Schematic and Symbolic Hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical Works

Nicola Jane Crosby-Grayson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

of the

Manchester Metropolitan University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History, Politics and Philosophy

the Manchester Metropolitan University

2015
Contents
Abstract........................................................................................................................................5
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................7
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................8
Structure of the Thesis .........................................................................................................................16
Part 1 Theoretical Ideas, Systems, and Schematic Presentation .........................................................23
Chapter 1: The Method of Reason ....................................................................................................24
  1.1 Reason as Systematic ................................................................................................................25
  1.2 The Position of Ideas ................................................................................................................37
  1.3 The Origin and Development of the Idea .................................................................................48
Chapter 2. The Figural Movement of Regulation ............................................................................64
  2.1 Regulative and Constitutive .....................................................................................................65
  2.2 Regulative Figures ...................................................................................................................77
  2.3 Ideal Figures of Reason ...........................................................................................................102
Chapter 3. The Schematic Realisation of Concepts ..........................................................................118
  3.1 The Schematism of Concepts ..................................................................................................119
  3.2 The Schematic Realisation of Ideas .........................................................................................138
  3.3 Heidegger and the Schema Image ............................................................................................152
Part 2: Practical Ideas and Analogy ...............................................................................................174
Chapter 4. Exhibition of the Morally Good Through the Typic of the Moral Law .........................176
Chapter 5. The Schematism of Analogy and the Figure of Christ: Bridging two types of hypotyposis .................................................................................................................. 194

Part 3. Symbolic Realisation and the Expression of Aesthetic Ideas ............ 212

Chapter 6. Rethinking the System .................................................................. 213

6.1. Systems in the First Critique .................................................................... 215

6.2. Systems in the Third Critique ................................................................... 224

Chapter 7. The Symbolic Realisation of Ideas .............................................. 245

7.1. Idea as Symbols ...................................................................................... 246

7.2. Kant’s Three Tier Account of the Symbol ............................................. 262

Chapter 8. Aesthetic Ideas and the Reflective Imagination ......................... 282

8.1 Defining Aesthetic Ideas .......................................................................... 283

8.2 Aesthetic Ideas and Symbols ................................................................... 298

8.3 The Aesthetic Ideal .................................................................................. 311

Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 323

Bibliography .................................................................................................... 331
...This work is dedicated to the memory of my beautiful mother, who died before I could finish it, to Gary Banham, the best teacher I ever had, and to my wonderful husband Matthew; my everything.
Abstract

Studies into schematic and symbolic hypotyposis in Kant's Critical works rarely set out how different types of concept and idea are realised comprehensively. As a consequence, it is difficult to compare the two types of exhibition in respect to how they differ and relate to one another. There are numerous reasons why these two modes have not been set out with clarity, I will focus on three. The first pertains to the nature of the subject matter itself as the schematism chapter is notoriously dense. Attempts to render Kant’s account coherent consistently fail to acknowledge the schema he addresses in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* and as a result they cannot be considered comprehensive or exhaustive. Secondly, the realisation of practical ideas is rarely addressed, referred to or included for comparison in works that address schemata and symbols. Consequently, one cannot gain a comprehensive view of Kant’s account of exhibition. The practical schemata (if one may call them that) prove interesting as they challenge the distinction between direct and indirect exhibition that Kant sets out so confidently in § 59 of the *Third Critique* (5:352). Thirdly, attempts to present Kant’s account of the symbol with clarity either seek to reduce the symbol to a mode of schematic exhibition (in line with schema from the *Architectonic of Pure Reason*), or, they fail to distinguish between the examples Kant gives and consequently make claims about one type of symbol based upon their understanding of another, all of which results in further confusion and complications.

This thesis will present a clarification of Kant’s account of exhibition with respect to the use of symbols, schemata, and analogy to establish the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art to communicate ideas and concepts. It will draw out
the rhetorical connotations affiliated with the term hypotyposis and present the
consequences of this in respect to philosophical methodology.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisory team, Dr. Ullrich Haase and Dr. Keith Crome for their support and advice throughout the writing of this work. I would especially like to thank the late Dr. Gary Banham who was my director of studies and my close friend, his knowledge of Kant’s works and his patience with my progress were invaluable to me.

Thank you to the Philosophy Dept. of Manchester Metropolitan University for the financial support I was awarded to complete this thesis and to Prof. Joanna Hodge for her encouragement.

I am very grateful for the help and support of my colleagues at the University of Manchester, specifically Jennie Blake, Rosie Jones and Katie Woolfenden for supporting me and enabling to finish this work. I would also like to thank Dr. I.M. Hotchkies for his continued support.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the love and support of my family and my husband which has given me the strength to keep on writing.
Introduction

This thesis is directed towards a clarification of Kant’s account of hypotyposis in his Critical works in order to discuss the difference between direct (schematic) and indirect (symbolic) exhibition. Hypotyposis is commonly defined in terms of a vivid, picturesque description of scenes or events. However, Kant’s use of the term is quite specific; he uses it to refer to the process through which concepts are subjected to inspection, illustrated, and thereby granted reality schematically (directly) or symbolically (indirectly). In terms of its etymology hypotyposis is a Greek concept derived from hypo, meaning under, below, beneath, and typosis figure, sketch or outline. The subject of exhibition in Kant’s Critical works is traditionally approached and introduced through an initial study of §59 of the Third Critique - On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality - where Kant states:

All hypotyposis (exhibition, subiectio sub adspectum) consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgement treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising; i.e., the treatment agrees with this procedure merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form of the reflection rather than its content (5:351).

Attempts to present a comprehensive explanation of Kant’s account of exhibition often begin with this passage granting it central significance and interrogating it with

---

reference to *The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding* from the *First Critique*. Consequently, most analyses fail to address some key features, distinctions and considerations that are set out in, e.g., Kant’s account of schematic exhibition in *The Architectonic of Pure Reason* (in the *First Critique*) or his discussion of the realisation of practical ideas in *The Typic of The Pure Practical Power of Judgement* (in the *Second Critique*). Examining §59 in light of the chapter on Schematism alone leads to a mistaken assumption that Kant views symbolic hypotyposis as the only means of granting reality to an idea. However, he discusses how theoretical ideas can be realised schematically in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* (A832/B860-A851/B879) and he sets out how practical ideas can be realised by analogy with the form of a natural law in the section on the *Typic* (5:67-71). One must recognise and clarify these early accounts in order to fully understand and contextualise Kant’s claims about symbolic and schematic exhibition in §59. Symbolic exhibition is not the only means of securing reality and exhibiting an idea, it is rather a means of securing objective reality for rational concepts, which can only be done indirectly\(^2\).

This thesis will approach the topic of exhibition by tracing its development throughout the Critical works. §59 will therefore be reached with a clear understanding of how Kant accounts for the realisation of theoretical ideas and concepts in the *First Critique*, and of practical ideas in the *Second*. Approaching the subject in this way enables the claims made in §59 to be understood in a wider context. Setting out Kant’s account of schematic exhibition comprehensively will

---

\(^2\) Kant states in §59 that: “Establishing that our concepts have reality always requires intuitions. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata. But if anyone goes so far as to demand that we establish the objective reality of the rational concepts (i.e., the ideas) for the sake of their theoretical cognition, then he asks for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition can be given that would be adequate to them” (5:351).
allow proper comparisons to be made between the two types of hypotyposis. By addressing the practical ‘schemata’ one can also identify and present a challenge to this distinction that could not otherwise be elucidated.

The thesis will begin by interrogating schematic exhibition in the First Critique, it will build on this by addressing the exhibition of practical ideas in the Second Critique and will supplement this with an analysis of the ‘schematism of analogy in Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason). The result of this approach is that §59 can now be framed as more than a stand-alone insight into Kant’s account of exhibition. As a consequence, when the symbolic realisation of ideas in the Third Critique is reached we can properly set the symbol apart from all types of schemata; as that which represents (and reflects) a different mode of exhibition. Approaching the symbol in this way enables us to lay the grounds on which a distinction between symbolic exhibition and the expression of aesthetic ideas through works of art can be established. The symbol is thereby revealed as capable of more than just the communication of an aesthetic idea; it presents the mind with a dynamic spectacle of its own living unity.

In addition to bringing clarity to Kant’s distinction between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, approaching the topic of exhibition in this way entails careful analysis of how practical ideas are realised. Analysis of the practical ‘schemata’ proves interesting and this thesis will argue that they draw Kant’s claim that there are only two modes of exhibition into question. The method through which the reality of practical ideas is secured in the Second Critique is designated as ‘schematic’ by Kant, however, in Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason Kant has recourse to a ‘schematism of analogy’ which suggests that these ideas are realised indirectly (using an analogy) in a manner akin to symbolisation (6:65). Careful analysis will
show that the practical modes point to a type of exhibition that is not strictly schematic or symbolic and could indicate a means by which the two can be bridged or connected. These interesting and important features go unrecognised in analyses of exhibition that begin with and focus on §59 as the practical ‘schemata’ are often ‘scantly noticed’ by secondary literature on the subject.\(^3\)

The importance and impact of Kant’s account of the symbol can be established in line with his progress of completing the Critical enterprise. The symbol must be recognised as an integral feature that enables Kant to account for the unity of the mind and address the interrelation of the mental faculties. However, bestowing centrality and importance on the symbol (as a mode of intuitive presentation that relies upon reflective judgement) raises questions concerning the extent to which Kant must have recourse to art in relation to his Critical philosophy. His choice of the rhetorical word ‘hypotyposis’ to refer to the way in which an idea gains reality suggests that a degree of art is necessary in relation to the method through which ideas are communicated and realised, and thereby also, to secure unity for the mind and for the subject of metaphysics.

Proper context can only be given to §59 and Kant’s claims in the Third Critique if they are approached in light of the exhibition of theoretical and practical ideas in the early critical works. This approach assists us with demonstrating problems in relation to Kant’s account of exhibition and it enables us to draw out its strengths. It helps us to view exhibition as a topic which is articulated throughout the Critical works and has impact on our understanding of the nature of the mind, the mental faculties, and

the unity of philosophy itself. What is brought to light by the increase in status of this topic is a corresponding recognition of the prevalence of rhetorical connotations in respect to the use of different types of figure in Kant’s wider Critical works. Figures are revealed as key features that are operative in the method through which reality is secured for different concepts and ideas. As a result the role of art gains importance in respect to theoretical philosophy and determinate judgements, practical philosophy and moral judgements, and in securing the unity of the two with reference to aesthetic reflective judgement.

The role and importance of art is not made explicit by Kant in reference to theoretical ideas and concepts in the *First Critique*. He seeks to secure reason as the fundamental, core faculty which grants order and systematic unity to our cognitions. However, this thesis will show that in order to bestow systematic unity reason must act in a ‘creative’ manner and it displays a capacity for ‘art’. This brings to light a conflict that can also be traced in the works of Plato. The conflict concerns an explicit criticism of art (and for Kant a desire to cultivate a method free from ‘exaggerated modes of expression’ that are present in Plato (A318/B375)) and yet a utilisation of art in respect to the method through which ideas and concepts are exhibited and communicated⁴. Plato uses figures, metaphors and similes to communicate his ideas, e.g., in his division of the subjects in *The Divided Line*⁵ (and in many of his other dialogues), and Kant has recourse to figures which betray the presence of art to demonstrate his system of ideas, concepts and intuitions⁶. Despite

⁴ This conflict is discussed in more detail in 1.3 *The Origin and Development of the Idea*.
⁶ See the discussion of the *Stufenleiter* or ‘step-ladder’ in 1.2.
Kant’s explicit desire to avoid such modes of expression to focus on architectonic priorities, the method through which these architectonic aims are realised reveals an integral role for art and figures in the communication of ideas which would otherwise be abstract and indemonstrable.

Writing on rhetoric has always sought to explain the significance of the symbol as a figure with a central role in relation to the communication of meaning. A key concern of this thesis will be to make this role explicit in relation to exhibition. In light of the conflict, outlined above, concerning Kant’s explicit desire to move away from an aesthetic methodology, one can still trace a central role for figures in communicating ideas and securing their reality. The consequence of this implied centrality goes unrecognised by Kant, yet it reveals a role for rhetoric that stands in contrast to his overt condemnation of it in §53 of the Third Critique (5:327). It is only by tracing the presence and use of figures in Kant’s account of exhibition that we can present his explicit recourse to rhetoric (via the use of hypotyposis) in §59 as the result or culmination of a series of figural references that are prevalent throughout his account of exhibition in all three Critiques.

The nature of exhibition can be traced, in its origins, beyond the birth of aesthetics within the domain of early semiotic theory. Early work on the nature of the symbol was done by Plato (Gorgias) and Aristotle (On Interpretation, Prior Analytics and the Rhetoric), Plato’s early distinction between good and bad rhetoric can be traced as present in Kant’s Third Critique and the early works paved the way for a distinction between proper and transposed signs that is considered the source of the direct/indirect distinction in Kant’s own theory of exhibition. In the middle ages, St. Augustine produced the first semiotic construction that distinguished signification
from symbolisation and this distinction is one that Kant also perpetuates and solidifies in the *Third Critique*.

In *Theories of the Symbol* Tzvetan Todorov traces the decline of rhetoric as occurring parallel to the stabilisation and control of the state. To survive this crisis, rhetoric – which was no longer an instrument of persuasion – sought to become beautiful. However, by presenting its value as merely ornamental, the fate of rhetoric became sealed and a number of factors contributed to its decline, Kant’s condemnation of rhetoric in the *Third Critique* is considered to be one of these factors. However, this thesis will argue that Kant’s concept of hypotyposis (particularly in relation to the symbol) advocates a revalorisation of rhetoric that is not overtly recognised as such by Kant himself or in secondary literature on the subject.

Todorov claims that Kant’s account of the symbol has a great impact on the meaning of the word. He states: “Kant is the one who reversed the usage [of the word symbol], in the *Critique of Judgement*, and brought [it] very close to its modern meaning”. This is a reference to Kant’s use of the symbol as a mode of *intuitive* representation and this thesis will show that Kant’s account of the symbol presents a new meaning in reference to its status as a mode of exhibition and its distinction from schemata, systems, and aesthetic ideas. Kant’s account of the symbol grants it a role that exceeds mere exhibition and indicates a higher unity that differs in kind (and nature) from the architectonic unity of a system. This ‘higher’ unity pertains to the unity of the mind, of the mental faculties and of philosophy itself and it enables Kant to complete his critique of pure reason. Kant thereby reverses not just the

---


8 Ibid.,p. 200.
usage, but also the meaning of the word ‘symbol’ so that it can be thought as an intuitive representation of a *Gestalt*, as an aesthetic totality.

Dethroning §59 from the heart of a discussion about Kant’s theory of exhibition undoubtedly raises the status of the topic. Exhibition is now traced as prevalent throughout the Critical works and is revealed as that which plays a key role in the concluding stages of Kant’s Critical project, as he seeks to secure the unity of philosophy, the mind, the faculties and experience. The main objective behind approaching the topic in this way is to obtain clarity in regard to the distinction between direct (schematic) and indirect (symbolic) exhibition. However, what is also gained is an invaluable context for this distinction which enables us to undertake a new engagement with the topic and to solve some of the problems exemplified in secondary literature on the subject.

This thesis will cover new ground as it will explicitly set out examples of regulative figures used by Kant in the *First Critique*, which demonstrate an appropriation of art by theoretical reason. In doing so, it will challenge an understanding of reason as purely systematic. It will clarify different types of schematic exhibition with reference to concepts and ideas, and it will challenge Kant’s claim that there are only two types of exhibition (direct and indirect hypotyposis) with reference to two practical modes of exhibition. The thesis will also present a new three-tier account of the symbol based upon the examples Kant gives in §59. This has not been set out before, despite the need for such clarification being demonstrated in accounts of the symbol in secondary literature\(^9\). The aforementioned clarification will enable a distinction to be made between the movement of the imagination in symbolic exhibition and its

---

\(^9\) This will be discussed in detail in 7.2.
operation in respect to the expression of aesthetic ideas through works of art. The result is an affirmation that aesthetic ideas and symbols are formally different and this challenges the dominant claim in secondary literature that they should be viewed as identical\textsuperscript{10}.

Although the focus of my study is on Kant's Critical works, the questions set out here and the discussions they prompt could be further supplemented with careful analysis of Kant's other texts, yet such a task can only suggest an area for future study that lies beyond the scope of this project. The theme of exhibition and the question concerning the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art, particularly in respect to aesthetics and the symbol, can also be traced as developing throughout philosophical aesthetics, most notably in Nietzsche's \textit{Birth of Tragedy}\textsuperscript{11} and Walter Benjamin's \textit{Origin of German Tragic Drama}\textsuperscript{12}.

\textbf{Structure of the Thesis}

Part One will discuss the role of the figure in the communication of theoretical ideas through works of science, while Part Two will consider the role of analogy in realising practical ideas through moral actions and Part Three will clarify Kant's account of the symbol in order to distinguish this mode of exhibition from both schematic exhibition and the expression of aesthetic ideas through works of art. Throughout the thesis the pervasive questions will be: to what extent must

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} See 8.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Nietzsche, Friedrich, \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}, translated by Douglas Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
\end{itemize}
philosophy appropriate art when communicating ideas, how and why do ideas need to be given form in order for us to secure their reality, and what is the significance of this for philosophical methodology?

Chapter One will secure ideas as concepts of reason that possess an illusory status which is also necessary. Ideas involve the projection of a unity that enables them to exceed the sphere of the understanding and its determinate laws. It will set out the position of the idea in Kant’s system of ideas, concepts and intuitions, and will acknowledge both Kant’s Platonic legacy and his desire to secure the proper usage of the term ‘idea’ for the sake of rigorous metaphysics. The position of the idea is set out in what Kant describes as a Stufenleiter (step-ladder)\(^{13}\). I will discuss how this illustration has a peculiar status as a figure of reason, as it presents a specific idea (of Kant’s system of ideas, concepts, and intuitions) and also presents the position of ideas in general (in terms of their distance from intuition). This chapter will clarify the defining features of Kant’s sense of ‘idea’ as that which lies necessarily behind a work or system. It will outline the position of the idea in order to give a context to the problems, demonstrating that ideas have reality and are not mere abstractions, and it will trace the origin and development of the ‘ideas’. Though Kant explicitly seeks to avoid any recourse to art, his appropriation of art is architectonic and he uses a specific type of figure that is not made explicit.

Chapter Two will trace the movement of reason as regulative. It will begin by questioning the distinction between ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ in relation to ideas and principles, and it will establish theoretical ideas as possessing regulative unity. Further examples of regulative, rational figures from the First Critique will be

\(^{13}\) See (A320/B376-70).
discussed in relation to how they supplement and reinforce the aforementioned stepladder. The objective is to set out the functions these figures perform and to establish their significance in relation to understanding the nature and capacity of reason itself. These figures are schematic; they present ideas directly (without transposition), but they do not secure objective reality (as ideas are by nature indemonstrable). These figures are not symbols, they differ in kind from those discussed in relation to rhetorical texts and thus a new type of figure is revealed that is not explicitly addressed by Kant but plays an intrinsic role in the communication of theoretical ideas. This chapter will conclude by drawing attention to a further figurative capacity of reason that is revealed in the production and use of personified, ideal figures. These figures have regulative use (as standards for judging the conduct of ourselves and others) and they reinforce my claim that there is a creative capacity of reason operative in the First Critique which is not addressed explicitly by Kant.

Chapter Three offers a clarification in respect to how different types of concept are realised schematically. A central feature of these realisations is a figure that Kant describes as a monogram\(^ {14} \). The monograms used to realise pure sensible and empirical concepts are sourced to the a priori and reproductive imagination (respectively), however, in relation to the schematic realisation of ideas, Kant refers to a monogram that is a product of reason (A833f/B861f). This monogram is a regulative figure that serves as the means through which an idea can become

\[^ {14} \text{A monogram is a figure, sketch or outline that is typically formed from a series of overlapping outlines.}\]
realised through a final end schema,\textsuperscript{15} as a system possessing architectonic unity. Kant describes it as an analogue to a schema of sensibility and we can trace similarities between his description of the way in which an idea develops and becomes realised, and A.W. Schlegel’s description of the process through which an art work is produced. This chapter will conclude with a critical response to Heidegger’s account of the schema image to demonstrate that the nature of the schema is not, as Heidegger claims, best understood as imagistic, but should more appropriately be thought as figural.

Part Two will consider two specific uses of analogy in relation to practical ideas that are relevant to the discussion of hypotyposis as exhibition; the typic of the moral law as set out in the Second Critique (5:67-71); and the ‘schematism of analogy’ discussed in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (6:65). Chapter Four will discuss how the idea of the good (the form of the moral law) is realised as it is presented by analogy with laws of nature. The exhibition of the moral law is judged according to a hypothetical imperative, claiming that our actions and those of others can be judged as good only if we would will them to become a universal law. The presentation of the good is therefore judged by analogy with the schemata operative in the First Critique (to gain cognition of the natural world), while the use of analogy as a means to present moral ideas is explored further in Chapter Five.

In Chapter Five I will examine the practical schema or ‘schematism of analogy’, which is problematic as it possesses features of both the schema (as it is direct), and the symbol (as it uses an analogy). The practical schema works with reference to the

\textsuperscript{15} The term ‘final end schema’ is coined by Gary Banham who uses it to refer to the schema Kant describes in the Architectonic of Pure Reason in relation to ideas. Banham, Gary, Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2000, p.57.
ideal figure of Christ, who serves as an example of the goodness to which man must aspire. As a figure, Christ indirectly embodies elements of mankind (he can suffer, be tempted and must strive to overcome desires), yet he directly and schematically presents the idea of God (as belonging to the Trinity). The use of analogy is not strictly direct, as Christ is granted human traits (this is necessary for him to serve as an example for us to emulate), yet it is not indirect either as Christ directly and schematically presents the idea of God. Through this figure a new engagement with God is undertaken (that contrasts with the one we encounter in 2.3) and Christ acts as a bridge not only between the human and the divine, but between the two types of hypotyposis; he thus presents a challenge to Kant’s claim that there are only two types of exhibition.

Part Three examines Kant’s account of the symbol as an indirect means to grant a semblance of objective reality to ideas, whilst maintaining their status and position (as indemonstrable). The indirect realisation of ideas, enabled by the symbol, is compared to the expression of aesthetic ideas through works of art. Chapter Six begins by revisiting the systems of the First Critique to illustrate that, in the Third Critique, Kant is concerned with a type of unity that differs in kind from the architectonic unity of the system; a unity that exceeds the possibility of any figural status. The new territory and objectives of the Third Critique must encompass the architectonic unity of each of the two domains (of practical and theoretical philosophy) as a whole, whose parts are interconnected but irreducible to one another. The advancement of Kant’s critical task consequently raises a challenge to his treatment of architectonic, systematic unity as the highest type (as set out in the First Critique). In the Third Critique we are dealing with the unity of experience, how this is enabled by the unity of the mental faculties, and how this presents the unity of
the mind itself. What conditions the possibility of our judgements of nature is not that we approach it merely as a system, but that we approach it as art. The role of art, therefore, reveals its prominence as that which conditions the possibility of the system.

Chapter Seven discusses the possibility of symbolisation and clarifies the terms on which this representation takes place. The symbol concerns indirect realisation of an idea by analogy with a determinate concept that is directly demonstrable. The key features of the symbol concern its nature as intuitive and its difference from the analogy on which it is based. The latter is significant as the analogy may be discursive while the symbol itself is intuitive. Recognising this difference is integral in order to preserve Kant’s distinction between the symbol (as intuitive) and the schema (as discursive). This chapter sets out Kant’s account of the symbol by attending to the examples given in the text to reveal a profane, a linguistic and a higher type of symbolisation. These must be differentiated as such in order for discussions of the symbol to be clear and correct in the conclusions they draw (which is not always the case, as shown in the secondary literature cited).

Chapter Eight begins by defining aesthetic ideas and setting out the functions they perform. The objectives are to compare aesthetic ideas with their rational counterparts, to set them apart from symbols, and to establish how they are realised (and communicated) through works of art. It is necessary to set aesthetic ideas apart from symbols as this distinction has significance in regard to questions concerning the extent to which the imagination (and art) can be traced as present within philosophical methodology in respect to the communication of ideas. The expression of aesthetic ideas differs from their exhibition (though both constitute ways ideas can be communicated), and I will use Kant’s distinction between poetry and rhetoric as
the basis of my argument that aesthetic ideas and symbols differ, as the movement of the imagination in each is granted a different degree of freedom, depending upon whether it has a determinate purpose. In conclusion I will discuss how the lawful operation of the imagination in generating an aesthetic ideal (in the Third Critique) can be juxtaposed to the capacity of reason to behave aesthetically (in the First). I will observe how, at the height of its powers (when engaged in reflection), the imagination operates lawfully, and, when employed to bring determinate knowledge into a higher unity, reason must behave aesthetically.

In the Conclusion I will summarise the main arguments in light of the questions set out in the Introduction concerning the extent to which we can clarify Kant’s account of hypotyposis in the Critical works and verify his claim that there are two types of exhibition. It will be shown that only through careful examination of the texts and examples given, in respect to each instance of hypotyposis discussed by Kant, can we gain a comprehensive view of his overall account of exhibition. The method of attending to the examples Kant gives mirrors the way in which the artist communicates aesthetic ideas and rules through the production of exemplary works of art. Though these works (and the examples discussed) are open to interpretation, they also constitute a valuable means of accessing Kant’s conception of schematism – which would otherwise remain ‘an art concealed in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180) – and symbolism – which offers us a means to realise ideas (indirectly) which would otherwise remain indemonstrable and abstract.
Part 1 Theoretical Ideas, Systems, and Schematic Presentation
Chapter 1: The Method of Reason

This Chapter consists of three sections; the first will discuss the nature and status of theoretical ideas, the second will present their position within Kant’s critical system, and the third will trace the development of the term ‘idea’ from Plato. The objectives are: to demonstrate some of the key features pertaining to Kant’s conception of ‘idea’, and, to illustrate that, although Kant defines ideas in terms of their ability to regulate systems, he communicates their role and place with reference to a particular type of figure. A conflict between a philosopher’s explicit aims and aesthetic features of his methodology can be traced in the work of Plato in respect to his classification of subjects in The Divided Line. Plato is overtly critical of art due to its distance from the truth, yet he appropriates an aesthetic methodology in his use of e.g. dialogue, metaphors, simile, allegory, and the figure of Socrates.

Kant’s ‘idea’ pays homage to Plato yet he seeks to avoid what he terms Plato’s exaggerated methods of expression (A318/B375). He outlines the position of the ‘idea’ to ensure that its usage is consistent and its meaning is secured, however, to communicate his system of ideas, concepts and intuitions he uses a figure which cultivates an exemplary status (as it influences and can be traced within other regulative figures as discussed in 2.2). I will therefore argue that there is a recourse to art implied within Kant’s methodology which not only stands in contrast to his explicit aims in seeking to avoid such methods, but is integral in relation to his wider task (a critique of pure reason) as art facilitates the communication of ideas.
1.1 Reason as Systematic

This section will demonstrate how Kant explores the nature of reason by attending to its method in arriving at ideas. It is necessary to understand how reason relates to the other mental faculties (of sensibility and the understanding) to generate a sense of its operations and its role in knowledge formation. I will explore the status of reason as ‘unconditioned’\(^1\) and as capable of engaging in contrasting movements (ascending from and descending to sensible intuition) to present the logical and transcendental use of reason in respect to theoretical ideas. Practical ideas have a different relation to sensible intuition and I will introduce this difference, but the focus of part one concerns the exhibition of theoretical ideas, and how Kant seeks to present reason as systematic and conducive to scientific investigations. This section will provide an insight into the nature of reason that will be supplemented by discussion of the position of the idea in Kant’s critical system (in 1.2) and will set the context for understanding the motivation behind Kant’s methodology in respect to the development and origin of the term ‘idea’ (in 1.3). If we start with Kant’s account of the method of reason this will enable us to gain a comprehensive understanding of theoretical ideas in terms of what they tell us about the nature of reason, how they can be realised, and how this contributes to our understanding of the mind and mental faculties.

In the Preface to the A edition of the First Critique Kant outlines the fate of human reason as burdened by questions it can neither answer nor ignore; it possesses an

\(^1\) Reason as ‘unconditioned’ simply refers to its status beyond any given condition.
inherent desire to strive beyond the bounds of what it can know. Reason is revealed as contradictory: it employs principles to organise and determine our experiences, yet it seeks to transcend the limits of experience and sets itself tasks that can never be completed. Because of its desire for such extension there are concealed errors latent within its operation, and reason falls victim to fallacies and illusions that for Kant must be recognised as such. If the central problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, as Kemp-Smith argues, ‘the analysis of our awareness of meaning’, then for Kant to conduct a critique of pure reason – to establish what reason can know about the nature of reality and morality – he must bring the errors and illusions to light. Though we may recognise that these illusions are operative, it may not be possible (or even necessary) to guard against them completely. Reason’s illusory objects can also serve as goals and precepts which guide our understanding in determining intuitions, however, we must establish and recognise the limits of pure reason if we are to make legitimate, truthful claims to knowledge.

In the *Preface* to the B edition of the *First Critique* Kant makes a distinction concerning the use of reason in the sciences to attain *a priori* knowledge. He states that there are two ways *a priori* knowledge can be related to its object: ‘either as merely *determining* it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere) or as also *making it actual*. The former is *theoretical*, the latter *practical* knowledge of reason’ (Bix-Bx). The theoretical use of reason enables us to make determinate

---

2 Examples of this feature of reason can be found in the *Antinomies* as Kant discusses how reason strives to ask questions such as: Is the universe finite or infinite in space and time? Is matter infinitely divisible or composed of simple parts? Do humans have free will or are we determined by causes beyond our control? Does the existence of the universe presuppose a necessarily existent being? (A426-60/B454-88)

judgements about objects which contribute to cognition but do not have a direct relation to sensible intuition. The practical use of reason concerns bringing about what ought to be through our actions and judging the value of such actions and their objects.

In relation to knowledge (as determinate cognition) Kant sets out a three-fold distinction between sensibility, the understanding and reason as follows:

All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought’ (A298-9/B355).

For Kant reason is the ‘highest’ faculty that enables us to organise our cognitions into a unity that exceeds the spheres of sensible intuition and the understanding. As pure concepts of reason ideas are not obtained like concepts of the understanding – through mere reflection on given appearances – pure reason is not concerned with given objects and does not stand in immediate relation to them. Rather, based upon the understanding and its judgements, ideas are arrived at through a process of inference that both bestows unity and grounds the possibility of meaning. Ideas possess a unity that differs from (and exceeds) the synthetic unity of concepts of the understanding and they stand in a correspondingly different double relation to sensibility; they serve as highest point of distance from it, and as that which grounds our meaningful experience of it.
Reason is distinct from the understanding in terms of the way in which it relates to objects (and to sensible intuition) and the unity of reason differs in kind from the unity of the understanding\(^4\). Kant clearly sets out this difference:

Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the rules of the understanding under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give the manifold knowledge of the latter an \textit{a priori} unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason, and which is different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding (B359).

Sensibility enables us to intuit given objects and gain cognition, these objects are given in experience which is itself governed by the rules of the understanding. Reason serves to organise the cognitions gained through our determinate judgements into a higher unity, and it conditions the possibility of our experience of nature as a system. Through ideas reason brings the unity of a totality to the employment and rules of the understanding in relation to experience. Transcendental ideas can be thought as a source for original concepts as they create new concepts of unity which exceed the understanding and sensible experience. Reason does not provide concepts of objects so that we may gain knowledge as cognition, rather it grants order to the concepts of the understanding and takes the understanding as its object\(^5\).

\(^4\) It is a subject of debate whether reason and the understanding differ in kind or by degree. Michelle Grier argues that it is Kant’s intention to show that they differ in kind and present two different functions of thought and I support this interpretation. Grier, Michelle, \textit{Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 119, footnote 33.

\(^5\) O’Neill refers to reason as discussed in the \textit{Prefaces} of the \textit{First Critique} as ‘reflexive’, she states ‘...throughout the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} reason is depicted as an \textit{active} capacity that both \textit{generates and may resolve problems}. Reflexive structure is part of the key to understanding Kant’s conception of vindicating reason’. This designation of reason as reflexive preserves the positive (regulative) and negative (fallacious) operations of reason as illusory, yet it adds a dynamic quality that is not taken into account in the designation of reason as merely systematic. O’Neill, Onora,
Sensible intuitions and the categories (concepts) of the understanding are constitutive in relation to objects (they concern rules in regard to the existence of these objects), ideas are merely regulative (concerned with directing and orienting the understanding to a higher unity)\(^6\). Ideas refer to the unconditioned and demand a completeness which exceeds any possible experience\(^7\). As the unconditioned, ideas of reason make possible the totality of conditions for any given conditioned and they serve as the ground of the synthesis of the conditioned. Thus the position of ideas as higher than concepts of understanding in terms of their role in organising appearances is reaffirmed as they ground the possibility of meaningful experience itself (as its basis).

Reason is directed towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions for any given condition, it provides a whole as a goal or end-product that we may grasp or attain through inference when any condition is given. The unconditioned can be inferred from any given condition and operates as an ideal projection; presenting a goal or hypothesis of an absolute totality of these conditions. Though the unconditioned is presented with the given (as obtainable through inference) it is not itself given in intuition as theoretical ideas cannot be presented *in concreto*.


\(^6\) The difference between constitutive and regulative ideas and principles is set out in detail in 2.1.

\(^7\) This is articulated in Norman Kemp Smith’s *Commentary* in which he sets out a three-fold function for ideas: they define a goal for scientific endeavours, they determine the criteria for truth and falsity, and they make it possible to distinguish between appearance and reality to reveal an ‘irreconcilable conflict between the ultimate aims of science and the human conditions’. Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’*, London: Macmillan and New York: Humanities Press, originally published in 1918 and enlarged 1923, p. liii.
For Kant the number of pure concepts of reason is equal to the kinds of relation pertaining to the category of causality (judgements) and to the three types of syllogism. Reason searches for ‘an unconditioned, first of the categorical synthesis in a subject, secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the members in a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system’ (A323/B379). The operation of reason in the form of these syllogisms leads to the ideas of an absolute subject (soul), an absolute object (world) and an absolute ideal (God). Kant claims that these ideas are necessarily presented in the subjects of psychology, cosmology, and theology, however, they do not refer to ‘real’ objects, they reveal necessary illusions at work in the operation of reason. Using these illusory goals reason directs knowledge gained by the understanding towards a projected end or aim that possesses no concrete reality. Reason is hereby revealed as a naturally dialectical projecting activity and this illusory yet regulative capacity within its operations must be recognised as such. The illusion generated by reason is a transcendental illusion that can be thought as negative in relation to the fact that it does not adhere to truth, and as positive in that it plays an instrumental role in enabling us to organise and

---

8 A syllogism is a judgement determined a priori in the extent of all its conditions. For example: ‘Caius is mortal’ I pursue a concept (man) that contains the condition under which the predicate (is mortal) of the judgement is given. I subsume the predicate under this condition taken in its whole extension (all men are mortal) and proceed to determine the knowledge of my object (Caius is mortal) (A321/B379).

9 Kant recognises that the word ‘absolute’ can be used in two ways, paradoxically it can mean the least that is said about an object (when referring to its inward nature as that which is true of a thing considered in itself) or the most that can be said of an object (to indicate that which is valid in all respects without limitation) (A324/B381). Kant uses it in the latter sense when criticising pure reason’s illegitimate claims to know the absolute, these claims are based on illusions and yield the antinomies.
regulate the employment of the understanding in its approach to intuitions by making it more systematic\textsuperscript{10}.

Reason operates in a manner that exceeds the understanding and sensibility in relation to its logical capacity to arrive at a unity of knowledge through inference and its transcendent capacity to unify thought. In the latter reason ascends from what is given through the senses, to arrive at the unconditioned as the highest unity, in the former it can either ascend from intuition or descend from the unconditioned to determine objects given in sensibility in accordance with ideas. These two movements show how the operation of reason depends on ideas to unify, determine and judge knowledge given through understanding and sensibility.

In his pre-critical work \textit{The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures} Kant writes of reason as concerning the faculty of judgement. He develops his account of the faculty of judgement with reference to a distinction between reason and understanding. Though both concern a capacity to judge, the understanding is the faculty of distinct cognition and mediate judgement, whereas reason concerns inferences drawn from syllogism. The function of reason in syllogistic inference is not concerned with intuitions; it concerns the universality of knowledge according to concepts and judgements\textsuperscript{11}. In the \textit{Transcendental Ideas} of the \textit{First Critique} Kant

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{10} Michelle Grier discusses the positive and negative role of illusion in Chapters 4&8 of Kant’s \textit{Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion}. Grier, Michelle, \textit{Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{11} Onora O’Neill claims that Kant uses syllogism to uncover the unity granting function of reason as it ‘links distinct propositions into larger units’. The function operative in syllogism is akin to (or even the same as) systematic unity and she quotes A305/B361 in support of this where Kant states that in inference reason seeks to reduce the varied manifold obtained through the understanding to ‘the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to achieve in it the highest possible unity’. O’Neill, Onora, “Vindicating Reason”, \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Kant}, edited by Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 280-308.
\end{flushright}
sets out the operation of ideas as related to the form of a syllogism as 'a judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its conditions' (A322/B378). In the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain object after thinking through the major premise in its whole extension. In doing this we gain a sense of the totality or universality of conditions for any given condition (which is the same as the totality of all conditions: the unconditioned).

In *The Pure Employment of Reason* in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant refers to two propositions which Michelle Grier argues are merely two ways of viewing the same necessary demand for unity as they express the same unifying function and concern the same act of reason viewed in different ways. The logical rule – that we must find for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion (Cf. A307/B364) – characterises the systematic unity of the manifold knowledge of the understanding as prescribed by reason. This rule is, however, based on an (illusory) transcendental presupposition that if the conditioned is given, the absolutely unconditioned is also given. Grier claims that the transcendental presupposition serves as an 'application condition' of the logical rule as it articulates the illusory goal in light of which we undertake a systematization of the knowledge of the understanding. Thus the transcendental presupposition operates as a necessary projected illusion that provides reason with a basis for a transcendental as opposed to a mere logical use.


It is interesting to note that the transcendental presupposition serves as an 'application condition' for the logical maxim, as Grier identifies with reference to Buchdahl *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*, pp. 496-530: both the transcendental ideas and the idea of a maximum are claimed to provide the analoga of schemata. Ibid, p. 268.
The transcendental idea transcends the limits of all experience; it is the concept of a maximum that can never be given in concreto, e.g. the idea of the absolute whole of all appearances. Kant states that this is ‘only an idea; since we can never represent it in an image, it remains a problem to which there is no solution’ (A328/B384 my italics). Whilst the transcendental idea is presented negatively - as problematic due to its illusory nature in causing us to mistake ideas for ‘real’ things - it plays a positive role in relation to its regulative capacity. Ideas direct the understanding to a point of unity beyond the sphere of understanding and sensibility, the understanding therefore gains an extension beyond its legitimate scope and reason grants the unity of a totality to its operations through the projection of a complete yet illusory whole\textsuperscript{14}. In terms of the movement of reason, transcendental ideas offer an ascent from sensible intuition to the understanding, they then go beyond this sphere using an illusion that is necessary to achieve this goal. Using a necessary (illusory) projection transcendental ideas perform a retrospective heuristic function to guide the employment of the understanding by constructing a focus imaginarius; an imaginary point of intersection at which the rules of the understanding converge (A644/B672)\textsuperscript{15}. The transcendental use of pure reason reveals a transcendental dialectic, it has a ‘natural’ relation to the logical employment of reason and there are three kinds of

\textsuperscript{14} In his unpublished paper Regulative Principles and Regulative Ideas Gary Banham identifies two uses of the term ‘regulative’ in the Critique. The first refers to the use of regulative principles of the understanding that bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori and apply to the relations between existences but do not constitute them. The second refers to the regulative use of ideas of reason to order concepts of the understanding with a view to totality. Banham asserts that in their regulative capacity ideas approximate to universality but there is no concrete indication that this is ever achieved as the unity of the transcendental idea is a projected (not a given) unity that assists the understanding through the principles of homogeneity, variety and affinity. These comprise a systematic unity that grounds the possibility of the logical employment of ideas and is reflected in the organisation of nature as a system. From a presently unpublished paper delivered by Gary Banham in 2010 at the 11\textsuperscript{th} International Kant Congress in Pisa. Banham, Gary, Regulative Principles and Regulative Ideas, 2010.

\textsuperscript{15} We will discuss the use of the focus imaginarius in more detail in Chapter two.
dialectical inference through which reason arrives at knowledge via principles. These correspond to three kinds of relation to representations: relation to a subject, relation to objects, and relation to all things in general (A333/B390).

In contrast to theoretical ideas, ideas of practical reason can be given in concreto through actions, they are causally determined by the will and thus, they can be realised in sensible intuition in a way that theoretical ideas cannot. The limits faced by determining what is through the application of theoretical reason do not hold for determining what ought to be through the application of practical reason as the latter does not follow laws or limits set by nature. In its practical application reason refers to ideas and creates its own order; it declares certain actions necessary though they can or may never take place empirically. Freedom and reason go hand in hand as humans are free to determine the world of sense via cognition but they are not determined by it and can act with freedom to make inferences that exceed the realm of nature in accordance with an absolute, unconditioned practical idea.

In the Ideas in General Kant refers to how the field of the practical concerns ideas which operate in the moral sphere as we exercise freedom. We judge the moral actions of ourselves and others, not from examples that are given to us in experience, but with reference to an idea that in its completeness exceeds any possible or given exemplification. Kant refers to ‘virtue’ as an example to demonstrate that we do not gain this idea by assimilating many virtuous acts we have seen and deriving a concept from them as an aggregated whole, rather we possess the practical idea of virtue which serves as an ideal standard (or archetype) that we use to judge given acts according to whether they pertain to it. In reference to this idea we judge examples that are given to us in experience: ‘as we are well aware, if anyone is held up as a pattern of virtue, the true original with which we
compare the alleged pattern and by which alone we judge of its value is to be found only in our minds’ (A315/B372). Whilst virtue can be realised in part through virtuous actions, the practical idea of virtue exists only in our minds, this is the original idea and the instances we experience are examples which show that it has some reality. We can never act in a way that perfectly equates with the idea of virtue, but it nonetheless serves as ‘an indispensable foundation for every approach to moral perfection’ (A315/B372).

In the Second Critique Kant seeks to justify the postulates of God, freedom and immortality by claiming that these follow from the existence of the moral law. Immortality provides the necessary duration for fulfilling the moral law, freedom satisfies conditions of independence from sensibility and the intelligible, and God serves as the necessary condition of the intelligible world and as the highest good. Thus we can begin to see how Kant connects the practical use of reason to its transcendental use which in turn provides an essential ground for its logical use.

Kant connects his enquiry into the transcendental ideas to his wider quest to secure the systematic unity of metaphysics as, not only has he marked out a set field for pure ideas and limited their number to three, he argues that there is a unity amongst these ideas that is systematic and natural: ‘The advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of this to the original being, is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premises to conclusion’ (A337/B395). He claims that the operation of human reason is by its very nature systematic, and this should assist us with securing systematic

---

16 As we go on to discuss this in 1.2 we will see that there is some agreement between Kant and Plato concerning ideas as archetypal, however, for Kant it is only practical ideas that can be thought of like this.
unity for the subject of metaphysics. By securing the ground of ideas within the logical use of reason, Kant extends the unity and clarity associated with the logical advance from premise to conclusion to the transcendental application of reason and (he hopes) to the whole of metaphysics\textsuperscript{17}.

If we understand the nature of reason as destined to ask questions it cannot answer, nor ignore we must conceive it as an active capacity of the mind which organises our cognitions into the highest unity. Though in doing this reason falls victim to illusory objects (that never exist in truth) positing these objects plays a necessary role in enabling us to systematise the knowledge we have gained and it characterises our approach to investigating nature. The method of reason as it arrives at ideas concerns: a logical use (in relation to syllogistic inference), a transcendental use (as the source of concepts and principles that exceed the sphere of the understanding), and a practical use (in relation to freedom). Ideas are necessary, as, they enable us to access the unconditioned which forms the basis for any given conditions, they present the highest point that reason can reach, and they serve to bring unity and regulate the understanding. In doing so ideas assist us in determining the world of nature and for Kant the systematic operation of reason is ‘natural’ as it mirrors the systematic organisation of nature itself. However, Kant’s analysis of transcendental ideas intends to show how we interrogate nature in accordance with ideas, not how nature is \textit{in itself}\textsuperscript{18}. We approach nature as a system and scientific theory is possible because we presuppose the systematic unity of nature as a transcendent idea (that

\textsuperscript{17} In a footnote to the second edition Kant clarifies this further, stating that metaphysics has, as the object of its enquiries only these three ideas: God, freedom and immortality, not to ground the basis of the natural sciences, but in order to pass beyond, transcend and exceed nature. We start with what is given and advance from knowledge of the soul, to the world, to God.

incorporates the logical principles of homogeneity, specification and affinity). This idea is not (and cannot be) derived from experience, however, it dictates how we organise our determinate judgements and forms an essential basis of scientific theory. Kant’s consistent affirmation of the nature of reason as systematic is communicated clearly in respect to how we organise our knowledge and how we must approach nature. The way in which reason arrives as ideas is carefully established as a systematic approach that is essential to metaphysics and science, and even though theoretical ideas cannot be given *in concreto*, clues to establishing their reality lie in the regulative functions they perform. Kant communicates the position of ideas using a figure that stands outside of this understanding of nature of reason as merely systematic and initiates discussion of the 'art' of constructing systems.

### 1.2 The Position of Ideas

The aim of this section is to show that the method through which Kant presents and secures the position of ideas reveals a problem concerning his understanding of the nature of reason, his explicit methodological aims and the manner in which he seeks to achieve them. We have already discussed how Kant understands the regulative unity of reason as inherently systematic, however, this section will argue that Kant’s system of ideas, concepts and intuitions exemplifies a creative capacity of reason that is not taken into account in his characterisation of it. To discover the true nature of reason and gain a comprehensive insight into the unity it possesses we must acknowledge this capacity, this will enable us to properly contextualise Kant’s development of the idea from Plato in 1.3.
The position of the idea in relation to other concepts and intuitions is presented and secured in an arrangement that Kant refers to as a ‘Stufenleiter’: a step ladder (A320/B376). The use of this term arouses a diagrammatic image in the mind, and although Kant does not present his arrangement as a diagram in the text, his description of it offers an additional clarification which supplements and reinforces the written explanation that follows. Kant refers to the figure of a step ladder to communicate his idea (of a system of ideas, concepts and intuitions) with clarity. The figure accompanies the rational explanation of the position and operation of ideas and thus, it is a direct, schematic presentation. This figure enables Kant to communicate the position of ideas ‘in general’ and, through its status as an architectonic presentation, it exemplifies the realisation of his specific idea (of a system of ideas, concepts and intuitions). The step ladder posits knowledge as objective perception that can be either intuition (Anschauung) or concepts (Begriffe):

The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation (sensatio), and objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter relates to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of reason (A320/B377).

---

19 Though there is no direct presentation in a diagram, the presentation of the position of the idea is ‘direct’ in the sense that it is presented itself and not transposed into something else. It therefore stands in contrast to an indirect, symbolic representation which does use a transposition.

20 It is important to note that no mention is made in the Stufenleiter of the ideal, the imagination, or pure sensible concepts (though we can arguably assume that the latter are implied in the reference to the ‘pure image of sensibility’).
This outlines the position of ideas in relation to concepts of the understanding; the ‘idea’ is secured as a ‘concept formed from notions’ (from pure concepts of understanding) that transcends the possibility of experience (cf. A320/B377). As they transcend experience, the application of ideas to sensible intuition is problematic. No examples of such ideas can ever be met with or illustrated in intuition; ideas do not govern the representations given in sensible intuition, they are, by their very nature indemonstrable and thus we reach the problem of how they can be exhibited and shown to have reality.

Kant aims to preserve proper usage of the term ‘idea’ as a concept of reason that is distanced from sensible intuition. We have already discussed how an idea can descend to intuition through the logical use of reason, but how can we show that our ideas are more than mere hypostatised abstractions? Illusion plays a necessary role in the regulative operation of transcendental ideas, and they should not be employed constitutively (taken to refer to ‘real’ objects), but how can these regulative ideas be shown to relate to sensible intuition? A degree of reality can be secured for practical ideas as they are manifested in concrete actions, but theoretical ideas remain necessarily abstract. However, it is important to establish that these ideas possess some reality as failure to do so not only renders them abstract, it weakens the social and epistemological status of metaphysics.

In 1.1 I discussed Kant’s attempt to secure the systematic unity of metaphysics through a consideration of how transcendental principles (which assume the systematicity of nature) are necessarily presupposed whenever reason is employed logically to determine nature. Thus, an idea such as, e.g., the sum total of all possibilities, is projected as a necessary end or whole which regulates any investigation of nature. Interrogation of the subject is enabled by the presupposition
of the soul, objects can be examined if a world is presupposed, and the unity of subject and object (soul and world) presupposes the sum total of everything that exists (God). Systematicity is intrinsically tied into the way in which ideas serve to regulate our theoretical knowledge of nature and ideas can become realised through their capacity to regulate a system. It is this possibility for realisation that we will interrogate further with reference to Kant’s use of the step ladder as an example.

The three regulative principles of a system are: homogeneity, specification (or variety) and affinity (cf. A657/B686). These account for the unification of knowledge into more than a mere aggregate. Kant states clearly:

By a system I understand the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason – of the form of a whole – in so far as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relative to one another (A832/B860).

The system is regulated by an idea that possesses architectonic unity; it regulates the whole by dictating the way in which the parts relate to one another, and the way that they relate in sum to the projected, complete whole as a totality. It is through its role in regulating a system that a degree of reality can be secured for an idea.

Let us remind ourselves what Kant means by architectonic:

By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of a science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge and therefore necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method (A832/B860, my emphasis).

For Kant the construction of a system is an ‘art’ that elevates an aggregate into a higher unity and is intrinsically connected to the method through which we may raise our knowledge to the ‘rank of a science’. It is necessary to consider the construction of systems – such as e.g. Kant’s system of ideas, concepts and intuitions – as an art
and to assess the impact this has on our understanding of the unity of reason as merely systematic. We must therefore consider the difference between a system itself (in terms of the unity it possesses) and the art of constructing such a unity.

To clarify the difference we need to consider: what Kant means by ‘construction’ as a method, how a system (that possesses architectonic unity) differs from the art through which it was created, and how this impacts upon our understanding of the nature of reason. Let us begin with an analysis of construction and what Kant means by this.

In *The Transcendental Doctrine of Method* Kant writes about *The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment*. He distinguishes the discursive employment of reason in philosophy from the intuitive (*a priori*) employment of it in mathematics and claims it is the latter that concerns the construction of concepts:

*Philosophical* knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit *a priori* the intuition which corresponds to the concept (A713/B741).

Kant states that to construct a concept we need a non-empirical intuition that is a single object, yet expresses universal validity for all intuitions that fall under the same concept, e.g., a triangle. To construct the triangle *a priori* I present it (either in my mind or by drawing it) and in turn this expresses the concept in a singular manner without impairing its universality, in the single pure intuition I combine the manifold that belongs to the schema of ‘a triangle in general’ (its concept). Philosophy employs concepts discursively to determine the given matter of cognition, mathematics uses an intrinsically intuitive method to construct concepts *a priori*. Kant states that the transcendental concepts used in philosophy such as, e.g., reality, substance or force do not use empirical or pure intuitions, they require only the
synthesis of empirical intuitions that cannot itself be given \textit{a priori}, and they yield no intuition (\textit{a priori} or otherwise) (cf. A722/B750).

Kant connects construction to pure intuition as it refers to how concepts are presented and given concretely, yet are at the same time \textit{a priori}. He does not refer to construction in terms of a creative act - the mathematician does not ‘create’ a triangle as such - but the construction of a triangle enables her to exact knowledge from it and is therefore part of her method. In \textit{On A Discovery According to Which any New Critique of Pure Reason has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One} Kant asserts that construction occurs spontaneously; it concerns the presentation of a concept through the spontaneous production of a corresponding intuition\textsuperscript{21}. If a pure intuition is spontaneously produced by the \textit{a priori} imagination this is similar to the process through which a pure sensible concept is schematised\textsuperscript{22}. This affiliation makes sense as constructing a concept enables it to become realised and concretised, though it remains \textit{a priori}. In relation to construction in the \textit{First Critique} however, Kant does not refer to the spontaneous production of a figure or image by the imagination, he points only to the ‘art of reason’\textsuperscript{23}. In his discussion of the differences between the methods of philosophy compared to mathematics Kant comments on the nature of reason itself and states: ‘…its method can always be systematic. For our reason is itself, subjectively, a system, though in its pure employment, by means of mere concepts, it is no more than a system whereby our


\textsuperscript{22} The schematisation of pure sensible concepts will be discussed in detail in 3.1.

\textsuperscript{23} Kant claims that both the philosopher and the mathematician practice ‘the art of reason, the one making his way by means of concepts, the other by means of intuitions which he exhibits a priori in accordance with concepts’ (A717-8/B745-6).
investigations can be conducted in accordance with principles of unity, the material being provided by *experience* alone (A737-8/B765-6). The nature and status of reason as systematic is clearly affirmed, yet Kant does not account for the art through which the systems of theoretical reason are created or constructed.

The account of construction Kant gives in reference to the use of reason in mathematics concerns the presentation (and exhibition) of concepts through a single, pure intuition. The step ladder (and the regulative figures discussed in 2.2) do not equate with mathematical construction as they are not singular, geometric figures. One could argue that the step ladder serves as a non-intuitive *a priori* figure (in that it needs never nor can ever be fully realised in intuition), and that the system it creates has universality (as it sets out the organisation of our theoretical knowledge in relation to all minds and cognitive enterprises). However, this figure comprises an aggregate which is organised into a system and its role is to communicate the arrangement of representations that play a role in the formation of our knowledge.

The step ladder is not a mathematical figure; it ensures consistent usage and meaning of the term ‘idea’, and it suggests a method that is useful for philosophy in respect to the communication of ideas. It does not present a single figure such as e.g. a triangle and the imagination (*a priori* or reproductive) is neither included within the divisions set out in the step ladder, nor addressed in reference to its construction. In contrast Kant’s account of mathematical construction is arguably affiliated with the *a priori* imagination and the schematism of pure sensible concepts. One can conclude from this that the step ladder is figural (as we could draw out the rungs in a diagram, it lies within this possibility) but it is not intuitive (as it must necessarily remain transcendental due to the indemonstrable status of particular and general
idea(s) it presents). Kant explicitly states that transcendental ideas are discursive and cannot be constructed, rather, they involve the synthesis of the manifold of empirical or possible intuitions. It is therefore not surprising that he does not explicitly address the way a figure such as the step ladder is constructed, as he has not acknowledged its possibility within his account of construction as specifically related to mathematics and intrinsically connected to intuition.

Let us discuss how the unity of the system itself differs from the art of creating it. Kant’s account of the unity of reason as systematic, and his characterisation of reason as a system also do not address and cannot account for its capacity to construct systems such as that exemplified by the aforementioned figure. The step ladder is, therefore, a specific type of figure which also has an exemplary status.

In Kant and the Unity of Reason Angelica Nuzzo claims that: ‘the unity of reason is expressed by the idea of a system, and implies both the completeness of its manifold elements and the systematicity of its structures’24. Nuzzo states that reason strives towards the organization and extension of knowledge gained by the understanding to form a complete system of knowledge. However, she argues that the unity of reason in Kant’s work also has a second, higher meaning, which reveals that for Kant reason itself is a ‘system’. We have discovered evidence to support this claim within the text of the First Critique (cf. A737-8/B765-6), however, Nuzzo’s claims do not and cannot account for the art of reason that becomes evident through its capacity to construct systems. The addition of an artistic dimension to the unity of reason stands outside of Nuzzo’s designation of it as merely systematic and

(alongside Kant himself), she fails to acknowledge that a degree of art is necessarily required in order for reason to construct, present, and thereby realise an idea through or as a system.

The construction of a system concerns an ability to organise given parts in accordance with a necessary idea that is not given in isolation or objectively by itself but is grounded in the very nature and operation of reason, this idea then becomes realised through the system that it governs. For Kant architectonic unity differs in kind from the synthetic unity between a concept and an intuition as it involves the organisation and regulation of parts in relation to a whole whose working unity exceeds itself to form a systematic totality. Though Nuzzo does refer to a second objective and theoretically ‘higher’ meaning of reason as a ‘unique and unitary faculty that is capable of radically different uses’, she connects these ‘uses’ to its ability to function practically and theoretically and not to its capacity to construct systems artistically (or aesthetically)\(^{25}\).

The step ladder serves as a diagrammatic figure which supplements mere explanation using words in a manner that assists Kant with the communication of his system, and enables a partial realisation of it in the mind of the reader. However, the ability to construct a system cannot be directly equated with the resulting construction as the former betrays the existence of a creative capacity. Construction of a system requires skill, application, work and discipline, whereas, the system itself merely concerns the possessive demonstration of a consistent unity that dictates the relation of parts to one another and to the whole. Though the system functions in a demonstrable and scientific way, let us not forget that Kant refers to the construction

\(^{25}\text{Ibid., p. 41.}\)
of it as an art. The art of constructing systems is not contained within the system, but it can be demonstrated through the presentation of diagrammatic figures such as the step ladder. The art of constructing these figures - if it is truly an art – can therefore only be inferred from the exemplary figures it constructs or creates.

