The Second Crusade, 1145-49: Damascus, Lisbon and the Wendish Campaigns

Abstract:
The Second Crusade (1145-49) is thought to have encompassed near simultaneous Christian attacks on Muslim towns and cities in Syria and Iberia and pagan Wend strongholds around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea. The motivations underpinning the attacks on Damascus, Lisbon and – taken collectively – the Wendish strongholds have come in for particular attention. The doomed decision to assault Damascus in 1148 rather than recover Edessa, the capital of the first so-called crusader state, was once thought to be ill-conceived. Historians now believe the city was attacked because Damascus posed a significant threat to the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem when the Second Crusaders arrived in the East. The assault on Lisbon and the Wendish strongholds fell into a long-established pattern of regional, worldly aggression and expansion; therefore, historians tend not to ascribe any spiritual impulses behind the native Christians’ decisions to attack their enemies. Indeed, the siege of Lisbon by an allied force of international crusaders and those of the Portuguese ruler, Afonso Henriques, is perceived primarily as a politico-strategic episode in the on-going Christian-Muslim conflict in Iberia – commonly referred to as the *reconquista*. The native warrior and commercial elite undoubtedly had various temporal reasons for engaging in warfare in Iberia and the Baltic region between 1147 and 1149, although the article concludes with some notes of caution before clinically construing motivation from behaviour in such instances.

On Christmas Eve 1144, Zangī, the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, seized the Christian-held city of Edessa in Mesopotamia. News of the fall of the county of Edessa’s capital city and the Latin settlers’ ensuing appeals for military help probably reached the West by the spring of 1145. Pope Eugenius III subsequently issued the papal bull *Quantum praedecessores* on 1 December of that year, and its reissue (with a few small changes) on 1 March 1146 brought about the official launch of the enterprise now known as the Second Crusade at King Louis VII of France’s Easter assembly.¹ *Quantum praedecessores* marked the formal proclamation and legitimisation of a military campaign to defend the Latin Church in Outremer. Ever since Giles Constable published his celebrated thesis on the scope of the Second Crusade, however, it has been widely accepted that the endeavour evolved into a general Christian offensive against a number of the Church’s enemies.² Thus, the siege of the Syrian Muslim city of Damascus in 1148 and the expeditions of the same year directed against the Baltic strongholds of Dobin, Demmin and Szczecin situated in the pagan Slav lands east of the River Elbe are believed to have formed part of the Second Crusade. The supposed scope of the venture was even greater than this: the Christian attacks on the Muslim-held Iberian cities and strongholds of Santarém, Lisbon, Cinta, Almada and Palmela in 1147, Faro, Almería and Tortosa in 1148, and Lérida
and Fraga in 1149 are all thought to have formed part of the same single enterprise to secure and expand the peripheries of Latin Christendom.³

When combined the various works on the constituent elements of the Second Crusade form a large corpus of historiography.⁴ The motivations underpinning the attacks on Damascus, Lisbon and – taken collectively – the Wendish strongholds have come in for particular attention,⁵ and as will be discussed, a number of themes have emerged. Scholars focus on the decision to attack Damascus rather than recover the city of Edessa, the initial *casus belli* of the Second Crusade. There appears to have been little appetite for recovering Edessa, and whilst the subsequent siege of Damascus ended in a spectacular failure, historians argue that the decision to attack the city was not as ill-conceived as was once presumed. Most of the discussions on the Baltic campaigns are not as narrow in approach, and in one significant way they reflect much of the older historiography *apropos* the Levantine crusades; namely, the campaigns around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea are thought to be the product of political and socio-economic motors. In much the same way, historians are reluctant to ascribe the Portuguese ruler, Afonso Henriques, with a range of worldly and religious concerns; certainly, his decision to assault Lisbon in 1147 is seen primarily as a matter of politico-strategic expediency. As such, some historians question the notion that the attack Lisbon was an integral part of the Second Crusade.

