The Problem of the Spare: Introduction to the Issue Dedicated to ‘Heirs and Spares’

BY JONATHAN SPANGLER

In September 1640, a second son was born to Louis XIII, King of France, and his consort, Anne of Austria. According to Mme de Motteville, première femme de chambre of the Queen, the King showed more pleasure publicly than he had at the birth of the Dauphin two years before, ‘not expecting to have such great happiness, seeing himself the father of two sons, when he been afraid of not having any at all.’ Such a boon, an heir and a spare, was a sure sign of renewed divine favour on the Bourbon dynasty — after two decades of sterility — and represents a situation known in dynastic states the world over, one in which stability is secured through multiple heirs.

But at the same time, the presence of a second son has always been a double-edged sword. The heir now had a potential competitor. Again using the example of the reign of Louis XIII, we see the King’s younger brother, Gaston, Duc d’Orléans, continually serve as a focal point (willingly or not) for those opposed to the regime. As one biographer of a different French spare wrote, while the English and the Spanish had a history of generational struggles between royal fathers and sons, ‘the kings of France had primarily to defend themselves against their brothers.’ This issue of The Court Historian presents new work by emerging scholars who are examining this struggle from a variety of perspectives, with a primary focus on Britain and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

1 Mémoires de Madame de Motteville sur Anne d’Autriche et sa cour, F. Riaux (ed.) (4 vols, Paris, 1855), vol. i, p. 70.


3 These papers were given at a conference sponsored by the Society for Court Studies, ‘Royal Heirs and Spares in Early Modern Europe’ held at Oxford University, 19-20 September 2013. I would like to thank my co-organisers Dr Catriona Murray of Edinburgh University, and Dr Janet Dickinson of Reading University, and all the participants — hailing from the US, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands — for making this an inspiring and enjoyable two days of sharing information and ideas on this topic.
The scenario of fraternal strife is not unique to France, and was dealt with in a variety of manners, most famously in the Ottoman practice of new sultans strangling all of their brothers. 4 Nor is it a new phenomenon for the early modern era. The late medieval period in both England and France was dominated by political struggles between royal brothers and between senior and cadet branches of the royal dynasty: Lancaster versus York, Orléans versus Burgundy. Ever since the development of primogeniture as a means of regulating succession in the western monarchies in the early twelfth century, the question had emerged of what to do with younger members of the royal house (particularly the male ones) whose blood endowed them from birth with authority, a sacred gift from Heaven that was dangerous to challenge without upsetting the socio-political order of the state. Blood and kinship were undeniably important, and well into the early modern era were used to justify rebellion, as seen in the manifestos of the Prince of Condé and the Duc d’Orléans in the early seventeenth century. 5 The key demand of such princes, repeatedly, was to participate in the running of the monarchy. Theirs was an older concept of collaborative monarchy, a corporate venture where the head of the family acted simply as chairman. As the early modern era progressed, this notion increasingly clashed with the emerging political doctrines of absolutism, or government by one prince only.

4 The Ottoman practice of fratricide, firmly in place by the fifteenth century, was ended during the reign of Ahmed I (ruled 1603-17). For a recent examination of this period of change, see Ganriel Pieterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003), pp. 10-13, 20-21.

In the Middle Ages, various strategies were employed to help lessen these tensions. In monarchies that developed the practice of primogeniture, the royal heir was given a subsidiary territory over which he could exercise authority until such time as he was called to the throne. The English heir was invested with the principality of Wales; the French heir governed the Dauphiné, though in both cases their real authority was limited. In the German-speaking lands, a tradition of partible inheritance led to ever smaller territories, and resulted in complex programmes of power sharing to compensate. In cases where rule was not divided equally among sons, younger sons were ‘lent’ portions of the royal domain to rule as an apanage: Lancaster and York for English princes, Orléans, Anjou, Burgundy for the French. While the English apanages were never entirely affiliated with the named county in terms of territorial rule, their French counterparts were, and this proved to be disastrous for the monarchy of France in the mid-fifteenth century, and nearly pulled the kingdom apart, as junior Valois princes, notably Burgundy, attempted to fashion their apanage into independent states.