The art of constructing a system is not present within the self-contained, structured ‘work’, rather, it refers to the method through which the work is produced and its unity is regulated. One could argue that the ‘art’ is not exhausted by the terms of the system, nonetheless, it does produce it and must be present in some sense. In the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* Kant draws an analogy between the organisation of a whole into a system (through which an idea is developed and realised) and the growth of an animal body: ‘The whole is thus an organised unity (*articulatio*), and not an aggregate (*coacervatio*). It may grow from within (*per intussusceptionem*), but not by external addition (*per appoestionem*). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes’ (A833/B861). This analogy implies that the realisation of the system can be thought as ‘natural’; in line with the growth of an organic body. For Kant the operation of reason as systematic is not merely analogous with nature (as a system), the system through which an idea becomes realised is analogous with the unfolding of an already present potential such as is revealed by the growth of an animal as it becomes that which it is. One could infer from this that the art of constructing systems does not bring anything to an idea that it did not already possess; it simply enables the idea to *become*. However, we know that the construction of the system does bring something important to an idea, and this is a *possibility for its realisation*. Though this realisation is already present as part of an idea’s latent potential, it is
only through its presentation in terms of a system (or its representation as a symbol) that it can be exhibited. The presentation granted by the artistic construction of the system enables an idea to be partially concretised, and as a result — it is realised and communicated. It reveals an intrinsic, defining feature of pure reason that should be recognised and made explicit as the art of constructing a system, is the art of constructing reality for a theoretical idea.

Kant refers to the construction of systems as an ‘art’ yet the systematic realisation of an idea through an architectonic presentation differs in nature and source from a work of art. Kant’s discussion of art in relation to genius in the Third Critique can be set in contrast to his presentation of the system as possessing architectonic unity. Works of aesthetic art are sourced to the productive imagination and present the felt unity of an open, aesthetic totality which differs from a system. Works of science are sourced to reason and constitute systematic, self-contained totalities that are regulated by a necessary, rational idea. Thus we gain a sense of two types of art: the art of the genius and the art of creating systems. However, the figure of the step ladder points to a way of communicating about the art of creating systems that is useful not for the artist, or specifically the scientist, but for the philosopher; one who is not interested in producing a work of beauty to express an aesthetic idea, or a work of science that contains an organisation of directly demonstrable facts. The philosopher seeks to communicate to others the true nature, arrangement and workings of the mind and mental faculties. The difficulty is that when dealing with a subject matter so distanced from intuition, the philosopher must recourse to methods used by the artist to grant form to the ineffable, and the scientist to bring rigour and unity so that she communicates with clarity. The step ladder differs from the other regulative figures we will discuss in 2.2. as it possess a unique exemplary status. It
supplements communication and enables realisation of the position of ideas in general, it presents a specific idea, and it indicates a method that recurs through Kant’s critical works, and is present in the work of Plato. The use of this figure (and others) suggests a **third type of art** which utilises the unity of the system, and the communicative potential of the work of art to form a complex hybrid of the two. Theoretical ideas are granted a possibility for realisation through the systems they refer to, but their reality is doubly affirmed when they are directly presented and communicated in a figure. What such figures do not, and cannot present are the means through which they themselves are constructed, though their status as examples can provide us with valuable clues about this\(^{26}\).

### 1.3 The Origin and Development of the Idea

This section will begin by showing how Kant’s account of ideas can be read as a development of and divergence away from the Platonic sense of idea as archetype. The objective is to illustrate the Platonic foundations of Kant’s sense of ‘idea’ and to show that, although he utilises elements of Plato’s account, he diverges from specific aspects to differentiate his methodology and avoid the criticisms made of Plato. Plato’s ‘idea’ as archetype is judged to be problematic in three respects: due to its exalted position it cannot be shown to possess reality, the abstract nature of these ideas means that we can access them only when our soul is disembodied, and no distinction is made between different types of concept or idea. Kant must address these criticisms in securing his own use of the term and he does this by establishing a secure position for ideas within his critical system and clearly defining a role for

\(^{26}\) We will discuss the status of the step ladder as an exemplary example further in 2.2.
theoretical ideas (as regulative) and practical ideas (as related to freedom and morality). This section will focus on the former and will attend to Kant’s methodology to demonstrate how he incorporates elements of Plato’s ‘idea’ whilst also maintaining some independence from it to avoid the aforementioned criticisms. I will discuss how Kant employs aspects of Plato’s methodology e.g. in his construction of figures such as the step-ladder, and how he reinterprets Plato’s philosophy to further his own ends. I will argue that Kant perpetuates an unrecognised, unresolved, methodological conflict between art and philosophy that is grounded in the work of Plato.

In *The Ideas in General* Kant refers directly to Plato’s use of the word ‘idea’ to mean ‘something which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but which far surpasses even the concepts of understanding’ (A313/B370). Kant and Plato share in the sense of an ‘idea’ as that which is not coincident with anything that can ever be met with in experience. The distinction between ideas in the Platonic sense and Aristotle’s categories of understanding is recognised and maintained by Kant as he states: “For Plato ideas are *archetypes of the things themselves*, and not, in the manner of the categories, merely keys to possible experiences’ (A313/B370 my italics)\(^{27}\). An idea in the Platonic sense concerns the form or true essence of e.g. things that we encounter in experience. For Plato we can only gain true knowledge of ideas when our disembodied soul participates in the realm of the forms (after death or before birth). During our embodied lives we encounter mere ‘copies’ of the

\(^{27}\) In his *Kant Dictionary* Howard Caygill claims that the origin of Kant’s ‘idea’ should be properly located between Plato and Aristotle: “For him [Kant], Plato hypostatized the ideas, making them into archetypes by means of a ‘mystical deduction’, while Aristotle confined their scope to empirical experience. Caygill argues that, with his use of the term Kant sought to establish a middle position which both acknowledged the transcendence of the ideas and the rigorous distinction of idea and concept”. Caygill, Howard, *A Kant Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p.236-7.
original, perfect ideas (forms or universals), these are given to us through instances in experience and they arouse our recollection of the archetypal idea to which they pertain. In *On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy* Kant maintains that Plato was mistaken to hold that we have an original intellectual intuition of these ideas in community with God. He identifies such claims as the source of a misguided, mystical intuition in philosophy and accuses Plato of kindling ‘the torch of exaltation’\(^\text{28}\). Kant claims that this problem arose as Plato sought to answer the question of how synthetic *a priori* propositions are possible (though of course, this is Kant’s own formulation of the question concerning the possibility of ideas). He projects his enquiry so that he can claim Plato’s success in this area whilst simultaneously avoiding his mistaken, mystical exaltation of ideas.

Kant’s criticisms of Plato are based on the latter’s failure to sufficiently determine his conception of ‘idea’. Kant observes that, as a consequence of this Plato may have spoken in opposition to his own intention, and claims it is not unusual to find that we may understand an author better than he understood himself (A314/B370). Kant seeks to clarify the term ‘idea’ and determine the scope of its use in order to preserve its correct meaning and to ensure that its use is consistent and its status is secured. Though Plato failed to do this, his sense of ‘idea’ nonetheless provides a necessary base from which Kant can proceed and we can deduce (from Kant’s projection of his own question concerning synthetic *a priori* knowledge) that he imports his own objectives (e.g. to provide a critique of pure reason) into the work of

Plato and swerves Plato’s use of ‘idea’ towards his own ends\(^2\). The swerving movement that characterises the mode through which Kant is influenced by and yet diverges from Plato recalls the movement of atoms discussed by Lucretius in *Of the Nature of Things*. For Democritus atoms moved in straight lines in all directions, in response to this Epicurus argued that they move straight down at a uniform velocity but may deviate from their regular course at random and unpredictable moments. Lucretius takes up Epicurus’ theory to suggest that atoms collide with one another in ways that involve chance, his use of swerve or *Clinamen* recognises that, although atoms are in a determined movement (downwards), they may deviate from this course and thus, his scientific account of atomic movement allows for the possibility of specific instances of free-will within a general pre-determined movement\(^3\). For Lucretius ‘swerving’ is the movement that accounts for the way atoms collide, he thereby avoids a completely deterministic view of the world by claiming that, although the atoms are pushed or guided in a general direction, the possibility of freedom is preserved as specific atoms can deviate within this course. All atoms are

\(^2\) Further evidence of this can be found e.g. when he states that Plato ‘realised our faculty of knowledge feels a higher need than to spell out appearances according to synthetic unity’ and when he claims that Plato knew our reason ‘naturally exalts itself’ to modes of knowledge that transcend empirical knowledge (so no empirical object can coincide with them) but must be recognised as having their own reality (and are not mere fictions) (A314/B371). Kant employs language characteristic of his own endeavour to swerve advances made by Plato in connection to the term ‘idea’ to further his own critical task.

\(^3\) The following extract may assist in giving an overview of Lucretius’ account of this movement:

“....In these affairs / We wish thee also well aware of this : / The atoms, as their own weight bears them down / Plumb through the void, at scarce determined times, / In scarce determined places, from their course / Decline a little – call it, so to speak, / Mere changed trend. For were it not their wont / Thuswise to swerve, down they would fall, each one, / Like drops of rain, through the unbottomed void; / And then collisions ne'er could be nor blows / Among the primal elements ; and thus / Nature would never have created aught [...] / ...Again, if ev'r all motions are co-linked, / And from the old ever arise the new / In fixed order, and primordial seeds / Produce not by their swerving some new start / Of motion to sunder the covenants of fate, / That cause succeed not cause from everlasting, / Whence this free will for creatures o'er the lands, / Whence it is rested from the fates, - this will / Whereby we step right forward where desire / Leads each man on, whereby the same we swerve / In motions, not as at some fixed time, / Nor at some fixed line of space, but where / The mind itself has urged...” / Lucretius, *Of the Nature of Things*, translated by W. E. Leonard, New York: J.M Dent and Sons & E.P. Dutton and Co. 1921.
guided or swerved in the same direction, yet they maintain the freedom to encounter
and collide with one another in specific ways.

We may transpose this description of the movement of atoms to enable us to
understand the way in which Kant utilises Plato’s conception of ‘idea’. He pushes or
guides Plato’s advancements - concerning his desire to secure metaphysics and
attain a place for philosophy as that which is concerned with ideas - to incorporate
and direct them towards his own ends. Yet he retains the necessary freedom to
diverge from Plato’s method of exalting and hypostatising ideas in order to open and
lead his own specific investigation. Kant shows that he is determined generally by an
advancing movement from the past and locates himself within the search to define
and secure a role for metaphysics. His methodological incorporation of Plato to
further his own ends not only involves projecting his ideas into Plato’s philosophy, he
extends Plato’s existing theories to incorporate his on the basis of a shared desire to
secure metaphysics and then strengthens and directs them towards his new ends.

It is interesting to note the nature of swerving and the combination of topics that its
discussion comprises; Lucretius writes poetically (artistically) about a scientific theory
concerning atomic motion and he observes the philosophical implications of this it in
terms of the moral question of free-will. This method thereby comprises a synthesis
of art, philosophy and science to show that a scientific theory of atomic movement
can be philosophically significant in terms of providing a method that ensures the
possibility of freedom and this is communicated through the artistic medium of
poetry. The swerving movement is analogous to both the development of a specific
idea within philosophy, and to the continuous development of a theory of ideas in
general. Kant’s philosophical methodology in relation to ideas mirrors nature and
replicates Lucretius theory concerning the movement of atoms. Just as the atoms
are free and yet swerved in a general direction, so the development of the ‘idea’ in metaphysics is guided (swerved) by reference to Plato though Kant remains free to deviate from this and develop his own account.

Kant’s references to Plato are often vague or veiled but he is quite clear to state that Plato’s ‘architectonic ordering of the world’ in the Republic is ‘worthy of respect and imitation’ (A318/B375). In the simile of The Divided Line Plato orders academic subjects according to the corresponding states of mind in which we apprehend the two orders of reality: the visible and the intelligible\(^{31}\). The figure of the line communicates Plato’s architectonic understanding of the subjects of philosophy, mathematics, science, art, and their respective states of mind; intelligence, reason, belief and illusion. Philosophy occupies the highest status in the intelligible realm due to its capacity to achieve intelligence, poetry and art occupy the lowest sphere of the visible realm as they are capable only of illusion. Plato uses a poetical device (a simile) to communicate his classification, yet within this system he is critical as to the worth of art, especially when compared with philosophy. The Divided Line serves as an early example of the polarised relationship between philosophy and art, as it exemplifies a philosophical employment of a poetic (specially figurative) methodology that delivers content explicitly designed to undermine it.

Kant’s desire to imitate Plato’s architectonic ordering of the world according to ends or ideas, and to leave aside his ‘exaggerated modes of expression’ (cf.A318/B375) indicates that he considers art (as a method of expression) in a negative sense as it uses figures, metaphors and allegory, and the art of

constructing systems as a positive and philosophically valuable enterprise. Kant therefore enters into a dialogue with Plato, seeking to understand him (better than he understood himself) so that he can distance himself from the poetic and rhetorical use of art, and preserve his architectonic advancements.

One could consider the step-ladder as Kant’s version of *The Divided Line*. Kant constructs the step-ladder to demonstrate the relation between intuitions, concepts and ideas (to secure the position of the idea). *The Divided Line* is a classification of claims to wisdom in order of importance with art (pertaining to illusions and appearances within sensible intuition) as lowest and philosophy (dealing with reason and knowledge as intelligence) as highest. Though they do not directly correspond with one another, there are undeniable methodological similarities in the way in which the specific ideas of each hierarchy are communicated and concerning how the general use of ideas is positioned as highest. Both involve a rational (schematic) construction that enables reference to a visual figure in the mind by analogy with a ladder-like, hierarchy which enables movement within in terms of ascent and descent.

Plato refers to a simile to communicate his architectonic ordering of the subjects and this reveals a conflict: he is explicitly critical of art and yet makes recourse to a visual figure in to communicate his idea (or system). Kant’s step ladder utilises the art of creating systems to illustrate his classification of ideas, concepts and intuitions yet the method through which the idea is communicated and realised in the mind of the reader is not taken into account by Kant or his system. Plato’s classification and

---

Kant’s system would not be intelligible or communicable without recourse to art in some sense. Both succeed in the creation of an image in the mind that is then recalled and referred to successively without further justification each time it is used (as it has already been concretised). It is evident that a hypothetical figure as a non-empirical intuition is constructed (or created) and becomes partially concretised, therefore it endures, though it remains necessarily abstract (as by their nature ideas cannot be realised in sensible intuition). The step ladder and The Divided Line serve as recurring figures that accompany determinate expression, yet this capacity is not explicitly acknowledged in either of them. Philosophy as a system and its place within a system of academic subjects is illustrated respectively by Kant and Plato using architectonic constructions as necessary figures. By recognising and discussing architectonic ‘art’ in relation to ideas Kant addresses the construction of the system in an attempt to minimise the role of art in favour of science. Thus, avoids metaphors, simile’s, dialogue and personified figures (in the manner in which they are used by Plato) but the subject matter of ideas as such, makes it impossible to abstain from any type of art and figural presentation so that he can communicate what would otherwise be abstract and inexpressible. Despite his explicit desire to move away from Plato’s exaggerated modes of expression, Kant cannot eradicate art from his methodology; it remains integrally bound to the communication of ideas as an indispensible feature of their expression and exhibition.

Though Kant acknowledges a Platonic legacy with his use of ‘idea’, his sense of ideas must be properly understood as incorporating a development designed to create distance from the Platonic idea as archetype (A316/B373). Though Kant makes many unreferenced claims about Plato, in The Ideas in General he refers directly to Plato’s Republic and acknowledges criticisms of this work e.g. those made
by Brucker in his Historica Critica Philosophica. Kant does not share in Brucker’s hasty dismissal of the work and claims that behind the Republic there lies a necessary idea that remains necessary despite the fact that it can or may never be realised. Kant identifies this idea and presents it as if it is taken directly from the Republic, though Plato never refers to it directly himself:

‘A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others – I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself – is at any rate a necessary idea…’ (A316/B373 my italics).

The ‘necessary’ idea is Kant’s development of and divergence away from Plato’s sense of the idea as archetype. Both provide a standard towards which we may strive, but Plato’s archetypal idea serves as an original from which copies in experience are derived, whereas Kant’s necessary idea serves a regulative function and advances its maximum as an archetype. This reading of the Republic foreshadows Kant’s formulation of the Universal Principle of Right in The Metaphysics of Morals. Thus it is evident that once again Kant projects his own ideas into the Republic in order to develop them and this gives us valuable clues as to how ideas influence one another and grow. Reading the Republic and gaining a 

---

33 E.g. That the work serves merely as ‘a striking example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker’ (A316/B373).

34 This serves as an example of what Kant referred to earlier when he claimed we may understand an author better than he understood himself. Plato does not make this idea of freedom and law explicit in his work, though it is possible for the reader to trace it as intrinsically necessary.

35 “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.” The Universal Principle of Right, Ak 6:231. Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Practical Philosophy, edited and translated by M.J Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
sense of each part enables us to grasp how the necessary idea acts to go beyond the unity and meaning of each part to bestow a higher unity which lies behind (and grounds) the work to regulate the parts as a projected totality. If ideas can swerve (as Lucretius claims the atoms do), they can move, grow, and collide with one another in a manner that displays that even though they may have a predetermined general direction (e.g. guided by the understanding or the general aims of the subject to which they pertain), the possibility of specific freedom and development is maintained (as Plato’s own idea in devising the Republic may have differed from the one Kant posits as necessary behind it). The necessary idea Kant traces behind the Republic provides clear evidence that he swerves Plato’s work to gain the momentum to develop his own philosophy of right and to develop his account of ideas in a manner that incorporates Plato’s successes and diverges from his failings; this is how we all learn from our predecessors.

If we return to how Plato’s sense of ‘idea’ was problematic: due to its status as archetypal, as a hypostatised abstraction accessed only when our soul is disembodied, and no distinction made between different types of concept or idea. Though our experience prompts recollection of the idea, it is difficult for Plato to secure the reality of ideas as we do not encounter and cannot access them directly. Likewise, if we can only grasp the reality of ideas when our soul is disembodied how can we connect them to sensible reality and show that they play a meaningful role in knowledge formation? Lastly, as Plato has not sufficiently determined the use of the term ‘idea’ it is used to refer to things that have differing degrees of reality, e.g., the form of a perfect chair, a circle, or equality. The ideas of each example relate to sensibility in a different way yet they are all treated the same by Plato. Thus, Kant must secure the relation of ideas to intuition, demonstrate the ground of the idea as
having some ‘reality’, and ensure that the term is used consistently by carefully distinguishing different types of concepts and ideas.

The position of ideas in relation to intuition is demonstrated through the step-ladder, and the reality of ideas can be secured in relation to their realisation through systems. Though we do not and may never encounter instances of e.g. the necessary idea (such as the one Kant traces behind the Republic) in experience, a consistent degree of reality can be secured as it provides an ideal standard through which we regulate our actions and upon which we base judgements about ourselves and others, in this sense it serves as a practical idea. However, in terms of how it lies behind and guides the de-vision\textsuperscript{36} of the Republic as a work; it serves as a necessary, regulative construct of reason that differs from the Platonic forms as it cannot be bound by or realised through any sensible example\textsuperscript{37}. The necessary idea behind the Republic posits a maximum that refers to ‘the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others’ (A316/B373). This maximum cannot be bound in sensible form so how it can be related to intuition? Plato’s forms are recollected as we experience examples (copies or instances) of them in intuition, but an instance of the necessary idea can or may never be given empirically; it is not exemplified in experience and we do not reach it via a process of prompted recollection. Rather, we

\textsuperscript{36} The way in which the work is devised.

\textsuperscript{37} Whilst some of Plato’s forms cannot be bound in a figure e.g. the equal, the idea of the equal is realised by examples (or instances) given in intuition and stands in contrast to the necessary idea e.g. that Kant traces behind Plato’s Republic as the latter does not relate to any single intuition. Some forms discussed by Plato refer to originals (ideas) that can be contained within figures (e.g. the form of a dog, a chair, or a man), these stand in even greater contrast to the idea as necessary and we begin to grasp the problems that arise due to Plato’s failure to distinguish between different types of Form (idea).
must determine the idea as that which lies necessarily behind an organised work (or system)\textsuperscript{38}.

The necessary idea behind the Republic regulates the organisation of the work into a ‘system’ with unity. It regulates the way in which the work is initially devised, it governs how the separate parts relate to one another, and it dictates how they are understood in relation to the work as a whole. Thus, the necessary idea relates to the ground and ends of the work, it thereby constitutes a ‘direct’ realisation of the idea though it does not grant any objective reality\textsuperscript{39}. Kant uses Plato’s Republic to exemplify the way in which an idea regulates a work into a self-contained systematic unity; the individual parts (or Books) relate to one another and to the work as a whole as they are regulated by the necessary idea that lies behind and is realised through the work itself. The idea is thereby realised schematically (directly) in this instance by the system it dictates, governs and regulates as a work of philosophy.

In On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy Kant emphasises the need for ‘work’ in philosophy and is critical of a new tone within the subject which he identifies with Schlosser\textsuperscript{40} and traces back to Plato. This tone arose as a result of Plato’s assumption of an original intellectual intuition of ideas gained in the realm of the forms. Kant links the immediate certainty that is supposedly gained from this to Schlosser’s use of intimation in place of the proper philosophical method of critique.

\textsuperscript{38} Though one may argue that the example referred to concerns the practical realisation of an idea in line with our actions in the domain of freedom, our focus here is on the realisation of the idea through the production of the Republic as a work of philosophy and not with the assessment of actions that seek to attain or fall short of the necessary idea as such.

\textsuperscript{39} ‘Direct’ in the sense in which it is not ‘indirect’ or symbolic.

\textsuperscript{40} J.G. Schlosser (1739-99) was Goethe’s brother in law and a former government worker who became a writer with a florid style, he translated some of Plato’s letters concerning the failed revolution in Syracuse.
Kant understands Schlosser to be claiming that critique is unnecessary and he points out the dangers of failing to attend to a “critique of pure reason” as without it we may use principles and follow laws that are base-less and without ground. Kant is critical of Schlosser’s method as ‘aesthetic’, he argues that an aesthetic methodology can only properly be utilised in philosophy after critique has taken place.

Kant traces Schlosser’s neglectful methodology to a problem with failing to properly contextualise Plato’s sense of ‘idea’ philosophically. For Kant Plato sought to answer the question: How are synthetic propositions a priori possible? Through attending to Kant’s method we know that this exemplifies Kant’s swerving of Plato’s theory of ideas towards his own ends, yet Kant criticises Schlosser for swerving Plato’s mystical deduction of ideas to avoid a method that requires the hard work and commitment of critique. To account for how we can have knowledge of things we have not experienced Plato’s ideas as archetypes are sourced to an original divine understanding and we gained them through an original, intellectual intuition. In Schlosser’s translations of Plato’s letters Kant identifies a tone that exalts the mystical nature of this intellectual intuition and favours a felt or intimated certainty which acts as a substitute for that gained through the hard work of critique. The tone Kant is critical of is characteristic of poetic talent, indulgence and enjoyment in exaltation, Kant claims of the so-called superior ones ‘…they are, like geniuses, already in a position to achieve everything that hard work alone can bring…’

For Kant the danger of philosophising with intuition in this way concerns an affiliation with religious knowledge that is bestowed in the manner of an apotheosis and stands

in contrast to the level and degree of certainty attained through validation that requires hard work and critique.

Kant is critical of the tone within philosophy that asserts a mystical view: that philosophy contains secrets that can be ‘felt’. He distinguishes pathological and moral feelings as, if we are to ascribe a role to feelings and intimation in philosophy and these feelings are pathological we embark upon a mistuning into exaltation and obscure pre-expectation that gives us a mere ‘surrogate of cognition, supernatural communication (mystical illumination), which is then the death of all philosophy’\textsuperscript{42}.

Kant refers to the use of Isis as a figure to show the danger of figural expression as ‘one can make the spectre into whatever one wants’\textsuperscript{43}. Lack of rigorous proof means that one makes recourse to analogies, probabilities and devices of this kind in place of real arguments. He criticises Schlosser’s use of empirical feeling with the aim of making us ‘better’ as, for Kant the use of moral ideas given through practical reason aim at making us more certain, it is the truth which is at stake with an undisciplined method. For Kant, reason’s inner idea of freedom as the foundation for the human will and principles gives us a secret that can only be felt and achieved through work, it is not a feeling that grounds knowledge, but a clear knowledge that acts on moral feeling.

For Kant philosophy requires work and he seeks to distance it from the play associated with art and the philosophy of Schlosser. Philosophy requires work from the subject and to determine and enquire into the essence of a thing, one must first enquire into one’s own faculty of reason. Whether we agree upon the source of the

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 398.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 399.
moral law matters not as it is pure speculation, what matters to Kant is bringing the moral law into clear concepts; this is the task of philosophy. Personifying the law and reason’s moral bidding into e.g. a veiled Isis is a mere aesthetic mode of expression, and such methods can only be useful and permitted after bringing the moral law into clear concepts. We must purify the concepts before we embark on aesthetic expression in order to preserve the rigour of philosophical method. If we chose to enliven our ideas ‘by a sensible, albeit only analogical presentation’ we run the risk of ‘falling into an exalting vision [schwarmensche Vision] which is the death of all philosophy’44.

We need to clarify our principles, we cannot intimate a law, and philosophy cannot utilise feelings in this manner. If it does, Kant claims that this makes philosophy into the voice of an oracle and the danger is, that we will philosophise poetically. Kant is critical of Schlosser’s mistaken swerving of Plato towards his ends in terms of supporting an intellectual intuition that does not require critique, but how can Kant justify his own use of swerving when he is so critical of Schlosser? Kant claims that Schlosser’s Plato is based on misunderstanding due to a projection of his (Schlosser’s) own ‘superior tone’ which Plato himself did not possess nor wanted to incorporate into metaphysics. He sources this tone to Schlosser’s desire to avoid the hard work of critique and claims he embarked upon a mistaken reading that resulted in a swerving of Plato’s work in the ‘wrong’ direction45. The difference between them is that Kant employs the method of critique and this forms the basis on which he can

___________________________

44 Ibid., p. 405.

45 As we can see from the start of this section, Schlosser chose to adopt Plato’s exaggerated modes of expression that Kant wished to avoid in favour of imitating and incorporating his architectonic order of the world according to ends.
utilise his (and Plato’s) method with a high degree of certainty and clarity. Schlosser’s method is ‘aesthetic’ and based on intellectual intuition or intimation, a mere ‘felt’ certainty. For Kant this grants the latter a lower degree of certainty and this is the source of Schlosser’s mistaken swerving of Plato towards ends the latter would not have desired. From this we can conclude that the guideline for swerving the work of another if it is to be done ‘correctly’ or with merit is intrinsically connected to the method of critique, to hard work, and must be done with the end or aim of certainty as truth.

In summary, this chapter has established that Kant understands the nature of reason as systematic and this is mirrored in the external nature it seeks to investigate. The position of ideas in relation to sensibility and the understanding is secured, and it is communicated using a type of figure that challenges the aforementioned understanding of reason and suggests its designation as systematic is not comprehensive. This discrepancy reveals a conflict between philosophy and art that can be traced as present in Plato’s work on the communication of ideas, though Kant explicitly seeks to avoid it. We have learnt the importance of tone when swerving the work of one’s predecessors towards new ends; it must be done correctly and an aesthetic methodology should only be utilised only after the hard work of critique, and intimation is not a valid criterion of truth. Chapter two will discuss the figural movement of regulation in more detail; it will present further examples of regulative figures, and will demonstrate how reason is at its most aesthetic at the very height of its operations in relation to theoretical ideals.
Chapter 2. The Figural Movement of Regulation

Chapter two will be split into three sections; the first will establish Kant’s distinction between regulative and constitutive in relation to principles and ideas, the second will analyse the movement of regulation with reference to examples of architectonic figures, and the third will introduce reason’s capacity to personify ideas in ideal figures. It is necessary to begin by distinguishing regulative from constitutive principles of the understanding to set this use of the terms apart from their use in reference to ideas of pure reason. This will enable us to clarify the use of ‘regulative’ to provide a comprehensive account of this movement in relation to the operations of reason. In 2.2 the regulative movement of reason is demonstrated with reference to examples of figures that reveal reason as possessing artistic capacity to construct systems. This capacity is not contained within the systems it creates and it is only by attending to examples that it can be made explicit. I will argue that the schematic presentation of ideas through regulative figures is distinct from singular, mathematical constructions (as suggested in 1.2), and representation by symbols or aesthetic ideas (to be discussed in Chapter’s 7 and 8).

In 2.3 I will elaborate further on the creative capacity of reason through analysis of its generation of ideal figures as personifications. These figures exemplify a regulative capacity that differs from the one outlined in 2.2 as ideal figures have a complex relation to realisation which conditions the possibility of systematic realisation. This clearly demonstrates that the artistic operations of reason do not just exceed its designation as systematic, they form an integral part of its nature and without this artistic capacity to generate ideal figures (in particular the
Transcendental Ideal), no systematic knowledge or schematic exhibition of theoretical ideas would be possible. Through the ideal figure of reason we witness a crossing of the divisions outlined in the step ladder, and a complex return to the idea as archetype (which Kant sought to distance himself from in diverging from Plato).

2.1 Regulative and Constitutive

This section will clarify Kant’s distinction between regulative and constitutive in the First Critique to enable a clear understanding of the regulative movement of reason. Kant refers to this distinction in relation to principles of the understanding in the Transcendental Analytic, and in relation to ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Consequently, we are presented with two senses of ‘constitutive’ and two senses of ‘regulative’; this section will present the differences between the two accounts and establish how they relate to one another. The objective is to clarify the movement of regulation (to assist with the discussion of regulative figures in 2.2.) so that we may further our understanding of pure reason itself. I will question the validity of Kant’s distinction between ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ with reference to secondary literature and will conclude with a brief analysis of three movements of regulation: extension, expansion and exhibition.

Let us begin with the use of ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ in the Transcendental Analytic in reference to the principles of the understanding. The term ‘principle’ comes from the Aristotelian word Arche and has a dual meaning: in an ontological sense a principle is the first ground of something, in an epistemological sense it is the reason for something. The reason for something is often connected to its ground and, therefore, the word ‘principle’ refers to the being of something and how this
being is known\textsuperscript{46}. In the In the \textit{Analytic of Principles} in the \textit{Transcendental Analytic}
Kant states that constitutive principles are concerned with the possibility of appearances, their determination, and their existence (cf. A178-9/B221-2). Regulative principles offer rules ‘according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception’ (A180/B223). Constitutive principles refer to the being or \textit{existence} of appearances, which they seek to bring under \textit{a priori} rules, and regulative principles are intrinsically tied to the bestowal of \textit{unity} as a means of organising appearances in order for them to become known.

The term ‘constitutive’ is applied to mathematical principles (the \textit{Axioms of Intuition} and the \textit{Anticipations of Perception}); these are constitutive as they justify the application of mathematics to appearances in order to e.g. determine a magnitude. Constitutive principles concern how appearances come about; how intuition is \textit{constructed} in a spatiotemporal sense and how perceptions are anticipated or preconceived to possess reality. They are termed ‘constitutive’ as they refer to the constitution of appearances in two main ways: firstly, we construct an axiomatic procedure for the quantification of numerical magnitudes so that we may determine what objects \textit{are} with immediate, intuitive certainty through the ‘successive synthesis of the productive imagination’ (A162/B203). Secondly, we postulate a degree of reality that arises from an instantaneous synthesis generated in the act of apprehension so that we can perceive appearances and empirical qualities in sensations (c.f. A167/B209), in this respect our perceptions are pre-constructed.

The dynamical principles (the *Analogies of Experience* and the *Postulates of Empirical Thought*) are ‘regulative’ as they concern rules by which experience can be unified according to the temporal relations between existences given to us in appearance. Regulative principles offer rules so that a unity of experience can arise from our perceptions and the categories can be employed objectively. In this sense (which is not constructive) they condition the possibility of unified experience and of knowledge of objects of experience. In contrast to the intuitive nature of constitutive principles the analogies are discursive as they apply to relations of existences (objects) and the necessary temporal connections between appearances. The *Analogies* condition the possibility of experience, and the *Postulates of Empirical Thought* determine the relation of the subject to its experiences as knowledge.

Constitutive principles are related to intuition as they constitute our experience, regulative principles are discursive and provide rules for relating objects so that experience is unified. Constitutive principles participate in construction; they are intrinsically connected to space and time and affiliated with mathematics. It is generally held that regulative principles do not participate in construction, in his paper *Regulative Principles and Regulative Ideas* Gary Banham states:

The principles of the Axioms and Anticipations are here characterised as including a mathematical synthesis which involves numerical magnitudes and it is due to this that Kant terms them "constitutive" principles as with them it is possible to construct a procedure for quantification. Regulative principles, by contrast, offer no such procedure, they refer in no sense to magnitudes and cannot thus be connected to a construction.\(^{47}\)

---

This is supported in the text as Kant claims that we cannot bring the existence of appearances under rules *a priori*: ‘For since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can apply only to the relations of existence and yield only *regulative* principles’ (A179/B222).

Our discussion of the step ladder in 1.2 brought to light the problem of how regulative figures as architectonic presentations are constructed? We know that they are not constructed in an intuitive or singular manner that is comparable with mathematical figures as their possibility is not acknowledged within Kant’s account of construction as related to mathematical procedure. We also know that regulative principles cannot participate in construction as outlined above. If the production of such figures is sourced to the art of reason (as Kant claims) then the regulative use of ideas should be able to account for their possibility and architectonic construction. Consequently, Kant’s sense of ‘regulative’ in respect to ideas must differ from its use in regard to principles of the understanding if the former is capable of the non-intuitive construction of figures.

When Kant uses ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ in reference to ideas in the *Appendix* to the *Transcendental Dialectic* ‘regulative’ refers to the way in which reason orders concepts of the understanding to bring them into unity (with a view to totality), and ‘constitutive’ is used only negatively - we are warned that to treat these organisational ideas as if they are constitutive of real objects is to misemploy them. Ideas have regulative use as they bring order to concepts of the understanding; they enable the greatest unity that these concepts can approximate to and grant a totality (which has no objective reality).
‘Constitutive’ is used in reference to what happens when regulative ideas are applied as if they supplied concepts of real objects (A644/B672). We have already discussed the illegitimate nature of regulative ideas such as God, World, and Soul when used constitutively, however, as regulative these ideas can direct the understanding towards a goal which secures its greatest extension. It is only when regulative ideas are misemployed (as if they were constitutive) that they present a threat to our desire for a disciplined use of pure reason, in their regulative capacity these ideas serve as maxims to guide our understanding towards a totality demanded and sought by reason. For Kant the regulative employment of ideas is distinct from construction in relation to intuition as reason is never in immediate relation to an object, only to the understanding:

It does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only orders them, and gives them that unity which they can have only if they be employed in their widest possible application, that is, with a view to obtaining totality in the various series’ (A643/671).48

In relation to ideas, regulative principles are organisational. The Cosmological Ideas are regulative as they concern the organisation of appearances into a totality (e.g. a ‘world’) which the understanding itself has no concept of. This totality should not be thought of as an ‘object’, it is a problem (faced by the understanding) that requires a solution which is provided by the dialectical capacity of reason to extend beyond its legitimate scope. The principle of reason which regresses the conditioned (given) to the unconditioned (which is not and cannot be given) is a regulative rule postulating what we ought to do. Transcendental ideas have no constitutive employment, but nonetheless they have ‘an excellent and indispensably necessary

48 Kant does not want to attribute creative power to ideas as one of the criticisms made of Plato’s idea as archetype was that the originals were sourced to a divine intellect as creator.
regulative employment’ (A644/B672). Regulative ideas direct the understanding towards a goal where ‘the routes marked out by its rules converge’, this point of intersection lies outside the boundaries of possible experience and refers not to a real object, but to a necessary illusion (A644/B672).\(^{49}\)

The hypothetical employment of reason in which ideas are treated as problematic concepts (as they have no ‘objects’) is ‘regulative’ as it aims to bring unity to our knowledge and it approximates a rule to universality. The unity possessed by this employment of reason is a *projected* unity that assists us with the discovery of principles for the understanding as it directs and secures its correct employment. In the *Transcendental Analytic* the dynamical principles of the understanding are regulative principles of intuition and the mathematical ones are constitutive. However, Kant states in the *Appendix*:

None the less, these dynamical laws are *constitutive in respect of experience*, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible a priori (A664/B692 my italics).

This implies that, although regulative principles of the understanding are *not* ‘constitutive’ in that they do not participate in the construction of our experience or objects of experience, they nonetheless are ‘constitutive’ in that they constitute experience; they enable us to have unified experience and condition the possibility of this.

Kant goes on to say that principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in regard to empirical concepts as ‘no schema of sensibility’ corresponding to them can ever be given and they can never have an object *in concreto* (A664/B692). In

\(^{49}\) We will discuss this further in relation to the *focus imaginarius* in 2.2.
intuition we cannot find a schema e.g. of the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding. However, Kant claims that an ‘analogon’ of such a schema must allow of being given. The analogon is the idea of a maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle, it is possible and allows of being given, as what is greatest and absolutely complete can be determinately thought. It is bound (by its completion) and does not possess the infinite possibilities ascribed to an indeterminate (or undetermined) manifold.

An idea of reason may serve as an analogue to a schema of sensibility with one specific difference; the application of a concept of the understanding to the ‘schema’ of reason does not yield knowledge as cognition of an object, rather, it yields a rule or principle ‘for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding’ (A665/B693). Principles of pure reason thereby possess a degree of objective reality as ‘every principle that prescribes a priori to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds although only indirectly, of the object of experience’ (A665/B693). These principles have objective reality not to determine anything in the object, rather, to indicate a procedure that brings the empirical and determinate use of the understanding into a harmony. Kant states that all subjective principles derived from the interest of reason in securing legitimate knowledge of objects are maxims of reason. When regulative principles are treated as constitutive and employed as objective a conflict results, but this can be avoided if they are treated as maxims.

Regulative and constitutive principles of the understanding both concern rules; constitutive principles use a priori rules and regulative principles offer rules by which


51 A maxim is a subjective principle that stands in contrast to e.g. an objective law.
experience can be unified\textsuperscript{52}. The understanding is the faculty of rules, it applies them to unify the manifold in intuition and therefore it is the source of principles according to which objects given to us must conform. The understanding follows procedural rules for uniting the manifold and provides the conditions for this unification; it secures the unity of appearances via rules and is complemented by reason which secures the unity of the rules of the understanding under principles. Each method of securing unity is different. The understanding secures unity using a rule that is ‘constitutive’ as it establishes the conditions both of objects of experience, and of experience itself. For reason the rule is ‘regulative’ as it does not concern the possibility of experience and the empirical knowledge of objects, rather it allows us to extend our concept of the sensible world beyond all possible experience and empirical limits.

In his paper *Is the Assumption of a Systematic Whole of Empirical Concepts a Necessary Condition of Knowledge?* Ido Geiger argues that regulative rules do concern the possibility of experience and adopts a transcendental interpretation of the *Appendix* to the *Transcendental Dialectic*\textsuperscript{53}. Upon this reading empirical concepts can have no meaning and we can have no criterion of truth for them unless we recognise that the systematic whole of knowledge must be presupposed, and not merely as a regulative and unachievable ideal that represents a hierarchical system of all empirical concepts to serve a heuristic or methodological role. Rather, for Geiger the systematic whole of knowledge is a necessary condition for the

\begin{quote}
A rule is a judgement that unites given representations; it is both a condition of unity and a procedure for unification.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
possession of any empirical knowledge and regulative rules concern the possibility of experience as they make it meaningful. One empirical concept indicates and therefore presents the regulative idea of a system of empirical concepts. This, for Geiger is a condition of the meaningfulness of any empirical concept and provides a criterion for empirical truth; without the regulative idea we possess neither.

This reading of the *Appendix* is controversial and Geiger strives to show with reference to textual evidence why a minimal or heuristic (methodological) interpretation proves insufficient; as its designation of a system of empirical concepts comprised *after* some knowledge is obtained reinforces classical empiricism (in asserting that the world is given to us merely sensibly). Geiger’s challenge is in line with Kant’s assertion that experience is conceptual and that the regulative idea of a systematic whole of empirical concepts is a transcendental condition of the possibility of empirical knowledge itself, and not merely a heuristic ideal. This shows that regulative ideas (along with regulative principles of the understanding) are constitutive of experience as without them, meaningful experience and knowledge (as the correspondence of concepts with intuitions) would not be possible.

This is a significant claim, not merely because it serves to cloud (or even dissolve) the distinction between regulative and constitutive in regard to the possibility of experience, it indicates a greater role for regulative ideas and the creative, projecting activity they engage in. This is important in relation to our question concerning the art of creating systems, and it shows that the creative capacity of reason potentially has a much larger role in knowledge formation. It therefore also grants greater validity to the concern that this capacity it is not taken into account in the designation of reason as merely systematic.
Could this redefinition of the regulative capacity of reason account for its ability to construct regulative figures? In order to answer this question we need to analyse examples of such figures, but first it is necessary to draw out some observations concerning the movement of regulation. There are three important functions performed, which reveal three important capabilities in respect to the regulative capacity of reason; extension, expansion and exhibition. I will focus on these movements in relation to the schematic presentation of theoretical ideas, as the expansion and exhibition of ideas through symbolisation will be discussed in Chapter 7 and the aesthetic expansion and exhibition of concepts in Chapter 8.

An idea can strive towards a maximum by revealing its scope and extent, it can be exhibited through a system, and this enables it to become expanded (by the possibility of its realisation) into a totality. In its regulative capacity an idea works on what is given to show its extent, to determine it with reference to a standard, or to enable it to be contextualised as part of (within) a system. Extending an idea to its determinate limit enables us to gain a maximum, exhibiting an idea through its presentation as a system enables realisation and the expansion of an idea into a totality requires both movements.

Let us consider an example, Kant refers to pure air, pure earth and pure water which are nowhere to be found, yet these ideas are necessarily required and exist in reason to regulate our investigations of nature (cf. A646/B674). A maximum is gained through extension and this enables two movements: ascent and descent. One may either ascend from what is given up to the pure idea, or descend from the pure idea down to determine the given. Reason can ascend from the given air, earth or water (which will be mixed and impure) and the extension of the given enables us to gain a maximum (the idea of a pure air, earth or water). Likewise, from the pure
idea of air/earth/water reason can descend to the given in order to judge intuitions using a standard that has never and need never be given itself. Pure ideas are present in what is given as they serve as necessary, ideal standards that enable us to make determinate judgements about it. However, these ideas are never given themselves (as the unconditioned can never be met with in the series of conditions), they are present as standards and possess a possibility for realisation (though this may never and need never be achieved).

The ideal standard gained by extending what is given (in terms of its purity) can also be used to exhibit the ideas of pure air/earth/water through their presentation in a system. The system sets out the position of the given in context with other options (and will need to differentiate parts in a hierarchy according to the idea of purity), through this system the idea can become realised schematically without the need for transposition. Though no objective reality is granted, a connection to intuition and given examples (which could even be drawn diagrammatically) ensures that the idea is shown to be more than a mere abstraction and its regulative function secures its reality.

A system is a schematic totality which can exhibit an idea; the idea extends throughout the parts and becomes expanded by its own presentation (as it granted a quality previously denied to it by its indemonstrable status. Extension is direct as the idea is always present in some degree in what is given and judged with reference to it, exhibition is direct (schematic) as the idea is not represented by anything else. Exhibiting the idea secures its reality and limits its scope, in turn this expands the idea beyond abstractions, thus, to exhibit an idea directly through a system or figure subsequently enables expansion of the idea into a realised totality.
So far we have considered three different possibilities within reason’s regulative employment. The first concerns the possibility of extending the given to gain an ideal standard, the second concerns the possibility of judging the given according to its position in a hierarchy (or system) that exhibits an idea in itself. The third concerns an expansion of the idea which is granted as it becomes realised and can demonstrate a connection to given objects in sensible intuition.

The regulative employment of reason can be understood as referring to the use of the idea as a standard or maximum to regulate our judgement of given particulars in line with universals. It may also be considered as that which contextualises the given within a system which both demonstrates the scope of the idea and presents its possibility for realisation. Finally, the regulative employment of reason enables an idea to be restricted in its scope and to become expanded into a totality; in line with which given intuitions are worked on, regulated and organised.

The ascent and descent of reason involved in demonstrating the extent of an idea (and used to judge given examples) are movements that take place within a hierarchical system which mirrors or reflects the structure of the step ladder. A system is organised so that one can move from the given up to the unconditioned (in search of the pure idea) or one can descend from the pure idea in order to judge the given intuition. This is the hierarchical movement of regulation which takes place within an architectonic totality to realise an idea directly, whilst maintaining its indemonstrable status.

In summary, constitutive principles and ideas are so called because they constitute and construct our experience in accordance with a priori rules. Regulative principles grant unity to experience and given objects but are not constructive. As we
are concerned with how to account for the possibility of regulative figures, we need to know whether the art of creating such figures can be sourced to regulative ideas. We have found that these ideas serve as analogues to a schema of sensibility and Geiger argues that regulative principles are constitutive. Therefore they could be the source of the art of creating regulative figures and systems. If Geiger is correct the creative capacity of reason is to be granted a much greater role than previously thought and this adds weight to my claims that there is a significant creative capacity within the nature of reason which is not taken in to account in our understanding of it as merely systematic. We will contemplate the source, significance, and art of creating regulative figures further in 2.2.

2.2 Regulative Figures

This section will analyse the movement of regulation with reference to examples of architectonic presentations used by Kant in the First Critique. The aim is to show how the regulative movement of reason is communicated with reference to key figures that reveal a creative capacity of reason to construct systems in order to exhibit ideas. Attending to examples of these figures enables us to analyse the schematic presentation of ideas, and to show that they are distinct from singular mathematical constructions and representations enabled e.g. by symbols.\(^{54}\)

This section will begin with a brief re-examination of the step ladder to reinforce its status as an exemplary regulative figure. It presents Kant’s idea of a system of ideas, \(^{54}\) I will refer to a ‘direct’ exhibition that does not involve any transposition as a ‘presentation’, and an ‘indirect’ exhibition as a ‘representation’.
concepts and intuitions and this idea recurs throughout the *First Critique*. The hierarchy presented in the step ladder can be traced in other regulative figures used by Kant to communicate the employment of reason in relation to: rules of the understanding, sensibility, real things, nature and speculative ideas. This section will consider the status of these examples as figures, it will illustrate their methodological significance and draw out their relation to the step ladder.

The key figures to be discussed alongside the step ladder are: the *focus imaginarius* which presents the regulative operation of reason in relation to the rules of the understanding, the *system of logical principles* used to present the operation of reason as analogous to the systematic organisation of nature into genus and species, the *analogon* that enables an idea to be thought determinately, and *speculative ideas as analoga of real things*\textsuperscript{55}. Analogy plays a key role in the figural, schematic presentation (and realisation) of ideas and it is necessary to clarify this so that we may set it apart from the use of analogy in symbolic (indirect) exhibition in the *Third Critique*.

This section will raise and contemplate questions such as: why does the communication of ideas require recourse to a figure? Why are the examples to be considered as figures? When do they become figural? Can we express ideas and the regulative movement of reason any other way, and what is the role of reason as artistic?

\textsuperscript{55} The schematic realisation of ideas using a *monogram* (sketch or outline) of reason is another key regulative figure but this will be discussed fully in 3.1 and 3.2.
The Step Ladder

The step ladder is an exemplary *regulative figure* that underlies all the others. It presents the systematic relation between ideas, concepts, and intuitions in a hierarchical structure that regulates the possibility for movement in terms of either an ascent to ideas as unconditioned or a descent to intuition to determine the given. Kant’s description of the arrangement of this system as a ‘step ladder’ arouses a diagrammatic image and exemplifies a creative capacity of reason which comes into play as an idea is communicated. This capacity is not accounted for within the characterisation of reason as systematic or Kant’s account of construction as mathematical and concerned with intuition. The step ladder is, therefore, a figure constructed by reason that presents the position of ideas in general and enables understanding of the regulative movement of reason as it extends, expands and exhibits specific ideas. Previous analysis has already established that Kant does not explicitly address how or why this figure is constructed and I have argued that its construction impacts upon how we understand the nature and unity of reason.

The step ladder communicates a hierarchy of ideas, concepts and intuitions and illustrates the position of the idea as indemonstrable in relation to intuition. The hierarchy has the unity of a system and its presentation in the mind is partially pictorial (diagrammatic), it serves as a non-intuitive figure that informs and supplements our understanding of the three-fold relation between reason, understanding and sensibility. This figure has exemplary status as it recurs; its presence and influence can be traced in all Kant’s attempts to communicate the regulative function and operation of reason in relation to principles and ideas. The communication of ideas necessarily involves an understanding of their position and
relation to intuition, both of which are presented in the step ladder. Though this figure need never be presented as a diagram itself, its hierarchical organisation (and ladder-like structure) involves a projected analogy that is constructed architectonically\textsuperscript{56}.

As an example the step ladder has a peculiar and unique status. It specifically concerns how a system is governed by fixing and regulating divisions so that we may read the relations between them. It exceeds the status of an ordinary example that gives us a general way of understanding something e.g. a dog, by exemplifying how a concept is applied to an intuition so that we may go on to determine other things in the same way e.g. a cat. This figure cannot be generalised in the same way as it communicates and exemplifies something more fundamental and specific (even though it has great application to all systems and to the workings of all minds). It is an exemplary example as nothing else can serve in its place to exemplify what it exemplifies. In this sense it is uniquely specific and cannot be generalised (as most examples need to be); the structure of this figure is cardinal of the system and the way that it is organised. It does not merely exhibit an idea; it contains within it the position of ideas themselves and exemplifies its own possibility for realisation. Nothing can be substituted for what is exemplified through this figure or fulfil the status it possesses; it perfectly shows how the art of constructing systems exceeds the system itself and any description it can give.

\textsuperscript{56} The analogy with a ladder is a projection as the step ladder is not ‘real’ but transcendental. This is \textit{direct} as it does not involve a transposition of the idea (of the organisation of the faculties) into an analogous determinate object, it involves an ideal presentation of the idea itself with reference to a construction that correlates with and presents it \textit{directly}.
As an example the step ladder is specific (as nothing else can serve in its place to exemplify what it exemplifies regarding the position of the idea and the systematic organisation of the faculties), however, it lends itself to presentation within other regulative figures. Let us proceed to analyse some architectonic presentations from the First Critique to draw out their figural status, their regulative function, and their connection to the step ladder in more detail.

The Focus Imaginarius

In The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason Kant describes how human reason seeks to transgress the limits of experience. He claims that transcendental ideas are just as natural to reason as the categories are to the understanding, the difference is, that while the categories lead to truth (in terms of the conformity of a concept with an object) transcendental ideas produce an irresistible illusion. This illusion can be thought negatively (as ideas should not be employed constitutively as if they referred to 'real' objects), or in a positive sense (as that which projects a goal to bring unity and guidance to the laws of the understanding). Reason does not have an immediate relation to objects, it treats the understanding as its object, and it does not create concepts of objects, rather, it grants order and unity with a view to totality that is inaccessible to the understanding, to ensure its effective application:

Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity (A644/B672).
For Kant, transcendental ideas serve a regulative function by directing the understanding towards a specific goal ‘upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge’ at a point of intersection, this point is a mere idea which Kant terms a ‘focus imaginarius’ (A644/B672). It is necessary to consider how this idea can be defined in relation to the functions it performs and how it relates to the step ladder as a figure. The objective is to ascertain what this figure tells us about Kant’s communication of ideas, his use of analogy, and the nature of reason itself.

The imaginary point concerns an ideal location that is communicated by a figural presentation; though it lies beyond the bounds of experience Kant communicates it by naming and concretising it. Presenting the idea as a focus imaginarius is intended to show how reason gives ‘the greatest possible unity and extension’ to the laws of the understanding (A644/B672). The concepts of the understanding proceed towards and comprise this point, but without the guidance of reason, they could not even aspire to it. By naming and describing this point Kant exhibits it, arousing a corresponding diagram of a point of intersection in the mind of the reader. The point becomes realised schematically (directly) as Kant communicates how reason regulates the operation of the understanding with reference to an imaginary point that reinforces the hierarchy of the step ladder.

A diagrammatic figure is aroused in the mind of the reader as Kant communicates the point at which the rules of the understanding unite into a totality (idea). As a result the idea becomes exhibited (though not in objective reality); it gains a possibility for realisation as it can be presented in a figure. The figure itself need

57 That is, it does not involve a transposition of the idea from itself into something else, only from its ideal to a partially realised (or realisable) status.
never be actualised, it is enough for the idea to possess this as a possibility. Through the figure the idea can be ‘seen’ in the mind, we could sketch it, it is demonstrated to have reality as a connection to intuition is secured (with reference to the hierarchy set out the in step ladder).

As a figure this point of intersection presents the regulative function ideas perform as they direct the understanding towards a projected goal. The goal may be illusory, but it performs an indispensable and necessary regulative function, and the figure supplements determinate explanation to present the transcendental sphere of reason with the direct certainty of vision. Michelle Grier describes how reason is revealed as ‘an essentially projecting activity’ as its illusory status enables it to unify and legislate to laws of the understanding by directing them beyond the scope of given experience. She states:

That Kant takes the legislating and projecting activity of reason to be intimately linked up with its illusory nature is evidenced by his simultaneous endorsement of the ideas and his characterisation of them as imaginary focal points.

For Grier Kant’s characterisation of the ideas as ‘imaginary’ has the potential to render them abstract and displays a negative contrast to their ability to project and organise. However, Kant’s description of the idea as a focus imaginarius serves to assist him in the communication, and thereby also, the realisation of ideas with respect to their relation to the understanding.


59 Ibid., p. 279.
Kant communicates the function of the *focus imaginarius* using two types of analogy; a projected schematic analogy, and a realised symbolic analogy. The former enables architectonic *presentation* of the illusory point by transforming it from ideal to real via a diagrammatic construction. The latter supplements the realisation achieved by the former with an additional *representation* by analogy with a determinate object (a mirror).

Constructing, presenting and naming an imaginary point arouses a figure in the mind of the reader that is not created by the imagination. It serves a necessary role by communicating an insight into the capacity of the understanding and presenting the ability, function, operations, and nature of reason. The architectonic presentation of this imaginary point uses a projected analogy in conjunction with an architectonic outline (schema) to present how reason can extend the understanding beyond its sphere. As a result we ‘see’ the movement, capacity and effect of reason in a constructed figure that is not sensible or intuitive. As a figure the *focus imaginarius* enables us to ‘see’ the logical progression of ideas beyond the sphere of understanding, and how reason grants unity. These operations cannot be given in sensible intuition and the imaginary point cannot be objectively realised, however, the use of a non-intuitive figure to present the illusory point and the regulative function it performs enhances our understanding of the operation of reason.

The necessity of this architectonic creation is further illustrated by a symbolic analogy (with a mirror) and the resulting effect is a *double-consolidation* of the function performed and enabled by the *focus imaginarius*. The projected analogy becomes reinforced by an imaginative representation that differs from the former as it utilises a symbolic transposition. What is added to the architectonic presentation by the imaginative representation is a supplementation and subsequent expansion. The
direct, analogical projection is expanded (aesthetically) by the transposed analogy and this assists Kant with his communication of the function of ideas; it brings clarity and amplifies the presentation of this otherwise indemonstrable procedure.

Just as a mirror enables us to exceed our regular sphere of vision and see objects e.g. that lie behind our back, the *focus imaginarius* allows Kant to present a procedure that exceeds the realm of direct or even mediate experience. It uses a figure to communicate the greatest possible extension of the understanding as necessarily comprising a point of intersection where its rules converge to reveal a higher unity. Just as a mirror is necessary if 'besides the objects which lie before our eyes, we are also able to see those which lie at a distance behind our back' (A645/B673), the *focus imaginarius* is necessary if reason is to aspire beyond the spheres of the understanding and sensibility. The mirror analogy presents the negative and positive capacities of illusion; though we know not whether ideas are present (like the reflected objects in a mirror) and we must guard against their illegitimate (constitutive) use, they serve to extend our sphere of knowledge (as the mirror extends our sphere of vision) so we can transcend the limits of our finite perspective.

The *focus imaginarius* offers an alternative diagrammatic presentation of the hierarchy presented by the step ladder. Its objective is not merely to establish a system of our representations, its specific aim to show how reason relates to the understanding by granting it unity via regulative operations that secure its extension and set it within limits. It comprises a mere *part* of the step ladder as it presents the relation between concepts of understanding and ideas, yet it reinforces Kant’s system (of ideas, concepts, and intuitions) and forms its own self-contained totality (as it presents the idea of how reason grants higher unity to the laws of the
understanding). The schematic construct is transposed into a familiar procedure concerning a directly demonstrable mode of extension (i.e. extending our sphere of vision through the use of a mirror). The architectonic presentation therefore becomes directly demonstrable by analogy with the use of a mirror and can be indirectly realised in sensible intuition. What was merely a projected analogy (which need never be realised in order to function to its maximum potential) becomes transposed by analogy with a directly demonstrable object. The idea gains a capacity to be realised in objective reality, but this is indirect and it cannot be presented as it is itself. The *focus imaginarius* is a diagrammatic, illusory figure that communicates what would otherwise be incommunicable and re-affirms the divisions outlined in the step ladder. It supplements and builds upon the diagrammatic figure of the step ladder to reinforce Kant's system using a schematic presentation and a symbolic representation.

