth Trust
- Unique access to supported accommodation through Catch 22 across all areas
- A strengthened strategic relationship with the Foyer Federation

The work of the Consortium was intended to be distinct from the 'business as usual' resettlement offer<sup>80</sup>, whilst remaining achievable so that it could be mainstreamed from March 2011. So, as well as ensuring consistent delivery of National Minimum Standards, the aim was to develop a sufficiently robust resettlement offer that included wraparound support to reduce the likelihood of the young person reoffending. This improved support package was called the *Enhanced Offer* - the primary focus of which was on meeting the

---

<sup>80</sup> Minimum National Standards require that young people have a Plan for the duration of their sentence based on an assessment of their risk of offending (ASSET). YOTs and the secure establishments are expected to deliver in accordance with this Sentence Plan and to meet at specified points during the custodial element for Sentence Plan reviews. YOTs and the local authority should work together to ensure that the housing, education, training and employment and other relevant needs of the young person are met upon release.



accommodation and education, training and employment needs of these young people<sup>81</sup>. The target group (cohort) were young people sentenced to a Detention and Training Order of 10 months<sup>82</sup> or less at Hindley YOI who come from (and return to) the Manchester, Rochdale, Wigan or Stockport YOT areas<sup>83</sup>.

## Setting-up the partnership

A strategic steering group was established to provide leadership and accountability to the project, whilst a parallel operational group was also formed to provide a structure through which service delivery and project implementation issues could be discussed. At the strategic level, representatives from many sectors attended, including: local authority, housing, YOTs, and education (although Children's Services were not in regular attendance and no mental health or substance misuse representation was made). This group focused largely on contractual and performance management issues. At the operational level, attendance and involvement was very high, with stakeholders who were very committed to resolving the barriers to young people's effective resettlement. Their meetings were divided in two: to cover both a thematic/organisational focus, along with individual case discussions to problem-solve for 'real' young people.

## The NWRC model

In the North West, the enhanced offer was articulated as a list of 16 entitlements. These were the provision of:

1. In-custody resettlement planning and Offending Behaviour Programme sessions;
2. Consistent YOT worker for the duration of the DTO;
3. YOT link to young person's family whilst they are in custody;
4. YOT to arrange for the collection of young person from custody (with parents/carers if applicable) and to provide a detailed plan for the day of release;
5. Pre-release course to be provided to young person 4 weeks prior to release;
6. Manchester College staff to attend all decision and final meetings;
7. Relevant (determined by need) staff from community partners to attend all planning meetings;
8. Appropriate (needs led) accommodation to be available upon release in the young person's home area;

---

<sup>81</sup> Health needs were not a primary strategic focus of the project but it is anticipated that they would be considered when they impact upon a young person's resettlement needs.

<sup>82</sup> Due to concerns about the very limited amount of impact that could be achieved with those serving short sentences, originally the plan was to work only with those spending at least three months in custody. However, it was realised that this would substantially limit the size of the cohort to be worked with, and so the decision was made to include even four month DTOs.

<sup>83</sup> The cohort does not include remanded young people. Nor does it include those who appeal and get their custodial sentence overturned; those who move outside of the four local authority areas, or those who serve part of their sentence at another institution to Hindley.

9. Appropriate (needs led) accommodation to be available on release in areas other than the home area as required;
10. Release on temporary licence (ROTL) to be accessed at the earliest possible opportunity- in some instances this will require an immediate application and the commitment of all partners to process this efficiently;
11. YOTs or other partners as determined by need to collect, stay with and return cohort individuals when accessing ROTL to minimise risk and enhance the ROTL experience;
12. Revised working arrangements for the LAC in the cohort to be determined;
13. Cohort to be part of the eAsset<sup>84</sup> pilot;
14. A sustainability plan is to be in place with the service providers to ensure that the young person is able to pick up services relevant to his needs at the end of his DTO;
15. A mentor is to be offered to all young people in the community; and
16. Offending Behaviour Programmes (OBP) including elements of restorative justice are to be delivered to all young people whilst in custody.

The enhanced offer was intended to deliver a more intensive and targeted approach to resettlement - focusing on the co-ordination of services that would facilitate multiple levels of support to young people. It covered a wide range of services and practitioners who were tasked to respond to the needs of individually identified young people – with both the targeted nature of provision and the delivery of services *in custody*<sup>85</sup> identified as a key component of the Consortium's work. The enhanced offer was also about joining up adult and children's resources - to look at sustainable protective factors that could minimize the and risk of reoffending.

## **Governance and senior level buy-in**

At the national level, the North West Consortium reported into and was accountable to the monthly YJB Resettlement Programme Board. This provided the Consortium with clear objectives - including some challenging targets around improving housing. Input from the YJB was found to be very helpful, and their acceptance of the need to be flexible to implementation change for the resettlement pilot in the North West<sup>86</sup> was welcomed.

Regionally, the Project Manager reported into a bi-monthly Steering Group that provided strategic direction to and accountability for the Project. With local authority partners looking to the future – the introduction of payment by results and local authority payment for remand places – they have all been keen to consider the financial implications of the resettlement pilot in relation to the development of joint commissioning and devolved custody budgets to ensure that resources are being used most effectively.

For Manchester, the Deputy Chief Executive of Manchester Council has been particularly committed to helping develop better resettlement pathways and has chaired additional

---

<sup>84</sup> Wiring up Youth Justice (WUYJ): a YJB initiative to provide YOTs with access to sentence planning information in eAsset.

<sup>85</sup> For example: Connexions, Eclipse (Young people's substance misuse service), and family support officers.

<sup>86</sup> A change in the cohort criteria to include young people sentenced to 4 month DTOs – to help meet throughput targets.

city-focused resettlement meetings – thereby embedding the Enhanced Offer more firmly within strategic structures<sup>87</sup>. There has also been widespread acceptance and understanding about the importance of resettlement (and its potential benefits) among Manchester City Council members. Indeed, some of the councillors visited Hindley to hear firsthand about young people’s experiences – helping them to appreciate the extent to which resettlement is a shared responsibility across multiple local authority departments and external agencies. Council members subsequently requested reports on (1) ETE actions and outcomes, and (2) accommodation needs and responses – which informed a presentation made to the Scrutiny Committee. Such political support has been greatly appreciated among delivery partners, and learning from the Manchester experience has been cascaded to other YOTs.

### **The role of the project manager**

For the last year of the Consortium (since April 2011), the part-time project coordinator post has been held by the (part-time) Resettlement Coordinator based at Hindley. The sharing of these two positions by one post-holder has maximised understanding of the complexity of the secure estate and allowed the partnership to capitalize upon recognised drivers and ‘champions’ for implementing change within the custody setting. The project manager’s direct knowledge of how ‘inward looking’ YOIs are, and her embedded position within the establishment has been highly valuable to the Consortium. In addition, the project manager role has been crucial in inputting and coordinating data management and providing monthly analysis for the Consortium.

---

<sup>87</sup> In particular, the Family Resource Panel – a multi-agency panel, chaired by Children’s Services to assess young people’s needs, put resources in place to meet those needs and subsequently review actions.

## 5 Implementing the Consortium

---

### The timetable

Partners to the Consortium agreed that the enhanced offer would be delivered to the cohort from January 2010. The detailed timetable for progress was as follows:

<b>Milestones</b>	<b>Due date</b>
Initial negotiations with potential consortium partners	April 2009
Working group final (of 3) meeting	30.9.09
Consortium Steering group established	30.11.09
Enhanced Offer developed and agreed with partners	31.12.09
Handover of Catch 22 monitoring to Project Manager	December 09
Project Go Live	2.1.10
Operational Group established	28.2.10
Final Steering Group and project close	31.3.11

### Partnership working between custody and community agencies

One of the key benefits of the enhanced offer is considered to be the consistent achievement of earlier resettlement planning: right from the start of the custodial sentence. This more structured approach to case planning facilitates better risk management and the commencement of family support/liaison early on (which can improve the chances of the young person returning to the family home post-custody). Rather than the YOT taking on sole responsibility for in-custody liaison and resettlement planning, the existence of the operational meetings means that case lists are taken to a multi-agency forum, and any barriers to resettlement can be addressed early on. The enhanced offer also encourages the prison to track the young people – to enhance input where needed, and also to learn lessons the young people's outcomes once they are released back into the community.

Another substantial benefit of the enhanced offer has been the provision of more face-to-face contact with young people in Hindley<sup>88</sup> - including one-to-one interventions and family mediation (often to attempt to improve the likelihood of young people returning home after custody). The list of entitlements articulated in the enhanced offer encourages the development of more holistic wraparound support and Hindley has enabled Consortium partners to book legal visits with a young person as required – supporting the continuity of service delivery that is key to agencies not disengaging from working with the young people. In some cases, more timely accommodation offers can also be made which then facilitate planning for accessible education provision in the area where the young people will live

---

<sup>88</sup> Although Hindley is a local YOI for the four consortium YOTs, so it is difficult to make comparisons with interventions undertaken for young people from further afield.

post-custody. This improved joining up of custodial and community youth justice work greatly enhances YOT staff understanding and knowledge of custodial processes and its impact upon young people. This means that they are more insightful and understanding in talking to young people about their custodial experiences; and also more informed in terms of making recommendations in their reports for court. YOT practitioners now also have access to eAsset in the community which improves and speeds up the sharing of information between custody and community.

The explicit identification and action to achieve shared goals has also helped to improve communication *within* Hindley – joining up the different ‘silos’ within the institution. As a result, of this recognised link between the work of the case managers, resettlement workers and custody practitioners, Manchester College and Hindley key-workers now share the same common language and can more effectively help each other.

Among stakeholders, the ‘joining up’ of education, training and employment (ETE) support from custody through to the community was thought to be one of the key benefits of the Consortium. This means that in-custody service deliverers are more aware of sustainable community ETE options, and that YOT and Connexions staff are better informed about what the young person had achieved in custody (so that duplication of education was minimized and young people do not unnecessary repeat work<sup>89</sup>). This improvement in the information flow about education has resulted in much more effective communication channels. One example of this was the Consortium realising that education information had hitherto been sent to the wrong person (the case manager) and never reached the YOT education coordinator. Members of the NWRC Operational Meeting were able to address this: giving named education contacts for the information to be sent to. This improvement is now helping a much wider group of young people than simply those who receive the enhanced offer because now there are named education contacts for all areas: *“The right people are communicating”*.

## **Release On Temporary Licence**

One of the aims of the enhanced offer was to encourage greater use of Release on Temporary Licence (ROTL). This is a critical element in enabling young people to prepare for release - enabling them, for example, to attend interviews for college, or to meet with prospective accommodation providers. However, whilst the focus on resettlement may have broken down Hindley’s cautious approach to allowing ROTL (arising from concerns about risk to the public), the prison still remains restricted by both its internal security focus, and Prison Service Orders which set national eligibility requirements<sup>90</sup>. The latter mean that it is impossible to achieve ROTL for a young person who has been sentenced to a DTO of less than six months. So, although there have been some very positive developments in terms of widening ROTL opportunities – for example, with the YMCA highlighting opportunities and sharing information with YOTs across the four local

---

<sup>89</sup> Hindley continues to deliver its offender management programme in isolation from other agencies however, which may make it difficult for YOTs to ensure smooth continuation of the programme in the community – although the opening up of E-ASSET to YOT staff may help to streamline this transition.

<sup>90</sup> Prison Service Orders require that in order to be considered eligible for ROTL, young people must be classified as low risk, and be without any adjudications for over three months.

authorities – the number of young people who can take advantage of this facility remains extremely limited.

## Partnership working across areas

It is important to acknowledge that due to different local authority structures, priorities, population needs and availability of resources, it is difficult (if not impossible) to introduce the same way of working across different YOTs. As a result, it is very difficult to identify and implement a single solution that can be adopted by all YOTs in unison, and approaches may need to be tailored to work for each local authority. But whilst it is challenging to work across different local authorities, Consortium members describe how they have learnt more about potential different models of working (and the contexts within which resettlement approaches work best) under a regional model than they would have done if operating in isolation. As a result of the Consortium, the four local authorities look to each other for good practice now.

The fact that the North West Consortium involves four different local authorities does allow for a certain degree of movement for young people in the cohort, whilst still being able to avail themselves of the enhanced offer. Moreover, because the consortium involves multiple local authorities, it is possible to accommodate a young person in an area away from offending peers for a 'fresh start'. For non-local authority organisations, having a regional focus is also a benefit as custodial institutions and regional/national voluntary and third sector organisations can avoid duplicating work by negotiating with multiple local authorities in a single forum. But some stakeholders questioned why only four local authorities had been asked to join the Consortium – and why the whole of Greater Manchester had not been joined together - to take advantage of ready-established collaborations<sup>91</sup>. This would have broadened out access to the enhanced offer to all young people in Hindley from Greater Manchester.

It is important however to recognise the huge demands caused by attempting to work across local authority borders and ensure that adequate resources and planning / negotiation time are allowed for in order to embed new processes. There is the additional challenge of trying to develop a pilot across a region that includes a large city along with other much smaller authorities. Manchester (due to its much bigger population, and larger throughput of young people), and Wigan (due to the location of Hindley) are perceived by some stakeholders to have benefited most from the regional Consortium. Smaller local authorities can be very wary of becoming a 'net importer' of disadvantaged young people if they have accommodation resources that 'out of area' young people may be referred in to<sup>92</sup>. One interviewee questioned whether Consortia should be clusters of similarly sized authorities – in terms of custodial throughput, Indices of Multiple Deprivation, and offending profiles. The question also remains about whether individual local authorities should be encouraged to develop their own resettlement process first, rather than spending

---

<sup>91</sup> GMAC is a well-established regional community safety partnership operating throughout 10 local authorities across Greater Manchester.

<sup>92</sup> Friction can be caused between local authorities who may perceive that their resources are being 'used up' by areas with higher throughputs of young people, (ie: that they are used to take overspill).

substantial amounts of time negotiating cross-border issues - particularly when, despite a regional approach, there will be inevitable pressure to return young people to their 'legitimate' local authority and original YOT supervision team.

## Partnership working across community agencies

The increase in collaboration between local authorities and other Consortium partners was judged by stakeholder interviewees to be quite significant. Good working relationships were developed between youth justice and non-justice agencies which led to numerous benefits, including: improving the resettlement process through better information sharing; supporting innovation; sharing good practice; and the development of enhanced access to ETE and accommodation. Evidence of this could be seen in positive practice developments, for example: increased joint working, more face-to-face contact with young people in custody, more consistently delivered resettlement support packages, and better continuity of service provision. The Consortium enabled agencies to see how their targets related to each other through developing mutual understanding and joint working. This explicit identification of shared and/or related resettlement targets facilitated the sharing of resources in order to meet common Key Performance Indicators – thereby using existing resources more effectively and avoiding duplication<sup>93</sup>.

The value of having both a high level strategic group and an operational group was highlighted by many stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation. Not only were those responsible for the delivery of services able to share responsibility for working with young people, but there was also an 'upper house' high-level strategic forum that secured strategic buy-in from relevant agencies and joined up resettlement resources. Thus, if there was any disagreement about operational level responsibility, the issue could be taken up to the strategic forum where barriers between the agencies could be removed. Both the operational and strategic fora were helpful in holding agencies to account – placing informal 'peer' pressure on representatives to ensure that services were put in place for each young person. The input of the YJB Programme Board at a national level was also mentioned as having a positive impact in terms of providing a source of authority to ensure that all relevant agencies contributed sufficiently to the resettlement process.

### **Accommodation pathways**

*The majority of young people return to the family home, and, although deemed suitable – because what else is there? – young people often have had unsettled periods: being thrown out; living with grandparents, extended family; living between parents; sofa surfing at friends'; periods of local authority care; being in a hostel; returning home. The chances of home being a good, stable environment to support other resettlement work are low. Young people's lifestyle prior to custody needs exploring – to understand more [about] the real risks to successful resettlement and completion of licence.*

---

<sup>93</sup> For example, children's and adult services being aware that they were working with the same family and streamlining the provision of interventions.

Despite a lot of work to secure improved accommodation pathways, appropriate, affordable housing remains a development priority and it is still a struggle to get young people into accommodation on day of release from custody. At the start of the Consortium pilot, Catch 22 was commissioned to provide accommodation within each of the four local authorities for young people on the cohort. Developing this provision took a substantial amount of time – requiring careful liaison with local authorities and the police to select properties (a process that benefited from Consortium partners all championing the right for young people to live in the selected areas) which delayed actual delivery of accommodation and support.

Unfortunately, the expectation that young people could come straight from an institutional setting and live largely independently in the community was misjudged. Without sufficient resources to provide intensive 24 hour live-in assistance, the provision of shared accommodation with floating support could not adequately support young people with more complex needs, and there was no scope to bring in other specialist providers as additional help. The addition of each new young person into shared accommodation (some of whom could be from outside of the local authority area) could disrupt the environment and prove counter-productive for the other housemates. Local antisocial behaviour teams were unhappy about having outsiders living in the area, especially as the location of Catch 22 key workers in Manchester meant that any incident that arose in one of the houses within the other local authorities was often resolved by local agencies before the key workers could attend. Lots of important lessons were learnt from implementation of the accommodation pilot within the North West. These are summarised in section [insert reference to later section].

### ***Education, Training and Employment***

*The majority of them have not been in school, they've got SEN, EBD, ADHD or they've been excluded, poor attenders, they've been on School Action Plus. To expect them to go into full-time education provision, to expect them to be able to hold that down **and** hold down accommodation at the same time is a big ask for these young people whose lives have been chaotic. You know that their background and their history - their family history – there's a whole host of mental health issues, behavioural issues, or they just don't give a sod. So they are the most difficult young people to work with when you've not got the family to work [with them].*

Despite the acknowledged difficulties of working with this group of young people, one of the key elements of effectiveness for the Consortium was thought to be the number of the cohort who accessed education, training and employment (ETE). Developing ownership over the delivery of pre-release education programmes within Hindley has increased the degree to which the institution prioritizes getting young people to attend sessions<sup>94</sup>. Post custody access to ETE also was perceived to be much higher for the young people on the enhanced offer – with most of the cohort starting some form of ETE provision within 10

---

<sup>94</sup> Being a split site, it is difficult to move young people across to attend educational sessions – but by involving Hindley directly in the design of some of these sessions, it is thought that their motivation to manage the logistics of getting young people to attend education has increased.



days of coming out of custody (often having a placement secured for the day or next day that the young person leaves custody). This was achieved through the successful development of much closer links for Connexions with both for custody and the community partners. Indeed, Connexions have been very proactive in their approach - keen to attend all the Consortium meetings and to meet with the young people whilst they were still in custody. There was also sufficient flexibility that if the young person did not like the placement, they could be given another one straight away. Connexions are also the key partner delivering sustained support to young people post-licence – when most of the other support packages end for the young person. At this point the young person generally carries on being supported by Connexions for another six months (although one stakeholder pointed out that provision over longer periods could be beneficial for many of the young people).