An alternative strategy, frequently employed with some success in France, was to send younger sons off on missions of conquest: notably the dukes of Anjou in Naples and Sicily. This continued even in the late sixteenth century, when Catherine de Medici encouraged her younger sons to become rulers in Poland (for a short time successfully for Henri, Duc d’Anjou) or the Netherlands (disastrously for François, Duc d’Alençon). But the

6 For example in the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg (better known as Hanover) in the mid-seventeenth century, the four sons of Duke George agreed to ‘power share’, each with a capital, but nevertheless jointly ruling certain aspects of the state. It was only through luck and tenacity that the youngest of these, Ernst August, managed to reunite all of the inheritance, and convince the Emperor to create a ninth electorate.

7 The same should be noted for Scotland: while there was physically a Duchy of Rothesay for the heir, the traditional title borne by the spare, ‘Duke of Albany’, corresponded to no actual territorial designation, merely referring vaguely to an ancient name for Scotland.

8 For the latest biography of Henri III, see Robert J. Knecht, Hero or Tyrant? Henry III, King of France, 1574-89 (Farnham, 2014). For Alençon, see Frédéric Duquenne, L’Entreprise du Duc d’Anjou aux Pays-Bas de 1580 à 1584 (Lille, 1998). Confusingly, Alençon was known as Anjou after the accession of his older brother Anjou.
practice of semi-independent apanages within France was more tightly controlled from the start of the sixteenth century. Titles like Prince of Wales and Dauphin became purely symbolic, and the duchies of Orléans or York served as sources of revenue and prestige, not political power. For England, many of the political stresses of having multiple royal heirs vanished in the Tudor age, due to a lack of potential heirs — though not of course discounting others who also shared the all-important element of royal blood, such as the Staffords, Howards, Courtenays, or Poles. Similarly, the dwindling number of royal Stewart heirs in Scotland in the mid-sixteenth century inspired great ambitions in their next of kin, the Hamiltons, and in illegitimate offspring as well, notably the Earl of Moray. More overtly, those with princely blood in France fanned the flames of the Wars of Religion, partly from religious conviction, but also in an attempt to gain a larger share in the authority of the monarchy. These ranged from cousins of the Valois in the male line, the Bourbons, but also those related through female descent, for example, the Duke of Lorraine or his cousins the Guise. This confusion came to a head in the 1580s when both Bourbons and Lorraines threatened to overthrow the monarchy, leading to a solidification of the acceptance of the Salic Law as a ‘fundamental’ legal concept. The same decade saw the strain on Elizabeth I as she was forced to execute her own logical heir, Mary, Queen of Scots, and kept a tight rein

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9 For dynastic struggles during the minority of Mary, Queen of Scots, see Pamela Ritchie, *Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548–1560: A Political Study* (East Linton, 2002).

10 As pointed out by Sarah Hanley, it is mistake to think that the Salic Law was fully accepted before this point: ‘Identity Politics and Rulership in France: Female Political Place and the Fraudulent Salic Law in Christine de Pizan and Jean de Montreuil’, in Michael Wolfe (ed.), *Changing Identities in Early Modern France* (Durham, NC, 1997), pp. 78-94.
on her other potential heirs.\textsuperscript{11} When she died, however, the translation of James VI into James I was untroubled by an excess of royal heirs — there were in fact few others.\textsuperscript{12}

