AN EXPLORATION OF THEWORKERS EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE DURING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: A QUALITATIVE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

The current thesis investigated the emotions of workers at a hospital in the United Kingdom. Historically, the topic of emotion has received scant attention from academics in organisation research. It has been placed antithetical to reason and since the Second World War, for the most part, it has remained off the research agenda. It was in the early 1990's that emotion started to attract attention and since then, research on the topic has gained momentum. Extending this movement further, the current thesis specifically asks the question: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organizational change?

As a research theme, organisational change has attracted attention by scholars interested in worker emotion. A change context involves emotion because workers stand to gain or lose prospects in such environments. Emotion is a form of adaptive behavior and from a research viewpoint, there is space to further develop our knowledge of how emotional experiences of workers emerge in organizational change. Focusing on this space, the current thesis specifically looks at the mental components of emotion. Case study based investigation and qualitative analysis was conducted with participants employed at a hospital enduring change.

Findings show that emotion as an experience involves intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. To understand how these are formed, further empirical analysis also showed that congruence, immediacy and certainty were related components of emotional experiences that emerged in change. Contributing to knowledge of emotion and implications for change management, the current thesis found that change was met with two types of participant reactions. Firstly, in anger and fear there was a perception that change was doomed to fail. Secondly, there was uncertainty about how change was important for participant prospects. These represent barriers to change which were not

managed at the hospital. The contribution is the recommendation that practical policy aimed at setting up programs designed to manage employee adjustment to change should be established.

Contributing to knowledge of emotional experiences of workers involved in change research, findings propose the presence of intentionality. Related to this core component, the participants experienced feelings of frustration. Intentionality functioned to turn feelings to emotion by providing direction towards persons and change programs. Intentionality was present in both beliefs and feelings, wherein the latter component was found to be directly about things rather than through mediation of some logical belief system with clear rationale. Additionally, findings suggest that beliefs and to a lesser extent feelings, explicated congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The latter three concepts represent new territory in the field of organizational change. Integrating the above findings, the current thesis proposes the tripartite model of emotion. The model represents how mental components co-operate and represent a dynamic understanding of emotion in change. In the field of organizational change, such a model has not been proposed in terms of the components that it integrates. The model provides a fresh way of thinking about emotion and how workers endure such experiences during change. Future research can extend the model and review its applicability to other organisational arenas.

The methodology employed in the current thesis is designed to elicit the interpretations that participants harbored in thinking about emotion during change initiatives. The collection and analysis of data involved techniques that reduce, compare, and synthesize data. The technique is designed for this study and presents a possible set of tools available for use in other research projects.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 WHY RESEARCH EMOTION

In organizations and in everyday life emotion is important because it influences how we see things. Emotion is a personal experience that shapes the workers thinking. Consider the worker in fear who is plagued with negative thoughts. Amidst rumors of redundancies he believes that tomorrow he might lose his job. His emotion may involve related beliefs about the fearfulness of the situation and the inferred consequences of job loss. Later in the day he might think about how his wife will react when she hears about his job loss and again a shudder runs down his spine. Appreciating this view of emotion Goldie (2004) argues that emotion is not just a brute feeling and it involves believing the world to be a certain way. For organization research, it took a long time to recognize this idea. The reason is that historically and in the wider scheme of things, research has neglected emotion. In the decades following World War II, emotion largely remained off the research agenda (Ashkanasy and Humphreys, 2011; Hartel et al, 2005). The prevalent argument against emotion has been that emotion is bad because it harms the worker's ability to act rationally (Ashforth and Humphreys, 1995; Fineman, 1993.

Organization research has focused on the idea that rational behavior is more important. That is, the worker, whether acting in his own interest or in the interests of the team, can best benefit the organization through rational responses. A rational response is seen to be one that minimizes economic costs and maximizes benefits. This

preference for rationality is rooted in early 20th century ideas by thinkers like Gulick (1937), Weber (1946), and Taylor (1912). Over the past 60 years, rationality has reigned over research agendas and consequently emotion has remained on the periphery of research.

"Prior to 1992, the study of emotions was, with a few notable exceptions, essentially next to nonexistent in the management literature. Textbooks in the field, for example, provided no coverage of the role of emotions in work settings except with respect to job satisfaction -"

Hartel et al (2005.p2.)

In the early 1990's, a new idea emerged. The idea was that knowledge of emotion is important because worker emotion is a way in which the worker experiences and knows his environment. During emotion the person forms beliefs about the environment and recognizes its importance for survival and progress (Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002b; Lazarus, 1991). Emotion is a basic human experience pervasive in organisations. Whether research acknowledges it or not, emotion will shape worker beliefs. Consequently, knowledge of emotion on the job improves understanding of worker experiences (Fineman, 2003,1993). Broadly speaking, the current thesis adopts this position; knowledge of emotion is better than ignorance of it.

Specifically, the current thesis is situated within a branch of organisation research concerned with organisational change. Studies in this area look at how change is managed within an organisation. The current thesis focuses on the individual and how emotion unfolds through inner workings of the mind. There are several reasons why organisational change provides an opportunity to research emotion. One reason is that change is typically met with emotional reactions by workers. Two common emotions are anger and fear (Elving, 2005). Change provides a good environment for researching emotion because it emerges during change as an adaptive response (Klarner et al, 2011) and so it should be researched as part of understanding organisational change. How the individual has an emotional experience during change remains fertile territory

for research. The second reason is that organisational change provides an opportunity to define emotion. Most studies of emotion in organisations fail on this front. They do not explicitly provide definitions of emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). As a concept emotion is not explicit. This is a gap in research. Researching emotion within organisational change provides a fresh understanding of emotion, which is currently not present in the field. Emotion is an emerging topic and one that could do with a definition.

The third reason is that knowledge developed will foster more research in the area. This has practical implications. Knowledge of emotion can enable better implementation of change in organisations through increased awareness of worker experiences and reactions (Carr, 2001; Klarner et al, 2011). Knowledge of emotion as adaptive behavior can help management in formulating methods to manage this aspect of change.

1.2 THE RESEARCH GAP

Reviewing emotion research Jonker and Botma (2012.p.15) note that "Not much attention has been paid to what really happens on the job". This is surprising because worker responses on the job are often based on emotion (Fineman, 2003, 1997, 1993). In the decade's post 1990, some studies have focused on emotion and how it links with topics like Group dynamics, Leadership, Justice, and Culture (Fineman, 2000). There has also been an emphasis on how emotion can be managed on the job – referred to as emotion work. Studies have examined how emotion impacts attitudes (Staw and Barsade, 1993), the area of emotional labour emerged (Morris and Feldman, 1996; Kruml and Geddes, 2000; Grandey, 2003) which was based on earlier work by Hochschild (1983). Links between emotion and identity have been explored (Ashforth, 1998; Ibarra and Petriglieri, (2010). Emotion and influence on justice has been researched (Harlos and Pinder, 2000). Contributing to this burgeoning body of literature,

the current thesis asks: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organisational change? Central to this question are two ideas that justify its importance in research. One idea is that emotion has not been explicitly defined in organisation research. The question addresses this concern. The second idea is that in defining emotion, research should focus on beliefs and related components like feelings that constitute the experience. Past research has avoided this research focus and instead has concentrated on causes or antecedents alone. Organisational change literature does not define or illustrate emotional experiences on these accounts (Klarner et al, 2011).

1.2.1 IMPLICATIONS OF WORKER EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT: PREVIEW OF OBJECTIVE ONE

The latter part of section 1.1 provided reasons why emotion may be researched in a change context. To this end one primary idea is that emotion is often present during change and it has implications for change management. If emotion is present during change then one may think about the implications this poses. In other words, emotion means something for implementing change successfully. The central idea here is to reflect on why emotion may be important for change management. In particular, one may think about the types of perceptions formed by workers involved in change (Elving, 2005). An emotional worker under the influence of anger may see the world as gloomy or grim (Forgas, 1991; Goldie, 2004; Cummins, 2006). His response to change depends on such perceptions. It follows that in order to manage change some understanding on this front is important. Studies covered in chapter two such as Klarner et al (2011), Elving (2005) and Carr (2001) demonstrate that the presence of emotion forms perceptions of change that can hinder the successful administration of change. Adopting

this concern the first research objective is the following: To explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for change management.

1.2.2 DEFINING EMOTION THROUGH INTENTIONALITY: PREVIEW OBJECTIVE TWO

This section previews the argument supporting research objective two. The argument is that most management studies do not explicitly define emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). However, it is important to define emotion so that what is being researched is somewhat understood. In particular, the current thesis provides a definition based on ideas by Solomon (2007), Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2004) and Lazarus (1991, 1994, and 2006). This contributes a novel definition elaborated in subsequent chapters where examples are provided. The above scholars are interested in the mental experience of emotion; they argue that as subjective experience, emotion transforms the way the worker sees situations. Therefore emotion should be defined in how it transforms the way a worker sees situations. The idea is that worker emotion is directed at the world and it is always about things in the world. For instance, I might be angry at my colleague for his actions, or I might feel happy at my achievements at work this month. In Philosophy, this is called the property of Intentionality, proposed by Goldie (2004) and Solomon (2007). If intentionality is an essential character of emotion, then the worker's emotion is always about things. The counter-argument is that emotion is not always about something. For instance, one may feel fear without knowing what one is afraid of. I explore this in chapter Two. Intentionality presents a concern in defining emotion in so far as its presence and role are not clear (Ashman, 2008). Therefore the second research objective is: To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experiences of workers involved in change.

1.2.3 INTENTIONALITY, BELIEFS AND FEELINGS: PREVIEW RESEARCH OBJECTIVE THREE

This section presents arguments supporting research objective three. When examining intentionality, there are two related components. The first component is the belief held by a person. A belief is about things one experiences. Therefore it is inherently intentional. Not focusing on this inherent intentionality, past research has focused on three ideas, which have kept emotion and beliefs apart. One idea is that emotion and reason (i.e. inferentially linked beliefs) are two separate states of the worker. This separation has meant that emotion is categorized as unrelated to reason. Research has focused on reason linking it with organisational benefit and greater management control. This is visible in movements like Taylorism and systems thinking. Philosophers also argue that emotion and reason are independent states and both rely on different underlying biological developments (Goldie, 2002b). In pursuit of knowledge, this idea has kept emotion in the closet. The second idea is that emotion precedes reason. The latter is often tainted by the former. This idea also kept emotion off the research agenda for decades because emotion was seen as contaminating reason. Emotion of the worker should be kept away from beliefs. The third idea research has focused on is that reason precedes emotion. That is, reason is the antecedent. The term reason refers to beliefs that a person has for doing something. A person may reason by believing that change brings about job loss (the antecedent). This antecedent may cause fear (the emotion) (Kiefer, 2005).

Focused on the above areas research may continue to flourish by relying on the central assumption – that emotion and reason are categorized as separate states. They are causally related. Emotion can cause emotion or be caused by it. This reveals a gap in knowledge. If emotion and reason can co-exist in the same experience, then the subjective experience of being emotional may involve some reasoning (i.e. beliefs). Goldie (2002a, 2004) and Lazarus (1991, 1994) argue that emotion forms beliefs that are

a part of that experience. This reveals relatively new research territory. Frijda and Mesquita (2000.p.46) note that

> "Although an influence of emotions upon beliefs is widely accepted in ancient wisdom, there is little research proving this".

As yet we do not completely understand how emotion as a subjective experience involves beliefs. It follows that in so far as workers amidst organisational change become emotional, the way in which they see change is sometimes influenced by emotion. Knowledge on this front can facilitate successful change. In the organisational change literature, Klarner et al (2011) argue that one approach is to explore the terrain utilizing the Lazarus theory. I turn to this in chapter two.

The second component is feelings. This is normally related to bodily states that one feels. (Oakley, 1991) notes it is possible to feel no bodily sensation whilst being emotional, an idea I review in chapter Two. The main point being that feelings are about things such as when one feels something is no right in a situation, or one feels irritated when angry. Whether feelings configure as more than just brute states (i.e. Goldie' (2002) thesis) is a concern faced in looking at intentionality. Given the lack of focus on intentionality in relation to the component beliefs and feelings, the current thesis looking at emotion proposes objective three. To investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs, and feelings in workers involved in change.

1.2.4 CONGRUENCE, IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY: PREVIEW RESEARCH OBJECTIVE FOUR

This section reviews arguments for research objective four. The two components that are beliefs and feelings exhibit relations to three other components: congruence, immediacy, certainty. These components are found in cross-disciplinary literature of philosophy and psychology. But little is known about them in organization literature.

