UNDERSTANDING PREVENT POLICING THROUGH DISPOSITIF AND REFLEXIVE RISK

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Abstract
In June 2011, PREVENT, as part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, was reformatted around the notion of ‘risk’. Despite this, there is a paucity of empirical enquiry which has examined the relationship between PREVENT and risk. The objective of this thesis is to analyse PREVENT policing, in terms of how risk is understood, as well as how PREVENT police operations are delivered, perceived and experienced by those tasked with counter-terrorism. This thesis is a single-embedded case study in a geographical area defined by government funding structure as ‘low risk’. Through conducting qualitative interviews with PREVENT police officers and individuals drawn from security disciplines and interconnecting institutions, three key themes were identified. First, risk was understood to be interrelated with the concept of trust. Specifically, there was an emphasis on increasing trust with both internal and external partners given that PREVENT is now deployed through a multi-agency approach. Second, PREVENT was conceptualised as “safeguarding” rather than counter-terrorism, counter-radicalisation and/or de-radicalisation. Third, risk was linked to the notion of “gut feeling” at the referral (identification) stage of counter-radicalisation in the absence of radicalisation knowledge. As well as the fieldwork data which are empirically driven, a second objective of this thesis is to use a theoretical framework of Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’, emanating from analyses of governmentality, as well as ‘reflexive’ risk, in line with the works of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens’ ‘risk society’, as measured against the interview data. Drawing attention to the effects of both risk positions at local level, this thesis argues that PREVENT policing cannot be reduced to a single factor risk perspective. Moreover, this thesis provides a more nuanced account of counter-terrorism through risk by illuminating the messiness, complexity and empirical reality of PREVENT policing on the ground.

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

Chapter 1

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1 Gonzales (2011).
PREVENT - A multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats.

The UK’s Counter-terrorism Strategy
The Revised UK Counter-terrorism Strategy (2009)
UK - United Kingdom
NSS - National Security Strategy
NRR - National Risk Register
TPIMs - Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
BME - Black and Minority Ethnic
CT - Counter-terrorism
AQ - Al-Qaeda
PP - PREVENT Policing

Chapter 2

US - United States of America
9/11 - Terrorist Attacks on the United States of America, September 2001
CRNT - Chemical Radiological Nuclear Terrorism
SDSR - Strategic Defence and Security Review
NETCU - National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit
JTAC - Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
NPOIU - National Public Order Intelligence Unit
NDET - National Domestic Extremism Team
NDEU - National Domestic Extremism Unit
ACPO - Association of Chief Police Officers
ISC - Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters
MI5 - The Security Service
MI6 - Secret Intelligence Service
CNI - Critical National Infrastructure
ICT - International Counter-Terrorist Threat
NIRT - Northern Irish Related Terrorism
PTA - Prevention of Terrorism ACT
NRA - National Risk Assessment
ACPOS - Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland
WECTU - Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit
SVEU - Scottish Violent Extremism Unit
RICU - Research, Information and Communications Unit
DCLG - Department for Communities and Local Government
DCSF - Department for Children, Schools and Families
PVE - Preventing Violent Extremism
OSCT - Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
DfE - Department for Education
MoJ - Ministry of Justice
FCO - Foreign & Commonwealth Office
CTU - Counter-Terrorism Unit
CTIU - Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit
SO15 - UK Police National Counter-terrorism Network
NCTPHQ - National Counter-terrorism Police Headquarters
PCC - Police and Crime Commissioner
ACPOTAM - Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters
YJB - Youth Justice Board
CLG - Communities and Local Government
PSA 26 - Public Service Agreement 26
EDL - English Defence League
UKBA - UK Border Agency
CTLP - Counter-Terrorism Local Profile
BCU - Basic Command Unit
LPU - Local Policing Unit
PEO - PREVENT Engagement Officer
SPOC - Single Point of Contact
MAPPA - Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
CHANNEL - Collaboration between local authorities, the police and statutory partners and the local community to channel at risk individuals away from radicalisation.
ERG22 - Extreme Risk Guidance 22 (22 vulnerability indicators of radicalisation risk).

Chapter 3

HoS - History of Sexuality
EU - European Union
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus

Chapter 4

WIA - Worst Imaginable Accidents

Chapter 5

UoA - Unit of Analysis
IPA - Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
DoS – Director of Studies

Chapter 6

ACT NOW - Interactive PREVENT product used to enhance police/community relations.
NPT - Neighbourhood Policing Team
SPOC - Single Point of Contact
IAG - Independent Advisory Group
Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 Introduction

Over the last decade, the organisation and principal methodologies of counter-terrorism\(^2\) work have undergone significant reform. In the UK, much of this innovation has taken place under the auspices of the PREVENT\(^3\) programme (Innes et al., 2011: 16). Prior to the attacks on the London transport system in 2005, PREVENT had been the least developed of the four CONTEST strands\(^4\) but, for one commentator, ‘over the course of the following five years, PREVENT became the world’s most extensive counter-radicalisation policy’ (Burke, 2006, as cited in Thomas, 2012).

Since its inception (and in its most recent formulation), the key task of PREVENT has been explicitly and specifically concerned with stopping radicalisation, discouraging people from becoming terrorists\(^5\) and challenging extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism (HM Government, 2011b: 25, [Figure 6.7]). In Home Office policy, radicalisation is defined as the ‘processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances’\(^6\) (HM Government, 2006: 1, 9; HM Government, 2011b). Thus, the organising logic of PREVENT is the interconnections between ‘knowledges’ about radicalisation and the practice(s) of ‘preventative’ security (Heath-Kelly, 2012). Theoretically, this modelling allows security agents to identify where individuals exist on a progression towards radicalisation, and more importantly, what particular traits or characteristics are common, or even necessary, within these stages of advancement (Martin, 2014a: 191).\(^7\)

PREVENT has also been the recipient of increasing academic attention mirroring the increased funding it has received within the broader milieu of the UK’s CT interventions.\(^8\) Related to this aspect, there has been a burgeoning academic literature which, rooted in positivistic epistemology, has focussed on testing the validity of isolated variables in terms of the potential of individuals to be

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\(^2\) CT hereafter.

\(^3\) In academia and government policy, ‘PREVENT’ and ‘Prevent’ are used synonymously. Throughout this thesis, I have used ‘PREVENT’ for coherence and to clearly separate the strategy from the verb.

\(^4\) PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE make up the further three pillars of CONTEST.


\(^6\) Whilst the term ‘radicalisation’ has become central to CT policy-making in the UK, as Kundnani (2012) points out, the concept of radicalisation is by no means as solid and clear as many seem to take for granted: hence drawing upon the UK Home Office definition within the present study.

\(^7\) See Sageman (2004, 2008); Wiktorowicz (2005), for important examples of such approaches.

\(^8\) The UK security environment is also driven by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Risk Register (NRR).
‘radicalised’ (Martin, 2014a: 191; see also King and Taylor, 2011; Horgan, 2008). Like radicalisation, a precise definition of PREVENT has thus far alluded the criminological gaze, however PREVENT has been broadly defined as ‘a multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats’ (Innes et al., 2011: 11).

1.2 PREVENT: Reform through Risk

With its aims to combat terrorism through local social programmes, the PREVENT policy has provided a new inward focus to British CT strategy (Rikabi, 2013: 25). Nevertheless, PREVENT has been criticised on numerous fronts since its formal introduction in 2008 leading to high profile reform. Notable criticism came from the Communities and Local Government Committee report, which concluded: the single focus on Muslims has been counterproductive to the aims of PREVENT; a required refocus of PREVENT to address a broader range of extremism across all communities; and suggested the need for a more comprehensive and effective assessment of risk (Aly et al., 2014: 369). Subsequently, in June 2011, PREVENT was (re)conceptualised upon the notion of ‘risk’. It is now accepted that the PREVENT strategy is presented as acting upon the risk of terrorism and is understood to address ‘radicalisation’ in the face of the ‘greatest risk to our security’ (HM Government, 2011b: 59, emphasis added). It is posited that the greatest risk to the UK remains al Qaeda-related terrorism and the ‘extremist ideas’ that ‘terrorist ideologies’ draw upon (HM Government, 2011b: 59, 6). However, in its revised version, PREVENT concentrates on all types of extremism, including right- and left-wing extremist ideologies. The PREVENT review in June 2011 also significantly altered the size and approach of PREVENT. In a determined effort to distance prioritising PREVENT activity based on population demographics (HM Government, 2011b).

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9 Throughout the present study I use the terms PREVENT ‘policy’ and PREVENT ‘strategy’ interchangeably to refer to HM Government (2011b).
10 See House of Commons (2010).
11 AQ hereafter.
12 Much like the concept of radicalisation, ‘extremism’ has become a nebulous term with many different interpretations and definitions. This has resulted in a polarised debate about what the term ‘extremism’ constitutes (Awan and Blakemore, 2013). In this instance, I have drawn upon the official UK government definition. Extremism is defined in the PREVENT strategy as, ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2011b: 107).
13 Pre-2011, PREVENT ‘priority areas’ were selected according to Muslim population density (see Kundnani, 2009).
the allocation of resources are now said to be proportionate to threat levels across the UK (HM Government, 2011b: 6). Consequently, PREVENT funding is restricted to 25 priority areas on an ‘intelligence-led basis’. Furthermore, as of 2014, 11 priority areas have been added, 5 of which are considered ‘supported areas’. Thus, the majority of PREVENT effort is now centred on risk ‘hotspots’ which are assessed against the threat of radicalisation and/or extremism. In essence, through a portrayal of radicalisation as a linear progression of subjectivity towards violence, the concept behind PREVENT renders governable those considered to be ‘at risk’ (see Heath-Kelly, 2012; de Goede and Simon, 2013; Martin, 2014b). Emphasis is placed on the creation of successful identification mechanisms and it sees success in terms of their predictive power (Martin, 2014: 191). As the PREVENT strategy outlines, PREVENT is a national strategy for countering terrorist ideology and religious radicalisation. It comprises interventions for ‘at risk’ individuals and other community-based strategies for countering extremism (HM Government, 2011b). Thus, understanding (and indeed preventing) forms of radicalisation might be seen as a cohesive project of risk knowledge which is deployed to render terrorism pre-emptively governable (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 2).

1.3 Statement of the Problem: On PREVENT

The existence of a risk-driven framework within UK CT most certainly should make us think carefully about how to frame, formulate, present and practically implement prevention policies. Yet, there are significant empirical and policy oversights that remain unanswered. First, PREVENT targets the potential future terrorist and thus the object of PREVENT’s desire is that which is categorically unknowable.¹⁴ (Martin, 2014b: 1-2, emphasis added). The importance accorded to the police’s role in this newly realised anticipatory logic is evident throughout CONTEST II and the revised PREVENT strategy. Although the PREVENT strategy makes clear, ‘[PREVENT] is not a police programme and it must not become one’ (HM Government, 2011b: 9), police authority members now demonstrate a high level of involvement in PREVENT.¹⁵ Furthermore, the establishment of an overt policing element designed to engage with communities and key partners to address the risks which may lead individuals to engage in terrorist activity remains a key pillar of PREVENT (HM Government,

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¹⁴ A key aim of PREVENT is to reduce the potential of terrorist violence before the threat has even crystallised within the mind of the perpetrator (Martin, 2014a).

However, despite a wealth of literature on PREVENT and the concept of radicalisation more generally, as Spalek (2014: 831) points out, ‘there is little substantive research about how individuals engaged in CT initiatives, whether police officers or other professionals, negotiate this challenging terrain’. This dearth has been exacerbated by the fact that numerous commentaries and policy-level analyses of PREVENT have specifically focused on Islam as linked to the concept of ‘suspect community’. Alas, this has been at the expense of systematically gathering evidence about how PREVENT interventions are being delivered, perceived and experienced by those tasked with counter-radicalisation on the ground.\(^{16}\)

Second, despite PREVENT being re-modelled around the concept of it risk in its reformatted version, qualitative (in-depth) analyses of PREVENT through a lens of risk are particularly shallow. Moreover, research which has examined PREVENT (and specifically the police’s role) in areas defined by government funding structure as ‘low risk’\(^ {17}\) is completely absent. In a similar way that PREVENT (as a policy) suffered from a fallacy of centring activity on certain communities pre-2011 revision, empirical research has followed suit. Whilst PREVENT has been critiqued from numerous angles,\(^ {18}\) most, if not all, have specifically focused on areas with a high Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population density. Paradoxically, such research risks perpetuating exactly the sort of broad-brush ‘essentialising’ that it criticises (Thomas, 2012). The aforementioned theoretical lacunas are astonishing when you consider the depth and scope of research that has been conducted around PREVENT since its inception.

Such academic oversight is also mirrored in government policy and the legislative frameworks associated with PREVENT. For instance, a keyword search of the PREVENT strategy identifies 42 matches for the words ‘priority(ies)/prioritised/prioritisation’. However, the PREVENT strategy in its revised form fails to provide any operational information regarding low risk, non-priority funded areas (see HM Government, 2011b). Whilst it is accepted that the PREVENT policy has been written with prioritisation in mind, this omission contradicts radicalisation as a non-exceptional phenomenon, of which the PREVENT strategy advocates.

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\(^{16}\) With notable exceptions, see Innes et al. (2011) and Fussey (2013).

\(^{17}\) To the best of my knowledge, there are no empirical-based studies which have provided an in-depth examination of PREVENT in areas outside of London, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and Cardiff.

\(^{18}\) See, for example, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010); Spalek and Lambert (2008); Spalek (2009a and b); Spalek et al. (2010); Thomas (2010, 2014).
1.3.1 Reading the Thesis

Having briefly outlined the concept behind PREVENT and highlighted some current empirical and policy dearths, this is an opportune moment to provide clarity on how this thesis should and should not be read. The present research is a single-embedded case study which relies on qualitative (in-depth) semi-structured interviews with PREVENT police officers and individuals drawn from intelligence and security disciplines in an area defined by government funding structure as ‘non-priority/low risk’. The choice of case study site was driven by theory and policy relevance. Of note, the present research adopts an idiographic position by accepting that the findings are potentially unique to the case study. This is in keeping with the ontology and epistemology of social constructivism, which structures the critique.

In total 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 participants over the course of 14 months. The PREVENT team consisted of a PREVENT Lead; a PREVENT Sergeant; a PREVENT Police Officer and a CHANNEL Officer. However, in order to contextualise the multi-agency arrangements of PREVENT, further interviews were conducted with various professionals drawn from law enforcement, intelligence disciplines, local authorities and inter-organisational roles; some with extensive experience and knowledge of PREVENT. This included a PREVENT Sergeant from a different police force; neighbourhood police officers; a Youth Offending Team Case Manager; a Supported Housing Officer; a Local Housing Officer; a Community Safety Officer; a Community Engagement Officer; and a CHANNEL Intervention Provider. The data derived from the PREVENT police team serves as the main unit of analysis for the thesis, whereas the data afforded by participants from interrelated CT roles should be read as an embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2012) within a single-embedded case study. The embedded unit of analysis is used to support or challenge the intensive qualitative data obtained from the PREVENT team, as reflected upon in the research findings.

As an important caveat, this thesis departs from existing analyses of risk and suspect communities within British CT. Rather, it follows a path similar to research by Heath-Kelly (2013: 3) by focusing on the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ that require examination relative to the incorporation of risk-based models within UK CT’. Specifically, this thesis provides perspective on how risk is deployed and understood from the insight afforded by practitioners tasked with counter-radicalisation. Since the present study does not analyse PREVENT
policing\(^{19}\) from a local community perspective (ultimately, the focus is upon issues of ‘how’ rather than ‘whom’), many might view the axiology\(^{20}\) underpinning the research as somewhat dispassionate. However, not only have community perspectives of PREVENT been covered elsewhere, but removing emotion from research should not be viewed with negativity or distain.

This thesis does not reject the imposition of any \textit{a priori} theoretical frameworks or ‘theory direction’ (Grbich, 2013) at the outset, but contains several \textit{study propositions}, thus coinciding with deductive reasoning (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) defines study propositions as ‘the hypotheses that the researcher is looking to test through data collection and analysis’. The insight of those tasked with counter-radicalisation provides a sufficient blueprint to examine the theoretical propositions of dispositif risk, emanating from Foucauldian analyses of ‘governmentality’, and reflexive risk, in line with the oeuvre of Beck and Giddens’ theory of a ‘risk society’. Both risk positions are tested empirically at local level rather than against exceptional frameworks, as has thus far been the case within the context of the war on terror. However, these study propositions were ignored temporarily to allow the fieldwork to ‘tell its own story, in its own way’ (Yin, 2012: 124). Subsequently, this permitted the development of categories and eventually “meaning” based on the experiences and accounts of the PREVENT practitioners and not on preconceptions (Yin, 2014: 124). Moreover, ‘bottom-up’ reasoning (at the fieldwork stage) avoided prematurely closing off possible areas of enquiry (Bryman, 1988).

The following section outlines the \textit{study propositions} that structure the theoretical framework of the thesis.

\textit{1.3.2 Theory Direction}

In academic circles, risk has become a major topic of concern within criminology in order to

\(^{19}\) PP hereafter.

\(^{20}\) ‘Axiology’ concerns the role of values and beliefs the researcher brings to research (Robson, 2002).
explain terrorism with ‘governmentality’ 21 and ‘risk society’ perspectives being at the vanguard (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 381). With regard to the former, Foucauldian analyses focus on how risk management technologies manage populations through abstract factors, noted in an early analysis by Robert Castel in 1991 before the recent renaissance of risk in post-structuralist studies of security (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 395). This growing critical body of scholarship has re-appropriated risk from Beck ‘to engage with the practices that are enacted in the name of managing risk and uncertainty’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 9). Scholars whom heed this charge argue that Beck’s narrative of risks as ideological attempts to “feign control” as produced by modernity do not travel well to current practices and technologies of risk in the current war on terror (see Aradau and van Munster, 2007).22 Rather, it is posited that the identification of risk is not the same as recognising the uncertainty of future events (Aradau et al., 2008: 150). Characteristic for most of this literature is that it constructs a concept of risk dispositif23 that works as a yardstick for comparing current risk practices and discourses (Peterson, 2012: 702). This ‘risk dispositif’ designates certain practices and discursive elements as fundamental to the modern understanding of risk24 (Peterson, 2012: 702) - for example, calculability and present control of future uncertainties,25 thus ‘making visible’ the unknown ‘which would not otherwise be seen’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a).

Interestingly, in providing exegeses of Foucault’s original genealogy of the dispositif, scholars have described risk involving a permanent adjustment of traditional forms of risk management in light of the double infinity of catastrophic consequences and the incalculability of the risk of terrorism (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 5). What is new is not so much the advent of a risk society as the emergence of a security politics marked by a precautionary or pre-emptive relationship to futurity that is quite different from templates of prevention.26 Foremost, it is argued the limit of knowledge and catastrophe mobilised in the precautionary dispositif introduces decisionistic politics as a form of governmentality of the future (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34).

21 In its most simple form, ‘governmentality’ may be seen as governmental practice that provides a discursive field of power/knowledge through which governmental problems are articulated and techniques of governance are rendered “thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom (they are) practiced” (Burchell et al., 1991: 3).
23 This approach takes its starting point as the conceptualisation of risk as a dispositif i.e. a heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material elements for governing social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 24).
24 See, for example, Lobo-Guerrero (2008); Muller (2008); Salter (2008).
26 See, for example, Anderson (2010a); Aradau and van Munster (2007); Stern and Wiener (2006).
As well as the exponential growth of post-structuralist analyses of security, recent criminological work of a critical nature that has embraced a concern with risk more generally (as opposed to terrorism in particular), has sought to extract elements of Ulrich Beck’s work, rather than adhering to the risk society thesis in its primary form (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 382). It is suggested Beck’s work on reflexive modernisation can be thought of as a ‘politics of risk’, which governs the phenomenon of social engagement as a form of technologies of risk management. Like Beck, Rasmussen (2001, 2004) and Coker (2002a and b) argue how reflexivity (a concept taken from Beck) has come to describe the post-9/11 world; a world in which ‘there is no one to give authoritative answers’, and a world that ‘ceases to be modern and becomes reflexive about its own modernity’ (Rasmussen, 2004: 386). The analytical aim of this approach is to describe the transition from one form of governance to another in order to understand the conditions of risk management as opposed to (as in critical risk studies) revealing the power structures implied in the everyday practices of risk (Petersen, 2012: 703).

The parameters of both perspectives of risk have raised a number of points of departure regarding the formulation of a critical stance in the war on terror (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34). However, the current literature also testifies to a distinct lack of empirical application at local level, as opposed to more exceptional frameworks. As Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2012: 3, adapted by the present author) observes, ‘given the focus upon risk within the war on terror, it is surprising that the operations of PREVENT have not been analysed from a risk perspective’. The present research explores the extent to which the experiences and accounts of those tasked with counter-radicalisation contribute to an understanding of PP as measured against the aforementioned risk positions. The concern of the chapter now turns towards justifying the study propositions by situating the present study as an academic endeavour.

27 ‘Governance’ tends to be defined by pluralistic and decentralised decision-making structures whilst ‘government’ is associated with the constitutional powers of a centralised sovereign state authority.

28 For instance, the concept of dispositif has been applied to: the indefinite detention (Butler, 2006; Ericson, 2008) extraordinary rendition (Mutimer, 2007) and targeted killing of suspected terrorists (Kessler and Werner, 2008; Leander 2011); the widespread biometric monitoring of increasingly mobile populations (Amoore, 2009, 2008; Muller, 2010); the pre-emptive detention of refugees and asylum seekers (Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Weber, 2007); the pre-emptive freezing of monies and assets suspected of terrorist ties (de Goede, 2011, 2012); and the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive war (Ehrenberg et al., 2010; Stern and Wiener, 2006; Weber, 2007b). Moreover, the literature on dispositif precautionary risk has focused primarily on ‘high level’, executive responses, such as control orders/Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure (TPIMs) (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009b; Zedner, 2009) as well as on crimes of association and preparatory offences (Pickering et al., 2008).

29 Some notable exceptions have made sound theoretical contributions in this area, if not directly related to PREVENT. For instance, Mythen et al’s. (2009) examination of the production of British Muslims as ‘risky’ communities in the post-9/11 era and the social consequences of this; see also Pantazis and Pemberton (2009).
1.3.3 Statement of the Problem: On Risk

‘[On risk] we have a range of approaches and perspectives rather than an all-embracing theory. It is even questionable whether such a theory would be helpful. We might be better off with a range of competing approaches which allow consideration of the sometimes contradictory aspects of risk phenomena, and support ongoing discussion. The central idea is to use a range of different approaches to describe, understand, or explain social phenomena. The observable similarities and differences then produce a “crystal” of perspectives which would lead to further insights’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, as cited in Zinn, 2008: 200).

The risk positions outlined above (albeit briefly) testify to the fact that risk studies are not a coherent discipline, but rather a pluralistic debate on the status of the concept of risk (e.g. analytical or descriptive/constituting; measurable/non-measurable). Importantly, when discussing the ontological merit of ‘risk’, Mythen and Walklate (2005) articulate that a degree of theoretical camp sitting has led to something of a critical impasse on the relative merits of each risk position. Many Foucauldians have resolutely upheld a position as relativist as the risk society is realist, thus pitching up ‘either side of the river of risk’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 394). Consequently, these predefined concepts of risk become like ‘frameworks for analysis’ or categories that are prescriptive for any possible envisioning of politics and change. Subsequently, it is arguable that research has erred towards analytic under appreciation, particularly with regard to explaining CT through risk.

Through an appreciation of both theories as structurally related through the logic of (concepts within) their functioning, this thesis recognises the diversity in conceptual understandings of risk by exploring the degree to which their liaison might not simply be marked by immanent contradiction(s). However, this thesis does not claim to conveniently merge both risk theories as sociological bedfellows. The objective of the thesis is not one of trying to force these very different perspectives into a harmonious theoretical cocoon. Rather, the aim is to avoid privileging one discourse on risk and perhaps suggest an alternative way: to search for potential and possibility and to go beyond philosophical criticism by enlarging our horizons to the existence of different yet co-habitus concepts within risk itself. Ultimately, this thesis posits that instead of the binary logic of governmentality theories of risk and the risk society position, there is perhaps a need for a more complex understanding of the unfolding...

30 See Aradau (2004) for a similar approach, if not directly related to PREVENT.
relationship between the two - this without the imperative to situate the argument within meta-theoretical claims.

1.3.4 Situating the Thesis

O’Malley (2004b) argues that risk has been understood either as a unifying or uniform concept, or indeed, taken to imply both. Moreover, as Walklate and Mythen (2011: 102) point out, such presumptions deny not only the potential of differential understandings of risk, they also deny diverse experiences of risk. In line with both theoretical assertions, the idea to undertake a thesis as an epistemological approach emerging from an analysis of the risk literature was borne out of a review for my Master of Research (MRes) degree. The review discovered that literature on risk which attempted to ‘labour at the interface’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005) was particularly sparse leaving risk, as a theoretical position, partially underdeveloped in social science(s) - this despite the huge literature on risk available across the entire spectrum of various disciplines. Many writings on risk implicitly adopt a particular definitional view that is oblivious either to the philosophical debate or to other disciplinary perspectives (Althaus, 2005: 568). As one (if indeed obvious) example, Beck moves directly into a variety of aesthetic and affective representations which he contrasts to a single, rationalistic “determinate judgement” (Tulloch, 2007: 153). In so being, there is a certain sense in the risk literature that as risk consciousness permeates all aspects of social existence, other rationalities and technologies of government have become archaic or subordinate (O’Malley, 2000: 460). Two observations should be immediately observed. First, it is arguable that there is a fundamental lack of attention given to theories which point to different discursive representations of meaning and risk amelioration within the deterministic rationality of risk thinking (Tulloch, 2007: 153). Second, this focus readily gives rise to a sense – albeit implicit – that other technologies of governance are in retreat before the inexorable advance of risk itself. Following guidance outlined by Jessop et al. (2008; see also Mythen and Walklate, 2005), this thesis can be situated as a reflexive investigation of the interconnections among the aforementioned dimensions of risk – that is, ‘the mutually constitutive relations among their respective structuring principles and the specific practices associated with each of the latter’ (Jessop et al., 2008: 393).

1.4 Research Aims
The objective of this research is to document how PP is understood and applied at local level using a critical lens of risk. It is hoped that the inclusion of the views of practitioners in this arena will: (1) enhance dialogue, and; (2) contribute to a more informative understanding of PP as linked to risk. Additionally, this thesis critically considers the implications and domain conjecture(s) of ‘dispositif’ risk and the notion of ‘reflexive’ risk (or reflexivity) as applied to PP. In doing so, further objectives of this thesis are: (1) to interpret and to use PP as a vantage point from which to read the way in which risk can be seen as interwoven in ways not made evident by current theoretical articulation; (2) to develop risk as a conceptual framework for CT practices by moving beyond a single theoretical position; and (3) to question whether a focus upon reflexive risk and dispositif risk helps to construct a more proportionate account of the realities of PP that better link policy and practice.

1.5 Research Questions

In relation to the research aims, the following research questions are analysed:

1. How is risk understood by PREVENT police officers in a ‘non-priority’ funded/low risk area?

2. How is PREVENT understood operationally by PREVENT police officers at local (low risk) level?

In contrast to the study propositions (outlined in section 1.5.1), the research questions are empirically driven thus coinciding with a ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory framework (Lander and Sheldrake, 2010). Justifications for adopting this approach, in contrast to, for example, template analysis, stem from the current state of literature on PREVENT which has so far largely evaded examining PREVENT from the perspective(s) of those tasked with delivering counter-radicalisation on the ground. Summing the situation up more generally, Bigo (2000: 98) states, ‘analyses of security ... are too inattentive to the security practices of security professionals and they are thus “the product of secondary rationalisations that reduce security or identity to natural objects”’. Further, whilst not directly applying such observations towards PREVENT, Mythen (2014: 179) posits, ‘we need to embrace rather than shy away from ambiguity and to observe rather than conceal grey areas’. In line with both observations, PP might be considered a grey
area given the dearth in research which has explored PREVENT through the insights of PREVENT practitioners. Thus, in the context of the present study, it was important to avoid ‘ring-fencing’ participants’ views via a rigid methodological framework: hence, adopting empirical and largely practically driven research questions.

1.5.1 Study Propositions

In contrast to ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory research questions, the present study also contains several study positions. However, it is important to note that the study propositions were ignored at the fieldwork stage to allow the data to ‘tell its own story, in its own way’ (Yin, 2012: 124). The study propositions were then applied at the data analysis stage in order to develop theories and concepts appropriate to the empirical data. Subsequently, this allowed for comparisons between current literature and fieldwork data. The study propositions are:

- To what degree does dispositif risk, in less than exceptional terms, help to construct a more proportionate account of PREVENT policing as a form of social control?
- It is possible to integrate reflexive risk and reflexivity into explanations of PREVENT policing, CT practice and social control?
- To what extent are the above risk theories interrelated within PREVENT policing?

The inclusion of study propositions within the present study coincide with significant lacunas within the literature. Amoore and de Goede (2008c: 13) posit, ‘the deployment of risk in the war on terror invites us to think about the complex new interplays of public private, governmentality and sovereignty biopolitics and geographics’. In relation to this observation, whilst many studies have been inspired by a Foucauldian disciplinary analytical framework in the context of the war on terror, as McKee (2009) points out, there has been a preference to ‘disregard the messy empirical actualities’ which results in a ‘fundamental inability to account for why the governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in practice’. Further, in the context of PREVENT, chorusing McKee, O’Toole et al. (2015) argue, ‘many studies of PREVENT have focused on its discursive underpinnings through textual analysis of policy documents’. O’Toole et al. (2015) further add, ‘we suggest there has been a neglect
within the literature on PREVENT of material practices of governing’. Importantly, this “discursive” reading of governmentality i.e. concentrating on rationales of governing as manifest in key (government) documents rather than the specific and concrete ‘art of governing’ (Stenson, 2005: 266), contradicts Foucault’s epistemological position. Whilst Foucault’s writings are textually based and historical, he argues for, ‘a way that is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation and one that implies more relations between theory and practice’ (Foucault, 2003b). Likewise, Beck’s work has been generously applied in the context of the war on terror; however, such research similarly suffers from a paucity of empirical enquiry. Thus, through the inclusion of specific study propositions, this thesis enumerates the interplay between each risk position and their effects at local level. Ultimately, this overcomes the narrow focus on ‘text-as-evidence’ (McKee, 2009: 19) by illuminating the messiness and complexity of empirical reality - an endeavour that hinders post-structuralist analyses of security given an arguable disconnection from the “real”.

1.6 Thesis Organisation

This thesis is organised into two parts. **Part I** (chapters 2-4) provides a review of the existing literature. **Chapter 2: CONTEST, PREVENT and Domestic (UK) Counter-terrorism Policy** provides an in-depth discussion of the PREVENT programme, CONTEST, and engages with a number of key moments when existing CT policy approaches were reassessed and calibrated post- 9/11. To begin, the chapter provides a synoptic perspective on discourses and practices of CT law with a particular focus upon CONTEST and CONTEST II. The chapter also provides perspective on PREVENT funding; the development of PP; and the downwards defluxion of CT responsibilities towards community level. Following this, the concern of the chapter turns towards exploring how ‘radicalisation’ has been made possible as a discourse - one that enables the performance of security around it (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 5). Moreover, the chapter highlights how PREVENT and CHANNEL (an extension of PREVENT) act upon futurity through, for example, the notion of vulnerability as linked to risk.

**Chapter 3: Dispositif, Governmentality and Risk** provides an exploration of Michel Foucault’s notion of the dispositif. The chapter begins by outlining Foucault’s original meaning of dispositif with a focus on three key interpretations of the term: dispositif as ‘apparatus’; dispositif power as ‘network’; and dispositif as ‘productive’. Given that concept of the

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31 See McKee (2009) for an important analysis of such.
dispositif was born through Foucault’s notion of governmentality the chapter then turns towards some of the central tenets of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ theory. This includes governmentality read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, ‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’.

The remainder of the chapter focuses upon more contemporary research from International Relations, Security Studies and Critical Risk Scholarship, outlining how such studies attempt to provide exegeses of Foucault’s securite de dispositif through the concept of ‘dispositif precautionary risk’. The chapter explores a growing body of work that has meticulously documented the discursive emergence and practical proliferation of a novel iteration of pre-emption that is quite different from templates of prevention in the context of the post-9/11 global security climate. Moreover, the chapter explores narratives of diminishing temporal control as ‘security issues have increasingly been defined in terms of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats’ (Aalberts and Werner, 2011: 2191). Lastly, the chapter considers the irruptive contingency of the future as techniques of imagination have taken on new political significance in the context of the war on terror (de Goede, 2008a: 155).

Chapter 4: Risk Society and Reflexive Risk begins by exploring the parameters of Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk (or World Risk) Society’ and the paradigm of ‘reflexivity’ because of a progression towards reflexive modernity. The first half of the chapter specifically focuses on the paradox of modernisation; Beck’s optimism about the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere through ‘sub-political’ means; and the ‘individualisation’ of risk according to Beck. The concern of the chapter then turns towards the work of Anthony Giddens in the context of his broader social theory of reflexivity. The chapter reflects upon several central tenets of Giddens’ work such as dis-embedding relations; the ontological (in)security of the ‘self’; and Giddens’ understanding of risk and trust within a postmodern world.

Part II of the thesis (chapters 5-7) provides a review of the methodological design; outlines the data analysis approach; provides analysis of the key themes distilled from the interview sessions; and reflects upon convergences, divergences and ambiguities between existing literature and research findings.

Chapter 5: Methodology describes the methodological research design and provides justifications as to why qualitative methods were deemed most appropriate in line with the research aims and ontological and epistemological position of the present study. Within this chapter, I also reflect on the

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32 See, for example, Adey and Anderson (2012); Amoore (2007); Anderson (2010a); Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2011); Cooper (2006); de Goede (2008a, 2012); de Goede and Randalls (2009); Ehrenberg et al. (2010); Elmer and Opel (2006); Kessler and Werner (2008); Krasmann (2012); Massumi (2005a, 2007); Moreiras (2005).
applicability of the research findings, both epistemologically and personally, and outline the data analysis method and approach.

Chapter 6: Key Findings provides analysis of three principal themes that emerged from the fieldwork interviews. These are risk and trust; PREVENT as safeguarding; and risk as gut feeling. First, this chapter highlights a significant change in PP methodology from a ‘threat-centric’ model to an ‘overt’ CT capacity, of which the concept trust is considered particularly crucial. Furthermore, this chapter highlights certain ambiguities regarding PP as a smooth top-down governance structure. Second, this chapter draws attention to the fact that PP is becoming entirely re-conceptualised through an invocation towards “safeguarding” vulnerable individuals. Subsequently, risk is not so much displaced but re-oriented through terminological modification. Accordingly, such a transformation is having a profoundly depoliticising effect upon the operations and objectives of PP. Lastly, the chapter highlights practitioners understanding(s) of acting upon “gut feeling” and “instinct” as linked to risk in the absence of radicalisation knowledge(s). Acting upon intuitive feeling is understood to offer various benefits for internal and external partners and objectives of PP more generally.

Chapter 7: Comparatives between Research Findings and Literature critically reflects upon the three key themes distilled from the interview sessions as measured against dispositif and reflexive risk. Within this chapter, it is argued both risk positions provide a sufficient theoretical framework in order to make sense of the fieldwork data. However, this chapter also highlights various theoretical ambiguities as measured against the research findings.

Chapter 8: Final Remarks and Directions for Future Research provides a summary of the preceding two chapters; reflects upon philosophy and pragmatics; and offers directions for future research.
Part I:  

Literature Review

“No human action, so to speak, is inevitable”.

- Aristotle (Rhetoric, 1357, 25-32, adapted from Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2000)

Chapter 2

CONTEST, PREVENT and Domestic (UK) Counter-Terrorism Policy

2.1 Introduction
As Thomas (2014) observes, describing PREVENT is not straightforward as it has involved a number of distinct and arguably contradictory elements. This chapter engages with a number of key moments when existing CT approaches were reassessed and calibrated. Clearly, the watershed moment for UK CT came with the 2005 terrorist attacks on London, of which the threat of suicide attacks by British citizens was “brought home” (CONTEST, 2006: 3). Moreover, the defeat of the Labour party in the May 2010 elections and the formation of a coalition government by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties led to a further review and reassessment of policies, which has subsequently initiated a new era of CT. The chapter specifically looks at the development of PREVENT in relation to these.

The first part of the chapter briefly explores the historical context of CT within the UK pre-PREVENT. The focus here will be on CONTEST in order to provide a synoptic perspective on discourses and practices of CT. It is hoped this will minimise (though far from address) potentially limiting historical amnesia. The final two-thirds of the chapter provide a detailed examination of PREVENT. Specifically, the chapter explores PREVENT funding; the development of PREVENT policing; the diffusion of PREVENT responsibilities towards local community level; and, following analysis by Heath-Kelly (2013), how ‘radicalisation’ has been made possible as a discourse - one that enables the performance of security around it. The concern here is not one of providing a detailed examination of ‘radicalisation’, but to analyse how the concept of radicalisation makes it possible for PREVENT and CHANNEL (an extension of PREVENT) to act upon futurity, as opposed to reactive CT methods.

Two important caveats must be acknowledged in the context of the chapter. First, exploring a longer time horizon of CT pre-CONTEST is not plausible for reasons of space. Second, this chapter omits analysing the broader contours of what constitutes “terrorism” for reasons twofold. First, it is for reasons of space. Over the last 15 years, there has been burgeoning research that has attempted to make sense of terrorism as a concept and as a tactic. To name but a few there is ‘new terrorism’ post-9/11, ‘lone-actor terrorism’, ‘catastrophic terrorism’, and ‘chemical radiological nuclear terrorism’ (CRNT). Second, providing a finely constrained examination of terrorism as outlined in legislative policy and/or academia risks missing important understandings of CT at the research phase.

2.2 CONTEST
The concepts, goals and structure of current CT policy for the UK are found in the strategy document *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (Weeks, 2013: 105; see HM Government, 2009a). First developed in 2003, CONTEST was the informal name given to a collection of strategies and abstract frameworks from which public safety and security organisations could work from to counter the threat of international terrorism within the UK (Weeks, 2013: 105). The introduction of CONTEST was manifested in a form of series of legislative norms and new institutions, such as the National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU) in 2004, and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) within the MI5 Security Service. The objective of the former was to combat “domestic terrorism” whilst JTAC identifies the sources of terrorism and assess the threat level. Post-9/11, the nature of the threat was originally constructed as an international one (Kuzmic, 2011: 5-6), although its domestic element was reflected internally before 2005 (e.g. Draft Report on Young Muslims and Extremism of April 2004).

Despite the delay in revealing the details to the public until 2006, CONTEST was leaked to *The Times* in 2004 that characterised it as “…one of the most ambitious government social engineering projects in recent years” (Weeks, 2013: 109). This circulating document was described as “an attempt to co-ordinate the pan-Governmental response to the emerging terrorist threat in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in September 2001” (House of Commons, 2009: 4). Moreover, CONTEST was simultaneously promoted as a macro socio-political strategy aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the public (Bonino, 2012: 189).

This is an important development as framings from 2001 “to win the battle of hearts and minds” have underscored terrorism not just as a threat to life, but also as a threat to British values (Fisher, 2012).

The battle to win hearts and minds was also clearly interrelated with a new policy focus on the need to promote “community cohesion” in Britain; a significant part of the response to the civil disturbances in

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33 In 2011, the NETCU merged with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET) to become the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU).

34 There are two further security and intelligence agencies that have roles in relation to CT; MI6 (Secret Intelligence Services) and GCHQ (the Government Communications Headquarters) (Choudhury, 2012: 26-27).

35 There are currently three different threat levels in respect of the International Counter-Terrorist (ICT) threat, the Northern Irish Related Terrorism (NIRT) threat for Great Britain and the NIRT threat for Northern Ireland (both set by the Security Service). These are communicated to the public via the GOV.UK and Security Service websites (Home Office, 2013c: 5). More specifically, within the UK there exists a threat assessment system which assesses the risk from terrorist attacks according to the following five levels of threat: critical – an attack is expected imminently; severe – an attack is highly likely; substantial – an attack is a strong possibility; moderate – an attack is possible but not likely; low – an attack is unlikely.


37 The term “hearts and mind” originates in counter-insurgence campaigns and was based on isolating insurgents through winning the support and trust of the majority (English, 2009).
duo-cultural ex-industrial towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 (see Cantle, 2001). Whilst social cohesion covers a range of socio-economic factors that affects groups or individuals defined by their social class and economic position, community cohesion is concerned more directly with relationships between communities defined by ethnicity or religion (Cantle, 2005). Key within this discursive mix was the conviction of the centripetal inward-looking dynamics of Muslim communities locked into a supposedly myopic reproduction of their “traditional” way of life38 (Afshar, 2012: 9). This mapped comfortably on to a dichotomy that fed both realistic and symbolic threats, coupled with a parallel trajectory of virulent enmities and the rhetoric of denigration (Alam and Husband, 2013).

Appreciating that 9/11 and the civil disturbances of 2001 undoubtedly served as inflection points so far as the governance of national security in the UK is concerned,39 the defining moment for CT development domestically was the 7 July 2005 London Underground terrorist bombings (Rikabi, 2013: 25). Less than four months after the Prevention of Terrorism ACT 2005 (PTA) was passed, a group of four Islamist British citizens placed bombs on a bus and on three tube trains throughout the London metropolitan area committing a domestic terrorist attack. The attacks resulted in 52 deaths and more than 770 were injured (House of Commons, 2012: 3). Authorities halted a copycat attempt on 21 July 2005, but the 7 July 2005 attack left substantial damage (Fisher, 2012: 219). This domestic terrorist attack was the first such kind committed by natural-born citizens who had an Islamist motive. In 2006, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, described this unprecedented threat from extremism as “... the poisonous propaganda of those people that warps and perverts the minds of younger people” (The Guardian, 2006, as cited in Awan and Blakemore, 2013: 5-6).

Issues of cohesion and integration were further intertwined with CT narratives after the 7/7 bombings. However, CONTEST in its original form garnered little attention until it was refreshed and made public in March 2009 as Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, better known as CONTEST II (House of Commons, 2009: 9; HM Government, 2009b).

2.2.1 CONTEST II

38 It should be noted, as Eid and Karim (2014) observe, ‘a suspicion of the “Other” and a need to control the definition of that “Otherness” have been integral elements of the creation and legitimation of British imperialism and colonialism’.
39 Mythen and Walklate (2008) emphasise the importance of 9/11 in relation to domestic CT governance structures; I have adapted this to include the UK civil disturbances of 2001.
In March 2009, the government published a revised CT strategy written by The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT hereafter), known as ‘CONTEST II’ (Kundnani, 2009: 20). CONTEST II set out the threat facing Britain and various priorities for dealing with it through to 2015, reflecting the National Security Strategy (NSS hereafter) (HM Government, 2009a: 10-11), the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR hereafter) and the wider Coalition Programme or Government (Home Office, 2012a: 7). The updated CT strategy was to be “based on principles that reflect British values” (HM Government, 2009a: 10-11), “the evolution of the threat, both home and abroad” (House of Commons, 2009: 8), and “the greater resources which have been made available by the Government to address terrorism” (Innes et al., 2011). One factor of this “changing security situation” was, according to the then Minister for Security Lord West, “to raise our game, break out of specialist ‘silos’, avoid being London-centric and ensure that lessons learned were being incorporated via a stronger central hub” (House of Commons, 2009: 9, see also Jackson, 2012: 77). Moreover, the NSS set out how it would ‘address and manage (the) diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, it’s citizens, our prosperity and our way of life’ (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 3, emphasis added; see also House of Commons, 2009: 9).

There are two key developments which distinguish the “new” security problematic (CONTEST II) from its original form (CONTEST). First, the new strategy signalled a commitment to a much more overt campaign of countering terrorist violence (Kundnani, 2009). CONTEST II was to represent the government’s ‘determination to place as much information as possible in the public domain ... (with regard to) security matters’ (House of Commons, 2009: 4). Importantly, CONTEST II explicitly included citizens as partners in this project to make Britain secure (HM Government, 2009a). Second, the new security strategy foregrounded the preoccupation with a ‘threat-o-genic’ (Massumi, 2007: 13) interconnected globe and greater emphasis on the protection of the ‘freedoms’ of liberal-democratic life. Specifically, CONTEST II aimed to build on the existing (CONTEST) policy “to reduce the risk” to the UK and it its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence (HM Government, 2009a: 6, emphasis added). Thus, as Jackson (2012: 79) observes, CONTEST

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41 While the NSS identifies threats from both international and domestic sources The National Risk Assessment (NRA) and The National Risk Register (NRR) assess those threats that are strictly domestic (Cabinet Office, 2008a: 5).
42 Championing a “free society” is also retained in the Cabinet Office (2009, 2010).
II explicitly reflects what Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 416) identify as the primary performative function of national security in the era of the war on terror: ‘to dissolve inside/outside spatialisations and therefore open up new spaces for the movement and entrenchment of neoliberal globalisation’.

To define the threat more specifically, CONTEST II elaborates stating that the threat to the UK (and many other countries) now came primarily from four sources: (1) the AQ leadership and their immediate associates; (2) terrorist groups affiliated to AQ; (3) ‘self-starting’ networks, or lone individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to that of AQ, but with no connection to that organisation; and (4) terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as AQ but that have their own identity and regional agenda (HM Government, 2009a: 11; see also HM Government, 2009b).

Moreover, underpinning the revised strategy was the combination of four alliterative ‘work-streams’ (or strands), known as the four P’s:

- **PREVENT**: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism;
- **PURSUE**: to stop terrorist attacks;
- **PROTECT**: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and
- **PREPARE**: ‘mitigating the impact of attacks’ by increasing Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and community resilience.⁴³

Each of these strands has a series of related objectives and supporting programmes reflecting the aims and principles of the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. Through their interlinking, CONTEST II is intended to provide a comprehension strategy for countering-terrorism, where “work on PURSUE and PREVENT reduces the treat from terrorism; work on PROTECT and PREPARE reduces the UK’s vulnerability to attack” (HM Government, 2009b: 11). Ultimately, CONTEST II acts as a bridge between intelligence, homeland security and conciliatory approaches to CT (Jackson et al., 2011: 224-9).

Although the four strands are given a unifying coherence within the strategy (see HM Government 2009a: 80) they are in fact incredibly diverse, deeply embedded in, but also productive of, practices, roles, policies, and even departments across government; from the Security Services to the Departments of Health, Education, and Communities and Local Government (Jackson, 2012).

The design of the work-streams and their respective goals are further explained in CONTEST

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II as attempts to address the complexities and strategic factors that drive current extremist ideology (Weeks, 2013: 112-13). Moreover, CONTEST II listed four longer-term strategic factors:

1. Unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (particularly [in] Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq) and state fragility and failure;

2. Violent extremist ideology associated with AQ, which regards most governments in Muslim countries as ‘un-Islamic’ or apostate; claims that these governments are sustained by western (sic) states who are engaged in a global attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims;

3. Modern technologies, which facilitate terrorist propaganda, communications and terrorist operations;

4. Radicalisation - the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range of causes (including perception of our foreign policy), varying from one organisation to another.44

Although there is no clear dividing line, domestically the focus of PREVENT is clearly on radicalisation whereas the remaining three are managed mostly through international efforts (Weeks, 2013: 116). Since this thesis is appositely concerned with the PREVENT strand of CONTEST, this chapter does not provide any coverage of other three strands (PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE). Rather, the remainder of the chapter provides an in-depth exploration of PREVENT.

2.3 PREVENT45 and the Concept of Radicalisation

45 The Home Office now has the lead responsibility of working with communities and local authorities on PREVENT. In Scotland, PREVENT is delivered by the Scottish Violent Extremism Unit (SVEU); this is a joint initiative between the Scottish government and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). The Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU) - a joint initiative between the four police forces
Since its inception, PREVENT has been explicitly and specifically concerned with ‘tackling the radicalisation of individuals’ (HM Government, 2006: 1), defined as ‘the processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances’ (HM Government, 2006: 1, 9). Thus, the stated goal(s) of PREVENT can be understood as ‘stopping radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming terrorists’ (HM Government, 2009a: 56, reprinted from the Cabinet Office, 2008b: 44). Of note, the centrality of the term ‘radicalisation’ can be seen in CT policy prior to the crystallisation of PREVENT within CONTEST II. For instance, the Home Office strategy paper Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy was published in 2006 as a response to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC). Specifically, the ISC warned that ‘across the whole of the CT community the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking’ (Huq, 2010: 17).

The PREVENT strategy understands that ‘ideology is a central factor in the radicalisation process’ (HM Government, 2011b: 40-44). Thus, a key objective of PREVENT is to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism’ by undertaking ‘counter-ideological work’ designed to ensure ‘no ungoverned spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish’ (HM Government, 2011b: 9). ‘Radicalisation’ here stands as a particular model for ‘explaining’ the causes of terrorism, understood as a process whereby ‘extremist ideas’ are propagated and disseminated by key activists and thinkers who therefore ‘radicalise’ others because of their ‘vulnerabilities’ to such a message (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 245). Identifying the nature of such ‘vulnerabilities’ therefore also emerges as a crucial means of preventing ‘radicalisation’. Following this, the other identified key objectives are to prevent individuals

in Wales - works with the Welsh Assembly to implement PREVENT in Wales. Furthermore, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) carry out counter-ideological or counter-narrative work (Choudhury, 2012: 26-27).

46 This is unsurprising given that there is no universally accepted definition of radicalism or radicalisation in academia or government. For example, the Home Offices’ (2006) definition of radicalisation is different to that stated in CONTEST II, defined as: ‘... the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups’ (HM Government, 2009a: 40). Moreover, in their project to ‘reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism’ (HM Government, 2009a, 8, 18, 54, 56), the Home Office and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism theorise ‘radicalisation’ as the process whereby international terrorism poses a new challenge to UK security by acting through British citizens (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 1). Additionally, over the last ten years, several other government bodies have established their own definitions of radicalism, which understandably has caused widespread confusion and convolution.

47 The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is explored in further depth later in the chapter.
being drawn into ‘extremism’ and to diminish the ‘risks of radicalisation’ within a number of institutional settings (including, notably, schools, colleges and universities) (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 245).

The portrayal of radicalisation as a linear progression can be read as interrelated with academic literature rooted in positivistic epistemology, which has sought to test the validity of isolated variables in terms of the potential of individuals to be radicalised (Martin, 2014a: 191; see also King and Taylor, 2011; Horgan, 2008). Recent academic literature has questioned the significance of a macro focus on the ‘root causes’ of radicalisation, instead focusing on ‘a cultural-psychological disposition’ (see Lacquer, 2000, 2004; Kundnani, 2012). The cultural-psychological approach to radicalisation offers predicative possibilities if particular dispositions or patterns of behaviour can serve as a proxy ‘indicator’ of risk (Kundnani, 2012). In this way, a more complex account of radicalisation has been proposed in which, a psychological process, such as a group dynamic or struggles with identity, is seen as interacting with a process of acquiring an extremist theology (Kundnani, 2012: 8-9).

It is within CONTEST II where the concept of identity (specifically “Britishness”, “integration”, and “assimilation”) can be read as a ‘risk factor’ in relation to radicalisation. A combination of the theological and psychological dispositions perhaps best sums up PREVENT(ion) within CONTEST II, since in policy terms in the UK, it is characteristic of the radicalisation discourse, and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined with questions of integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion (Lindekilde, 2012: 110). As well as this, PREVENT emphasises the individual as driven by a persuasive ideology (Sedgwick, 2010: 480) which becomes salient through social networks (see Sageman, 2004) and personal crises for the uptake of extremist ideas (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 6). Moreover, the prominent focus on the psychosocial well-being of individuals is clear in the 2009 CONTEST (II) strategy. As the strategy makes clear, ‘people are not only vulnerable to radicalisation because of political and economic grievances. A range of social and psychological factors are also important’ (HM Government, 2009a: 44). Further, it is stated that radicalisation can be understood, ‘not simply a result of actual or perceived grievances. It may be the result of family or peer pressure, the absence of positive mentors and role models, a crisis of identity, or

48 The importance of socio-economic factors, as well as cultural-psychological dispositions, is retained in the latest version of the PREVENT strategy which states, ‘individuals drawn towards right-wing terrorism are usually poorly educated males and often unemployed (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals)” (HM Government, 2011b: 21).
changing circumstances (e.g. a new environment following migration and asylum)” (HM Government, 2009a: 89).

2.3.1 Funding for PREVENT

Interrelated with new and developing discourses on the concept of radicalisation, there has been considerable intellectual, political and economic investment in developing and enhancing PREVENT activity (Innes et al., 2011: 4). The initial pathfinder year of 2007/8 (see DCLG, 2007a and b) made £6m available to 70 priority local authorities, specifically those with having a Muslim population density of 5% or more to build on their existing work to engage with communities, forge partnerships with police, community and faith groups49 and work with mosques and education institutions (DCLG, 2007b). However, it is suggested that local authorities and other bodies were expected to initiate activity with little notice or negotiation (Thomas, 2014; see also Thomas, 2009; Husband and Alam, 2011). In the following 2008-11 period, PREVENT was expanded to all local authorities with 2% or more of their population as Muslim (Thomas, 2014). Of note, funding for PREVENT was significantly expanded between 2008/09 and 2010/11 when £45 million was committed for the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’50 (PVE hereafter) strategy through the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG hereafter) via local authorities. Moreover, in 2009/10, DCLG also established a £3.2 million Challenge and Innovation Fund for local authorities not receiving the Area Based Grant (HM Government, 2011b: 101). Furthermore, an additional £5.1 million - made available through the Community Leadership Fund - intended to complement work being taken forward by local authorities and support leadership capacity within Muslim communities (HM Government, 2011b: 101).

Across all departments, including the Home Office, Foreign Office, and the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF hereafter), this all added up to a 2008-2011 PVE budget of £140 million - an increase in funding by threefold since 2001, some £85 million of which came from the DCLG, and the security-focused remainder from the Home Office (Thomas, 2010: 447-448). Moreover, as of 2014, it is suggested that PREVENT has involved

49 As Rikabi (2013: 26) observes, ‘local government interaction with Muslim and interfaith organisations is not new; the United Kingdom has established a link with Islamic charities and political groups since the 1980s’.

50 PREVENT work has been underway since 2006 when the DCLG launched two funds under the auspices of the PREVENT strategy: (1) Community Leadership Fund (centred at capacity building, young people, women and faith leaders) and (2) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (funding to projects of local authorities and civil society) (see DCLG, 2008). Thus, whilst it is often cited that PREVENT has been part of UK CT policy since 2007, this assertion is misinformed.
a spend of at least £200 million on community-based education and engagement (Thomas, 2014). Figure 2.3 outlines funding for PREVENT from 2009-2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Funding Amount (£) for PREVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>47,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>44,384,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>35,996,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>35,078,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>39,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2015</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3: PREVENT Funding 2009-2015

It is important to note that the majority of PREVENT funding goes to CT policing (provided by the Home Office). Moreover, it is argued that the policing element of PREVENT is more unique and distinctive than the other strands of the cross-government CONTEST strategy which have continued the kinds of working practices associated with established CT methods (see Innes et al., 2011). Further, since this thesis is appositely concerned with PP, the policing element of PREVENT warrants analytical depth of its own.

2.3.2 PREVENT Policing

Police authority members now demonstrate a high level of involvement in PREVENT. This is unsurprising since one of the national threats to the UK that the Strategic Policing Requirement recognises is terrorism, of which the national security risk assessment identifies

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53 In an accounting of programme spending in 2010, the House of Lords concluded that 70 percent of funds went to local police, 15 percent went to social programs, 9 percent went to partnership agencies, and a government campaign to denounce extremists spent 3 percent (Rikabi, 2013: 2).
54 In the following discussion I draw generously from HM Government (2014c), given that government policy documents centred on PREVENT policing are significantly sparse.
as a tier one risk\textsuperscript{56} (HM Government, 2014c: 37). Structurally, the police CT network in England and Wales consists of a London-based CT command (SO15), with four regions hosting a CT unit (CTU) and four hosting a CT intelligence unit (CTIU). The units are co-ordinated nationally and managed locally by a lead force (HM Government, 2014c). Moreover, to support the national network, each police force in England and Wales retains Special Branch capability either individually or collaboratively with other forces and it deals with all national security issues including CT (HM Government, 2014c). Typically, these consist of a group of police officers and staff who work at a local level to comply with the provisions of CONTEST and the strategic policing requirement (HM Government, 2014c: 19). Furthermore, since 2010, there has also been a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit with responsibility for enforcing the removal of unlawful terrorist material online (HM Government, 2014c).

It is suggested that PVE funding has led to 300 new dedicated police posts nationally, split between Regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs), Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and ‘engagement posts’ where members have been engaged in the development of the national CT network since its inception in 2006/07. These substantial units are comprised of staff drawn from a number of disciplines, including highly skilled detectives, community contact teams, financial investigators, intelligence analysts and high-tech crime investigators (HM Government, 2014c). The CTUs are largely self-sufficient and can effectively co-ordinate routine enquiries and operations without compromising the commitment of local forces to day-to-day policing (HM Government, 2014c: 19). The CTIUs, while still substantial, are smaller in scale than the CTUs and are focused upon the development of CT intelligence rather than the investigation of offences. Where a terrorist-related incident or intelligence is identified within a CTIU area the initial investigation is carried out by CTIU staff (HM Government, 2014c). Once the initial intelligence gathering has reached a stage where there is sufficient evidence for action (such as the arrest of a suspect), the investigation is then handed over to a specially trained CT investigator (HM Government, 2014c: 19).

The Home Office makes grant funding available to all forces on an annual basis. Allocation is based on advice from the National Counter-Terrorism Police Headquarters (NCTPHQ),\textsuperscript{57} and the ring-fenced money goes to Police and Crime Commissions

\textsuperscript{56} A tier one risk is judged to be the highest priority for UK national security over the next five years, taking into account both likelihood and impact (HM Government, 2014c: 37).

\textsuperscript{57} From 1 April 2014, the headquarters’ functions of the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPOTAM) have been performed by the National Counter Terrorism Police Headquarters (NCTPHQ) (HM Government, 2014c).
(PCC hereafter) specifically for CT purposes (HM Government, 2014c). There is a complex administrative structure in place to deliver the CT grant to different locations across forces in England and Wales.\(^5^8\) Moreover, the grant has 16 different budget lines and in 2012-2013 figures suggest government funding for CT policing was £573 million (House of Commons, 2014). Furthermore, in 2013/14, the total CT policing grant provided was £563m (HM Government, 2014c). Lastly, the security and intelligence agencies receive a budget of £2.1 billion. In 2011-12, MI5 allocated 72% of its resources to international CT whereas MI6 and GCHQ allocated roughly a third each of their budgets to international CT (House of Commons, 2014). Second in funding are local authorities and communities (provided by DCLG) and third are Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO hereafter) overseas operations (Kuzmic, 2011).

2.3.3 PREVENT Policing: Three Phases of Development

Innes et al. (2011) have broadly defined three distinct phases for the development of PP. Phase One entailed a traditional model of CT policing which was far more narrowly conceived and placed more accent upon the need for ‘covert’ activity.\(^5^9\) In essence, PP was predicated upon a clandestine threat-centric model\(^6^0\) (Innes et al., 2011). Phase Two involved a reconfiguration of assets as part of the “refresh” of approach involved in CONTEST II. Whilst PREVENT staff and units were altered, there was limited innovation in terms of how public-facing services were delivered. In effect, there was an increase in capacity but it was still lacking defined PREVENT capabilities (Innes et al., 2011). Phase Three has entailed an entirely new overt method of doing CT policing by mixing social interaction and police work to dissuade suspected political extremists from participating in or supporting terrorist activities (Rikabi, 2013: iv).