While the French monarchy of the seventeenth century would continue to be troubled by members of the extended royal house — notably the Prince of Condé in the 1650s — the contrasting pattern of a limited number of royal heirs continued in Stuart Britain, as there was rarely more than one heir at a time, with the exception of the younger brothers of Charles II (York and Gloucester). Indeed, several of the Stuart heirs or spares died young, depriving the dynasty of potential leadership or, more crucially, a safeguard against a further lack of successors.\textsuperscript{13} In such instances, royal dynasties sometimes looked abroad for potential heirs, as seen in the Spanish Habsburgs looking to their cousins in the House of Savoy in the late sixteenth century,\textsuperscript{14} and the Stuarts considering the House of Orange in the late seventeenth — a potentiality which of course was fulfilled with the accession of William III in 1688.\textsuperscript{15}

The British monarchy, by becoming a dual monarchy, had also gained a new advantage in the Stuart era, in that a younger brother who needed to be removed from the centre of political activity could be sent to a subsidiary court, as was James, Duke of York,

\textsuperscript{11} The paper given by Catherine Chou presented some of the arguments for Mary Stuart’s rightful succession, put before the English Parliament in the 1560s and 1580s by her supporters.

\textsuperscript{12} As discussed in the paper by Janet Dickinson. James VI had no siblings and only one (legitimate) first cousin: Arbella Stuart. His more distant potential heirs were the various descendants of Lady Frances Brandon.

\textsuperscript{13} The deaths and subsequent reactions, notably in terms of court ceremonial (mourning and investitures), of Henry, Prince of Wales (d. 1612) and Henry, Duke of Gloucester (d. 1660), were the subjects of the papers given by Nathan Perry and Catriona Murray, respectively. Similarly, the death of a French spare in infancy was marked in formal portraiture aimed at representing the fecundity (and thus the importance) of the Queen, as presented in the paper by Alex Greer on the Rubens family portraits commissioned by Marie de’ Medici.

\textsuperscript{14} The subject of the paper given by Liesbeth Geevers.

\textsuperscript{15} Before ever considering himself as a Stuart heir, William of Orange struggled to present himself as an ‘heir’ to the stadholderate of the Dutch Republic, as discussed in the essay by Alexander Dencher in this issue.
when he was sent to Edinburgh to act as the King’s ‘High Commissioner’ there (1679-82),
during the Exclusion Crisis following his conversion to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{16} This advantage, the
uses of multi-polarity (can we coin a new term, ‘poly-aulicity’?) in a composite monarchy,
was well known already to the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century, whose various members
(male and female) were sent to govern parts of the expanding Habsburg empire, from Madrid
to Vienna, but also including Innsbruck, Graz, Prague, and especially Brussels.\textsuperscript{17} This strategy
gave a chance to exercise genuine authority to a younger member of the dynasty, but also
solidified the collective rule of the dynasty across its domains. To a more limited extent, this
strategy remained a useful pressure release in the eighteenth century with the union of the
crowns of Great Britain and Hanover, though in this case, Frederick, Prince of Wales, was
resident in Hanover before 1728, not to keep him away from politics in London, but to
educate him as a ‘German’ prince, and to maintain the presence of the Electoral family in
their hereditary German lands.\textsuperscript{18} Other Hanoverian cadet princes were sent to Hanover as a
means of furthering their education and experience of the wider world, notably by attending
the newly founded University of Göttingen.\textsuperscript{19}

By the eighteenth century, therefore, a new sort of ‘spare’ had emerged: the dutiful
supporter of his elder brother, who sought fulfilment in areas away from politics. This is


\textsuperscript{17} Possibly the most ‘movable’ of all Habsburg dynastic chess pieces was Margaret of
Austria, whose representation as a potential Habsburg ‘spare’ was discussed in the paper by
Megan Reddicks. In the same period, Henry VIII’s sister Margaret was considered a Tudor
spare before the birth of his first children, but also had to establish a new identity as consort
of James IV of Scotland: this duality as expressed in the language of correspondence was the
theme of the paper given by Graham Williams.

\textsuperscript{18} As discussed in the paper presented by Michael Schaich.