Context is the key to understanding the Lisbon debate. A heterogeneous fleet of north-European warriors set out from the Dart estuary in May 1147 largely in response to Pope Eugenius III’s and Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux’s calls to defend the Latin Church in the Levant.⁶ The fleet stopped en route and assisted Afonso Henriques with his siege of Lisbon, which then fell to the allied forces on 24 October. Constable pointed out that the Christian warriors and their preachers employed crusading language, imagery and themes in the sources before and after the siege. He also noted that the crusaders had originally vowed to reach the Holy Sepulchre and that they were signed with the cross again before they besieged Lisbon. Thus, he argued, ‘these crusaders regarded their campaign(s) in Portugal’ as a stage in ‘the fulfilment of the vow against the enemies if Christendom’, and hence, ‘the expedition should…be regarded as part of the broader crusading effort.’⁷

Some historians have taken Constable’s contention much further. It has been argued that Bernard of Clairvaux preached in support of a proposed attack on Lisbon and that northern European warriors had liaised with the Portuguese in this regard before they put in at Oporto; in short, the crusaders’ involvement in the siege of Lisbon was premeditated.⁸ Alan Forey has challenged the idea that the crusaders planned to support Afonso Henriques before they made landfall in Iberia by questioning the veracity of key documents and the notion that Bernard of Clairvaux encouraged the crusaders to assist the Portuguese ruler.⁹ In response, Jonathan Phillips has suggested that Afonso probably made contact with the Church authorities and other northern Europeans with whom he was familiar before the fleet
set sail from Dartmouth. Afonso’s aim was to ensure that the fleet sailed to Lisbon with the hope of advancing Christianity and securing the financial rewards that a successful siege might bring.\textsuperscript{10} The two most important sources for the siege of Lisbon, \textit{De expugnatione Lyxbonensi} and the so-called ‘Lisbon Letter’, both demonstrate that the Portuguese ruler knew of the fleet’s existence before it reached Lisbon, but this does not prove that the crusaders’ attack on Lisbon was premeditated. And as Forey points out, the former source indicates that the negotiations which resulted in the allied attack on Lisbon did not commence until the fleet had made landfall in Portugal. He concludes that the fleet was essentially persuaded to assist Afonso only after reaching Oporto (presumably to collect provisions), and the crusaders had not, therefore, initially intended to assist Afonso Henriques with his intended siege.\textsuperscript{11} Far from seeing the attack on Lisbon as part of a broader crusading effort conducted between the years 1147-49, the campaign was ‘obviously just an episode in the continuing conflict between Christians and Muslims in the Peninsula.’\textsuperscript{12}

Afonso Henriques was a demonstrably pious man with a strong crusading pedigree and close connections to the Templars.\textsuperscript{13} He instructed the bishop of Oporto, Peter Pitões, to meet and make welcome the crusaders as the fleet reached the town of Oporto, and to convince them by whatever means necessary to help the Portuguese ruler in the siege of Lisbon. According to the \textit{De expugnatione Lyxbonensi}, the bishop then made an impassioned address to the crusaders duly aimed at securing their assistance in the planned siege. Whilst the anonymous, eyewitness author of the \textit{De expugnatione Lyxbonensi} may have embroidered some of the words of the set-piece speeches found in this source to emphasise how the crusaders at Lisbon acted with right intention and a unity of purpose, it is not certain that this was the case with the bishop’s sermon to the northern crusaders.\textsuperscript{14} Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Peter’s sermon clearly drew on – amongst other themes – those employed in the preaching for the Levantine crusade, including its divine sanction and salvific character.\textsuperscript{15} His sermon also aligned with the preaching, and indeed, the papal and clerical support afforded the native Iberian Christians who campaigned against their Muslim enemies in 1147-48.\textsuperscript{16} This was an immensely devotional milieu; to the bishop of Oporto and presumably the man who ordered him to secure the services of the northern Europeans, namely, Afonso Henriques, the siege of Lisbon would have been perceived as an episode of spiritually meritorious Christian violence congruous to those occurring elsewhere on the peninsula.

Whilst Afonso may have thought and hoped that his actions at Lisbon would obtain from God an eternal reward, there is little doubt that he had a number of temporal reasons for choosing to attack Lisbon in 1147: the timing was certainly right, and he was unquestionably an ambitious man. Afonso probably saw the arrival of the crusader fleet as an opportunity to exploit the political collapse of the previously dominant Almoravids in al-Andalus and the temporary disunity of the Taifas, the independent petty Muslim kingdoms created in the wake of the Almoravid collapse. The capitulation of Lisbon would also reinforce Afonso’s credentials as a Christian king worthy of papal recognition,
and further assert his independence from his nominal overlord, the emperor Alfonso VII of León-Castile. Such was the politico-strategical ambition of the man and owing largely to what may have been a fortuitous decision by the crusaders to set down at Oporto en route to the Levant in May 1147, many historians consider that Afonso’s decision to besiege Lisbon was in fact devoid of a spiritual stimulus.\(^{17}\)