Progress in getting employers on board has also been described by stakeholders as a particular achievement for the Consortium. Involvement of the Construction Youth Trust (CYT) has resulted in an increase in employer engagement which has facilitated access to more appropriate work placement and apprenticeship opportunities for young people. CYT has also had an important role in advocating for the young people with prospective employers – a critical element of support, as the young people rarely have qualifications or work experience to strengthen their employability (and indeed, have a custodial sentence to undermine it). Working across the four local authority areas, CYT has been able to support young people even if they move (within the Consortium area). Although an unending task, one stakeholder did comment that in order to increase the amount of opportunities for young people, CYT need to continue to expand the number of businesses that they have engaged – but this is acknowledged as a very lengthy and time consuming process.

One area where there has been little progress is in relation to enabling young people in custody to take the test for the Construction Skills Certificate Scheme (CSCS) card - which is practically essential for anyone hoping to gain employment in the construction industry. Because the Construction Industry Training Board (CITB) exams to gain a CSCS card are online, it is impossible to sit them in custody due to security concerns. As a result, young people wanting to join the construction industry still come out of custody unable to get a job – and although they are supported to get their CSCS card in the community, this remains a barrier to them gaining employment prior to, or immediately upon release. Indeed, some ROTL to construction sites is prevented, as CSCS cards are sometimes required as a pre-requisite for those visits. The best that the Consortium has been able to achieve is an agreement with the education department at Hindley that young people can be prepared so that they are ready to sit the CSCS exam immediately that they leave custody.

So, whilst making great strides, some members of the Consortium feel that they have not been able to impact as much as they would have liked in terms of ETE opportunities - particularly in terms of work-based training for the cohort. The gap between the Consortium's aspirations for young people and the reality of the job market - in terms of the availability of apprenticeships, training and employment opportunities - is substantial. At the moment a substantial proportion of the cohort are going into work based training as opportunities for apprenticeships and 'real' work are scarce. Unsurprisingly, employers are

not automatically keen to employ young people out of custody, and a great deal of time and resources are required to develop and support a pool of 'compassionate' trainers and employers who can look after and coach young people with limited work and/or social skills. In order to sustain this, employers need to have confidence that the resettlement approach is well-informed, professional, and that partners understand **both** the employment market and the needs of the young people. Most importantly, the Consortium needs to be able to provide continuous support to the young people that are placed with those training organisations and employers.

The majority of the cohort would prefer to be in employment – but with youth unemployment rates high, many of them have ended up in education. The extent to which employment preferences cannot be met for the cohort may be a stumbling block for resettlement outcomes. One stakeholder mentioned that it would be helpful if more education providers working with young people in custody (at present only Manchester College does this). The predominance of September starts for college courses mean that young people released from custody at other times of the year can have to wait months before they can access education. Additionally there are not enough pre-entry level courses which are necessary because approximately 10% of the cohort ceased attending school full-time at primary school. Young people can sometimes end up duplicating lower level educational provision due to a lack of adequate information sharing about their educational needs.

It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that every young person on the cohort will be able to secure training or employment as many of them have learning difficulties, substance misuse or mental health problems. So, whilst the value of employment is indisputable (enabling young people to see that there is a different lifestyle available to them, and capitalizing upon good employers/colleagues providing young people with positive role models), there is a substantial challenge in moving young people on from a position of supervision and multi-agency support into work placements where they have to be independent, get to work for the start of the day and cope with the complexities of social interaction with workmates.

### ***Children's Services and the Family Resource Panel***

For looked after children, another positive achievement of the Consortium has been the reduction in social work de-registration of cases as they enter custody. Looked after children now have an assessment in custody to determine whether such case closure is appropriate – and (even if closure is decided) this keeps social workers much more engaged in the resettlement process. Overall, stakeholders report a substantial improvement in communication with Social Services since the consortium started.

In Manchester, Family Resource Panels (FRPs) have been newly established and have made also a positive impact: providing strategic multi-agency input to allocate resources that will assist in delivery of resettlement plans. This strategic support has been important in increasing access to the wide range of services needed to provided wraparound support,

and has been particularly useful for looked after children who have been removed from Section 20 and need a residential placement sorting out<sup>95</sup>.

### ***Integrated Offender Management***

Many young people on the cohort are prolific offenders and so are simultaneously under the Intensive Offender Management (Spotlight) Programme<sup>96</sup> when they return to the community. Cultural or communication problems between Consortium stakeholders and those involved in Spotlight have identified the need for a closer working relationship. Although those involved in Spotlight stated their priorities were also to reduce reoffending, the perception of Consortium stakeholders were that priorities for Spotlight conflicted with those of the Regional Resettlement Consortia: the former placing an emphasis on enforcement and surveillance highlighting an increase in non-compliance, and the latter entailing multi-agency effort to implement a resettlement plan and get resources for wraparound support in place. Those involved in Spotlight view the perception of Spotlight to seek to breach as inaccurate.

Across Greater Manchester, the police are being very assertive in their Offender Management approaches:

*So what the police are doing, they're going knocking on the door – the kid's not in – right that's one [breach of licence conditions]. They're knocking on the parent's door: 'Where's your son?' 'We've not seen him for a couple of days' – right, that's two. They're getting statements from Mum, or they're getting a police statement 'I've seen him with a known associate.' They're pushing us to act on their statements. ... It's a bit of tension, a bit of a sticking point.*

*The kids can't move basically before they're breached. The Inspectors are pushing for us to breach and recall – which obviously we're trying not to do. ... The message we need to get across to IOM is that we need to be working more in partnership. It's not all about enforcement, they've got to meet us half-way when we're trying to resettle [young people] back into the community – because the whole idea is that we're trying to stop these kids bouncing back and forth, in and out of Hindley. Because every time they bounce back they lose all the provision that we've put in place and it gets harder and harder for us to get it – especially accommodation and education, as you can imagine. So we really need the police on board to understand what our objectives are.*

As a result, the Consortium's attempts to reduce reoffending by supporting young people's resettlement and trying to understand their non-compliant behaviour were perceived to be

---

<sup>95</sup> Section 20 of the Children Act (1989) deals with situations where parents have asked for help from Children's Services, because for some reason their child can no longer stay at home. Parental responsibility remains with the parent/guardian, but the local authority is responsible for finding suitable accommodation for the child.

<sup>96</sup> Integrated Offender Management is an overarching framework that allows local and partner agencies to come together to ensure that the offenders whose crimes cause most damage or harm locally, are managed in a coordinated way.

undermined somewhat by the active Spotlight attempts to evidence breach. In order to address this, Greater Manchester Probation Service and the YOTs have been delivering presentations to the police about desistance theory, resettlement practice and appropriate use of breach. Direct liaison with the Spotlight teams to raise awareness of the aims (and anticipated outcomes) of the NWRC has increased awareness of regional resettlement approaches and encouraged the Spotlight teams to understand how automatically seeking to breach young people can undermine the resettlement process and sometimes result in increasing offending over the long-term. Thus, working more closely with the police is helping to support delivery of the Resettlement Consortium's aims, and this should be encouraged further – perhaps by greater police membership involvement within the Consortium meetings.

## **Influencing working practices**

### ***Partnership approaches to resettlement – linked strategic and operational approach***

As described in previous sections, the North West Consortium has brought about a substantial increase in partnership working and in collaboration between partners and local authorities. There are more partner agencies on board, and much better 'buy-in' from those parties relevant to the resettlement process. The benefits generated from this approach include: information sharing at the regional level; greater transparency and sharing of resources; and improved willingness to work together. This is truly joint ownership of resettlement – focusing on achieving positive outcomes for young people, and looking to solve problems rather than just blame other agencies for barriers that remain unaddressed.

This coordinated multi-agency drive to improve the resettlement process has meant not only that more people are involved in resettlement planning, but also that planning is undertaken and put into action at an earlier stage. Direct multi-agency information sharing enables strategic managers and practitioners to explore which agency can offer the services needed: highlighting the gaps in provision and resulting in more 'joined up' provision, and bridging the divide between juvenile and adult services. The case management approach adopted by the North West Consortium, combined with the development of the strategic Family Resource Panel in Manchester (and more recently, the introduction of Intensive Alternatives to Custody) has facilitated a step-change in the resourcing and implementation of resettlement for young people. Furthermore, there is some anecdotal evidence of Youth Courts taking resettlement work into account when young people return before them, and using sentencing options to support its continued delivery.

Whilst it could be argued that the elements of the enhanced offer should be the basic entitlement for any young person being resettled after serving a Detention Training Order, it has required an enormous amount of work to implement in practice and delivery of several of the elements remains precarious. For example, in relation to the list above:

Enhanced offer element	Development required, benefits (and limitations) to delivery
<p>1. Local Authorities to provide direct work sessions to the cohort in custody to facilitate engagement, plan for resettlement and undertake Offending Behaviour Programmes as relevant. YOTs to email Hindley Keywork team to detail these having taken place.</p>	<p>This required Hindley to enable any Consortium partner to be able to book a 'community partners' room' – as this was key to the agencies not disengaging from working with them</p> <p>Due to the split-site design of Hindley, there were logistical difficulties in getting young people moved over to where education sessions were taking place, which was a barrier to young people actually attending education. By putting Hindley in charge of delivering the education sessions, the level of priority that they assigned to getting young people to attend education programmes increased.</p> <p>Hindley continue to deliver the in-custody Offender Behaviour Programme alone – which limits YOT case manager awareness of what has been covered in custody – although the opening of eASSET to YOT staff should minimise this.</p>
<p>2. Consistent YOT worker for the duration of the DTO</p>	<p>Ensuring the consistency of YOT worker between custody and community has been challenging to achieve – particularly during this time of staff cut-backs where quite a few case manager posts have been lost. For YOT teams with larger throughput numbers, the cohort has to be shared between a team of resettlement workers.</p>
<p>3. YOT link to young person's family whilst they are in custody</p>	<p>Parenting Officer posts that existed within Manchester Youth Offending Service ceased in November 2011. A new team has since been appointed and encouraged to work with the family pathways team at Hindley to provide through the gate support.</p>
<p>4. YOT to arrange for the collection of young person from custody (with parents/carers if applicable) and to provide a detailed plan for the day of release</p>	<p>If the YOT is unable to undertake the pick-up, an escort service is put in place.</p>
<p>5. Pre-release course to be provided to young person 4 weeks prior to release</p>	<p>Not all young people wanted to undertake the pre-release course – particularly if they were already involved in another course that they wanted to complete.</p>

Enhanced offer element	Development required, benefits (and limitations) to delivery
6. Manchester College staff to attend all decision and final meetings	Hindley-based Manchester College staff attend meetings, but there was concern that there was only a focus on college options – which may be inappropriate for a number of the young people. Connexions now have greater input in planning meetings.
7. Relevant (determined by need) staff from community partners to attend all planning meetings	For the first half of the Consortium project, children’s services were often absent from these decision meetings – with many operational social workers unaware of the resettlement pilot, and continuing to deregister young people from Looked After Children status once they were sentenced to custody.
8. Appropriate, needs-led accommodation available upon release in the young person’s home area	Catch 22 funding ran out after twelve months of the resettlement project.
9. Appropriate (needs led) accommodation to be available on release in areas other than the home area as required	The need for emergency accommodation, and support for young people that is not tied to accommodation provision (ie: in any tenure, especially Bed and Breakfast accommodation, but also including the parental home) is still not provided for. Affordable accommodation for young people is extremely scarce (in Manchester especially), and only a small amount of supported accommodation is available - often with substantial waiting lists. New models for provision are being explored strategically.
10. Release on temporary licence (ROTL) to be accessed at the earliest possible opportunity- in some instances this will require an immediate application and the commitment of all partners to process this efficiently	ROTL has extremely strict conditions and requires a substantial amount of time to set up – such that young people on four month DTOs are not able to avail themselves of this facility because the time taken to achieve eligibility <sup>97</sup> plus the time taken to process the application <sup>98</sup> exceeds the two month custodial sentence. In addition, the lack of flexibility and requirement to name exactly where the young person is going and who they are going to meet, means that firm arrangements have to be put into place early on - without a guarantee that the visit

<sup>97</sup> Young people have to be on the enhanced regime in order to be able to apply for ROTL – and this takes time to achieve. They also need to have no history of absconding or trafficking of illegal goods into custody.

<sup>98</sup> It typically takes six weeks to implement a ROTL from the date of application.

Enhanced offer element	Development required, benefits (and limitations) to delivery
11. YOTs or other partners as determined by need to collect, stay with and return cohort individuals when accessing ROTL to minimise risk and enhance the ROTL experience	will be allowed.  This requires the YOS/partner agency to spend virtually a whole day with the young person – which is a very intensive way of working for those with large caseloads.
12. Revised working arrangements for the LAC in the cohort to be determined.	In Manchester the Resettlement Consortium has been able to make use of the pre-existing Family Resource Panel – a Children’s Services-led strategy group for managing resources necessary for supporting young people on the edge of care.
13. Cohort to be part of the E-ASSET pilot	Until very recently, E-ASSET (an information management system that contains not only ASSET type information, but also any communication or other information generated whilst the young person is in custody) was only available to those working in custody. The Youth Justice Board has however piloted the granting of access to YOTs, along with the provision of training.
14. A sustainability plan is to be in place with the service providers to ensure that the young person is able to pick up services relevant to his needs at the end of his DTO.	Typically it is Connexions who continue working with young people beyond the length of the licence. However, this tends to focus on individual service delivery plans, rather than incorporating multi-agency case coordination.
15. A mentor is to be offered to all young people in the community.	Unfortunately mentoring capacity was much lower than anticipated and in Manchester, those mentors who were in place were working under a specific model that was not appropriate for the enhanced offer <sup>99</sup> . Following the cuts to Youth Offending Teams, volunteer coordinator posts were lost and Manchester YOT struggled even to maintain existing mentor capacity.
16. Offending Behaviour Programmes (OBP) including elements of restorative justice are to be delivered to all young people whilst in custody.	The restorative justice element of the enhanced offer was added at the end of 2010 – but with the Manchester Interventions and Programmes Team severely overstretched and more staff leaving, restorative justice could only be delivered by Hindley

<sup>99</sup> Under this model, mentors were matched to an offender, rather than the other way around, which meant that only a small number of offenders could access a mentor.

Enhanced offer element	Development required, benefits (and limitations) to delivery
	Chaplaincy service.

Whilst some might argue that the enhanced offer does not add any fundamentally new elements of resettlement support, it does provide a much more effective delivery mechanism, having addressed many of the barriers to effective resettlement that YOT workers faced. Its implementation was greatly facilitated by the presence of high calibre case managers who responded positively to the challenges introduced by the Consortium approach and who met regularly to review their work. Supported by enlightened agencies outside of the Youth Offending Service, the main constraint that they faced was restricted resources which meant that mentoring and restorative justice could only be delivered in limited circumstances. Unfortunately, the Consortium was developed at a time of unprecedented public sector spending cuts which hit YOT aspirations for developing mentoring in particular<sup>100</sup>. In addition, ETE targets and family support were particularly difficult to deliver under the economic circumstances.

### **Main lessons learnt / barriers to resettlement**

The North West Consortium has revealed the key requirements for delivering an effective multi-agency response to the resettlement of young people, entailing: strategic drive; focused coordination and linking of both strategic and operational development; and extensive partnership buy-in (along with the committal of resources). The strengthening of awareness of the huge range of issues associated with delivering effective resettlement has been achieved across all service levels – securing commitment to change from the YJB national Board, Heads of Service across the region, and also from practitioners. The YJB has provided a framework for the working relationship between the youth justice and non-youth justice agencies, and representation from the YJB Programme Manager at meetings means that issues or examples of good practice have been escalated more efficiently.

Among local stakeholders, there was wide recognition of the substantial benefits derived from the work of the Resettlement Consortium, along with acknowledgement of the lessons learnt and the barriers that still need addressing. These include that:

- A substantial amount of time is needed for the initial planning, networking and early implementation of a Resettlement Consortium – with a focus on inter-agency transparency about funding and service provision. Direct input from the relevant YOI is needed from the outset so that a seamless transition from custody into the community can be worked towards. Consortium members need to develop a detailed understanding of the problems that are facing young people in custody, and direct practitioner communication is necessary, including in particular the agencies falling under the umbrella of Children’s and Young People’s Services and Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). As much strategic resource allocation as possible helps to drive resettlement work forward and new structures and/or

<sup>100</sup> Whilst Manchester YOT recruited a mentor coordinator during the lifetime of the Consortium, this post has multiple responsibilities, rather than focusing specifically on resettlement support.



processes may be required within large organisations in order to ensure that information can be passed down effectively from strategic to operational levels.