\textsuperscript{19} The dukes of Cumberland, Sussex and Cambridge were sent in 1785. Clarissa Campbell-
Orr, ‘Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Queen of Great Britain and Electress of Hanover:
Northern Dynasties and the Northern Republic of Letters’, in Campbell-Orr (ed.), \textit{Queenship
typified in France by Philippe, Duc d’Orléans, younger brother of Louis XIV. Philippe had been raised, according to contemporary accounts, to think of nothing else but to support his older brother in all things. His governor, the Maréchal du Plessis-Praslin, wrote in his memoirs that his goal had been to make sure Philippe knew that ‘his true grandeur consisted in always being in the good graces of His Majesty and to never give him any reason to suspect his fidelity due to poorly controlled ambition’. The example was continually held up to him of his uncle Gaston, whose disloyalty had so troubled the government of Louis XIII, and even lingered (half-heartedly) into the disturbances of the early years of the reign of Louis XIV.

Gaston’s situation highlights one of the main problems encountered in previous reigns, one simply of personality in an increasingly popularised (or ‘media friendly’) monarchy: Gaston was undeniably more charming than his older brother the King, and beloved both by fellow courtiers and the wider populace, as a living embodiment of the amiability of their father, the people’s king, Henri IV. More specifically, Gaston also demonstrated his popular touch as a military commander, which the less effusive Louis XIII struggled to do. In the next generation, therefore Philippe was given limited opportunities to shine in his military career; a limitation that was only highlighted by the example of the battle of Cassel (April 1677), one of the few opportunities he was given to demonstrate his


21 The biography by Georges Dethan (cited above) is more revealing in its original (1959) title: *Gaston d’Orléans: Conspirateur et prince charmant*. This had been the case also in the previous generation, when the Duc d’Anjou (the future Henri III) was everything his brother Charles IX was not: a warrior, a *gallant*. 

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command skills — in which he triumphed, to the embarrassment of Louis XIV. But more generally, Philippe was encouraged to be docile and to rely exclusively on his brother for his happiness (and indeed for his fiscal independence). The result was a scenario in which the ‘spare’ was seen as purely decorative, as Philippe’s own wife, Elisabeth-Charlotte, Duchesse d’Orléans, wrote: ‘Alas, in this country, the brother of the King has no other will than that of the king himself.’

But Madame underplays her husband’s important role — one he did in fact learn from his uncle Gaston — in fostering his own programme of artistic patronage (art, architecture, theatre, music) as an alternative to the official patronage of the King. This is seen notably in the Duc d’Orléans’s building projects at his main residences of the Palais Royal and Saint-Cloud, but also in his long-term patronage of French opera long after Louis XIV had given up such frivolities for a more pious life.

This is not to ignore the position of the heir. He too had to find his way, which could prove to be quite difficult in an era of increasing longevity — in spite of the quackery of early modern royal physicians, and due rather to lessening royal participation on the battlefield.

Another by-product of this increase in royal lifespan emerged in both Britain and France in the eighteenth century: the spare was no longer a younger brother, but the son (or even grandson) of the heir. The case of two heirs in direct succession is analysed by Matthieu

22 Nancy Nichols Barker, Brother to the Sun King: Philippe, Duke of Orléans (Baltimore, 1989), p. 163. To underscore her point, and to highlight that this pettiness in the character of Louis XIV has been realised by historians for some time, Barker quotes Ernest Lavisse’s Histoire de France (c. 1910): ‘Louis XIV took it ill if someone stole something of his glory’.