PP is now conceptualised as a blended methodology integrating elements of traditional CT policing with practices derived and distilled from and ‘Community Policing’ and ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ philosophies. Whilst Community Policing models are diverse, and thus not something that can be easily defined (Spalek, 2009: 4a), Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 5) consider Community Policing as comprising the following characteristics:

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\(^{5^8}\) The distribution of £24 million for PP in 2010/11 is illustrated in Appendix A. Although such figures are now outdated, the data provides perspective on the management of CT finances.

\(^{5^9}\) See Innes and Thiel (2008).

\(^{6^0}\) The principle focus of a threat-centric model is on intercepting and interdicting motivating offenders in a comparatively low-visibility fashion (Innes et al., 2011).
‘Community Policing relies upon organisational decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way communication between police and the public. It assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police be responsive to citizens’ demands when they decide what local problems are and set their priorities. It also implies a commitment to helping neighbourhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organisations and crime prevention programmes’.

Moreover, Rosenbaum (1988: 334) summarises the fundamentals of Community Policing as ‘an emphasis on improving the number and quality of police-citizen contacts, a broader definition of ‘legitimate’ police work, decentralisation of the police bureaucracy, and a greater emphasis on proactive problem-solving strategies’.

‘Neighbourhood Policing’ is also being explicitly linked to CT activities. Neighbourhood Policing has been broadly defined as, ‘an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime and disorder, and to improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security’ (ACPO, 2006: 10). As Innes et al. (2011) observe, this connection to Neighbourhood Policing is important because there is evidence that PREVENT work cannot be disconnected from more mainstream policing concerns. For instance, it is argued that ‘personal relationships’ will constitute the working capital for building trust and confidence in order to allow for community intelligence to be passed to the police (Spalek, 2009). Moreover, police may operationalise ‘soft power’ through processes of persuasion, negotiation, and agenda setting, providing a far more subtle mode of influence (Innes et al., 2006, as cited in Spalek, 2009a: 10). In essence, it is suggested PP is enhanced and may even be dependent upon the efficacy of more routine policing services (Innes et al., 2011). As the then director of ACPO, Sir Norman Bettison put it, “we will be successful in PP only when it is mainstreamed into Neighbourhood Policing” (House of Commons, 2012: 29; see also Bettison, 2009). Reflecting this genealogy, PP is said to pivot around three main activities: (1) community engagement and community intelligence generation; (2) identifying and mounting disruptions against presenting risks; and (3) community impact management (Innes et al., 2011: 3). Moreover, Innes et al. (2011: 16) further break down these activities into two distinct sets of actions: (i) general community level interventions designed to inhibit and decay existing and potential social support for violent extremist ideologies. Thus, PREVENT is as much concerned with the social environment in which risks and threats are propagated, as with threats themselves. It seeks to address vulnerabilities and enhance community resilience; (ii) nested within these community level
interventions there is a more specific targeted focus upon preventing the radicalisation of individuals and small groups.

Set against this backdrop, research by Innes et al. (2011: 90) identified that PP now typically takes place through four principal modes of intervention (see Figure 2.3.1). These are:

- **Protective** – where the police own the intervention in terms of defining the problem to be addressed and undertaking the response;
- **Mobilisation** – where the community engages in self-help behaviours to deal with a perceived threat;
- **Type 1 Co-production** – the orthodox notion of collaborative working wherein the community seeks police involvement to tackle a problem;
- **Type 2 Co-production** – involves the police utilising community based informal social control resources to manage a problem.

![Figure 2.3.1: PREVENT Policing Intervention Modes](image)

2.4 Counter-Radicalisation: Community Involvement

It is now accepted that PREVENT objectives are sought through a variety of local community partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as voluntary agencies and community groups ‘with police forces, local authorities and their partners working closely together to oversee and deliver the project’ (DCLG, 2008b: 9). This is reflected in the range of government departments and agencies that have developed PREVENT products and activity. This has included PVE funding for Youth Offending Teams through the Youth Justice Board (YJB); DCSF toolkit on extremism (‘Learning Together to be Safe’); and Department for Business, and continuing Communities and Local Government (CLG) work, including the Community Leadership Fund.
and the Challenge and Innovation Fund. Furthermore, the important role played by radical Islamist political groups in Further and Higher Education settings also led to a funding focus on Universities and Colleges implementing ‘Innovation and Skills’ guidance on extremism (DIUS, 2008). As well as this, PREVENT teams or posts have been established in almost all governmental departments to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information and to improve strategic communications (HM Government, 2009b: 80). Moreover, as Kuzmic (2011) observes, further projects have included road shows targeting extremism of charismatic leaders to “community venues”, but also rather wider initiatives of schools’ twinning for sharing views on extremism. Some funding has also gone directly to mosques, such as North London Central Mosque, to counter the ideological legacy of imprisoned Abu Hamza 62 (DCLG, 2007b). Other projects, such as the Conviction film about Bristol bomb plotter Isa Ibrahim, were funded directly by Home Office. 63 The PVE agenda has also sought community involvement through ‘civil society’ groups. 64 This is supported by “National Indicator 35” which local authorities have to select as one of their “core priorities”. National Indicator 35 requires local authorities to have: “understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities”; “knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism and the PREVENT objectives”; “development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action plan, in support of delivery of the PREVENT objectives”; and to demonstrate “effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions” (DCLG, 2009). However, as a result of governmental pressure on local authorities under the Common Spending Assessment to adopt ‘National Indicator 35’ (in order to develop ‘resilience to violent extremism), some local authorities refused to adopt it initially, but all were required to report on it to Government Offices (Thomas, 2012; see also LGA, 2008b). Although many local authorities have remained deeply anxious about PVE (Turley, 2009), pressure from government saw PVE continue to grow to the point where all local authorities with significant Muslim communities were involved, although a number of Muslim community groups refused to participate (House of Commons, 2010; see also Thomas, 2010: 448).

The diffusion of formal responsibilities for policy

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62 Abu Hamza is a self-style preacher and radical cleric. Originally imprisoned for 7 years in 2007, in January 2015, Hamza was sentenced to life in prison on US terrorism conviction.

63 Conviction is the 20-minute film which aims to dissuade young people from extremist ideology through negative example of Muslim convert Andrew Isa Ibrahim, who was imprisoned for planning a suicide attack in Bristol. Conviction is also said to allow PREVENT partners to identify and understand vulnerabilities Ibrahim presented as he was becoming radicalised. Of note, the movie was commissioned by the Avon and Somerset Police.

64 For a breakdown of PREVENT activities, as supported by DCLG funding (2008), see Appendix B.
implementation and service delivery outlined above can be framed relationally in terms of ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ strategies of CT engagement. Whilst the former may be understood as policing and community intelligence generation, the latter includes the development of dialogue, participation and community feedback between communities, state agencies and voluntary organisations in a way that serves to increase the fragile battle for “hearts and minds”. Consequently, there has been a consistent and conscious effort to balance the predominately hard powers associated with PURSUE and soft powers used in PREVENT activities. This effort is reflected in the statement, ‘…we have to manage the negative impact that PURSUE activity can have on communities and therefore our PREVENT agenda; but PURSUE operations are also necessary to support our PREVENT objectives … and PREVENT interventions need to be considered for PURSUE type problems’ (HM Government, 2009b: 80). The importance accorded to a balanced approach is also reiterated in the NSS, which states the need to ‘respond robustly whilst resisting the provocation to over-react’ (HM Government, 2009a: 86; Cabinet Office, 2008b: 28).

Balancing soft power mechanics whilst simultaneously resisting the urge to “over-react” is undoubtedly a difficult undertaking (Weeks, 2013). At present there is no publically available document that measures the effectiveness of the balance of power, or overall effectiveness of PREVENT for that matter, within the CONTEST strategy. This is despite the introduction of the Public Service Agreement 26 (PSA 26) (HM Government, 2009a: 86). PSA 26 embodies the same stated goal as CONTEST 2009, ‘...to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism’ (HM Government, 2009b: 158) and is supposed to measure progress across three outcomes: ‘…building resilience in domestic communities; counter-radicalisation work in key domestic sectors and services; and interventions in overseas priority countries’ (HM Government, 2009a: 86). However, as Weeks (2013: 119) points out, how assessments will occur, how frequently they will occur, or even what the metrics for assessment is remains, at the time of writing, unclear. Thus, inevitably, PREVENT has been the subject of fervent criticism both operationally and ideologically.

2.5 PREVENT: A Failing Policy

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65 For examples of ‘softer strategies’, as delivered by local authorities via DCLG funding (2009-2011), see Appendix C.
Although PREVENT was significantly developed from 2007-2010, it was still considered incomplete. Notable criticism came from the Communities and Local Government select committee (House of Commons, 2010), as well as from former head of the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit, Robert Lambert. A coalition in the House of Commons began reviewing the programme in 2010, particularly in relation to its alleged exclusive attention to Islamist terrorism. Far from pursuing a macro socio-political strategy aimed at winning “hearts and minds”, PVE’s mono-cultural focus on Muslims was said to be in stark contradiction to the overriding policy goal of community cohesion (Thomas, 2010). Subsequently, the problematic design of PVE had left progress hobbled by institutional tensions at both local and national level (Thomas, 2010). For instance, at the level of local state, the House of Commons criticised the goals of PREVENT on the basis that British Muslims had been unaware of extremism in their communities. Moreover, it was posited that individuals could not be certain that information routinely gathered as part of one process would not end up being utilised for exactly such counter-terrorist activity (see Kundnani, 2009). At national level, it was suggested government relations with Muslims may have worsened; a situation exacerbated by the growth in state surveillance of Muslim communities and an “unhealthy conflation” of policing (House of Commons, 2012: 3). Regrettably, PREVENT became increasingly viewed as a political shibboleth (Kundnani, 2009).

The year-long Parliamentary review into the auspices of PREVENT also found significant gaps in the United Kingdom’s domestic terrorism policy. For instance, although the 2009 CONTEST strategy states that the major terrorist threats come primarily from four sources, it also states that the strategy contains ‘programmes’ relevant for tackling terrorist threats from any quarter (HM Government, 2009a: 11). However, the intent of this statement is somewhat contradictory given that a later statement in the same report states: ‘this strategy does not address the threat from domestic extremism’ (such as from animal rights) (HM Government, 2009a: 59). Moreover, whilst the focus upon far-right extremism has widened since the implementation of CONTEST II, it remains problematic. For example, there was no threat level for terrorist threats outside of those related to AQ or Northern Ireland, which demonstrated the minimal scope of the government’s terrorist prevention strategy. Furthermore, it was argued that far-right wing extremist organisations went unchecked because the criteria for determining terrorist organisations required them to

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66 Introducing PVE, the government acknowledged, ‘there has always been a tiny minority who oppose tolerance and diversity’ (DCLG, 2007b: 2). However, the same document also stated that ‘the key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007b: 7; see also Thomas, 2010: 7).

67 For a detailed analysis on animal rights and the question of terrorism, see Hadley (2009).
support other like-minded groups internationally (Rikabi, 2013). In response, the UK government stressed that only 17 people associated with far-right extremism were currently serving a sentence in Britain and thus, far-right extremism was considered far less serious a threat than that of AQ or similar Islamist terrorist groups. However, the review into PREVENT also found that a majority (80 per cent) of respondents in the consultation believed that PREVENT should address the wider problems of far-right extremism (Awan and Blakemore, 2013; see also HM Government, 2011b). Whilst the UK government has recognised the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups and as such banned certain groups which promote violence, critics argue similar far-right groups like the English Defence League (EDL) remain operational (the main difference between these groups being the ideologies and motives). For example, the Terrorism ACT 2000 created measures that meant certain international terrorist groups would not be able to operate in the UK (Home Office 2011, as cited in Awan and Blakemore, 2013: 11).

The Home Office review also argued that the PREVENT policy of the previous Labour Government had ‘not clearly recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law’ (HM Government, 2011b: 50). The proposal for a commitment to challenging not just “violent extremism” but “extremism” in general can, under The Terrorism Act 2006, be seen as a response to public criticism(s). For example, the criteria determining who was entitled to access funding was considered too loose so that groups that were “extremist”, but not engaged in criminal violence, could get funding (Kundnani, 2009: 20):

‘The PREVENT programme we inherited from the last Government failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that PREVENT should have been confronting’ (HM Government, 2011b: 1).

Moreover, much of the funded work was of little relevance to actually reducing the risk of extremism, since ‘PREVENT had not consistently reached the few people who are most

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68 It could be argued this area of CT is still to be fully addressed (see Awan and Blakemore, 2013).
69 It is argued that many projects have been manipulated by community organisations. For example, Choudhury talks about “PREVENT entrepreneurs” (Choudhury, 2012: 56-57; see also Kuzmic, 2011: 13).
70 Derrida’s notion of “autoimmunity” is instructive in relation to this particular flaw in PREVENT. As Derrida (2003: 99-100) notes, an autoimmune crisis ‘ends up producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm’.
susceptible to terrorist propaganda’ (HM Government, 2011b: 7).

Ostensibly, there was also proposals for major renegotiation of PREVENT implementation and responsibilities regarding the intention to ensure the removal of communities’ work from the PREVENT agenda (Martin, 2014a). In the SDSR published in October 2010, a central concern regarding CONTEST II was the need to reform the counter-radicalisation work stream, specifically through ‘separating it much more clearly than before from general communities’ policy’ (Cabinet Office, 2010: 42; see also House of Commons, 2010). Whereas much of the original PREVENT work, including its focus on shared values and cohesion, had been implemented through the Home Office, it is now stated that the Home Office would lead on protecting those individuals most at risk from violent extremist influences (HM Government, 2011b). In contrast, the DCLG would be tasked with focussing solely on community cohesion and ethnic integration thus enabling local communities to be able to challenge extremists seeking to undermine ‘our way of life’ (DCLG, 2007a: 4; HM Government 2011b: 6).

Lastly, it was argued PREVENT nearly ignored any terrorist organisations that held their conduct on the Internet (see House of Commons, 2010; cf., HM Government, 2013b). Moreover, the 2007 discovery of unexploded car bombs in London and the 2007 Glasgow airport attack also highlighted the unreliability of CT to prevent attacks (Fisher, 2012). Given these criticisms, the UK government conceded that PREVENT was confused in its delivery of government policy to promote integration whilst simultaneously preventing terrorism. Subsequently, a new policy was released in 2011 allowing the coalition government the opportunity to initiate a new era of CT policy.

2.6 PREVENT 2011: New Government, New Objectives

In June 2011, a revised PREVENT strategy was released for public view having undergone a year-long parliamentary review.71 It is now accepted that the PREVENT strategy, as pursued by the DCLG (and defined by CONTEST II) is concerned with five strands (Meer, 2012: 12) – each conceived as prophylactic factors for people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists. These are:

71 Specific aims of the review are outlined in HM Government (2011b).
(1) Challenging violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
(2) Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the otherwise peaceful institutions where they are active;
(3) Supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
(4) Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism;
(5) Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.\(^7^2\)

These principles are supported by two ‘strategic enablers’: (i) developing understanding, analysis and information; and (ii) strategic communications (Turley, 2009: 6). In practice, working towards these objectives pivots around three main types of activity:

- **Counter-radicalisation** – focuses upon inhibiting the spread and influence of extremist ideas both generally and in specific cases;

- **De-radicalisation** – involves acts to reduce the influence of extremist ideas where they have gained traction;

- **Community cohesion building** – is focused upon increasing the resilience of communities so that they are less likely to be influenced by extremist views.\(^7^3\)

Within this overall framework, the new PREVENT strategy is aligned around three specific objectives (now referred to as the three I’s: *individuals, ideology, and institutions)*:

- Respond to the *ideological* challenge of terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the threat we face from those who promote these views;

- Provide practical help to prevent *individuals* from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support;

\(^7^2\) HM Government (2011b).
\(^7^3\) Innes et al. (2011: 6).
• Work with a wide range of sectors/institutions (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation or which support counter-radicalisation work.\textsuperscript{74}

It is suggested that working with key sectors ensures that there is ‘an awareness and understanding of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalises work and that each sector is capable of developing an effective response’ (HM Government, 2011b: 63, [Figure 102]). As the PREVENT strategy makes clear:

‘Wherever possible, the partnership should comprise social services, policing, children’s services, youth services, UKBA, representatives from further and higher education, probation services, schools, local prisons, health and others as required by local need. We encourage greater levels of partnership working between local authorities and partners in future’ (HM Government, 2011b: 97 [Figure 11.12]).

Importantly, in its revised version, PREVENT challenges extremist (non-violent) ideas that are part of the terrorist ideology whilst remaining committed to protecting freedom of speech (HM Government, 2011b: 6).\textsuperscript{75} However, championing British democratic values\textsuperscript{76} does not disappear. As the PREVENT strategy makes clear, ‘work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values’ (HM Government, 2011b: 5 [Figure 3.6]). Moreover, an emphasis on the lack of resilience in certain places and communities, which is said to allow the flourishing of apologists for violence, is also retained in the revised strategy. As the PREVENT policy outlines, ‘a stronger sense of belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We believe that PREVENT depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith dialogue’ (HM Government, 2011b: 28).

The concept of ‘identity’/‘values-based tone’ (Thomas, 2012) also remains central to the reformatted PREVENT. As the strategy states, ‘some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. We note that organisations working on PREVENT have

\textsuperscript{75} Protecting the right to freedom of expression is also reiterated in the Home Office report \textit{Tackling Extremism in the UK} (HM Government, 2013b).
\textsuperscript{76} Promoting British values is also heavily embedded within government policy discussion on education. See HM Government (2011b: 69 and 2012a: 21).
also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b: 17). Moreover, the PREVENT strategy adds:

‘Social movement and social network theory emphasise that radicalisation is a social process particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalisation is about ‘who you know’. Group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination are necessary to encourage the view that violence is a legitimate response to perceived injustice. We have also seen evidence to support this theory from classified government reporting’ (HM Government, 2011b: 17).

Furthermore, with regard to the key drivers of radicalisation, the strategy suggests, ‘people who distrust Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith cultural groups should not mix, and who see a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity are all likely to be more supportive of violent extremism’ (HM Government, 2011b: 18 [Figure 5.26]).

Interestingly, promoting British values is also embedded within the definition of ‘extremism’, defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2). Of note, the definition of extremism has been expanded to include ‘calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2) - this most likely influenced by the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, in 2013.

2.7 PREVENT(ion) through Risk

What is particularly apposite is the centrality of the word risk within the revised PREVENT policy. Indeed, the word ‘risk’ appears 105 times (see HM Government, 2011b). It is now accepted that PREVENT is presented as acting upon the risk of terrorism and is understood to address ‘radicalisation’ in the face of the ‘greatest risk to our security’ (HM Government, 2011: 59). Moreover, although PREVENT is a national programme, under the revised strategy, it is said to be prioritised at local level according to risk assessment. As the PREVENT strategy states, ‘all communities are affected by the threat from terrorism but the nature and extent of the threat will vary across the country; local responses need to be appropriate to local circumstances’ (HM Government, 2012d: 5). In part, this is result of the government’s

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77 Other key drivers include: racial or religious harassment; a negative view of policing; and perceptions of discrimination (HM Government, 2011b: 18, [Figure 5.26]).
“commitment to localism” more generally (HM Government, 2011b: 6). The PREVENT review of June 2011 also significantly altered the size and approach of PREVENT (Thomas, 2014). Funding was restricted to 25 priority areas on an ‘intelligence-led basis’ and the sole, securitised control of the OSCT meant that local autonomy over PREVENT activity is significantly restricted (Thomas, 2014). As the PREVENT strategy makes clear, ‘funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific PREVENT benefits’ (HM Government, 2011b: 98, 34). Moreover, the OSCT manages a network of up to 25 PREVENT co-ordinators within local authorities in defined priority areas. These people ensure smooth delivery of the policies by co-ordinating their: (1) police element; (2) local authorities; and (3) community partners (Kuzmic, 2011). In essence, PREVENT is now centred on ‘hotspots’ of potential radicalisation, with local co-ordinators (funded by the Home Office) tasked with directing local PREVENT-funded activity (Thomas, 2012).

An intelligence approach according to risk(s) can be read as conscious effort to distance PREVENT activity centred on community demographics (HM Government, 2011: 11). For 2011/12, following an analysis of all local authority areas across the UK, the 25 priority areas are as follows:

- Barking and Dagenham
- Birmingham
- Blackburn with Darwen
- Bradford
- Brent
- Camden
- Derby
- Ealing
- Hackney
- Hammersmith and Fulham
- Haringey
- Kensington and Chelsea
- Lambeth
- Leeds
- Leicester
- Lewisham
- Luton
- Manchester
- Newham
- Redbridge
- Stoke-on-Trent
- Tower Hamlets
- Waltham Forest
- Wandsworth

Of note, the PREVENT strategy also states, ‘we expect these areas to change over time’ (HM Government, 2011b: 95). As of 2013, 6 further areas have been added as ‘priority’. These are Cardiff; Enfield; Greenwich; High Wycombe; Islington; and Liverpool. Moreover, as of 2014,

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78 Although the strategy was put together by OSCT, it captures the contributions of a broad range of governmental departments and agencies. For example, in 2011 figures show PREVENT had around 44,000 participants and funded 261 social integration projects (HM Government 2011b: 28, as cited Rikabi, 2013: 26). Three departments direct most of the policies anchored in the strategy: the Home Office, the DCLG and the FCO (HM Government 2011b: 11). These departments provide funding and have their own offices for particular policies. The Department for Education (DfE) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ) also play smaller part. However, this set up has been criticised as departmental fragmentation supposedly leads to “competition for PREVENT pie” (Choudhury, 2012: 49).

79 See Appendix D.
5 further areas have been identified as ‘supported areas’. These include Slough; Sandwell; Dudley; Walsall; and Kirklees.

There has also been a critical discursive shift towards understanding risk through a language of “vulnerability”, commonplace in the 2009 strategy and ubiquitous in the 2011 revision (Martin, 2014b: 6). In the second version of CONTEST, the words ‘vulnerable’ and ‘vulnerability’ (to describe those individuals vulnerable to ‘violent extremism’) were used no less than 32 times (Richards, 2012: 23). In the latest CONTEST strategy, this figure fell to 24 but the updated PREVENT strategy used the words vulnerable, vulnerability or vulnerabilities in this context a total of 75 times (Richards, 2012: 23). Thus, while narratives of grievance do not disappear, in the revised version, there is a more explicit focus on the individual through the language of vulnerability. Accordingly, the subject of radicalisation becomes the individual who is “vulnerable to radicalisation”, “vulnerable to recruitment”, and “vulnerable to violent extremist messaging” (HM Government, 2011b: 83). As the PREVENT strategy outlines, ‘we judge that radicalisation is driven by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, makes that ideology both attractive and compelling’ (HM Government, 2011b: 5). The PREVENT strategy also adds, ‘we judge that communities who do not (or, alternatively, cannot) participate in all civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation by all kinds of terrorist groups (HM Government, 2011b: 27, [Figure 6.20]). Moreover, psycho-cultural understandings of radicalisation are retained in the latest PREVENT strategy which outlines that a key driver of radicalisation is about “who you know” (Government, 2011b: 17 [Figure 5.23]).

In the revised policy, it is suggested vulnerability indicators not only have to be local in nature but also proportionate to local levels of risk. The ACPO (2008) implementation plan states:

‘It is important that the local response to PREVENT is proportionate to the level of risk and vulnerability in the area, as determined by risk assessment ... delivery is likely to be more intense and comprehensive in those areas where risk and vulnerability is considered to be greatest’ (ACPO, 2008: 4, as cited in Innes et al., 2011: 72).

The construction of judgements about relative risks and vulnerability is said to be grounded in the ‘richer picture’ process with such information contributing to the production of a ‘Counter-Terrorism Local Profile’ (CTLP hereafter) (Innes et al., 2011: 72). Developed and introduced

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80 For a detailed analysis of psycho-cultural theories of radicalisation, see Horgan’s (2008) “bunch of guys” analysis.
in 2009, CTLPs are documents to be shared between key actors involved in delivering PREVENT. In brief, a CTLP is ‘a report that outlines the threat and vulnerability from terrorism-related activity within a specific area (e.g. police Basic Command Unit (BCU)/Local Policing Unit [LPU], local authority area or force)’ (HM Government, 2013: 3). Furthermore, the HM Government (2012b: 3) report outlines, ‘an essential part of engaging partners in PREVENT is making relevant information available to them to help them target activities and resources as effectively as possible’. Moreover, the most updated CONTEST review adds, ‘we continue to share with local authorities the CTLP, a summary of available information about terrorism and extremism in a specific area’ (HM Government, 2013: 21).

It is posited that CTLPs help to achieve a ‘richer picture’ by outlining the threat, vulnerability and risk from extremist activity relating to terrorism within a specific area, thus providing partners with a practical and consistent approach to sharing CT-related information (HM Government, 2012b). Specifically, the aims of a CTLP are to: (1) develop a joint understanding amongst local partners of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks relating to terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism; (2) provide information on which to base local PREVENT programmes and action plans; (3) support the mainstreaming of PREVENT activity into day-to-day policing, local government and partnership work; and (4) allow a targeted and proportionate use of shared resources (HM Government, 2012b: 7).

Furthermore, detailed guidance about how to construct a CTLP has been issued to local forces and partners (Innes et al., 2011). Accordingly, local authorities and the police are responsible for ensuring that the local partnership action plan: (1) addresses the main objectives of the PREVENT strategy; (2) is jointly agreed and managed by the police, local authority and other partners; (3) is proportionate to the level of threat in the area; (4) reflects local needs; (5) sets out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress and sets a process out for evaluation; and (6) is fed back into ACPO’s (TAM) Prevent Performance Framework in order to demonstrate progress against priority issues (HM Government, 2012b: 22). Of note, whilst CTLPs assist local policing bodies specifically in ‘focusing on key risk areas in relation to PREVENT (and other areas of CONTEST)’ (HM Government, 2012b: 13), it is suggested that a CTLP does not provide a complete assessment of activity in an area. Rather, Home Office policy recommends

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81 Further decentralisation has also taken place resulting in a major change in the local CT landscape. Since 2012, the elected PCCs plan local PREVENT strategies while the Chief Constables remain independent. CT is thus becoming increasingly localised and employs more elements of “stakeholder security” (Jarvis and Lister, 2010).
that CTLPs are read in conjunction with other available information to produce a more complete overview of the risks in an area (HM Government, 2012b: 7).

2.8 The CHANNEL Programme

‘Risk is a theme that runs through the entire CHANNEL process: risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to statutory partners and any intervention providers’ (HM Government, 2012d).

In 2007, APCO launched an extension of PREVENT known as the CHANNEL programme. CHANNEL is the core instrument of the second objective of PREVENT, protecting and supporting vulnerable individuals who are exhibiting radicalised behaviour, by working in partnership with communities and key partners to reduce or manage risk (HM Government, 2011b). Funded through the OSCT, CHANNEL relies on co-ordinated activity at local level and uses existing collaborations between local authorities, the police, statutory partners (including the education sector, social services, children’s youth services and offender management services) and the local community (HM Government, 2012d: 7). Furthermore, official language describes CHANNEL as ‘a multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b: 55).

In its policy formation, CHANNEL provides a focus for public sector professionals and members of the community to refer individuals of concern to a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system bringing to bear a variety of resources and expertise to counter-radicalisation (HM Government 2009a: 136; see also HM Government 2009b: 11-12). After an initial referral, risk assessments are made on each individual case and a programme of ‘intervention’ is tailored to suit the individual’s needs (HM Government 2009a, 172–173, 150). Moreover, CHANNEL is modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management processes, such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk offenders; it uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs (HM Government, 2011b: 57).

At the time of writing, CHANNEL covers 75 local authorities and 12 police forces (HM Government, 2011b: 57). Furthermore, as CHANNEL processes have matured, the number of CHANNEL referrals nationally has increased and now stands at a total figure of 3934 referrals (ACPO, 2014; see Figure 2.8).

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82 The total funding for CHANNEL for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately £4.7 million (HM Government, 2011b: 60). There is no data entry for the period 2011-2015.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CHANNEL Referrals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
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<td>748</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2015</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2.8: National ACPO Statistics for CHANNEL Referrals 2006-2014*\(^{83}\)

Not all individuals referred will be assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism, or in need of support from CHANNEL. Out of 3934 referrals, some 777 (20 per cent of referrals) were assessed by a multi-agency panel to be vulnerable to being attracted towards terrorism and will have gone on to receive support through the CHANNEL process (ACPO, 2014; see also HM Government, 2012d). Furthermore, whilst CHANNEL supports vulnerable individuals of any age, figures indicate an emphasis on supporting impressionable young people. For instance, between April 2007 and the end of March 2014, CHANNEL received 1450 referrals that were under the age of 18 at the time they were referred (ACPO, 2014).\(^{84}\) However, ACPO (2014) also note that many of these individuals would not have been suitable for CHANNEL intervention and thus would have been sign-posted to more appropriate services. This observation is reiterated in the PREVENT strategy which states, ‘the referral process can, if poorly handled, include people who are not at risk of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b: 56).

There is a practitioner responsible for co-ordinating delivery of CHANNEL in all areas. In addition, a CHANNEL project requires a multi-agency panel and information sharing protocols (HM Government, 2012d: 7). Thus, some areas have a dedicated police CHANNEL co-ordinator who establishes and maintains a panel, which may include members of local authorities, social workers, schools

\(^{83}\) ACPO (2013b, 2014).
\(^{84}\) These figures have been drawn from police forces by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) who is responsible for collating information on CHANNEL at national level. Recording standards have varied over time and across forces, so aggregated data may not be internally consistent and there is some evidence of imperfect data entry (ACPO, 2014).
and universities or people from local community\textsuperscript{85} (HM Government, 2011b: 55). In other areas, this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual’s responsibilities, for example, by a PREVENT Engagement Officer (PEO) or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) within the police force. It is suggested PEOs and SPOCs have access to the support and expertise of the CHANNEL co-ordinators within their region (HM Government, 2012d: 7). Further, the role of the multi-agency panel is to develop an appropriate support package to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism based on an assessment of their vulnerability (HM Government, 2012d). The panel is thus responsible for managing the safeguarding risk, which is in line with other multi-agency panels where risk is managed, such as Children and Adult Safeguarding panels and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) (HM Government, 2012d).

The CHANNEL process begins through a referral of the “vulnerable individual” made by “referral partner” (teachers, social and youth workers, etc.)\textsuperscript{86} McGready (2011) suggests vulnerability indicators can be broken down into ‘expressed opinions’, ‘material indicators’, ‘behaviour and behavioural changes’, and ‘personal history’. A snapshot of vulnerability indictors is reproduced in Figure 2.8.1.

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\textsuperscript{85} These are closely aligned to the PREVENT priority areas. 

\textsuperscript{86} Appendix E outlines the CHANNEL Model Scheme, as described in HM Government (2012d: 15).
After the initial screening for appropriateness, a preliminary assessment is led by the CHANNEL police practitioner and will include their line manager and, if appropriate, senior statutory partners (such as the local authority, the police, Probation Trusts, children’s and youth services and the education sector). The most recent guidelines published lists 22 “vulnerability factors” (referred to as ERG22 or “Extreme Risk Guidance 22”), broken down into three dimensions, which include:

- Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
- Intent to cause harm; and

Snapshots of the three dimensions for radicalisation are reproduced in Figure 2.8.2; Figure 2.8.3; and Figure 2.8.4 (taken from HM Government, 2012c).
1. **Engagement with a group, cause or ideology**

   Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as “psychological hooks”. They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway into terrorism. They can include:
   
   - Feelings of grievance and injustice
   - Feeling under threat
   - A need for identity, meaning and belonging
   - A desire for status
   - A desire for excitement and adventure
   - A need to dominate and control others
   - Susceptibility to indoctrination
   - A desire for political or moral change
   - Opportunistic involvement
   - Family or friends involvement in extremism
   - Being at a transitional time of life
   - Being influenced or controlled by a group
   - Relevant mental health issues

*Figure 2.8.2: Psychological Hooks*

2. **Intent to cause harm**

   Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:
   
   - Over-identification with a group or ideology
   - ‘Them and Us’ thinking
   - Dehumanisation of the enemy
   - Attitudes that justify offending
   - Harmful means to an end
   - Harmful objectives

*Figure 2.8.3: Intent Factors*

3. **Capability to cause harm**

   Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:
   
   - Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
   - Access to networks, funding or equipment

*Figure 2.8.4: Capability Factors*

It is suggested these three dimensions also help to inform whether support is needed and what form support will take. It is also envisaged that through tracking these factors, the individual’s
progress can be charted. At this point partners should collectively assess the risk and decide whether the person: (1) is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and therefore appropriate for CHANNEL; (2) should be referred to a different support mechanism; or (3) should exit the process (see HM Government, 2012c). Moreover, in assessing risk, it is suggested that due consideration should be given to: (i) the risk the individual faces of being drawn into terrorism; and (ii) the risk the individual poses to society (HM Government, 2012c).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the origins, assumptions and content of PREVENT, as part of CONTEST, since its policy inception in 2006. In doing so, this chapter has detailed the key modifications made to PREVENT by both Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition governments. Several significant areas have been explored as linked to the operations of PREVENT, such as PREVENT funding structure; the diffusion of PREVENT responsibilities through community involvement; and the development of PREVENT policing. Further, whilst PREVENT remains a model from which most European governments have taken inspiration (Vidino and Brandon, 2012: 164), it is also important to acknowledge the rather clumsy and contradictory implementation of PREVENT pre-2011. Thus, this chapter has also engaged with several of the fervent criticisms and concerns expressed over PREVENT as a policy.

This chapter has also explored how ‘radicalisation’ has been made possible as a discourse - one that enables the performance of security around it (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Theoretically, this allows practitioners tasked with counter-radicalisation to act upon futurity through the concept of ‘vulnerability’ as linked to risk. Whilst the aim of this chapter has been one of making sense of this particularly complex policy, PREVENT (or more specifically PP) provides a blueprint to explore the empirical actualities of two risk positions at local level. The concern of the thesis now turns towards each risk position beginning with Michel Foucault’s securite de dispositif, as borne through the concept of ‘governmentality’.

Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction

This chapter engages with the turn to risk management and measurement as practices of governing in line with Foucauldian thought. While the univocal logic of ‘risk society’ tends to take a weak social constructionist approach to incalculable risk in concert with a critical structuralist perspective, advocates of Foucauldian approaches mostly adopt a ‘strong’ version of social constructionism and a post-structuralist approach to power relations (Lupton, 1999: 84). Importantly, such analyses posit the diversity of risk practices can be understood as a deployment of a governmental dispositif (or securite de dispositif as it is originally referred) to govern social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). The first part of the chapter discusses Foucault’s original concept of dispositif including dispositif as ‘apparatus’, dispositif power as a ‘network’, and dispositif as ‘productive’. As a caveat, the concept of risk is not discussed within this part of the chapter since Foucault did not put risk at the heart of his notion of dispositif. Following this, Foucault’s concept of governmentality is explored including governmentality read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, ‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’.

The second half of the chapter engages with literature that spans the pervasive idiom of exceptionalism; a revised calculus of risk that hyper-extends to ‘precautionary’ measures within risk rationality; and the subsequent modification of sovereignty. Specifically, the chapter explores exegeses of Foucault’s notion of dispositif under the logic of dispositif ‘precautionary risk’ that is deployed at the horizon of catastrophic future and radical uncertainty (see Aradau and van Munster, 2007, 2008a and b). Accordingly, this chapter draws attention to how the identification and management of risk is said to be a way of organising reality, taming the future, disciplining chance and rationalising individual conduct (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 26; Hacking 1990). Moreover, the chapter highlights how pre-emptive strategies are said to be wedded to a creeping shift in risk assessment from retrospective estimations of harm to an outlook based on futurity (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221). This shift to a ‘state of pre-emption’ (Ericson, 2008) ushers in a number of dilemmas around the political deployment of discourses of risk (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221). As a final caveat, whilst security studies have been profoundly interested in the changing practices of surveillance post-9/11 and 7/7, it

87 See Dean (2010) for a similar analysis of such trajectories.
is not surveillance *per se* that concern the contributions of the latter half of the chapter, but risk as a technology of *preventative* practice and pre-emptive *imagining* (cf., Amoore and de Goede, 2005; Lyon, 2003).

### 3.2 Securite de Dispositif: ‘Apparatus’

In an interview with philosopher Roger-Pol Droit in 1975, Michel Foucault outlined a key concept to use in order to grasp the power of play (Cote, 2007: 9).\(^8\) Here, Foucault cites an exceptionally detailed definition of the *dispositif*, one that translates as ‘apparatus’:

‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as a programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary reinterpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of positions and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of - shall we say - formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need’ (Foucault, 1980b: 194-195; cf., Foucault, 1980a).

Theorists drawing upon Foucault have used various terms to refer to the way in which heterogeneous elements are assembled to address an “urgent need” and invested with strategic purpose (Foucault 1980a: 194).\(^9\) These include apparatus, deployment, mechanism, construct, alignment, technology of government, regime of practices, assemblage, positivities, etc. However, following Agamben’s (2009) reading of dispositif, I simply wish to differentiate dispositif from apparatus, noting that for Foucault the latter is *contained* in the former. As Foucault notes, ‘the apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements ... By the term ‘apparatus’ I mean a kind of formation, so to speak, that at a given

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\(^8\) As well as drawing upon the work of Foucault, I have also drawn generously from Agamben (2009), Cote (2007) and Deleuze (1992), given their exceptionally detailed reading(s) of Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’.

\(^9\) See also Dean (1999: 21); Rose (1999: 52).
historical moment has as its major function the response to an urgency’ (Foucault, 1980a: 194).

Borrowing the term “positivity” from Hegel⁹⁰ (which he later applies under the guise of apparatus), Foucault takes a position with respect to a decisive problem: the relation between individuals as living beings and the historical element (Agamben, 2009: 4). In this sense, the “historical element” constitutes the set of institutions, of processes of subjectification, and of rules in which power relations become concrete (Agamben, 2009). Thus, as Agamben (2009: 4) observes, Foucault’s ultimate aim is not the reconciliation of the two elements; it is not even to emphasise their conflict. For Foucault, what is at stake is rather the investigation of concrete modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, mechanisms, and “plays” of power (Agamben, 2009: 4). To put it differently, the emphasis here lies not simply on the collection of elements per se (the purpose) but also on the system of relations established between the elements (Deleuze, 1992).

The relationship between the elements can be conceptualised in relations of knowledge (discourse),⁹¹ power, and subjectivity (Brigg, 2001: 3). However, as Deleuze (1992: 159) notes, for Foucault, ‘knowledge, power and subjectivity are a series of variables which supplant one another’. In other words, Foucault assumes that ‘power produces knowledge’ and they directly imply one another (Foucault, 1977: 27). Thus, Foucault directs his attention to understanding how the exercise of control in a society and its history disguises, rarefies and wraps itself systematically in a language of truth, discipline, rationality and knowledge (Perezalonso, 2009). Foucault is interested in solving this problem:

‘Relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth’ (Foucault, 1980b: 93).

By Foucault’s own admission, understanding the precise nature of the interconnection between the heterogeneous elements is no easy task: ‘it is like a game, the changing of positions, the modifications of function, which can also vary widely’ (Foucault, 2001: 299, as

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⁹⁰ Although Foucault borrowed the term from Hegel, Hegel is indebted to the teachings of Jean Hyppolite for the concept of “positivities”.

⁹¹ As Ditrych (2013: 2) observes, discourse is understood as including ‘a specific collection of statements for which certain conditions of existence can be defined, and a system of their formation determining what can be said and how and where the boundaries that delimit the marginalised and excluded lie. Discourse has ontological power (pouvoir d’affirmation) with respect to the domains of objects. It does not create being out of nothingness; but it is indispensable in endowing this being with meaning, in forming logos from chaos’ (see also Foucault, 1981).
cited in Cote, 2007: 43). Moreover, this game is comprised of relations of power and knowledge and therein such relations are fundamental to the constitution of any dispositif (Cote, 2007). The dispositif is therefore ‘always inscribed in a game of power, but it is also always linked to one or many limits of knowledge, which emerge from but equally condition the dispositif’ (Foucault, 2001: 300, as cited in Cote, 2007: 42, emphasis added). In The Order of Discourse, for example, Foucault outlines the hypothesis that a constitution of any dispositif is the many limits of knowledge. Foucault notes that, ‘in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality’ (Foucault, 1981: 52). However, for now, understanding “dispositif” as borne through the notion of positivity, Agamben (2009: 6) advances the hypothesis that “apparatus” is an essential technical term in Foucault’s thought (cf., Ploger, 2008). Apparatuses are, in point of fact, what take the place of the universals (les universaux) in the Foucauldian strategy; not simply this or that police measure, this or that technology of power, and not even the generality obtained by their abstraction (Agamben, 2009). Rather, an apparatus is ‘the network (le réseau) that can be established between these elements’ (Agamben, 2009: 7).

3.2.1 Dispositif: Power as ‘Network’

Power - in its complex and polyvalent myriad relations - is always both an effect and a constitutive element of any dispositif (Cote, 2007: 131). Power is perhaps most clearly visible in Foucault’s 1977-78 College de France lectures, Securite, Territoire, Population (see inter alia Foucault, 2007). Foucault begins by exhorting that the juridical model of sovereignty be abandoned; to not look at power as if it has a single centre, but at its extremities, its maternal means of intervention and its actual apparatuses of violence (Foucault, 2007). As Foucault (1980b: 102-103) notes, ‘we should direct our researches towards domination and the material operators of power - towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of the Leviathan in the study of power’. This methodological shift to more complex causal relations reflects Foucault’s inexorable turn to seeing power as diffused, decentralised, and arranged in microphysical relations (Cote, 2007).

In his analysis of the implementation of polyvalent disciplinary power, whether in
schools, in army barracks, in emerging industrial factories, or in prisons, Foucault posits that the dispositif stands as a rebuke of the notion that power is monolithic or as a centralised point (Foucault, 2003a: 266-77). Rather, Foucault envisages power as ‘relations of force that intersect or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another’ (Foucault, 2003a: 266-7). This is why Foucault speaks ‘of a regime of multiple governmentalities’, of which governing is ‘much more than reigning of ruling’ (Foucault, 2007: 76-77); government is concerned with man’s conduct qua his relations with other man and things. Ultimately, the notion of dispositif makes untenable the vision of a single central luminous source, which emits power into a variegated spectrum (Cote, 2007). As Deleuze (1992: 73), drawing upon Foucault, articulates:

‘These power-relations, which are simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse, do not emanate from a central point or unique locus of sovereignty, but at each moment move ‘from one point to another’ in a field of forces, marking inflections, resistances, twists and turns, when one changes direction, or retraces one’s steps’.

This declaration of a shift flags a significant reconceptualisation of power, namely that power that is not a commodity possessed by individual subjects, but an expression of relations of power and knowledge which is both iterable and polyvalent (Cote, 2007: 22). However, as the term ‘resistances’ suggests, power and it’s dispositifs are always a site of contestation; the composition of those complex networked relations of struggle are always changing, cohering and diverging, depending on the particular relations of force at a given historical moment (Cote, 2007: 131-132). In this way, the heterogeneous lines that make up a dispositif are not like the iron bars of a prison cell; they are more like the lines that link different nodes in a network - and such complex relations are always open to rearticulation, to further cohesion or divergence (Cote, 2007: 162). As Deleuze (1992) makes clear, one could speak of hard lines of sedimentation but within a dispositif, there are always lines of “breakage” and “fracture”. In short, dispositifs always leak; they are always in process, sometimes attaining greater cohesion, other times, breaking apart into new formations (Cote, 2007: 162). This is why ‘dispositifs are subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked and subject to drifting’ (Deleuze, 1992: 189, *italics in original*). Thus, following their emergence, elements are always subject to renegotiation, displacement, or consolidation (Brigg, 2001). Moreover, untangling these lines within a dispositif is like drawing a map, doing cartography; this is what Foucault terms ‘working on the ground’ (Deleuze, 1992: 159).
Understanding power and networks of Power (with a capital P) this way, Foucault directs our gaze to the first element of the dispositif; that it is not a hermeneutic instrument but a heterogeneous ensemble which produces meaning and subjectivity through the particular composition of its elements (Cote, 2007: 9). There is not a single dispositif of power; it proposes neither an “organising finality” nor a “universal frame” nor is it merely determined by the unitary necessity of the mode of production (Cote, 2007: 9). Rather, a dispositif refers to a complex network of relations, to combinatorial processes that allow us to ‘see and speak’ (Deleuze, 1992). Thus, dispositifs are neither transcendental nor totalising: ‘they are expressive combinatorial machines which make words, things, and subjectivities intelligible’ (Cote, 2007: 10). Importantly, the visibility of what we can see that of which we speak valorised in terms of power cannot be traced back to a general source of light, which could be said to fall upon pre-existing objects; it is made from lines of light which form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus itself (Deleuze, 1992). Thus, the discursive and non-discursive heterogeneous elements are not linked in any inherent or originary way, but are compositional in particular relations and answer to certain greater problems in a particular society (Peltonen, 2004: 216). Therefore, each apparatus has its own way of structuring light, the way in which it falls, it disperses, its blurs, disturbing the visible and the invisible, giving birth to objects which are dependable on it for their existence (Deleuze, 1992: 160). According to Deleuze (1992: 166), ‘a dispositif compromises truths of enunciation, truths of light and visibility, truths of power, truths of subjectivation. Truth is the actualisation of the lines which constitute a dispositif’.

3.2.2 Dispositif as Productive

The dispositif is not simply a heterogeneous ensemble of domination; Foucault is also clear about the productive role of the dispositif:

‘The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function ... I said that the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a rational and concrete intervention in the relation of forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilise them, and to utilise them’ (Foucault, 1980b: 194-196).

The centrality of production can be seen in some of the most detailed and meticulous passages in *Discipline and Punish* (see Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, general tactics are employed in
diverse institutional contexts to satisfy functional imperatives; space is organised, enclosed, partitioned and divided according to hierarchical rankings, such that individual activities can be at once supervised and optimised (Foucault, 1977: 141-149). Moreover, for Foucault, time is divided, regulated, programmed and coded, such that individual activities can be synchronised according to predetermined rhythms and incorporated into efficiently functioning machines (Foucault, 1977: 149-156). Spatial distributions and temporal patterns are then co-ordinated, so that the institution in question can attain maximum efficiency with a minimum of interference (Foucault, 1977: 156-69). The common denominator of these heterogeneous tactics is their basic target - namely, ‘the ordering of human multiplicities’ (l’ordonnance des multiplicites humaines) (Foucault, 1977: 218) which, according to the disciplinary dispositif, must be rendered at once docile and useful (Brenner, 1994: 692). Moreover, whilst Foucault never provided a theoretical exposition of his basic categories, as Brenner (1994: 291) observes, his extensive use of the term “function” in Discipline and Punish suggests the following definition: ‘a function is any discourse, practice, or effect of the latter which produces a designated or latent consequence in a given social context. A dispositif emerges when a cluster of functions aims toward the same set of targets, such that a functional system is formed’. In The History of Sexuality, Volume: 1 (HoS hereafter), the concept of dispositif has an even more visible productive role. The basic thesis of HoS is the explicit inflection of examining power through a dispositif of sexuality, which is inscribed on the body and exercised in myriad relations. In other words, we, as subjects, are not “outside” dispositifs, because, as Foucault (1980b: 128) observes, ‘it is not possible to place one’s self outside’. Rather, for Deleuze (1992: 164), drawing upon Foucault, ‘[w]e belong to social apparatus (read ‘dispositifs’) and act within them’. Yet, Foucault insists quite explicitly against Weberian theories of bureaucratisation and organisational rationalisation; that this dispositif is never reducible to the institutions through which it operates (Brenner, 1994):

‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus (appareil); it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets … it may be taken over either by ‘specialised’ institutions … or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end … or by pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganising their internal mechanisms of power … or by apparatUSES (des appareils) that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning … or finally by state
apparatuses (des appareils etatiques) whose major, if not exclusive, function, is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole’ (Foucault, 1977: 215-216; see also Brenner, 1994: 692).

In this way, there is no a priori causality or determination - that is, there is no non-discursive base from which the discursive emanates, nor is there a transcendental subject which provides a normative matrix to co-ordinate those effects (Cote, 2007). Indeed, the utility of the dispositif comes to those with whom it answers a particular need (Foucault, 1980b). Typically, it involves identifying an “urgent need” and then delineating the various responses, specifically those that result in a cohesive network of relations (Foucault, 1996). As Cote (2007: 137), drawing upon Foucault, suggests, ‘an attempt is made to resolve it with an entire arsenal of implements and arms (the laws concerning the poor, the more-or-less forced isolation and, finally, imprisonment’). However, this does not necessitate a strictly instrumental response, or a “simple” tautological affirmation: “I, reason, exercise power over you, madness”. Instead, it is a reflexive dynamic process, which plays out in a complex set of relations. Or, in Foucault’s (1996: 259) words, ‘the heterogeneity of power – how power is always born of something other than itself’. Unravelling the complex relations that bring about this need is one way of proceeding if there is neither an ordinary subject nor an unchanging, objective, transcendent truth (Cote, 2007: 44).

Having outlined some of the major tenets of Foucault’s securite de dispositif, the chapter now turns towards a focus upon Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. It is recognised that the concept of the ‘dispositif’ is based on Foucault’s work on governmentality which has correctly been regarded as a “key notion” (Allen, 1991: 431) of his work. However, since the usage of the term governmentality can be applied as a way of refiguring the overall trajectory of Foucauldian thought, it is important to clarify and distinguish the concept of governmentality.

3.3 Governmentality

Unlike the critical-realist scholarship on risk pioneered by Beck and Giddens, a governmentality approach contends that, ‘there is no such thing as risk in reality’ (Dean, 1999: 177). Consequently, a strength of the governmentality approach is that it does not buy into the
ontological aspects of the things it describes (Joseph, 2012). Thus, rather than being preoccupied with the obsolescent ontological debate which grapples with the question ‘is risk really out there?’ A Foucauldian approach goes a step further in its analysis to reveal how risk acts as a ‘dispositif’ through which the rationality of neoliberalism shapes modern life, regimenting our conduct, and legitimising a wide-reaching security architecture geared to survey, categorise and target entire populations by governing them ‘at arm’s-length’ (Clapton, 2011).

It is within the lectures of 1978 and 1979 that focus on the ‘genealogy of the modern state’ where Foucault coins the concept of governmentality (Lemke, 2002). As Rose (1999: 3) observes:

‘Within these lectures Foucault sketched some pathways for analysing power that were not transfixed by the image of the state or the constitutive oppositions of conventional political philosophy or political sociology. They defined their problem space in terms of government, understood, in the words of Foucault’s much-cited maxim, as “the conduct of conduct”’. 93

This maxim argues that strategies of political rule, from the earliest moments of the modern nation state, entailed complex and variable relations between calculations and actions of those seeking to exercise rule over a territory, a population, a nation and a microphysics of power acting at a capillary level within a multitude of practices of control that proliferate across a territory (Rose, 1999: 17). Importantly, Foucault links this concept to the dispositif, which makes possible an analysis of ‘polymorphous techniques of subjugation’ (Brenner, 1994: 685). Thus, fundamentally, it is a term that encompasses ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’ (Lemke, 2002: 2). In this vein, Foucault endeavoured to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). As Deleuze (1986) observes, in the space left open by the disappearance of the Weberian problem of legitimate domination, a persistent questioning ranges the whole of Foucault’s work: how are we to seize these infinitesimal, diffused and heterogeneous power relations so that they do not always result in phenomena of domination or resistance? How can this new ontology of forces open up to unexpected processes of political constitution and independent processes of

92 For Foucault (2007: 286), a body like the state is indispensable for governmentality: ‘the state is therefore a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities’.

93 As Lazzarato (2006: 15-16) points out, elements of “the conduct of conduct” maxim were already found in the Nietzschean concept of “forces” that was the precursor to Foucault’s conception of “strategic relations”. This modality, defined as an “action upon an action,” spreads through the will to “control the conduct of others”.
subjectification? Understood this way, the problem of security is not simply a problem of law or legal transgression. The problem of security is always a problem of security governance (see Dean, 2007).

In Foucault’s much cited monographs and lectures, he uses governmentality in two ways. In the first instance, his discussion of governmentality encompasses a historical narrative about the shifting governing rationalities of political modernity (Lyness, 2014: 84). As Foucault (2007: 14) makes clear:

‘First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power - sovereignty, discipline, and so on - of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, (and, on the other) to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalised”’ (Foucault, 2007: 144).

Second, the semantic linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (“mentalité”) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). When taken together, these complex relationships establish a framework through which political discourse is circumscribed and reiterated (Foucault, 2007). For example, in modernity it is argued all forms of government have attempted to ‘rationalise’ themselves, to account for the ‘authority of their authority’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 15). Rationalities appear therefore as knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and agencies upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and Hindess, 1998). In essence, rationalities make social problems practically manageable. Accordingly, technologies are the means of realisation of rationalities: the social practices that are aimed at manipulating the social and physical world according to identifiable routines (O'Malley, 1992: 269; see inter alia Foucault, 1988b). As such, governmental rationalities and technologies

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affect behaviour and ‘construct’ forms of ordered agency and subjectivity for governing the conduct of individuals, collectivities and populations\textsuperscript{95} (Aradau, 2004: 264).

3.3.1 Governmentality: Population

As Foucault’s description of governmentality highlights, governmentality has “the population”\textsuperscript{96} as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument (Foucault, 2007: 108, 144). Importantly, from a Foucauldian point, “population” does not mean people but is a \textit{statistical category}, neither the individual as singularity, nor the people as a whole (Bigo, 2008). Population and the environment are perceived to be in a perpetual living interrelation of which the state must manage (Foucault, 1988a: 160). In Foucault (1988a: 160) words, ‘the true object of the police becomes ... the population’. As such, it leads again to an opposition with discipline (Foucault, 2004: 57). Discipline classifies, and establishes a division between the capable and the incapable (the normal from the abnormal in Foucauldian terms) (see Foucault, 1977). In contrast to disciplinary normalisation, as Bigo (2008: 99), drawing upon Foucault, points out:

‘Security starts from cases, from their statistical distribution, from the differential risks posed by each case, from the probabilities of their occurrence and it determines whether they are more or less dangerous, whether they have a greater or lesser chance of occurring in reality. It shows dramatically that in its contrary aspect insecurity, or more precisely (in)security, there is only one and the same process: the norm is sought from the starting point of the most pronounced curves of the statistical distribution of danger which are labelled as abnormal’.

Moreover, in Foucault (2007: 65; 2007: 93) words, ‘[t]he operation of normalisation consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and (in) acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable’. The norm that Foucault speaks of ‘is an interplay of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). Foucault stresses the articulation of the security-insecurity process grounded on the phenomenon, not attempting to hinder it, or stop it (Bigo, 2008: 100), but, on the contrary, ‘making other elements of reality function in relation to it, in such a way

\textsuperscript{95} See Dean (1999); Ewald (1991); Lupton (1998).
\textsuperscript{96} Foucault understands population not as the entirety of all the state’s subjects, but as an entity “with its specific phenomena and processes” (Foucault, 2007: 66).
that the phenomenon is cancelled out’ (Foucault, 2007: 88).

Viewed through this Foucauldian lens, the dispositif of risk is instrumental in producing a strategic ordering of society whereby ‘risk identities’ are attributed to individuals, groups and ‘failed’ or illiberal states necessitating targeted interventions which extend the neoliberal project (Clapton and Hameiri, 2011). As Bishop (2014: 232), drawing on the work of Clapton and Hameiri (2011), suggests:

‘HIV is socially constructed as universally de-bounded ‘risk’ which merits more urgent international policy responses than peripheral problems such as curable disease and famine. This kind of strategic ordering produces risk-based hierarchies which privilege certain forms of life over others, protecting the core from risks accumulating in the ‘illiberal’ periphery’.

This is one of the defining qualities of governmentality: a concern with the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, and the increase it its wealth, longevity, health and so on (Foucault, 1978 [2001]: 216-217).

3.3.2 Governmentality: Subjectification

Foucault uses the notion of government in a comprehensive sense geared strongly to the older meaning of the term and adumbrating the close link between forms of power and processes of subjectification (Lemke, 2001: 191). As Lemke (2002: 2; see also Foucault, 1991) observes, ‘“government” also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul, etc.’ Analysing this trajectory in Foucauldian thought, Reid (2008: 27) applies the term strategisation and questions: ‘how is it that the aleatory fixation of the natural body becomes the enemy against which the norm of a population is defined? How is it that those norms which constitute society, aided by the demographic sciences of population become the foundation for a security project through which the populations involved become mobilised?’ Fundamentally, according to Foucault, the basis of threats posed by natural life are established by the biopolitical constitution of a society (Reid, 2008).  

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98 Providing a detailed examination of biopolitics is beyond the scope of this chapter. The purpose here is less to track the early history of the biopolitics of security and its complex relation with the emergence and subsequent development of life science, however, than to establish how and why biopolitical technologies of governance constitute a distinctive dispositif.
Foucault, biopower (also understood as biological traits), like governmentality, addresses the population (Foucault, 2003a: 241).\textsuperscript{99} Whilst biopower is the form of power that takes the population as its object for the purposes of fostering life, biopolitics is a subset of governmental intervention, which constitutes ‘a specific area of governmental intervention’ (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010a: 8; Foucault, 1980a: 136 and 2002: 246-258). Foucault (2008) thus describes a diagram of power, through which he illustrates how biopower has taken control of the body, population and life itself. For Foucault, the logic of biopower is one of production: ‘it exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it’ (Foucault, 1978: 177). Further, as Ojakangas (2005: 6) argues, in the case of biopower, ‘its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism’. Foucault sums this up as ‘the regulation of populations for society’s overall betterment’ (Foucault, 2007: 10; see also \textit{inter alia} Foucault, 2008).

These calculative modes are tied explicitly to advances in rationality more generally, as modes of rationalising and regulating the art of governing (Foucault, 2004: 316-317; see also Elden, 2007: 573). It is calculation (\textit{calcul}) rather than an earlier notion of ‘wisdom’ (\textit{sagesse}) which is the model for these rationalities: ‘calculation of forces, relations, wealth, elements of force’ (Foucault, 2004: 315). As Foucault (1978: 137; see also Foucault, 2008) suggests, ‘the dispositifs of power and knowledge begin to take into account the ‘processes of life’ (the species, the race, and the large scale phenomena of population) and the possibility of controlling and modifying them’ to the point where management of species life became the ultimate end of government.