Scholars hold similar views \textit{apropos} the allied Christian attacks on the pagan targets around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea, the next strongholds to be attacked by warriors whose actions were sanctioned by ecclesiastical authorities in 1147. While preaching in support of the campaign to Outremer in March 1147, Bernard of Clairvaux attended a major assembly of the German nobility at Frankfurt am Main, and here he seems to have verbally sanctioned an extension in the geographical scope of the crusade. Saxon nobles declined Bernard’s invitation to campaign in the East, justifying their decision by referring to the idolatrous activities of the neighbouring pagan Wends. Bernard subsequently promised the Frankfurt am Main audience the same spiritual privileges for fighting the Wends as those offered to warriors who vowed to campaign in Outremer. Whether it was the Saxon nobles or Bernard of Clairvaux who first mooted the extension of spiritual privileges to those wanting to fight the Wends is unclear. One way or another, Bernard wholly supported the decisions made by the Saxon nobles and a number of them then took the cross a Frankfurt am Main after vowing to campaign against their pagan neighbours.\(^{18}\)

Eugenius III reacted quickly to the initiative taken at Frankfurt am Main by issuing a bull on 11 or 13 April 1147. \textit{Divina dispensatione} (II) effectively sanctioned the campaign to the southern Baltic region while mentioning the original expedition planned to liberate the Church in the Latin East, and referring to the contemporaneous Christian-Muslim conflict in the Iberian Peninsula.\(^{19}\) Individuals in northern Germany, Denmark and Poland promptly responded to Bernard’s and Eugenius’s calls to arms and were ready to embark against their pagan neighbours in the summer of 1147. The campaign against the Wends had two parts. A combined Saxon army was headed by Duke Henry the Lion and supported by the Danish fleets of the rival kings Knud V and Svend III. This force unsuccessfully besieged the remote and newly fortified pagan Abodrite outpost at Dobin on Lake Schwerin in July 1147. Margrave Albert the Bear and the papal legate, Anselm of Havelberg, led a second force; this army may have included a Polish contingent headed by the Piast prince, Mieszko III the Old. The combined forces set out from Magdeburg in late July and advanced towards the territory of the pagan Liutizians. After the capture of Havelberg, the army pushed on to unsuccessfully besiege Liutizian Demmin on the River Peene. A contingent led by Albert the Bear continued east to the gates of the western Pomeranian trading station of Szczecin. Here Albert discovered that the town was already in Christian hands, which effectively put an end to the Wendish campaign.\(^{20}\)
Contemporaries reproached the crusaders for their inability to defeat the pagan Wends, and some of the original allegations levelled at them have found their way into the modern historiography. The Saxons were seemingly only interested in the receipt of tribute: ‘They did not want to kill the goose that laid the eggs, even for the good of their souls’. The expedition is thought to have provided the Danes with an opportunity to seek revenge against Slav pirates and slavers. For the Poles, it was simply a chance to intimidate the ‘Prussians’. The traditional historiography has the Saxons, Danes, and Poles seemingly united in their pursuit of their non-pious goals. As Christopher Tyerman states, ‘politics got the better of piety’. Jay T. Lees has likewise recently ascribed the attacks on the Wends as the product of temporal objectives. However, he disagrees with the notion that a shared endeavour stimulated the attacks on the pagans. He suggests that when the Christian protagonists marched against the Wends they did so out of fear that a Christian adversary might claim territory east of the River Elbe that they themselves had a claim to possess. He concludes with the leaders of the Wendish crusade doubting that their campaign was a ‘righteous enterprise’.