The *focus imaginarius* communicates the relationship between reason and the understanding and illustrates the function of ideas. It is problematic to present these directly as ideas are indemonstrable and the imaginary point of intersection does not 'exist' materially. However, this operation can be concretised in a figure which enables Kant to communicate it with clarity and the imaginary point is thereby granted intelligible existence. It is necessary to illustrate how the ideas of reason can regulate the employment of the understanding to prove that our ideas are not empty abstractions. Ideas can therefore be exhibited through presentation of their position in a system (as Kant does using the step ladder) and in relation to their operation in regard to the understanding (as he does with the *focus imaginarius*). Both diagrammatic figures are architectonic presentations which utilise a projected analogy to enable ideas to be exhibited. Through such figures Kant can
communicate ideas (which would otherwise be problematic due to their indemonstrable status) by presenting them directly (schematically) using figures that exemplify the art of creating systems.

The System of Logical Principles

Systematic unity is presupposed by reason as it can be found and traced in nature; special natural laws fall under more general laws and for Kant this is not an ‘economical requirement of reason, but a law of nature’ (A560/B678). Reason and nature complement and reflect one another, for Kant this aids the exhibition of reason’s systematic unity and adds truth and necessity to its laws. The organisation of nature corresponds to the systems of reason as both can be thought using the same logical principles; homogeneity, specification (variety), and continuity of forms (affinity). The way in which reason operates is therefore consistent with nature and this provides us with an empirical criterion of truth as we presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary (A651/B680).

The logical law of genera and other universal concepts exists as we look for a ‘hidden identity’ amongst objects given in intuition. This law presupposes a transcendentental principle of homogeneity that enables empirical concepts to be possible. The understanding must attend to both genera (identity) and species (diversity) and reason is thereby revealed to possess a two-fold self-conflicting interest (in seeking to identify similarities and establish differences). These two interests of reason foster two different perspectives and aim at two different conclusions; homogeneity guides those who seek unity (and descend from the pure idea to the manifold), specification enables differentiation (as we ascend from the
given up to the genus). These two approaches reflect the possibility for ascent or descent outlined by the step ladder, the descent secures the extension of an idea, the ascent an extension of the given, however, it is through the conjunction of both and the affinity between them that ideas are secured and presented as systems.

The logical law of specification rests on a transcendental law that leads us beyond what can be given sensibly as reason guides the understanding so that it may search for differences. Kant states that it is only under the assumption of differences in nature and the condition that its objects exhibit homogeneity, that we can have a faculty of understanding: “For the diversity of that which is comprehended under a concept is precisely what gives occasion for the employment of that concept and the exercise of the understanding’ (A657/B686). The understanding can only gain knowledge through higher and lower concepts, never directly through mere intuitions. Reason prepares the field for the understanding: firstly; through the principle of homogeneity of the manifold under genera, secondly; through the principle of a variety of the homogeneous under lower species, and thirdly - to complete systematic unity - a law of the affinity of all concepts. These are the necessary principles for a system and refer to the manner in which nature is necessarily approached and interrogated by reason.

Kant presents the system of logical principles architectonically in a manner that arouses a diagrammatic image in the mind using the same method we encountered in the focus imaginarius and the step ladder:

The systematic unity, prescribed by the three logical principles, can be illustrated in the following manner. Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. This horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which has its own
narrower horizon; that is, every species contains subspecies according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclusively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of points which possess no extent (individuals). But for different horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to which, as from a common centre, they can all be surveyed; and from this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness – genera, species and subspecies (A659/B687).

Kant seeks to demonstrate how the three logical principles are connected and presents them in a manner akin to the systematic presentation of ideas, concepts and intuitions outlined in the step ladder. The method of presentation is similar as both concern architectonic, diagrammatic figures which are constructed by reason to demonstrate a possibility for movement in terms of an ascent and a descent. However, there are also differences. Both are hierarchical organisations, but the system of logical principles intentionally reflects the relation between genus, species and subspecies in natural science. The genus is positioned as the highest point as its scope extends the furthest and it is illustrated in terms of a point with the most extensive horizon. Species lie within the horizon of the genus and their scope extends in a manner that is smaller than the genus but extends beyond that of the subspecies. The subspecies lie below the species (within its horizon) and open up smaller horizons all of which are contained within the horizon of the genus.

We could draw the systematic relation between genus, species and subspecies in a diagram and it is by arousing a diagrammatic figure in the mind of the reader that Kant succeeds in communicating the idea the idea of this system and presenting it directly; enabling us to ‘see’ its structure and organisation. Architectonic art grants reality as the idea becomes realised as a system in the mind. Kant provides us with an explanation of this system (which by itself is an arguably abstract notion) and we
are presented with an accompanying figure. Through this figure the relation between the logical principles is outlined, realised and exhibited, enabling us to ‘see’ organisationally how the genus contains the species, and how the species contains the sub-species within it.

The diagrammatic figure illustrates how we are carried to the highest stand-point through the law of homogeneity, to the lowest through the law of specification, and how there are no different, original, first genera which are isolated from each other through the law of continuity of forms. It serves as an example of architectonic art as the idea of the system of logical principles is consolidated into a hierarchical structure which becomes figural as it is communicated to a reader. The extent of the idea is shown through the hierarchy of genus as highest and sub-species as lowest, and through the differing scope of horizons at each point. Recognition of the transcendental law on which the logical law is based, not only expands the idea of the logical principles as a system, it helps us to contextualise the principles in terms of their relation to one another.

Kant presents the system of logical principles using an architectonic method that secures its reality through its possibility to be presented as a diagrammatic figure. The system is not realised in sensible intuition as, like the focus imaginarius its unity is a mere projected unity and to retain its status as an idea it cannot be directly demonstrated in objective reality. As the organisation of the principles within this system are intrinsically related to the manner in which we interrogate nature, a

---

60 The logical principle of systematic unity (that we should find for the conditioned the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion) presupposes a transcendental principle (that as the conditioned is given the whole series of conditions is likewise given) and this is the basis on which we organise nature into a system.
symbolic transposition of the idea into a natural image would be possible e.g. the genus could be presented as the trunk of a tree, the species as the branches and the subspecies as the leaves. Indirect representation of the idea would grant it a semblance of objective reality, however, Kant illustrates the idea as a systematic construct of reason using a type of art that presents the idea directly as itself; the objective reality is sacrificed in order to present the idea directly for the sake of truth and clarity.

**The Analogon**

Principles of pure reason cannot be constitutive in regard to objects because no schema of sensibility can be given that corresponds to them. Without the schemata of sensibility acts of the understanding are undetermined (or indeterminate), just as the unity of reason itself is undetermined. However, Kant states: ‘But although we are unable to find in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily allow of being given’ (A665/B693 my italics). He suggests that, although the unity of the understanding’s concepts cannot be given sensibly, an analogon of a schema must be given in order to realise it as a rational concept.

What does Kant mean here by an analogon?\(^61\) There can be no sensible intuition that corresponds to the way in which reason orders the acts of the understanding according to ideas as ideas are too far removed from sensible experience; they cannot be given in this manner. Although no schema can be given in intuition for the

\(^61\) In Pluhar’s translation the word is given merely as ‘analogue’ which implies: that which stands alongside or corresponds to, but is not completely or directly the same as (A665/B693). Kant Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1996.
thoroughgoing systematic unity of the acts of the understanding, an *analogue* that corresponds to the idea of a maximum must allow of being given as what is greatest and absolutely complete can be thought determinately (A665/B693). The *analogon* enables a connection to intuition that ensures that an idea can be realised and yet it allows the idea to maintain its position and definitive status. It is not a direct realisation in objective reality that results in cognition, rather, it yields a rule or regulating principle for the systematic unity of the acts of the understanding. The *analogue* of a schema of sensibility is, therefore, the self-contained system of an idea of reason that presents a *maximum*. Though there can be no given schema for the idea of reason, the idea itself is an *analogue* of a schema of sensibility as it presents the greatest and most absolute maximum ‘… in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle’ (A665/B693). What is greatest and absolutely complete can be thought (though it may not be given), thus, the idea of reason presented in or by a *system* is the *analogue* of a schema of sensibility. The system directly presents the idea itself and this presentation serves as an *analogue* to a sensible schema as an idea is thought determinately in terms of what is absolutely great (a maximum), and thereby also, realised.

We can conclude that the system may stand in place of a schema of sensibility in order to realise an idea and this presentation is figural, yet it does not require a direct presentation in terms of a sensible intuition. Just as the sensible schema realises and restricts concepts of the understanding, the system restricts (and demonstrates) the scope of the idea by presenting it as a diagrammatic figure to enable its realisation. The system serves as an *analogue* to a schema of sensibility as, just as concepts of the understanding require schemata, concepts of reason require systems and the function performed by both concerns the restriction and realisation.
of a concept. Michelle Grier claims that the transcendental principle serves as an ‘application condition’ of the logical principle and thereby also as an analogue of schemata as ‘it articulates the goal in light of which we undertake the systematisation of the knowledge of the understanding’\textsuperscript{62}. The transcendental principle mirrors the schemata of sensibility as, using an illusory projection as a goal or end it supplies the conditions under which a concept can be applied in order for knowledge of the understanding to be systematised and realised.

The difference between an idea of reason and a schema of sensibility is that the application of concepts of understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of an object. It gives a rule or principle that regulates the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. The function of the analogon is therefore to enable an idea to be thought determinately by analogy with a schema of sensibility; this gives us an insight into the operation of reason and the role of ideas in determination. We can make sense of, and communicate the operations of reason by analogy with the way that pure concepts of understanding function in relation to sensibility. Thus, we familiarise the indemonstrable by analogy with that which is demonstrable and the presentation of the system (as a capacity for realisation in respect to ideas) as an analogue shows it plays a necessary role as an analógica figure. The way in which concepts of the understanding are realised in intuition therefore plays an integral role in enabling Kant to communicate how principles of reason regulate the understanding. However, ideas of reason and the schema of sensibility are so heterogeneous that the only means to bridge them is through

recourse to analogy. Analogy is revealed as a key methodological tool which enables the presentation, communication and realisation of ideas.

**Speculative Ideas as Analoga of Real Things**

We can trace the use of analogy in reference to the presentation of ideas further in *The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason*. Here Kant seeks to show that ideas are not ‘empty thought entities’ but have some objective employment despite the deceptive illusions they give rise to, he therefore conducts a transcendental deduction of them (cf. A669-70/B697-8).

Something can be given to reason as an object *absolutely* or, an object *in the idea*. With the latter no object is given and there is only a schema which serves as a means of relating to other objects and enables us to contextualise and situate the idea; other objects are thereby presented in terms of how they fit into the system by means of a relation to this idea. E.g. the concept of a highest intelligence has no objective reality (no direct relation to an object), it is ‘a schema constructed in accordance with the condition of the greatest possible unity of reason’ (A670/B698). The object of this idea (God) is posited as a ground or cause of the way we view objects of experience as if they were caused by a higher intelligence.

The transcendental ideas of psychology, cosmology and theology do not directly relate to or determine any object but involve necessary presuppositions that we can use to extend our empirical knowledge into systematic unity. The transcendental deduction of the ideas of speculative reason shows how these ideas use analogies

63 There is further evidence in support of this bridging capacity of analogy in Kant’s account of symbolic exhibition in the *Third Critique* as discussed in Chapter’s six and seven.
to regulate our knowledge. In psychology we connect all appearances as if the mind were an ‘I’, in cosmology we follow the condition of appearances as if it were endless to posit a ‘world’, in theology we view all possible experience as if it formed an absolute, dependant, sensibly conditioned unity, and as if the sum of all appearances had a single ground beyond itself as a self-subsistent, original, creative reason (God). The last idea uses a double analogy that raises it to the status of an archetypal figure (which we will discuss further in 2.3) it serves to guide the empirical employment of reason and secure its greatest possible extension.

These three ideas use analogies to regulate the way in which an object in the idea is posited, they employ illusions to enable the extension of an idea and its unity beyond the understanding (and our empirical experience). Reason constructs an architectonic illusion and a figure (comprising a whole or totality) is posited to illustrate and guide the extension of the understanding. What is revealed is a hierarchy within reason in terms of how it relates to intuitions. Things are ‘given’ to reason in three ways: as objects absolutely (with synthetic unity), as combinations of rules (requiring a higher unity), and, as objects in the idea (which ground the possibility of the systematic unity of any and all experience). Reason reveals itself in possession of a hypothetical, creative capacity to project illusory objects as figures which serve architectonic ends.

Kant states that these ideas: ‘ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema – the schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature’ (A674/B702). These ideas have the reality of a method or procedure that enables their exhibition. Though Kant elsewhere refers to the schema, as a product of the imagination (cf. A140/B179), there is no role ascribed to the imagination in relation to the realisation of ideas. He
states that we should regard speculative ideas as ‘analogia of real things’ and not as real things themselves (A674/B702). By removing the conditions that would limit concepts of the understanding and make possible determinate cognition we are free to think something not contained under a determinate concept and we represent it to ourselves as standing to the sum of appearances in a relation analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another (A674/B702)\(^\text{64}\).

The way in which appearances stand in relation to one another regulates our abstraction from them and enables us to posit an ‘object in the idea’ following analogical laws. These laws regulate the creation of ideas (and ideals) and enable us to realise them creatively using a rational construction. We think an idea as that which cannot be contained under a concept of the understanding, this grants a freedom and creative obligation to reason, it responds by constructing a system to present, communicate and realise the idea. Thus, these ideas concern systematic projections (of an ‘I’, a ‘world’ or ‘God’) based on present parts within a system that can be clearly determined, these are then extended by a projection - in conformity with the idea - towards a whole as a goal or end product.

The architectonic projection enables the idea to relate to ‘real’ things through the use of analogy as a methodological procedure which bridges the gap between heterogeneous relata. We abstract from that which we have determinate knowledge of and ascend in order to gain access to that which we cannot completely determine (and in doing this we are guided by the projected goal of reason). Analogy assists us by providing a rule for seeking and a mark for discovering, it guides us through

\(\text{\ldots}\)

\(^\text{64}\) The ideas of psychology, cosmology and theology concern relation but reason’s use of relation (and totality) must be distinguished from its use as a mere concept of understanding.
unfamiliar territory via the projection of laws and goals to orient us. The empirical unity of what we already know is extended via a higher architectonic unity that grounds the former and regulates our knowledge. We posit the being of ‘I’, the ‘World’ and ‘God’ as ‘objects in the idea’, as, to posit them with actuality would be an illegitimate employment of reason that would not extend our knowledge or direct us to its ground or unity as cause.

Reason must give the idea of systematic unity an object in the idea in order to think it, this object cannot come from sense experience (as experience can never give an example of complete systematic unity e.g. God), it must come from reason. The object is postulated as a problem and thus it becomes the ground of an analogy by which we view all things in the world of sense. It is not a ground of the systematic order of the world as a real thing, it is an idea from which unity can be further extended; it is the schema of a regulative principle by which reason extends systematic unity over all fields of experience.

Kant uses an example from medical physiology to show utilise its utilisation of a regulative principle of reason. Everything in an animal has its use and purpose (in a teleological sense that differs from a mere mechanical, causal relation). A regulative principle of reason (e.g. God) secures the highest possible systematic unity via its purposive power as supreme cause of the world as if it was the intelligent cause of all things. Kant states that it is ‘natural’ for us to assume a legislative reason that corresponds to our own in the form of an ‘intellectus archetypus’ as an object of reason from which we derive all systematic unity of nature. This assumption of an intelligent archetype as the cause or ground of all systematic unity, a complete purposive unity, is bound to the nature of our reason and gives us clues as to its inner constitution. Regarding transcendental theology (discussed further in relation to
the *Transcendental Ideal* in 2.3), Kant states that we may think a being by analogy with objects of experience, only as an object in the idea, not in reality. We think it by analogy with an object of experience so that reason may generate an object in the idea. An object is realised and posited in a sense, but not objectively so, it is a vehicle for reason that enables a procedure or method to guide, direct, and ground the possibility of systematic unity.

Transcendental theology allows for the projection of God as an object in the idea, an (unknown) substratum of systematic unity and order. The purposiveness of the world is necessary for reason as a regulative principle pertaining to its investigation of nature, it is an idea that relates not to a *being* (distinct from the world) but to the regulative principle of systematic unity by means of a schema of this unity. Through the schema of a supreme intelligence (a schema that it would have if it was real and could be realised objectively) we cannot know the primordial ground or cause of the world, only how we should use this idea in *relation* to the systematic employment of reason in respect to things in the world. We therefore presuppose a transcendental object that we have no concept of in itself. All we have is the schema (the way in which this idea *could* be realised) and, in relation to the systematic order of the world, we think this unknown being by analogy with an intelligence we can comprehend; as an infinite extension of ourselves (as rational human beings).

The regulative idea of God is valid only in respect of our employment of reason in reference to the world, it is a being in idea only and the quality of its reality is indeterminate. Kant goes on to say something which brings to light a fourth view of nature. I may regard seemingly purposive arrangements as purposes and derive them from the divine will only on condition that we regard it as a matter of
indifference whether we assert that God (in divine wisdom) has willed it to be so, or nature has arranged it thus:

For what has justified us in adopting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle is precisely this greatest possible systematic and purposive unity – a unity which our reason has required as a regulative principle that must underlie all investigation of nature (A609/B727).

This type of schema enables realisation according to a unity, in this sense it differs from a schema of sensible intuition as it functions to serve reason in a regulative manner and there is no role for the imagination. The purpose of this schema is not exhibition (hypotyposis), it is the realisation of unity in relation to a final purpose that shows a connection between reason and nature.

What is thus revealed is a relation between reason, nature and the system based on the unity of a method. The principle of systematicity guides us in seeking a necessary unity of nature as connected to and grounded in the idea of a supreme being which we must adopt in order to view appearances as systematically connected. We presuppose a perfect God which is justified by our empirical knowledge of the order of the world. Kant connects perfection with the idea of a complete systematic unity; we should approach nature as if this systematic or purposive unity is everywhere to be met with not as created but as already present and known to be infinite. Though we may discover in the world only a little of the perfection we may ascribe to God (as a standard of perfection/ground/cause of systematic unity) this idea is required by reason in order to make judgements about things in the world and to regulate how we ourselves think, act, and judge. Whilst some philosophers treat nature and divine wisdom (God) as the same, for Kant God’s divine wisdom exists to direct reason to nature. Pure reason does not merely extend our knowledge beyond experience, it contains regulative principles that
prescribe a greater (more perfect) unity than the understanding alone can achieve. This systematic unity provides the means by which reason checks itself in line with what it determines in the world i.e. according to how it makes sense of nature. This enables reason to justifiably account for its distance from sensible intuition which would otherwise render its operations doubtful, illusory, abstract, or empty.

Kant now proceeds to reinforce the step ladder: “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas” (A702/B730). For Kant knowledge begins with intuitions that have a priori sources and ground the possibility of systematic unity by enabling us to abstract from and extend beyond their given status to realise the unity of nature as a system. Systematic unity possesses an a priori ground in reason, yet reason in its speculative employment can never transcend the field of possible experience. However, what does transcend experience and is also a priori, are the methods and the principles that reason uses to make sense of, and bring unity to knowledge of nature. Reason transcends experience through its provision of a method by which to organise experiences. This method lies outside of experience itself (just as the art of creating systems lies outside the system) in one respect it extends beyond experience as an end or goal, yet in another it must always relate and pertain only to what is possible.

These are just some examples of regulative figures used and referred to by Kant, in sum they reveal a creative capacity of reason in relation to the art of creating systems. These figures present ideas directly (schematically), though they do not become realised in sensible intuition they are demonstrated to have reality with reference to the regulative functions they perform. The objective behind Kant’s use of these figures is clarity in respect to communicating ideas and understanding the
nature of reason, this is why they are privileged over symbolic representations (though the *focus imaginarius* involves both). These architectonic organisations (systems) *become* figural as they are communicated, in a gesture to the presence of the reader. These figures present ideas as systems comprised of interrelated parts, they differ from mathematical constructions as they are not singular or intuitive, and they differ from symbols as they are direct. Artworks communicate rules and ideas through exemplary models, however, though we have sought to clarify Kant’s use of these figures with reference to examples, they are examples of architectonic art and are not aesthetic; their construction is sourced to reason and no role is ascribed to the imagination.

All the figures reaffirm the system set out in the step ladder and confirm its status as an exemplary example. The *focus imaginarius* presents reasons regulative function in relation to the understanding both schematically and symbolically; through two different uses of analogy. The system of logical principles shows how reason is consistent with the organisation of nature so that whether we seek an identity amongst givens, or their differentiation, both are only possible due to a systematic, transcendental presupposition. The analogon shows how systems are analogous to schemata of sensibility in terms of their ability to realise and restrict ideas with reference to a maximum. Speculative ideas are analyga of real things as they ground the possibility of systematic unity for any and all experience, and by analogy with the way in which appearances relate to the understanding we posit an object in the idea to regulate and realise ideas.
2.3 Ideal Figures of Reason

This section will consider ideal figures of reason which differ from the regulative figures discussed in 2.2., the function these figures perform is regulative, but they differ due to their personified, *ideal* status. These figures are not mathematical constructions, they present ideas as personified (human) figures and exemplify a creative capacity of reason which must be considered alongside that which we have already established in relation to the communication and realisation of theoretical ideas. This section will consider the figures Kant refers to in the *Ideal in General* and the *Transcendental Ideal* in terms of their nature, their position (in relation to the step ladder), the functions they perform, and their capacity for realisation.

It is necessary to establish the nature and position of these ideals to clarify their function so that we may properly ascertain their scope, communicate their purpose, and gain further insight into the creative capacity of reason. This analysis will suggest that these ideal figures serve to bridge the divisions set out in the step ladder and initiate a complex return to the idea as archetype. They show how reason operates with reference to figures at the very extent of its capacity, and this provides a basis on which we can draw parallels with the lawful activity of the imagination in Chapter eight.

*The Ideal in General*

Kant establishes the position of the *Ideal in General* by reinforcing the hierarchy and divisions of the step ladder. Objects are determined by or through concepts of the understanding as they are connected to sensibility and given objective reality. Though an object is determined using concepts, its connection to sensibility gives it objective reality, therefore, both empirical concepts and concepts of the
understanding can be exhibited *in concreto*. Ideas are further removed from sensibility; they contain a completeness that empirical knowledge cannot attain and they cannot be presented *in concreto* (A567/B595). Kant states that with ideas ‘reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it’ (A568/B596). Ideas are aspirational; they have systematic ends which must be possible, but need never actually be reached. The ideal is even further removed from objective reality than the idea; Kant states it is an individual instance of an idea that is not realised concretely but is nonetheless determined or determinable. He defines it as follows:

By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely *in concreto*, but *in individuo*, that is, as an individual thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone (A568/B596).

Kant connects his conception of the ideal to perfection (as the maximum extension possible of an idea), to practical ideas (as connected to the realisation of the good), and to Plato. He refers to the idea of humanity as there is a necessary connection between the ideal and human beings as it always involves reference to a personified, human figure e.g. the perfect man. Kant refers to Plato to clarify his sense of ideal and claims: ‘What to us is an ideal was in Plato’s view an idea of the divine understanding…’ (A568/B797). Kant’s intention is to emphasise the ideal as a perfection and this echoes Plato’s theory of the Forms in which the idea is a perfect, original, archetype (or universal) that we are prompted to recollect as we experience imperfect copies or instances. However, Kant emphasises the regulatory role of ideals as practical; they provide perfect standards which assist us with judging the moral conduct of ourselves and others. In its capacity as an archetype the ideal

---

65 This observation will be pursued in relation to the ideal of beauty discussed in Chapter 8.
presents and acts as a rule, it is distinguished from concepts of the understanding as it does not relate to possible experience (though it must not be impossible), and it aims at 'complete determination in accordance with a priori rules' (A571/B599).

For Kant the ideal has practical power as a regulative principle that we can use to improve our actions and judgements in line with a maximum. He gives an example: virtue and wisdom are ideas, the wise man is an ideal 'existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom' (A569/B597). The idea gives the rule and the ideal serves as the archetype for the complete determination of the copy. The conduct of the wise man within us presents a standard that is useful for judging our actions (and the actions of others) and it serves to guide us if we seek to reform ourselves through approximation to a perfect, ideal standard. Ideal figures do not have objective reality, but they are not ‘figments of the brain’ either; they supply reason with a complete concept which serves as a standard against which we can measure given instances (A569/B597).

If the *Ideal in General* were to be ascribed a place in the step ladder, it would be positioned *above* concepts of the understanding and ideas as furthest removed from sensible intuition. However, an ideal figure e.g. the wise man has a connection to sensibility that in some ways appears closer than that of the regulative figures discussed in 2.2. In an ideal figure the idea is personified and bound in sensible form in a way in which e.g. the *focus imaginarius* seems abstract in comparison. Let us look at the nature of the way in which the ideal presents an idea *in individuo*.

On the one hand the idea is presented *directly* (as the ideal figure does not utilise a symbolic transposition in which the idea is removed from itself and represented by an analogous determinate object), yet on the other, the idea is transposed from its
status as indemonstrable *in concreto* to determinable *in individuo* (from concretely indemonstrable to individually presented) and in this respect the ideal figure is a representation of the idea. The idea is presented directly, but it is represented by the personified figure and the analogy used concerns a transposition only in respect to its status (as the indemonstrable is presented as demonstrable).

Kant’s omission of the ideal from the step ladder suggests that it cannot be adequately presented architectonically. The ideal exceeds systematic unity as, in presenting an ideal figure reason displays a capacity that approximates to a unity which differs from that of an architectonic totality. Reason presents an ideal, e.g., of wisdom through a personification of the idea which becomes individuated in the ideal figure of a wise man. This figure is not produced or created by the imagination as Kant states that the ideal figure is distinct from products of the imagination which are not based on intelligible concepts but are a ‘kind of monogram’ with no assignable rule that forms merely a ‘blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences’ (A570/B598). For Kant products of the imagination are not determinate; they are akin to the type of representations that painters carry in their minds and may be ‘improperly entitled ideals of sensibility’ (A570/B598). The ideal figure is a product of reason that does not present the idea architectonically (systematically), but as a perfected instance of the idea such as it would be found in a human being. The idea is presented as itself and it is *represented* by a personified figure. The way in which the idea is ‘realised’ is not through direct, schematic presentation in or as a system, the ideal figure has human properties that are extended to grant a maximum, perfect standard; it serves as exemplary and also as that which exceeds any given instances. Reality is secured for the idea through an extension of given instances (and human properties) to their maximum and is contained in a figure.
The figure presents an archetypal standard by which we can compare and judge the actions of ourselves and others. The position of the ideal (as above the idea) and its function (as an archetype) dictate that it need never be fully realised or attained to serve a practical, regulative purpose. The ideal therefore possesses an elevated position beyond any sensible presentation as that which our actions should approximate to and be judged in accordance with, it is presented as an aspiration but remains necessary nonetheless.

The function of the *Ideal in General* is to make an idea into an individual, determinate thing (to *realise* it), but not by granting it objective reality. For Kant ideals do not have the creative power ascribed to Platonic archetypes (they do not create the *ectypa* (copies) that we experience), they have practical power as regulative principles. The ideal presents an individual instance of an idea which becomes realised through a figure in a manner that differs from the examples of architectonic art already discussed. A system presents an idea that becomes realised directly with reference to a diagrammatic figure, in contrast, the ideal figure of, e.g., the wise man does not merely present an idea, it *represents* it in a figure that does not possess diagrammatic or systematic properties, but human traits. The ideal concerns a representation that is not created by the imagination (as supplementary or associative), but is generated necessarily by reason itself; it thereby reveals an artistic capacity of reason to effect *representation*66.

66 Though the ideal involves representation, Kant distinguishes it from an artistic representation such as that which exists in the mind of the artist and relates to the imagination (A570/B598). It is also different to a symbolic representation as the aim is not exhibition and there are not two relata involved (one directly demonstrable and the other an idea (cf.5:352)).
It must be acknowledged that, in terms of its function the *Ideal in General* does make an architectonic contribution. The ideal figure serves as a standard or archetype for the complete determination of the copy; it gives us a standard with which we compare and judge our conduct though we can never attain to the perfection it presents (A570/B598). The manner in which the ideal is composed (as a figural representation) enables it to function as an archetype, dictates its nature as necessarily related to humanity, and establishes its position as beyond ideas, concepts and intuitions. The ideal figure, e.g., of the wise man serves as an indispensable standard for judging the wisdom of ourselves and others as it rests on determinate concepts. Its primary function is to provide a standard that contextualises our conduct and enables us to make judgements; the ideal figure presents a goal that we approximate to and use for judging. The figure provides a standard that enables the ideal to function as architectonic, but this is secondary, the primary and most striking capability of the *Ideal in General* is that it represents the idea and serves as a perfect, aspirational figure which reflects, exceeds and extends our human properties to their maximum perfection.

The figurative capacity of reason exemplified in the personification of an ideal blurs the divisions of the step ladder as it binds transcendent properties of the idea within a determinate (human) figure. The idea is represented in a figure created by reason that is not a product of sensible experience i.e. it is not devised according to the conditions of time and space, but according to a capacity of reason that enables the projection of a figural representation as a personification. The ideal representation betrays a movement that differs from those discussed in relation to architectonic presentations (extension and expansion). With this figure the idea is extended to gain a maximum through its representation in a perfect individuated
instance; a figure that reflects human (and divine) properties and differs in kind to the diagrammatic figures discussed in 2.2. The *Ideal in General* represents the supersensible by binding it in a presentation that is not realised sensibly (in accordance with the conditions of time and space) but through a figure created by reason that reflects the human form. The idea is contained within a human figure that we can approximate to (and in this respect must be possible), yet its status as a perfect (divine) individuation (that cannot be given sensibly) is impossible to attain.

The polarisation of ideas and intuitions by the step ladder is breeched by the ideal figure which connects an indemonstrable idea (that cannot be realised *in concreto*) with sensible reality (through the form of a figure) to realise it in an individual instance. The idea is thereby presented (or *represented*) not as objectively real and existing but as that which we can approximate to, and though a degree of reality is secured (in relation to its regulative capacity for judging and acting) a degree of abstraction must necessarily remain. The ideal blends architectonic and representative art; it betrays a figurative capacity of reason through which an ability to achieve representative art (a capacity formerly ascribed only to the imagination) is revealed. Though the ideal figure serves an architectonic function (in providing a standard for our judgements and actions) it’s representation as a figure with human dimensions (and properties) initiates a complex return to sensible intuition as an idea is represented and bound in a figure.

*The Transcendental Ideal*

The *Transcendental Ideal* concerns a figural capacity of reason that is fallacious yet reveals the extent of its operations in its highest capacity. It differs from the *Ideal*
in General as it concerns the origin of the idea of God, not from a practical, moral perspective, but as that which plays a regulative function in theoretical enquiries into nature\textsuperscript{67}. The Transcendental Ideal contains an intrinsic contradiction in terms of its position as the highest possibility (the \textit{ens summum}\textsuperscript{68}; which everything conditioned is subject to) and the absolute ground or condition to which all thought of objects’ content can be traced back. For Henry Allison the central question in respect to this ideal concerns:

How, on the one hand, can Kant affirm the rational necessity of the concept of the \textit{ens realissimum}\textsuperscript{69}, while on the other, insisting on the necessarily fallacious nature of all attempts to establish its existence?\textsuperscript{70}

On the one hand Kant affirms the rational necessity of the concept of this ideal, whilst on the other he recognises that all attempts to establish its existence will prove ‘fallacious’. In the analysis that follows I will draw out the creative capacity of reason to generate an ideal figure when operating at the absolute height of its capability, which for Kant also forms the ground for the possibility of any (and every) determination. The objective is to illustrate the role of the figure in respect to theoretical reason as it engages in determination, and to demonstrate why this capacity should be addressed and included when accounting for the nature of reason. Though the ideal figure is a fallacious illusion, it is important to note that in this instance it is not the illusion itself that constitutes an illegitimate extension of


\textsuperscript{68} The idea of the sum total of all reality

\textsuperscript{69} The idea of an individual with the highest degree of reality as an ideal of reason.

reason, it is our misemployment of it that can have this result if we fail to attend to its illusory status.

The *Transcendental Ideal* of pure reason refers to the idea of God as an ideal figure. This figure is posited as necessary by theoretical reason but any attempts to prove ‘his’ existence will prove erroneous. The *Transcendental Ideal* is generated through a transcendental idea (of the sum total of all possibility) that is first realised, then hypostatised, and finally personified, and it is this last act which brings the idea into the figure of God. So why is the transcendentally ideal figure of God necessary for the determination of objects? And how do we get from the transcendental idea of the sum total of all possibility to the ideal figure of God as the highest being?

In Kant’s *Transcendental Idealism* Henry Allison claims that Kant embarks on a three step regressive argument in relation to the *Transcendental Ideal*. Kant contrasts the principle of determinability with the principle of thoroughgoing determination. The former is a logical principle which uses the principle of contradiction to affirm that of every two contradictory predicates only one can apply to a concept, the latter is a metaphysical principle which affirms that among all possible opposing predicates one must apply to a given object. The latter considers given objects in respect to the sum of all possibility and determines given things as deriving their possibility from a share they have in the whole. The three steps Kant must make concern firstly, moving from the principle of thoroughgoing determination to the sum total of all possibility, secondly, moving from the sum total of all possibility
to the *omnitudo realitatis*\(^71\), and thirdly, from the *omnitudo realitatis* to the *ens realissimum*\(^72\).

The principle of thoroughgoing determination cannot be exhibited *in concreto*, it is a transcendental idea that does not represent an object, rather, it represents a *procedure* for cognising an object\(^73\). It is the procedure that requires reference to all of reality as *omnitudo realitatis*; we must presuppose all of reality (and the sum total of all predicates which forms a transcendental substratum) in order to define any individual object given within it. Reality itself is a positive affirmation (of the absence of non-reality) and this allows us to exclude negative predicates (which do not express reality) from the *omnitudo realitatis*. Kant draws an analogy between the operation of reason in doing this and in disjunctive syllogism as both proceed via a process of elimination. We completely determine things by comparing them to the sum total of all possible predicates and this idea (though it is itself indeterminate) individualises itself *a priori* into an individual existence completely determined by the idea as an ideal of reason\(^74\). All the things which we seek to determine only make sense in light of a positive account of the sum of all possible predicates as the source that must be presupposed (and not constituted) by all finite beings and things. In his Commentary Norman Kemp Smith rightly explains: ‘All negations are therefore derivative; it is the realities which contain the material by which a complete

\(^{71}\) The idea of an ‘all’ of reality (A575/B604).


determination of anything becomes possible.\textsuperscript{75} The view of the sum of all possible predicates as a positive ground that possesses reality is what grants it its status as ideal and individuated.

Kant communicates reason’s employment of the \textit{Transcendental Ideal} as ‘proceeding in a manner analogous with its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms’ for the same reasons he grounds his conception of ‘idea’ in syllogism: to avoid the accusations made against Plato that ideas are mere hypostatised abstractions. However, he also uses a figurative analogy to consolidate the procedure through which the complete determination of things is a limitation of this original necessary ideal:

All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space (A578/B607).

Allison refers to the quotation above and notes Kant’s use of metaphorical language in relation to the discussion of ideals e.g., in Kant’s lectures he uses an analogy of light with reality, and shadow with negation to make the same point outlined above. The use of the light/dark reality/negation metaphor recurs in other works e.g. \textit{Reflexion} and Kant also refers to an additional metaphor ‘of an inexhaustible supply of marble’ from which an infinite number of statues can be created by carving from the whole.\textsuperscript{76} This use of recurring analogies that accompany

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. p 523.

\textsuperscript{76} See Allison, Henry, \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defence}, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, p. 400. Also (28:1005;34), (R5270 18:138-39), and (Fort 20:302;390).
expression assist Kant with communicating what would otherwise remain an abstract and indemonstrable movement of reason.

Kant makes the step from thinking the ‘all’ of reality as a totality, to thinking it as an individual with the highest reality. The idea (of the sum total of all possibility) becomes individuated (into an ideal) as the concept of an object that can be determined through the idea and it becomes ‘the only true ideal of which human reason is capable’ (A576/B604). The Transcendental Ideal concerns the ground of the possibility of complete determination, it differs from the totality of the ‘all’ of possibility (which is an idea) as it grounds the possibility of all things and is presupposed to be contained in an individual primordial being. Reason does not presuppose the existence of this being, only the idea of such a being so that we may derive a concept of the unconditioned from it as a resting point where reason can conclude its regress (A578/B606). The actual existence of such a being lies outside of the scope of our reason and knowledge. It is not the realisation of this idea (as a possibility) that is the source of the fallacy (as this is a ‘natural’ illusion (A581/B609)), it is our employment of this illusion as we seek to hypostatise, and personify it. It is here that reason oversteps the bounds of its legitimate employment as we personify this idea into the figure of God. The idea becomes hypostatised ‘because we substitute dialectically for the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the understanding, the collective unity of experience as a whole’, we then think this whole as one single thing that contains all reality in itself ‘and by means of the above mentioned transcendental subreption, substituting for it the concept of a thing which stands at the source of the possibility of all things, and supplies the real conditions for their complete employment’ (A582-3/B610-11). Allison claims that distributive unity pertains to things given in space and time (unified by the understanding) and
collective unity is the systematic unity of reason, therefore to transform the former into the latter ‘is to convert a principle holding at the empirical level into one applicable to things in general’ and this is the source of the transcendental subreption through which the ideal becomes personified\textsuperscript{77}.

The transcendental ideal plays a role in the determination of objects; it serves as the ground of the possibility of complete determination of any and every thing. It is a projected realisation manifested by a subreption in reason that need never itself be realised (as it transcends all possible experience). It does not contain the same possibility for realisation possessed (yet never achieved) by the \textit{Ideal in General} and this indicates a noteworthy difference between them.

The \textit{Ideal in General} must possess a possibility for realisation as, in order to serve as an exemplar it must be attainable. Though it is never actually attained this ideal cannot be completely beyond the realms of our possibility or we would simply not aspire to it. The \textit{Transcendental Ideal} does not contain any possibility for realisation by us; it is a fabrication created surreptitiously by reason to assist, enable, and serve us in determining all things. We cannot approximate to this ideal, we could never attain it and by its very nature it exceeds the sphere of human capability. We cannot even think this ideal without making it figural.

The purpose for which this ideal is postulated is the determination of all finite and limited existences. Its own existence is not necessarily presupposed as actual, its mere idea will suffice. The possibility for any and every complete determination is based on this ideal created by reason. This is a necessary projection that enables

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid pp. 407-8
reason to reach and conceive of the unconditioned so that determination can take place. There is no possibility for the fabricated representation of an individual figure constituted by the idea of the possibility of all that exists as completely determined, to ever be realised objectively. The Transcendental Ideal is realised, (in the sense of being acknowledged and created by reason via a subreption), then hypostatised (as the idea of a primordial being), and personified (into the figure of God as the being of all beings). The creation and personification of the ideal realises it to an extent, but not objectively so and it has a more distant relation to sensible reality that the theoretical idea (which can be presented diagrammatically) or the Ideal in General (which can be realised through its regulative use as a standard for acting and judging). The possibility for actuality possessed (but never realised) by the Ideal in General is distinctly absent in regard to the Transcendental Ideal.

The Transcendental Ideal concerns a realisation of manifold ideas in an individual being that is necessarily presupposed in order for us to determine any and every thing theoretically. The Ideal in General involves the postulation of a perfect being (figure) that enables us to compare and judge the actions of ourselves and others practically. The Transcendental Ideal grounds the possibility of determination, its status as necessarily comprising a primordial ground that must be presupposed in order for any judgement to take place, means that its function extends beyond that ascribed to the Ideal in General. It is a representation based on a subreption of reason that is necessary in order for any architectonic ordering to be possible; it therefore grounds the possibility of the architectonic order brought by ideas. Though

---

78 These steps taken by reason to realise, hypostatise and personify the ideal differentiate it from an object in the idea such as e.g. a world or a soul (excluding the theological ideas of speculative reason), these are not necessarily bound in any figure and function in a different manner.
the movement of reason in representing the *Transcendental Ideal* is analogous to syllogistic inference, it is the figurative representation (or personification) that provides the grounds for the possibility of any architectonic art. Thus, the representation of this ideal is necessary in order for reason to create systems architectonically and this is significant in relation to definitions of reason as systematic in nature. Reason cannot become systematic without first creating that which enables systems to be possible, the creative act thereby conditions the possibility of systematic unity.

Through its status as a figure the *Transcendental Ideal* achieves a crossing of the boundaries of the step ladder in a manner that surpasses that achieved by the *Ideal in General*. If it were to be presented in the step ladder it would occupy highest point (as *ens summum*) and, through its status as the primordial being (*ens originarium*), it would occupy the ground. The ideal would not only require dual positioning, it appears to blend many oppositions e.g. that between constitutive and regulative principles, between that which is possible/impossible in respect to realisation, the distinction between architectonic and representative art, and that with sensible and ideal status. These distinctions become blurred and strained at the level of the ideal as reason must perform a necessary recourse to figuration that initiates complex return to sensible reality. This movement demonstrates that reason at its furthest distance from sensible reality makes a recursive movement back to it by means of a figurative capacity that demands the ideal is personified rationally for determination to be possible. Reason does not employ the material of sensibility to create the ideal figure, rather, the creation of the figure and the act of personification is an artistic operation that is performed as reason reaches the extent of its powers and is tied to its nature and possibility.
Thus, at the very height of its powers, reason reveals an artistic capacity within its operation that must be considered in any assessment of its true nature. The importance of this revelation will be reinforced in 3.2. and will be revisited as we go on to draw parallels between the operation of reason and the imagination in Chapter eight.
Chapter 3. The Schematic Realisation of Concepts

This Chapter will be split into three sections: the first concerns an analysis of the schematic realisation of theoretical concepts, the second concerns the schematic realisation of theoretical ideas, and the third offers a critical reply to Heidegger’s account of the schema-image. The aim of this chapter is to uncover the role of the figure in schematic exhibition as this is not recognised explicitly by Kant yet it is significant in relation to the truthful realisation and communication of our ideas and other concepts. The first section will engage in a clarification of schematic hypotyposis to establish the nature of the procedure through which different types of concept are realised, the second will focus on the schematic realisation of ideas to show the extent to which this requires reason to behave figuratively, and the third will challenge Heidegger’s claims that the schema is imagistic.

3.1 will demonstrate that pure sensible concepts are realised through a *figural schema*, empirical concepts are realised through a *recollective schema*, and pure concepts of the understanding are realised through a *transcendental schema*. I will assess the extent to which each type of schema uses figures to realise concepts and will draw attention to the relation each schema (and concept) has to images. It is necessary to distinguish different types of concept to gain a comprehensive account of the schema and to reveal the role of the figure in schematising, realising and communicating concepts. 3.2 will discuss the schematic realisation of ideas through a *final end schema*¹ and I will argue that this procedure takes place figuratively using

---

¹ The term ‘final end schema’ is coined by Gary Banham in *Kant and The Ends of Aesthetics*. Banham, Gary, *Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 57
a monogram (sketch or outline) produced by reason to add support to my claims that an artistic capacity of reason is intrinsically related to the communication and realisation of ideas. 3.3 will challenge Heidegger’s claims in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that the schema is imagistic by arguing that it is figural and the two are not the same. This argument will reveal an intrinsic connection between the bestowal of form, the philosophical communication of ideas and the realisation of concepts with reference to schematic hypotyposis as clarified in sections 3.1 and 3.2. I will argue that the figurative capacity of reason goes beyond a mere ‘look’ to a bestowal of form and this formative aspect is not acknowledged in Heidegger’s account.

An analysis of how different types of concept are realised schematically is necessary to distinguish them from one another so that we may gain a comprehensive understanding of the nature of schematisation. This will enable us to make a clear distinction between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis and will provide grounds on which we can juxtapose the operations of the imagination and reason in Part 3.

3.1 The Schematism of Concepts

In order to properly define what Kant means by a schema this section will attend closely to the examples he uses in The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding. I will demonstrate how the examples used reveal that pure sensible concepts are realised through a figural schema, empirical concepts through a re-collective schema and pure concepts of the understanding by a transcendental schema. The aim of this section is to develop a comprehensive account of the nature
of schematism in relation to concepts so that we may compare this with the schematic realisation of ideas (discussed in 3.2). I will set out how different types of concept are schematised, and highlight the role of the *monogram* as a figure. By clarifying the schemata of different concepts we can separate concepts from schemata and schemata from images (a distinction that will be discussed further in 3.3) to demonstrate how the different schemata compare and relate to one another.

In the *Third Critique* Kant clearly states that there are two ways that concepts can be exhibited: schematically (directly) or symbolically (indirectly) (5:351-2). Direct exhibition of a concept in sensible intuition enables a determinate judgement to be made. Indirect exhibition of a rational concept (idea) by reflective judgement operates by analogy with the process determinate judgement follows in schematising. Kant begins the chapter on schematism by stating that in determinate, subsumptive judgements an object is judged as contained under a concept if the intuition and the concept are homogenous in some significant or defining respect. To clarify this he gives an example: we judge that a given intuited object is a ‘plate’ as the empirical concept ‘plate’ is homogenous with the roundness of the intuited object (A137/B176). The roundness thought in the concept is intuited in the object and this shows firstly, that the concept must contain something represented in the object and secondly that in order to apply this empirical concept we make reference to a figural quality in terms of shape or form. The concept plate and the intuition of a plate are homogenous with reference to the figural quality of roundness that is contained within the concept and intuited in the object².

2 Roundness is not necessarily a defining element as plates can also be square, however, in judging an object as ‘a square plate’ one still makes reference to its form and clarifies the judgement.
Kant then outlines the problem; pure concepts of the understanding are so heterogeneous to empirical intuitions it leads us to ask: ‘How then is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?’ (A177/B138). How can pure concepts be applied to intuitions? This is what a transcendental doctrine of judgement must show and this question motivates the following investigation. To highlight the importance of this question let us look back to what Kant states in the *Transcendental Doctrine of Elements*:

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. (A51/B75)

We must secure a relation between our pure concepts and the things we intuit in sensibility in order for our concepts to have any meaning. Concepts are connected to intuition through a schema which is neither a concept nor an intuition; it is a ‘third thing’ homogenous with both that makes the application of the former to the latter possible. Kant describes the *transcendental schema* as a mediating representation that is both intellectual (pure) and sensible (connected to intuition) (A138/B177).

Kant makes a distinction between the way in which empirical concepts are schematised and the way in which pure concepts are schematised with reference to the schema, let us start with the pure concepts. Concepts of the understanding contain pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general, time contains an *a priori* manifold in pure intuition. Time is therefore homogenous with pure concepts - as it of it as a plate with reference to its shape. This reinforces the view that most plates are round as the latter needs no clarification of its shape (as circular) within its description.
constitutes a unity, it is universal, and it rests on an a priori rule - and with intuitions (as appearances) - as it is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus, pure concepts of the understanding are applied to appearances by means of time which mediates the subsumption. Pure concepts, in addition to the functions of understanding expressed in them must contain ‘a priori certain formal conditions of sensibility’ namely, those of inner sense (A140/B179). These give the conditions under which the concept can be applied. As all objects are given via (temporal and spatial) modification of sensibility and a priori concepts contain certain formal conditions of sensibility, these conditions constitute the means by which a concept can be applied to any object:

This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concepts of the understanding is restricted, we shall entitle the schema of the concept. The procedure of understanding in these schemata we shall entitle the schematism of pure understanding (A140/B179).  

We now have a definition of the transcendental schema; it gives the formal and pure (temporal) condition of sensibility to which the employment of the pure concept of understanding is restricted. The procedure of the understanding within a restricted sphere through which the concept becomes realised is the schematism of pure understanding. Kant goes on to say that the schema is always a product of the imagination but the synthesis of the imagination aims at no ‘special intuition’ (as e.g. it would with a specific image), it aims at ‘unity in the determination of sensibility’ in general (A140/B179). This distinction in the type of unity the imagination seeks forms

\[\text{3}\] It is important to note here that although Kant refers to inner sense in reference to the application of pure concepts of understanding what he claims about the formal and pure conditions of sensibility is also applicable to space.
the basis on which Kant outlines the difference between the schema and the image.

To clarify this further he refers to an example:

If five points be set alongside one another thus, ...... , I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself (A140/B179 my italics).

If we set out five points ...... the imagination aims at a 'special unity' and synthesises them so that we gain an image of the number five. But this is not schematism, if we think a number in general (any number), the schema represents the method whereby any multiplicity can be represented in an image in conformity with a concept. The schema is not the image of the number five that is generated as the imagination aims at a specific unity, it represents a method whereby the imagination operates in a general way to ensure unity in the determination of sensibility as a whole in accordance with concepts. The schema is a means of making concepts applicable to intuitions and preparing intuitions to be subsumed under them. An image is not adequate to or comparable with a concept as it is specific and the synthesis of the imagination is limited to generating a specific unity with a much smaller scope. In contrast the schema is a procedure that allows concepts to become realised and intuitions to be subsumed so that a given image can be judged as belonging to a concept. Kant states that it is the ‘...representation of a universal procedure of the imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept’ (A140/B179-80).

Pure concepts of understanding are not schematised in relation to a figure, Kant states: ‘It is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in
accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression’ (A142/B181). The *transcendental schema* is a transcendental product of the imagination that concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to the conditions of its form; not as a figure in space, but in time in respect of representations connected *a priori* in one concept in conformity with the unity of apperception. The latter point marks a key difference between the schematisation of pure and sensible concepts⁴ as the former are intrinsically connected to the self as a unity of apperception and present or govern our experience as unified.

Pure concepts of the understanding cannot be met with ‘directly’ through examples given in intuition, i.e. we do not experience causality itself as given, rather, what we experience is governed by the category of causality. The application of the concept to the intuition is linear and the connection between the two heterogeneous relata is mediated by the *transcendental schema*⁵. The *transcendental schema* is pure (devoid of empirical content) but shares features of intuition (in that it is in part sensible) and features of the concept (in that it is also intellectual). The operation of judgement in the *transcendental schema* proceeds as follows: I judge that B is an effect of A, as, when I apply the concept of *causality* to the intuition of B I must note the temporal succession which governs the movement from A to B. The pure concept of causality is realised through time which gives me a sense of before B (A), then B. The application of the concept through time enables the realisation of the pure category of causality in the intuition of B. The concept of causality can only be

---

⁴ There are two types of sensible concept: pure sensible concepts and empirical concepts, in referring to ‘sensible’ concepts I am referring to both types.

⁵ The application in linear in comparison to e.g. the schematisation of empirical concepts which requires a regression, or symbolic exhibition which involves a circular movement that connects two distinct yet analogous relata.
realised through temporal succession using the *transcendental schema* as this enables application of it to the intuition of B.

The operation of judgement is subsumptive and determinate as the schema *restricts* the scope of the concept (as judgement subsumes given objects under it), and the concept becomes *realised* enabling a determinate judgement (uniting concept and intuition) to be made. The schema dictates the scope of the concept by restricting it whilst the sensible nature of time presents the possibility for realisation of the concept. We are thus presented with three aspects of the *transcendental schema*; the sense in which it serves to realise the concept in time (experienced through intuition), the sense in which it restricts the scope of the concept (by using time to limit it to certain sensible conditions), and the schema as related to a function of the understanding and not to images or any 'special intuition'.

The schemata of the categories (determined by time) serve as the only means by which concepts of the understanding can relate to objects and possess significance. The categories are only meaningful in regard to the empirical and this is their only sphere of employment. However, the synthetic unity of a pure category with an intuition transcends this sphere as the ground of an ‘a priori necessary unity that has its source in the necessary combination of all consciousness in one original apperception’, appearances are subordinated under universal rules of synthesis given by the categories, and united into one experience (A140/B185). The schemata of pure concepts of understanding therefore bear a relation to the self whilst organising appearances under the rules of the categories and both are necessary in order for us to have unified experience.
Let us now discuss sensible concepts; we will begin with pure sensible concepts and proceed to empirical concepts. For Kant it is schemata and not images that underlie our pure sensible concepts to bring abstract geometrical shapes in connection with sensible intuition. Geometrical shapes are pure figures and pure sensible concepts are *a priori*, yet they have a necessary connection to sensibility as they can be realised through given examples. These examples are not entirely adequate to the pure sensible concept of e.g. a ‘triangle’ as this concept cannot be fully illustrated or represented adequately by an image in empirical intuition. A triangle is a *pure figure* and any particular representation does not equate with the pure sensible concept of a ‘triangle in general’. When I make a determinate judgement that ‘this is a triangle’, I refer to the pure sensible concept of a ‘triangle in general’ that I possess and not merely an empirical image used to illustrate it. Kant states that the triangle is represented by a rule of synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space; it relates to sensibility in a pure way, and therefore it is a pure sensible concept (A141/B180).

Kant’s use of the triangle as an example with which to discuss pure sensible concepts is criticised by Normal Kemp-Smith as a strange choice as there are other geometrical shapes of which there are no such variation⁶. However, I will venture that Kant’s choice of a triangle and the fact that there are three different types of triangle assist him with illustrating his point and do not, as Kemp-Smith claims, make it more confusing. ‘Triangle in general’ is a pure sensible concept and there are different types of triangle, however, no matter which type we ‘see’ or encounter,

⁶ ‘As there are three very different species of triangle, the concept triangle is a class concept in a degree and manner which is not to be found in the concepts, say, of the circle or the number five’. Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’*. London: Macmillan and New York: Humanities Press, originally published in 1918 and enlarged 1923, p.338.
we judge it as ‘triangular’. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of ‘triangle in general’ as images are too specific (and could present us only with e.g. an equilateral, isosceles or scalene triangle). The image of a triangle must betray a type, but the schema (as the means through and by which we judge it as a triangle) is more general and concerns a procedure through which the triangle is connected to intuition whatever its type (just as it caters for any sized circle or square). The image of a specific triangle cannot attain the universality of the concept ‘triangle in general’ as it would not be valid of all triangles. Kemp-Smith is therefore mistaken in his reductive dismissal of this example as complicating Kant’s account of the schema, on the contrary, it clarifies his distinction between the schema and the image with reference to the realisation and exhibition of pure sensible concepts.

Pure sensible concepts are schematised through a figural schema as a product of the a priori imagination. This schematism takes place according to space and shape as the imagination generates an a priori rule through the delineation of a ‘monogram’\(^7\). The monogram is not an image, it is a figure akin to a pure image that serves to determine an intuition e.g. of a triangle as illustrating the concept ‘triangle’. The monogram presents a figure or outline that serves as a general rule through which intuitions are determined as illustrating the concept delineated. It offers a generic template through which we recognise and judge examples given in intuition as belonging to a certain pure sensible concept. Kant is clear to distinguish the delineated form or figural schema from an image:

\[\ldots\text{the image is a product of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and as it were, a monogram,}\]

\(^7\) A monogram is defined in terms of a design according to an identifying mark which can be constituted by an overlapping of letters or images.
of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible (A141-2/B181 my italics).

Though the monogram is akin to a pure image and constitutes a ‘special intuition’ in this respect, it is schemata and not images that underlie pure sensible concepts. Images do not possess the universality necessary for representing a method used to determine sensibility. Kant’s example of the triangle revealed that an image of a triangle is not valid for all triangles (as it is too specific), whereas the concept ‘triangle in general’ is applicable to all types and varieties. An image is limited by its specificity, it has no general validity or universality and cannot be adequate to a pure sensible concept. In contrast, the schema represents a method; it is a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space that can only be thought through the monogram.

Let us now move on to empirical concepts. Though Kant fails to explicitly address a specific distinction between pure sensible concepts and empirical concepts, we must distinguish them in order to compare similarities and differences concerning the way they are schematised. Pure sensible concepts are mathematically determinable and a priori, empirical concepts are dependent upon experience and their application has to be learnt. The latter share homogeneous features with the intuitions that serve as examples of them in intuition, however, they are general in ways that the specific intuitions that realise them are not. Though they are more homogeneous with intuitions than any other type of concept Kant is clear to affirm:

Still less is an object of experience or its image ever adequate to the empirical concept; for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept (A141/B180).
Kant uses the example of the empirical concept ‘dog’: I have the empirical concept of a ‘dog’, I see a dog, and I apply the concept I have to the example I see before me to make a determinate judgement that ‘this is a dog’. The empirical concept ‘dog’ covers dogs in general, whereas an image of a dog must present a specific type. The representation of the intuited dog must be homogeneous with the concept ‘dog’ in order for the application of the concept to the given intuition to take place, the similarity required is general and related to the appearance of the example as a figure. The concept dog and the intuited example are both ‘four-footed animals’, or to use Kant’s example of a plate: the intuited plate and the concept ‘plate’ both involve reference to ‘roundness’\(^8\). The rule of application for an empirical concept to an intuition is, therefore, a general rule that is partially based upon the appearance of the intuition as a figure. We judge that intuition A is an example of concept A because both relata possess a general figural quality of which A is necessarily composed. The general quality (A-ness) must be intrinsically related to the definition of A as A, but it is not specific; it is not the means by which I recognise a particular A, but instead serves as the means by which I recognise all A’s as A’s.

Empirical concepts can be thought of as general templates that we apply to specific intuitions when we judge them to be compatible with one another in a fundamental sense that is related to the definition of the concept. The empirical concept ‘dog’ as a ‘four footed animal’ is a general concept of nature and its figural status plays a partial role in enabling us to determine and judge given intuitions as ‘dogs’. As the concept ‘dog’ is applicable to all dogs independent of type, it is applied

\(^8\) With both examples context and position as part of a causal nexus is also important, this is why empirical concepts are schematised in a manner that is partially figural yet also refers to the transcendental schema and pure concepts of the understanding.
in a manner akin to the pure sensible concept of a ‘triangle in general’. It signifies (expresses) a rule that shows my imagination can:

...delineate the figure of a four footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents (A141/B180).

The concept ‘dog’ presents a rule according to which my imagination delineates a four footed animal in general\(^9\). The figural nature of this procedure should be recognised, yet we must also uphold Kant’s desire to distinguish the schema of empirical concepts from images.