The component of congruence appears when an emotional worker generates beliefs that are congruent with the emotion they are experiencing. An angry person will generate beliefs that confirm 'the blame he attributes' to somebody, and this in turn makes that person angrier. Whether feelings have a role to play here is less clear. The second component is immediacy. Elster (2012) explains that we know little about immediacy. This appears when an emotional person sees things as closer than they might otherwise seem to an unemotional observer. Things look magnified, or closer. A fearful worker may believe in the threat of redundancy looming around the corner compared to a worker who is not emotional. That is, a fearful worker may feel afraid to an unjustifiable extent. This feature configures in the experience of emotion. The third and last component is certainty. Mesquita and Frijda (2000) note, that a belief held by a deeply angry person is often unshakeable. Emotion has an impact on the certainty of beliefs held in that experience. The person may also feel certain without being able to say why. In this case there is a feeling of certainty, which is apart from the kind of feeling where one feels their heartbeat racing. This is not a visceral feeling; instead, one knows something by feeling that this is the matter (Goldie, 2004). Within the workers emotional experience the three components appear; covered in chapters two, four and five. To this end research objective four is proposed as the following: To determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with the components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty.

1.2.5 HOW TO REPRESENT RESEARCH FINDINGS: PREVIEW RESEARCH OBJECTIVE FIVE

Given the pursuit of a qualitative sense of the workers emotional experiences, this section is about how my research output (emotional experiences of participants) can be represented. The current thesis in chapter six proposes a model. This model represents the components of emotion induced from data analysis. A model can be categorized as normative or descriptive (Simon, 1986). A normative model is represents how behavior should ideally occur. By comparison, a descriptive model is about representing how behavior actually occurred. Emotion research has proposed both types of models (Lopes et al, 2006; Smith and Kirby, 2001; Forgas, 1995). A normative model provides a causal ordering of events to represent emotion. This representation treats emotion as inert physical stimuli and it is an impoverished approach because mind stuff is left out (Sartre, 2006; Goldie, 2002b, 2004). Emotion broken down into biological units does not constitute a walking talking worker who has opinions and feelings. A descriptive model, induced from data consisting of opinions and emotional stories, provides a way of representing what emotion may have been experienced like (Huy, 2002). Between organisational corridors workers share stories and bits and pieces of emotional experiences. Lazarus (1991) uses a model that represents the themes of such experiences. The Lazarus model underpins arguments throughout this thesis and it is covered in depth in subsequent chapters. Similarly, a descriptive model is presented in chapter six. This model, a central contribution, adds to our understanding of emotion as a mental process in change. To this end, the following research objective is established in following chapters: based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts the components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in a change context.

We have seen that in asking the question "How is emotion experienced during organisational change?" five research objectives have emerged. I will revisit and integrate these and provide related arguments throughout the current thesis.

1.3 SCOPE OF RESEARCH

There are two ways of understanding emotion. One way is to look at the environment and the factors in the environment. Here, one aims to determine the behaviour of environmental factors that determine emotion. The other way is to look at the mind of the worker. The focus here is on the emotional experience and how one knows the environment through inner workings that make up a state of mind. The current thesis falls in the latter category (Lazarus, 1991; Goldie, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Solomon, 2007, 1973). Specifically, research defined emotional experience with the formation of beliefs alongside feelings.

1.4 ONTOLOGY OF EMOTION

There are a variety of ontological interpretations of emotion. At the fundamental level, one interprets two substances; the mental and the material. The relation between the two remains an unsolved philosophical conundrum (Goldie, 2002a; Oakley, 1992; James, 1957; Descartes, 1988). If one thinks in this way, then one may try to reduce emotion to a simpler state such as beliefs. There are studies that define emotion as a set of beliefs (Kenny, 1963; Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 1984). Alternatively, one may interpret emotion as reducible to bodily developments. Such are biological explanations (Damasio, 1996; LeDoux, 1993). These are not useful in the current thesis because this is not a biological study of emotion. In the current thesis aligning with Goldie (2002a) and Lazarus, (1991) emotion is interpreted as an experience of the worker. Arguments in the next chapter and in the philosophy section of Chapter Three demonstrate this interpretation in greater depth. Ontologically, emotion is first and foremost interpreted as an experience. It is transient. It is lived as an ongoing experience rather than taken to signify some static state. As experience it involves believing the world to be a certain way and feeling it in that particular way intrinsic to that experience. Secondary to this,

the current thesis concedes the possibility of a material reality, supported by the methodological rationale in Chapter Three, and maintains that material explanations such as biological theories fall outside the scope of the current thesis. Ontologically causal explanations of what emotion is cannot provide the emotional experience. The latter is a different reality and it must be studied as such (Goldie, 2002, 2002b, 2004, 2009).

1.5 THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT – CHANGE WITHIN THE NHS

The research for this thesis was conducted at the National Health Service (NHS). The NHS is a nationwide government funded organisation which provides health service across the United Kingdom. It has been undergoing organisational change for a number of years.

In response to the Calman Hine Report published in 1996, Cancer Care Networks had been established throughout the United Kingdom. The aim was to provide what the report described as 'seamless cancer care to patients'. The workers who had volunteered to participate in my research were administrators and clinical personnel (nurses) situated at one of the cancer wards in the hospital in Nottingham. The hospital was part of a group of three hospitals, which together made up the Cancer Care Network in the North region of the United Kingdom. On a broad scale, this Network was a part of the National Health Service (NHS) of the country which is a government run health provider in the United Kingdom.

These workers presented an opportunity to do research for two reasons. Firstly, in terms of the empirical context, the hospital was undergoing organizational change. The reason for the change was the provision of better services for cancer patients. Each patient has a journey based on their diagnosis – their pathway and accompanying end of life care. The aim of the organisational change was to distribute resources so that

patients get the best care. This included the distribution of expertise, knowledge, and good practice by General practitioners, nurses, and administrative staff. The change was top down. This meant that information was funneled down to different sections of the hospital and the network as a whole. As I will elaborate in subsequent chapters (4 and 5), due to lack of information sharing, overall the organisational change had brought about uncertainty, fear, and anger amongst the participants that took part in my research. The climate was one of uncertainty about the change. For instance, one of the participants had remarked *"Nobody knew why or what was happening"*. There was insufficient sharing of the right information with the right workers.

Secondly, past research shows that a hospital is an arena filled with emotional encounters between patients and workers. Locke (1996) explains that the decision of a Doctor to give his patient treatment, even though sometimes he is aware of the low chances of success and has fears about this; is driven by a belief about providing comfort to the patient and his family. In one sense, the doctor's belief about providing comfort to patients and their families buries his fears about the low chances of success. Were he to think entirely rationally, the doctor may reason that the low chances of success outweigh the costs incurred in terms of resources spent on treatment. Thus, emotional experiences of hospital workers involve beliefs. Bolton (2008) argues that hospital settings involve work tasks that give rise to emotions due to the nature of the tasks which involve interactions with disease, pain, and morbid conditions. It seems that a hospital is fertile ground for the cultivation of emotions. If we better understand how to manage emotion then we may better deliver healthcare services. I will return to this in chapter three, which looks at research methodology and provides a detailed exploration of empirical issues and philosophical arguments.

1.7 CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS

The current thesis provides a new way of thinking about emotion of the worker. A model is presented in chapter six which brings together the various components of emotion. These components were derived from inductive data analysis, and from the interpretations presented in chapters four and five. In initial chapters, the literature review chapter helped sharpen the focus on relevant components.

The conclusion chapter expounds the contributions of the current thesis. It draws on research findings presented in the discussion and data chapters. Form a practical viewpoint it was found that management at the hospital failed in gaining the support of research participants. Support is a necessary factor behind successful change. Participants in anger and fear saw change as something they did not understand and they resented management. The contribution is the recommendation that a policy aimed at developing programs for emotional adjustment to change needs to be implemented. This includes regular doses of information for workers involved in change. The outcome is likely to be better management of emotions in change, and smoother transitions based around co-operation; so that workers do not feel left out of the process.

The main theoretical contribution is a model of emotion presented in chapter six. The model relates components that are derived through inductive data analysis. The model shows how during emotional experience appraisals of change aspects are formed. The model provides a picture that has not been proposed in change literature. Klarner et al (2011) call for research that provides such understanding of emotion. The model contributes to this call for research. A criticism is that this approach leaves out the external factors of change that can bring about emotion. Future research may wish to link the proposed model with external factors deemed worthy by studies that reflect on the findings of the current thesis or consider relevant environmental factors.

In addition to a theoretical contribution the current thesis also proposes a particular methodology in chapter three. Drawing on personal construct psychology and constructive alternativism (a set of ideas by Kelly, 2003, 1963) and located within the broader school of interpretivism a set of procedures are provided in order to conduct research. From philosophical ideas through to data collection, analysis, and interpretation this provides a particular toolkit for doing research. In terms of practical implications it seems that better knowledge of how emotion is experienced by workers can enable better management in delivering healthcare. Both workers and managers in a change context can anticipate to some extent the emotional reactions that are possible and how to interpret such reactions. Chapter six discusses the findings. Building on this chapter eight provides detail on the practical, theoretical and methodological contributions of the current thesis.

1.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The current chapter introduced my research focus. The research question and related research objectives, presented below, are revisited throughout this thesis.

How is emotion experienced by workers involved in Organisational Change?

Research objectives

1   To explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for change management
2   To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change
3   To investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs, and feelings in workers involved in change
4   To determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with the components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty

5   Based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts the components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in a change context.

The rest of the thesis will expound and critically appraise arguments related to the research focus laid out in the current chapter. The thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter provides a literature review that presents and challenges arguments about change, emotion, and constituent mental components. These form the theoretical base that my research will build further and contribute towards. Next, chapter three presents the research methodology. This includes the philosophical stance of the thesis and details about how data was collected, analysed, as well as related concerns about research methods. Chapter's four and five present the research data. This addresses the concerns around research objectives. Next chapter six is a discussion of the findings. Chapter seven presents reflexivity. This chapter shared the lessons learnt on my research journey. It considers the involvement of the 'I" around other actors in the research process. The conclusion chapter presents the contributions of the thesis. This carves out the difference that research has made.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In a general sense, organisations are continuously changing. With the passage of time aspects of the organisation mature and develop. On the other hand, in a fast paced and technically advanced environment, organisations often undergo deliberate changes implemented by management. In this latter scenario, the worker will not always adapt to change on his own. At times he might experience emotion that seeks to preserve his personal interests and he might perceive the change as a threat. If the worker is a creature of habit than he finds comfort in routine. The saying goes 'if it ain't broke than don't fix it'. For many workers their routine is comfortable and acceptable, and they are not interested in changes. Things don't appear broken and they feel secure. But in a dynamically changing environment the management does not always share this view. Technological advancements and competition are viewed as the key to successful change and the worker is left to one side. He is expected to adapt to whatever the management throws his way. When change is implemented from the top down, workers, as active agents, participate in programs and initiatives, and sometimes this presents barriers. What is known is that change often faces the barrier of emotion (Klarner et al, 2011). However, we know little about how worker emotion contributes in this arena. In particular, we know little about how the individual workers emotional experience and constituent mental components of intentionality, feelings and beliefs are formed. The current chapter takes stock of a growing body of literature concerned with emotion and change, and points to the prospect of further research on the mental capacities of workers.

The previous chapter briefly presented the issue and posed the question - How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organisational change? In this regard chapter one presented the idea that emotion has been ignored in most of organization research. Generally emotion has been thought of as the enemy of reason. Contrary to this view, my research question rests on the premise that instead of ignoring emotion, researchers should attempt to understand how it is experienced. Emotion consists of believing the world to be a certain way and this needs more research attention. The current chapter builds a novel view on emotion by reviewing philosophical accounts and cognitive theories of emotion. These arguments support the proposed research question and the research objectives outlined in the previous chapter.

I begin with a review of organizational change literature and arrive at a specific gap in the change literature addressed by the current thesis. This is followed by a brief history of research which provides a wider historical context justifying why emotion is important across management and not just within change. The remaining bulk of the chapter reviews arguments about intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. These demonstrate the importance of the concepts and the presence of related under researched concepts picked up again in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

2.2 IMPLICATIONS OF WORKER EMOTION FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE

The current section reviews literature about the importance of emotion and change management. In other words, ideas relevant for research objective one are reviewed. To restate, the objective is: to explore the implications of workers emotional experience for change management. Specifically the central argument by Klarner et al (2011) is also presented which points to the gap in our knowledge of the workers emotional experience during change.