- There are certain features of the youth justice system that can facilitate (or conversely, hinder) resettlement, including:
  1. A range of education, training and employment providers need to be involved with young from when they are in custody.
  2. Duplication of lower level educational provision needs to be eradicated by ensuring accurate and timely information sharing about young people's educational needs and attainment between custody and community agencies.
  3. Sufficient pre-entry level roll-on, roll-off education courses are required for young people in the community as many of them have very low education levels. Access to courses that can be accessed throughout the year is important.
  4. The imposition of a tag upon young people coming out of custody can severely limit their ability to engage with resettlement interventions.
  5. Resources are needed to develop and maintain mentoring support for young people and community-based restorative justice.
  6. Mental health and undiagnosed behavioural and learning difficulties are common problems that need to be addressed;
  7. Whilst it is relatively easy to develop individual support plans for young people, executing those plans can be more difficult with constrained resources. The reduction in support at the end of the licence period needs to gently taper – and for some young people, provision of support over longer periods would be beneficial. Insight into how many young people coming out of custody drop-out of education, exactly when this occurs, and what outcomes then result for them would be very helpful for advancing this area of service delivery.
- Whilst the Project Manager was a key contact point for all partners, several stakeholders suggested that there should also be a universal administrative system to save on duplication of data entry. There is clear evidence that multi-agency information management systems can significantly improve communication between large numbers of agencies and reduce the time spent in front of computers – enabling practitioners to increase the amount of direct delivery time spent with clients<sup>101</sup>. Such a joining up of client data would enable re-offending rates and patterns to be analysed in more detail – identifying key features of the resettlement cycle, and uncovering detailed risk factors associated with re-offending.
- It was felt by many stakeholders that the family home was often deemed 'suitable' only because it was the only practical option for the young person. Yet returning young people to their families is not always beneficial if they are negative role models. Indeed, it was acknowledged that even sending young people back to the *neighbourhood* where they committed their offences can often be counter-productive. The North West accommodation pilot was quite informative about

---

<sup>101</sup> Haines et al (2011)

developing accommodation support for young people coming out of custody. Lessons included that:

1. Time is needed to build confidence among both YOTs and YOIs that the chosen accommodation provider can deliver safe, secure and appropriate accommodation. Providing a 'housing surgery' in the YOI might help to overcome initial reservations among both staff and young people, thereby maximising referral rates.
2. There should preferably be a range of accommodation options and locations so that young people can be matched to most the appropriate housing option for them.
3. A substantial amount of time is needed to effectively support young people – so careful thought needs to be given to any time limits for accommodation provision.
4. Floating support should be provided for young people irrespective of their accommodation situation. Support for those in bed and breakfast and hostel accommodation is needed critically.
5. Accommodation providers need reliable estimates of client throughput in order to plan staff resources, and ensure sufficient *localised* delivery so that staff are not travelling huge distances and '*spending more time driving than delivering*'.
6. Close supervision of residents is required in households of multiple occupancy, in order to: (1) improve behaviour, (2) build confidence among YOTs/YOIs that the accommodation can deliver safe, secure and appropriate support for young people, and (3) thereby maximise referrals.
7. Putting together a group of young people in a shared house together can sometimes lead to antisocial behaviour and plans should be put in place to address this. Local authority and police responses to such ASB should be managed carefully in order to support the resettlement process: '*If we are going to help more young people - from reoffending to positive independence, then every agency has to treat them with respect.*'
8. Multi-agency consortium approaches do run the risk of blurring professional boundaries – particularly where there is a strong case management approach – as responsibility for coordinating service delivery can become complicated, and the existence of a large number of targets delivered across a large number of agencies can render plans relatively inflexible, limiting the extent to which service providers can re-negotiate delivery design.

*Key challenges that remain to be addressed at national policy level*

- Getting any YOI to be flexible and progressive in its approach to resettlement (particularly in relation to ROTL and allowing young people to sit the CSCS exam in custody) would require new prison service orders from central government. Current restrictions on ROTL make it impossible to make this facility available to those sentenced less than six months DTO (three months in custody). Examples of good ROTL development are coming through from other regional Consortia however, where ROTL is being used in association with Incentives and Earned Privileges, and

institutions are actively identifying the young people who could be eligible for ROTL after three months and working with them to manage their behaviour to gain ROTL. It is also important to pay attention to enhancing ROTL opportunities in the community – usually requiring Consortia to work closely with the local authority where the institution is based.

- National policy change is needed in relation to housing to improve resettlement accommodation pathways for young people. In particular, young people are not currently deemed to be homeless until they exit custody, which means that local authority homelessness departments will not consider their needs until they have left custody, with the result that young people are left unsure of their future housing situation throughout the whole custodial period. It is easy to envisage why this would unsettle them, making it difficult to engage them in interventions in custody, and undermining the resettlement process in the community. In addition, the Benefits Agency is not paying housing benefit to young people who have a social worker which makes it extremely difficult to accommodate those young people.
- As mentioned earlier in the report, Integrated Offender Management can conflict with the aims of resettlement. In order to address this, the police may need to be made aware of about desistance theory, the aims (and anticipated outcomes) of resettlement practice and when the use of breach procedures may not be appropriate.

## The legacy

In terms of the sustainable impact, it is thought that the Consortium has successfully raised the priority of resettlement issues across all the relevant agencies – so that they no longer ‘wash their hands’ of young people when they are sentenced to custody, or consider the custodial period as ‘respite’ from having to work with them. There is a desire to continue creating more linkages with prospective partners<sup>102</sup>, to firm up sustainability plans for ongoing support for young people, and to strengthen housing support and pathways. Of course, work could carry on developing the Consortium – inviting more agencies and growing the pool of supportive employers/trainers. But the future also entails the increasing challenge of voluntary resources drying up – and getting funding commitments without clear evidence of the cost-benefits of the Consortium resettlement approach is perhaps impossible. It is important to note that the agencies doing the work (committing the resources) are not necessarily the ones that reap the rewards from reduced reoffending (ie: reductions in court and custodial costs). Thus there is a concern that as the YJB funding comes to an end, partnership development and progress could cease, and ‘silo-mentality’ could return without a project manager to drive the process.

---

<sup>102</sup> Including Barnardos, Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service and young people’s Substance Misuse Services.

## PART 3: THE CLIENT EXPERIENCE/IMPACT EVALUATION

### 6 Who were the young people?

---

This chapter provides a summary of the profile of young people who received the “enhanced offer”. After giving a breakdown of the throughput of young people, we then look at their basic demographics, care history and educational background. We then consider the offending history of those involved, including the offences for which they received this most recent custodial sentence. The chapter then finally considers the stated “needs” of the children, and what agencies their caseworkers considered that it would be necessary to involve in order to address these and prevent reoffending. The chapter concludes by suggesting what the “typical” profile of a young person receiving the enhanced offer would look like.

#### Numbers receiving the enhanced offer

During the 25 month period from March 2010 to March 2012 (our analysis period), there were 168 young people released from HMYOI Hindley to the supervision of YOTs the NWRC areas (who have now completed at least 3 months licence). This is the cohort considered to have received “the enhanced offer”. The table below shows that almost two-thirds of the young people came from the three Manchester City Council YOTs (63 per cent<sup>103</sup>), with North Manchester YOT with the largest single throughput (29 per cent of all). The smallest throughput was through Stockport (7 per cent) and then Wigan (8 per cent); although the third area outside Manchester, Rochdale, accounted for almost a quarter of all throughput in the NWRC (23 per cent).

#### *The numbers from each YOT area*

YOT area	Frequency	Percentage
North Manchester	48	29%
South Manchester	24	14%
Central Manchester	33	20%
<b>ALL MANCHESTER</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>63%</b>
Wigan	14	8%
Stockport	11	7%
Rochdale	38	23%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>168</b>	

Base = 161; 7 missing

Over 25 months, the 168 young people average out at a median average of 7 young people every month being released from prison into the supervision of NWRC YOTs (mean average

---

<sup>103</sup> Please note that percentages are rounded to the nearest per cent for clarity, which may result in figures not always adding up to 100.

of 6.72) (see table below). Apart from the start-up month, and the last couple of months (where the figure is slightly skewed by excluding those not including those having completed 3 months licence), the throughput over the two years was reasonably steady. Only September 2011 saw throughput of less than 5 young people, and only two months saw numbers greater than nine (11 in November 2010 and 12 in July 2011). Even if we exclude those earliest and latest 'artificial' months, the median average remains 7 young people per month.


***The numbers released from custody in each month***

		Frequency of all	Percentage of all	
2010	March	2	1%	
	April	8	5%	
	May	5	3%	
	June	6	4%	
	July	6	4%	
	August	7	4%	
	September	6	4%	
	October	6	4%	
	November	11	7%	
	December	8	5%	
	2011	January	9	5%
		February	7	4%
March		7	4%	
April		9	5%	
May		8	5%	
June		8	5%	
July		12	7%	
August		8	5%	
September		3	2%	
October		9	5%	
November		7	4%	
December		5	3%	
2012	January	7	4%	
	February	2	2%	
	March	2	2%	

Base = 168; all

The median average length of DTO sentence that was being served by the young people receiving the enhanced offer was 8 months. However, the chart below shows that it was only just less than half (47 per cent) that were serving short sentences of 4 or 6 months. At the other extreme, one in every five young people was serving a sentence of 18 months or more.

### ***Length of time spent on the enhanced offer (length of sentence)***



Base = 168; all

Overall, these sentence lengths meant that the median average length of time that a young person received the enhanced offer in the community was 4 months (120.5 days), but the mean average length is considerably longer at closer to 5.33 months (160.35 days). As such, a good proportion of young people had substantially longer involvement with the NWRC on release because of those few longer sentences. In fact, length of community involvement, not including the time consortium partners spent with the young person in Hindley, ranged from 30 days for a 2 month DTO up to 481 days (which must have involved consecutive sentences). This all means that the enhanced offer cohort, like any DTOs, received very different lengths of support within their licence period, necessitating different approaches and programmes.

### **Gender, age and ethnicity**

HMYOI Hindley is an all-male custodial institution, all the young people receiving the enhanced offer were male.

The ethnicity of the young people is shown in the table below. Reflecting the juvenile prison population, the majority of young people were white. In fact, the 81 per cent white was exactly the same as recorded in the evaluation of the DTO (Hazel et al, 2002). The next

biggest group was Black or Black British, with only 8 per cent. This ethnic mix is reasonably representative of the juvenile prison population as a whole.


### ***Ethnicity of young people***

<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
White British	127	75%
White Other	10	6%
Asian/Asian British	7	4%
Black/ Black British	13	8%
Mixed	11	7%

Base = 168; all

The age of the young people at the time of sentencing, and so (apart from the earliest) the start of their involvement with NWRC partners, is shown in the graph below. As would be expected from the profile in HMYOI Hindley, all the young people were between 15 and 17 years of age. The majority of them were 17 years old (55 per cent), although almost a third were 16 years old (30 per cent). Reflecting the general juvenile prison population then, only a smaller proportion were 15 years old (14 per cent). This spread looks similar to previous evaluations of juvenile custody and resettlement projects. Reflecting the top heavy skew, the median age of 17 years was higher than the mean average of 16.41 years old.

### ***Age of young people on starting the enhanced offer (going into custody)***




Base = 168; all

### **Care history**

Given that it is already well established that young people in the youth justice system (and in custody in particular) have had a disproportionate involvement with care services during childhood, it comes as no surprise that the young people receiving the enhanced offer have a substantial care history. As a summary figure, about a quarter of the young people (26 per cent) had been “looked after” by their Local Authority at some point in their lives.

Moreover, more than one in one in every seven of those involved with the consortium partners was in the care of the Local Authority at the time that they started their custodial sentence.

### **Percentage of young people “looked after” by the Local Authority prior to custody**



---

Base = 168; all

The instability implied by these figures was not mirrored by the YOT’s rating of the suitability of the young people’s housing at the time of sentencing. The large majority (91 per cent) were considered to be in suitable housing immediately prior to going into custody.

However, the extent of their care history was reflected in the vulnerability of the young people at the start of their sentences. According to their YOT case workers, the majority (56 per cent) were rated as having medium or above vulnerability at the time of going into custody.


### **Education, training and employment background**

The existing level of educational attainment for those starting to receive the enhanced offer was very low. Despite the fact that most young people were well past the age that GCSEs would normally be taken, almost three quarters (73 per cent) had no qualifications (Base = 154; 14 missing). This figure seems to reflect a wider lack of engagement with education, training or employment (ETE) prior to custody. Indeed, the chart below shows that the



majority of young people (56 per cent) were not involved with ETE at the time of sentencing. Only a very small minority (6 per cent) had any form of employment.

**Percentage of young people in ETE at start of the licence period**




---

Base = 168; all

**Offending behaviour and criminal justice background**

The young people had a substantial criminal history before their current custodial sentence. On average, they started offending around their 14<sup>th</sup> birthday (mean average = 13.70 years; median 14 years). This is almost identical to the mean ages shown in our previous research with this population in custody and resettlement projects (e.g. Hazel et al, 2002). As the chart below shows, there was some spread to this figure from 10 years old to 17 years old.

### Age of young people at time of first offence



Base = 168; all

The cohort had a mean average of 6.57 convictions previous to the DTO (median of 6; Base = all), although there was a substantial range from no previous convictions to 30 previous convictions. Just more than a quarter (76 per cent) had 10 or more previous convictions, with 5 per cent having an average of 18 or more convictions.

### Number of previous custodial sentences

Number of previous custodial sentences	Frequency	Percentage
0	108	64%
1	34	20%
2	9	5%
3	5	3%
4	8	5%
5	4	2%

Base = 168; All

Similarly, a substantial minority of the young people had been in custody before. According to the table above, more than a third of them (36 per cent) had received a previous custodial sentence, with one in three of those (15 per cent of all) having been inside more than once before.

It is perhaps not surprising then, that the majority of the young people (57 per cent) had been designated a “Deter Young Person” at some point prior to their current sentence. That label is given to young people considered at particularly high risk of offending.

## Current offences

What did the young people receive their current custodial sentence for? It is very difficult to pinpoint the particular index offence that prompted the DTO because these custodial sentences are often given for a combination of offences. The picture is even more complex when considered within the context of the Scaled Approach. However, it is possible to note all the offences that were considered at the time when the sentence was given, and these are listed in the table below. The most common offence for which a DTO was imposed was domestic burglary (30 per cent). The next most common offences were breach of statutory orders (24 per cent) and robbery (21 per cent). Violence against the person was only involved for about one in six cases (17 per cent). Reflecting the change in patterns of offending over the last 10 years, the highest cause of a custodial sentence when the DTO was evaluated in 2002, vehicle taking (which was then linked to a third of offenders), was only involved for 11 per cent of the offenders. We should note figures for breaching an order was involved, either statutory or bail; this suggests that a substantial proportion have a recent history of non-cooperation with the authorities – which would suggest a significant challenge for the NWRC in trying to ensure resettlement and compliance to licence conditions.

**Table: Offences for which current sentence being served**

Offences	Frequency	Percentage
Robbery	36	21%
Sexual offences	4	2%
Breach of statutory orders	40	24%
Domestic burglary	50	30%
Drugs	17	10%
Violence against the person	29	17%
Other	9	5%
Theft or handling stolen goods	21	13%
Bail breach	5	3%
Non-domestic burglary	5	3%
Public order	11	7%
Motoring offences	3	1%
Vehicle taking	19	11%
Criminal damage	2	2%
Arson	2	2%
Fraud	1	1%
Death by dangerous driving	1	1%

Base = 168; all. Totals add up to more than 100% because possible for the DTO to be for more than 1 offence.

Somewhat less than a third of cases were recorded by the YOTs as being classified as serious (30 per cent). The fact that this is not the case for the majority at the time of a custodial sentence underlines how the DTO was given for an accumulation of offences, either at that time or in association with the past or overall risk posed by the young person. In the context of the NWRC, it demonstrates the complexity of the offending pattern that the enhanced offer was attempting to unravel to prevent future offending.

## The needs of the young people

At the start of their involvement with the NWRC, the young people were generally considered to be likely to reoffend after custody. The median average ASSET score rating received at this time was 32 [dynamic and static factors], which means that about half of the young people were considered to be highly likely to reoffend when they were eventually released (subject to intervention). Indeed, more than one in six young people had a score of 40 or more (Base = 168; all). Again, this underlines the scale of the difficulty facing the resettlement consortium in trying to reduce the chances of reoffending. The ASSET score is calculated by looking at the young person's needs and problems across a whole range of areas, and scores that high suggest substantial problems to be tackled in several of these.

**Table: Areas of need that may hinder resettlement**

Areas of need	Frequency of all	Percentage of all
Offending behaviour	130	81%
Constructive activities	71	44%
Substance misuse	111	69%
Anger management	51	32%
Low qualifications	59	37%
Unemployment	65	40%
Family problems	83	52%
Housing / homelessness	35	22%
Life skills	44	27%
Mental health	34	21%
Physical health	3	2%
None	2	1%


Base = 161; 7 missing

That assessment is supported by the various needs of the young people detailed to us by the YOTs. Before each young person left custody, we asked the YOTs to record what needs the young person has that might hinder successful resettlement. The results, in the table above, confirmed a range of needs for a substantial proportion of the cohort receiving the enhanced offer. Not surprising, the biggest need was to address offending behaviour for four in five young people (81 per cent) – indeed, perhaps this is even lower than one would expect for young people in custody. The two other needs for the majority of the children were substance misuse for more than two thirds (69 per cent) and family difficulties for just over half (52 per cent). Several other issues were areas of need each for a substantial

minority, including lack of constructive or purposeful activities (44 per cent), unemployment (40 per cent), low qualifications (37 per cent), anger management (32 per cent), and life skills (27 per cent). In addition, accommodation problems (22 per cent) and mental health issues (21 per cent) were each considered to hinder the resettlement of about one in five young people.

Each of these alone was considered to possibly hinder successful resettlement. However, as the chart below shows, for the large majority of young people (86 per cent), YOTs identified multiple areas of need that would need addressing. Indeed, on average, it was considered that the young person had four different areas of need that could hinder resettlement (median = 4, mean = 4.08), and a quarter had six or more that would need to be addressed.


**Count of areas of need that required addressing for resettlement**



Base = 168; All

This clearly presented a complex task during the licence period, and pointed to needing multiple agencies offered by the consortium concept. Indeed, that approach was confirmed when asking the YOTs before the young person left custody which agencies they planned to involve in addressing their needs. The median average number of agencies they planned to intervene during the licence period was slightly more than the number of issues above, at 4.5 (mean = 4.51). Although there were 4 per cent where no agencies were to be involved, six or more agencies were planned to be involved in almost a third of cases (30 per cent) (see chart below).

**Count of agencies planned to be involved in supervision**




---

Base = 168; all

The agency most intended to be involved was Connexions, where they were to help almost four in every five young people (78 per cent). The only other agency to be considered needed for the majority was drug agencies (59 per cent). However, as the table below shows, there were eight other agencies where YOTs intended them be involved in at least one in five young people. It is clear that each enhanced offer would involve the coordination of multiple agencies to address multiple needs.