Images can be connected with concepts (determined and judged) only by means of the schema to which they belong, they are never completely congruent with concepts and necessarily require a schema in order to be determined. Though empirical concepts and intuitions share a sense of general homogeneity, some divergence from the delineated figure is possible (e.g. three legged dogs) as long as the necessary (defining) features of the monogram are adhered to and preserved in the example judged as being contained under the empirical concept\(^{10}\). As with the pure sensible concept, the general delineated figure is dictated by a rule connected to the basic definition of e.g. a ‘dog’ (as a four footed animal) or a ‘triangle’ (as a three sided shape). The schematism of these concepts is figural in relation to this mode of determination as it is related to the specific form of the empirical intuition and concerns the extent to which it corresponds with the general form dictated by a pure sensible or empirical concept and delineated in accordance with a rule.

\(^9\) Kant’s use of the word ‘delineate’ here points to a capacity of the imagination to sketch out, depict or represent pictorially the figure of a four footed animal.

\(^{10}\) Just as with the square plate, the figural template is necessarily adjusted and incorporated even if only in terms of negation e.g. not a round plate, not a four legged dog.
Kant describes the schemata of empirical concepts alongside the schemata of pure sensible concepts as the manner in which empirical concepts are schematised is partially figurative. However, the application of empirical concepts has to be learnt and as general concepts of nature, the context in which the intuited figural forms are given has significance\textsuperscript{11}. As empirical concepts refer to context the imagination must re-call the form of an intuition as related to an empirical concept before using it to make a determinate judgement. It undertakes a regression in order to engage in conceptual recognition of particulars that are present in the empirical intuition, these are then deemed sufficiently related to a (previous) correctly judged empirical concept. For example, I see a ‘dog’ before me and my imagination effects a regression in order to recognise it as a ‘dog’ (it refers to previous intuitions and correctly determined empirical examples of dogs). I measure the given ‘dog’ against a general template (a figure of a ‘four footed animal’ that has in itself never been experienced) that has been generated with reference to previously intuited empirical examples\textsuperscript{12}. The figure of a ‘dog in general’ (as a ‘four footed animal’) is used to recognise the given dog because this intuition fits the template and we can judge it as belonging under the same concept. A plate exemplifies roundness and refers to the pure sensible concept of a circle, a dog is schematised with reference to its appearance as a ‘four footed animal’ which is not a pure sensible concept but a living (embodied) figure that participates in a causal nexus.

\textsuperscript{11} E.g. if I see a four footed animal in a horse box I am more likely to judge that it is a horse, whereas, if I see a four footed animal on the end of a lead being walked around a park I am more likely to judge that this is a dog (even if I am too far away to see either of them clearly).

\textsuperscript{12} The general figure as a template is not strictly \textit{a priori} as it is generated from experiences, but it is not sensible either as it has itself never been experienced itself.
Pure sensible concepts are schematised through monograms generated by the a priori imagination, empirical concepts are schematised using a monogram that is produced through a process of recollection and so I have termed this a recollective schema. Empirical intuitions can be considered as specific exhibitions of general concepts of nature; they describe nature in a general way and examples are given and judged as pertaining to general concepts. These intuitions are given in experience which is governed by the pure concepts of the understanding so though empirical concepts are realised in part in a manner that relates to them figurally, they are also realised with reference to the transcendental schema of pure concepts of the understanding.

Let us summarise the types of concept we have discussed and the ways they are schematised (exhibited) so that we can compare them with one another. The transcendental schema is a product of the imagination that realises concepts of the understanding by making them homogeneous with intuitions through time. Representations are connected a priori in one concept in conformity with the unity of apperception so that our experience appears unified. Concepts of the understanding therefore have an intrinsic connection to the self and present or govern our experience as unified. Pure sensible concepts are realised through a figural schema using a monogram generated by the a priori imagination. This schema refers to space and is figural as these concepts are realised according to their appearance as general figures which differ from images as the former need not betray a type. Empirical concepts are realised through a recollective schema which uses a monogram and takes place with reference to figural qualities in relation to the concept and intuition, but also with a reference to context as they pertain to intuitions given within the unified experience governed by pure concepts of the understanding.
These concepts are schematised spatially (with reference to their appearance as figures) and temporally (as part of a causal nexus).

The *transcendental schema* differs in kind from the *figural schema* of pure sensible concepts and the figural element of the *re-collective schema*. The pure schema serves in place of the *monogram*, the special unity that the *transcendental schema* aims at represents a method and the operation of the imagination in this type of schematism is not imagistic, it is at most relational as the unity comes from the concept itself, not from the imagination (though the imagination must harmonise with it through the pure synthesis). What is achieved by the application of a pure concept to intuition by the *transcendental schema* is not a figural but a synthetic unity related to and expressed by concepts that cannot be contained within a figure that relates to sensible intuition. This is why the schema of pure concepts of understanding is ‘transcendental’. In summary, pure sensible concepts are schematised via a rule of synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space, pure concepts of the understanding are schematised via the determination of inner sense in general according to the conditions of its *form* (time), and empirical concepts are schematised with reference to both of these methods.

Sensible schemata use a *monogram* which is closer to the ‘special intuition’ which characterises the unity of an image, however the *monogram* has a capacity to be general where an image can only be specific. Pure concepts of the understanding aim at unity in the determination of sensibility and do not use a *monogram* of the *a priori* or reproductive imagination. Thus, the difference in unity generated by each type of schema that connects concepts with intuitions is revealed: unity is given to the *figural schema* through space as pure sensible concepts are illustrated in intuition, unity is given to the *transcendental schema* through time as pure categories
are realised by schemata, and unity is given to the *recollective schema* through a combination of space and time that thereby yields examples of empirical concepts in intuition. These examples are judged via a synthesis of the spatial aspects of the *figural schema* and the relation to a temporal network and general concepts of nature that characterises the *transcendental schema*.

It is important to attend to the figural aspects of schematisation if we are to understanding the true nature of schematic exhibition and gain insight into the role of the imagination. The schema is referred to as both a procedure and product of the imagination yet Kant does not make the role of the imagination and its capabilities explicit, particularly in regard to its role in the formation of knowledge as cognition. He refers to the schematism of the understanding and its approach to appearances and their mere (sensible) form as ‘an art concealed in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180). We must *artfully* apply the correct concepts to intuited objects to gain knowledge of the world around us and determinate judgements are made possible through the ‘art’ of schematism which itself remains concealed and is not ‘open to our gaze’ (A141/B180-1). Schematism is designated as an artistic, mysterious and indemonstrable product and procedure and it is interesting to note Kant’s analogy between vision and clear determination here. Our knowledge is dependent upon the ‘art’ of schematism, without it our concepts are empty and have no meaning. We can never ‘see’ or make this ‘art’ determinate which means that the process through which we judge and know things is itself unknowable. The basis of our knowledge (as cognition) is unknowable in some respects, it is a mysterious art concealed in the depths of our soul. Kant’s description of schematism as an ‘art’ and his explanation of the way concepts are realised (through *examples* given in intuition) reveals a similarity with the method through which an artist expresses aesthetic ideas through
exemplary works of art. Both methods concern the realisation and exhibition of concepts residing in the mind which are granted reality via a connection to intuitable form.

What we gain from a comparison of the different types of schema is a collective sense of how all three schemas operate differently (through space and time) to achieve a common goal. They all give form to concepts in order to present them directly; as they are, or as they appear in intuition.

In his paper on *Post-Modernism and Judgement* Howard Caygill claims that there are two ways of reading the mediation that takes place between the concept and the intuition in Kant’s account of schematism in the *First Critique*. As a result of these readings Caygill traces a notion of ‘invention’ in Kant’s account of the legitimation of judgement that is significant in respect to our question concerning the role of the figure. In regard to the two readings Caygill states:

The first remains within the discourse of judgement: the schema mediates between the discriminations of sense and the laws of the understanding. The second exceeds judgement and *points to a notion of invention* in which the schema is understood as a 'product of transcendental imagination', as an activity prior to the discriminations of intuition and the subsumptions of the pure concepts (my italics)\(^\text{13}\).

For Caygill the first reading concerns how the schemata of sensibility realise and restrict the concepts of understanding by limiting them to conditions that are due to sensibility. Kant describes an act of judgement in which the schemata mediate between a particular intuition and a particular concept and in this sense the first reading refers to a specific application. In the first reading “the schema is *reified* into

a function that facilitates mediation, while in the second it designates the activity of mediation”\textsuperscript{14}. The schema of the concept is discussed in regard to its scope and limits as if it were not merely an abstract notion, but a real and concrete pathway that an abstract concept must travel to gain reality; it travels a specific path of mediation to reach its destination in intuition, and the schema becomes ‘reified’. This view of the schema presents the process of schematisation as an artistic act as the schemata of sensibility first realise the categories, and at the same time restrict them and what is this if not a process of giving form in a temporal sense?

In the second reading sensibility as a whole realises the faculty of the understanding in the very process of restricting it. This reading refers to the general phenomenon of the restriction and realisation of the understanding by sensibility and Caygill claims this sense of mediation ‘exceeds judgement’s hierarchy of concept and intuition and its language of discrimination and subsumption’\textsuperscript{15}. Both readings involve restriction and realisation, but what is restricted and realised differs in each case.

Kant states that the schemata are limited to conditions that lie outside the understanding and are due to sensibility: ‘The schema is, properly, only the phenomenon or \textit{sensible concept}, of an object in agreement with the category’ (A146/B186 my italics). If we interpret this in light of the first reading of the mediation the schema is a sensible concept; a phenomenon of an object in agreement with a concept and this implies it could be known sensibly\textsuperscript{16}. A sensible concept can be

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Defined as any state or process known through the senses rather than by intuition or reasoning.
given shape, it can be realised, restricted, recognised and agreed upon in a manner that relates solely to appearances and not to things in themselves. For Kant, the categories without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for concepts and do not possess an object, and here we reach the second reading of the mediation of the schema: ‘This objective meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realises the understanding in the very process of restricting it’ (A147/B187). Here it is the whole of sensibility itself that provides the categories of the understanding with objective meaning.

In both readings mediation involves realisation and restriction, and is akin to a process that bestows form. It realises and restricts in the manner of a temporal figuration or formation which gives the category objective meaning in experience. Kant states in the Transcendental Aesthetic that we can present time only by analogy with space. Though the transcendental schema of the pure concepts of the understanding are given unity and realised through time, this can only be expressed by analogy with space as Kant states ‘…all relations of time allow of being expressed in an outer intuition’ and this representation is itself an intuition (A33/B50). If we combine this formative capacity of mediation with Caygill’s claims that in particular applications the schema becomes ‘reified’, one could argue that even the transcendental schema is figurative by analogy. The process of schematising a concept in order to demonstrate that it is not empty is therefore intrinsically bound to a bestowal of sensible form in order to exhibit or express an intellectual reflection or

17 The necessity of becoming sensible and being given form is here connected to how the categories acquire objective meaning and this is an important association to bear in mind when we come to discuss how ideas are realised.

18 ‘And just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we endeavour to make up for this want by analogies’ (A33/B50).
function of the understanding. The figure plays an integral role in the schematic realisation of pure sensible and empirical concepts, and we can even trace its presence in respect to the *transcendental schema* as concepts of the understanding have meaning only once realised and restricted by sensibility and this necessitates them being bound in sensible form through time which can itself only be expressed by analogy with space, and thus it becomes figural.

### 3.2. The Schematic Realisation of Ideas

So far we have considered the schemata of pure sensible concepts, empirical concepts and pure concepts of understanding, we also know that rational concepts can be realised directly (schematically) or indirectly (symbolically). This section will focus on the direct presentation of ideas and I will attend to indirect modes of representation in Part 3. Kant discusses how ideas are schematised in *The Architectonic of Pure Reason* where he describes how an idea becomes realised using a *monogram* of reason. This type of schema often goes unrecognised in secondary literature as it is not discussed in Kant’s chapter on *Schematism*, but in *Kant and The Ends of Aesthetics* Gary Banham recognises and refers to it as a ‘final end schema’ and this is a fitting term for the way an idea develops and becomes realised.\(^{19}\) It is important to attend to this schema as it not only illustrates how theoretical ideas become realised, it outlines a key role in this process for a figure

created by reason. Recognising this schema and clarifying the role (and nature) of this figure will enable us to develop a comprehensive understanding of schematic hypotyposis as direct exhibition. I will present Kant’s account of how ideas are realised through a final end schema and will illustrate the process with reference to two examples which vary in scale. In doing this I will discuss the dual meaning and use of the term ‘architectonic’ for Kant, and will demonstrate the realisation of ideas as a recursive process that involves a complex relation to time. The use of the monogram as a particular type of figure that is created beyond the bounds of sensible intuition will reaffirm my earlier claims about the artistic capacity of reason (discussed in Chapters 1 & 2).

Kant defines ‘architectonic’ as ‘the art of constructing systems’; it is what raises knowledge to the rank of a science and makes a system out of an aggregate by uniting the manifold under one idea (A832/B860). Architectonic refers to the art of constructing a system on the basis of the idea of a whole, and it refers to that idea itself in terms of a general delineation or outline. The latter is the monogram required in order for an idea to be realised through a final end schema. Howard Caygill observes that Kant’s use of ‘architectonic’ combines Baumgarten’s definition

---


21 Gary Banham identifies the schema through which ideas are realised as a ‘final end schema’. He claims that it contributes to the elaboration of a ‘general’ aesthetic by confirming a three-fold role for the imagination as ultimately tied to the system of pure reason and its determinate ends. Banham coins the term as he elaborates on Howard Caygill’s claims (in Post Modernism and Judgement) that the schema is more than a mediating function between understanding and sensibility. For Banham Caygill’s account describes ‘a general restriction and realisation of the understanding by sensibility which is activated not by the schema having a function of mediation, but rather itself being the activity of mediation’. For Banham the final end schema gives the outline or monogrammata of the entire system of pure reason; it provides a notion of the final end of this system which requires a relation between three distinct doctrines of transcendental judgement. He goes on to argue that a general aesthetic emerges through Kant’s account of imagination, schematism and judgement and this provides a link between the architectonic of all three Critiques. Banham, Gary, Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 57.
of it as designating the structure of metaphysics in his *Metaphysica*, with Lambert’s use of it as referring to the ‘art’ of establishing such a structure in his *Architectonik* 22. ‘Architectonic’ therefore refers to the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge and the art of constructing that which is deemed to be scientific. The architectonic end of a structure anticipates a systematic link between the constituent parts, yet it also describes the art of connecting these parts together in line with an idea; it involves the detection of scientificity within a unity governed by an idea and the construction or creation of a work in accordance with it.

In the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* Kant states that reason requires the systematisation of an aggregate in line with an idea in order to further its essential ends. He refers to an idea as a concept provided by reason of the form of a whole that determines *a priori* the scope and position of the parts, the idea also contains the end and the form of the whole in line with this *a priori* determination (A832/B860). The whole comprises or dictates the unity of the end to which all the parts relate and this enables us to detect parts that may be missing and prevent any unnecessary additions. Kant describes the way in which a whole grows (or develops) as it becomes realised:

The whole is thus an organised unity (*articulatio*), and not an aggregate (*coacervatio*). It may grow from within (*per intussusceptionem*), but not by external addition (*per appositionem*). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes (A833/B861).

According to this description an idea becomes realised as it develops organically and naturally\textsuperscript{23}. Kant emphasises the growth of an idea as a process of becoming what it is intended to be, its development concerns a natural realisation of present yet hidden or latent potential. Kant communicates this process using a simile: the idea is ‘like an animal body’ and this imaginative representation supplements the determinate discussion to arouse an accompanying image of growth that recurs and is perpetuated throughout this section to reinforce the process as organic and natural\textsuperscript{24}. Kant’s emphasis on the realisation of ideas as a natural process establishes and reinforces his view of nature as systematic in the \textit{First Critique}\textsuperscript{25}. This gives us an insight into the realisation of any and every idea intended to raise a work to the rank of a science and it shows us that theoretical ideas are realised through a natural process of systematic growth. The natural systematic unity that accompanies and dictates the realisation of an idea is echoed in our understanding of nature - our knowledge of ‘what is’ - and it therefore makes sense that this view of systematicity as natural should also guide the organisation of our manifold modes of knowledge into one large, natural, informative system that prescribes and is comprised by the way in which we interrogate nature.

The method through which architectonic unity is presented mirrors the organisation of nature into a \textit{system} of species and genera. Kant describes the formation of a system by analogy with a lowly organism:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} Here we can draw a parallel with A.W. Schlegel’s view of the work of art as possessing an organic form which unfolds as it becomes realised and expressed. Schlegel, A.W. \textit{Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur}, Stuttgart, Vol 2, 1967, pp.109-110.

\textsuperscript{24} The use of this metaphorical language recurs throughout this section of the \textit{Critique} in relation to the movement of reason, the progression of metaphysics and the development of the idea.

\textsuperscript{25} I will compare this with his view of nature as art in the \textit{Third Critique} in Chapter 6
Systems seem to be formed in the manner of lowly organisms, through a *generatio aequívoca* from the mere confluence of assembled concepts, at first imperfect, and only gradually attaining to completeness, although they one and all have their schema, as the original germ, in the sheer self development of reason (A835/B863)\textsuperscript{26}.

The use of natural imagery and metaphorical language recurs as Kant describes the faculty of knowledge as having two ‘stems’ (A835/B863) and of philosophy as following many paths ‘until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at last been discovered’ (A838/B866). The growth of the idea is presented as organic and natural and if we consider this in terms of e.g. the necessary idea identified behind Plato’s *Republic* the maximum advanced arises naturally out of the creation and development of the work as it becomes realised with architectonic unity.

In instances in which an idea is realised through a work that possesses systematic (or scientific) unity the end is that which guides the division of the whole into parts and it is also that which the parts aim towards. Kant is clear that the realisation of an idea occurs through a schema:

> The idea requires for its realisation a *schema*, that is, a constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of which must be determined *a priori* from the principle defined by its end (A833/B861).

This type of schema requires a constituent manifold and order of its parts that must be determined *a priori* in line with its end. The difference between a schema devised empirically (technically), and one devised in accordance with an idea

\textsuperscript{26} This is the same analogy used by A.W. Schlegel in respect to his view of a work of art possessing organic form and a specific type of unity (of the whole to the parts that comprise it) which arises as a result of the way it is produced by the artist: “Organic form, again, is innate; it unfolds (*blicket*) itself from within, and acquires its determination contemporaneously with the perfect development of the germ” Schlegel, A.W. *Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur*, Stuttgart, Vol 2, 1967, p.109-110.
(architectonically) is that the latter originates from an idea through which reason gives the ends a priori and it serves as basis of architectonic unity\textsuperscript{27}. A science is formed architectonically ‘in view of the affinity of its parts and of their derivation from a single supreme and inner end, through which the whole is first made possible’ (A834/B862). Ideas in general possess and require a final end schema, they are constructed by human reason, and works of science (as well as the sciences themselves) are generated in accordance with them.

Let us consider the role of the monogram used to realise ideas schematically in more detail. The realisation of any idea involves a monogram, this is akin to a plan or blue-print that gives the form of a whole to a system and guides the division of this whole into parts. The ends of the whole are determined a priori as is the scope of the parts and their position in relation to one another. A work is constructed or created in accordance with an idea using a monogram of reason which assists with the communication of the idea to others and ensures that the unity of an aggregate is raised to the status of a science through adherence to and utilisation of a final end schema.

Earlier analysis revealed the schema as a product of the imagination; the monogram of the pure sensible schema is produced by the a priori imagination, the monogram of the recollective schema is produced by the reproductive imagination and the transcendental schema as a mediating activity is a transcendental product of the imagination. But the final end schema is not produced by the imagination and does not refer to the transcendental aesthetic (space and time as formal conditions

\textsuperscript{27} Caygill gives a clear formulation of this ‘The architectonic end is distinguished from a ‘technical’ one by not being derived from empirical criteria arising from scientific discoveries; rather it anticipates them’. Caygill, Howard, A Kant Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 84.
of sensibility). The monogram of this schema is an a priori product of reason that not only enables the realisation of ideas, but also (as we will see) the entire system of pure reason. This monogram is a figure that possesses a unique status. It is not merely intelligible – as even the higher system of philosophy as metaphysics in general can be drawn in visible tabular form\(^{28}\), nor is it sensible - as it is an a priori product of reason; it has a status that is not explicitly addressed and falls outside of the traditional dichotomy of the visible and the intelligible. This figure is of particular importance in enabling scientificity to be achieved and it makes possible the realisation of theoretical ideas as works and systems. It lends itself to the realisation of ideas on a varying scale e.g. it can communicate ideas such as. Kant’s step ladder or Plato’s Divided Line, yet it is also operative on a larger scale and can present the ‘system’ of metaphysics itself\(^{29}\).

Kant develops the final end schema as part of the doctrine of method in an attempt to secure metaphysics on the path of a science (by establishing it as a systematic subject devised in accordance with a necessary idea). His discussion of this schema arises from a desire to secure the architectonic unity of all knowledge arising from pure reason and thereby also of metaphysics. He claims that Plato and the ‘founders’ of metaphysics failed to do this as they did not clearly determine the correct usage and meaning of the term ‘idea’. As a result they did not determine the proper content, systematic unity, and limits of metaphysics as a subject. Kant acknowledges Plato’s influence yet is critical of his lack of methodological clarity and


\(^{29}\) We can also trace the presence of the monogram in relation to the realisation of theoretical ideas through works of science in e.g. the gradient system of acids and alkali’s and on a larger scale as operative in e.g. the periodic table.
his failure to secure metaphysics as a system with a clear final-end schema. Establishing this is important (and necessary) as without the idea of a system of metaphysics, the subject itself cannot be ‘realised’ or legitimised.

Kant discusses how knowledge must be organised for a particular subject to be judged ‘scientific’. The modes of knowledge must not be presented as an aggregate, they must be a system; the parts must stand in a relation to the whole and to each other, and the terms of this relation are determined by the end of the idea (devised in accordance with the whole). Kant states that to establish a science one must have an idea on which to base it, however, the scheme itself and the definition given at the start are seldom adequate to the idea once it has been realised (A834/B862). The ends of the idea (e.g. of metaphysics as a subject) must therefore guide the ‘de-division’\(^\text{30}\) of the subject even though it has not yet been realised with completeness and is therefore subject to change as it grows and develops. This is the same for the realisation of any theoretical idea and thus ideas are revealed to have a recursive relation to time as through the final end schema an idea must retrospectively guide the schematic realisation of itself.

Let us look at how this is possible. Ideas possess architectonic unity and the parts that in their affinity comprise the whole both derive from and make possible a single supreme end. The idea as a system has a strange paradoxical relationship to time as it dictates the relation of parts and the parts must combine to dictate the end. The end (as a whole) makes the parts possible (by giving them scope and a position relative to one another), and the parts (in their unity, sum and affinity) make possible

\(^{\text{30}}\) The word ‘de-vision’ refers to the way in which an idea is initially devised, and not the ‘division’ of a whole into parts.
the end as the form of a whole. Kant describes how ‘only after we have spent much
time in the collection of materials in a somewhat random fashion at the suggestion of
an idea lying hidden in our minds’ does it then become possible for us to discern this
idea with more clarity ‘and to devise a whole architectonically in accordance with the
ends of reason’ (A834-5/B862-3).

The idea changes as it develops and Kant ties the development of the term ‘idea’
to the development of metaphysics itself as a subject; when discussing how ideas in
general become realised he uses the idea of metaphysics itself as an example. Kant
states that an idea is realised in accordance with a monogramma that guides its
realisation through the division of whole and parts. This is a priori and comes before
the idea is realised in order to guide the end result (much like architectural plans
guide and are necessary for the construction of a building). The monogramma
constitutes the means by which the idea is present before, after, and during its own
realisation and also serves as proof that the idea is realised in itself (and not by
using a symbolic transposition). Though the original idea may differ greatly from the
system as a whole through which it is eventually realised, it is nonetheless present
initially as a point of departure, it then acts as a guiding feature and a finally as a
destination. The idea grows through time but it orients its own development and
swerves itself towards its own completion.

The realisation of an idea through a monogram must follow a plan, or order that is
determined by reason and it must therefore become realised with reference to

31 See 1.3. for a full discussion of this movement of swerving which I discuss in relation to Plato’s
influence on Kant. The movement is relevant here as though it necessitates e.g. an idea being guided
generally towards its destination, it allows for the possibility of divergence and freedom (to grow,
change and develop) as it progresses to its end as a goal.
temporal succession (though it does not develop and unfold in a linear respect). The
idea must project into the future and present possibilities in order to then direct its
own realisation along the correct path towards its required end or aims. It must also
reach back into the past in order to ensure that it remains loyal to its origins and
consistent so that it can present and correctly interpret the status quo in line with its
intended aims. As it becomes realised it must retain a traceable temporal connection
to past, present and future to secure its origin (ground), departure and progress
(guided movement towards realisation from its ground), and destination (the terminal
point of realisation, presentation or communication). The idea disjoints time in order
to realise itself through a final end schema as it retrospectively guides its own
realisation. The creation of the monogram by reason does not have a linear relation
to time (in the same sense as e.g. the transcendental schema); it projects forwards
and must regress back to guide the realisation of itself not through a reflective
anamnesis, but a projected anamnesis that performs a heuristic function\textsuperscript{32}.

As the idea cannot be realised in the manner of the categories - through
schematisation according to the conditions of time and space - the purpose of the
final end schema is not to realise the idea in sensible intuition, but to realise it
through an ordering of the constituent parts of its manifold in accordance with the
ends of a whole. An idea may become realised schematically through a system but
this grants it different type of reality to e.g. a triangle, a dog, or even causality; it does

\textsuperscript{32} The difference between a reflective anamnesis and a projected anamnesis is that the former
requires a circular movement between two relata to initiate reflection. A reflective anamnesis occurs
e.g. as an idea is realised symbolically, the idea is transposed out of itself into something else and
then returns back to itself as that which has become realised by analogy with something else. The
initial movement is guided by the event that has not yet occurred (indirect realisation) as this is its
goal or aim. Projected anamnesis is not a circular movement between two relata, it is a linear
'shooting forth' that projects e.g. a plan, scheme, outline or monogram into the future using knowledge
of the idea as an end-product before it is gained i.e. before the idea has been realised schematically
as a system.
not have any objective reality yet it can still be demonstrated. The reality of the final end schema is therefore granted through the regulative function it performs; it serves to guide the development of a system and regulates the architectonic unity that is comprised by (and governs) a relation between whole and parts. The final-end schema is therefore, a means through which an idea can be realised directly, that is, in itself and not via a transposition into something else. However, as the idea is not connected to sensible intuition its realisation must retain the form and status of a projection, (though it retains a possibility for presentation in the manner of a blueprint, plan or diagram).

Let us look at how Kant sets out metaphysics itself as a subject. This is significant as it exemplifies the schematic realisation of an idea through a monogram on a large scale (as the idea pertains to metaphysics itself). Kant shows how the idea of metaphysics can be realised and clarified through a final end schema by constructing a monogram that is guided by the idea it seeks to realise. Kant defines philosophy as ‘the system of all philosophical knowledge’, it serves as an archetype that we use to judge attempts at philosophising and each subjective philosophy, and so we must take it objectively. On philosophy as an idea he states:

Thus regarded philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists in concreto, but to which, by many different paths, we endeavour to approximate, until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at last been discovered, and the image, hitherto so abortive, has achieved likeness to the archetype, so far as this is granted to [mortal] man (A838/B866).

We cannot learn philosophy, we can learn only to philosophise. Kant explains that philosophy is thought as a scholastic concept (of a system of knowledge concerned with logical perfection) but the real basis of the term ‘philosophy’ lies in a conceptus cosmicus. The latter relies upon a personification of the archetypal system of
philosophy into the ideal philosopher. For Kant philosophy concerns the essential ends of human reason and the philosopher is ‘not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason’ (A839/B867). In comparison to the mathematician, the natural philosopher and the logician (who are artificers) Kant claims the philosopher is ‘a teacher [conceived] in the ideal, who sets them their tasks, and employs them as instruments, to further the essential ends of human reason’ (A839/B867). The philosopher does not exist in concreto, but the idea is present in all human reason and its systematic unity in line with essential ends is the subject of Kant’s concern.

He then sets out all philosophy as a system. He divides philosophy itself into two separate systems; one concerned with nature (the law of all that is) and one concerned with freedom (the moral law and that which ought to be). The whole system of philosophy is divided into knowledge from pure reason and knowledge obtained by reason empirically; pure and empirical philosophy. There are two branches of pure philosophy: criticism (or propaedeutic) and metaphysics (as the system of pure reason). He goes on to say that metaphysics is divided into speculative philosophy (as theoretical knowledge of nature) and practical philosophy (in relation to morality and actions); a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. In the narrow meaning of the term metaphysics (the metaphysics of nature) it is divided into transcendental philosophy (concerned with the understanding and reason) and physiology (nature). In respect to physiology the employment of reason is divided into immanent and transcendental; the former concerns corporeal nature.

33 There is some discrepancy in the system Kant sets out as at first he refers to metaphysics as one of the two branches of pure philosophy but he then goes on to say that metaphysics encompasses criticism and may be applied to ‘the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can be known a priori …’ (A841/B869).
(physics) and thinking nature (psychology), and the latter concerns transcendental
knowledge of the world, and transcendental knowledge of God (the whole of nature
as being above nature). This sets out the complex architectonic structure of
metaphysics as Kant views it in the First Critique and though this idea changes as it
becomes developed throughout his critical works, important features of it remain34. It
is quite clear that, for Kant the idea of philosophy enables construction of this
monogram as a systematic structure: ‘The originative idea of a philosophy of pure
reason itself prescribes this division, which is therefore architectonic’ (A847/B875).
Although Kant acknowledges that there have been problems with the subject of
metaphysics - as it has never been set out with such unity before, and much more
was expected of it – the results he gains are valuable not in terms of extending our
knowledge, but in respect to preventing errors and granting ‘dignity and authority’ to
the subject (A851/B879). Kant uses an interesting analogy to describe the relation
between metaphysics and reason as he claims human reason cannot dispense with
metaphysics and must always return to it ‘as to a beloved one with whom we have
had a quarrel’ (A850/B878). We return to metaphysics because it concerns the
essential ends of human reason and is that alone which constitutes philosophy: ‘Its
sole occupation is wisdom; and it seeks it by the path of a science, which, once
trodden can never be overgrown, and permits of no wandering’ (A850/B878).

The idea of metaphysics as a science is realised through the systematic
organisation of philosophy and proves itself as meaningful (and not an empty
concept of reason). Only the idea itself is necessary for this type of realisation, no
intuition is needed and no mediation by the imagination. However, it is important to

34 We will return to this architectonic in our discussion of the Third Critique in Part 3.
remember that the creation of systems is considered by Kant to be an ‘art’ and though the art of constructing systems is a rational enterprise the natural movement of reason itself grants the form of a system to an idea in order that it may be realised, just as the artist grants form to an aesthetic idea in order to exhibit it.

In conclusion, ‘architectonic’ refers to the structure or unity of a system, and the art of creating such a system; in most systems it is human reason that engages in this creation, but it seems for Kant that in relation to the idea of metaphysics, the ideal figure of the philosopher is the source of this creation. The way in which an idea develops is characterised as an organic process and this reaffirms an understanding of nature (and reason) as systematic which prevails throughout the First Critique. However, we can draw parallels with the creation of the system (in terms of its production and unity) and that of a work of art and this will be pursued further in Part 3. We must also note the way that Kant communicates the growth and development of an idea using analogies with nature (to perpetuate the systematic similarities between the two). The final end schema required to realise an idea does so with reference to the idea’s regulative capacity through a monogram created by reason. This monogram is a transcendent figure that needs never be realised in intuition and reveals that this type of schema possesses a transcendental status that akin to that of the transcendental schema used to realise concepts of the understanding. Both schemata are ‘transcendental’ but the difference concerns their relation to the imagination; the transcendental schema is a product of the imagination whereas the final end schema is a product of reason. We discussed how the idea possesses a peculiar relation to time as retrospectively guides the

35 I will discuss the significance of the transcendental status of the final end schema in relation to Heidegger’s account of the schema image in 3.3.
realisation of itself yet retains the possibility to change as it becomes developed. The idea of metaphysics itself (and of Kant’s system of philosophy) exemplifies the realisation of an idea through a monogram with reference to its architectonic unity and though the reality granted to any idea retains the status of a projection, it demonstrates that the idea is more than a mere abstraction. Kant refers to the realisation of ideas in general in respect to their growth and development, and the realisation of the specific idea of metaphysics itself and the latter demonstrates the importance of having a final end schema in respect to legitimacy, reality, and methodological clarity.

3.3. Heidegger and the Schema Image

This section will offer a critical reply to Heidegger’s account of the schema in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I will argue that the schema is not imagistic (as claimed by Heidegger), but that its operation involves reference to a monogram as a figure and the difference between the two concerns a capacity for generality without betraying a ‘type’. The aim of this section is to show that Heidegger’s understanding of the schema as imagistic lends support to my argument (that a specific type of figure is required for the exhibition of concepts and ideas), and to demonstrate that Heidegger’s account does not address the formative capacity of reason that is pertinent to a comprehensive understanding of schematism and transcendence. Though this capacity is operative in relation to the schematism of ideas it is significant as it concerns a transcendental type of schema that goes beyond the ‘look’ of any image and realises ideas with reference to a monogram (as an
architectonic figure of reason). I will argue that Heidegger’s account of the schema as imagistic denies the status of pure concepts and fails to recognise the capacity and status of the monogram as a construct of reason that transcends the bounds of time and space (which are necessary for any image to appear).

This section will outline the context of Heidegger’s approach to the subject of schematism and will go on to discuss his account of the schema image with reference to the examples he gives. I will outline some of the problems with Heidegger’s interpretation and engagement with Kant to conclude that no adequate account of the schema can be given without addressing the monogram. This figure is necessary for communicating and securing theoretical ideas in general, and the idea of metaphysics itself. It reveals a connection between the bestowal of form, the communication of ideas and the realisation of concepts through schematic hypotyposis.

Let us begin by outlining Heidegger’s approach to schematism. It is necessary to look at his method (and objectives) in interpreting Kant’s First Critique to understand why schematism – particularly the transcendental schema - is the central focus of his account. I will also compare Kant’s need to secure the architectonic unity of metaphysics with Heidegger’s desire to uncover the grounds of this unity to set his discussion of schematism in context to his wider task.

Heidegger understands schematism as that which reveals transcendence and enables the structures of ontological knowledge to become accessible to us as finite beings. For Heidegger The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding is an important part of the First Critique and forms ‘the central core of the whole
voluminous work. Its importance is affirmed by Kant himself who considered it to be one of the most difficult sections to negotiate. Heidegger’s objective in analysing schematism is to ascertain how a priori structures betray ontological questions operative at a fundamental level in Kant’s epistemological project. Hence, it is transcendental schematism (in relation to pure concepts of the understanding) that Heidegger views as integral to uncovering the ground for the possibility of ontological knowledge.

In his analysis of schematism Heidegger seeks to penetrate the basis of Kant’s underlying assumptions and ‘retrieve’ the grounds which form the foundations of Kant’s task. Heidegger describes his methodology in relation to the First Critique as a ‘retrieval’ which aims to bring to light the originality of the origin of metaphysics (KPM2). In Heidegger, Kant and Time Charles M. Sherover describes Heidegger’s method of ‘retrieval’ [Wiederholung] as a ‘probing for questions that have not been answered or explored in sufficient depth in order to see what new questions Kant’s work suggests to us’. He suggests that Heidegger sought to maintain a dialogue with Kant and regarded him as alert to the problem of metaphysics (as a subject requiring a firm, secure foundation). For Sherover Heidegger is concerned not with what Kant intended to say, ‘but with the import he sees in what Kant did and did not


37 See Heidegger’s reference in KPM80 to Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass where he wrote “In general, the Schematism is one of the most difficult points. Even Herr Beck cannot find his way therein. – I hold this chapter to be one of the most important’ Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass vol. 5, no. 6359


39 Ibid. p 10.
say concerning the problems with which he dealt. He claims Heidegger’s study of Kant enables him to rethink the implications of Kant’s work, to *retrieve* them; to disclose the basic possibilities concealed within, and make manifest that which Kant did not or could not say. He explains: ‘The task of a retrieve is not to chronicle the past, but to wrest out of it a deeper comprehension of our present situation and the possibilities for development it yet offers’.

Kant’s desire to secure metaphysics and Heidegger’s desire to uncover its grounds both require recourse to an architectonic method. Kant seeks to secure the architectonic unity of metaphysics and in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* he addresses the nature of this unity in relation to way theoretical (systematic) ideas become realised through a *final end schema*. Kant explicitly states the need for architectonic unity and a secure use of the term ‘idea’ and he outlines the architectonic figure of the step ladder which enables him to realise his idea of a ‘system’ of ideas, concepts, and intuitions. Kant traced the problems of metaphysics as a threat to its grounds; terms were used inconsistently and the subject had no proper direction, scope or methodology. He warns us against building on the unsecured land which currently houses the structure of metaphysics:

For this ground has been honeycombed by subterranean workings which reason, in its confident but fruitless search for hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions, and which threaten the security of the superstructures. Our present duty is to obtain insight into the transcendental employment of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be in a position to determine and estimate its influence and true value (A319/B375-6).

---

40 Ibid. p 11.
41 Ibid. p 12.
42 For a full discussion of architectonic figures and the use of the step ladder see 1.2 and 2.2.
His intention with this analogy is to demonstrate the need for consistency in regard to the use of key terms and to show that a ‘critique’ of pure reason is necessary.

Heidegger seeks to question the grounds of the architectonic unity of metaphysics (which Kant sought to attain). He does not address the final end schema but in the Introduction to KPM he outlines his interpretation of Kant’s task in the First Critique as a “laying the ground” [Grundlegung] of metaphysics. Heidegger understands the overall task of the First Critique as placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology and he ties the subject of metaphysics to the study of the human being. He claims states that ‘… the idea of fundamental ontology will prove itself and present itself in an interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the ground for metaphysics’ (KPM1)43.

Heidegger draws analogies with the building trade to posit metaphysics not as a freestanding, outer construction, but as a shared inner construction that lies within the human being44. Although both philosophers refer to metaphysics as within the human being Kant refers to it as a ‘natural disposition’ (B21 my italics) which implies a natural propensity and Heidegger interprets the First Critique in terms of the foundations of this propensity. He writes of metaphysics as a ground-laying, not of

43 In his paper Heidegger and Cassirer on Kant Calvin O’Shrag compares interpretations of Kant’s work. He discusses the main points of Heidegger’s thesis and sets out Ernst Cassirer’s counter thesis before evaluating the two. He puts Heidegger’s interpretation in context: there are two traditional schools of Kant interpretation, the Marburg School (who uphold the central importance of the First Critique in respect to epistemological concerns) and the Heidelberg school (for which the Second Critique and its ethical concerns are of central importance). O’Shrag claims that Heidegger sought to go beyond the presuppositions of both schools with a task related to the unifying ground of metaphysics by addressing fundamental ontology in a manner that reformulates the central questions of the First Critique. O’Shrag, Calvin, “Heidegger and Cassirer on Kant”, Kant-Studien, 58, (1967): 87.

44 ‘It is true that metaphysics is not a building or structure [Gebaude] that is at hand, but is really in all human beings “as a natural construction or arrangement”’. This is a reference to CPR 2nd Edition [B21] which is made in (KPM1).
an already constructed building, but as ‘the projecting of the building plan itself so that it agrees with the direction concerning on what and how the building will be grounded’ (KPM2). This echoes Kant’s use of the building analogy and his account of how theoretical ideas are realised schematically (through a *final end schema*). It serves as evidence firstly, that Heidegger views the *First Critique* as engaged in an architectonic undertaking and secondly, that in order to communicate his own idea of metaphysics Heidegger makes reference to a scheme or plan which ‘directs’ the building process.\(^45\)

Heidegger interprets laying the ground for the foundations of metaphysics by analogy with the projection of a building plan but claims this cannot occur as a by-product of an already established foundation or constructed building; it must be prior to this. He states that laying the ground is not the ‘empty producing of a system and its subdivisions’, it is rather, the projecting of the building plan as ‘…the architectonic circumscription and delineation of the inner possibility of metaphysics that is the concrete determination of its essence’ (KPM2 my italics). The projection of the building plan corresponds with the projecting activity required from the *final end schema* in order for an idea to be realised using a *monogram* of reason. Heidegger’s description of this procedure implies that a directional projection is necessary, and is guided by an idea of the destination to be attained, this echoes the way in which the *monogram* disjoints time by retrospectively guiding the schematic realisation of itself.\(^46\) The *monogram* circumscribes and delineates the idea (e.g. of metaphysics

---

45 See 3.2 for a full discussion of how the *final end schema* is operative on different levels according to a varying scale. The realisation of an idea using a *monogram* of reason occurs in relation to the realisation of specific ideas, and in respect to the idea of metaphysics in general as it is intrinsically connected to the architectonic ends of human reason.

46 See 3.2 for a detailed discussion of this recursive capacity.
itself) as a projection in order for it to become realised. The idea is present as ‘original germ’ or starting point and it guides (and restricts) the realisation of itself as it becomes that which it is. Thus, it is present throughout as its own end or aim and this makes the realisation schematic (direct).

We can trace the presence and necessity of a final end schema in Heidegger’s method, and it is evident that, although he does not recognise or identify this schema, he explicitly refers to the projecting activity it enables in respect to the art of creating systems (and the communication of the idea of metaphysics as a subject).

To fully contextualise Heidegger’s discussion of the schema image let us situate it within the architectonic of KPM. One must engage in a ‘retrieval’ as part of the ground-laying and this must be conducted in stages which Heidegger sketches out using a fourfold division: a starting point, the carrying out of the laying of the ground, laying the ground in its originality, and laying the ground in a retrieval. Heidegger’s account of the schema fits into the second stage as a ‘Carrying out the Projection of the Inner Possibility of Ontology’. Within this stage there are 5 sub-stages and his discussion of the schema comprises the fourth. The first concerns the essential elements of pure knowledge (pure intuition and pure thinking), the second concerns the essential unity of pure knowledge, the third explores the inner possibility of the essential unity of ontological synthesis and the fourth stage concerns the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge, it is here that Heidegger gives his account of the schema-image.

Kant’s account of the schema is intended to address the gap between concepts and intuitions to account for the possibility of determinate judgements and show that our concept possess reality and meaning. Addressing this gap becomes particularly
important when the concept and intuition are not homogeneous with one another (as is the case with pure concepts of the understanding). For Heidegger pure schematism is ‘pure making sensible’ and through it transcendence becomes ‘visible’ to us as finite beings (KPM64). Schematism enables us to interrogate transcendence so that we can get to the grounds of metaphysics and retrieve the questions that not only remain unanswered, but were not even raised by Kant.

Let us now discuss the examples Heidegger uses to communicate the capacity and depth of images as compared to concepts. The intention is to uncover the basis for his claims about the image character of the schema and to demonstrate that his account does not allow for the existence of real pure concepts (as he argues that all conceptual content can be brought into an image) nor does it address the exhibition of ideas. The two are connected as pure rational concepts are schematised with reference to a monogram (a figure of reason) that is constructed in a manner that does not require the imagination. The monogram does not need to appear sensibly; it reveals a capacity of reason to behave figuratively which preserves the purity of the rational concept (idea) whilst still enabling its realisation.

For Heidegger the subject of schematism is approached via the question of subsumption and this forms a gateway into his discussion. Subsumption is not just about applying concepts to objects so that we can make determinate judgements of them (for Heidegger or Kant), ontological subsumption is required if we are to gain ontological knowledge and this is a ‘bringing to concepts’ that ‘concerns the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of the imagination’ (KPM77 my italics). Heidegger ascribes a central role to the imagination, it does not merely bridge the gap between a concept and an intuition, it operates at a fundamental level that is prior to and conditions the possibility of this type of subsumption. For Heidegger the
imagination is operative in relation to original and authentic concept formation and is capable of a double forming; it can provide for something like an image, and it can bring into an image (KPM64). The schematism chapter therefore gives us insight into more than the process through which concepts are applied to objects (which is an epistemological concern with metaphysical consequences for Kant), it also reveals how appearances are ‘brought to concepts’ (which for Heidegger lies within the sphere of ontology) and concerns how concepts are brought into being.

In relation to the examples he uses, Heidegger discusses three types of images: those which are of something ‘at hand’ (as the look of a determinate being), those offering a likeness, and those which possess the quality of a look in general (KPM65). He claims that the schema necessarily possesses an image character (despite trying to maintain Kant’s explicit distinction between the two) and calls the type of image used to schematise (which is not an image of something ‘at hand’, or a likeness) the schema image:

The schema is indeed to be distinguished from images, but nevertheless it is related to something like an image, i.e., the image-character belongs necessarily to the schema. It (the character of the image) has its own essence. It is neither just a simpler look (“image” in the first sense) nor a likeness (“image” in the second sense). It will therefore be called the schema-image [das Schema-Bild] (KPM68).

He discusses the examples used by Kant to illustrate how different types of concept are schematised, and refers to examples of his own to show how different types of image can communicate and show content.

We have already discussed how pure sensible concepts are schematised through space using a figural schema, pure concepts of the understanding are schematised through time using a transcendental schema, and empirical concepts are
schematised with reference to both time (a causal network) and space (figural qualities) using a *recollective schema*. Pure sensible concepts (e.g. triangles) are realised using a *monogram* of the *a priori* imagination, pure concepts of the understanding (e.g. causality) operate in a sense that is pre-figural and reveals an intrinsic connection to the self (as the unity of apperception)\(^{47}\), empirical concepts (e.g. plates or dogs) were realised with reference to both a causal nexus and a *monogram* generated by the reproductive imagination\(^{48}\).

Heidegger’s examples are intended to clarify the image character of the schema by distinguishing different types of image and illustrating the capacity of images to present and represent content (pertaining to different types of concept). Heidegger never states this explicitly so it is necessary to work through his examples to establish what they are examples of and what they show in relation to schematism. Firstly Heidegger refers to an object, a ‘this here’ (present at hand) which has a relation to the image that concerns the empirical intuiting of what shows itself (KPM65). This is akin to what Kant would describe in relation to the application of an empirical concept; an object is given and we can judge it via a process of subsumption due to the heterogeneity between intuition and concept. This is an example of an image at hand which shows the object directly so that we may judge it as such.

He then refers to an example of a photograph; which is a likeness or transcription of what shows itself as image. This offers a ‘look’ in one sense (of itself as a photo

\[^{47}\text{One could also argue that concepts of the understanding are *figural by analogy* as an appearance in space is required to make time perceivable (see the discussion in relation to Howard Caygill’s *Postmodernism and Judgement* in 3.1.)}\]

\[^{48}\text{The schematism of concepts is discussed in detail in 3.1.}\]
present at hand) yet it also shows that from which it has taken its likeness (KPM66). It is an image in two senses; an image at hand (of a photo) and an image as likeness (of what the photograph shows, i.e. of what it is a photograph of). The photograph at hand and any object as a ‘this here’ are both conducive with the procedure Kant describes in relation to the application of an empirical concept (or concepts). However, the photograph at hand does not just show the image of itself (so that we may judge it as a photograph), it possesses the capacity to depict other images as likenesses (so that we can judge it as a photograph of something).

To further illustrate this point Heidegger uses the macabre example of a photograph of a death mask. This is an image at hand (as a photo), and it communicates a likeness (of a death mask), yet it also shows how many images in general (such as a photo, a death mask, the face of a dead human being) can appear. On top of this it communicates a specific image as likeness that pertains to the face of the dead human being whose appearance is captured in the mask. Thus, in this example we have present: an image at hand (of the photo), an image as likeness (of the death mask), an image in general (concerning how a photo, death mask, face of a dead human being can appear) and a specific presentation of the face of a single human being whose likeness is communicated by the photographed death mask. Heidegger’s objective is to examine the way in which images can communicate a generality (that pertains to many types), as it is this capacity of the image he interprets as rivalling the capacity for generality possessed by the concept.

Heidegger seeks to show that both images and concepts can confirm that a look pertains to a certain type of thing (as present ‘at hand’, offered via a ‘likeness’, or adhering to the qualities of such a thing ‘in general’). For Kant, a concept is applied to an intuition if that intuition is judged as homogeneous with the concept or as
governed by it (in the case of pure concepts of the understanding). The examples Heidegger uses are intended to show that images can bridge the gap between concepts and intuitions by enabling us to judge according to presence, likeness and the possession of general qualities common to all things judged to be of the same type (offering the same ‘look’).

Heidegger connects the ability of images - to present or represent objects and assist with our judgements of them - with the process of schematism as ‘making sensible’. On the one hand ‘making sensible’ can refer to the immediate empirical intuiting of something, but for Heidegger it also refers to the contemplation of a likeness in which the look of a being presents itself (KPM66). A photograph presents an image of a thing (as likeness) and he interprets this image as performing the same function as a concept, however, this is stands in contrast to Kant’s account of a concept as distinct from a sensible intuition as set out in the step ladder (A320/B377). Although concepts and intuitions are both cognitions, intuitions relate immediately to the object and are singular, concepts relate mediatley by means of a feature several things may have in common (A320/B377).

An image is a sensible intuition (which for Kant has its own ‘special unity’ to form an image we perceive), concepts are either empirical or pure, i.e. they are either general and drawn from experience by means of comparison, reflection and abstraction or not taken from experience at all\(^49\). Heidegger argues that an image

\(^{49}\)In Aristotle’s *Metaphysics noesis and aeisthesis* (thinking and perceiving) are two operations of the mind and this raises the question of how they are related in respect to the acquisition of knowledge. Either the thinking comes from the perceiving (privileging sensibility), or vice versa (privileging thought). Kant followed Epicurus to develop on his theory that *noeta* anticipate the shape of *aistheta*, but possess no meaning apart from them. He sought to avoid the conflict between the empiricists and rationalists by deriving his sense of concept from the imaginative reflection on the form and content of experience. In *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* Kant claims that
can present a range or generality in the look that it offers, but for Kant, understanding this as such and making a judgement with reference to a concept involves reflection and a mediation that goes beyond an immediate empirical intuining of an object or its likeness. The judgement that this is a photo, this is a death mask, or this is the likeness of a dead human being (named X) is only possible due to reflection and recourse to concepts, it is not an immediate intuiting. Thus the generality Heidegger traces as present in the image is really operative in the process through which we reflect on an image and the attributes of what we are seeing, for Kant only then can we make a judgement. Our judgements are not merely based on the intuitive content presented to us by the image, the concepts (and ideas) we possess anticipate or shape our intuiting and we are active in bringing meaning to the sensible content we apprehend. Let us consider the example of the house that Heidegger uses to explore how an image can present a range.

For Heidegger, the ‘looks’ of the examples already discussed show how something appears in general, and thus, he argues that they can communicate a unity applicable to many which is akin to conceptual unity and ‘what representation represents in the manner of the concepts’ (KPM66). In relation to the example of a house he states: “We say: this house which is perceived, e.g. shows how a house in general appears, and consequently it shows what we represent in the concept house” (KPM67). He claims that the sensible, visual intuition of a specific, perceived house also reveals a generality that is represented in the concept; that the image reflection takes the key attributes known immediately of a thing, and if the thing is unthinkable without these attributes they are judged to be part of the concept e.g. in relation to a body a key attribute is impenetrability. This is abstracted from the sensible intuition, reflected upon, judged as indispensable, and understood to be part of the concept. This is a summary taken from the definition of concept given in: Caygill, Howard, *A Kant Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 119.
presents the look of both the specific house and the general concept. The way in which a house appears, and what this appearance shows us is: that in order to be a house it does not need to appear exactly as it does and the image of the house communicates the range of possible appearances connected with any determinate house. He then goes one step further to claim:

What we have perceived is the range of possible appearing as such, or, more precisely, we have perceived that which cultivates this range, that which *regulates and marks out* how something in general must appear in order to be able, as a house, to offer the appropriate look (KPM67; my italics).

He claims that the range appears in the image of a determinate house (how it is present is not made clear, perhaps he intends an analogy with the way in which a photograph presents a likeness but this is not explicitly drawn) and we perceive it alongside that which cultivates it.

There is a formidable leap from Heidegger’s claims about the possibility of perceiving generality in a specific image, to his claim that we can perceive that which ‘regulates and marks out how something must appear’ as the latter seems to imply that we perceive something akin to the unity of a concept (or an idea). If we refer back to the earlier analysis of how different types of concept are schematised, the *monogram* is a figure, sketch, or outline produced by the *a priori* or reproductive imagination or by reason, and it is in relation to this figure (and particularly in relation to ideas) that a regulative capacity is revealed. The *monogram* of reason needs never appear and be presented in time and space, yet it enables realisation of a theoretical idea as a system. In this respect we can trace a difference between the image and the *monogram* as the latter transcends the bounds of time and space as a pure figure. However, even in relation to the realisation of empirical and pure
sensible concepts, the monogram (as figure) differs from an image due to its general applicability, scope and nature.

Previous analysis revealed that empirical concepts e.g. ‘house’ are realised with reference to a recollective schema using a monogram that is generated empirically and verified with reference to previous correctly judged intuitions. This monogram enables us to make a judgement and apply a concept on the basis of the figural appearance of the intuited object in space and its role, relation and function as part of a causal nexus (time). In line with this understanding of schematism, one would judge a given intuition as a house if one could apply the monogram generated empirically of ‘a house in general’ (which consists of those indispensable features of a house e.g. four walls, front door, windows and roof) under the conditions of time as dictated in a world governed by pure concepts of understanding (i.e. that it was something which is or could be lived in). Thus, Heidegger’s claims about the generality of the image lend support to my argument about the role of the monogram in schematising (as some monograms have a visual dimension) but it differs from an image due to its status as a figure that is comprised of (and capable of) generality in a way that exceeds the specificity possessed by any image.

Images possess synthetic unity and this type of unity pertains to the imagination in relation to the synthesis of apperception, or a description of the unity between a concept and an intuition in the determinate judgement of an object. Heidegger describes the image of a house as capable of regulative unity, yet this is discussed by Kant only in relation to principles and ideas. In respect to schematism only the monogram of reason (which stands outside of any appearance in sensible intuition and therefore cannot be an image) is capable of regulative unity (in relation to the way in which a theoretical idea is realised systematically).
The imagination operates differently when presenting or generating an image as compared to its role in schematising (through which any multiplicity can be presented in an image in conformity with a concept). For Heidegger, this would be covered by his argument that it is capable of a double forming, if we consider Kant’s example of the 5 dots, for Heidegger it is only by understanding image as schema image that we call five points an image of the number five; as the look of five points ..... conforms to the representation of the rule for presentability of the number (KPM70). He argues that, in representing the rule of presentation the possibility of the image is already formed and this is the true look - the schema - that belongs to the schema image. I have argued that Kant uses this example to differentiate the schema from the image as, when generating an image the imagination has, as its goal a certain specific or ‘special’ unity, whereas its operation in schematising concerns a procedure that aims at unity in the determination of sensibility in general, which is not the same thing. The former concerns a generation of a specific unity (such as that which would pertain to a self-contained image e.g. a photograph) and the latter concerns the unity generally required in order for our understanding of the world and the determinate judgements we make to be coherent in relation to what we perceive sensibly so that we can have a unified experience.

Let us look at how Heidegger interprets the other examples used by Kant; he begins with empirical sensible concepts and pure sensible or mathematical concepts and goes on to discuss the transcendental schematism of pure concepts of the understanding which he claims concerns ‘the innermost essence of ontological knowledge’ (KPM79).

In reference to the example of the dog Heidegger claims that the imagination can specify the form in general without being limited to the experience of a concrete
image and this is in line with Kant’s account. However, he accounts for this possibility by tracing a descending depth of generality behind the image, rather than by noting the figural qualities (the dog is defined by both Heidegger and Kant as ‘a four footed animal’) which, accompanied by a context given with reference to the role of ‘dogs’ in a causal nexus, accounts for the generality in relation to empirical concepts and assist us to make correct determinate judgements of given intuitions.

In *Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant* Martin Weatherston recognises that, although Kant distinguishes the schema from the image, the schemata of empirical and pure sensible concepts are the bases of the production of images and this is why Kant refers to the schema as representing ‘a universal procedure of the imagination in providing an image for a concept’ (A140/B179-80). Heidegger acknowledges a ‘positive structural relationship’ between the schema image and the schema yet he makes a controversial move in stating: ‘beyond the representation of this regulative unity of the rule, the concept is nothing’ (KPM69). For him the need for the concept is displaced by what he understands as the role of the schema as the concept is grounded in this schema and always refers to it.

The schema images of mathematical (pure sensible concepts) are more adequate to their concepts and here Heidegger makes a direct reference to what Kant terms a *monogram* (figure) but what he terms ‘the schema image’: ‘...the schema-image of a mathematical construction is equally valid whether empirically exact or roughly sketched out’ (KPM70). How can an image be specific and unique and at the same time be roughly sketched out? An image cannot be both of these things at once as

the intuited image is fixed in appearance as a picture e.g. if I see what looks like a person emerging from some smoke I see a human figure, I do not see an image of a person as the image would tell me different, specific information (that the person is male/female, tall/short etc). A figure can be roughly sketched out and or empirically exact, but an image cannot.

In relation to Kant’s example of the triangle and how it encompasses a possibility for different types, Heidegger claims that on the one hand, the restrictive appearance of the schema image comes close to the unity of the concept, yet on the other its breadth (generality) comes close to the universality of this unity (KPM70). It is difficult to understand from his account how the schema image could encompass different types of triangle all of which are understood via the concept ‘triangle in general’. But the general figure of a triangle (as a three sided shape) is an adequate and general description of the figure of a triangle in general. Heidegger states that the schema image gets the character of its look from the fact that it ‘springs forth’ from out of possible presentation (which is represented in its regulation) bringing the rule into the sphere of intuitability. But one cannot conclude from this that the rule comes from the intuited sensible image and not from reflection on that image, or from its status as a figure.

