Evaluation of the South West Resettlement Consortium: Final report

November 2012

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We are grateful to a range of people for the help and support they have provided to us during the course of this project. Our thanks go to North Somerset Council and Consortium Local Authority partners for funding the evaluation. We would also like to thank the Youth Justice Board, for full engagement. In particular we would like to acknowledge the help of Helen Mercer, YJB Resettlement Programme Manager.

The authors would like to acknowledge the involvement of Professor Mike Maguire, University of Glamorgan. We would like to thank him for his contributions from beginning to end, including reviewing this report.

We could not have undertaken the project without the assistance of Mike Rees, the SWRC Manager, and the cooperation of all the SWRC partners.

We are grateful to the stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed in depth as part of this study, and to all those professionals in Youth Offending Teams who helped in distributing and collecting questionnaires. Finally, our thanks go of course to the young people involved for sharing their views and information about themselves, including in particular those who gave their time to be interviewed in depth.

We do not underestimate the trouble that people took to find time to talk to us and invest in the evaluation in challenging and busy times. We are pleased that parties locally and nationally have recognised the importance of research informed policy and practice in resettlement and have already started feeding in early findings from this evaluation.

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November 2012
PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1 The South West Resettlement Consortium

Introduction and background to the South West Resettlement Consortium

The development of the South West Resettlement Consortium began in September 2009 – with appointment of a part-time project manager post. At this point, the initial focus for the consortium was to bring together stakeholders involved in the resettlement of young people from across six local authorities. However, there was limited previous collaborative tradition among the six local authorities, and so developing effective ways of working and seeking to institute change across this regional geography was a substantial challenge. Moreover, due to strategic wariness of committing to a new scheme with unknown potential to produce sustainable positive outcomes, getting meaningful engagement from sufficiently senior representatives of such a wide group of services was a demanding task. In particular, it took quite some time to persuade the YOTs of the value of the consortium approach. As a result, a substantial amount of time was spent on establishing an agreed terms of reference and service level agreements so that regular board meetings could commence working together in an effective way. The original project manager left post in Spring 2010, and a new manager took over in July 2010, largely reforming the partnership. The terms of reference for the Board were signed in October 2010, although the partnership between agencies was considered effectively operational by end of Summer 2010.

Aims and Objectives

According to the YJB, all of the regional consortia were set up to enable all agencies involved to work together to provide a seamless transition back into the community for young people in custody. Buy-in from participating local authorities was thought to be critical for ensuring that young people had their resettlement service entitlements met. It was anticipated that better communication between Secure Establishments, YOTs and Local Authorities would enhance outcomes for the young person through:

- better use of resources through information sharing,
- potential for innovation,
- coherent practitioner development
- dissemination of effective practice across areas of shared interest,
- continuity in relationships with the young person,
- practical arrangements for ETE and accommodation, and
- a consistent approach to resettlement through an agreed ‘enhanced offer’.
At the regional level, the aim of the South West Resettlement Consortium was defined as seeking ‘to reduce the risk of re-offending, improve outcomes for young people leaving custody and to manage the risk of harm to the public through effective, efficient, equitable and sustainable management of resources.’ Through a partnership between Local Authority, secure estate, third and private sector service providers, the objectives were to:

- Improve strategic and operational links between Local Authority services (including YOTs), the secure estate, the third sector and commercial organisations;
- Identify how existing resettlement pathways could be improved through more efficient use of resources and collaboration;
- Improve organisational efficiency and quality;
- Increase transparency and accountability;
- Optimize the efficiency of connecting activities in the provision of resettlement;
- Raise the profile of resettlement within each participating Local Authority and the secure estate;
- Identify, share and implement ‘what works’ across the South West Consortium;
- Provide a consistent ‘enhanced offer’ to young people leaving the secure estate across the South West Consortium;
- Participate in the evaluation of consortium working in order to evidence its value in delivering positive resettlement outcomes for young people leaving custody;
- Pilot locally-led solutions to resettlement; and
- Include effective resettlement programmes in plans and budgets beyond March 2012.

**Structure and implementation of the SWRC**

A Consortium Management Board was established to coordinate and promote interagency activity, with a membership that comprised:

- senior representatives of youth offending services in the Consortium area
- senior representatives of secure establishments in which young people from the consortium area are regularly placed
- senior representatives of Consortium local authorities
- senior representative of the Avon and Somerset Criminal Justice Board

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1 The management board remained able to co-opt additional members or invite other local authorities and/or secure establishments to join the consortium.
2 At October 2010 this was Bath and North East Somerset, Bristol, Gloucestershire, North Somerset, Somerset and South Gloucestershire – and remains so in June 2012.
3 Namely HMP Eastwood Park, HMP Ashfield YOI (managed by Serco) and Vinney Green Secure Unit (managed by South Gloucestershire Council).
• senior representative of Avon and Somerset Constabulary
• senior representative of Avon and Somerset Probation Service
• a representative of the YJB’s South West regional team
• the YJB’s Resettlement Programme Manager
• Third Sector organisations

The key responsibilities of the Management Board were to:

• coordinate and monitor the delivery of an agreed “enhanced offer” of resettlement support to young people leaving custody and returning to live in the consortium area
• facilitate, across partner agencies, integrated support throughout young people’s custodial sentences thus ensuring effective plans are in place for resettlement
• piloting locally led solutions to resettlement e.g. processes and priorities.
• work to ensure that young people leaving custody have access to the mainstream health, social care and education services to which they are entitled
• support active contribution by all members of the consortium to the national evaluation of the Resettlement Consortium Model
• support the work of third sector providers in relation improving resettlement and hold them to account for the delivery of any services for which they are contracted or grant-aided
• promote the participation and feedback of young people in their experience of the consortium/resettlement process
• positively promote the Consortium model across the area, both internally within public sector agencies and externally via the media
• provide the YJB, other YOTs, local authorities and secure establishment with “lessons learned” from the Consortium in order to inform national policy
• establish and support as appropriate advisory/task and finish groups of various stakeholders including practitioners and/or operational managers from YOTs, the secure estate, local authorities and the third sector.
• work closely with the established SW Resettlement and Secure Forum.
• include resettlement programmes in their plans beyond March 2011.

Alongside the strategic focus of the Management Board, it was intended to also run a ‘Practice Implementation Group’ that would address more operational issues. The first meeting of this group took place in July 2011, and the plan is for the group to consider service delivery issues on a thematic basis.

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4 In October 2010, this group comprised: The Foyer Federation, Construction Youth Trust (CYT), Making the Change (Brent Knoll Hostel), 2nd Chance Project, the YMCA, and 16-25 Independent People.
2 The Evaluation

Aims and Objectives

The main aims of the evaluation were to focus on the extent to which the Resettlement Consortium generated:

- Increased collaboration - between partners and with local authorities;
- Improved links between the secure estate, YOTs, Children’s services and local authorities;
- Improved resettlement experiences for young people leaving custody, and
- Improved access to mainstream and specialist services for young people (especially accommodation and education, training and employment).

The key purpose of the Consortium was to enhance resettlement outcomes for young people through:

- better use of resources through information sharing
- potential for innovation
- coherent practitioner development
- dissemination of effective practice across areas of shared interest
- continuity in relationships with the young person
- practical arrangements for ETE and accommodation
- a consistent approach to resettlement through an agreed ‘enhanced offer’.

Thus the evaluation also needed to focus on each of these areas and be able to inform the more specific research questions (as listed in the ITT documentation):

1. What are the key components of the enhanced offer delivered in each area, and how is this different to business-as-usual?
2. What are the enablers and barriers to successful implementation of the resettlement offer (and component activities) by the partner agencies?
3. What perceptions do young people have of their resettlement experience in the pilot areas?
4. Do these young people perceive any connection between their resettlement experience and their reintegration into the community and likelihood of reoffending?
5. What aspects or characteristics of their resettlement process (in the pilot areas) do young people identify as most and least valuable?
6. What is the estimated overall cost of the resettlement consortia to individual partners? Where possible, this should be broken down into:
i. Constituent elements
ii. Start-up versus long-term costs

7. How do these costs compare to ‘business as usual’?

Design, timing of data-collection

The research team\(^5\) used a variety of data sources and a combination of data collection methods - both qualitative and quantitative - to evaluate the three Regional Resettlement Consortia areas\(^6\). The tender specification asked that the ‘three individual evaluations will as far as possible complement each other through the sharing of instruments, e.g. topic guides, data collection forms and spreadsheets’. So, whilst implemented as separate evaluation projects that were responsive to local priorities, the overarching design was constructed to ensure consistency and comparability as far as possible across the three research studies. Exactly the same research methods were adopted for the South West and North West Consortia evaluations, and the quantitative dataset and stakeholder interview schedules were common across all three Regional Resettlement Consortia areas.

The evaluation commenced in April 2011 and the data collection/fieldwork period ran from July 2011 to the end of April 2012.

Quantitative methods

**Development of the cohort database (for future outcome analysis)**

Although the feasibility study for this evaluation\(^7\) highlighted some of the difficulties involved in assessing outcomes across the three consortia sites (mostly related to small throughput numbers), part of this research team’s task was to leave in place a data collection/MIS system that could be used to assess outcomes over the longer term. The aim was to design a system that would allow for the generation of data-sets which could be analysed using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)\(^8\). PSM allows better matching of the treatment group (in this case RCC cohorts in the three consortia) with a ‘control’ group using PNC data, and is the current way in which Ministry of Justice carries out reconvictions analysis. Part of our evaluation approach was therefore to ensure that such data are routinely collected to enable reconvictions analysis to take place beyond the life of the evaluation project.

The research team undertook a “data scoping” exercise at the outset of the evaluation, to determine not only any data "gaps" that would need addressing to support future use of PSM, but also to check the quality and consistency of data-sets across all of the YOTs.

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\(^5\) Comprising the University of Salford and ARCS UK, with consultancy input from the University of Glamorgan and other external experts.

\(^6\) The North West, South West and Wessex Regional Resettlement Consortia.

\(^7\) Unpublished feasibility study on evaluating the resettlement consortia, conducted for the Youth Justice Board by IRIS Consulting.

\(^8\) PSM avoids many of the pitfalls identified by the IRIS feasibility report, using different statistical methods and making smaller groups less of a problem in identifying success of an intervention.
involved in the work of the Consortium. Generating a complete dataset that could support PSM required thorough auditing and manipulation of existing data collection systems and negotiating both amendments and additional data collection (including accommodation and ETE and where they related to stakeholders outside the YOT\(^9\)). Much of the data for PSM reoffending analysis was already being collected by YOTs, but a substantial amount of work was required to combine the data in a format that supported the generation of the required statistical outputs. It is this dataset that has provided most of the quantitative data for the results presented in this report.

\textit{Cohort and comparison samples (for current outcome analysis)}

The characteristics of the cohort are provided in detail in Chapter 6 ("Who were the young people?"). The cohort consisted of all those who received the "enhanced offer" and were released during the 19 month period from September 2010 to March 2012 (N82).

As noted above, the feasibility study for this evaluation had predicted difficulties in assessing outcomes for any cohort. This was partly because it would not be easy to run a full experimental model with the sample size and impracticalities of a randomised controlled trial. In addition, the time constraints for the evaluation meant that it would not be possible to compare reconviction data for the cohort and one in a different geographical area.

Nevertheless, it was important to try to contextualise any improvements in the cohort who received the enhanced offer. To some extent, improvements could be charted by capturing “distance travelled” – for instance by comparing ASSET scores at the start and end of sentence. But this does not tell us how this compares to how the young people would have done without the enhanced offer. Second, it was possible to compare outcomes with previous cohorts in our resettlement research across England and Wales. These include the England-wide evaluation of the DTO (Hazel et al, 2002) which could be considered a baseline with ‘standard’ resettlement activity, and the RESET evaluation (Hazel et al, 2010) which represents some enhanced resettlement practices. While this was useful, it still would not tell us how young people would have done in our consortium area specifically, if the enhanced offer had not been available.

As such, we drew up a comparison group of all those released from custody in the year previous to the cohort receiving the enhanced offer. However, it is still possible that the individuals serving a custodial sentence and seeking resettlement are quite different year to year. Therefore, in deciding whether to use this group to contextualise outcomes for the comparison group, we compared the samples for statistical differences across SEVEN key variables, seen in the table below. The only significant difference between the groups was that the comparison group had fewer previous convictions on average than the cohort. It is possible therefore, that the group is slightly harder or higher risk than the comparison group, which might theoretically account for some of any improved outcomes. However,

\footnote{Accommodation and ETE data have been explored as possible additional dynamic variables to be added into PSM reoffending outcome analysis. In addition, changes in the proportion of those young people accessing accommodation, education, training and employment have been measured, along with how well these outcomes are sustained.}
the comparison was not judged at any lower level of risk of reoffending according to their ASSET scores at the start of their sentence. In fact, the cohort group had higher (although not significant) ASSET scores. Consequently, all those released from custody in the year previous to the introduction of the enhanced offer (N58) was seen as a suitable comparison group to contextualise the outcomes for our cohort.

### Table: Comparing the Cohort and Comparison group samples across ten variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Cohort Group</th>
<th>Comparison Group</th>
<th>Test and whether statistically significant</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>82 in analysis</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean ASSET Scores at start</td>
<td>Mean = 31.47</td>
<td>Mean = 27.67</td>
<td>Independent samples T-Test ×</td>
<td>Cohort slightly higher ASSET scores, but not significant (using matched scoring system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of previous convictions</td>
<td>Median = 6</td>
<td>Median = 9</td>
<td>Ind sample median ✓</td>
<td>Cohort significantly lower previous convictions than comparison group. So, this may account for some of the cohort’s lower offending on licence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of previous custodial sentences</td>
<td>Mean = 0.61</td>
<td>Mean = 0.5</td>
<td>Independent samples T-Test ×</td>
<td>No sig difference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTO total sentence length (months)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mann-Whitney × Kolmogorov-Smirnov × Ind sample median ✓</td>
<td>Median sentence is slightly longer for Cohort, but not significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average days in custody</td>
<td>Median = 89</td>
<td>Median = 89</td>
<td>Ind sample median ✓</td>
<td>No difference in median custody period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average days in community</td>
<td>Median = 90.5</td>
<td>Median = 90</td>
<td>Ind sample median ✓</td>
<td>No difference in sentence median licence period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average days served</td>
<td>Median = 180</td>
<td>Median = 179.5</td>
<td>Ind sample median ✓</td>
<td>No difference in median sentence length, although a few had longer sentences on cohort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant = $P<0.05$; 82 in the cohort group excludes 20 released to Probation

There is an interesting (for researchers) statistical analysis issue when comparing the outcomes between the cohort and comparison group in this study. Strictly speaking, these groups are populations rather than samples – all those released in our consortium area in their respective time periods. As such, arguably, it is not necessary or appropriate to use significance testing – because there is no sampling chance to take into account (everyone is included). Thus, every difference reflects what is a real difference the two groups, as long as we do not try to generalise out to the rest of the country (which may be quite different). However, it was considered that significance testing was still useful to (a) give us some sense of how large or ‘important’ any difference might be, and (b) whether the difference was large enough that it is likely to be replicated elsewhere (or in future in our consortium area). Consequently, we do report significance here anyway - using both tests of association for disaggregated data, and binomial tests to show difference in the “population groups” as a whole or when comparing with our previous research cohorts.
**Collection of feedback from young people**

Additional feedback was collected via structured questionnaire from young offenders at two key periods in the resettlement process: firstly, in the two week period before they were released from custody; and then a follow-up questionnaire completed either at the end of their licence period, or three months post-custody - whichever happened soonest.

These questionnaires contained mixed qualitative and quantitative questions, the team sought to gather this feedback from all of the young people who were: (a) in custody during the fieldwork period, and (b) had either completed their licence or spent at least three months back in the community before the end of fieldwork. In order to do so the research team needed to enlist "on the ground" support from custodial institution and YOT workers to assist with implementation of the questionnaires.

**Cost-benefit strand**

One of the aims of the evaluation was to deliver an assessment of value for money, and draw some conclusions concerning whether consortia outcomes appear to justify the costs. Thus, the research team also undertook cost-benefit research across all three sites, in order to identify the “added value” effect of the enhanced resettlement approach overall - both by individual consortium and by constituent elements. Although a full-blown cost-benefit analysis (CBA) would have been both too resource-intensive and dependent on forms of data that were unavailable, it has been possible to assess aspects of the project’s costs and benefits via something less than a full-blown CBA.\(^{10}\)

By assessing the direct costs and benefits of outcomes that could be generated by consortium activities (on the basis of existing data and feedback from respondents), and by including full discussion of the direct and indirect cost dimension of a range of both “hard outcomes”\(^{11}\) and “intermediate outcomes”\(^{12}\) that the consortium might generate, the research team have been able to provide some careful analysis of the cost-benefit implications of the regional consortium approach. Linkages with the wider literature have been made wherever possible.

**Qualitative methods**

**Ongoing literature/practice review**

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\(^{10}\) Both CBA and cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) require that data-collection systems be in place to gather consistent (and time-linked) information concerning all project inputs and outcomes, and full-blown exercises also require either the costing of a range of intervention alternatives (as in full CEA), or the utilization of a range of costing models for estimating values around some of the less tangible benefits (as in full CBA), because of the controversy surrounding how some of these benefits should be quantified.

\(^{11}\) Such as apparent reductions in re-offending.

\(^{12}\) E.g. positive impact on educational achievement or accommodation problems.
The review of the available research, policy, and practice literature concerning the resettlement of young offenders, and the “anchoring” of our research findings in this literature is an important strand of this evaluation - not least because this area of policy and practice is currently in a state of flux (partly due to the impact of the Green Paper, and other developments such as the move toward “payment by results”).

**Semi-structured interviews with young people**

Interviews with young people constitute another key strand of data for the evaluation - providing detailed insight into their experience of the resettlement project and its impact upon their lives back in the community.

Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on young people’s involvement with the project and the background to their participation, their experiences of assessment of the programme, and their perceptions of the effectiveness of methods and approaches used in relation to their assessed needs. All interviews were digitally recorded and partially transcribed at the time of interview (after gaining the respondents’ permission).