For Foucault, biopolitics - understood as specific strategies of power situated and exercised over the population - thus concerns the collective mass, but simultaneously necessitates the regulation of its depths and its details (Foucault, 2008). As Foucault (1982: 244, as cited in Murphy, 2012: 22) makes clear, ‘the exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, not is it a structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organised, it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation’. Further, from the perspective of governing, the content of these interests is less important than the mode of calculation itself: assuming that social actors undertake this form of calculation makes possible the manipulation and direction of their behaviour and conduct (Lyness, 2014: 85). As Lyness (2014: 85-86), drawing upon Foucault, makes clear:

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\item[99] Whilst Foucault’s concern is with biological factors, he extends this to include ‘social’ problems, what he calls the populations ‘public’ attributes. These include ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements (Foucault, 2007: 75).
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‘If rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds in a non-random way, in a systematic way (to these modifications), then artificially modifying the environment in which *homo economicus* is embedded should be accompanied by a resulting change in behaviour. His conduct can be conducted; in short, he is in Foucault’s terms “eminently governable”’ (see also Foucault, 2008: 269-270).100

This is a key feature of the mode of ‘government at a distance’ that Nikolas Rose (1999: 49-50) discusses as a hallmark of governing in advanced liberal societies. Moreover, glossing Foucault – who says, ‘this I believe is the essential principle in the establishment of the art of (biopolitical) government; introduction of economy into political practice’, (Foucault, 1991: 92) - Dillon (2008: 313) construes the ‘economic’ logic of biopolitics as a broadly transactional logic; the space of biopolitics as a transactional space; and the self-governing freedoms through which biopolitics of security are practiced as transactional freedoms - what Foucault terms “circulation”.

3.3.3 Governmentality: Circulation

In his delineation of practices of security from those of discipline, Foucault locates ‘the absolutely crucial notion of risk’ (Foucault, 2007: 61). Working through a painstaking genealogy of smallpox, Foucault identifies new ‘fields of application and techniques’ of risk (Amoore and de Goede, 2008c: 10). No longer did the management of disease ‘follow the previous practice of seeking purely and simply to nullify the disease [...]’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). Instead, Foucault notes ‘the emergence of a completely different problem’ (Foucault, 2007: 65; see also Amoore and de Goede, 2008c). Whilst discipline operates through the enclosure and circumscription of space, and sovereignty capitalises a territory, biopolitical apparatuses are concerned with ‘allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, devising between the good and the bad circulation, ensuring things are always in movement’ (Foucault, 2007: 65; 2007: 18, see Elden, 2007; Lobo-Guerrero, 2007; Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 11). Moreover, in addressing and seeking to counteract the “aleatory events” that disrupt “good”

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100 Noting that with liberalism, the individual must be ‘left alone’, Foucault wryly noted the paradox that it was precisely this individual - *homo economicus* - who was increasingly ‘manageable’ through what he called ‘environmental’ forms of government (Braun, 2014). However, as Braun (2014: 54) points out, ‘Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism still presupposed a subject who responds in terms of a particular kind of rationality - for instance, as a rational economic actor who accepts the ‘reality’ of the market - and it is precisely this ‘free’ exercise of reason in relation to this reality that renders the subject governable’.
circulation and make the population less productive (Foucault, 2007: 246), Foucault (2007: 17) specifically questions the way mechanisms of security operate in a spatial order ‘to be a perfect agent of circulation’. Paraphrasing Foucault (2007: 64): ‘how should things circulate or not circulate?’ The purpose of biopolitics is fundamentally the facilitation and optimisation of “circulation”. Circulation is concerned with flows, but flows have to be monitored and regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268). The question of critical governmental reason thus becomes ‘how not to govern too much’ (Foucault, 2008: 13, see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). As Adey (2009: 12) articulates, ‘the continual calibration of circulation is organised in order to protect that circulation from strangling life’. Consequently, power does not operate by probation but by the ‘delimitation of phenomena within accepted limits, rather than an imposition of a law that says no to them’ (Foucault, 2007: 66).

As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 279) observe, it is important to note that Foucault’s use of circulation refers to ‘circulation in the widest and most generic sense of the term’. Indeed, Foucault states that in his use of the concept he means circulation understood ‘in a very broad sense of movement, exchange and contract, as a form of dispersion, and also as a form of distribution’ (Foucault, 2007: 64). At the same time, Foucault identifies a set of more technical issues regarding circulation, as the problematic of biopolitics and circulation includes diverse modes of circulation and not just the things that circulate (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). Accordingly, circulation emerges as both the key instrument and target of biopolitics:

‘[...] By ‘circulation’ we should understand not only this material network that allows the circulation ... but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things’ (Foucault, 2007: 325).

Thus, “circulation” becomes the referent object of security as security shifts from sovereign territoriality to life since ‘circulation concerns a world understood in terms of the biological structures and functions of species existence together with the relations that obtain between species life and all its contingent local and global correlations’ (Dillon, 2007b: 11). In further exegeses of Foucault’s work, Dillon102 (2007b: 12) goes on to say:

102 Whilst Dillon questions the mechanisms and technologies that are presently deployed by those that take life as their referent object, he seeks to extend Foucault’s original theses to the analysis of the political rationalities and technologies of security, which are now common among regimes of biopower, which increasingly characterise the 21st century (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 269).
‘The logic of threat installed by liberal biopolitics of security is ultimately not that of an externalised enemy. Neither another competitive state nor an existential other form of life, the threat to life in the liberal struggle biopolitically to secure life becomes life itself, the very means by which lifelike properties circulate and propagate’.

3.3.4 Governmental Milieu

Subjectification alongside circulation leads to a further crucial aspect of governmentality. Foucault contends that the exercise of power through biopolitics and apparatuses of security involved planning and intervening in a “milieu” (Foucault, 2007; see also Murphy, 2012). Politically, Foucault explains, the milieu is also a ‘field of intervention in which ... one tries to affect, precisely, a population and the conjunction of a series of events produced by these individuals, populations, and grounds, and quasi natural events which occur around them’ (Foucault, 2007: 21). This, as opposed to, the ‘capitalising’ of state, territory or province as in sovereignty, or a space of discipline (Foucault, 2007: 20-22). It is then ‘that in which circulation is carried out’ and involves and relies on a mix of natural (rivers, marshes, hills) and artificial (an agglomeration of individuals, houses, etcetera) ‘givens’ (Foucault, 2007: 21). Importantly, Foucault (2007: 20) also outlines that a milieu can be understood as ‘the space in which a series of uncertain and temporal elements unfold’ (“l’aléatoire”), then as ‘both the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). Thus, according to Foucault, a milieu as a space of security should instead be read as ‘a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another’ (Foucault, 2007: 20-21).

Through his discussion of the milieu, one of the key dynamics in Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between security and circulation is that security’s object remains beyond its grasp, that the deployment of the technologies of security is done within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008b: 524). Instead, the dispositif of security is presented through its relationship to the event: as the art of governing and the treatment of the uncertain, the *aleatory* (Foucault, 2007). It is a project, as Foucault notes, which demands

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103 How to act under conditions of indeterminacy and uncertainty is not a new problem – far from it. As Foucault and others teach us, the problem of how to seize possession of an uncertain future has reverberated across various modalities of liberal government and rule (Anderson, 2010a: 780; see also Foucault, 2007, 2008; Rose, 1999).
that any investigation of security is oriented towards a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable; good management therefore ‘takes into account precisely what might happen’ (Foucault, 2007: 20; de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008b: 524; Murphy, 2012: 34). Such an orientation to the uncertain future inhibits the very idea of risk. In Foucault’s (2007: 19) words:

‘Security will rely on a number of material givens ... it is simply a matter a maximising the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is risky and inconvenient ... while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed’.

Fundamentally, then, securing life is about letting ‘life live’, or, as Foucault (2007: 30) puts it, ‘a question of constituting something like a milieu of life, existence’ (Foucault, 2007: 30). This produces, as Huxley writes, ‘the conditions in which (regulated) freedoms are exercised’ (Huxley, 2006; see also Foucault 2007: 189). Accordingly, viewing security as a dispositif of circulation within a life environment and not as a dispositif of disciplining bodies opens up and entirely different spatial configuration of security in which entirely different analytical methods are invariably sought (Evans, 2010: 416-417). Moreover, understanding power as heterogeneous, Foucault attempts to explain how notions of threat actually provide societies with their generative principles of formation (Evans, 2013). Thus, it is unsurprising that since Foucault’s death there have been several exegeses of Foucault’s work, as linked to risk.

3.4 Dispositif, Insurance and Risk

Acolytes of Foucault have attempted to elucidate how neo-liberal states discipline and govern through risk (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 385).

Theorists largely heralding from the governmentality tradition posit risk as multiform and heterogeneous whilst its rationality and

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104 This section borrows heavily from previous research undertaken by Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008c) for reasons twofold. First, Aradau and van Munster clearly articulate specific developments, transformations and transitions between insurance and risk. Second, their work more generally can be considered a catalyst for the significant growth in literature that examines ‘precautionary’ risk rationality.

105 For an analysis of governing through autonomous subjects, see Sending and Neumann (2006).
logic are to be derived from an attentive analysis of configurations of practices (Aradau and van Munster, 2005). The combination of rationalities and technologies define risk as a ‘family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future’ (Rose, 2001: 7). Moreover, a dispositif of risk implies a specific relation to the future, a relation that requires the monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to control and minimise its potentially harmful effects (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 9).

Inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, François Ewald (1986) and Jacques Donzelot (1984) have offered a genealogical analysis of risk that posits insurance as a dispositif for governing the social (Aradau, and van Munster, 2008a: 5). The rationality of insurance is based on the principle of solidarity that replaces the juridical principle of responsibility as response to the problematisation of specific social and historical problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Interestingly, the dispositif of risk insurance emerged where politics and economics proved incapable of managing social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Insurance provided an answer to the ‘scandal of the poor’ in the post-revolutionary French République, where neither political equality nor capitalism could (Donzelot, 1984, as cited in Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 18). Despite equality before the law and equal sovereignty, the poor had no property and were therefore forced to sell their labour. Yet, free access to work did not mean the end of indigence - the great political concern of the century (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). The ‘discovery’ of the work accident, for example, could have disrupting effects for the social fabric, with its disputable claims to responsibility and exacerbation of questions of exploitation (Aradau, and van Munster, 2008c:10). In this way, a rationality of risk reformulated accidents as something inherent to work, against which workers could however be protected through insurance (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 18) which reinforced the paradigm of risk insurance. Thus, insurance, in Donzelot’s words, could:

‘Modify the relations between capital and wage-earners without distorting the historical logic on which they rest, ensure a better moralisation of the individual by transforming the social milieu, concretise the invisible bond between men of which the State is the visible expression’ (Donzelot, 1988: 399).

In these analyses, insurance appears as a desecuritising technology rather than a means of governing security. This desecuritising aspect is linked with ‘social security’, a different form
of security – according to Ewald – that is built upon the logic of solidarity rather than danger or threat (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a: 6). Yet, Ewald (1986) adds another side to the reparation and compensation that insurance offers, namely prevention. The problem of compensating losses is inseparable from the problem of reducing the probability of their occurrence (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a). In this sense, one can argue that the neo-liberal modification of the paradigm of insurance and solidarity is rather a tipping of the balance in favour of prevention (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a).

It is argued the rise of neo-liberalism has spelt the end of the practice of collective risk management in favour of ‘prudentialism’ and prevention, in which subjects are required to prudently calculate, and thereby minimise, the risk that could befall them (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 20; see also O’Malley, 1992). This particular subjectivity is made possible by discourses on, for example, terrorism and risk, and the resulting ‘at-risk’ consciousness, has been characterised as the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ (Rose, 1990, 1993; Petersen, 1996). This captures the notion that ‘life should be an enterprise of oneself’ (Petersen, 1996: 48), a personal project, to be continually and actively assessed, managed, worked and improved upon (see Rose, 1990, 1993; Lupton, 1995; Petersen, 1996, 1997). In turn, this requires the individual to adopt a calculative and prudent attitude with respect to risk and danger106 (Petersen, 1996: 51).

This does not however, reactivate the traditional understanding of risk, but redirects the dispositif of insurance towards the individual – hence the reference to the notion of “new prudentialism” (O’Malley, 1992: 261). Thus, insurance becomes a matter of (rediscovered) individual responsibility, prudential conduct and ultimately choice. Prudent individuals were said to negotiate the vicissitudes of fortune on their own and thus avoided becoming a burden on the others (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). As neo-liberalism attempts to extend the criteria of the market and its forms of decision-making to other areas, insurance increasingly tends to only insulate the ‘wise’ against contingency (Aradau and van Munster, 2008: 6). Thus, governmentality authors increasingly point out the divide between universal social insurance provided by the state and the ‘privatisation of risk management’ (Rose, 1996: 58). Alongside the attack from neo-liberalist accounts, it is posited insurance has undergone further transformations as a result of the challenge from the scientific discoveries that seemed to undermine the very logic of calculability and the possibility of providing calculations for the

106 Baker and Simon (2002) have aptly described this shift as a move from “spreading risk”, concerned with the socialisation of risks by spreading them out over the whole population, to “embracing risk” leading to a de-pooling of collective risks towards individual responsibility.
future that has underpinned the insurance dispositif (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 27; see also Beck, 1999c; Bigo, 2008). Accordingly, the relation to the exception is modified by the unknowable catastrophic event. As Aradau et al. (2008: 152) point it, ‘at the horizon of catastrophe, precaution, prudence or pre-mediation imbue liberal regimes with a different exceptionalism’. Moreover, this transition relies on what Beck would dismiss as the ‘ideological formation of risk’, as the pretence of professionals that risks can be controlled against their intrinsic incalculability and unpredictability (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 17).

As Ewald has succinctly formulated in relation to this latter challenge, risk ‘tends to exceed the limits of the insurable in two directions: infinitely small-scale (biological, natural, or food-related risk), and toward the infinitely large-scale (‘major technological risks’ or technological catastrophes’ (Ewald, 1993: 222). Moreover, as Aradau and van Munster (2007: 21) articulate, the two ‘infinities’ of risk remind us of Beck’s incalculable risks: risks created by science or civilisation itself. The infinity of risk is doubly manifested in their potential effects and in their ‘being’, posing a theoretical dilemma for the insurance dispositif (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21). In so being, governmentality scholars have attempted to make sense of what happens when the authority of knowledge and statistical technologies are surpassed by the horizon of catastrophic events. It is posited, risk understood as a dispositif for governing possible future irruptions of social problems offers an answer to this dilemma (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34). The question for governmentality theorists thus becomes one of ‘taming the limit’ of both infinities of risk and to mobilise discourses of vigilance, prevention and monitoring to govern uncertainty, or ‘govern the ungovernable’ within a dispositif of governance.  

3.4.1 Dispositif Precautionary Risk

Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2007: 90) have recently described ‘a society in which there are uncontrollable and unpredictable dangers against which insurance is impossible’, and whereby so-called ‘international terrorism’ becomes another example of ‘a risk that goes beyond rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’. Foremost, it is argued that paradoxically, the recognition of incalculability and perpetual

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107 Of course, it depends on cultural and social dispositions which risks are qualified as catastrophic (cf., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
108 The term “taming” is theorised in Ian Hacking’s (1990) formulation, ‘the taming of chance’ in relation to probabilities and statistical laws.
109 See also Aradau and van Munster (2008); cf., Beck (1999c).
imminence of catastrophe\textsuperscript{110} does not lead to an abandonment of calculative techniques in favour of, for example, an introspective embrace of contingency through a resigned political-philosophical recognition of the fragility of modern life (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 10; see also de Goede and Randalls, 2009: 867; Fierke, 2007: 203). Rather, in the context of the post-9/11 global security climate, the dominant conceptual underpinning contemporary (in)security governance has taken on an actively precautionary posture (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Stockdale, 2014). Aradau and van Munster (2007) make this point succinctly in arguing the representation of the double infinity of terrorism has led to the emergence of a ‘new’ dispositif of risk, which they term “precautionary risk” that has been grafted upon the ‘old’ technologies of risk management:

‘Between exceptional measures and the immediacy of action on the one hand and the ordinary administrative, police or insurance measures on the other, the ‘war on terror’ spans the whole space between the two definitions of securitisation. A genealogy of the dispositifs of risk would allow us to understand the challenge of the catastrophic and the ‘incalculable’ in relation to the ordinary practices of risk management’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34).

This development resonates with the international security environment, which in recent years has adopted many of the characteristics described by narratives of diminishing temporal control, as ‘security issues have increasingly been defined in terms of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats’ (Aalberts and Werner, 2011: 2191). Further, it is suggested precautionary risk is based on four interlinked rationalities that allow for the deployment of specific technologies of government: zero risk, worst-case scenario, shifting the burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25). These rationalities are derived from the catastrophic and radically contingent elements of risk and they replace the earlier rationalities of risk insurance: risk identification, risk reduction and risk spreading (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25). Any level of risk is now considered unacceptable; risk must be avoided at all costs (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25).

Drawing upon the work of Ewald (2002), Aradau and van Munster (2007) posit precautionary risk tends to exceed the limits of the insurable in two directions. The first element of infinity that undermines a politics of insurance is the catastrophic element, the grave and irreversible damage that an event can cause (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21). The second

\textsuperscript{110} Perpetual imminence of catastrophe is linked to the dominant rhetoric of inevitability which finds its legacy in prior international threat scenarios (see \textit{inter alia} Coaffée, 2009).
element of infinity is that of uncertainty - that is, ‘to what one can apprehend without being able to assess’ (Ewald, 2002: 286). As Ewald (2002: 283-84) observes, ‘the precautionary principle does not target all risks situations but only those marked by two principle features: a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other’. Furthermore, both the large and small-scale risks outlined by Ewald are related to scientific knowledge. The specific deployment of scientific knowledge then incorporates the affective domain, rendering fears and anxieties as means of anticipating the future (Amoore, 2009). ‘The precautionary principle’, writes Ewald (2002: 288), ‘presupposes a new relationship with science and with knowledge’, one which ‘invites one to anticipate what one does not yet know, to take into account doubtful hypotheses and simple suspicions’. Thus, when knowledge is unable to define the prospect of the future, to compute its own effects upon the future, the logic of insurance is surpassed (Ewald, 2002). This is because (traditionally) insurance requires the identification of risk and the statistical estimation of an event happening (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 28).

According to Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2008), the double infinity of risk (as Beck hypothesised) thus makes terrorism difficult to govern by the technologies of insurance risk.111 Yet, as Aradau and van Munster (2007) observe, this does not mean that these technologies dwindle out of existence or that governmentality is suspended. Rather, it is posited a Foucauldian approach does not portray risks as calculable/incalculable, but focuses on ‘how’ presumably incalculable catastrophic risks like terrorism are governed (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21).

3.4.2 Dispositif Risk: ‘At the Limit’

To understand how anticipatory action based upon risk functions, it is important to acknowledge the presence of the future - that is, the ontological and epistemological status of ‘what has not and may never happen’ (Massumi, 2007). To put it differently, the proliferation of anticipatory action and the emphasis on an open future, are inseparable from a spatial-temporal imaginary of life as contingency (Dillon, 2007a). Such invitations are symptomatic of a trend to draw upon the cultural imaginary to develop a revised calculus of risk which hyper-extends the anticipatory dimensions (Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 34; see also Amoore and de Goede, 2008a).

111 This despite certain similarities to Beck’s uninsurable risks, of which Aradau and van Munster (2007) acknowledge.
the context of the war on terror, it is argued “governing” has involved championing an activist approach to security and instigating the discursive emergence and practical proliferation of a novel iteration of “pre-emption” (Stockdale, 2014). The pre-emptive decision taken in the context of potentially catastrophic uncertainty is effectively severed from knowledge, enacting a purer decisionism reminiscent of the so-called precautionary principle made familiar by theories of environmental governance (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 105; see also Ewald, 2002). Accordingly, a security politics marked by a precautionary relationship to futurity is quite different to templates of prevention. If prevention supposes a causal and actuarial relation to futurity, pre-emption is self-consciously speculative and entails an orientation to the future as “surprise” (Anderson, 2010a: 783). Put differently, pre-emption is less about prediction, but entails an open orientation to multiple potential futures and a valuation of action in the present despite incomplete knowledge or unknowable threat (de Goede, 2014: 49).

Although there are obvious convergences between the logic(s) of precaution and pre-emption, there is also an importance divergence. The form of action that characterises precaution is the stopping or halting of something before it reaches a point of irreversibility. As Massumi (2007: 14) puts it:

‘Precaution is parasitic. It acts on processes that have an actual or possible existence prior to the intervention and does so on the basis of a determinate empirically apprehended threat. Pre-emption is different; it acts over threats that have not yet emerged as determinate threats, and so does not only halt or stop from a position outside. Its form of intervention is incitatory and it is justified on the basis of indeterminate potentiality’.

Thus, pre-emptive acts become immersed in the conditions of emergence of a threat, ideally occurring before a threat has actually emerged (Anderson, 2010a: 790). What is interesting and disquieting is the extent to which ‘pre-crime’ measures shift risk assessment from retrospective

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112 See, for example, Adey and Anderson (2012); Amoore and de Goede (2008a); Anderson (2010a, 2010b); Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2008a and b, 2011); Cooper (2006); de Goede (2012, 2008); de Goede and Randalls (2009); Ehrenberg et al. (2010); Massumi (2005a, 2007); Elmer and Opel (2006); Kessler and Werner (2008); Moreiras (2005).
113 The primary purpose of “governing terror(ism)” is to eliminate terror through the advance of good government or make terror at least governable through the advance of security technologies (Dillon, 2007b: 8).
114 It should be made clear, pre-crime and the pre-emptive logic that drives it are not synonymous with prevention. Pre-emption emphasises action under conditions of uncertainty about a future event, a focus on emergent threat in a world of interdependencies and circulations, and a generative role given to collective apprehension (Anderson, 2010a: 790).
115 Specifically, it is the potentially catastrophic nature of “new terrorism” which is said to have harboured pre-emptive security logic; see Mythen and Walklate (2008: 221-223).
probabilistic estimations of harm to a pre-emptive approach heavily oriented and slanted towards dystopic future imagining\textsuperscript{116} (Mythen and Khan, 2005, \textit{emphasis added}). As Aradau and van Munster (2007: 106) put it, ‘[w]hat counts is a coherent scenario of catastrophic risk and an imaginary description of the future’.\textsuperscript{117} Accordingly, the sovereign order (or security decision) no longer remains within the realm of empirically verifiable facticity but discernibly extends into the realm of the imagination (Aradau et al., 2008).

The socio-political ramifications of this recasting of perceptions of present and future have been quite significant (Stockdale, 2014: 94). Firstly, the precautionary dispositif of risk reconfigures the debates on securitisation through the introduction of speed and urgency at the heart of democracies (Buzan et al., 1998) and a risk-based approach that emphasises the everyday practices of bureaucrats and security professionals (Bigo, 1996, as cited in Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 332). It is argued decisionism and speed coexist with routines and everyday practices of the police, the military, immigration officials and other managers of unease (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 332). Moreover, the unknowability of the future thus places decision-makers ‘in the uncomfortable position of having to take drastic action in the face of an inescapably elusive, uncertain threat’ (Cooper, 2006: 119). Security is thus not only about the exceptional, that which threatens survival and goes beyond normal politics, but about everyday routines and technologies of security professionals (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 17).

Second, a dispositif of risk is a set of procedures of strategic configuration different from others. The dispositif of risk emerges from the police state and its interventionism as a different way to manage population by ‘laissez-faire’, related to temporality, to the institution of prevention and to the future (Bigo, 2008: 96). Third, the security dispositif is related to \textit{limits}, to standard deviation, to averages (Bigo, 2008: 97). In Foucault’s (2007: 8) words, security is related to ‘an order of calculation of probability, of statistical regularity’.

Prevention understood this way means to anticipate the emergence of undesirable social behaviours within a population categorised as ‘high risk’ based on a \textit{virtuality} of danger (Aradau, 2004). Thus, strategies of prevention are based on the assumption that if prevention is necessary, a danger exists, even if only in a virtual state before being actualised (Aradau, 2004: 267). Moreover, as these correlations remain arbitrary and can only be proven \textit{a posteriori}, dangerousness becomes ‘a quality immanent to a subject’ (Castel, 1991: 287, \textit{italics in original}). Thus, in a Castelian sense, the security

\textsuperscript{116} For analyses of such, see Amoore and de Goede (2008a); Anderson (2010b); de Goede (2008b); de Goede and Randalls (2009); McCulloch and Pickering (2009a); Moreiras (2005); Stockdale (2014); Zedner (2007, 2009).

\textsuperscript{117} See also Aradau and van Munster (2008b: 29-30).
dispositif cannot be analysed as being derived from the logic of exception or an exceptional situation (Bigo, 2008). Rather, as Bigo (2008: 97) points out, ‘security is related to normality and liberty, not with war and survival, nor with coercion and surveillance. It differs from sovereignty and discipline as it is a cost calculation inside a series of probable event’. The organisation of modernity is no longer put into effect through the rationality of the diagram of the panopticon (Bigo, 2008). Ultimately, the audience becomes destabilised:

‘The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely archaic, since the panoptic dispositif basically involves putting someone in the centre – an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance – who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals’ places within this mechanics of power. To that extent we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign ... on the other hand what appeared now, is not the idea of a power which would take the form of an exhaustive surveillance of individuals ... but the set of dispositifs which, for the government and those who governed, make relevant very specific phenomena which are not exactly individual phenomena ... although individuals featured in them in a certain way, and there are specific processes of individualisation’ (Foucault, 2007: 68, 97).

According to Bigo (2008: 100-101), processes of individualisation, that is to say, profiles drawn from statistical categories and differential risk, normalise and put under the “ban” certain cases rather than others, and finalise the criteria to discriminate between categories until each category is one unit only. However, as Bigo (2008: 101, emphasis added) further explains, ‘the uniqueness is not based on the person, but on the category he represents, and if it is not him, it may be his brother, its identity and subjectivity is not important for the process’. Yet, at the limit of knowledge, intelligence becomes itself insufficient (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 31). The Home Office official report on the 7/7 London bombings points out this dilemma: nothing marked out the four men involved in the attacks, they were all ‘unexceptional’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 27; see also HM Government, 2006). As the underestimation of intelligence and knowledge is considered irresponsible from the viewpoint of precautionary risk, the scope and field of intelligence needs to be enlarged accordingly (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 31). Moreover, according to Aradau and van Munster (2007: 32) ‘profiling everybody is regimented into technologies of vigilance and prudentialism. We are not only supposed to monitor our own behaviour, but detect signs of risk in the others’.

Lastly, where hyper-reality describes the simulation of the real, the danger with the construction of terroristic futures
is that they result in a condition of ‘hyper-riskality’, where creative visions of risk influence meanings to the extent that the probability of threat is eclipsed by (imagined) fear of harm (Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 34). In a climate of ‘hyper-riskality’ it is suggested that cultural representations and political narratives of risk mould material decisions about crime and security regulation as much as firm evidence of tangible threats (Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 34). To this end, the ‘failure of imagination’ within US security and intelligence services reported by the 9/11 Commission (see United States Government, 2004) undoubtedly acted as a catalyst for a shifting calculus of risk in the U.S which favours early intervention to prevent potential harms (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). This trend is not exclusive to the United States but has also been a particular feature of the political landscape in the UK and the EU. Tony Blair’s post 7/7 assertion that “the rules of the game are changing” served as the harbinger for an extensive programme of domestic securitisation coupled to international military interventions, mobilised largely under the banner of the “war against terrorism” (Mythen et al., 2012: 3).

By inscribing the future as that which must be secured above all else, this shift can be understood to have fundamentally challenged the cacophonous post-Cold War debates concerning appropriate spatio-material “referent objects” of security (Stockdale, 2011: 1). Subsequently, a number of key binaries which have traditionally underpinned a states’ coercive capacities have been eroded and even reversed as countermeasures are pursued that seek to anticipate threats before they emerge (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009a; see also inter alia Zedner, 2007). What these observations imply is that the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security (Zedner, 2007: 261-2) since the possibility of forestalling risks foregrounds what Cynthia Weber terms one’s “pre-thoughts” (Weber, 2007: 115, see also inter alia Stockdale, 2014). Taking the argument further, Dillon (2005a: 3 cited in Murphy, 2012: 118) suggests the ‘event of terror’ presents an ‘intended catastrophe’ which sees the return of Descartes’ ‘evil demon’, signalling the limits of calculable knowledge, wrecking ‘the best risk calculations’, he concludes, ‘you have to imagine the very worst’. The result is that material evidentiary circumscriptions of the decisional process are diminished considerably, as the sovereign decider is encouraged, or even compelled, ‘to take into account doubtful hypotheses and simple suspicions ... to take the most far-fetched forecasts seriously’, since the Cartesian “malicious demon” of catastrophe could emerge at any time and in any form (Ewald, 2002: 288). As Ewald (2002: 268) envisions, we should ‘out of precaution, imagine the worst possible, the consequence that an infinitely deceptive malicious demon could have slipped in the folds of an apparently innocent enterprise’.
With the sovereign decision thus contingent upon imagined scenarios rather than explicit knowledge, a condition emerges in which no future is considered impossible and thus, by default, every individual - regardless of their particular characteristics - is a potential suspect and is placed upon a ‘continuum of risk’ within the unlimited realm of the imaginary (Ericson, 2008: 66; see also Ewald, 2002). Moreover, it is argued that this logic of security illustrates how liberal forms of rule are twisted into illiberal forms of knowledge collection, spatial regulation and de-subjectivation (Opitz, 2004: 94). Consequently, the dispositif of insurance recreates a governmental dispositif at the limit (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 31), ultimately tipping risk management towards a rather drastic mode of prevention.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with the notion of dispositif as emanating from Foucauldian analyses. The chapter has explored several key tenets of Foucault’s original concept of dispositif and attempted to provide perspective and conceptual clarity. The chapter has also drawn attention to several central tenets of ‘governmentality’ read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, ‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’. The chapter has also engaged with an amalgamation of research that departs from a traditional theoretical lens emanating from International Relations - scholarship which argues for a different conceptualisation of risk for security studies. Exegeses of Foucault’s work within a post-structuralist framework posit that the introduction of a dispositif ‘at the limit’ develops forms of accountability that take precautions against a politics of generalised and arbitrary decisions at the limit of knowledge as a result of a double infinity of risk in its catastrophic effects and the uncertainty of its occurrence (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 33-34). What is new is a ‘precautionary’ element grafted onto existing risk management structures. For such scholarship, security, then, is not a disciplinary dispositif, nor is it surveillance through a panopticon; it is risk management at the limit. Whilst the parameters of such are open to contestation, particularly in relation to governing the “ungovernable”, as this chapter has made clear, what it means to govern (in)security and risk understood this way raises a number of issues about the formulation of a critical stance in the war on terror (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34).
Chapter 4

Risk Society and Reflexive Risk

4.1 Introduction

This chapter departs from Foucauldian analyses of risk and examines the two major exponents of the ‘risk society’ thesis: Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens in the context of broader social theory of reflexivity, advanced modernisation and individualisation. Although they initially

There is nothing new about the concept of reflexivity. Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, first published in 1759, was dealing with something very similar in his considerations of ethical character (Webb, 2006: 35). Moreover, as Albert (2001: 66-67) notes ‘reflexivity’ in the sense of social awareness of risks has been a constant characteristic of governmental processes. Nevertheless, what has changed significantly is the reconfiguration of risk with the emergence of ‘reflexive modernity’.
developed their diagnoses of risk and late modernity largely separately of each other, the writings of Beck and Giddens have much in common: hence, the reason to consider them together.\textsuperscript{119} The first half of chapter explores several key parameters of the risk society thesis including Beck’s optimism about the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere through ‘sub-political’ means; the paradox of reflexive modernity and the ‘individualisation’ of risk. The chapter then turns towards explaining the paradigm of ‘reflexivity’ through the work of sociologist Anthony Giddens. Through Giddon logic, the chapter explores postmodernity, which refers to the epistemological dissolution of modern knowledge production and the corresponding dissolution of identity (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005). Specifically, the chapter explores the concept of dis-embedding relations; the ontological (in)security of the ‘self’; and the dynamics of risk and trust in postmodernity.

4.2 Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk Society’

One of the most renowned attempts to grasp recent societal transformations; why and how the risk society emerged and; to describe the conditions on existence within it (Danisch, 2011: 237) can be found in Ulrich Beck’s ubiquitously cited Risk Society. Beck has developed powerful analyses of the ways in which the rise of the risk society is transforming social reproduction, nature and ecology, intimate relationships, politics and democracy (Elliott, 2002: 294). Moreover, the ‘risk society’ has in many ways not only been posited as a visionary excursion into our present condition, but also a prophetic perspective on the future (Adam and van Loon, 2000: 1). It is thus unsurprising that Beck’s highly original formulation of risk society has continued to challenge the social science tradition whilst stimulating an eruption of interest in the concept of risk itself (Mythen, 2005: 130). The risk society perspective argues that the notion of risk has become a pervasive and integral aspect of the modern condition (Beck, 1992a). In précis, the risk society aegis recounts an epochal shift from industrial society to the risk society via a three-tiered historical typology through which transitions in the composition and cognition of risk (or hazards are they are often termed) are recounted (Mythen, 2007: 796): ‘pre-industrial’, ‘industrial’, and ‘risk’ societies (Beck, 1995: 78). The latter of these, ‘risk society’, argues Beck (1996: 28, 1999: 73, \textit{italics in original}), ‘is

\textsuperscript{119} This is not to deny major divergences within their writings.

not an option which could be chosen or rejected in the course of political debate’. Instead, it is an inescapable structural condition of advanced industrialisation through which the automatic operation of autonomous modernisation processes or “hazards” of that system, in Beck’s words, ‘undermine and/or cancel the established safety systems of the provident states existing risk calculation’ (Beck, 1999: 77, italics in original).

As a driving force in political transformation and individual action, Beck (2000: 13) is adamant that it is the ‘... perception of threatening risks that determines thought and action’. For Beck (1992a), these risk perceptions create a manufactured risk. Thus, Beck (2002b: 9) believes the development of techno-scientific development (in line with capitalist modernisation) has served to intensify, not alleviate, risk production. In Beck’s (2002b: 8-9) words, ‘with the technologies of the future - genetic engineering, nanotechnology and robotics, we are opening a new ‘Pandora’s box’’. That is, risks that are both created in a literal sense through inappropriate human action upon ‘plants and animals i.e. the earth’ (Beck, 1992a: 13) in the first place, and secondly they are ‘... decisions contingent, endogenous entities which are generated by the practice of people, firms, state agencies and politicians’ (Beck 1992: 98).121 ‘Risks’, writes Beck (1997: 30), always depend on decisions - that is, they presuppose decisions. Thus, in much of Beck’s writings he demonstrates a realist approach to risk since risk, for him, is another word for hazard of danger (Lupton, 1999: 61). This realist approach however, is not consistently maintained throughout his work. In some parts of Beck’s writings, the social and cultural processes by which understandings and perceptions of risk are mediated are highlighted, and therefore he demonstrates a ‘weak’ version of social constructionism through an appreciation of “risk as knowledge” (Lupton, 1999; see Beck 1999c: 21-31, 134-35).

In making sense of the risk society perspective, it is important to clarify hazard from risk; a separation necessary by Beck’s own admission. For Beck, in comparison to the temporally compact hazards arising in pre-industrial cultures, the toxicity of contemporary security risks (hazards) are on an unprecedented scale since they cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially (Danisch, 2011: 239). Whilst Beck (1992a: 21) posits that risk is a ‘... systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself’, Borne (2006) usefully articulates the separation of risk, security and destruction, of which Beck envisages. In Borne’s (2006: 26)

121 Beck suggests such decision making is the responsibility of institutional elites in industry, labour, government and civil society – planners charged with the task of calculating and assuming responsibility for the risks that might befall the lives of others (Beck, 1994a).
words, risk (under Beckian logic) can be read as ‘the probability of an occurrence for a given threat-hazard’, and the degree of susceptibility of the exposed to the source of that hazard – vulnerability. Moreover, as Borne (2006: 26) points out, ‘combined with these two elements, a third can be added: the capacity of humanity to deal with these hazards’. Thus, Borne (2006: 26) articulates, ‘risk’, as presented in the World Risk Society, can be understood as follows:

\[ \text{Risk} = \frac{\text{Hazard (H)}}{\text{Capacity (C)}} \times \text{Vulnerability (V)} \]

Importantly, Beck does not wish to suggest that daily life in the risk society is intrinsically more hazardous than in the pre-modern world - a world characterised by famine, plagues and natural disasters (Elliott, 2002: 295). Rather, for Beck, no notion of risk is to be found in traditional culture; pre-industrial hazards or dangers, no matter how potentially catastrophic, were experienced as pre-given (Elliott, 2002: 295). They did not lend themselves to calculation in any systematic way but were instead attributed to such external factors as divine provenance or cosmic fate (Beck, 1994a). However, with the beginning of societal attempts to control, and particularly with the idea of steering towards a future of predictable security, the consequences of risk become a political issue (Elliott, 2002: 296). Thus, for Beck, the risk society emerges when:

‘The dangers of industrial society begin to dominate public, political and private debates and conflicts. Here the institutions of industrial society become the producers and legitimators of threats they cannot control. What happens here is that certain features of industrial society become socially and politically problematic. On the one hand, society still makes decisions and takes actions according to the pattern of the old industrial society, but, on the other, the interest organisations, the judicial system and politics are clouded over by debates and conflicts that stem from the dynamism of risk society’ (Beck, 1994b: 5, emphasis in original).

In this sense, the risk society thesis documents the deleterious effects of environmental risks on everyday life while paradoxically championing the emancipatory capacity of risk to generate productive dialogue in the political sphere (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 223).

As Mythen and Walklate (2005: 384) point out, ‘this ground shift is suggestive of a wider point about social distribution. While the logic of the class society is sectoral - some win and some lose - the logic of the risk society is universal: ultimately, everyone loses’. This is because, according to Beck (1992a: 19), ‘the problems and conflicts relating to distribution
in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems and conflicts that arrive from the production, definition and distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks’. To put it differently, the production of risk is subordinate to the production of wealth, to the extent that risks are taken to be predictable and limited but necessary side effects of technical and economic progress (Dean, 1999: 181). Beck (1992a: 49) concretises this historical transformation thus:

‘The dream of class society is that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning ... the driving force in the class society can be summarised in the phrase ‘I am hungry!’ The driving force in the class society can be summarised in the phrase ‘I am afraid!’ The commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need’.

Making something of a chronological leap, Beck goes on to discuss the cultural profile of risk in industrial society. In industrial society, the general public pressed political parties to ensure the adequate distribution of “goods” (e.g. housing, health, employment, etc.) Conversely, in the ‘post-needs risk society’ goods distribution is steadily augmented by public concern about the overproduction of ‘bads’ (Beck, 1992a: 20), as typified by the Chernobyl incident. In Beck’s (1996: 31) terms, ‘the injured of Chernobyl are today, years after the catastrophe, not even born yet’. Moreover, as Beck (2002b: 4) puts it, ‘we, with our civilising decisions, cause global consequences that radically contradict the institutionalised language and promises of authorities in catastrophic cases worldwide’. Thus, environmental pollutions, nanotechnology, human cloning and bioterrorism are sui generis defying temporal or geographical enclosure (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 283-284).

4.2.1 The Paradox of Modernisation

By postulating the emergence of new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, on a perceptual plain, this is indicative of a movement away from differential class-consciousness toward a universal risk-consciousness (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 383). As Sanjay Reddy (1996: 237) claims, ‘moderns had eliminated genuine indeterminacy or “uncertainty” through the myth of calculability’. However, by the end of the twentieth century, these foundations of risk logic, according to Beck, are subverted and suspended since manufactured risk shatters extant methods of insurance (Beck, 1994b: 2). Industrial society is shaped by hazards that are predictable and thus manageable through, for instance, insurance policies, welfare support systems and legal rules (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). By contrast, the global risk society
spawns conditions of extreme uncertainty whereby decision-makers are no longer able to guarantee predictability, security and control. ‘[T]he hidden central issue in world risk society’, Beck argues, ‘is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy and everyday life’ (Beck, 2002a: 41). Alternatively, as Aradau and van Munster (2007) put it, control is ideological, doomed to fall short of the measure of reality. Hence, how according to Beck, the violent force of ‘worst imaginable accidents’ (WIAs) overpowers methods of institutional regulation (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 228).

Beck posits a scenario in which the forces of modernisation have generated a giant Hegelian contradiction. Paradoxically, the more modernity produces goods, the more it produces harms of unprecedented magnitude (O’Malley, 2004a: 324). Thus, for Beck, ‘risks’ are “man-made hybrids” (Beck, 1999: 146) or “quasi-subjects”, whose acting-active quality is produced by risk societies’ institutional contradictions (Beck, 1999: 150). As Beck (1999c: 199) states, ‘the more modern a society becomes, the more unintended consequences it produces, and as these become known and acknowledged, they call the foundations of industrial modernisation into question’. This, Beck (1992a) terms, ‘the logic of the boomerang effect’ proliferates as an outcome of modernisation itself.122 Consequently, risk becomes symbolic due to the prerequisite of its perpetually escalating character. Since risks, according to Beckian logic, are ‘a bottomless barrel of demands’, this process regenerates continuously. Thus, both risk and the perception of risk increase because of the unintended consequences produced as modern societies seek the ‘logic of control’ (Beck, 1999c: 139). In Beck’s much cited terms, ‘the more we attempt to “colonize” the future with the aid of the category of risk, the more it slips out of our control’ (Beck, 1999c: 139).

This damaging cyclical effect is what Beck calls ‘reflexivity’ (Beck, 1999: 109). Summing up the emergence of reflexivity, Beck (2000b: 81) states, ‘the conditio humana opens up new - with fundamentally ambivalent contingencies - complexities, uncertainties and risks which, conceptually and empirically, still have to be uncovered and understood’. This is what Beck (1992a: 56) names a ‘system-immanent normal form of the revolutionising of needs’. Characteristic of this process is a referential but self-sustaining interplay between risk and economy. In other words, fear and its satiations are merely symbolic and ‘independent of (their) context of satisfying human needs’ (Rigakos, 1999: 140).

122 Lupton (1999: 13) succinctly sums up this situation thus: ‘strategies which attempt to tame risk often have the paradoxical effect of increasing anxiety about risk through the intensity of their focus and concern’.
4.2.2 Reflexive Modernity According to Beck

Drawing upon the work of Beck, Elliot (2002: 297) observes, ‘the most striking limitation of social theories that equate modernity with industrial society lies in their lack of comprehension of the manner in which dangers to societal preservation and renewal infiltrate the institutions, organisations and subsystems of modern society itself’. In contrast to this grand consensus on modernisation, Beck (1992a; see also Elliott, 2002) argues that we are between industrial society and advanced modernity, between simple modernisation and reflexive modernisation. He describes the consanguinity between risk and modernisation thus:

‘The concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernisation. Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernisation and to its globalisation of doubt. They are politically reflexive’ (Beck, 1992a: 21, emphasis in original).

Moreover, in later writings, Beck develops these distinctions where he states:

‘In view of these two stages and their sequence, the concept of ‘reflexive modernisation’ may be introduced. This precisely does not mean reflection (as the adjective ‘reflexive’ seems to suggest), but above all self-confrontation. The transition from the industrial to the risk epoch of modernity occurs unintentionally, unseen, compulsively, in the course of a dynamic of modernisation which has made itself autonomous, on the pattern of latent side effects. One can almost say that the constellations of risk society are created because the self-evident truths of industrial society (the consensus on progress, the abstraction from ecological consequences and hazards) dominate the thinking and behaviour of human beings and institutions’ (Beck, 1996b: 28).

Indeed, Beck finds an ideology of progress concealed within dominant social theories that equate modernisation with linear rationalisation (Elliott, 2002: 296). In Beck’s opinion, the

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123 This chapter does not critically examine the theoretical quandaries and inner-contradictions of Beck or Giddens’ work. For instance, Beck’s hyperbolic style translates as a ‘hermeneutic leap’ from macro processes to assumed subjective experience, which is not based on empirical substantiation. Moreover, Beck’s understanding of the politics of community does not acknowledge either hierarchical or discursive forms of power. Thus, Beck homogenises the concept of reflexivity across a horizontal line of structure and agency. However, it is likely that the range, intensity and quality of individualisation will be mediated by embedded forms of stratification rather than reflexive processes as understood through nebulous structuration. Likewise, Giddens has been criticised for his “anything goes” outlook to social reality. Not only have such critical analyses been conducted elsewhere, but the limitations of both authors’ work are not a central concern of this thesis.
prevailing irrationality can be overcome only by way of rationality. As Beck (1997 [1993]: 126, 1994b: 33) notes: ‘it is not an excess of rationality, but a shocking lack of rationality, the prevailing irrationality, that explains the ailment of industrial modernity. It can be cured, if at all, not by a retreat, but only by a radicalisation of rationality, which will absorb the repressed’.

Overall, Beck’s theory of reflexive modernisation can be read as an attempt to reformulate and develop critical theory’s critique of rationality and science within a new social and historical context (see Beck, 1994b). Unlike critical theory however, Beck points to the fact that goal-rationality (instrumental reason) - because of its unpredictable and incaulcable side effects - tends to go beyond itself and become a reflexive and ‘self-critical’ post-goal-rationality (Post-zweckrationalita¨t):

‘Risk rationality develops an existential ‘logic’ of shock, suffering and pity on a global scale in opposition to the ‘instrumental rationality’ which Max Weber places at the centre of his sociology and Horkheimer and Adorno and, most recently, also Jurgen Habermas have criticised (albeit in completely different ways). One could say that risk reflexivity – or, more generally, reflexive modernisation – is an ambivalent, realist critique of instrumentally stunted reason. Here in key domains of social rationalisation it can be empirically and theoretically demonstrated how the radicalisation of modernity leads to a self-confrontation, self-delegitimation and self-transformation of instrumental rationality’ (Beck, 2009a [2007]: 198-9; 1994a: 9).

Accordingly, this reflexivity ushers in a new stage of modernity that brings with it a reordering of social institutions based around the distribution and management of risks (Beck and Willms, 2004: 195). The question then becomes how to summarise the Beckidian concept of ‘reflexivity”? Importantly, Lash (1994a: 200) stresses that Beck (1992a) distinguishes between reflexivity and the notion of reflection, where reflexivity is ‘like a reflex. It is neither individualistic nor conscious nor internal’. Furthermore, reflexivity involves a representative rather than a participatory democracy, so that there is little space for the influence of social movements or politicised identities on decision-making processes or forms of expertise (Lash, 1994: 259). As Spalek (2009b: 186), drawing upon the work of Lash (1994), observes:

‘Reflexivity can include reflection, where reflection might be thought of in terms of individuals, collective groups and/or institutions intentionally and rationally reflecting upon the part that they play in the perpetuation of identified social problems as well as reflecting upon ways in which they can intervene and act so as to minimise harms’.
Beck (1999a: 109; 1994c: 175-8) however, is critical of both Giddens’ and Lash’s inclination to conceive of reflexive modernisation as a conscious process mediated by knowledge (reflection) (Rasborg, 2012: 14, italics in original). Beck does not disagree with Giddens and Lash - in that knowledge plays an important role in reflexive modernity. However, as Rasborg (2012: 14) observes, contrary to Giddens and Lash, Beck emphasises that the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernisation (to a large extent) is unawareness, in as much as risk must be seen as the unintended consequences of industrial modernisation (reflexivity):

‘What distinguishes my concept of reflexive modernisation from those of Giddens and Lash? To put it briefly and pointedly: the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernisation is not knowledge, but - more or less reflexive - unawareness. It is this aspect of the distribution and defence of unawareness (Nichtwissen) that opens the horizon of inquiry for non-linear theories (of reflexive modernisation). We live in the age of unintended consequences, and it is this state of affairs that must be decoded and shaped methodologically and theoretically, in everyday life and politically’ (Beck, 1999: 119; 2007: 224).

Beck thus makes a distinction between, on the one hand, reflexivity - understood as the confrontation of modernity with its own results (risk) - and on the other reflection - understood as a possible awareness of the ‘self- destructive potentials’ of the (world) risk society (Beck, 1999b: 73; 1999: 109–12; 2007: 219). Whereas the first notion refers to a structural reflexivity, the second refers to individual (self) reflection. In relation to the former, structural reflexivity refers to the “self-undermining” and “self-transforming” effects of the natural logic of industrial development (Beck, 1994a: 174–183). The industrial dynamic quasi-autonomously leads to a social stage in which the guiding ideas and core institutional responses of the first modernity (e.g. the gender-imbalanced nuclear family, the ideal of standardised full employment, the abundant exploitation of nature in the name of progress) no longer appear self-evident or infallible (Beck, 2001: 23–24). For Beck, reflexive modernity also means the self-confrontation with the effects of risk society in as far as the reflexive self calls itself into question. ‘Within the horizon of the opposition between old routine and new awareness of consequences and dangers’, writes Beck, ‘society becomes self-critical’ (Beck, 1999c: 81). In effect, reflexivity is the turning back on oneself and a form of self-evaluation within the contingencies and uncertainties of risk society (Lawson, 1985, as cited in Webb 2006: 36). Downplaying the evident limitations of this categorisation, it is the autonomous, compulsive dynamic of advanced or reflexive modernisation that leads to the
increasing ability people have to self-confront and therefore transform, the social conditions in which they exist (Beck 1992: 197). Thus, self-reflexivity, or the individual reflection of these changing institutional conditions, involves a shift from former heteronomous or collective monitoring of agents to the autonomous, active, and permanent self-monitoring of individual life narratives (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 35; Lash, 1994b: 115–116).124

In this way, Beck (1999b: 73; 2007: 219) is able to point out that the transition from industrial society to the (world) risk society occurs in a ‘reflex-like’ way, rather than as a conscious and intentional process of which agents are fully aware. In other words, the reflexivity of the (world) risk society, in Beck’s opinion, does not necessarily imply an increasing reflection in the sense of an increasing awareness of risk (Rasborg, 2012: 15). Rather, society, as Beck (1994b: 8; 1992: 19) puts it, ‘becomes a theme and a problem for itself’. Thus, for Beck (1994b: 5-8), it is exactly this ‘self-confrontation’ that makes modernity ‘reflexive’. Dean (1999: 181) usefully sums up this process thus: ‘to speak of reflexivity is not to say that society has become more reflective or thoughtful or necessarily better informed about decision-making. Rather it is to say that modernity finds itself in reflexive state of “self-confrontation”’. Ultimately, then, Beck’s account of reflexive modernity is not (or not only) a realist account of the emergence of new risks; it is an assessment of the social construction of risk that accompanies the multiplication and dissemination of measures for the calculation and assessment of risks, and the consequences of such technologies and knowledge on everyday subjectivities (Binkley, 2009: 92).

Whilst Beck’s early elaborations of reflexive modernity stress that reflexive modernity is ‘reflection free’ (see Beck 1995: 176), as Lash (1994a: 176-7) points out, in later writings, Beck develops the distinction between reflexivity (self-dissolution) and reflection (knowledge): ‘(r)eflexivity of modernity can lead to reflection, but it need not do so’. Thus, as Beck’s work develops, the reflexive and reflective domains begin to converge into what Elliott (2002) terms strong and weak forms of reflexivity. A strong reflexive position maintains that reflexivity occurs because of institutional dynamism, which results from purely unintended consequences (Borne, 2010: 22). A strong reflexive position linked to ‘self-reflexivity’ is associated with Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s Das ganz normale Chaos der Liebe and Giddens’ Modernity and Self-Identity and The Transformation of Intimacy. This form of reflexivity neatly fits a shift to the autonomous monitoring of life narratives and of love relationships (Lash, 1994b: 115-116). However, a weak form of

124 This should not be read as confronting a complete rupture between two historically different social forms, but that we increasingly come to live in a social environment that is characterised by a mixture of collective and reflexive features (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003: 171).
reflexivity would suggest a combination of reflex and reflection, ‘... a partial and contextual interaction of dissolution and reflection’ (Elliott, 2002: 302).

Lastly, according to Beck, unlike in the pre-industrial era where natural hazards are said to emit tangible effects that ‘assault the nose and eyes’ (Beck, 1992a: 21), anthropogenic risks in the present day become more potent: the ‘social explosiveness of hazard’ ensures that large-scale incidents are routinely reported by the mass media (Beck, 1999c). As a result, the damaging consequences of manufactured risks begin to dominate the ‘public, political, and private debates’ (Beck, 1999c: 144) which subsequently arrest the public imagination, leading to general discontent with the operations of expert institutions (Larana, 2001: 26, cf., Giddens, 1990). In chorus with the assessment of what Joost van Loon (1998) calls ‘virtual risks in an age of cybernetic reproduction’, Beck stresses ‘only by thinking of risk in terms of reality, or better, a becoming-real (a virtuality) can social materialisation be understood’ (Beck, 1999c: 136, emphasis in original). Moreover, according to Beck, a crisis in the legitimacy of modernisation processes themselves is exacerbated by a widespread reflection on the unintended consequences of this project, which includes a generalised sense of insecurity about personal future(s) (Binkley, 2009: 92). Consequently, for Beck, the scale and extent of manufactured threats force citizens to consider risk in political terms.

4.2.3 Sub-Politics

For Beck, the concept of reflexive modernisation signals a ground shift in cultural goals and political objectives where global institutions and individuals compete for political space125 - something Beck terms ‘sub-politics’. The ‘hidden substratum’ of modernity, Beck believes, will be subject to cosmopolitanism from below generated through ‘sub-political’ means (Beck et al., 1994: vi). Beck (1999d: 32) argues that ‘people have passed a kind of crash course in the contradictions of hazard administration in risk society ... They have learned more information, more vividly and more clearly than even the most critical critique could ever have taught them or demanded of them’. Society, in effect, seeks to reclaim ‘the political’ from its modernist relegation to the institutional sphere by locating the politics of risk at the heart of forms of social and cultural life (Elliot, 2002: 297).

125 Some critics have suggested an overemphasis on this development and thus the concept embodies nothing more than a “business as usual mentality”. Nonetheless, the transformation to a reflexive modernity suggests a society that is innately aware of the inappropriate development patterns that are based on the central tenets of modernity (Borne, 2006: 37, emphasis in original).
champions a system of differential or ‘sub-politics’ in which ‘politics becomes generalised and centreless’. In its purest form, ‘sub-politics means ‘direct’ politics – that is, ad hoc individual participation in political decisions, bypassing the institutions of representative opinion-formation’ (Beck, 1999c: 39). Through direct actions - including protest marches, blockades, petitions and consumer boycotts - individual citizens are able to combine in order to contest both national policies and wider global issues (Mythen, 2007: 796-799). In addition, there are no expert solutions in risk discourses because experts can only supply factual information and are never able to assess which solutions are culturally acceptable (Beck, 1996a: 20). Politics, therefore, ‘gains priority over expert reasoning’ (Beck, 1999c: 42).

Ultimately, for Beck, the reinvention of politics arises from the flow of information generated from the agent upward by the process of reflexive monitoring (Dodd, 1999: 199; cf., Giddens, 1994b: 15). This, Beck argues, allows individuals from outside the political system to appear on the ‘stage of social design’, as do collectivities (Ferguson, 2003: 207). Thus, Beck’s thesis envisages the emergence of an informed and active citizen galvanised by risk into the practices of ‘cosmopolitan political realism’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2010b). In essence, the burden of risk migrates from the jurisdiction of institutions to the individualised sphere of personal decision-making (Mythen, 2005: 130). These underlying transitions in the nature and the experience of risk encourage Beck to beckon in ‘a new mode of societalisation, a “metamorphosis” or “categorical shift” in relation to the individual and society’ (Beck, 1992a: 127).

4.3 Risk and Individualisation

‘We are damned to choose’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 163).

Whilst Beck is clearly uneasy about techno-scientific development(s), the arrival of reflexive modernisation is not wholly about risk; it is also about the expansion of choice (Elliott, 2002). For if risks are an attempt to make the incalculable calculable, then risk monitoring presupposes agency, choice, calculation and responsibility (Elliott, 2002: 298). Thus, Beck’s ‘risk society’ is not restricted to technological risks, but is also concerned with societal self-transformation from within by processes of individualisation \(^\text{126}\) and institutionalised individualism respectively (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxi).

\(^{126}\) For Beck (1992a: 90, 127, italics in original) “individualisation” is understood as a new contradictory mode of societalisation.
permeating analogous spheres of cultural experience, the individualisation process intertwines with lifestyle choices, the undermining of class identities, life course/biography (de-standardisation) and the development of diverse and reflexive life paths (Mythen, 2005: 136; see also Beck et al., 1994). Accordingly, the cultural ubiquity of risk on daily life feeds a process of individualisation through which individuals become responsibilised into a perpetual process of decision-making and inured to make personal risk assessments (Hudson, 2003: 44). Thus, for Beck (1994b: 14), individualisation means ‘the disintegration of the certainties of industrial society as well as the compulsion to find and invent new certainties for oneself and others without them’. Moreover, processes of individualisation are dependent on decision-making as it assumes agency - the ability to shape one’s destiny through self-determination and identification (Lupton, 1999). As Beck (1992a: 87; see inter alia Lupton, 1999) puts it, there has been ‘a social surge of individualisation in which people have become compelled to make themselves centre of the conduct of life, taking on multiple and mutable subjectivities’. Thus, individualisation can be read as a social transformation that is both complex and ambiguous: ‘seen from one angle it means freedom to choose, and from another pressure to conform to internalised demands, on the one hand being responsible for yourself and on the other dependent on conditions which elude your grasp’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 7).

For Beck, the ‘individualisation of risk’ comes with many of the features of reflexive modernisation as individuals are increasingly encouraged to adopt lower thresholds of risk tolerance, to extend their awareness of the temporality of their own actions into a far-reaching future and to incorporate a self-distancing regard for their own conduct in the face of uncertain outcomes (Binkley, 2009: 87; see Beck, 1992a, 1994; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 1996). Hence, how individualisation is fraught with risk (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). According to Beck, ‘in the individualised society, the individual must ... learn, on pain of permanent disadvantage, to conceive of himself or herself as the centre of activity, as the planning office with respect to his/her own biography, abilities, orientations, relationships and so on’ (Beck, 1992a: 135; see also Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 1996). Furthermore, for Beck, individualisation is depicted as a multifaceted process, which underscores transformations in personal relationships, family structure, education and employment (Beck, 1992a: 127; 1998: 169; cf., Giddens, 1990, 1991).

The general thrust of the theory of individualisation is that ‘given’ forms of collective identity have been eroded and are being supplanted by more ‘open’ practices of
personal choice under heightened levels of societal *reflexivity*.\(^{127}\) Thus, ‘do-it-yourself’ biographies become the prevalent form of cultural determination (Beck, 1994b: 15) via ‘reflexivity’. Moreover, according to Beck, heightened levels of reflexivity stems from the dynamic interplay of a number of social changes that are increasingly characteristic of late modernity (Adams, 2006: 512). Paramount to the emergence of a reflexive modernity is the analysis of contemporary interconnectedness between reflexive globalisation and accentuating individualisation, to the extent where the global becomes the local and the personal becomes the political (Smith et al., 1997). As Beck puts it, the world risk society thus unleashes a ‘cosmopolitan moment’ in which ‘global risks force us to confront the apparently excluded other, tearing down national barriers and mixing natives with foreigners’ (Beck, 2009a: 15, [2007]; see also Beck and Sznaider, 2006). Thus, heightened levels of reflexivity lead to a situation where nothing can be taken for granted as simply ‘the way things are done’ (Gergen, 1991: 48-80). That is to say, reflexivity disassembles autopoiesis and reassembles communication flows into hybrid systems (Beck, 2009b: 12). In light of Beck’s observations, important work on theorising human agency and reflexivity has followed.\(^{128}\) For instance, according to Ray (1999: 258), drawing on the works of Lash and Urry (1994) and Castells (1996):

‘The same processes of modernity/globalisation create the conditions in which context can be reconstructed: global flows of goods, people and information present us with potential lifestyle choices; the critical legacy of the Enlightenment eventually led to the emergence of critiques of modernity/progress manifested in New Social Movements such as environmentalism and feminism’.