Reviewing literature about change is important because the empirical context of the current thesis presents an environment where change was being implemented. The Cancer Care network is one amongst a few prominent networks in the country. It is located at a hospital which is part of the National Health Service. The NHS is a public sector based provider of healthcare across the United Kingdom. At the time the data was collected there was organisational change taking place in the network. In general there were change initiatives taking place throughout the NHS system of hospitals.

Successful change requires adaptive responses from workers (Liu and Perrewe, 2005b). Emotion is an adaptive response (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg et al, 2008). Therefore, the presence of emotion in change is important because it indicates the degree to which workers have adapted. That is, change may be been accepted or rejected, and this may depend on emotion. This can determine the extent to which change is successful. Based on this, studies argue that organisational change presents an opportunity to explore emotions in the workplace (Klarner et al, 2011; Maitilis and Sonensheim, 2010; Kiefer, 2005; Elving, 2005). Generally, organisational change is defined as a set of planned actions commonly carried out by senior ranking workers in the hierarchy (Weick and Quinn, 1999). The purpose is to improve performance in organisations. Often, such change occurs due to environmental demands, which may include government regulation, technological advance, and changing economic conditions of a country (Amiot et al, 2006).

On the one hand, organisational change involves modifying non-human conditions (for instance this includes modifying technology, structures, putting in place formalized rules, workplace furniture). On the other hand, it involves managing worker behaviour (this includes modifying job tasks, job roles, beliefs, emotions, and personal goals) (Ibarra and Pertiglieri, 2010, Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001, and Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). The focus of the current thesis is emotion. This is a type of worker behavior. Therefore, the current thesis falls into the latter category concerned with worker

behavior. In the latter category, studies of emotion tend to look at observable employee actions that occur within change situations, or they focus on the inner psychological workings of employees (Ashkanasy and Humphreys, 2011; Klarner et al, 2011; Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001). In this respect, the current thesis is specifically concerned with psychological workings of the workers emotional experience. Therefore, it is situated on the human side, or what may be recognized as the soft aspect of change.

Change management literature in general highlights two paths open to workers. In an organization a worker can either hinder change or he can facilitate change. Looking at how employees hinder change, some studies show that workers often react to change by resisting it (Ford et al, 2008; Huy, 2002; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). Worker reactions often take the form of negative emotions. A primary reason is the lack of clear communication by management, which expects workers to adapt to change. This can leave workers uncertain and confused (Maitilis and Sonenshein, 2010; Kiefer, 2005). According to Lindblom, (2004) a worker will react with anger or fear because he does not understand the impact of change on job prospects. Furthermore, he may not understand the impact on his career prospects in the long run. In such cases, concerns about job security and one's place in the organization can arise (Amiot et al, 2006). Jones et al (2008) argue that workers may also reflect on consequences in personal life. The belief that change may lead to job loss is common and can induce negative thoughts and emotions in both the workplace and in personal life scenarios. These thoughts are antecedents and consequences of becoming emotional during change. Elving (2005, p. 133) provides the example of an uncertain employee who is plagued with negative thoughts.

"Will I still have a job after this change", "Will I still have the same co-workers after the change", and "Can I still perform my tasks in the same way I used to do then."

In the worker's mind there is doubt about what will happen to her job *tasks.* There is uncertainty. Fear and uncertainty are reactions that arise during change due to lack of sufficient communication across the organizational hierarchy (Sutton and Kahn, 1987). Restructuring announcements can be met with a sense of job insecurity. One's job tasks can be perceived as redundant in the context of change. Chapters four and five will explain that such uncertainty also appeared in the minds of my research participants who worked at the cancer care network where research data was collected. These workers were emotional and experienced similar negative thoughts about the adverse impact of change on their lives.

Examining implications of emotion some studies argue that emotional workers perceive change as a threat and this can lead to costly delays in administering change (Del Val and Fuentes, 2003). Sometimes this can lead to the failure of change initiatives and projects because workers have not been involved in change. Successful change requires that workers in the organization participate in organization wide initiatives (Bovey and Hede, 2001). This includes managing emotion, which is a force that influences how workers may perceive change as something that should be resisted or something positive that should be supported (Forgas, 1991; Lazarus, 1994; Kunda, 1999). To enable the worker to cope with emotions and wider developments across the hierarchy, the management should actively manage workers. An example is the study by Huy (2002), which proposes that management should be ready for resistance to change. A manager should plan meetings designed to enable workers to talk about any emotions or uncertainty building up in their minds. Unplanned and poorly communicated changes can reduce employee desire to work (Leana and Barry, 2000). At the same time, to the extent that the employee is presented with change, the employee creates interpretations

and consequences based on what is already in his or her mind (Maitilis and Soneheim, 2010). For successful change, there must be a dialogue between management and employees about emotional reactions arising during change. As Fineman (2003 p.130) notes "The ability to manage change in others is typically considered a key skill for effective management." What he is arguing about is the managerial act of recognizing a distressed employee, and providing consolation and clarity. Additionally, it is not just about others, one must also manage emotion in the self in times of change.

The studies reviewed above focus on negative emotions such as anger or fear. A negative emotion is a mental state that anticipates undesirable consequences for the self and others (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Overall, negative emotions have attracted more attention than positive emotions (Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010). Perhaps this is because negative emotions are pervasive during change. Typically, workers often perceive or feel that change is not beneficial. This evokes negative emotion such as anger or fear. Consequently, due to the pervasive presence of negative emotion documented in the literature, workers involved in change, either believe that change is a bad thing, or they resort to negative feelings because change is not communicated, and as a result it is not very well understood by workers (Bovey and Hede, 2001; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999).

Negative emotions are barriers to successful change and whilst they are prevalent in a change context, studies have also looked at positive emotions. A Study by Howard (2006) examined positive emotion. The study presented the idea that positive emotions can benefit the implementation of change, and this occurs when the worker experiences positive emotions such as happiness or joy, and latches on to hopes and possibilities for his development in the organization. Howard (2006) draws on biological and psychological studies such as Schulkin et al (2003), Trugade and Fredrickson (2004) and Tobias (1996). To some extent this serves to show that most work on positive emotion, as indeed noted by Howard (2006), has been conducted in other fields such as

neuroscience and psychology. The limit in this case is that biological explanations are not directly informative when studying social situations in organizational change. Alternatively, the impetus must come from organization studies. Biological variations such as heartbeats per second, or the release of a chemical compounds in the blood stream, are not indicators that easily translate into consequences for organizational development. Studies suggest that positive emotions are important because they increase employee resilience to negative thoughts (Avey, et al, 2008). Overall the above studies show that both positive and negative emotions represent important factors behind the success or failure of change.

In studies researching emotional experience during change, one common theme is the notion of unfair treatment (Smollan, 2012; Kiefer, 2005; Biess and Tripp, 2002). Smollan (2012) recognizes that workers can experience anger, frustration, and anxiety when they perceive unfairness in organisations. A worker may blame the actions of managers tasked with implementing change. Generally, negative emotions such as anger will be experienced by workers who believe that wrongdoing and unfair practice has taken place (Kiefer, 2005). The content in chapters four and five provide accounts of emotional experience where unfairness was perceived in the actions of others in a hospital. With regard to the theme of unfairness, Smollan (2012 p.176) note, that, "..much of the separate and related literatures on organizational change and organizational justice have neglected the important role of emotion." It seems that a study such as the current one looking at emotional experience can expect to find beliefs that are about unfair treatment during change. Additionally emotions are experienced more strongly when a worker continues to believe that he or she has been treated unfairly rather than fairly (Bies and Tripp, 2002). This suggests negative emotions are likely to be encountered during change, particularly where unfairness is perceived. Emotion covered in chapters four and five that present findings are therefore negative emotions as speculated in the literature.

The case for studying emotion during change is made by Klarner et al (2011). They argue that emotional experiences of workers enduring change, remains poorly understood. The mental workings of the emotional worker prevalent during organizational change require examination. Klarner at al (2011) propose that the Lazarus theory provides a fresh perspective hitherto not sufficiently employed by research looking at emotion during change. The theory was proposed by Lazarus (1991) and it explains that emotions are experienced when we recognise some problem in the environment. We form beliefs to evaluate the harm or benefit of the problem, and about how to cope with the problem, and how to act in that situation. The theory provides a fresh focus for further research because it introduces three key components – Intentionality, Feelings, and Beliefs.

These components have not so far been integrated to examine emotion in change. Whilst Lazarus (1991, 1994, 2006) provides a sharp focus through these components, his ideas are developed further and in more depth by arguments of Goldie (2002, 2004, 2009), Frijda and Mesquita (2000), Solomon (1973, 2007). Latter sections where Lazarus's work is revisited theoretically demonstrate that the components in Lazarus (1991) are developed by these latter writers to varying degrees.

Overall, the arguments presented in the current section demonstrate that emotion has implications for change management. Emotional workers sometimes due to lack of involvement can perceive change as a bad thing. The management is to some extent, responsible, particularly where change requires both employee support, and support for employees. Without this, notions of unfairness can also arise. From a practical viewpoint, Klarner et al (2011 p.339) propose that "A better understanding of how emotions unfold during and across changes can lead to more focused managerial interventions intended to effectively manage the change process". Developing a focus on this and to aid analysis in chapters four and five the following objective is proposed:

Objective One: To explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for change management.

Addressing this, the chapters at the rear of this thesis, elaborate on the importance of management involvement, and the shortcomings that arose at the National Health Service Hospital, where data was collected, and participants were did not support change.

Astonishingly, it took almost half a century for the above focus on emotion to emerge in organisation research. One might reason that only after a call for research during the early 1990's by those like Fineman (1993) and Ashforth and Humphrey (1995), research momentum stated gaining some momentum. In this context, the relatively poor knowledge of emotional experience may not seem too surprising. However, to understand the reasons, a wider historical perspective needs to be reviewed. This is covered in the next section and it shows that in the history of organisation research, the emergence of some arguments prevented the type of understanding that my thesis builds. Now we turn to consider some of these arguments placed primarily in the first three quarters of the 20th century.

2.3 The Anti-Thesis- A Historical Perspective

Historically, emotion has not been a great concern in organisation research. In fact, emotion has largely been a taboo subject. Organisation research traditionally looked towards emotion as a dis-advantage for the worker and a threat to reason (FIneman, 1993; Ashforth and Humphreys, 1995). The position amongst researchers was: If reason involves a set of beliefs that lead to beneficial reactions, then reason is desirable. Emotion prevents reason and beneficial decisions. Therefore, it is undesirable. In order

to eliminate emotion and attain reason and make beneficial decisions, researchers should focus on reason. Ashforth and Humphreys (1995 p.3) sum this up by explaining that research did "foster a belief that emotion is the antithesis of rationality". Consequently, emotion has been largely ignored.

During early and mid-20th century, this attitude was adopted by researchers. Rationality was prized by researchers because it led to beneficial decisions while emotion was the enemy. Research was devoted to developing a rational account of worker behaviour and decisions (see Weber, 1946; March and Simon, 1993). The mechanical engineer turned organisation theorist Taylor (1912) described the dominant assumption held by researchers who he called scientific managers

"The duty of gathering in of all this great mass of traditional knowledge and then recording it, tabulating it, and in many cases, finally reducing it to laws, rules, and even to mathematical formulae, is voluntarily assumed by the scientific managers"

Taylor, (1912, p.29).