**Construction of individual case studies**

In order to add some depth to the results from the other research strands, the research team designed and developed a set of carefully chosen case studies. These case studies enabled us to identify complex causal chains and the contexts within which they might be related to specific outcome patterns. Case studies were drawn from across the local authority areas where the consortium operates, and have been used to highlight key types of participation or “pathways” through the project that were taken by particular types of participant. This sample of case studies was drawn purposively, based on initial assessment of the available data concerning the characteristics and circumstances of young people focused on by the consortium (and reflecting the range of key sub-groups of these young people).

**Interviews with key staff and other agency stakeholders**

Another major strand of qualitative data collected during the research was the stakeholder consultation. Feedback from key participants having had some involvement with the consortium and/or direct involvement with issues concerning the resettlement of young offenders provides a rich supplement to the documentary material and official data referred to elsewhere.

In terms of particular agencies/sectors, the team aimed to gather feedback from as wide a range of respondents across all the organisations/groups involved in the Consortium. As is the case for many partnerships focusing on issues of this kind, the number of organisations involved in resettlement was substantial and in many cases it was necessary to consult multiple representatives from particular agencies\textsuperscript{13}. A mix of methods was therefore used

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\textsuperscript{13} A single local authority might have representatives from a range of separate departments involved for example, and is also involved both at strategic level and in implementation work.
to consult key stakeholders, and across this range of respondents, the research team focused on finding out:

- what their involvement was with the work of the consortium;
- what their interest was in relation to issues concerning the resettlement of young offenders;
- what they saw as the key factors that facilitate or impede effective partnership work to address resettlement issues;
- what they saw as being the key contributions of specific partners (both ideally, and in practice);
- what their perceptions were in terms of effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) of SWRCYP-style approaches;
- what shape they thought that future work in this area should take (and why);
- the extent to which SWRCYP-style approaches are “transferable” from one area to another, and
- how efforts to address resettlement issues for young offenders should be prioritised alongside the range of other responsibilities that agencies have.

The research team conducted one to one interviews with key stakeholders from the resettlement consortium (with some on more than one occasion), targeting those individuals who had the most direct involvement. In addition, given that there was inevitably a larger pool of potential respondents than the team could canvas on a one-to-one basis, in order to allow the maximum number of stakeholders to share their views and experiences with the research team, a brief questionnaire was developed so that stakeholders who could not be interviewed also had the opportunity to provide their input. Direct interviews were digitally recorded, and partially transcribed (manually, at the time of interview). The research partnership used the same research instrument across all three consortia sites.
3 What is known about resettlement – a brief literature review

Introduction

A robust body of theoretical, research and development work exists on the factors within adult resettlement that promote desistance from crime\(^\text{14}\). In contrast, the evidence base on the resettlement of young offenders is less developed. Despite the Youth Justice Board noting that the successful resettlement of young people leaving custody is a ‘significant challenge’\(^\text{15}\), and the widely acknowledged fact that resettling young offenders requires ‘multiple solutions’\(^\text{16}\), services provided for them are often inadequate and/or poorly coordinated. Although there are some exceptions - for example, highly structured, long-term programmes are known to be able to reduce re-offending, even among persistent young offenders for whom other interventions have been unsuccessful\(^\text{17}\) - the majority of provision across England continues to be relatively ineffective. For example, in terms of re-offending, research has shown that levels of re-offending following release from custody are higher for young people than for adults, with over 70 per cent of young people re-offending within 12 months of release\(^\text{18}\), and over 80 per cent within two years\(^\text{19}\). Added to this, re-offending often occurs soon after release, with about a third of young people re-offending within one month of release\(^\text{20}\).

Before moving on to look at the support needs of young offenders in more depth, it is worth briefly highlighting what constitutes ‘effective’ practice in the field of adult resettlement. The growing body of research in this field has demonstrated that the provision of social and practical support to both short and long-term adult offenders can be an effective means of reducing re-offending. Indeed, in terms of reducing re-offending, ‘rehabilitative’ interventions are more likely to be successful than deterrence-based interventions\(^\text{21}\). Research has found that those interventions that appear to be most effective display the following characteristics\(^\text{22}\):

- **Multi-modal** – taking a more ‘holistic’ approach, rather than delivering one dimension of work\(^\text{23}\).
- **Targeted** – allocating resources to those most at risk and most in need of services, rather than low-risk/need offenders\(^\text{24}\).

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\(^{14}\) See Lewis et al. (2007)
\(^{15}\) Youth Justice Board (2005a: 5)
\(^{16}\) Harding (2006: 391)
\(^{17}\) Buckland G. and Stevens A. (2001)
\(^{18}\) See for example Youth Justice Board (2005a) and Medhurst and Cunliffe (2007)
\(^{19}\) See for example Social Exclusion Unit (2002) and Hagell (2004)
\(^{20}\) Youth Justice Board (2005a) and Hazel et al. (2002)
\(^{21}\) Sherman, L. W. et al. (1997)
\(^{22}\) See especially Lewis et al. (2002) and Raynor (2003)
\(^{23}\) Gaes et al. (1999)
\(^{24}\) For low-risk/need offenders, intensive treatment might even be criminogenic – see for example Andrews et al. (1990)
• **Intensive** – delivering interventions that are able to address multiple needs simultaneously.\(^{25}\)

• **Theoretically sound** – drawing specifically on criminological theory and research concerning criminal etiology and desistance from crime.\(^{26}\)

• **Desistance-focused** – rather than focusing on ‘factors associated with offending’, working around those factors that research has shown are associated with desistance from crime.\(^{27}\)

• **Motivational** – recognising the need for offenders to ‘buy in’ to the intervention.\(^{28}\)

Indeed, it is suggested that any effort to rehabilitate and resettle offenders should be based on the stated needs of those individuals the interventions are meant to be supporting—whenever possible ‘involving program participants directly in program design, administration and evaluation, rather than having decisions concerning peoples’ lives and welfare made entirely by others’.\(^{29}\) Certainly this appears to be one of the characteristics of those interventions identified as ‘working’ or ‘promising’ by the *Maryland Report*.\(^{30}\)

The question remains, though, as to why interventions identified as being particularly effective in international research have been less effective when implemented in the UK.\(^{31}\) It is suggested that this is often because only one of the two basic tenets for resettlement identified by the *Maryland Report* are translated into practice in the UK. For example, the *Maryland Report* suggested that rehabilitation interventions ‘work’ when they:

- Are structured and focused, use multiple treatment components, focus on developing skills, and use behavioural (including cognitive-behavioural) methods; and,
- Provide for substantial, meaningful contact between the treatment personnel and the participant.

However, it would appear that a large proportion of interventions in the UK often adopt a cognitive-behavioural approach, whilst perhaps failing to provide the opportunities for any substantial relationship to develop between the personnel delivering the interventions and those participants ‘receiving’ them. This is in spite of much recent resettlement research focussing on what has been termed the ‘relational’ aspects of the rehabilitative process— in particular, the issue of what characterises an effective working relationship between an offender and their criminal justice worker.\(^{32}\) There is now an emerging sense from much

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\(^{25}\) Interventions of this nature are the most likely to be effective in assisting offenders to overcome the often multiple disadvantages in their lives - see for example McGuire (2002)

\(^{26}\) Maruna and Immarigeon (2004)

\(^{27}\) See for example, Harper and Chitty (2005)


\(^{29}\) See, for example, McMurran (2002)

\(^{30}\) Harris, 2003

\(^{31}\) Sherman, L. W. *et al.* (1997)

\(^{32}\) In particular, cognitive behavioural therapy.

\(^{33}\) See Hollin et al. (2008)

\(^{34}\) Robinson and Raynor (2006)

\(^{35}\) See Batchelor and McNeill (2005)
recent probation research\textsuperscript{36} that the quality of the immediate relationship between worker and offender may be the crucial factor in determining whether or not that person desists from further crime. This is certainly nothing new. Until relatively recently, the essence of much resettlement work was to ‘provide a supportive relationship, based on the assumption that this relationship would be influential and would facilitate change’\textsuperscript{37}. Something which is supported by much older psychotherapeutic research which found that the kind of person the worker is (or at least comes across as being) seemed to be more important for therapeutic success or failure than the particular methods of intervention employed\textsuperscript{38}.

The support needs of young offenders leaving custody

The lives of young offenders are far more likely than those of non-offenders to be characterised by the ‘risk factors’ identified by research\textsuperscript{39} concerned with the etiology of offending. These include:

- school absenteeism, truancy, and or exclusion;
- friends involved in offending;
- family conflict;
- unstable living conditions;
- family members involved with the police or criminal justice system;
- poor relationships with either parent;
- aggressive/violent behaviour (during school age years);
- drug and/or alcohol misuse;
- harsh or erratic discipline in the family; and,
- neglect or abuse.

A report by the Prison Reform Trust\textsuperscript{40} found that: at least three quarters of the young people in its study had absent fathers and a third absent mothers; more than a quarter had witnessed domestic violence; a similar proportion had experienced local authority care; a fifth were known to have harmed themselves; 11% to have attempted suicide; and more than one in 10 had suffered the untimely death of a parent or sibling.

Added to this, the actual experience of custody itself is, for many young people, a traumatizing event. Research has found that violence is endemic within YOIs with young offenders often reporting that they feel unsafe, that they have been victims of violence and bullying, and that they feel isolated and alone\textsuperscript{41}. This had led some to argue that many

\textsuperscript{36} See for example Rex (1999)
\textsuperscript{37} Burnett (2004: 181)
\textsuperscript{38} Smith (2006)
\textsuperscript{39} See, for example, Farrington (2002), Communities that Care (2001) and Social Exclusion Unit (2002)
\textsuperscript{40} Jacobson et al (2010)
\textsuperscript{41} See, for example, Farrant (2004) and Harvey (2007)
young people in custody are doubly punished - first, through very difficult childhoods characterised by loss and disadvantage, and second by being locked up\textsuperscript{42}.

In terms of the needs of young offenders leaving custody, an evaluation of the RESET\textsuperscript{43} project - aimed at improving the resettlement outcomes of young offenders - identified multiple support needs amongst the young people it engaged with\textsuperscript{44}. For example:

- 61\% reported needing more constructive activities;
- 50 \% reported needing help to address offending behavior;
- 46\% reported unemployment problems;
- 39\% had low qualifications or skills affecting future employment;
- 39\% reported substance misuse problems;
- 35\% reported family problems;
- 27\% reported needing help with anger management; and,
- 23\% were homeless.

Similarly, other research\textsuperscript{45} has shown that young offenders leaving custody are often confronted with a wide range of problems - often the same problems that they were experiencing when they went into custody, although for many, the problems have been exacerbated by the custodial sentence. Furthermore, many young people leaving custody are returning to significantly disadvantaged communities where offending is endemic. It thus becomes apparent why the Youth Justice Board concludes that the successful resettlement of young people leaving custody is such a 'significant challenge'\textsuperscript{46}.

**Barriers to effective practice**

It is clear that successfully resettling young offenders requires ‘multiple solutions’\textsuperscript{47}. Efforts to rehabilitate young offenders need to address not just the behaviour that resulted in conviction, but also the complex dynamic family and personal factors that gave rise to such behaviour. These factors need to be addressed holistically - by a range of providers.

In terms of the secure estate addressing offending behaviour specifically, the degree to which work is undertaken and the methods used vary between Local Authority Secure Units, Youth Offending Institutions and Secure Training Centres. Nonetheless, all the institutions in the secure estate face a number of common challenges, including\textsuperscript{48}:

\textsuperscript{42} Jacobson et al (2010)
\textsuperscript{43} Resettlement, Education, Support, Employment and Training (RESET) – a project funded by the European Social Fund and supported by the YJB which aimed to improve the resettlement outcomes of young offenders
\textsuperscript{44} Hazel et al. (2010)
\textsuperscript{45} see, for example, Farrant (2006) and Gray (2010)
\textsuperscript{46} Youth Justice Board (2005a:5)
\textsuperscript{47} Harding (2006: 391)
\textsuperscript{48} Hobbs & Hook Consulting (2001)
• A lack of age appropriate programmes;
• The opportunities for pro-social modeling not being capitalised upon sufficiently;
• Very limited work undertaken with families (despite acute awareness of this need);
• Little evaluation of impact (apart from Prison Service accredited programmes); and,
• Little experience of costing work.

As mentioned, despite the need for the establishment and maintenance of good family relationships being recognized by practitioners as associated with effective resettlement, it is often not delivered in practice. Yet supporting family contact through mediation and relationship support can be crucial. Not only are young people in custody who maintain contact and receive regular visits from family members more likely to have accommodation arranged on release than those who do not, but also, family mediation with young people can result in accommodation being made available to them - where there had previously been resistance (even if only on an initial and temporary basis). With the links between severe accommodation problems or homelessness and recidivism being well documented, assessing and responding to any housing needs should be an integral element of resettlement plans. Each young person’s accommodation needs should thus be identified early on, with appropriate actions initiated to support them - well before release into the community.

In addition, despite the well established resettlement benefits associated with young people engaging in education, training or employment (ETE), research in 2002 found that around only forty per cent of young people serving Detention and Training Orders (DTOs) were involved in any form of education or training during the community period of their sentence. Indeed, the Youth Justice Board has identified both strategic and operational barriers to facilitating the engagement in ETE for young people leaving custody, including:

• strategic lack of awareness of the scale of the issue;
• professional lack of knowledge about the youth justice system;
• conflicting objectives and targets between agencies;
• confused responsibilities between agencies;
• ineffective and non-existent protocols; and,
• limited and tardy transmission of key information.

Whilst systems and processes are in place to ensure thorough assessment of need in both custodial and community youth justice settings, there is often a discrepancy between the

49 Youth Justice Board (2010a)
50 Niven and Stewart (2005)
51 Eagle and Gammampila (2005)
52 Hagan and McCarthy (1997)
53 Youth Justice Board (2006a) and Youth Justice Board (2004)
54 Hazel et al. (2002)
55 Youth Justice Board (2006b)
needs identified and the availability of services to provide support. The RESET evaluation\textsuperscript{56} revealed that on average, workers planned to involve four agencies for each young person. However, in practice, the RESET workers managed to involve only half the number of intended agencies. For the young people with highest support need (the 29\% for whom the input of at least six stakeholders was required), only seven per cent actually received that level of support.

In terms of which agencies were most commonly involved, the most successful partnerships were with other social support agencies - for example other resettlement projects (79\% of cases) and social services (70\%). Less success was achieved with other agencies from the state sector - including the local education authority (40\%), schools (43\%) and training providers (36\%). Only low engagement was achieved with the voluntary sector (9\%) and local employers (7\%).

Those working in the RESET programme experienced substantial problems in engaging other agencies to meet the needs of the young offenders. Whilst substance misuse (46\%), offending behaviour (42\%) and homelessness (40\%) were the issues most commonly tackled, support needs that were addressed in less than a third of intended cases included unemployment (32\%), anger management (29\%), employability (22\%), low qualifications or skills (19\%) and mental health issues (10\%). Furthermore, according to Asset data, the proportion of young people with housing problems at the end of their involvement with RESET was almost identical as those with housing problems when they first joined the project (23\% vs. 24\%).

There is also a growing body of evidence that reveals the discrepancy between institution-based and community resettlement work. In 2002, an evaluation of the Detention and Training Order also highlighted, among other things, the extent to which there was a lack of continuity across the custody and community phases of youth sentences\textsuperscript{57}. In half of the cases (49\%) examined under the RESET evaluation\textsuperscript{58}, no information on the offending work that had been undertaken in custody was received by resettlement workers. Only in about two of every five cases (38\%) did resettlement workers feel that they had enough information to form a continuous programme of support for addressing offending behaviour post-release. More broadly, a separate report by the National Audit Office found that only 6\% of YOTs reported that young people were able to continue the educational programme they had started in custody upon release\textsuperscript{59}. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Ofsted recommend the development of a national statutory plan - to be completed for each child and young person as they move through the criminal justice system, and that is recognized by all stakeholders - in order to ensure integration between services\textsuperscript{60}.

\textsuperscript{56} Hazel et al. (2010)
\textsuperscript{57} Hazel et al. (2002)
\textsuperscript{58} Hazel et al. (2010)
\textsuperscript{59} National Audit Office (2004)
\textsuperscript{60} Ofsted (2010)
Effective practice and outcomes

In terms of general reducing reoffending interventions, approaches focused on the risk factors for offending among individual offenders have achieved reductions in reoffending - although no single approach has been identified as suitable for all young offenders. In general, the Youth Justice Board recommend that programmes should:\n
- target high- and medium-risk offenders;
- be well-structured with a clear rationale;
- use an approach that challenges the offender's reasoning and perception;
- address a full range of criminogenic risk factors - including family / environmental factors;
- adhere to agreed objectives and procedures; and,
- be present in a menu for working with young offenders as part of a 'multimodal' package.

There is evidence to suggest that different approaches need to be taken in the community from those adopted in custody however. For young people in custody, programme characteristics – type, length and intensity – play a greater role in influencing the outcome of the intervention than the characteristics of the offender. The opposite is the case in the community, where both the development and implementation of young people’s aftercare programmes require awareness of the evidence on effectiveness, plus a sound theoretical foundation for behaviour modification.

The RAP evaluation considered five main theoretical approaches to young offender behaviour modification:

- Intensive Aftercare Programme.
- Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Aftercare Programme.
- Holistic Care Programmes.
- Managed Care Model.
- Family Involvement Models.

Despite the mixed evidence about the effectiveness of each of these approaches, whichever approach is chosen, the authors of the evaluation state that the research evidence is clear: staff need to be trained in the theoretical rationale of the approach adopted, and the application of the approach. Without adequate staff training, successful implementation will be compromised.

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61 Youth Justice Board (2005b)
62 Hobbs & Hook Consulting (2001)
63 Galahad SMS Limited (2010)
64 Galahad SMS Limited (2010)
Although the RAP evaluation did not focus on young people leaving custody specifically, it is worth reflecting upon the research findings, which revealed that compared to those young people not involved in it, young people participating in the voluntary RAP scheme:

- were more likely to reduce the severity of their substance misuse\(^{65}\);
- tended not to drop out of contact with this voluntary scheme\(^{66}\);
- had fewer unmet needs\(^{67}\); and,
- appeared to value the relationship with their RAP worker - greatly appreciating the brokerage role fulfilled by the scheme in helping them access other services, and the very practical style of assistance provided by RAP workers.