Moreover, the new conditions for the construction of self/social identity cover ‘the recasting of meaning in work and leisure’, ‘the reconstitution of community and the particular’ and ‘the heterogenisation of complexity of space and everyday life’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 3). This has led to the assertion that reflexivity increasingly constitutes self-identity in late modern societies (Adams, 2006: 512; see also Giddens, 1991).

According to Beck, it is a lack of social structures which establishes itself as the basic

\(^{127}\) This refers generally to the ability to act in the world and to critically reflect on our actions and in ways that may reconstitute how we act and feel and even reshape the very nature of self-identity itself (Ferguson, 2003: 199).

\(^{128}\) Cf., Bauman (1992: 134) who characterises postmodernity as the ‘age of contingency für sich, of self-conscious contingency where postmodernism represents a crystallisation of and contribution towards this self-consciousness’.
feature of the social structure (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 51) - resulting in a post-traditional and individualising society (Adams, 2006: 512). In contrast to the era of ‘simple modernity’, for Beck, a space has opened up which provides greater autonomy for subjects to define their identities while interacting in new ways with ‘expert systems’ (Ferguson, 2003). However, Beck’s notion of individualisation is a complex phenomenon, and, as Borne (2006: 92) points out, much of Beck’s work is easily misunderstood. Importantly, individualisation processes do not mean that individuals live autonomous lives free from social regulation, nor is this continuing enhancement of “self-reflexivity,” synonymous with a picture of fully autonomous “self-programmable individuals” (Castells, 2000b: 19). Beck makes clear individualisation does not mean ‘... atomisation, isolation, loneliness, the end of all kinds of society, or unconnectedness’ (Beck, 1994a: 13). Thus, individualisation does not suggest a separation from society, but rather a reconstitution of the fundamental tenets of the relationship between institutional structures and individual activity (Borne, 2006: 92). Essentially, it is less about subjective consciousness and identity (Beck, 1992a: 128). To clarify this, Beck refers to an institutionalised individualisation, which in many ways turns the notion of individualisation on its head, actually referring to a collective social structure (Borne, 2006: 92). The biographical consequences of late modernity are on the contrary, understood in terms of growing ambiguity and precariousness (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003). For Beck, increased individual freedom of choice intrinsically implies more uncertainty and risk and thus brings about ‘precarious freedoms’ in a Butlian sense (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1996, 2002, see inter alia Butler, 2006). Hence, the possibility of a “breakdown” of biography (Beck, 1992a: 12; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Thus, individuals, Beck maintains, although unable to escape structural forces in general, can decide on which forces to act and which to ignore (Skeggs, 2004: 80). This, Beck argues, does not create a ‘free’ individual; rather, it creates individuals who live out, biographically, the complexity and diversity of the social relations which surround them (Skeggs, 2004: 80). It is this ‘self’, this biographical production, that Beck calls ‘reflexive modernity’.

4.4 Reflexive Action According to Anthony Giddens

Anthony Giddens is another prominent sociologist who has based a substantial part of his analysis of late modernity on the notion of risk. Giddens, like Beck, emphasises that risk is a specifically modern phenomenon that is caused by human intervention in nature and, in a wider
sense, by the increasing de-traditionalisation and institutional reflexivity of late modern society (see Giddens, 1990, 1991). Thus, for both Beck and Giddens, we are witnessing the transition from modern society to late modern society based on ‘reflexivity’.

Whilst Beck foresees a future of uncertainty and potentially catastrophic dangers, Giddens tends to paint a more positive picture of the new type of society we are about to enter (through an emphasis on the realisation of individual identity) (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 608). Whereas Beck advocates the ‘risk society’ is shaped by a reflexive modernity because of the inability of bureaucracies to control the political awareness of science and technology, Giddens stresses the part played by individuals in this process of liberation from bureaucratic control (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 608). Giddens (1990) likens this social change as expressed through a restructuring of time and space; a ‘dis-embedding’ of expert systems; and as a radically increased reflexivity (see Giddens, 1990). Moreover, in his analysis of late modernity, Giddens is focussing on the second level of transformation: the growing ability of individuals to rid themselves of the shackles of old ties, to master reality, and to a certain extent, choose their own life course(s). Thus, whilst Giddens is a scholar very much influenced by the thought of Beck, he advances perhaps a more optimistic reading of individualisation through his notion of a failure of trust within expert systems.

According to Giddens (1998a: 27; 1999: 26), early modernity, which by and large was coincident with industrial society, was dominated by ‘external risks’, that is, risks that could somehow be perceived as independent of the actions of the individuals, that could fairly well be calculated, and that could therefore also be subjected to actuarial tables (e.g. unemployment, sickness, etc.). Further, for Giddens, reflexivity within ‘new’ modernity (or what is sometimes called late or postmodernity)\(^\text{129}\) is an advanced staged of modernity, which is distinguished from classical or industrial societies and from reflexive modernity. Specifically, Giddens suggests it is the proliferation of an everyday culture of risk which places burdensome demands upon the self, forcing individuals to habitually make reflexive choices (Hudson, 2003: 44) in light of new information and knowledge (Giddens, 1991). In this way, self-reflexivity, distinguished from structural-reflexivity, is a state of mind in which the agent increasingly mediates and navigates through the institutions and values of the social world as well as a more introspective reflection on the self and personal identity (Green, 2009: 181; see Giddens, 1991). Thus, whilst remaining aware

\(^{129}\) As Giddens (1990: 45-46) puts it, ‘postmodernism concerns aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity ... postmodernity means that the trajectory of social development is taking us away from the institutions of modernity towards a new and distinct type of social order’.  

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of the obvious divergences between Beck and Giddens’ sociology of risk, the concept of *reflexivity* plays an important part in both authors’ dialogue. As Lash (1994b) observes:

‘What indeed, it might be wondered, is ‘reflexivity”? To this question two answers must be given. First there is structural reflexivity in which agency, set free from the constraints of social structure’ then reflects on the ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ of such structure; reflects on agency’s social conditions of existence. Second there is self-reflexivity in which agency reflects on itself. In self-reflexivity, previous heteronomous monitoring of agents is displaced by self-monitoring. Beck’s *Risk Society* and Giddens’ *Consequences of Modernity* mainly address structural reflexivity. Beck here foregrounded reflexivity on the institutions of science in the framework of ecological critique, while Giddens’ focus is more general reflexivity regarding the rules and resources of society. (Lash, 1994b: 115-116).

4.4.1 The Uncertainty of Knowledge: Ontological (In)security

Although Beck has achieved fame for the concept of the risk society, insecurity is far more basic to Giddens’ *problematique* (Lash, 1994: 117, *italics in original*). Importantly, Giddens draws on ethnomethodology for his idea of hermeneutically mediated reflexivity. Giddens defines ontological security as an emotional phenomenon, incorporating ‘confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action’ (Giddens, 1990: 90). Giddens (1990: 117), in effect, asks ‘how do we *consciously* achieve ontological security?’ According to Giddens, the modern world is a world where even knowledge is uncertain. At the very same time, that knowledge is reflected upon and thus appropriated it is likely to be revised still further and yet new forms of knowledge emerge (Green, 2009: 191).

Converging (to a degree) with Beckidian logic, according to Giddens, attempts to monitor targeted behaviour(s) so as to control future happenings (and increase security) paradoxically expose new categories of ‘risk’ which must then, in turn, be assimilated and harmonised within institutional frameworks (Donoghue, 2008: 347). Giddens likens this condition to ‘being aboard a careering juggernaut’, where social practices and institutions in the modern world are unstable, disembodied and unpredictable (Green, 2009). In Giddens’ words:
‘To live in the ‘world’ produced by high modernity has the feeling of riding a juggernaut. It is not just that more or less continuous and profound processes of change occur; rather, change does not consistently conform either to human expectation or to human control’ (Giddens, 1991: 28).

Drawing upon the work of Giddens, Green (2009: 181) observes increased reflexivity or in Giddens’ terminology ‘riding the juggernaut’ goes hand in hand with increased vulnerability, or at the very least, an increased perception of vulnerability, which manifests itself in ontological insecurity and anxiety (see also Giddens, 1991). The rapid change and institutional reflexivity of late modernity, in other words, threatens ‘ontological security’ that, in Giddens’ (1991) view, is a condition for the creation of a coherent self-capable of coping with the complexity of late modernity. Thus, pre-modern dangers and external risks are, to a large degree, replaced by ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Giddens, 1994b: 78, 152, 219; 1998b: 28; 1999: 26-8) - that is, an existential uncertainty found in societies where traditional certainties are eroded as a consequence of the ‘end’ of tradition and the ‘end’ of nature (Rasborg, 2012: 9). Hence, late modernity is an uncomfortable and insecure world, subject to both local and global hazards, at least partially severed from the concrete and comfortable structural certainties of modernity (Green, 2009: 181).

For Giddens, modernity then, as a reflexive social order, ‘manufactures’ its own (i.e. internally referential) risks and uncertainties in a different way to previous times (Webb, 2006). In a postmodern fashion, we are confronted with ‘high-consequence risks’ that refer to global threats to the environment caused by human intervention in nature (holes in the ozone layer, global warming, etc.,) (Giddens, 1994b: 78, 152 and 219). However, much like assertions made by Beck, this new structure of risk does not necessarily mean that ‘real riskiness’ altogether has increased in late modern society (Giddens, 1991: 114–17; 1998b: 27). On the contrary, increasing life expectancy indicates that a risk-reduction has occurred with regard to the basic life security (Nielsen, 1996: 182). Thus, overall, it seems more appropriate to say that late modernity is characterised by a change of the ‘risk profile’, from dangers determined by nature to man-made risks (Giddens, 1994b: 4; 1999: 36). Giddon logic also suggests that the welfare state as an ethos of government has been severely undermined by the onset of the advanced liberal politics. According to Giddens, the welfare state and its universal social services have gradually withered away to be replaced by much more individualistic rationalities of governance (Webb, 2006). Accordingly, a market rationality in all spheres of human action relating to individual choice, responsibility and freedom, is valorised (Webb, 2006). Active citizenship is encouraged with individuals being increasingly held responsible
for managing and calculating their now risk (Webb, 2006: 338-39). However, for Giddens (and much like Beck), risk in a post-traditional order is about individually ‘colonising the future’ (Giddens, 1991); those who are unable to do so subsequently fall into the category of ‘targeted populations’ requiring forms of intervention and/or protection (Ferguson, 2001: 39; cf., Dean, 1999: 167). Ultimately, if modernisation presupposes increased individualisation, then these individuals - less controlled by tradition and convention - will be increasingly free also to be in heterodox opposition to the dystopic consequences of modernisation (Lash et al., 1996: 113). Thus, regardless of whether they are accentuated as institutionalised behavioural expectations or biographical self-interpretation, as symbolic self-classification or intersubjective self-aspiration (Ziehe, 1992: 102, as cited in Lash et al., 1996: 195), what is demanded of individuals in every case is cognitive, social and affective competences which, practically coerce them to form and expand reflexive self-relations (Lash et al., 1996: 195, emphasis added).

4.4.2 Identity: The Reflective Self

‘Awareness of risk seeps into the actions of almost everyone. Everyday life is experienced as situated calculations about the possibilities for action and as a dialectic of counter-factuals. Risk discourse tells them what to do and who to be. The self itself ‘becomes reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography’ (Giddens, 1991: 11, 53, adapted by the present author).

For Giddens, when trying to understand the progression towards postmodernity there is a second aspect of equal importance: reflexive social action is governed by the question how the actor is supposed to express his identity (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 608). According to Giddens (1991), a prerequisite of late modernity is self-reflexivity: a condition whereby individuals perpetually consider their self-identity. Giddens (1991: 5) summarises ‘reflexivity of the self’ as follows:

‘The reflexive project of self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems. In modern social life, the notion of lifestyle takes on particular significance’.

Moreover, with formulaic truths and local tradition undermined as pre-given and fixed ontological frameworks for the construction of ‘self’ identity (and enhanced by a greater social mobility), responsibility is transferred to the individual (Ray, 1999 258). Hence, the reflective
project of the ‘self’ (Giddens, 1991, 1994). More precisely, ‘self’ identity has come to be a
product of the interpenetration of self-development and social systems.

The realisation of late modern society through an optimistically configured reading of
biographical identity construction is central to Giddens’ ‘third way’: ... state institutions must
now develop concurrently with the idea of the ‘self-monitoring individual’ and the ‘reflexive
agent’ (Giddens, 1991; see inter alia Giddens, 1998a, 2000). The reflexivity of modernity,
then, is transposed from this structural level into the fabrics of personal existence, from
institutions to the rational outlooks of a calculating individual (Binkley, 2009: 92-3). Amidst
the rubble of radical and unsettling social upheavals we do not simply find postmodern
dissolution, despite some commonalities with the conception of selfhood found in versions of
that movement, but a flexible, authored self, more open, transparent and above all, reflexive

‘Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and
psychological information about possible ways of life. Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which
the question ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions’.

Drawing upon the work of Giddens, Ray (1999: 258) outlines that self-identity works
reflexively as individuals are able to, and indeed have to, choose, change and reflect on their
identity/identities (although the choices are not limitless). Moreover, for Ray (1999: 258),
individuals are ‘able to’ do so thanks to the liberating effect of ‘living in a post-traditional
world’ in which individual choice is driven by the everyday exposure to other cultures, liberal
ideology and marketing images. Conversely, the act of choosing also becomes imperative to
the human condition, as a strategy to cope with the threat of existential isolation and personal

‘The narrative of self-identity has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly
changing circumstances of social life, on a local and global scale. The individual must integrate
information deriving from a diversity of mediated experiences with local involvements in such a way
as to connect future projects with past experiences in a reasonably coherent fashion. Only if the person
is able to develop an inner authenticity – a framework of basic trust by means of which the lifespan can
be understood as a unity against the backdrop of the shifting social events – can this be attained. A
reflexively ordered narrative of self-identity provides the means of giving coherence to the finite
lifespan, given changing external circumstances’.
Giddens (1991) maps out some of these ‘dilemmas of the self’ where each person must navigate between the emancipatory qualities of late modernity and the fragmented, uncertain and potentially meaningless search for self in an increasingly unregulated world (Green, 2009: 196). As Green (2009: 197), drawing upon the work of Giddens, states: ‘uncertainty and anxiety (or ontological insecurity) are only overcome by self-reflexively developing an authentic self-identity in which individuals strive to overcome their inner psychic blocks that prevent a person from ‘being true to themselves’’. Hence, the increasing prowess of ontological (in)security within the reflective project of self-identity. Moreover, for Giddens (1991), this situation is exacerbated by an uncertain and fluctuating world; riding the juggernaut of late modernity needs to be carefully navigated by the capacity to existentially determine a ‘true’ reflective self. This goes to the heart of Giddens’ project to transcend the dualisms of agency/structure (see Giddens, 1984). Green (2009: 197) usefully summarises this situation thus:
‘The conditions of late modernity lead individuals to continuously create, recreate and reflect on their self-identity in a world that is itself reflexively ordered and liable to unpredictable change. The late modern world is therefore a world in which the ability to personally construct and maintain an identity is crucial to survival. Otherwise insecurity and anxiety are all that late modernity has to offer’.

A need to create new communities of meaning would appear to be a key component of the ‘post-traditional’ human condition. Giddens likens this to an ongoing project of lifestyle choices. For Giddens, ‘self’-identity becomes increasingly understood in terms of personal biography and this - echoed by Maffesoli and his concept of ‘neotribalism’ (1996) - is fed by ‘myriad social sources’. This is the nature of the enhanced sense of agency interrelating dialectically with the social/cultural. As Adams (2006: 512-513) succinctly puts it:

‘Social theorists whose work otherwise differs in many ways converge in an emphasis upon extended reflexivity: ‘identity is in the process of being redefine as a pure reflexive capacity’ (Melucci, 1996: 36); ‘(there is) an increasingly significant reflexive subjectivity’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 3); ‘people have to turn to their own resources to decide what they value, to organise their priorities and to make sense of their lives’ (Heelas, 1996: 5); ‘the self today is for everyone a reflexive project’ (Giddens, 1992: 30).

Thus, the reflexive self - rather than being reliant upon the self as an aesthetic project or a space for strategic experimentation - is a self-produced through the technique of biography and the ability to understand and reflect upon the risks that surround the self (Skeggs, 2004: 81). Moreover, Giddens sees institutional reflexivity (also referred to as ‘structural’ reflexivity) as
fundamental to the development of a new universal ‘life politics’ where (like Beck) individuals search to create a coherent biography in a fractured world (Skeggs, 2004). Skeggs (2004) usefully captures the reflective ‘self’ that ‘knows’ itself, of which Giddens centrally postulates:

‘This is not a technique of the self, in which aspects previously considered to be fixed, immutable, beyond will or self-control are increasingly made sites of strategic decision-making – the prosthetic self – where the edict ‘I can, therefore I am’ constitutes the self rather it relies upon the old edict ‘I think therefore I am’. The emphasis is on the ability to ‘think’ drawing on elements of possessive individualism that rely upon the ability to stand outside of that which one considers to be a self and to separate from the body in order to have a (we can insert ‘thinking/reflecting’) proprietal relation to him/self as bodily property’ (Skeggs, 2004: 82).

Importantly, according to Giddens (1990, 1991), central to an understanding of such ‘dilemmas of the self’ is that self-identity is bound up with trust in expert systems and ‘symbolic tokens’.

4.4.3 Risk and Trust in Postmodernity

Trust has been conceptualised as representing a defining feature of late modernity and the demarcation between what has been called ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ society (Giddens 1990; 1991; 1994a). According to Giddens (1990), trust is intrinsically linked in the modern world to risk. When risk and trust combine, they invariably relate inversely (Ekberg, 2007). Without some awareness of risk, we do not trust. Thus, in an environment of high trust, risk is low, and in an environment of low trust, risk is high (Ekberg, 2007: 356-357; see also Lash, 2000). Trust is therefore akin to faith. As Green (2009: 190; see also Giddens, 1990) observes, ‘we do not know that our symbolic tokens will be honoured or that are experts are competent – we simply must trust them. A breakdown in such trust would therefore threaten the very foundation of the social world we inhabit’.

Giddens (1990: 34) defines trust as ‘confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles “technical knowledge”’. Moreover, whilst Beck (1992a; 1999c) is slightly at odds with Giddens - since he believes that the key defining feature of modernity is ‘risk’ - both writers stress the importance of individual and societal reflexivity and see this as the lens through which people both become aware of, and act upon

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130 The ‘prosthetic self’ is a more recent version of Foucault’s ‘aesthetic self’ proposed by Lury (1998).
risk/trust (Ward, 2007: 122; see also Beck et al., 1994). In this way, the issue of trust/mistrust is not so much about the proliferation of risks, but that individuals and groups have developed heightened levels of reflexivity on which they can act (i.e. decide whether or not to trust a particular person, institution or system of knowledge) (Ward, 2007: 122).

Giddens asserts that trust exists in an environment of socially created transformative human activity. Human activity creates intended and unintended consequences (contingencies) and thus involves risk and danger, to which trust is a response mechanism (Schlidiether, 2010). Importantly, for Giddens, trust is related to absence in time and space: the ability to have confidence even though the trusted person or social system is out of direct contact, which is also a fundamental precondition for the existence of social systems (Giddens, 1990: 33). Giddens refers to this throughout his work as ‘time-space distanciation’ (see Giddens, 1990; see Figure 4.3).

![Figure 4.3: ‘Time-Space Distanciation’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010: 9)](image)

Time-space distanciation refers to a situation where action is not dependent on physical presence. Rather, presence and absence collapse into each other and are thus subsequently connected; a situation conditioned by the quality of a social system. Traditionally, societies - or organisations - were organised and linked through place and time (Schlichter, 2010). In order to interact, individuals had to be at exactly the same spot at the same time. In modernity, these links are untied and the social system can work independently of time and space constraints (Giddens, 1990); what Giddens terms the ‘emptying out’ of social relations. As Giddens (1991: 17) makes clear, ‘the emptying out of time and space is in no sense a unilinear development,
but proceeds dialectically. Many forms of ‘lived time’ are possible in social settings structured through the separation of time and space. The emptying out of time and space is crucial for the second major influence on modernity’s dynamism: the dis-embedding of social institutions (Giddens, 1990). The concept of dis-embedding is a process that leads to a situation where social relations are ‘lifted’ away from a local interaction context and are reconstructed across unlimited intervals of time and distance (Giddens, 1990). According to Giddens (1990), two types of dis-embedding mechanisms exist: the creation of symbolic tokens and the establishment of expert systems. For Giddens, a requisite for a dis-embedding ‘social system’ is one or more conditions of ‘time-space distanciation’. Accordingly, social systems function without the necessity of direct interaction between experts and clients. As Giddens (1990; see also Schlichter, 2010) puts it, during the dis-embedding process, social interactions and ‘relations would become impersonal, at a distance’ and ‘something’ will come between the individuals concerned. Hence, how Giddens stresses the separation of time from place, which leads to place becoming increasingly phantasmagoric (Giddens, 1990: 18-19, *italics in original*). Dis-embedding can therefore be understood in terms of technological advancements and the associated recalibration of social processes to accommodate changes in the ways in which we inhabit social spaces (Schlichter, 2010: 7).

According to Giddens (1990), time-space distanciation is dependent on trust, and is (in itself) a *result of trust*. Trust involves the attribution of probity to a person or system to act in a reliable way in relation to contingent outcomes and situations with incomplete knowledge (Giddens, 1990: 6). The banking crisis of 2008 is an instructive example of the unfolding relationship between trust, time and space that Giddens centrally postulates. Trust is therefore a prerequisite for ‘dis-embedding’. The notion of dis-embedding relations should not however, by read as separate from the ‘the appropriation of knowledge’ and ‘ontological insecurity’. Rather, under Giddon logic, trust is a substitute for knowledge and an adaptive response to uncertain futures and incalculable risks. Thus, trust ‘offers security in the face of future contingencies’ (Giddens and Pierson, 1998: 108). Giddens highlights one of the central contradictions of the risk society is the tension between trust and mistrust, or trust and scepticism (Ekberg, 2007: 357). Our increasing dependence on trust in expert systems as a strategy for managing and reducing risk has produced its opposite in anxiety and doubt (Ekberg, 2007: 357). Accordingly, in an era defined by ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1990) and ‘existential anxiety’ (Giddens, 1991), ‘stasis’ becomes the norm and individuals and groups constantly reflect upon their place in society and the role of traditional institutions
Trust is thus implicated in an individual’s ontological security - the concept that Giddens uses to represent an individual’s confidence in their social identity, and in their situation and how to proceed with it (Schlichter, 2010). Drawing upon Giddens (1990), Misztal (1996) summarises Giddens’ concept of trust in a world of increasingly precarious individual identities:

‘Modern institutions are grounded in ‘reflexivity’ and modern individuals, without the guidance of traditional authority, must self-reflexively construct their identities. Consequently, the conditions of trust in pre-modern and modern societies are totally different, with the former based on personal trust secured by kinship, community, religion and tradition, and the latter resting on trust in abstract systems’ (Misztal, 1996: 89).

Importantly, Giddens distinguishes between trust in people and trust in abstract systems. Abstract systems, such as the example of legal and banking systems given previously, are combinations of technical means, procedures, professional expertise and other structures (Schlichter, 2010). Moreover, trust in abstract systems enables dynamism in modern societies by allowing social individuals to act with confidence in the absence of personal knowledge of, or contact with, the structures, people and actions embodied in the system (Schlichter, 2010: 6). Abstract systems are thus dis-embedding mechanisms, enabling time-space distanciation and providing security as well as guarantees to their service users (Schlichter, 2010; Giddens 1990). Moreover, since an abstract system is a means to stabilise relations across time and space - ‘something to trust in’ (Giddens, 1990) they are also central to ontological security in conditions of modernity (Giddens, 1990: 113). However, in the absence of trust, social actors are forced to take many actions to reduce risk and uncertainty, to control situations by face-to-face interactions and confidence-building measures, and to set in place procedures and regulations to govern social interactions (Schlichter, 2010: 6). Furthermore, as Ekberg (2007: 356-357) observes, this is especially pronounced ‘in an environment emptied of the security of traditions, one saturated with high consequence risks and where the lack of consensus among experts results in a more sceptical attitude towards truth claims’. This is because, according to Giddens (1996: 42), the image of science as omniscient and infallible has been shaken and accordingly, ‘science has lost a good deal of the aura of authority it once had’. Moreover, for Giddens, since the modern world is characterised by a continuous process of reflection upon new and unforeseen forms of knowledge (Giddens, 1991), trust ‘has to be continually won’ (Giddens, 1994a) and is therefore ‘constantly renegotiated with lay audiences’ (Giddens,
Giddens provides two examples of abstract systems: the symbolic tokens of media of exchange e.g. money (see Giddens, 1990: 22-26), and expert systems enabling complex systems to work e.g. transport systems (see Giddens, 1991: 27-29). The first type - symbolic tokens - are a media of exchange which have standard value, and thus are interchangeable across a plurality of contexts (Giddens, 1991: 18). With the maturation of modernity, groups can act on the basis of these media, in principle, without taking into consideration the specific characteristics of that group (Giddens, 1990). An example (in fact, the only example Giddens provides) - is money. The other type of abstract system is the so-called expert system, which is a system based on, or formed from, a combination of technical means, procedures, professional expertise and other structures (Schlichter, 2010; Giddens, 1990). Describing expert systems, Giddens (1990: 27) gives the following definition: ‘systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today’. Thus, for Giddens, expert systems bracket time and space through deploying modes of technical knowledge that have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who use them (Giddens, 1991: 18).

Lastly, Giddens outlines the concept of ‘access points’ (see Figure 4.4). According to Giddens, access points are where people actually meet and interact with the abstract system (also called the ‘expert system’). However, as Giddens (1990: 91) observes, the fact that access points are places of tension between lay scepticism and professional expertise makes them acknowledged sources of vulnerability for abstract systems.

![Figure 4.4: ‘Access Point’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010)](image)

4.5 Conclusion
In presenting the panoramic theory of the risk society, Beck and Giddens aspire to offer an alternative sociological imagination for investigating the dynamics of contemporary society (Ekberg, 2007: 343-344). Further, in postulating the reflexive age of modernity, in Beck’s (1998a: 9) terms, ‘the script of modernity has to be rewritten, redefined, reinvented’. This chapter has introduced the twofold concept of reflexivity as the pivotal mechanism propelling the shift to a reinvented late modern society. The chapter has engaged with Beckian etymology, which demonstrates a concern with the increasing insecurity and risk associated with mediating existence in contemporary society. For Beck, reflexivity plays an important part, of which the concern is ‘individualised’ processes. This is in contrast to Giddens (1991, 1994a, 1994b) who prefers to speak of an ‘institutional reflexivity’ that, in a wider sense, can be said to be an effect of the post-traditional society; it is the dis-embedding of social actors and a decline in trust in expert systems which allows for an individualisation and self-reflection within postmodern risk society.

Quite clearly, there are divergences between each author’s works however, as has been argued, Beckian and Giddeon logic share mutually constitutive points of convergence among their respective structuring philosophical principles (see Figure 4.5). Fundamentally, both theorists conclude: the ethos of wealth creation that characterised industrial modernity has been overshadowed by an ethos of risk avoidance; class-consciousness has been displaced by a risk consciousness; and the increased awareness of living in an environment of risk, uncertainty and insecurity has become a major catalyst for social transformation (Ekberg, 2007: 344).

Figure 4.5: The Parameters of the Risk Society (as cited in Ekberg, 2007: 345)
This chapter has drawn attention to theoretical frameworks underpinning the contours of each authors’ works, of which stress that ‘high-consequence risks’ and ‘manufactured uncertainty’ within a ‘world risk society’ indicate the breakdown of the principle of insurance, in as much as it becomes difficult to identify, predict and calculate risks (Beck, 1995: 106–10). Hence, the risk society as characterised by a dislocation, disintegration and disorientation associated with the vicissitudes of detraditionalisation (Beck, 1992a; Giddens, 1994b). The highly developed (world) risk society, in Beck’s and Giddens’ opinion, seems to be a post-risk-calcul...
Part II:

Research Design, Research Findings

& Data Analysis
Chapter 5

Methodology

5.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters took as their focus the theoretical propositions of ‘dispositif risk’ and the ‘risk society’. This proved essential for contextualising empirical findings. This chapter discusses the research methodologies employed and the applicability of the data extrapolated. Moreover, this chapter discusses why qualitative methods were selected as the more viable approach for the present study, as opposed to quantitative methods. Further, this chapter moves on to tackle the practical concerns of data collection and analysis from a personal, ontological and epistemological perspective.

5.2 Research Questions

1. How is risk understood by PREVENT police officers in a ‘non-priority’ funded/low risk area?

2. How is PREVENT understood operationally by PREVENT police officers at local (low risk) level?

5.2.1 Study Propositions

- To what degree does dispositif risk, in less than exceptional terms, help to construct a more proportionate account of PREVENT policing as a form of social control?
It is possible to integrate reflexive risk and reflexivity into explanations of PREVENT policing, CT practice and social control?

To what extent are the above risk theories interrelated within PREVENT policing?

5.3 Research Design

Consideration was given at the outset to the suitability of various methods for conducting this research. Yin (2009: 10) states that ‘the first and most important condition for differentiating among the various research methods is to classify the type of research question being asked’. Since this study is interested in exploring how PREVENT works rather than if PREVENT works i.e. theory building (see Rogers, 2000), a case study approach was most appropriate. Hammersley (1992: 183) defines a case study as:

‘A case as such can be identified as any phenomenon located in time and space about which data are collected and analysed. It can comprise single individuals or a group, particular events of a situation, a specific organisation, social institution, neighbourhood, national society or global process. Case studies can address the micro situation of a single person in everyday life or the macro situation of a nation state in the global world. Case studies are defined by the focus of the instance of the phenomenon, not by the method used to study it’.

The present research used a single-case design that adheres to three of Yin’s (2014) five rationales for a case study approach. First, the present study can be considered a critical case by empirically testing two risk positions at local level rather than against exceptional frameworks in the context of the war on terror. Second, the present study can be understood as a revelatory case since, to the best of my knowledge, there are currently no empirical studies which have examined PP (or PREVENT for that matter) in an area defined by government funding structure as ‘non-priority/low risk’. Third, the present study might be read as an unusual case given that the research departs from existing analyses of risk and suspect communities within British CT.

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131 Yin (2009: 8) also identifies two further conditions: (i) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and (ii) the degree of focus on contemporary, as opposed to historical, events.

132 Theory building has been operationally defined as ‘the process of modelling real-world phenomena’ (Torraco, 1997: 123).
Whilst a single-case design has been called into question for lacking breadth (Robson, 2002) and its unclear comparative advantage (as opposed to randomised controlled trials for example), a single-case design provided a sufficient blueprint to test two risk positions against the empirical actualities of PP at local level. The greater level of detail that was afforded when examining a single-case allowed for a more comprehensive assessment of the usefulness of the study propositions in a different context. Furthermore, the relationship between the case study and theory direction is reciprocal. As Yin (2014: 37, adapted by the present author) observes, ‘some theory development as part of the (case study) design phase is highly desired’. Moreover, Zinn (2008: 200) states ‘empirical data (or at least everyday knowledge) are necessary to develop hypotheses to integrate them into a large picture’. To put it differently, Yin (2014: 34) posits ‘a real-life “case” is needed to be a concrete manifestation of the abstraction’. Thus, whilst PREVENT embodies contemporary “real life” context, a broad exploration of PREVENT would err towards the research becoming too abstract and thus would not produce the grounds for a case study. Subsequently, defining the boundaries of the case i.e. ‘risk’, ‘police and CT practitioners’, and ‘low risk area’, allowed for an appropriate method of investigation. It is acknowledged that empirical data with a cross-case sample offers the potential to more fully contextualise the research findings as well as accentuate the implications further. As Silverman (2011: 156) observes, ‘the relative flexibility of qualitative research can improve the generalisability of our findings by allowing us to include new cases after initial findings are established’. When initial categories and themes began to emerge within the data, cross-case theme analysis was considered, however it was conceded that this approach was outside the limitations of the present study for reasons fivefold: (1) concerns emerged regarding the difficulty of negotiating access to another PREVENT team operating in a low risk area (of which I had previously encountered); (2) having to correlate the same level of time building trust with the second case study in order to minimise inconsistencies between the data sets; (3) assume that all respondents in the second case study would participate in order for populations to be compared which were representative of each case; (4) transcribing a further data set would have been a hugely time consuming task that inevitably would have diverted attention away from data analysis within the present case (this is not to mention the time and resource

133 Of note, two interviews were conducted with a PREVENT Sergeant working in a different police force area. However, the data distilled from this participant was used to test the validity of the data derived from the key informants rather than adhering to a multi-embedded case study.

134 As well as the five points outlined, statistical generalisation does not coincide with the underlining aim of the present research.
consuming nature of fieldwork more generally); (5) a single-case study allowed for a more comprehensive examination of two risk positions at local level.

5.3.1 Case Definition

The aforementioned traits of case study research outlined by Hammersley (1992) have been broken down further into distinct sub-categories. Stake (2000: 437-8, as cited in Silverman, 2013: 139) identifies three different types of case study which include: the *intrinsic* case study where ‘the case is of interest ... in all its particularity and ordinariness’; the *instrumental* case study in which a case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a generalisation, in essence it facilitates understanding of something else, whether it be a theoretical debate or a social problem; and the *collective* case study where a number of cases are studied in order to investigate some general phenomenon. Yin (1994, 2009, 2014) also suggests that there are three different types of case study; these are *exploratory*, *descriptive*, and *explanatory*. Moreover, Hakim (1992) suggests there are *descriptive*, *selective* and *experimental* case studies. The present study cannot be categorised into a singular case study sub-category but coincides with the logic of three case types. First, the case study is *instrumental* to facilitate a more informed understanding of PREVENT operationally in a low risk local area. Second, within Yin’s categorisation, the case study is *exploratory* as the nature of risk and its relationship with PP are explored. Lastly, in line with Hakim, the case study is *experimental*, as the relationship between two risk positions is examined at local level rather than against exceptional frameworks in the context of the war on terror.

Yin (2009) states that a case study may be further classified in terms of the number of cases being studied and number of units of analysis (UoA hereafter) within the study, creating a 2x2 matrix (as shown in Figure 5.3).

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<tr>
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<th>Single-Case</th>
<th>Multiple-Cases</th>
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<tr>
<td>Single unit of analysis</td>
<td>Single-holistic case study</td>
<td>Multiple-holistic case study</td>
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In the present study, a single-embedded case was investigated, defined as ‘risk as linked to the operations and understandings of PREVENT police officers and individuals who occupy interrelated CT roles in an area defined by government as ‘low risk’’. The decision about whether to use an embedded or holistic case study is argued to depend upon the research questions being posed: embedded if it involves more than one unit of analysis or holistic if it involves a single UoA (Yin, 2009). The present study entails three UoA: (i) risk as understood by PREVENT police officers; (ii) how PP is operationally understood by PREVENT police officers within a ‘low risk’ area; (iii) the previous two units of analysis tested against the accounts of practitioners from interrelated CT roles. The single-embedded case study design for this research is represented in Figure 5.3.1.

Exploring three units of analysis finds support in Yin’s (2009: 3) assertion that ‘a case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence’. Furthermore, Lofland and Lofland (1984: 11) put forward that the aim of qualitative research is to ‘collect the richest possible data’. In the present study, ‘rich data’ is conceptualised as the collection of varied information, from multiple perspectives, which is relevant to the research.
question(s) posed (Lofland and Lofland, 1984; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). Whilst the appropriate ‘form’ of the case study has been established, Eisenhardt (1989, as cited in Borne, 2006) suggests that case study research can involve the use of qualitative and quantitative data separately, or a synergistic combination of both. The present research is based entirely on a qualitative methodological design, justifications for which are outlined in the following section.

5.3.2 A Qualitative Approach

A methodological approach is not stark choice between ‘words or numbers’ or ‘precise/imprecise’ data. Nor is it to suggest that qualitative methods are ‘intrinsically superior’ or vice versa (Silverman, 2013). Rather, the choice of research method is dependent on the nature of what the research is trying to describe (Hammersley, 1992: 163). The present study is interested in ‘how’ questions (how an aspect of the social world is put together by its participants) rather than ‘how many’ questions can be put to participants, which significantly influenced the methodological design. It is argued a qualitative research approach enables an ‘individualistic’ conventional methods approach to collecting data by way of direct contact with research subjects. As summarised by Gillham (2000: 11), one benefit of qualitative analysis is that it enables the researcher to ‘explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more “controlled” approaches’. Such interaction on a personal scale provides the researcher with realistic accounts, providing rich data, contrasting the ‘thin abstractions of numbers’ provided by quantitative research (Robson, 1993: 370). As Burgess (1984) observes:

‘In qualitative research, the realities of everyday lives are explored as they are experienced and explained by the people that live them. This research yields rich and complex data, in which subjective experience and social action are grounded in the context of both time and place, allowing the researcher to get close to the data’.

A qualitative approach also satisfies the ontological interest of the present study in providing a unique voice and ‘subjectivity’ during the collection of data. The quality of undeniable (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 1) is centred on the authenticity of human experience (Silverman, 2013: 6) since the voices of individuals tasked with CT are underresearched and under-theorised. This notion is reinforced by Creswell (2007: 39) who states
that qualitative research is most appropriate when there is a need to ‘…study a group or population…or hear silenced voices’. Thus, in the present study, there was a lack of desire for such sentiment to become manifest as numbers in a quantitative study since, as Silverman (2013: 6) observes, utilising quantitative methods has the potential to lead to that unique voice becoming muted by the deadening ‘thud’ of aggregate statistics. Furthermore, given the research topic, which is constantly forming and evolving, it was deemed important to highlight individual experience(s), concepts and understandings with a heightened level of detail. Moreover, as Miles and Huberman (1994: 75) point out, it is argued qualitative methods specifically allow the researcher to describe and analyse the nuanced patterns of relationships that exist in these types of environments. Additionally, whereas quantitative data often represents macro trends, using qualitative data allows more discrete information to be considered (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 40). Subsequently, a qualitative approach generated “rich”, unique and varied data that are virtually impossible to obtain through other methods (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 2).

Lastly, qualitative methods were also deemed most appropriate through a lack of desire to make systematic comparisons in order to account for variance of different understandings of risk in other PREVENT areas. Thus, this thesis does not pretend to make generalisations. Rather, the aim is to contextualise and construct assessments of a single-embedded case study, of which participants’ experience may be more applicable to areas with shared similarities. Subsequently, the present study should not be seen as an attempt to make categorical truths about all PREVENT teams, but as an attempt to raise questions by looking at a small body of data in intensive detail. Accordingly, statistically representative samples were deemed undesirable.

5.3.3 Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews

Individuals that work in a ‘low risk’ PREVENT team are significant to the key aims of this research in that they provide data from ‘live’ primary sources. Thus, in-depth (open-ended) semi-structured interviews were deemed most appropriate for the present study. Semi-structured interviews allowed a common and an individual element, which enabled me to follow areas of the respondents’ interests as well as ensuring participants discussed key areas. Of note, whilst (open-ended) semi-structured interviews provide the core fieldwork, various informal discussions took place prior to the fieldwork commencing which should be read as complementary since this approach ultimately added depth as well as specificity to the
methodology. Moreover, such conversations were deemed necessary in order to become sensitised to the research area.

A qualitative interviewing approach also coincides with ontological position of the research which affirms that those interviewed were selected based on their respective understanding and experiences of PREVENT. Moreover, when attempting to reach a deeper understanding of an under-researched phenomenon, the importance of attaining points of views through conversation is stressed by various academics (see Burgess, 1982). Furthermore, interviews semi-structured in nature are intended to avoid the obstacles experienced by Wilson et al. (1982) when trying to obtain co-operation from interviewees, namely, reluctance and lack of co-operation (initially however, this approach far from addressed this issue!).

Semi-structured interviews were also considered most appropriate since they enable a far greater (theoretically informed) flexibility and adaptability that is conducive to both researcher and interviewee (Silverman, 2013). Of note, whilst semi-structured in nature, the research questions were more in keeping with an interview protocol: that is, a ‘guided conversation’ with the interview protocol serving as a ‘conversational guide’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The interview protocol contained a subset of topics that were considered relevant and thus were more in keeping with a mental framework rather than adhering to a list of questions that were verbalised to each participant. Further, whilst a semi-structured interview protocol ensured all interviews generated comparable data, departures from the guidelines were encouraged in order for participants to reflect more freely. Moreover, by not sticking to a formalised interview structure, the interview guide was able to develop as the research progressed (King, 1994: 18). Subsequently, this allowed for the inclusion of new topics and the removal of those that elicited vague responses. As Silverman observes (2013: 11), ‘you can become much more effective as a researcher if you reject arbitrary, self-imposed categories and instead systematically pursue knowledge about a topic wherever the data might take you’. Silverman’s observations neatly coincide with a quality of qualitative interviews since questions can be modified based on the researcher’s ‘perception of what seems most appropriate in the context of the conversation’ (Robson, 1993: 231), as opposed to, for instance, survey research.

Lastly, prior to and during fieldwork, numerous informal interviews and discussions were not recorded (most were face-to-face, whilst two were by telephone). Hammersley and Atkinson (2003: 139) observe that interviews in ethnographic research ‘... range from spontaneous, informal conversations in places that are being used for other purposes to formally arranged meetings in bounded settings out of earshot of other people’. When
discussing interviews, the present study focuses only on the ‘formal’ interview since research data was not obtained through ethnographic methods. This raises a number of important issues which require (albeit brief) discussion. First, there are numerous inherent advantages to ethnographic research. Herbert (2000) argues for the use of emphatic observation in order to tackle and disentangle the complexity that exists between process, meaning and place. Ethnography, according to Herbert, offers the flexibility between such macro and micro-logical connections whilst simultaneously proffering the ability to engage with theoretical assumptions and data collection. In Herbert’s (2000: 564) words, teasing out the connections between the micro and macro requires the ability to ‘... develop a vibrant, recursive conversation between theory and data’. I accept Herbert’s observations, however, using informally obtained data without informing participants that they are in fact participating in an interview, raises a number of ethical issues. Moreover, taking this approach would have entirely contradicted the open and honest etiquette of the research. Furthermore, these informal discussions were so numerous that it would have been more appropriate to categorise them as ‘participant observation’. Even so, one might question why the present study lacks an element of first-hand primary evidence in order to strengthen the credibility of the findings rather relying on second-hand and third-hand evidence (Yin, 2012). To reiterate, informal discussions were so numerous that recording and transcribing each informal conversation would have been particularly challenging.

5.3.4 Ethical Considerations and Risk Management

Originally, the idea was to provide thick descriptions of the case study including its location. Doing so would have supported the numerous justifications as to why research in a low risk area (as defined by government) is empirically warranted. Moreover, as Seale (1999: 108) observes, threats to transferability are dealt with most adequately if details, or “thick” descriptions of the “sending” context (or the “sample”), are provided’. However, for reasons of respecting anonymity within the present study, this is not possible. Anonymity refers to concealing the identity of the participants in all documents resulting from the research, therefore actively protecting the identity of research participants (King and Horrocks, 2010: 117). In the context of the present study, the PREVENT team had far fewer officers in comparison to a PREVENT team operating in a ‘high risk’ area. Thus, had the case study

135 The present study also has attained ethical approval in line with the university’s code of ethics.
location been identified, it would have been possible to hypothesise who participated in the research study even if one could not directly link individuals to interview quotations. Moreover, even the use of pseudonyms would not suffice to protect anonymity of participants since pseudonyms are blind to unexpected ethical dilemmas. In this instance, it was imperative to avoid ‘thoughtless rule following’ (Silverman, 2013). Observations by King and Horrocks (2010: 110) make clear the position of the present study: ‘The name of the participant is not the only way in which the participant can be identified. In a semi-structured interview with a ‘key informant’ (someone who has specific information relating to the research), the position that the person occupies and/or other attributes and characteristics will be both relevant to the interview and identifiable to others’.

Whilst I accept that the omission of “thick-descriptions” of the case study area could have an effect on the overall impact of the research, it is the responsibility of the researcher to comprehensively think through the impact that participation might have for people taking part (King and Horrocks, 2010: 210). Thus, the present study is anonymised in its entirety.

5.3.5 Informed Consent

Research subjects must be informed about the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research entails and what risks, if any are involved (Silverman, 2013: 162). This principle underpins the meaning of informed consent. Importantly, Silverman (2013: 162) points out, ‘consent is not simply resolved through the formal signing of a consent document at the start of research. Instead it is continually open to revision and questioning’. It was decided that conducting research into PREVENT raised a number of issues which extended beyond formal consent. The approach taken within the present study was one of avoiding a highly formal and bureaucratic way of securing consent in favour of fostering relationships in which ongoing ethical regard for participants is sustained (Silverman, 2013). The primary objective of this was to conduct ethically sound research as openly as possible without deception. Of note, I have maintained contact with several participants post-fieldwork, thus adding to the ethical nature of the research.

This is not to say that formal informed consent was not obtained. Prior to each interview, all participants were provided with an information sheet explaining the content of
the research, confidentiality issues, and data protection considerations. This included informing participants of their right to refuse to participate or withdraw from the investigation whenever and for whatever reasons they wished. Participants were also informed that interviews were to be fully transcribed on my own personal computer (as opposed to a shared network space e.g. a university library). Moreover, participants were made aware that the transcribed data would be solely accessible to myself and my Director of Studies (DoS) and would be stored in a safe and secure place in line with the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, participants were informed that their data would be destroyed at the end of the research. Lastly, participants were informed that their data would be anonymised, as would the identity of the case study. If participants were happy to proceed with their participation, they were required to sign an informed consent sheet in order to formalise their consent.

5.4 Validity

Validity refers the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley, 1990: 57). Howe (1988) argues that research that does not utilise scientific, positivist methods has been criticised for producing ambiguous and untrustworthy data that are not reliable or valid; what can be termed ‘issues of generalisation’. However, validity can be conceptualised differently depending on the epistemological position of the researcher. The present study does not adhere to the search for a ‘singular, objective, empirically valid, universal truth, existing out there in the world’ waiting to be uncovered through the application of ‘the scientific method’ (Taylor and Ussher, 2001: 295). This approach is not fitting with the research question(s). Rather, the present study adopts a position similar to Taylor and Ussher (2001) who, in their analytic account of S&M, outline:

‘There is the rejection of the notion that complex phenomena may be explained by identifying an objective truth since supposed inner truth or essence reduces the opportunity for continual reflection and restricts the meaning of social interaction. Equally, there is a rejection of the assumption that there must be a unitary, fundamental and rational underlying pattern of exposition ‘ordained by nature itself’ (Taylor and Ussher, 2001: 295, adapted by the present author).

136 See Appendix K.
Similarly, the present study does not aim to have external validity in the positivist sense to the point where the findings generate a blanket understanding that can be applied nationally or even locally (Brock-Utne, 1996). In essence, there is no attempt at meta-theorising. Rather, the emphasis is upon the multiplicity of individual realities or epistemologies each with their own inherent validity (Ussher, 1999). As Mallon (2007: 98) notes, ‘while human culture and decisions have impacts on numerous features of the world, the impacts on humans are sui generis (unique)’.

This epistemological position is consistent with a social constructionist approach (Gergen, 1999). From both an epistemological and ontological perspective, emphasising that there is no insistent or essential human drive or desire which pre-exists its cultural conscription (Foucault, 1980a) is advantageous in order to ‘contextualise’ the complex dynamics, interrelations and understandings of the PREVENT/risk relationship as constructed within a local environment. As Dickens (2004: 333) observes, ‘...the ways we understand the world are formed by the ways in which we interact with each other in our local cultural milieu’. Thus, the general aim of the present study can be read as of expanding and generalising theories (analytical generalisations) and not to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalisations) (Yin, 2014).

Whilst the results are not generalisable as descriptions of what other PREVENT teams or individuals do (since the circumstances and mechanisms will be different for individuals in other areas/teams and interpreted differently), they can be considered analytically generalisable as descriptions of what any individual tasked with carrying out CT through PREVENT can do. Thus, whilst the findings are inherently subjective they are likely to have greater applicability for those individuals and teams in areas defined by the government as ‘low risk’.

It is also important to note that the data distilled from the interviews with the PREVENT Sergeant in a different police force shared increasing parallels with the insight of the PREVENT officers at the case study site. Furthermore, whilst consciously distancing the findings from statistical generalisation, the research findings should be read as exploratory rather than definitive in ways that further analytical possibilities are opened up. This position is in keeping with a case study approach whereby ‘the lessons learned could assume the form of a working hypothesis either to be applied in re-interpreting the results of existing studies of other concrete situations or to define new research focusing on yet additional concrete situations’ (Yin, 2014: 40-41).

Whilst the term ‘validity’ does not map well onto the qualitative research paradigm of the present study, nevertheless, Yin (2009) outlines four tests that are
commonly used to judge the quality of case study research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. A number of steps were taken in order to increase the validity of the research findings. First, when assessing the quality of qualitative research, Guba and Lincoln (1994) replace internal validity with ‘credibility’. This refers to the extent to which the researcher’s interpretation is endorsed by those whom the research was conducted (King and Horrocks, 2010: 160). In Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) words, ‘the participants are the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results’. Whilst participant feedback on individual transcripts would have strengthened the accuracy and interpretation of the research data, I did not ask for participant feedback on transcripts since confidentiality requires that individual data are not stored against responses. Subsequently, extended analysis of the transcribed data that involved a level of detail beyond basic helped to promote credibility. Moreover, once findings were established, transcripts were subject to further detailed analysis to ensure that findings were true to the original data.

It is argued researchers using qualitative analyses need to explicitly detail the process via which themes are identified (Attride-Stirling, 2001). During the data analysis phase, I ensured that there was sufficient evidence to support the themes that had been identified from the transcripts. Moreover, I have documented the thematic analysis process (see Appendices G, H and I; and Section 5.9) in order to make explicit the decisions made in relation to data collection, analysis and reporting. Subsequently, this increases transparency for other researchers wishing to review or replicate the research. Furthermore, Section 5.9.1 provides examples of the coding technique used within the data analysis stage (see Appendices H, I and J) in order to increase the ‘trustworthiness’ of the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Lastly, the benefits of a single-embedded case study design adhered to two of Maxwell’s strategies for combating threats to validity. First, a single-embedded case design allowed for intensive long-term field involvement. This helped to produce a complete understanding of field situations and relations, including the opportunity to make repeated interviews (Maxwell, 2009: 244-245). Second, the present study used multiple sources data through conducting interviews with 14 practitioners from a variety of institutions in order to gain a range of perspectives, accounts and experiences that usefully illuminated the research question(s). Lastly, rival hypotheses (also termed “negative cases”) are reflected upon in chapter 6, thus increasing the internal validity of the data (Yin, 2003).

137 See Appendix F.
5.4.1 Reliability

Reliability refers to ‘the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions’ (Hammersley, 1992: 67). Thus, reliability can be read as the degree to which the findings of a study are independent of accidental circumstances of their production (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 20). Murphy et al. (1998: 70, adapted by the present author) sum this up as:

‘(i) Qualitative researchers demonstrating that they have taken into account the inherent instability of the phenomenon they are studying; (ii) this entails distinguishing between instability that is integral to the research context itself and that which they have introduced themselves through the research process’.

With reference to Murphy et al’s. (1998) former point, it is acknowledged that if the research was repeated at a time when the funding structure of PREVENT had significantly changed or altered, this potentially could have an impact upon the findings. In relation to Murphy et al’s. (1998) latter observation, given that interviews were conducted, it was important to satisfy the criterion of using ‘low-inference descriptors’ (Silverman, 2011, italics in original). Silverman (2011) suggests this can be achieved by: (1) tape recording all interactions; (2) carefully transcribing these tapes according to the needs of reliable analysis; and (3) presenting long extracts of data in the research report. The present research adhered to all three principles. First, measures were employed to ensure the accuracy of data, such as transcribing verbatim in order to remain faithful to context and structure of participants’ utterances. Second, after the audio recordings had been transcribed, transcriptions were checked for errors by re-listening to the audio-recordings in full alongside transcriptions. Third, the research findings contain detailed and descriptive data from the interview sessions in order to highlight the context of the original data. Of note, less descriptive data have also been included where extremely poignant to the case in point.

5.5 Participants

In total 21 interviews were conducted with 14 individuals (multiple interviews were conducted with the PREVENT officers in order to ‘drill-down’ on themes and concepts) over the course of 14 months. The intensive data for this research is derived from interviews with the
PREVENT officers (key informants). This includes a PREVENT Lead; a PREVENT Sergeant; a PREVENT police officer; and a CHANNEL Officer. Initially, I gained access through contacting the PREVENT team via email. Following this, several meetings took place between myself and the PREVENT officers at a mutual safe space in order to outline the nature of the research and to discuss dates and times for fieldwork to commence. Of note, during the fieldwork stage, a PREVENT Lead suggested various other key stakeholders who had extensive knowledge of PREVENT at local level. Consequently, interviews were conducted with a PREVENT Sergeant from a different police force; neighbourhood police officers; a Youth Offending Team Case Manager; a Supported Housing Officer; a Local Housing Officer; a Community Safety Officer; a Community Engagement Officer; and a CHANNEL Intervention Provider. Some of these participants were accessed on the basis of opportunistic and snowball sampling, whereas others were accessed theoretically as a result of frequently cited interrelated job roles within participants’ accounts of PREVENT (as discussed further in Section 5.6.1). The data gathered from these subsequent interviews is used to supplement the intensive qualitative data from the case study in a supportive or challenging fashion, as reflected in the research findings. Thus, the data derived from the extended sample should be read as an embedded unit of analysis within a single-embedded case study.

Lastly, the choice of interview location, time and date were dependent on participant preference and work schedule(s) (this is reflected upon in section 5.7.5). Of note, most interviews were conducted at the participants’ place of work; however, two interviews were conducted in a safe space at a university.

5.6 Sampling Approach

Prior to the fieldwork stage, it was important to think critically about the parameters of the population of interest to the research. As Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 202) put it: ‘many qualitative researchers employ ... purposive, and not random, sampling methods. They seek out groups, settings and individuals where ... the processes being studied are the most likely to

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138 During the fieldwork phase, the PREVENT team was restructured leading to some participants adopting various PREVENT roles within the PREVENT team.

139 It should be noted that in case study research using the term “sampling” can be problematic. As Yin (2014: 43-44) observes, ‘using the sample portion of the term risks misleading others into thinking that the case comes from some larger universe of population of like-cases, undesirably reigniting the spectre of statistical generalisation’. However, the term sampling has been used in this instance on the basis that there are numerous other PREVENT teams operating in low risk areas even if the findings are not considered statistically generalisable.
occur’. Burgess (1984) describes this as ‘judgement sampling’ or ‘purposive sampling’. Here, respondents have been selected as ‘they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles’ (Ritchie et al., 2003: 78). It was identified that the most appropriate sampling approach for the present study was purposive sampling in order to constrain extraneous variation and sharpen external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989: 533).

5.6.1 Extending the Sample: Embedded Unit of Analysis

As emerging themes within the data became apparent, the decision was taken to negotiate access with other stakeholders. The aim of this was: (1) to say more about the data sample; and (2) to test themes against a wider data set. Alasuutari (1995: 156) describes this process through using the analogy of an hourglass: ‘a narrow-case analysis is broadened ... through the search for contrary and parallel cases, into an example of a broadened entity. Thus, the research process advances, in its final stages, towards a discussion of broader entities. We end up at the bottom of the hourglass’. Extending the data set also allowed for the examination of social relationships within a multi-agency CT framework. Moreover, Clive Seale (1999) suggests that, rather than a focus upon ‘individuals’, students should realise that all kinds of phenomena can be studied for research purposes. Underlining Seale’s point, Giampeitro Gobo (2007: 203-204) states:

‘The (qualitative) researcher should focus his/her investigation on interactive units (such as social relationships, encounters, organisations), not only because social processes are more easily detectable and observable, but also because these units allow more direct and deeper analysis of the characteristics observed’.

As well as a purposive approach to sampling, the present study also used theoretical, opportunistic and snowball sampling methods. As Mason (1996: 100) puts it:

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140 Having made initial contact with individuals from interrelated CT roles, there was a conscious effort to allow participants to respond before making further contact. This was to ensure that participants did not feel like they were being coerced into participating and that their consent was informed in more than bureaucratic ways (as consistent with the PREVENT team).
‘Theoretical or purposive sampling is a set of procedures where the researcher manipulates their analysis, theory, and sampling activities interactively during the research process, to a much greater extent than in statistical sampling’.

Theoretical sampling was achieved by conducting further research into the local structure of PREVENT and subsequently identifying individuals of interest (initially, participants were contacted via email to outline the nature of the study). Furthermore, various participants were also accessed via ‘snowball’ sampling. Snowball sampling identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich (Creswell, 2007: 127). Moreover, Rubin and Rubin (2005: 65) state, ‘finding interviewees with the relevant first-hand experience is critical’, and further maintain that ‘enlisting individuals who are, or have been, directly involved is better than interviewing those who are not’. In the present study, snowball sampling was achieved via a PREVENT lead suggesting individuals who might be particularly useful for the present investigation. During the course of fieldwork, I also accepted several invitations to attend presentations, talks and training days which helped to expose further respondents - a process described by Burgess (1984: 55) as ‘opportunistic sampling’. Becker (1970: 35) identifies this as one of six strategies set out for aiding researchers to identify their sample group and ‘gather information in a more direct and purposive way’.

5.7 Reflexivity

In its broadest sense, reflexivity responds to the realisation that researchers and the methods they use are often entangled in the politics and practices of the social world (King and Horrocks, 2010). This realisation brings about the unavoidable acceptance that doing social research is an active and interactive process engaged in by individual subjects, with emotions and theoretical commitments (King and Horrocks, 2010: 126). Moreover, reflexivity enables a critical stance to be taken towards the impact of both the researcher and the context in which the research takes place (King and Horrocks, 2010: 126).

5.7.1 Epistemological Reflexivity

Willig (2001) identifies two kinds of reflexivity: epistemological reflexivity and personal reflexivity. Epistemological reflexivity advocates that the researcher reflects upon assumptions
about the world that have been made in the course of research (King and Horrocks, 2010). This includes how the research questions have been defined, interview schedules structured, and the method of analysis taken (Willig, 2001: 23). Various assumptions based on epistemological reflexivity are outlined in Section 5.7.2. Moreover, certain assumptions also coincide with the ‘axiology’ (Robson, 2002) which underpins the present study.

5.7.2 Assumptions

1. That I would be successful in negotiating access to a PREVENT team (case study) in a ‘non-priority’ (low risk) area;
2. That every member of a PREVENT team would be willing to participate in order for the case study to be representative of that particular population;
3. That participants would be interested in learning the conclusions of this study and benefit from the research findings;
4. That the inclusion of the views of practitioners in this arena would enhance dialogue and, at the same time, provide perspective on PREVENT policing as linked to risk;
5. That experience is ‘paramount’ to understanding risk and the operations of PREVENT by negating cultural and linguistic forms which structure what is considered ‘experience’ (Silverman, 2011);
6. That a focus upon dispositif and reflexive risk might better link PREVENT policy to practice;
7. That interviewing those participants from CT roles would provide a balanced, evidence-led and non-partisan assessment of PREVENT and its effects in a ‘low risk’ area.