Armed with this assumption, researchers saw the organization as a physical system governed by hidden laws. Like a physical system, the organisation was made of parts, including workers, tasks, and technology. Using laws, one could integrate these parts in various ways to build an optimal whole *(see the systems approach in Hatch, 1997)*. Of this view were the Public administration theorists like Gulick (1937) Weber (1946) and Secklor-Hudson (1955). For most of the 20th century, their overall aim was to assign tasks according to mathematical precision so that when followed by workers the result would be rational decisions. This meant reaching the set goals with maximum possible benefit at the lowest cost in terms of resource use. Theorists believed that under management control, workers were rational agents. Workers would follow the assigned tasks. The pinnacle of development was reason with no room for the workers' emotions. However, in the context of this historically prevalent attitude, some studies have

considered the inadequacy of traditional Taylorist thinking and highlighted the need to research emotion. In the 1920's, Roethlisberger and Dickson (2003) at the Hawthorne plant in Chicago researched how working conditions impacted worker productivity. Their study found that aside from working conditions, the workers at the plant were productive whenever they managed their emotions at work. Raz (2002) explains that workers who were emotionally stable performed better and encouraged others despite the same working conditions. This result was unexpected because Roethlisberger and Dickson (2003) were not exclusively researching worker emotions. They were interested in productivity and they unexpectedly found that rationality alone seemed insufficient in accounting for worker reactions. Similarly, drawing on psychoanalysis Selznick (1948) presented the worker as an emotional being rather than calculating automaton. He argued that workers did not reflect the mathematical rationale found in Taylorist thinking. Dror (1967) explains that Taylorist thinking employed quantitative formulas to workout job routines. This emphasis on quantification has meant that historically the qualitative aspects reflecting how workers actually think, feel, and experience emotion in workplace situations has largely been ignored. In the current thesis the focus is on the experience of workers. That is, an interest is developed in the opinions of workers who undergo emotional experiences during change. There is not the desire to quantify opinions but to explore them in their richness and depth. Historically, this approach has remained relatively scarce.

In the 1970's, Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that the subjective sense in the worker's emotion represents a peculiar way of reasoning and using beliefs. The study saw emotion as an experience that forms beliefs leading to an emotionally laden way of thinking. In this sense, Janis and Mann (1977) are close to the current thesis in so far as emotion is seen to provide a peculiar experience and view of the world that occurs during anger or fear. In the 1980's and early 1990's there was a greater emphasis on worker satisfaction in the workplace. Studies such as (Laffalando et al, 1992 and Locke,

1985) positioned emotion as a sub-topic covered under the general category of satisfaction and well-being. This provided a degree of focus. However, emotion was not seen as a topic in its own right until the call to arms by Fineman (1993). He argued that the workplace is an emotional arena. As such worker behaviour needs to be understood with a focus on emotion as a research topic in its own right.

In the current section, we saw that historically studies touched on sentiment or feelings of the worker. Studies protest that emotion and the kind of thinking formed through it requires attention. For this task the traditional faith in quantitative explanations found in earlier studies seems insufficient (Fineman, 2007). We find traces of concern about emotional experience of the individual with no specific research focus or agenda with regard to emotion. In the wider scheme of things, for a good part of the 20th century, the focus of my thesis remained unexplored. Some of the studies reviewed in this section refer to emotion but they do not talk about how emotional experience organizes beliefs of a certain sort alongside related components of intentionality and feelings. Goldie (2002.p.24) has argued that emotional experience forms the sort of beliefs not formed otherwise. The components of intentionality and feelings have a role to play here. A role explored in the following section.

2.4 EMOTION AND INTENTIONALITY: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TWO

Chapter one introduced the second research objective. That is, to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. Accordingly this section reviews arguments about emotion and its relation with intentionality. Most accounts of emotion, many of which reside within the disciplinary spheres of philosophy and cognitive psychology, suggest intentionality as a central part of emotion (Lacewing,

2004; Fineman, 2003, 1993; Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002c; Nussbaum, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al, 1988).

However, in organisation studies of emotion intentionality is extremely scarce and is not explicitly present (Ashman, 2008). The absence of this concept may be accounted for by the idea that most philosophical and cognitive accounts use intentionality in defining emotion and given that most organisation studies do not define emotion (Gooty et al, 2009) one can logically expect a lack of attention provided to intentionality. This expectation would stand to the extent that emotion involves intentionality as a central component, something addressed in the sections below and within data chapters four, five, and six.

Ashman (2008) suggests that there is an implicit unspoken assumption which states that all researchers share a common definition of emotion. This is the reason why explicit definitions are often missing in studies that look at emotion in the workplace (i.e. emotion work).

> "It might be argued that a good deal of what has been published on the subject of emotion work does not pay adequate attention to defining and explaining the psychological construct at its centre; that being – emotion."

Reflecting on lack of definitions of emotion in research, Gooty et al (2009) point out that it makes little sense to investigate emotion without a guiding definition of what one is dealing with. Addressing this point, the current research proposed objective one in the previous chapter. That is, to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change.

In formulating a definition of emotion, Goldie (2002b) explains that from an ontological viewpoint research has adopted two approaches. One approach is to define emotion by seeing it as a part of a causal series of stimuli. This portrays emotion impersonally as an inert part of some cause and effect circuit. The other approach involves seeing emotion as an experience. One interprets it is a personal experience that involves seeing the world in a certain way. The current thesis adopts this latter approach, whereby emotion is envisioned as a personal unfolding experience. In the section below, this view is expounded. A drawback here is that with a causal explanation, one can measure emotion as part of a causal series. This makes emotion more amenable to scientific and impersonal explanations adopted by the former approach (Fineman, 2008a; Goldie, 2002a, 2002b). The latter approach, in seeing emotion as a personal experience, is less concerned with discrete measurements of emotion and therefore relatively less concerned with predictions. Within organizational change literature Klarner et al (2011) have pointed to the approach adopted in the current thesis as an advantage whereby research can illustrate the way in which an emotional worker experiences change. In so far as the worker is angry about something, there is a complex of stories to tell here. This is the richness of emotion that is unpredictable and worth explaining through a qualitative inquiry into the person journey in a change context.

2.4.1 INTENTIONALITY

The quality of emotion as something transient or continuously unfolding is another way of saying that emotion is a lived experience. This makes it a process and a way of seeing the world (Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002c). Central to this view is the concept of intentionality. The concept of intentionality was historically applied to the study of the mind. Intentionality means that the mind is always in a state where it is *about* things in the world (Montague, 2009; Ashman, 2008; Goldie, 2002a.p.16; Solomon, 1973).

Applied to emotion, one may argue that emotion as a state of mind is about things, i.e. you are angry about what you see as unfair dismissal from your job. This argument stretches back centuries. Aristotle (2001) used intentionality in defining emotion. He defined emotion as a form of pain or pleasure. Emotions like happiness induce pleasure and they are desirable. Emotions like fear induce pain and these are not desirable. Aristotle (2001) defined emotion as a state of mind that is always about things encountered in one's experience. Others including Goldie (2004; 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) Sartre (2006) De Sousa (1990) and James (1957) also propose that emotion is always about things in the world. The philosopher Descartes (1989, p. 51) wrote about emotion as *caused by the action of the soul, which decides to conceive of this or that object.* By soul he meant the mind and proposed that one can become emotional either about one's thoughts or about objects perceived in the material world. Similarly, James (1957.p.451) saw emotion as one's attention toward ones bodily changes. He proposed that hairs standing on the back of your neck, goose bumps on the skin and accompanying variations in heartbeat are all bodily changes. When noticed as changes one's body is undergoing, the person experienced emotion. It is the result of believing that the body is undergoing changes.

For James, (1957) emotion is also about something, in this case my own body. The counter argument is provided by Solomon (1973). He argues that emotion is not always about things in the world. It is not always directed at things.

"It is not necessary to press the claim that all emotions are "about" something. Kierkegaard's dread may be an emotion which is not "about" anything, or, conversely, may be "about" everything".

Solomon (1973) argues that emotion may not be about anything in particular. It may be a general intense feeling. A person may feel an enduring grief beyond some specific cause of his or her grief. Perhaps emotion is directed at a thought that one cannot easily place in memory at a given point in time. One may forget or feel uneasy but not be able

to explain why. One may become emotional about something that sits beyond one's attention. In his recent work, Solomon (2007) admits this point and so overturns his earlier argument and adopts the argument that emotion is inevitably about things.

Both Goldie (2002.p.13-14) and Oakley (1992, p.11) argue that emotion may be about some specific object such as a person or process encountered in experience. At the same time, they point out that emotion is not unchanging in its focus. It is not static. It involves intentionality in so far as this is attention of the observer directed at an object along with other emotion inducing object-features or related thoughts. For instance, in a change context we are emotional and afraid of job loss and in that experience we have related thoughts such as mortgage concerns or money problems. This experience unfolds in a complex environment which is itself in continuous flux. The news of my job loss may get worse as I find out that my mortgage is now in danger due to changes in the economy and I may not have a place to live (Tye, 2008; Sartre, 2006; Goldie, 2002a). The environment may seem confusing and complex because change has not been communicated to me or I have not been certain about where change is happening. This point was made earlier that change management requires worker involvement and often lack of involvement and clear communication can raise negative emotions (Elving, 2005), particularly since emotion is about what the employee perceives as change.

Goldie (2002a.p.13) makes this point in writing that emotion is not "unchanging". It involves many feelings, beliefs about things, and physical changes. I return to these components – feelings and beliefs - in latter sections of the chapter. Solomon (1993) defines emotion as judgments. He argues that we cannot experience anger without judging that we have been wronged. This is a view similar to Nussbaum (2001). Both argue that as a judgment emotion therefore has to be about things or it has to be about people that judgments are passed over. In some way, these are things that impact our survival. Therefore, again it follows that emotion must be intentional: I am angry because I believe I was mistreated at work. In the context of change the worker may be emotional

about a variety of things. The data chapters present the analysis of the types of things my research participants experienced emotion about.

The problem with this argument is that one may have the same judgments and not feel angry or any other emotion (Tye, 2008). I may judge by believing that the organisation is restructuring but this does not necessarily induce any anger or any fear in me about my job security. I may be familiar with the idea and not feel any emotion. Therefore, it seems that emotion may not be constituted by judgment or personal evaluations alone. Goldie (2002a) proposes that emotions are a special set of beliefs that enable one to escape from situations that don't meet the demands of our everyday projects in life. So the worker becomes angry when a situation does not go her way. She uses her freedom to escape from the annoying colleague who does not agree with her. The colleague is blamed as wrong. The point is that even in being about the world or in being about imagined things in the mind, emotion remains very much about things one comes across. Intentionality seems characteristic of emotion. One may also argue that intentionality is not always about things outside one's body or even about bodily changes. One may become emotional about the thoughts one has or the visual images one conjures up in the mind, things that are imagined (Tye, 2008). It follows that if the mind is directed at things - either imagined in the mind or sensed in the world around us - then emotion as a state of mind must also always be about such things (Solomon, 1985.p.166-167).

Contrary to this thought Tye (2008) has argued that many states of the mind (i.e. he calls these consciousness states) are not intentional. Thus, he argues that if emotion is a fundamental part of the mind then this implies that emotion too as consciousness of the world may not be intentional at times. One may just experience the sudden feeling of dread and not be particularly clear on what it is about. A person may experience anxiety and find that he is unable to pinpoint the reason why. Searle (1983p.2-3) argues that there are states such as sudden elation or joy which seem less amenable to the idea

that they involve intentionality. Sudden joy may not necessarily be about anything specific. This gives rise to the thought that perhaps emotion is not wholly intentional. This is a further project that follows once research has determined the place of intentionality in emotional experience.

Overall, determining whether intentionality is present in emotion and to some extent whether it is a necessary feature of emotion remains an open problem. As commented earlier, a review of literature shows that studies of emotion in organisations has somewhat ignored intentionality. It seems implied but scarcely explicit. For my thesis, in pursuit of Objective two, determining the presence of intentionality presents one task. This means that as part of Objective two, Chapter Four will determine whether intentionality was displayed by participants who took part in my research. This involves determining whether intentionality is necessary and whether it provides a sort of transient (i.e. afraid of job loss and related things) quality to emotion (see section 4.5).

In providing a definition of emotion and thinking about intentionality a related concept is 'feelings'. This concept has not been clearly defined in emotion research in the workplace (i.e. emotion work studies). The terms feeling and emotion are often used interchangeably (Gooty et al, 2009). For instance, Fineman, 2003.p.9-18) uses feelings and emotion as somewhat synonymous and is unclear in terms of how they are different. The two states are related and form part of the worker's experience; however, they are not the same states. There are philosophical studies that define emotion and distinguish it from feelings. Oakley (1992.p.7) explains that *to feel something involves attending to or noticing it.* During emotion, one often feels bodily agitations such as heartbeat variations or hairs standing on the back of the neck. One may also feel psychic agitations such as being annoyed or hopeful. The latter seems less familiar than the former. To clarify, Oakley (1992, p.7) gives an example of psychic agitations:

For example, a person who has been feeling hopeful all morning of being offered a promotion by his employer over lunch is unlikely to have been thereby feeling bodily agitation for the duration of the morning.