RAP staff believed that the voluntary nature of RAP enhanced the appeal of the scheme to young people – with a reputation as something enjoyable rather than being perceived as a ‘punishment’\(^{68}\). Perhaps as a result, both engagement and compliance with court orders was better among young people involved with the scheme.

A 12-month reconviction analysis using Police National Computer (PNC) data\(^{69}\) suggested that young people on RAP were slightly less likely to reoffend than a matched sample of young people not engaged with the programme – although the difference was small and not statistically significant\(^{70}\). The largest observable difference between the two groups was that young people in the non-RAP group were reconvicted for summary offences in much greater numbers than the RAP group - although the sample size was too small for this finding to be statistically significant. In addition, young people on RAP who had less problematic use of alcohol or drugs\(^{71}\) were significantly less likely to be reconvicted within one year than comparative non-RAP young people. RAP also appeared to have better outcomes than the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme\(^{72}\) (89% reoffending rate on ISSP as compared to 78% on RAP).

Key recommendations from the RESET evaluation\(^{73}\) focused on improving the coordination of resources and staff; making local partnerships work effectively; better preparing young

\(^{65}\) The RAP teams under study appeared to be more successful than non-RAP teams in engaging young people who were reluctant to address their substance misuse

\(^{66}\) Drop-out rates for RAP were less than 25% for the first three quarters of 2007/08

\(^{67}\) RAP appeared to be more successful in finding, placing and encouraging young people to engage with training and employment than their non-RAP YOT colleagues – with 89% of young people in the RAP sample receiving assistance with employment and training, against 64% of the non-RAP sample

\(^{68}\) Engagement strategies included: creating informal ‘drop-ins’; unstructured and informal atmosphere; non-judgmental non-authoritative approach; flexibility in engagement ‘terms’; matching young people and RAP workers; and incentives and rewards for attendance

\(^{69}\) This comprised a sample of 294 young people; 147 of whom were on RAP at the time and 147 who were not

\(^{70}\) 78% of young people on RAP were reconvicted within one year of their first offence, compared to 86% of those not on RAP

\(^{71}\) Measured through the AADIS score

\(^{72}\) ISSP - another programme for high-risk young offenders.

\(^{73}\) Hazel et al. (2010)
people for release; and improved communication / information flow between custody and community. The report concluded that successful resettlement requires:

- Widespread partnership coordination to address offenders’ multiple needs, and
- Effective cooperation between custodial institutions and community agencies to ensure preparedness for release.

The evaluation also found pockets of very good practice that could be linked to positive resettlement outcomes for young people. The research team identified three different models of working – each with different outcomes:

- A ‘case management’ model where the RESET worker(s) became a member of the casework Youth Offending Team, but took on more custody cases than normal. Areas where this model dominated had a reoffending rate of 41%.

- A ‘coordinating’ model where the RESET worker took on responsibility for arranging multi-agency resettlement support - developing partnerships with state, voluntary and private stakeholders in order to address the range of needs presented by offenders leaving custody (as identified by case managers). Areas where this model dominated had a reoffending rate of 22%.

- An ‘institution based’ model where planning and delivery of resettlement work (including post-release outreach) was primarily coordinated and followed-up by RESET staff within the institution (rather than the local YOTs). This institution-based approach had a reoffending rate of only 5% - although this was a very specific demographic group.

Estimation of the financial costs and benefits of rolling-out the RESET programme of enhanced resettlement support across all custodial placements was conducted. This showed that the RESET package cost £8,074 a year for a young person with a medium level of need. However, when the likely reductions in frequency and seriousness of offending were factored in, there was an annual net saving of at least £12,333 for every offender. Considering that at that point in time, approximately 6,500 young people were given Detention and Training Orders (DTOs) each year in England and Wales, rolling-out enhanced resettlement practice could have brought total annual savings to the public purse of over £80million. Indeed, the RESET evaluation showed the potential cost-effectiveness of youth resettlement:

- Annual costs per young person without resettlement support: £78,040
- Annual costs including 9 months of resettlement support: £65,707
- Potential annual savings for all young people on DTOs: £80,164,500

Evidence of the substantial potential fiscal benefits to be derived from coordinated resettlement work is mounting. In 2011, a Barnardos review of the lack of supported accommodation for young people released from custody showed how it results in a cycle of

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74 This was a female group from one YOI compared to a largely male cohort in the other groups.
homelessness and reoffending\textsuperscript{75}. This study identified that stable housing can reduce the risk of reoffending by 20\% and showed that supported accommodation on release from custody can produce savings of more than £67,000 over 3 years for each single young person.

**Future directions**

It is now commonly accepted that the effective resettlement of young offenders - ‘among the most challenging people to reintegrate’\textsuperscript{76} - requires ‘multiple solutions’\textsuperscript{77}, with many things needing to come together in order to create the best opportunities for success. The Youth Justice Board appear to be moving in this direction with the development of a national Youth Resettlement Framework\textsuperscript{78}, addressing as it does seven areas or ‘pathways’, including: ‘accommodation’; ‘education, training and employment’; ‘health’; ‘substance misuse’; ‘families’; and, ‘finance, benefits and debt’. There is also an overarching pathway - ‘case management and transitions’ - intended to improve ‘partnership-working and the management of the transition from custody to the community’\textsuperscript{79}. Furthermore, the government’s Youth Crime Action Plan\textsuperscript{80} aims to ‘expand existing resettlement provision’ for young people by: placing a new duty on local authorities to fund and commission the education and training of young offenders in custody; and, developing a more comprehensive package of support for young people leaving custody, that includes ensuring access to suitable accommodation and health services for all as they leave custody.

Also underway is the development of Regional Resettlement Consortia (Refer to each specific consortium in their final evaluation report). Delivered by the Youth Justice Board\textsuperscript{81}, these consortia are piloting innovative approaches to resettlement with the aim of encouraging integrated working between the youth justice system, children’s services and other types of statutory and non-statutory agencies. The consortia also aim to address concerns regarding continuity and information sharing through the custody–community transition. Young offenders coming out of custody within the consortia areas will receive enhanced resettlement support including mentoring and extra support with accommodation and education, training and employment.

\textsuperscript{75} Glover and Clewett (2011)  
\textsuperscript{76} Hagell (2004: 4)  
\textsuperscript{77} Harding (2006: 391)  
\textsuperscript{78} Youth Justice Board (2005a)  
\textsuperscript{79} Youth Justice Board (2005a: 4)  
\textsuperscript{80} HM Government (2008: 60)  
\textsuperscript{81} A regional consortium is also being piloted in London by the London Criminal Justice Board (LCJB), although the YJB is assisting with the development of the project and has contributed funding towards the evaluation
PART 2: THE ORGANISATIONAL EXPERIENCE/PROCESS EVALUATION

4 Establishing the consortium

The work of the consortium to develop an enhanced offer for the resettlement of young people was designed to comprise both strategic and operational elements among the existing services provided by YOTs, Secure Estate and Third Sector. The strategic aspect of the Consortium included the engagement of public, private and third sector partners in the delivery of resettlement outcomes, whilst the operational elements included services delivered directly to young people (e.g. information advice and guidance; multi-agency meetings and offending behaviour programmes).

Local interpretation of the purpose of the consortium

In general, there was a shared understanding among stakeholders that the main aims of the consortium were: to ensure that resettlement planning took place from the start of every young person’s custodial sentence; to engage a wide range of support services to help develop and deliver the resettlement plan for them; and to remove existing barriers to young people’s effective resettlement. Thus, the ‘enhanced offer’ (although not a term frequently used by consortium members), was seen to comprise a set of requirements or expectations about the seamless transition of support that should be provided to young people from custody through into the community, which would maximise their chances of effective resettlement by increasing the ‘menu’ of support services that were available to them. As such, it included expectations about the availability of Release on Temporary Licence (ROTL); opportunities to have a mentor; the provision of accommodation and other agency support – especially education, training, employment and other positive activities.

However, clarity of understanding about the aims of the consortium varied among members - with YOT staff more confident about what it was seeking to achieve than other members. In particular, YOT staff recognised the potential benefits of including the full range of community support services in the early stages of resettlement planning – thereby enabling case managers to devote more time specifically towards addressing offending behaviours. YOT staff thus perceived a greater sense of coordination and cohesion to resettlement planning from the establishment of the consortium. They welcomed the greater involvement of the third sector in partnership working – made explicit through more formal agreements and process development. They also felt that they had an increased understanding of how their role aligned with what happened in custody. But custodial staff remained somewhat unaware of the impact of resettlement work upon young people’s outcomes in the community.

82 For example: the engagement of employers through the Consortium partnership with the Construction Youth Trust and 16-25 Independent People.
Nevertheless, the SWRC Protocol made explicit the outcomes that were anticipated for the cohort:

- a reduction in reoffending of young people in the Consortium cohort,
- increased suitable accommodation placements for young people on release as part of the resettlement process,
- improved access of young people into education, training and employment,
- improved public confidence in the youth justice system,
- decrease in numbers of victims,
- decrease in use of custody commensurate with risk to the community and seriousness of offending,
- reduction in financial costs of criminal justice system, and
- improved health outcomes of young people in custody and on post release supervision.

**The SWRC model**

In essence, the intention was for the resettlement offer to be made available to all young people sentenced to a detention and training order at Ashfield YOI, Eastwood Park or Vinney Green Secure Unit between August 1st 2010 and 31st March 2012. The offer itself comprised the following elements:\[83:\]

1. An allocated, named lead professional for every young person to coordinate provision and act as a single point of contact for a child and their family when a range of services are involved and an integrated response is required. This professional is responsible for ensuring that the young person gets appropriate interventions that are well planned, regularly reviewed and effectively delivered.
2. Multi-agency training planning meetings at regular, scheduled intervals throughout the period of the detention and training order.
3. A defined exit strategy to be put in place for every young person at the end of their order.
4. Every young person to have an intervention plan/exit strategy with named professionals attached to all appropriate actions/interventions in accordance with need/risk (articulated within the sentence plan).
5. All young people (as appropriate) to have access to a mentor with whom they can build a supportive relationship across both the secure, community and exit elements of their sentence.

\[83\] For items 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, there was a commitment to deliver this aspect in all Consortium YOT areas.
6. An ETE progression route to form part of every intervention plan across both the secure and community elements of the sentence.

7. Release on temporary licence (ROTL) to be used to support a young person’s transition into the community where appropriate.

8. Offending behaviour programmes scheduled into the intervention plan for all young people.

9. The delivery of employability skills as part of an information advice and guidance programme will be captured within the intervention plan.

10. Where CAMHS/substance misuse support is required, handover or joint appointments to be held from custody to the community/YOT; from YOT to Community.

11. Young people to be supported to attend community CAMHS/substance misuse appointments.

12. All young people to be registered with a GP within 10 days of release from custody.

13. Priority access to the six Local Authority YOT areas to Brent Knoll House.

14. Accommodation to be identified / secured prior to release.

15. Family support to be available as appropriate throughout a young person’s stay in custody and upon release.

16. Information sharing with Police/Probation including where available Integrated Offender Management services to ensure improved management of risk to/from young person in relation to transition arrangements.

17. Where appropriate, young people to be engaged in positive activities and volunteering opportunities.

18. Consortium access to custodial records (eASSET).

19. Access to a range of services from the Third Sector.

However, whilst the explicit focus was on young people resettling to the Consortium area from one of the three main secure estate institutions (Ashfield, Vinney Green or Eastwood Park), YOTs within the Consortium have keen to provide same level of opportunities to all young people that they resettled. With the emphasis being on making more effective use of community resources, there were no specific exclusionary criteria (and no explicit identification of a particular cohort of young people being worked with), and so local YOTs were able to widen access to resettlement resources to include young people resettling into the six local authority areas from other custodial institutions. In a similar vein, YOTs were reluctant to exclude young people given lengthy custodial sentences prior to 1st August 2010 from the cohort, and have been providing access to the same enhanced resettlement services to this group. However, it is recognised that those young people serving sentence on remand, and those recalled to custody to serve their whole sentence in custody (and

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84 As of January 2011, this included: the Foyer Federation, Construction Youth Trust, Making The Change (Brent Knoll House), 2nd Chance Project, the YMCA, 16-25 Independent People, and various Integrated Offender Management partners focusing on the transition of young offenders moving into adulthood.
therefore have no community licence period) may have similar resettlement needs to the Consortium cohort, but would not be able to access support as a matter of course. However, the Consortium did later agree to offer services to those on remand where possible. Furthermore, whilst keen to include probation partners in the Consortium, and cover transitional issues between the children’s and adult youth justice system, only limited management board engagement has been achieved with the probation service. This, and (associated to a degree) difficulties in securing data from the probation service because they do not use the same system mean that young people who turned 18 years old were not included in the evaluation’s assessment of resettlement outcomes. This separation is an issue problematic to smooth transition to young adult and a key area of concern in provision of resettlement support.

**Governance and senior level buy-in**

The SWRC had external oversight from the national YJB Programme Board, which meets every two months. The YJB Programme Board has specified the following national objectives for all the regional resettlement consortia:

- increased collaboration between partners / with local authorities;
- improved links between the secure estate, YOTs, Children’s services and local authorities;
- improved resettlement experience for young people leaving custody; and
- improved access to mainstream and specialist services for young people, especially accommodation and education, training and employment.

However, apart from the national YJB Programme Board, the SWRC has little governance at the regional/local level. Although the work of the consortium is shared with Avon and Somerset YOT managers’ meetings, there is no formal governance or senior strategic oversight at the local level. The Consortium is thus seen very much as a ‘partnership of the willing’ that is developing through consensual agreement, which, whilst taking a steer from the central YJB, is pursuing its aims through the localism agenda.

**The role of the project manager**

The part-time project manager post was originally given to someone with a background in local authority management, and after they left was then allocated to a YOT manager from one of the Consortium areas. As a result, the current post holder benefits from (1) a detailed understanding of the youth justice system in the community and (2) pre-existing working relationships with networks of managers/practitioners. The project manager role focuses on coordinating arrangements for, and chairing the Management Board meetings – where statutory, independent and voluntary sector partners are brought together to develop resettlement activity that will improve outcomes for young people and the community.
5 Implementing the Consortium

The timetable

Although the SWRC protocol defines the operational period as 1st August 2010, delivery of the enhanced resettlement service is considered to have commenced in April 2011 – when the Consortium’s protocol was signed off by all the partners. Whilst funding for the project manager post ceases in July 2012, the end date for the cohort was formally agreed as 31st March 201285.

Partnership working between custody and community agencies

One of the priorities for the Consortium was to increase communication between custody and both the YOTs and community providers. Relatively few of those working in community-based resettlement have direct experience of the custodial environment – and so do not fully appreciate the constraints that are in place when working within the secure estate. This is true not only of voluntary and third sector agencies, but also of many YOT staff. YOT staff felt that attending the Consortium Management Board meetings had given them an increased understanding of how their role aligned with what happened in custody as the SWRC Consortium facilitated more communication between custodial institutions and community agencies - focusing on both basic information sharing (for example: about chaplaincy services, and the ROTL process within Ashfield), and more practical efforts to try to improve accommodation routes, so that in the future suitable, stable housing could be accessed in advance of young people leaving custody.

However, some crucial information sharing gaps remain. Custodial staff can be unsure about whom to share information with in relation to the education and offending behaviour programmes that young people have attended whilst in custody. They also feel that they lack information about post-release outcomes for young people they have worked with. Whilst a few case studies have recently been shared among the Consortium partners, these relate to only a very small sample, and without more substantive evidence, custodial staff only hear about the resettlement experiences of those young people returning to custody. This need for the central recording of in-custody work undertaken with young people is well recognised for several reasons (including: to prevent any gaps and/or duplication in community-based resettlement work; to ensure a smooth transition into the community for young people; and to facilitate review of the effectiveness of resettlement activity), and it is hoped that the recent opening up of access to E-ASSET to YOT staff will help. But some stakeholders question whether E-ASSET data is completed sufficiently to make access to it helpful to YOTs in their resettlement planning work.

85 South West Resettlement Consortium for Young People 2010 The Enhanced Offer incorporating existing good practice commitments, services and new provision.
One of the key difficulties in planning an effective resettlement package relates to Release on Temporary Licence (ROTL) from custody. ROTL is crucial for resettlement in that it allows young people to return to the community for interviews for work or college placements or for interviews to help them secure accommodation offers. However, ROTL has extremely strict conditions and requires a substantial amount of time to set up – such that young people on four month DTOs are not able to avail themselves of this facility because the time taken to achieve eligibility\textsuperscript{86} plus the time taken to process the application will take longer than the two month custodial sentence. In addition, the lack of flexibility and requirement to name exactly where the young person is going and who they are going to meet, means that firm arrangements have to be put into place early on, without a guarantee that the visit will be allowed. As with many YOIs, these restrictions result in low level of ROTL use at Ashfield – and successfully bringing about any changes would be difficult due to the pressures on Governors to ensure that institution security arrangements are upheld. Thus, change to make ROTL more responsive to the resettlement needs of young people would have to be introduced from the centre.

Another limitation in relation to education, training and employment provision for the South West is that although the YJB funded Construction Youth Trust to work with young people in Ashfield YOI who were interested in the construction industry, those with other career interests had no additional provision. Thus, young people who wanted employment in other industries had no additional resources, and remained largely excluded from other trades and professions. Greater insight into the ETE support needs of the cohort (or young people in custody as a whole) could inform the extent to which a sole focus on the construction industry can improve resettlement support options.

One suggestion about broadening out the numbers of young people benefiting from such a construction focus was to develop home refurbishment projects which could meet the priorities of accommodation providers, whilst also supporting young people. It was suggested that more young people could have benefited from a broader range of enhanced ETE options if the YOTS and their partner agencies had developed networks in the community and then enabled the providers to gain access to young people inside the institutions – although this is speculation, and there is no guarantee that this would have proved to be more effective. The focus of this provision solely within Ashfield YOI alone was also questioned, as many young people from the consortium area are placed in other institutions – and so could not benefit from this resource.

Another key problem was the inability to enable young people to attain the Construction Skills Certificate in Safety card whilst in custody. YOIs are unable to facilitate young people taking the test to get a Construction Skills Certificate Scheme (CSCSC) card in custody due to prison security measures\textsuperscript{87}. As a result, young people in custody have no opportunity to gain a critical qualification for the construction industry, and getting construction work or even placements upon release remains largely impossible. Recently young people in Ashfield

\textsuperscript{86} Young people have to be on the enhanced regime in order to be able to apply for ROTL – and this takes time to achieve. They also need to have no history of absconding or trafficking of illegal goods into custody.