5.7.3 Personal Reflexivity

Personal reflexivity in qualitative research specifically invites us to look ‘inwards’ and ‘outwards’, exploring the intersecting relationships between existing knowledge, our experience, our research roles and the world around us’ (King and Horrocks, 2010: 125, emphasis in original). To put it differently, personal reflexivity involves considering the ways in which our beliefs, interests and experiences might have affected the research (Willig, 2001). Importantly, qualitative interviewing is itself a highly personal activity that necessitates critical self-reflection (King and Horrocks, 2010: 129, emphasis in original) or ‘disciplined self-reflection’ (Wilkinson, 1988: 493). In what follows, I move beyond reporting simple ‘personal
thoughts’ towards providing a conceptualisation of personal experience which can be read as ‘confessional’ (King and Horrocks, 2010).

5.7.4 Identifying Methodological Dilemmas

Various methodological dilemmas were identified prior to the fieldwork stage. First, Creswell (2007: 138-9) observes that, ‘gaining access to organisations, sites, and individuals to study has its own challenges. Convincing individuals to participate in the study, building up trust and credibility at the field site, and getting people from a site to respond are all important access challenges’. Figuratively speaking, the present study found itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the experiences and accounts of PREVENT police officers are significantly under-represented in both government policy and academia. On the other hand, one of the most challenging aspects of applying social research procedures to this study was gaining access to a PREVENT team operating in a low risk area.

Second, over the last five years, the police service has been subject to several significant budget cuts to both pensions and staff for the first time in their history. Thus, it was identified that shrinking budgets; the demands of the police service as a profession; and the time consuming nature of academic research, potentially made negotiating access even more difficult - a situation exacerbated by the fact that a ‘low risk’ case study site would have far fewer practitioners working within PREVENT as opposed to a ‘high risk’ area. Related to this aspect, it was identified that respondents might decline invitation to participate based on the assumption that anonymity might be harder to preserve.

Third, the basis of the attended problems associated with the differential exercise of power by the interactants and insider/outside perspectives was identified. Kvale (2006) for example, states that the interview is actually a hierarchical relationship with an asymmetrical power distribution between the interviewer and interviewee. Furthermore, Creswell (2007: 140) drawing upon the work of Kvale (2006), discusses the interview as ‘being “ruled” by the interviewer, enacting a one-way dialogue, serving the interviewer containing hidden agendas, leading to the interviewer’s monopoly over interpretation, enacting “counter-control” by the interviewee who does not answer or deflects questions, and leading to a false sense of security. Given the status of respondents, as well as the academic literature on police culture (see Reiner, 2010), this point had perhaps even more pertinence given that the methodological approach involved
‘interviewing up’ (Silverman, 2013). As Silverman (2013: 206) points out, as a researcher ‘you may find elite members unhappy about ‘opening up’ about themselves’.

Lastly, significant cognisance was given to the volume of negative political, media and academic attention PREVENT has received since its policy inception. Subsequently, the reverberations of participants being deceived, misrepresented and/or misunderstood meant that there was greater likelihood that (as a researcher) I would be viewed with suspicion and/or acquire biased data. For instance, Mair (1989) points out that the detached, depersonalised and ‘uncontaminated’ account of research that is often presented is arguably a very powerful and well-researched ‘illusion’. Moreover, Bourdieu (1977) emphasises the ability of the interviewee to temper their opinions and ideas for ‘official representation’ thus providing the interviewer with an official account, or an account of what the interviewee believes the interviewer wants to hear. Thus, the issue of what Silverman (2011: 369) refers to as ‘the truth status of respondents’ accounts’, and the ‘official/unofficial’ narrative (Bourdieu, 1977) was particularly acute to the present study.

5.7.5 Resolving Methodological Dilemmas

Having initially made two unsuccessful attempts at negotiating access to other research locations,\(^{141}\) several steps were taken in order to adhere to accountability and responsibility; what Gill (1995) terms ‘accountable reflexivity’. Ashmore (1989) states that, ‘it is the duty of a qualitative and quantitative researcher to apply a form of methodological reflexivity to all components of the research procedure’. After successfully negotiating access with the PREVENT team, the ‘co-construction’ of the research began months prior to the fieldwork stage. Due consideration was given to the validity of the data because of the fervent criticism of PREVENT as a policy. Specifically, the decision taken was to spend several months building up trust and generating a rapport with the participants\(^ {142}\) in keeping with a case study design. As Yin (2014: 37) makes clear:

\(^{141}\) One police constabulary declined whilst the other did not respond. The identities of both police constabularies have been withheld in keeping with the anonymised nature of the research.

\(^{142}\) It is argued the term ‘validity’ does not map well onto qualitative research paradigms. Thus, building trust with participants can be read as a methodological step taken to enhance the ‘trustworthiness’ of the research findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
‘Students think, by having selected the case study method, they can proceed quickly into their fieldwork. No presumption could be more misleading. Among other considerations, the relevant field contacts depend upon an understanding - or theory - of what is being studied’.

Moreover, generating a level of trust with the PREVENT team was based on the understanding that ‘field relations should be treated as data’ (Silverman, 2013). As Gubrium and Holstein (2003b) articulate, the qualitative interview process is an ‘interactional project’ from the moment the research is conceived and not just at the interview stage. This is because in qualitative interviewing ‘we actively manage how the interaction will unfold’ since ‘we unavoidably co-create or co-construct the events that take place’ (King and Horrocks, 2010: 134, italics in original). Thus, reflexivity locates researchers as involved and implicated in the entire process of knowledge production (Finlay and Gough, 2003: xi). Ultimately, solidifying trust with the research participants allowed for the following methodological advantages. First, trust helped to permit asking questions as the fieldwork progressed without creating too much suspicion. Second, due to staff reductions and budget cuts within the police force, it was imperative to make sure that fieldwork began around the most appropriate time for the participants’ schedules and not the most convenient time for myself (as a researcher). Respecting time restrictions and preferences helped to build healthy relationships, which ultimately generated “richer” data. Third, participants were allowed to reflect upon their decision to participate over a significant period of time, which helped to maintain ethical standards.

It is also important to note that several methodological steps were taken prior to fieldwork commencing in order to minimise the likelihood of accumulating biased or research-lead data. During several informal discussions with participants (prior to field interviews), a determined effort was made to avoid directly asking participants the research questions, thus minimising researcher influence and affect. As Creswell (2007) observes, ‘it is important that disclosure is handled by the researcher by presenting general information, not specific information about the research study’. Rather, it was the nature of the research that was discussed in order to be explicit about the particular agenda(s) of the research (Gill, 1995). Of note, during interviews I adopted a stance of ‘talking back’ to the interviewee (Griffin, 1990). Thus, questions were used to promote a two-way dialogue with which helped to explore key themes. Whilst this approach is subject to criticism, particularly with regard to researcher

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143 The decision to be sensitive and respectful of participants’ time constraints and preferences was also based on the perspective that access is a ‘process’ and not an ‘event’ (see Yin, 2012).
neutrality, a two-way dialogue helped to generate what Wilkerson (2007) terms “accelerated intimacy”.

In order to reduce power difference at the fieldwork stage, it was decided that the best way to achieve this was to be as open as possible with the participants, both morally and practically. During various informal discussions, participants were assured of the nature of the research, which perhaps resulted in interviewees reflecting more honestly and openly at the fieldwork stage. Moreover, during the fieldwork stage, I accepted various invitations to attend presentations delivered by the PREVENT team which contributed to a reduction in power imbalance by relating to members in the field (Perakyla, 1989: 131).

5.7.6 Reflecting on Methodological Dilemmas and Resolves

At the beginning of the fieldwork phase I had achieved a position of trust within the PREVENT team, which provided various methodological benefits. First, this helped to create a more comfortable interview environment, which contributed to richer contextual data through more open and honest answers. Second, Gray (2004: 224-5) suggests that in qualitative interviews, maintaining control is essential and can be achieved by ‘minimising long-winded responses and digressions’. He goes on to argue that the researcher should not feel concerned to interrupt the respondent if this enables the interview to stay focussed (Gray, 2004). Moreover, Arksey and Knight (1999) add ‘improvisation throughout the interview is fundamental to maintaining control’. In various instances within the present study, participants did digress from what was being discussed however, this was actively encouraged when it brought perspective to the research that I had not considered before. The following interview data reflects one such situation:144

Participant: ... you know, I’m sort of going off on a tangent here ... remind me what the question was ... I think I’ve just lost it there ...

Interviewer: You were discussing the links between PREVENT and local authorities ...

Participant: Yeah, it is a crucial part of our work ...

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144 Interview with practitioner No.03.
Nevertheless, since the nature of the research entailed interviewing ‘up’ (Silverman, 2013), had any participant spent a great deal of time on matters which were of minimal significance to the research, it is questionable whether I would have had the confidence to ensure the interview stayed on course had there been no relationship in place. Overlooking this had the potential to waste time, as well as neglect more pertinent topics for discussion.

Attaining a position of trust also raised various methodological ambiguities. Hall (2000) recommends researchers should aim to maintain a balanced status where they are considered as accepted within their sample, though at the same time not completely immersed. Similarly, Davis (1973: 342) writes that the researcher should aim to adopt a ‘middle ground’ position between what he describes as the “Martian” and the “Convert”, in order to obtain ‘a valid objective account of their [participants] subjective world’ (Davis: 1973: 337, emphasis in original). According the Davis (1973), the latter involves “going native” whilst conversely, the former individual prefers minimal interaction with participants. In the context of the present study, remaining within this ‘middle-ground’ was a difficult task that had to be carefully navigated throughout the research process. Thus, further caution is anticipated regarding notions of a strong professional empathy with the participants and a perceived lack of objectivity (Unler, 2012). However, a perceived lack of objectivity should be considered a necessary sacrifice given that the police are an increasingly difficult-to-access group.

Even after I had built trust with several key informants, the schizophrenic nature of power differentials came to the fore in numerous interviews. For instance, in certain interviews (as a researcher) I was personally afforded a position of trust within the PREVENT team, albeit hypothetically. The following responses display this situation:

\[\text{Participant: } \ldots \text{ Yep, I can call upon Paul Dresser, 'cause, you're my man; you know all about that, you can help this individual'}.\]

\[\text{Participant: } \text{I have contacts with the likes of... OK, for instance ... You, (name of contact), (name of contact) – head of security, (name of contact) on the senior management team ... OK, I've got contacts with these types of people'}.\]

\[145\text{ Interview with practitioner No.04.}\]
However, in other instances with the same participant, my position had reverted to that of an outsider with less expertise than the interviewee:146

*Participant:* “The problem is ... we’ve got the Police and Crime Commissioners and you find a lot of the surveys ... when surveys are going out asking, “What do you want your local police to do?” They’re not going to say terrorism because a lot of the time people don’t understand that, they’re not going to say burglary ... Any idea of what they say? ... What the top one tends to be ... or top two?”

*Researcher:* “Anti-social behaviour?”

*Participant:* “No. It features up there, but not in the top two ...”

*Researcher:* “Car crime?”

*Participant:* “Illegal parking and dog shit! Dog fouling ... that’s the top two. Are police officers responsible for policing dog poo all over the place? Not really, you know? ... I mean the council do have their own departments but that’s what the public want ...”

Moreover, in a different interview, a participant reflected upon their experience of friction between the academic world and the world of policing, particularly in relation to different interpretations of radicalisation and how this has affected PREVENT operationally in the past. Whilst during the interview there seemed to be an egalitarian relationship between interviewer and interviewee, upon transcription of the data, power differentials became apparent. The following interview dialogue demonstrates how our “brought-selves” can enter the relationship dynamic in qualitative interviewing:147

*Participant:* “When you’re looking at the academic side in universities when you’re trying to sell the agenda, and it’s about going in at the relationship level with those people and over time building that trust is the problem”.

*Participant:* “You know, some of the universities don’t like the terminology, because it’s the academic world. Let’s approach it in a way that they actually like that terminology or want to discuss it”.

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146 Interview with practitioner No.04.
147 Interview with practitioner No.05.
Participant: “Very much from the academic side is that if we go into universities and use the word ‘radical’ they will turn round and say, ‘There’s nothing wrong with being radical’” ...

5.7.7 Reflecting on Resolves and Findings

Byrne (2004: 182) recognises that what an interview produces is a particular representation or account of an individual’s views or opinions. Thus, there is a lack of stability of such apparent ‘realities’ as ‘facts’ and ‘experiences’ (Silverman, 2011). In chorus, Rapley (2004) points out: (i) interviews do not appear to give us direct access to the ‘facts’ or to events; and (ii) interviews do not tell us directly about peoples ‘experiences’ but instead offer indirect ‘representations’ of those experiences. Thus, cognisance should be given to the volume of criticism PREVENT has received since its inception from media, academic and government policy circles. Moreover, given the initial methodological obstacles i.e. negotiating access, it is important to question whether access was granted for the present case study because the PREVENT team were operationalising CT in a manner they were particularly pleased with and thus were willing to discuss this with a researcher. Accordingly, further concerns may emerge regarding perceived professional bias and the pursuit of vested interests on the part of the case study.

Second, caution is anticipated with regard to the sample size. Although the data is a reliable set in order to identify data patterns, a small data sample makes ambitious conclusions challenging to defend. However, due to the exploratory element of the research, the aim of the present study was one of ‘making a lot out of a little’ (Silverman, 2013) by looking at a small body of data in intensive detail. In support, Rubin and Rubin (2005: 68) argue, ‘an interviewer does not need a large amount of respondents to increase the reliability or credibility of their findings’. Furthermore, the sample size also reflects the desire to gain enough data yet ensure that participant recruitment and data collection did not exceed the timescale and operational limitations of the study. Moreover, the sample size mirrors the fundamental structure of PREVENT in line with local funding allocations based on risk assessment. Lastly, the sample size is reflective of the axiology that underpins the present study. Recognising that there are fewer PREVENT officers operating in ‘non-priority/low risk’ areas should not mean that their voices remain hidden or considered inconsequential. Research which continues to focus on ‘priority/high risk’ PREVENT areas only exacerbates the marginalisation of those working within PREVENT in ‘low risk’ areas from both political and academic discourse. Importantly,
whilst historically the police are far from a marginalised group, in the context of empirical research into PREVENT, the police very much embody underrepresentation.

Third, it is important to recognise the potential paradoxical effects of ‘over-rapport’. Rorty (1979) emphasised how we constitute knowledge through conversation and social practice. For Rorty (1979), rather than knowledge being conveyed in conversation, it is brought into being. This has resonance for qualitative interviewing as we become increasingly aware of the constructive nature of social interaction and the part played by active subjects in making sense of their experiences (see inter alia Gubrium and Holstein, 2003a and b; King and Horrocks, 2010: 17). Indeed, Shotter (1993: vi, emphasis in original) describes how ‘conversation is just one of our many activities in the world. On the contrary, we constitute both ourselves and our worlds in our conversational activity’. In relation to these observations, developing a rapport with participants in order to strengthen the integrity of the data paradoxically can compromise the validity of the data; the very thing I was trying to minimise.

Fourth, Silverman (2011, italics in original) states that interviewers are active subjects. Gubrium and Holstein (2004: 152) add to this argument stating, ‘while the respondent ... actively constructs and assembles answers, he or she does not simply “break out” talking. Neither elaborate narratives, nor one word replies emerge without provocation’. Rapley (2004: 26) takes this argument further and posits, ‘interviewing is never just ‘a conversation’: the interview ‘may be conversational, but you as the interviewer do have some level of control. You routinely decide which bit of talk to follow-up, you routinely decide when to open and close various topics and the interaction as a whole’. Whilst due consideration must be given to the open-ended nature of the interview scenario, there is also the converse argument that philosophically, complete researcher neutrality does not exist since inevitably the researcher brings a point of view to all conversations producing a negotiated text (Fontana and Frey, 2005, italics in original).

Fifth, my presence and reactions as a researcher within the initial informal meetings might have influenced participants’ responses at the fieldwork stage. However, throughout the fieldwork stage, I was extremely conscious that building trust with participants was not seen as ingratiating behaviour, which could ultimately reinforce participants’ opinions in a way that can become leading. Ultimately, however, it is only the participants who can assess the degree to which trust was viewed as ingratiating or leading. Conversely, had I failed to establish a rapport with any of the interviewees, this might have reinforced insider/outsider perspectives and/or minimised the ‘truth status of respondents’ accounts’ (Silverman, 2011, see also King and Horrocks, 2010).
Consideration must also be given to the inconsistency in levels of trust between the PREVENT team and participants accessed through theoretical, opportunistic and snowball sampling. Such inconsistency has a greater chance of participants from the extended sample providing an “official” account rather than truthful account. As Wright Mills (1940: 904) succinctly puts it, ‘human actors do vocalise and impute motives to themselves and others, attributing this to their perceptions based on past experience’. Thus, it is important to recognise the heightened level of risk attached to snowball sampling when considering the acquisition of biased data. For instance, participants might have suggested individuals who held similar views, beliefs and accounts thus reaffirming their own views. Such caution finds support in Lyman and Scott (1970) postulation of ‘accounts’ - that is, a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry” (Lyman and Scott, 1970: 112).

As the example in the Section 5.7.6 demonstrates, even when significant effort is made to minimise power imbalances within the interview environment, this does not mean that our “brought-selves” do not or cannot enter the interview scenario. Thus, consideration of the validity of this particular interview is important since, on a broader level, my own “brought-selves” (as an academic) is part of the group the participant referred to.

It is also important to be reflexive with regard to writing and representation at the data analysis stage as well as within pragmatic fieldwork. Two such issues lead to the data analysis of the present study becoming a highly personal and moral activity particularly with regard to representation. The first issue regards the size of the data sample. Working with a small data sample allowed me to obtain a significant degree of trust. However, this made analysing the data an even more personal task, one that came with an unforgiving social responsibility to tell the story of participants in the most accurate way possible. As well as this, as a researcher, I felt a degree of guilt having been responsive (face-to-face) to the participants on many occasions, to then using their working lives for the purpose of bringing their experiences to a wider audience. Consequently, at the write-up stage it was important to continuously reflect upon with whom I was communicating with in order for my own brought-selves not to take hold leading to a sense of audience pervading the writing and the written text (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000: 149).

During the write up stage it was also imperative to balance the verisimilitude

148 Tierney (1995) identifies four potential audiences: colleagues; those involved in interviews and observations; policy makers; and the general public.
(Richardson, 1994: 124) of academic writing – that is, a level of detail that makes the work come alive - whilst maintaining a style of writing that was personal, accessible and, most importantly, remained fully committed to telling the participants’ accounts accurately. As Czarnaiwaska (2004) makes clear, writing objectively, in a scientific way, has the impact of silencing the participants thus perpetuating the exact thing the present study aims to negate. Moreover, as Gilgen (2005) writes, ‘this silence is contradictory to qualitative research that seeks to hear all voices and perspectives’. Subsequently, there was a conscious effort not to overlay the voice of the participants by the authoritative voice of the researcher and a determined effort not to decouple the responsibility of the researcher from an interpretation of the data (Creswell, 2007). In essence, producing a chapter on findings and data analysis became a highly daunting endeavour, not least because of personal reflexivity and knowledge construction firmly situated within the ethical domain (Doucet and Mauthner, 2002).

5.8 Data Analysis

5.8.1 Transcription of Data

In order to ‘log the data’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 66) an audio-recorder was utilised as opposed to taking field notes. The strength of using audio-transcription lies in the fact that recorded conversations can be replayed, transcriptions can be improved, and analyses can take off on a different tack unlimited by the original transcript (Silverman, 2013). The tape-recorded conversations were studied extendedly involving close, repeated listening. This offered the advantage of revealing any previously missed features of the originalisation of talk (Silverman, 2013). Moreover, analysing the transcripts in-depth helped to satisfy ‘low inference descriptors’ (Silverman, 2011); it is debatable whether fieldwork notes offer this advantage. Furthermore, it was recognised that taking field notes could have affected the natural free-flowing element of conversation because of the difficulty of asking questions and writing answers simultaneously (Creswell, 2007: 134). As Pile (1990) observes, quickly inscribed notes may be incomplete and partial which could prove integral to the research findings. For example, an interview with a CHANNEL Intervention Provider exceeded three hours. Thus, had field notes been taken as opposed to audio-recording equipment, it is likely that a great
deal of this data would have been lost through the inevitably of playing “catch-up”. As Pile (1990: 217) makes clear:

‘An analysis of language can only be carried out with confidence if there is an entire record of a conversation. Hastily scribbled notes are not accurate enough to be used in this way. Tape-recorded sessions provides the only viable data for this kind of analysis’.

I alone transcribed data by typing the audio recordings for reasons fourfold. First, I wished to become fully immersed in the data in order to gain a heightened level of familiarity, which might have been less possible through eliciting secretarial assistance. Second, it is generally accepted that doing your own transcription is the first step of data analysis since it allows for the initial formulation of emerging codes and themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). As Atkinson and Heritage (1985) point out, the production and use of transcripts are essentially research activities. Third, undertaking my own transcription was in keeping with the interpretative element of the data analysis (see Bird, 2005) where meanings are created, rather than simply a mechanical one of putting spoken sounds on paper (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999). Fourth, I decided that it was my responsibility alone to ensure confidentiality was adhered to (see Yin, 2014). Of note, to maintain the confidentiality of participants, any names including colleagues, locations (such as cities, towns, universities, buildings, etc.,) have been replaced in the transcribed data by bracketed text, e.g. ‘(name of colleague)’, ‘(name of location)’, etc. This also helps to preserve the anonymity of the case study location, as well as individual participants.

Most appropriate to the present study was full (verbatim) transcription. Commenting on the transcription process more generally, King and Horrocks (2010: 143) point out, ‘the golden rule to avoid becoming swamped by the transcription process is to think carefully about what needs to be transcribed, and at what level of detail’. Nevertheless, all interviews were transcribed verbatim to ensure a level of detail beyond basic. Moreover, partial transcription of the data through identifying common themes or main areas of interest conflicted with the research epistemology. Lastly, full verbatim transcription is in keeping with thematic analysis which requires a rigorous and thorough “orthographic” transcript – a “verbatim” account of all verbal (and sometimes nonverbal [e.g., coughs]) utterances (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 17).

All words were included in the

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145 Prior to each interview, every participant was informed that if they did not feel comfortable with the recording of interviews, field notes would have been taken.
transcription although intonation and body language descriptions were not. The omission of paralinguistic aspects can lead to ‘missing content’ (Silverman, 2013) when trying to make sense of the transcribed data. It can also lead to a ‘shallower understanding’ of participants’ experience (King and Horrocks, 2010). Nevertheless, paralinguistic content was deemed not central to the analysis. Moreover, to minimise distorting the meaning of data, only minor ‘tidying up’ was carried out. Whilst acknowledging that full verbatim is without grammatical or other tidying up, the decision was taken in order to aid comprehension. For example, on several occasions the word ‘us’ was used as opposed to ‘our’. It was felt that this could have been obscure to readers. Lastly, cursing words have been included in the transcribed data since such terms emphasised the nature of participants’ understandings and feelings around certain experiences, accounts and discussions.

5.8.2 Thematic Analysis

Existing literature which explores the understandings and experiences of PREVENT officers is particularly sparse. Thus, the present study took an exploratory approach across professionals since there was no desire to compare and contrast the accounts of professionals across disciplines. The data afforded by professionals in interrelated roles was used to supplement the intensive qualitative data in a complimentary or challenging fashion. Thus, the data collected from the interviews was amalgamated into one data set.

Transcription of the data sets was analysed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase model of thematic analysis150 (as discussed later in the chapter). Thematic analysis seeks to apply meaning to data by exploring salient themes within a text at different levels (Attride-Stirling, 2001) through ‘careful reading and re-reading of the data’ (Rice and Ezzy, 1999: 258) - this allows the context of the discussion to be maintained. Moreover, thematic analysis techniques were selected primarily because of the flexibility and variability with which they can be applied to provide a rich and detailed account of the data (Braun and Clark, 2006).

The data analysis adhered to a more detailed and nuanced account of thematic analysis concentrating on particular themes that were identified as “key” to participants’ accounts. Boyatzis (1998: 161) defines a theme as ‘a pattern in the information that at minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon’. Importantly, the “keyness” of a theme was not necessarily dependent on

150 For a breakdown of this process, see Appendix F.
quantifiable measures, but in terms of whether it captured something important in relation to the overall research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 10). As Braun and Clarke (2006) make clear, prevalence is an important factor to consider when coding for themes in the data, however they also emphasise that this is not something that is or should be quantifiable. Rather, the data analysis approach followed observations by Lofland et al. (2006) who emphasise the importance of “meaning”: what concepts participants use to understand their world and what meaning or significance such concepts have for them. Acknowledging that a rich overall description of the data would have allowed for an accurate reflection of the content of the entire data set, doing so would have potentially limited the depth and complexity of the key themes.

The data analysis of the present study is positioned within a constructivist paradigm, which maintains that all knowledge is perspectival and contingent (Lyotard, 1984). Moreover, in contrast to a semantic approach - that is, the analyst is not looking for anything beyond what a participant has said or what has been written (Braun and Clarke, 2006) - thematic analysis was carried out at latent level. Analysis at the latent level identifies or examines the underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualisations and ideologies that are theorised as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 13). Furthermore, the analytical procedure was informed by Schutz’s (1970) social phenomenology - in particular Schutz’s second postulate - where a level of subjective interpretation is in line with preserving the participants’ subjective point of view whilst acknowledging the context within which the phenomenon was studied (see also Horsfall et al., 2001; Leininger 1994). This approach is in keeping with latent analysis since the analytical process involved interpretation: where there is an attempt to theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications (Patton, 1990). As Gibbs (2007: 52) points out, ‘coding should remain grounded in the data in the transcript, but this does not mean it simply reflects respondents’ view of things’. Participants’ accounts of PREVENT as a ‘network’ are instructive in this respect. Moreover, to strengthen the rigor of interpretation in the present study, findings are illustrated with quotations from the raw data where interpretation has taken place (Rice and Ezzy, 1999). This ensures that data interpretation remains directly linked to the words of the participants, thus strengthening the credibility and validity of the data (Patton, 2002).

Other data analysis techniques were considered but deemed inappropriate for the present study. In particular, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA hereafter) (Smith, 1996) was considered. IPA ‘aims to explore in detail participants’ personal lived experience and how participants make sense of that personal experience’ (Smith, 2004: 40).
This type of analysis allows for in-depth analysis of individuals’ perceptions, understanding and accounts. Importantly, whilst IPA donates a social constructivist epistemological position, it is particularly well suited with a ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory framework (Lander and Sheldrake, 2010). However, since the present study contains ‘theory propositions’ (Yin, 2014), thematic analysis was deemed most appropriate since the flexibility of thematic analysis allows both bottom-up data analysis and theory driven analyses (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, since the data sample was extended to include professionals working within various interrelated CT roles, IPA would not have been appropriate as a method of analysis for the present study given that it requires a homogenous sample (Brocki and Wearden 2009).

5.8.3 Data Presentation

There are differing levels of verbatim data that researchers can include when presenting their data. In the present study, a large number of direct and descriptive quotations are presented in order to retain the content and richness of the original data which increases the reliability of the data (see inter alia Silverman, 2011). Less descriptive data has also been integrated into the text where extremely poignant to the case in point.

There are different methods available to researchers for structuring their data presentation. In the present study, data has been separated into two chapters (chapters 6 and 7) in order to maintain a level of clarity for readers. Chapter 6 presents the key findings from the interview sessions as broken down into three overarching (or organising) themes: risk and trust; PREVENT as safeguarding; and risk as gut feeling. Within these organising themes, there are a number of sub-themes that are explored. Following this, the primary concern of chapter 7 is to analyse the data by making comparatives between the research findings and literature review (Parts I and II of the thesis).

5.8.4 Data Analysis Approach

The data were subjected to several levels of scrutiny following a framework described by Braun and Clarke (2006).\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{151} It should be noted that data analysis occurred in a non-linear fashion rather than a smooth transition between each phase.
Phase 1: Generating initial codes

Phase 2: Searching for themes

Phase 3: Organising and reviewing themes

Phase 1 Coding: ‘the production of initial codes from the data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 18)

Following initial immersion in the data, the thematic analysis process began by manually identifying codes within the data, rather than utilising specific computer software (other than Microsoft Word). This phase involved the production of initial codes from the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006), with the central idea to move from a lower level of meaning (the raw text) to a higher level of understanding that can inform the research question (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). A code refers to ‘the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). Whilst a code is considered as the lowest order premise found in a text (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003), nevertheless, the process of coding is part of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) since it entails organising research data into meaningful groups (Tuckett, 2005). The content of the entire data set was systematically coded, rather than coding to identify particular (and possibly limited) features of the data set. This approach helped to give full and equal attention to each data item, and identify aspects in the data items that subsequently formed the basis of repeated patterns (themes) across the data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Codes could entail single or stand-alone responses, however, there were no such instances given the open-ended nature of the interviews.

In relation to the organisation of data, a ‘block and file’ approach to thematic analysis was considered. A benefit of a block and file approach is that the data remains largely intact with easy-to-access quotes (Grbich, 2013: 63). However, it was conceded that this approach would have created large columns of data that would have become unwieldy (Grbich, 2013: 63). Consequently, a combination of ‘block and file’ and ‘conceptual mapping’ thematic analysis was carried out. This minimised the disadvantage(s) of adhering to a single analytical approach i.e. simplifying and decontextualising the data against the generation of unwieldy data sets. Moreover, using both approaches allowed the data to be theoretically interpreted at an earlier stage (Braun and
Given that the organisation of data did not exclusively adhere to a block and file approach, data extracts were coded inclusively to minimise the loss of context (Bryman, 2001). Each code was linked to the text response (each response was labelled with a letter to identify the transcript and a number so it could be located within the transcript (see Appendix H). Of note, certain extracts were coded by more than one theme. For instance, certain themes overlapped within participants’ accounts, e.g. “buy-in” was coded alongside “familiarity”, “openness”, “honesty” (key theme one) and also “safeguarding” (key theme two). However, there was enough distinction between each theme thus avoiding the potential pitfall of ‘too much overlap’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, when testing provision themes against the accounts of participants from interrelated CT roles, certain participants’ accounts provided an inconsistency across the data set. However, negative cases have also been explored, thus reducing researcher bias by challenging the robustness of the theme. Lastly, codes were generated using an inductive reasoning (bottom-up) approach, where the codes identified emerged from the data rather than a pre-existing theoretical coding frame (Patton, 1990) e.g. template analysis. This ensures the thematic analysis is data-driven rather than trying to fit participants’ views into a theoretical framework (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Phase 2 Searching for themes: ‘This phase re-focuses the analysis at the broader level of theme’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 19)

After all the data had been coded and collated, codes were then sorted into potential themes. The name of each code was saved in a specific Microsoft Word file and a brief description was made in order to organise each code into theme-piles (see Appendix J). At this stage, some codes went on to form mains themes e.g. “trust” whilst other themes e.g. “product”, “buy-in”, went on to form sub-themes with an organising theme. Separating themes into ‘sub-themes’ and ‘main themes’ allowed for a level of structure and a hierarchy of meaning within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Phase 3 Organising themes: This phase involves the refinement of Candidate Themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006)

Once codes had been identified, commonalities were explored to develop organising themes. Organising themes arrange codes into clusters of similar issues. They bring together components/fragments of ideas or experiences, which are ‘often meaningless when viewed
alone’ (Leininger, 1985: 60). However, whilst data within themes should cohere together meaningfully, there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Accordingly, the themes were reviewed to promote internal homogeneity (where data within themes cohere meaningfully) and external heterogeneity (clear distinctions between themes) (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, the process of organising themes was facilitated by two levels of reviewing. First, reviewing at the level of the coded data extracts was carried out by re-reading the text segments associated with each code and consideration was given to the strength of a coherent pattern; what Yin (2011) terms ‘reassembling the data’. Second, the entire data set was reviewed in order to consider the validity of individual themes considered against the original data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). At this stage, each theme was judged against level of overlap, and in relation to the other themes.

Chapter 6

Key Findings

6.1 Introduction and Chapter Organisation

This chapter reflects on the key themes which were distilled from the interview sessions with PREVENT police officers and practitioners from interrelated CT roles. As a caveat, this chapter does not examine the two areas of risk outlined in the literature review. Drawing comparatives between literature review and research findings is the primary purpose of the following chapter. The key themes from the research data are outlined below:

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6.2 Key Theme 1: Risk and Trust

Common to all participants accounts was an understanding that a key objective of PREVENT is to forge alignments and build relationships between security, local authorities and civil society.\(^{152}\) This objective was accorded importance since it establishes a wide-reaching, ‘overt’, collaborative counter-terrorism capacity;\(^{153}\) what is termed the ‘rich picture’ approach (Gregory, 2010: 94; see also Innes et al., 2011: 16). Whilst countering terrorism necessarily requires a degree of secrecy and some of what takes place does so out of public view, participants recognised that for PREVENT to be successful and durable, PREVENT cannot be solely the domain of the police.\(^{154}\) Thus, both internal and external engagement was considered a chief priority of PP. This is in keeping with the PREVENT strategy which states: ‘PREVENT must be a cross-government and cross-community programme to meet its objectives (HM Government, 2011b: 100); challenging ideologies is a collective responsibility (HM Government, 2011b: 44).

Adding support to research by Innes et al. (2011), participants recognised that engagement under the auspices of PREVENT is designed to perform two main functions. First, engagement work was understood to provide a communication channel in order for individuals and groups to convey their concerns to the police. However, participants were fervent in their accounts that PREVENT, through a multi-partnership approach, should *not* be understood as ‘community intelligence’ generation. Rather, the message was one of promoting a “willingness

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\(^{152}\) This was understood as “using an army of helpers”.
\(^{153}\) Interview with practitioner No.04.
\(^{154}\) A common theme distilled from the interviews was that PREVENT was understood as a “societal” responsibility rather than a “policing” responsibility.
to share concerns". Thus, the emphasis was on providing partners (and civil society more generally) with an understanding of how to act upon risk and concern(s). Second, engagement was considered important in order to inform and reassure partners and communities about PREVENT activities, thus coinciding with the concept of reassurance policing.

“Risk assessment is something that perhaps us as police probably wouldn’t be aware of because it’s quite a subtle and specific area of work that they’re the experts in. We then rely on them to put two and two together to: a) recognise the risk of vulnerability to think ... what am I going to do about? Who do I contact? ... And that’s where I think we face a real challenge of PREVENT ... getting that message out there and; b) making sure it’s clearly and correctly understood”.

“For me, one of the things essential to PREVENT is it’s about trust and confidence – trust and confidence in the process and the people involved. PREVENT’s very much in that pre-crime space ... and I think that’s quite a good phrase because it’s very much about ... can we give people, in terms of communities, partners, and internally within the police, the trust and confidence to understand what we’re trying to do ... to work with vulnerable people, to know what to do with that information and to have that trust and confidence to know by giving us that information they’re not going to have their picture all over the front of the local newspaper - we’re not going to breach their confidentiality, etc.”

These two chief priorities of PREVENT coincide with ‘strategic enablers’ as outlined in chapter 2. The aim of the former is ‘strategic communications’, whilst the aim of the latter is to ‘develop understanding, analysis, and information communications’ (Turley, 2009: 6).

In chapter 2 it was outlined how the OSCT ensures smooth delivery of PREVENT by co-ordinating their police element; local authorities; and community partners. Moreover, the aforementioned ‘strategic enablers’ help to achieve the last strategic objective of PREVENT, *institutions*. However, a multi-partnership approach in line with the last strategic objective of PREVENT should not be simply assumed at local level. Since the geographical area was defined as ‘low risk’, it therefore had no direct funding for statutory partners on a full-

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155 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05.
156 Several participants suggested that key to overt engagement is “myth-busting” common misconceptions about PREVENT.
157 Interview with practitioner No.02.
158 Interview with practitioner No.04.
time basis. This is a result of the way PREVENT is fundamentally structured at local level (see HM Government, 2011b). Importantly, whilst participants recognised that considerable effort is made to reach out and engage with both communities and institutional partners, effort does not automatically equate to success. Thus, both internal and external engagement had be “worked on” and “won”. Subsequently, increasing the trust and confidence of internal and external partners was understood to be the most important aspect of overt counter-radicalisation through PREVENT. As one participant put it, “everything comes down to trust and confidence - without which PREVENT would not work”. Thus, in large part, the participants’ conceptualised risk as interrelated with the notion of trust.

The concept of trust was by far the most recurring theme in participants’ account of PREVENT operationally at local level; largely since it was recognised that PREVENT has moved away from a ‘threat-centric model’ to an overt counter-radicalisation methodology. As one participant put it, “the PREVENT team is the Neighbourhood Policing Team of Special Branch”. The overt element of PP as interrelated with the concept of trust is succinctly outlined in the following interview dialogue:

“We always, always deliver what we say we are going to deliver, when we say we are going to deliver, and I think all these ... maybe small bits, that might not even be linked with PREVENT as such, give out trust and confidence. And I think we’ve established some very good relationships in key places and I’d like to think by working more with them, they now completely trust the way that we work because they’ve seen the way things are done and when we say we’ll try and get back to them with information by saying, “Look, we might not be able to because this could become quite a hot issue” ... If you are completely open and honest, and by giving examples of how you’ve done things in the past ... And again, word clearly gets around, because in the old days nobody had heard of you and now people come to you who you’ve never interacted with but you’d been recommended by somebody else, you know ... saying things like, “You should be getting these people into your school”. That’s always reassuring because you presume that they wouldn’t do that if they had had a bad experience. Trust and confidence is absolutely key and that’s the same for partners, agencies and community members, because occasionally you

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159 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05.
160 This view was shared by all PREVENT police officers.
161 Interview with practitioner No.04.
162 Interview with practitioner No.04.
The need to build trust is recognised in the PREVENT strategy which clearly states, ‘trust in PREVENT must be improved’ (HM Government, 2011b: 6 [Figure 3.15]). However, in the battle to win “hearts and minds”, the focus of the PREVENT strategy is centred on increasing trust at local community level (macro level; see HM Government, 2011b). Subsequently, the PREVENT strategy offers little conceptual insight into issues of inter-organisational trust (micro level). However, central to participants’ accounts was the fact that PREVENT officers not only had to win “hearts and minds” of the local community, but also those of semi-public professionals, local authorities and internal partners. The discussion that follows provides perspective on the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships within PREVENT with an emphasis on institutionalising logics of prevention via internal and external engagement.

6.2.1 “Buying-into” PREVENT through Trust

Common to all participants responses was the conceptualisation of PREVENT as a “product”, whereby key institutional partners e.g. the wider policing family, local authorities, semi-public professionals and individuals and groups at local community level “bought into” PREVENT as an agenda. The notion of “buy-in” which the participants referred to can be understood as institutionalising logics of prevention resulting in counter-radicalisation engagement via multi-agency partnership collaboration. Participants regularly referred to the engagement process (both externally and internally) as getting the required “buy-in”:

“When we started out it was done internally. Now we need to get our messaging out to staff; you pick on key partners, so local authorities: fire, probation, health, higher education, etc. So, you sort of, target our partners. That alone is one heck of amount of work if you think about the amount of people involved in that, bearing in mind there’s no one size fits all, and that’s been a process. If you go to the Heads of your partners and get their buy-in it makes it much easier to roll it out further along down the line”.

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163 Interview with practitioner No.02.
164 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04.
165 This is my own interpretation from the interview sessions.
166 Interview with practitioner No.04.
“We are Special Branch cops but this is still very much about the pre-criminal space, dealing with people and issues often long before they do anything criminal. So we have to tread, understandably, very carefully in order to get that buy-in.” \(^{167}\)

Moreover, participants often referred to the PREVENT agenda as a “product” to be “sold” to key partners both internally and externally. \(^{168}\) The emphasis was on a sensible and efficient approach towards delivering PREVENT as a “product”. \(^{169}\) Getting the desired buy-in was a process that usually took place in the form of presentations and/or training specifically targeted towards those identified as having a key role to play in counter-radicalisation on the ground. Those considered key partners included the wider (internal) policing family; the education sector; health institutions; local charities; the housing sector; and the local community more generally. \(^{170}\) Furthermore, various participants likened internal/external engagement to a form of “sales pitch” where the PREVENT agenda was or was not “bought into” by partners. \(^{171}\) Related to this aspect, PREVENT was understood as a product to be “sold” since engagement work entailed approaching organisations whom, at times, had limited understanding of PREVENT and/or the CONTEST strategy. \(^{172}\) Thus the aim of selling PREVENT through a “sales-pitch” approach was to make partners aware of PREVENT \(^{173}\) and in turn, provide a level of understanding with regard to how PREVENT “fits” within inter-connecting organisations and institutions. \(^{174}\) Participants also discussed external engagement with civil society. One specific ACPO product that was considered to be producing positive benefits with regard to police/community relations was ‘ACT NOW’. \(^{175}\)

“One of the teachers at (name of local college) asked if I would come along to the Air Cadets, so I’ve gone and given a presentation on the ACT NOWs at the Air Cadets. And again, word of mouth, another Air Cadets have asked up in (name of  

\(^{167}\) Interview with practitioner No.02.  
\(^{168}\) Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05.  
\(^{169}\) Interview with practitioner No.03.  
\(^{170}\) Whilst these were identified as key partners, several participants made it clear that there was no organisation, institution or community that the PREVENT team would not engage with either internally or externally; as one participant noted, “there’s nobody that we wouldn’t make the time for” (interview with practitioner No.02).  
\(^{171}\) Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 03; 04.  
\(^{172}\) Interview with practitioner No.03.  
\(^{173}\) Interview with practitioner No.04.  
\(^{174}\) Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 04; 05.  
\(^{175}\) Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 09.
In brief, ACT NOW is an interactive CT exercise developed by the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit. It provides communities with an insight into how police officers make decisions in the event of a terrorism incident. Moreover, ACT NOW is designed to ‘support engagement between people from different communities, ages, cultures and faiths and to develop open dialogue using facilitators in local settings’. It has an important role to play in supporting wider community engagement and helping the police, its partners and local people tackle the challenge from violent extremism. A participant discussed the interactive nature of ACT NOW:

“ACT NOW is a table-top exercise. Its DVD-based, it gets everyone in the room acting as detectives and it takes you through a major incident. So, information comes into the incident room, and we’ve got information on a group and a load of peroxide has been purchased. What are you thinking? What are the information processes? What information would you like? And it just opens up their eyes to loopholes and how long things take to do and generally everybody really enjoys the product ... We change it a little bit at the end ‘cause they’re all thinking at that point we’ll go ...”

By implication, the success of ACT NOW does not necessarily materialise in the same way across different localities, of which some participants reflected upon when discussing ACT NOW in relation to local and regional difference(s).

Another method of external engagement came in form of presentations delivered directly to civil society by PREVENT police officers in order to spread awareness of the PREVENT strategy following a specific incident. This can be understood as protective intervention whereby police own the intervention in terms of defining the problem to be addressed (Innes et al., 2011: 90). However, employing this approach was said to happen far less frequently since the decision to “push” direct engagement (protective intervention), rather

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176 Interview with practitioner No.01.
177 ACPO (2013a).
178 ACPO (2013a).
179 Interview with practitioner No.01.
180 Interview with practitioner No.01.
than being “invited” by communities to engage (type I co-production) came with a significant degree of risk.\footnote{Interview with practitioner No.02.} Thus, “inviting” rather than “demanding” participation in PREVENT(ion) was understood to work in a circular relationship between communities and PREVENT officers (or those representing PREVENT). As one participant put it:

“We’ve done talks directly with community groups. We’ve done talks in Mosques ... Not many ... (name of colleague) is doing a group ... I think it’s sort of a presentation tonight with (name of local charity) in (name of location). So, these things do happen. We don’t tend to push it as much because ... you know ... Special Branch going into community groups ... We tend to prefer to be invited because you can send out the wrong message by saying we’re coming; we want to come to you ... So, you know, you do get invitations but that’s more a slow burner ... I don’t think we’ve ever said, nor would we ever say no to anybody who declares an interest. We’ll make the time morning, noon, or night to speak to groups, but unless it’s something really important or following a particular incident like a fall-out from EDL marches, we don’t tend to specifically offer our services, but we are always happy to do it”\footnote{Interview with practitioner No.02.}.

6.2.2 Trusting PREVENT

A crucial factor of whether or not internal and external partners “bought-into” the PREVENT strategy was understood to be based on the notion of trust. Importantly, the level of trust and confidence of partners was correlated with the level of “familiarity” of whoever was representing or spreading awareness of PREVENT,\footnote{Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04.} which in turn, increased trust within ‘personal relations’. Moreover, levels of familiarity were considered against the longevity of occupying a PP position:\footnote{Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 04; 05.}

“I’ll speak from a (name of police constabulary) perspective. The longevity of which I’ve been in post, which is (number) of years, (name of colleague) has been here a bit longer than me, and people like the fact that it’s the same voice, it’s the same person, and if someone’s got a concern, once you’ve done a few case studies with
someone they know that you’re not actually there to arrest someone at six o’clock in the morning if there’s a concern about something.” ¹⁸⁵

“(Name of colleague) has got (name of location), and he’s been on the PREVENT Unit ever since it started - even before it was called PREVENT. So he’s always had (name of location), so he’s got quite a lot of contacts in that area - like universities, colleges, local authorities ... So he’s able to canvas things with key institutions very easily”. ¹⁸⁶

It is interesting to note that common to the participants’ discussions was the fact that levels of trust were correlated not only with radicalisation knowledge(s) or expertise of the individual, but also with the personal demeanour of the officer and social knowledge of communities and institutional partners; what is termed ‘soft power’ (see Innes et al., 2007). Moreover, a heightened level of familiarity was said to allow PREVENT officers to canvas PREVENT within a multi-partnership framework more efficiently and effectively.¹⁸⁷ This was understood as important since specific counter-radicalisation messages were said to often trickle down to Neighbourhood Policing level and be promoted on behalf of the PREVENT team through an internal multi-partnership methodology. Moreover, this mode of operation was considered crucial since it was recognised that Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT) had already established relationships with the communities they serve. Thus, utilising the ‘soft-power’ of Neighbourhood Policing Teams was understood to be a particularly effective way to take PREVENT forward¹⁸⁸ since PREVENT was conceptualised as a fine balancing act between effectively maintaining fragile police/community relations whilst simultaneously spreading counter-radicalisation messages and awareness of PREVENT.¹⁸⁹

“Nationally going out to communities has been really, really hard. And I think what we've done here is ... we’re only a team of (number) ... you’ve got to use an army of helpers out there. So, from a policing perspective, we’ve got our Neighbourhood Policing Teams and that’s how (name of police constabulary) does their policing, it is through their Neighbourhood Policing Teams. So for the sake of argument, if we want to get the message out to say ... the Somali community, there are two Neighbourhood Officers based at (name of university), they’ve got a lot of contacts,

¹⁸⁵ Interview with practitioner No.04.
¹⁸⁶ Interview with practitioner No.01.
¹⁸⁷ Interview with practitioner No.01.
¹⁸⁸ Interview with practitioner No.04.
¹⁸⁹ Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 14.
we use them. If we want to message out the Bangladeshi community in (name of location), we got to the Neighbourhood Policing Teams there”.

“For about four and a half years now, we have had identified Single Points of Contact within our Neighbourhood (Policing) Teams, people such as the Community Cohesion Officers who we engage with, so we engage heavily with them should we need to put out a certain message, and we liaise with them directly, you know? The Neighbourhood Teams and Single Points of Contact are like another arm of PREVENT, because we have the knowledge of PREVENT, they have the contacts. And, we also engage through the IAG’s – Independent Advisory Groups, to get key community members involved in it. So as much as we might not necessarily be there day-to-day, the messaging of this is done at a precautionary level in (name of location) that’s the thing, so it’s proportionate to the make-up”.

“If you haven’t got the buy-in of your Neighbourhood Teams, you really are missing a trick. And, you know, there’s no doubt that a significant part of the security services’ work originates from information that comes from Neighbourhood Teams – that’s a fact. So, although it’s very, very rare, with the help of neighbourhood cops, I’m hoping there’s enough within each team now that something will get flagged up with enough experience compared to say, two or three years ago ... there’s enough visitors to the door, whether it’s an email through or a call: “have a look at this”...”

When discussing the importance of trust as linked to overt engagement, participants’ accounts also provide enlightening perspective on the “communities defeat terrorism” rhetoric that is ubiquitous in government policy. Whilst all participants were sanguine about the potential of communities defeating terrorism, such a pronouncement was understood to be utopian. One participant succinctly summed up the situation thus: “This idea ... this great joined-up working with the community isn’t there and I can’t ever see the day that that happens. It happens on a small-scale with certain individuals within a community”. Rather than approaching communities directly or vice versa, it was suggested community engagement happened far more prevalently with key trusted individuals both internally and externally and

190 Interview with practitioner No.04.
191 Interview with practitioner No.05.
192 Interview with practitioner No.02.
193 Interview with practitioner No.02.
not with “communities” in the broader sense of the term. Utilising key trusted individuals is more akin to the concept of ‘strong network ties’ (Innes et al., 2011; Gravonetter, 1973, 1983) emanating from theories on social networking (Gravonetter, 1973, 1983). In a recent article, Spalek (2014: 832) terms these ties ‘connectors’ – people who are able to negotiate “sameness” and “difference” in order to build relationships with people so as to create environments conductive to implementing counter-terrorism initiatives. For Spalek (2014: 832) ‘connectors’ identifies social connectivity as a dimension to the role of connector. As Spalek (2014: 846) observes, ‘individuals are interacting with wider networks of people and organisations, building bridges and connections. In the context of counter-terrorism, connectors are therefore people who are socially networked, in that they are able to develop purposes of preventing and responding to terrorism’. 

Whilst a direct approach at local community level was certainly not unheard of, it was considered rare. Rather, the emphasis was on engaging with key trusted individuals in the first instance, be that a professional within the health sector, the education sector or society more broadly. The following interview dialogues reflect upon such:

“And you know ... a direct approach to communities like I’ve said wouldn’t be, as such, a last resort because sometimes you go direct to the person themselves ... but you have to tread very carefully and work out, why are you doing it, what are you hoping to gain, what are the downsides, etc. ... Because it is ... it is risky. You say something wrong and you know, a friend’s family might hear in the community and literally ... years of hard work might be undone by you making an unnecessary or uncalled for or undiplomatic move. And ... you know ... literally, within certain areas, it’s taken months, if not years, to regain trust ... so in your communities you’ve got to go very carefully”.

“You do get direct contact, for instance, (name of colleague) yesterday met a councillor in (name of location) who is Muslim - really good guy, done a lot of work with him, I have an awful lot of trust in him and he understands PREVENT ... and he has come forward with a number of things to discuss with regard to an individual

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194 One participant did voice concerns regarding the problematic nature of unofficial and unelected “community leaders” representing community preference and concern.
195 Interview with practitioner No.02.
196 Interview with practitioner No.02.
197 Interview with practitioner No.02.
or an incident or community tensions or whatever. And it’s about using those key individuals within a community”.¹⁹⁸

Moreover, common to all participants’ accounts was the fact that PREVENT relies heavily on key trusted individuals both internally and externally in order to push awareness of PREVENT (or specific counter-radicalisation messages) out to the community (type 2 co-production) when a direct policing approach was considered too risky (as measured against fragile police/community relations). The emphasis was on “spreading the word” using key trusted individuals as partners within communities to promote an understanding of PREVENT¹⁹⁹ or canvas specific counter-radicalisation messages:

“If you need to go and speak to communities, you’d usually try and identify a trusted person within the community, as opposed to just going into the community. Because you know, you’ve got to be aware of the effect on an individual in a community if you start ... “Oh, we’ve got an individual, we’ve got concerns about A, B, C” ... you know, you’ve got to understand the community the police have came in asking questions about, it would be suicidal ... because ... you know ... that community would never ... and understandably ... would never come forward. So if you’ve got a particular issue, you’ve got to delicately try and find somebody within the community”.²⁰⁰

“It’s almost a hypercritical way that I’m looking at it. I want their help but I can’t go to them. And, I think what you have to do is, you have to go through your partners. You go through some key individuals within partnerships, we do have some key contacts and you try and spread the message that way because you can’t just go around saying, “Right PREVENT is going to do a presentation”, because people will become scared, they won’t get on board and you create the complete wrong atmosphere”.²⁰¹

“At the end of the day, if I want to speak to Bangladeshi community, “Who are you?” “Special Branch”. And you can see where that goes. But if that message is delivered by a local police officer, somebody they know and trust, or likewise, someone from

¹⁹⁸ Interview with practitioner No.04.
¹⁹⁹ Interview with practitioner No.04.
²⁰⁰ Interview with practitioner No.02.
²⁰¹ Interview with practitioner No.04.
the local health authority, or local housing group who work with vulnerable tenants, who understand our world, they can make that link and join up that information. That’s how you get through to the communities, because it’s almost too risky to go directly to them because you can alienate them big time, because the suspicions are there, we’ll see stuff in the media and it’s out of context and you’ve got to make sure the message is clear and accurate”. 202

Moreover, much like research by Innes et al. (2011: 37-38), key trusted individuals were considered to have a core repository of ‘soft’ skills that are needed to be able to network, coordinate and mobilise interested actors in an effective manner. In this way, type 2 co-production and protective intervention modes proposed by Innes et al. (2011) were understood to be increasing interrelated when conceptualised against the notion of trust as linked to risk.

Whilst a direct approach from individual community members203 was said to happen far less frequently than co-production with trusted key individuals, nevertheless, the emphasis was one of being “familiar”, “open” and “honest”204 in order to increase the likelihood of individuals simply “sharing concerns”. One benefit of working within a PREVENT team with far fewer staff was that engagement could become “personalised”205 thus bringing a heightened level of openness and honesty to multi-partnership counter-radicalisation. In turn, this was said to minimise the potential of individuals from being deterred from sharing concerns because of a complex (and unfamiliar) policing environment.206 This can be seen in the following interview dialogues:

“We’re trying to emphasise as well that it’s not a case that we will be arresting this individual that they’re asking us to consider. It is just about being honest and open, and that they’re not given a switchboard number, they have a personal telephone number into this office so they’re not going to have to explain everything over again and possibly lost in translation from what they’re saying to where it ends up. They do get the full package because we’re a small team, so we can do that with them. It takes time, but if you’ve had an experience in the past with the police, it can sort of, put you on your guard with what you might want to share”. 207

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202 Interview with practitioner No.04.
203 This approach to counter-radicalisation coincides with type 1 co-production – collaborative working wherein the community seeks police involvement to tackle a problem (Innes et al., 2011: 90).
204 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05.
205 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.
206 Interview with practitioner No.02.
207 Interview with practitioner No.03.
“Things that come in from the community, like ... I visited on a couple of occasions an Imam in (name of location) through my NBM208 and he knows me that well. He knows that if he has a problem in his Mosque, he’ll ring my direct number, so sometimes it doesn’t have to come in through an NBM team ... It’s getting yourself known and getting that confidence that they know they can ring us and I’ll ring him back” 209

“...Going back to the safeguarding issue with getting the buy-in with people who work in that sphere, it’s making yourself visible. You get the trust by talking very openly about what you’ll do with the information that they give ... And I think that it’s perfectly understandable why some partner agencies might be reluctant to pick up the phone, you know? It’s a very confidential area to report somebody in. You have to have trust”, 210

Whilst working in a low risk PREVENT area with fewer staff offered some operational benefits, participants also voiced certain disadvantages. When discussing the importance of trust in relation to a multi-agency partnership approach, several participants discussed the issue of high employee turnover within other institutions. It was suggested that high employee turnover within key partner institutions had the potential to detrimentally effect already formed relationships.211 Such relationships were said to be heavily reliant on trust and thus often take a significant amount of time to develop.212 Subsequently, high staff turnover within other institutions made it (potentially) more difficult for PREVENT, as an agenda, to remain on the “radar” of partner institutions since trust had to be “worked on” or “won” all over again.213 Thus, regular engagement with key partners was accorded importance in order to maintain a high level of commitment to the PREVENT agenda through making new recruits within partner institutions aware of PREVENT.214 Moreover, regular engagement was considered important since a multi-partnership approach was understood to be, at times, dependent upon fragile

208 NBM is an acronym for Neighbourhood Beat Manager.
209 Interview with practitioner No.01.
210 Interview with practitioner No.02.
211 An emphasis on the term potential is important since there was no suggestion that high employee turnover automatically leads to relationship breakdown with key partner institutions.
212 Interview with practitioner No.05.
213 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05.
214 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05.
“goodwill”\textsuperscript{215} in an institutional environment already littered with competing demands and organisational objectives.\textsuperscript{216} The following interview transcripts outline this situation:

“The thing about PREVENT, PREVENT is about relationships and they take time to build up. And for me, as much as you know, turnover of staff, you’ve got to be mindful with this, especially in probably in our sort of area where we have no statutory partners who are full-time on this because we’re not a funded area, so we’re relying on partners’ goodwill as well to identify somebody or a number of people to engage on this agenda. You’ve got to go in and really sort of … softly softly approach, but once you have those initial rapports … those partnerships … you do tend to keep them on board … But again … it’s the effect of the relationships with individuals … but if you change those staff it’s very difficult to try and build that up over quick period … So it’s very much effective relationships (that) will maintain this agenda within partners and communities”.\textsuperscript{217}

“The initial approach is there but afterwards you keep a link because a lot of people, whether it be an organisation with a high turnover of staff who are coming through, or the recent … sort of … situation with a lot of cuts going through organisations, they’re losing a lot of staff, so they’ve got to juggle their own resources. So, you have to keep that engagement going. So it’s making sure people who are coming into new roles are aware of the strategy”.\textsuperscript{218}

There is one final dynamic to the research data regarding the notion of trust. PREVENT officers tended to equate trust with openness, honesty and familiarity which then lead to legitimacy and confidence in PREVENT as an agenda. However, when this provisional theme was tested against participants in interrelated CT roles, some participants tended to equate trust with being directly responsive to community concern in a disruptive fashion.\textsuperscript{219} ‘Disruption’ goes to the heart of the second formal aim of PREVENT to ‘disrupt and/or respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it’ (HM Government, 2011b: 7). Public acceptance of disruption as a legitimate outcome of PREVENT activity was mentioned by various participants who occupied interrelated CT positions.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} Interview with practitioner No.05.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Interview with practitioner No.05.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Interview with practitioner No.05.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Interview with practitioner No.03.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Interview with practitioner(s): No.07; 08; 09; 14.
\end{itemize}
Accordingly, disrupting the risk of radicalisation through heightened levels of resilience\textsuperscript{220} was seen as a central concern in order to build trust within local communities:\textsuperscript{221}

“There’s incidences that have been targeted against particular communities, getting the message out, there is a lot of that, in how serious it’s been taken and if we’ve managed to get anyone to go to court, etc. It’s getting those messages back out that’s a key element of our business”\textsuperscript{222}

“The ideology of these extremist groups saps away at your communities and at your cohesion, so clearly there’s a community tension element to the work that we do. And, we will try and quickly identify that where we can; tensions what are brewing in the community. So that might be as simply as making sure racist graffiti is removed very quickly and that it is not allowed to take hold. That might mean working with colleges - the local college to make sure that they’re aware of the PREVENT agenda - so if anyone comes into the college espousing extremist views, the staff they’re aware and have the tools to challenge that or that they know who are the specialists to speak to if it’s beyond their remit to be able to that”\textsuperscript{223}

For some participants from interrelated CT roles, there was an emphasis on the importance of community cohesion building - that is, increasing the resilience of communities so that they are less likely to be influenced by extremist views (Innes et al., 2011: 6) when conceptualised against risk and trust. This adds a further layer of complexity to how practitioners within PREVENT relate to and understand risk and trust within CT on the ground.