### ***Agencies the workers intended to be involved***

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage of young people</b>
Connexions	126	78%
Drugs agencies	95	59%
Intensive Offender Mgt.	74	46%
Mentoring	19	12%
RAP	56	35%
Learning mentor	12	7%
Social Services (over 16s)	21	13%
Housing	33	20%
Sports development officer	10	6%
Police	33	20%
Construction Youth Trust	19	11%
Other YOT workers	47	29%
Other Consortium Partners	39	24%
Education agencies	45	28%
CAMHS	24	15%
Local employers	8	5%
Children's services	37	23%
Training providers	29	18%
Probation workers	5	3%
Youth services	3	2%
Money advice services	2	1%
Health services	12	7%
Local JCP	9	6%

Base = 162; 6 missing

### **Summary**

From the data, it has been possible to present a picture of the young people as they start to receive the enhanced offer. This also gives us some idea about the type of person requiring resettlement work more generally. It is a picture of a young person with childhood instability, disengaged from ETE, with an established criminal history and multiple areas of needs that increase the risk of reoffending. In short, just about the most challenging combination for successful resettlement to be achieved. To illustrate this picture more clearly, the 'typical' profile of a young person who was to receive the enhanced offer is described through an homunculus in the box below:

- Male
- Probably white
- Living in urban Manchester
- Older juvenile (probably 17 years old)
- Possibly in care at one time or another (one in four chance)
- Living in suitable accommodation before custody
- Vulnerable
- Probably not in any ETE, and have no qualifications
- If in ETE, it's certainly unlikely to be employment

- Started offending between the ages of 13 and 15 years old
- Already have convictions in double figures
- Possibly been in custody before (one in three chance)
- Considered to be at a medium to high risk of reoffending
- Have multiple areas of need (probably about four)
- Have substance misuse issues
- Probably have family issues
- Possibly have a lack of purposeful activities
- Will need the help of multiple agencies for successful resettlement



## 7 Receiving the enhanced offer

---

Having established in the last chapter that the young people had multiple needs that needed addressing during the resettlement period, this chapter goes on to look at what support the young person received and engaged with after release. We begin by looking at what preparatory support for resettlement was given to the young person in custody, partly to see how joined up the sentence was able to be. Then, we look at whether the NWRC was able to address all the needs identified in the young person previously, and what agencies were involved. Some needs are then considered more closely, including housing needs and ETE.

### Custody and preparation for release

As the disposal given to the young people receiving the enhanced offer was meant to be served half in custody and half the time in the community under supervision, it is intended that the two parts form a continuous sentence. As such, it might be expected (and the research in the literature review in this report supported) that (a) there would be work going on while in custody to plan for effective resettlement and (b) the young person themselves would be prepared in some way for release.

In terms of planning, there are DTO review meetings held in custody, attended by interested parties. In the case of meetings for young people receiving the enhanced offer, these were each attended by a median average of 2 agencies in addition to the YOT caseworker. The table below shows that Connexions was by far the most likely agency to have attended meetings inside, with that being the case for more than three-quarters of young people (76 per cent). IRS workers attended meetings for about half of young people, and the police for a third. These numbers are a substantial shift from the picture at the time of the DTO evaluation (Hazel et al, 2002), when only 10 per cent of cases saw any involvement from outside agencies other than the YOT.

#### ***Agencies attending DTO meetings in the institution, compared to the DTO evaluation***

---

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Frequency of all</b>	<b>Percentage of all</b>
Connexions	116	76%
IRS	75	49%
Police	49	32%
Social Services	27	18%
CAMHS	11	7%
Care home keyworker	5	3%
Drugs agency	22	15%
Education agency	12	8%
Victim awareness	2	1%
Other	-	-

---

Base = 153; 15 missing

Two-thirds of young people (68 per cent; Base=166, 2 missing) attended a pre-release course in order to help them prepare and adjust for resettlement. That kind of adjustment, and preparations for release may be made easier by the prison allowing release on temporary licence (ROTL). This allows the young person time to de-institutionalise, and help with the preparations for ETE, housing and other support ready for resettlement. However, only a very small number were able to take advantage of ROTL (4 per cent; Base=161; 7 missing). An even smaller number were given an Assisted ROTL to help with resettlement (3 per cent; Base=148; 20 missing).


An additional task in preparation for release is to produce a 'day of release' plan with the young person. This was undertaken with practically all the young people receiving the enhanced offer. For only one young person did the YOT report no release plan had been put in place in time for release (Base=159; 9 missing).

### Transition in addressing offending behaviour

A key aspect of a continuous custody-community sentence like the DTO is to be able to provide a coherent programme across both parts to address the offending behaviour of the young person. In theory, by closer working between the NWRC and HMYOI Hindley, the young person's offending behaviour will be addressed in such a way. Certainly, the need to address offending behaviour was identified as necessary to address above.

Certainly, according to the YOTs, programmes addressing offending behaviour were given to three quarters of young people while in custody (77 per cent; Base = 148; 20 missing). Moreover, the chart below shows that the YOTs were able to obtain full information on what addressing offending behaviour activity had taken place inside for almost three-quarter (73 per cent; Base =153; 15 missing). Partial information was obtained for most of the rest, with only 7 per cent left with no information passed from the custodial institution.

#### ***Extent of information on addressing offending behaviour activity available from institutions for after custody***



Base = 153; 15 missing

Although there should not be any cases of information not flowing from the institution to the YOT on this, that negative figure is substantially less than that found in either the DTO evaluation (21 per cent) or the previous resettlement project, RESET (49 per cent)<sup>104</sup>. Furthermore, the 71 per cent of full information is a third higher than DTO evaluation (an easily significant difference; Binomial Test).

## Tackling needs

In the previous chapter we looked at the different areas of need for each young person that may hinder resettlement. We noted that a median average of 4 areas of need were identified (mean was 4.08). During the licence period, the median number of these areas actually addressed, according YOTs, was 3.5 (mean = 3.61). The fact that the mean average was somewhat higher than the median indicates that a minority of young people received support in a disproportionately high number of areas.

The number of cases where no areas of need were addressed (n22) was substantially more than those where no help had been intended (n2). However, most of the young people had seen multiple areas of need addressed. Indeed almost the same amount as identified previously had more than 6 needs addressed (23 per cent).

### *Count of areas of need that were addressed during the licence period*

Number of areas of need	Frequency of all	Percentage of all
0	22	13%
1	15	9%
2	19	11%
3	28	17%
4	26	16%
5	20	12%
6	18	11%
7	7	4%
8	8	5%
9	5	3%

Base = 168; all

The table below shows that three areas were tackled in the majority of cases. Offending behaviour (whether a continuous programme or not) was addressed for almost all the young people (90 per cent), with drugs being the next most tackled area (61 per cent) and then needing purposeful activities (52 per cent). Family issues (41 per cent), unemployment (39 per cent) and anger management (33 per cent) were each addressed more than a third of cases.

<sup>104</sup> As noted in chapter 2 above, these projects are useful to compare at aggregate level because the DTO evaluation represents a baseline with no enhanced resettlement activity, and RESET offers a previous programme of enhanced resettlement (but without a consortium approach or single YOI approach). We cannot, however, be sure that they were precisely comparable cohorts.

**Table: Areas of need tackled during licence period**

Areas of need	Frequency of all	Percentage of all
Offending behaviour	133	90%
Constructive activities	77	52%
Drugs	90	61%
Anger management	49	33%
Low qualifications	32	22%
Unemployment	57	39%
Family	60	41%
Housing / homelessness	36	24%
Life skills	45	30%
Mental health	22	15%
Physical health	4	3%
None	2	1%

Base = 148; 20 missing

How do the percentage of cases addressed for each area compare with the needs identified? The table below lists the extent to which the percentage of young people for each area tackled was more or less than the percentage with identified need. We find that in five areas, fewer young people had the issue being tackled than those where need was identified. These were: drug misuse; low qualifications; unemployment; family problems and mental health.

**Table: How much the required support need was actually being addressed**

Areas of need	Percentage need	Percentage tackled	More or less than needed
Offending behaviour	81%	90%	9% more
Constructive activities	44%	52%	8% more
Drugs	69%	61%	9% less
Anger management	32%	33%	1% more
Low qualifications	37%	22%	15% less
Unemployment	40%	39%	1% less
Family	52%	41%	11% less
Housing / homelessness	22%	24%	2% more
Life skills	27%	30%	3% more
Mental health	21%	15%	6% less
Physical health	2%	3%	1% more
None	1%	1%	Same

Base = 148; 20 missing

These topics may be taken as an indication of the areas hardest needs for the NWRC to tackle in reality. In some cases, the short fall is considerable – most notably in low qualifications where it was 15 per cent and the family where it was 11 per cent. In contrast, some areas of need like offending behaviour and constructive activities were tackled in

significantly more cases than planned. As such, these may be considered areas that it is easier to address during resettlement.

## Planned and actual agency involvement

It is perhaps reasonable to hypothesise that the some areas of need are harder to address because it is harder to arrange help from agencies responsible for those. Certainly, it can be noted that the two areas in the table above where the tackled:need ratio was healthiest were both areas where it would be possible for the YOT or even caseworker to lead, without outside help.


So, were the shifts in whether areas of need were tackled reflected in whether planned agencies were involved? Yes, the average number of agencies actually involved was slightly less than planned (median = 4.5, mean = 4.51). Similar to the areas of need, the numbers of young people with no agencies involved was greater than planned (from 4 per cent to 13 per cent), but the proportion of young people helped by six or more agencies, was almost identical to that planned (28 per cent compared to 30 per cent). The table and chart below show the count of agencies involved, and then compared to those planned. They show a similar distribution between the two sets of figures.

### *Count of agencies involved in supervision*

Number of agencies	Frequency of all	Percentage of all
0	20	12%
1	10	6%
2	17	10%
3	25	15%
4	25	15%
5	24	14%
6	26	10%
7	9	5%
8	8	5%
9	7	4%
10	2	1%
11	2	1%
12	2	1%
13	-	
14	-	
15	1	1%

Base = 168; all

**Count of agencies planned and actually involved in supervision**



Base = 82; All

Appropriate to the needs identified, some agencies were involved with more young people than others. As planned, Connexions was the most involved agency, helping four in every five young people (81 per cent), followed by drugs agencies (51 per cent) and intensive offender management (46 per cent). And like the plans, there were 10 agencies that were involved with at least one in five young people. It seems that the NWRC did indeed coordinate multiple agencies to address multiple needs.

***Agencies involved with young people during licence period***

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage of young people</b>
Connexions	120	81%
Drugs agencies	76	51%
Intensive Offender Mgt.	74	50%
Mentoring	14	10%
RAP	55	37%
Learning mentor	11	7%
Social Services (over 16s)	21	14%
Housing	32	22%
Sports development officer	7	5%
Police	47	32%
Construction Youth Trust	10	7%
Other YOT workers	50	34%
Other Consortium Partners	36	24%
Education agencies	40	27%
CAMHS	17	12%
Local employers	8	5%
Children's services	27	18%
Training providers	29	20%
Probation workers	8	5%
Youth services	1	1%
Money advice services	3	2%
Health services	12	8%
Local JCP	8	5%

Base = 148; 20 missing

Like the areas of need, there were some agencies involved with more young people than planned, and some involved with less – and again, this would suggest that some of the agencies were easier to engage with or coordinate than others (see table below). Eleven agencies were involved in more cases than planned, with most difference being with the police (12 per cent more than planned). In contrast, nine agencies were involved with less cases than planned, possibly suggesting difficulties in coordination or partnership. These included substance misuse agencies, Construction Youth Trust, and Children's Services.

### ***Agencies involved with young people during licence period***

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Percentage planned</b>	<b>Percentage engaged</b>	<b>More or less than planned?</b>
Connexions	78%	81%	3% more
Drugs agencies	59%	51%	8% less
Intensive Offender Mgt.	46%	50%	4% more
Mentoring	12%	10%	2% less
RAP	35%	37%	2% more
Learning mentor	7%	7%	Same
Social Services (over 16s)	13%	14%	1% more
Housing	20%	22%	2% more
Sports development officer	6%	5%	1% less
Police	20%	32%	12% more
Construction Youth Trust	11%	7%	4% less
Other YOT workers	29%	34%	5% more
Other Consortium Partners	24%	24%	same
Education agencies	28%	27%	1% less
CAMHS	15%	12%	3% less
Local employers	5%	5%	Same
Children's services	23%	18%	5% less
Training providers	18%	20%	2% more
Probation workers	3%	5%	2% more
Youth services	2%	1%	1% less
Money advice services	1%	2%	1% more
Health services	7%	8%	1% more
Local JCP	6%	5%	1% less

Base = 148; 20 missing

## **Housing**

We will now consider some particular needs identified in previous research as important for resettlement success (see the literature review), focusing first on accommodation. The table below shows that just less than two thirds of the young people went to live with at least one of their parents on immediate release from custody (64 per cent), with supported accommodation being the second most popular but with just 13 per cent.




### ***Accommodation on release from custody***

<b>Accommodation</b>	<b>Frequency of all</b>	<b>Percentage of all</b>
Parental home	107	64%
With other relatives	17	10%
Young people's Home	7	4%
With friends	3	2%
Supported accommodation	22	13%
Independent housing	6	4%
Hostel	1	1%
B&B	4	2%

Base = 168; all

The accommodation was clearly integrated into the planning for release done by NWRC partners, with only a small proportion of young people (2 per cent) not having had accommodation arranged or confirmed more than 24 hours prior to their release.

### ***Was accommodation confirmed more than 24 hours prior to release?***



Base = 77; 5 missing

Most of that majority group who lived with their parents when they were released lived stably throughout their period. Of the young people who stayed in the parental home when they were first released, about two-thirds (63%, n100/7 missing) lived there throughout their licence period. The proportion of all the young people that stayed with their parents at any time during the licence period was lower than in the earlier DTO

evaluation (69 per cent to 78 per cent in Hazel et al, 2002) but higher than in the RESET project (56 per cent in Hazel et al, 2006). This difference may reflect differences in age groups, but it does show that finding accommodation away from the family home was more of an issue with this group than the evaluation of ten years ago.

***Places stayed in the community at any time during the licence period***


<b>Accommodation</b>	<b>Frequency of all</b>	<b>Percentage of all</b>
Parental home	111	69%
With other relatives	24	15%
Young people's Home	8	5%
With friends	15	9%
Foster parents	1	1%
Supported accommodation	25	16%
Independent housing	9	6%
B&B	6	4%
No fixed abode	2	1%
Hostel	4	3%
Other	2	1%

Base = 160; 8 missing. Totals add up to more than 100% because can stay more than 1 place

The proportion of young people in suitable housing was actually lower at the end of the licence period than before (85 per cent compared to 91 per cent), despite a rise in the proportion at the time of release (to 96 per cent). This indicates that there was an issue with breakdown of placements. However, the decrease between start and end of sentence was not large enough to be considered statistically significant if considering it a broader problem (McNemar Test).

It can be seen in the chart below that although this pattern was not found in the RESET project evaluation, a similar fall was found in the comparison group of all those leaving custody in the year before the enhanced offer. Indeed, this equivalent fall in the comparison group over this was period was large enough to be statistically significant (McNemar Test). Similarly, the difference between the suitability of accommodation in the cohort and the comparison group at the end of the licence period was statistically significant (85 per cent to 75 per cent; Binomial Test). As such, this is evidence that although the enhanced offer did not improve their accommodation suitability over time, it did perhaps reduce the extent of the decline, and *limit* the likelihood of their accommodation becoming unsuitable by the end.

**Trend in suitability of accommodation compared to previous project**




Base=142; 26 missing

**Education, training and employment**

The findings in relation to the young people’s involvement in education, training and employment were mixed, but showed success in arranging, if not sustainability. Given the poor background in ETE engagement for this group, this is perhaps to be expected. The chart below shows that just over two thirds of the young people (69 per cent) were involved with ETE activity at some point during their supervision period. This compares favourably with the DTO evaluation where the figure was about half (53 per cent). Of those engaged at some point, about half were involved for at least a month (37 per cent of all). About one in eight of the cohort (12 per cent) started but were only in ETE for less than a week of the supervision period.

Importantly, the 69 per cent attendance figure is significantly higher than the 47 per cent attending ETE in the comparison group from the year before the enhanced offer (Binomial Test), suggesting that the NWRC did make a difference to ensuring at least some ETE engagement.

### Amount of ETE attendance during the licence period




---

Base = 155; 13 missing

Indeed, making that difference through support seems to be suggested by the figures for agencies managing to arrange education successfully in the first place (whether or not attended). The chart below shows that ETE was arranged for three quarters of the young people (76 per cent), which again is significantly better than the equivalent figure for the comparison group the year before of less than half (47 per cent; Binomial Test).

A further 13 per cent were working on their employability with Connexions (or at least had this arranged), which could be considered another form of training. As such, only 11 per cent of young people had no ETE related activity arranged during the licence period which, although important to address, is substantially better than previously found.


**Percentage of young people for which ETE set-up for during the licence period**



Base = 155; 13 missing

There does, however, appear to be a delay in organising these arrangements, which risks losing the engagement and compliance of young people when they first come out of custody. About half of young people did not have ETE arranged by the time of their release. This is an issue found in previous research (e.g. Hazel et al, 2002).


**Percentage of young people for which ETE was set-up PRIOR to release**



Base = 155; 13 missing

Consequently, it is worth considering briefly what was happening in relation to communication between the custodial institution and community agencies about education to help with this transition period. According to the YOT's rating, they received full information on the child's education and training activity while in custody in two thirds of cases (67 per cent). They received partial information for a further quarter (23 per cent). The full information figure is significantly better than found in the DTO evaluation (Binomial Test) and an improvement on the RESET figure (see the chart below). So, this suggests that there were not substantial problems in communication – certainly not to prevent half the young people not having ETE arranged for release.


**Extent of information on education and training available from institutions for after custody**



Base = 165; 3 missing

Oddly, however, despite this improved communication, YOTs felt that only a small minority of young people (18 per cent) were able to have a continuous programme in education or training (see the chart below). However, our same concerns exist here as for the data in relation to addressing offending behaviour.

**Extent to which key workers considered it possible to form a continuous programme in education or training (for those where education or training was set up)**




Base = 129 (all those where education or training was set-up); 3 missing

The effort in arranging education and the increase in attendance is still evident to some extent at the end of the licence period where a third are still engaged. However, at 34 per cent compared to 30 per cent attendance at the end for the comparison group, this is not statistically significant (Binomial Test).

Of more concern is the difference in ETE engagement between immediately prior to custody and the end of the licence period (see the chart below). This shows that even though the young people had a poor level of ETE engagement prior to custody, by the end of their journey through custody and the licence period, it is even lower. So, if the area of ETE added to their risk of reoffending at the start of their sentence, logically it is even more of a problem at the end. And this is despite the considerable additional work in this area by the NWRC. While it is disappointing to see in relation to the enhanced offer, it is perhaps or a reflection of the consequences of the disruption that custody brings.