\textsuperscript{87} No internet access or use of cameras.
have been able to undergo practice tests in custody\textsuperscript{88}, but without the ability to put employment in place for when a young person leaves custody, the risks of them reoffending very quickly after release into the community remains high. So, despite work to get construction companies with jobs to offer to visit young people in custody, the barrier to such employment remains, and as a result, construction companies offer fewer positions now. With very low rates of ROTL, arrangements could not even be made for young people to take the test in the community. One stakeholder questioned whether the YOI was lending itself in any meaningful way to raising young people’s employability, and commented that with the number of education staff of facing redundancy, the staff themselves were struggling to keep self-motivated.

Although the Management Board meetings were held in one of the custodial institutions (Vinney Green Secure Unit), and despite the Consortium project manager being invited to attend Ashfield resettlement committee, strategic involvement of the institutions in the Resettlement Consortium has been limited. This may reflect the fact that custodial institutions are very constrained in how responsive they can be to introducing new resettlement approaches because of prison service orders and the need to maintain strict security measures. Indeed, one of the stakeholders commented that what Ashfield YOI contributes to the resettlement process now has not changed much from prior to the Consortium’s arrival. Part of the reason for this was suggested as a desire to provide the same level of service to young people, regardless of the local authority in which they lived. So, the consortium was seen as simply helping Ashfield to maintain existing standards and ensure that support is delivered consistently to young people post release.

In terms of accommodation support, despite a more coordinated resettlement focus from the initial DTO meeting, and more agency engagement with subsequent DTO meetings, YOT case managers are still experiencing some ‘11\textsuperscript{th} hour’ accommodation arrangements. Without proper information management about the cohort, the Consortium has not been in a position to judge whether all the cohort were receiving sufficient and appropriate services in custody. Originally caseload information and basic statistics were only available quarterly in arrears – which meant that the Consortium was unable to identify problems across the consortium areas at a case by case level. Overarching needs assessment for the whole cohort could not be undertaken in any detail, so no joint gap analysis would be possible, and there was no way of identifying priority areas for joint service development.

This situation was not helped by the fact that the way the secure youth estate is run impedes resettlement work – many young people serve sentences long distances from their homes, and so cannot easily attend appointments to sort out ETE placements or accommodation provision (even if ROTL was allowed). YOT case managers are trying to support young people placed in institutions spread throughout the country. Unsurprisingly, they struggle to find the resources to support young people serving sentences far away to the same extent as those sentenced to local institutions. Conversely, most institutions work with young people from across the country – and when geographically limited pilots are introduced, they can find it difficult to segment their population sufficiently to support the

\textsuperscript{88} The CSCS dummy test which runs from a CD driver (rather than the internet), became available for young people in custody to practise on in January 2012.
delivery of specific interventions. Indeed, there is understandably a desire not to provide enhanced (differentiated) levels of support to specific sub-sections of the custodial population.

**Partnership working across areas**

Several stakeholders were unclear about why a regional (cross-local authority) approach had been pursued for the Resettlement Consortium – and questioned whether it was an effective way to address the issues. For the South West, with no history of inter-authority collaboration, a substantial amount of work was required to bring the relevant stakeholders together. Although there has been some convergence of criminal justice approaches across the local authority borders (including probation and victim service delivery across Avon and Somerset), the historic lack of collaborative working between local authorities resulted in an uphill struggle to get them to work together cohesively at the start of the process.

Inevitably, due to differences between local authorities, there are substantial disparities between YOTs. For example: whether staff teams are structured around generic caseloads or specialist posts; in terms of access to local resettlement resources; in relation to experience of previous resettlement initiatives (such as IRS or RAP); and different local relationships with the Looked After Children team. As such, trying to impose a regional focus in an attempt to develop a consistent resettlement approach would be very challenging. In addition, the enormous changes brought about by the public funding cuts, which themselves have radically altered YOT teams – both in terms of their strategic location within their local authority, and the structure through which their services were delivered - have rendered it difficult to get consistency in approach across the whole Consortium area. The partnering of YOTs with and without previous IRS/RAP experience was judged to be unhelpful – preventing the former from springboarding on from previous developments whilst waiting for partners to catch up, which can only happen slowly given the lack of resources to evolve. However, it was also noted that joining up as a consortium may have enabled the smaller YOTs to tap into more resources and learn from the outcomes of the whole cohort – not just the small numbers of young people sent to custody from their area.

It is inevitably difficult to pool resources because of long distances between the six local authorities, and also due to differences in support needs between rural and town young people. For stakeholders located outside Bristol, it was felt that many of the resettlement resources were (understandably) located in the largest city – but that young people from...
other local authority areas were unlikely to travel to avail themselves of those services. Thus, the regional focus may sometimes be too large, in that young people will often not travel outside their area to access services. However, it was recognised that for some young people, the regional Consortium provided a resettlement approach that responded well to their mobility and their multiple needs – by offering community-based support that was available across the region throughout the licence period and beyond.

Although young people are, as far as possible, sent to their most local institution, many actually serve a sentence outside the area. Structuring the resettlement consortia around a regional focus (rather than national implementation), has required YOTs and YOIs to segment young people into those ‘entitled to the enhanced offer’ and those not. Whilst the desire to pilot and learn from new youth justice approaches is understandable, this difference in geography has been difficult to contend with for the YOIs in particular, whose information management systems may not be up to the task of identifying young people from specific regions of the country. Initiatives set up within custody, are thus likely to be delivered to ‘non-cohort’ young people, and those undertaking resettlement work in the community are reluctant to offer less of a service to those resettling back into their area from institutions further afield.

**Partnership working across community agencies**

One of the Consortium’s priorities was to increase the support opportunities for young people – particularly in terms of accommodation and education, training and employment – with the aspiration of bringing different partners together who could add value to, and impact positively upon resettlement. But with no single individual responsible for resettlement partnerships within YOTs, this meant that no single stakeholder was responsible for engaging with the Consortium, and so multiple representatives attended board meetings from each YOT, which reduced consistency and may have limited the extent to which Board meeting discussions were shared with YOT staff not in attendance. Nevertheless, YOT staff interviewed for this evaluation had greater confidence in what the consortium was seeking to achieve than other stakeholders, recognising the potential benefits of including the full range of community support services in the early stages of resettlement planning – as this enabled case managers to devote more time specifically towards addressing offending behaviours. YOT staff thus perceived a greater sense of coordination and cohesion to resettlement planning from the establishment of the consortium. They welcomed the greater involvement of the third sector in partnership working which had been made explicit through more formal agreements and process development.

The Consortium also made it easier for third sector delivery partners to communicate with all the YOTs in one forum, rather than having to undergo multiple duplicated discussions. But initial attempts to draw in a wider variety of third private sector organisations into the Consortium were not entirely successful. The consortium has been able to raise the profile of resettlement, enhance ETE links and make resettlement planning more consistent, but it has not made any fundamental changes to resettlement practice locally other than put more support in place immediately post-release for young people. Without detailed analysis
of the cohort’s support needs and corresponding gap analysis, it is difficult to devise an ‘enhanced offer’ that responds effectively to resettlement needs.

Several stakeholders described how better communication between the YOT and Children’s Social Care is still required – especially in relation to Looked After Children and accommodation, as there has been some confusion about the roles of Inside Out, the local authority Housing Officer, and Children’s Social Care - which has impacted negatively upon accommodation planning. Children’s and Young People’s Services – Children’s Social Care and the Leaving Care team in particular - need to know more about the work of the Consortium, and CAMHS should also be more directly involved in supporting the resettlement work. There has however been some successful delivery of training to local authority staff around the Southwark judgement, as the regional nature of the Consortium enabled members to identify that local authorities were being inconsistent in their response to the Southwark ruling, and devise a method of addressing this.

The Consortium has also been helpful in providing advice and support to Brent Knoll House (a new resettlement hostel) in developing its policies and procedures. Provision of training and support in delivery. But perversely, application for, and award of the BIG lottery Youth In Focus grant for resettlement services created a sub-group within the Consortium that unintentionally excluded other service providers and may have made them question their role in ongoing resettlement work. Whilst bringing substantial new resources into the area, this development may also have simultaneously reduced the variety of providers involved in resettlement activity locally, and some stakeholders are concerned that delivery will be skewed away from broader partnership work.

Whilst it is not undesirable to expand the Consortium membership indefinitely, it could have been helpful to have health and substance misuse input at an earlier stage. In particular, custodial health professionals need to communicate better with their community counterparts about the young people being released. There is also a substantial cohort of young people who have been transferred to probation upon release because of their age. The potential role of the probation service furthering the work of the resettlement consortium could also have been capitalized upon as ‘transition issues’ are well recognised among Consortium members.

Several stakeholders commented that the Consortium would have benefited from a stronger practitioner focus. Although an Implementation Group has been developed, it has been slow to take off, and is unlikely to involve a direct case management approach (which Yots had decided against – keeping this at the individual Yot level). Such developments are difficult to establish and maintain in times of substantial resource loss, such as those experienced by YOTs over the past few years. Indeed, it is important to recognise that the

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92 Looked After Children managers are beginning to attend the Consortium Board meetings, as the focus turns to the 1625 resettlement project funded through the BIG Lottery Youth In Focus programme.
93 In relation to the requirement to provide accommodation for 16-17 year old homeless people.
94 The National Treatment Agency have recently become involved in the Consortium, through their lead with responsibility for substance misuse services - both in the secure estate and the funding/monitoring of community services.
95 For example: the Resettlement Panel approach adopted in Wales.
Consortium may have played an important role in making sure that partner contributions are *maintained* and *stabilised* during this period of public sector contraction – keeping key stakeholders focused on developing practice and imposing informal group accountability.

**Influencing working practices**

Whilst the key components of the enhanced offer as delivered in the South West may not differ substantially from what would previously be considered to be ‘best-practice business-as-usual’, the regional focus of the Consortium allows resettlement support to respond to young people’s multiple needs by (1) providing through the gate work to provide seamless access to support in the community; and (2) offering community support that extends past the licence period – even where people move to a new local authority area (as long as it is within the Consortium region). Service development has to evolve in two slightly tangential directions: firstly, to provide more resettlement resources for young people, but second, to do so in a joined-up way so that the numbers of individuals/agencies that young people have to liaise with are minimized/streamlined – to prevent overloading the young person.

**Key advantages of the Consortium approach:**

1. *Increased collaboration between partners and with local authorities*

   There has been notably more collaboration between partners and local authorities, resulting in a more constructive and consistent approach to resettlement. The Consortium has been effective at getting key partners together and maintaining communication. It has also driven forward effective practice: improving awareness of young people’s resettlement needs; demonstrating the importance of through the gate continuity of care; and facilitating some of the third sector partners to offer work placements for young people returning to the community. The Consortium has been able to quash concerns that in these times of public sector cutbacks, fewer prison visits and less support will be delivered to young people in custody.

2. *Increasing the consistency of resettlement practice through the ‘enhanced offer’*

   The main value of the Consortium was thought to be its potential to deliver greater consistency in planning for release from the very start of all young people’s custodial sentences. This was thought to be particularly beneficial in giving young people the chance to consider their resettlement options whilst in custody - rather than having it thrust on them as they return to the community. As a result, young people should feel more confident that their resettlement needs are being addressed from the outset of their sentence, should therefore feel more supported in custody, more in control of what happening to them, and hopefully more motivated to engage with the positive aspects of custody. Taking advantage of opportunities to get involved in active resettlement planning could thus help to allay young people’s fears about both loss of control in custody and what might happen to them upon return into the community.
• **Practitioner development and sharing knowledge of effective practice**

The Consortium was also perceived to have been valuable in keeping practitioners alert to the wide range of young people’s needs and in expanding their understanding of resettlement approaches from across the region. As a result, resettlement is addressed in a broader way: with case managers more assertive at getting young people engaged in mentoring and other opportunities; young people now more likely to have activities and/or support in place over the first weekend that they are released back in the community; and case managers are more likely to be able to get resources in place to continue support for the young person once their licence expires. In contrast, prior to the Consortium’s existence, voluntary services (such as the Construction Youth Trust) could only offer work experience placements to the most engaged young people, and actual work was only available for young people who had a CSCS card – making such opportunities few and far between.

• **Better use of resources through information sharing**

By creating networks of practitioners and managers focused on enhancing resettlement processes, and by increasing knowledge of resources available locally, the Regional Resettlement Consortium in the South West has undoubtedly benefited cohort members. But without any specific tasks, targets, or contribution required from Board members (other than sharing information), it is difficult to drive through substantial changes over a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, many positive steps have been taken, including: the championing of good practice locally; increasing practitioner awareness of resources; strengthening interagency cooperation; the development of proactive resettlement planning; and the pooling third sector resources (which smaller YOTs operating alone may not have been able to create sufficient demand for, but working as a consortium they are able to access such services for the young people they work with). By increasing practitioner awareness of resettlement resources, service providers can reduce the amount of time spent researching sources of support and advocating on behalf of their client. Instead, practitioners can focus on delivering their specialist service - which for YOT practitioners means that they can concentrate on interventions to reduce likelihood of reoffending, rather than spending a lot of time addressing practical issues.

**Enablers and barriers to the regional consortium approach**

Among local stakeholders, there was wide recognition of the substantial benefits derived from the work of the Resettlement Consortium, along with acknowledgement of the lessons learnt and the barriers that still need addressing. These include that:

• Accommodation and ETE support needs to be lined up for young people to access immediately upon release from custody.

• Either Consortia need to be made up of YOTs with similar levels of resettlement experience, or additional resources need to be made available to enable less developed YOTs to catch up – so that ‘pioneer’ YOTs do not feel that they are ‘treading water’.
Consortia need to focus on developing very wide networks of partners to support young people through the different stages of their resettlement and a very transparent process is necessary to hold them to account. Clear pathways need developing for young people and one of the Consortium’s roles should be to ensure that all parties share responsibility to deliver positive outcomes. It may be useful to develop a panel model to achieve this (similar to that used in Wales) – providing a more strategic focus to case management and ensuring that resource provision is responsive to the needs of the cohort.

It is important for stakeholders to understand more about young people’s resettlement support needs – following young people’s outcomes for several months after leaving custody and undertaking resettlement gap analysis, perhaps leading to longer-term resettlement planning. One stakeholder commented that ‘We are fooling ourselves to think that custody is a deterrent, so my answer is that more investment must be put into prevention, particularly prevention around the siblings of young offenders.’

It needs to be recognised that there is only very limited capacity to institute change within the secure estate at the local/regional level. Many of the barriers to developing more effective resettlement that emanate from the institutions can only be addressed through new prison service orders.

Given the down-turn in the economy it is increasingly difficult to respond to young people’s ETE needs. The Consortium may well have prevented agencies from pulling out of partnership working and retreating into silo working. So whilst more development is still needed within key local authority departments, and although gaps remain in ETE, positive activities, and sustained support/mentoring, the situation would likely be much worse without the existence of the Regional Resettlement Consortium approach.

Legacy

The SWRC Consortium was not designed as a time-limited project with the aim of leaving a legacy, but was rather considered to be a long-term development process that would evolve good practice. Emphasis has been placed on the natural evolution of existing resettlement good practice, rather than thinking in terms of ‘problems that needed to be addressed’. Thus, the SWRC protocol describes how it was intended that the Consortium would be ‘building on the success of youth offending team partnerships and secure establishments, in reducing re-offending, managing risk and improving outcomes for children and young people leaving custody.’

However, the successful application by key partners within the Consortium for BIG Lottery Youth In Focus programme funds means that additional resources for resettlement support are available locally until March 2016. Whilst the funding for the Consortium project manager post ceases in July 2012, the Management Board is considering how the regional

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96 It was suggested by one stakeholder that the Consortium approach was based on some unrealistic expectations about the ease of being able to engage local authorities in resettlement work.
coordination of resettlement work could be kept ongoing - perhaps funded through external sources, or developing the Consortium as a social enterprise.

Summary

A largely ‘organic’ development approach has been taken by the South West Consortium – reacting to issues as they arise, rather than specifying targets / desired progress from the outset. Whilst this has been valuable in creating and strengthening practitioner networks and in increasing awareness of resources that can be accessed for resettlement planning, information sharing between custody and community remains limited. Consortium meetings are used to raise awareness of specific aspects of custodial management (such as the role of the chaplaincy service, use of ROTL etc.), but there is insufficient strategic engagement to allow for consideration of how policies and procedures might be changed to further improve the resettlement process. Moreover, whilst there is a desire on behalf of custody staff to share information about what young people have achieved in custody, they remain unsure about who to share it with, whilst also desiring more post-release information about young people’s outcomes – so that they can begin to assess the effectiveness of their work.

Although Yots decided against it, the Consortium may have benefited from more of an implementation focus – with a case management approach that enabled individual young people’s needs to be identified and any barriers to responding to their needs discussed for action. By building up more detailed insight into young people’s real support needs, comparative analyses can be undertaken across each of the three institutions - to learn about potential resettlement models and the outcomes that these can achieve.
PART 3: THE CLIENT EXPERIENCE/IMPACT EVALUATION

6 Who were the young people?

This chapter provides a summary of the profile of young people who received the “enhanced offer”. After giving a breakdown of the throughput of young people, we then look at their basic demographics, care history and educational background. We then consider the offending history of those involved, including the offences for which they received this most recent custodial sentence. The chapter then finally considers the stated “needs” of the children, and what agencies their caseworkers considered that it would be necessary to involve in order to address these and prevent reoffending. The chapter concludes by suggesting what the “typical” profile of a young person receiving the enhanced offer would look like.

Numbers receiving the enhanced offer

During the 19 month period from September 2010 to March 2012 (our analysis period), there were 82 young people released from custody to the supervision of YOTs in the SWRC areas (who have now completed at least 3 months licence). This is the cohort considered to have received “the enhanced offer”. Although this is not offered in any formal sense to the young people on an individual basis, it is used as shorthand in this report for meaning receiving the benefits that the SWRC is intended to bring to those young people within its care. In addition, there were 20 young people who were too old by the time of release to be handled by the youth justice services, so were transferred to the care of adult probation. It is arguable whether they should be considered to have received “the enhanced offer” as probation was a partner within the consortium, but they were too old to be considered part of the youth justice system. In the end, they are excluded from this evaluation, partly because no data were available from probation.