Not feeling bodily agitations means not noticing them. In not noticing bodily agitations, the person feels hopeful with thoughts of what his promotion might bring with it. These are psychic agitations. One has a feeling of elation however no physical correlate. Whereas feelings seem to be involved in emotion, Rey (1980) argues that feelings are not always present. You may be angry at your boss for yelling at you but you may not feel anger at that moment because your attention is directed at the slide show in the meeting. This view is not so difficult to justify if one argues that bodily changes are often not felt when one feels fear of job loss and it is only afterwards that one notices a change in heart rate or goose bumps on the skin. To this end feeling is intentional in that it is about things – you feel what you perceive. But what about psychic agitations? It seems that Oakley (1992) refers to psychic agitations as the quality of being angry. It is the *what it is like to be angry* experience, or what Nagel (1974) referred to as qualia. So the person in the passage above feels hopeful and yet has no bodily agitations throughout his morning of hopefulness.

This suggests two things – first, that the feeling must be a part of emotion. One can subtract bodily agitations as in the example above and continue to feel emotion as a mental feeling of things. But taking away psychic agitation seems to strip emotion of its mental quality – leaving behind a cold sober state. Secondly, given feelings must be involved in emotion they seem to provide some knowledge because they are about things in the world. In other words feelings seem to be intentional. Goldie (2004) argues that feelings provide knowledge of bodily agitations (introspective knowledge) and some knowledge about one's environment (extraspective knowledge). In fear, one may notice bodily changes such as hairs standing at the back of the neck. One may also notice there is danger around the corner through an alarming feeling of fear. There is some

feeling of danger or risk. Goldie (2004) argues that feeling in this sense provides rough knowledge about what requires attention in the environment. It is a general indicator that guides the attention of the observer. For instance, the worker who is anxious about organisational restructuring may feel a guiding fear to look out for cues. Literature thus offers feeling as a feature of emotional experience and something that involves intentionality in so far as it is feeling towards things in our experience. In defining emotion, my thesis seeks to position feeling as a feature of emotion. In Chapter Four, the nature and role of feelings is presented based on research conducted with the participants at the cancer care network (see section 4.7).

Studies covered up to this point argue that intentionality is a feature of emotion. Studies also place an emphasis on feeling as a component of emotion. We have seen that feelings seem to be directed either towards the self or towards other things in the environment. In this sense they are clearly intentional in nature. Whether and to what extent this is the case will also be determined by an answer to whether emotion always displays intentionality, for without intentionality, how can feeling exist in so far as it has to be about things?

The third and last important argument I want to cover in this section is about how emotion is grasped in the current thesis in relation to intentionality and feelings. The previous chapter presented an ontological appreciation of emotion (section 1.4). There, I described emotion as an experience. Nagel (1974) and Goldie (2007) describe emotion as a reality that is lived. It is the experience of what it is like to be emotional at a particular time and place through the perspective of a particular person who sees the world emotionally. Ontologically, the causal pathway traversed by an individual observer is his personal journey. To appreciate this more fully, first consider the alternative approach, that emotion can be represented as a series of causal links that fit as a part of a larger causal circuit of effects.

This description would provide a mechanical sense of emotion as a system made of smaller parts that fit together into a material order most likely bodily developments that represent emotion at a neurological level (see LeDoux, 1993; Damasio, 1994). Such a description is faced with the task of relating the body with the mind: (the Cartesian dualism) a task that still remains a challenge for philosophers and psychologists (Goldie and Spicer, 2002). However, causal accounts only deal in brute matter and thus a causal description is impoverished because there is no mental view of what that experience is like from the inside. By a mental view, studies mean the experience of living an emotional encounter (Solomon, 2007; Lacewing 2004; Goldie, 2002.p.17-23; Lazarus, 1991). It is the inner view of the person. As conscious entities, we experience emotion not merely through bodily agitations but also as a way of seeing the world. This way in which we see the world is the experience of what it is like and it sits in tandem with visceral changes such as variations in heartbeat and increased perspiration. Goldie (2006) argues that this mind stuff – the emotion as experience – cannot be explained sufficiently by cause-effect type explanations found in the hard sciences. While such criticism might be warranted, we find that it portrays mind stuff or objects of experience as something other than caused. Objects of emotion for instance are then experienced rather than caused. The reality of emotion is the view from the inside. If this is taken away, then we are left with mere bodily developments.

In the context of most contemporary emotion work literature, Ashman (2008) argues that emotional experience is seen as received as if it is something that happens to workers like a disease or condition. Alternatively, he argues that emotion is a deliberate action that is directed at things and represents a type of experience that one lives and therefore has the power to form. Similarly, Fineman (2003) in looking at emotion work, (i.e. tasks that involve emotion – see Bolton, 2005) argues that the experience involves workers as thinking entities that give meaning to the world when they are emotional. Solomon (1993) and Goldie (2002a, 2002b) argue that such experience is necessary for

understanding emotion because it is what sets us apart from inanimate objects placed under the scientific lens. The current thesis adopts this view of emotion as an experience. Ontologically, then the current thesis employs this understanding and constructs findings offered in subsequence chapters with this viewpoint of emotion.

The current section presented some key concepts related to intentionality including feelings. To define emotional experience of the workers, it seems that **intentionality is** an essential concepts proposed in literature. I return to these throughout the current chapter. For now, we can think about emotion as *a psychological experience about things in the world (intentionality) that involves making sense of and seeing the world in a certain way.* Below, I turn to arguments that support the third research objective which was briefly introduced in Chapter One. This looks at beliefs in emotion and their formation.

2.5 EMOTION AND BELIEFS

The current section addresses Objective three: To investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. We begin with a perspective that organizes emotion and beliefs (cognitions) as topics treated separately by research. Next, feeling is brought in, the above section has explained that feelings seem intentional and this implies that they might be related to beliefs that are also inherently intentional as argued here. The overall purpose here is to review arguments about intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – as components of emotion.

Organization studies examining worker behaviour during the 1990's primarily employed theories of worker cognition (Lord, 1995). In these theories, cognition normally referred to the inferentially organised beliefs held by workers. These were seen to have explanatory power in accounting for worker behaviour such as decision making. Around

the same time, but at a slower pace, emotion research was gaining momentum. With these two distinct streams of research, the concepts of emotion and cognition (beliefs) were kept apart. Out emerged two different streams of research applied to worker behaviour in organizations. As a result, the focus of the current thesis has not been addressed because that would require thinking about emotion and beliefs as joined and not as separate topics in different research streams. Fortunately – given that there is little to draw on in organisation research on emotion - there are cognitive theories of emotion that link emotion and beliefs. In this section I will review these theories. In particular, there is the Lazarus theory argued by Klarner et al (2011) which presents an opportunity for looking at emotion and beliefs in an organisational change context from a fresh perspective. The review demonstrates two positions adopted by cognitive theories that stand in contrast with the position of the current thesis.

The first position consists of research that focuses on a belief as an antecedent of emotion. The second position consists of research that focuses on a belief as a consequence of emotion. Here, a gap in knowledge is exposed because a third position is little researched. This third position focuses on emotion as an experience consisting of beliefs.

2.5.1 WHAT IS A BELIEF?

De Sousa (1990.p.7) defines a belief as some claim about things. It is an assertion about the existence of some state of affairs thought to be the case. For instance, a worker may believe that a colleague has been dishonest about work. This is a belief in the sense that the worker forms it in his mind. It is about the presence of some state of affairs, whether perceived as happening in the environment or imagined in the observers mind. In this sense a belief involves intentionality since it is about something (Goldie, 2002b). A worker who experiences emotion during change believes in some aspect of change as

meaning something, and it is this something, perhaps an adverse consequence such as job loss, that the worker might be angry about.

Emotion theories have presented two sorts of beliefs – evaluative beliefs and reactive beliefs. In connection with emotion, Goldie (2004) explains that an evaluative belief involves weighing the benefits or harms in a situation. Once this is established, the person forms reactive beliefs expressing how one should react to the situation – this reaction is sometimes recognised as a decision of the worker (Scruton, 1996; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984.p.267). This is the belief of re-acting in some way specific to one's situation (Simon, 1987). According to Goldie (2002a.p.20-24), both types of beliefs seem to have existential and attribution conditions. The existential condition is the assertion of the mere existence of a thing. For instance, a job task is carried out as existing or we believe that a worker simply 'is'. Anything believed to exist is thereafter attributed some condition that specifies how it exists. This is the attribution condition. For instance, the worker 'is productive'. Thus the worker believed to exist is attributed productivity as the specific way in which it continues to exist. One cannot have a belief without at least the existential condition followed by add-on conditions such as productivity in the above example. To understand the necessity of these conditions let us for a moment refute Goldie (2000) by assuming that both conditions vanish. Then it seems logically false to hold a belief because we have a claim and it needs to be about something posited as existing with this or that property. Without a thing, the belief is attributed nothing – hence it's logically incoherent.

Given that we have some idea of what we mean by the term 'belief', we can turn towards arguments from cognitive accounts and philosophical explorations of emotion. Related to this, a number of concepts are reviewed, including intellectualization, pre-existing beliefs, congruence, immediacy, and belief certainty.

2.5.2 COGNITIVE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION

Cognitive accounts of emotion such as those by Schachter and Singer, 1962; Oatley and Laird, 1987, Ortony et al., 1988, Forgas. 1995; Scherer, 1984, 1999, 2004 and Lazarus, 1991 – are concerned with evaluative and reactive beliefs. These studies primarily consider a belief as an antecedent to emotion rather than as something that forms during emotion. The studies imply that beliefs bring about emotion as antecedents. But they do not follow this through to infer that the same beliefs may persist in that experience after it has arrived (i.e. when the person is emotional). This highlights two things – on the one hand, it highlights how beliefs have been researched in relation to emotion. The emphasis has been on beliefs as antecedents. On the other hand, this highlights that previous research was limited in its scope.

One of the early studies that considered beliefs was Schachter and Singer (1962). They tried to explain how emotion occurs. They showed that an individual forms an evaluative belief to recognise his bodily agitations. This leads to the experience of emotion. That is, a belief in the body undergoing certain changes is the antecedent that generates emotion. One notices an increase in perspiration, a weakening sensation in the knees, and a variation in heartbeat and labels this his feeling of fear. The drawback with Schachter and Singer (1962) is that their theory of emotion does not pay attention to the person-environment relationship. They only refer to beliefs about the body (notice beliefs in being about the body are intentional). For instance, Schachter and Singer (1962) do not explain how a person may feel fear because he understands that company restructuring is to blame whilst he undergoes bodily agitations such as goose bumps and perspiration. Instead, the theory assumes the person labels bodily agitations as for instance fear without knowing why. Schachter and Singer (1962) do not consider the environment's impact on belief formation. A few years later Mandler (1975) argued that beliefs evaluating person-environment relationships are important because beliefs

evaluating one's bodily agitations are not enough. One also has to believe in something fearful or angering lurking about. The environment is scanned for cues to understand why the goose bumps occurred and why one feels afraid.

However, both studies propose that evaluative beliefs are essential for emotion. Beliefs might in turn also result from emotion. That is, emotion may be followed by some reasoning about things and how one felt in retrospect. Power and Dalgelish (2003) explain that prior to the above studies beliefs were not important variables and most studies expressed emotion through bodily agitations. Before the 1960's, studies such as the Canon (1931) experiment expounded emotion in terms of central autonomic activity. At the time, psychological accounts were not center stage. However following Schachter and Singer (1962), subsequent studies placed an increasing emphasis on beliefs – see (Niedenthal et al, 2006; Lazarus, 1994, 1991; Scherer, 1988; Marr, 1982 – for their ideas on the categorization of sensory input as feeling type shortcuts; and Bower, 1981 – on network theories of emotion). These subsequent studies argued that beliefs are essential for emotion because an emotion is not just bodily agitation on its own. There is something more and one would surmise that mind stuff is also necessary for a person to feel emotional. Whilst beliefs were used to represent emotion, some studies such as Ortony et al (1988) over-intellectualized emotion. By this I mean that Ortony et al (1988) took a set of beliefs and arranging them hierarchically they argued that through the successive formation of these beliefs the individual would experience emotion. In this approach, all one needs is a set of beliefs to represent emotion. In philosophical circles this view is strongly proposed by Solomon (1993.p.126) who claims that *I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me.* Solomon (1993) argues that given the right beliefs thought up in the right sequence, one will inevitably feel an emotion. This argument conveniently leaves out the component of feelings as something other than a sequence of beliefs. The need to consider feelings as an additional component alongside beliefs was not a focus under this over intellectualizing

view. As Goldie (2002a) notes such approaches are watered down explanations that lose the richness of emotional experience. In attempts to explain emotion using beliefs research mechanizes emotion and leaves out components like feelings.