While Christian forces marched against pagan strongholds around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea in 1147, King Conrad III of Germany and King Louis VII of France led separate forces over a classic pilgrimage route towards the Holy Land largely in response to Eugenius III’s and Bernard of Clairvaux’s call to arms. After being shipped over the Bosphoros, the respective forces were devastated in Anatolia through dehydration, malnutrition, fatigue, disease and Turkish attacks. King Louis and many of the French magnates managed to embark on ships at Attaleia on the southern shore of Anatolia, and the king eventually arrived at Antioch in March 1148. The prince of Antioch, Raymond of Poitiers, had courted the French king while he was still in France in anticipation of his help in strengthening the prince’s power in northern Syria. Raymond hoped to subjugate a number of neighbouring cities including Aleppo, the centre of Zangīd power. The capture of Aleppo would have strengthened the Latin presence in the region, and in theory, it would almost certainly have made the recapture of Edessa an easier proposition. After spending three months recuperating, however, Louis VII declined the prince’s proposals and instead headed south toward the kingdom of Jerusalem. The alleged affair between Raymond and his niece, the king’s wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, is often cited as a reason for Louis’s refusal to help Antioch. Aryeh Grabois argues that the king had little interest in campaigning in northern Syria or indeed in recovering Edessa, since his priority was the accomplishment of his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Whilst Louis was undoubtedly very pious, such an interpretation largely discounts the scope of the Capetian’s motivations for going on crusade. A strand of the historiography seeks to place Louis’s decision within the context of Byzantium’s troubled relationship with the principality of Antioch. Phillips, for example, points out that the prince of Antioch was a vassal of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, and that the French crusaders blamed the emperor for their various problems in the empire and Anatolia. Increasing the power of the Antiochene prince in northern Syria would in effect extend Byzantine influence in the Levant, and
this was something that the king and his advisors would not countenance.\textsuperscript{29} Louis’s reasoning for marching south may have been much more prosaic: the native Christian population of Edessa was slaughtered, enslaved or exiled following the failed uprising that attempted to recover the city in October 1146.\textsuperscript{30} Much of the city, including the walls of the citadel, was then razed.\textsuperscript{31} There was little point in recovering Edessa, and by extension, Louis may have felt there was less need to attack Aleppo as an indirect means of regaining the devastated city.

One must also take the wishes and concerns of King Conrad III of Germany and the Jerusalemite nobility into consideration when discussing Louis’s decision to march south. Having recuperated at the Byzantine court in Constantinople from his ordeals in Anatolia, Conrad arrived by ship at Acre in April 1148. Louis was still in the north at this point recovering from his own troubles in the peninsula. The eyewitness, Otto of Freising, indicates that the German king subsequently made an agreement with King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem and the Templars to lead an army against Damascus in the following July.\textsuperscript{32} It may be that Conrad was aware of the hopeless situation in Edessa and had been convinced that an attack on Damascus was in the best interests of the settlers in Outremer. William of Tyre confirms that the Jerusalemite nobility hoped the crusaders would offer them military assistance in taking a neighbouring Muslim city. He adds that Patriarch Fulcher was sent to Louis VII, who was at that time residing in Tripoli, to convince the king to continue south to Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{33} Perhaps it is not surprising that Louis chose to march south with the weakened French army and looked to join forces with Conrad and the Jerusalemite barons, given that they had already agreed to attack Damascus. Surely, Louis must have also considered that assisting the kingdom of Jerusalem (while taking the opportunity of visiting its holy places) would be of most benefit to Latin Christendom, especially given his likely concerns with fighting in northern Syria.

The decision to attack Damascus in 1148 has come in for a great deal of attention. Zangī had begun to threaten the independence of Damascus in 1135 and he laid siege to the city four years later. The Damascenes approached the rulers of Jerusalem and offered them a number of incentives to lift the siege, which they managed to do: it was hardly in Jerusalem’s interests to have the acquisitive Zangī in control of the largest Muslim city in the region. The plan to attack Damascus was thought to be ill-conceived, particularly as its subsequent failure made an enemy of a city that had been allied with Jerusalem since 1140.\textsuperscript{34} Hoch has since offered a number of reasons why Damascus was chosen as a target in 1148. Most contentiously, he argues that there had been a complete realignment in Muslim power in Syria in the years immediately preceding the arrival of the Second Crusaders in the Levant, the chief and pertinent product of which was an alliance between Damascus and Zangīd Aleppo made in the spring of 1147. If Hoch is correct, this agreement essentially rendered obsolete the former alliance between Damascus and the kingdom of Jerusalem. And in any case, that alliance was made in a specific strategic situation in 1140, and should not be viewed as an unconditional long-term
agreement. A Damascene-Aleppan alliance would have posed a significant threat to the security of the Latin kingdom.  