\textsuperscript{220} For analyses of ‘resilience’ within UK CT, see Hardy (2014); Mythen and Walklate (2014).
\textsuperscript{221} Interview with practitioner No.04.
\textsuperscript{222} Interview with practitioner No.07.
\textsuperscript{223} Interview with practitioner No.08.
6.3 Key Theme 2: PREVENT as Safeguarding

The second key theme which was common to all participants’ accounts was an understanding of the interconnectedness of two PREVENT objectives. Key to realising the second objective of PREVENT, protecting (or supporting) vulnerable people (HM Government, 2011b: 55), was the third objective of PREVENT, institutions. Participants shared the understanding that a key requirement of PREVENT is to forge strategic relationships with those who have “quality ... inter-personal relationships” within communities of concern – teachers, health workers, community groups, higher education staff and Neighbourhood Policing Teams, etc. Such relationships were understood to be important since these bodies were considered to be on the “frontline”. Various participants referred to this as utilising the “army of helpers” – without which, preventing extremism would be increasingly difficult to achieve at local level. Interestingly, the enlistment of expertise was being achieved through an invocation towards “safeguarding” vulnerable individuals. This situation is reflected in the following interview dialogues:

“You’d like to think you could sit here with the millions of people who live here and we’re all going to be nice and friendly and that you would tell us if someone is going off the rails, but life isn’t like that. You’ve just got to hope that the people you’re engaging with to help sort of ... be part of the army out there ... and understand ... not just about PREVENT, but also appreciate the wider concept of safeguarding and making sure we are treating people and looking after those people who are most vulnerable.”

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224 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.
225 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 02.
226 Understanding PREVENT through an invocation towards “safeguarding” was shared by all participants.
227 Interview with practitioner No.02.
"For me, that’s about going to the key people, so we’ll pick on the safeguarding teams, the youth offending teams within local authorities who are working with vulnerable people. Do they understand some of the risks that are out there to young people? And do they feel confident in order to report that in? You’ve got to use your army of helpers, and that goes right up to the communities as well".228

The enlistment of key institutional partners into the governance of PREVENT was understood not so much a passing instrumentalisation, but more as a mode of activation and authorisation that works through what is called “embedding expertise” (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 325-326). Research by de Goede and Simon (2013) suggests that embedding expertise positions frontline professionals as the “eyes and ears” of society in order to “spot and disrupt” radical and suspect behaviour – disruption being the second objective of PP (HM Government, 2011b; see also Innes et al., 2011). Moreover, de Goede and Simon’s (2013) analysis of the Nuansa programme in the Netherlands reported an important transformation in the concept of countering radicalisation: one from an “eyes and ears” ethos to one of “hand and heart”. Much in the same way, participants were fervent that the process of embedding expertise should not be read as an “eyes and ears” tactic. Although semi-professional workers were considered to be on the “frontline”, the emphasis was firmly on a shift in both policy and practice from a perceived focus on encouraging frontline staff to “spot radicals”, to one that promotes a willingness to “signal or share concerns”. Furthermore, a willingness to share concerns around risk was understood in the spirit of “protecting vulnerable people” being drawn into terrorist activity through an invocation of caring for the most vulnerable individuals in the community.229 Moreover, an ethics of care was said to provide partners with a heightened level of understanding regarding radicalisation as a process and not an event.230 Further, an invocation of care was understood to help partners conspicuously reflect upon the fact that, in contrast to PURSUE, PREVENT governs within a ‘pre-criminal’ space.231

6.3.1 Embedding Expertise through Safeguarding

The axis along which embedding expertise works - and in fact, the goal to which PREVENT and internal/external alignments are primarily geared - was understood along a language of

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228 Interview with practitioner No.04.
229 This understanding was shared by all participants.
230 Interview with practitioner No.03.
231 This point was supported by the dialogue of various semi-public professionals and local authority workers.
“safeguarding”. This underscores the intimate and situated nature of the interventions it seeks to achieve (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 328), in addition to deploying a calculus of risk. Moreover, an invocation of safeguarding was understood to reorient rather than displace risk. Whilst most participants acknowledged that the notion of risk has played a role in CT since the morphogenesis of PREVENT, an invocation towards safeguarding was considered beneficial in relation to mainstreaming PREVENT within other sectors. For example, PREVENT, conceptualised as safeguarding, was considered to “soften” the PREVENT strategy and thus partners were more likely to engage with and commit to the PREVENT agenda.232 This was because terms such as “Special Branch”, “terrorism” and “PREVENT” were said to “turn partners off” and/or muddy the link between PREVENT, risk and vulnerability:233

“One thing I’ve learned ... I don’t usually talk about being from SB because people have a preconception, and if you say to people, “Can we discuss this individual, or can we share some intelligence regarding the police, we’re just watching this chap?” ... Both people are going to go ... “We’re not interested in that.” However, if I say to the same person, “Hi, can I share some possible safeguarding issues because we’ve got some real concerns about this guy?” ... they’ll go, “Yeah; what do you want to know?” Exactly the same thing, different language. You get the vibe”.

Thus, re-orientating language towards safeguarding was understood to help embed expertise in order for PREVENT to operate through a multi-partnership approach at local-level:235

“I think we still absolutely use terms like radicalisation, grooming, brainwashing and all the terms that have been used before, but safeguarding is the term that they think best sums up what we do, but also its language that other partners know and understand and we often start talks with ... “This is about extremism and terrorism”, which ... ultimately it is, But to get the buy-in of all the range of frontline services that we give talks to, the safeguarding is the bit that people instantly think, “Argh, I get it”. PREVENT is such a meaningless word, in fact, most people think it’s about crime prevention, sort of ... the people who fit alarms and stuff ... So we’ve moved away from that because it’s not helpful, whereas safeguarding is a word that is used daily by your absolute key partners and people get that. That certainly features more

232 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 05.
233 Interview with practitioner No.04.
234 Interview with practitioner No.04.
235 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.
in our language. So whilst we still talk about the same issues and radicalisation, it’s within the sphere of safeguarding". 236

Interestingly, an invocation towards safeguarding was also seen as somewhat necessary, partly because of misconceptions with the word ‘PREVENT’. 237 Participants acknowledged that the scope of PREVENT had been interoperated too broadly in the past by key partners and communities. 238 It was suggested PREVENT had become understood by some (external) partners as “crime prevention” more broadly rather than counter-radicalisation. Thus, promoting and utilising language based around “safeguarding” was now common practice since safeguarding was considered to best describe PREVENT(ion) work at local level. 239

The language of safeguarding was also seen to have an interrelated relationship with trust and risk discussed in the previous section. Much like the blurring between type 1 and type 2 co-production outlined in the previous section, participants suggested that changing terminology and language associated with PREVENT objectives has allowed for “smarter ways of working”. 240 First, understanding PREVENT as an ethics of care was seen to help govern externally through utilising key trusted individuals within the community:

“It’s not just about getting the trust and confidence of partners; it’s also about what we’re doing with the communities. And when going out into the communities, some communities might just put the brick wall up, “We’re not interested, we know what you’re about”... and then how do you get through? You’ve got to then use, not the police, but use your partners in community cohesion, stuff like (name of local charity, 01), (name of local charity, 02), who really know the community and can help sell the message on your behalf to say, “This is a safeguarding issue”...” 241

Second, contextualising the aims of PREVENT within a safeguarding sphere was understood to be more accepting and welcoming to key partners. 242 Third, an invocation towards

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236 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02.
237 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.
238 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.
239 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 05.
240 Interview with practitioner No.05.
241 Interview with practitioner No.04.
242 Interview with practitioner No.05.
safeguarding was understood to help partners conspicuously recognise and assess their own role and responsibilities within the broader PREVENT strategy: 243

“We link PREVENT to a safeguarding approach and using such language is a way we’ve been really successful with partners because ... I remember speaking with someone who is a lecturer at (name of college), we had a chat after a presentation I did ... and he was really well informed on terrorist stuff and he said to me, “Look, we’ve all got a duty of care around safeguarding; whatever our organisation is, we’ve got a duty of care. But never before would I have put safeguarding and counter-terrorism in the same sentence”. And that’s PREVENT!” 244

The relationship between an invocation of care and engaging with institutional partners was increasingly apparent in participants’ discussions around WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness for PREVENT). In very brief terms, WRAP is an interactive and facilitated workshop developed by OSCT (HM Government, 2011b: 57) which invites workers from the education sector, health institutions, youth organisations, local authorities, community groups, etc., to participate in one-day training sessions. In essence, it is a programme tailored towards providing an understanding of how and why various partners might signal concerns around polarisation and radicalisation. Not only does WRAP go to the heart of the third objective of PREVENT, institutions, but as its name suggests, another of its aims is to bring awareness to key partners regarding what PREVENT does and does not entail. 245 Of note, PREVENT police can lead WRAP training, however both internal and external partners can also deliver their own WRAP training within identified spaces of risk. 246 Due to the low number of staff within the PREVENT team (compared to a priority-funded PREVENT area), local authorities had been encouraged to deliver WRAP themselves. 247 As one participant put it:

“It’s quite a good product, but it’s about three hours long and trying to get local authority to sit down for three hours when they’ve got quite a lot of things to do is hard. So, each authority has been given it here to try and train their own staff themselves, and ... we’re all trainers in WRAP, but obviously, it takes up time. So if we were to do every WRAP session you’d never see us again.” 248

243 Interview with practitioner No.05.
244 Interview with practitioner No.04.
245 Interview with practitioner No.06.
246 Interview with practitioner No.07.
247 Interview with practitioner No.01.
248 Interview with practitioner No.01.
It is perhaps unsurprising then that when the data sample was extended to document the accounts of key individuals who occupied inter-connecting CT roles, the relevance of WRAP was evident in their accounts of PREVENT at local-level. WRAP was understood as a safeguarding tool with the following objectives: (1) bringing together organisations that are regularly and routinely in contact with potentially vulnerable individuals; (2) instilling confidence in key partner institutions and making sure people are aware of the connections between vulnerability and radicalisation; (3) allowing partners to understand where and how to pass relevant information on; (4) allowing partners to more conspicuously reflect upon their own organisational role within PREVENT; and (5) making sure that the concept of PREVENT is correctly understood. The following interview dialogues reflect upon the concept of WRAP at local level:

“WRAP training comes across as very much a safeguarding tool, and the ethos for me when we’re delivering the WRAP is around … “This is your normal day job; you’re probably going to work with vulnerable people anyway but this is just another thing to be aware of”. And it is very, very hard to spot, and you might not have any concrete evidence that people are actively involved in extremism or terrorism but if you’ve got people that are arising a suspicion, pass that on ‘cause that might be part of the bigger jigsaw”.

“There are quite a few good clips on the WRAP with actual individuals that have recognised people who are potentially being radicalised and seeing what’s done about it. So then people can look at that and think “…Well yeah, I can now see where my role fits; I can see where my organisation’s role fits within PREVENT …” And it’s not just about the police, it’s about taking care of our community - and that’s partner agencies, third sector partners/agencies and the community”.

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249 Interview with practitioner No.09.
250 Interview with practitioner No.09.
251 Interview with practitioner No.11.
252 Interview with practitioner No.07.
253 Interview with practitioner No.14.
254 Interview with practitioner No.08.
255 Interview with practitioner No.08.
256 Interview with practitioner No.14.
6.3.2 “Radicalisation: Another Form of Abuse”

Common to all participants’ accounts was the fact that a language of safeguarding effaces connotations of punitive intervention, evoking instead a questionably more palatable brand of normalisation. Participants suggested that depoliticising the radicalisation process has helped to embed the principles of PREVENT within existing processes for safeguarding vulnerable individuals whilst also enabling workers from key institutions to understand the parallels between PREVENT and existing support and intervention processes (see also HM Government, 2011b: 84). Much like official CHANNEL documentation which states ‘radicalisation should be considered as another form of abuse in a similar way to exploitation, intimidation and coercion’ (NHS England, 2014: 3), participants drew equivalences between PREVENT(ion) and existent mechanisms in place to protect vulnerable people from alcohol or substance abuse or engaging in crime.257 Key to PP was providing partners with a layer of context as to why individuals may be drawn into terrorism through the notion of “vulnerability”. Moreover, vulnerability to radicalisation was promoted in a similar manner to other forms of abuse since partners could make sense of, and relate to, such terminology:258

“Everyone gets the safeguarding message. And again, the other phrase I use is “radicalisation is another form of abuse”. So you look at the abuse that happens in terms of vulnerable adults, vulnerable children - the process of PREVENT is exactly the same. So within communities we’re asking our key partners to look out for those vulnerable people who might be a subject of abuse – PREVENT’s just another film to put into that process”.259

“What we’ve always said is that it is just about safeguarding people against abuse in terms of childhood, things that would cause alarm bells in terms of protecting children, protecting vulnerable adults, domestic abuse, and just trying to see radicalisation through the same lens ... That it is a form of abuse, it is someone who might be getting groomed, getting involved in something that they wouldn’t have

257 This understanding was shared not only by PREVENT officers but also participants who occupied interrelated CT roles.
258 Interview with practitioner No.05.
259 Interview with practitioner No.04.
dreamed of doing at the beginning of the process, some of those key points that may have affected that change or how people might have acted to bring someone from their initial viewpoint to a much more extreme one”.

Furthermore, the concept of “vulnerability” through a language of risk was understood to depoliticise and simplify radicalisation as a concept for PREVENT officers:

“When somebody’s referred in I will look at what the problem is. So, is it because they’re just vulnerable, or is it because they’ve said something, or done something overtly, or have they mentioned a group, or have they suddenly just changed appearance or religion? You’ve got to look at it all when it comes in but generally those are my questions that I go through. I have to simplify things because it can get very, very complicated”.

Participants also provided perspective on the most recent guidelines published by the Home Office (2012d) which lists 22 vulnerability factors (referred to as Extreme Risk Guidance 22 or ERG22), as linked to risk. Overall, participants recognised that understanding the risk of radicalisation as linked to vulnerability has provided useful and practical operational benefits, however some participants voiced certain concerns regarding the formal structure of ERG22. Participants emphasised the importance of treating vulnerable people on an individual basis rather than operationalising a blanket attribution of risk assessment. Moreover, since participants emphasised the potential and partially unknowable futures of radicalisation, concerns were voiced regarding the rigid, audit-like framework of ERG22.

“There’s the formal risk guidance ... the ERG22 risk guidance which is a formal thing ... but I guess ... I’ve never really got my head around it; a lot of is common sense as to what ticks the box. I think the ERG thing is a bit like ... you know these questionnaires you see, “Are you an alcoholic?” And then you look down this check box and it gives you some crazy thing. Just ’cause you put some ticks in some boxes, to me, isn’t really ... it’s a bit artificial. But I think by chatting to people sitting round a table, which is what we’re trying to do, get everyone’s heads together, you know ... see if anyone has any contact with that individual, or if we need to make contact.

260 Interview with practitioner No.07.
261 Interview with practitioner No.01.
262 Interview with practitioner No.05.
263 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 05.
if its deemed necessary to do that. That’s a far better way of assessing risk rather than making these judgement calls by putting these ticks in boxes or putting a number in which ... you know ... risk will be different for you as it is for me. But based on somebody’s assessment or somebody’s number ... you know ... you can go in many different ways ... somebody could be risk assessed as high when they’re actually low or vice versa”.264

Lastly, whilst the terms “vulnerable”, “vulnerability” and “safeguarding” were understood to simplify and depoliticise the concept of radicalisation to the point where key partners could reflect upon their own role within PREVENT strategy,265 this morphogenesis in PREVENT(ion) was not viewed as an entirely smooth one.266 Participants offered the view that the implementation towards a multi-agency partnership approach has taken time to develop,267 particularly in relation to the NHS.268 Several respondents discussed having to change the “mindset” of key organisational partners in terms of positioning PREVENT as interrelated with their own organisational duties and institutional understandings of risk. This was not least because of the various rigid definitions of “vulnerability” and the required traits an individual must evidence in order to be considered “vulnerable”.269 For instance, participants offered the view that a strict definition of vulnerability had been indoctrinated into the NHS. A specific case that several participants reflected upon was Doctor Bill Abdullah - the man behind the Glasgow Airport attack.270 It was suggested that Doctor Abdullah would not have coincided with any of the safeguarding definitions adopted by the NHS when assessing his level of “vulnerability”, and yet he was radicalised to the point of committing a domestic terrorist attack.271 Whilst it was suggested that over time there had been an appreciation of the variations of the term “vulnerability”272 thus allowing for a more harmonious multi-agency approach, some participants voiced concerns regarding the pressure of institutions to work within their own organisational silos because of conflicting interpretations of risk alongside inordinate budget restraint:273

264 Interview with practitioner No.02.
265 Interview with practitioner(s) No.05; 14.
266 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04.
267 This view was shared by all PREVENT officers.
268 Interview with practitioner No.02.
269 Interview with practitioner No.02.
270 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.
271 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.
272 Interview with practitioner No.02.
273 Interview with practitioner No.04.
“I made a note of something in a meeting and I just came across it yesterday; whether we should use the word vulnerable or whether we should use the word susceptible. The issue with vulnerability for me is ... the definition of vulnerability varies. So, I’ll give you a practical example in terms of someone with mental health issues – health will view that person in terms of is it physical or mental vulnerability? My definition of vulnerability would probably not fit either of them. So, I’ll give you my interpretation – it would be the Glasgow doctors because Doctor Abdullah who was behind that one wouldn’t have fit into those two categories and yet he was vulnerable because he was radicalised. But he was a working class man, very intelligent man - I mean, he was a doctor for goodness sake! And yet, he went down the radicalisation process. So was he vulnerable? Answer, yes. But what do we do in terms of that multi-agency partnership around CHANNEL, to make sure that partners appreciate that? ... And that’s where I think the word susceptible is more appropriate. Without trying to confuse the issue, does that open things up and make it a bit of a more broad description? I don’t know what the answer to that is. I don’t know what you might do from a practical PREVENT perspective. If we were to have the likes of Doctor Abdullah who wouldn’t fit into the criteria in terms of vulnerability with health or in terms of the No Secrets document - which is what health work on and their own definition. What we would do with PREVENT; we would take ownership of that individual ... So we have an individual, we know he’s vulnerable, he gets referred in through the CHANNEL process, the partners go, “Nah, sorry, it’s mental health, that’s got nothing to do with us.” So then it’s a case of - what do we do with that individual?”

274 Interview with practitioner No.04.
6.4 Key Theme 3: Risk as Gut Feeling

The final key theme distilled from the interview sessions was an emphasis upon the notion of acting upon individualised instinctive feelings of risk. However, it is important to be clear on what the research data does and does not indicate on this matter. The research data does not suggest that the relationship between preventing radicalisation and risk should be understood exclusively through the notion of gut feeling. Nor does the research data indicate that referrals, made by a referral partner, are operationalised exclusively through social actors (be that internally or externally) acting upon risk as instinctive “feeling”. What the research does indicate is that key partners (e.g. the internal police family, teachers, social and youth workers, civil society, etc.) are encouraged to act on “gut feeling” as linked to individualised risk “feelings” in the absence of radicalisation knowledges(s).

As the following dialogue outlines:

“I think a gut feeling is something ... probably because it is so broad and everybody knows what you mean, because we do talk about theories of radicalisation, some of the concepts are difficult, you know? Getting your head around some of the concepts, being social isolated and all the other things ... that may be talked about but gut feeling is something that everybody understands instantly and it is that catch-all, you know ... “I’ve just got a feeling that something’s wrong” ... and it could be as simple as that. People feel relieved that it is a term that they can completely understand and I don’t have to know what Terrorism Act. S.1 Part 1 is; you know? Stuff like that. The gut feeling is simple language that people know ... “I’ve got a gut feeling that something’s not right”...”

Of note, acting upon instinct in order to reduce risk was understood to be interrelated with the previous two key themes. First, common to all participants’ accounts was that acting on “gut feeling” should be read in correlation with the trust and confidence of partners to “share concerns” about a “vulnerable individual”. As one participant put it:

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275 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04; 14.
276 Acting on gut feeling was encouraged when engaging with partners face-to-face and through PREVENT “products” such as a “Trust Your Instincts” DVD (interview with practitioner No.05).
277 Interview with practitioner No.02.
278 Interview with practitioner No.03.
“We want them to just share that concern that they have at a very early stage if necessary, if they have the confidence to, not necessarily come to us, but to go to a colleague and share that concern. That uneasiness they feel about a subject.”

Second, in a similar way to how PREVENT, understood as safeguarding, has re-oriented risk, acting upon instinct was understood to help simplify understandings of radicalisation by acting upon innate and existential feelings of risk. For instance, gut feeling was understood to be something everyone could relate to since, we all, in some way, navigate the vicissitudes of life through individualised existential feeling(s):

“The last person I referred in was a member of a right-wing group, who was very young and the information given to me was that they weren’t quite happy with the people they were associating with and it was just a gut feeling. They didn’t know anything about this right-wing organisation; it was just a gut feeling that they had that it was just not right. So a little bit of research from us and we thought, ‘Yeah, your gut feeling is probably right, they shouldn’t be associating with those people’. So that was referred into CHANNEL.”

“That’s one thing that we particularly say to people. You might see something and don’t understand why you’re unhappy with it, and again, it’s about that trust and confidence of telling the police and letting them decide whether or not it’s worthy of investigation. I know after the 7/7 bombings they were interviewing some of the people around some of the houses where the bomb factory was, or the house where they were making the bombs, and there was one or two people said, ‘I noticed the tree in the garden started to turn white, and I thought it was a bit strange but I didn’t know why’. So, to them they just had a gut feeling of, ‘It’s a bit weird, I don’t know why, but it doesn’t seem right’. For them there’s no reason to think that there’s a terrorist bomb factory going on and the tree’s been bleached, but they knew something wasn’t quite right.”

Furthermore, in a similar way to the depoliticising effect of the notion of vulnerability towards radicalisation knowledge(s), acting on instinct was seen to depoliticise and simplify the concept

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279 Interview with practitioner No.03.
280 Interview with practitioner No.02.
281 Interview with practitioner No.02.
282 Interview with practitioner No.14.
283 Interview with practitioner No.14.
of radicalisation for partners when considering a PREVENT referral in an environment shaped by juxtaposed understandings of risk:

“I think people have begun to accept and agree that there is slight variations regarding what is a vulnerable individual ... or vulnerability is inevitably going to be different to each individual ... the threshold at which somebody crosses that point of vulnerability into doing something more dangerous and potentially where they pick up the phone and speak to somebody it is going to be different for every individual. I think again, it’s a relatively new thing PREVENT and definitions evolve over time. And I think there might become a meeting of minds but gut feeling ... that is always going to be there and that covers a huge spectrum. And that gut feeling is used in Home Office terminology because that’s the catch-all, the levels of vulnerability, the levels of threat that people perceive may have different thresholds at which concern them, but it still has to be that gut feeling, whether it be the level is 9 out of 10 or 1 out of 10, it still is a gut feeling that something is not quite right”. 284

It was suggested that gut feeling was to be encouraged as an individual risk ‘litmus test’ 285 or “threshold” 286 in the absence of radicalisation knowledge(s). Whether this was with reference to external partners or internal partners, the principle was understood to be the same. As one participant put it, “What we want them to think about is not only their experience in their role but also life in general, to use that as their risk test, you know? Their risk threshold that they feel”. 287 Whilst this may seem indicative of an “eyes and ears” approach i.e. community intelligence generation as linked to the disruption of radicalisation (the first PREVENT objective), rather, acting upon gut feeling was embedded in participants’ accounts of the second PREVENT objective: supporting vulnerable individuals. 288

6.4.1 “It might be nothing, but ...”

When discussing the notion of risk as linked to gut feeling, participants regularly alluded to the strap-line “it might nothing, but ...” 289 The phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” very much embodied the understandings of counter-radicalisation work much in the same way as the

284 Interview with practitioner No.05.
285 Interview with practitioner No.03.
286 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05.
287 Interview with practitioner No.03.
288 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04; 05.
289 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 01; 02; 03; 05.
phrase “radicalisation is another form of abuse”. When discussing engagement with both internal and external partners, participants reiterated the importance of implanting the phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” into the mindset of key institutional partners. Contextualising to key partners what is meant by the term “it might be nothing, but ...” whilst simultaneously building the trust and confidence of partners to act upon a feeling of uneasiness was seen to be a key undertaking for PP:

“So it’s very useful both for us, but especially for reporting agencies and we often end our talks with “it may be noting, but ...” which you have seen on some of the talks we do. And there’s still a huge number of calls that come in ... sort of almost apologetically ... “I don’t want to trouble you, but ...” But it is that gut feeling, you know... something isn’t quite right ... so it is very useful”.

“It’s not a motto for PREVENT, it’s something I’ve come up with, OK? I pinched it from the MET because that was part of an advertising campaign they used before the Olympics with regard to getting people to be eyes and ears basically, and that’s not really the PREVENT agenda but, you know ... suspicious packages, people acting strange, all this stuff; you know ... don’t be afraid to report it to the conventional hotline etc., etc. But for me, and everything you do has to be focused around trust and confidence, so we go back to the doctors and we’ve given them the phrase. If they can leave the presentation with “I’m sure it’s nothing, but ...” in the back of their mind, that hopefully gives them the trust and confidence in terms of what we’re trying to do with PREVENT. And no matter how little, no information is insignificant because we say a lot of the time, it’s the smallest bit which can complete the picture, and you think, “Actually, that makes sense - now we can go to the where we need to with this information regarding this person”. So ... it’s pretty much a local thing, there’s nothing like it nationally. I think it would be great if it was adopted nationally”.

Moreover, it was suggested the phrase allowed partners to more contextualise PREVENT within a ‘pre-criminal’ space thus separating the operations of PREVENT from PURSUE. It was suggested that “it might be nothing, but ...” as linked to “gut feeling” allowed partners
to situate PREVENT at the “bottom-end” of a security sphere rather than conceptualising the objectives of PREVENT against high-level security threats:295

“Key is getting that report in and a much lower level, the bottom stage, the what ifs, the gut feeling, that if someone is fairly far on we would have already had that report, and then it wouldn’t necessarily be PREVENT because they might be well into the criminal sphere. But it’s just giving people the trust and confidence at the bottom end to report it in”. 296

“Partners phone in and we have a catchphrase that we’ve got "I’m sure it’s nothing, but...” And they’re phoning up using that phrase because they understand the concept of PREVENT - they have a concern about a vulnerable individual and they’re not quite sure what to do with it”. 297

However, as can be seen in the above dialogue acting on gut feeling through the motto, “it might be nothing, but...” should not be read in isolation from trust but is increasingly dependent on trust in order for the referral process to commence through a willingness of partners and communities to simply share concerns.298 The emphasis was on sharing “a feeling of uneasiness” at an early stage - be that with the police or a work colleague299 - if institutional partners (and individuals with the local community) had the trust and confidence to do so. The following interview except outlines the interrelatedness of trust and instinctive feelings of risk:

“We’re not saying it is definitely going to be terrorism or extremism, it might be drugs for instance, but if you have, for whatever reason, that feeling inside that suggests “I don’t know what it is but there’s just something not quite right with this person” ... that you have the confidence to contact your local police, somebody at work through your local partners or the PREVENT team”. 300

It was also suggested “it might be nothing, but...” was helping to unite Neighbourhood Policing Teams and Special Branch in a more harmonious and co-productive relationship301 -

295 Interview with practitioner No.05.
296 Interview with practitioner No.02.
297 Interview with practitioner No.04.
298 An emphasis on gut feeling as linked to both trust and risk was common to all PREVENT police officers and most of the participants from interrelated CT roles.
299 Interview with practitioner No.03.
300 Interview with practitioner No.05.
301 Interview with practitioner No.4.
a CT methodology largely unheard of in the not so distant past. Several participants suggested the phrase, “it might be nothing, but ...” was, in a metaphorical sense, “opening doors”, with Neighbourhood Policing Teams more likely to engage with the PREVENT team through an appreciation and understanding of the phrase “it might be nothing, but ...”\textsuperscript{302} Moreover, the internal policing family were actively encouraged to act around the notion of gut feeling in the absence of radicalisation knowledge(s):

> “Police officers act an awful lot on instinct, hunches, experience, and you know, we actively encourage them to act as such around PREVENT. Because there is no definitive rule book that says ... when you become radicalised this is what you’re going to do, this is how you’re going to behave, this is what you’re going to say, this is the sort of materials you’re going to have in your house. That isn’t there - it could literally be anything. So yeah, it’s a massive thing - hunches, instinct, experience”\textsuperscript{303}

Furthermore, acting on gut feeling was understood to be helping Special Branch policing shake its reputation as a “secret squirrel”\textsuperscript{304} and operate in a much more overt fashion. As one participant put it:

> “The world of PREVENT is very much the overt face of Special Branch. Special Branch has always been associated with the secret service, a secret squirrel. What we’ve done with PREVENT is open up doors, so in the office you now get cops phoning up saying, ‘Can I run this past you?’ When I joined you wouldn’t have looked at someone in Special Branch never mind picked up the phone to ask them a question”\textsuperscript{305}

Acting upon instinct was also entwined with the operations of PREVENT in various other ways. First, acting on instinct was accorded importance within risk management protocols post-referral. Various participants suggested that instinctive feeling should work alongside standardised risk assessment models, for example ERG22, in a complementary fashion.\textsuperscript{306} One participant summed up this situation thus:

\textsuperscript{302}Interview with practitioner No.04.
\textsuperscript{303}Interview with practitioner No.14.
\textsuperscript{304}Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 05.
\textsuperscript{305}Interview with practitioner No.04.
\textsuperscript{306}Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 05.
“I think you’ve got to have something that’s standardised, so we all stick to sort of ... the same guidance ... but for me the ERG22 is useful if you do have someone within CHANNEL, that you can continually monitor them against it, and whether they are increasing in threat or whether it is lowering. So again, its national, I think you’ve still got to go with your gut instinct and your personal engagement with an individual.”

Second, acting upon instinct was deemed important because of time itself. Since deliberation takes time, the quicker the decision the lesser the risk and vice versa. Communities and partners were encouraged to “share a concern” at an early stage if they had a gut feeling in the absence of radicalisation knowledge(s). The emphasis was on promoting a willingness to share concern(s), thus allowing the police to “make the call” through risk management post-referral; this as opposed to individuals trying to assess the situation and/or work their way through it conspicuously, since by that time the progression towards radicalisation and/or extremism might have gone “too far down the road”.

As one participant put it:

“Don’t try and work out whether that individual is going to go on to become a terrorist because there’s so much else before that. We’re hoping that we’ve caught it at an early stage, if it is, but don’t try and come up with the solution or the answer - let other people consider it.”

Lastly, a willingness to share concern was also being encouraged at the earliest stage possible since participants equated deliberation with the breakdown of previous missed opportunities. By promoting the phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” the preference was firmly on dealing with an abundance of referrals rather than missing a potentially crucial opportunity to intervene and offer support to a radicalised (or potentially radicalised) individual.

6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a conceptual analysis of three key themes that emerged from the interview data: risk and trust; PREVENT as “safeguarding”; and risk as gut feeling. Participants’ accounts of PREVENT demonstrate a significant change in CT methodology from a threat-centric model to an ‘overt’ CT capacity. Importantly, participants offered the view that new open ways of working cannot be divorced from the notion(s) of trust/confidence if PREVENT is to be successful in gaining a ‘rich picture’ of radicalisation risk at local level. Thus, this chapter has provided perspective on what was considered to be operationally beneficial (and vice versa) with regard to inter-organisational partnerships, something the PREVENT strategy gives surprisingly sparse attention to (see HM Government, 2011b).

Whilst local authorities and semi-public professionals were considered a crucial component of counter-radicalisation on the ground - as connoted by the phrase “utilising an army of helpers” - the findings highlight certain ambiguities regarding the operationalisation of PREVENT as a smooth top-down governance structure. Whilst a multi-partnership approach towards counter-radicalisation was considered imperative, the findings indicate that in a geographical area with no direct funding for statutory partners, multi-partnerships at local level should not be simply assumed. Hence, how PREVENT was “sold” as a “product” to targeted key partners.

The chapter has also provided perspective on the “communities defeat terrorism” rhetoric that has become ubiquitous in government policy. Whilst direct engagement with communities was one method operationalised at local level, practitioners accounts are indicative of engaging far more prevalently with key trusted individuals in order to cascade awareness of PREVENT and/or specific counter-radicalisation messages. This is because direct engagement was understood to carry a degree of risk when conceptualised against fragile police/community relations.

The chapter has also highlighted how PREVENT has become entirely re-conceptualised through changes in terminology and language. In order to achieve the second and third objective of PREVENT, PP has been reconfigured through an invocation towards “safeguarding” vulnerable individuals: hence, how radicalisation was understood as “another form of abuse”. Ultimately, an ethos of safeguarding was understood to have a profoundly depoliticising effect upon the operations of PREVENT which offered significant advantages, particularly regarding how key partners conspicuously assessed their own role within the PREVENT strategy.
Finally, participants’ accounts highlight the importance of acting upon “gut feeling” and “instinct” as linked to risk in the absence of radicalisation knowledges(s). The phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” was understood to proffer practical advantages, specifically the development of internal and external multi-partnerships. Moreover, acting on intuitive feeling was interrelated with the concept of “trust”, “supporting vulnerable individuals” and a “willingness to share concerns”. Lastly, the objective of promoting the strap-line “it may be nothing, but ...” was to implant the phrase into the individual and organisational mindset of key institutional partners in the hope of contextualising the PREVENT strategy as governing within a ‘pre-criminal’ space.

Chapter 7

Comparatives between Research Findings and Literature

7.1 Introduction and Chapter Organisation
The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse the key findings of the research outlined in the preceding chapter. Critically, the research findings are considered, measured and contrasted against dispositif and reflexive risk, as explored in chapters 3 and 4. Comparatives between research findings and current literature will then be drawn upon in order to crystallise conclusions and thoughts for future research in the final chapter. As a caveat, there is no conclusion provided within this chapter since the final chapter shapes the research findings into a final thoughts paradigm. An outline for this chapter is produced below:

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7.2 Key Theme 1: Risk and Trust

7.2.1 Reading overt PREVENT Policing through the Risk Society

The research findings make clear that the political power of PP is not immediately structured in terms of the hegemonic role of the state. PP is dependent upon a complex set of relations between state and non-state authorities, upon infrastructural powers, and upon the activities of
authorities who do not form part of the formal or informal state apparatus (Rose, 1999: 15). Such bodies and practices frequently reside outside, or parallel to, state institutions and thus their sum total amounts to a ‘new regime of governing’, where ‘traditional’ government structures have become sub-ordinate (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 556). Thus, PREVENT tasked as “joint responsibility” marks a departure from traditional forms of government. Government is associated with notions of centralised, sovereign state authority, possessing constitutional powers (those institutions and agents charged with governing); ‘governance’ tends to be associated with more informal, decentralised and pluralistic decision-making structures (the modes and manner of governing); and governing to the act of governing itself (Griffin, 2012: 210). Accordingly, multi-agency PREVENT(ion) can be understood through the ‘multi-lateralisation’ of auspices and providers that constitute the modern security assemblage, thus eschewing the traditional one-dimensional security dichotomy (Dupont, 2004).

In light of the above observations, PP might be thought of as “a product” of the late modern condition itself, in line with ‘reflexivity’ explored in chapter 4. There it was argued that the political landscape of a reflexive modernity extends from, and disrupts, traditional political structures (Borne, 2006). Importantly, an overt PP architecture might be seen as indicative of a general shift towards system-induced reflexivity (Giddens) as well as individualised reflexivity (Beck). Thus, the relationship between PP and reflexive modernity addresses two levels of sub-politics: hence examining Beck and Giddens’ work synonymously in the following discussion. As Borne (2010: 71-72) notes (on sub-politics), ‘within reflexive modernity the first is the level which represents an opening up of governance processes through partnership working. The second level of sub-politics operates at the individual level in the form of participants of the scheme’.

Although Beck constructs a developmental model of modern societies in which tensions of classical modernity pave the way for reflexive modernity, reflexivity is as much a part of reflexive social systems (or reflexive culture) as it is of individual cognition (Webb, 2006: 35; see inter alia Giddens, 1991). As Giddens (1991: 20) articulates, institutional reflexivity is ‘the regularised use of knowledge about circumstances of social life as a constitutive element in its organisation of transformation’. In this regard, institutional reflexivity is linked to re-evaluation: a social ‘activity’ is reconsidered and refined in perpetuum via the use of information relating to that activity (Giddens, 1994b: 86). To put it differently, reflexivity is ‘the circularity of social knowledge’, and within this paradigm exist

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316 The third objective of PREVENT is indicative in this respect.
reflex(ive) responses by individuals and by institutions (Ferguson, 1997: 225). The re-evaluative element of PP can be seen throughout the previous chapter, for instance, PREVENT understood as “safeguarding”.

Second, a reflexive system (or institutional reflexivity), generates an output as a function of an input. The establishment of reflexive systems in late modernity is best considered as an acculturation process that requires a new discipline among the carrying subjects (Webb, 2006: 35). This critical perspective can be summarised in a twofold question: what is the impact of a security device on the relationship between the users and their activity, and between the users and the institution? (Lianos, 2003: 420). Much like Rasmussen’s (2001: 298) observations on NATO, the research findings suggest PP defines itself by the constructive character by which it has set a new security agenda through an overt multi-partnership (CT) approach. For example, whilst it was recognised that means testing the success of PP is an increasingly difficult task (largely as result of PREVENT governing within a ‘pre-criminal’ space), it was suggested the success of PP might be gauged by the amount and standard of partner referrals.317

“Here we’ve doubled our referrals from 2012/2013. And success is a really hard thing to measure, you know? I might sit here and think we’ve been really successful, but what evidence have I got of that? It’s a hard one to measure what you’ve prevented ... and one of the ways I think you can do that is by looking at the referrals that are coming in from partners”. 318

Third, an important part of reflexivity is the self-awareness brought about by reflection on one’s ability to construct one’s own terms of existence (Rasmussen, 2001), or as Beck puts it, ‘the radicalisation of modernity leads to a self-confrontation, self-delegitimation and self-transformation of instrumental rationality’ (Beck, 2009a, [2007]: 198-199). In this way, reflexivity is not only relevant for a number of new security issues, reflexivity has the potential to transform the security agenda (Rasmussen, 2004: 394) because of risk’s ‘origin in decision-making’ (Beck, 1999c: 50) in the context of a certain political project.319 This redefinition is a self-conscious break with the past and forms the basis for the construction of a new praxeology of security. To put it differently, ‘methods’ of government transform with the times; what Beck (1994b: 35) terms the ‘politics of politics’. Importantly, Beck (1994b: 34-36) distinguishes

317 Interview with practitioner No.04.
318 Interview with practitioner No.04.
319 This is what Beck (1992a: 46) terms ‘symbolic politics’.
between ‘rule-directed politics’ and ‘rule-altering politics’, of which PP through a multi-agency framework exemplifies the latter. This is a type of politics one might refer to as constructivist as it seeks to redirect policy by changing the entire conception of the environment of action (Rasmussen, 2001: 299). Indeed, one of Beck’s central ideas is that constructivism is not only a philosophy of science but also a characteristic of our times. PP can be seen as being in a time of re-construction since the organisation of PP is actively reconstructing the terms of its own existence through overt CT engagement. A participant alluded to the (re)constructive character of PP when discussing external CT engagement:

“So, the guy stood at the front said, “Right, this is your slot - what would you like to say now?” And my opening gambit was, “I work in PREVENT - has anyone heard of PREVENT?” At which point all heads nodded ... And I had a bit of a hallelujah moment there because as a key partner, they had their training, they recognised, remembered and understood and that was fantastic.”

However, since multi-agency partnerships had to be “worked on” or “won” (in large part dependent upon trust), the participants’ accounts suggest PP might be read as “under construction” rather than construction as “complete”.

Fourth, PP invites a discourse of reflexivity through individuals taking up certain socially acceptable positions and behaviours and rejecting those categorised as dangerous or deviant (Hacking, 1990). In this sense, reflexivity is developed into a communicative competence through confronting risk as a matter of personal responsibility and institutional responsibility (Webb, 2006: 35):

‘I think there was a lot of society that never recognised the fact that they had key role to play in PREVENT and preventing radicalisation. A lot of people looked at PREVENT and thought, “that’s the police, MI5, their job - what on earth do I have to do with that?” After the training they can see what their role is; they can see why they should become involved’.

“We had a referral from a psychiatrist who was dealing with a patient, went to see his line manager, his line manager had been on a WRAP course, understood it all, got on the phone and said, “Can we have a discussion?” That for me was a major

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320 Interview with practitioner No.04.
321 By Giddens’ own admission, he uses the term ‘structural reflexivity’ rather than ‘reflexive modernisation’ since, for him, the latter connotes completed structuration.
322 Interview with practitioner No.14.
step forward with health because when you think of patient/doctor confidentiality ... But that person was thinking outside the box ‘cause he immediately identified that he potentially posed a real risk and needed help”.323

In this sense, PP is indicative of Beck’s cultural relativist approach. As Beck notes, risks ‘are now no longer thought of as arbitrators but as protagonists in the confrontation, which is enacted in terms of projections (Beck, 1995: 92, emphasis added). However, contextualising partners’ roles within PREVENT, at both individual and institutional level (through WRAP for instance), also coincides with a softening of Beck’s writings in which he seeks to integrate cultural relativism and natural-scientific objectivism; what Beck calls ‘a sociological perspective’ (Beck, 1995: 76). As Beck points out, certain risks come to the centre stage since they are:

‘Symbolically mediated. Symbols that touch a cultural nerve and cause alarm, shattering and making comprehensible the unreality and hyper-reality of hazards in everyday life, gain a key significance in the abstractness, imperceptibility and impalpability of the process of devastation kept alive by the advanced industrial hazards’ (Beck, 1995: 47).

Fifth, recall how overt CT engagement was accorded importance in order to “inform and reassure communities about PREVENT activities”.324 One way of getting partners “on-board” was through de-mystifying common (mis)conceptions about PREVENT via reassurance policing.325 This is being achieved through open methods of working which informs both internal and external partners what PREVENT is, and it importantly, what it is not:

“PREVENT really has two principle sides to its work - one is the frontline liaison training workshops with frontline staff informing what PREVENT is and just as importantly what it isn’t”.326

Moreover, the reassurance element of PP is embedded within the PREVENT strategy which states, ‘PREVENT enables government to effectively communicate its policies in areas of controversy’ (HM Government, 2011b: 47). The PREVENT strategy further adds, ‘in addressing ideological issues, we also need to be very clear about our purpose and method’

323 Interview with practitioner No.04.
324 Interview with practitioner No.02.
325 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 06; 09.
326 Interview with practitioner No.02.
(HM Government, 2011b: 51 [Figure 8.53]). Reassuring communities (more broadly) and institutional partners through de-mystifying the objectives of PP was a key part of participants’ accounts:

“It’s about recognising with communities and bringing them together ... trying to de-mystify the PREVENT extremism agenda to them to make sure some of those concerns that are put across nationally, such as PREVENT as a spying tool or getting communities to inform on themselves ... Work was done in the borough to try and assuage some of those fears.”327

Furthermore, participants’ accounts of ACT NOW also evidence the de-mystifying function of PP. A participant reflected upon such: “[On ACT NOW] it starts a debate, and you’ll always get different answers but it’s trying to explain why things have happened in the past and how we’ve developed over time”.328 The de-mystifying qualities embedded within ACT NOW are also outlined within official ACPO documents, which state: ‘by engaging local communities in the debate about extremism, ACT NOW helps to dispel myths in a policing of extremism context. It puts under the spotlight the procedures and thought processes that the police go through to arrive at vital decisions’.329 Furthermore, participants suggested that certain myths about PP operations have taken a significant amount of time to break down,330 partly as a result of the toxic legacy left by the PREVENT agenda in its original form:

“It’s a question of education and explaining what PREVENT is; what we seek to achieve by having PREVENT. It did get a bad press when it first launched because it was seen, in fact, it was directed towards the Muslim community. And it’s taken an awfully long time to try and break down some of those barriers and explain it’s not about just radicalisation in those communities, it’s not about just terrorists within those communities - it’s about radicalisation and terrorism across the board”.331

In order to make sense of the reassuring and de-mystifying function(s) of PP through a lens of reflexivity, it is necessary to move away from ‘natural-scientific objectivism’ about

327 Interview with practitioner No.09.
328 Interview with practitioner No.01.
329 ACPO (2013b).
330 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 07; 14.
331 Interview with practitioner No.07.
hazards (Beck’s term for the realist approach) and towards a Beckidian ‘weak’ version of social constructivism. In ‘risk society’, Beck notes that there is a difference between ‘a risk itself’ and ‘public perception of it’, commenting further that, ‘it is not clear whether it is the risks that have intensified, or our view of them’ (Beck, 1992a: 55, emphasis in original). Risks are ‘risks in knowledge’ and therefore perceptions of risk and risks themselves ‘are not different things, but one and the same’ (Beck, 1992a: 55). However, as Lupton (1999: 60) observes, in a later article, Beck similarly argues that risks are ‘social constructs which are strategically defined, covered up or dramatised in the public sphere with the help of scientific material supplied for the purpose’ (see Beck, 1996a: 4). De-mystifying common frames of misconception about PREVENT in the public sphere would adhere to Beck’s weak version of social constructivism rather than his realist approach to risk in its primary form.

PP is indicative of the heuristic value of Beck’s concept of self-conscious constructivism in other ways. On the one hand, attempts to increase the legitimacy of both PREVENT officers and the PREVENT strategy through reassurance policing embodies the paradoxical effect of modernisation which Beck alludes to. Paradoxically, attempts to monitor targeted behaviour(s) so as to control future happenings (and increase security) subsequently expose new categories of ‘risk’ because of political decisions. Beck (1992a: 80) terms this ‘the political side effects of civilianisation’s side effects which threaten the continued existence of the democratic political system’. In more simple terms, Beck (1999c: 141) refers to this as the ‘pre-emptive risk trap’. According to Beck (1992a: 80), pre-empting risks paradoxically creates risks which must then be assimilated and harmonised within institutional frameworks since the system is caught in the unpleasant dilemma of either failing in the face of systematically produced hazards or suspending fundamental democratic principles through repressive ‘buttresses’. Institutional systems, Beck (1992b: 137) notes, ‘continually produce frictions, disharmonies and contradictions within and among individual biographies’. Whilst Beck applies his argument at the level of policy decision-making (rather than at individual level), it is possible to apply his argument within other domains. It would seem utilising ‘connectors’ (Spalek, 2014) in order to promote awareness of PREVENT and/or suppress local level risk on the police’s behalf can be read as PP finding itself in the ‘pre-emptive trap’ (Rasmussen, 2006) - that is, managing future risks whilst navigating the many unintended consequences of that action.333

Whilst the pragmatics of a key trusted

332 As Beck (1999c: 141) states, ‘policy-makers become paralysed because every action holds a new risk’.
333 This condition also has connotations of ‘being aboard a careering juggernaut’ (see Giddens, 1990).
individual or a ‘connector’ can, to a degree, be plausibly explained though Beck’s notion of the ‘pre-emptive risk trap’, Beckidian logic also has its limitations when measured against this finding. Specifically, Beck’s affirmative inclination to attribute political reflexivity as rooted in henneneutical voluntarism is problematic. As Mythen (2004) observes, Beck’s concept of ‘individualisation’ through cosmopolitan political realism homogenises both the public’s abilities to negotiate risk information and subsequent environmental behaviour, thus reducing all changes in lifestyle as evidencing reflexivity. However, PP delivered through key trusted individuals should not be read as an inevitable inclination to engagement or a complete transformation of socio-political structures. Rather, the role played by key trusted individuals draws attention to how people respond variably to information received. Accordingly, individualisation bleeds into multi-source biographies rather than positing overt engagement as totalising human experience, which is blanketed by overarching ‘reflexivity’.

Recall from the previous chapter that the PREVENT agenda is understood by practitioners as a “product”. What this suggests is that the PREVENT strategy is understood as having an evaluative element to it. Importantly, as Webb (2006: 36) observes, ‘whilst reflexivity conjures up an image of an incessant contest with self and others in the risk society there is far more to the concept. The reflexive process is inter-subjectivity in the sense that individuals monitor their own and others’ behaviour, not as isolated acts but as instances of shared understanding of how to make sense of a complex life’. This evaluative process, what Elliot (1996) terms ‘reflexive scanning’, can be seen in the participants’ discussions, for example, “bringing awareness around PREVENT”, and “trying to explain how you see it fitting within their roles” At a phenomenological level, such consciousness contributes to the emergence of a particular form of subjectivity - that is, a particular way of thinking about, relating to and situating the self in terms of the broader social and political context within which the self is embedded (Robertson, 2001: 230). As Webb (2006: 36, emphasis added) notes, reflexivity is the ability of the individuals of a social system ‘to reflect on and importantly, evaluate both their conception of the system and their role in it and to choose activities according to their reflexive evaluation’. In this respect, individuals reflexively make, or as the case might be, do not make themselves the subjects of social processes that are regulating social control (Ferguson, 1997). This is because the ‘reflexive individual’ in late modern society is interested in knowledge(s) and thus people always feel compelled to know,

334 Interview with practitioner No.03.
335 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 14.
with reference to some description of risk, what they are doing and why they are doing it (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 98). As Ferguson (1997: 229) puts it:

‘A by-product of pervasive and diffuse contemporary media discourses, the ‘reflexive individual’ is interested in and simultaneously concerned about how they (as individuals) are governed, and the structures that are in place to control them’.

Moreover, reflexivity suggests that their (social actors) monitoring is not just a passive check but is strategic, allowing them to order the rules of interaction and challenge them in doing so (Webb, 2006: 36). Since the “buy-in” of partners had to be “worked on” or “won”, challenge was an accepted element of an overt (multi-partnership) PP approach:336

“There was a person in the audience who was a professional, (who) had a professional background and had gone on to become a councillor, who was challenging PREVENT. By the end of the session I was invited to lunch to discuss PREVENT further with him and by the end of that he was on board ... He could see where we are trying to go with it”.337

Hence, while it is the institutional processes themselves that are governing the management of ‘risk’, individuals as ‘service users’ are reflexively engaged in a proxy evaluation of those services (see Lash and Urry, 1994: 4). That is, ‘in a socially reflexive era, expertise does not remain the sole province of the expert’ (Ferguson, 1997: 229). This is because individuals are (more) knowledgeable about social/policy processes and interventions and they have become increasingly critical and reflexive with reference to them (Lash and Urry, 1994: 4). In this context, the rules of social interaction are not fixed at all and social actors do not have to take them for granted; the rules do not provide the conditions for interaction but are themselves subject of debate (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 614). That is to say, reflexive actors do not have to take their condition for granted (as a fate), but seek to shape their own condition. They actively engage with diverse sources of incoming information flows, which are an inevitable part of survival in a social environment where no role, task or function – indeed no identity (in a Giddeon sense), is fixed (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 614, adapted by the present author). As a participant noted:

336 Interview with practitioner No.03.
337 Interview with practitioner No.03.
“I was asked to speak to 30 doctors a few weeks back in (name of location), and it was at (name of location) and I should have thought, (name of location), 30 doctors, that doesn’t sound quite right, because when I got there ... there was 290. It was every GP in (name of location). So, I thought – “Fantastic! - Here’s an opportunity”. So, I got asked a question from a doctor who said, “We have patients who don’t necessarily want their information shared with the police - you’re saying around PREVENT that we should trust you - with all due respect, why should I trust you?”...” 338

Having to secure the “buy-in” of partners fits with reflexivity as characterised by a loss of control (Beck, 1999c: 139). Ends are no longer believed to be controlled by the means allocated to achieve them. Moreover, because of this lack of control of outcomes, taking a decision becomes a risk in itself. ‘Risks’ writes Beck (1997: 30), ‘always depend on decisions – that is, they presuppose decisions.’ In the risk society since nobody craves ownerships of bads, the logic is no longer based on possession, but avoidance (Mythen and Walklate, 2005). Moreover, it becomes a risk because it is based on a scenario for the future and it is risky because any reflective decision is in fact a choice between risks rather than a choice between a safe and unsafe policy (Rasmussen, 2001: 294). According to Beck, this in fact makes you reflect on everything you are doing to others as if it was something you were doing to yourself. As the interview excerpt outlined previously indicates, the individual was consciously reflecting upon the decision to engage based on the aetiology of risk; this most likely influenced by the No Secrets document which governs the NHS. Thus, it is possible to draw upon Beck’s notion of ‘individualisation of risk’ where he states: ‘we are concerned with individualised institutional situations, whose connections and fractures (neglected at the level of system) continually produce frictions, disharmonies and contradictions within and among individual biographies’ (Beck, 1992a: 137). Furthermore, from a Beckidian position, this aetiology of risk is recognised at policy level. The PREVENT strategy states:

‘In common with other sectors, uptake of PREVENT in the health sector has not always been consistent. This has been partly due to the unfamiliarity of the subject matter and partly because early training was not always

338 Interview with practitioner No.04.

339 Here, Giddion logic is also instructive; as Giddens (1990: 90) observes many people ‘bargain with modernity in terms of the trust they vest in symbolic tokens and expert systems. The nature of the bargain is governed by specific admixtures of deference and scepticism, comfort and fear’.

appropriate. ACPO’s internal 2010 review of PREVENT policing has also identified issues regarding information sharing in the health sector’ (HM Government, 2011b: 85, [Figure 10. 144]).

The PREVENT strategy further comments, ‘the Department of Health will need to ensure that the crucial relationship of trust and confidence between patient and clinician is balanced with the clinician’s professional duty of care and their responsibility to protect wider public safety’ (HM Government, 2011b: 85, [Figure 10.145]). This goes to the heart of Adam Smith’s original concept of reflexivity that ‘we must imagine ourselves not the actors but the spectators of our own character and conduct and consider how these would affect us when viewed from this station’ (Smith, 1974: 190, as cited in Webb, 2006: 35).

Fundamentally, in order to understand PP through overt methods of prevention, reflexive monitoring of risk is intrinsic to both personal (Beck) and institutionalised (Giddens) risk processes (Webb, 2006: 34). Moreover, it is also important take into account the ‘sociological perspective’ (Beck, 1995) developed in Beck’s later writings, as well as a natural-scientific objectivist disposition and cultural relativist disposition, both of which are more prominently (though not exclusively), associated with Beck than Giddens.

7.2.2 Trusting PREVENT

In chapter 4 it was outlined how, for Giddens, the concept of risk is inseparable from trust. Thus, whilst the following discussion is centred on the notion of trust, this should not be read as a departure from the overall theme of risk. Rather, participants’ accounts of trust coincide with Giddens’ definition of reflexivity as ‘the constant appropriation of new knowledge as the basis for social organisation and self-identity’ (Giddens, 1990). In short, reflexivity is described as ‘a process of continuous monitoring and surveillance, and of making adjustments as new information and revised knowledge become available’ (Ekberg, 2007: 354).

Drawing upon the work of Giddens (1990), Ekberg (2007) maintains it is not the emergence of trust that differentiates reflexive modernity from pre-modernity and primary modernity, but the emergence of new definitions and expressions of trust. Moreover, recall that in chapter 4 it was outlined how, for Giddens (1990), trust is operationalised at two levels: inter-personal trust and system-based trust (Giddens also refers to this as trust in ‘abstract-systems’). The research findings suggest that both internal and external partners are more likely to “buy-into” the PREVENT strategy based on trust developed at interpersonal level rather than abstract-systems
level (the PREVENT agenda). Thus, Giddens’ *The Consequences of Modernity* is particularly apposite to the following discussion.\(^{341}\)

Giddens (1990, 1991) is careful to remind us that trust is also central to the radical transformation of intimate inter-personal and intra-familial relations occurring within reflexive modernity. Liberated from the oppressive bonds of patriarchal traditions, reflexive individuals form relationships based on mutual, reciprocal and active trust (Ekberg, 2007: 257) and thus, according to Giddens (1990, 1991), we still have bonds of intimacy that remain at the local level. In particular, friendships and sexual partners remain physically proximate even in reflexive modernity characterised by dis-embedding processes (Giddens, 1991). As Green (2009: 192) observes:

‘The basis of intimacy, or personal trust, in the modern world is mutual openness and self-disclosure. Intimate relationships are therefore formed through a process of self-enquiry or self-reflection that is then shared with another. This is part of the search for self-identity which is bound up with the process of self-reflection in the late modern world. The character of intimacy is therefore transformed as a consequence of a dis-embedded and increasingly global society that is nevertheless still routinely traversed on a day-to-day basis in physical localities’.

In a Giddens sense, the participants’ discussions around the concept of trust, as linked to a multi-partnership (CT) approach through trusted key individuals, suggest that PP might be read through the concept of “kinship connections” (Giddens, 1990). As Giddens (1990: 101) points out, ‘kinship connections are very much the bonds which can be relied upon in the structuring or actions in fields of time-space’. For Giddens (1990: 101), in pre-modernity kinship provides a nexus of reliable social connections that in principle, and very commonly in practice, form an organising medium of trust relations. This is true on the level of both fairly impersonal and more personal connections (Giddens, 1990: 101). Troubling Giddens somewhat since he states that kinship relations are no longer the carriers of intensively organised social ties across time-space (Giddens, 1990: 108, emphasis added), utilising key trusted individuals or ‘connectors’ might be understood through the concept of kinship connections based on a “pure relationship”.\(^{342}\) A pure relationship is a more equal, open and democratic relationship that is

\(^{341}\) The strength of Giddens conceptualisation of ‘trust’, as measured against the research findings, lies in the fact that he rejects the Luhmanian view that trust must be seen as separate from confidence (see Giddens, 1990: 29-33). In the same way that participants understood trust as synonymous with confidence, Giddens homogenises both concepts by postulating that trust is the link between faith and confidence which distinguishes it from “weak inductive knowledge” (Giddens, 1990: 33).

\(^{342}\) Utilising key trusted individuals in the fight against extremism and/or radicalisation coincides with two of Giddens’ typologies of trust and personal relations: ‘kinship relations’, and ‘personal relations’, rather than adhering to Giddens’ third typology: ‘sexual intimacy’, in conditions of modernity.
actively sustained rather than passively accepted and a flexible relationship that retains a permanent option of reversal (Ekberg, 2007: 357). In Giddens’ (1991: 6) words:

‘A pure relationship is one in which external criteria have become dissolved: the relationship exists solely for whatever rewards that relationship as such can deliver. In the context of the pure relationship, trust can be mobilised only be a process of mutual disclosure. Trust, in other words, can by definition no longer be anchored in criteria outside of the relationship itself – such as criteria of kinship, social duty or traditional obligation. Like self-identity, with which it is closely intertwined, the pure relationship has to be reflexively controlled over the long term, against the backdrop of external transitions and transformations’.