According to Oakley (1992), the argument offered by Solomon (1993) is weak for the reason that we may hold the same belief – that someone has wronged me - without necessarily experiencing an emotion such as anger. We may believe someone has wronged us but we may be too arrogant to let this bother us. So whilst beliefs seem to be involved in emotion, one must take care not to over-intellectualize an account and pay too much attention to beliefs as sufficient in understanding emotion (Goldie, 2002a.p.32). Here, one is in danger of ignoring other ingredients. Studies explained that emotion also involves intentionality and feelings. So whilst other components are important in understanding the complexity of emotion, this does not in some way make beliefs less important. The arguments covered in the current section place beliefs as antecedents to emotion. Other studies treat beliefs as consequences that follow on from emotion states (Scherer, 2001 p.372). Past research has not focused on how emotion after arriving on the scene forms beliefs. As argued earlier, beliefs are antecedent to emotion and they may persist during that state. You may continue to be angry by holding the same beliefs with more certainty. This highlights that research emphasizes beliefs as antecedents leaving aside a focus on how during emotion beliefs are formed.

It seems that emotion necessarily involves evaluative beliefs. Otherwise, as Solomon (1993) points out, one could not feel angry unless one believes in some wrongdoing that has had an impact on one's life. One cannot feel afraid without believing that a fearful thing lurks around the corner. One cannot feel sad without the belief that something has been lost. Goldie (2002a) however, proposes that sometimes beliefs are not involved. He argues that we may have animal-like emotional responses where in the heat of the moment we do not consciously believe in something as dangerous for having this or that harmful feature. Instead we react with a sudden reflex like fear without taking a moment

to think. In hindsight, looking back on the experience, a person may post-rationalize to explain the experience by ascribing beliefs to account for the fear (Goldie, 2002a.p.34). This suggests that in addition to beliefs about things, which are clear expressions of intentionality, a worker involved in change may respond to news about change with a sudden reflex like feeling. This reaction involves no beliefs conjured up consciously. Similar to this idea Goldie (2004) and Goldie (2002b) has argued that feeling towards something is a kind of intentional expression that is a general knowledge or indicator that there is something in the environment that requires the observers attention. Before the worker conceives some definite cause for concern, she initially reacts by experiencing a feeling about might be a threat to her prospects. This suggests that emotional experience involves intentionality both in terms of beliefs as well as feelings. The latter has received little attention as a component in its own right. The term feeling is often used loosely. Fineman (2003) proposes that feelings are those components of emotion that are more personal whereas an emotion is the public expression that is the front face. It is not clear here how emotional experience involves intentionality through, beliefs and feelings as components. These components as they persist in relation to each other remain absent in change management literature and within management research in general.

In addition to evaluative beliefs, Lazarus and Folkman (1984.p.152) argue that to tackle or cope with the environment, the individual forms reactive beliefs. This second type of belief, which I mentioned earlier, is a person's decision to react to the environment. Lazarus (1991) and Solomon (2007) note that an evaluative belief is employed up to a point and then reactive beliefs emerge amidst emotion because an evaluation often requires some re-action by the person. Fineman (2003) proposes that reactive beliefs are often immersed in emotion and involve feelings towards employees in workplace situations. How this happens has not been coherently researched. Addressing the relation between intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – covered in the above arguments –

the current thesis proposes research objective three. That is, to investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. Some arguments further supporting this position are reviewed in latter sections.

In relation to beliefs and feelings as components of emotion, in their conceptual paper, Frijda and Mesquita (2000.p.45) focus on beliefs alone. They argue that emotion impacts beliefs in two ways – "They may give rise to beliefs where none existed, or change existing beliefs; and they may enhance or decrease the strength with which a belief is held." At a detailed level, Frijda and Mesquita (2000) are referring to three impacts here. First, they note that pre-existing beliefs one brings to a situation may be impacted by being modified and consequently, emotion ensues. The pre-existing beliefs enter into emotion and hence in some way are modified or persist through emotion. Secondly, new beliefs may form during emotion. These may be generated from perceptions of the situation or past memories that are recalled as the situation develops (Tye, 2008). Both pre-existing and generated beliefs are relevant in so far as they persist during emotion. Thirdly, through emotion the strength, which is the certainty attached to a belief as true, is enhanced or decreased. In the following section I now proceed to consider these impacts one at a time. Arguments implying the potential role of feelings are also reviewed.

2.5.3 PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS

We saw that according to Solomon, (1993) pre-existing beliefs can give rise to emotions like anger or shame. If there is a situation where a person has a pre-existing belief that one should be treated kindly and this mis- matches with his belief formed during the situation, that I was not treated kindly, in such cases, it is likely that anger would ensue (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). At the same time a person's pre-existing belief that led to anger may continue to persist during her anger. Goldie (2009) suggests a similar idea he

calls counterfactual thinking - that emotion emerges when one believes he or another person did not act as they should have acted in a situation. This gives rise to emotions like regret, shame and anger. In these cases, pre-existing beliefs require adherence to or validation through a situation perceived in a certain way. Such situations usually involve moral beliefs about the rights and wrongs committed against self or others in a given situation. Frijda et al (2000) suggest that moral beliefs about righteousness or fair treatment are often already imbued with emotion. As such, Goldie (2002a.p.144) agrees that pre-existing beliefs bring with them emotions and feelings from past experiences. In a change context often such emotion imbued beliefs are stubbornly latched onto. When experience negates the held beliefs the person becomes emotional. Mesquita and Frijda (2000) note that we just don't know how beliefs persist or form once the individual is in his or her emotional state. In subsequent chapters on data analysis, particularly Chapter Four, I will use empirical evidence to illustrate the behavior of pre-existing beliefs in the emotional experiences of the research participants.

2.5.4 BELIEF FORMATION

Once we are in the grip of emotion, the red mist covers our eyes and the world looks different. Goldie (2002a.p.186) writes

> "If I am already angry at having had to wait so long for the bus, I may tend to see the person getting on in front of me as going especially slowly (just to annoy me?), and therefore I am likely to have thoughts about him which will justify, from my point of view, my anger towards him."

The man in the passage is angry. In anger, he generates beliefs that justify and fuel his anger further. The point here is that for the angry person the world looks especially grim.

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Similarly, for a jealous husband a phone call by his wife's colleague asking to speak to her may seem unjustifiably suspicious and inappropriate. News of unemployment in the economy may fuel fear in a worker generating consonant thoughts of job loss and impact on personal life. In cognitive psychology, Niedenthal et al (2006) call this **emotional congruence**. That is, emotion states generate congruent beliefs. But is this a necessary condition of emotion? It seems to me that one may very well not have congruent thoughts that propagate an angry experience into further intensity. Goldie (2002b p. 243) proposes that "We adult humans, however, are capable of a turn of reflectiveness." This means that in anger we can become aware that we are angry. Such awareness of one's state can reduce the likelihood of generating congruent beliefs that may otherwise seem unjustified. The reason is that an angry person who realizes the skewing impact of his anger may be inclined to question the beliefs generated in that state. That is, he may question emotional congruence. He may ask himself about the beliefs he holds and whether these are good assertions such that reliable explanations of situations are gained. Goldie (2004) proposes that such self-realization is difficult because one is absorbed in the red mist of emotion and unable to think otherwise. This somewhat explains the undesirability of emotion in the workplace. It is a skewing impact on the workers thoughts; a bad impact for worker reasoning which should be dispassionate and in line with minimization of economic costs and maximization of benefits – as advocated by the traditional management theorists view. Goldie (2002b) suggests that feelings have role here. Consider the worker who has to attend a change management initiative (a training session) as a part of change being administered at his workplace. While he has beliefs about the training, he also has feelings directed at the training. Goldie (2002b) argues that feeling towards things is a puzzling idea. The feeling a worker may have is clearly intentional however is it to be perceived as an add-on to a belief the person may be harboring. This is not known. Perhaps feelings may direct one to adopt a congruent belief that is in consonant with an already held view. An early study by Flam

(1993) has suggested that feelings may organize beliefs and so possess a governing role in making the world appear to the observer who is under its influence.

A study by Staw and Bardade (1992) showed that emotions such as anger and sadness can also lead to lack of creativity because the person does not pay attention to alternative explanations of a scenario. Congruence means the person thinks in one direction. A tunnel vision effect settles in and hinders creativity that would otherwise come from thinking about alternative solutions to a given problem. Slovic et al (2007) also propose emotional congruence; they propose that negative states like fear or anger provide a pessimistic picture of the world. Likewise, positive states like happiness can provide unjustified optimism. One seeks congruent beliefs that spiral further into the emotion. The angry person becomes more and more angry. In the context of the current thesis, emotional congruence is interpreted in terms of how one experiences the world through it. Ontologically, congruence is a part of being emotional. Chapter five will demonstrate that emotional experiences of participants involved an iterative train of thought. In Chapter Five, I focus on beliefs and through data analysis I show that a participant formed beliefs in emotion such that their experience progressively got worse in anger and fear. My thesis explores emotional congruence and it demonstrates that it leads to specific beliefs through emotion (see section 5.3). Chapter four also covers some ideas on how intentionality, beliefs, and feelings seem inter-related.

Reflecting on belief formation, some studies also propose that emotion guides attention towards problems or threats in one's environment (Goldie, 2004; Sartre, 2006, Flam, 1993; Simon, 1987; Frijda, 1986). For example, a worker in anger may find that he notices the angering non-cooperative actions of his colleague. The onset of anger will guide his attention such that reactive beliefs (i.e. Decisions) to cope with the problem are formed. He might confront the colleague about the situation. However, Fineman (2003) argues that we do not know what types of beliefs form in such workplace situations. In our example, will anger guide the person to confront his colleague by aggressive

accusations? This is a fertile area of research. Specifically, Frijda (1986) suggests that a person in emotion will give attention to the problem believed to be inducing the emotion. In fact, both Goldie (2004) and Lazarus (1991) argue that anger generates beliefs to cope with problems. This is the adaptive function of emotion. Goldie (2004.p.11) argues like he has done earlier in Goldie (2002a), that in reacting to the environment, our emotion focuses our attention on the emotion inducing property of the problem we face. For example, the insulting slant that embarrassed and angered me in front of other colleagues is what I form beliefs about. Similarly, Scruton (1974) and Solomon (1993) propose that our belief in the fearful property of a thing fixes our attention towards finding resolve in what we come across. These writers were inspired by Sartre (2006) who offers an alternative account of emotion. He proposes that a person is always involved in life long projects, constantly evaluating situations and using his freedom to make decisions to attain goals. When these projects come up against barriers, the person escapes into emotion. Sartre (2006) sees this as deliberate action. For instance, a worker who receives a pay rise escapes into his happiness, an imaginary world, where he imagines the pay rise and the better life. Similarly, a worker fearing loss of face breaks down and faints in front of colleagues. He escapes the barrier (loss of face). In emotion, Sartre (2006) suggests that an imaginary world is created. He explains in the following passage

> "For example, this face that I see ten yards away behind the window must be lived as an immediate, present threat to myself. But this is possible only in an act of consciousness which destroys all the structures of the world that might dispel the magic and reduce the event to reasonable proportions. It would require, for instance, that the window as 'object that must first be broken' and the ten yards as 'distance that must first be covered' should be annihilated."

The passage shows that an emotional world is different. Beliefs in emotion are not like beliefs in everyday cold states. Beliefs in emotion are not just assertive claims about the world. Instead, through them, the "structures of the world" change. Such beliefs do not depict distance as one would experience it in a non-emotional state. In the passage, distance separating the face in the window and the observer must be "annihilated". To this fearful observer, the face in the window looks closer than normal. Thus, the distance in this imaginary world vanishes. The condition Sartre (2006) depicts here is similar to an idea called **immediacy**.