The subsequent campaign against Damascus is habitually termed a fiasco with the episode ending with an ignominious withdrawal of the allied Christian forces. But the actual decision to attack Damascus may not have been ill-conceived. The recovery of the city of Edessa, the initial *casus belli* of the Second Crusade, was no longer a viable option. Knights of the Temple, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem and Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem appear to have convinced King Conrad III of Germany to attack Damascus. Given King Louis VII of France’s likely concerns with campaigning in northern Syria, perhaps he and the remaining Jerusalemite nobility were happy to endorse the plan to attack the Syrian city. If Hoch is correct, moreover, a Damascene-Aleppan alliance posed a significant menace to the security of the kingdom in 1148; hence, the move against Damascus could be seen as a judicious attempt to remove the threat with an allied force of crusaders and Latin Jerusalemites, notwithstanding the military incompetence or Frankish political intrigue that may have caused its rapid failure.

Few modern commentators doubt the spiritual motives of those Christian warriors who arrived in the Levant in 1148 and who went on to besiege Damascus. This may be because they are thought not to have the same types of geopolitical considerations for originally embarking on crusade as those that historians ascribe to the native Christians involved in the Iberian and Baltic campaigns. The native Christian elites undoubtedly had various temporal reasons – the attainment and maintenance of honour, family tradition, memory and a desire to augment the heroic deeds of forbears, the creation, expansion and exploitation of new and existing commercial opportunities and so on – for engaging in warfare in Iberia and the Baltic region. The Christian offensives undertaken between 1147 and 1149 on the western and northern peripheries of Christendom fit into a well-established pattern of worldly aggression and expansion. Normal temporal aspirations were not suspended during these years. It is possible, even likely, that Christian aggression in Iberia and the Baltic area would have occurred without papal and clerical support.

But there is a danger in clinically construing motivation from behaviour in such instances. The evidence does not allow a neat separation of religious from worldly matters. The ubiquitous medieval concern for the soul was no less important to contemporaries than the desire for land nor the various other forms of temporal gain. In fact, spiritual matters intertwined with temporal concerns in the minds of contemporaries. The mass of evidence suggests that the processes of conquest, subjugation and extraction were considered spiritually beneficial, and God certainly rewarded spiritually meritorious acts with earthly gains.

Moreover, attempting to secure and expand the peripheries of Christendom and engaging in penitential warfare was often the same thing. Take the Lisbon campaign: the tumultuous events in the
Near East in 1144 that gave rise to subsequent papal bulls and Bernardine inspired preaching coincided with advantageous geopolitical circumstances in the Iberian Peninsula that expedited Christian territorial expansion. As native, noble warriors, those who fought in Iberia - and indeed in the Baltic region - had obvious worldly ambitions and obligations. The warriors in each region had also been familiar with the notion of spiritually rewarding warfare since at least the second half of the eleventh century, and these same warriors were instrumental in seeking papal and/or clerical endorsement for their military actions. In other words, they endeavoured to secure religious and spiritual privileges and support in pursuit of long-held temporal concerns. Consequently, Christian forces campaigning around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea were able to ally together to form substantial armies while securing papal indulgences for their subsequent actions. In Iberia, Afonso Henriques was able to engage his enemy with allied Christian support, which may or may not have intended to assist the Portuguese ruler before putting in at Oporto. Acquisitive and in pursuit of long-held temporal goals most definitely, but the native Christian warriors who fought in Iberia and the Baltic region also hoped to obtain God’s mercy in return for their actions. To deny them a religious component to their bellicosity as some historians are wont to do risks making light of the spiritual anxiety prevalent in the medieval mind where the pains of ‘purgatory’, the horrors of hell and the glory of heaven were no less real than the bloody sword in a warrior’s hand.

2 Constable, ‘The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries’, 213–79.

3 Alan J. Forey has provided the greatest challenge to the so-called ‘Constable thesis’ in his ‘The Second Crusade: Scope and Objectives’, 165–75.

4 Although since Constable’s highly influential article there have been only four major works dedicated to the history of the Second Crusade: Gervers, *Second Crusade*, Phillips and Hoch, *Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*; Phillips, *Second Crusade*; Roche and Jensen, *Second Crusade*.

5 This theme is the main focus of this historiographical essay given the limited space provided. The historiography of the Second Crusade is discussed at length in Roche, ‘The Second Crusade: Main Debates and New Horizons’ from which much of the present discussion is borrowed.