If nothing else, this does raise some policy questions whether these young adults, who receive DTOs but are then transferred out of the system should continue to benefit from an enhanced offer received by juveniles. Is it in the Local Authority’s interests to continue to work with them in the same way? If it is, then the consortium may point the way. Whether or not it is or is not, the experience with the data here also raises questions about the compatibility between records systems of the two age groups and how that affects continuity of support. Conversely, as we’ve found in this case, if these systems do not speak to each other, it should raise concerns about how local youth justice services will monitor progress in resettlement cases.

The table below shows that almost a third of the young people came from Bristol (32 per cent) with another 22 per cent coming from Somerset. Bath and North East Somerset and South Gloucestershire only each had a handful of young people released to them from custody over the period in which they have been involved with the consortia.
The numbers from each Yot area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yot area</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath and North East Somerset</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Somerset</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Gloucestershire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 82; all

Over 19 months, the 82 young people average out at a median average of 4 young people every month being released from custody into the supervision of SWRC YOTs (mean average of 4.32) (see table and chart below). Apart from two peak months (9 in January 2011 and 10 in August 2011), the numbers being released into the consortium area have been very steady each month, deviating only 2 either side of the mean.

The numbers released from custody in each month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>January</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 168; all
The median average length of DTO sentence that was being served by the young people receiving the enhanced offer was 8 months (median 8.47 months). However, the chart below shows that it was only just less than half (49 per cent) that were serving short sentences of 4 or 6 months. At the other extreme, more than one in every eight young people was serving a sentence of 18 months or more.
Overall, these sentence lengths meant that the median average length of time that a young person received the enhanced offer in the community was 3 months (90.5 days), but the mean average length is considerably longer at closer to 4.62 months (138.56 days). As such, a good proportion of young people had substantially longer involvement with the SWRC on release because of those longer sentences. In fact, length of community involvement, not including the time consortium partners spent with the young person in custody, ranged from 0 days for a 2 month DTO (and excluded from some of our analysis) up to 904 days (which must have involved consecutive sentences). This all means that the enhanced offer cohort, like any DTOs, received very different lengths of support within their licence period, necessitating different approaches and programmes.

**Gender, age and ethnicity**

The large majority of the young people in the cohort were male (93 per cent), although the number of females (7 per cent) was slightly more than in the general juvenile secure estate (5 per cent)\(^98\) (see chart below).  

The ethnicity of the young people is shown in the table below. Reflecting the juvenile prison population, the majority of young people were white. In fact, the 74 per cent white was about 10 per cent higher than in the rest of the juvenile secure estate. The next biggest group was Mixed, which accounted for almost 1 in every 5 young people (19 per cent).

**Ethnicity of young people**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/ Black British</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Base = 81; 1 missing**

The age of the young people at the time of sentencing, and so (apart from the earliest) the start of their involvement with SWRC partners, is shown in the graph below. As would be
expected from the profile in the secure juvenile estate, the vast majority of young people were between 15 and 17 years of age (94 per cent, which is 1 per cent less than the equivalent population). Indeed, almost 9 in 10 of the cohort were 16 or 17 years old (88 per cent). Reflecting the skew to the upper age, the mean age of 16.24 years was higher than the median average of 16 years old.

**Age of young people on starting the enhanced offer (going into custody)**

![Age distribution chart]

Base = 82; all

**Care history**

Given that it is already well established that young people in the youth justice system (and in custody in particular) have had a disproportionate involvement with care services during childhood, it comes as no surprise that the young people receiving the enhanced offer have a substantial care history. As a summary figure, two in five of the young people (40 per cent) had been “looked after” by their Local Authority at some point in their lives. Moreover, more than one in every five of those involved with the consortium partners (21 per cent) was in the care of the Local Authority at the time that they started their custodial sentence.
A range of other working definitions of vulnerability and risk during childhood were applicable to the cohort. The table below details the involvement of the young people with the care services. More than three quarters had previous contact with social services (77 per cent), and four in five had siblings in a similar situation (81 per cent). Around or more than a quarter of the young people had been on the child protection register, voluntarily accommodated, had a Care Order, been remanded to LA accommodation and been an eligible child in need.
Social care background of the young people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of social care</th>
<th>Immediately prior to custody</th>
<th>At any time</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Soc Services</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibling in contact with SS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked after</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Child Protection Reg</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Accomm</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care Order</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remanded to LA Accomm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible child</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant child</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = All; missing as stated

The instability in childhood implied by these figures was only partially mirrored by the Yot’s rating of the suitability of the young people’s housing at the time of sentencing. The large majority (83 per cent) were considered to be in suitable housing immediately prior to going into custody. However, this still meant that around 1 in every six young people was in unsuitable accommodation prior to being locked up.

However, the extent of their care history was reflected in the vulnerability of the young people at the start of their sentences. According to their Yot case workers, the majority (51 per cent) were rated as having medium or above vulnerability at the time of going into custody.

Education, training and employment background

The existing level of educational attainment for those starting to receive the enhanced offer was very low. Despite the fact that about half of young people were past the age that GCSEs would normally be taken, three quarters (75 per cent) had no qualifications (Base = 71; 11 missing). This figure seems to reflect a wider lack of engagement with education, training or employment (ETE) prior to custody. Indeed, the chart below shows that the majority of young people (53 per cent) were not involved with ETE at the time of sentencing. Only a very small minority (8 per cent) had any form of employment.
Offending behaviour and criminal justice background

The young people had a long and substantial criminal history before their current custodial sentence. On average, they started offending around age 12 (mean average = 12.67 years; median 12 years). This is younger than the mean ages shown in our previous research with this population in custody and resettlement projects (e.g. Hazel et al, 2002). As the chart below shows, there was some spread to this figure from 10 years old to 17 years old, but with a skew to the lower end.
The cohort had a mean average of 7.15 convictions previous to the DTO (median of 6; Base = all), although there was a substantial range from no previous convictions to 39 previous convictions. Just less than a quarter (22 per cent) had 10 or more previous convictions, with 6.2 per cent having an average of 15 or more convictions.

### Number of previous custodial sentences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of previous custodial sentences</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, a substantial minority of the young people had been in custody before. According to the table above, more than a quarter of them (26 per cent) had received a previous custodial sentence, with more than half of those (14 per cent of all) having been inside more than once before.
It is perhaps not surprising then, that more than two thirds of the young people (70 per cent) had been designated a "Deter Young Person" at some point prior to their current sentence. That label is given to young people considered at particularly high risk of offending.

**Current offences**

What did the young people receive their current custodial sentence for? It is very difficult to pinpoint the particular index offence that prompted the DTO because these custodial sentences are often given for a combination of offences. The picture is even more complex when considered within the context of the Scaled Approach. However, it is possible to note all the offences that were considered at the time when the sentence was given, and these are listed in the table below. The most common offence for which a DTO was imposed was breach of statutory orders (47 per cent). This high number means that a substantial proportion have a recent history of non-cooperation with the authorities - which would suggest a significant challenge for the SWRC in trying to ensure resettlement and compliance to licence conditions. The next most common offences were violence against the person 24 (per cent) and theft or handling stolen goods (27 per cent). Robbery against the person was only involved for about one in five cases (20 per cent). Reflecting the change in patterns of offending over the last 10 years, the highest cause of a custodial sentence when the DTO was evaluated in 2002, vehicle taking (which was then linked to a third of offenders), was only involved for 11 per cent of the offenders.

**Table: Offences for which current sentence being served**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of statutory orders</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the person</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft or handling stolen goods</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bail breach</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-domestic burglary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motoring offences</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle taking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death by dangerous driving</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 81; 1 missing. Totals add up to more than 100% because possible for the DTO to be for more than 1 offence.
The needs of the young people

At the start of their involvement with the SWRC, the young people were generally considered to be likely to reoffend after custody. The median average ASSET score rating received at this time was 33 [dynamic and static factors], which means that the majority of the young people were considered to be highly likely to reoffend when they were eventually released (subject to intervention). Indeed, about one in seven young people had a score of 40 or more (Base = 79; 3 missing). Again, this underlines the scale of the difficulty facing the resettlement consortium in trying to reduce the chances of reoffending. The ASSET score is calculated by looking at the young person’s needs and problems across a whole range of areas, and scores that high suggest substantial problems to be tackled in several of these.

That assessment is supported by the various needs of the young people detailed to us by the Yots. Before each young person left custody, we asked the Yots to record what needs the young person has that might hinder successful resettlement. The results, in the table above, confirmed a range of needs for a substantial proportion of the cohort receiving the enhanced offer. Not surprising, the biggest need was to address offending behaviour for three quarters of young people (77 per cent) – indeed, perhaps this is lower than one would expect for young people in custody. The two other needs for the majority of the children were education, training and employment for three in five (60 per cent) and drugs for just over half (54 per cent). Several other issues were areas of need each for a substantial minority, including living arrangements (42 per cent), family issues (32 per cent), motivation to change (24 per cent), social skills and perceptions (23 per cent), and constructive or purposeful activities (23 per cent). In addition, victim awareness (22 per cent), life skills (21 per cent) and lifestyle (21 per cent) were each considered to hinder the resettlement of about one in five young people.
### Table: Areas of need that may hinder resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of need</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offending behaviour</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive activities</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger management</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETE</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low qualifications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living arrangements</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical health</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim awareness</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to change</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer pressure</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social skills and perceptions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 79; 3 missing

Each of these alone was considered to possibly hinder successful resettlement. However, as the chart below shows, for almost all of the young people (92 per cent), Yots identified multiple areas of need that would need addressing. Indeed, on average, it was considered that the young person had four different areas of need that could hinder resettlement (median = 4, mean = 4.58), and a quarter had six or more that would need to be addressed.
This clearly presented a complex task during the licence period, and pointed to needing multiple agencies offered by the consortium concept. Indeed, that approach was confirmed when asking the Yots before the young person left custody which agencies they planned to involve in addressing their needs. The median average number of agencies they planned to intervene during the licence period was 3. However, the mean average was a little higher at 3.27, meaning that it was planned to provide a small number of young people with a disproportionately high number of agencies’ support. Although there was 1 per cent where no agencies were to be involved, five or more agencies were planned to be involved a quarter of cases (25 per cent) (see chart below).
Apart from other Yot colleagues (61 per cent), the only agency to be considered needed for the majority was Connexions (53 per cent). However, as the table below shows, there were six other agencies where Yots intended them be involved in at least one in five young people. It is clear that each enhanced offer would involve the coordination of a number of agencies to address multiple needs.
**Summary**

From the data, it has been possible to present a picture of the young people as they start to be involved with SWRC partners. This also gives us some idea about the type of person requiring resettlement work more generally. It is a picture of a young person very well known to social services, disengaged from ETE, with an established criminal history and multiple areas of needs that increase the risk of reoffending. In short, just about the most challenging combination for successful resettlement to be achieved. To illustrate this picture more clearly, the ‘typical’ profile of a young person who was involved with the SWRC partners is described through an homunculus in the box below:

- Male
- Probably white
- Probably released into the community in 2011
- Probably on a sentence of less 8 months or less

---

**Agencies the workers intended to be involved in addressing need**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of young people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connexions</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs agencies</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Offender Mgt.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning mentor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services (over 16s)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports development officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Youth Trust</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other YOT workers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Consortium Partners</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education agencies</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMHS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s services</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training providers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money advice services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Knoll House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local JCP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 74; 8 missing
- Older juvenile (16 or 17 years old)
- Possibly in care at one time or another (two in five chance)
- Have a history with social services, as do siblings
- Quite likely to have been an eligible child at one point
- Possibly been on the Child Protection Register
- Quite possibly subject to a Care Order in the past, been voluntarily accommodated and possibly remanded to LA accommodation
- Living in suitable accommodation before custody
- Probably vulnerable
- Probably not in any ETE, and have no qualifications
- If in ETE, it's certainly unlikely to be employment
- Started offending around aged 11 to 12 years old
- Already have at least 6 or 7 convictions
- Probably not been in custody yet (but if have, just as likely to have been multiple times)
- A “Deter Young Person”
- Probably in custody partly because breached a previous Order (or bail)
- Considered to be at a high risk of reoffending on ASSET
- Have multiple areas of need (probably about four)
- Probably have substance misuse issues
- Possibly have family issues that need addressing
- Possibly have a issues with my living arrangements or housing
- Will need the help of multiple agencies for successful resettlement
7 Receiving the enhanced offer

Having established in the last chapter that the young people had multiple needs that needed addressing during the resettlement period, this chapter goes on to look at what support the young person received and engaged with after release. After we establish where the young people were placed in custody, we look at what preparatory support for resettlement was given to the young person in custody, partly to see how joined up the sentence was able to be. Then, we look at whether the SWRC was able to address all the needs identified in the young person previously, and what agencies were involved. Some needs are then considered more closely, including housing needs and ETE.

Custody and preparation for release

About little more than three quarters of the young people who received the enhanced offer of support from the SWRC were placed in HMYOI Ashfield for their final institution before release. Of the remainder, 12 per cent were equally split between Rainsbrook STC and Vinney Green Secure Unit. The other four institutions took the remaining 11 per cent between them.

Final custodial institution before release for the young people

Base = 79; 3 missing
We only received information about the mobility while in custody of 42 of the 82 young people, but this number showed that only two had moved institutions. This is a shift from the evaluation of the DTO (2002), where it was found that a fifth of ‘trainees’ had been transferred from one institution to another during the period in custody.

As the disposal given to the young person was meant to be served half in custody and half the time in the community under supervision, it is intended that the two parts form a continuous sentence. As such, it might be expected (and the research in the literature review in this report supported) that (a) there would be work going on while in custody to plan for effective resettlement and (b) the young person themselves would be prepared in some way for release.

In terms of planning, there are DTO review meetings held in custody, attended by interested parties. In the case of meetings for young people receiving the enhanced offer, these (in total) were each attended by a median average of 1 different agency in addition to the Yot caseworker (mean = 1.43). The table below shows that a representative from Social Services was the most likely agency to have attended meetings inside, for 41 per cent. IRS was next most prolific, attending meetings for a third of young people (33 per cent). Connexions (23 percent) and substance misuse agencies (26%) each went for about a quarter of the children. These numbers are a positive change from the picture at the time of the DTO evaluation (Hazel et al, 2002), when only 10 per cent of cases saw any involvement from outside agencies other than the Yot.

### Agencies attending DTO meetings in the institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connexions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMHS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care home keyworker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs agency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education agency</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim awareness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health agency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 61; 21 missing

Two-thirds of young people (66 per cent; Base=38, 44 missing) attended a pre-release course in order to help them prepare and adjust for resettlement, but the data was not made available for a good proportion, so this result should be taken with caution. That kind of adjustment, and preparations for release may be made easier by the prison allowing
release on temporary licence (ROTL). This allows the young person time to de-institutionalise, and help with the preparations for ETE, housing and other support ready for resettlement. However, only a fairly minority were able to take advantage of ROTL (16 per cent; Base=71; 11 missing). An even smaller number were given an Assisted ROTL to help with resettlement (3 per cent; Base=6; 13 missing).

**Transition in addressing offending behaviour**

A key aspect of a continuous custody-community sentence like the DTO is to be able to provide a coherent programme across both parts to address the offending behaviour of the young person. In theory, by closer working between the SWRC and the custodial institutions like Ashfield, the young person’s offending behaviour will be addressed in such a way. Certainly, the need to address offending behaviour was identified as necessary to address above.

Certainly, according to the Yots, programmes addressing offending behaviour were given to three quarters of young people while in custody (75 per cent; Base = 60; 22 missing). However, the chart below shows that the Yots were able to obtain full information on what addressing offending behaviour activity had taken place inside for only about a third (35 per cent). Partial information was obtained for another 28 per cent, which left more than a third of young people (37 per cent) with no information passed from the custodial institution.

**Extent of information on addressing offending behaviour activity available from institutions for after custody**

![Graph showing extent of information on addressing offending behaviour activity available from institutions for after custody.](image)

*Base = 68; 14 missing*
As the chart above show, those figures are better than the RESET project six years ago, but worse than the ‘baseline’ figures in the DTO evaluation ten years ago, when full information on addressing offending behaviour work was transferred for about half of young people. While it is possible that Yot workers’ expectations may have risen in this time in relation to what is ‘partial’ information, it is concerning that the professionals in the community do not seem to be able to access information from the custodial institution.

It is perhaps not surprising then that only a third of young people (33 per cent), similar to the full information figure, were able to have a continuous programme in addressing offending behaviour, spanning both the custody and community elements. This is about half the figure found in the DTO evaluation. Again, though, it is possible that Yot workers’ expectations have risen, although this figure and the lack of information flow combined does suggest a problem with communication between key workers inside and those in the community.

*Extent to which YOT workers consider it possible to form a continuous programme in addressing offending behaviour*

![Bar chart showing percentages of young people.](chart)

**Base = 76; 6 missing**

**Tackling needs**

In the previous chapter we looked at the different areas of need for each young person that may hinder resettlement. We noted that a median average of 4 areas of need were identified (mean was 4.48). During the licence period, the median number of these areas actually addressed, according YOTs, was 3 (mean = 3.61). The fact that the mean average
was somewhat higher than the median indicates that a minority of young people received support in a disproportionately high number of areas.

Although the number of cases where no areas of need were addressed (n16) was substantially more than those where no help was intended (n1), most of the young people had multiple areas of need addressed. One in five young people had at least six needs addressed (20 per cent) rather than the one in four (25 per cent) where there were six need identified.

**Count of areas of need that were addressed during the licence period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of areas</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 82; All

The table below shows that three areas were tackled in the majority of cases. Offending behaviour (whether a continuous programme or not) was addressed for almost all the young people (90 per cent), with drugs being the next most tackled area (61 per cent) and then needing purposeful activities (52 per cent). Family issues (41 per cent), unemployment (39 per cent) and anger management (33 per cent) were each addressed more than a third of cases.