Elster (2012) highlights that immediacy is not well understood in research. He explains that immediacy depicts the emotional person as an impatient person. The idea is that in emotion objects and events seem magnified, closer, and more likely. A worker might believe that something such as job loss is a close threat. What might happen to 'me' seems closer. Elster (2009) argues that in addition to the belief that something is closer than it might otherwise seem, the emotional person may also have a tendency to react more swiftly because things seem closer. Goldie (2004) also notes that the skewing impact of emotion on beliefs portrays the world as an exaggerated reality. In this reality the person has a tendency to evaluate the situation and react (i.e. form a reactive belief). The emotional person may think that this problem in my pathway is a barrier that is an immediate threat. This requires coping. A theory that was developed along these lines is offered by Frijda (1986) who refers to an emotion as an action readiness state. The idea is that a person faced with harm or benefit tends to react in a way such that needs are preserved – what we call reactive beliefs or decisions. This notion of action readiness means that emotion is defined as a form of mobility or tendency to re-act. So Frijda (1986) argues that anger drives the individual to focus on the angering problem in his environment. Likewise, fear drives one to take precautions in the face of a perceived threat. However, similar to Lazarus (1991), the idea offered by Frijda (1986) is that harm or benefit is assessed as an impact on what one prefers. In other words, the person

asks: How does my situation impact my goals in terms of harming the chances of achieving them or benefiting my cause? How one reacts by forming specific evaluative and reactive beliefs in this respect represents under-researched territory (Frijda et al, 2000). This is territory that is addressed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis (see Sections 5.6 and 5.7) where the goal of research participants immersed in an organisational change context was impacted – the goals being to carry out job tasks without barriers seen as features of change.   The point is that these theories present management research with an opportunity to understand how emotional workers might react by decisions (formation of beliefs to react) in workplace situations where anger is experienced. Elster (2012) points out that given the Frijda (1986) theory, research cannot tell us whether for example fear leads to avoidance or confrontation. The beliefs connecting emotion and reactions are missing. The employee may not run away from imminent threat or as Sartre (2006) proposes he may not faint to escape the situation. He might confront the person to find out more about the fearful aspect of the situation. I will gauge the concept of immediacy with empirical data presented in Chapter Five. It seems that an understanding of immediacy is necessary for knowing how beliefs are formed and to what end do emotional workers react or make decisions to act (see Chapter Five, Section 5.6).

2.5.5 BELIEF STRENGTH

The last concept I want to cover in this section is Belief Strength which is the third impact of emotion on beliefs proposed by Frijda and Mesquita (2000.p.45). They argue that emotion attaches a degree of certainty to beliefs. This strengthens the hold one has on the particular belief which one believes to be especially true in anger. Frijda and Mesquita (2000) propose that even in the face of contrary experiences, the person will stand by his belief no matter how outlandish it may seem to others. The emotional

rationality here is such that certainty of one's belief drives evaluations and reactions in the face of contrary logical evidence (Averill, 2001; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Belief strength is not the same as emotional congruence, a concept we covered earlier. It seems to me that belief strength gains some of its certainty from congruence but the two are not the same thing. Belief strength is the absolute trueness of a belief - so you hold as Frijda and Mesquita (2000) argue - certainty that such and such is the case with conviction beyond reasonable doubt. By contrast, congruent beliefs are beliefs that contribute to that one belief you are certain about. In your anger you may be certain that your boss is unfair, and you may seek out congruent beliefs such as asserting that he has been unfair to others as well on past occasions. This contributes to your belief that he is unfair.

In their study, Small and Lerner (2008) found that people in anger have a tendency to attach a high degree of certainty in blaming others. Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2011) found that such increase in certainty leads to an increase in the intensity of emotion. Therefore, in a recursive loop, this suggests that an increase in certainty makes the angry person even angrier. A study by Lerner and Tiedens (2006) suggests that this increase in certainty may have an adverse impact on employee reactions. We saw above that anger breeds certainty and this in turn makes the person angrier. Lerner and Tiedens (2006) found that angry people are likely to blame other people of wrongdoing rather than place blame on circumstances. Thus, the employee in anger may form a sort of tunnel vision that targets others. By contrast, sad people tend to place blame on the environmental conditions of an event (Small and Lerner, 2008). Thus, reactions are skewed by the certainty increase of emotion.

Nonetheless, the formation of evaluative and reactive beliefs during emotion in terms of the impacts just discussed does remain fertile ground for research. We saw that the kind of picture that emerges for the emotional worker thus depends on how pre-existing beliefs are changed, what beliefs form during emotion, and the strengthening impact of

emotion on beliefs. For the emotional worker this may paint a certain picture of the world.

Another argument I want to cover here proposes an idea called the affect heuristic. This argument shows that emotion is involved sometimes without beliefs and sometimes with beliefs held by organisational actors. An affect heuristic is a type of heuristic. Bazerman (2006p.8-14) defines a heuristic as a "what if" rule. It is a mental shortcut for thinking fast without having to reflect or ponder about a problem. For instance, I believe that my manager used to work for a competitor a few years ago. A heuristic to organize my thinking in this regard might be that my manager as a former competitor is beneficial in terms of experience. Vastfjall and Slovic (2013.p.253) propose that an affect heuristic replaces beliefs with felt emotions. One feels that this is the right thing to do. So you hire an employee because you feel like it is intuitively correct to do so. This reliance on brute feeling means that beliefs are entirely taken out of the equation. Vastfjall and Slovic (2013) note that this widespread concept is useful in making instant decisions but it can also lead to bias. The affect heuristic seems an excessive reliance on feelings which may have been useful to early man in the hunter gatherer sense. However, in contemporary society a worker often will employ beliefs laden with emotion to gain a picture of the world that is emotionally seen - involving an organization of beliefs alongside intentionality and feelings. However, this does not mean that feelings have no value apart from when they are experienced alongside beliefs. As argued in the earlier section, Goldie (2004) posits that brute feelings can give us some signal or general guidance towards the harmful or beneficial things in the environment. This type of guidance too has limits. For without beliefs, it seems emotional experience would be an impoverished existence where one feels one's way through for instance a logical problem faced in the workplace. Surely here beliefs would be helpful in so far as addressing such problems requires a degree of conceptual sophistication. In connection with heuristics, Forgas (2006) has argued based on earlier similar ideas in Bower and

Forgas (2001); that beyond heuristics if we respond in conceptually sophisticated ways (i.e. a set of concepts strung together as beliefs) then emotion will more likely form beliefs. The reason is that the more ideas we generate, the more likely we are to respond with and recall those memories that are emotionally laden.

This idea resounds in studies by scholars including Fineman (1993), Harlos and Pinder (2000), Peter et al (2006) and Fischer and Jansz (2008). The argument is thus two-fold. On the one hand, affective heuristics do away with beliefs entirely in emotional responses. On the other hand, responses that are not heuristic are more likely to involve emotion. Indeed Forgas (2006) aligns closely to my thesis in so far as he argues that organisational experience of actors cannot be studied without a focus on emotion.

In this section, I covered a host of concepts related to the second objective of my thesis. That is to - Explore how emotional experience forms beliefs. This objective is addressed in Chapter Five. That chapter revisits the concepts found in through data analysis. These were congruence, Immediacy, and certainty. The chapter demonstrates how in emotion, participants displayed a sort of reasoning that involves what Goldie (2002a.p.12) recognised as beliefs of a sort found only in emotional experience. Now I turn to consider Objective Three that was proposed in the previous. This third objective is about combining the focus of the first two objectives and providing conceptual coherence that sharpens the research contribution of the current thesis.

2.6 A MODEL OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE

The arguments reviewed so far have covered how emotional experience involves intentionality alongside a place for feelings and beliefs. These components further develop through processes like congruence, immediacy, and certainty. Overall, they represent worker experience as a personal journey through organisations and through

times of changes. Ideas about how best to represent such experience coherently, is the focus of the current section.

Psychological studies of emotion have used models to represent how for instance anger emerges (Bower 1981; Ortony et al, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Buantempo, 2004). In organizational change literature, models have also been proposed (Klarner et al, 2011; Liu and Perrewe, 2005; Huy, 2002; Kiefer, 2002, 2005). Models have looked at antecedents of emotion, coping efforts, and consequences for change. At a broad level, studies use two types of models: normative and descriptive (Simon, 1986). A normative model of emotion would provide a prescription or an ideal to strive towards (Elster, 2009). In other words, normative models are about what the worker ought to believe, feel, and how he ought to act in organizations. This type of thinking is a regress back towards Taylor's philosophy where the central idea is that scientific management can engineer workers such that they will react as they should in accordance with mathematical rules and reliability. A counter argument is that this type of thinking is a watered down way of representing emotion. In other words, a normative model deprives emotion of the personal experience that is intrinsic to the quality of feeling emotional (Goldie, 2002a, 2002c, 2004; Goldie and Spicer, 2002). Studies that try to develop normative models of emotion are essentially attempts to rationalize away emotion. One uses reason, a set of inferred beliefs, to explain the experience of emotion. That is, we return here to the notion of over-intellectualization of emotion. A study offers an explanation of action out of emotion that could equally be applied in explaining the same action carried out without emotion (Goldie, 2002a). This does not address the heightened experiences of being emotional.

For normative models, the onus is on finding regularities in worker behaviour – typically a cause and effect series comprising of logical or biological networks, is proposed (see Bower, 1981; LeDoux, 1993). This kind of an explanation characterizes emotion, not as an experience that is actively lived, but instead as a passive cause-effect trajectory of

events. In one sense, this sort of explanation presents the emotional worker much like an inert thing such as a rock which falls down a building subject to various natural forces with no mind of its own. Simon (1987.p.62) argues that normative models are not sufficient for explaining worker emotion because workers do not follow mathematical reasoning proposed by such models. A person often experiences a feeling of satisfaction when goals are met and does not go further to look for some mathematically better option. The happiness derived from meeting personal goals is enough. Likewise, the fear of going further than what is personally deemed enough tends to drive workers to deviate from pursuing the mathematically optimal reaction (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Bazerman, 2005 p.7). During change workers are anything but mathematically rational (Flam, 1993; Huy, 2002).

In order to explain how workers actually behave in the workplace, descriptive models are used. This type of a model attempts to represents actual rather than some ideal type of worker action (see Huy, 2002). This includes worker actions out of emotion. As Goldie (2002a) has argued action out of emotion is one that occurs when emotional experience forms beliefs about a situation and about how to react in a situation (i.e. reactive beliefs). A descriptive model of emotion would illustrate the experience of what it is like to be emotional. The aim of such a model would be to provide a way of thinking about emotion rather than provide prescriptions of worker emotion. Bardade and Gibson (2003) point out that such explanation about the psychology of emotion and the way of seeing through emotion is scarce in research circles. Klarner et al (2012) argue that more models are required to advance understanding of emotion in change. From a practical viewpoint, this presents value in the form of better management understanding of employee behavior. To this end, the current thesis proposes objective five. Based on empirical data analysis develop a model, to develop a model that depicts the components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in a change context.

The current study proposes a model in chapter six (see section 6.3). This is the tripartite model of emotion experienced by workers during organizational change. To some extent the model is guided by ideas in the current literature review. However, it primarily draws on the empirical findings presented in chapters four and five. The proposed model coherently represents emotion as a transient experience that can be thought about across three layers. These layers are interpreted in chapter six and contain the components intentionality, feelings, and beliefs, as well as related components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. Overall, the model will contribute to research in the form of a descriptive model that aligns with ideas of Lazarus (1991, 1994) and Goldie (2004, 2002a, 2002b). In the model emotion is represented as a process and this answers the call to research by (Klarner et al, 2011) who asked for the development of such research efforts in organizational change literature.

Thus far, the current chapter has covered relevant arguments in cross-disciplinary areas spanning across from philosophy of mind, psychology of emotion, through to Organizational change. In this regard, research objectives have been proposed. The following section will review the value of a movement in organisation research which has some relevance, and it provides ideas that may be somewhat informative in reflecting on emotional experience of workers.

2.7 IDEAS FROM EMOTIONAL LABOUR RESEARCH

In organisation research, emotional Labour is a concept that has gained momentum and one that provides a focus on emotion. The concept was developed by Hocschild (1983) who introduced and defined it as the management of one's emotion in jobs that require interaction with the public. The worker expresses the socially accepted facial expressions and bodily reactions whilst managing to hide the actual emotion they are

feeling. Emotion is a commodity to be used in the workplace such that the customer is kept satisfied. There are several definitions of emotional labour (Morris and Feldman, 1996; Kruml and Geddes, 2000; Grandey, 2003, Mann, 1999; Fisher and Ashkanasy, 2000; Hancock and Tyler, 2001). At the same time, Brook (2009) and Fisher and Ashkanasy (2000) point out that there is no widely accepted definition. The current thesis sees emotion as a psychological experience. A relevant definition close to this would be that emotional labour is an attempt by the worker to conform to rules about emotional display through psychological formation of emotions (Ashforth and Tomiuk, 2000). With this definition, the effort is from the inside out rather than a sociological conception where social forces - the outside - bring about change in the mind (emotional labour).