6 Pope Eugenius III commissioned his fellow Cistercian, Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, with preaching in support of the Levantine Crusade. Bernard preached in person in the Low Countries and the Holy Roman Empire, and two of the three main contingents on the Lisbon campaign consisted of Flemings and Rhinelanders. The third main contingent consisted of Anglo-Normans and we know Bernard sent a missive to England, as did Eugenius III, and it is likely that *Quantum praedecessores* formed part of this communication. Pope Eugenius also wrote to Count Thierry of Flanders and sent a missive to the town of Tournai. Bernard’s secretary, Nicholas of Clairvaux, addressed a letter to the count and nobles of Brittany in which he announced the forthcoming visit of Geoffrey of Lèves, bishop of Chartres, to preach for the expedition. Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘Epistolae’, 311–17 (no. 363) and The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, 460–63; Eugenius III to the bishop of Salisbury, 36 (no. 8959); ‘Historiae Tornacenses partim ex Herimanni libris excerptae’, 345; ‘Historia gloriosi regis Ludovici VII, filii Ludovici grossi’, 126; Nicholas of Clairvaux, ‘Epistolae’, 671–72.


8 Constable did not offer an opinion in this regard. Works arguing that the northerners’ assistance in the siege of Lisbon was premeditated include: Livermore, ‘The *Conquest of Lisbon* and Its Author’, 1–16 and Phillips,
'St Bernard of Clairvaux, the Low Countries and the Lisbon Letter of the Second Crusade’, 485–97.


10 Phillips, Second Crusade, 139–42.

11 De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, 68; Edgington, ‘The Lisbon Letter and the Second Crusade’, 337; Forey, ‘The Second Crusade: Scope and Objectives’, 168–69. Similarly, James O’Callaghan suggests that the arrival of the fleet was merely coincidental. See his A History of Medieval Spain, 41–44, 230. Susan B. Edgington has recently steered a path between the theories of Forey and Phillips. In agreement with Phillips, she maintains that Afonso knew of the existence of the fleet before any of its ships made landfall in Iberia. Edgington also hypothesises that Afonso knew when the main fleet was likely to make landfall near Lisbon and made preparations to receive it. Like Forey, however, she concludes that the crusaders only agreed to assist Afonso after they had disembarked in Iberia, and it would therefore be very difficult to view the crusaders’ actions at Lisbon as premeditated. See her ‘The Capture of Lisbon: Premeditated or Opportunistic?’ 257-72.

12 Forey, ‘The Second Crusade: Scope and Objectives’, 168–69. This is not the place to argue whether the Iberian Christians who fought at Lisbon should be considered crusaders. There is no scholarly consenses on what is meant by the terms ‘crusade’, ‘crusaders’ and ‘crusading’, and the dominant ‘pluralist’ definition of a crusade with its emphasis on the textual existence of prescribed devotional and juridical formulae is problematic for one simple reason: the lamentable dearth of extant documents in some regions of modern Europe. See Roche, ‘The Second Crusade: Main Debates and New Horizons’, esp. 25-32.

13 Phillips, Second Crusade, 140-41.


15 De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, 70-73, 78-9, 123. Also see Phillips, ‘Ideas of Crusade and Holy War’, 128-33.

16 Eugenius III, no. 3, 36–37, reprinted in Kahl, ‘Crusade Eschatology’, 43–44; Eugenius III, ‘Epistolae et privilegia’, 1346 (no. 295); Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo general de la Corona de Aragón,

17 In addition to Forey’s work see, for example, Tyerman, God’s War, 308–17 and Lay, ‘The Reconquest as Crusade’, 123-30.

18 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, 210–13 and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 76–78; Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘Epistolae’, 432–33 (no. 457); for the translation see The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, pp. 466–68.


21 Christiansen, Northern Crusades, 53–56.

22 Schultze, ‘Der Wendenkreuzzug 1147’, 96–97; Kahl, Slawen und Deutsche, 225–27. Güttner-Sporzyński has recently suggested that the decision of the Poles, under the leadership of the Piast dynasty, to campaign against the Wends and the Prussians in 1147 was influenced by a Piast tradition of waging holy wars against enemies of the faith and a pragmatic state policy. See his ‘Poland and the Second Crusade’, 115-54.

23 Tyerman, God’s War, 305–08.


26 As Phillips points out, the literature referring to this supposed affair is extensive. See his Second Crusade, 319, n. 18.


30 Mayer, Crusades, 105.


32 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, 264–65 and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 102–03.


36 See, for example, Phillips, *Second Crusade*, 227.


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