Importantly, Giddens stresses the part of ‘personal relations’ within pure-relationships. Discussing the concept of “friend” as today’s substitute for “honourable companion”, Giddens suggests that whilst social connections can involve emotional intimacy this is not a prerequisite of maintaining personal trust in conditions of modernity (Giddens, 1990: 119, emphasis added). For Giddens, it is institutionalised personal ties and informal or informalised codes of sincerity and honour, which provide frameworks of trust (Giddens, 1990: 119, emphasis added). A participant summed up the police/partner relationship thus: “You have to be seen as a friend ... but a friend that you’re going to need almost never”.343 Moreover, recall that for the PREVENT officers, a key component of PP was demonstrating to partners and communities that “you’re as good as your word”344 by operating in an “open”, “honest” and egalitarian manner, thus coinciding with a ‘soft’-policing approach:

“An awful lot of people who don’t trust PREVENT, who think the police spy on them, who think as a soon as they give us information their name will be all over the newspapers and then the person will be arrested. That’s not what PREVENT’s about ... It’s how you promote that”.345

“Do we understand the concerns of things from their side, and not be dealing with it in a completely police-y-type manner. I think it’s fair to say a lot of groups that we’ve been to have been ... not shocked, but I’d like to think pleasantly surprised that it’s not this over-bearing, you know ... people still hear Special Branch and go, “Oh,

343 Interview with practitioner No.02.
344 Interview with practitioner No.04.
345 Interview with practitioner No.04.
I thought he’d be in uniform”. So you know ... even that is a bit of a shock for them”.

Furthermore, the importance accorded to ‘soft policing’ within PREVENT has connotations with Giddens’ “focused interaction” (Giddens, 1990: 82). As Giddens (1990: 85) points out, ‘facework’ commitments tend to be heavily dependent upon what might be called the demeanour of system representatives or operators. Accordingly, recall that participants highlighted the importance of operating in an “open” and “honest” manner, particularly if the issue became “too hot”. Such a situation is reflected in Goffman’s front and backstage performances, of which Giddens’ work around trust is heavily influenced. As Giddens (1990: 86, emphasis in original) notes, ‘the clear distinction between front- and backstage reinforces demeanour as a means of reducing the impact of imperfect skills and human fallibility’.

Adding support to the argument that PP operates through ‘kinship connections’ which are built on “pure-relationships”, the participants’ accounts of the fragility of police/community relations based on trust are informative. Giddens (1990: 101) points out that kinship connections ‘are often the site of conflict or tension’, whilst a pure relationship is ‘continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within it’ (Giddens, 1992: 58). This is because, according to Giddens, pure relationships exemplify autonomy and flexibility yet at the same time exemplify a loss of loyalty, stability, solidarity, security and commitment (Ekberg, 2007: 356-357). A participant reflected upon the fragility of community trust when external engagement was used to push relevant awareness of PREVENT out to a Kurdish community:

“So we did all this when I first started, the first time it came round, and (name of location) came back to me and said, “We can’t really do that anymore because we’ve got a lack of trust and confidence in that community now due to an incident in the community prior to me getting here; somebody’s told them something in confidence and it’s went through the wrong protocol and some people ended up getting arrested basically, and that community won’t forget that incident unfortunately in (name of location)”’. Whereas in a different place ... in (name of location) they were, like ... “Yeah. We’ll do it”. So we’ve had to ... over time ... try to do it differently in (name of location), because people don’t tend to forget”.

346 Interview with practitioner No.02.
347 Interview with practitioner No.02.
348 Interview with practitioner No.01.
Moreover, recall that PP utilises key trusted individuals when protective intervention (police defined) is considered too risky. As one participant noted: “You can go the direct route, but it can also be a risky one because you can equally do something in a Mosque and people might go “we’re not happy with that”, and that can backfire and further alienate people”.\(^{349}\) Thus, the research findings neatly fit with the different attitudes towards risk in a reflexive modernity - a different ontology and aetiology of risk and a heightened sensitivity to the social and political consequences of a risk event (Ekberg, 2007: 347). Further, the fragility of police/community relations suggests that trust in people or abstract systems can never be absolute or constant over time, but must be reconfirmed periodically (see inter alia Schlichter, 2010). Losing the trust of the Kurdish community (as just one example) embodies reflexivity in so far as reflexivity can be seen as the conscious self-consideration of one’s contemporary life in terms of a tension between other-informed and self-informed sources of determination (Heelas, 1996: 4); what Giddens terms ‘dilemmas of the self’ (see Giddens, 1990, 1991). The concept of ‘dilemmas of the self’ is also wrapped up in Giddens’ notion of ‘chronic reflection’ - that is, constant reflective evaluation of the situation as a result of anxiety, trust and doubt (Giddens, 1990; see Figure 7.2). For Giddens (1990), commitments to practices are constantly adjusted based on knowledge rather than tradition. Moreover, according to Giddens (1990), modern human beings are affected heavily by chronic reflection and this has consequences for their identity.

![Diagram of Chronic Reflection](image)

Figure 7.2: ‘Chronic Reflection’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010: 12).

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\(^{349}\) Interview with practitioner No.04.
To support the argument that multi-agency partnerships within PP are (to a degree) formed and maintained as ‘pure relationships’, various participants suggested that key to engagement is “time” itself. Participants voiced concerns regarding the potential of high staff turnover to detrimentally affect multi-agency partnerships since trust takes time to cement. Hence, how participants suggested that trust had to be continually sustained or “won” through “openness” and “honesty” rather than being passively accepted. Moreover, recall that for Giddens (1994a), in the modern-world, networks must be worked at, earned, or ‘have to be continually to be won’. This is because integrity cannot be taken for granted on the basis of a person’s incumbency of a particular social position (Giddens, 1994a: 197). Giddens sums the concept of ‘active trust’ thus:

‘Trust on a personal level becomes a project to be “worked at” by the parties involved, and demands the opening out of the individual to the other. Where it cannot be controlled by fixed normative codes, trust has to be won, and the means of doing this is demonstrable warmth and openness’ (Giddens, 1990: 121, italics in original).

In this sense, trust is based on a highly reflexive relationship since it presupposes ‘facework commitment’ that has to be ‘actively negotiated’ (Giddens, 1991) and ‘renegotiated with lay audiences’ (Giddens, 1990). Giddens (1990) terms this ‘voluntary commitment’. In a similar way, the participants suggested that developing and then maintaining the trust of partners was crucial if PP was to be successful and durable in an institutional environment shaped by competing priorities and organisational objectives.350 Again, Giddens’ work is informative where he states: ‘even in the domains of expert systems active trust becomes more dominant partly because of the divisions within, and contestations of, expertise’; what Giddens terms ‘institutional opening out’ (Giddens, 1994a: 187). However, Giddens goes further and suggests risk is contained within a relationship of deep trust between individuals and collective institutions (Giddens, 1990). This is because, as Giddens observes, the issue of trust/mistrust is not so much about the proliferation of risks, but that individuals and groups have developed heightened levels of reflexivity on which they can act i.e. decide whether or not to trust a person or institution (Ward, 2007: 122). High employee turnover within partner institutions was seen as a potential barrier to achieving what Giddens (1991; see also Green, 2009) terms ‘emotional

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350 This finding has parallels with the social contract theory of John Locke. Locke argues that the need and desire for political institutions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional commitments recognise that their relationships are liable to conflict and inequalities of power that can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domination (Young, 2006: 105).
intimacy, openness and sincerity’ which provides both internal and external forms of ‘authenticity’. Importantly, for Giddens (1991: 197), ‘the authentic person is one who knows himself/herself and is able to reveal that knowledge to the other’. Thus, interpersonal trust plays a particularly important role within PP since ‘revealing that knowledge to the other’ might be read in a similar way to “a willingness to share concerns”. The notion of trust also has significant implications for governing at a distance. Whilst participants suggested PP largely relies on key trusted individuals, the research findings also indicate that various other partners and individuals are involved in PREVENT, even if, in a Giddeon sense, the relationship is less intimate. Importantly, when discussing trustworthiness in postmodernity, Giddens (1990: 85) suggests ‘many encounters with representatives of abstract systems are periodic and transitory’. Such situations were reflected on numerous occasions in participants’ accounts. As one participated noted, “we also engage through the IAG’s – Independent Advisory Groups to get key community members involved in it, as much as we might not necessarily be there day-to-day”. Thus, PP also has connotations with Giddens’ notion of ‘time-space distanciation’ (see Figure 7.3). The research findings suggest that through the concept of trust, PP attempts to dis-embed the PREVENT strategy within key institutions both internally and externally in order to govern at a distance (Rose, 1999). The following interview dialogue instructively describes the dis-embedding and re-embedding nature of PP:

“We do a lot of stuff internally with police, principally Neighbourhood Teams because you assume that they have the neighbourhood contacts ... they have ... they are likely to know the communities. We do a little bit of stuff with 24/7 police officers but they tend to deal with the job in and out, but less likely, certainly not impossible, that they’ll see and assess something on a one-off. So, we do a lot of training with them. We try and do it at least once a year ... We’ll do stuff specifically with the PVP Unit - Protecting Vulnerable People Unit - which is a form of MAPPA. Quite clearly, there is a huge crossover there, you know? PREVENT will form a very small part of that, which is far more domestic abuse, child abuse, but nevertheless there is a crossover”.

351 Interview with practitioner No.06.
352 See Figure 7.3.
353 Interview with practitioner No.02.
In Giddens’ terms, dis-embedding supports the establishment of procedures with less personal contact. However, for Giddens (1990; see *inter alia* Schlichter, 2010), dis-embedding is dependent upon trust - those involved must believe that the social relationship will endure at a later time. Maintaining the trust of partners through ‘re-embedding’ trust was reflected in numerous participants’ accounts:

“We make it clear that if we go down to a school, we’re not going to go, “Right, thanks for the information, see you later”. The school, the hospital, whatever it is will be a key part of that programme. We tell people quite openly that we’re not going to go in and then go behind the school’s back saying, “Guess what?” They aren’t going to be side-lined and the police then scurry off to dark places with that information never to be seen again. We never do that”.\(^{354}\)

To understand PP as an upholding of social relations over time and space constraints, Giddens’ caretaker/infant couplet based on D. W. Winnicott’s ‘potential space’ is informative.\(^{355}\) For Giddens (1991: 38), an awareness of the separate identity of the parenting figure originates in the emotional acceptance of *absence*: the ‘faith’ that the caretaker will return, even though he or she is no longer in the presence of the infant. This creates ‘potential space’ that can lead to ‘ontological anxiety’. However, such ontological anxiety can be

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\(^{354}\) Interview with practitioner No.02.

\(^{355}\) Demonstration of this continual renewal of the “contract” which individuals undertake with one another is also the exact point of Harold Garfinkel’s “experiments with trust” (see Giddens, 1990: 98).
overcome by the discipline of routine which helps to constitute a ‘formed framework’ for existence by cultivating a sense of ‘being’, and its separation from ‘non-being’, which is elemental to ontological security (Giddens, 1991: 39). However, as the participants suggested, high employee turnover potentially made governing at a distance (through Giddens’ concept of ‘dis-embedding’) challenging since the introduction of new staff within partner institutions required PREVENT to be ‘re-embedded’, usually through ensuring that new recruits were aware of the PREVENT strategy. Subsequently, it was suggested that trust (at times) had to be “won” all over again.356 Thus, it would seem high employee turnover is opposed to emotional inoculation against existential anxieties since trust, by its very nature, entails a commitment to ‘leap into the unknown’, a hostage of fortune which implies a preparedness to embrace novel experiences (Giddens, 1991: 41). Nevertheless, the data suggests that the axial position occupied by ‘expert’ systems in a reflexive sense is supplanted allowing PP to re-contextualise the experiences of individuals, groups and institutions – in that ‘the everyday experience of citizens is dis-embedded ... before being re-embedded within the lived relations that re-introduce a degree of local definition’ (Scourfield and Welsh, 2003: 404). Subsequently, overt CT engagement is developed and evolved through de facto categories of ‘risk’ created by ‘expert’ systems i.e. PREVENT, and correspondingly, PP operationalised through a multi-agency framework might be thought of as advanced via reflexivity.

7.2.3 Troubling Giddens

Giddens (1990) highlights that inter-personal trust and systems-based trust is interrelated. Giddens calls the meeting points of the two levels of trust ‘access points’, of which trust in abstract systems is highly dependent on the individual’s experience(s) at access points (Schlichter, 2010). By means of access points, a person can meet the system in two ways (thus distinguishing between two forms of trust): trust in persons or facework commitment (inter-personal trust, ‘front-stage’) and trust in systems or faceless commitment (systems-based trust, ‘back stage’) (Giddens, 1990: 88). WRAP is an indicative example of Giddens’ access point(s) since it provides the link between ‘personal’ and ‘systems’ trust (Giddens, 1990). However, for Giddens, when reflexive individuals invest their trust in abstract systems, they trust the

356 Interview with practitioner No.03.
credentials and legitimacy conferred through professional codes of practice, qualifications, accreditation, licensing, performance and reputation (Giddens, 1990: 87). In Giddens’ words, ‘the real repository of trust is in the abstract system, rather than the individuals who in specific contexts “represent” it’ (Giddens, 1990: 85). Thus, for Giddens (1990: 85), access points merely carry a reminder that ‘it is flesh-and-blood people (who are potentially fallible) who are its operators’. Giddens is essentially exposing a difference between ‘expertise’ (the system of knowledge) and the ‘expert’ (representative), and locating trust as being a factor between the two (Ward, 2007: 125).

To a degree, the research findings support Giddens’ assertions on trust within postmodernity. Several participants talked openly about the myth-busting aspect of PP, as linked to the past mismanagement of PREVENT, which had resulted in a degree of mistrust towards the PREVENT agenda. However, the research findings also trouble Giddens logic, particularly trust conceptualised in a one-dimensional manner as Giddens suggests. Although not using such terminology, participants made clear the interrelated nature of inter-personal trust and trust at ‘abstract’-system level.357

“I remember we had a case in (name of university), where the response from the Dean of the School was, to quote him, “Yeah, the PREVENT team did exactly what they said they would do”. That then promotes a whole host of trust and confidence, you know? We’re not bullshitting you here. We are here for all the right reasons. We want to work with you and you need to trust us - this is how we do our business. But that takes time to get that trust and confidence. And again, going back to the other communities - how the hell do we try and spread that message? Because all it takes is one bad example of the police in the media and all of a sudden it’s, “Yeah, the police, you can’t trust them” ... you know Plebgate and all that stuff. That does so much damage to the overall trust and confidence in the police. It happened in London, it had nothing to do with me but we all get labelled with that, “It’s all the police, they’re all the same”. So one instance like that can do an awful lot of harm when trying to build trust and confidence in a very specific area of work like what we cover.”.358

Thus, when making sense of CT engagement through a lens of reflexivity, local level trust cannot be conceptualised in a one-dimensional manner. PP is located within a complex array

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357 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 05.
358 Interview with practitioner No.04.
of dynamic issues that influence not only trust, but also knowledge formation. Moreover, and similarly to observations made by Borne (2006: 99) on the CRISP project, de-mystifying common misconceptions about PREVENT suggests the discursive representations of PREVENT cannot be considered in autonomy, but must be sensitive to the underlying social and political processes that exist, including virtual risk. Risk based on virtuality is more Beckidian than Giddeon and coincides with the cultural relativist approach to risk. For Beck (2000: 13), risks are ‘a type of virtual reality or real virtuality’. Beck is aware that his concept of ‘[World] Risk Society’ is also a ‘science, media and information society’ (Beck, 1992a: 46), and ‘... the political site of world risk society is not the street but the television’ (Beck, 1999c: 44). For the reflexive agenda, this is established through the relationship between aesthetic and cognitive reflexivity (Borne, 2010: 82). Beck exemplifies this by maintaining that ‘... the images in the news of skeletal trees, or of dying seals have opened people’s eyes’ (Beck, 1999c: 71). For Beck, this opening of people’s eyes is evidence of a reflexive modernity.

Castells’ (1996, 2000a) analysis of risk presents a theoretical overlap with Beck with respect to the creation of knowledge and the circulation of information in a globalised world (Borne, 2010). Importantly, a common term for both commentators is the notion of ‘real virtuality’ (Borne, 2010: 83). Castells (2000a: 318) tells us that real virtuality is a ‘... system in which reality itself is fully immersed in a virtual image setting in the world of make believe, in which symbols are not just metaphors, but comprise of actual experience’. In a similar vein, as Borne (2006: 99) observes, Beck concurs with Van Loon (2000) who describes a ‘cybernetic reproduction’ of risk, arguing that risk cannot be understood outside of its representative form. According to Beck, risks (in the present day) become more potent as a direct result of “virtuality”. Thus, the scale and extent of manufactured threats force citizens to consider risk in political terms. Such discussions move to the heart of what constitutes risk and should be understood in light of the epistemological debate that exists between realists and constructivists (Borne, 2006: 99). Considering these dynamics, as well as Giddeon logic in relation to trust and risk, fundamentally influences the extent that PP is capable of being fully understood through the concept of reflexive modernity.

359 The Carbon Reduction Innovation Support Pilot (CRISP) in Plymouth, UK, represents collaboration between governmental and non-governmental actors to produce sustainable lifestyles and contribute towards sustainable development more generally (Borne, 2006: 100).
7.3 Key Theme 2: PREVENT as Safeguarding

7.3.1 Embedding Expertise: Assemblage over Network

In the preceding section, it was argued PP might be understood as governing at a distance (Rose, 1999) through methods of embedding expertise. For example, the concept of WRAP evidences the panoply of agents and agencies which are brought together in order to reduce the risk of radicalisation at local level. This is much in keeping with the notion of governmentality, of which risk can be read as ‘governed via a heterogeneous network of interactive actors, institutions, knowledge(s) and practices’ (Lupton, 1999: 87). Moreover, recall the utility of a dispositif outlined in chapter 3 as ‘coming to those with whom it answers a particular need (or “urgent need” as Foucault referred to it). Identifying this urgent need then delineates various
responses, specifically those that result in a cohesive body of relations: an attempt is made to resolve it with an entire arsenal of implements and arms (Foucault, 1996). This heterogeneity of “arms” (mechanisms, institutions) is what Foucault terms a dispositif.

One might posit that PP - as operationalised within a ‘hyper-complex’ security environment - coincides with the concept of dispositif. However, it is my opinion that comparatives can only be made by moving away from readings of Foucault’s dispositif which have been depicted as reductionist - seeing it as an attempt to define a functionalist concept as ‘the basic unit’ (Brenner, 1994: 687) - and towards the view that a dispositif should be read as generative (see Huxley, 2006). The reductionist reading of dispositif as a prosaic device or as utilities ‘to produce something – a machinic contraption’ (Foucault, 2003a: 10) becomes problematic when measured against the participants’ account of PREVENT. Rather, the participants’ accounts of embedding expertise through PP are more in keeping with the Deleuzian reading of dispositif as ‘assemblage’.

As a caveat, the term ‘assemblage’ did not feature in any of the participants’ responses or accounts. Rather, most participants tended to refer to the wider body of social actors responsibilised through a multi-partnership CT approach as a ‘network’:

“It’s about trying to identify groups out there who would benefit from some awareness of the PREVENT strategy and hopefully make the engagements with them and long term it’s to set up the liaison and the networks really”.

“It’s crucial, the partnership, and certainly where you can now see where ... you can see the impact of budget cuts ... massively have hit local authority and again, you know, you’re looking to establish the workings and network that you can call upon quite quickly if there is a concern there and be able to be very active, very quickly”.

The notion of network coincides with the literature on ‘dispositif as ‘apparatus’: a complex and combinatory ‘network’ of relations that allow us to “see and speak” (Deleuze, 1992). Indeed,
one might be tempted to depict the invocation of the teacher, social worker, healthcare professional etc., which distributes and enmeshes responsibility for preventing radicalisation through society as connoting a ‘network’. However, understanding PP through the concept of assemblage is based on an interpretative approach to thematic analysis and is justified in the following ways. First, it is important to understand the context in which the term network was used. Participants’ accounts of PREVENT are indicative of PREVENT officers forming part of an assemblage, not bodies that sit over and apart from assemblage. Their manoeuvres and negotiations are entangled in a wider governance structure and it is through such relationships that the constraints and impositions of the ‘centre’ are revealed (Allen, 2011). In this way, “embedding” expertise does not sit well with readings of dispositif as apparatus or network as discussed in chapter 3, even if the term ‘assemblage’ was not directly used. Rather, embedding expertise shares increasing parallels to forging alignments within literature on assemblages that is ‘the will to govern as a point of convergence and fracture’ (Li, 2007: 268).

Second, following the work of McFarlane (2009: 2) on “translocal” assemblages, the key partners which the participants described as making up the multi-partnership “network” had far more historical depth than the notion of “node” or “point” suggests – as connoted by network e.g. the health sector; the education sector, the fire service, the probation service, etc. Thus, it is difficult to understand the last strategic objective of PREVENT (i.e. *institutions*) as simply a spatial category, output, or resultant formation. Rather, it was found that not only does PP signify doing and performance but at different moments in times, these relations within and between sites in the assemblage are vulnerable to collapse, or to re-assembling in different forms (McFarlane, 2009: 6-7). The re-assembling of different forms can be seen within participants’ accounts of (mis)trust. Moreover, as the research findings indicate, there is an emphasis placed on fragility and provisionality, fissures and fractures that accompany processes of gathering and dispersing (McFarlane and Anderson, 2011: 124-125). Therefore, PP through a multi-agency approach should not be read as an assemblage whereby anything goes, but is vulnerable to fracture and dispersion:

“We also go into the voluntary sector, community youth groups, youth offending teams (YOTS), UKBA ... a lot of housing groups, particularly a lot of housing where they’re supported by (name of local housing group), which is a housing group which looks after people with mental issues. And it tends to be these groups; they ask us to come along as a one-off, but some others are almost embedded ... For example, now
at (name of university) we are officially part of the Social Work course. We were hoping to get in with Nursing, but that hasn’t quite worked out ... And teacher training ... but, you know, as time goes on it’s expanding and expanding. But training still remains a significant part of our job, either as one-off training, or with police, or regular officers”.

“I’ve had a couple of schools that looked like they were interested and then the Head Teacher has said, “I’m really sorry, I’ve got targets that I have to hit - I don’t want you to come in and give your training”...

In more simple terms, participants emphasised the “hard work” required to draw complex “social and material formations” that consist of “heterogeneous elements” together ... and sustain these connections in the face of increasing tension” (Li, 2007: 264). As Ong and Collier (2005) suggest, assemblages are never ‘reducible to a single logic’, and they do not ‘always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake’. Chorusing this viewpoint, Tsing (2005) states, ‘every situation brings with it its own different set of connections that are unpredictable in both their constitution as well as their outcome’.

Lastly, a conceptual lens of assemblage combines a focus on the (discursive) ‘problematisation’ of radicalisation as a security matter with analysis of the ways in which the problem is rendered technical, how alliances are forged in its name, and how it acts in local settings (see Li, 2007: 265). This is important when providing perspective on language and terminology associated with counter-radicalisation on the ground. Thus, as Ploger (2008: 54) observes, ‘if one wants to emphasise Foucault’s work on the relations between elements, a translation of dispositif as “assemblage” (Deleuze’s ‘agencement’) could be seen as relevant’.

In a similar way to assertions made by de Goede and Simon (2013) on the Nuansa

364 Interview with practitioner No.02.
365 Interview with practitioner No.01.
366 In the 1980s, Foucault frequently used the expression “problematisation” apparently referring to the political relevance of a dispositif: “it is true that my attitude isn’t a result of the form of critique that claims to be a methodical examination in order to reject all possible solutions except for the one valid one. It is more on the order of ‘problematisation’ - which is to say, the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics” (Foucault, 1984b: 384).
367 This does not mean that I am entirely abandoning Foucault’s notion of dispositif as ‘apparatus/network’. As Legg (2011) articulates, the interconnections between apparatus and assemblage can be productively thought of as a dialectic. Thus, according to Legg (2011: 129-130), ‘what we are left with between the two author’s discussions is an acknowledgement that apparatuses are etymologically and genealogically indissociable from assemblages. Since both emerge as part and one of each other, they are almost comically assemblage-like’.
training programme, PP acts as complex assemblage that does not definitively and coherently act but is rather a ‘generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular realities’ (Law, 2004: 7). Thus, PP can be seen as a ‘broad descriptor of different historical relations coming together, as an ethos oriented to the ‘instability’ of interactions, and the potential for novelty and spatiotemporal difference, and as a concept for thinking the relations between stability and transformation in the production of the social’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 171-172, italics in original). Importantly, in discussing the internal dynamism of assemblages, Deleuze directs our attention to how, as he puts it, ‘all the elements of a non-homogenous set converge, making them function together’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 39). The emphasis is squarely the bringing together of the heterogeneous entities into some form of temporary relation (or set of relations) without presupposing that these relations necessarily constitute on organism (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). An assemblage is therefore both the provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences and a continuous process of movement and transformation as relations and terms change (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). The term provisional is crucial since the line of fracture between PREVENT police and key partners - the line drawn by the will to govern supplemented by the capacity to coerce - threatens the assemblage. Remarkably, the same line enables diverse authorities to forge workable (though fragile) alignments among themselves (Li, 2007: 269). Understanding risk through the concept of “vulnerability” is indicative in this respect. As one participant noted when discussing more routine police work:

“If you have someone brought into custody under the Mental Health Act and we would say, “Look, this individual has real problems, they need some help”. And then they get assessed by a psychiatrist who might say, “Nah, they’re alright”. But that’s not possible because we know of that person’s vulnerabilities”.369

Embedding expertise within PP can also be understood through two further lines of thought. First, Giddens’ (1990) theory of modernity suggests that the esoteric aspects of expertise in modern systems have little or nothing to do with the ineffability of pre-modern

368 Nuansa is a knowledge-gathering group for frontline professionals involved in CoPPRa and RecoRa programmes in the Netherlands (see de Goede and Simon, 2013). In relation to the CoPPRa and RecoRa programmes, de Goede and Simon (2013: 317) outline, ‘CoPPRa is an EU-funded Belgian initiative that seeks to bridge Community Policing and counter-radicalisation through the development of training materials for frontline police to spot signs of radicalisation’. RecoRa on the other hand, was ‘an EU-funded programme that brought together counter-radicalisation practitioners from the UK, the Netherlands and Germany to workshop best practices with frontline professionals’ (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 317).

369 Interview with practitioner No.04.
expertise. Instead, key to modern abstract systems is the dependence on a combination of training and specialisation. The knowledge incorporated in modern forms of expertise is, in principle, available to everyone, have they the available resources, energy and time acquire it (Giddens, 1991). Thus, abstract systems are opaque to the majority. Their opaque quality – the underlying element in the extension of trust in the context of dis-embedding mechanisms – comes from the very specialisation that abstract systems demand and foster (Giddens, 1992: 30). As Giddens (1990: 145) points out, ‘technical knowledge, in one shape or another, is re-appropriated by lay persons and routinely applied in the course of their day-to-day activities’. Moreover, the interaction between expertise and re-appropriation is strongly influenced by ‘access points’ (Giddens, 1990). WRAP is an indicative example of such since, through a mixture of risk and opportunity, the high-consequence risk of terrorism permeates the core of day-to-day activities within partner institutions.

Second, embedding expertise might be read in a similar way to observations made by Aradau and van Munster who describe how the anticipatory governance of terrorism has manifested as a dispositif of risk that ‘activates all the technologies imaginable in the face of uncertainty’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 105). Importantly, such observations are indebted to Foucault’s notion of governmentality and the ‘retreat of state’. As Lemke (2002: 11), drawing upon the work of Foucault, observes:

‘What we observe today is a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government, that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. These effects entail not just the simple reproduction of existing social asymmetries or their ideological obfuscation, but encompass the displacement of forms of practices that were formerly defined in terms of nation state to the development of forms of sub-politics, “beneath” politics in its traditional meaning’.

Whilst both avenues of thought shed light on the semantics of flexibility and the introduction of new structures of production within a neo-liberal governmentality (Lemke, 2002), there is also a further dynamic to PP. PP requires a disaggregated framework in which subsidiary authorities possess a significant degree of autonomy in terms of practically pursuing the overall goal of pre-empting radicalisation and/or extremism. In a similar way to the objectives of the Nuansa programme, partners and communities ‘autonomatised’ by PP are
simultaneously ‘responsible’\(^{370}\) (Li, 2007: 269) since internal and external partners (as well as society at macro level) are recruited into the assemblage and authorised to act in its name (see de Goede and Simon, 2013). This adds a coercive element to governmental strategies that operate, as far as possible, \textit{through} rather than against the desires and interests of their target population (Dean, 1999: 209). This, then, is not entirely governmentality as outlined in chapter 3. The notion of a highly centralised governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an antithesis of freedom and agency (see \textit{inter alia} McKee, 2009; Stockdale, 2014) does not provide an adequately nuanced account of the empirical actualities of PP at local level. Rather, embedding expertise within PP might be more plausibly understood through Judith Butler’s (2006) reading of governmentality - that is, ‘sovereignty within the midst of governmentality’.

7.3.2 \textit{PREVENT} and the Petty Sovereign

Butler follows Foucault by arguing that the proliferation of governmentality is most visibly illustrated in the current moment by the ongoing “disarticulation” of the state ‘into a set of administrative and bureaucratic powers’ (Butler, 2006: 55). This phenomenon is particularly characterised by the downloading of what she terms “prerogative power” to unelected agents of the state - a managerialisation of governance in which appointed “officials with no clear claim to legitimate authority” are endowed with what amounts to sovereign power within a particular context (Butler, 2006: 54-56). In a similar way to Butler’s observations on ‘decisioners’ within American national security, PP governs \textit{through} risk by evoking institutions and individuals as partners - they are essentially powerless (not controlling the inaugurating forms of power that they deploy) - while wielding the power to render unilateral decisions. This is sovereign power performing itself through governmentality by ‘ruling’ through the application of rules (Butler, 2004: 56–65), partly embodying the power of the state in everyday engagements (Huysmans, 2011) in which new (relatively) hidden or obscure powers are invented and acted upon (McRobbie, 2006).

The various actors that are tasked with CT through PREVENT are diffusely constituted by the interaction within an assemblage of multiple-existences of power, each exercising its own varied degree of agency vis-à-vis the ultimately sovereign centre (Rose and Miller, 1992; Stockdale, 2014). For instance, key trusted individuals considered partners emerge as the power

\(^{370}\) The responsibilisation of citizens as an adaptive strategy within crime control is far from a new development (see \textit{inter alia} Garland, 1996), nor is it a novel observation in relation to the ‘risk society’.
of the ‘official’- a figure that is ‘deployed by tactics of power (s/he) does not control’ but who is also able to exercise decisional power in a way that ‘reanimate(s) a sovereignty that the governmentalised constellation of power appeared to have foreclosed’ (Butler, 2006: 65). Butler has labelled these figures “petty sovereigns”. Butler applies her analysis to figures such as border guards, airport security officials, customs agents, intelligence officers, and military field commanders. However, it is important to recognise that the petty sovereign figure can refer to any agent endowed with such capacities within the broader governmental assemblage, given that Butler leaves open the possibility of an otherwise (Butler, 2006: 56, 65, emphasis added). In the context of the present study, this ‘otherwise’ might be understood as any social actor ‘delegated with the prerogative power to render unilateral decisions in a particular context’ (Butler, 2006: 56). Or, to put it differently, any “manager of unease” that is responsibilised to help prevent or reduce the risk of radicalisation e.g. a health worker, an education worker, a community leader, a charity worker, etc. This is because, as de Goede (2008b: 176) points out, the governing effects of petty sovereigns ‘do not just target precisely circumscribed risk groups, but affect society at large, through assumptions and definitions of ‘normal’ behaviour’. The following dialogue(s) illustrates the downloading of prerogative power within PP:

“We also train people, for instance, people within (the) fire (service), to give them an input on PREVENT, and they will then go and cascade that message on, so that isn’t us sort of face-to-face with them, it’s their own staff”.

“Going back a few years, there was 5 white kids in a school in (name of location) who came out with some quite radical right-wing views. (Name of colleague) arranged for a local Imam he knows to go along, talk to them in a classroom for a couple of hours. Not only did that guy change the perception of those five kids - basically their view of the world was that all Muslims are terrorists - but following that chat, they then spread that message amongst the wider school. That to me is success.”

371 Butler applies the concept of the “petty sovereign” at the exceptional level within her discussion of Guantanamo Bay. In the present study, Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign is applied at local level since the delegation of PP power to key partners means that such individuals are not true sovereigns - they are constituted within the constraints of governmentality - and yet they act.

372 Interview with practitioner No.06.

373 Interview with practitioner No.04.
Utilising Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign in order to explain PP as co-production highlights the productive tension between the ‘structure’ of PREVENT as a pre-emptive dispositif of risk outlined in chapter 3 and the autonomous ‘agency’ of these seeking to render it actionable that is key to governance of PP within a ‘pre-criminal’ space. Moreover, Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign is also illustrative of agency/structure dichotomy central the concept of reflexivity. As Mythen and Walklate (2010b: 55) observe, one of the key shortfalls of risk theorising has been its inability to articulate a meaningful relationship between structure and agency. For instance, Beck (1992a: 191) notes, as a consequence of reflexive modernisation, political decision-making processes, no matter on what level they occur, can no longer be understood as the enforcement or implementation of a single model determined in advance, but is rather a process of collective action. This implies that the official decision-making authority of political institutions is necessarily decentralised (Beck, 1992a: 191). However, both Beck and Giddens have equally fallen into the trap of conflating agency either with responsibility (prudentialism), affect (neurosis), or political confrontation (cosmopolitanism) (Mythen and Walklate, 2010b). This paradox is defined by Archer (2007: 41) as one in which there is a ‘failure to transcend the dualisms of subject/object, structure/agency and thus to recognise each as constitutive of the other’.

Whilst all structural properties found in any society are continuously activity dependent, nevertheless, it is possible to separate structure and agency through analytical dualism, and to examine their interplay in order to account for the structuring and restructuring of the social order (Archer, 2012). Fundamentally, this is important for two reasons. First, structure and agency are different kinds of emergent entities, although space precludes entering the debate about emergence here. This is shown by the differences in their properties and powers, despite the fact that they are crucial for one another’s formation, continuation, and development (Archer, 2012: 51). Bhaksar (1989: 76) puts it succinctly: ‘People and society ... do not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather they refer to radically different things’. Thus, structure and agency operate diachronically over different tracts of time because: (i) structure necessarily predates the action(s) that transform it; and (ii) structural elaboration necessarily postdates those actions (Archer, 2010).

Drawing upon the work of Butler, Stockdale (2014: 108-109; see also Butler, 2006: 62) suggests petty sovereigns are constrained within an overarching discursive/governmental structure since ‘they do not fully control the aims that animate from their action and yet equally retain a significant degree of agency since the general idea of pre-emption can only be translated into a functional security rationality by delegating prerogative powers to various agents tasked with making it
so’. The participants’ accounts within the present study might be read in a similar way. As one participant put it, “it’s about the Housing Manager or any local authority worker working alongside the local cop”. However, Stockdale (2014) further comments there is an additional dimension to the connection between Butler’s paradigm of political power and the praxis of the agency-structure relationship that obtains under pre-emptive security governance. For Butler, petty sovereigns are far from coincidental since they often serve as figures through which pre-emptive security rationalities are practically operationalised (Stockdale, 20014; see also Butler, 2006). In other words, it is those figures which Butler sees as embodying sovereignty within governmentality that are often on the frontline implementing pre-emptive security logic (Stockdale, 2014). In a similar way, since the PREVENT team had fewer officers than that of a ‘priority/high risk’ area, gaining the trust, confidence and support of frontline institutions was considered a chief priority of PP. One such method was through training workshops with partner institutions considered to operate on the frontline.

“Quite clearly it is highly unlikely that one of us in the team is someone that sees something. It’s way more likely that someone working as a frontline staff - be it any institution - is going to see something.”

Furthermore, the downwards defluxion of prerogative power to unelected frontline agents can also been seen within the PREVENT strategy which states: ‘departments and statutory partners have undertaken activity to raise awareness and help frontline staff to identify signs of vulnerability’ (HM Government, 2011b: 57, [Figure 9.12], emphasis added).

Taken at face value the ‘petty sovereign’ figure might imply that the managers of risk could reign at free will, as Butler (2006: 96) puts it, ‘governmentality produces lawless sovereignty’, one with ‘no end in sight’. However, as Huber and Scheytt (2013: 8) point out, it would be an oversimplification to argue that risk management is a dispositif that could be used as a totalitarian instrument of power by organisational or political elites in a completely undistorted manner and of their own will. Recall that the latter half of the original definition of the dispositif is that of ‘a formation ... the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces ...’ (Foucault, 1977, as cited in Agamben, 2009: 2). Although power here is not understood as a position by

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374 Interview with practitioner No.04.
375 Interview with practitioner No.02.
376 Interview with practitioner No.04.
377 This can also be understood through Giddeon logic, since, for Giddens, ‘the prime condition of requirements for trust is not lack of power but lack of full information’ (Giddens, 1990: 33).
378 Interview with practitioner No.02.
an individual à la Max Weber, it serves a strategic purpose, but not by a single actor ruling at will (Huber and Scheytt, 2013: 8). Rather, relevant partners and individuals “responsibilised” through a dispositif of risk might be read in a similar way to observations made by Young (2006) on social connectivity and responsibilisation. For Young (2006), a social connection model of responsibility comprises responsibility as an interpretation of obligations of justice arising from structural social processes, which can only be discharged through collective action. Moving away from the paradigmatic of the ‘liability model’ - that is to be responsible is to be guilty or at fault for having caused a harm and without valid excuses - Young (2006: 119) interprets responsibility ‘by virtue of social roles or positions, as when we say that a teacher has specific responsibilities, or when we appeal to our responsibilities as citizens’. In this meaning, finding an agent responsible does not imply finding the agent at fault or liable for a past wrong, but rather refers to agents ‘carrying out activities in a morally appropriate way and aiming for certain outcomes’ (Young, 2006: 119). In the context of the present study, as various participants suggested, post-PREVENT training partners “could see their role and responsibility within PREVENT”. Reading PP through the concept of “petty-sovereign”, as well as in line with Young’s (2006) responsibility model, perhaps provides a partial response to Amoore and de Goede’s question: ‘how is responsibility to be reintroduced to the decision, such that it confronts the political difficulties of indecision?’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008c: 182). In essence, PP might be read as a politics of ethics with its focus on individual and institutional responsibility to act on principles of conduct and by connecting subjective decisions to the reproduction of sovereign decisions with gravitational power (Huysmans, 2011).

7.3.3 PREVENT(ion) through Language

As can be seen in the previous chapter, terminology and language associated with the operations of PP play an important role in achieving both the second objective of PREVENT (i.e. protecting vulnerable people), as well as a multi-institutional CT approach (the third objective of PREVENT). The research findings indicate that preventing radicalisation and/or extremism is realised discursively through language and terminology, which ultimately fuses exceptionality to normality regarding who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Importantly, it is not that language determines outcomes, but inter-subjective understandings formed through

379 Interview with practitioner(s) No.06; 14.
discursive practice \textit{delimit} spaces for agency, and thus have a causal effect on what outcomes are possible (Fisher, 2012). Two key phrases that are helping to mainstream PREVENT in various key sectors are “vulnerability” and “safeguarding”.

Li’s (2007) concept of ‘problematisation’ is particularly instructive when analysing how the heterogeneous parts of a dispositif are assembled and orders hold together and endure both across differences and through differences (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). For Li (2007), ‘problematising’ is an important element in the assemblage, and analysis of ‘how problems come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of deficiency and promises of improvement’ remains important, alongside questions of how knowledge is rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged, and how failures and contradictions are reincorporated into the assemblage (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319). Participants’ accounts suggest that the ‘problematisation’ of radicalisation has been made possible through notions of radicalisation as a process and \textit{not as an event}, as linked to terminological modification.

The importance of language does not escape Deleuze in his rendering of dispositif as assemblage. Deleuze connects the concept of dispositif to that of power in Foucault’s writing, where relations of power ‘constitute an act upon an act’. For Deleuze (1988), a dispositif is a discursive or non-discursive force that disperses in space through discourses (speaking, words). Moreover, according to Deleuze, one of the main points is that ideologies and subjectification ‘always assume an organisation or “system” within which they operate’ (Deleuze, 1988: 29). What Deleuze is hinting at is the centrality of language and expression to any dispositif. As Deleuze (1992: 9) notes, ‘a dispositif comprises of truths of enunciation; truth is the actualisation of the lines which constitute a dispositif’. This assertion finds support in work by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 407) who term assemblage a “constellation” which can be divided on two axes. It is the second of these axes that is of concern to the current discussion: “enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 81). Enunciation refers to a collection of languages, words and meanings; a provisional unity is produced through the ‘co-functioning’ of \textit{words} (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006: 52, \textit{emphasis added}).

Although I have drawn upon Deleuzian etymology above, this does not mean that Foucauldian logic disappears out of view; far from it. As the previous chapter demonstrates, PP is transforming from a punitive-based model to a

\footnote{The curve of enunciation which conditions the dispositif (Deleuze, 1992) might be read in a similar way to changes in terminology within PREVENT(ion) governance.}
more normalised invocation of care - the phrase “radicalisation as another form of abuse” clearly evidences this morphogenesis. Further, PP understood as “safeguarding” transforms the distinction between normality and exception and thus modifies our understanding of the relationship between politics, risk and preventing radicalisation in ways similar to observations made by Aradau et al. (2008: 152), who state:

“The architecture of the normal takes shape through heterogeneous and mundane actuarial practices, through the arbitrary declarations of risky-ness and bureaucratic reallocation of power. The imperceptible and unknowable captured by technologies of risk are re-inscribed upon concrete everydayness, thereby colonising normality. Rather than the limit of normality, risk infuses exceptionalism within the governementality of everydayness”.

Such assertions go to the heart of what is considered Foucault’s greatest intellectual accomplishment: to investigate the microphysics of power by diffusing the macro-perspective of the state and centring on the power-holders through the notion of dispositif.

Foucault’s microphysical layer of the dispositif is an important departure point to make sense of participants’ understandings of radicalisation “as another form of abuse”. Foucault’s conceptualisation of power-knowledge as a microphysical layer of interconnected disciplinary dispositifs is employed in his account of the emergence of ‘normalising’ practices. However, drawing upon the work of Georges Canguilhem, Foucault extends the concept of the ‘norm’ in new directions. For Foucault, the norm draws its meaning from what is outside itself that does not conform to what it requires; it evaluates this outside negatively, but is also dependent on it (Ennis, 2008: 257). Foucault supports this observation in his discussion of the carceral system within Discipline and Punishment (see Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, the dispositif of the prison is positioned at the centre of the disciplinary continuum of different types of carceral institutions (Ennis, 2008: 257). Importantly however, as Ennis (2008: 234) observes:

“Normalising processes are not, as is often assumed, the product of the functioning of disciplinary dispositifs in general. Foucault argues that the fact that these processes spread across society was due to the influence which the carceral system exercised over other institutions involved in the supervision, correction and improvement of individuals who fell outside the normal range of various behaviours”.

381 For a detailed analysis of exceptionalism in the context of the war of terror, see Neal (2006).
In this development, behaviour is placed on a “grid of normality” which ultimately links categories (or “institutions”) that had previously been separate; this without suggesting that the resultant formation is top-down mechanisms of power (see Foucault, 1991). Rather, separate institutions ‘shape behaviour in congruence with particular sets of norms and with a certain goal’ (Dean, 1999: 15, emphasis added). Subsequently, as Foucault (1975: 304) observes, behaviour is either normalised or pathologised by teachers, doctors and social workers who emerge as the new “judges of normality”. Participants’ accounts of PP suggest embedding expertise through the notion of “radicalisation as another form of abuse” might be read in a similar way.³⁸²

³⁸² Ericson and Haggerty’s Policing the Risk Society (1997) is also instructive here. Specifically, Ericson and Haggerty posit policing as “risk communication” and the police as “knowledge workers” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 3, 19); see also Rose (1998).

³⁸³ This is without going as far to suggest that various institutions automatically follow the dictates of a central authority.

PP conceptualised as “safeguarding” also coincides with the logic of dispositif precautionary risk, which emphasises the central importance of mundane, everyday life to practices of anticipatory security (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a). As Louise Amoore (2009: 55-56) has put it, data-led security practices ‘concerned with anticipating an uncertain future’ - that she calls algorithmic war - ‘(re-inscribe) the imaginative geography of the deviant, atypical, abnormal “other” inside the spaces of everyday life’. The latter point is particularly crucial since the knowledge practices that cast radicalisation as a social process or continuum suggest the possibility of early identification and intervention in the life-worlds of potential future radicals (de Goede and Simon, 2013). Importantly, this literature is influenced by Foucault’s concept of the norm even if it has been extended and applied in new directions. Ultimately, whilst Foucault’s aim was to “cut off the king’s head” in political analysis, counter-radicalisation as linked to an invocation towards “safeguarding” is helping PP to govern as a ‘headless body as if it indeed has a head’ (Dean, 1994: 156).³⁸³ This is a crucial element of counter-radicalisation through PP since, the notion of dispositif is ‘far from being a single system of management with a common rationality, it consists of knowledges, practices, and institutions that have no more unity and no more necessity beyond the simple fact of being stitched together’ (Braun, 2014; see also Deleuze, 1988). As Deleuze (1992: 163, 160) notes, ‘a dispositif is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on’.

In light of these observations, many might posit that this, then, is not the risk society explored by Beck: an account of risk almost wholly
preoccupied with cataloguing the growth of man-made dangers. However, this does not mean reflexivity is entirely fallible in making sense of PP understood as “safeguarding”. An invocation towards safeguarding is indicative of PP as a reflexive organisation. For instance, Jessop (2003) suggests that there are several conditions for effective reflexive self-organisation. These are:

‘(a) Simplifying models and practices, which reduce the complexity of the world but are still congruent with real world processes and relevant to actors’ objectives; (b) developing the capacity for dynamic, interactive social learning among autonomous but interdependent agencies about causal processes and forms of interdependence, attributions of responsibility and capacity for actions, and possibilities of co-ordination in a complex, turbulent environment; (c) building methods for co-ordinating actions across social forces with different identities, interests, and meaning systems, over different spatio-temporal horizons, and over different domains of action; and (d) establishing a common world view for individual action to stabilise key players’ orientations, expectations, and rules of conduct’ (Jessop, 2003: 147).

PP understood as safeguarding adheres to all four conditions. Moreover, Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde (2005) suggest that the implications of shifting from rational to reflexive ethics leaves reflexive organisations with the aim of uniting members through a collective understanding of the situation their organisation is in the contest of extreme uncertainty. One participant succinctly summed up this situation of uncertainty: “Whatever our organisation is we’ve got a duty of care. But never before would I have put safeguarding and counter-terrorism in the same sentence. And that’s PREVENT!” This is because reflexive organisations are confronted with a divergence and conflict of ethical perceptions of its members (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005). Indeed, as Beck notes, the ‘latent unintended consequence’ of risk society does not mean no knowledge at all but one knowledge whose claims are controversial (Beck, 1999c: 120, emphasis in original). Furthermore, for Beck, the latent unintended consequences thus denote a conflict of different expert knowledge leading to a battle-ground of pluralistic rationality claims (Beck, 1999c: 120, italics in original). The participants’ discussions around juxtaposed definitions of “vulnerability” are indicative of the dogmatism Beck refers to. Moreover, for reflexive organisations, the measure of integration is the ability of their members to shape the future for themselves (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 617). Changes in terminology and language as connoted by “vulnerability”, “risk” and “safeguarding” should not be viewed as separate from this observation.

384 Interview with practitioner No.04.
Lastly, reflexive organisations are not just socially designed, they transform into such through social necessity. Moreover, for Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde (2005: 617), what separates bureaucracies from reflexive organisations is that reflexive organisations are ‘forced to communicate openly’. The overt nature of PP can be seen throughout participants’ accounts in the preceding chapter. Thus, viewing PREVENT as a reflective authority perhaps goes someway in addressing observations made by Aradau and van Munster (2007: 12) who state, ‘it is not clear how a theory of risk based on an evolutionary understanding of modernity can explicate the risk technologies deployed in the war on terror’. Furthermore, reflexive decision-making, in this case an invocation towards an ethics of care, might also be read as putting the limited use of intelligence that job segmentation generates to the fore, because in a late modern society, structured by latent rather than manifest consequences, intelligence, in particular social intelligence, must be maximised (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 617). A multi-agency approach to counter-radicalisation is considered imperative since, as English (2009: 131) observes, ‘intelligence is the most vital element in successful counter-terrorism’. In this way, PP contextualised as “safeguarding” can also be understood within the conceptual matrix of political analysis.

7.3.4 PREVENT(ion) through Safeguarding: Political Rationality

In chapter 3, it was argued the heterogeneous elements that make up a dispositif could be understood more systematically as techniques, technologies and rationalities for the government of society. Moreover, it was suggested that the semantic linking of governing and modes of thought indicate that it is not possible to study technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). Indeed, the concept of governmentality defines a discursive field in which the telos of action is ‘rationalised’ following a specific form of reasoning (Hindess 1996: 106). PP contextualised as “safeguarding” might thus be conceptualised as what Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, following Foucault, term a “political rationality”385 (Rose and Miller 1992; see also Aradau and van Munster 2007: 97; Stockdale, 2014: 100). A political rationality “problematises” a certain

385 As Lemke (2002: 2-3) observes, it is within the lectures of 1978 and 1979 and a focus on the “genealogy of the modern state” that Foucault outlined the importance of political rationalities. For Foucault, the semantic linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (“mentalité”) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them.
aspect of the social world, and offers a framework through which “programmes of government” can be developed in response to the identified problem(s) (Stockdale, 2014: 181-2, 100). Moreover, PREVENT(ion), as linked to an invocation of care, might be seen as an attempt of ‘rationalisation’, and an account for the ‘authority of authority’. As Rose (1990: 10) observes, ‘contemporary government ... operates through the delicate and minute infiltration of the ambitions of regulation into the very interior of our existence and experience as subjects’. Rationalities appear therefore as knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and agencies upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and Hindess, 1998).

The research findings embody the literature on political rationality in various ways. First, as Rose and Miller (1992: 178) posit, ‘political discourse is a domain for the formulation and justification of idealised schemata for representing reality, analysing it and rectifying it’. In chorus, Stockdale (2014: 8) articulates:

‘Political rationalities are explicitly premised upon an underlying normative claim regarding the particular realm of human affairs with which they are concerned, as they both affirm that this area requires governmental action, and offer a normative-conceptual framework that guides political action in a certain context by both articulating the sort(s) of problem(s) to be addressed, and providing a programme for action through which political power can be mobilised toward these ends’. Coinciding with this logic, recall form the previous chapter that “safeguarding” was understood to be “more welcoming to partners”,386 “people seem to “get it” more”,387 and “it’s the only way we can afford to do it”.388

Second, because political rationalities imply such a practical dimension whose actualisation will be subject to the inexorable vagaries of social context, political rationalities ‘do not have the systematic and closed character of disciplined bodies of theoretical discourse’ (Stockdale, 2014: 178). Thus, it is possible to discern regularities that are termed political rationalities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 276) as those that refer to a ‘discursive field within which the exercise of power is conceptualised’, which combines ‘justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities’ with ‘notions of the appropriate forms, objects, and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175; Stockdale, 2014: 100). In the context of the present study, participants suggested

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386 Interview with practitioner No.05.
387 Interview with practitioner No.02.
388 Interview with practitioner No.04.
that in the past, the phrase PREVENT had problematically become associated with situational crime prevention more generally.\(^{389}\)

Third, because they are concerned both with framing a social problem as in need of rectification and providing a governmental framework through which it can be addressed, ‘political rationalities have a characteristically moral form’ that ‘consider(s) the ideals or principles to which government should be directed’ (Stockdale, 2014: 178-9, 100-101, emphasis added). As the participants made clear: “We’ve moved away from the word PREVENT as it was unhelpful, whereas safeguarding is a term used by our partners daily”.\(^{390}\) Here, the interview discussions embody Foucault’s later analysis of thinking as a situated practice of critical reflection that establishes a certain critical distance from existing forms of acting and understanding and works to remediate and recombine these forms (Collier, 2009: 80). As Collier (2009) observes, Foucault’s 1978-79 governmentality lectures place new emphasis on thinking as an active response to situated problems and as a key driver in shaping new topologies of power. Moreover, such occurrences are situated amid upheaval, in sites of problematisation in which existing forms have lost their coherence and their purchase in addressing present problems, and in which new forms of understanding and acting have to be invented (Foucault, 2009: 95).\(^{391}\) However, it would also seem PP coincides with a re-reading of Foucault’s account of neoliberalism itself. Examining ‘advanced liberal government’ (rather than a generalised concern with neoliberal governmentality), Rose et al. (2006: 84) emphasise how projects of political rationalisation ‘are constantly undergoing modification in the face of some newly identified problem or solution’. Concurring with Rose et al. (2006), Collier (2009: 99-100) argues that neoliberalism is not a form of knowledge-power or a kind of governmentality that establishes the ‘conditions of possibility’ for thinking and acting in a certain way. For Collier (2009), it is not a diagram of power or a congeries of technical elements. Instead, as Collier (2009: 100) writes, ‘it is a form of thinking, a kind of reflection that aims to critique and remediate existing mentalités and practices of government that have become uncertain or problematic’.

Fourth, political rationalities have what one might term an ‘epistemological’ character. That is to say, they are articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of the objects governed - society, the nation, the population, the economy (Rose and Miller, 1992). In

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\(^{389}\) Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.

\(^{390}\) Interview with practitioner No.02.

\(^{391}\) Interestingly, an emphasis on ‘thinking’ and ‘inventing new forms’ is also indicative of Beckidian societal self-critique.
particular, they embody some account of the persons over whom government is to be exercised. As Rose and Miller (1992: 276, italics in original) point out, ‘these can be specified as members of a flock to be led, legal subjects with rights, children to be educated, a resource to be exploited, elements of a population to be managed’. The epistemological character of PP is evident within the interview discussions around PREVENT contextualised as safeguarding which effaces connotations of punitive intervention, evoking instead a questionably more palatable brand of normalisation through appropriate “advice”, “guidance” and “support” offered to individuals vulnerable to extremist trajectories. Lastly, political rationalities are articulated in a distinctive idiom. The language that constitutes political discourse is more than rhetoric. It should be seen, rather, as rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations (Rose and Miller, 2008). Applying such observations to the present study, operationally (and rhetorically) the term “vulnerability” was considered the subject of debate not least because of juxtaposed institutional definitions and interpretations of the concept itself. However, as some participants suggested, over time terms such as “safeguarding” and “vulnerability”, as linked to the operations and objectives of PP, are becoming politically legitimate among authorities alike. This is because political rationalities are morally coloured, grounded upon knowledge, and made thinkable through language (Rose and Miller, 1992, emphasis added).

7.4 Key Theme 3: Risk as Gut Feeling

As the previous chapter makes clear, (external and internal) partners, as well as the local community more generally, are encouraged to act upon risk using the experiential system (intuitive, automatic, natural, narrative) rather than the rational system (analytical, deliberative). In so being, PP coincides with the literature on pre-emption outlined in chapter 3 since the primary basis of the security decision based upon instinctive risk shifts risk from the realm of empirically verifiable facticity to the realm of the imagination (Stockdale, 2011). As Melinda Cooper (2006: 120) concisely explains, the core premise of the logic of pre-emption ‘exhorts us to respond to what we suspect without being able to discern; to prepare for the emergent long before we can predict how and when it will be actualised; to counter the unknowable before it is even realised’. Moreover, acting upon risk in a compressed time space and devoid of democratic deliberation (Stockdale, 2014) is being primarily encouraged based
on “gut feelings” (Elmer and Opel, 2008: 14; see also de Goede, 2012). As Elmer and Opel (2008: 14) emphasise, “gut instinct” emerges as the primary basis for decision/action ‘in the absence of either time to contemplate decisions or adequate intelligence and research on which decisions are based’. The absence of time and intelligence can be seen in the participants’ discussions regarding the relationship between partner referrals and acting upon risk as instinctive feeling(s):

“Tell us what you’ve got when you’ve got that gut feeling, that hunch rather than when you’re sure something’s wrong because by then it might have gone too far down the road”.392

“We don’t want them to then sit there and try to assess it and work their way through it”.393

Participants emphasised the importance of not deliberating whether to act upon risk through an emphasis on “sharing concerns” at the earliest possible stage. Thus, the research findings coincide with precautionary dispositif of risk outlined in chapter 3, which reconfigures the debates between securitisation as the introduction of speed and urgency at the heart of democracies (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 332). However, before proceeding further it is important to be clear on what is being argued. Democratic deliberation quite clearly plays an important role within PP operations. If deliberation played no such role, PP would be reduced to merely an exercise of violence. The concept of democratic deliberation featured in many of the participants’ accounts of risk management as linked to ‘gut feeling’ post-referral: “let us make that call”;394 “don’t try and come up with the solution or the answer, let other people consider it”;395 “the second side of things is dealing with the individual referrals of people of concern. Trying to assess what level of risk they actually do pose”.396 This said, an “elixir of speed” (Falk, 2010: 255) is being encouraged over democratically oriented deliberation at the referral stage (i.e. identification) since, as one participant noted, “I think that’s where the breakdown in previous missed opportunities has been”.397 In this way, the importance of acting on “gut feeling” most clearly illustrates how a pre-emptive politics relies on the play of ‘affect’

392 Interview with practitioner No.14.
393 Interview with practitioner No.03.
394 Interview with practitioner No.14.
395 Interview with practitioner No.05.
396 Interview with practitioner No.02.
397 Interview with practitioner No.03.
(Massumi, 2007), as it illuminates the decisional logic through which such a politics of risk is operationalised. In other words, affective resonances are not merely crucial to making the future actionable in the present – they also provide the underlying informational basis in the context of a pre-emptive rationality since, in Ewaldian terms, precaution “invites one to anticipate what one does not know yet” (Ewald, 2002: 288). As one participant stated: “Don’t try and work out whether that individual is then going to go on to become a terrorist because there’s so much else before that”.398

7.4.1 PREVENT as Pre-emption and the Play of Affect

Theorising ‘affect’ as the pre-individual capacity to affect and to be affected, Brian Massumi emphasises the role played by autonomic bodily responses, which have been defined as in-excess of conscious states of perception and therefore point to a ‘visceral perception’ preceding perception (Massumi, 2002: 25). For Massumi, the turn to affect is about opening the human body to its indeterminacy (Clough et al., 2007). It is therefore necessary for Massumi to define affect in terms of its autonomy from conscious perception and language, as well as emotion (Clough et al., 2007). Massumi (2002: 25; see also Clough et al., 2007: 66) proposes that if conscious perception is to be understood as the narration of affect - as it is in the case of emotion - there is, nonetheless, always “a never-to-be-conscious autonomic remainder”, “a virtual remainder”, or an excess that pertains to the virtuality of affect itself. Massumi’s concept of the “affective fact” usefully captures this idea. For Massumi, the affective fact refers to a circumstance in which an ‘affective mechanism ... exhibit(s) the certainty to which empirical facts aspire’- that is, an empirically ungroundable set of premises to which the powerful resonance of affective responses grants the semblance of veracity (Massumi, 2005a: 7; 2010: 55; Stockdale, 2014: 143). The idea of affective fact can thus refer to precisely the sort of imagined potentialities upon which anticipatory action is premised, since the latter cannot be grounded in empirical data - as they exist only in the ultimately unknowable future - and yet are endowed with an adequate degree of veracity to serve as the basis for concrete interventions in the present (Massumi, 2010: 68; Stockdale, 2014: 143-144).