Pure concepts of the understanding are grounded in pure schemata, which Heidegger claims can procure an image for them (KPM72). He acknowledges Kant’s explicit statement that ‘the schema of a pure concept of the understanding is something that can never be reduced to any image whatsoever’ (A142/B181 my italics). Yet he reinterprets this to argue that Kant meant merely to exclude their reduction to a specific kind of image, i.e. those images that pertain to the sphere of the empirically intuitive (the schema images of pure sensible and empirical
concepts). For Heidegger the relation between pure concepts of the understanding and time concerns the innermost construction of transcendence. He claims that time - as pure intuition - can procure a ‘look’ prior to all experience, and this is a ‘pure image’ (KPM73). For Kant the pure image of all objects in general is time (A142/B182) and for Heidegger the schema of the pure concepts of understanding can be brought into the pure image of time and this is their sole possibility of having a certain look (KPM74). He argues that time is the schema image as it represents (and regulates) unities as rules and imparts a possible look.

This type of image must be pure and formable in a variety of ways, the schemata of pure concepts of the understanding are ‘a priori determinations of time according to rules’ (A145/B184) or ‘transcendental determinations of time’ (A138/B177). This schematism is transcendental as it forms transcendence a priori and to illustrate this Heidegger uses an example of the transcendental schematism of the category of substance. Substance signifies that which forms the ground, therefore its schema must be a representation of that which forms the ground presented in the pure image of time. Time shows its own permanence and gives the pure look of something like lasting in general and as this pure image it presents that which forms the ground in pure intuition (KPM76). Substance signifies that which forms the ground of a thing which adheres, time is only the pure image of the notion of substance if it presents this relation in a pure image. For Heidegger this interpretation must show that substance can procure a pure image a priori in time. Time has a central role in Heidegger’s understanding of schematism, all objects must be given to us in time and thus, time is what grounds reality of things in an ontological sense.

Two problems occur as a result of Heidegger’s understanding of transcendental schematism as imagistic. The first concerns his extension of the image character to
the transcendental (pure) concepts; this serves to deny the pure status required of something to be transcendental. Heidegger would argue that he is bringing transcendence itself into view and letting it ‘spring forth’, but if this is the case, the second problem gains importance. In addressing transcendental schematism Heidegger does not attend to the way in which ideas are schematised and this would be a key factor in understanding the true nature of transcendence and thereby also, of schematism; as pure concepts of reason are the furthest removed from sensible intuition, and, they are not presented within a temporal horizon. Had Heidegger pursued this avenue of thought he would recognised that the image character of the schema could only be salvaged with reference to its figural qualities and this possibility comes into view if we attend to the monogram of reason which concerns the figure, sketch or outline of a system to realise a theoretical idea. Although the monogram can be sketched out diagrammatically to assist with the communication of a theoretical idea (and to show how an idea develops) it is not dependent upon an appearance in time and space to affirm its reality.

Heidegger does not address the monogram as a schematic, architectonic figure produced by reason to enable the realisation of pure rational concepts (ideas). However, it has significance as a specific type of figure that is not a product of the imagination (not imagistic), and is not required to appear in space and time. The monogram reveals an artistic capacity of reason that impacts upon Heidegger’s account of the schema-image as it presents a challenge to his claims about the centrality of the imagination and is required in order for any theoretical idea to be communicated. Our discussion of the schematic realisation of ideas in 3.2 revealed that there are two types of transcendental schema operative in relation to the realisation of pure concepts. Heidegger’s focuses on the transcendental schema
used to realise concepts of the understanding but he neglects to address the final end schema in respect to concepts of reason and it is the latter which regulates the application of the former and is therefore the most transcendent.

We have discussed Heidegger’s approach to schematism from an ontological perspective and have outlined his conception of the ‘problems’ of metaphysics. Kant’s concern is with securing architectonic unity, and Heidegger’s retrieval of Kant seeks to penetrate the grounds of this unity itself. Heidegger swerves Kant’s account of schematism to serve his own (ontological) ends and he has been criticised for this in secondary texts. Martin Weatherston refers to Ernst Cassirer’s notable criticism that with KPM:

Heidegger speaks no longer as a commentator, but as a usurper, who as it were enters with the force of arms into the Kantian system in order to subjugate it and to make it serve his own problematic 51.

Cassirer is not alone in his accusation that Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is compromised by his own wider task. Marjorie Grene complains that Heidegger has ‘remade Kant in his own image’ and Karl Lowith accuses him of ‘self-interpretation in the text of another” 52. However, his method of retrieval as clarified by Sherover suggests that Heidegger never sought to produce a commentary or loyal interpretation; his intention was to proceed by means of an internal critique, uncovering questions concealed within Kant that are relevant to his own task 53.


Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s account of schematism is influenced by his desire to secure the image character of the schema, yet his failure to address the schema discussed by Kant in *The Architectonic of Pure Reason* means that he misses an opportunity to engage with, reveal and interrogate transcendence (and schematism) in relation to the realisation of ideas. This failure is significant as this type of schema presents a direct challenge to his interpretation of the nature of the schema as imagistic, and impacts upon his claims about the centrality of the imagination and time.

In summary, 3.1 sought to clarify the way in which different types of concept are schematised. The purpose of this clarification was to establish the role of the figure (as *monogram*) in the realisation of concepts and ideas (as discussed in 3.2). The realisation of concepts and ideas requires a bestowal of form which can take place with reference to sensible intuition (in space and time) or transcendentally (with reference to a figure created by reason) however, pure concepts of the understanding are only figural by analogy. The figure is revealed to play a necessary, intrinsic role in respect to the schematic presentation of ideas and concepts and this will enable us to make a proper comparison with symbolic representation and the capacity of the imagination in Part 3. What we have learnt about the role of the figure in relation to ideas, concepts, and exhibition will also reveal the extent to which philosophy must appropriate a rhetorical methodology in respect to communicating such topics.
Part 2: Practical Ideas and Analogy
Chapter 4. Exhibition of the Morally Good Through the Typic of the Moral Law

The purpose of this chapter is to understand how Kant accounts for the exhibition of practical ideas and to determine whether this mode of exhibition should be thought as direct (schematic) or indirect (symbolic). Kant discusses how practical ideas (of good and evil) can be realised and how we use them to make moral judgements in the section entitled *The Typic of The Pure Practical Power of Judgement* in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It is important to consider how practical ideas can be realised as Part one looked at theoretical ideas and concepts (from the *First Critique*), and Part three will address symbolic exhibition and aesthetic ideas (in the *Third Critique*). Part two will show that Kant’s account of the way in which practical ideas are realised is not strictly schematic or symbolic as they are realised in a manner that is not entirely conducive to either type without reduction or blending the two. This chapter will address what Kant means by the ‘typic’ of pure practical reason to determine what this tells us about the nature of exhibition. I will pay particular attention to the role of analogy as the use of it not only differentiates the exhibition of practical ideas from theoretical ones, it also enables realisation of the former with reference to the latter. It is necessary to compare practical exhibition with the schemata we have discussed so far, however, the former should not be reduced to the latter. For Kant practical ideas (in the domain of freedom) are realised by analogy with natural laws (and the *transcendental schema*) yet they require mediation by the understanding (not the imagination). The objective in setting the

54 The status of practical exhibition is interpreted differently in secondary texts on the subject as the analysis will show.
practical schema in context amongst the discoveries made so far is also to ascertain the role of the figure (or lack thereof) in this mode of exhibition. This chapter will demonstrate that the practical schema makes recourse to an aesthetic capacity of reason but this is not in terms of a figural construction, rather it suggests an aesthetic of morals connected to rational feeling\textsuperscript{55}.

I will begin with a summary of Kant’s discussion of the typic to present the nature of this mode of exhibition and will compare it to the types of exhibition discussed so far. Setting the typic in context will allow us to present the development of Kant’s account of exhibition (from the theoretical to the practical domains) so that we may properly contextualise his discussion of symbolic exhibition and aesthetic ideas in the Third Critique.

The section on the typic is in Chapter two, Book 1 of the Second Critique entitled: \textit{On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason}. The structure of the Second Critique is set out as follows: There are two parts, part one is \textit{The Doctrine of the Elements of Pure Practical Reason}, and part two is \textit{The Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason}. Part one is divided into two books: the \textit{Analytic of Pure Practical Reason}, and the \textit{Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason}. Book one has three chapters, in the first \textit{On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason} Kant sets out to show that pure reason is practical by establishing the basis of the moral law in freedom. In chapter two \textit{On the Concept of the Object of Pure Practical Reason} Kant presents a table of categories of freedom and following this is the section \textit{On the}

\textsuperscript{55} Gary Banham uses the phrase ‘aesthetic of morals’ in respect to the use of (and reference to) a practical schema in the Second Critique and \textit{Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason}. Banham, Gary, \textit{Kant’s Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine}, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 231.
Typic of Pure Practical Judgement. Howard Caygill claims that this section ‘parallels the discussion of schematism’ in the *First Critique*\textsuperscript{56}.

There is a noteworthy reversal in the architectonic structure of the *Second Critique*, this work possesses the same components as the *First Critique* but the order is reversed in the Analytic. In the Analytic of the *First Critique* Kant’s method begins with intuition, then moves on to concepts and finally to principles. In the *Second Critique* he begins with principles, proceeds to concepts, and then seeks to extend the study to the senses (intuition)\textsuperscript{57}. The reason for the reversal is that in the *Second Critique* Kant’s concern is the will and he therefore examines reason not in relation to objects, but in relation to the will and its causality. Principles of the empirically unconditioned causality must be considered and established first, before they can then be applied to objects and finally are subject to sensibility.

Kant begins the section on the *typic* by stating that the concepts of good and evil determine an object for the will\textsuperscript{58}. These concepts fall under a practical rule of reason which determines the will *a priori* in regard to its object\textsuperscript{59}. We employ the practical power of judgement to assess whether an action possible for us in sensibility falls under this rule. We must look at whether ‘what is said universally (*in abstracto*) in the rule is applied *in concreto* to an action’ (5:67). A practical rule of pure reason


\textsuperscript{57}The other difference is that Kant incorporates the practical “aesthetic” into the analytic instead of making it a separate section so the *Second Critique* is divided only between analytic and dialectic.

\textsuperscript{58}The ‘object’ of practical reason is to be regarded as an effect possible through freedom. Beck clarifies this and claims ‘object’ must be taken to cover states of affairs produced by action and the action itself. Beck, L. W. *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{59}Kant states that ‘The sole objects of practical reason, are, therefore, those of the good and the evil. For by the first one means a necessary object of our power of desire, by the second, of our power of loathing, both according to a principle of reason (5:58)
concerns the existence of an object (as practical), and carries necessity in regard to the existence of the action (as a practical rule). It is a practical law and not a law of nature; it is ‘a law of freedom according to which the will is to be determinable independently of everything empirical (merely through the presentation of a law as such and of its form)...’ (5:68). The problem concerns how our actions can be occasioned by a law of freedom that determines the will independently of nature (and the empirical domain), yet must belong to experience and therefore also to nature (as our actions take place empirically).

It seems paradoxical to try and find a case given sensibly under laws of nature that also permits application of a law of freedom ‘and to which the suprasensible idea of the morally good to be exhibited in that world in concreto can be applied’ (5:68). The case must be given sensibly (under natural laws) yet it must allow for application of a law of freedom and exhibition of the suprasensible idea of the morally good. We have already discussed the problems with applying laws and exhibiting concepts (and ideas) in relation to pure theoretical reason and how these are solved as concepts are applied to intuitions through schemata and become exhibited in intuition. Theoretical ideas were shown to be applicable a priori in conformity with concepts of understanding as a means of organising these concepts into meaningful systems (that do not obtain objective reality but can still be demonstrated to have theoretical reality). Here we get to the crux of the problem with practical ideas:

…the morally good is something that, in terms of the object, is suprasensible, so that nothing corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition; hence the power of judgement under laws of pure practical reason is subject to special difficulties which are due to [the fact] that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions as events that occur in the world of sense and thus, to this extent, belong to nature (5:68).
Demonstrating the reality of practical ideas is met with ‘special difficulties’ as we need to account for how a law of freedom (pertaining to ideas) can be applied to actions in the world of sense\(^60\). Theoretical reason is concerned with seeking the pure (universals) behind given examples and specifics, with practical reason the concern is reversed and its pure status is problematic in terms of how it can be realised in examples. Pure practical ideas do not have a demonstrable relation to intuition whereas the relation of theoretical ideas to intuition is outlined in Kant’s step ladder (A320/B376). The status of the practical idea makes its realisation even more problematic and, although the problem of exhibition was discussed and rectified through analysis of schematism in the *First Critique*, something more is needed here. Mediation by the imagination will not suffice for connecting the very separate domains of nature and of freedom and this type of idea cannot be schematised using a *monogram* of the imagination, or of reason.

Kant needs to account for how actions (in the world of sense) can be subsumed under a pure, practical law. He is not concerned with the possibility of the action in sensibility; this lies within theoretical reason as causality is a category of the understanding that can be realised in sensible intuition via the *transcendental schema*. His concern ‘is not with the schema of a case according to laws, but with the schema (if this word is fitting here) of a law itself…’ (5:68)\(^61\). A different kind of causality is operative as it is the determination of the will through the law itself (and not the action as the result) that ‘ties the concept of causality to conditions that are

---

\(^60\) Moral concepts have a peculiar status as, on the one hand they are more abstract than theoretical ones (as their relation to intuition is more distant), yet on the other, they can be realised by events and actions in the domain of nature.

\(^61\) Note Kant’s hesitancy in applying the word schema to this type of exhibition as this is relevant to the debate about its nature.
entirely different from those that amount to natural connection’ (5:68). The concept of causality is extended beyond the sphere set out by its schematic exhibition in intuition (as a concept of nature) as it is revealed to be applicable in and to the domain of freedom. Causality here does not constitute a natural connection between objects, it is that which enables objects (as ideas) to be realised as actual. Herein lies the difference between causality in reference to objects of nature (of which we can have theoretical cognition) and causality in relation to the will through which the object of the good is realised and brought into being by the free actions of the subject.

A law of nature, as that to which given objects are subject, must have a corresponding schema (as a product or procedure of the imagination) that exhibits a priori the pure concept of understanding that the law determines\textsuperscript{62}. For the law of freedom (as a causality not sensibly ‘conditioned’) and the concept of the unconditionally good, ‘there is no intuition and hence no schema that can be laid at its basis for the sake of its application in concreto’ (5:69). The imagination is not operative here and the moral law has no cognitive power to mediate its application to objects of nature other than the understanding. The understanding cannot lay a schema of sensibility for the power of judging at the basis of an idea of reason, what it gives is:

…a law that can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and hence a law of nature, though only in terms of its form; therefore we can call this the type of the moral law (5:69).

\textsuperscript{62} See (A137-47/B176-87).
Laws of nature have corresponding schemas, the law of freedom has no schema it is realised instead by analogy with a natural law that can be exhibited in objects of sense only in terms of its form as the type of the moral law. The idea of the morally good can therefore be exhibited through actions that typify this law.

The rule for judging under the practical power of reason is this:

Ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to occur according to a law of the nature of which you yourself were a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will (5:69).

This grants a basis on which we can judge actions in line with practical ideas to ascertain whether they are good (or evil); according to which idea they are judged to realise. This procedure of hypothetically testing the categorical imperative enables us to judge actions by analogy with the laws of nature to generate a type of the moral law. It is a hypothetical device that we can use to test whether an action fits the form of a categorical imperative. We test whether we can will our maxim and at the same time view it as a universal law without contradiction. If we cannot conceive of our action as a law of nature, or if it can be conceived, but not willed by us without inconsistency arising we must view it as contradictory (and it cannot be judged as ‘good’, that is, as realising the practical idea of the good). This rule requires that one must be able to will one’s maxim and at the same time its universalisation without contradiction and thus it gives us a criteria for judging.

Kant now refers to three instances as examples: deceiving to ones advantage, ending one’s life due to weariness and viewing the plight of others with weariness.

He asks ‘if you too belonged to such an order of things, would you indeed be in it with the agreement of your will?’ (5:69). If we take the first as our prime example, I cannot propose that everyone should be deceived by others for their own advantage because I would not will this behaviour to be universalised; I could not will myself to be part of a world in which this action was universal without contradiction. If I willed this then, as much as I could take advantage of them, people would take advantage of me and therefore there would be no real advantage for either party. As a proposition this becomes contradictory\(^{64}\). The same can be said that I cannot propose that ending one’s life due to weariness should become a universal law of nature, just as I cannot propose that viewing the plight of others with indifference should be universalised. Both would involve me jeopardising myself if I became weary, or needed help. Kant concludes that we cannot be a part of such an order of things in agreement with our will, therefore the actions and behaviours give cannot be judged as ‘good’ in accordance with the moral law.

The comparison of a maxim of action with a universal law of nature is not the determining basis of the will but it gives us a type for judging the maxim according to moral principles. By analogy with the form of a natural law we can make a moral judgement about a maxim of action (chosen or committed by the subject or ourselves) according to whether it realises a practical idea. If the maxim cannot be reconciled with or does not stand up to the form of the natural law, then it is either morally impossible or morally unacceptable. The law of nature (which Kant claims is

\(^{64}\) It is not a logical contradiction in the same sense as judging e.g. X is not X. Bielefeldt remarks that the logical operation in respect to the categorical imperative differs from its progression in a theoretical application and he cites John R. Silber who states ‘The command of the moral idea of reason is a command of human existence, not only a demand of cognition’. Silber, John R. “Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft”, *Kant-Studien*, 56, (1965): 253-273. Bielefeldt, H., *Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
at the disposal of even the most common understanding) gives us a type for judging particular maxims of action, the type is not a universal, but it may function as such. We judge according to the causality of the will through freedom and in doing so we make the law of nature ‘merely the type of a law of freedom’ (5:70). By tying the application of the law of pure practical reason to experience (by analogy with nature) we can judge given actions as examples; this is the only way practical ideas can be said to be exemplified (or exhibitable) in intuition.

For Kant, using the nature of the world of sense as a type of intelligible nature is permitted as long as I do not transfer any intuitions to the latter and refer it only to the form of lawfulness as such. This means that none of the material aspects of the law of nature are transposed (in the analogy), just the formal ones. Of the intelligible, nothing but freedom by means of the moral law and the use of pure practical reason has a reality for us, and it has reality only as a presupposition inseparable from that law. All intelligible objects that reason leads us to under the guidance of that law have no reality other than this. Reason is entitled and required to use nature (in terms of its pure form of understanding) as the type of the power of judgement. One should keep what belongs to the typic of concepts from being classed with the concepts themselves to guard against empiricism so that practical concepts of good and evil are not thought of as experiential consequences. Kant separates the good from happiness as the typic must maintain the nature of the morally good as different to anything that can be reached through an assimilation of experiences and it guards
against mysticism in practical reason which for Kant ‘turns what served only as a symbol into a schema’ (5:70).

For Kant rationalism concerning the power of judgement is the only thing adequate to the use of moral concepts as it ‘takes from sensible nature nothing more than what pure reason can also think on its own, i.e., lawfulness…’ and carries to the supersensible ‘nothing but what can, conversely, be actually exhibited through actions in the world of sense according to the formal rule of a natural law in general’ (5:71). He claims we should guard primarily against empiricism in regard to practical reason as mysticism is at least ‘compatible with the purity and sublimity of the moral law’ (5:71). Mysticism involves reference to a similar feeling of exaltation and transcendence as that of respect. Empiricism is more compatible with common thinking, and Kant claims that empiricism and inclination ‘degrade humanity if they are elevated to the dignity of a supreme practical principle’ (5:71). Empiricism is more dangerous than mysticism in regard to confusion about the nature of pure practical reason and the morally good, as the fanaticism of mysticism is less likely to yield a lasting state of mind.

Let us try to determine the nature of this type of exhibition in line with Kant’s claim in the *Third Critique* that there are two types of exhibition: *schematic* or *symbolic* (5:351):

---

65 Kant is here warning us against any attempt to treat a type of the realm of ends (a mere ideal thought) as if it were a schema of a transcendent intuition (an actual realm). Beck, L.W., *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 163.

66 Here we can trace parallels between Kant’s moral and aesthetic theories that he goes on to develop further in the *Third Critique* when he argues that beauty is a symbol of the morally good and also that the imagination is insufficient when faced with the possibilities of rational conception in the *Analytic of the Sublime*.
Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, exhibitions of the concept. Schematic exhibition is demonstrative. Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy [...] in which judgement performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol (5:352).

In Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy Heiner Bielefeldt claims the law of nature is treated as a symbol of the moral law. His claim is based on an understanding that ideas can only be demonstrated indirectly (symbolically), moral ideas cannot be schematised by the imagination and therefore he claims that the understanding takes on a symbolic function. For Bielefeldt the analogy between the law of nature and the law of freedom allows us to take the latter as a symbol of the former and he quotes Gerhard Luf, and H.W. Cassirer in support of his designation of this mode of exhibition as symbolic describing the natural law as ‘the necessary symbolic medium for representing the moral law’. He extends what he terms ‘the symbolic significance of nature’ further to encompass purposiveness (as teleological order) to claim that: ‘This totality of the moral system also finds its symbolic representation in the order of nature, when considered as a purposive whole’. This interpretation is problematic as Kant never claims that the Typic is symbolic, in fact he refers to it repeatedly as a schema (albeit he is not happy about

68 Ibid., pp. 48-9
69 See footnote 35 on page 50 where Bielefeldt quotes H.W. Cassirer in respect to Kant’s use of Typic: ‘His meaning would be more adequately expressed by the term ‘symbol’ [...] What he is trying to show is that the finite moral being is capable of symbolising the supersensible law by means of the concept of a universal law of nature’. He also refers to Paul Diedrichson stating ‘what [Kant] calls the ‘type’ (Typus) of the moral law is precisely a concretising of the abstract moral law in a symbolically concrete form’. Bielefeldt, H., Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 50-1.
70 Ibid. p 51-2
calling it this either). It is also confusing as what is symbolised for Bielefeldt changes: firstly he claims that the understanding performs a symbolic function (when this is performed by reflective judgement in the Third Critique), secondly he states the law of nature symbolises the law of morality/freedom (whereas Kant understands the symbol as a mode of intuitive presentation and neither relata in this relation are intuitive or directly demonstrable), thirdly he claims that the order of nature symbolises the totality of the moral system (which causes similar problems as both relata have the status of ideas). Whilst I would not argue that the typic concerns a presentation of the practical idea by analogy, this does not equate it with Kant’s definition of a symbol as a mode of intuitive presentation that concerns demonstration of an otherwise indemonstrable object by analogy with something that is directly demonstrable (5:351-2). Neither relata are directly demonstrable as one concerns the practical idea and the other refers to a natural law. We will see in Chapter 7 that this presentation does not equate with any of the types of symbol outlined by Kant. Also, no real transposition takes place and we cannot claim definitively that this presentation is indirect as the morally good is not transposed into anything else in order to be presented; what is transposed is form as a device for judging, and this is not strictly the same as a symbolisation.

In Kant’s Practical Philosophy Gary Banham affiliates the typic with the final end schema discussed in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. In relation to the final end schema Banham states:

71 A symbol and an analogy are not the same thing as we will discuss in Chapter 7, though the former requires the latter, the latter can occur without the former being attained.

72 For a discussion of this schema see 3.2. We will continue discussion of this type of schema in relation to the ‘schematism of analogy’ in Chapter 5.
With this type of schema we can see the dependence of the organisation of a whole enquiry on a part that makes it possible and is supreme. This is the type of schema that is employed in practical philosophy. Banham has valid reasons for recourse to the final end schema as it does not have a direct reference to intuition and this is in line with the status of the typic. He states that a use of analogy is necessary in practical philosophy and it is through this that he seeks to connect the typic with the final end schema. He observes that Kant’s first appeal to analogical presentation in moral philosophy is in the Groundwork where the categorical imperative is introduced as if it were a law of nature (4:421). In the Second Critique Kant refers to the typic as a description of how an action can be presented as if produced by a law of nature, yet here ‘the rule underlying this analogical procedure is supplied as being a schema ‘of a law itself’ (5:70). Banham claims that the notion of the typic relates to the final end schema as, the latter concerns how a system must be organised (in accordance with an end that is also responsible for the form of the parts) and ‘the typic supplies the condition under which a law is presentable and hence organises the sensible in accordance with an intelligible principle’. For Banham we can equate the final end schema with the typic as the latter shapes moral character in accordance with an end (in a manner akin to the way a system is constructed and realised). Though Banham’s account is less problematic that Bielefeldt’s (as he does not designate the typic as symbolic) the practical schema cannot be equated with the final end schema for a number of reasons. This schema concerns the realisation of a theoretical idea (which differs in nature to a practical one), it does not enable realisation with any objective reality.

---

74 Ibid., pp. 233-4.
(only in terms of a projection) and it concerns a system (which differs in nature and kind from a human moral agent). Perhaps the most important difference is through the final end schema and idea is realised using a monogram of reason and this is not mentioned by Kant (or possible) in respect to the realisation of practical ideas.

In his Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck addresses the section on the typic. He begins by discussing the different types of schema from the First Critique and failing to recognise or address the final end schema, he focused on the schemata set out in the chapter on schematism. He refers to the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary of ‘type’ as ‘That by which something is symbolised or figured; a symbol, emblem’75. He acknowledges that this does not capture Kant’s use or meaning of the term, and observes that the term is connected to Kant’s distinction between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, but he does not establish clearly to which mode of exhibition the typic belongs. As the concern of practical reason is with what ought to be done Beck states:

We have, therefore, an analogy: a schema of a case occurring according to a law is necessary for knowledge of the case, while a schema of the law itself is necessary to connect in practice, possible events in sense experience with a cause under a law which is not a law of natural connection. Because the schema of a case has an intuitive component, it is always cognitive in function. But no intuition is available to a practical law of what ought to be…76

Beck acknowledges that Kant’s use of the word schema (in reference to the law) here is problematic and he cites passages where the word is used in a broad sense, seeking to blend and incorporate its meaning within ‘type’ (in spite of the symbolic

76 Ibid., p. 158
definition) even claiming it means ‘hardly more than an example’\textsuperscript{77}. He goes on to say that just as the schema is the ‘third thing’ to mediate between concept and intuition, so the typic is the ‘third thing’ to mediate between ‘the concept of nature, all that is, and the concept of what ought to be’\textsuperscript{78}. Beck’s understanding of the typic appears to designate it as schematic, however, his attempts to affiliate it with the schemata of the \textit{First Critique} are not definitive as he also seeks to differentiate between the two modes of exhibition (and to preserve the status of practical concepts). The status of the typic is therefore questionable; it is not conclusive whether Kant intends it to be schematic (though he appears to designate it as such), or symbolic (due to its use of analogy which is characteristic of symbolisation). We have seen that attempts to reduce the typic to the schemata discussed in the \textit{First Critique} risk jeopardising its practical nature, and the necessary distance from intuition possessed by both relata in the analogical relation prevents the typic from being judged symbolic. Debate about the nature of the practical schema will continue in Chapter 5 in reference to the ‘schematism of analogy’ so now let us ascertain whether this mode of exhibition can be said to be aesthetic in nature.

The nature of the typic as a mode of exhibition relates to the modes of schematic exhibition discussed in 3.1 as the moral law is realised by analogy with a natural law. The natural law is used as a determinate basis on which to judge morally and it thereby enables the realisation of the practical idea of the morally good. It is only in relation to the natural world of determinate objects (that can be judged schematically) that we can claim that the typic and the realisation of practical ideas

\textsuperscript{77} See footnote 64 in Beck, L. W., \textit{A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 158.
takes places with reference to figures. It is figural only because it takes place by analogy with the determination of objects through the *transcendental schema*, and thereby also, through the *recollective* and *figural schemata*. The idea of a natural order of the world is a systematic, theoretical idea and thus, the *typic* operates by analogy with the *final end schema* as well and is figural by analogy in respect to the *monogram* of reason (though practical ideas are not realised *monogrammatically*).

However, it is not merely via an analogical relation to figures that the realisation of the idea of the morally good can be said to be aesthetic; it is through a relation to moral feeling as respect [*Achtung*]. Respect is produced by reason alone and serves as an incentive to make the moral law the maxim of our actions. Although this feeling is not pathological or empirical, it reveals an aesthetic capacity of practical reason that stands in contrast to the systematic nature of reason explicitly emphasised in the *First Critique*. Feeling is an integral part of the nature of the human subject, and the feeling of respect differs from the feelings of e.g. pleasure and displeasure (which gain importance in respect to aesthetic judgements in the *Third Critique*). Howard Caygill claims that: 'In CPrR Kant redefined feeling in order to establish a place for respect as a special kind of feeling'. He observes that the importance of feeling is a theme that can be traced as developing throughout the three *Critique*’s to gain a central role in the *Third Critique*.

The role of feeling in the exhibition of practical ideas grants us insight into how reason must behave aesthetically to realise ideas practically. The purity and sublimity of the good can be judged as present based on the presence of the feeling

---


80 Ibid p. 198.
of respect in relation to actions. This feeling is caused by respect for the moral law, and we judge an action as ‘good’ (as realising the practical idea of the good) based on this feeling which is both aesthetic (in that it is felt) and rational (in that its source is reason). The feeling of respect resulting from an action is the grounds on which we determine that the idea of the morally good has been realised. The totality of the action in which the idea is realised, is one of feeling, but is connected to the form of a law. It is a rational feeling, but it is a feeling nonetheless and this shows that even in respect to an idea of pure practical reason and its realisation, schematism takes place with reference to an aesthetic capacity of reason. It is the feeling of respect that communicates the realisation of the idea and grants it reality, this capacity of reason to utilise feeling is not taken into account in Kant’s earlier analysis of reason and its capabilities in the First Critique. Only in relation to schemata is a capacity of reason to impose form revealed as a process that emulates the aesthetic.

The idea of the good is not realised using a monogram (of reason or the imagination), nor through demonstration of a connection to intuition in the manner outlined in the step ladder (though it does make use of this by analogy). Rather, we judge a maxim of action in line with the form of a natural law. Form is imposed in the realisation of practical ideas, but one cannot argue that this is done figurally (except by analogy with the theoretical concepts and ideas already discussed). This rational procedure - of operating in accordance with laws to generate a type - refers to a practical schematism and not to symbolisation as realisation of the good is direct. Although the form of a law is transposed from nature into the intelligible, the idea of the morally good itself is communicated directly and is not made into something else
in order to be realised as it is in e.g. Plato’s *Simile of the Cave* where the good is symbolised by the sun\(^{81}\).

In conclusion, the *typic* constitutes a means through which practical ideas can be realised *in concreto* by analogy with the formal aspect of a law of nature. It serves as a practical schema which presents a challenge to Kant’s claim that there are only two types of exhibition and this is evident if we compare interpretations of the *typic* in secondary texts. Interpretations alternate between claiming it is schematic (and attempting to show that it is the same as one of the types of schema discussed in the *First Critique*) or claiming it is symbolic and disregarding definitive features of the symbol (such as its intuitive, demonstrable status) as discussed in the *Third Critique*. I have sought to demonstrate that neither approach is advisable as both suffer the same consequences as the *typic* does not adhere definitively to either type of exhibition, rather, it serves to cloud the distinction between the two types and highlights a problem that will be further developed in Chapter 5.

The *typic* operates by analogy with natural laws and theoretical schemata and in this respect has a (somewhat distant but traceable) connection to figures. However, this mode of exhibition reveals an aesthetic capacity of reason in relation to the feeling of respect. This feeling indicates that the practical idea of the good has been realised and plays an intrinsic role in the practical exhibition of ideas. If we combine this capacity with the figural capacity outlined in relation to theoretical schemata this supports the view that the nature of reason as systematic does not take into account key features of its aesthetic ability.

---

Chapter 5. The Schematism of Analogy and the Figure of Christ:
Bridging two types of hypotyposis

It is in a footnote to the main text in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* that Kant refers to a ‘schematism of analogy’ (6:65). Following on from questions that arose in relation to the *typic* in chapter 4 this chapter will question the nature and status of this mode of exhibition to ascertain whether it may rightly be considered schematic, or whether it is symbolic. A schematic realisation of concepts concerns direct exhibition with no transposition through which concepts are realised and their scope is restricted. A symbol is a presentation by analogy; a representation of an indemonstrable concept or idea by analogy with something demonstrable. If the schematism of analogy cannot be classed as either type of exhibition this presents a challenge to Kant’s claims in § 59 of the *Third Critique*. As a result the schematism of analogy would be thought as either: mid-way between the two positions, or as a third type of exhibition that is not made explicit by Kant nor recognised in secondary literature.

The figure of Christ plays an integral role in the realisation of the practical idea of the highest good and this chapter will draw out the capacity of pure practical reason to recourse to such figures (as personifications) in relation to exhibition. On the one hand Christ directly and schematically presents this idea as he is part of God, yet he indirectly represents an ideal goal as standard for human beings. There is a complex relation between the three relata of God, Christ and Man. God is a supersensible idea and transcendental ideal, Christ is an ideal figure who presents the idea of the good and represents an exemplary human being, and man can think both by analogy with an extension of his own attributes, but can never be adequate to either. These
figures relate to one another in a combination of direct and indirect ways, and this is the crux of the problem in determining the nature of the schematism of analogy without being reductive.

It is first necessary to recall Kant’s distinction between the symbol and the schema and set out how practical ideas differ from theoretical ideas. I will then clarify the schematism of analogy by contextualising the role of Christ and, to illustrate the need for clarity in this area and to demonstrate the consequence of failing to attain it, I will refer to interpretations of this mode of exhibition by Gary Banham and James Dicenso.

Let us briefly recall the distinction between schemata and symbols and how the typic fits into this distinction. It is of equal importance to make our concepts sensible, as it is to make our intuitions intelligible and we do this through schemata. The schema is not a concept or an intuition, it is a ‘third thing’ homogeneous with both which makes application of the former to the latter possible. In the chapter on Schematism in the First Critique Kant discusses pure sensible concepts, empirical concepts and pure concepts of the understanding. Though the precise ways in which these concepts are realised may differ, they are all realised directly and schematically without any transposition. Pure sensible concepts (e.g. triangles) are realised using a monogram generated by the a priori imagination. Empirical concepts (such as dogs) are realised using a monogram generated by the reproductive imagination, and pure concepts of the understanding (such as causality) are realised through time (which acts as the ‘third thing’ homogeneous with both intuition and concept).
The schematic exhibition of theoretical ideas does not involve mediation by the imagination and is discussed by Kant in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason*. The idea presents a standard in the form of a maximum which regulates the production of a system and the system as a whole is realised via a *final-end schema*. This schema is devised in accordance with a *monogram* that is a product of reason and the idea is not granted objective reality but it is realised through its capacity to perform a regulative function; as a systematic means of organising an aggregate. It has ‘reality’ as it governs the organisation of parts in relation to a whole as a system.

In § 59 of the *Third Critique* Kant states that concepts can be realised in two ways: *schematically* (directly) or *symbolically* (indirectly) (5:351). Kant is clear that “all intuitions supplied for a priori concepts are either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, exhibitions of the concept” (5:352). He refers to three examples of symbolisation and these differ according to the nature of the analogy on which each relation is based\(^{82}\). A hand mill used to symbolise a despotic state is a *profane* symbol as: other objects could serve in its place, the state is not strictly an idea of reason and the analogy between relata is constructed. The words ‘foundation’, to ‘depend’, to ‘flow’ are *linguistic* symbols as they open up a reflective space within language by analogy with movement and a living scene to supplement the direct communication of meaning. Beauty as a symbol of the morally good is a *higher* symbol as it uses a specific, natural analogy. It is the only example that could (arguably) be considered an intuitive experience (or symbolisation) of an idea of reason, note also that the morally good is a practical idea. In all three examples

\(^{82}\) A full discussion of symbolisation is conducted in Chapter 7.
symbolisation involves analogy and a transposition so that one thing represents another and the concept is exhibited indirectly.

So, in order to be considered schematic the ‘schematism of analogy’ must directly exhibit a concept or idea, if it indirectly exhibits an idea using an analogy it must be symbolic. However, before moving on to discuss the schematism of analogy in detail, let us reconsider how Kant accounts for the realisation of practical ideas in The Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgement in the Second Critique. This introduces the problem presented by the schematism of analogy and may also indicate a means through which to solve it.

Practical ideas are further distanced from intuition as nothing corresponding to the morally good can be found in any sensible intuition, these ideas are not concerned with architectonic unity, nor are they related to cognition. Kant claims that a natural law which can be exhibited, may be used in its formal aspect to secure reality for the practical idea of the good. We compare maxims of action with universal natural laws which form a determinate basis on which we can judge the morally good. This enables realisation of the moral law, and the practical idea of the good is realised by analogy with a formal aspect of the type of the natural law 83.

This realisation does not involve a monogram of reason or the imagination, nor does it directly involve a schema of sensibility. The moral law is exhibited by analogy with the form of a natural law based on a reformulation of the categorical imperative. We judge the actions of ourselves and others to determine whether these actions are

83 Here we can recall what Kant states in the Second Critique: ‘What the understanding can lay at the basis – as a law for the sake of the power of judgement – of the idea of reason is not a schema of sensibility but a law, but yet a law that can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and hence a law of nature, though only in terms of its form; therefore we can call this the type of the moral law’ (5:69).
of a type that we would will to become a universal law of nature. The typic is not strictly schematic (direct) as the form of the law is transposed, however, no intuitive (material) content is utilised which would render it symbolic. Realisation of the idea of the good is direct but as the form of a law is transposed from nature into the intelligible this is achieved indirectly\textsuperscript{84}.

Let us discuss some differences between practical and theoretical ideas. Theoretical ideas as systematic can attain a projected reality on the basis of their regulative function. Practical ideas are realised through moral actions that are committed and judged in line with the idea of good. One could therefore argue that practical ideas possess a higher degree of reality as they are realised directly in everyday life, however, our actions refer to the practical ideas of good and evil which cannot themselves be presented and our actions only allow inference to the existence of these ideas within the disposition of a human being. From the discussion of the typic we know that the realisation of practical ideas does not take place with reference to a monogram and the idea of the morally good cannot be presented adequately in an architectonic construct or system. Systems do not have any moral requirements, they merely need to have architectonic unity. Practical ideas are demonstrated through the free actions of a subject and the idea of the morally good exceeds any demonstration in any special intuition or systematic figure (though it can be presented and personified in an ideal figure).

Moral actions involve a specific and particular type of object which is the idea of good itself. Good and evil are concepts we use to describe an action and the motivating disposition behind it and these ideas are attained through a created

\textsuperscript{84} A full discussion of the typic is conducted in Chapter 4.
causality pertaining to the will. It is the relation to the free choice of the individual (who could have done otherwise) which gives the action that realises the good its moral worth. The realisation of practical ideas therefore reveals a creative capacity of the will and a sense of causality associated with the freedom of the subject, this stands in contrast to the causal nexus which governs objects of nature in the theoretical realm.

In *Religion* Kant poses a hypothetical question, he ask us to:

Assume a human being who honours the moral law, and who allows himself to think [...] what sort of world he would *create*, were this in his power, under the guidance of practical reason – a world within which, moreover, he would place himself as a member (6:5-6).

As human beings we are subject to the external world of nature in which objects are causally related beyond our control and we makes sense of our cognitions by systematising them under theoretical constructs. Morally, we are free to create our own world and the actions we take indicate the dominant moral concepts that regulate our disposition. We judge the former determinately based upon cognitions and the correct application of concepts, and the latter based on the presence of a rational feeling which determines the existence of the good.

In the text on *Religion* Kant refers to Christ as the personified idea of the good principle. He states that this idea has complete reality in itself, for it resides in morally-legislative reason (6:62). This practical concept must possess reality as we ought, and therefore must be able to conform to it. It does not need to meet the same conditions as a concept of nature to be realised:

There is no need, therefore, of any example from experience to make the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as a model already in our reason (6:62).
The example of such a being need not exist nor ever have existed yet the idea possesses necessity and reality in itself.

The prototype of a human being well pleasing to God resides in reason, and each human being has within them an example of this idea. Outer examples or actions allow inference to one’s inner moral disposition, but they cannot adequately communicate or present it. To judge the moral worth of an action, we must portray the actor in human guise, thus if an exemplary human being descended from heaven ‘we would have no cause to assume in him anything else except a naturally begotten human being’ (6:63). The human being well pleasing to God must be afflicted by the same needs and inclinations as us, he must withstand suffering and resist temptation is he is to serve as an example to be emulated. One who possesses innate goodness is good merely by omission, whereas, one who endures through the process of resistance and suffering communicates active goodness that can only be attained through free action.

Christ possesses a dual status as part of God and example for humanity but it is the latter that enables realisation of the idea of the highest good. In the First Critique God is presented surreptitiously as a Transcendental Ideal - as the sum and ground of all that exists - in a figure that stands outside of any possible emulation by man. However, through the figure of Christ a different perspective and a new engagement with God is undertaken and this solidifies Christ’s position as key to the nature of

---

85 Kant states: ‘For let the nature of this human being well pleasing to God be thought as human, inasmuch as he is afflicted by just the same needs and hence also the same sufferings, by just the same natural inclinations and hence also the same temptations to transgressions as we are. Let it also be thought as superhuman, however, inasmuch as his unchanging purity of will, not gained through effort but innate, would render any transgression on his part absolutely impossible’ (6:64).
realising practical ideas. Christ embodies and presents the goodness of God, yet he represents this in human form to bring the otherwise impossibly transcendental within our realms of possibility. We could follow a rule that superhuman conduct communicates as a precept, but this type of being could ‘not be presented to us as an example to be emulated’ (6:65) and the pedagogical value that Christ possesses as an example would be removed.

In the footnote to the section on *The Objective Reality of this Idea* Kant states that we need an analogy with natural being to make supersensible characteristics comprehensible to us (6:65n). He refers to how ‘philosophical poets’ and the Scriptures ascribe a higher rung on the moral ladder to finite, flawed and free human beings as: ‘The world with its defects/is better than a realm of will-less angels’86. To communicate God’s love for us, the Scriptures recourse to a form of representation that attributes to God the highest sacrifice a living being could perform; he gives humanity his only son and,

…although through reason we cannot form any concept of how a self-sufficient being could sacrifice something that belongs to his blessedness, thus robbing himself of a perfection. We have here (as means of elucidation) a schematism of analogy, with which we cannot dispense (6:65).

The Scriptures impose a narrative so that we can make sense of God’s love for us by analogy with ourselves and what this act would mean for us. This communicates God’s love as excessive, but it does not mean that we can or should infer that the human response to such an act belongs to the concept of God or could expand our cognition of him.

86 Albrecht Haller, *Concerning the Origin of Evil*, 1734. (as cited in Religion 6:65)
To clarify the meaning of this practical ‘schema’ Kant states that in ascending from
the sensible to the supersensible we can schematise, which he here defines as
‘render a concept comprehensible through analogy with something from the senses’
(6:65n). But we cannot infer that what belongs to the sensible must therefore be
attributed to the supersensible. If we look back to the definition of symbolisation in
given earlier⁸⁷ if the practical schema involves rendering a concept comprehensible
using an analogy it is difficult to differentiate this from symbolism. However, the
symbol is designated as a mode of intuitive presentation and with the practical
schema no intuition is supplied. If we refer back to the typic, we can see that with the
schematism of analogy there is a transposition, but it is not one that concerns any
intuitive content. Christ need never have existed and he is not a sensible empirical
intuition even though he serves to demonstrate the indemonstrable concept of God.

We comprehend Gods love for us by analogy with an act of sacrifice that we are
capable of and thus, we render the concept comprehensible by analogy with our own
experience of loss. But we cannot infer that what belongs to our experience must
therefore be attributed to God, i.e. that he would suffer the same feelings. This is
anthropomorphism. Kant claims we cannot say:

Just as I cannot make the cause of a plant comprehensible to me (or the cause
of any organic creature, or in general of the purposive world) in any other way
than on the analogy of an artificer in relation to his work (a clock), namely by
attributing understanding to the cause, so too must the cause itself (of the plant,
of the world in general) have understanding… (6:65n).

⁸⁷ ‘All hypotyposis consists in making a concept sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic […]
Hence all intuitions supplied for a priori concepts are either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain
direct, symbols indirect, exhibitions of the concept. Schematic exhibition is demonstrative. Symbolic
exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuitions as well), in which judgement
performs a double function: it applies the concept to an object of a sensible intuition; and then it
applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the
former is only the symbol’ (5:352).
We use an analogy to make the supersensible comprehensible, but it does not follow that traits which belong to that used to construct the analogy must also belong to the supersensible concept. Kant states that, if we support a concept with an example, the example does not necessarily belong to the object itself. This is not true of the other types of concept realised schematically using examples (triangles, dogs, causality) it therefore suggests an indirect exhibition. But what Kant implies here is a dislocation of schema, concept and object as he states:

...between the relationship of a schema to its concept and the relation of this very schema of the concept to the thing itself there is no analogy, but a formidable leap which leads straight to anthropomorphism... (6:65n)

The schema uses an analogy to make a concept comprehensible, but this does not belong to or expand the thing itself that the concept refers to. The transposition serves to exhibit the concept not to give cognition of the thing itself. Kant states that it would run counter to all analogy to say that if we use a schema for a concept this schema must also belong to the object. Just because I make a scenario (e.g. the cause of a plant) comprehensible by analogy with another scenario (an artificer’s creation of a watch) I cannot infer that traits possessed by the artificer (understanding) must be possessed by the cause of the plant. I can exhibit the relation between the cause and the plant by analogy with the other relation, but this does not expand my cognition of the cause of the plant. Likewise, I can exhibit God’s gift of Christ to mankind by analogy with my own ability to sacrifice my child, but this does not mean that I can attribute the loss that I would suffer to God.

Using a schematism of analogy man can emulate Christ but human attributes cannot be extended to God. Christ exhibits the idea of the highest good and makes it comprehensible, he is the ‘third thing’ homogeneous with both sensible human
beings and the supersensible idea of God. However, the human traits he possess in order to be utilised as an example for humanity cannot be attributed to God. God is the supersensible object, Christ is the schema, and man provides the analogy, but the traits of man which make the supersensible idea comprehensible via the schema of Christ cannot expand God as a concept, or enable cognition of him.

As a mode of exhibition the schematism of analogy realises the idea of the highest good (God). The idea is made comprehensible through Christ as this figure enables a schematism of analogy with man to become operative. On the one hand exhibition is direct as no real transposition takes place (Christ is a part of God), yet it is indirect as Christ represents a perfected instance of humanity (though this is not intuitive). This suggests that the schematism of analogy goes further than a mere symbolising relation as it uses an analogy to make a practical idea comprehensible with reference to three relata. It is more than symbolic as the analogy ensures a more direct connection than a mere symbolising relation would allow.

In his book on *Kant’s Practical Philosophy* Gary Banham notes that, in contrast to its role in theoretical philosophy, the role of the schema in practical philosophy has been ‘scantly noticed’\(^\text{88}\). Kant’s describes this schema merely in contrast to the schema of object determination but he does not set out the procedure with clarity. To make sense of the schematism of analogy Banham recalls the *final end schema* used to realise theoretical ideas in the *First Critique*. Using a *monogram* of reason the idea becomes altered in the process of execution and ‘only becomes clear in a

progressive fulfilment’ (A834/B862-3)\(^89\). His attempt to elucidate the schematism of analogy is as follows:

It would be my contention [...] that it is best pictured not after a manner of pathological motivation but through practical feeling, the very practical feeling that it is a major task of the Religion to describe. However, the pattern of determining this practical feeling in the divine and in ourselves is in accord with a final end schema such as is described in the First Critique and it is this that describes the true schema of analogy.\(^90\)

For Banham through a developing (open) account of the nature of practical feeling we can conceive of an appropriate analogy between the supersensible within and beyond us. The analogical procedure adopted becomes more sophisticated as it develops and this in turn alters the description of practical feeling. If we overlook the fact that the final end schema refers to the realisation of theoretical ideas we can see how affiliating the practical schema with it secures the latter as a mode of direct exhibition. However Banham then goes on to say:

This schematism of analogy will further the final end schema by utilizing the procedure described in the Third Critique: ‘judgement performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former is only a symbol (5:352).\(^91\)

The concept of practical feeling (respect) is applied to the sensible intuition of persons, then the rule of reflection on these persons is applied to a different object (God as the supersensible outside us) which is judged in accordance with freedom as the supersensible within us. For Banham the symbol of God is given through traits of personality belonging to human beings and symbolisation of the supersensible

\(^{89}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 123.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
‘gives us the peculiar supersensible figuration we term ‘God’.” He claims the schematism of analogy opens up a recursive analogical connection as the traits of this figuration are a reference back to ourselves.

Banham affiliates the practical schema with the direct schematic realisation of theoretical ideas (as systems) and the indirect symbolisation of God. Despite his recognition of practical feeling as a pivotal defining feature of practical ideas, recourse to the final end schema does not take this into account as it is not a necessary part of any system. Also, by designating this mode of exhibition as symbolic and claiming a recursive analogical connection he risks the anthropomorphism that Kant warned us against. Although we may exhibit the idea of God by analogy with traits that we possess, we cannot, and must not infer that these traits belong to God and Kant does not designate this relation as symbolic.

Banham is not clear about the nature of this mode of exhibition and thus his account of the practical schema designates it as combining both types of exhibition. He does not mention the figure of Christ, but with reference to his interpretation as comprising elements of the schematic and the symbolic we can begin to see how Christ might serve as a bridge these two types of hypotyposis.

In his Commentary to Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason James Dicenso observes the dual nature of Christ’s status. On the one hand Christ is referred to as prototype, archetype and original image using the term Urbild which conveys a rational principle in a graphic image. On the other he is referred to using

92 Ibid.
Vorbild, as an anticipatory image which is yet to come\textsuperscript{93}. It is the latter that Kant uses when he states:

There is no need, therefore, of any example from experience to make the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as a model already in our reason (6:62).

This suggests that Christ acts not merely as an existing prototype, but as a projection of that which we should aspire to be. Here we can see an affiliation with the projected whole used to regulate a system via the \textit{final end schema}, but, Dicenso does not pursue this affiliation, instead he draws on similarities with Kant’s account of the symbol.

This is apparent in the language he uses as Christ ‘represents’ a fully realised ethical disposition, and we ‘reflect’ on his example to cultivate our own inner morality. Dicenso claims that the representative nature of religious images in relation to practical ideas highlights their symbolic function as they imperfectly express an ideal ethical disposition for us to emulate. For Dicenso the footnote explaining the schematism of analogy further reflects the representational status of religious images and doctrines. He suggests we personify ethical endeavours to make them ‘more imaginatively accessible’ and this not only shows the ‘pedagogical importance’ of Christ, it reveals our propensity to render ideas in intuitively graspable form\textsuperscript{94}. Dicenso notes equivalence between the philosophical poets with their rendering of

\textsuperscript{93} Dicenso states: ‘Noteworthy here is the use of the term \textit{Vorbild}, rather than the previously employed \textit{Urbild}, to indicate Jesus’ role as an ethical exemplar. A \textit{Vorbild} is literally a “before image”; it therefore anticipates something that is yet to come […] Just as Jesus is a prototype (\textit{Urbild}) for the perfected moral disposition toward which we all should be striving, so too is he a model (\textit{Vorbild}) of ethical autonomy that we must actively emulate.’ Dicenso, James. \textit{A Commentary on Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.105
abstract concepts in accessible terms, and traditional religious imagery. He claims that the Scriptures use representation as, given the limitations of human beings, ‘some form of imagistic representation is not entirely optional for guiding our moral practice.’ He affiliates the schematism of analogy with these imagistic, intuitive symbolisations. However if we look at his attempt to clarify the practical schema in a footnote he writes:

In the third *Critique*, Kant differentiates such schemata from *symbols* that generate representations of *ideas* in accordance with *mere analogy* (CJ V:352). Religion further divides the notion of schematism into two types, “object determination” and “analogy,” and these generally parallel the prior differentiation between schematism as such and symbolism.

We can see that Dicenso tries to preserve the schematic status of this mode of exhibition by securing it as a type of schematism which differs from that of object determination. Yet he marks it as different because it uses an analogy and this renders it parallel to symbolisation but not equal to it as such. He does not address how it is possible for the schematism of analogy to be parallel to the symbol and yet differ from it and still be schematic. As a result the boundaries between the two types of exhibition become blurred in a manner that is not properly accounted for.

Dicenso’s reasons for affiliating the schematism of analogy with symbolisation is that we are embodied, socially formed, fallible beings more attuned to sense experience and imagination than abstract principles. We therefore require pedagogical assistance from ‘culturally produced representational forms’ to make

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
ethical principles accessible and useful for our lives and conduct\textsuperscript{97}. He refers to narratives, images and historical doctrines as ways in which ethical principles can be represented through a schematism of analogy and claims that the distinction between the schematism of object determination and the schematism of analogy ‘parallels that between schematism as such, requiring sensory input, and the symbolisation of ideas providing no sensory information, as formulated in the third Critique (CJ V:352)\textsuperscript{98}. He then goes one step further to claim:

The schematism of analogy follows Kant’s definition of symbolism as offering analogical representation, drawing from the world of sense, of ideational abstractions and intellectual faculties that cannot be directly represented (e.g., our propensity to evil, moral laws, a moral disposition)\textsuperscript{99}.

Kant is clear that the idea of the highest good personified through Christ has reality in itself and resides in reason, it is a rational idea that need never be made intuitive in the world of sense – this is like asking for miracles. The only way that this idea can be brought near to the world of sense would be through an account of practical feeling or lawfulness in a manner akin to the \textit{typic} – but Dicenso does not recourse to either.

In summary, in a continuation of the investigation into the realisation of practical ideas started in Chapter 4 I have sought to ascertain whether the schematism of analogy is schematic or symbolic. This mode of exhibition is not strictly schematic as a transposition between relata is involved and the relationship between relata is not straightforwardly direct. If we compare this type of exhibition with the schematic exhibition of pure sensible concepts, empirical concepts, pure concepts of the

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. pp. 105-6.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid. p. 106.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
understanding or theoretical ideas – the practical idea is not schematised using a
monogram (of either the imagination or of reason) nor via any reference to time. The
schematism of analogy is not symbolic either, as the idea of God is not transposed
into that which it is not in order to be exhibited and in this sense it is presented
directly. The presentation of God and the idea of the highest good are not realised
with reference to a demonstrable intuition and do not constitute a profane or
linguistic symbolisation. This leaves us with the option of the higher symbol
(exemplified by beauty as the symbol of the morally good), however, lack of a
connection to sensible intuition also rules this option out.

Because there are three relata involved in the realisation of the idea of the highest
good: God, Christ and Man, it cannot be properly designated as either schematic
(direct) or symbolic (indirect) - it utilises features of both. Clues as to the nature of
the schematism of analogy lie in the typic which involves a transposition that is
formal not intuitive. However, it is the figure of Christ that plays a key role in this
mode of exhibition. He is the ‘third thing’ homogeneous with the supersensible
concept of God and the sensible concept of man. He therefore acts as a bridge
between them – so that the idea of the highest good can be realised through the
actions of human beings- and thereby also between the two types of hypotyposis.

Pure practical reason is revealed as creative in relation to a capacity to generate
figures not as theoretical constructs, but as personifications that provide standards
for judging and serve to realise the idea of the good as we can emulate them with
our conduct. If we combine this creative capacity with that of the will itself (to bring
objects such as the good into being) we can add to our understanding of the nature
of reason itself as meta-systematic; as more than systematic in nature and capacity.
Reason is capable of creating architectonic figures, monograms and personifications
in relation to nature (as subreptions) or freedom (as ideal figures). What is also revealed through our investigation into the realisation of practical ideas is the role of rational feeling (respect) and the importance of analogy as a methodological device. We must recognise that the use of an analogy need not culminate in a symbolic representation (and this will be discussed further in Chapter 7) yet it plays an intrinsic role in relation to this practical mode of exhibition.

What has also been revealed by this analysis is the importance of examples in relation to the realisation of concepts and ideas and this is something that will be pursued further in part 3. Morally we can emulate exemplary figures, but aesthetically examples serve as the only means through which artistic rules, ideas and methods are communicated. The communication and thereby also the realisation of ideas through figures may, as Dicenzo suggests make them more accessible to us (as the abstract becomes grounded in a demonstrable form), to gain a comprehensive understanding of this part 3 will continue to investigate the role of the figure in relation to symbolic exhibition and the expression of aesthetic ideas.
Part 3. Symbolic Realisation and the Expression of Aesthetic Ideas
Chapter 6. Rethinking the System

Chapter 6 will revisit Kant’s conception of system from the First Critique to show how it becomes changed and developed in the Third Critique. The development of ‘system’ as a notion is intrinsically connected to the philosophical method through which ideas are communicated and realised. In the First Critique theoretical ideas are realised through systems which enable us to gain cognitive knowledge of nature, in the Third Critique Kant seeks a unity to account for how the theoretical and practical domains can be brought together. He claims this unity is possible through reflective judgement, he seeks an a priori principle for judging and makes recourse to peculiar methods with seemingly paradoxical traits\(^1\). Comparing the systems of the First Critique with the types of unity presented in the Third will enable us to trace the development of ‘system’ from that which possesses architectonic unity, to that which grounds the possibility of architectonic unity and is of a higher, aesthetic nature.