**Percentage of young people in ETE at start and the end of the licence period**



Base = 132; 36 missing

It should be noted that a small number of young people were apprenticed during the licence period (8 per cent).

**Percentage of young people apprenticed at any point**




Base = 166; 2 missing

In summary, the flow diagram below shows the pathway of arrangement and attendance in ETE during the course of the licence period, compared to the comparison group. It shows

that the group with the enhanced offer consistently out-perform the comparison group, but that the difference is less marked the more the result depends upon continued engagement by the young person rather than the emphasis on arrangement. Nevertheless, it still results in a small difference at the end of the licence.

***Young people's pathways to ETE success compared to Comparison Group***




Base = 151-167; 1-17 missing

**Risk of Reoffending: ASSET Scores**

Overall, the young people had a significantly lower ASSET scores by the end of their involvement with the enhanced offer compared with the their release, and then again compared with the start (One way ANOVA Test [Greenhouse-Geisser] and Friedman Test]. The mean average score dropped from 31.08 to 28.54. Although a drop of some kind is expected anyway after an intervention, this was bigger than the comparison group whose mean average drop was not statistically significant. Indeed, the chart below shows how the NWRC group started off with a higher mean average ASSET score, but ended their sentences with a lower mean average score. This suggests that the enhanced offer made a significant improvement to reducing the young person’s risk of reoffending as measured by ASSET.

**Trend in ASSET scores**



Base=144-168; 0-24 missing

It should be noted that in order to continue the work established under the enhanced offer after the end of the licence, the young people are given a Sustainability Plan. This was given to about two thirds of young people over our analysis period, but the data from the YOT for this figure contained a high number of missing cases, so should be considered with caution (66 per cent; Base = 73; 88 missing).

**Summary**

This chapter has considered the provision for young people receiving the enhanced offer, looking at the support they had and how it affected their needs and risk factors. The consortium clearly engaged with the challenge of providing multiagency support for multiple needs, although it was clearly easier to meet some than others, with perhaps difficulties working with some agencies. Overall, it showed fairly consistent improvements,

reflected in the significant improvement in ASSET scores. Importantly, these improvements were generally significant in comparison with the comparison group and the findings from previous evaluations involving similar young people. The picture was of much more multi-agency involvement both when the young person is in custody and when meeting their needs once out of custody, and more communication between custodial institution and community agencies.

Given that the young people are still at risk at the end, and there are a substantial number not in ETE, there is clearly still room for improvement in across the board, and particularly in the use of ROTL, and ensuring the sustainability of ETE.

## 8 Compliance during supervision – breaching and reoffending

---

Inevitably, any evaluation of the success of a youth justice intervention will judge it in terms of the overall aim of the youth justice system, which in England and Wales is whether it “prevents offending” (Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and guidance). We recognise that offending may not be stopped or even significantly reduced within one short intervention, and may be more cumulative over time with a group with criminal behaviour this established, and that ‘softer’ intermediate targets found in the previous chapter may well be more realistic in indicating longer-term success with these individuals. Nevertheless, it is important to assess whether there has already been any kind of change in compliance post-release.


Ideally, the preferred way to measure this would be in line with the standard Ministry of Justice guidelines and look at reconvictions one year after release. However, the timeline afforded this evaluation does not permit that measure. Therefore, we are using other “proxy measures” that have become our standard in resettlement work for the Home Office and Youth Justice Board over the last 14 years. There are four “hard” outcome measures in the evaluation of the NWRC, which examine how successful the Project was in supporting the young people to abide by their sentence. These are (a) whether the young person did something during their licence period that was against the conditions of their Order (a “breachable action”), (b) whether they were arrested for an offence allegedly committed during the supervision period, and (c) whether they have been convicted for any offence committed within three months of release (to equivalise), and (d) whether the young person was returned to custody for either breaching their Order or reoffending during the licence period.

### Breaching

Just over half of young people receiving the enhanced offer (57 per cent) did something that “failed to comply” with the conditions of their Order at least once during their licence period (even if no action was taken). Failure to comply means engaging in any activity that is against the conditions of the supervision part of their sentence, including not turning up for a scheduled activity or getting in trouble with the police. It is also referred to here as “committing a breachable action” because the YOT could send the child to court for a further judicial decision at this point, and they could be returned to custody to complete their sentence.

This figure is not significantly different from the comparison group, where 58 per cent breached within their supervision period (Binomial Test). However, it is notably *worse* than both the RESET group (which also did not see a significant difference) and the original DTO evaluation (see chart below). This may be because the group had higher risk levels, because of local breach practices, or perhaps another factor related to resettlement practices that we will explore later.


**The number of people committing a breachable action, compared to comparison group and other projects**



Base = 166; 2 missing

Furthermore, the chart below shows that the first breachable actions happened quickly after release, with the highest number occurring in the first week and the bulk of these initial failures to comply happening in the first few weeks.


**Raw numbers of young people's first breachable actions at each week after release**



Base = 168; all (Totals add up to the 94 who committed a breachable action)

Indeed, the median amount of time to first failure to comply was 31 days, which was down from 39.5 days for the comparison group (not a significant difference using Independent Sample Median Test). The chart below compares the speed of this first failure compared to the previous evaluations for this group. There were more failures in the first week for those receiving the enhanced offer (19 per cent) than any other group, including being almost double that from the original DTO evaluation. So, almost one in five committed a breachable action in the first week.

**First type of breachable action, compared to comparison group and other projects (for those who breached)**




Base = 94 who committed a breachable action

On the surface, given the amount of support to this group, it looks odd that the NWRC breaching figures are not improved, and are even worse than other evaluations – particularly in terms of speed. However, it may well be that this “amount of support” gives us a clue as to why this may be the case. The chart below shows what this first breachable action was, compared to less resettlement support (the comparison group and just the DTO). What this demonstrates is a shift when receiving this support (as a proportion of those who breached at all). The numbers where it was triggered by a new offence has been reduced from around 20 per cent to only 1 per cent. Instead, this has been replaced, relatively, by failure to cooperate fully with partner agencies in the consortium, which accounted for 26 per cent of first breachable actions compared to just 3 per cent in the comparison group. In other words, the introduction of partner agencies providing extra support seems to have resulted in about a quarter of those who breached doing so earlier

than they otherwise would (if they would at all). It appears that providing the extra support and activities has provided more events for them to have to comply with.

**First type of breachable action, compared to comparison group and other projects (for those who breached)**



Base = 94 (all those failing to comply)

It is possible that this situation is made worse by the increase in Integrated Offender Management, which affected 72 per cent of the sample (Base = 151; 7 missing) and other differences in breaching practice.

Certainly there are a few factors that made a significant difference (Likelihood Ratio Log-linear Test) to whether someone was highlighted as having committed an action against their licence:

- YOT Area

Some YOTs have significantly higher breach rates than others, with Wigan and Rochdale having double the rates of some others. Almost 9 out of 10 Rochdale young people were recorded as failing to comply (see table below)



### **Breaching rates of each Yot area**

<b>Yot area</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
North Manchester	45%
South Manchester	46%
Central Manchester	38%
Wigan	79%
Stockport	55%
Rochdale	87%

Base = 166; 2 missing

- Being looked after prior to custody (at any time) meant you were less likely to comply
- Being a Deter Young Offender at any point in the past
- Having more needs to be addressed
- Not having suitable accommodation on release
- Not attending ETE (although this could be a reason for breaching)
- Having Integrated Offender Management in practice
- Having more agencies involved in supervision

When placed in a binary logistic regression model (which compares for any factors that might be influencing each other and shows the strongest), the following variables remain significant:

- YOT area
- Being a Deter Young Offender at any point in the past
- Having more needs to be addressed
- Not attending ETE (although this could be a reason for breaching)


So, although the number of agencies involved does seem to be making a difference to the breaching rate, two types of factors are making the most fundamental difference. First, the needs of the young person and how challenging they are. Second, practice at a local level, with key differences between the YOT areas.

## **Reoffending**

Just more than one in five young people on the enhanced offer committed an alleged offence during their licence period (22 per cent committing an offence leading to charge). This represents a significant reduction of 7 per cent from the comparison group the year before (Binomial Test). The chart below shows that this is about half the offending rate for the DTO evaluation, and about half the rate of the North West portion of the RESET project evaluation. Interestingly though, even the comparison group was significantly lower than these other comparators, which suggests that something was being done better in the North West already, and had improved significantly since 2006. This is open for discussion, but our initial thoughts based on previous research on what works with reoffending is that

this may have been the movement of all secure placements for this group to HMYOI Hindley, which may have already improved coordination between custody and community agencies.

***The number of people committing an offence in the licence period, against comparison group and previous resettlement projects***




---

Base = 154; 14 missing

Young people on the licence offended slightly more quickly than the comparison group, but not significantly so (Mann-Whitney Test, Independent Sample Median Test, Kolmogorov-Smimov Test). Their median average to first offence for those who did offend was 51 days compared to 54 days for the comparison group.

The chart below shows that there are some peaks in first offences around the second week and around the two month mark, but otherwise the number of people committing offences for the first time is fairly steady each week.

**Raw numbers of young people's first offence each week after release (up to week 20)**




---

Base = 168; all

The chart below shows the relative speed of first offence compared to the young people in the previous RESET evaluation and DTO evaluation. After a similar peak in the first couple of weeks, the rise in the NWRC groups (both enhanced offer and cohort) is much steadier, not reflecting the continued fast rise in the early weeks previously seen in evaluations.

**Weeks to first offence, cumulatively, compared to previous projects (percentage of those who offended only)**



Base = 168; all

The only factors that were associated with a significant increase ((Likelihood Ratio Log-linear Test) in the likelihood of offending during the licence period were:

- Having previous custodial sentences
- Having more previous convictions
- Having been a Deter Young Offender at any point
- Having suitable accommodation on release

So, apart from needing suitable accommodation, the other variables that distinguished whether someone would offend again related to their criminal history. Of course, this

demonstrates how much of a job it would be to turn around the most entrenched offending patterns, and that it was easier for the enhanced offer to completely prevent offending with when criminality was less established.

This should not be taken as suggesting that nothing else is important in preventing offending, just that these were showing up as making a significance level with this group. However, given that this is a population rather than sample groups, so arguably does not need a significance test to tell us if there was a difference (see earlier discussion on data analysis), the table below shows some other factors that seemed to make an impact on whether those in the cohort reoffended within the licence period:

### ***Non-significant differences to offending***

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Percentage with factor</b>	<b>Percentage without factor</b>
Looked after at time of sentence	35%	20%
Qualifications	14%	24%
Attending ETE for more than a week	26%	16%
Having IOM in practice	26%	15%
Having 6 or more agencies involved	36%	18%

Base = Varied, but mainly 154; 14 missing

Also, there were again clear differences between the YOT Areas (just failing to reach significance). Young people were almost twice as likely to be arrested and charged for offending if they lived in Rochdale than some other areas, and four times more likely than if they lived in North Manchester.

### ***Offending rates of each YOT area***

<b>YOT area</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
North Manchester	9%
South Manchester	26%
Central Manchester	20%
Wigan	21%
Stockport	20%
Rochdale	38%

Base = 166; 2 missing

## **Reconvictions and returned to custody**

Just less than a quarter of young people receiving the enhanced offer (24 per cent) have been convicted for an offence committed during this licence period, with 5 per cent gaining more than one conviction (Base = 156; 12 missing).

In order to compare with equivalent figures available from the comparison group (more figures will become available in time), we can compare on convictions for offences within three months after release. On this measure, 16 percent of the cohort were reconvicted,

compared to 22 percent of the comparison group. While this is a clear difference between the populations and can be reported as such, it is not significant enough with this limited throughput to be able to say for sure that it could be replicated (Binomial Test).

An additional calculation compared the conviction rate for the young people before the current sentence (since started offending) and enhanced offer with an equivalised rate for the licence period since, pro rata over a year. In short, it is a model of how many convictions the young person received in the year before custody compared to how many they are projected to receive in the year after release, based on their licence period rate of offending. Using this model, we see a reduction of an average 1.88 convictions per person per annum, which is a 69 per cent drop and the equivalent of 315 convictions per year (see the table below). The same model with our comparison group gives an average reduction of 2.04, which is a 63 per cent drop and the equivalent of 209 convictions. There is a 6 per cent improvement in the average yearly convictions between our comparison group and the NWRC group. That's the equivalent of just over a hundred convictions a year.

***Average yearly convictions model***

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Cohort</b>	<b>Comparison</b>
Average yearly convictions before custody	2.70	3.23
Average projected convictions after release	0.82	1.19
Drop in conviction rate	1.88	2.04
Percentage reduction	69%	63%
Reduction in yearly convictions	315	209

Base = 168; all.

The table below shows the spread of convictions since release until the end of the analysis period, not restricted to their own licence period (so, there is no equivalence of time). Domestic burglary is the most common offence for which the young people have been reconvicted since release (13 per cent). All other offences only gathered convictions by less than 10 per cent of the cohort, with the most being for violence against the person, and theft or handling stolen goods (both 9 per cent).

### ***Convictions since release***

<b>Offences</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Robbery	5	3%
Sexual offences	1	1%
Breach of statutory orders	12	8%
Domestic burglary	21	13%
Drugs	-	-
Violence against the person	14	9%
Other	4	3%
Theft or handling stolen goods	15	9%
Bail breach	1	1%
Non-domestic burglary	4	3%
Public order	8	5%
Motoring offences	7	4%
Vehicle taking	6	4%
Criminal damage	3	2%
Arson	-	-
Fraud	-	-
Death by dangerous driving	-	-

Base = 168; all.

Just over a fifth of young people (22 per cent) were returned to custody by a court before the end of their licence. This compares with 27 per cent of those in the comparison group. Although not significant for generalisation (Binomial Test), it does represent a drop of 5 per cent.

### **Respondent perceptions of the impact on young people**

*We're such a tiny, tiny component in these young people's lives. Trying to do what we do: trying to change their attitudes, trying to address their offending behaviour and trying to get services involved when they actually couldn't give a damn. We may touch some people's lives in a positive way that helps turn them around, but it's very difficult to identify exactly what it is that you've done that has given a successful outcomes.*

There are huge challenges involved in working with such largely chaotic, vulnerable young people – the majority of whom come from very deprived backgrounds where the social modelling of offender identities is common. However, one of the practitioners working within Hindley commented that the Consortium cohort were receiving a notably different service than other young people on DTOs – having more contact with their YOT workers, more one-to-one interventions and family mediation. Although the young people may be largely unaware of the resettlement changes, their support needs are now identified much earlier on in the sentence and a multi-agency plan is then developed for them. Consortium partners seek to build up a working relationship with the young person while they are still in custody to ensure better continuity of care for the young person upon release.

As far as possible, the young people have consistent workers and, with greater communication between partners, stakeholders anticipate that the young people should feel that there is a greater cohesion between all of the agencies working with them. The involvement of such a wide range of agencies means that young people get specialised support from the right people and have access to a much more complete wraparound service. More work is undertaken to improve relationships between young people and their families – which is critical to improving the likelihood of young people returning home post-custody. One YOS stakeholder commented that they feel the young people have greater commitment to their resettlement plan now because they have effectively signed up to a contact under the enhanced offer. As a result, the young people are more confident in what the YOS will do to support them, and equally they know what they have to do in return. This is important as this positive experience of agency support and the building of trusting relationships with key practitioners lessens the negative impact that the custodial experience can have upon young people:

*The custodial experience creates cynicism and apathy at a young age. Changing the internal perception of the young person is a major challenge.*

Thus Consortium stakeholders perceive that their work has had a substantial positive and beneficial impact across many elements of the young person's life. Practical arrangements are planned and delivered more consistently now: each young person has a 12 week multi-agency support plan (commencing 3 weeks prior to being released from custody); they have a plan for their release day; and they are met at the prison gates (either by a family member or a resettlement worker).

One area of work where the Consortium has not been able to have as much positive impact as anticipated is in relation to accommodation. Several stakeholders reported that some young people are sent back to dysfunctional families because there is no suitable alternative – and that a return to offending is therefore highly likely. Whilst resettlement in a new area would be a positive move for many young people (especially for those where reducing gang involvement is a goal), many of them do not want to live in unknown areas, and modern telecommunications enable rapid linkages with friends wherever they live.

The expansion of ETE opportunities for young people has had a beneficial impact both in terms of positive activities and self-esteem. NEETs are identified sooner, and learning disabilities are now picked up whilst the young person is still in custody. Young people get priority placements on certain offending behaviour courses and resettlement support in custody. Every young person will also have a start date organised for their ETE commencing within 10 days of release. Connexions try to get them an education placement that commences the Monday after their release date, and Manchester College is offering fast-track access and more short-term courses. But stakeholders recognise the huge challenge of getting young people to engage with ETE in the community; *'If we can't track them down to sort their benefits out, there's no chance that ETE can engage them in 30 hours of work'*.

The impact of Construction Youth Trust has also made a substantial difference for young people through increasing the amount of work-based training opportunities that are available. Employers are offering more placements as a direct result of Consortium partner



networking, and there have been a number of innovative developments, including that: employers are now able to go into Hindley to talk to young people about employment opportunities. The Consortium's work has also had a positive impact on the uptake of substance misuse services by embedding harm reduction education within work on ETE aspirations. However, there remain challenges in relation to substance misuse – as even young people with an identified (tier 3) substance misuse problem are not keen to take up appointments with the young person's substance misuse service (Eclipse). The voluntary nature of both this service and mental health agencies mean that it is easy for young people to decline to engage with them – yet these issues remain hugely important in terms of the risk of reoffending.

Of course, it is not possible to deliver the complete enhanced offer perfectly to every young person – there are gaps, delays and frustrations in aspects of service delivery for many of them. The following quote illustrates a case where a young person was living in an inappropriate accommodation placement and on a waiting list for an apprenticeship:

*We're holding him by the skin of our teeth – to keep him on track. He's really pissed off. It's that kind of scenario where we need a mentor to keep him through this quagmire of issues that are beyond his control and beyond ours to some extent. ... [This] young lad who is in inappropriate accommodation, we can't get him anything suitable and he's sofa-surfing at the moment, and I am worried that he'll reoffend – I really am.*

The difficulty of managing licence requirements, engaging with the multi-agency resettlement process and intensive ETE demands, whilst also dealing with Spotlight and having to manage relationships with family and friends once more can prove difficult to handle for some of the cohort:

*What some young people say as they are leaving [Hindley,] is that they would rather be in custody until the end of their licence because it's easier than trying to keep up with lots of appointments and restrictions – they find that very, very difficult.*

So, whilst it is clear that young people's experiences of the resettlement process have improved, further enhancements can still be made. It was suggested by a couple of stakeholders that young people should be made more directly aware of the enhanced offer so that they could discuss what they want to achieve out of this opportunity in a more explicit way. By enabling young people to understand better what is happening to them, practitioners can secure their buy-in more. As with all youth justice interventions, developing trusting relationships between staff and young people is critical. This is difficult to achieve in reality (and as yet, difficult to measure), but stakeholders describe how continuity in relationships has been a key driver in helping young people reach their goals when they come out of custody. One stakeholder commented that those working in the field of resettlement need to have different expectations and work in different ways with this client group than they do with other groups of young people. Behavioural issues need addressing positively – rather than just punishing – and it would be beneficial if Consortium partners could (where appropriate) overturn eviction/benefit decisions, if this is anticipated to facilitate the continuation of positive resettlement work.