The table below shows that two areas were tackled in the majority of cases. Offending behaviour (whether a continuous programme or not) was addressed for four out of five young people (82 per cent), with ETE being the next most tackled area, for almost a quarter (73 per cent). Drugs issues were also tackled in almost half of cases (46 per cent).
Table: Areas of need tackled during licence period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of need</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offending behaviour</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive activities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger management</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETE</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low qualifications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living arrangements</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim awareness</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to change</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer pressure</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social skills and perceptions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 66; 16 missing

How do the percentage of cases addressed for each area compare with the needs identified? The table below lists the extent to which the percentage of young people for each area tackled was more or less than the percentage with identified need. We find that in eight areas, less young people had the issue tackled than those where need was identified. These were: drug misuse; family problems; living arrangements; physical health; self-esteem; motivation to change; peer pressure, and social skills and perceptions. These topics may be taken as an indication of the areas hardest needs for the SWRC to tackle in reality. The biggest drop between expected help and the issue being tackled was in living arrangements, suggesting that case workers found it difficult to arrange for the young person to be engaged with housing organisations.
Table: How much the required need was actually addressed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of need</th>
<th>Percentage need</th>
<th>Percentage tackled</th>
<th>More or less than needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offending behaviour</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>5% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive activities</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>8% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger management</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETE</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>13% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low qualifications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living arrangements</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical health</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim awareness</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>7% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to change</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer pressure</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social skills and perceptions</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5% less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 66; 16 missing

In contrast, some areas of need were tackled in substantially more cases than planned. In particular, ETE was tackled in 13 per cent more cases than planned, and victim awareness and constructive activities in 7 per cent of cases. As such, these either mean that unexpected problems came about in these areas during the licence period, or may be considered areas that it is easier to address during resettlement.

**Planned and actual agency involvement**

It is perhaps reasonable to hypothesise that the some areas of need are harder to address because it is harder to arrange help from agencies responsible for those. Certainly, it can be noted that the two areas in the table above where the tackled:need ratio was healthiest were both areas where it would be possible for the YOT or even caseworker to lead, without outside help.

So, were the shifts in whether areas of need were tackled reflected in whether planned agencies were involved? Yes, the average number of agencies actually involved was slightly less than planned (median = 2, mean = 2.4). However, what is rather concerning is that for a quarter of all young people (26 per cent), no other agencies were involved other than the YOT. And rather than the quarter of young people planned to see six or more agencies, this actually only happened for 16 per cent (see the table and chart below).
**Count of agencies involved in supervision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of agencies</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 82; All

**Count of agencies planned and actually involved in supervision**

Appropriate to the needs identified, some agencies were involved with more young people than others. Beyond fellow YOT officers, Connexions was actually the most involved agency, helping half of young people (49 per cent). This was followed by substance misuse agencies (36 per cent), usefully other consortium partners (34 per cent) and Social Services for over 16s (21 per cent) These four were the only external agencies involved by the Yot workers with more than one in five young people. It does show that incorporating partners is possible, but that this was only done with a few agencies substantially. There is clearly more scope to involve more agencies more of the time.
Agencies involved with young people during licence period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of young people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connexions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs agencies</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Offender Mgt.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning mentor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services (over 16s)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports development officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Youth Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other YOT workers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Consortium Partners</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education agencies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMHS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training providers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money advice services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Knoll House</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local JCP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 61; 21 missing

So, does this mean that some agencies were more difficult to involve than planned? Like the areas of need, there were some agencies involved with more young people than planned, and some involved with less – and again, this would suggest that some of the agencies were easier to engage with or coordinate than others (see table below). Six agencies were involved with more young people as planned, five as planned, and 13 less than planned. Those more than planned included 11 per cent more young people involved with Integrated Offender Management and 10 per cent more with other consortium partners. The latter clearly fitted with the consortium ethos. As we suspected from the lack of help with housing needs, the biggest drop between planned and actual agency help was with housing agencies, where they were used 15 per cent less than planned. Clearly, this suggests underlines the possibility of real problems engaging with housing and education agencies, to the detriment of addressing young people’s needs.
We will now consider some particular needs identified in previous research as important for resettlement success (see the literature review). Given the apparent problem engaging with housing agencies and addressing housing needs, we'll focus first on accommodation. The table below shows that just 16 per cent of the young people went to live with at least one of their parents on immediate release from custody. This figure is very much lower than found in previous studies. For instance, it is more than four times less than the 72 per cent of children in the DTO evaluation who went to stay in the parental home after release. This may suggest less stability in accommodation. Instead, the most common destination after custody was supported accommodation, where 28 per cent of young people went.

### Agencies involved with young people during licence period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Percentage planned</th>
<th>Percentage engaged</th>
<th>More or less than planned?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connexions</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>4% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs agencies</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Offender Mgt.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning mentor</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services (over 16s)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports development officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Youth Trust</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other YOT workers</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>13% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Consortium Partners</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education agencies</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMHS</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s services</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training providers</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation workers</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth services</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1% less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money advice services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>As planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Knoll House</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4% more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local JCP</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1% less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 61; 21 missing

### Housing

We will now consider some particular needs identified in previous research as important for resettlement success (see the literature review). Given the apparent problem engaging with housing agencies and addressing housing needs, we'll focus first on accommodation. The table below shows that just 16 per cent of the young people went to live with at least one of their parents on immediate release from custody. This figure is very much lower than found in previous studies. For instance, it is more than four times less than the 72 per cent of children in the DTO evaluation who went to stay in the parental home after release. This may suggest less stability in accommodation. Instead, the most common destination after custody was supported accommodation, where 28 per cent of young people went.
**Accommodation on release from custody**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental home</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With other relatives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Home</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported accommodation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 78; 4 missing

Despite not relying on the parental home, accommodation was clearly integrated into the planning for release done by SWRC partners, with only a small proportion of young people (7 per cent) not having had accommodation arranged or confirmed more than 24 hours prior to their release.

**Was accommodation confirmed more than 24 hours prior to release?**

![Diagram showing 93% confirmed, 7% not confirmed]

Base = 77; 5 missing

The young people who lived with their parents when they were released did live fairly stably throughout their period. Of the 36 young people who stayed in the parental home when they were first released, the large majority (86%, n31) lived there throughout their licence
period. The percentage who lived at the parental home at any time during the licence period (48 per cent) was also lower than the 78 per cent figure from the DTO evaluation and the 56 per cent equivalent in the RESET project. This difference may reflect differences in age groups, but it does show that finding accommodation away from the family home was more of an issue with this group than the evaluation of ten years ago. However, the parental home was the most popular type of accommodation, with the next most likely place to stay at some point during the licence being supported accommodation (35 per cent).

**Places stayed in the community at any time during the licence period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Frequency of all</th>
<th>Percentage of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental home</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With other relatives</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Home</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With friends</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported accommodation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent housing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fixed abode</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absconded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 79; 3 missing. Totals add up to more than 100% because can stay more than 1 place

The proportion of young people in suitable housing was higher at the end of the licence period than before (94 per cent compared to 83 per cent), although it was even higher at the time of release (to 96 per cent). Unlike the previous RESET resettlement project, there was a significant improvement between accommodation at the start and the end of a young person’s sentence in the SWRC (McNemar Test). As such, although we do not have data for this from the comparison group, there is evidence here that despite the difficulties in addressing housing need and engaging housing agencies, that the young people in the SWRC did very well in accommodation. The consortium seemed to help with accommodation.
Trend in suitability of accommodation compared to previous project

The findings in relation to the young people’s involvement in education, training and employment were mixed, but were largely positive. This is despite the poor background in ETE engagement for this group. The chart below shows that three quarters of the young people (76 per cent) were involved with ETE activity at some point during their supervision period. This is significantly better than the DTO evaluation where the figure was about half (53 per cent; Binomial Test). Of those engaged at some point, 60 per cent were involved for at least a month. About one in six of the cohort (16 per cent) started but were only in ETE for less than a week of the supervision period.

Importantly, the 76 per cent attendance figure is significantly higher than the 47 per cent attending ETE in the comparison group from the year before the enhanced offer (Binomial Test), suggesting that the SWRC did make a big difference to ensuring at least some ETE engagement.
Indeed, making that difference through support seems to be suggested by the figures for agencies managing to arrange education successfully in the first place (whether or not attended). The chart below shows that ETE was arranged for the large majority of the young people (85 per cent).

A further 8 per cent were working on their employability with Connexions (or at least had this arranged), which could be considered another form of training. As such, only 7 per cent of young people had no ETE related activity arranged during the licence period which, although important to address, is substantially better than previously found.
There does, however, appear to be a delay in organising these arrangements, which risks losing the engagement and compliance of young people when they first come out of custody. Just less than half of young people did not have ETE arranged by the time of their release. This is an issue found in previous research (e.g. Hazel et al, 2002).
Consequently, it is worth considering briefly what was happening in relation to communication between the custodial institution and community agencies about education to help with this transition period. According to the YOT’s rating, they received full information on the child’s education and training activity while in custody in just over half of cases (55 per cent). They received partial information for a further quarter (22 per cent). The full information figure is the same as found in the DTO evaluation but less than the RESET figure (see the chart below). So, this suggests that there were not substantial problems in communication, although no real improvement.

**Extent of information on education and training available from institutions for after custody**

![Diagram showing extent of information on education and training available from institutions for after custody](image)

Base = 73; 9 missing

Oddly, however, despite this improved communication, Yots felt that less than half of young people (43 per cent) were able to have a continuous programme in education or training (see the chart below).
Extent to which it was possible to form a continuous programme in education or training (for those where education or training was set up)

Base = 51 (all those where education or training was set-up); 3 missing

The effort in arranging education and the increase in attendance is still evident at the end of the licence period where half are still engaged.

Percentage of young people in ETE at the end of the licence period

Base = 63; 19 missing
It should be noted that a small number of young people were apprenticed during the licence period (8 per cent).

**Percentage of young people apprenticed at any point**

Base = 62; 20 missing

In summary, the flow diagram below shows the pathway of arrangement and attendance in ETE during the course of the licence period.

**Young people’s pathways to ETE success**

- All young people: 100%
- ETE Arranged: 77%
- ETE Attended: 76%
- ETE at end: 40%

Base = 62; 20 missing
Risk of Reoffending: ASSET Scores

Overall, the young people had a significantly lower ASSET scores by the end of their involvement with the enhanced offer compared with the their release, and then again compared with the start (One way ANOVA Test [Greenhouse-Geisser] and Friedman Test]. The mean average score dropped from 31.47 to 27.42. A drop of some kind is expected after an intervention, but it was not significantly better than the comparison group. The average drop in ASSET scores for the cohort was 3.73, which wasn’t significantly different from the comparison group (Independent samples T test; Mann Whitney; Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test; Independent sample median)

Trend in ASSET scores compared to comparison group

Summary

This chapter has considered the provision for young people involved with the SWRC, looking at the support they had and how it affected their needs and risk factors. The consortium clearly made some differences with these “soft” indicators of success, although it was clearly easier to meet some than others, with perhaps difficulties working with some agencies.

On the negative side, the communication between custody and community agencies was very poor in places, including in relation to addressing offending behaviour, preventing consistent and continuous work to be done with the young person. In addition, there seemed identified needs in young people that couldn’t be met, and a substantial minority
that did not get any of their needs addressed. Likewise, there were real problems ensuring that many agencies worked with the young people – again, with a substantial minority of young people not involved with any agency other than the Yot. That said, there was more involvement with consortium partners than planned and overall risk factors over the course of the sentence (as measured by ASSET) went down, albeit not significantly more than the comparison group.

Despite seemingly having problems engaging with housing agencies, and less young people in parental homes, housing outcomes were very positive. Similarly, ETE outcomes were mainly positive, with attendance at any time being a particular measure of success.

Having established that the SWRC showed some signs of success in these “softer” measures, the next chapter examines “harder” measures of improvement through the intervention, focusing on complying with the Order and not reoffending.
8 Compliance during supervision – breaching and reoffending

Inevitably, any evaluation of the success of a youth justice intervention will judge it in terms of the overall aim of the youth justice system, which in England and Wales is whether it “prevents offending” (Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and guidance). We recognise that offending may not be stopped or even significantly reduced within one short intervention, and may be more cumulative over time with a group with criminal behaviour this established, and that ‘softer’ intermediate targets found in the previous chapter may well be more realistic in indicating longer-term success with these individuals. Nevertheless, it is important to assess whether there has already been any kind of change in compliance post-release.

Ideally, the preferred way to measure this would be in line with the standard Ministry of Justice guidelines and look at reconvictions one year after release. However, the timeline afforded this evaluation does not permit that measure. Therefore, we are using other “proxy measures” that have become our standard in resettlement work for the Home Office and Youth Justice Board over the last 14 years. There are four “hard” outcome measures in the evaluation of the SWRC, which examine how successful the Project was in supporting the young people to abide by their sentence. These are (a) whether the young person did something during their licence period that was against the conditions of their Order (a “breachable action”), (b) whether they were arrested for an offence allegedly committed during the supervision period, and (c) whether they have been convicted for any offence committed within three months of release (to equivalise), and (d) whether the young person was returned to custody for either breaching their Order or reoffending during the licence period.

Breaching

Just fewer than a third of young people receiving the enhanced offer (63 per cent) “failed to comply” with the conditions of their Order at least once during their licence period. Failure to comply means engaging in any activity that is against the conditions of the supervision part of their sentence, including not turning up for a scheduled activity or getting in trouble with the police. It is also referred to here as “committing a breachable action” because the YOT could send the child to court for a further judicial decision at this point, and they could be returned to custody to complete their sentence.

This figure is not significantly different from the comparison group, where 60 per cent breached within their supervision period (Binomial Test). However, it is notably worse than both the RESET group (which also did not see a significant difference) and the original DTO evaluation (see chart below). These groups had a breaching rate of 50 per cent or less. This may be because the group had higher risk levels, because of local breach practices, or perhaps another factor related to resettlement practices that we will explore later.
The number of people committing a breachable action, compared to comparison group and other projects

Base = 64; 18 missing

The cohort had exactly the same breaching rate of 52 per cent as the comparison group if the licence period is equivalised at 3 months (Binomial Test).

However, The cohort had a higher average number of breachable incidents during the licence period (median = 2; mean = 2.08) compared to the comparison group (median = 1; mean = 1.89), but these were not generalisably significant (Independent Sample Median Test).

Furthermore, the chart below shows that the first breachable actions happened quickly after release, with the highest number occurring in the second week and the bulk of these initial failures to comply happening in the first few weeks.
However, they did not happen as quickly as the comparison group. The median amount of time to first failure to comply was 28 days, which is significantly longer before breaching than the comparison figure of 20 days (Independent Samples Mean Test). Interestingly though, the mean average days for the cohort (43.40) was quicker than for the comparison group (45.71), suggesting that there were a few in the comparison group who raised the mean.

The chart below compares the speed of this first failure to comply compared with the previous evaluations. There were less failures in the first week for those receiving the SWRC enhanced offer (6 per cent) than any other group, including being just half that of the comparison group. The numbers breaching did speed up and overtake the comparison group after the first week, though.
First type of breachable action, compared to comparison group and other projects (for those who breached)

On the surface, given the amount of support to this group, it looks odd that the SWRC overall breaching figures have not improved. However, it may well be that this “amount of support” gives us a clue as to why this may be the case. The chart below shows what this first breachable action was, compared to less resettlement support (the comparison group and just the DTO). What this demonstrates is a shift when receiving this support (as a proportion of those who breached at all). The numbers where it was triggered by a new offence has been reduced from around 18 per cent to only 7 per cent. Instead, this has been replaced, relatively, by failure to cooperate fully with partner agencies in the consortium, which accounted for 9 per cent of first breachable actions compared to none in the comparison group. In other words, the introduction of partner agencies providing extra support seems to have resulted in about a quarter of those who breached doing so earlier than they otherwise would (if they would at all). It appears that providing the extra support and activities has provided more events for them to have to comply with.

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99 It is noted that the SWRC members themselves do not necessarily see increased breach rates as a negative action, although it may be a negative outcome for the young person. They may see this as appropriate enforcement action.
**First type of breachable action, compared with the DTO evaluation (for those who breached)**

Certainly there are a few factors that made a significant difference (Likelihood Ratio Log-linear Test) to whether someone was highlighted as having committed an action against their licence:

- higher number of previous convictions
- not attending any ETE (which may be a breachable action in itself)
- no Education/Training info from the institution

First, the higher number of previous convictions reminds us that the SWRC was trying to deal with young people who already have an entrenched criminal lifestyle, and are going to be very difficult to guide through a licence period. Second, these significant factors remind us of how central ETE is to successful resettlement.
Reoffending

Just more than two in five young people on the enhanced offer committed an alleged offence during their licence period (41 per cent committing an offence leading to charge). This represents a reduction of 3 per cent from the comparison group the year before, but this was not generalisably significant (Binomial Test). The chart below shows that this is about the same rate for the DTO evaluation, and about a third more than the RESET project evaluation.

*The number of people committing an offence in the licence period, compared to comparison group and previous resettlement projects*

![Bar chart showing reoffending rates]

Base = 154; 14 missing

Using a similar equalised measure, 35 per cent of the SWRC reoffended within the first three months compared to 30 per cent in the comparison group. Young people on the licence offended at exactly the same median rate as the comparison group. Their median average to first offence for those who did offend was 42.5 days. However, the mean did show a slightly slower rate of first offending from 49.5 days to 54.8 days.

The chart below shows that there are some peaks in first offences around the second, fourth and third week, but otherwise the number of people committing offences for the first time is fairly steady each week (although some weeks don't have any).
Base = All who offended in first 20 weeks

The chart below shows the relative speed of first offence compared to the young people in the previous RESET evaluation and DTO evaluation. There does not appear to be any difference to the shape of the lines compare to previous studies.
The only factors that were associated with a significant increase (Likelihood Ratio Log-linear Test) in the likelihood of offending during the licence period were:

- Been voluntarily accommodated
- On child protection register
- No ETE immediately prior to custody
- Less information on offending behaviour programme work in custody
- Subject to IOM in practice
- Involvement of more agencies

These are factors that give a fairly good spread across some of the key areas for resettlement. We know that our cohort and wider young people were more likely to offend.
with more of a social care background, if they haven't engaged with ETE, and haven't had their offending addressed. The interesting elements to the above are the suggestion that IOM or the involvement of more partners may have negative consequences. Again, these imply a link to the greater surveillance from greater support.