23 Quoted in Erlanger, Monsieur, p. 206.

24 This patronage, at Saint-Cloud in particular, is the subject of the essay in this issue by Marlen Schneider.

25 The musical patronage of Philippe d’Orléans was the subject of the paper given by Don Fader, and of an extensive overview: ‘Music in the Service of the King’s Brother: Philippe I d’Orléans (1640–1701) and Court Music Outside Versailles’, Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music, 19 (2013).
Lahaye in his contribution to this issue, focusing on the contrast in education and resultant style of political thought of the Grand Dauphin (son of Louis XIV) and his son, the Duc de Bourgogne. In Britain this developed beyond the well-known pattern of father and son strife — embodied in the collapse of communication between George I and his son the Prince of Wales in 1717, and the subsequent political rivalry between George II and the ‘Leicester House Set’ led by the next Prince of Wales — to a more complex intra-generational rivalry between the sons of George II, Frederick Lewis, Prince of Wales, and William, Duke of Cumberland, as analysed in this issue by Sarah Kinkel. In both the French and British cases, much of the rivalry between heirs and spares stemmed from differences in political outlook more than specifically dynastic issues.

What mattered most, therefore, was something more than individual ambition. It was the collective prestige of the dynasty. With a loss of real political or military power, Bourbon princes turned instead to ceremonial and representational authority. With the increased sacralisation and ceremonialisation of absolutist monarchy in France, titles and etiquette became more important, and there was no higher sign of recognised superiority than the title used for the king’s son, ‘Monseigneur’, or for the king’s younger brother, ‘Monsieur’ — no further qualification was needed. This practice of extreme simplification in titles of address then expanded to other princes of the blood: ‘M. le Prince’, ‘M. le Duc’, ‘M. le Comte’, for the prince de Condé, the duc d’Enghien (later Bourbon) and the comte de Soissons, respectively. And also for women: ‘Madame’ for the wife of ‘Monsieur’, and ‘Mademoiselle’


27 This is the subject of this author’s current project: a comparative analysis of the four men who were known by this title in the early modern period: François, Duc d’Alençon; Gaston, Duc d’Orléans; Philippe, Duc d’Orléans; and Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, Comte de Provence (the younger brothers of Henri III, Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Louis XVI, respectively). The last of these, Provence, did become king of France in 1814 (as Louis XVIII), when his brother, Charles, Comte d’Artois, took on the mantle of the ‘last Monsieur’ (before he too became king, in 1824, as Charles X).
for the senior unmarried daughter of a royal prince; the king’s own daughter was called ‘Madame Royale’, comparable to ‘Princess Royal’ in Britain. To this was added a hierarchy of forms of address topped by ‘Son Altesse Royale’ and ‘Son Altesse Serenissime’.  

And yet the expansion of such titles furthered still more competition, for example between those outside the dynasty who yearned to be a part of the royal hierarchy, the so-called princes étrangers — those magnates who lived at the French court but whose status derived from membership in foreign sovereign houses such as Lorraine or Savoy — and the princes légitimés, the illegitimate sons of French monarchs and their descendants, such as the dukes of Angoulême or Vendôme. Their aspirations were reiterated and pushed further by the legitimated offspring of Louis XIV, notably the Duc du Maine, whose desires were nearly achieved in 1714 due to the particular affection of his aged father. Both the foreign and legitimated princes adopted forms of address comparable to the French royal family, and other visual markers of status according to the increasingly complex rules of etiquette. Such competition was seen as healthy by the louisquatorzian regime, and diffused opposition to the king himself, by fostering dissent amongst his courtiers.

Other honours given by the Crown both to support the prestige of the family member and (more cynically) to foster competition between them included raising the rank of those formally serving the heir or the spare: for example, in 1682, Louis XIV allowed Monsieur to name the Duchesse de Ventadour as his wife’s dame d’honneur, the first time someone other

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29 This is the topic of the essay in this issue by Blythe Sobol.