## ***Specifying the cohort***

Numerous stakeholders described how the enhanced offer is more effective for young people on longer sentences because there is more time to engage them, to get support in place (in particular accommodation) prior to release. As this interviewee explains:

*A four month DTO is only two months in custody, another two months on licence – it doesn't afford us a lot of opportunity, a decent window for putting support in place for these young people. So they potentially get the least support.*

The enhanced offer cannot help those recalled to Hindley to serve their full sentence as they have no licence conditions when released back in the community, and therefore no obligation to engage with services and no resettlement support – yet their support needs will be equally as high as other young people sentenced to custody. Moreover, there are many young people managed by YOTs in the community who may have similar support needs to those sentenced to a DTO at Hindley, and who would benefit from the more intensive and holistic levels of support provided under the enhanced offer. For those who seem likely to end up in custody in the future, it is a shame not to be able to work with them in this coordinated way until they have received a custodial sentence. The current selection criteria for the cohort also discriminates against females – as only young offenders who are sentenced to Hindley can access the enhanced offer. Moreover, as young people make the transition from children's to adult services, experiencing the reductions in levels of support that result, this can leave them feeling very isolated and vulnerable.

Many stakeholders commented that the enhanced offer should be made available for all young people, but doubted whether in today's fiscal environment that would be possible. In order to expand availability of the enhanced offer just to all the young men in Hindley would be a challenge – requiring stakeholders to find out about resettlement resources in all the many different areas that they will return to. To expand this resettlement approach further, the enhanced offer would need to be evolved for specific groups of young offenders, for example: those on remand; those on longer sentences who move into the adult estate; girls; and younger cohorts (who would require more liaison with school). To minimise (and avoid duplication of) work, institutions would need to be limited to accepting young offenders from only specific local authorities – and they could then focus on developing resettlement pathways for the young people back into those areas.

With devolved budgets, and local authority financial responsibility for remand places on the horizon, the North West Consortium partners are keen to learn any lessons from this pilot that can be applied to young people on remand as their numbers have not reduced as much as young people's custody population. Yet expanding the model so that local authorities and other Consortium partners could deliver an enhanced offer to young people across all the institutions that they get sent to would be a huge task. There is also concern over the current consultation paper on the secure estate which contains proposals to develop centres of excellence – presumably entailing more young people serving sentences away from their local area. Yet more local provision is needed – otherwise resettlement is too difficult to implement effectively. Other concerns relate to the question of who will drive this agenda forward if the YJB funding is not available. The funding of accommodation

placements remains a huge barrier for cohort members who are not a looked after child. The whole design of the enhanced offer results in increasing demand for services and in a time of such substantial public sector cut-backs, the potential impact upon agency resources and staff workloads may be difficult to support.

### ***Young people's perceptions***

As part of the research, detailed face-to-face interviews were conducted with a small sample of young people who had received the enhanced offer. The key messages derived from these interviews were that for most young people the resettlement experience was seen as a positive and helpful process. The support that the young people received to find education, training and employment was particularly welcomed. For some of them the enhanced offer also helped them to find suitable accommodation. Generally speaking, this level of support was seen as a necessary for their smooth transition from custody back into the community. There were, however, some criticisms about the resettlement experience. One young person thought the process was too strict and that there was not enough choice in terms of available opportunities and activities. For another young person, a lack of communication between resettlement partners over an apprenticeship opportunity led to major disappointment and disillusionment. These negative perceptions were the minority view however.

There was almost universal acknowledgement from the young people that their resettlement experience was connected to their reintegration into the community and their future propensity to reoffend. Most of them said that the experience of custody, combined with the resettlement work had kept them out of trouble. Learning how to live independently and having something to do such as a job or college placement, meant that reoffending was less likely to occur. Increasing their motivation, their feelings of independence and their hopes for the future all contributed positively as well.

The young people typically considered that the most valuable aspects of the resettlement process were the employment or educational placements –especially being able to gain qualifications and work experience. Other valuable aspects of the enhanced offer included: help with drug awareness; anger management; independent living skills; support with relationships and other general support. The least valuable aspects of resettlement that were mentioned included being on curfew, consequential breaches, and unfulfilled promises of apprenticeship opportunities.

## Case studies

### Case study 1

Jason was 17 years old when he received an 8 month DTO for offences of Domestic Burglary, and Vehicle Theft or Unauthorised Taking.

He had been offending for over 7 years, having committed his first offence at age 10, although the available data suggested that he had only one previous conviction. A number of key areas were identified as being important to Jason's resettlement, including:

- anger management,
- offending behaviour,
- constructive activities,
- drug or alcohol problems,
- family problems,
- homelessness,
- low qualifications,
- unemployment, and life skills.

Agencies that were intended to be involved in addressing some of these areas included CAMHS, Connexions, Construction Youth Trust, Drug or Alcohol Services, Housing Services, Local Employers, Mentoring Services, Social Services (16+), Childrens Service, and Training Providers.

Representatives from a number of agencies attended DTO meetings concerning Jason, including Social Services, CAMHS, Connexions, a drug and alcohol service, and IRS, and a keyworker from a care home also attended one of the meetings.

Jason was interviewed by the evaluation team in April 2012, which was three months after leaving custody. He was living on his own in a flat, was receiving ongoing support from the YOT, and was attending retail training 3 days a week.

Jason's YOT worker told him about the resettlement plan prior to release. He felt that it sounded useful and he thought that it would help him go back into the community without people "looking down on him". Jason singled out the first two weeks after release as being of particular importance:

*In the first few weeks after release I didn't really do much – just getting re-established with myself. The first two weeks is the test. It's crucial and it proves*

*whether someone is going to re-offend or not. I just kept to myself and kept out of trouble. It wasn't difficult – I found it easy.*

Education and training had been organised for Jason on his release, although as he did not like the training that had been arranged for him, he organised an alternative training placement in the retail sector. Jason claimed that he had had plenty of support from the YOT and other agencies, and he seemed particularly pleased with his treatment by the YOT workers:

*YOT [workers] treat you as a person and not as an ex-prisoner.*

*They are all nice people. I would trust them - just safe man.*

*I've enjoyed the chats and the banter – its good banter like.*

In terms of other support, Jason singled out drug awareness work as being the most useful strand of support offered by the resettlement team.

More generally, Jason felt that the resettlement process works at a steady pace “that you're comfortable with”, he felt that it was successful. He has been keeping out of trouble because of the custodial experience and all the help that he's received, and at the time of interview he was particularly proud of keeping all his YOT appointments and not breaching:

*I'm most proud of keeping all my appointments and not breaching. . . It's gone good, I'm not going to over exaggerate. The programme is good as well.*

Jason seemed quite optimistic, and commented on how he might advise other young people who had become involved in offending and been in custody:

*My advice to someone due for release, “Keep your head down, don't go back to doing what you were doing before you went inside, keep your mates away, and get onto your own thing, find out what you are best at doing and get a job doing it. Then stick at it. You can turn it around.”*

## **Case study 2**

Gary was 17 years old when he received an 8 month DTO for a drugs offence and breach of statutory order. His first recorded offence was committed when he was 13 years old, and the available data suggests that he had eleven previous convictions (several of which involved custody according to the respondent's feedback, although the official records are unclear).

A number of key areas were identified as being important to Gary's resettlement, including:

- drug or alcohol problems,
- offending behaviour,
- family problems,
- homelessness,
- low qualifications, and
- anger management.

Agencies that were intended to be involved in addressing some of these areas included Housing Services and Connexions, although the records suggest that DTO meetings were attended only by an IRS representative, and a keyworker from a care home.

Gary was interviewed by the evaluation team at the end of April 2012, by which time he had been back in custody for two months (on unrelated charges).

His last resettlement plan contained practical information about cooking, washing, health care, and how he could look after himself. When Gary was last on release Connexions helped him get onto some college courses in catering and plastering. When he is next released he wants to meet with Army Careers. As he put it:

*I want to go into the army to get away from all the crime on the estate.*

Gary says that the YOT workers have helped him move on and provided assistance to him with sorting his life out and getting a nice home. He found the support was useful and helpful. They organised visits to the gym for him where he could go boxing. Gary was on ISS and this involved daily trips to the YOT offices.

*The YOT people were good. They helped me. . . Some of them are good and some of them are lazy.*

He added:

*If I hadn't of had any help from the YOT I would have been back inside sooner.*

When asked what he would like to change about his life he mentioned "doing crime and doing drugs". His advice to a friend who was due for release would be "stop doing drugs and crime; and don't come back; and get a job."

### **Case study 3**

Tom was almost 18 when he received an 18 month DTO sentence for a drugs offence. He was 14 years old when he committed his first recorded offence, with 8 previous convictions and one custodial sentence.

At the time of interview, Tom was living with his grandparents, and working full time. He received YOT support for 12 months post-release, and was released almost a year and a half ago.

Key issues identified concerning Tom's resettlement included:

- anger management,
- offending behaviour,
- family problems,
- low qualifications,
- unemployment, and
- mental health issues.

Resettlement work with Tom was meant to involve a range of services/agencies, including CAMHS, Connexions, Construction Youth Trust, Drug or Alcohol Services, Spotlight, Local Employers, Local JCP, Police, RAPt (similar), and Training Providers – although only Connexions is recorded as being involved in actual DTO meetings concerning Tom.

The records suggest that all of these areas were in fact addressed as part of resettlement work undertaken with Tom, and that all of the above agencies were also involved to some extent.

As part of his resettlement plan Tom was promised an apprenticeship through the Construction Youth Trust whilst he was still in custody. He claims that there was no follow-up about it, and that after waiting 9 or 10 months he still did not hear anything about it again. He feels that he was badly let down, but did not blame the YOT for this during interview. In addition to problems experienced with CYT, Tom was disappointed with Catch 22. They tried to organise accommodation for him but it all fell through. As he expressed it:

*They let me down really. It was lucky that I didn't get back into trouble because I was tempted. It wasn't the YOT. The YOT worker helped me out a lot to be honest. Catch 22 tried to organise accommodation for me but this all fell through as well. I was really disappointed. . . . I went to a couple of training things and they said they would get back to me but they never got back to me.*



Whilst he was still in custody, Tom studied for maths GCSE. On release he continued with his studies through Skills Solutions. However, Tom felt that this was a waste of time because they wanted him to go back to level 2 which he had already done prior to release.

Tom's mother helped him to get his current job - fitting solar panels. The best time he has had since being released is starting this job. The YOT workers have helped Tom out a lot and have helped him stay out of trouble and out of custody. He trusts them and said that he could talk to his YOT worker about anything:

*I trust them (the YOT workers). I could tell her anything – not just about staying out of trouble, but about family and everything. I thought she was fantastic. . . .YOT kept me going. . . . The best thing was that I could go to her and tell her anything and she would give me a good answer.*

Overall, Tom is not happy about the resettlement process, however. He says that workers are still phoning him up now to offer him apprenticeships when it is too late. Tom thinks that resettlement work needs to improve. He knows some people who have been released; got themselves back into trouble; and are now back in custody.

#### **Case study 4**

Craig was 17 when he received a 24 month DTO for an offence of violence against the person. He was 15 at age of first offence, and 2 previous convictions were listed in the data-set for him.

He was 19 at the point of interview, and was living on his own in a flat. He was not on any court order, and was working 2 days a week on a bike project, having been released from the YOI a year and a half ago.

Details concerning his resettlement highlight a number of key areas for attention, including:

- offending behaviour,
- constructive activities,
- drug or alcohol problems,
- family problems,
- low qualifications, and
- life skills

The records suggest that a number of agencies/groups were intended to play a role in resettlement work with Craig, including Connexions, Drug or Alcohol Services, Housing Services, Spotlight, Local Schools/Colleges, and Mentoring Services. "Voluntary work" is also listed.

Representatives from IRS and Connexions are the only ones listed as having been involved in DTO meetings concerning Craig.

Craig claims that he did not hear much about the resettlement plan prior to release. He can recall that there was something in it about going to college and that was the main thing that he aimed to get out of it. The course wasn't due to start immediately upon his release so the resettlement team helped Craig get into a job as soon as he came out. He was released on a Friday and started work on the Monday. Craig said that this helped him get into a routine and meant that he didn't go back to hanging around with his old mates:

*The best thing (on release) was getting into work straight away – getting into a routine. This meant that I didn't go back to hanging around with my mates again.*

*I was nervous about reoffending, but everything has been ok.*

One of the most enjoyable things that Craig has done with the YOT team has been his involvement with the bike project. This has led to him completing the coast to coast trip for charity. He has faced some difficulties along the way. These include problems with money and budgeting; dealing with Probation; and being on a tag.

Craig trusts the YOT workers, and feels that they have done a really good job:

*The YOT people are really good and I would trust them. . . . They do a really good job – It's been the best thing that's ever happened to me anyway.*

They've set up the bike project which has given him the opportunity to gain some work experience. Craig's advice to someone about to be released from YOI would be to stick with the YOT because they do help you get to a better place. The resettlement plan has worked for Craig and has kept him on track and out of trouble. Life for him now is a lot different from what it was before he had the help.

## Summary

This chapter has considered the outcome of the enhanced offer for young people in terms of compliance with their Order. In short, it has looked at whether they breached the terms of their Order or reoffended during the licence period. Whether a young person breached the terms of their licence, and the speed at which they did it, was the same or worse than the various comparisons we made. It was suggested that this was because the enhanced offer brought with it more activities for the child to fail, and more agencies not to try to comply with. So the more support brought unforeseen difficulties. In addition, huge variations in breach rates across YOT areas raised questions about differing practices towards the management of young people.

In contrast, measures of reoffending were all positive, with significant drops compared to the comparison group and previous evaluations. It was noted that the consortium's YOT areas already had a better reoffending rate and slower speed of offending than our other comparisons, and suggested that it might be due to an established relationship with just one custodial institution, improving custody-community partnerships even before the NWRC. Although not always a big enough difference to make significance, there were also clear improvements under the enhanced offer in relation to reconvictions and returning to custody.

The enhanced offer clearly made an impact in the hard measures we used to assess achieving the aims of the youth justice system, which is not easy with a group with such a challenging criminal and social history. The next chapter examines the cost savings that may result from these positive impacts.

## PART 4: IMPLICATIONS

### 9 Cost-benefit analysis

---

This chapter presents an audit model of costing the consortium against the outcome benefits shown in the previous findings chapters (above). The process involves first attempting to identify, separate and accumulate the running costs that could reasonably be said to have been incurred by the consortium in addition to normal practice. Second, these costs are divided by the number of units involved, to give us a unit cost per case (usually per annum). Third, these costs are set against each of the (average) benefits seen in previous chapters to see how much each added benefit costs. Fourth, from previous research, we try to identify and accumulate the costs savings that would be incurred from the benefits shown above (e.g. less custody costs from lower reconviction rates). Finally, all these calculations allow us to estimate the net savings from operating the consortium, both per case and cumulatively.

The rest of this chapter runs us through this model for the consortium:

#### Running costs of the consortium

Since some of the costs related to slightly different periods, the costs over the year 2011/2012 have been used as a standard to indicate the most accurate picture of the full running costs of the scheme<sup>105</sup>. We will assume that approximately half of the total number of young people received the 'enhanced offer' in the year 2011/2012, i.e. 84 young people. The unit costs have been worked out on the basis that 84 young people received support during this year.

Although the amount of support was greater during the community half of their sentence than in custody, the overall costs can be divided equally to provide a mean value. Similarly, although the average sentence length was 8 months, the overall costs of support can be divided equally to produce a mean cost per case.

---

<sup>105</sup> All costs are expressed in 2011/2012 prices. All figures have been rounded to the nearest pound.

### ***Total running costs***

<b>Item</b>	<b>Total project cost for year 2011/12 (£)</b>	<b>Unit cost per case (£) (12)</b>
Project coordinator (1)	50,000	592
Travel etc. (1)	398	5
Admin support and office costs (2)	1,714	20
Monthly meeting operational managers (3)	8,368	100
Bi-monthly meeting strategic managers (4)	4,339	52
Manchester YOS resettlement meetings bi-monthly (5)	2,129	25
Manchester Family Resource Panels (6)	7,750	116
National coordinator (7)	3,183	38
Construction Youth Trust CYT (8)	30,287	361
Hindley support through Wigan YOS (9)	1,168	139
Careers solutions (Connexions) (10)	113,698	1,354
Consortium paperwork per case (11)	1,680	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>224,714</b>	<b>2,822</b>
Total excluding Manchester special contribution (13)	134,835	

The table above shows that our model calculates the total cost of the consortium (including the contribution by Manchester City Council) at £224,714. This gives us a unit cost of £2,822 per annum for those receiving the enhanced offer.