**Reconvictions and returned to custody**

Just less than a quarter of young people receiving the enhanced offer (23 per cent) were convicted for an offence committed during this licence period, with 5 per cent gaining more than one conviction (Base = 65; 17 missing). The figure after three months (for later comparison) was 23 per cent (Base = 66; 16 missing). There were no equivalent figures from the comparison group available from the Yot.

An additional calculation compared the conviction rate for the young people before the current sentence (since started offending) and enhanced offer with an equivalised rate for the licence period since, pro rata over a year. In short, it is a model of how many convictions the young person received per year before custody compared to how many they would receive per year base on their licence period rate of offending. Using this model, we see a reduction of an average 1.63 convictions per person per annum, which is a 61 per cent drop and the equivalent of 134 convictions per year (see the table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average yearly convictions before</td>
<td>2.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average yearly convictions after</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop in conviction rate</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage reduction</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in yearly convictions</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 82; all.

The table below shows the spread of convictions since release until the end of the analysis period, not restricted to their own licence period (so, there is no equivalence of time). Breach of Orders is the most common offence for which the young people have been reconvicted since release (17 per cent), followed by theft or handling stolen goods, and criminal damage, both at 12 per cent. Violence against the person was associated with 11 per cent of convictions since release. All other offences only gathered convictions by less than 10 per cent of the cohort, with the most being for drugs (9 per cent).

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100 It should be noted, however, that this model is approximate. It is possible that offending would increase as they get older (to the usual peak at 18 years old). This would increase the chances of reconviction close to the time of arrest for the current offence, and also during the licence period. It should also be noted that conviction rates may be affected by amount of time spent in custody before this current sentence, or after release.
### Convictions since release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of statutory orders</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the person</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft or handling stolen goods</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bail breach</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-domestic burglary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motoring offences</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle taking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death by dangerous driving</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base = 168; all.

Just over a quarter of young people (29 per cent) were returned to custody by a court before the end of their licence. This compares with 26 per cent of those in the comparison group. Although not significant for generalisation (Binomial Test), it does represent a small increase in reconvictions. It is slightly worse 24 per cent who were returned to custody in the DTO evaluation and should be investigated further in the future.

### The number of young people returned to custody during the licence period for breaching or new offences

![Bar chart showing percentages of young people returned to custody for breaching or new offences]({% image %})

Base = 68; 14 missing
Respondent perceptions of the impact on young people

Many of the stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation described how the Consortium has been helpful in reminding practitioners of young people’s needs and alerting them to developing good practice from elsewhere. Not only is there an increased understanding of how the custodial system operates among community-based workers, but there is also more consistency in developing resettlement planning right from the start of the custodial sentence (rather than leaving it to the discharge meeting). Activities and/or support are often lined up for young people during their first weekend back in the community (as they are often released on a Friday). Some YOT stakeholders described taking a more innovative approach to their resettlement work with young people – introducing a greater variety of support; being more assertive in ‘selling’ the benefits of mentors; and encouraging young people to reflect upon the options and make their own choices to maximise engagement. Perhaps partly as a consequence of the presence of a wide variety of voluntary and third sector organisations at the Consortium Board meetings, YOT staff appreciate better how sport / activities / role models can have a positive impact upon a young person’s identity (and offending) – and now have more options for enabling young people to access support for longer post-licence.

Other perceived benefits for young people include:

- **Improved resettlement experiences for young people leaving custody**

The fundamental change introduced by the Consortium is that young people’s resettlement support needs are now addressed from the outset of the DTO sentence. Each young person who leaves the secure estate should now have a plan for when they are back in the community, and a support worker/mentor to assist them. Young people can therefore feel more settled in custody because they know people are helping to sort their resettlement needs out. They can focus on and get engaged with custodial activities and feel more in control of what will happen to them. ‘Any opportunity for them to be involved [in resettlement decision-making] can allay any fears about their loss of control in custody.’ This can have longstanding positive impacts upon their future reoffending rates and quality of life in general.

- **The impacts of enhanced resettlement support, improved access to services**

Young people are often calmer and more focused in custody than they are in the community – so that the custodial element of the sentence provides a key opportunity for getting interventions in place. As a result of the Consortium, young people now

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101 Young people in custody often have multiple, long-standing support needs, relating to: experiences of local authority care, involvement in antisocial behaviour, poor educational backgrounds, and traumatic family histories. Often static factors (such as experience of abuse, family involvement in offending and living in high risk areas) cannot be changed – and it is important to understand the lifestyle and environmental factors that
consistently receive a good resettlement service. Workers no longer ‘wash their hands’ of young people once they are sentenced, and a greater understanding of their support needs is developing across multiple agencies – supported by the parallel social work development of the Team Around the Child approach.

There has been substantial change in agencies moving from isolated conversations to a large forum within which to discuss resettlement issues. But whether the ‘enhanced offer’ has managed to expand the range of options for young people, or help to prepare young people to desist from re-offending has been questioned by a few stakeholders – particularly when long-term community based support may not be sufficiently intensive to support this; and the involvement of employers, colleges and housing providers may currently be inadequate as well. The cohort may be benefiting from more employment and pre-employment options (~ with less emphasis on college, as a lot of the cohort may not want to return to a classroom environment), but many need to develop their work-readiness and will need substantial help with their learning difficulties, and often their attendance issues too.

- **Continuity in relationships with the young person**

Due to the functional structure of case allocation within many YOTs, a young person’s resettlement worker is often a new practitioner for them to get to know – so continuity in relationships is not always achieved. Nevertheless, young people have a more coordinated resettlement experience now in the South West, and more agencies are involved so that they have more opportunities. But it is difficult to pool resources over large distances – and young people from rural areas may not wish to travel into town to access support.

- **Practical arrangements for ETE and accommodation**

Whilst the Consortium has brought about much greater access to education, training, and employment for young people, many areas are now losing links with Connexions and the Youth Service as staff leave (having been made redundant as part of the public sector cut backs). ‘11th hour’ accommodation decisions still arise for some young people in custody, and the more intensive support needs (for those involved in the care system, for instance, those living in bedsit, or bed-and-breakfast accommodation, or those who have offending family members) are often not addressed sufficiently. Some resettlement resources are only available as part of an accommodation offer – yet young people who are not in need of accommodation (who have either gone home or into Local Authority care) still need to access support.

**Young people’s perceptions:**

As part of the research, detailed face-to-face interviews were conducted with a small sample of young people who had been through the resettlement process in the South West\textsuperscript{102}. The young people had generally positive perceptions about the resettlement can cause people to start reoffending. Once back in their communities, the pressures to become involved in criminal behaviour again are often very strong.

\textsuperscript{102} Nine young people from across the region were interviewed between April and June 2012.
experience in the South West. Resettlement work was provided to help people with their essential needs on leaving the secure estate. In particular, help was provided in terms of finding people somewhere to live, and finding appropriate ETE. In addition to this, the resettlement work was provided to prevent people reoffending and going back to prison. This was done largely through the support of the YOT team.

The link between the resettlement work and the likelihood of reoffending was acknowledged by all the young people interviewed for this evaluation. There were two things that kept people away from offending. The first of these was the resettlement work, and the second was the prospect of a return to prison.

The most valuable aspects of the resettlement process varied according to each individual. Help in finding employment or a college place ranked highly, as did finding accommodation when it was needed. The young people also mentioned the value gained through talking about the consequences of criminal behaviour. In addition, being able to keep out of trouble due to the resettlement experience was noted. The young people were less likely to identify the least valuable aspects of resettlement. Some of them mentioned restrictive orders such as curfew or tag. One young person said that there were too many meetings to attend.
Case studies

South West case study 1

At the time of being interviewed by the research team, Michael was 17 years old and living at a half-way house. He was out of work, but looking for a job, and had 10 days remaining on his court order. Support from the YOT was ongoing, but fairly minimal at the time of interview.

Unfortunately, the research team was unable to uncover specific details concerning Michael’s background and his identified resettlement needs from within the available data-sets.

Michael was introduced to his resettlement plan whilst still in custody. When he was first released he was sceptical about the plan and whether or not it could help him. As time has gone by he now realises that it is helping him. As Michael put it:

When I first heard about the plan I thought it was a load of shit – but that was when I first came out. I appreciate that what is in it helps me now.

Michael says that the best thing that the resettlement plan has done for him is to find him somewhere to live. This has helped provide more structure in his life. Although the YOT did not organise ETE for Michael, the people at the communal house did arrange an apprenticeship in a warehouse. Unfortunately this didn’t work out for Michael and he was let go after 3 weeks because he was “fooling around”.

Michael admits that the resettlement work has stopped him from re-offending. He now says that he is more mature and that he can walk away from an argument without getting into a fight. He believes that these changes are partly due to the work that the YOT have been doing with him.

Michael regrets losing the warehouse job. He trusts the YOT workers and believes that they are good at their job. His advice to others in similar circumstances is to take up the support offered rather than “mess around”.
South West case study 2

Alex was 17 years old when he was interviewed by the research team, and was living at home with his mother. He had one month of curfew left to run, and had a college placement for a Carpentry course (but was also looking for work). He had been released from a YOT 3 weeks previously, and was receiving ongoing resettlement support.

Unfortunately, the research team was unable to uncover specific details concerning Alex’s background and his identified resettlement needs from within the available data-sets.

The resettlement plan was not mentioned to Alex prior to his release. The best thing about the support he has received has been in terms of increased motivation and encouragement. Alex organised the forthcoming college placement for himself. His experience of working with the YOT team is a positive one. They have helped him to get enrolled in the gym and he has been able to talk about things in a relaxed environment.

Alex regrets getting into trouble in the first place. He said that the key to being successful on release is determination and having the ability to say no.

Alex said that the most enjoyable aspect of the resettlement process has been playing pool with his YOT worker and having the opportunity to talk about his future. He is no longer involved in any criminal activity and believes this is due to the overall experience of custody and resettlement.

Alex now finds it easier to speak to people and feels that he has a clearer idea of what he wants to do in the future. He also appeared to be quite pleased to be interviewed as part of our evaluation:

*I’m most proud of coming along today for this interview.*
**South West case study 3**

Stella began an 8 month DTO sentence at the age of 16, for offences of robbery and violence against the person. She is listed as having 13 previous convictions, with her first offence being committed when she was 13 years old.

In terms of resettlement issues, a wide range of areas were identified as needing attention or support, including:

- anger management,
- offending behaviour,
- constructive activities,
- drug or alcohol,
- physical health,
- family support,
- living arrangements,
- education, training/employment,
- victim awareness,
- mental health issues,
- life skills,
- restorative justice,
- lifestyle,
- peer pressure,
- self esteem,
- motivation to change

Resettlement plans for Stella were intended to involve a range of agencies/groups including CAMHS, Connexions, Drug or Alcohol Services, Housing Services, Local Schools/Colleges, and Social Services (16+), in addition to several YOT Workers. Some of these were present at DTO meetings concerning Stella’s resettlement - CAMHS, Children’s Social Care, Drug and Alcohol services, and a Keyworker from a care home.

According to information in the database, work was in fact undertaken to try and address most of the above areas - in addition to “curfew” – and agencies listed as being actually involved in such work post-release include: Social Services (16+), Children’s Service, CAMHS, Drug or Alcohol Services, and the police.

At the time of interview by the research team, Stella was living in independent housing ("with friends"), and was out of work - “just being a bum”, as she put it. She had finished her order just over a month previously.
Stella claimed not to be aware of a resettlement plan – she could not recall if it had been mentioned, although she suggested that she sometimes “wasn’t listening” to the YOT workers because her mind was focussed on getting released. Her release was itself a positive experience, and she commented that “it felt amazing”.

The YOT organised a college placement for Stella, however she did not take this up because she thought that it would lead to her getting into fights. She took up a work placement but only lasted for one day. This was because she was only allowed to smoke every 3 hours.

On release, the resettlement workers helped Stella to find a flat. Unfortunately she had to leave the flat because she was “having so many parties” – behaviour which Stella now regrets.

Stella said that her family and friends had noticed a change in her. She said that the YOT workers have helped her get through things when they got a bit hard, and she clearly felt a degree of trust in her main YOT worker:

> My YOT worker is amazing – I love her. I still go in now and have a cup of tea with her when I’m passing. . . . YOT helped me get through things when they got a bit hard.

Stella claimed she is not involved in any crime now, and that this is due to the experience of custody and the help that she has received. The thought of returning to custody was clearly a negative one for Stella:

> Since release I haven’t been nicked once and I haven’t had any fights. This is because I don’t want to go back inside.
South West case study 4

At the time of interview, Robert was 17 years old and was living with his girlfriend and her family. He was on a Youth Rehabilitation Order, and had received YOS support continuously until two weeks previous, when he had moved to a new area.

Unfortunately, the research team was unable to uncover specific details concerning Robert's background and his identified resettlement needs from within the available datasets, but he suggested that he was presented with his resettlement plan a week prior to release. He felt nervous about meeting his resettlement officer but hoped that the plan would prevent him from reoffending.

When Robert left custody he was put onto ISS. This meant that for 25 hours per week he had a number of different commitments to fulfil through the YOT. This included unpaid work; victim awareness; learning social skills etc.

Prior to moving away Robert was waiting to hear back about a college placement. In order to succeed on release, Robert said that you need to have the will to change. He trusted the YOT workers and said that they were good at what they did. As he describe it:

Every YOT worker that I worked with I trusted – I think they are good at their job. They taught me that you don’t have to offend to get what they want. . . . You need to have the will to change to succeed on release.

Robert regrets all of his past offending behaviour. He believes that he has changed because of the extra support that he’s been given. As he put it:

I hoped the plan would stop me from reoffending which it did.

I no longer reoffend and no longer need to look over my shoulder every 5 minutes.

I’m most proud of completing my licence without breaching it.

Robert is planning to start college in September to study Mechanics.

Summary

This chapter has considered the outcome of the enhanced offer for young people in terms of compliance with their Order. In short, it has looked at whether they breached the terms of their Order or reoffended during the licence period.

Looking at our different “hard” measures of success, we see a mixed picture. While breaching rates were the same or worse than comparisons, the committing of breachable
offences did not happen as quickly in the SWRC. Reoffending rates were slightly better than the comparison group, but not significantly so, and no better than the previous studies. The SWRC did not seem to affect the speed of reoffending. And the return to custody rate was not any better, and in fact was a little worse than with the comparison group. So, from these results, the one positive was the slowing down of the speed of breaching.

However, there were questions raised about the higher chances of breaching with more agencies involved through the consortium.

Overall, it seems that involvement with the SWRC has not yet had the same effect on these “hard” measures as with the “soft” measures in the previous chapter. The next chapter examines the cost savings that may result from any positive impacts.
PART 4: IMPLICATIONS

9 Cost-benefit analysis

This chapter presents an audit model of costing the consortium against the outcome benefits shown in the previous findings chapters (above). The process involves first attempting to identify, separate and accumulate the running costs that could reasonably be said to have been incurred by the consortium in addition to normal practice. Second, these costs are divided by the number of units involved, to give us a unit cost per case (usually per annum). Third, these costs are set against each of the (average) benefits seen in previous chapters to see how much each added benefit costs. Fourth, from previous research, we try to identify and accumulate the costs savings that would be incurred from the benefits shown above (e.g. less custody costs from lower reconviction rates). Finally, all these calculations allow us to estimate the net savings from operating the consortium, both per case and cumulatively.

The rest of this chapter runs us through this model for the consortium:

Running costs of the consortium

The table below shows that our model calculates the total cost of the consortium at £224,714. This gives us a unit cost of £2,799 per annum for each cohort member.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total project cost for year 2011/12 (£)</th>
<th>Unit cost per case for year (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project coordinator (1)</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator travel</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium meeting attendance (2)</td>
<td>7,645</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room hire (3)</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYT Construction Youth Trust (4)</td>
<td>30,287</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National coordinator (5)</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-25 Independent People (6)</td>
<td>149,769</td>
<td>1,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>229,624</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,799</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:

1. All staffing costs include on-costs of NI and pension contributions. The coordinator costs include 40% time plus on-costs and admin support
2. 8 meetings per year (average). 9.25 officers @ 40k average (£47,520 inc. on-costs), 8 x half day = 826. Some representatives attend every meeting. Others attend less frequently, as indicated. The members included in the calculations for this group are:
- Project coordinator (already covered)
- Ashfield YOI
- BANES YOT
- N Somerset YOT
- Gloucester YOT
- South Gloucester YOT
- Bristol YOT
- Brent Knoll Making Change
- Second Chance
- Somerset YOT (0.25)
- Eastwood Park (0.5)
- Vinney Green (0.5)
- YJB (already covered)
- CYT (already covered)
- Independent People (already covered)

3. Room hire costs are calculated for 8 meetings at £30 per meeting
4. CYT costs include salary for PH plus proportion of CYT other costs for year (inc proportion of national director and operations director)
5. The national coordinator spends approximately 6% of her time on each regional pilot. No overheads
6. 16-25 Independent People: full year costs for 3 staff plus on-costs, overheads, travel, training, recruitment etc. Also mentoring, activity with young people, office overheads and management charge. Full budget is available if required. Please see the point made in the final section of this chapter about the inclusion of this cost.

As always with cost-benefit analysis, there were a number of additional considerations that required a ‘judgement-call’ by researchers, and it is important to note these for transparency. Three YOTs also have IRS resettlement workers, initially funded through the YJB (Bristol, Somerset, Gloucestershire). The resources for these are reported to have been retained in these YOTs, although the budgets are recorded differently as it is no longer a ring-fenced grant. Some of the workers are now sessional, but the resources are used in the same way.

It is also important to be aware of set-up costs for the consortium, although these have been excluded from running costs as all these costs relate to the period prior to April 2011. These are shown in the table below. As all costs are expressed in 2011/12 prices, prices for 2010/11 have been adjusted by 1.043, and prices for 2009/10 have been adjusted by 1.078.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set up costs for South West consortium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Item</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current coordinator (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room hire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting attendance (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:

1. Current coordinator costs are 38,500 per year, including all on-costs and travel of £1,000 per year.
2. This figure may actually be lower, as it would be expected that attendance was lower in the initial period of setting up the consortium.