I will begin in 6.1 by revisiting the systems of the First Critique so that in 6.2 we can set the unities of the Third in proper context. I will set out the key features and principles pertaining to theoretical systems and reframe some of the problems in relation to accounting for how these systems are ‘created’. Systems possess regulative, architectonic unity, and through them ideas are realised with respect to a monogram of reason. They have a projected reality which serves them as positive (in respect to providing an end or aim) and negative (as it does not secure objective

\(^1\) For these reasons Kant warns that this Critique ‘…may fall short of the clarity we are entitled to demand elsewhere, namely, where we deal with cognition according to concepts…’ (5:170). Reflective judgements reveal a subjective universality, judgements of taste in respect to beauty are ‘disinterested’ and reveal purposiveness without a determinate purpose, and the imagination is shown to operate in a manner that is lawful but without a law.
reality and can be generated by a subreption of reason). In the First Critique systematicity is reinforced and reflected in nature, it guides our investigations of nature and through it reason surreptitiously generates the transcendentally ideal figure of God. I will refer back to the regulative figures discussed in 2.2 to show how the notion of a system as a regulative idea (used to raise knowledge to the rank of a science) necessarily changes as ‘systems’ are given reality and serve to constitute our experience of nature by analogy with art in the Third Critique.

In the Third Critique Kant needs to account for how we can have meaningful experience of the manifold forms and empirical laws of nature; how we experience nature not as a system, but as if it had been designed and created by an intelligence with a purpose in mind. In 6.2 I will consider the systems Kant presents in the Introduction as here he is concerned with unities that enable systematicity to be possible and have a different relation to sensible reality. I will split the nine sections of the Introduction into three trichotomies and will summarise the content of each before offering a comparison to the systems of the First Critique to emphasise key points of interest and difference. The first trichotomy presents Kant’s system of

---

2 The First Introduction was written by Kant before the whole of the Third Critique had been completed and he subsequently replaced it with a shorter version. There are differences between the two in relation to in relation to content, organisation and length. Unless indicated otherwise I will refer to the second Published Introduction as this is the focus of this section.

3 In Kant and the Unity of Reason Angelica Nuzzo refers to a footnote at the end of the Introduction. Here Kant refers to his methodology and partitions as necessarily tripartite in respect to synthetic unity which requires three elements: a condition, the conditioned, and the unification of the two (5:197). She traces this as exemplified in the Introduction: ‘The introduction is clearly structured according to a trichotomic synthetic partition. It is divided into nine sections that form three groups, each of which in turn consists again of three terms. The condition of the main trichotomy is presented in §§ I-III; the conditioned made possible by that condition is introduced in §§ IV-VI; and the concept of the unity of condition and conditioned is finally achieved in §§ VII-IX. Similarly, each term of the major trichotomy is constituted by a condition (§§ I,IV, VII), a conditioned (§§ II, V, VIII), and their unification (§§ III, VI, IX). § III, § VI, § IX, as third terms of each minor trichotomy, respectively mention in their title a moment or a function of unification (Verbindungsmittel, Verbindung, Verknüpfung).’ Nuzzo, Angelica, Kant and the Unity of Reason, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, pp 94-99. It is worth noting here, that although in the published Introduction Kant uses three different
philosophy, the second presents his system of the mental faculties, and the third presents the unity of nature and of the mind itself. I will demonstrate how the systems of the Third Critique exceed the architectonic unity of those presented in the First and approximate to a Gestalt totality as, to complete his critique of pure reason Kant must outline the scope of philosophy and present the unity of the human mind.

6.1. Systems in the First Critique

Let us begin by revisiting the notion of system Kant used in the First Critique to show how it changes and develops in the Third. In the Architectonic of Pure Reason Kant defines the system as ‘what raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of a science’ (A832/B861). He understands ‘system’ as referring to ‘the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea’ (A832/B861). For an aggregate to be considered a ‘system’ it must possess architectonic unity which raises the manifold modes of knowledge into the rule governed, regulative unity of a system. A system requires homogeneity, specificity and affinity between the component parts which combine to comprise it as a whole. These three principles account for the unity of a system, its regulative capacity, and its totality. A system is designated as such when its form is an idea or concept provided by reason, and one can determine a priori the scope of its manifold content and the positions of the parts in relation to one another (A832/B860). The system is regulated by an idea of reason and possesses words to describe the nature of unity referred to in the First Introduction he used the word ‘system’ repeatedly.
architectonic unity which governs the way in which the parts relate to one another and in sum to the projected whole as a totality.

For Kant, ‘architectonic’ also refers to the art of constructing systems (which differ from the system itself) and in Chapter 2 I identified a problem concerning the construction of a system. The means through which systems are constructed is not addressed, recognised or accounted for in Kant’s discussion of construction (A713/B741). Kant understands construction as a mathematical enterprise and distinguishes the employment of reason in an intuitive mathematical sense, from its philosophical employment as discursive. He claims mathematical knowledge is gained by reason from the construction of concepts and concerns the a priori exhibition of an intuition which corresponds to the concept, the art of constructing systems is therefore not taken into account within this mathematical mode of construction. Systems present ideas using architectonic figures e.g. the step ladder, but these figures do not occur spontaneously as products of the a priori imagination (like mathematical shapes or figures) they are produced discursively by the art of reason as it brings unity to a manifold. Theoretical ideas anticipate, project, and guide systematic organisation as an end and Kant refers to the nature of reason itself as (subjectively) a system (A737-8/B765-6) but this cannot account for its capacity to create systems as an ‘art’ and we are left wanting in relation to the question of how this takes place.

The unity of the system and the way in which it functions reflects the way that we interrogate nature, and the way that the human mind works and is comprised. For Kant, nature as a system is reflected in the operation of reason (as systematic), and

---

4 See 1.2 The Position of the Idea for a more detailed discussion of Kant’s account of construction and how the creation of architectonic figures stand outside of it.
this also gives him grounds on which to secure metaphysics as a systematic subject. The operation of reason is judged ‘natural’ as it reflects the systematic organisation of nature, but this is not a statement about how nature is in itself, it concerns the way we must interrogate and make sense of it in accordance with ideas. We presuppose the systematic unity of nature as a transcendental idea and this grants a basis on which we organise our knowledge and it grounds the possibility of scientific theory.

The architectonic unity of a system is ‘higher’ than the synthetic unity between a concept and intuition as it is not about synthesising two parts together, it concerns the unity of distinct parts with one another and their combined unity in line with the whole. Theoretical ideas are realised through systems that possess regulative unity which determines the way in which the parts relate to each another and to the whole as a totality. The unity of the system is therefore, a projected totality that need never be objectively realised in intuition (as the idea must retain its indemonstrable status). The idea serves as the origin, it guides the way the system is devised, and it serves as the end or aim as theoretical ideas are realised through a final end schema.

Theoretical ideas are realised systematically through presentation in an architectonic figure which presents the scope, unity and organisation of the constituent parts. These ideas enable us to make determinate judgements and the movement of reason is such that it can either ascend from intuition (referring to the idea in order to judge the given) or descend to intuition (to determine what is given). Ideas therefore possess a double relation to sensibility; they constitute the highest point of distance from it as ‘pure’ and they provide the ground of all appearances as ‘sum’. Kant solidifies a connection between ideas, systems and syllogism which provides a logical basis on which he secures the transcendental ideas of
metaphysics (God, World and Soul) as more than mere hypostatised abstractions. These ideas have logical ground in a subreption that is rationally (and diagrammatically) demonstrable but cannot be intuited sensibly, presentation of ideas through systematic figures shows they can be demonstrated and realised without compromising their transcendental status.

Let us briefly refer back to examples of architectonic figures discussed in Chapter 2. The objective was to ascertain how these figures present ideas and display a connection to the exemplary figure of the step ladder. The figures discussed were the step ladder (which presents Kant’s system of ideas, concepts and intuitions), the focus imaginarius (which presents the regulative operation of reason in relation to the rules of the understanding), the system of logical principles (which presents the operation of reason as analogous to the systematic organisation of nature into genus and species), the analogon (that enables an idea to be thought determinately), and speculative ideas as analoga of real things.

The step ladder serves as an exemplary example that is referred to and reinforced by the other regulative figures e.g. the focus imaginarius. These figures exemplify a creative capacity of reason that is not taken into account in its characterisation as merely systematic nor is their creation addressed in Kant’s account of construction as mathematical, singular, and concerned with intuition. The step ladder outlines the position of ideas; it is a diagrammatic figure that underlies and informs our understanding of the three-fold relation between reason, understanding and sensibility. Its presence and influence can be traced in all Kant’s attempts to

---

5 The transcendental ideas grant order to the concepts of the understanding, the understanding is the object of reason and the three ideas of metaphysics (God, world, soul) direct the knowledge gained by the understanding to a projected end that in itself has no concrete reality.
communicate the regulative function and operations of reason. Its hierarchical organisation involves a projected analogy that is integral to its architectonic structure, and it need never be presented in intuition. It presents the specific idea of a system (of ideas, concepts and intuitions), and it secures ideas in general as a part of this system. The recurring role of this figure enables Kant to preserve and secure proper usage of the term ‘idea’, which in turn helps him secure a philosophical method in relation to metaphysics and the communication of ideas.

The focus imaginarius is an imaginary point of intersection at which the rules of the understanding converge. It is also a diagrammatic figure and it communicates how the understanding can extend beyond its own sphere. This figure gives support to Kant’s claim that reason by its very nature is systematic and grants order and gives unity to concepts with a view to totality that is inaccessible to the understanding itself. It presents the method through which ideas of reason regulate the operation of the understanding with reference to an imaginary point which reinforces the hierarchy established by the step ladder. The relation between the step ladder and the focus imaginarius demonstrates how regulative figures are interlinked and self-referential in the First Critique as they support, supplement, reinforce and enhance one another.

The System of Logical Principles arouses a diagrammatic figure that presents its structure and systematic organisation (A659/B687). This figure reinforces the step ladder in terms of its method and structure yet it differs in terms of content. It illustrates how reason may ascend to the highest stand-point through the law of homogeneity, how it descends to the lowest through the law of specification, and that there are not different, original, first genera (through the law of continuity of forms). This system displays a regulative unity that governs the relation of the parts to each
other and to the whole via a projection that serves to realise the idea directly. Kant refers to pure ideas of air, earth and water to demonstrate how reason employs them to determine examples given in intuition claiming that we interrogate nature in accordance with them to make determinate judgements based upon a ‘system’ of knowledge (A645-6/B673-4). Systematic unity is generated as the pure ideas regulate the movement of reason within a hierarchy; it ascends to the pure idea or descends to determine the given and these movements recall the structure of the step ladder and thereby also the *focus imaginarius*.

The systems of the *First Critique* present reason and nature as complimentary reflections of one another. This aids exhibition of reason’s systematic unity and adds truth and necessity to its laws. Reason and nature are thought using the same logical principles (homogeneity, specification and the continuity of forms) and these presuppose a transcendental principle which forms the basis on which we organise nature into a system to gain cognitive knowledge of it. Unity is granted to nature (and to systems) by a reduction of the seemingly diverse, by detecting the hidden identity amongst parts (homogeneity) or by differentiating the manifold in accordance with a pure idea (specification). The former secures the extension of an idea, the latter an extension of the given, however, it is through both and the affinity between them (continuity) that an idea is expanded into a totality and secured as a system.

Kant refers to an idea in terms of an *analogue* to a schema of sensibility (A665/B693), this regulative figure cannot be represented diagrammatically (as its generality means it is applicable to different instances) but it has a specific reference
to the system\textsuperscript{6}. Although the unity of the understanding’s concepts cannot be given sensibly, an \textit{analogue} (to the schema of sensibility) must be given in order to realise a rational concept. This grants an analogous connection to intuition that ensures that theoretical ideas can be realised, yet it maintains the position and definitive status of the idea as transcendent. The \textit{analogue} of a schema of sensibility is therefore, the self-contained system of an idea of reason. Systems present ideas directly and serve as \textit{analogues} to a sensible schema as the idea is thought determinately in terms of a maximum. The system stands in place of a schema of sensibility to realise an idea in a way that is figural and gives sensible bounds, yet it is discursive rather than intuitive. Just as a sensible schema realises and restricts concepts of the understanding, the system restricts the scope of the idea by presenting it as an analogue of the former to enable its realisation. Reason functions in a manner analogous to the way that pure concepts of understanding function in relation to sensibility and the presentation of this capacity as an \textit{analogue} shows a necessary use of the system as an analogical figure and recalls the divisions set out in the step ladder.

In \textit{The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason} Kant discusses \textit{speculative ideas as analoga of real things}. He seeks to show that ideas have objective employment despite their illusory nature and that speculative ideas have the reality of a method or schema (A674/B702). When something is presented as an object in the idea it is given to reason as a schema and we can contextualise the idea through its relation to other objects in a system. An object in the idea is necessarily presupposed, e.g. the transcendental ideas of psychology, cosmology

\textsuperscript{6} Kant states: “But although we are unable to find in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily allow of being given” (A665/B693)
and theology presuppose an ‘I’, a ‘world’ and a ‘God’ and these presuppositions serve to regulate and extend our knowledge into a systematic unity it would not otherwise be capable of. Speculative ideas employ illusions to enable the extension of appearances and of the understanding as reason creates them architectonically by binding them into a totality.

Reason obtains creative freedom from the understanding and speculative ideas are presented as architectonic constructions. Through the device of analogy the architectonic projection relates the idea to ‘real’ things and its illusory status proves necessary for us to organise objects and experiences into a higher, systematic unity. Speculative ideas enable extension and organisation of the given by providing the ground of systematic unity as a projected whole. It is not a ground of the systematic order of the world (as a real thing), it is an idea from which unity can be further extended; the schema of a regulative principle by which reason extends systematic unity over all fields of experience. The projections of an ‘I’, a ‘world’, and ‘God’ are employed to extend the determinable parts into a projected whole reason is architectonic and creative as it extends determinate figures (e.g. man) so that we gain an idea (of God) which assists us with organising given instances or parts in line with the idea of a whole.

Reason, God and Nature are linked through the use of analogy and the principle of systematicity. The unity of nature and empirical knowledge is grounded in the idea of God (as perfect) and this underlies the systematic connection of all things. We approach and investigate nature as if systematic and purposive unity is everywhere. The idea of God as a perfect unity directs reason to nature and in turn regulates the unity of knowledge. Kant reinforces the figure of the step ladder to claim that our knowledge begins with intuitions which have a priori sources in reason (A702/B730).
Systematic unity has an *a priori* ground in reason and although reason must relate to possible experience, its methods and principles (which we use to make sense of and bring unity to nature) are transcendent.

In summary, systems of the *First Critique* can realise theoretical ideas directly using architectonic figures and ideas regulate systems in a manner that secures their architectonic unity. This unity raises knowledge to the rank of a science and assists Kant in preserving the use of the term ‘idea’ and securing a systematic method for the subject of metaphysics. The key principles that comprise a system are homogeneity, specificity and affinity which are reflected in nature and dictate our investigations of it. These ensure that there is regulative unity amongst parts in a system and that parts relate to one another in a way that complements and secures the whole in line with an intended idea (to ensure its realisation). Ideas serve as the highest point of unity and the ground or basis of systematic unity in respect to knowledge of nature, and the movement of reason within a system enables it to ascend from or descend to intuition for the purpose of determination.

The art of creating a system differs from the system itself and is not accounted for in Kant’s concept of construction. The system is not a singular, intuitive, mathematical figure, it possesses a discursive status and the architectonic figures which enable theoretical ideas to be realised are collective and interlinked. These figures support and reinforce each other with reference back to the hierarchy outlined in the step ladder as an exemplary example. The imagination plays no role in the construction or creation of architectonic figures and though they have an illusory status through them ideas are shown to regulate systems and extend the understanding beyond its sphere. Systems can serve as an analogue to a schema of sensibility, they use projected analogies to exceed the scope of the understanding,
and can grant reality to ideas though not objectively so. The architectonic unity of systems in the *First Critique* reflects the unity of nature in general and dictates the nature of our investigations of it. The next section will draw on these features to show how the notion of system becomes extended in the *Third Critique*.

### 6.2. Systems in the Third Critique

In the *Third Critique* Kant needs to account for how we can have meaningful experience of the manifold forms and empirical laws of nature. At this stage of his critical task he seeks a means to bring unity to the very separate and heterogeneous domains of practical and theoretical philosophy. It is judgement, and specifically reflective judgement which presents the possibility for unification of these domains into a ‘system’ of philosophy. Reflective judgement differs from determinate judgement in that it does not seek theoretical cognition of objects, in the *First Introduction* Kant writes:

‘Judgement can be regarded either as mere[ly] an ability to reflect, in terms of a certain principle, on a given presentation so as to [make] a concept possible, or as an ability to determine an underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation. In the first case it is the reflective, in the second the determinative, power of judgement. To reflect [...] is to hold given presentations up to, and compare them with, either other presentations or one’s cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible’ (5:211’ F.I.)

---

7 In *Kant and The Unity of Reason* Angelica Nuzzo claims that: ‘Judgement becomes the faculty that first allows us to speak in a meaningful way of the system of experience, of the system of the faculties, and of the system of philosophy itself’. Nuzzo, Angelica, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 89.
In order for us to experience nature’s particular empirical laws with unity (and have unified, meaningful experience) we must presuppose the formal purposiveness of nature with our cognitive, mental faculties. In the Third Critique Kant deals with the unity of experience and of the mental faculties, these types of unity are prior to and condition the possibility of architectonic, systematic unity. The unity of experience, the mental faculties and the mind are interrelated and co-dependent, they must therefore be secured if Kant is to complete his critical project and secure the unity of the metaphysics itself.

This section will address the types of unity operative in the Introduction to the Third Critique and compare them to the systems of the First Critique. I will address each of the three trichotomies in turn and will focus on the nature of the unity discussed.

The Unity of Philosophy and Critique

In the Preface to the Third Critique Kant sets out the questions this work will deal with: Does judgement (as a mediating link between understanding and reason) also have a priori principles of its own? Are these constitutive or regulative? Does judgement give the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure/displeasure? (5:168). He is clear that this work will complete his critical enterprise and that judgement must be treated as a ‘special part’ of his critique of pure reason; so that it may be annexed to

8 Angelica Nuzzo describes the Introduction to the Third Critique as ‘the methodological key’ to following the development of the work. She claims it is more than an ‘invitation to the text’ as it serves as ‘the conclusion of both the third Critique and of the critical project as a whole’. Ibid., p. 88.
the theoretical or practical domains as needed (5:168). Kant perpetuates the building analogy he has used before in respect to metaphysics to explain why the Third Critique and its treatment of judgement are necessary:

For if a system of pure philosophy, under the general title metaphysics, is to be achieved some day […], the critique must already have explored the terrain supporting this edifice, to the depth at which lies the first foundation of our power of principles independent of experience, so that no part of the edifice may give way, which would inevitably result in the collapse of the whole (5:168).

He makes it clear that the main focus will be aesthetic judgements (in respect to the beautiful and sublime in nature and art) as, though they do not provide cognition of objects, these judgements alone ‘prove a direct relation of this power to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some a priori principle’ (5:169). The relation to feeling in these judgements differs from that of the rational feeling of respect (in relation to the practical domain of reason) and it is the relation to this type of feeling that ‘necessitates a special division for this power in the critique’ (5:169).

In § 1-3 of the Introduction Kant outlines a division of philosophy in terms of two distinct parts and presents judgement as a means to connect them. In § 1 On the Division of Philosophy Kant outlines how, in light of the results of the previous two Critique’s philosophy can be thought as two separate parts: the theoretical concerns concepts of nature and sensible experience (under the legislation of the understanding), and the practical concerns the supersensible concept of freedom (under the legislation of reason). In respect to causality, concepts of nature are governed by mechanism and technically practical principles, but the concept of freedom concerns the faculty of desire and the free will of the human being as a rational, moral agent. The practical and the theoretical are two distinct parts which use distinct concepts, and differ in terms of the nature of causality pertaining to each
domain. These parts cannot be integrated or reduced to one another, they are fundamentally different and we need to retain this distinction between them.

In § 2 On the Domain of Philosophy in General Kant establishes philosophy as the range within which a priori concepts have their application. We refer concepts to objects to gain knowledge as cognition and he sets out a geography within which we can do this. The ‘territory’ is the realm in which cognition is possible (all experience), a ‘domain’ is a part of the territory over which concepts legislate (e.g. practical or theoretical). Our cognitive power has two domains within which it can legislate a priori, yet it has only one territory (possible experience). Understanding and reason operate within the same territory (as they co-exist within the same subject) but cannot form one shared domain.

Concepts of nature present objects in intuition as mere appearances (not in themselves), the concept of freedom allows us to present its object as a thing in itself (but not in intuition) (5:175). Neither provides theoretical cognition of objects or of the thinking subject as things in themselves as the supersensible sphere is inaccessible theoretically and the ideas which occupy it can only be granted practical reality. However, the concept of freedom must be able to actualise in the world of sense:

Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] the purposes […] according to the law of freedom. So there must after all be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically (5:176).
This middle ground offers a means to bridge the gulf between the two domains. A complete critique of pure reason is therefore necessarily tripartite and judgement constitutes the ‘third term’ required to realise the ‘system’ of philosophy\textsuperscript{9}.

In § 3 judgement is presented as the means to connect [\textit{Verbindungsmittel}]\textsuperscript{10} the two parts of philosophy to bring them into a ‘whole’\textsuperscript{11}. Understanding and reason have their own legislation and the higher cognitive powers indicate judgement as a possible mediating link between them. Hypothetically, by analogy with reason and understanding Kant claims we can therefore ‘suppose’ that judgement might have a legislation or a (subjective) \textit{a priori} principle by which it can search for laws. Judgement has no domain, but it could have some territory and by analogy it is assumed to have a connection to the higher cognitive powers that operate according to the transcendental, \textit{a priori} principles of lawfulness and final purpose. Kant states that the soul’s powers or capacities are three: \textit{the cognitive power} through which the understanding refers to nature as appearances, \textit{the power of desire} which concerns reason and contains the concept of freedom, and \textit{the feeling of pleasure/displeasure}.

\textsuperscript{9} In the Translators Introduction to the \textit{Third Critique} Werner S. Pluhar notes that, in regard to the question of how the \textit{Critique of Judgement} completes the critical system, Kant’s method involves pointing to already familiar parts of the system to show that the less familiar is required as a ‘mediator’ between them. He recalls this method being used in the \textit{First Critique} in relation to the schema - which is introduced to mediate between pure concepts of the understanding and the imagination - and in the \textit{Second Critique} in relation to the \textit{typic} -which mediates between reason’s moral law and the understanding (Page lxxxvi).

\textsuperscript{10} I am referring to Nuzzo’s translation of the terms of unity in Nuzzo, Angelica, \textit{Kant and the Unity of Reason}, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 96-7.

\textsuperscript{11} It is interesting to note that Kant does not use the word ‘system’ in the title of this section or any of the three sections in this trichotomy. If we look at the \textit{First Introduction} he uses the word system in the title of each of the first three sections, in fact Kant uses this word very frequently in the titles of the sections: \textit{Philosophy as a System}, \textit{The System of the Higher Cognitive Powers}, \textit{The System of the Powers of the Human Mind}, \textit{Experience as a System}, \textit{Natural Forms as so Many Systems}, and also the critique of pure reason (as an enterprise) as a system. This leads one to question why he omitted the word from all the section titles of the published \textit{Introduction}. This alteration suggests a change in orientation with respect to the nature of this unity, or at the very least, a reconsideration of such a centralised use of the term in reference to organisation and content.
The understanding gives laws *a priori* through concepts of nature, reason can legislate *a priori* in respect to the concept of freedom, and we can suppose by analogy that judgement contains an *a priori* principle in relation to feeling which would grant it a means of mediating between the two domains.

Three parts are necessary for Kant’s critique of pure reason (in respect to *a priori* principles), not to secure architectonic unity, rather, the critique of pure reason ‘must decide all of this before we attempt to construct the mentioned system so as to inform us whether this system is possible’ (5:179 my italics). The unity of this system could only be described as ‘architectonic’ once it becomes operative, but before that can happen something prior is required.

If we compare the first trichotomy with the systems of the *First Critique* we can see that when Kant presents the whole of philosophy as two domains (of understanding and reason) with a potential for mediation (by judgement) he is not concerned with realising a theoretical idea with architectonic unity. To unite the theoretical and practical domains Kant’s concern is with that which needs to be in place to bring them together into a unity; a ‘means to connect’ them which, at this stage is not akin to a finalised ‘system’. He starts with a supposition by analogy as there is no homogeneity between the parts (the practical and theoretical domains) there is only specification so he pursues a search for affinity supposing by analogy that reflective judgement could be the ‘third thing’ by which we can bridge the divide.

Though the unity of philosophy could be presented diagrammatically (as it is in the table at the end of the introduction) it encompasses the architectonic unity of the theoretical domain, and the unity of practical freedom, despite the fact that the two can never be made homogeneous. This unity must be more fundamental, and of a different nature to that of the systems in the *First Critique* as it encompasses two
types of causality (in relation to the mechanism of nature and in relation to the
freedom of the will) and two separate incompatible domains. Securing the unity of
these domains will secure the unity of philosophy in a way that presents the unity of
the mind and mental faculties. This may parallel the way in which systems of
theoretical reason reflect nature but what Kant introduces here is that which must be
in place in order for systematic unity to be possible. He sets out the domain of
philosophy in terms of a geography and this is methodologically different to
presenting a system as an architectonic figure as he uses an imaginative analogy to
supplement and communicate his idea. A geographical map or picture not only
presents the parts e.g. the countries, it also presents that which links and separates
them (e.g. the bodies of water), whereas, a system cannot present that which lies in
between the parts, only that which unites them towards an end (the idea as a whole).

The Unity of the Mental Faculties and Experience

The second trichotomy (§ 4-6) outlines the unity of the cognitive faculties and the
unity of experience\textsuperscript{12}. In this trichotomy Kant seeks to demonstrate what he
supposed by analogy in the first: that judgement is one of the cognitive faculties and
that it possesses an a priori principle. Reflective judgement makes possible a system
of experience by approaching and interpreting nature’s manifold empirical laws as if
they were created by an understanding that we think by analogy with our own. We
presuppose that nature is constituted in a way that is conducive with our cognitive
faculties and this secures the unity of experience and the mental faculties.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{12} The word ‘system’ is not used in the titles of these sections, however, in the First Introduction § 4 is entitled On Experience as a System for the Power of Judgement.}\]

230
In § 4 On Judgement as a Power that Legislates A priori Kant discusses judgement as a power that legislates a priori and describes it as the ‘ability to think the particular as contained under the universal’ (5:179). He distinguishes determinate from reflective judgement, although both involve a relation between particulars and universals: the former involves subsumption of a particular under a given universal, with the latter the particular is given and judgement must find the universal. Nature in its empirical diversity is left undetermined by the universal transcendental laws of the understanding and determinate judgement. Particular empirical laws are contingent but necessary and must be united by a principle of reflective judgement that cannot come from experience as:

...it is to be the basis for the unity of all empirical principles under higher though still empirical principles, and hence is to be the basis that makes it possible to subordinate empirical principles to one another in a systematic way (5:180).

The principle must be given to reflective judgement by itself and particular empirical laws are viewed in terms of a unity they would have if they had been given or created by an understanding that we refer to by analogy with our own. Reflective judgement uses this idea as a principle for reflection and particulars are thought as contained under a universal law that judgement gives to itself. Reflective judgement’s a priori principle is revealed as that of the purposiveness of nature which guides and conditions the possibility of our reflections on it. This principle forms the basis on which empirical principles can relate to one another in a systematic way, it assists our cognitive powers, and makes possible a ‘system’ of experience.

In § 5 The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature is a Transcendental Principle of Judgement Kant seeks to show that the principle of the purposiveness of nature is transcendental and not metaphysical (as it concerns pure concepts of
objects of possible empirical cognition in general and does not have to be given empirically) it therefore requires a deduction. We judge the unity of nature in its empirical laws and the possibility of the unity of experience (as a system) to be contingent (5:183), yet we must assume this unity in order to form a whole of experience and to view particular laws as having coherence:

Hence judgement must assume, as an *a priori* principle for its own use, that what to human insight is contingent in the particular (empirical) natural laws does nevertheless contain a law-governed unity, unfathomable but still conceivable by us, in the combination of what is diverse in them to [form] an experience that is intrinsically [*an sich*] possible (5:184).

Reflective judgement must think of nature according to a principle of purposiveness for our cognitive power to gain a unified (system of) experience of diverse particulars. The transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is a subjective principle (maxim) of judgement that gives us a means of reflecting on objects of nature to have a coherent experience.

Our understanding makes a coherent experience out of given perceptions of nature (which could be infinitely diverse or unconnected), it possesses certain laws *a priori* which enable nature to be an object of experience and it must think these rules as necessary. The understanding cannot determine nature’s empirical particulars as connected *a priori*, but in order to investigate them an *a priori* principle must be presupposed; the principle that ‘a cognizable order of nature in terms of these laws is possible’ (5:185). A harmony between nature and our cognitive powers is presupposed *a priori* by judgement and this *a priori* principle of judgement relates to the subject and prescribes a law for reflection not to nature but to itself: ‘This law could be called the *law of the specification of nature* in terms of its empirical laws’ (5:186). What Kant supposed by analogy in the first trichotomy is revealed as a
necessary principle that enables us to search for empirical laws and it grounds the possibility of experience and cognition of nature in its manifold.

In § 6 On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature Kant connects the attainment of an aim to the feeling of pleasure and claims that, as the condition of reaching this aim is an a priori presentation (with respect to reflective judgement), there is ‘a basis that determines the feeling of pleasure a priori and validly for everyone’ as we refer the object to our cognitive power (5:187). For Kant, when we discover that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws can be unified under one principle, this gives rise to a noticeable pleasure (5:187). Our success in doing this is ‘felt’ and we would feel displeasure if we failed to achieve this unity and could not apply the principles of systematic unity to nature in general. Judgement presupposes this unity indeterminately so we have to accept the possibility of a potential diversity of laws that no human understanding could find unity in. Kant claims that our need to systematise means that we would continue to investigate and experience nature in hope of gaining simplicity and unity: ‘For judgement bids us proceed in accordance with the principle of nature’s being commensurate with our cognitive power’ (5:188).

The unities that Kant is concerned with in respect to experience and the mental faculties operate according to a principle that forms the basis for the possibility of a system and dictates an approach to nature as art. This approach makes possible a system of empirical particulars which are united under the principle of nature’s purposiveness for our judging of it as if it were created by an understanding we think by analogy with our own. Reflective judgement ascends from the particular in nature to the universal using a principle that is not taken from experience but is that which must be in place for experience as a system to be possible. The movement of
ascension recalls reasons ability to ascend or descend the step ladder, but it differs as it is that which must be in place in order for such movement to be possible.

The key principles pertaining to systems in the First Critique (homogeneity, specification and affinity) would not be possible if we did not presuppose the transcendental a priori principle of the purposiveness of nature that judgement gives to itself. The principle serves to guide us and enables us to have interconnected experience of nature, architectonic unity is only possible on the basis of this presupposition that nature is harmonious with our cognitive faculties. We are granted a concept of nature that differs from nature in generality (as presented and required in the First Critique) as the Third Critique focuses on nature in respect to particulars which we must experience as art. Nature in general relies on the homogeneity of phenomena, but nature in its manifold deals with specificity; in terms of the synthetic unity of different empirical cognitions and how we can know specific causes of specific effects.

The role of feeling (which is not necessary in relation to architectonic unity) also gains importance and is central in relation to reflective judgement. It is a feeling of pleasure in response to the presence of commensurability with our cognitive powers (and the absence of disharmony) that must be in place before reason can operate systematically and order cognitions we have gained. A feeling of pleasure is felt not from the system, but from our experience of the possibility of systematisation. Using reflective judgement we evaluate the unity of nature as if it was created by an understanding (as art), this involves use of this understanding as a regulative idea that is subjectively necessary for reason. A theoretical idea regulates a system with architectonic unity, however, the principle of purposiveness is also constitutive in respect to how constitute the manifold in order to approach it coherently. It bridges
the distinction between regulative and constitutive and because of this its unity differs from that of a regulative figure or system, its status is such that it is that which enables architectonic (regulative) unity to be possible\textsuperscript{13}.

\textit{On Nature and the Unity of the Mind}

In the first two trichotomies Kant sought to show why a \textit{Critique of Judgement} is necessary; to unite the two domains and bring unity to philosophy (and to the mental faculties) and to show how we can have unified experience of nature in manifold. In the final trichotomy he sets out how judgement can use it’s \textit{a priori} principle in respect to judging art and nature (aesthetically and teleologically) but it is the former that enables judgement to secure a special part in Kant’s critique of pure reason.

§ 7 concerns the \textit{Aesthetic Presentation of the Purposiveness of Nature}. Kant clarifies the aesthetic character of an object as that which constitutes a reference to the subject and the feeling of pleasure or displeasure aroused by a given object is a subjective feature that can never be an element of cognition. Purposiveness is not a characteristic of an object, an object is purposive if its presentation is directly connected with a feeling of pleasure or displeasure in the subject. This is an aesthetic presentation of purposiveness that does not involve reference to a concept and precedes cognition of the object, Kant states that it:

\textit{…cannot express anything other than the object’s being commensurate with the cognitive powers that are, and insofar as they are, brought into play when we

judge reflectively, and hence [express] merely a form of subjective purposiveness of the object (5:189-190).

The apprehension of forms by the imagination is compared by reflective judgement to its ability to schematise and refer intuitions to concepts. An object is regarded as purposive if, in this comparison the presentation (unintentionally) brings the imagination in harmony with the understanding. This harmony is the source of a feeling of pleasure and the object is viewed as purposive for aesthetic reflective judgement\(^{14}\).

The form of the object is judged to be the basis of a pleasure that is valid for the judging subject and for everyone: ‘The object is then called beautiful and our ability to judge by such a pleasure (and hence also with universal validity) is called taste’ (5:190). A judgement of taste has subjective universality, it claims to be valid for all judging subjects as we all have the same cognitive faculties that are set into play when reflecting on the form of a given object. A feeling of pleasure is connected to the presentation of an object ‘...as if it were a predicate connected with the cognition of the object’ and we treat it as required of everyone (5:191).

In § 8 On the Logical Presentation of the Purposiveness of Nature Kant distinguishes aesthetic from logical purposiveness and refers the latter to nature. We present the purposiveness of given objects as subjective (when the apprehended form is in harmony with the cognitive powers and direct pleasure arises from reflection) or objective (when the harmony of the form relates to a concept to enable determinate cognition by the understanding). Kant states: ‘When the concept of an

---

\(^{14}\) On purposiveness Nuzzo writes: ‘As a transcendental principle of the faculty of judgement, purposiveness plays a role in cognition insofar as it represents the regulative principle for the possibility of a systematic unity of experience. Purposiveness, however, is not only a regulative but also a constitutive principle. It is the constitutive a priori principle of the (faculty of) feeling of pleasure and displeasure’. Nuzzo, Angelica, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 222.
object is given and we use it for cognition, the task of judgement is to exhibit \textit{(exhibere)} the concept, i.e., to place beside the concept an intuition corresponding to it' (5:192). Here a given intuition can be subsumed under a concept, he goes on that exhibition can occur via the imagination e.g. in art when a concept is made real, or through nature’s technic (its power to produce things in terms of purposes) to present the product as a natural purpose. Subjective purposiveness is a principle for judging that is not contained in an object yet we attribute to nature a concern for our cognitive powers (by analogy with a purpose):

Hence we may regard natural beauty as the exhibition of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and may regard natural purposes as the exhibition of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness… (5:193).

Beauty is regarded subjectively and judged aesthetically (based on feelings), and natural purposes are judged objectively and logically, (with reference to concepts).

The \textit{Third Critique} is therefore divided in relation to the power to judge purposiveness aesthetically, and the power to judge it logically; aesthetic and teleological judgment. The \textit{Critique of Aesthetic Judgement} concerns ‘a principle that judgement lays completely \textit{a priori} at the basis of its reflection on nature’ and without this purposiveness of nature in respect to our cognitive powers the understanding would not be able to operate successfully (5:193). There is no \textit{a priori} basis for claiming objective purposes in nature, rather, judgement contains the transcendental principle of the formal purposiveness of nature which serves a regulative function and prepares the understanding (and reason) so we can make logical judgements in respect to natural purposes. The latter would not be possible if the former was not in place.

Aesthetic judgement ascertains by taste whether the form of a thing is commensurate with our cognitive powers, teleological judgement can judge objects
in terms of the principle of a purposiveness of nature but it cannot make a priori assertions that nature makes products with reference to purposes. Aesthetic judgement is therefore, a ‘special power’ of judging things according to a rule, but not to concepts, teleological judgement judges according to concepts but involves ‘special principles’ that reflect upon but do not determine objects (5:194). Teleological judgement belongs to theoretical philosophy, but aesthetic judgement ‘contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects; hence it belongs only to the critique that is the propaedeutic to all philosophy’; the critique of the judging subject and his cognitive powers that are capable of a priori principles (5:194).

§ 9 How Judgement Connects the Legislations of the Understanding and of Reason concerns the unity of the mind, the connection between the faculties and the unity of philosophy. The concept of freedom cannot determine our theoretical cognition of nature and the concepts of nature cannot determine practical laws of freedom. The sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, but the effects of freedom can be realised in nature. Causality offers a link between the two domains as the effect according to freedom is the (appearance or existence of a) final purpose which presupposes ‘the condition under which it is possible [to achieve] this final purpose in nature’ (5:195-6). Judgement presupposes this condition a priori and provides us with a concept that mediates between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. The concept of a purposiveness of nature therefore makes possible a transition from the theoretical lawfulness of nature to the final purpose set by freedom which can be actualised in nature in accordance with its laws. The understanding gives laws to nature a priori but leaves a supersensible substrate undetermined. Judgement’s a priori principle for judging nature’s particular laws provides this substrate with determinability, and reason gives it determination
through its *a priori* practical law: ‘Thus judgement makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom’ (5:196).

In relation to the higher powers of the soul for theoretical cognition, constitutive *a priori* principles lie in the understanding, for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure they lie in judgement, for the power of desire they lie in practical reason which determines the final purpose and carries pure intellectual liking for its object. Judgements concept (of a purposiveness of nature) belongs to the concepts of nature as a regulative principle of the cognitive power, but aesthetic judgements about objects (of nature or art) are constitutive in regard to the feeling of pleasure/displeasure and Kant's former distinction between regulative and constitutive becomes integrated\(^\text{15}\). Spontaneity in the ‘play’ of the cognitive powers and their harmony with one another is the basis of this pleasure and makes the concept of the purposiveness of nature suitable for connecting the domain of nature with that of freedom. In regard to freedom’s consequences, this harmony ‘promotes the minds receptivity to moral feeling’ as reflecting aesthetically opens up the only experience of freedom we may have (5:197)\(^\text{16}\). Kant presents a table to give an overview of the higher powers ‘in their systematic unity’ (5:198). It presents the mental powers, the cognitive powers, their *a priori* principles and their applications. Immediately following the table he remarks on his methodology as necessarily tripartite. *A priori* divisions are either analytic or synthetic, analytic ones are always bi-partite, synthetic ones must refer to a condition, a conditioned, and the concept

\(^{15}\) See 2.1 for a discussion on the difference between regulative and constitutive ideas and principles.

\(^{16}\) This point is made by Nuzzo in Nuzzo, Angelica, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 258.
that arises from their union ‘hence the division must of necessity be a trichotomy’ (5:198)\textsuperscript{17}.

The notion of reflective judgment is not referred to within Kant’s table of judgements in the \textit{First Critique}; it is a new notion, along with the capacity to reflect on an object’s form\textsuperscript{18}. The objective behind reflection is not to apply a concept to an intuition to gain cognition, it is to reflect on a feeling of pleasure occasioned by an objects form (based on a harmony between the imagination and the understanding) so we can make a judgement of taste. Such judgements are subjective, yet they possess validity based on an \textit{a priori} principle of the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties. The unity of the mind is revealed through the existence of a feeling (with an \textit{a priori} basis) aroused by the way the cognitive faculties relate to one another to produce harmony through attunement of the understanding and the imagination (which differs from their interrelation in respect to determinate judgements). Though this is subjectively experienced we can judge it as valid for all subjects with the same cognitive faculties and it possesses a subjective universality.

\begin{quote}
17 In relation to the position, function and achievement of this final section Nuzzo states: ‘The third trichotomy can be read as the conclusive union, or the final connection, that arises out of the problems discussed in the first two trichotomies (as “condition” and “conditioned” of the entire \textit{Critique}), placing them in light of a new critical development’. Ibid., p. 222.

18 Kant does refer to reflection in respect to concepts of reflection in the \textit{First Critique} (A260-289/B316-346). He distinguishes logical and transcendental reflection claiming that the latter occurs in every judgement to enable us to compare given representations to determine to which cognitive faculty they belong (A262/B318). Henry Allison claims ‘it remains an open question’ whether the contrast Kant makes in the \textit{Introduction} in regard to determinate and reflective judgement ‘marks a major change in his conception of judgement’ and cites Beatrice Longuenesse for whom ‘reflection and determination are complementary aspects of judgement from the very beginning of the “critical period”. Allison, Henry. \textit{Kant’s Theory of Taste}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p 16. Longuenesse, Beatrice, \textit{Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’}, translated by Charles T Wolfe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 163-6. I wish to claim that Kant’s formulation of reflective judgement in the \textit{Third Critique} is new in respect to its status as possessing an \textit{a priori} principle relating to the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.
\end{quote}
However, we should note that the nature of the unity secured is that of a connection [Verknüpfung]\(^{19}\).

In comparison to the systems of the *First Critique* the unity of purposiveness differs from that of a regulative idea as the purposiveness of nature is not necessary (as nature could be infinitely diverse) and it is based on a feeling; a sensible experience. It differs from the *monogram* of reason that needs never be realised in objective reality as the unity of purposiveness must be experienced for us to utilise it in a reflective judgement; this ties it to sensible experience though it also exceeds sensibility in terms of its validity and *a priori* status. Although Kant presents the unity of philosophy and thereby also the unity of the mind systematically in a diagram (5:198), that which enables this system cannot itself be systematised. Here we come to the crux of the difference with the unities of the *Third Critique* in contrast to those in the *First*; the unities of the *Third Critique* cannot be presented in a figure. We must recognise their aesthetic nature in regard to the role of feeling, but the unity of experience, of the mind and mental faculties, and thereby also of philosophy itself are beyond any figural presentation. The system of philosophy can be set out architectonically (diagrammatically) *after* the unity of experience and the mind are secured, but the unity granted to nature by the *a priori* principle of reflective judgement is not secured through the use of a figure as it is in e.g. schematism (through the use of *monograms* generated by the imagination or reason).

---

\(^{19}\) According to Nuzzo's translation of the terms, and her trichotomic reading of the Introduction, the type of unity must be properly understood and kept in context: 'In Kant's terminology, *Verbindung (conjunctio)* is a stronger bond that brings two terms together conjoining one with the other. *Verknüpfung* (nexus), on the other hand, brings a link to the fore yet still maintains the two terms as separated by an “in-between”. Thus, the title of this section already warns us of the kind of “unification” that we should expect to take place at this point'. Nuzzo, Angelica, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, pp. 248-9.
The position of judgement in the ‘system’ of philosophy mirrors the role of the imagination in schematising; it is the ‘third thing’ which acts as a bridge between two heterogeneous elements to bring unity. The unity of an intuition with a concept is synthetic in nature, the unity pertaining to the system through which a theoretical idea is realised is regulative, the unity of a practical idea is based on moral feeling, and the unity of the mind comprises the two aforementioned unities to exceed the sphere of both. We can think the nature of this unity as that of an aesthetic totality or Gestalt (more than the sum of its parts), it cannot be presented directly in a figure though it enables our experience to be unified. Once this unity is secured we can then present the architectonic unity of the philosophy, the mind, and the faculties. But the manner through which we experience nature by analogy with art to get to the stage of systematisation cannot be secured through a diagrammatic figure. However, one must acknowledge that we need to experience nature in manifold as art in order to be able to systematise our cognitions, our mental faculties, our mind and philosophy itself, this reveals a role for art in relation to experience (and systematisation) that is fundamental (but not figural) and related to the creative process.

So what have we learnt about the ‘systems’ or unities of the Third Critique in comparison to those in the First? The unities of the Third Critique condition the possibility of systematisation and they connect to sensible objective reality through the role of feeling in aesthetic reflective judgements. They are not concerned with raising knowledge to the rank of a science, but with that which enables us to have meaningful, unified experience so that we can gain any knowledge at all. In the Third Critique the unities are not intended to realise abstract theoretical ideas, rather they communicate a complex aesthetic phenomenon in relation to a necessary
presupposition that is both regulative (in respect to the possibility of systematic unity) and constitutive (in respect to the faculty of feeling). In the *Third Critique* the unities do not concern a systematic interrelation between parts in relation to a whole (reflected in the way we investigate nature in general), they concern how we approach nature (in manifold) as purposive for our experience of it. It is only possible for us to have two conflicting approaches to nature because the latter is a precondition of the former; we must experience nature as art in order to systematise it.

What the two have in common is a use of analogy; systems in the *First Critique* are anaogues of sensible schemata, they present ideas directly in architectonic figures and they generate fallacious illusory figures (e.g. the transcendentally ideal figure of God). In the *Third Critique* it is Kant’s initial supposition by analogy that enables him to begin finding the common ground between the two domains. By analogy with the operations of reason and the understanding (the familiar, known parts of the system of the mental faculties) he can hypothesise about the role of judgement and orient his task in relation to this new area. Clues about the nature and operations of the mind are revealed by this method and will be discussed further in relation to the mind’s capacity for indirect (symbolic) exhibition Chapter 7.

The unities of the *Third Critique* concern: experience, the mind, mental faculties, and philosophy itself, they can only be presented diagrammatically after they are systematised and this is not possible unless we presuppose that nature is purposive and we view it as art. The role of art is therefore central and made explicit as, through aesthetic reflective judgements art conditions the possibility of the system. Kant’s critical project has reached its concluding stages, and his notion of ‘system’ as the dominant and most effective means of securing and defining unity has
changed as it becomes developed. The nature of the unity that he requires in the *Third Critique* does not concern the logical principles of homogeneity, specification and affinity (as set out in the *First Critique*), and this could be the reason Kant omitted the word ‘system’ from the title of the published *Introduction* when it dominated the unpublished version so obviously.
Chapter 7. The Symbolic Realisation of Ideas

This Chapter will examine § 59 of Kant’s Third Critique to present Kant’s account of symbolic hypotyposis. In 7.1 I will set out how ideas are realised symbolically and are indirectly granted a degree of objective reality. I will work through some key considerations such as: the relation between the intuitive symbol and the rule governed analogy on which it is based, how symbolic exhibition compares to schematic exhibition, and how the possibility of the symbol is significant for the communication of ideas and the unity of the mind. In contrast to my analysis of schematic exhibition, I am not concerned with tracing the role of the figure, my interest lies in the lawful activity of the free imagination. The symbol reveals the analogic logic of reflection and presents the unity of the mind and mental faculties as the basis on which we can exhibit and communicate ideas (which would otherwise remain indemonstrable). I will seek to preserve the aesthetic nature of the symbol whilst clarifying key aspects of its nature in relation to morality, form and reflective judgements. I will also lay the groundwork for distinguishing between symbols and aesthetic ideas in 8.2 as based on the difference between the free (poetic) movement of the imagination in contrast to its guided (rhetorical) reflection.

20 In Kant’s theory of Taste Henry Allison suggests this section marks a return to the themes set out in § 9 of the Introduction and is the culmination not just of the Dialectic (as the formulation and resolution of the antinomy of taste), but of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement as a whole. Allison, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Taste, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 236 & 245.

21 Nuzzo identifies the logic of reflective judgement as the logic of analogy (which she claims always implies a certain reference to the supersensible), she states: ‘The analogic procedure of the faculty of judgement leads Kant to explore the issue of the “connection” and “unification” of all our faculties with regard to their common substrate. The supersensible will appear as the common territory (or to use the language of the Introduction, the “field” § II) in which all of our cognitive faculties are eventually unified (§ 59, 258-259 AA353, 28-34).’ Nuzzo, Angelica, Kant and the Unity of Reason, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 319.
In 7.2. I will present Kant’s account of the symbol based upon the examples he uses as comprising three tiers or types: a profane, a linguistic, and a higher type of symbolisation. I will account for why I have separated the examples in this way with reference to the text and will refer to some problematic interpretations of Kant’s account of the symbol to demonstrate the impact of failing to acknowledge this distinction. I will refer to the examples Kant uses as the peculiar nature of symbolisation dictates a method of analysis that must comprise and retain a *modus aestheticus* in contrast to a *methodus logicus*\textsuperscript{22}.

### 7.1. Idea as Symbols

Let us discuss how ideas can be symbolised and set out the difference between the symbol and the analogy on which it is based. I will demonstrate how the symbol relates necessarily to the schema yet differs from any of the other types of exhibition discussed so far. I will emphasise the aesthetic nature of the symbol and outline its significance in relation to the communication of ideas and the unity of the mind.

In the *Third Critique* Kant maintains that rational ideas cannot be directly demonstrated in objective reality (and judged determinately) (cf.5:342). But in § 59 *On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality* he claims ideas can be realised through symbolic hypotyposis in which reflective judgement uses an analogy and performs a double function: ‘it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different

\textsuperscript{22} Kant sets out this distinction in § 60 *On Methodology Concerning Taste* where he writes: ‘So in fine art there is only manner (modus) not method (methodus): the master must show by his example [*vormachen*] what the student is to produce, and how’ (5:355). In footnote 41 pertaining to this section Pluhar also refers to the § 94 of the *Logic* where Kant states that all cognition must conform to a rule, this rule is either manner (which is free) or method (which is constraint) (Ak. IX, 139).
object of which the former is only a symbol’ (5:352). To render Idea C intuitable I apply concept A to an example of A in intuition, then I apply the mere rule by which I reflect on the intuition of A to the idea C of which A serves only as the symbol. A and C are connected through an analogous rule of reflection (B) which guides the initial use of concept A to indirectly demonstrate C.

Judgement performs a double function composed of two separate acts; one reflective and one determinate. These acts are united in the movement of reflection and culminate in the production of an intuitive symbol that indirectly presents (or exhibits) an idea. A rational concept is rendered by a concept or object that is directly demonstrable, the rational concept itself remains undetermined but is presented by analogy. The relation between the rational concept and that which enables exhibition of it is indirect and occurs through a transposition; this marks the symbolic exhibition of ideas as distinctly different to the schematic realisation of concepts and ideas we have discussed so far (which have all been direct).

The symbol partially embodies the rational idea in respect to a shared formal principle possessed by the idea in question and the object used to exhibit it. Symbols are chosen due to formal similarities, but the formal analogy does not dissolve the differences between the relata in the symbolising relation. Kant states

---

23 Henry Allison describes the determinate act as ‘quasi-determinative’ and notes that, although the basic thesis that ideas of reason are capable of indirect exhibition (or analogue’s of schematisation) can be found in the first two Critique’s (in relation to transcendental ideas providing an analogon of a schema (A665/B693) and the moral law being thought by analogy in the Typic (5:67-76)) its characterisation as a symbolic exhibition and its connection with reflective judgement are contributions of the third. Allison, Henry, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 255.

24 The typic and the schematism of analogy have direct and indirect features, but cannot be designated as straightforwardly symbolic. See part two for a full analysis of the realisation of practical ideas.

25 This concept of the symbol embodying the idea can be found in Wicks, Robert, *Kant on Judgement*, London, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 173.
that judgement operates in a manner analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising in terms of the form of reflection and not in terms of the content of this reflection (5:351). The symbol is a mode of intuitive presentation (to be contrasted with the discursive) and in its reflective capacity judgement must go beyond the mechanical procedure of subsuming via schematisation to operate artistically\textsuperscript{26}.

No objective knowledge of the reality of the idea is gained through presentation of it as a symbol as Kant maintains that the symbol is not a type of knowledge, it is a mode of intuitive presentation (5:351-2). We may gain relational knowledge (based on a rule of analogy between the indemonstrable idea and the demonstrable concept) and Kant claims that a mere way of presenting something may be called cognition, but only for the purposes of determining an object practically ‘as to what the idea of the object ought to become for us and for our purposive employment of it’ (5:353). The use of analogy as a heuristic procedure to guide reflection and search for meaning is a key feature of judgement that unites its operations in respect to: beauty and the sublime, gaining empirical cognition, the cognition of life and organisms, God, and thinking in general\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{26} In reflective judgement an intuition is not merely subsumed under a concept, the imagination must freely choose an empirical concept to serve as the symbol of an idea. In its freedom the imagination operates lawfully to effect a harmony with the determinate lawfulness of the understanding. An empirical concept is selected as an appropriate symbol for the idea based upon the degree of harmony aroused between the imagination and the understanding. The harmony is constituted by an analogous rule of reflection between the two relata which manifests itself as a feeling aroused by a similarity of form in reflecting on each. The relation is aesthetic in relation to the feeling aroused by the harmony, but it is also connected to the determinate form of the object symbolising the idea. Reflective judgement is employed artistically to measure the pleasurable harmony aroused between the imagination and the understanding by the relata which serves as a guide in choosing the symbol.

\textsuperscript{27} This argument is made by Angelica Nuzzo who also claims that the theme of analogy unifies the activity of judgement in relation to all these areas. Nuzzo also observes that analogy always requires recourse to the supersensible (as the point of unity for all our mental faculties). Nuzzo, Angelica, \textit{Kant and the Unity of Reason}, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 319.
In footnote 31 to § 59 Werner S. Pluhar refers to Kant’s later work *On The Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff* to expand upon how the symbol serves to provide objective reality for rational concepts. In this text it becomes clear that Kant intends the rule of reflection that constitutes the analogy on which the symbol is based, to be constructed according to or in line with a category of understanding. It is difficult to reconcile this categorical element of the analogy with Kant’s distinction between the two types of exhibition as it appears to reduce symbolic presentation to a type of schematic presentation. In the section entitled *How to provide Objective reality for Pure concepts of Understanding and Reason* Kant states that:

> When objective reality is directly attributed (*direkte*) to a concept by an intuition corresponding to it, that is, when the concept is immediately represented, this action is schematism; however, if the concept cannot be represented immediately, but rather only through its consequences (*indirekte*), it can be called the symbolisation of the concept (20:279-80 my italics).

According to this analysis symbolisation of a concept is an indirect attribution of objective reality. This is achieved through a rule of analogy that concerns a similarity between the consequences of the two relata in the symbolising relation. Defining the symbol as an indirect representation according to a similarity of consequences appears to reduce it to a derivative of schematic presentation as the analogous rule of reflection between relata is constructed in relation to the pure concept of causality. In this work Kant presents the symbol as based on a categorical analogy and does not emphasise its aesthetic mode of presentation (as he does in the *Third Critique*). The intuitive element seems compromised as the categorical rule of reflection on which the analogy is based determines how the symbol is defined and understood. Kant goes on to say:
The symbol of an idea (or a concept of reason) is an analogical representation of an object. That is, its relation to certain consequences is the same as the one that is attributed to the object in itself and its consequences, even though the objects themselves are of wholly different orders, as for example, when I represent to myself certain products of nature, perhaps the organised things, animals and plants, in relation to their cause, and a clock in relation to man as its maker, because the relation of causality in general as a category is the same in the two cases. But the inner constitution of the subject of this relation remains unknown to me, and thus only the former can be represented, never the latter' (20: 279-80 my italics).

It is the relation of causality which constitutes the basis of the rule on which the analogy operates. Kant gives an example of cognition by analogy using God; although I can have no theoretical knowledge of God, I can have knowledge by analogy which is necessary for reason to think, Kant then states:

*The categories are the basis of this knowledge*, since they necessarily belong to the form of thought, whether it be directed toward the sensible or the supersensible, even though and just because by themselves they determine no object and do not constitute cognition (20:279-80 my italics).

The problem identified concerns how to account for a discursive rule of analogy in a symbolising relation whilst maintaining the symbol as a mode of intuitive presentation that differs from the schema. It may help to refer to the *Analogies of Experience* in the *First Critique* to clarify the extent to which the symbol relates to pure concepts of understanding. The analogies provide a picture of experience and

---

28 The *Analogies of Experience* (discussed in A176-218/B218-65) are composed of three principles which provide rules for the objective employment of the pure category of relation. The analogies concern the way we represent appearances to ourselves in order for experience to be possible, they are the *a priori*, regulative principles which are necessary for knowledge and experience. Things are related to one another in terms of three analogies which are governed by principles; the principle of the permanence of substance, the principle of succession in time, and the principle of co-existence in accordance with reciprocity and community. The first analogy works as follows: in order for us to experience change or co-existence it is necessary to postulate a permanence underlying things in time. Though ‘duration’ or ‘permanence’ may not exist in itself, it is necessary for us to postulate them and we experience time by analogy with the existence of an underlying permanence. The second analogy concerns the principle of succession in time (causality), though causality may not exist in itself, we experience time as irreversible and this requires us to order our experience by analogy with cause and effect. The third analogy concerns the principle of co-existence, the relation of appearances is thought in terms of simultaneity. It is necessary for us to think that everything which so-exists does so at the same time in order for experience to be possible as we order our
explore the mode of operation concerning how all categories are possible in experience. The *Axioms of Intuition* and *Anticipations of Perception* provide the conditions for the possibility of experience but are not themselves met with in any experience, anything met with in experience is done so through the categories, and thereby through causality which governs what we see using the analogies.

The purpose of the analogies for Kant is to show that experience is possible only if we represent appearances as necessarily related in time. The relations between perceptions are prior to experience and are what make unified experience possible as relations between appearances are governed by three modes of time: duration, succession and co-existence. Analogy is as fundamental to the way in which we order experience through time as the categories are to the form of thought, we experience appearances by analogy with these three principles and this reinforces the sense of analogy as relational.