30 The positioning of the bastards of Louis XIV was the topic of the paper given by Giora Sternberg. His new book widens the scope of this analysis to look at the ramifications of court etiquette at the French court more generally: Status Interaction during the Reign of Louis XIV (Oxford, 2014).
than the king or queen was served by someone of ducal rank.\textsuperscript{31} In Britain it took some time for the Hanoverians to establish such intricately formal rules of protocol for younger sons (once these started to be born in the 1720s), but the much smaller court there — and its less central position in politics — meant that many of these led more private lives by royal standards. Some even considered marriage a private concern, until this went too far with the marriage of George III’s brother the Duke of Cumberland to Anne Luttrell (the widow Horton) in 1771, which led to the Royal Marriages Act of 1772.\textsuperscript{32}

By the eighteenth century can we say that this evolution of rigid protocol in terms of titles and regular recognition of honours and privileges helped diffuse the tension between kings and their brothers, their sons, and their cousins? None of the papers given at the ‘Heirs and Spares’ conference went further into this area to examine the role of the younger brothers of Louis XVI in the last years of the ancien regime in France,\textsuperscript{33} or the role of the younger brothers of George III. Recent biographies to make it clear that, while the Comte de Provence was an enthusiastic Anglophile and eager to share ideas on English-style constitutional monarchy with his older brother (though completely ignored), the same level of political interest cannot be said of George III’s brothers, the dukes of York, Gloucester and Cumberland.\textsuperscript{34} This seems like a call for a second conference focusing more exclusively on

\textsuperscript{31} Erlanger, \textit{Monsieur}, p. 224.

\textsuperscript{32} After the passing of this act, the King discovered that his other brother, the Duke of Gloucester, had also married (in 1766) without royal consent and quite ‘inappropriately’ for someone of his rank. See Stella Tillyard, \textit{A Royal Affair: George III and His Troublesome Siblings} (London, 2006).

\textsuperscript{33} Not the brothers, but the cousins of Louis XVI, the dukes of Orléans, were presented in the paper by Philip Mansel, stressing the continuous oppositional position of this cadet branch of the royal family.

\textsuperscript{34} On the young Provence, and in particular his efforts to avert the crisis of July 1789, see Philip Mansel, \textit{Louis XVIII} (London, revised edn 2005), pp. 40-46; for the siblings of George III, see Jeremy Black, \textit{George III: America’s Last King} (New Haven and London, 2006), pp. 149-51.
the heirs and spares of the later eighteenth century. Much of what we know about this period is undoubtedly coloured by the experience of the next generation in Britain where the over-abundance of royal sons (the dukes of York, Clarence, Kent, Cumberland, Sussex and Cambridge) nearly brought down the monarchy, and certainly damaged its reputation in the eyes of the public. Only the public image of devotion to duty forged by Victoria (supplemented by the economies of Prince Albert), brought the family back from the brink and confidently into the modern era.\(^{35}\) In France, our memory of this period is undoubtedly influenced by the treachery (from a dynastic point of view) of the Duc d’Orléans, whose overt opposition to Louis XVI in the first years of the Revolution played a role in the downfall of the monarchy in 1792 and the King’s execution.\(^{36}\)

In summary, we can see that the theme ‘heirs and spares’ actually covers quite a wide range of issues, politically, socially, culturally, and can be divided into several sub-categories. For example, female heirs: how does the possibility of female succession in England or Scotland change the dynamics of the heir and the spare when compared with the more strictly patrilineal structure in France? Other heirs can be considered in the sphere of politics, as agents who often weakened the regime through opposition, such as successive princes of Wales in Britain or the Orléans princes in France. We have seen a category of heirs who died before they could inherit a throne, but there are also contrasting instances of spares who were not expected to succeed at all, but did. Such was the theme of two of the conference’s keynote speakers: Glenn Richardson, who spoke about the Duc d’Orléans, second son of King François I, who later became Henri II; and Anne Somerset, who presented some of her recent work on Princess George of Denmark, the younger daughter of a younger son, better known to us as Queen Anne. In general, the various studies emerging on this fascinating and


overlooked subject reveal that individual heirs and the spares in Britain and France played a role not to be discounted in the development of monarchy, though it could vary in extremes from loyal support to serious threat.

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