**Financial benefits of the consortium**

**Reduction in re-offending**

Although the number of offences committed in the previous year by the 82 young people who received the ‘enhanced offer’ is unknown, some inferences may be made from the index offences that led to their DTO sentence and from other studies. Previous research has indicated that the ‘top end’ persistent offenders may commit around 20-30 offences per year (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Liddle, 1998; Renshaw, 2007). The offences would include not only those serious ones for which they might receive a DTO sentence but also less serious, and therefore less costly, offences. Other estimates have assumed that high level offenders are caught for around one in three of the offences they commit (Gray et al, 2005). It should be noted, however, that not all of the present group would necessarily be persistent offenders, as some might have received a DTO for a relatively serious offence, following one or two previous convictions for other matters.

Each of the 82 young people had a mean of 7 previous convictions, from a mean age of 12 (i.e. over approximately 4-5 years on average). So they were likely to have been convicted of approximately **2 offences in the previous year** of a similar type to their index offence. On the basis that they may have been caught for around one in 3 of the offences they commit, we assume that each young person would have committed approximately **6 similar offences** for in the previous year. The table below shows the types of offence for which they received a DTO, the unit cost of each, the mean number of offences likely to have been committed by each (averaged across the whole group), the mean offending profile across the group and the overall cost per individual young person.
### Calculated unit costs of each offence type committed by the cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence type</th>
<th>% of group with index offence (2)</th>
<th>Unit cost of offence (£) (3)</th>
<th>Mean no of offences per individual in previous year (4)</th>
<th>Unit cost of offences in previous year (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8,993</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>4,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the person</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12,853</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>10,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft/handling</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle taking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug offences (5)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,933</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order and motoring (6)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non domestic burglary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38,826</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>2,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson (7)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23,606</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach/ bail breach/ other (8)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26,121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:

1. The following are notes relating to assumptions and calculations made in the table above, corresponding to the numbers in brackets:
2. The offence types have been grouped in order to fit the categories for which cost information is available.
3. The percentages might not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding.
5. This is not a picture of any one individual’s actual offending, but the mean profile, averaged across the whole consortium group of 82. Offences are assumed at 6 per year with the types of offence in proportion to their percentage representation as index offences. The total comes to more than 6, due to rounding.
6. There were 105,570 drug offences in England and Wales in 2004 (Mwenda, 2005) at an average cost of £14,663 (Brand and Price, 2000). Most were for possession with 14% for dealing. This includes only the criminal justice system costs, not those to society in general, but does include costs in relation to trafficking. Since the latter are disproportionately high, we include only 20% of the mean cost here.
7. Total costs are not available for these offences. Since they may be considered to be victimless crimes a nominal CJS cost (similar to that for criminal damage) has been used here.
8. The Arson Prevention Bureau and KBT cite a figure of 115,100 deliberate fires in 2003. These were estimated to cost £2.2bn, making a unit cost of £23,606 at 2011 prices.
9. Total costs are not available for these offences. Since they may be considered to be victimless crimes a nominal CJS cost (similar to that for criminal damage) has been used here.

So, averaged across the whole group, the cost of each individual’s offending in the previous year cost an estimated £26,121 to taxpayers and society.

A number of measures of offending and risk of offending for 82 the young people receiving the 'enhanced offer' have been compared with those of a comparison group of 58 who were given DTOs in the previous year. The comparison group were shown to have had significantly more convictions prior to custody than the consortium group\(^{103}\), although they had fewer previous custodial sentences than the consortium group and their mean ASSET scores (indicating risk of offending) were 8% lower at the start of sentence. It is possible that the higher offending histories of the comparison group could have influenced their slightly higher rate of offending on licence, although ASSET scores suggested that they would not be any more at risk of reoffending (and may be at slightly lower risk than the cohort). No significant differences were found between the consortium group and the comparison group over this year on either their subsequent offending or their risk of offending as indicated by ASSET scores.

However, if we were to assume that the 3% difference in reoffending during the licence period were actually due to the effects of the consortium\(^{104}\), a saving would be made of 3% of the cost of each young person’s offending. This would amount to a saving of £784 to the public purse and society in the first year after release from custody.

The effects of the consortium’s support for individual young people would be likely to have the greatest impact in the first year following custody. The effects might last for, say, a further one and a half years. So discounting the savings over a ten year period would lead to an overall unit saving per young person of 2.5 x £784, i.e. £1,959.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current year</th>
<th>Over 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean cost of crimes committed per individual if no ‘enhanced offer’ provided (£)</td>
<td>26,121</td>
<td>261,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean unit saving due to ‘enhanced offer’ (£)</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education, training and employment (ETE)**

The ETE status of the 82 young people who received the consortium’s enhanced offer can be compared with that of the comparison group, and also with young people receiving an enhanced from a different consortium in North West England. 76% of the South West

\(^{103}\) T test

\(^{104}\) Given that we are dealing with a ‘population’ figure rather than a sample, this does measure the real difference between the two years. As such, the figure contained in this paragraph is a real saving. However, the lack of a statistical difference means that we cannot be sure that this difference (and saving) would be replicated in future years.
consortium group attended ETE during their licence period, in comparison with only 47% of the comparison group. In the North West, 69% attended during the licence period.

At the end of the full sentence, 40% of the young people in the South West consortium were engaged in ETE. There are no comparable figures for the South West comparison group but this rate compares favourably with the North West consortium, in which 34% of the group were engaged in ETE at the end of their sentence. Additional support for this suggestion is indicated by the figures for ETE having been arranged for the young people by the end of their sentence. 77% of those receiving the offer in the South West consortium had ETE arranged for them, a similar percentage to the North West where 76% had ETE arranged.

The figures for attendance during licence imply that 29% more young people received help with ETE than they would have without the help of the consortium. This finding is supported by the figures for engagement in ETE at the end and for having ETE arranged, which are similar to the North West consortium, in which a similar assumption was made.

So we assume that the consortium helped 29% of the 82 young people towards ETE. Since it is likely that not all of these young people would have fully taken up the arrangements or would have dropped out subsequently, we assume that half of these (about 15%) would have been helped to stay in ETE. This makes a total of 12 young people who were helped in this area and thus may have avoided being NEET at age 18.

The lifetime costs of being NEET (not in education, employment or training) at age 16-18 have been estimated in a few studies. Lawlor et al (2008) has estimated the resulting costs of unemployment, crime, mental health problems and drug use. The annual costs were discounted over a 10-20 year period, making a total lifetime cost to the state of £310,040. Coles et al (2010) also provide a lifetime cost for the consequences of being NEET at age 16-18 that includes tax foregone, benefit payments, substance misuse and health problems. This lifetime cost to public finance per individual is £58,721. This is lower than Lawlor’s estimate and avoids potential double counting of those with multiple problems. It also excludes personal ‘resources costs’ to the individual, so is the preferred estimate.

This would make a total lifetime cost saving of £704,652 for the consortium group and a unit saving of £8,593 per young person. We assume that the young people are already 16 years of age, so the benefits would start to be realised in the first year. Using Lawlor’s assumption of discounting the effects over 20 years, the savings in the first year would be £430 and the savings over 10 years would be £4,296 per individual.

**Savings from reduced chances of being NEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current year</th>
<th>Over 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of young people who avoid being NEET at age 16-18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost these young people would incur without consortium help (£)</td>
<td>35,232</td>
<td>352,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean unit saving per young person with enhanced offer (£)</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4,296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Avoiding the need for emergency housing

No figures are available for the number of young people who were in suitable housing at the end of their sentence, although 79% were considered to be in suitable housing at the start. No information is available for the housing status of the comparison group. In comparison, approximately 8% of the young people in the North West consortium were helped to avoid becoming homeless or requiring emergency housing.

Since there is no evidence that the consortium’s enhanced offer did make a difference to the housing status of the group, we might make a tentative assumption of a 2% improvement in housing compared with comparison groups. This would make approximately 2 young people who were helped to avoid homelessness and emergency housing.

An estimate has been made of the costs of homelessness by the new economics foundation (nef, 2008) of £28,612 per year (£26,000 at 2008 prices) per individual. This also included costs due to crime, substance misuse, mental health problems, benefits and lost output. Since most of these matters have been included elsewhere in the present analysis, an earlier estimate by Quilgars et al (2004) has been used. This gives the cost of a homelessness application at £840 and a year of emergency housing at £18,724.

This would make a total cost saving of £39,128 in the first year after release. We assume that the benefit would continue for a further year but, after this time, the benefit might become insignificant as other circumstances become more significant in the lives of the young people.

Savings from reduction in homelessness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current year</th>
<th>Over 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of young people helped to avoid homelessness and emergency housing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of homelessness application and housing for these (£)</td>
<td>39,128</td>
<td>78,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean unit saving per young person with enhanced offer (£)</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of costs and benefits

The table below shows a summary of the estimated benefits per individual young person alongside the unit costs of the project. Although the consortium saves the public money in reduced reoffending, reduced chances of becoming NEET and reduced homelessness, the project still costs more than it saves in the first year.

It must be emphasised that the figures for the benefits are only approximate estimates, based on the assumptions outlined above, so the confidence in the findings is low. In order to make more accurate estimates of the benefits of the project, more complete outcome data would be needed. The largest assumed savings are due to a trend to reduction in
offending on licence, although this is not a reliable finding as it was not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit costs and savings per individual provided with ‘enhanced offer’</th>
<th>Current year</th>
<th>Over 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Savings due to reduced offending</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings from reduced chances of being NEET</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings from reduction in homelessness</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total savings</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,691</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,209</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of consortium</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net savings</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1,108</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,410</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The net benefits over a ten year period have also been estimated, but the confidence in this prediction is even lower. However, it would be expected that any gains that were made would continue for at least one further year, and longer in some areas such as future employment. During this period, the net savings move into surplus.

However, a case may be made for the cost of 16-25 Independent People (£149,769) to be included as both a financial cost and a financial benefit, given that the grant money was secured as a result of consortium activity. If this is no longer included as a net cost in the calculations (or equated out), the consortium begins to look very low-cost and makes annual net savings of over £500 per young person.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit costs and savings per individual provided with ‘enhanced offer’</th>
<th>Current year</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Savings due to reduced offending</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings from reduction in homelessness</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total savings</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,691</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,209</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of consortium</td>
<td>973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net savings</strong></td>
<td><strong>718</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,236</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 Reflections, lessons and recommendations

This chapter is designed to help us begin to learn the lessons from the South West Resettlement Consortium experience. It is presented as a 'reflective discussion' in which we try to sum up what the consortium brought us, and pull out lessons and recommendations from that. It will provide the opportunity to consider what the consortium was able to add to the local youth justice landscape, and what it found challenging. The main aim is to establish pointers for how we can enhance the effectiveness of resettlement practice in the future. It does not dwell on any procedural difficulties, implementation issues or similar organisational points – any of which are covered in the report above – but on what is useful to the development of resettlement policy and practice.

This reflection is designed to kick-start a wider discussion on the consortium. It should be used as a starting point for policy maker and practitioners about the future of resettlement support. In particular, the recommendations presented in italics are intended to inform debate on practical suggestions for taking resettlement forward.

Immediate suggestions for improvement to SWRC at a local level are highlighted in red italics.

In terms of what has emerged from the SWRC experience in general, then, we would highlight the following areas, in no particular order:

**The SWRC....ensured greater coordination and cohesion to resettlement planning**

At the strategic level, the consortium provided examples of useful partnership and planning, and importantly ensured greater management level focus on the issue of resettlement. Managers and staff recognised the benefits from partnership and early joint planning.

There has been much more collaboration between partners and local authorities, which has helped maintain communication. There were some agencies that have been highlighted by the evaluation as needing greater integration and the consortium should try to ensure greater buy-in from senior managers in those areas.

**The SWRC....showed the potential for working closer together at the operational/delivery level**

However, for maximum benefit to be made of these links, and make more fundamental changes to resettlement practice, the partnerships will also need to operate at the delivery level of individuals. It is recognised that there are resource issues at every stage.

*Detailed analysis of the cohort’s support needs and corresponding gap analysis will enable a more individual and direct “enhanced offer” responding to needs. Collecting and sharing*
case-level information on a systematic basis will help unblock problems and ensure shared responsibility for individual cases.

**The SWRC....has helped drive forward effective practice locally**

By improving awareness of young people's resettlement needs and demonstrating the importance of custody-community continuation of care, the consortium has underlined local focus on resettlement and shared some good practice. It also help raise practitioners' awareness of resettlement approaches in other areas.

**The SWRC....highlighted the need for resettlement coordinators within Yots**

With no person responsible for resettlement within a Yot, there was inconsistency in engagement with the consortium. Previous research has highlighted the importance of someone focusing on resettlement partnerships and developing relationships.

**YOTs should consider designating someone responsible for resettlement and providing resources for a coordinating and engaging partnership role to complement the work of the consortium (rather than generic casework)**

**The SWRC....showed the challenges and benefits of working across different LA areas**

The limited collaborative working historically between agencies made a multi-area partnership challenging. There were also problems caused by differing team structures (i.e. generic caseloads or specialist posts), differing access to resources, and different relationships with the LA departments. However, it was seen as useful for smaller Yots to tap into the resources of the consortia, and for a Yot to learn good practice from others.

**It may not always be appropriate for the consortia to be across many areas. There needs to be flexibility in approach, depending on the local context.**

**The SWRC....showed the benefits of closer working between custodial agencies and community agencies at the practitioner level**

The shared operational meetings ensured better communication more widely between the custodial institution and the community agencies. It helped each to understand the abilities of and constraints on the other. It helped understanding of how their roles aligned. The joint working also improved community agencies’ knowledge of working practice in custody. However, there is still a lack of clarity about who to contact, particularly about sharing information about a young person’s progress in programmes, and custodial staff feel that they don't know about outcomes for individuals in the community.
Custodial institutions should ensure that they put in place procedures to allow maximum access to the young people for community partners to enable more continuity of service.

Appropriate contact details for who to speak to about individual cases, or some other way of discussing cases, should be facilitated.

Ideally, the custodial institution should be involved with each young person when they leave the institution. This would both increase understanding of what happens in the community and so allow better preparation, and ensure more continuity of service for individuals. If not, a forum or medium to allow custodial institutions to monitor the outcomes of cases in the community should be arranged.

There should be central recording of all in-custody work undertaken with young people, and this should be accessible to key community agencies. If E-ASSET is used, it must be completed fully by custodial staff.

The SWRC....could benefit from closer working between custody and community agencies at the strategic level

There were limitations to management level coordination between custody and community. This was partly due to perceived restrictions on change in the community, and concern with equity of treatment to prisoners outwith the consortium.

Steps should be taken to ensure that it is clear that the prison service level agreement allows for innovation in resettlement. National level agreement should make it clear that initiatives like the resettlement consortia are additional services for young people and should not be blocked on the grounds of inequity.

More emphasis should be placed on the role of the prison in resettlement, and of the prison management having a role in the consortium.

The SWRC....made it easier to involve third sector partners

The consortium made the involvement of third sector partners much easier and more explicit through agreements and process developments. It allowed them to communicate with several YOTs and other partners in one place, allowing ease and consistency.

The SWRC....highlighted the limitations in juvenile to young adult transition

Although keen to include probation partners in the Consortium, there has only been limited engagement. This has highlighted a gap with support during this transition. In particular, it limited information flow, both in terms of records and data, and in relation to sharing of experiences and good practice (both at the individual and agency level).
Prioritise greater engagement of Probation in the consortium, to ensure more of a seamless transition of service and addressing needs across the age divide. Improve data flow and ensuring that systems are compatible, to allow for easier information sharing and monitoring/tracking.

**The SWRC....began to break down the barriers to ROTL**

Focus on resettlement has helped to break down institutional concerns about release on temporary licence, which were dominated by a risk and security agenda. A substantial minority of cases now took advantage of ROTL. It is essential that practical difficulties are worked through to allow it to be used more widespread.

Effort should be made to ensure greater use of ROTL and that this is built into planning from an early stage, with necessary regulatory actions made in advance. This should be seen as an important part of resettlement activity. More consideration should be paid to speeding up the ROTL processing to allow for release for shorter sentences.

**The SWRC....made progress with employment in a difficult financial climate**

Although there were significant operational issues, the SWRC showed that it was possible to work closely with an employment project or agency to help get young people back into work. The work with CYT was useful, but highlighted that young people interested in other industries had no resources.

More work needs to be done to bring local employers into partnership with consortia, particularly with industries beyond construction. Even in this current climate, they need to understand the aims of resettlement and have confidence in local operations. Conversely, support mechanisms for young people in work need to be underlined.

Work needs to be done nationally to enable CSCS tests to be taken in custody in preparation for release. This may be by opening up an element of online working in prisons, or ensuring that the Construction Industry Training Board allows a different medium.

In the meantime, locally, work needs to be done to ensure that training for the CSCS card is undertaken in custody and the test is set-up to be taken immediately on release.

Focus should also be paid to teaching the young people about work culture rather than just vocational skills. This includes working structure as well as elements like what to expect from banter, attitudes, working with colleagues etc.

**The SWRC....highlighted the problems of long-distance custodial placement**
While the practical problems of custodial placement are recognised, the emphasis on resettlement highlights problems with long-distance placement. It is very difficult for effective resettlement planning to be made at long distances, even without considering the resource implications.

*The emphasis on effective resettlement in order to reduce reoffending may require the Youth Justice Board to review if any more can be done to ensure closer placements.*

**The SWRC....was instrumental in securing funds for more resources**

The winning of a BIG Lottery Youth in Focus award was a major achievement for consortium partners, and those resources probably wouldn’t have gone to help young people in the area without the SWRC’s existence. However, concerns have been highlighted of the risk of the funded sub-group skewing delivery away from broader partnership work.

*Care should be taken not to exclude other services providers from the benefits of the new project and retain the emphasis on broad partnership.*

**The SWRC....was able to make significant differences to ETE and indicative improvements to reoffending**

Although impact on “hard targets” in relation to offending and breaching was small and mixed, the consortium was very successful in making a difference to some “softer” targets that are likely to impact on reoffending longer-term. In particular, there were positive results in relation to ETE and housing. The significant improvement in ETE attendance during the sentence was particularly impressive. Moreover, these improvements were made at a time of financial pressure on agencies and when those going into custody are arguably becoming more challenging (as numbers decrease).

*The local area should continue to be committed to resettlement support and look to expand its scope – in particular an emphasis on partnership at the delivery level.*
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