The *Analogies of Experience* are *a priori* regulative principles necessary for knowledge and experience to be possible. Experience is empirical knowledge which determines objects; it is a synthesis of perceptions not in itself contained in perception (A177/B219). Our experience of things is not mere intuition or sensation; it is a reflection and an ordering of the manifold according to analogies so that appearances can be ‘experienced’ as given. Kant states that our experiences come together as a manifold without order which has to be ‘represented in experience, not as it comes to be constructed’ (A177/B219). The manifold is constructed by the analogies so that things make sense as given in time through duration, succession and co-existence (the three analogies of experience).

It is in relation to the *Analogies of Experience* that Kant sets out the use of analogy in philosophy as different to its use in mathematics:

In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formula's which express the equality of two quantitative relations, and are always constitutive; so that if three members of the proportion are given, the fourth is likewise given and, that is can be constructed. But in philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations; and from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a fourth, not of the fourth member itself. The relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected (A179-80/B222).

In philosophy analogies give us clues as to whether there is a qualitative relation between things; they provide a rule for seeking and a mark for discovering the fourth member in experience. The principles of the *Analogies of Experience* are connected with the *existence* of appearances and their *relation* to one another, the existence of the appearances cannot be known *a priori* but the rules for connecting the appearances can. Existence only lends itself to regulative principles, therefore, if a perception is given in a time relation to another perception we may assert a necessary connection between them in time. In mathematics analogies are always quantitative (constitutive); they therefore give us knowledge which relates to an object. In philosophy analogies are qualitative and concern relations between appearances; from three given members we can obtain only knowledge of the *relation* to a fourth member, not the fourth member itself\(^{29}\). The *Analogies of Experience* are connected with the *existence* of appearances and their *relation* to one another, the existence of the appearances cannot be known *a priori* but the rules for connecting the appearances can. Existence only lends itself to regulative principles, therefore, if a perception is given in a time relation to another perception we may assert a necessary connection between them in time. In mathematics analogies are always quantitative (constitutive); they therefore give us knowledge which relates to an object. In philosophy analogies are qualitative and concern relations between appearances; from three given members we can obtain only knowledge of the *relation* to a fourth member, not the fourth member itself\(^{29}\). The *Analogies of Experience* are connected with the *existence* of appearances and their *relation* to one another, the existence of the appearances cannot be known *a priori* but the rules for connecting the appearances can. Existence only lends itself to regulative principles, therefore, if a perception is given in a time relation to another perception we may assert a necessary connection between them in time. In mathematics analogies are always quantitative (constitutive); they therefore give us knowledge which relates to an object. In philosophy analogies are qualitative and concern relations between appearances; from three given members we can obtain only knowledge of the *relation* to a fourth member, not the fourth member itself\(^{29}\).

\(^{29}\) Nuzzo states: 'In the symbol, the figure of a chiasm between four terms is drawn. Three terms are given while the fourth is the lacking intuition that would correspond to a concept which cannot be exhibited. The intuition corresponding to a demonstrable concept now takes the place of this fourth lacking term'. She describes how, for Kant analogy is an indirect procedure of inference that presupposes a common ground that must be anticipated or constructed by reflective judgement: 'It presupposes an aesthetic representation that does not aim at determining anything in the object but is the way of searching for the meaning of an indeterminate and indeterminable concept [...] analogy is the thought-way that does not take into account only what things have in common but proceeds in thinking that in which things differ'. Analogy sets out from the point of heterogeneity. Nuzzo, Angelica, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, pp. 322-3.
Experience are thus regulative rules according to which a unity of experience arises from perception.

Kant states that the analogies have significance in relation to the empirical employment of the understanding as they deal with knowledge and experience of appearances. What the analogies demonstrate is that appearances have to be subsumed not under the categories but under their schemata, and this is a crucial point (A181/B223). As the object(s) of the analogies are appearances, knowledge of them according to a priori principles consists in our possible experience of them: ‘These principles can have no other purpose save that of being the conditions of the unity of empirical knowledge in the synthesis of appearances’ (A181/B224). This unity can be thought only in the schemata of the pure concepts of understanding, not in the categories themselves. The category expresses a function which is restricted by no sensible condition, it contains the unity of the schema of a synthesis in general. These principles justify us in combining appearances only according to an analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts:

In the principle itself we do indeed make use of the category, but in applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema as the key to its employment, or rather set it alongside the category, as its restricting condition, and as being what may be called its formula (A181/B224 my italics).

To represent appearances as a unified experience we employ the categories, but we apply the schema of the category to experience (we apply the time-relation which enables realisation of the category in intuition) in order to connect the appearances and represent experience itself as unified. The Analogies of Experience do not use the category, but the schema itself and this demonstrates that the use of relation for
the purpose of analogy does not necessarily imply a strictly categorical, discursive connection. In place of the category, the schema is used and the use of the analogy is not strictly categorical (though it is related to the transcendental schema). It is the schema of the category not the category itself which is called upon to order our experience in a regulative manner. This shows a use of analogy as related to the schema but not necessarily discursive; it therefore protects the intuitive nature of the symbol.

To clarify, it is the means by which the category is exhibited in intuition which provides the rule of the analogy and this is the realisation of the concept in time. The process which occurs in-between the category and the intuition (the schema which is homogeneous with both) is called upon to order appearances so that experience may appear unified, this is important not only for experience itself, but for the unity of the subject having the experience. What this reveals is a possibility of separating the analogical from the categorical, whilst maintaining a connection to the transcendental schema.

Thus the connection to the schema in symbolising an idea is presented, but any attempts to understand symbolisation as a form of schematism can be separated from this association as follows; though the analogy itself is related to the schematic (in terms of where it derives its rule) it does not follow that this makes it categorical, and the symbol as the result or end of the analogy is distinct from it. This is an important distinction to bear in mind, the symbol and the analogy on which it is based are not the same. Though the analogy may be related to the process of schematisation, it is not related to the category itself, and the symbol (as distinct from it) remains an intuitive mode of presentation.
We have established that the rule of the analogy (on which a symbol is based) is related to the schema of a category (of relation). Let us now consider how the symbol (as an intuitive representation) differs from the schematic presentations we have discussed so far. The symbol differs from the schemata of sensible concepts (the figural and recollective schema) as it does not involve realisation with reference to a monogram of the imagination. These schemata can be referred to in the determinate act (of judgements double function) but the second, reflective act does not occur with reference to a figure. It is an aesthetic act in which the imagination is granted a degree of freedom (to choose an object directly demonstrable in intuition) yet in its freedom it must harmonise with the lawful operation of the understanding. The symbol may refer to the recollective schema as part of its determinate act and it refers to the transcendental schema in relation to the formal rule of the analogy on which it is based. The symbol mirrors the movement of recollection that forms part of the recollective schema as the imagination moves between the relata to enable partial realisation of the idea through a formal similarity with the determinate object. In contrast to the linear movement of the imagination in determinate judgements, reflective judgement requires the imagination to double back and recall an analogous formal reflective that will suffice in exhibition of the idea. It is a circular expansive movement. Reality is then granted and the idea is expanded through the realisation of a possible (indirect) connection to objective reality and the given object is elevated by its symbolic status.

The symbol differs from the final end schema as it does not concern the organisation of parts in line with a whole according to the logical principles of systematicity. In a symbolic representation there are two relata and realisation is partial and indirect, a systematic presentation of an idea is direct, the idea is
presented in itself and is not transposed into an analogous object. Also, the symbol
does not involve realisation of an idea with reference to a monogram of reason,
reflection is guided by the formal analogy but it is the imagination and not reason that
is operative here. The imagination displays a lawfulness and harmony with the
understanding to enable the indirect realisation of an idea, not as a projection (with
reference to a diagrammatic figure) but in objective reality. In doing this it operates
aesthetically and engages in a movement that cannot be presented (or represented)
figuratively.

In The Idea of Form Rodolphe Gasche refers to symbols as figures of a concept:

‘Symbols must consequently be understood as figures of concepts as well, which, unlike the spatial and temporal figuration of pure concepts of
understanding in schematism, results from a merely formal transposition of forms
of judgement to concepts of reason without producing definite cognition’.

Though the method through which the symbol realises an idea cannot itself be
made figurative, what is granted to the indemonstrable idea that becomes
symbolised is a figural realisation that does not (and cannot) present the idea
directly, but embodies it partially and binds it in a sensible form.

The symbol differs from the practical modes of exhibition (the typic and the
schematism of analogy) as it is straightforwardly indirect. Though the symbol can
enable relational knowledge and is thereby affiliated with practical ideas, as a mode
of exhibition it differs due to its connection to objective reality and the nature of the
analogy on which it operates as involving a different type of transposition. The
symbol is not concerned with the provision of an exemplary standard, but with
securing reality and meaning without determination. Howard Caygill claims that

30 Gasche, Rodolphe, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics, Stanford: Stanford
because *Religion* was written after the *Third Critique* it signals Kant’s desire to reduce the symbolic to the schematic but I have presented a different interpretation of the nature of the practical schemata in the discussion of the figure of Christ as a means to bridge the two types of exhibition in Chapter 5\(^3\).

We have established the ways in which the symbol differs from schematic presentations due to the ways an idea is transposed and its ability to indirectly grant a degree of objective reality. Let us now consider the significance and use of the symbol in respect to the communication of ideas to demonstrate what the possibility of the symbol indicates for the unity of the mind (discussion of the latter will continue in 8.2). In § 60 *On Methodology Concerning Taste* Kant considers the consequences of his account of beauty as the symbol of the morally good in § 59. He is clear that there can be no science of the beautiful but this does not mean it has no value in respect to aesthetic reflective judgements and the method through which we communicate ideas with one other. The *First Critique* explored our need for truth in relation to the exhibition of concepts and ideas, the *Second Critique* showed how we are concerned with ensuring the good can be realised, in the *Third Critique* the two are connected with one another through beauty as Kant’s account of the symbol reveals the unity and interrelation of the mental faculties.

Kant discusses the relation between taste, morality and method and refers to the importance of examples in respect to the genius and the communication of ideas through fine art. Examples can be used as models to guide (not to imitate) in the production of fine art but the artist also refers to an ideal (that need never be

achieved). Ideas should be communicated through art with as much originality as possible, whilst also being guided by past discoveries and a need to bear a practical ideal in mind in respect to truth and goodness. Kant also affirms the importance of freedom in respect to the student (genius) of fine art though he may utilise the teachings of examples and refer to an ideal. In producing art the imagination must be free - as taste must also be free in judging it – even though it is guided by a method which refers to past examples and takes their historical significance into account.

Kant claims we can be prepared to judge and produce fine art by cultivating our mental powers and exposing them to the humanities: ‘because humanity [Humanitat] means both the universal feeling of sympathy, and the ability to engage universally in very intimate communication’ (5:355). Communication is invaluable to humanity as it can be engaged in universally in respect to taste, morality and knowledge and when the two qualities outlined above combine, Kant claims they ‘constitute the sociability that befits humanity’ (5:355). The question of how historically we have sought to combine freedom with constraint is answered in reference to society in terms of ‘the art of the reciprocal communication of ideas between its most educated and cruder segments’ (5:355-6). We must cultivate taste as ‘the universal human sense’ and make our ideas culturally accessible (with reference to symbols), thereby ensuring that we communicate with one another in a sympathetic way (5:356). This will enable us to attain what Kant terms the ‘happy relation’ of being cultured and refined, whilst still maintaining a connection to nature and freedom (5:356).

Taste is ‘the ability to judge the way moral ideas are made sensible […] by means of a certain analogy in our reflection’, it is to judge nature and art with reference to morality through beauty as a symbol (5:356). Thus, through judging and communicating with symbols we can develop our moral ideas and our receptivity to
moral feeling to participate in what Nuzzo terms ‘the intersubjective social context of exchange, participation, and communication of ideas’\textsuperscript{32}.

We can share ideas and feelings with as much truth as we can (in respect to their indemonstrable nature) with respect to examples, symbols, schemata, and the attribution of a shared capacity for interrelation of the mental faculties in other judging subjects. We can therefore communicate socially with freedom and constraint, and the movement of the imagination exemplifies this when symbolising an idea using reflective judgement. We can thereby make our abstract (practical and theoretical) ideas more accessible in a way that promotes receptivity to goodness and truth through beauty.

The symbol does more than enable an indirect presentation of an idea; it presents the unity of the mind through the harmonious interrelation of the mental faculties with one another. In \textit{Kant’s Aesthetic Theory} Donald Crawford observes that if beauty in nature and art is to be seen ‘by any moral being as such a symbol (of morality), then there is a basis for implying that others ought to agree with our judgements of taste because they ought to be morally sensitive’\textsuperscript{33}. The implication is that we all possess the same capacity for unity as we have the same mental faculties and this is the basis on which our judgements of taste have validity and we demand assent from others. We do this by analogy with the determinate validity of moral judgements (which will be discussed further in 7.2). In the \textit{Idea of Form} Rodolphe Gasche goes into great detail discussing whether Kant’s use of hypotyposis initiates a revalorisation of rhetoric, he observes that Kant’s use of the term also designates

\textsuperscript{32} Nuzzo, Angelica, \textit{Kant and the Unity of Reason}, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 327
\textsuperscript{33} Crawford, Donald, \textit{Kant’s Aesthetic Theory}, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, p. 149.
something new and different: ‘...Kant’s very new and original use of the term narrows hypotyposis down to the production of the reality of our concepts, and with it the life of the mind and its powers’\(^34\). He refers to hypotyposis as a transcendental presentation that relates the powers of the mind into a swing and claims: ‘If this way of relating sensibility, understanding and reason is called hypotyposis by Kant, this is because the presentation is that of the tableau, the *scene d’ensemble*, of the life of the mind’\(^35\). Gasche claims that through hypotyposis the mind presents itself with a spectacle of the harmony and strife of the faculties which animates the mind, and enables it to affects itself through this animation. He states that: ‘Coming into life through a presentation that takes the faculties together, the mind becomes affected by its own spectacle. It experiences and feels itself as, a unity’\(^36\). For Gasche hypotyposis accounts for the dynamic life of the mind and the way it affects itself. He designates both schematic and symbolic hypotyposes as precognitive and as actualising a power of judgement that enables theoretical and practical cognition to be possible\(^37\). For Gasche schemata and symbols endow the mind with life and secure it as a whole, this whole is an achievement of the imagination which brings the disparate faculties together into a harmonious living unity\(^38\).

The role of the imagination as central is supported by Nuzzo, as is the designation of the symbol as the source of unity where the cognitive faculties harmonise\(^39\). Kant

---


\(^{35}\) Ibid., p. 210-11

\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 211.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., p 215.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., p 217.

designates the imagination as the power of exhibition (5:232). In schematising the imagination must obey the laws of the understanding, but in symbolising it is granted a degree of freedom guided by the end of exhibition. In 8.2 I will designate this movement of the imagination as rhetorical as it solidifies a way of communicating ideas that is aesthetic yet is guided by a determinate end. It is therefore not merely aesthetic, nor is it systematic, the imagination is granted reflective freedom from the laws of the understanding, yet displays a lawful harmony that is conducive in respect to communicating ideas with clarity and validity.

In conclusion, the analogy on which the symbol is based is composed of a rule related to the schema of the category of relation. The analogy and the symbol are not the same; the symbol is the end or aim of the analogy (that through which the idea becomes realised), and the analogy is the rule governed element through which two heterogeneous relata are brought into a relation. The symbol partially embodies an idea, it grants an indirect connection to objective reality and possesses an aesthetic unity that counteracts the analogical distance between relata. The idea is granted realisation and the object chosen is elevated to symbolic status; both relata thereby engage in a circular crossing of paths as the move into spheres from which they were formerly excluded. The symbol assists with the communication and realisation of ideas as it makes indemonstrable concepts accessible through art and is conducive to the development of taste and the cultivation of moral feelings. Through the possibility of the symbol the unity of the mind and mental faculties can be presented to itself as a dynamic, living whole as a gestalt totality that exceeds the sum of its parts.
7.2. Kant’s Three Tier Account of the Symbol

This section will offer a clarification of Kant’s account of the symbol according to the examples of symbolic hypotyposis given in § 59. Kant’s use of examples to communicate this procedure presents a modus aestheticus that mirrors the communication of ideas by the artist through the creation of exemplary works of art. His explicit intention in using examples is to bring clarity to his claim that beauty is a symbol of the morally good. I will argue that the examples can be interpreted as displaying a profane, a linguistic and a higher type of symbolisation. What Kant thereby achieves is the presentation of a three-tier account of the symbol as the examples he uses communicate the performance of three separate tasks: the simple presentation of a complex concept by the profane symbol, the aesthetic supplementation of a simple concept by the linguistic symbol, and the indirect exhibition of an idea by the higher symbol.

The aim of this section is two-fold: to present Kant’s account of the symbol as composing three-tiers and to show why such separations are useful in terms of clarity. Kant’s account of the symbol possesses layers of complexity that vary according to the different degrees of harmony between the relata in each symbolising relation. I will refer to the work of Paul Guyer and Henry Allison, to demonstrate the need to make distinctions between different types of symbol, and to outline the consequences of failing to observe them.

To establish that our concepts have reality we must be able to present them. Kant uses the word hypotyposis to discuss the sensible presentation or exhibition of concepts. This is traditionally a rhetorical term which combines the Greek hypo
‘under’, ‘below’, ‘beneath’ and *typosis* ‘figure’, ‘sketch’ or ‘outline’. Kant states that concepts can be realised in two ways: *schematically* (directly) or *symbolically* (indirectly) (5:351).

Before discussing the symbol we should make some clarifications about the idea in terms of its position in regard to intuition and its possibility for schematic realisation. To show that our ideas are not empty abstractions we must be able to connect them to knowledge and experience, as outlined by Kant in the step ladder (A320/B377). This arouses a diagrammatic image which presents the position of the idea hierarchically and demonstrates why the application of ideas to intuition is problematic; no examples of an idea can ever be met with as, by their nature and position ideas are indemonstrable.

In the *First Critique* Kant acknowledges a Platonic legacy with the use of the term ‘idea’, yet he endeavours to move away from Plato’s sense of the idea as archetype and posits the idea as that which lies necessarily behind a work or system. The idea is necessary as it is present initially to guide the creation of a work and it is that towards which the work is directed in terms of its end or purpose. Kant’s sense of ‘idea’ cannot be realised in the manner of a Platonic archetype, i.e. by an example or ‘copy’ in experience, but he must ensure a connection to intuition to show that it is not a mere hypostatised abstraction. In the *Architectonic of Pure Reason* Kant discusses how theoretical ideas can be realised through a *final end schema* using a *monogram* that is a product of reason.40. Reason’s ability to generate this *monogram* betrays a figurative capacity and though the idea is not granted objective reality, it is realised through its capacity to perform a regulative function; as a systematic means

---

40 See 3.2. for a full discussion of how ideas are realised through a *monogram* of reason by a *final end schema*. 

263
of organising an aggregate. The final-end schema guides the way in which the whole is initially devised (in terms of the ends or aims of its structure), and it guides its division into parts; through it an idea may retrospectively guide the schematic realisation of itself.

For Angelica Nuzzo, § 59 of the Third Critique serves as ‘the crucial exemplification’ of the analogic function of reflection with regard to the problem of how our concepts can be realised. Here Kant seeks to show that we can secure an indirect connection between ideas and objective reality, He states:

‘All hypotyposis consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgement treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising; i.e., the treatment agrees with this procedure merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form of the reflection rather than its content’ (5:351).

The symbol involves an indirect representation of an idea using an analogy. It differs from schematic realisation as the idea not presented in itself. The symbolic presentation is indirect; a re-presentation of the idea by something else connected to it by an analogous rule of reflection. Schematic hypotyposis of pure concepts of understanding, empirical concepts, or pure sensible concepts, involves ‘direct’ application of a concept to intuition. In symbolic representation the application of the idea to the intuition is ‘indirect’ and the idea is transposed out of itself and into an


42 No application is ever fully ‘direct’ as a general concept is applied to a specific intuition e.g. we have no direct experience of a ‘dog in general’ or a ‘triangle in general’. However, it is ‘direct’ in the sense that in schematic presentation the concept is not made into something else in order to be realised.
object that can be directly demonstrated. The indemonstrable idea becomes demonstrable by analogy with an object that can be exhibited empirically. As outlined earlier, one must distinguish between the intuited symbol and the rule governed analogy it uses. The analogy comprises a mere part of the symbolising relation as a whole, it initiates a unity between relata that is not raised to the status of a totality but concerns a rule connected to the form of thought.

We have discussed the position of the idea, its schematic realisation, how the symbol differs from an analogy, and how it enables the idea to gain a semblance of objective reality. Let us now refer to how the examples Kant gives of symbolic hypotyposis fall into three groups or types: the *profane*, the *linguistic* and the *higher*. These three sets of examples combine to convey a three-tier presentation of the symbol ascending from the profane to the higher with the linguistic positioned as intermediary between the two43.

*The Profane Symbol*

The first two examples of symbolic hypotyposis refer to political institutions: A monarchy ruled according to its own constitutional laws, is symbolised as an animate body and a monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will is symbolised by a mere machine; a hand-mill (5:352). The animate body and the hand mill serve as symbolic representations of different types of monarchy due to an analogous rule of reflection: ‘For though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand mill, there

43 One could argue that the examples fall into four groups due to Kant's discussion of symbolic cognition in relation to God. However, cognition by analogy of God is not given as an example of symbolic hypotyposis. It is used by Kant to define a 'way of presenting' something in relation to cognition, i.e. to consider whether a way of presenting something can be considered knowledge as cognition (5:353).
certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect on the two and on how they operate \([\text{Kausalität}]\) (5:352). These examples constitute a ‘profane’ type of symbolisation for two reasons. The first concerns the status of the monarchies as ideas, the second concerns the nature of the analogy on which these symbolic presentations are based.

In \textit{Perpetual Peace} Kant refers to a form of government (a state) as either republican or despotic (8:352). He refers to ‘republican’ and ‘despotic’ as political principles, which establishes them as different to ideas\textsuperscript{44}. Kant infers here that any type of state that is not republican is thereby despotic. This implies that despotism is not merely a principle, but an empirical concept that can be realised by an example in intuition. However, in \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View} Kant refers to despotism as ‘Law and power without freedom’ (7:330-1). This posits despotism as a force which is closer to an idea as it can regulate or guide towards an end without being directly demonstrable. Due to these inconsistencies, the status of the despotic state as an idea is questionable and one must recognise that both types of monarchy can be presented (and thereby realised) in intuition in a manner in which an idea (e.g. Kant’s system of ideas, concepts and intuitions) cannot. These examples demonstrate a \textit{profane} type of symbolisation as they are not restricted to the indirect demonstration of an indemonstrable rational concept, but instead provide a means of substituting a complex concept for a simple one achieving a subsequent simplification of the former by the latter.

\textsuperscript{44} “Republicanism is the political principle of severing the executive power of the government from the legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself made: consequently it is the administration of the public will, but this is identical with the private will of the ruler.” (Ak 8:352)
The second reason for the profane status of these symbols lies in the nature of the analogies on which they are based. The symbolic presentation of a monarchy as a hand mill works on an analogy that takes its rule from the schema of the category of causality. Previous analysis into how the analogies of experience are constructed using the schema of the category and not the category itself leads us to conclude that in a symbolising relation - as outlined with reference to the profane examples - the analogy is built upon a time-relation or similarity of consequences which characterises a relation to the schema of the category and not the category itself. As there is no similarity between the relata in the symbolising relation the analogy is built despite dissimilarities and is constructed, not natural. It serves an explanatory role connecting the content of each relata by drawing them into a definition connected to temporal movement. Though any symbol or metaphor works despite dissimilarities, as we discuss the other types of symbol we will see that each uses a different kind of analogy the nature of which is dictated by and dependent upon the degrees of similarity between the relata. The status of the analogy used in the profane symbol as: related to the schema, artificial, and non-specific (as any other mechanical device could serve in place of the hand mill), means it is not present as part of common understanding and the presence of one *relatum* does not necessarily prompt or evoke the other.

45 Directly after this category is identified as dictating the procedure of analogy Kant goes on to say that “This function [of judgement] has not been analysed much so far, even though it very much deserves fuller investigation; *but this is not the place to pursue it*” (5:352 my Italics). Kant is not concerned with pursuing the extent to which the category serves as a rule governing the procedure of analogy, the focus of his investigation is the symbolic presentation of the idea which comes about as the result or end of this analogy. One can therefore conclude that Kant does not intend the categorical aspect of the analogy (which dictates the rule according to which the analogy operates) to be the primary focus of his account of the symbol. He emphasises the symbol as a mode of intuitive presentation of rational concepts which differs from the sign (which merely expresses a concept). The categorical element of the analogy does not participate heavily in his definition of the symbol as, it is important to set the intuitive nature of the symbol in opposition to the discursive nature of the category.
Kant’s first attempt to demonstrate the process of symbolic hypotyposis has succeeded merely in illustrating how complicated concepts can be consolidated into simple ones through an analogous rule of reflection built upon the schema for the category of causality. What is achieved by the representation of the monarchy as a single object is a consolidation or reduction of the multi-faceted presentation of a despotic state; this is condensed into a single, simple object which reflects the causality in the complex one due to a similarity in causal mechanism between the two. The ‘profane’ symbol is given its name and location (on the lower tier) as what it achieves is less than what the symbol can achieve by definition; the indirect exhibition of an idea in sensible intuition. This type of symbol does not serve a function as complex and theoretically indeterminate as the higher symbol of beauty and it is for these reasons that I call this type of symbolisation ‘profane’. The reflection involved in contemplating this type of symbol is constructed and controlled and the freedom of the imagination is impaired, as, in reflectively judging the hand mill as a symbol of the despotic state it is guided heavily by the understanding and the reflective space between the two relata is very small.

The Linguistic Symbol

Let us now consider the examples which yield linguistic symbols; these function according to an analogy constructed upon the schema of the category of relation. One word serves as a substitute for another (or others) which are related to the symbolising word by an analogy built on a similarity of meaning. The linguistic examples achieve the presentation or evocation of a living scene as expression is extended to incorporate the communication of movement or position:

Our language is replete with such indirect exhibitions according to an analogy, where the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but
contains merely a symbol for our reflection. Thus the words *foundation* (support, basis), to *depend* (to be held from above), to *flow* (instead of to follow) from something, *substance* (the support of accidents, as *Locke* puts it), and countless others are not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes; they express concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only according to an analogy with one, i.e. a transfer of our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond (5:352-3).

The symbolic word does not exhibit the symbolised meaning, rather, the presentation supplements the determinate meaning with an accompanying visual scene. This effects an aesthetic presentation of the word, which thereby connects it to intuition. The linguistic examples are more specific than the profane yet they impart a greater degree of reflective movement to the imagination. The analogy breathes life into the determinate meaning of the word and using imagery it connotes movement or position to connect the word to a living scene.

The use of the symbolic word effects a transfer which opens up a unique space for reflection which would not otherwise be present and is not strictly necessary. It is an addition, an excess, e.g. we could easily use the word ‘follow’ in place of the word ‘flow’, yet it expands our reflective experience within language to use the latter. The reflective experience evoked does not possess a determinate meaning, rather, the use of the symbolic word supplements the meaning aesthetically. It enables the word to expand beyond its determinate meaning e.g. ‘to follow’ can be used in a mathematical sense, (as 4 follows 3), whereas ‘to flow’ evokes the movement of a river (the words flowed freely). The use of symbolic language brings to mind the art of poetry and rhetoric, however, Kant also refers to the use of the word ‘substance’ by *Locke* to show the place of symbolic language in philosophy.

Linguistic symbols combine a number of elements to construct a new concept which builds upon and supplements the simple, in this sense they achieve expression of that which would otherwise be inexpressible. The concepts expressed
in a linguistic symbol (e.g. that B depends on A) do express that to which no intuition can correspond (as B does not hang like a pendulum from A and I will never see it doing so). It is fair to say that what is presented by the linguistic symbol must have a status beyond empirical intuition, but it does not follow from this that it has the same status as an idea. The connection between the relata in this symbolising relation is more specific than the profane symbol due to a similarity in meaning, which reinforces the strength of the analogy. The type of reflection is constructed, controlled and directed towards a specific meaning. However, it differs from the profane symbol due to an expansion of the reflective space opened up for the imagination, and the possession of an inventive capacity.\footnote{In the First Introduction to the Third Critique Kant connects judgement and reflection to influencing and even creating the possibility of a concept, he identifies reflection as involving a process of comparison “with either other presentations or ones cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible.” (20: 211).}

Linguistic symbols may appear to be the most profane as Kant observes that ‘our language is replete with them’ (5:352), however, they are more than mere indirect signs. Symbolic language is presented for reflection as a supplementary accompaniment allowing the imagination an expansive yet controlled role in communication. The linguistic symbol presents movement and offers a connection to a living scene that is not strictly necessary, yet aids reflection in a poetic and evocative sense.\footnote{It is the operation of the imagination which discovers the greatest possibility of symbolic hypotyposis in language and it is surprising that Kant does not refer to the use of aesthetic ideas through the language of poetry in § 59 as he refers to them earlier in (5:315). This suggests a distinction that we will interrogate further and pursue in relation to the question of whether aesthetic ideas are symbols in 8.2.}

\[\]
The higher symbol is exemplified by beauty as the symbol of the morally good:

Now I maintain that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; and only because we refer [Rucksicht] the beautiful to the morally good (we all do so [Beziehung] naturally and require all others to do so, as a duty) does our liking for it include a claim to everyone else’s assent, while the mind is also conscious of being ennobled, by this [reference], above a mere receptivity for pleasure derived from sense impressions, and it assesses the value of other people too on the basis of their having a similar maxim in their power of judgement (5: 353).

Through an analogous rule of reflection between the relata concerning the ennoblement\(^{48}\) of the mind above mere sensation, the presence of beauty serves as a symbolic realisation of the idea of the morally good. The first question we must ask when considering beauty as a symbol of the morally good is: Is the morally good (das Sittlich-Gute) a rational concept? Is it an idea?

In her paper “The Beautiful Is the Symbol of the Morally-Good”: Kant’s Philosophical Basis of Proof for the Idea of the Morally-Good Felicitas Munzel discusses the problems with determining what each term in the analogy between beauty and morally good names. She claims this is the core problem which compromises our understanding of it as a symbol\(^{49}\). As different authors interpret the terms to mean different things, a precise analysis of the analogy on which this symbolising relation is based is problematic and open to (mis)interpretation. Munzel begins by discussing the difficulties with identifying das Sittlich-Gute with freedom,

\(^{48}\) To ennoble is to invest with dignity or honour, to exalt.

she considers the distinction between ‘Sittlichkeit’ and ‘Moralitat’, and examines the meaning of ‘Sittlich-Gute’ in other works of Kant. She concludes that ‘one can begin from the premise that Sittlich-Gute refers to an idea of reason for which we are seeking to discover what follows from the idea for us’ 50 (my italics). Aside from the reference in § 59 of the Third Critique, Munzel states there are five other passages in the published works of the corpus in which Kant refers to the Sittlich-Gute as such an idea51. Kant refers to the good as both an idea of reason and as an object of reasons idea, therefore the status of the morally good as simply and specifically an idea of reason is questionable. However, the inability of the morally good to be presented directly in intuition combined with the aforementioned evidence that Kant intends it to be granted the status of an idea will suffice to distinguish the morally good from the profane and linguistic examples discussed earlier.

The morally good is represented in intuition through the experience of beauty and is ‘realised’ in this sense. The mind becomes ennobled and this provides us with a standard by which we judge others according to their capacity to elevate their own mind, which is revealed in an ability to make aesthetic or moral judgements. One might ask: is the shared ennoblement between the relata and its consequential effect upon the mind based on a feeling, or could one interpret (or reduce) it to a similarity that enables one to recall the category of relation? It is clear that what is achieved by the symbolising relation of beauty and the morally good is able to fulfil both criteria, thus the analogy is of a double strength.

50 Ibid., p.317  
51 They are as follows; in the Typic of the Second Critique, in the Analytic of the Beautiful and in the discussion of intellectual interest in the beautiful (Third Critique), in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and in the Metaphysics of Morals. (For more detailed analysis see Ibid. pp. 317-31.
The analogy between beauty and the morally good is set out by Kant in relation to four points of comparison. We like the beautiful directly as we reflect on it in intuition (without a concept), we like morality with reference to its concept but it also pleases us immediately. We like beauty without any interest, liking for the morally good is connected necessarily with an interest that follows from the moral judgement but does not ground it. In judging beauty the imagination is free but harmonises with the understanding, in moral judgements the freedom of the will harmonises with itself (according to the laws of reason). Judging beauty involves a subjective universality (independent of concepts) that we declare valid for others, moral judgements have objective universality which is valid for all and rests on a concept (cf.5:354-5).

The status of the analogical relationship between beauty and the morally good is designated as ‘natural’ and this sets it apart from any artificial or constructed relation. One may argue that this follows from the modality of aesthetic judgement, however, the necessity of the subjective principle in a judgement of taste is referred to common sense as sensus communis, whereas the natural relation between beauty and morality is one that Kant observes ‘even the common understanding habitually bears in mind’ (5:354). This analogy differs from the constructed analogy of the profane symbol as it is specific; beauty for Kant is not a symbol of the morally good it is the symbol. This implies that nothing else is capable of symbolising this particular idea. The natural reference to morality made in the presence of beauty serves to supplement what could involve merely the schema of the category of relation. It provides a basis for our demand for assent as we require others to judge beauty in the same way (using the same natural reference). Exhibition of the idea of the morally good in sensible intuition becomes possible through the experience of
beauty as a symbol. However, Kant does not state that beauty is the sensible realisation of the idea of the morally good, instead he states:

The morally good is the intelligible that taste has in view, as I indicated in the preceding section; for it is with this intelligible that even our higher cognitive powers harmonise, and without this intelligible contradictions would continually arise from the contrast between the nature of these powers and the claims that taste makes' (5: 353).

By analogy with the morally good, judgements of beauty (taste) can be grounded upon an idea which grants intelligibility and gives a basis on which one can demand the assent of others. The symbolic relation is revealed as reversible in this respect, as it is not just beauty which serves as the sensible realisation (exhibition) of the idea, it is the idea which serves to elevate the sensible experience of beauty into the intelligible. The purpose of the analogy is not strictly exhibition of the ‘idea’ of morality as it also serves to legitimate judgements of taste by analogy with moral judgements.

The natural analogy of this symbol reveals a unity that differs in kind from the synthetic unity between concept and intuition; it creates an aesthetic totality. The mind becomes elevated through the natural reference of beauty to morality. This arises from a feeling of harmony which exceeds that of the profane and linguistic symbols by a matter of degree as ‘even our higher cognitive powers harmonise’ (5:353). There is harmony not only between the relata themselves, but between the powers of imagination, understanding and reason. The mind is elevated as it becomes conscious of its own higher unity through what Gasche terms in The Idea of Form; a tableau or living picture. It is, therefore, the higher symbol of beauty that

reveals the aesthetic nature of the symbol most fully as the possibility of symbolic representation enables the mind to present itself with a living picture of its own aesthetic unity. The indirect representation of ideas through symbols is important as it secures the unity of the mind and mental faculties and it demonstrate the living unity of the mind in a way that enables Kant to complete the unity of his critical system as a whole.

It is necessary to refer to interpretations of Kant’s account of the symbol in secondary literature to affirm the importance of distinguishing the symbol from the schema, to recognise the need to understand the rule governed analogy as a mere part of the intuitive symbol and to identify the different types of symbol exemplified. In *Kant’s Theory of Taste* Henry Allison raises the question:

…how can the mere reflection on a sensible intuition, which *ex hypothesi* is not governed by a determinate concept, be viewed as formally analogous to the explicitly rule-governed reflection on the corresponding intellectual object?\(^{53}\)

His concern is with how reflection using the indeterminate concept of beauty (involved in a judgement of taste) can be formally analogous to reflection on an intellectually or morally determined object? He defines symbols as ‘intuitions that exhibit a conceptual content in an indirect fashion by means of an analogy’\(^{54}\). In regard to the ‘profane’ examples Allison states that, though there is no resemblance between the type of institution (constitutional monarchy or despotic state) and the physical object (animate body or hand mill) there is a resemblance concerning the nature of our reflection on each. In the first case reflection appeals to the idea of a purposive, organic connection between parts which is an appropriate resemblance of

---

54 Ibid., p. 255
a constitutional monarchy. In the second case the hand-mill operates as a mere
machine which ‘captures metaphorically the functioning of a despotic government’\textsuperscript{55}.

For Allison the key to Kant’s account of symbolisation is: ‘the idea of a formally
analogous reflection, which in the examples cited seems to concern the manner in
which the relationship between the whole and its parts is conceived’\textsuperscript{56}. He mistakenly
reduces the symbolic to the schematic in line with the way in which ideas are
realised through the \textit{final-end schema} and by reducing the former to the latter he
fails to take into account the nature of the symbol as a distinct mode of intuitive
representation. The symbol and the system differ in kind, they constitute two different
means of realising an idea and Allison’s reduction of the symbolic to the schematic
fails to acknowledge Kant’s distinction between the two types of unity, and thereby
also between the two types of exhibition. It neglects to uphold the necessary
connection to intuition by which Kant defines symbolic presentation and the
possibility of connecting the idea to objective reality is lost as the \textit{final end schema} is
realised directly with reference to its capacity to regulate a system or work, it has no
necessary connection to intuition.

Allison makes it clear that to claim that beauty symbolises morality is to claim that
there is not only ‘sufficiently significant isomorphism between reflection on the
beautiful and moral reflection’ but also, that the ‘former activity may be regarded as a
sensuously directed analogue of the latter’\textsuperscript{57}. For Allison there are two types of
reflection; moral reflection and aesthetic reflection. Both are based on a liking, but in
moral reflection our liking is based on a concept of the good and the aesthetic nature

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
of a judgement of taste regarding the beautiful dictates that our liking is not based on determinate concepts but merely on reflection on an intuition. For Allison the distinction between these two types of reflection (governed by feelings which have different bases) lies at the basis of the question outlined earlier and so he asks: how can the two types of reflection be formally analogous when one is sensible and the other is intellectual?

The problem for Allison is that Kant’s profane examples of symbolic hypotyposis fail to explain this as the hand mill and the animate body: ‘each involve a reflection based on determinate concepts (of a hand-mill and an organism), whereas this is precisely what is lacking in the mere reflection on taste’\textsuperscript{58}. The profane examples use reflection based on determinate concepts, but for Allison this is entirely different to the type of reflection required for the symbol of beauty which is not a determinate concept. He thereby addresses the need to differentiate between Kant’s examples concerning the type of reflection involved in each but he makes no explicit distinction between the different types of symbol exemplified.

In \textit{Kant and the Claims of Taste} Paul Guyer presents a negative account of the symbol as it is not an example or schema of the rational concept. His justification is that the connection between the symbol and its referent is looser than that between the examples and schemata and their respective referents. In failing to distinguish between the examples Kant gives as communicating different types of symbol Guyer makes claims about the nature of the symbolising relation between beauty and the morally good based on observations he has drawn from the relation between a hand mill and a despotic state. There is a conflict in Guyer’s account concerning the

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 256
relation between the symbol and what it symbolises as, based on a recognition of the affinity between beauty and morality he claims there is more than a mere arbitrary connection, yet based on the relation between a hand-mill and a despotic state he claims that there is not.

Guyer does not distinguish the symbol from the analogy and subsequently makes claims about the former which apply only to the latter. On the one hand he implies a dislocation of the symbol from the analogy by stating the objects given in the examples are ‘symbols of analogies between themselves and what they symbolise’\textsuperscript{59}. Though Kant clearly states that it is the rational idea which is symbolised not the analogy. On the other he claims there is no radical difference between ‘the thesis that the beautiful is the symbol of morality’ and ‘the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgement’ that Kant has already drawn in § 42\textsuperscript{60}.

For Guyer, the similarity between relata in a symbolising relation concerns the way that ideas or events are connected through time and he refers to the profane example of the hand mill to illustrate this. He observes that both relata refer to objects (the hand mill refers to grain and the despotic state refers to people) being subjected to operations outside of their control (the grain is to be ground into flour by the hand mill, the people are being dictated to by a monarch). Both become changed

\textsuperscript{59} Neither an organism nor a hand mill is an example –an instance- of a kind of government, obviously, nor is either a schema, a form of intuition corresponding to a logical relation, as temporal succession corresponds to the relation of ground and consequent. Instead, these objects serve as symbols of analogies between themselves and what they symbolise.’ Guyer, Paul, \textit{Kant and the Claims of Taste}, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 333 (my italics).

\textsuperscript{60} ‘On Kant’s theory of symbolism, then, there is no intrinsic connection between a symbol and what it stands for, or no way in which the content of one representation is essentially connected to that of another. One thing may serve as the symbol of another only because the structure of reflection is the same in the two cases. But if this is the nature of symbolism, then the thesis that the beautiful is a symbol of morality cannot be expected to differ radically from the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgement which Kant has already drawn in §42.’ Ibid., p. 334
as they are converted into whatever the operation of the mechanism (the hand-mill or the despot) is designed to produce (flour/slaves). He states:

The actual content of the symbol – a mechanical device – is not an instance or schema of what it symbolises – a human institution – but there is a similarity in the way in which ideas are connected in thinking of either the symbol or what is symbolized. The structure of reflection in considering the operation of a hand mill is analogous to the structure of reflection in thinking of the workings of despotism, and thus the former may serve as a symbol of the latter. But there is no connection in content – a hand mill is certainly neither a part nor a kind of despotism.

For Guyer anything that allows one to relate ideas in the same way as the hand mill could serve equally well as a symbol of despotism as ‘there is no intrinsic connection between a symbol and what it stands for’. He makes claims about the nature of the symbolising relation between beauty and the morally good based on observations he has drawn from the relation between a hand mill and a despotic state and attributes qualities we have traced as pertaining to the profane symbol, as present in the higher. This demonstrates the consequences of failing to distinguish between the examples Kant gives as communicating different types of symbol. Guyer claims there is no connection in content between the relata involved in a symbolising relation and we know this to be true in relation to the profane symbol, but it is not necessarily the case in relation to linguistic symbols, and it is not true of the higher symbol.

The purpose of referring to Allison and Guyer here is to draw attention to the interpretive problems which arise from failing to distinguish between the symbol and the analogy, and between the different types of symbol referred to by Kant. Allison mistakenly reduces the symbol to the schema with reference to the unity of

---

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
systematicity as he has not addressed the difference between the two types of exhibition involved in realising an idea and consequently the intuitive status of the symbol is compromised. Guyer does not distinguish between the symbol and the analogy and he also subjects the symbol to a schematic analysis compromising the aesthetic nature of the reflection involved in connecting the relata and exhibiting the idea. These interpretations combine to present a negative view of the symbol built on the basis of it possessing no intrinsic relation to that which it symbolises, though both acknowledge that there appears to be a discrepancy in Kant’s account as the profane examples cannot be equated with the higher.

In conclusion, the examples Kant uses to demonstrate symbolic hypotyposis present the symbol as performing three different tasks and this is the basis of my separation of his account into three types. The profane symbol is a simple presentation of a complex concept; a substitution of the latter by the former using a constructed analogy between two otherwise unrelated terms. Linguistic symbols are presentations of complex or new concepts that evoke images and movement. They are built upon an analogy of shared meaning and serve to supplement communication. The higher symbol of beauty realises the idea of the morally good and legitimises a judgement of taste through a double analogy built upon a shared quality of feeling and four points of comparison between the two types of judgement. The unity of this symbolising relation enables a crossing of the aesthetic and the rational in a manner that is not achieved by the other examples. Consequently the divisions outlined by Kant in the step ladder become blurred as the idea is transposed from its ground in reason and exhibited in intuition.

It is necessary to clarify the examples Kant gives and to distinguish between the symbol and the schema to avoid any reduction of the former to the latter such as that
which occurs explicitly in the work of Allison and is implicit in the work of Guyer. Kant intends the examples of symbolic hypotyposis to give clarity to his claim that beauty is a symbol of morality. However, like the poet who promises a mere entertaining play with ideas yet provides food for the understanding, Kant’s use of these examples communicates more than is explicitly intended. The presentation of a three tier account of the symbol is on the one hand indicative of a problem with the modus aestheticus of using examples if we wish to present this negatively. Yet this discrepancy can be transposed into a positive interpretation which uncovers possibilities for this method and its use in philosophical aesthetics.

This chapter has set out Kant’s account of the symbol and of symbolic exhibition so that we can compare it to the expression of aesthetic ideas through works of art in Chapter 8. We have discussed how indirect exhibition using an analogy differs from the schematic (direct) exhibition discusses in part one and the practical realisation of ideas discussed in part two. Through an analogous relation to morality the symbol of beauty not only presents an opportunity for ideas to gain a semblance of objective reality, it reveals the interrelation of the faculties, This is conducive to the communication of ideas, to making aesthetic judgements of taste, to the unity of the mind, and to completing the unity of Kant’s critical system. I will argue in Chapter 8 that the movement of the imagination in symbolising (through which these unities are achieved and presented) differs from its free movement in creating a work of art and reveals a lawful operation that provides an interesting comparison with the aesthetic capacity of reason discussed in part one.
Chapter 8. Aesthetic Ideas and the Reflective Imagination

Chapter 8 will define what Kant means by an ‘aesthetic idea’ and set out how they differ from symbols. It will draw parallels between the creative capacity of reason (in the First Critique) and the lawful operation of the imagination (in the Third Critique) in respect to the production of ideas and ideals.

8.1 will explore how aesthetic ideas can indirectly exhibit ideas of reason, serve as counterparts to rational ideas, and aesthetically expand concepts. It is necessary to define what Kant means by an aesthetic idea in order to understand how they work in relation to the functions they perform and what they can tell us about the capacity of the imagination. Aesthetic ideas can give sensible expression to rational concepts and work on material given by nature so that it exceeds it given, natural status. Through the use of aesthetic attributes these ideas can aesthetically expand concepts, and serve as substitutes for logical exhibition. I will refer to examples Kant uses in the Third Critique to discuss these operations and to outline the role of the genius in respect to the creation of works of art that express aesthetic ideas. Once we have established what aesthetic ideas are, we can ascertain their relationship with symbols in 8.2 as this is a subject of debate in secondary literature.

In 8.2 I will argue that, although aesthetic ideas and symbols both involve a free movement of the imagination, when exhibiting ideas the imagination is directed towards a determinate end, whereas, in expressing aesthetic ideas through works of art it is granted a greater degree of freedom (though this may also prove purposive). I will discuss the difference between the two reflective movements through a comparison of poetry (in which the imagination is granted its greatest degree of
freedom to express aesthetic ideas) and rhetoric (in which the imagination is guided by a determinate end, as it is in exhibition). 8.2 will show that, though the imagination is free to reflect in both endeavours, in relation to aesthetic ideas its primary aim is expression (though exhibition may also occur), in relation to symbolising ideas of reason the primary end is exhibition (though expression may occur). I will explore how symbolising has a determinate end that is not necessarily required from a work of art, yet it is the aesthetic nature of the reflection enabled which can present the unity of the mind and mental faculties.

8.3 will discuss the ability of the imagination revealed in § 17 On the Ideal of Beauty in respect to the generation of an aesthetic standard idea as a component of the ideal of beauty. It will explore how the imagination of the Third Critique is granted a role that was denied to it in the First Critique in respect to the production (and expression) of ideas, and the generation of a standard which grants the minimal conditions according to which something can be judged beautiful. This section will conclude by drawing parallels between reason and imagination as, at the extent of its powers reason behaves figuratively and the imagination reveals itself as capable of lawful correctness.

8.1 Defining Aesthetic Ideas

This section will set out what Kant means by an aesthetic idea by exploring the functions they perform in relation to the examples Kant gives and how these have been addressed in secondary literature. I will then outline the role of the genius in relation to the production of works of art which express these ideas.
Fine art must have spirit, Kant defines aesthetic ideas in relation to spirit (Geist) which itself is defined as an animating principle in the mind that imparts a purposive momentum and sets the mental powers in play.

Now I maintain that this principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas; and by an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it […] an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (presentation of the imagination) can be adequate (5:314).

For Kant spirit is that which enables the exhibition of aesthetic ideas and these ideas are sourced to the imagination. The nature of aesthetic ideas is introduced as he states that they exceed determinate concepts and expression in language and positions them as counterparts to rational ideas which exceed any sensible presentation. In respect to aesthetic ideas the imagination is productive and active, let us set out the functions aesthetic ideas can perform before discussing the way they are used and the examples Kant gives.

Firstly, the imagination can create another nature out of the material given to it by actual nature (5:314). Secondly, it can restructure experience (following analogical laws and principles of reason) and can process material from nature into something that surpasses nature (5:314). Thirdly, presentations of the imagination are called ideas as they strive beyond the bounds of experience and ‘try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts’ to grant them a semblance of objective reality, and ‘they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate’ (5:314). Aesthetic ideas therefore have dual status: they are intuitions produced by the

---

63 It should be noted that Kant first introduces the aesthetic idea in § 17 as the ‘aesthetic standard idea’ (5:233). We will discuss this type of idea in relation to the aesthetic ideal in 8.3 as it differs from the aesthetic ideas presently being discussed.
imagination, and they are ideas which function in accordance with ‘principles which reside higher up in reason’ (5:314).

Having set out the functions aesthetic ideas can perform, let us consider them in respect to how they are used. A poet may use aesthetic ideas to give sensible expression to rational ideas e.g. ‘of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation and so on’ (5:314). He can also take things exemplified in experience e.g. death, envy, love, fame, and ‘by means of an imagination that emulates the example of reason in reaching [for] a maximum, he ventures to give these sensible expression in a way that goes beyond the limits of experience, namely with a completeness for which no example can be found in nature’ (5:314).

For Kant it is the art of poetry that expresses aesthetic ideas most fully and can manifest them to their greatest extent. Aesthetic ideas are used to aesthetically expand concepts in an unlimited way as the imagination in its creative capacity can set intellectual ideas in motion and concepts become expanded beyond their determinate scope. Finally, aesthetic attributes are supplementary presentations that express a concepts kinship and implications with other concepts, Kant states ‘they are called aesthetic attributes of an object, of an object whose concept is a rational idea and hence cannot be exhibited adequately’ (3:215). He gives an example: ‘Thus Jupiter’s eagle with the lightening in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock is an attribute of heaven’s stately queen’ (5:315). Aesthetic attributes do not present the content of a concept, they present ‘something that prompts the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words’ (5:315). Here we come to the final use of aesthetic ideas for Kant: aesthetic
attributes yield an aesthetic idea ‘which serves the mentioned rational idea as a substitute for logical exhibition’ (5:315). However, the proper function of this aesthetic idea is to quicken and animate the mind; opening it up to kindred presentations and animating it with spirit to give the imagination a momentum ‘that makes it think more […] but in an undeveloped way’ (5:315). Kant refers to a poem by Frederick the Great\textsuperscript{64} which serves to show how aesthetic ideas can animate rational ideas by means of aesthetic attributes\textsuperscript{65}.

To summarise, aesthetic ideas can create another nature, they can restructure experience and process given material into something that exceeds given nature and they can try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts. In respect to how they are used, the poet uses them to give sensible expression to rational ideas, to take things exemplified in experience and express them in a way that goes beyond any possible experience, they can aesthetically expand concepts, and, using aesthetic attributes the poet can yield an aesthetic idea that may serve a rational idea as a substitute for logical exhibition.

\textsuperscript{64} ‘Let us part from life without grumbling or regrets.
Leaving the world behind filled with our good deeds
Thus the sun, his daily course completed
Spreads one more soft light over the sky
And the last rays that he sends through the air
Are the last sighs he gives the world for its well-being’ (5:315-6).

\textsuperscript{65} He also refers an inscription above the temple of Isis: ‘I am all that is, that was, and that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil’, and describes how it was used By Johann Andreas von Segner (1704-77) to install a sacred thrill in his pupils, intended to attune the mind to solemn attentiveness (5:316).
Kant further defines these ideas in reference to the ineffability of the presentations they enable and the resultant feeling ‘which quickens our cognitive powers and connects language, which otherwise would be mere letters, with spirit’ (5:316).

In Comment I he returns to the definition of ideas that he set out in the First Critique and states that all ideas are ‘presentations referred to an object according to a certain principle’ (5:342). This principle is objective (for rational ideas) or subjective (for aesthetic ideas) but neither can ever become cognition as both are distinct from concepts of the understanding. Aesthetic ideas are referred to an intuition via a subjective principle of the harmony of the cognitive faculties, and rational ideas are referred to a concept via an objective principle. With a rational idea the imaginations’ intuitions cannot reach the concept, whereas, with an aesthetic idea the understanding’s concept cannot reach the entire wealth of intuitions presented by the imagination. Both types of idea have their principles (subjective for aesthetic ideas and objective for rational ones) and both have them in reason (5:344).

Aesthetic ideas are intuitions of the imagination to which no concept can be adequate and rational ideas contain the supersensible to which no intuition can ever be adequate. Thus, Kant states ‘we may call aesthetic ideas unexpoundable presentations of the imagination, and rational ideas indemonstrable concepts of reason’ (5:342). In contrast, concepts of the understanding are demonstrable and can be shown to have reality as they can be schematised, which proves they are not empty. Before moving on to how Kant accounts for the production of works of fine art (which express aesthetic ideas) with reference to the genius, let us consider some responses to his account of aesthetic ideas.
In *Kant’s Theory of Taste* Henry Allison claims that presentations of the imagination are ideas as they perform a quasi-schematising function, and possess transcendental pretentions. He writes:

…aesthetic ideas may serve as indirect expressions of their rational counterparts precisely because they necessarily involve a striving towards transcendence, either in the sense of endeavouring to depict something inherently supersensible or of attempting to approximate imaginatively the completeness or totality that is thought in the idea but is not attainable in experience\(^{66}\).

Allison understands aesthetic ideas as operating in a manner that emulates or reflects the operation of reason in striving for completion and ascending to the supersensible. It is on the basis of this parallel capacity that he later claims aesthetic ideas constitute a ‘significant subset’ of possible symbols that can exhibit an idea independently of determinate concepts\(^{67}\). He claims aesthetic ideas can symbolise ideas of reason, and therefore also, they symbolise morality and, although Kant does not refer to aesthetic ideas in relation to beauty as the symbol of the morally good in § 59, ‘they remain an essential presupposition of the whole account’\(^{68}\).

In relation to the capacity of aesthetic ideas to give sensible expression to rational ideas and to take things from experience and present them in a manner that goes beyond all experience, we can clearly see how they strive towards transcendence in what Allison refers to as a ‘gesturing towards the supersensible’\(^{69}\). To express rational ideas the imagination must present them creatively in a manner that enables us (through our experience of this presentation) to recall or connect with the rational

---


\(^{67}\) Ibid., p. 258.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., p. 261. I will argue in 8.2. that, although aesthetic ideas and symbols both involve indirect exhibition, the primary aim of symbols is exhibition, whereas with aesthetic ideas, this may occur but the primary aim is expression.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 257
idea. To sensibly express things such as love and envy that are given in experience in a manner that approximates beyond their status as an instance or example the imagination must gesture towards their supersensible status as concepts. It is revealed to operate in such a way that it emulates the capacity of reason and exceeds the sphere ascribed to it in and by the First Critique. The imagination is said to strive after completeness (beyond that which could be given by nature or experience) but this is not done systematically. The completeness it seeks is of an indeterminate, aesthetic, organic nature and the objective is not to acquire determinate cognition.

In Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, Rudolf A. Makreel observes a difference in the way rational and aesthetic ideas seek to go beyond experience:

Rational ideas transcend nature, and aesthetic ideas surpass it by transforming and enriching experience. While reason seeks the completion of nature in a supersensible realm, the imagination attains a completion that remains tied to the sensible realm itself. The imagination either finds a sensible presentation of a transcendent idea of reason, or gives a more complete presentation than is found in nature of such experienced things as death, envy, and love.

Makreel’s attention to the transformative and creative ability of the imagination reveals it in possession of a capacity not merely to be productive, but to transform and create original presentations. Rational ideas by their very nature transcend experience in order to seek completion and create order in relation to experienced cognitions. Aesthetic ideas must retain their sensible status whilst at the same time they gesture to (and some would argue symbolise) rational ideas. Aesthetic ideas can present such a wealth of sensible information that they approximate to a completion that exceeds the bounds of determinate concepts; their dual status

ensures that they retain their sensible status even when seeking an approximation to completeness that lies beyond it\textsuperscript{71}.

In relation to the way in which aesthetic attributes give life to abstract rational ideas to make them meaningful (e.g. Jupiter’s eagle) Makreel claims this occurs in a manner akin to the way symbols grant a connection to experience\textsuperscript{72}. Though I will argue with a designation of these ideas as straightforwardly symbolic, the example of the poem by Frederick the Great reveals a capacity for aesthetic attributes (and ideas) to enable access to feelings and experiences that would otherwise be inaccessible.

In this poem the king animates his rational idea of an exemplary attitude that one should or could possess at the end of one’s life. Aesthetic attributes are used and referred to so that we (as readers) can connect with what would otherwise be an abstract and exclusive feeling. I do not need to be at the end of my life to gather (from the aesthetic attributes used) what this exemplary attitude would feel like, I can gather this from the poetic use of attributes and analogous connections with the setting sun and the altruistic concern for the well-being of the world (5:315-6).