The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:

1. Manchester College, grant funded by YJB. All staffing costs include on-costs of NI and pension contributions. Travel etc. costs cover meetings and travel across the north west region over one year (12 months but does not exactly match financial year 2010/11)
2. The overall admin support costs of £12,000 cover 7 consortium areas
3. Monthly operational group: 10 officers @ 27k (32,076 inc. on-costs), 12x half day = 7,531. The members included in the calculations for this group are:
  - Project Manager (costs already covered)
  - Resettlement manager Rochdale YOS
  - Case worker Stockport YOS
  - IRS worker Wigan YOS
  - Case Manager representing Manchester YOS
  - Rochdale Learning Mentor
  - Rochdale Connexions PA
  - Manchester Connexions PA
  - Senior Practitioner HMYOI Hindley (equivalent to YOS Case Manager)
  - NACRO Housing Officer
  - YMCA Support Worker
  - CYT Coordinator (costs already covered)

4. Bi-monthly strategic group: 7 officers @ 40k (47,520 inc on-costs), 6 x half day = 4,339.  
The members included in the calculations for this group are:
  - Project Manager (costs already covered)
  - Manchester's Youth Justice Manager
  - Wigan YOS Manager
  - Stockport Head of Service
  - YPLA manager
  - Inclusion manager Wigan LA
  - Careers Solutions Manager (costs already covered)
  - External Relations and Employer Engagement manager JCP
  - Research and Intelligence Analyst Manchester City Council
5. YOS manager, locality managers, case managers, support staff meet every 2 months for 2 hours. Only Manchester cases, so approx 80% of cohort
6. 7-8 senior managers meet to discuss options for accommodation and support every week (this group now included as YP in need). Average of 20 cases discussed over a full day, each one discussed twice (start of DTO and on release). Only Manchester cases, so approx 80% of cohort, 67 young people in year.
7. The national coordinator spends approximately 6% of her time on each regional pilot. No overheads
8. This includes portion of salary for Adeeb Ahsan, who also works in Yorkshire, plus proportion of CYT other costs for year (inc proportion of national director and operations director). Grant from YJB
9. Hindley YOI: approximately one day additional officer time for applying for/arranging ROTL and assisting visits by other YOI officers to young people in custody. These have been prioritised through the consortium work.
10. Connexions (Careers Solutions) support with individual PA for all those from Manchester, Wigan, Rochdale. Stockport have IRS workers to fulfil this role. Manchester has 2 FTE staff and 25% of manager's time, unit costs are provided per Manchester case. Total cost is £103,818, of which Manchester YOS pays £80,000. Careers solutions make up the shortfall from existing budgets.
11. Additional paperwork for consortium is 20 min at each of 3 stages = 1 hour
12. The unit cost per DTO is based on a total number of 84 young people receiving help over one year.
13. Manchester City Council requested information to show their contribution to the consortium costs. These figures show their additional contribution over and above the costs assumed to fall equally to all partners Connexions contribution, Manchester YOS and FRP.

As always with cost-benefit analysis, there were a number of additional considerations that required a 'judgement-call' by researchers, and it is important to note these for transparency. First, a new resettlement course was set up in Hindley YOI at the same time as the resettlement consortium began. Since this was provided through existing resources it has not been included here, even though the consortium cohort would have been given priority to attend this course.

Second, IRS workers were funded by YJB in Wigan and Rochdale. The level of resource has been maintained although it is managed differently, with a broader scope and another organisation involved. These were not included.

Third, the Foyer Federation received a grant of £20k to enhance the strategic relationship between the Foyer federation and YJB over a 2 year period April 2010- March 2012 to cover the 4 consortia areas and all other work done by the YJB with Foyer. Since this was not about consortium delivery of actual bed spaces to young people, but a strategic relationship which has led to advice/support and in some cases improved accessibility to Foyer services, it has not been included in the project costs.

Fourth, firms' CSR (Corporate social responsibility) budgets cover the costs of supervising the placements on site. This is not a project cost, as it should be available to young people in certain categories of need nationally.

Lastly, Catch 22 did not contribute to the consortium during current year so have not been included

## **Financial benefits of the consortium**

### ***Reduction in re-offending***

Although the number of offences committed in the previous year by the 168 young people who received the 'enhanced offer' is unknown, some inferences may be made from the index offences that led to their DTO sentence and from other studies. Previous research has indicated that the 'top end' persistent offenders may commit around 20-30 offences per year (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Liddle, 1998; Renshaw, 2007). The offences would include not only those serious ones for which they might receive a DTO sentence but also less serious, and therefore less costly, offences. Other estimates have assumed that high level offenders are caught for around one in three of the offences they commit (Gray et al, 2005). It should be noted, however that not all of the present group would necessarily be persistent offenders, as some might have received a DTO for a relatively serious offence, following one or two previous convictions for other matters.

Each of the 168 young people had a mean of 6 previous convictions, from a mean age of 14 (i.e. over approximately 3 years on average). So they were likely to have been convicted of at least 2 offences in the previous year of a similar type to their index offence. On the basis that they may have been caught for around one in 3 of the offences they commit, we assume that each young person would have committed approximately 6 similar offences for in the previous year (with the exception of death by dangerous driving which is comparatively rare and unlikely to be repeated). The table below shows the types of offence for which they received a DTO, the unit cost of each, the mean number of offences likely to have been committed by each (averaged across the whole group), the mean offending profile across the group and the overall cost per individual young person.

**Calculated unit costs of each offence type committed by the cohort**

Offence type (1)	% of group with index offence (2)	Unit cost of offence (£) (3)	% of costs to public sector (4)	Mean no of offences per individual in previous year (5)	Unit cost of offences in previous year (£)
Domestic burglary	20	4,036	37	1.2	4,843
Robbery	14	8,993	56	0.84	7,554
Violence against the person	11	12,853	47	0.7	8,997
Theft/handling	8	1,042	27	0.48	500
Vehicle taking	7	5,110	29	0.42	2,146
Drug offences (6)	7	2,933	100	0.42	1,232
Public order and motoring (7)	5	156	100	0.3	47
Non domestic burglary	2	3,483	20	0.12	418
Sexual offences	1	38,826	28	0.06	2,330
Arson (8)	1	23,606	Not known	0.06	1,416
Criminal damage	1	1,070	15	0.06	64
Fraud (9)	1	5,110	Not known	0.06	307
Death by dangerous driving (10)	1	1,801,975	41	0.01	18,019
Breach/ bail breach/ other (11)	21	156	100	1.26	197
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>			<b>6.04</b>	<b>48,070</b>

The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:

1. The offence types have been grouped in order to fit the categories for which cost information is available.
2. The percentages might not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding.
3. Costs have been derived from Duborg et al (2005), Brand and Price (2000) and Keep Britain Tidy (2004).
4. The percentage of costs falling to public sector agencies are derived from Duborg et al (2005), Brand and Price (2000) and Keep Britain Tidy (2004) where a breakdown is available. The categories of expenditure included as public costs are criminal justice services, health services, lost output (as incurs costs of welfare benefits and lost production) and victim services. The estimates available for drug offences included only CJS costs and addressing drug trafficking so the entire estimate falls to public sector. Only CJS costs were used in the estimates for motoring offences and breach. No breakdown of the costs is available for arson. However, where public buildings are targeted, the public costs would be close to 100%
5. This is not a picture of any one individual's actual offending, but the *mean profile*, averaged across the whole consortium group of 168. Most offences are assumed at 6 per year (except death by dangerous driving) with the types of offence in proportion to



their percentage representation as index offences. The total comes to more than 6, due to rounding.

6. There were 105,570 drug offences in England and Wales in 2004 (Mwenda, 2005) at an average cost of £14,663 (Brand and Price, 2000). Most were for possession with 14% for dealing. This includes only the criminal justice system costs, not those to society in general, but does include costs in relation to trafficking. Since the latter are disproportionately high, we include only 20% of the mean cost here.
7. Total costs are not available for these offences. Since they may be considered to be victimless crimes a nominal CJS cost (similar to that for criminal damage) has been used here.
8. The Arson Prevention Bureau and KBT cite a figure of 115,100 deliberate fires in 2003. These were estimated to cost £2.2bn, making a unit cost of £23,606 at 2011 prices.
9. The total cost of fraud offences in 2000 was £13,818m for an estimated number of 9,212,000 offences (Brand and Price, 2000), making a unit cost of £1,500m in 1999 prices. This includes public and private sector costs, CJS costs and transfer costs such as benefits. Brand and Price provide a lower and a higher estimate. The lower estimate is half this figure above, which may still be far too high, since this group is unlikely to have been involved in costly high-level fraud. For this reason, an estimate is made here that is equivalent to a costly property offence.
10. This is treated as homicide but the expected frequency is lower than that for other offences.
11. Total costs are not available for these offences. Since they may be considered to be victimless crimes a nominal CJS cost (similar to that for criminal damage) has been used here.

So, averaged across the whole group, the cost of each individual's offending in the previous year cost an estimated £48,070 to taxpayers and society. Without the single offence of death by dangerous driving the cost would be £30,051.

A number of measures indicate a small but significant reduction in subsequent offending by the 168 young people who received the 'enhanced offer' in comparison with that of a comparison group of 104 young people who received DTOs over the previous year. The comparison group were shown to be no different from the consortium group in terms of previous convictions, age at first offence and sentence length (see Chapter 2).

On most of the available measures of re-offending, the consortium group re-offended less than the comparison group and several of these difference reached statistical significance. The size of the difference ranged from 5% to 7%, so we assume an overall improvement of 6% in comparison with those not receiving the enhanced offer. Since details of the frequency and seriousness of re-offending are not available, we assume that the types of offence would be similar to those for which they were convicted prior to the DTO. This would lead to a unit saving of 6% of the cost of each young person's offending. This would make a saving of £2,884 in the first year following release from custody if the improvement were maintained.

However, In comparison with earlier measures of reoffending, the consortium group's re-offended was considerably lower. They offended 20% less than the original DTO group and

9% less than the group in the North West in an earlier project, RESET. For this reason the savings have been estimated on the basis of a 20% reduction in re-offending. This would lead to a unit saving of 20% of the cost of each young person's offending in one year after release (if the improvement were maintained), i.e. £9,614.

One difficulty is that firm assumptions cannot be made about whether the reduction in re-offending is maintained over the full year or beyond. There is some evidence that offending reverts towards the level of that in the comparison group level at the end of the licence period unless there is adequate continued or tapered support, but there is no information available yet on offending beyond this period. So a further calculation has been provided on the savings due to reduction in offending during the licence period itself. The mean length of time in community on licence was 160 days, making a saving of £4,209 during this period.

The effects of the consortium's support for individual young people would be likely to have the greatest impact in the first year following custody. The effects might last for, say, a further one and a half years, although this is somewhat speculative as information about offending over this period is not available. So discounting the savings over a ten year period would lead to an overall unit saving per young person of 2.5 x £2,884, i.e. £7,211.

#### ***Savings from reduced offending***

	<b>Current year</b>	<b>During licence period</b>	<b>Over 10 years</b>
Mean cost of crimes committed per individual if no 'enhanced offer' provided (£)	48,070	21,045	480,700
Mean unit saving due to 'enhanced offer' (£)	9,614	4,209	7,211

#### ***Education, training and employment (ETE)***

The ETE status of the 168 young people who received the consortium's enhanced offer can be compared with that of the comparison group. Although only 34% of the consortium group were engaged in ETE at the end of their sentence, compared with 44% who were engaged prior to going into custody, this is probably to be expected after a spell in custody when links with schools and colleges would be lost and the young people are likely to have been taken off school rolls. In comparison, the comparison group's engagement in ETE fell further from 54% before custody to only 30% after custody. Although the difference after custody was not statistically significant, this implies some beneficial effects of receiving the enhanced offer.

Additional support for this suggestion is indicated by the figures for ETE being arranged for the young people by the end of their sentence. 76% of those receiving the offer had ETE arranged for them, compared with only 47% of comparison s<sup>106</sup>. This implies that around

<sup>106</sup> Binomial test

29% more of the consortium group than before may have received positive help in this area. This finding is further supported by the figures for attending ETE during the licence period. 69% of the consortium group actually attended ETE during their licence period, compared with 49% of comparison s, a difference of 20 percentage points. This difference was also statistically significant<sup>107</sup>.

We assume that the consortium helped 29% of the 168 young people towards ETE. Since it is likely that not all of these young people would have fully taken up the arrangements or would have dropped out subsequently, we assume that half of these (about 15%) would have been helped to stay in ETE. This makes a total of 24 young people who were helped in this area and thus may have avoided being NEET at age 18.

The lifetime costs of being NEET (not in education, employment or training) at age 16-18 have been estimated in a few studies. Lawlor et al (2008) has estimated the resulting costs of unemployment, crime, mental health problems and drug use. The annual costs were discounted over a 10-20 year period, making a total lifetime cost to the state of £310,040. Coles et al (2010) also provide a lifetime cost for the consequences of being NEET at age 16-18 that includes tax foregone, benefit payments, substance misuse and health problems. This lifetime cost to public finance per individual is £58,721. This is lower than Lawlor's estimate and avoids potential double counting of those with multiple problems. It also excludes personal 'resources costs' to the individual, so is the preferred estimate.

This would make a total lifetime cost saving of £1,409,304 for the consortium group and a unit saving of £8,389 per young person. We assume that the young people are already 16 years of age, so the benefits would start to be realised in the first year. Using Lawlor's assumption of discounting the effects over 20 years, the savings in the first year would be £419 and the savings over 10 years would be £4,194 per individual.

### ***Savings from reduced chances of being NEET***

	<b>Current year</b>	<b>Over 10 years</b>
Number of young people who avoid being NEET at age 16-18	24	24
Cost these young people would incur without consortium help (£)	70,465	704,652
Mean unit saving per young person with enhanced offer (£)	419	4,194

### ***Avoiding the need for emergency housing***

The housing status of the 168 young people who received the enhanced offer was also compared with that of the 105 young people in the comparison group. In a similar way to ETE, a reduction in the percentage in suitable housing is to be expected after a spell in custody, as the young people lose contact with families and other significant relationships. The percentage of the consortium group in suitable housing fell from 91% before custody to

<sup>107</sup> Binomial test

85% at the end of their sentence ( a reduction of 6%) compared with a fall from 89% to 75% (a reduction of 14%) in the comparison group. The difference between the 2 groups was statistically significant at the end of sentence<sup>108</sup> but not before entering custody, thus implying that the enhanced offer had made a significant difference in assisting the young people with their accommodation needs. The difference between the 2 groups in the percentage fall during sentence was 8%.

So we assume that the consortium helped 8% of the 168 young people to avoid becoming homeless or requiring emergency housing. We assume that all of these made use of the help since they were judged to be in suitable accommodation at the end of their sentence. This makes a total of 13 young people who were helped in this way.

An estimate has been made of the costs of homelessness by the new economics foundation (nef, 2008) of £28, 612 per year (£26,000 at 2008 prices) per individual. This also included costs due to crime, substance misuse, mental health problems, benefits and lost output. Since most of these matters have been included elsewhere in the present analysis, an earlier estimate by Quilgars et al (2004) has been used. This gives the cost of a homelessness application at £840 and a year of emergency housing at £18,724.

This would make a total cost saving of £254,332 in the first year after release. We assume that the benefit would continue for a further year but, after this time, the benefit might become insignificant as other circumstances become more significant in the lives of the young people.

### ***Savings from reduction in homelessness***

	<b>Current year</b>	<b>Over 10 years</b>
Number of young people helped to avoid homelessness and emergency housing	13	13
Cost of homelessness application and housing for these (£)	254,332	508,664
Mean unit saving per young person with enhanced offer (£)	1,514	3,028

### **Summary of costs and benefits**

The table below shows that the savings to the public purse and society per young person provided with the enhanced offer outweigh the costs of the consortium considerably, implying a net saving of almost £9,000 over a full year for each young person receiving the enhanced offer. The largest savings are due to a reduction in offending. Even if a reduction in offending cannot be assumed beyond the licence period, a saving of over £2,000 per person would be made during that time.

<sup>108</sup> Binomial test

***Unit costs and savings per individual provided with 'enhanced offer'***

	<b>Current year</b>	<b>During licence period</b>	<b>Over 10 years</b>
Savings due to reduced offending	9,614	4,209	7,211
Savings from reduced chances of being NEET	419	183	4,194
Savings from reduction in homelessness	1,514	663	3,028
<b>Total savings</b>	<b>11,547</b>	<b>5,055</b>	<b>14,433</b>
Cost of consortium	2,822		
<b>Net savings</b>	<b>8,725</b>	<b>2,233</b>	<b>11,611</b>

The net benefits over a ten year period have also been estimated, but the confidence in this prediction is much lower. However, it might be expected that significant gains would continue for at least one further year, and longer in some areas such as future employment.

## 10 Reflections, lessons and recommendations

---

This chapter is designed to help us begin to learn the lessons from the North West Resettlement Consortium experience. It is presented as a 'reflective discussion' in which we try to sum up what the consortium brought us, and pull out lessons and recommendations from that. It will provide the opportunity to consider what the consortium was able to add to the local youth justice landscape, and what it found challenging. The main aim is to establish pointers for how we can enhance the effectiveness of resettlement practice in the future. It does not dwell on any procedural difficulties, implementation issues or similar organisational points – any of which are covered in the report above – but on what is useful to the development of resettlement policy and practice.

This reflection is designed to kick-start a wider discussion on the consortium. It should be used as a starting point for policy maker and practitioners about the future of resettlement support. In particular, the recommendations presented in italics are intended to inform debate on practical suggestions for taking resettlement forward.

Immediate suggestions for improvement to NWRC in particular are highlighted in red italics.

In terms of what has emerged from the NWRC experience in general, then, we would highlight the following areas, in no particular order:

### ***The NWRC....secured the buy-in of senior policy makers***

The project showed that it was possible to capture the interest of senior policymakers and practitioners at the local level in resettlement, and that this was essential in ensuring that agencies (in particular Local Authority agencies) were committed to it. Having one or more champions among senior staff in the Local Authorities gave authority to the project, ensured that senior practitioners focused their efforts on it, and had someone that the project was accountable to. Maintaining senior practitioners focus in this way is important with resettlement where the immediate benefits to different agencies may not be clear if they do not share youth justice's "hard targets".

In the NWRC, it also helped that there was one major Local Authority, and its champions within, that took the lead in this way.

*Priority should always be given to ensuring the buy-in of the most senior policy makers and practitioners in a local area as early as possible. It is important that they take on a leadership role.*

*It is important that senior practitioners are kept aware of the longer term benefits to their agencies of effective resettlement, even if they do not share short term youth justice targets.*

*Attention should be paid to ensuring that agencies that need to play a part in resettlement should share targets in relation to resettlement outcomes.*

*Where consortia are over more than one Local Authority area, it may be useful for one area to take a lead role, to ensure that people feel a sense of accountability to some body (beyond a steering group)*

### ***The NWRC....combined strategic and operational working to good effect***

The consortium model in the North West combined a strategic policy overview (where issues were identified and new ideas discussed) with a focus on partnership delivery at a case level. These two levels worked very well together, and often problems at the operational level would highlight an issue for the strategic level to deal with. The combination also ensured that there was a clear delivery structure and plan to new policy and partnership ideas – they were not just left for agencies to interpret and implement themselves. It ensured that partnerships worked at all levels. The operational meetings helped to ensure that all took responsibility for the young person, not just the YOTs. The structured approach also allowed more effective shared risk management. A multi-agency operational forum also meant that there was less chance of passing the buck on resettlement problems – the problems were identified and the right agencies were there to find the right solutions.