The notion of affect understood as a pre-emptive politics of risk usefully sheds light on the research findings around individualised intuitive risk feelings. Firstly, Zajonc (1980) proposers those affective reactions

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398 Interview with practitioner No.03.
to stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently guiding information processing and judgement. Under this logic, affective reactions may serve as orienting mechanisms, helping us navigate quickly and efficiently through a complex, uncertain, and dangerous world (Slovic et al., 2004). Recall that acting upon gut feeling was accorded importance since it was “simple language”399 that partners “understood instantly”400 and could “immediately relate to”.401 Secondly, affect means the specific quality of “goodness” or “badness”: (1) experienced as a feeling state; and (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus (Slovic et al., 2004: 312). Thus, affect shifts its mode of intervention from corrective perturbation responding to chaotic stirrings to alarm in response to the uncertainty of threat (Massumi, 2005b). Damasio (1994; see also Slovic, 2004: 314) for example, argues that when a negative somatic marker is linked to an image of a future outcome, it sounds an ‘alarm’. The participants’ accounts of risk as linked to a feeling of uneasiness suggest that, in the context of PP, dispositif precautionary risk has moulded itself to threat. Outlining the concept of ‘threat’, Massumi (2005a) observes, ‘threat’ does not belong to linear time, but ‘belongs to the non-linear circuit of the always have been ... a threat that does not materialise is not false. It has the affective reality of a past future, truly felt’ (Massumi, 2005a: 3). Thus, as Massumi (2005b: 35, emphasis added) puts it, ‘a threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldn’t be a threat. A threat is only a threat if it retains indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not a substantial form, but a time form: a futurity. The threat as such is nothing yet - just a looming’. Accordingly, for Massumi (2005b), the event remains virtual - future-past - but is real and present in its effects. The present reality of its effects means that threats are responded to pragmatically all the while remaining virtual (Massumi, 2005a: 8). Thus, threat is a futurity with a virtual power to affect the present quasicausally. Moreover, as Massumi (2005b: 35) observes, ‘when a governmental mechanism makes threat its business, it is taking this virtuality as its object and adopting quasicausality as its mode of operation. That quasicausal operation goes by the name of security’.402

Risk conceptualised as ‘virtuality’ coincides with the notion risk outlined by Beck. ‘Risk’, writes Beck, ‘reverses the relationship of past, present and future’.403 Thus, risk is the

399 Interview with practitioner No.05.
400 Interview with practitioner No.03.
401 Interview with practitioner No.02.
402 The virtuality of risk is mentioned in PREVENT strategy but only with reference to the technological interpretation of ‘virtual’, rather than virtuality as futurity (see HM Government, 2011b: 44).
403 Similarly, Giddens (1991: 111) makes this point in his discussion of risk as the ‘colonisation of the future’.
consequence of an action, which has yet to materialise. In attempting to avoid risk, one is thus defining present problems by their perceived future consequences (Rasmussen, 2001: 239). In Beck’s (1999c: 52) words, ‘future events that have not yet occurred become the object of current action’. At present, there is no effect, only the scenario of what may happen. Scenarios make risks, in Beck’s phrase, a ‘real virtuality’ (Beck, 1999c: 136). Accordingly, the very causality of political discourse is thus circumvented. It is not present actions that are to produce future results, but perceived future results that produce present actions (Rasmussen, 2001: 239).

Acting on gut feeling - as read through Massumi’s concept of affect - also coincides with the logic of dispositif precautionary risk since there is a paradoxical reciprocity between threat understood as a quasicause (see Massumi, 2005b). Importantly, radical uncertainty about both the precise nature of the threat and the moment at which it is likely to emerge does not serve as an impediment to anticipatory action (Stockdale, 2014). Rather, it instead provides the very reason for it, since the radical uncertainty of the present as well as the potential imminence of future catastrophe suggests that, ‘(w)ithout some form of action, a threshold will be crossed and a disastrous future will come about’ (Anderson, 2010a: 780). Or, in Massumi’s (2007: 8) words, ‘the threat is known to have the ontological status of indeterminate potentiality’. Moreover, as Stockdale (2014) articulates, ‘the indeterminacy of potentiality demands that anticipatory adopts a lower threshold of certainty with respect to the nature and imminence of the threat’. In the context of the present study, acting upon risk as linked to individualised risk threshold(s) was a recurring theme in the participants’ discussions:

“*The threshold at which somebody crosses that point of vulnerability into doing something more dangerous and potentially where they pick up the phone and speak to somebody it is going to be different for every individual*.“ 404

“The levels of threat that people perceive may have different thresholds at which concern them, but it still has to be that gut feeling - whether it be the level is 9 out of 10 or 1 out of 10 - it still is a gut feeling that something is not quite right“ 405

“We want them to think about, not only their experience in their role, but also life in general, to use that as their risk test, their risk threshold that they feel“ 406

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404 Interview with practitioner No.03.
405 Interview with practitioner No.05.
406 Interview with practitioner No.03.
Accordingly, PP encourages active citizenship through individuals managing and calculating their now risk (see Beck 1999). Such a perspective coincides with Beck’s (and to a degree Giddens’) assertions on the ‘individualisation’ of risk outlined in chapter 4. In Beck’s (1994a: vii) words, ‘the notion of ‘risk’ is central to modern culture today precisely because so much of our thinking has to be of ‘as-if’ kind. We regularly construct potential futures, knowing that such construction may in fact prevent them coming about’. Or, to put it differently, ‘modernity institutionalises the principle of radical doubt and insists that all knowledge(s) takes the form of hypotheses: claims which may very well be true but which are always open to revision and may have at some point to be abandoned’ (Giddens, 1991: 1). As the participants suggested: “We’re not saying it is definitely going to be terrorism or extremism”;407 “If it’s nothing, as is often the case, it can be written off in a matter of hours, after you’ve done the checks”.408 Giddens (1991: 29) sums this situation up thus:

‘The popularity of futurology in the system of high modernity is not an eccentric preoccupation. It signals a recognition that the consideration of counterfactual possibilities is intrinsic to reflexivity in the context of risk assessment and evaluation’.

Furthermore, Beck posits that there has been the transformation of personal time consciousness, and the adoption of a uniquely reflexive future orientation embedded in the practice of self-government (Binkley, 2009). According to Beck, individuals are increasingly encouraged to act upon thresholds of risk tolerance, to extend their awareness of the temporality of their own actions into a far-reaching future and to incorporate a self-distancing regard for their own conduct in the face of uncertain outcomes (Binkley, 2009: 87).409 With the cultural ubiquity of risk in everyday life, for Beck, individuals are responsibilised into a perpetual process of decision-making and inured to making personal risk assessments (Hudson, 2003: 44). As Beck (1994b: 8) puts it, individuals are now expected to master these ‘risky opportunities’, without being able to make the necessary decisions on a well-founded and responsible basis, that is to say, considering the possible consequences. Importantly, Beck (1994c: viii) suggests that ‘we differ among ourselves in our various diagnoses of what these political ramifications might be’. Thus, rather than the Kantian or Cartesian subject of simple modernity, as Lash (2002: ix), drawing upon the work of Beck, observes:

407 Interview with practitioner No.03.
408 Interview with practitioner No.02.
‘Reflexes are indeterminate. They are immediate. They do not in any sense subsume. Reflexes cope with a world of speed and quick decision-making. What Beck often omits to say is that the individual must choose fast, must – as in reflex – make quick decisions. The non-linear individual may wish to be reflective but neither has the time or space to reflect in an atmosphere of risk in which knowledge and life changes are precarious’.

The research findings also trouble the concept of risk as conceptualised within modernist understandings that use risk and uncertainty interchangeably and thus consider each as separate epistemic conditions. Rather, acting on gut feeling coincides with a pre-emptive logic of security through a transformation of the logic of risk itself. As Aradau et al. (2008) make clear, risk understood as a dispositif (due to the double infinity of risk) tries to discipline uncertainty by bringing uncertainty under control, making it orderly and docile. The idea of risk thus renders the inherent contingency of the future both “knowable and actionable” by “making the unpredictable predictable” (Aradau et al., 2008: 150). Or, in Ewaldian terms, to calculate risk is ‘to master time, to discipline the future’ (Ewald, 1991: 207).

Such findings also support Stockdale’s (2014) excellent recent critique of Philip Fisher’s typology of temporal spaces. In his 2002 book *The Vehement Passions*, Fisher offers an account of the way “the passions” - meaning the affective resonances that colour and characterise the human experience - are crucial to mediating our understanding of, and relation to, temporality in general and the future in particular (Fisher 2002: 78). Importantly, Fisher makes a clear distinction between what he terms the “imminent future” and the “abstract future”, and their respective relationships to the present (Fisher, 2002: 79; Stockdale, 2014: 128). Fisher describes the abstract future as temporally distant (far removed from our existence in the present) that we cannot possess any coherent knowledge or understanding of what the future holds (Fisher, 2002: 79). This is because the epistemic fuzziness of the temporal distance means that ‘we cannot think of ourselves as acting reasonably about it’; and as such, no impetus to act is generated regarding its potentialities (Fisher, 2002: 80; Stockdale, 2014: 128). By contrast, Fisher contends that the imminent future’s temporal proximity (about-to-be-realised moment) grants it an adequate degree of intelligibility which thus activates the sorts of affective resonances that generate the impetus for action in the present (Fisher, 2002: 80-81; Stockdale, 2014: 128).

\[410\] In more simple terms, Fisher (2002) posits that the operation of passions is deemed a necessary condition for action in the present. 231
In summarising Fisher’s future concepts, Stockdale (2014: 129; see also Fisher, 2002: 76) outlines that, for Fisher, the immediately imminent future is the only temporal space from which potential events can generate the degree affective resonance required to trigger some sort of action (a decision to act).

As Stockdale (2014: 130-131) instructively articulates, ‘Fisher’s affectively mediated account of our relation to the future provides a psycho-philosophical grounding which travels well to the conventional articulation of pre-emption in the context of exceptional (inter)national security concerns that are located in the Fisherian imminent future’. Moreover, Stockdale (2014) usefully draws attention to the death of Jean Charles de Menezes which is instructive in this respect since, as Stockdale (2014) suggests, it is plausible that the officers’ decision to “shoot to kill” was based on the “feeling” that an attack was imminent; this most likely attributable to the previous 7/7 atrocities. However, the experiential contents of risk as ‘gut feeling’ i.e. pragmatic speculations which actively populate the sensations of the present, inhabits the Fisherian abstract future since PP confronts radical uncertainty that is confined to speculative imaginings of radicalisation and/or extremism which may or may not actualise. However, under this logic, Fisher’s framework suggests that this would not generate the sort of affective response that would precipitate action. Yet, following Stockdale (2014), it is precisely this type of ostensibly in-actionable potentiality that the logic of PP takes as one such basis for action since PREVENT encourages the intrusion of distant events into everyday consciousness (Giddens, 1991: 27).

As Stockdale (2014) astutely observes, understood this way, pre-emption radically alters the distinction between the abstract and the imminent future to the point where they “collapse”. In Stockdale (2014: 132, italics in original) words, passions can be activated with respect to ‘potentialities, irrespective of their temporal proximity in the lived present’. Thus, by encouraging partners and individuals to act on risk as gut feeling, PP operates in a rather Machiavellian manner. As the famous Machiavellian passage reads:

‘It is necessary not only to pay attention to immediate crises, but to foresee those that will come and to make every effort to prevent them. For if you see them coming well in advance, then you can easily take the appropriate action to remedy them, but if you wait until they are right on top of you, then the prescription will take long to take effect, because the disease is far too advanced’ (Machiavelli, 1531 [reprinted 2010]).
Understanding PP in this way thus adds an additional layer of support to the broader claim that PP functions as a political rationality since PREVENT changes the spatiotemporal conceptions of the future with regard to the unfolding relationship of prevention as pre-emption. Prevention requires certainty to legitimate action, however under pre-emptive logic, uncertainty acts as a catalyst for anticipatory action in the present. Whilst the two adopt different methodologies to capture and act on future space-times, PREVENT(ion) within the Fisherian abstract future (through individualised gut feeling[s]) has not been reinvented, but rather refigured towards risk as pre-emption.

7.4.2 PREVENT: Risk as Politics

PP understood through Massumi’s notion of “affect” provides enlightening perspective on the identification of risk at the referral stage. However, and to reiterate, it would be incorrect to suggest that no deliberation of risk(s) takes place post-referral; the participants’ accounts of ERG22 are indicative of democratic deliberation, which to a degree, guides decisions based on risk. Moreover, a second side of PP, or what the participants considered “the follow on” from gut feeling, was that of dealing with individual referrals.411 Thus, it is implausible to suggest that risk management within PP is entirely operationalised on the basis of pure speculation of what an unknowable future might hold (Hacking, 1990) i.e. a gut feeling. Rather, the participants’ accounts of PP post-referral suggest that the praxis of risk in a preventative governance framework requires the ongoing accumulation of what O’Malley (2004b) terms “risk knowledge”, which refers to any information deemed to be relevant or necessary for the creation of an informed picture of the future412 (O’Malley, 2005: 51; see also Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Thus, PP might be understood as characterised by ‘the dance of affect and reason’ (Finucane et al., 2003).

Slovic et al. (2004) posit that risk in the modern world is confronted and dealt with in three fundamental ways:

‘Risk as feelings refers to our fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on hazard management. When the first of these two

411 Interview with practitioner No.02.
412 Hence, how according to Rose (1998: 185), the claims experts/professionals become, in certain fundamental senses, knowledge workers, engaged in the accumulation, calibration, classification and interpretation and communication of information relevant to judgements about risk.
orders of fact overlap in their pretension to certainty, this in effect produces a third reality - risk as politics’ (Slovic, 2004: 311, emphasis added).

However, as Massumi (2005a) observes, as well as overlapping with the traditional family of facts, affective facts overlap with command by logic by homology with it. Moreover, according to Slovic et al. (2004) the central political significance of affect rests on these overlaps because they enable a slippage between the orders they bring in contact. As Slovic et al. (2004: 316, emphasis added) put it, ‘while we may be able to “do the right thing” without analysis, it is unlikely that we can employ analytical thinking rationally without guidance from affect somewhere along the line and vice versa’. In this way, the experiential mode of thinking and analytical mode of thinking are continually active, interacting in what has been characterised as “the dance of affect and reason” (Finucane et al., 2003).

The notion of “the dance of affect and reason” is instructive in explaining risk management within PP post-referral:

“If it’s been a flippant remark, it’s been something whereby I think they’ve been a little bit naive, the discussion will go round the table whether ... do we approach them and let them know that we know about it? If it’s a child, do we get their parents in and have a word with them? ‘Cause a lot of stuff these days is like social media, things put on Facebook and like, for instance, Anders Breivik put himself in full uniform with a gun ... some kids have got, like, Swastikas in the background ... not really knowing what it is but they’re referred into us, and have they got extreme right wing views? We don’t know sometimes”. 413

Moreover, the aim of “judgement” within “the dance of affect and reason” is to develop a better understanding of a future threat precisely at the edge of calculable knowledge in order to render it actionable. As Briggs (2005: 57, as cited in Murphy, 2012: 119) contends, whilst these threats may be beyond measures, ‘information is a means to an end - better and more confident judgement’. Thus, in opposition to the claim by Beck who presents risk society as ‘riddled with risks of which we can have neither knowledge nor measure’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 93), the post-referral operations of PP might be thought of as characterised by what Aradau and van Munster (2007: 93) call “the quest for knowledge” in the form of risk management around prevention. To put it differently, in a Derridian sense, ‘the decision, if there is to be one,

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must advance towards a future which is not known, which cannot be anticipated. In these terms, a decision that is anticipatory is not a decision at all, but merely the application of a body of knowledge’ (Derrida, 1994: 37; see also Derrida, 1992).

Most directly relevant to the current focus on decision-making under risk, and also consistent with the positive view of emotions as affect, Slovic et al. (2004) have proposed an “affect heuristic” that highlights the importance of affect for risk perceptions and risk-related behaviour (see Slovic et al., 2004). For Slovic et al (2004: 314), the feelings that become salient in a judgement or decision-making process depend on characteristics of the individual and the task as well as the interaction between them. Moreover, it is argued individuals differ in the way they react affectively, and in their tendency to rely upon experiential thinking (Peters and Slovic, 2000). As Slovic et al. (2014: 314) posit:

‘Tasks differ regarding the evaluability (relative affective salience) of information. These differences result in the affective qualities of a stimulus image being “mapped” or interpreted in diverse ways. The salient qualities of real or imagined stimuli then evoke images (perceptual and symbolic interpretations) that may be made up of both affective and instrumental dimensions. The mapping of affective information determines the contribution stimulus images make to an individual’s “affect pool.” All of the images in people’s minds are tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect. The affect pool contains all the positive and negative markers associated (consciously or unconsciously) with the images. People consult or “sense” the affect pool in the process of making judgements’.

The participants’ discussions around “dealing with referrals” might be read in a similar way. For instance, the standardized risk framework of ERG22 coincides with a “quest for knowledge” (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 91), or, as Ben Anderson puts it, “anticipatory epistemic objects” - the knowledge strategies through which ‘future possibilities and potentialities are disclosed, objectified, communicated and rendered mobile’ in the face of unpredictable futures (Anderson, 2007: 158; see also Lakoff, 2008). In one sense, the application of a precautionary logic is invoked through the mapping of radicalisation as a linear, teleological process as linked to ERG22. Moreover, the concept behind ERG22 transforms radicalisation risk into a carefully crafted artefact, one linked to notions of normalisation. Thus, ERG22 dissolves the notion of a subject or a concrete individual, and puts in its place a combinatory of risk factors in a Castelian sense:

‘To intervene no longer means, or at least to begin with, taking one’s target a given individual in order to correct, punish or care for him ... There is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject
because there is no longer a subject. What the new preventative policies primarily address is no longer individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their primary aim is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger’ (Castel, 1991: 288, *emphasis in original*).

In the context of the present study, PP understood *entirely* through the concept of ERG22 adheres to what the governmentality literature has called ‘clinical’ risk. Clinical risk works by locating probabilistic indicators of future conditions (O'Malley, 2004b: 22; see also Aradau and van Munster, 2009). Furthermore, under this rationality, risks are to be detected in ordinary situations, inscribed in everyday behaviours (Aradau and van Munster, 2009: 7). Accordingly, as Castel (1991: 283, *italics in original*) suggests, ‘there can only ever be imputations of dangerousness, postulating the hypothesis of a more or less probable relationship between certain present symptoms and a certain act to come. In this way, risks ‘dwell “in” the subject even though it has often not yet manifested itself in any act’ (Castel, 1991: 283). In relation to risk management through ERG22, the language of (susceptibility to) persuasion, disadvantage and vulnerability creates a “vulnerable” (potential) suspect separate from radicalised recruiters.

Importantly, the research findings do not fully coincide with Castel, or the logic of clinical risk since participants emphasised radicalisation as a “fluctuating and unpredictable” process (Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012: 19). Thus, the notion of “affect heuristic” is instructive since it sheds light on the participants’ accounts of the role played by gut feeling *alongside* risk knowledge management. In contrast to Castel who states, ‘the essential component of intervention no longer takes the form of direct face-to-face relationship between the carer and the cared, the helper and the helped, the professional and the client’ (Castel, 1991: 281), participants emphasised the importance of individual engagement, experience, common sense *and* gut feeling post-referral.414 This, then, does not fully coincide with observations made by Castel or dispositif at the limit. Rather, PP might be read as case-management within the oeuvre of governmentality.

Under a case-management approach, individuals are deemed threatening or disruptive in some way to the social order. Risk calculation in this type involves the qualitative assessment of risk for individuals or groups who are deemed to be ‘at risk’ (Dean, 1997: 17). However, in contrast to clinical risk rationalities, a case-management approach uses more individualistic

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sources of data derived from interaction with and observation of specific clients (Lupton, 1999). Once risk is assessed, techniques for managing it on the part of the relevant experts are brought into play (Dean, 1997: 217-18; Lupton, 1999). Risks are thus created, circulated, proliferated and capitalised upon in a whole variety of burgeoning ways and identified by a whole host of new actors who enter the scene. Interestingly, Foucault (2007: 68) questions: ‘Is security a different ‘dispositif” based on risk and profiling of population, based on monitoring the future and the potential actualisation of the present? Have we escaped from the territory with the population as statistical category and not as people?’ Whilst there was to be no reply, in the context of present study, it would seem the combination of ERG22 alongside risk management as individual engagement, common sense and gut feeling has connotations with Foucault’s original reading of dispositif, as well as dispositif conceptualised as statistical categorisation at the limit.

Chapter 8

Final Remarks and Directions for Future Research

8.1 Introduction

The axiology underpinning this thesis might be interpreted by some readers as dispassionate. This thesis has not sought to provide a review of PREVENT in relation to the concept of suspect communities and/or BME demographics. Whilst such analyses have certainly contributed to a greater understanding of PREVENT,\(^4\) such tracks have become significantly worn and subsequently research into PREVENT has become repetitive and fatigued. Rather, this thesis has explored PP as linked to the concept of risk, both of which play a crucial role in preventing

\(^4\) See, for example, Spalek and Lambert (2008); Spalek (2009a and b); Thomas (2012).
radicalisation at local level, yet are significantly under-researched and under-theorised.

By pursuing a somewhat experimental pathway, the objectives of this thesis can be read as triadic. First, this thesis contributes to a rather underwhelming knowledge of PP. Second, this thesis has examined two risk positions at local level rather than against exceptional or discursive frameworks, as has been the case in the context of the war on terror. Third, this thesis has drawn attention to the complicity and structurally related functioning of concepts within dispositif risk and reflexive risk as measured against the empirical reality of PP on the ground. However, I acknowledge the idiographic nature of the research and thus consciously distance the findings from statistical generalisation. Moreover, there is no desire to situate the findings within grandiose theoretical claims by proposing this thesis conveniently merges two very different risk positions as harmonious sociological bedfellows. In essence, there is no attempt to meta-theorise. Rather, this thesis has followed a sketch outlined by Tulloch (2007) who observes, ‘different parts of different traditions can be used together in future risk research, provided that two conditions are met: first, that the critiques of the risk society tradition and parts of the governmentality tradition for “meta-theory” are met via detailed local empirical research; second, that the theory of knowledge representation and the power of the researcher-as-writer becomes part of the risk analysis as a norm of research practice’ (Tulloch, 2007: 166, emphasis in original).

8.2 On Pragmatics and Philosophy

This thesis has drawn attention to the significance of trust within PP. Figure 3.15 of the PREVENT strategy clearly states, ‘trust in PREVENT must be improved’ (HM Government, 2011b: 6). However, in the battle to win “hearts and minds”, the focus of the PREVENT strategy is centred on increasing trust at local community level (macro level). Subsequently, there is a virtual absence of space devoted to the issue of inter-organisational trust (micro level; see HM Government, 2011b). This thesis has provided perspective on this oversight by situating the findings within Giddon logic, specifically, The Consequences of Modernity. The findings indicate that PP heavily relies on the development of positive interpersonal “pure” relationships that might be thought of as “kinship connections” before trust and confidence are formed at abstract-systems level (the PREVENT agenda itself). Moreover, it would seem personal relations are significantly influenced by the personal demeanour of PP officers: hence, the emphasis on ‘soft power’ - that is, openness, honesty and familiarity. Importantly, once “active trust” was established, key partners were more likely “buy-into” PREVENT and “sell”
PREVENT as an agenda to other key stakeholders, institutions and individuals at local level.

The thesis has also drawn attention to how PP upholds social relations over time and space constraints. PP attempts to dis-embed (and re-embed when and where necessary) the PREVENT agenda within key partner institutions. However, certain relationships within a multi-partnership framework were considered periodic and transitory and thus, ontological anxiety was overcome by the emotional acceptance of absence. In so being, it would seem PP is functionally alien to methods of working which ignore the intricate nature of trust at both individual and abstract level, thus troubling Giddeon logic which conceptualises trust in a one-dimensional manner. Crucially, what both levels of trust require is a reciprocal relationship that takes a considerable amount of time to cement. At present, research that examines inter-organisational partnerships within PREVENT, particularly in relation to the notion of trust, is significantly lacking. This thesis strongly advocates the need for further research into this oversight.

*Figure 11.18* of the PREVENT strategy states, ‘policing has played a galvanising role in developing local PREVENT partnerships and bringing together a wide range of other organisations to support the strategy’ (HM Government, 2011b: 99; see also HM Government, 2013b: 4). Related to this statement, this thesis has drawn attention to how PP eschews the traditional one-dimensional security dichotomy and thus addresses two levels of sub-politics: governance processes through partnership working (systems induced reflexivity) and at individual level in the form of participants of the scheme (individual reflexivity).\(^416\) Moreover, whilst PP might be thought as ‘rule-altering politics’ (Beck, 1994b: 34-36) as a result of the ‘multi-lateralisation’ of auspices and providers that constitute this new security assemblage, as has been argued, it is important to avoid blanketing Beck’s realist approach in its primary form and remain aware of Beckidian etymology which includes a cultural relativist approach, natural-scientific objectivism, constructivism, and a sociological perspective (Beck, 1995: 76).

Whilst this thesis does not challenge the sanguinity of the aforementioned PREVENT statement (i.e. HM Government 2011b [Figure 11.18]), it does highlight some ambiguities regarding the operationalisation of PREVENT as a smooth top-down governance structure. Many might posit the hyper-complex security environment that PP operates in as embodying

\(^{416}\) For a similar analysis of sub-politics and governance (though not applied towards CT), see Borne (2010: 71-72).
post-structuralist readings of Foucault’s concept of governmentality. However, this thesis has argued that a highly centralised governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an antithesis of freedom and agency does not provide an adequately nuanced account of the empirical realities of PP in a low risk area. Rather, PP operates diffusely within an assemblage of multiple-existences of power, each exercising its own varied degree of agency vis-à-vis the ultimately sovereign centre (Rose and Miller, 1992, 2008; Stockdale, 2014).

Subsequently, this thesis highlights the potential of the generative reading of dispositif as “assemblage” to offer an alternative account to that of “network”, the pre-dominant and often de facto concept used in discussion of governance reform (McFarlane, 2009). The potential of assemblage as a theoretical tool lies in its very manipulability: in its widest sense it can be used as a broad descriptor of disparate actors coming together; as a way of thinking about phenomena as productivist or practice-based; and as an ethos that tends to the social information, and as a means of problematising origins, agency, politics and ethics (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011: 126). However, as Amoore and de Goede (2008) point out, this does not mean that such technologies exist as all-encompassing and all-seeing mechanisms by the state. On the contrary, rather than viewing power as omnipresent and totalising, this thesis has argued that the PP might be considered what William Connolly (2005: 144) describes as a ‘complex assemblage’ fashioned by ‘resonances’ between multiple sites of authorisation (Amoore and de Goede, 2008b).

Inevitably, such complexity brings with it sites of resistance, dogmatism and mutation. Thus, the empirical actualities of PP coincide with a more ‘critical realist’ reading of governmentality, as opposed to post-structuralist discursive accounts of identity. For example, this thesis has drawn attention to some potential barriers to achieving the second and third objectives of PREVENT, such as high employee turnover within key partner institutions, competing organisational objectives and juxtaposed organisational interpretations and definitions of “risk” and “vulnerability”. Thus, rather than being passively accepted, a multi-partnership approach had to be “worked on” and “won”. Interestingly, securing the “buy-in” of both internal and external partners is, in one way, achieved through terminological modification that embeds alignments of expertise along an axis of “safeguarding”. Moreover, contextualising the radicalised (or potentially radicalised) “vulnerable” subject in need of “protection” was understood to be pragmatically necessary since, rhetorically, the lines between PREVENT and PURSUE were understood to have become increasingly blurred in the past; a point reiterated in the PREVENT strategy (see HM Government, 2011b, [Figure 6.40]).

Even given the positive benefits produced by re-orientating risk towards an
invocation of safeguarding, it is problematic to assume coherent joined-up methods of PREVENT(ion) where funding restriction means it is not compulsory to govern in such a way. This situation is potentially exacerbated in a world of ‘lightly-engaged strangers’ (Young, 1999) and the burgeoning body of official security actors that is the hallmark of social and political relations. In the context of the present study, whilst in theory PREVENT is recognised as a multi-agency approach - that is, ‘the coming together of various agencies to address a problem’ (Crawford, 1998: 119) - the research findings err towards PP as ‘inter-agency’ involving ‘some degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies’ (Crawford, 1998: 119). Interestingly, Mythen and Walklate (2005: 15) point out the danger of governmentality is that ‘individuals are portrayed as insentient “docile bodies” observing and obeying disciplinary discourses’. In chorus, Lupton (1999: 102) states, ‘governmentality can be criticised for devoting too much attention to ... discourses and strategies and not enough to how people actually respond to them as part of their everyday lives’. In the context of PP, the research findings support both assertions.

The PREVENT strategy states, ‘one of the effects of PREVENT to date has been the improvement in understanding and co-operation between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, including security’ (HM Government, 2011: 10). At a policy level, this thesis highlights a fundamental divide between the assumption made in governmental rhetoric which champions “communities defeat terrorism” and the realistic uptake at the case study site. Whilst participants recognised that, to a degree, individuals and groups within the local community generate intelligence, the “communities defeat terrorism” rhetoric was considered utopian. Rather, PP operates far more prevalently in a co-productive manner with key trusted individuals or ‘connectors’ (Spalek, 2014), more akin to the concept of ‘strong network ties’ emanating from theories on social networking (see Gravonetter, 1973, 1983). Thus, rather than PP adhering to governmentality in its primary form, this thesis has engaged with Butler’s conceptualisation of sovereignty in the midst governmentality (Butler, 2006).

The research findings suggest it is those figures Butler terms ‘petty sovereigns’ who are considered frontline workers in the fight against extremism rather than “communities” in the broader sense of the term. Moreover, it was also found that this method of working was far from coincidental but pragmatically necessary given that PP operates within a ‘pre-emptive risk trap’ (Beck, 1999c: 141) as a result of what Beck terms ‘the political side effects of civilianisation’s side effects which threaten the continued existence of the democratic political system’ (Beck, 1992a: 80). Thus, Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign deserves cognisance when analysing
pre-emptive governance within PP as it implies an answer to the agency-structure dichotomy. The delegation of PP power to key partners means that such individuals are not true sovereigns - they are constituted within the constraints of governmentality - and yet there is space for practical agency within which they act.

It has also been argued that the figure of the petty sovereign does not mean there are significant ramifications for ‘capricious proceduralism outside the law’ (Butler, 2006: 92) as Butler suggests. Rather, this thesis has argued PP might be understood as a dispositif that serves a strategic purpose, not by a single actor ruling at will, but in line with Young’s (2006: 123) responsibilisation model which suggests that ‘responsibility derived from social connection is ultimately political responsibility’. As Young (2006: 123) clarifies, ‘most fundamentally, what I mean by “politics” here is public communicative engagement with others for the sake of organising our relationships and co-ordinating our actions’. Accordingly, PP attempts to turn the democratic public and political community upside down forming associations and experimenting with new kinds of political participation as a political rationality. Thus, the concept of risk cannot be reduced to a mere description of a certain empirical political reality (Peterson, 2012: 696). Nor can political rationalities be divorced from ‘risk’-oriented thinking. Rather, risk must be understood as a medium for defining the possibility of politics since political risk is contingent on political action. Thus, PP becomes a politics of risk. Subsequently, it would be fruitful for future research to examine PREVENT from a vantage point of political theory and political science, as well as sociology and criminology.

Understanding PP through notion of sovereignty in the midst of governmentality also raises further questions regarding “the decision” of risk that ushers in the political. Whilst a detailed discussion of securitisation theory is beyond the scope of this chapter, an important point warrants discussion. It becomes arguable that both Schmitt and securitisation theory which preclude giving sufficient recognition to the possibility of multiple and dispersed decisions and ultimately the possibility of locating either sovereignty or “the political” in any unambiguous and decidable way is problematic (cf., Schmitt, 1985). Conversely, this thesis adds support to Doty’s (2007: 130) argument for ‘the possibility of securitisation practices originating from social actors who are not necessarily strategically positioned politically or institutionally’. As Doty’s (2007: 130) conceptual reading of border vigilantes suggests, arguably, just the reverse may be the case: “the decision” “we,” “the people,” “the nation,” “the society,” is in fact a plurality of decisions made from diverse locales including “from below”. Similarly, PP understood as “societal responsibility” exposes a hole at the heart of a definitive locus of sovereignty; everyone is potentially the “police” - faceless
creators and up-holders of the social order if they so desire (cf., Doty, 2007: 133; 2009).

This thesis has also argued the importance of the notion of affect to PP. To understand how PP governs in the present to avoid potential harm in the future, this thesis has drawn attention to risk as individualised gut feeling(s) to the point where, following Stockdale (2014), the abstract and immediate future - in a Fisherian sense - collapse. Thus, while the idea of pre-emption is perhaps most often associated with discourses of security exemplified through exceptional and discursive frameworks, this thesis has highlighted the central importance of daily, mundane and everyday life to practices of anticipatory security which requires fastidious attention at its own level. Subsequently, this thesis has perhaps responded to observations made by criminologist Richard Ericson that the logic of pre-emption can be seen to permeate all aspects of the exercise of power in the current moment and not just exceptional practices and discourses (Ericson, 2008: 58). PP is conceived in terms of “safeguarding” the future of “vulnerable” individuals from what may or may not come to pass by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are conceived in relation to an imagined future since PREVENT governs within a pre-criminal space. Thus, from a Foucauldian (and Nietzschean) standpoint, PP can be seen to operate ‘against time, and thus on time, in favour of a (hoped for) time to come’ (Deleuze, 1992).

8.3 On Risk

This thesis has aimed to complement critiques of PREVENT by introducing a critical risk perspective which, as Heath-Kelly (2012: 3) points out, ‘is much more frequently applied to the war on terror technologies of biometrics and data mining of financial transactions, exceptional CT measures, or the re-evaluation of security practice around risk’. However, to be clear, the theoretical subtleties and nuances of governmentality and risk-society theories (and the wider integrities and social utility of these theories) have not been the only focus of this thesis. The objective has not been to reify either Foucault’s or Beck’s work or exegeses of said authors. As Mythen and Walklate (2005: 380) point out, ‘given the sprawling corpus available, coverage of both perspectives is necessarily incomplete’. Like all theories, they simply provide the theoretical lens through which PP has been systematically analysed. Nor has the object of the task been one of solely exploring PP. Rather, this thesis has drawn attention to the fact that PP cannot be reduced to a single risk perspective. Whilst it is acknowledged that different types of risk have their distinctive rationality and set of technologies, i.e. each of the disciplines is underscored by particular methods for acquiring and applying knowledge to
uncertainty shaped by risk, in instances they are functionally complementary. As Anderson (2007: 158) observes, O’Malley has previously made a similar argument drawing on the example of the promissory logic of contract law where he cautions against any one-dimensional understanding of anticipatory practices by arguing that uncertainty itself has long been a distinctive modality of governance based on both (see O’Malley, 2000: 461). In the context of PP, to understand the ways in which the concept of risk has been interpreted, made calculable, displaced, supplemented and substituted, what is necessary is to consider a genealogical analysis of different paradigms of risk and their lines of descent (Aradau and van Munster, 2008c: 9). It is arguable that research has erred towards a unilinear theory of the war on terror through using a single measuring rod for comparing and contrasting CT modalities. However, as this thesis argues, it is problematic to reduce PP to a singular discursive terrain of risk described and thus, a more critical approach is required. A first step would be to take the dialectical relationship of risk as interwoven within PREVENT(ion) more seriously.

It is not that alternative means of theorising terrorism prevention should be downplayed; it is acknowledged that dichotomised rationales exist. Nevertheless, the aim has been to highlight in an intellectually engaging manner the relevance of concepts within ‘risk’ as measured against the empirical reality of PP at local level. Moreover, the ways in which the relation between subjectivity and risk interact within an inter-disciplinary framework might themselves be an object of study for future research. Further, in similar manner to observations by Neal (2006) on the politics of exception, it would be instructive for security studies and risk studies to engage with discourse, where discourse is taken in the broadest possible sense: as a co-habitual relation between, objects, subject positions, concepts and strategies (Neal, 2006: 43; Foucault, 2002). Interestingly, it is within The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002) where Foucault outlines such guidance. Drawing upon the work of Foucault, Neal (2006: 182) outlines, ‘looking into the various discourses on madness, Foucault realises these are not all talking about the same thing. In legal parlance, in religious settings, in medical diagnoses, and in daily experience, quite different notions of madness are apparent; so much so as to undermine the idea that the statements are united by a common object’ (Foucault, 2002: 35-36; see also Neal, 2006: 182). Similarly, the theoretical departure point for this thesis has been that different notions of risk may be activated within PREVENT by many different actors at particular times for diverse purposes, in the same manner that Foucault suggests with the advancement of archaeological analysis (see inter alia Foucault, 2002).
This thesis has also taken great inspiration from an example outlined by Mythen and Walklate (2005), ‘to raise problematic theoretical questions, lay bare contradictions in policy and flag up residual ambiguities that require further investigation’. Thus, following Mythen and Walklate (2005), the spirit of the thesis has been of one of adventure, rather than empirical precision. Moreover, underlying this exploratory method is a belief that criminological theory should enable us to offer up accounts of cause and effect by appreciating the positive facets of more than an exclusive risk paradigm, together with a ‘willingness to labour at the interface’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 394). Furthermore, by situating the ambit of the criminological imagination at the forefront the present study, this thesis has followed the advice of Jock Young (2003) and endeavoured to continue the Mannheimian tradition of exploring ‘dangerous thoughts’ - of thinking through and behind the contemporary criminological scene towards a fuller understanding of the concepts it has come to adopt (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 395). Interestingly, Young (2003) advised for the need to reconnect criminology to sociology. Should this thesis be read as an attempt of such? In certain ways, perhaps.

Criminology, particularly with reference to “war on terror”, has stubbornly grappled with the dichotomous question: ‘risk society’ or ‘governmentality’? The epistemological underpinnings of this thesis refute the option of choice. Rather, as Jessop et al. (2008: 393) suggest, it is important that research enables movement towards multi-dimensional and polymorphous accounts based on: (a) the elaboration of sufficiently rich concepts for each of the dimensions of said relations; and (b) their deployment in a manner that permits researchers to explore more precisely their differential weighting and articulation in a given context. Moreover, as Jessop et al., (2008: 393) observe, ‘failure to pursue this strategy can lead to two distinct but symmetrical types of quasi-reduction to one-dimensional analyses. Both types occur when the conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring one aspect of a complex phenomenon has greater precision, depth, and breadth than the frameworks developed for other aspects’.

To conclude, whilst this thesis has drawn attention to how different risk positions provide a mutually integrative storyline of PP at local level, it would be interesting to see how many domains such a vantage point could be applied. Through taking a rather unusual exploration, it is hoped we can progress our understanding of risk by adopting an ameliorative approach that embraces the perspectives and collective wisdom of risk positions despite immanent contradictions that seem apparent at face value. Looking at the way in which two risk positions define and treat risk, this thesis has
evidenced points of ambiguity that might act as catalyst for future scholars to explore the possibilities of an “otherwise” (Doty, 2007); a key trajectory of critical scholarship.

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Spalek, B. (2009a). “Community Policing within a Counter-Terrorism Context: The Role of Trust when Working with Muslim Communities to Prevent Terror”. (Online), available at: http://works.bepress.com/basia_spalek/1


Appendix A

National PREVENT Policing Funding Distribution 2010-2011.\textsuperscript{417}

\textsuperscript{417} HM Government (2011b: 101).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Police officers and staff in forces and CTUs</td>
<td>Prevent Engagement officers working to develop community connections, understand communities, identify risks and share information with partners to support Prevent objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>National coordination of Prevent by ACPO (TAM)</td>
<td>ACPO (TAM)’s Prevent Delivery Unit supports police forces with their contribution to Prevent by overseeing their delivery of ACPO’s Prevent strategy, working with OSCT to allocate resources according to risk, building capability in forces to deliver Prevent activities, developing guidance to install best practice and rolling out programmes to engage communities in Prevent events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Channel Coordinators</td>
<td>Channel coordinators lead multi-agency partnerships that evaluate referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and work alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels to provide tailored support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit</td>
<td>A dedicated police unit to assess and investigate terrorism-related illegal internet content and take remedial action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Development of CTLPs and information sharing</td>
<td>The development of comprehensive assessments of threat, risk and vulnerability in local areas for sharing with police partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Training and awareness raising</td>
<td>Developing and delivering police Prevent awareness-raising exercises such as Operation Nicole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Other activities focusing on engagement with vulnerable individuals</td>
<td>Activity aimed at Muslim communities, enabling discussions with the police and local partners around issues such as radicalisation, supporting vulnerable individuals and terrorism legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix B**

*Local Authority Delivered (PREVENT) Activity in 2008:*\(^{418}\)

\(^{418}\) HM Government (2011b: 28)
### Appendix C

*Local Authority Projects via DCLG Funding 2009-2011*:\(^{419}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54%</td>
<td>Debates, discussions and forums</td>
<td>‘Safe space’ debates to discuss current affairs or grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
<td>General educational activities</td>
<td>Presentations to schools about Islamic beliefs and culture. Addressing under-achievement of Pakistani boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Leadership and management activities</td>
<td>Establishment of mosque management committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of professional media training to key contacts to help them manage media interest around terrorism issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Non-accredited training</td>
<td>Active citizenship training for local Muslim women’s forum. Training of imams in English language, ICT and British society by qualified tutors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Arts and cultural activities</td>
<td>Local theatre production which raised issues of extremism in communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Sports and recreation</td>
<td>Boxing clubs, football clubs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{419}\) HM Government (2011b: 29)
### Appendix D

**PREVENT Priority Areas as of 2013:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate percentage of projects</th>
<th>Description and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MOST CT 20%                       | Activity focused on terrorism and targeted at the most vulnerable people and sectors  
  • activity which challenges the terrorist ideology for example, speakers challenging terrorist narratives;  
  • support for vulnerable people through identification, referral and intervention; and  
  • projects addressing grievances for example, ‘safe-space’ debates on issues related to terrorism. |
| 25% Cohesion and integration activity with reference to extremism and/or terrorism | projects aimed more specifically at extremism and/or terrorism, but with no attempt to focus on vulnerable people or institutions. |
| 40% General cohesion and integration | broad interfaith, anti-racism and Islamic education projects, without reference to extremism or terrorism;  
  • activity aimed at Muslim communities viewed as diversionary (for example, sports activity) but without any focus on the most vulnerable or with any reference to extremism or terrorism; and  
  • general Muslim forums, Muslim women’s groups, leadership and mentoring for young people. |
| 10% Governance, research, training | internal local authority training, additional posts, research and evaluation. |
| LEAST CT 5%                        | Capacity building  
  • general training of imams, faith capacity building. |
Key:

A: Leeds; B: Bradford; C: Blackburn; D: Manchester; E: Liverpool; F: Stoke; G: Derby; H: Leicester; I: Birmingham; J: Cardiff; K: Luton; L: Brent; Camden; Ealing; Enfield; Greenwich; Hackney; Hammersmith and Fulham; Haringey; High Wycombe; Islington; Kensington and Chelsea; Lambeth; Lewisham; Newham; Redbridge; Tower Hamlets; Waltham Forest; Wandsworth; and Westminster; M: Barking and Dagenham.

Appendix E
CHANNEL Model Scheme: \(^\text{420}\)

[Diagram of the CHANNEL Model Scheme]

\(^{420}\) HM Government (2012d: 15)
### Appendix F

*Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (adapted from Yin, 2003: 34).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tests</th>
<th>Case study tactic</th>
<th>Phase of research in which tactic occurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct validity</td>
<td>• <em>Use of multiple sources of evidence</em></td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Establish chain of evidence</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have key informants review draft case study report</td>
<td>Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Validity</td>
<td>• Do pattern-matching</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Do explanation building</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Address rival explanations</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use logic models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Validity</td>
<td>• <em>Use theory in single-case studies</em></td>
<td>Research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use replication logic in multiple-case studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>• Use case study protocol</td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop case study database</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

421 Text in italics indicate which design tests were adhered to within the present study.
### Appendix G

_Braun and Clarke’s Six Phases of Thematic Analysis (taken from Braun and Clarke, 2006):_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description of the process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Familiarising yourself with your data:</td>
<td>Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Generating initial codes:</td>
<td>Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Searching for themes:</td>
<td>Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reviewing themes:</td>
<td>Checking in the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Defining and naming themes:</td>
<td>Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells; generating clear definitions and names for each theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Producing the report:</td>
<td>The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H

Examples of Coding Technique:\footnote{422}

Overt ‘soft-power’ policing (interactions)

Multi-partnership through safeguarding (strategies/tactics)  
PREVENT as a product (strategies/tactics)  
Overt ‘soft-power’ policing (interactions)

2  
‘Going back to the safeguarding issue with getting the buy-in with people who work in that sphere, it’s making yourself visible; you get the trust by talking very openly about what you’ll do with the information that they give ... And I think that it’s perfectly understandable why some partner agencies might be reluctant to pick up the phone, you know? It’s a very confidential area to report somebody in. You have to have trust’.

3

2

3

4

5

6

7

Engagement dependent on trust (conditions)  
Potential barrier to engagement (conditions)

Maintaining overt engagement (strategies/tactics)  
Potential barrier to engagement (conditions)

2

2

2

3

4

5

6

7

‘The initial approach is there but afterwards you keep a link because a lot of people, whether it be an organisation with a high turnover of staff who are coming through, or the recent ... sort of ... situation with a lot of cuts going through organisations, they’re losing a lot of staff. So they’ve got to juggle their own resources. So you’ve got to keep that engagement going. So it’s making sure people who are coming into new roles are aware of the strategy’.

\footnote{422} The right-hand margin highlights the descriptive codes used; text attached to arrows indicates the progression towards phase two coding; and linguistic connectors i.e. examples given in the participants’ accounts, have been highlighted with a dashed line in the right-hand margin.
I think we still absolutely use terms like radicalisation, grooming, brainwashing and all the terms that have been used before, but safeguarding is the term that they think best sums up what we do, but also its language that other partners know and understand and we often start talks with... “This is about extremism, and terrorism”, which... ultimately it is. But to get the buy-in of all the range of frontline services that we give talks to, the safeguarding is the bit that people instantly think, “Argh, I get it.” PREVENT is such a meaningless word, in fact most people think it’s about crime prevention, sort of... the people who fit alarms and stuff... So we’ve moved away from that because it’s not helpful, whereas safeguarding is a word that is used daily by your absolute key partners and people get that. That certainly features more in our language. So whilst we still talk about the same issues and radicalisation, it’s within the sphere of safeguarding.”
Situating PREVENT within ‘pre’-criminal space (conditions)  

Engagement linked to gut feeling (strategies/tactics)  

PREVENT as a product  

‘Gut feeling is sort of, a strap-line that we use with all our sort of engagement, whether we’re using the trust your instincts DVD or whether we’re using the strap-line from the MET, it’s just about saying to people, right then, we’re talking about terrorism or extremism here, things that they might sort of see as a very high level, it’s a case of saying alright then, you might come into contact with somebody, they might live next door, you know ... Somebody who you might see changes, or something’s not quite right, we’re not saying it is definitely going to be terrorism or extremism, it might be drugs for instance, but if you have, for whatever reason, that feeling inside that suggests I don’t know what it is but there’s just something not quite right with this person, that you have the confidence to contact your local police, somebody at work through your local partners, or the PREVENT team. And it is just about reacting to that gut feeling. It might not be something as evident as you know? Chemical bottles in a neighbours back garden but there’s just something, you know? You might see the changes much like us, you know? Its communities that will defeat terrorism not just us, you’re the ones who will see the changes and differences in your communities’.

Confidence to pre-empt (conditions)  

Pre-emption (strategies/tactics)  

PREVENT as societal responsibility (strategies/tactics)
## Appendix I

*Examples of Block and File Phase One and Phase Two Coding:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Field notes</th>
<th>Initial Code (One)</th>
<th>Organising Code (Two)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT is about relationships and they take time to build up. And for me, as much as you know, turnover of staff, you’ve got to be mindful with this, especially in probably in our sort of area where we have no statutory partners who are full time on this because we’re not a funded area, so we’re relying on partners goodwill.</td>
<td>High staff turnover</td>
<td>Potential barrier to overt inter-organisational counter-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There’s so much pressure for people to perform in individual silos and it does worry me; ........................................................................................................................................</td>
<td>Differing organisational objectives</td>
<td>Potential barrier to overt inter-organisational counter-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... situation with a lot of cuts going through organisations, they’re losing a lot of staff, so they’ve got to juggle their own resources. So you’ve got to keep that engagement going. So it’s making sure people who are coming into new roles are aware of the strategy;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was new to that division and didn’t know what had gone on. So again it depends on how long you’ve been there; if people have moved on they can</td>
<td>Lack of familiarity and experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>try and do stuff that could just absolutely destroy some stuff at times;</td>
<td>Decreased levels of trust and confidence from partners and communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m seen as a bit of an outsider, from the accent alone.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| People like the fact that it’s the same voice, it’s the same person; | Heightened levels of familiarity |
| With the longevity of being in post, we’ve been able to show ... look you’ve shown an interest four years ago. |

| If you are completely open and honest, and by giving examples of how you’ve done things in the past ... And again, word clearly gets around; | Increased level of trust and confidence from key partners and communities |
| By being open and honest it hopefully builds up that trust and confidence element; |
| It is just about being honest and open, and that they’re not given a switchboard number, they have a personal telephone number into this office; |
| It is very much about being open and transparent. |

| Openness and honesty | Increased level of trust and confidence of key partners and communities |
## Appendix J

**Examples of Block and File Thematic Analysis with Explanation of Codes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of data-driven code</th>
<th>PREVENT Policing reliant on Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanation of code</strong></td>
<td>Trust and confidence as an important component of multi-agency partnership approach to counter-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Interview details per quote restricted)</td>
<td>Trying to get people on board ... explaining how we deal with referrals, and, you know, trying to gain that trust and confidence and support of frontline institutions; Without that trust and confidence, people just aren’t going to pick up the phone or pop in to see you; You’d usually try and identify a trusted person within the community; One of the things essential to PREVENT is it’s about trust and confidence – trust and confidence in the process and the people involved; It’s very much about, can we give people, in terms of communities, partners, and internally within the police, the trust and confidence to understand what we’re trying to do – to work with vulnerable people; We do get things coming in from the community, but it’s a case of spreading the word using your key trusted individuals as partners within the communities themselves to promote that understanding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of data-driven code</th>
<th>Safeguarding through Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of code</td>
<td>Changes in terminology and language as a crucial component of external and internal engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s getting that terminology right that has proved over the years doing this role, that people fully understand safeguarding and if you contextualise safeguarding to them, people seem to get PREVENT more;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You’ve got to look at the terminology that people understand, bring it down to terrorism and the act is the final thing, but let’s take it back to the beginning as it were, and let’s see why that person has been vulnerable to being drawn into that arena;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What terminology do you want? Because if you do have somebody from their own organisation there they do sort of get it;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguarding is the term that they think best sums up what we do, but also its language that other partners know and understand;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think the word safeguarding seems to soften the strategy, the agenda. I think where a lot of misconception with it has been because police have been pushing the agenda, it must be a criminal act ... Whereas when you talk about safeguarding, it’s reminding people that this is pre-criminal space and it seems to be more accepting. So changing terminology and the best terminology to use seems to be more welcoming with a lot of organisations out there, so I think that has helped massively;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You know, some of the universities don’t like the terminology because it’s the academic world. Let’s approach it in a way that they actually like that terminology or want to discuss it. So we might not just go in and mention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interview details per quote restricted**
terrorism, extremism or PREVENT; we would always make reference to those but then we would discuss it in a safeguarding format that they get;

Most people see PREVENT in terms of safeguarding now, particularly when you have bodies like NHS on board ... it helps soften that message, and you know ... that’s the way it needs to be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of data-driven code</th>
<th>PREVENT as Assemblage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of code</td>
<td>Multi-partnership approach evidencing points of fracture and dispersion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Now, at (name of university) we are officially part of the Social Work course. We were hoping to get in with Nursing, but that hasn’t quite worked out ... teacher training ... but you know, as time goes on it’s expanding and expanding, but training still remains a significant part of our job, either as one-off training, or with police, or regular officers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We’ll deal with NHS to some degree, although they tend to do a lot of their own training. But we’ll deal with some staff, adult safeguarding, child safeguarding ... a lot of stuff with schools, colleges and universities. And again ... schools we identified as a key area, one area where it’s an absolute nightmare to get into and its very much based on an individual school’s buy-in, ‘cause either the Head Teacher “gets it” ... or because something has happened at a particular school and they think ... “Argh right” ... But that is a real problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Interview details per quote restricted)</td>
<td>Everybody’s complaint within PREVENT is that schools ... not necessarily because they’re against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREVENT, but because they just don’t have the
time in the timetable ... and it’s sort of mentioned
in the Extremism Task Force but it doesn’t really
say a great deal that we already didn’t know;
Very much from the academic side is that if we
do into universities and use the word “radical”
they will turn round and say, “there’s nothing
wrong with being radical”;
So we have an individual, we know he’s
vulnerable, he gets referred in through the
CHANNEL process, the partners go: “nah, sorry,
it’s mental health, that’s got nothing to do with us”.
So then it’s a case of - what do we do with that
individual?
We go into the voluntary sector, Community
Youth Groups, Youth Offending Teams, UKBA ...
a lot of housing groups, particularly a lot of
housing where they’re supported by (name of local
housing group), which is a housing group which
looks after people with mental issues. And it tends
to be these groups, they ask us to come along as a
one-off, but some others are almost embedded;
Still there are those who simply will not accept
what PREVENT’s about and that’s still the
ongoing challenge. And unfortunately, it takes the
likes of a Woolwich to underline that, and God
forbid that something else happens that then makes
people realise, “Right, we have to take this
seriously”, and then doctors say, you know,
“Right, we’re willing to share this information
because we can’t do this on our own”. Yes,
patient/doctor confidentiality is very important but
ultimately we need to support that individual and I
think there are cases where it’s been shown not to
be the case;
We’re struggling a little bit in getting into the schools because the schools are dictated by the curriculum and they don’t have to take you on board.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of data-driven code</th>
<th>Buying into PREVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of code</td>
<td>Multi-partnership approach understood through “buy-in”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So we have to tread, understandably, very carefully in order to get that buy-in; You’ve got to understand that your communities are actually a bit more to do with things like housing, health; these are the things that actually concern people far more, and if you jump over to these onto other subjects ... You have to try and first get that buy-in. If you haven’t got the buy-in of your neighbourhood teams, you really are missing a trick; If you want to get people to buy into what you do, it’s quite useful to make them aware that you are looking at every form of extremism including the people who are making your lives increasingly grey; We’ve got buy-in from the senior management teams from that department ‘cause we have different directives within force, but within the force area to ... you know ... engage with the police with regard to CONTEST, and specifically PREVENT, you go through a gold, silver, bronze CONTEST structure; ... we often start talks with ... “This is about extremism and terrorism”, which ... ultimately it is. But to get the buy-in of all the range of frontline services that we give talks to, the
safeguarding is the bit that people instantly think, “Argh, I get it”;
If you go to the Heads of your partners and get their buy-in it makes it much easier to roll it out further along down the line;
...Going back to the safeguarding issue with getting the buy-in with people who work in that sphere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of data-driven code</th>
<th>PREVENT as a Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of code</td>
<td>PREVENT officers’ understanding of PREVENT as a product in relation to multi-agency engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We all deal with it differently on how we try to promote ourselves and get ourselves out into them areas. So I came upon with a little bit of an email of products we did, like, table topping exercises with children and courses like the ‘ACT NOW’ we do. We go and give a presentation or a DVD on conviction ... there’s loads of ACPO products we can use ... some we don’t use because we don’t think that they work very well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>So one went in to MAPPA who were told of some violent things which were going on in the house and how they were dealing with it. They got invited on to the MAPPA panel, referred by the Head Teacher so ... the first time they seen me was turning up trying to sell them this product, and then they suddenly seen me sat at a MAPPA panel;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There’s generally new ACPO products that are coming out and you’ll get emails from them saying; there’ll be an event on a certain day, and it’s attending to get trained up in something;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Interview details per quote restricted)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It gets rolled-out differently up and down the county ... so we’ll get given a product and it’s however best we think it’ll work here to promote it;

If we’ve got a new ACPO product come out that’s worked in one area but not in another ... so like ... for us here, we seem to do brilliantly with the ACT NOW product in universities and colleges;

You’ve got to literally go out and do a bit of a ... I suppose you can class it as a bit of a sales pitch – you’re trying to sell this product to them and trying to explain how you see it fitting within their roles;

I’ve got a team of (number) doing PREVENT so you go to the local police, and it’s almost a sales pitch to say, we have this product to bring awareness to you around PREVENT;

You’ll be aware that ACPO have a number of national products that can be used across health, colleges, universities etc., usually in DVD format, whether that be .... to me that product does need some sort of context putting to it, whether us going in or whether you train a partner up to show that there are national products, but they are not a one size fits all which we have found within our area so a couple of instances, we have made local products;

So again, we appreciate with having only (number) in the team we are not going to hit everyone, so we’ve got to work that little bit smarter, so one thing we’re literally in the process of rolling-out is that product;

You have to be sensible and efficient with how we go out and deliver this product now;
Appendix K

Fieldwork Participant Consent Form:

I am PhD student in the school of Social Sciences at MMU. I am conducting research as part of my PhD thesis and I would greatly appreciate your participation in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before you consider consenting to take part in this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Research Project</th>
<th>The evolving meaning of prevent policing, community engagement and social control in the context of a progression towards both ‘reflexive modernisation’ and ‘dispositif’ precautionary risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Researcher</td>
<td>Paul Dresser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Researcher’s Contact Details | Email: 11066778@stu.mmu.ac.uk  
Email: paul.dresser@northumbria.ac.uk  
Mobile Number: 07912680933                                                                 |

423 The title of the thesis was subsequently shortened; hence the different title on the Consent Form.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Supervisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Kathryn Chadwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Robert Grimm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Peter Joyce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor’s Contact Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Kathryn Chadwick:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:K.Chadwick@mmu.ac.uk">K.Chadwick@mmu.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims of this research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To consider critically the implications of Beck’s ‘risk society’ and Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ thesis to our understanding of the revised Prevent policy, community engagement and Prevent Policing practice with a specific focus upon ‘risk’. It is hoped the data from this research will establish a wider-ranging agenda for criminological thought as a result of a fuller embrace of interdisciplinary risk theories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why do you want me as a participant?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I wish to interview Prevent police officers/staff to explore their views on community engagement, Prevent and associated policing practice both pre- and post-policy revision (2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What will this involve?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is proposed interviews are to last between 60-120 minutes and each interviewee to be interviewed a minimum of three times.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How will my data be recorded?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictaphone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Will this be confidential?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, only pseudonyms will be used. Your data will be stored on a secure part of my computer. Your data will not be stored on common areas of networks or on desktops of shared computers. Your data will only be accessed by me and my supervisor and the second marker(s). Your data will be destroyed at the end of my dissertation/thesis work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What If I Change My Mind?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If at any point during the interview or afterwards you may withdraw your consent from the research. This means I will not use your data and will destroy any data collected related to you.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can I Read Your Results?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PhD THESIS PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: ‘The evolving meaning of prevent policing, community engagement and social control in the context of a progression towards both ‘reflexive modernisation’ and ‘dispositif’ precautionary risk’.

Name of researcher: PAUL DRESSER

Name of supervisor: Dr. KATHRYN CHADWICK

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated………. for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. I acknowledge the risks associated with the study and they have been explained to me.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.

3. I agree to take part in the study.

____________________  __________________  __________________
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participant</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>_______________</td>
<td>______</td>
<td>__________</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of person taking consent</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>___________________________</td>
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