Aesthetic attributes enable us to make connections between concepts and material, they help us to draw relations between things, and this supplements our interpretation of e.g. concepts or experiences. Makreel argues that this relational capacity (which he views as akin to symbolisation) can suggest affinities where

\textsuperscript{71} Though the rule of the understanding are shown to transcend their own sphere at the point at which they intersect (exemplified in the focus imaginarius), the excess of aesthetic ideas differs from this. The determinate purpose of the former is to regulate cognitions into knowledge, whereas the purpose of the latter is to animate the mind (which can prove purposive, but does not have a determinate cognitive purpose as its goal).

conceptual connections cannot be drawn and that, in this way aesthetic attributes not only aid reflection and can broaden our interpretation of experience, they may also add a moral dimension.\(^\text{73}\)

Henry Allison argues against thinking that a combination (or collection) of aesthetic attributes can constitute an aesthetic idea. He claims they are analogous to logical attributes, and just as a collection of logical attributes does not constitute a concept, aesthetic ideas are not mere collections, they require a rule or organising principle. In relation to aesthetic and rational ideas he states:

In both cases a rule or ordering principle is required, though in the case of aesthetic ideas it remains indeterminate. Thus, by an aesthetic idea may be understood an indeterminately, that is, aesthetically ordered set of aesthetic attributes […] one might think of it as something like a principle for the selection and organisation of aesthetic attributes such that they constitute a meaningful and aesthetically pleasing whole.\(^\text{74}\)

Kant clearly designates aesthetic ideas as counterpart to rational ones, and this is the basis on which Allison draws the aforementioned parallel between the two in terms of the possession of an organising rule or principle. Allison describes aesthetic attributes as the ‘matter’ of an aesthetic idea and the organisation or unity as the ‘form’; it is the latter that makes the idea communicable by giving it coherence and a ‘rule –governedness’ akin to that of a logical idea.\(^\text{75}\) However, it is a concern if Allison is designating the unity of the aesthetic idea as architectonic; as if aesthetic unity operates the same way as e.g. the unity of a system. Allison recognises that as a whole the aesthetic idea should be aesthetically pleasing, and refers to them as

\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 122.
\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 283
possessing ‘an organic unity’ that ‘cannot be specified in a determinate manner’. However, the radical difference between a scientific system and a work of art becomes compromised if we think the unity of an aesthetic idea as akin to that of a system. In fact, Makreel presents a challenge to such a reduction in his designation of reflective interpretation (such as is necessitated by an aesthetic idea) as ‘tectonic’:

Whereas systematic interpretation proceeds architectonically on the basis of fixed rational rules, reflective interpretation proceeds *tectonically* on the basis of revisable and indeterminate guidelines.

The way in which the parts function in relation to the whole differs in respect to the architectonic unity of a system and the tectonic unity of reflection as with the latter ‘the parts of a given whole are used to enrich and specify our initial understanding of it’ and thus, the unity has a hermeneutic dimension that is missing from the former.

In *Kant and the Claims of Taste* Paul Guyer claims there are three elements necessary to understand Kant’s conception of aesthetic ideas: the idea of reason (which concerns the content or theme of an art work), the particular images or intuitions that are presented and suggested to the mind (the attributes), and between the two is the aesthetic idea. For Guyer the aesthetic idea ‘suggests the idea of reason on the one hand and the indeterminate array of images on the other’ and he refers to the example of Jupiter’s eagle to clarify these claims. The rational idea is embodied by the aesthetic idea and this suggests a variety of presentations which enliven it, to consolidate his claim Guyer states:

---

76 Ibid.


78 Ibid.

More generally we might conceive of the rational idea as the abstract theme of a work, the aesthetic idea as the vehicle for the realisation of that theme, for instance the plot of a work of fiction or the particular moment of an action chosen for portrayal in an historical painting, and the attributes as the particular images that are explicitly used and furthermore inexhaustibly suggested to illustrate the plot or action\textsuperscript{80}.

This account appears comprehensive, but the aesthetic idea is set in the service of exhibiting the rational idea and, according to our understanding of the functions aesthetic ideas can perform, this account is not exhaustive. It accounts for one of the many uses of the aesthetic idea and does not explore their capacity to restructure experience or to create another nature out of that which is given. Guyer presents the unity of these ideas as synthetic; the aesthetic idea is comprised out of the synthesis of the rational idea with the wealth of imaginative presentations, and it is not clear how the aesthetic idea differs from the presentations that supplement it or the rational idea which serves as its theme (or content).

Let us move on to a discussion of Kant’s account of genius. Aesthetic ideas are expressed through works of art created by a genius, which Kant defines as follows: ‘Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art […] Genius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’ (5:307). The talent of a genius comes from her nature as a subject and she prescribes the rule to art by producing works that are original and exemplary (to be followed but not imitated by others). The works produced by a genius are defined by their original and exemplary status and these two elements are essential\textsuperscript{81}. Kant’s concept of originality refers to ‘a talent for producing something for which no

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 359.

\textsuperscript{81} Howard Caygill states that Kant’s concept of genius is most notable in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and the *Third Critique*. Both works designate the genius as essentially original; engaging in non-imitative production and discovering that which cannot be taught or learnt. Caygill, Howard, *A Kant Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 213.
determinate rule can be given’ which he situates in contrasts to e.g. a skill (5:307). The works produced by a genius must be exemplary as the rules by which they are created are prescribed by nature and cannot be communicated by any other means, and the art work produced must serve as an example so it can arouse original ideas in the minds of others who possess similar talents.

The faculties which constitute genius are the imagination and the understanding but they interrelate differently compared to how they engage in cognition. Here the aim is aesthetic and the imagination is not restricted by concepts of the understanding, it is free to supply a wealth of material that can subjectively quicken the cognitive powers (5:317). For Kant the genius utilises a ‘happy relation – one that no science can teach and that cannot be learned by any diligence’ through which we can discover ideas for given concepts and express them in a manner that communicates to others the ‘mental attunement’ they produce (3:317). A work of fine art that presents an aesthetic idea is produced by, and also arouses a harmony between the faculties of imagination and understanding, this is the spirit which can ‘express what is ineffable’ and make it ‘universally communicable’ (5:317). It must do this without the constraint of rules in a manner that is original and reveals a new rule.

Kant makes four clear points about genius, firstly it is a talent for art (not science), secondly, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product (its purpose) and a relation of the imagination to the understanding. Thirdly, it manifests itself (not in exhibiting the aforementioned concept) but in the way aesthetic ideas are expressed and presents the imagination as free from rules but purposive (for exhibiting). Lastly, the subjective purposiveness in the imaginations free harmony with the understanding presupposes a proportion and attunement that can be brought about not by rules or science, only by the subject’s nature (5:317-8). The genius produces
exemplary works which require a degree of academic correctness and taste, and these works transmit rules through their status as examples to be followed; they are thereby utilised as a source of inspiration for future artists who possess similar talents.

In § 50 Kant claims that art that shows genius is inspired, but to be fine art it must also show taste (5:319). He appears to change the priority he ascribed to genius and prioritises taste as the most important element for a work to be beautiful. After presenting an account of genius as the source of inspiration, spirit, originality and exemplarity, Kant now states that the freedom of the imagination must be commensurate with lawfulness of the understanding (5:319). Genius cannot be granted lawless freedom, taste must discipline it and clip its wings to introduce clarity and order, this is necessary if products of fine art are to be ‘fit for being followed by others and fit for an ever advancing culture’ (5:319). Therefore, if something needs to be sacrificed Kant claims we should ‘sooner permit the imagination’s freedom and wealth to be impaired than that the understanding be impaired’ (5:320).

In Comment I Kant refers to genius as ‘the ability to [exhibit] aesthetic ideas’ and states that in products of genius art receives its rule from nature in the subject (not from a deliberate purpose) (5:344). We judge beauty ‘according to the purposive attunement of the imagination that brings it into harmony with power of concepts’ (5:344). The subjective standard for aesthetic unconditioned purposiveness that is the basis for our demand for assent it is supplied by nature in subject and sourced to the supersensible substrate of all our powers. It is referred to that by which our cognitive powers harmonise (the ultimate purpose given by intelligible nature) and in this way purposiveness can be based a priori on principle that is subjective and universally valid (5:344).
Henry Allison understands genius as a ‘unique productive force’ that encompasses a particular type of causality related to our ability to reflectively judge products of art with taste\textsuperscript{82}. We must view art as if it was produced by nature (unintended), whilst also being conscious of it as a work of art (intended). But Paul Guyer observes Kant’s claim that the rule for producing artworks is itself sourced to nature (within the subject), therefore, there is no need to view a work of art ‘as if’ it were nature, as ‘a work of artistic genius does not merely \textit{look} like a product of nature but \textit{is} one, and thus has no need to \textit{look} like one after all’\textsuperscript{83}.

Allison refers to the genius as possessing a two-fold capacity; the ability to discover and express aesthetic ideas, and an ability to ‘apprehend “the imagination’s rapidly passing play”’ (5:317)\textsuperscript{84}. Both involve the imagination in its free-play through which it accords with the understanding and is granted coherence and communicability, it is in this way an artist can communicate rules for others to follow. The genius must possess a capacity to invent as part of the creative process, and that which she creates must be appropriate to express the idea to others. The genius must possess an imaginative, creative power (sourced to nature within) through which aesthetic ideas can be expressed, yet this same nature refers to an ability within us all to recognise, receive and grasp these ideas with reference to a feeling of attunement. Allison defines a genius as: ‘someone who is blessed with the unteachable ability to produce coherent imaginative associations (aesthetic ideas) that are particularly suited to express an underlying thought’\textsuperscript{85}.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. p. 286.
We have already noted that Kant’s treatment of genius appears inconsistent, Allison claims it fluctuates and shifts in respect to how it relates to taste and the question concerning which trait should receive primacy when classifying a work as fine art\textsuperscript{86}. Allison notes that this shifting evaluation of the nature and role of genius is accompanied by changes in respect to the significance of aesthetic ideas\textsuperscript{87}. He traces a ‘thin’ and a ‘thick’ concept of genius as present in the Third Critique. The ‘thick’ concept concerns traits of genius as exemplary and original and refers to the essential elements of understanding, judgement and an inventive imagination, all of which enable the genius to give the rule to fine art. The ‘thin’ concept limits genius to an imaginative capacity and emphasises a need to clip its wings and ensure it is disciplined and trained to illustrate the dangers of the imagination operating with lawless freedom\textsuperscript{88}.

In summary, we have explored the functions and uses of aesthetic ideas as presented by Kant and conducted a brief discussion of the genius as the one who can exhibit these ideas through works of fine art. Though the capacity of the imagination has been expanded beyond any ascribed to it in the First Critique, we have also found that Kant is careful to ensure it is bound and subordinate to the understanding for the sake of clarity and taste with respect to our judgements. Let us now pursue a question that has been anticipated in respect to whether aesthetic ideas are the same as symbols.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Allison concludes by claiming that the ‘thick’ concept of genius is the one that must be attributed to Kant in respect to his views on ‘the nature of artistic beauty and the conditions of the possibility of its production’ Ibid., p. 301.
8.2 Aesthetic Ideas and Symbols

This section will show that, although both are capable of presenting (and thereby realising) rational concepts, aesthetic ideas and symbols differ in significant respects. In 8.1 we saw that Henry Allison thought aesthetic ideas should be considered as a ‘significant subset’ of symbols. Through a comparative analysis of the movement of the imagination in respect to poetry and rhetoric I will argue that the expression of aesthetic ideas differs from the symbolic exhibition of rational ideas. It is important to distinguish between expression and exhibition to gain a clear understanding of hypotyposis, and to grasp the ways in which different types of idea are communicated, in doing this, the role of art in securing the unity of metaphysics, the mind, and the mental faculties can be made explicit.

Let us begin by reaffirming the definitions of each. A symbol is an indirect exhibition of a rational idea using a sensible intuition that judgement treats in a manner analogous to the process it follows in schematising (5:351). Symbols are indirect exhibitions and according to the examples Kant gives in § 59 they can be profane, linguistic or higher. An aesthetic idea is a presentation of the imagination to which no determinate concept can be adequate. These ideas can create another nature following analogical laws, restructure experience, process given material so that it exceeds its given status, and approach an exhibition of rational concepts. They give sensible expression to rational ideas, take things given in experience and express them in a way that goes beyond experience, aesthetically expand concepts, and, aesthetic attributes can yield an aesthetic idea that serves a rational idea as a

\[\text{\textsuperscript{89}} \text{Ibid., p. 258.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{90}} \text{See 7.2 for a discussion of the types of symbol exemplified.}\]
substitute for logical exhibition. Symbols enable the indirect exhibition of rational ideas, aesthetic ideas can express ideas of reason, approximate to rational concepts, and expand concepts beyond their determinate scope. It is clear that there is a very close relation between the two and they are both capable of exhibition, but whereas exhibition is a defining feature and purpose of the symbol, it is but one of the many uses of an aesthetic idea and, though they may approximate to an exhibition of rational concepts, this is not necessarily achieved.

For Henry Allison aesthetic ideas are the ‘key’ to understanding how beauty can symbolise morality, he claims:

…it is precisely by means of aesthetic ideas that indirectly exhibit ideas of reason (in virtue of their analogous ways of gesturing to the supersensible) that beauty (both natural and artistic) functions as a symbol of morality91.

For Allison the way in which aesthetic ideas ‘gesture to the supersensible’ affirms their similarity to symbols. He claims they can express or exhibit ideas independently of determinate concepts and this explains how beauty (as the expression of aesthetic ideas (5:320)) can symbolise morality. He thereby affiliates aesthetic ideas with what we have termed the ‘higher’ symbol of beauty. The capacity of aesthetic ideas to serve as a substitute for logical exhibition is the function upon which Allison claims that they act as symbols: ‘Indeed such ideas fit perfectly our functional definition of a symbol as an intuition that exhibits conceptual content in an indirect fashion by means of an analogy’92. He does not equate the way in which they can sensibly express ideas of reason with symbolisation, rather, it is in relation to how aesthetic attributes enable an aesthetic idea that approximates to a completion


92 Ibid., p. 258.
beyond the sensible that is the basis of his judgement of similarity. However, there are two relata involved in a symbolising relation, and there could be numerous (even a multitude) of aesthetic attributes that together yield an aesthetic idea which could serve as a substitute for logical exhibition. Though there is a substitution (or transposition) involved in both operations, I would argue that the formal structure is not the same.

Kant does not refer to aesthetic ideas in his account of the symbol in § 59. If he considered them to be the same it is strange (particularly in respect to the linguistic examples) that he makes no reference to poetic, artistic examples and it suggests that he viewed them as different. Though aesthetic ideas and symbols both involve harmony between the imagination and the understanding, in symbolising the movement of imagination is restricted (to a formal analogy between two relata), whereas, in expressing aesthetic ideas it is expansive (and restricted only by taste). Symbols involve a partial embodiment of an idea of reason so that it can be realised with a semblance of objective reality. Aesthetic ideas are not reductive, partial presentations, they are expansive and present a wealth of material that exceeds determinate concepts. The symbol presents a mere part of an idea and grants it reality by analogy with something directly demonstrable, aesthetic ideas present more than a determinate concept, an excess that both retains and exceeds sensible status, the formal structure of each is therefore different.

Support for my view of the difference between the two can be found in Robert Wicks’ *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgement*. Wicks notes that the formation of symbols has a literalism that differs from ‘the genius-inspired, metaphor-
related, mystifying creation of aesthetic ideas"\(^93\). He differentiates between Kant’s account of the symbol and the use of metaphor, claiming that, for the symbol imaginative resonance and expansion (such as that granted by aesthetic ideas and metaphors) is not necessary. Symbols are more prone to ‘fix the activity of one’s imagination than stimulate it’\(^94\). Wicks understands that symbols lack an excess of meaning and, in contrast to aesthetic ideas there is no mystery to their operation, this is why Kant secures a symbolic relation between beauty and morality: ‘because symbolism is a more manageable, determinate, logically amenable and philosophically-effective concept from the standpoint of literalistic, systematic philosophy’\(^95\). Whilst I do not advocate any reduction of the intuitive aesthetic nature of the symbol, Wicks distinction between the symbol and the aesthetic idea supports my view that the two are not the same.

One way in which they do compare is in respect to the communication of ideas, this is a shared feature (though they achieve it differently). The genius communicates aesthetic ideas through art. Symbols enable realisation and thereby also communication of ideas, and through the higher symbol of beauty they present a means through which the unity of the mind and mental faculties can be secured and experienced. The communication of aesthetic ideas through works of art relies on a similar unity in respect to how we judge these works (using taste) and demand assent from others on the basis of their possession of the same mental faculties that are capable of the same feelings of attunement in judging beauty.


\(^{94}\) Ibid.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., p.175-6.
In order to set out the similarities and differences between aesthetic ideas and symbols it is necessary to examine them in relation to the key functions they perform. Poetry expresses aesthetic ideas most fully and it is therefore useful to consider the movement of the imagination in poetry as exemplifying the expression of aesthetic ideas. In contrast, with rhetoric the movement of the imagination is directed towards a specific, desired end (as it is in symbolic exhibition) and this offers an interesting point of comparison with its free movement in poetry. For Kant:

Fine art, [...] is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social communication (5:306).

However, Paul Guyer claims that art-works do have a determinate end as they are intended as a particular type of object96. Therefore, in order to judge a work of art ‘one must not merely recognise it to be the product of the general intention to produce pleasure by the engagement of the cognitive faculties, but must also recognise it as having been intended to be an object of some particular type’97.

When the imagination is employed purposively to exhibit a concept, it is set to work and we can draw parallels between the way it searches for an example with the way in which the rhetorician seeks to communicate his ideas and construct his argument (with reference to examples that will serve the purpose at hand) and persuade his listeners. In respect to the creation of a work of art (e.g. a poem) the imagination is set into play so that it can express concepts and ideas in a manner that is meaningful, but not discursive. In poetry examples are not employed strictly for the purpose of exhibiting rational concepts, they are created to express aesthetic

______________________________


97 Ibid., p. 356.
ideas. These ideas enliven the mind as they embellish the given and the determinate
to present a wealth of information using attributes that may, or may not be analogous
to the idea they serve to express.

The difference between these two art forms captures the difference between
aesthetic ideas and symbols and could shed some light on the question of whether
they should be considered as the same.

In poetry the presentations of the imagination that are provided for a concept may
belong to its exhibition, but this is not their primary purpose. These presentations
serve to aesthetically expand concepts beyond their determinate scope in a way that
can set our intellectual powers in motion and goes beyond that which could be
apprehended within the concept (5:315). Here we see that there is a role for
aesthetic ideas in enabling exhibition, but they also extend beyond this role and it is
not their determinate goal or aim. Poetry and oratory (rhetoric) take the ‘spirit which
animates their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of the objects’, these
attributes accompany the logical ones and give momentum to the imagination so that
it thinks more, but in an undeveloped way (5:315). In Kant’s example of the poem
written by Frederick the Great aesthetic attributes are employed to animate a rational
idea. The imagination recalls previous pleasures and associations (of beautiful
sunsets) which it conjoins with this presentation (of an attitude to have at the end of
one’s life) to arouse sensations and animate the mind. Kant states that we can even
use supersensible ideas to effect this animation beyond the bounds of the
determinate concept (e.g. virtue and goodness). Aesthetic attributes quicken the
mind and animate concepts so that they become aesthetically expanded and
presented (or expressed); the aim is aesthetic and the imagination is free though it
may indirectly serve cognition.
With poetry the primary aim of the imagination is expression, though exhibition may also be achieved. We express aesthetic ideas to communicate them to others without the constraint of rules and determinate concepts. Genius is a talent for expressing these ideas (not for symbolising rational ideas) and the imagination is granted a great degree of freedom, however, academic correctness and taste must also be displayed in a talent for producing exemplary works. In its freedom the imagination displays an ability to operate in lawful harmony with the understanding, and this harmony is purposive for judging beauty and communicating aesthetic ideas so that works of art can be followed and culture can be advanced. In § 51 On the Division of the Fine Arts Kant divides the arts according to the way people express themselves and communicate through speech; according to words (the arts of speech), gesture (visual art) and tone (the art of the play of sensations). The arts of speech are poetry and oratory and here he makes an important distinction:

Oratory is the art of engaging in a task of the understanding as if [it were] a free play of the imagination; poetry is the art of conducting a free play of the imagination as [if it were] a task of the understanding (5:321).

The basis of Kant’s distinction between rhetoric and poetry concerns how the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding are employed. Rhetoric presents a task of the understanding as if it were a free-play of the imagination; it is directed towards a desired end and thus it deceives the listener through a purposive engagement of the imagination in the guise of an employment of the understanding. Kant claims that rhetoric delivers less than it promises as it does not engage the understanding purposively but uses the imagination to supplement its persuasion. In contrast, with poetry the imagination operates freely yet displays a lawfulness with the understanding so that it delivers more than it promises. The poet promises nothing more than an entertaining play with ideas yet ‘in playing he provides food for
the understanding and gives life to its concepts by means of the imagination’ through the presentation of aesthetic ideas (5:322).

The difference between the two concerns the way in which the cognitive powers of the understanding and the imagination interact with one another. In order for the art in question to be considered fine art (and poetry is the highest of all the arts) these powers must combine in such a way that they do not impair one another and the harmony between them appears spontaneous and unintentional. Kant is quite clear that ‘anything studied and painstaking must be avoided in art' and that fine art must be free in a double sense:

...it must be free in the sense of not being a mercenary occupation and hence a kind of labor, whose magnitude can be judged, extracted, or paid for according to a determinate standard; but fine art must also be free in the sense that, although the mind is occupying itself, yet it feels satisfied and aroused (independently of any pay) without looking to some other purpose (5:321).

Here we can see that in works of fine art the imagination must be free and not employed to achieve a determinate goal such as exhibition (although this may occur). Rhetoric is ranked lower than poetry by Kant as it involves the purposive employment of the imagination to achieve a determinate end. The expression of aesthetic ideas in poetry does not require the imagination to be employed purposively to achieve the exhibition of rational (or other types of) concept. Whereas, with rhetoric, and likewise also in symbolic hypotyposis, a determinate end serves to guide the operation of the imagination, this impairs its freedom to express in an unbounded way as it is employed to further the purpose of exhibition.

In § 53 Comparison of the Aesthetic Value of the Various Fine Arts Kant reinforces the status of poetry as the highest of all the arts due to its origins (from genius) and its effects. He claims that it expands and fortifies the mind and is that which links the exhibition of the concept with a wealth of material that exceeds
determinate linguistic bounds (5:326). For Kant ‘poetry lets the mind feel its ability to use nature on behalf of and, as it were, as a schema of the supersensible’ (5:326).

The implication is that poetry works in a schematic rather than a symbolic manner, and Kant never refers to aesthetic ideas as symbols, or as symbolic anywhere in the text. The designation of poetry as ‘schematic’ makes sense if we look at the material it employs e.g. in respect to how aesthetic attributes combine to yield an aesthetic idea which may serve in place of logical exhibition. The aesthetic attributes must comprise a relation to the concept that allows them to express and thereby also exhibit it. The further that the multitude of kindred presentations extends, the less direct the connection becomes, and even if a substitute is employed to exhibit and express a concept e.g. Jupiter’s eagle is used to express the king of heaven, there is a ‘direct’ relation in terms of aesthetic qualities in respect to the feelings they arouse (e.g. the majesty of the eagle as the mightiest bird, and the status of the king, both are powerful and impressive). The relation to the attributes is therefore direct in relation to feelings in a way that, e.g. the relation between a hand mill and a despotic state is not. The hand mill does not enliven the mind and quicken it in the way that the aesthetic presentation of Jupiter’s eagle does as it is not an aesthetic or poetic presentation.

In § 53 Kant explains that poetry plays with illusion, and even though this can be used purposively by the understanding this is not the explicit intention. He splits oratory (rhetoric) into two types: the art of persuasion (ars oratoria), and rhetoric proper. The former seeks to deceive the listener by means of a beautiful illusion and its objective is to persuade the listener to serve the advantage of the speaker. Kant states that:
...it corrupts the maxims and attitudes of the subjects, even if objectively the action [they are persuaded to perform] is lawful; for it is not enough that we do what is right, we must also perform it solely on the ground that it is right (5:327).

He describes how this type of rhetoric is not appropriate for the bar or the pulpit as it concerns the ‘machinery of persuasion’ and though it can be used to vividly exhibit ideas or express them, the danger is, that we can never shake off the feeling that we have been ‘artfully hoodwinked’ (5:327).

In contrast, poetry is honest and sincere; it delivers more than it promises. It promises only to engage the imagination in play in a way that will harmonise with the understanding in an entertaining manner. In footnote 63 (5:328) Kant explains that a beautiful poem is a source of delight, whereas, reading the best speech of a Roman orator or politician ‘has always been mingled with the disagreeable feeling of disapproval of an insidious art, an art that knows how to move people like machines to a judgement that must lose all its weight with them when the meditate about it calmly’ (5:328). Here he reinforces his earlier distinction between ‘good rhetoric’ which concerns excellence of speech and belongs to fine art, in contrast to ‘bad’ rhetoric; oratory or *ars oratoria*, which is the art of using people’s weaknesses to serve one’s own aims. The former is displayed by an expert speaker, the latter is without art, but capable of great force, and is politically dangerous. One must note that it is in relation to rhetoric that the movement of the imagination takes on a moral dimension for Kant, art which is not fine art is not immoral, whereas bad rhetoric takes away our freedom to choose the right action, and the opportunity to cultivate our own awareness to moral feeling.

In *The Idea of Form* Rodolphe Gasche observes how, in the *Third Critique*, Kant condemns the art of the orator, yet with his use of the term hypotyposis, he
advocates a philosophical appropriation of rhetoric ‘that transforms its essence’. He describes how poetry lets itself be used purposively (though this is not its aim), it invigorates and expands the mind, providing food for reason and giving life to ideas as it sets the mental faculties in play. Rhetoric is more serious, it lets itself be guided by precepts and examples and borrows from poetry to achieve its ends, in this respect it is dishonest and deceptive. He claims that rhetoric derives from poetry and is therefore secondary in comparison as the schematism enabled by poetry is more animating than the exemplification of what is good or right in good rhetoric (which does not require aesthetic animation) and more honest than the treacherous and manipulative ars oratoria.

For Gasche Kant’s use of the word ‘hypotyposis’ betrays origins that are distinctly rhetorical. He traces the etymology of the word, with emphasis on its visual meaning as that which must be put before the eyes. Gasche claims rhetoric becomes ‘revalorised’ when Kant needs to address the presentation of concepts. He refers to hypotyposis as a ‘reality producing function’ and states that the term refers to a mode of presentation that is vivid, comprehensive, moral, aesthetic, and constitutive of subjective reflection. What is presented is given life and reality and for Gasche Kant uses the term in a way that differs from its traditional usage.

---


99 For Gasche, Kant’s specific use of hypotyposis as a ‘subjectio sub adspectum’ connotes visual exhibition, a ‘throwing under the eyes’. He traces this as present in Cicero’s use of the term in De oratore, and an appeal to the eye by Quintilian for the sake of clarity. Du Marais use of hypotyposis as a visual painting of tableau further develops and emphasises its visual qualities, and Henri Morier introduces a moral aspect to the tableaux that is intertwined with the pleasure of the eye. Gasche claims ‘These are the major features that characterise hypotyposis as a rhetorical figure of style’ Ibid., pp. 207-8.

100 Ibid., p. 208.

101 Ibid., p. 209.
Gasche discusses schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, for him the purpose behind them is largely the same: to present a concept so that it acquires figurality and is shown to have ‘reality’. The difference is that schematism takes places according to the conditions of time (inner sense) and symbolism reveals functions of reflective judgement. Symbols help concepts to become meaningful in a non-discursive way, they serve as figures or forms prior to any concretisation. Gasche claims that, the rhetorical connotations of the term hypotyposis serve to endow the mind with life by securing it as a whole and providing the means through which it feels or affects itself:

‘It thus appears that Kant totally recasts the philosophical notion of hypotyposis by endowing it with qualities that originate with this notions rhetorical usage. Yet the latter’s attributes – vividness, synopsis, moral grandeur – become fundamentally transformed as well because, by exclusively concerning the mediating figures of the faculties, they pertain to the life of the spirit alone, to its totality and it its self-affectation through the moral grandeur of its own spectacle’.

Gasche links ‘good rhetoric’ to a philosophical attempt to understand the workings of the mind and mental faculties and this is an achievement of the imagination. It is the imagination which brings unity to the mind and he questions whether Kant’s conception of the imagination in the Third Critique as that which ‘secures the liveliness of style and the surprising and invigorating connections that make the communication of arguments persuasive’ is essentially rhetorical.

Kant’s account of the symbol enables the mind to feel its own unity. With exhibition the determinate end is realisation of a concept and this can be direct or

---

102 Ibid., p. 216.
103 ‘But as is the case with the rhetorical notion of hypotyposis that Kant reappropriates for his philosophical thought, his whole theory of the imagination may also be the result of an attempt to put the rhetorical concept of the imagination to work for the philosophical understanding of the mind’ Ibid., p. 218.
indirect, with expression, there is no transcendental synthesis (schematic exhibition), or a projection of form built on an analogy that is constructed despite dissimilarities (like the profane symbol). It does not involve a complex concept in place of a simple one to connote a living scene (as with linguistic symbols), nor is there necessarily a specific, natural analogy utilised (as with the higher symbol) as many different aesthetic attributes can be used to present or express aesthetic ideas. The movement of the imagination in communicating an aesthetic idea can be thought as a playful harmony between the faculties of the imagination and the understanding (which can be purposive in respect to judging beauty with taste though this is not its purposive end or aim). In contrast the movement of the imagination as it is employed to exhibit concepts is serious work with a determinate end. In symbolising the freedom of the imagination may be granted to an extent (e.g. to find an appropriate symbol), but it is bound by its task and differs from the free expansion of the imagination in expressing aesthetic ideas through poetry.

In conclusion, I have shown that the movement of the imagination in respect to aesthetic ideas and symbols can be differentiated in respect to the amount of freedom from a determinate end it is granted. The tone of its operation in respect to each is different though both involve communication of meaning with recourse to the aesthetic unity of the mind that we can attribute to others on the basis of their possession of the same cognitive faculties.
8.3 The Aesthetic Ideal

This section will explore how the imagination contributes to the ideal of beauty by generating an aesthetic standard idea. This idea plays a role in judging beauty as it pertains to the form through which an object is given (and the resultant attunement of the cognitive faculties) to present the basic conditions under which something can be judged beautiful. There are two components to the ideal of beauty; an intuition of the imagination (the aesthetic standard idea) and a rational idea (of morality), the two must be united and I will question how this unity compares to that of a subsumption of an intuition under a concept.

The aesthetic standard idea is reductive and provides the basic conditions that need to be met for judging something beautiful, it therefore differs from aesthetic ideas (as discussed in 8.1 & 8.2) which are expansive and provide a wealth of material for reflection. The production of this type of idea reveals a lawful capacity of the imagination to emulate reason and operate in a manner denied to it in the First Critique, it therefore enables us to draw interesting parallels between the two faculties.

In § 17 On the Ideal of Beauty Kant tries to account for how we can have an ideal of beauty that is not based on a concept (to preserve the freedom and disinterested status of a judgement of taste). He can only incorporate an ideal into adherent (fixed) beauty that does not pertain to a pure judgement of taste. Kant refers to the empirical criterion for judging beauty as ‘the broadest possible agreement among all ages and peoples’ regarding the feeling that accompanies a presentation (5:231-2). He suggests that a taste confirmed by examples stems from a ‘deeply hidden basis common to all human beings’ which underlies their agreement when judging the form of given objects (5:232). In The Art of Judgement Howard Caygill observes:
Kant carefully refers to the forms under which objects are given and not the objects themselves, and form, according to § 14, registers the fundamental proportion of the cognitive powers\textsuperscript{104}

It is with reference to form and its effect on the cognitive powers of all who judge it that we can treat some models of taste as exemplary. Kant claims that the highest model, the ‘archetype’ is a mere idea that everyone must generate within and by which we judge any given examples\textsuperscript{105}

The archetype of taste is the ideal of the beautiful which cannot be presented by concepts, it is an ideal of the imagination which rests on the power of exhibition. The ideal of beauty is a standard that we possess which can never be fully realised; it is an aspiration or an excess. It is elevated beyond the possibility of sensible presentation, yet it is also that to which all sensible presentations of beauty must approximate. Kant states that if we seek an ideal of beauty it must pertain to adherent beauty and a judgement of taste regarding it cannot be completely pure and free. The judgement must be partly intellectual and therefore, the ideal of beauty has two components; the aesthetic standard idea, and the rational idea. The rational idea of the ideal of beauty must be connected to an underlying idea of reason with a degree of fixed purposiveness. Kant explains:

‘It is man, alone among all objects in the world, who admits of an ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, [i.e., in man considered] as an intelligence, is the only [thing] in the world that admits of the ideal of perfection’ (5:233).

The ideal of beauty refers to man’s inner humanity, and is connected to the rational idea of the good. The aesthetic standard idea is ‘an individual intuition (of the


\textsuperscript{105} In the First Critique Kant defines an ideal as follows: ‘Idea properly means a rational concept, and ideal the presentation of an individual being as adequate to an idea’ (5:232 and A567-71/B595-99).
imagination)’ that is not derived from proportions taken from experience as determinate rules, rather, it is in accordance with this idea that the rules for judging become possible in the first place (5:234). The standard idea takes elements from experience but the greatest purposiveness in the structure of its shape lies in its form. The form is an intrinsic element of the idea and it is the basis on which the thing was created in and by nature. The form gives us an insight into the kind (or species) as a whole, yet can present this as individuated as ‘an aesthetic idea fully in concreto in a model image’ (5:233).

The standard idea holds up an image which ‘hovers’ between ‘all the singular and multiply varied intuitions of the individuals, the image which nature used as the archetype’ but which it has never attained completely in any one individual (5:235). It is not an archetype, but it offers a standard or form which ‘constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty’ in terms of presenting merely the correctness in the exhibition of its kind (5:235). This idea grants us a standard by which we can judge man as belonging to a particular species, and it underlies the standard idea of a beautiful person in terms of one who has regularity and is free from defects and excessive characteristics. The material gathered from experience is worked on to generate a standard that need never have (or ever be) experienced in order to serve a function in judging. From our experiences the imagination forms an idea ‘to which only the kind as a whole but no individual by itself is adequate’ (5:233). This idea enables us to make an aesthetic judgement as the imagination recalls the standard idea to compare a given object; it ‘projects, as it were, one image onto another, and from the congruence of most images of the same kind it arrives at an average that serves as the common standard for all of them’ (5:234).
Kant describes how this is possible with reference to two examples; one that pertains to the judging of adult men, and an analogy from optics that describes how the area where images are united (and cross over one another with a shared shape) grants the shape of the aesthetic standard idea. The same standard could be attained mechanically (or mathematically) if we were to calculate the size and shape of e.g. a 1000 men, then generate the average measurements: ‘yet the imagination does just that by means of a dynamic effect arising from its multiple apprehension of such shapes on the organ of the inner sense’ (5:234).

Kant goes on to affiliate the aesthetic standard idea with correctness and rules, it forms a condition for judging beauty in that it does not contain any specific characteristics that might cause deviation from the standard idea. We like it (and it is useful for judging beauty) as ‘it does not contradict any of the conditions under which alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful’ (5:235). This idea is academically correct, regular, average, and contains no specifics or anything that may betray an individual character. What it lacks is the excess of beauty; that which causes us to linger in contemplation of it, and a connection to the moral. A connection to morality is found in the rational component of the ideal of beauty, this exalts the feeling aroused in judging beauty as a ‘visible expression of moral ideas that govern man inwardly’ (5:236). However, judging by this type of ideal is never merely aesthetic, as it must refer to the rational idea of man’s humanity.

In the Ideal of Reason in the First Critique Kant states that ideals of reason rest on determinate concepts; they serve as rules and archetypes for our actions and critical judgements. In the Third Critique the imagination is granted a role in relation to the ideal in that it generates an aesthetic standard idea (which serves as both a source of academic correctness and grants rule that guide us when judging beauty). In order
to set this operation of the imagination in context, let us look back to Kant’s discussion of the ideal of reason in the *First Critique* where he addresses the capacity of the imagination differently. In comparison to ideals of reason he states:

The products of the imagination are of an entirely different nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of them; each is a kind of *monogram*, a mere set of particular qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a determinate image – a representation such as painters and physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image [...] Such representations may be entitled, though improperly, ideals of sensibility (A570/598).

He goes on to argue that the extent of the imaginations capability, is to generate models of possible empirical intuitions that cannot be realised and furnish no rules. Through the aesthetic standard idea the imagination completes a function akin to that ascribed to reason in the *First Critique* as it is revealed as capable of generating rules which take the form of an indispensable standard for our aesthetic judgements of beauty. The free lawfulness of the imagination dynamically generates a model as standard, and this exceeds (or to use the language Kant employs in relation to ideas of reason, it ‘transcends’) experience (A571/B599). Thus, in the *Third Critique* the imagination reveals itself as able to operate within a domain (and at a standard) ascribed only to reason in the *First Critique*.

The primary task of the imagination in the *First Critique* was to mediate between concepts and intuitions to enable us to make determinate judgments and thereby acquire knowledge as cognition. This revealed the operation of the imagination as synthetic (in respect to uniting concepts and intuitions), exhibitive (in regards to concepts), productive (in respect to *a priori monograms*) and reproductive (in respect to the *monograms* through which empirical concepts are realised). The imagination
fell largely under the control and guidance of the understanding and was bound by its laws to serve the determinate ends of cognition.

In the *Third Critique* the imagination is still productive and reproductive but in respect to aesthetic ideas, it operates in a state of free-play that is not bound by the determinate laws of the understanding (though it may display a lawful harmony with them). In *The Art of Judgement* Howard Caygill claims that, in generating the aesthetic standard idea the imagination grants us a non-conceptual mode of estimation that does not involve a given intuition in conformity with concept, but orients judgement through a relation between the universal idea (of reason) and an individuation (of the imagination)\(^\text{106}\). The aesthetic standard idea is concerned with the form of an individual (attained via comparison and in line with teleology) and judgement is enabled through recognition of a proportionality that is neither individual nor universal, but in-between the two\(^\text{107}\).

Robert Wicks understands the unity between the imaginations individuation and reasons idea as a ‘flatly generic conception of the human structural appearance with a generic conception of the essence of human beings as moral beings’\(^\text{108}\). The aesthetic image of a standard human and a generic concept of morality are fused together in a manner that recalls the logical format of the harmony of the cognitive faculties when the imagination is subsumed under the understanding\(^\text{109}\). He claims the only difference is that in this instance we are dealing with a peculiar type of intuition and a peculiar type of concept (as both are indeterminate). This account


\(^\text{107}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{109}\) Ibid.
appears reductive and fails to note the significance achieved in respect to the imagination’s production of an idea that differs in kind from the aesthetic ideas produced and expressed by the genius.

For Makreel, the imagination of the *Third Critique* is reflective and interpretive yet plays an epistemological role in organising and orientating the subject. The imagination is not only revealed as able to aesthetically *expand* concepts by supplying a wealth of unbounded material. Through the aesthetic standard idea it demonstrates that it can *reduce* a multiplicity of recalled images to a standard idea which we like: “…merely because it does not contradict any of the conditions under which alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful” (5:235). Just as the imagination can productively exhibit attributes which aesthetically expand a concept, it can dynamically reduce a multiplicity of apprehended forms to obtain a standard that serves as a model for judging.

Makreel claims there are similarities between the aesthetic ‘normal’ idea and the monogram of the *a priori* imagination which enables schematisation of pure sensible concepts¹¹⁰. However, it is more comparable to the way in which we judge empirical concepts. Empirical concepts must be learnt and when we are presented with an object, in order to make a correct determinate judgement the imagination must recall previous correctly judged instances to see if the given object measures up. This is similar to the way in which the imagination must recall (or reproduce) intuitions to generate the aesthetic standard idea to grant the minimal conditions the beauty of a

---

¹¹⁰ ‘In fact the aesthetic normal idea is comparable to the mathematical monogram of pure sensible concepts insofar as both involve a rule for the construction of a figure and are not reducible to a particular empirical image’ Makreel, Rudolf A., *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the ‘Critique of Judgement’*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, p.115.
given object. The similarities in recalling intuitions to assist with judging are apparent, but the difference is two-fold: each judgement has a different end (one is reflective and the other is determinate), they utilise different relations to time (though both affect a regression, correctly judged examples of empirical concepts are part of a causal nexus in a way that the aesthetic standard ideal is not).

What is exhibited through the generation and use of the aesthetic standard idea is not merely a model for judging, but a capacity of the imagination to emulate reason and play a role in reflective judgement. It reveals itself as capable not merely of the expression of aesthetic ideas that expand concepts and present a wealth of material, but as capable of dynamically reducing experiences to generate a minimum standard that pertains to the form a thing must have if it is to be judged beautiful.

Makreel calls aesthetic standard ideas ‘normal ideas’ to differentiate them from the aesthetic ideas discussed in relation to works of art and rightly claims that these ideas have largely been ignored in secondary literature111. He defines them as follows:

The aesthetical normal idea is an individual intuition of the imagination that is not given in any empirical intuition, nor is it simply a priori. The imagination produces this idea “by means of a dynamical effect”, which arises from its “multiple apprehension” of different figures 112.

These ideas have a status comparable to aesthetic ideas used expressed by the genius as they are produced by the imagination, yet they differ as, with the former the imagination engages in a reduction (of multiple images) to generate a standard,

111 Ibid., p.113.
112 Ibid., p. 114.
whereas with the latter it engages in an expansion beyond the bounds of any determinate concepts.

In contrast to the rational idea (which is reached through a process of inference), the aesthetic standard idea is generated through an operation of the imagination that is in one sense tied intrinsically to sensible intuition, but in another goes beyond it to yield knowledge of an average standard that may never be intuited. The imagination affects a retroactive successive apprehension of multiple shapes (intuited in the past) in order to project an average standard into the present to be used for judging. It possess a complex temporal dimension which is revisited by Kant in the *Analytic of the Sublime* and is identified by Makreel a ‘regression’\(^{113}\).

Kant cannot clearly explain the operation of the imagination in generating the aesthetic standard idea. In attempting to grasp this process he asks ‘who can elicit nature’s secret entirely?’ and observes that as the imagination recalls previously intuited images, it does this in a manner that is ‘wholly beyond our grasp’ (5:233)\(^{114}\).

Makreel observes that, although the aesthetic standard idea is ‘unsatisfactory from the standpoint of explanation, it is suggestive for the theory of interpretation’ as it possess a status that is neither *a priori* (as it is grounded in sensibility) nor strictly empirical (as it transcends the given instances to generate a standard)\(^ {115}\). Thus, it serves as an example of how the imagination of the *Third Critique* breaks down (or

\(^{113}\) Ibid., p. 73.

\(^{114}\) This reminds us of Kant’s discussion of the schematism of the understanding in the *First Critique* as ‘an art concealed in the depths of the human soul’ that is unlikely to ever be ‘open to our gaze’ (A141/B180-1). It also draws us back to his disclaimer in the Preface of the *Third Critique* where Kant explains that his treatment of reflective judgement ‘may fall short of the clarity we are entitled to demand elsewhere’ i.e. when we deal with cognition according to concepts (5:170).

transcends) the boundaries that were set by the step ladder in the First Critique to operate in a manner that appears paradoxical from a determinate perspective. These ideas serve as an example of how the imagination may ‘read between the lines’ of ordinary experience\textsuperscript{116} and how the imagination of the Third Critique can emulate reason.

Makreel outlines the difference between an ideal of reason and an ideal of the imagination:

‘The rational idea of man’s purpose is a moral idea and provides the ideal of human beauty an objective universality that transcends the subjective universality of the pure aesthetic judgement. The normal idea of human beauty, being an interpretive or reflective idea adaptive to particular experience, is not yet universal\textsuperscript{117}.

This captures the way in which the ‘normal’ idea differs from a necessary idea of reason; it is reflectively interpretive and grants only the minimal conditions that form a basis on which we can judge something to be beautiful. The capacity of the imagination to contribute to the ideal of beauty by generating the aesthetic standard idea enables us to draw interesting parallels with the operations of reason as set out in the First Critique and examined in part 1.

Both reason and the imagination are revealed as capable of generating ideas and ideals, the main difference (other than the source of these) is that the ideas of reason have more universality. In conclusion, let us draw some parallels between the two capacities to gain a comprehensive view of their capabilities. Reason can generate and realise ideas using a monogram it produces itself, the imagination can generate monograms both \textit{a priori} and reproductively and it can produce ideas of its

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 117.
own which are realised through works of art. Reason behaves lawfully as it grants order (and unity) to the understanding, the imagination can behave lawfully in service to the understanding or, in its freedom it may harmonise with the understanding without this being set as a determinate purpose or end. Reason can generate regulative figures to realise ideas (which have dual status in relation to sensibility as highest point of distance and ground) by presenting them as systems, the imagination can express ideas through works of art by generating presentations that are ideas and intuitions (and also have dual status in relation to sensibility).

The imagination plays a mediating role in schematising, the schema is referred to by Kant as a product or procedure of the imagination, reason can also schematise ideas using a **monogram**. Though the imagination is the faculty of exhibition, reason can exhibit ideas (though they do not gain objective reality). Both can realise rational ideas; reason achieves this schematically through direct presentation in a regulative figure that possesses no objective reality, the imagination achieves this symbolically and gains objective reality for an idea, but represents it indirectly. Both can disjoint time; reason generates ideas that retrospectively guide the schematic realisation of themselves, the imagination effects a retroactive successive apprehension in respect to the aesthetic standard idea and must regress in respect to schematising empirical concepts through the **recollective schema** (it also engages in a regressive, circular reflection in symbolising ideas of reason).

Reason becomes figurative in order to communicate and thereby realise its ideas and ideals and in doing so it initiates a complex return to sensibility. The imagination at the height of its operations communicates ideas through presentations that exceed and yet retain sensible status, it reveals itself as lawful and correct (particularly in respect to its capacity to generate an ideal through the aesthetic
standard idea). Ideal figures of reason become personified in order to be communicated and to serve a practical function in respect to our judgements and actions. Through their status as personifications they bring a sense of humanity to what would otherwise be a formal figure (such as that generated in respect to the ‘perfect’ man in line with an aesthetic standard idea). In terms of method, the way in which reason generates ideas and ideals is communicable (once it is bound in a figure), but the method through which the imagination creates and expresses ideas and generates ideals has an ineffable incommunicable quality; it cannot be taught, learnt or communicated, except with reference to examples\textsuperscript{118}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{118} ‘Thus one can indeed learn everything that Newton has set forth in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy, however great a mind was needed to make such discoveries; but one cannot learn to write inspired poetry, however elaborate all the precepts of this art may be, and however superb its models’ (5:309).
\end{flushright}
Conclusion

Let us now return to some of the questions raised in the *Introduction*. These concern: the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art (and the nature of this appropriation) in respect to the communication of ideas, whether there really are only two modes of exhibition in Kant’s Critical works, and whether the use of figures to communicate ideas could present a challenge to our understanding of the nature of reason as ‘systematic’. As a consequence of the latter may also ask why the systematic account should be preserved, and whether Kant changed his mind about the dominance of systematic unity when he wrote the *Third Critique*.

In terms of the role and importance of figures in relation to the communication of ideas, it is interesting to consider whether it is possible for us to communicate ideas without having recourse to figures? If we cannot, rhetoric is thereby revealed as an intrinsic part of communication about abstract subject matter and must therefore be recognised as a key feature of philosophical methodology. If we can communicate without having recourse to such figures, this implies that Kant has chosen to procure them and to employ rhetoric in a manner that contradicts his overt condemnation of it as dishonest and deceptive: ‘an insidious art, an art that knows how, in important matters, to move people like machines’ (5:328). Either way, this thesis has shown that rhetoric (and thereby also art) plays a central role in Kant’s account of exhibition in respect to the communication and realisation of ideas and concepts.

In the *Introduction* I referred to how rhetoric has been contemplated in philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. The distinction between good and bad rhetoric has been a pervasive theme as philosopher’s recognised the value of it in relation to excellence of speech, yet it is correspondingly acknowledged as politically dangerous; as the art
of persuasion used to manipulate listeners in line with the desires of the speaker. Philosophy needs argument to persuade and convince its readers (and listeners) of a particular point of view, particularly with subjects and areas that are open to interpretation. But philosophy should not seek to manipulate; arguments should be clear and valid with the aim of communicating the truth. Therefore, if rhetoric is employed it should be done so in pursuit of the truth and in line with the good.

The question concerning the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art relates directly to a need to clarify Kant’s account of hypotyposis by paying particular attention to the role of the figure. This thesis has shown that the communication of theoretical ideas is done with reference to regulative figures and, at the absolute extent of reason’s capability ideas are personified into ideal and transcendentally ideal figures. The communication of practical ideas through the actions of ourselves and others are also judged with reference to personified ideal figures and using a formal analogy with natural law. Communication of aesthetic ideas is done through works of art and thought the method through which this is achieved cannot be communicated with reference to figures (as it is ineffable) works of art express these ideas by giving them form. These works are judged reflectively and through reflective judgement we can realise theoretical or practical ideas indirectly by analogy with that which is directly demonstrable. All of these modes of exhibition reveal a use of figures and art in respect to the communication and realisation of abstract content (ideas, concepts and ideals). Rhetoric and poetry are affirmed as necessary features of exhibition, though for symbols and schemata the former gains precedence as the freedom of the imagination is guided by and engaged in the task of exhibition.

In relation to schemata I have shown that pure sensible concepts are schematised figurally with reference to a monogram of the pure a priori imagination. Empirical
concepts are schematised by means of recollection via a method that is partially figural and uses a monogram of the reproductive imagination. Theoretical ideas are realised systematically through a final end schema using a monogram created by reason. We can thereby conclude that all schematism takes place with direct reference to a figure except the realisation of pure sensible concepts through the transcendental schema, however, even this schema (which realises concepts through time) is figural by analogy with space.

The realisation of practical ideas is achieved through the typic by analogy with a natural law. The use of analogy suggests that this mode of exhibition differs from other schemata, and the 'schematism of analogy' in Religion reinforces this distinction. However, lack of a proper transposition between relata suggests that these are not symbolic exhibitions and this suggestion is further supported as they can be shown to possess both direct and indirect features. The practical modes must therefore be thought of either as a different type of exhibition, or as that which bridges the two. I have argues that the status of practical exhibition is secured with reference to the figure of Christ who serves as a bridge between the human and the divine and thereby also, between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis.

Symbols realise rational ideas by analogy with something directly demonstrable, but a closer inspection of the examples Kant gives reveals that only the higher symbol fits this description (and this is not without its problems). What his account does reveal however, is how the mind seeks to simplify complex concepts in order to communicate and realise them by analogy with something determinate through the use of profane symbols. Also, how opening up a reflective space within language eases and amplifies communication, to connote a living scene and breathe life into determinate meaning through linguistic symbols (language that is reflective, but is
concerned with exhibition and differs from poetry). The higher symbol shows how, when we feel, judge or are in the presence of beauty we experience a feeling analogous to that of respect for the morally good and thus the idea of the good becomes realised by analogy. The higher symbol presents the dynamic unity of the mind as it becomes affected by an awareness of its own aesthetic unity, and this is an achievement of the imagination. The higher symbol proves most valuable, not because it realises the morally good (as exhibition of this practical idea has already been demonstrated), but because it reveals and presents the unity of the mind and enables Kant to secure unity for his Critical system.

The way aesthetic ideas are exhibited (or expressed) through works of art is not strictly a symbolic exhibition, nor is it schematic, and if Kant intends it to be symbolic it differs from the profane, linguistic and higher types of symbol he sets out in §59. Also, the type of exhibition achieved when an intuition of the imagination is united with the rational idea of humanity to gain an ideal of beauty falls outside Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata. In sum the practical modes of exhibition together with the expression of aesthetic ideas and the generation of aesthetic ideals point to more than merely two types of exhibition (as claimed by Kant).

In some respects Kant’s distinction between schemata (as direct) and symbols (as indirect) is useful as we can separate them from one another in respect to the use of analogy. But once we discover we can schematise by analogy the distinction starts to become blurred and in the Third Critique Kant refers to other types of exhibition that do not fit within this distinction. This thesis has undoubtedly discovered a problem with attempting to reduce all the modes of exhibition in Kant’s Critical works to schematic or symbolic hypotyposis.
Let us now revisit the question of whether Kant’s use of figures in the communication (and realisation) of ideas presents a challenge to his understanding of the nature of reason as ‘systematic’ and whether Kant changes his mind about the centrality of systematicity in the Third Critique. Reason is affirmed as systematic in and by the First Critique particularly in respect to the way it reflects and conditions how we interrogate nature. The art of creating systems is sourced to reason but the possibility of such art is not addressed within Kant’s account of construction. However, this ‘art’ forms an essential part of our understanding of how ideas are exhibited through systems and it impacts upon our understanding of the nature of reason itself; it suggests that reason is not merely systematic, but meta-systematic by demonstrating it is capable of art.

There is an alternative to this option though as the imagination plays a mediating role in exhibiting concepts in the First Critique and in the Third Critique it is designated as the power of exhibition. The imagination is shown to emulate reason in the production of ideas and ideals and this could indicate a parallel capacity in reason to produce art. Either, reason emulates the imagination (as it did in producing a monogram to schematise ideas) or there is an alternative source for the art of creating systems. The former reaffirms the nature of reason as meta-systematic and definitions of its true nature should take this into account. However, if the ‘alternative’ source could be the imagination then this power plays a much greater role than suspected (and recognised), and this should also be made explicit. The imagination can transcend the boundaries set out in the step ladder (as it does in the reflective movement through which it symbolises), therefore, it could have a connected to (or even be) the source of the art through which systems are created and ideas are realised directly. Though this would reveal a much greater role for the imagination
(as the power of exhibition and as that through which the mind can be presented with a dynamic picture of its own living unity), it would also preserve the nature of reason as systematic.

Reason possesses a central role in Kant’s Critical system. Its systematic nature not only grants us a way in which to order and bring unity to our cognitions, it determines the way we interrogate nature in order to make sense of it, and it enables us to communicate what we have learnt to others to advance society. However, there is evidence to suggest that Kant changes his view concerning the priority of systematic unity in the Third Critique particularly if we compare the First Introduction with the published version. The word ‘system’, which is used so frequently in the First Introduction, is omitted completely from the titles of the published version. I have suggested that this could be because Kant discovers a unity that exceeds architectonic or systematic status; that of a gestalt totality of the mind which captures its dynamism and other aesthetic qualities. It is only through a unity of this sort and a view of nature by analogy with art, that Kant can bring unity to his Critical philosophy and the systems within it.

If we return to the question concerning the extent to which philosophy can appropriate art, let us recall the figure of the philosopher that Kant sets out in the Architectonic of Pure Reason (A839-40/B867-8). Here he claims the ideal philosopher is a teacher conceived in the ideal; the lawgiver of human reason, concerned with philosophy as the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (Cf. A839/B867). The philosopher is not merely a scientist concerned with logic and systematic unity, nor is she merely a moralist, or an artistic genius. Kant’s account of exhibition and the necessary philosophical appropriation of art it involves, presents the ideal philosopher as ‘the good
rhetorician' who encompasses traits of all three. The ideal philosopher has recourse to a rhetorical employment of the imagination to realise our concepts and ideas but can also employ the freedom and capabilities of the imagination and direct them toward desired ends in line with the moral vocation of humanity. The full power of the imagination can therefore be employed in the service of argument, persuasion and communication, but this should always be for the good of mankind, directed by human reason, and with a concern for advancing knowledge through science.

There is scope to develop further analysis in respect to the extent to which philosophy can appropriate art (in relation to an aesthetic methodology). This would involve reference to the methods employed by Nietzsche in his *Birth of Tragedy* where he uses the figures of Apollo and Dionysus in place of concepts, and illustrates different stages of reality with reference to Raphael’s painting of the *Transfiguration of Christ*\(^{119}\). Kant’s account of the symbol is further developed both in this work and in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* by Walter Benjamin\(^{120}\). In response to Nietzsche Benjamin points to the dangers of employing an aesthetic methodology without attending to morality, reason and narrative structure; as any imaginary phantasm could gain power. These works indicate areas for further study which could build on the discoveries of the present thesis. Extending the analysis of exhibition to Kant’s other works would likewise also prove fruitful as would further analysis of exhibition with detailed reference to Kant’s *Analytic of the Sublime* and the *Critique of Teleology*.


Bibliography

Allison, Henry  

---  

---  

---  

Ameriks, Karl  

Aristotle  

Banham, Gary  

---  

---  

Banham, Gary, Schulting, Dennis and Hems, Nigel  

Beck, L. W.  

Benjamin, Walter  

Bielefeldt, H.  

Bigger, Charles P.  

Bird, Graham  

Broad, C. D.  

Burnham, Douglas  

Buroker, J. V.  
Cassirer, Ernst  “Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik: Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation” translated by Martin Weatherston, Kant-Studien, 36 (1931): 17.


Crawford, Donald Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.


Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, Chicago/London: Open Court, 1934.


Kemp Smith, Norman


Longuenesse, Beatrice

Lucretius


Lyotard, J. F.


Makkreel, Rudolf A.


---


Munzel, G. Felicitas.


Nietzsche, Friedrich


Nussbaum, Charles


Nuzzo, Angelica

Kant and the Unity of Reason, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005.

O’Neill, Onora


O’shrag, Calvin

“Heidegger and Cassirer on Kant”, Kant-Studien, 58, (1967): 87

Parret, H.

Kant’s Asthetik/Kant’s Aesthetics/L’esthetique de Kant, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998.

Pippin, R. B.


Plato


Rueger, A. and Evren, S.


Sallis, John


Sherover, Charles


Timmerman, J. and Andrews, R., editors