*The partnerships in resettlement should work at both a strategic and operational level. The strategic level should focus on forming useful partnerships and coordinating overall agency collaboration while the operational level puts this into practice. It is important that clear working practice for partnership is put in place, with structural opportunities (e.g. case meetings, key procedures) for agencies to work together on the ground.*

*Operational meetings that discuss individuals are essential to ensuring that all agencies take responsibility for cases, not just the YOT. There needs to be a sense of shared ownership of the young person by all parties at all stages of the sentence.*

### ***The NWRC....ensured earlier resettlement planning***

The consortium seemed to deliver on the holy grail of custody-community disposals – focusing on resettlement rather than short-term containment from the very moment that the young person goes inside. It had a more structured approach to case planning and started family support/liaison very early on. It allowed very early identification of any barriers to resettlement.

Again, this was partly because the young person appeared on every agency's agenda – both custody and community – right from the start. It was less possible for the young person to be 'out of sight, out of mind'. This is not just for the benefit of the community agencies – it also allowed the custodial institution to learn lessons from tracking the young people back into the community.

*Both community and custodial agencies need to be involved in planning for the young person from the beginning of the sentence. Meetings in the community should be attended by custodial staff and vice versa.*

*Operational meetings that discuss individuals are essential to ensuring that all agencies take responsibility for cases, not just the YOT. There needs to be a sense of shared ownership of the young person by all parties at all stages of the sentence.*

### ***The NWRC....showed the benefits of closer working between custodial agencies and community agencies***

The shared operational meetings ensured better communication more widely between the custodial institution and the community agencies. Better working practices together helped ensure more contact for the community agencies with the young person when in custody, supporting the continuity of service. The joint working also improved community agencies' knowledge of working practice, opportunities and restrictions in custody. It also improved contacts, so that people knew immediately who they need to see about a problem.

*Custodial institutions should ensure that they put in place procedures to allow maximum access to the young people for community partners to enable more continuity of service.*

### ***The NWRC....provided a common language over resettlement for local agencies***

With all agencies working together, they were able to recognise when they had a related problem, but where silos and separate agency cultures had prevented that being realised before. It forced agencies to start sharing terms and improved common understanding. This was also the case within the institution as well as across to the community and between community agencies. It also gave a common aim and focus for all agencies – including the custodial departments. They now all knew that the aim was effective resettlement. They were also able to find common targets and how other targets worked together and benefited each other.

*Ensure that all agencies working with young people sentenced to custody share a common primary aim of effective resettlement, and work towards common targets to make that happen.*

### ***The NWRC....began to break down the barriers to ROTL***

Focus on resettlement has helped to break down institutional concerns about release on temporary licence, which were dominated by a risk and security agenda. Although this has not materialised much in practice, the possibility now exists, and it is essential that the practical difficulties are worked through.



*Effort should be made to ensure greater use of ROTL and that this is built into planning from an early stage, with necessary regulatory actions made in advance. This should be seen as an important part of resettlement activity. More consideration should be paid to speeding up the ROTL processing to allow for release for shorter sentences.*

### ***The NWRC....showed benefits to consortium working across local areas***

Given different local authority structures, effective working across YOTs and other localised agencies has been a significant achievement. Doing so has had a number of benefits, including sharing good practice, more mobility for young people, consistency of support when young people move, avoid duplication of negotiations for third sector agencies etc. It also encouraged better working relationships between local authorities.

*Consider widening the consortium area to take in the whole of Greater Manchester.*

### ***The NWRC....found difficulties in accommodation***

The consortium experienced serious difficulties in ensuring suitable housing for all the young people, and this has been highlighted here as a critical factor in determining individual success.

*Priority should be given to forming relationships with housing providers and developing new ways to offer young people different independent and supported housing options. Young people's expectations in relation to accommodation should be managed carefully. More support is needed for those in hostel and other temporary accommodation.*

*National policy needs to improve resettlement accommodation pathways. They need to be considered homeless before they leave custody and relevant Local Authority agencies need to consider their needs at this stage. Attention needs to be paid to the problem of the Benefits Agency not paying housing benefit to young people with a social worker.*

### ***The NWRC....made progress with employment in a difficult financial climate***

Although there were significant operational issues, the NWRC showed that it was possible to work closely with an employment project or agency to help get young people back into work. However, there remain problems with ensuring that young people in custody can take the CSCS test to allow them to work immediately on release.

*Work needs to be done nationally to enable CSCS tests to be taken in custody in preparation for release. This may be by opening up an element of online working in prisons, or ensuring that the Construction Industry Training Board allows a different medium.*

*In the meantime, locally, work needs to be done to ensure that training for the CSCS card is undertaken in custody and the test is set-up to be taken immediately on release.*

*More work needs to be done to bring local employers into partnership with consortia. Even in this current climate, they need to understand the aims of resettlement and have confidence in local operations. Conversely, support mechanisms for young people in work need to be underlined.*

*Focus should also be paid to teaching the young people about work culture rather than just vocational skills. This includes working structure as well as elements like what to expect from banter, attitudes, working with colleagues etc.*

### ***The NWRC....started to explore roll-on roll-off courses and other more flexible education***

In the past, our research has identified several problems with educational support that harmed resettlement chances. These included not having courses in custody that allowed for short sentences, not having flexible start dates to community courses, not running courses during summer holidays, not having enough pre-entry courses. The consortium started to make real progress with some of these, and the lessons are worth reiterating more widely.

Attention should be paid to ensure that education courses are more flexible both in custody and in the community, allow for roll-on roll-off courses without specified start dates, operate all year round etc.

*There should be more pre-entry courses in custody and in the community to ensure that this group of young people are not prevented from education and training progression.*

### ***The NWRC....reduced the deregistration of social work cases in custody***

The consortium made real progress in keeping social work focus on young people when they go into custody and be ready for support when they came out. There were substantial improvements in communication with social services.

*Social services should never deregister young people when they go into custody. The custodial placement should mean more work needs to be done to on preparation for the young person's release rather than less. Looked after children should continue to be assessed while in custody.*

### ***The NWRC....highlighted the positive working of Family Resource Panels***

This new multi-agency input assisted in the delivery of resettlement plans and increased access to a wide range of services.

*More multi-agency panels that span the gap between social work and youth justice should be piloted*

### ***The NWRC....showed serious problems with increased breaching***

This research highlighted that increased resettlement support means increased agencies to comply with and increased activities for a young person to have to succeed with. It therefore increases the chances for the young person to fail to comply. Ironically then, but increasing resettlement support, it is possible to harm the resettlement development as breaching proceedings are taken out against the young person. It also means that young people are more likely to have proceedings taken against them even though they have been doing well avoiding reoffending.

*Urgent attention needs to be made to ensure that young people are not disadvantaged from increased chance of breaching because they are receiving additional resettlement support. Increased support should not mean increased requirements.*

### ***The NWRC...was not in partnership with Spotlight***

There are tensions between the operational management of NWRC and the Spotlight programme. The focus of the work of the consortium has been to reduce re-offending and resettle young people back into communities as quickly and effectively as possible. In order to achieve similar aims the Spotlight programme has placed an emphasis on enforcement and surveillance to ensure that young people adhere to their licence conditions; this has highlighted an increase in non-compliance with conditions of licence, although it does not necessarily indicate an increase in re-offending. This needs to be addressed at both an operational and a strategic level in Spotlight so that both programmes have a clearer understanding about the process of managing these young people on post-custody licence. Any emphasis on enforcement of compliance through breaching would shift the focus away from constructive partnership and threatens to disengage young people.

Like the NWRC, the priority for Spotlight is to reduce re-offending and there have been briefings in some areas for Spotlight managers on Desistance Theory which have helped to demonstrate why breaching for non-compliance does not always bring about the right outcome.

*Police and YOS workers need to develop an agreed understanding about the best way to manage a young person's resettlement in local communities so that there is good engagement and a high level of compliance. Key to this is the involvement of Police representation in the NWRC Steering Group and in local discussions about the further development of this work.*

### ***The NWRC...was able to reduce reoffending and saves money***

The bottom line is that the NWRC saw reductions in offending, the speed of offending and indicative improvements to reconvictions and returning to custody. It seemed to make a real difference to the risk of reoffending and actual reoffending rates. Similarly, it also saw soft improvements to arrangements for ETE and accommodation. And all this was achieved in a time of financial squeezing and cuts to agencies more generally. It underlined how it was necessary to coordinate partnerships in order for resettlement to work. In the end, it brought estimated savings of £11,547 per young offender per year, and a net saving to the public purse of almost £9,000 per year.

*Consideration should be given to how the NWRC model of strategic and operational level partnership working can be adopted more widely. Priority should be given to coordinating partnerships for resettlement.*

## 11 References

---

Andrews, D. A., Zinger I, Hoge R, Bonta J, Gendreau P, & Cullen F. (1990). "Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis." *Criminology*. 28, 369 (3)

Batchelor, S. and McNeill, F. (2005) 'The Young Person-Worker Relationship', in T. Bateman and J. Pitts (eds), *The RHP Companion to Youth Justice*. Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing.

Brand S. and Price, R. (2000) *The economic and social costs of crime*, Home Office Research Study 217, 2000.

Buckland G. and Stevens A. (2001) *Review of effective practice with young offenders in mainland Europe*. Report to the Youth Justice Board.

Burnett, R. (2004) 'One-to-one ways of promoting desistance: in search of an evidence base', in R. Burnett and C. Roberts (eds), *What Works in Probation and Youth Justice: developing evidence-based practice*. Cullompton: Willan.

Coles, B, Godfrey, C, Keung, A, Parrott, S and Bradshaw J, (2010) Estimating the life-time cost of NEET: 16-18 year olds not in education, employment or training, University of York, 2010.

Communities that Care (2001) *Risk and Protective Factors for Youth Crime: Prevalence, Salience and Reduction*. London: Youth Justice Board.

Dubourg W, Hamed J & Thorns J (2005)*The Social and Economic Costs of Crime against Individuals and Households 2003/04*, Home Office Online Report 30/05, London, Home Office,

Eagle, S. and Gammampila, A. (2005) *Evaluation of the Nacro On Side 11 Project at HMYOI Portland*. London: Nacro.

Farrall, S. (2004) 'Social capital and offender reintegration: making probation desistance focused', in S. Maruna and R. Immarigeon (eds), *After Crime and Punishment*. Cullompton: Willan.

Farrant, F. (2004) *A sobering thought. Young men in prison*. London: Howard League.

Farrant, F. (2006) *Out for good: the resettlement needs of young men in prison*. London: Howard League.

Farrington, D. (2002) 'Developmental Criminology and Risk-Focused Prevention', in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaes, G., Flanagan T, Motiuk L, & Stewart L. (1999). "Adult Correctional Treatment." *Crime & Justice*. Chicago, Ill, 26, 361(65)

Galahad SMS Limited (2010) *Evaluation of Resettlement and Aftercare Provision*. Report to the Youth Justice Board.

Glover, J. and Clewett, M. (2011) *No Fixed Abode: The housing struggle for young people leaving custody in England*. London: Barnardos.

Godfrey C, Hutton S, Bradshaw J, Coles B, Craig G and Johnson J(2002) *Estimating the cost of being 'Not in education, employment or training' at age 16-18*, York: SPRU, University of York

Graham J and Bowling B (1995), *Young People and Crime* London: Home Office

Gray E, Taylor E, Roberts C, Merrington S, Fernandez R and Moore R(2005) *Intensive supervision and surveillance programme: the final report*, YJB and Oxford University

Gray, P. (2010) 'The resettlement needs of young offenders leaving custody: an emotional dimension'. *Prison Service Journal*, 189:25-28.

Hagan J, McCarthy B, Parker P, and Climenhage J (1997) *Mean Streets Youth Crime and Homelessness*.Cambridge University Press.

Hagell, A. (2004) *Key elements of effective practice - resettlement*. London: Youth Justice Board.

Hagell, A., Hazel, N. and Shaw C. (2000) *Evaluation of Medway Secure Training Centre* London: Home Office

Haines K., Gray P., Liddle M., Tofts C. and Wright S (2011) *Informing and modernising care in a substance misuse treatment community: Linking Policy, Strategy, Management and Practice*. Report to Swansea SMAT and the Welsh Assembly Government.

Harding, J. (2006) 'Some reflections on risk assessment, parole and recall', *Probation Journal*, 53(4): 389-396.

Harper, G. and Chitty, C. (2005) *The Impact of Corrections on Reoffending: A Review of What Works*, Home Office Research Study 291, London: Home Office.

Harvey, J. (2007) *Young men in prison: surviving and adapting to life inside*. Cullompton: Willan.

Hazel, N., Hagell, A., Liddle, M., Archer, D., Grimshaw, R. and King, J. (2002) *Assessment of the Detention and Training Order and its impact on the secure estate across England and Wales*. London: Youth Justice Board.

Hazel, N., Liddle, M. and Gordon, F. (2010) *Evaluation of RESET: a major resettlement programme for young offenders*. London: Rainer.

HM Government (2008) *Youth Crime Action Plan*. London: Home Office.

Hobbs & Hook Consulting (2001) *Research into Effective Practice with Young People in Secure Facilities*. Report to the Youth Justice Board.

Hollin, C. R., McGuire, J., Hounsome, J. C., Hatcher, R. M., Bilby, C. A. L., & Palmer, E. J. (2008). Cognitive skills offending behavior programs in the community: A reconviction analysis. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 35, 269-283.

Jacobson J, Bhardwa B, Gyateng T, Hunter G and Hough M (2010) *Punishing disadvantage: a profile of children in custody* London: Prison Reform Trust

Keep Britain Tidy and Arson Prevention Bureau (2004) , *Arson, Key Facts. The Scale of the Problem*, Factsheet

Lawlor E, Nicholls J and Santfilippo L (2008) *Unlocking Value: how we all benefit from investing in alternatives to prison for women offenders*, New Economics Foundation, London

Lewis S., Maguire, M., Raynor, P., Vanstone, M., Vennard, J. (2007) 'What Works in resettlement? Findings from Seven Pathfinders for Short-term Prisoners in England and Wales' *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, Vol 7 (1), 33-53.

Lewis, S., Maguire, M., Raynor, P., Vanstone, M., Vennard, J. (2007) 'What Works in Resettlement? Findings from Seven Pathfinders for Short-term Prisoners in England and Wales', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, Vol 7 (1), 33-53.

Liddle M (1998), *Wasted Lives*, London: Nacro

Maruna and Immarigeon (2004) *After crime and punishment* Cullompton: Willan

McMurrin, M. (2002). *Motivating offenders to change: A guide to enhancing engagement in therapy*. Chichester: NY: Wiley.

McNeill F (2006) 'A desistance paradigm for offender management', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 6(1): 39-62.

McGuire J (2002) Integrating Findings from Research Reviews in McGuire, J. (ed) *Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment, Effective Programmes and Policies to Reduce Re-offending*, Chichester: Wiley

Medhurst, C. and Cunliffe, J. (2007) 'Re-offending of juveniles: results from the 2005 cohort study', *Ministry of Justice Statistical Bulletin*. London: Home Office.

Mwenda L (2005), *Drug Offenders in England and Wales 2004*, *Home Office Statistical Bulletin*, London: Home Office.

National Audit Office (2004) *Youth offending: the delivery of community and custodial sentences* London: The Stationery Office

National Audit Office (2006), *The Office Accommodation of the DCMS and its Sponsored Bodies* London: The Stationery Office

NEF (2008) *Work it out - barriers to employment for homeless people* <http://www.bitc.org.uk/resources/publications/homelessness.html>

Niven S and Stewart D (2005) *Resettlement outcomes on release from prison in 2003* London: Home Office

Office for National Statistics (2011) , *Consumer Price Indices, all items, June 2011*.

Ofsted (2010) *Transitions Through Detention and Custody* London: Ofsted

Quilgars D, Jones A, Pleace N and Sanderson D (2004) *The Safe Moves Initiative: an evaluation*, Centre for Housing Policy, University of York

Raynor, P. (2003) 'Evidence-based practice and its critics', *Probation Journal*, **50** (4), pp. 334-45.

Renshaw J (2007), *The costs and benefits of effective resettlement of young offenders*, *Journal of Children's Services*, vol. 2, 4, 18-29

Rex, S. (1999) 'Desistance from Offending: Experiences of Probation', *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 35(4): 366-83.

Robinson, G. and Raynor, P. (2006) 'The future of rehabilitation: what role for the probation service?', *Probation Journal*, 53(4): 334-346.

Sherman, L. W. et al. (1997) *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising?* Report to US Congress. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice

Smith, D. (2006) 'Making sense of psychoanalysis in criminological theory and probation practice', *Probation Journal*, 53(4): 361-376.

Social Exclusion Unit (2002) *Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners*. London: Cabinet Office.



Youth Justice Board (2004) *Accommodation Needs of Young Offenders* London: Youth Justice Board

Youth Justice Board (2005a) *Youth Resettlement: a Framework for Action*. London: Youth Justice Board.

Youth Justice Board (2005b) Risk and protective factors. (See also the full report by Barry Anderson, Sarah Beinart, Prof David Farrington, Jonathan Langman, Pat Sturgis and David Utting). London: Youth Justice Board

Youth Justice Board (2006a) *'Suitable, Sustainable, Supported Accommodation* London: Youth Justice Board

Youth Justice Board (2006b) *Barriers to engagement in Education, Training and Employment* London: Youth Justice Board

Youth Justice Board (2010): *Integrated Resettlement Support (IRS) - Management Guidance* London: Youth Justice Board

**For further details please contact:**

**University of  
Salford**  
MANCHESTER



**Professor Neal Hazel**  
Director  
Centre for Social Research (CSR.Salford)  
University of Salford  
Salford  
Greater Manchester  
M5 4WT  
T: +44 (0)161 295 5122  
E: [n.hazel@salford.ac.uk](mailto:n.hazel@salford.ac.uk)

**Dr Sam Wright**  
Director  
ARCS LTD  
Sheraton House  
Castle Park  
Cambridge  
CB3 0AX  
Tel: +44 (0)1223 370104  
E: [sam.wright@arcs-ltd.com](mailto:sam.wright@arcs-ltd.com)