In the context of the current study, the main limitation of emotional labour is that it is not about psychological experience of the individual, or about belief formation. Emotional labour is a sociological concept. Ashkanasy and Humphrey (2011) identified levels of emotion research in organisations. The intra-personal level, the between-person emotional variation level, the interpersonal level, and the leadership and team's level. The Intra-personal level is about the psychological workings of the worker and this is where the current thesis may be positioned. By contrast, Ashkanasy and Humphreys (2011) position emotional labour at the interpersonal level. Emotional labour is about social interactions rather than intrapersonal workings of the mind.

At the same time, some studies in emotional labour open up space to suggest support for the current thesis. One example is a study by Martin et al. (2000). They explain an encounter between a shopkeeper behind the counter and a customer. The decision to serve the customer with a smile, even though the worker felt angry inside, is driven by her commitment to maintaining company norms. She attempts to control her expressions of emotions.

"A customer wanted to buy two identical baskets of Body Shop products. Two similar Baskets had already been made up, but they were not exactly the same; the washcloths were different colors. Karen said, 'OK, I'll make you one exactly the same'. As Karen turned away from the customer, she rolled her eyes and smiled at the observing researcher. (Researcher, Observation in Franchise Shop, USA)"

Martin et al., (2000, p.124)

This exchange shows that emotional experience involves beliefs. Karen feels anger but in that experience the belief to suppress the anger is generated, whereby the anger is managed. Thus clearly emotion does form beliefs for Karen; however, the study like other emotional labour studies is not concerned with the intra-personal level. Another example is the study by Locke (1996), which looked at emotions within a hospital setting. Locke (1996) explains that the decision of a Medical Doctor to give his patient a particular treatment, even though he is aware of the low chances of success and has fears about this; is driven by beliefs about providing hope and comfort to the patient and his family. In one sense, the Doctor's belief that he can provide some comfort to patients and their families persists during fears about the low chances of success. So clearly fear does form beliefs that evaluate and lead to reactions. Overall, the concept of emotional labour grows with popularity. Ashforth and Humphreys (2011.p.220) emphasize the "need for more research at level 1 (within person)". This is where the current thesis is positioned and contributes to.

2.8 CONCLUSION: THE KEY THEMES

In general, the current chapter reviewed arguments that support the proposed research objectives. These objectives underlie the following research question: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organisational change? The current chapter revealed several themes in research. In early sections of the chapter, organizational change studies justified the need to research emotion as a common reaction during change. Arguments demonstrate that emotion has implications for change management, namely, if left unmanaged, emotion can be a hindrance to the implementation of effective change. In a change context, negative emotions frequently prevail (Klarner et al, 2011; Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010; Kiefer, 2005) and their impact can be in the form of resistance and voluntary disengagement. Following this, a tighter focus on emotion and its mental components was developed. Initially, the argument pertaining to intentionality was addressed. This was followed by a review of arguments about feelings and beliefs, and the emergence of components that explain how beliefs are formed during emotion, such as congruence, immediacy, and certainty. From a historical viewpoint, the general trend indicates that organisation studies have given little attention to emotion. For the most part it has been viewed as a bad thing that contaminates reason. However, in the last couple of decades that research has generated increasing interest in emotion.

The current review found that definitions of emotional experience are often neglected in organisation research (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). In relation to this, the theme of intentionality emerged. The problem of intentionality asks whether emotion is always about things, either perceived in the environment, or conceived as something in the mind of the individual (Tye, 2008; Goldie, 2002a). Determining if intentionality is a necessary condition of emotion emerged as a focus. Chapter four draws on empirical data and discusses this theme. It was a widespread character of emotional experiences. Chapter six will proceed to present intentionality as a central component of the proposed tripartite

model of emotion. A related focus in studies has been an emphasis on feelings. To define emotion would involve further clarity on where feelings stand in that experience. Gooty et al (2009) point out that this distinction is often ignored by scholars. From an ontological viewpoint, the current thesis does not see emotional experience as a causal series that involves intentionality and related components. This is an impoverished perspective. Instead it is conceived as the experience of what it is like to live through an emotion. It is the experience of being emotional about something. Whether, to be emotional is to always be emotional about something, is an idea explored in chapters four and five. Overall, with respect to research objectives one and two, chapter four will present research findings and reflect on where within the emotional experience of research participant's demonstrated intentionality. Latter sections delve into the related components of feelings and beliefs manifested during emotion.

A review of studies related to objectives three and four showed that emotion forms beliefs and feelings that enable one to appraise situations and then to react to them (i.e. decisions) (Goldie, 2002a.p.35-40; Lazarus, 1991). Both beliefs and feelings displayed the notion of intentionality in so far as both mental states were directed at things that the observer was emotional about. Subsequently arguments suggested three themes that reflect the formation of beliefs and some involvement of feelings– congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The congruence of beliefs where a negative belief leads to a gloomy picture and a positive emotion leads to an optimistic view of the world is one area for focus (Goldie, 2002a, 2004, 2009). In emotional experience, beliefs and to some extent feelings, provide the experience whereby things seem more immanent. This is the immediacy condition suggested by Goldie (2002a) and Elster (2012). This forms the second theme for focus. Thirdly, research also suggests that emotion forms beliefs that make one more certain of blaming others or of knowing things about one's angering situation (Goldie, 2002, Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). The third theme to emerge is the notion of certainty as a condition of emotion formed beliefs. In emotion, one experiences

a conviction that is absolute in a sense not experienced outside emotion. Chapter five will address research objectives three and four covering the issues in this paragraph. The three themes resonated with the evaluative and reactive beliefs that research participants formed during emotion. These will be presented and then discussed subsequently in chapter six.

Lastly, Research objective five was supported by studies that represent emotion as a model. Instead of using a normative model to represent research findings, a descriptive model seems justified. A normative model is not suitable because it presents idealistic 'ought to' illustrations of emotion (Simon, 1983, 1986; Plous, 1994). For instance, this is the emotion one ought to experience. What resonates here is the idea of emotional labor whereby emotion is a commodity readily available prescription useful in commercial transaction. By comparison, a descriptive model is justified because the current thesis focuses on presenting emotional experience in terms of 'what it is like' or the personal encounters of the individual. The operative term is 'actual' unfolding of emotion. The tripartite model of emotion presented in chapter six ties together the answer to the proposed research question. In other words, it illustrates how components integrate to provide a way of thinking emotion in a change context. The model succinctly organizes the themes that have come to the surface in the current chapter and were empirically derived by data analysis, presented in chapters four and five. It addresses the question at the heart of the current thesis, that is: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organisational change?

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters reviewed arguments about the research question – How is emotion experienced during change? The current chapter looks at how research was done in order to find answers. The starting point is philosophy. And this is not without reason. Consider that emotion sits alongside a range of other research topics loosely coupled under the label 'organisation research.' Philosophy is a unifying thread binding these topics together (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2004). The idea is that if a group of researchers use philosophical ideas to interpret something, than the aim here is to grasp the nature of thing, with clarity. Through consensus researchers can then proceed to study topics of interest. The value of philosophy according to Russell (1912) is that it provides a specific type of knowledge that unifies a discipline.

"The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs"

Russell (1912.p.22)

For Russell (1912) philosophy involves the act of questioning held assumptions. The researcher challenges held "convictions, prejudices, and beliefs". He holds them up for questioning and explores underlying assumptions that are often taken for granted. Generally, these are the unchecked assumptions we operate with in going about doing research. Scruton (1996.p.3) proposes that philosophy is about asking abstract

questions. For instance in researching emotion the focus from a philosophical viewpoint is on asking the basic question about the essence of emotion. I may ask - what is the nature of emotion in terms of the thing that makes it the way it is? Philosophy asks about the true nature of things in the world. Given its primacy over other disciplines and certainly as a unifying thread for management research the chapter starts with a discussion of philosophical ideas underpinning research. First a range of philosophical arguments and debates about emotion research are reviewed. My thesis rests on the argument that constructive alternativism – a philosophy proposed by Kelly (1955) – is the right position for my research because it enables exploration of the personal view of the emotional worker. Following this the research design is presented. This opens space for arguments about repertory grid technique (RGT) which is the data collection and analysis tool used for my research and one that sits adjacent to constructive alternativism. This is followed by a discussion of the reliability, validity, and the ethics of research.

3.2 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: ONTOLOGICAL VIEWS OF EMOTION

This section reviews philosophical arguments and considers ideas useful in thinking about emotion. The ontology of emotion discussed in the previous two chapters – that is emotion is an experience – is also addressed from different philosophical viewpoints. Three main arguments applicable to emotion are found in the branch of Philosophy known as Philosophy of mind. Scruton (1996, p.39-41) proposes that philosophy of mind consists of three groups of philosophers. These are the empiricists, the rationalists and the phenomenologists. Philosophers in these groups hold ideas about the nature of reality (what is termed ontology) and about the nature of knowledge of reality (what is termed epistemology). This section demonstrates that the current thesis warms up to the Phenomenologists interpretations of emotion and it is interested in the experience of

what it is like to be emotional. That is, the current thesis is interested in appearances. Related to this the data collection section explains that interviews conducted. In interviews conversations provided some access to how the world appears to emotional participants. Through analysis this was organized to represent the internal workings of the mind. Chapters four, five and six represent how emotion made the world appear and a model is provided to represent the internal workings of the mind.

The empiricist argues that we can develop knowledge of emotion only through direct experience of the material world. Ontologically emotion is a material development. We use our body to experience emotion. Epistemologically the way to understand emotion is through observation. Knowledge about how the mind works or what it is - are generated through experience (Bhaskar, 2007.p.19). The problem with this idea is that we presume to know the world of experience (physical entities) using our beliefs and feelings which themselves are not physical entities. Unless we can reduce beliefs to physical variations such as bodily agitations we are using apples to represents pears. The thought that matter and mind are separate substances is the mind-body problem. This remains an open problem (Goldie and Spicer, 2002). The idea is that mind and body are two different substances. As such we can spend time slicing up and mixing up one substance (i.e. the body) and we will still not account for the other substance (the mind). The two are fundamentally different.

This problem was addressed by Leibniz (1989) who was a rationalist (the second group philosophers in the philosophy of mind arena). Whereas empiricists prize material order and the direct experience of observing the world, rationalists like Leibniz (1989) look towards reason as the ultimate road to reality. Leibniz (1989) had faith in mental reality. He rejected materialism which is the idea that matter can explain away mental developments like memory, beliefs, emotion. For him the mind is a different substance. Upholding materialism emotion would then be wholly reducible to material developments. This position is adopted by contemporary neurologists such as Damasio

(1994) and LeDoux (1993) who see emotion as chemical and material bodily agitations. As a rationalist, Leibniz (1989) argues that ontologically emotion is made of mind stuff. The mind brings with it some a priori truths independent of what is gained from the outside world. Scruton (1996) explains that for Leibniz (1989) the mind is a fundamental reality. Emotion as a part of the mind is also fundamentally mind-stuff. Similarly Solomon (1985) also points out that for Leibniz (1989) emotions are confused perceptions. This means that emotional people see things in a skewed manner. Here as mind stuff that skews perceptions of the world emotion is then disorder in rational thinking. A view upheld by rationalists like Spinoza as well as the philosopher Kant, both of whom saw emotion as a disease of the mind. Amongst philosophers the idea that emotion is bad for thinking has deep roots. Goldie and Spicer (2002) note that emotion has been ill researched and ignored in modern philosophy due to the very idea that emotion is bad.

However with Leibniz (1989) his account demonstrates the primacy of mind and therefore the primacy of emotion as mind stuff which he believed was different from matter in substance. Emotion is then not seen as good or bad but instead as mind stuff that is intrinsically different. Rationalists who want to use reason to explain emotion are faced with this problem of the mind matter ontological divide. This remains an unsolved problem in philosophy (Goldie and Spicer, 2002). Using reason to explain emotion seems to face the problem of over-intellectualization (chapter two section 2.5.2). The current thesis in finding emotional experience formed beliefs takes care in keeping site of this problem. Ontologically the current thesis does not aim to explain away emotion as merely a set of beliefs held by the worker. Chapter five exposes that during emotion the set of beliefs that account for some way of reasoning makes use of themes of certainty, immediacy, and congruence which were discussed in chapter two.

Phenomenologists are the third group of philosophers in the philosophy of mind. Here I would refer to Husserl (1999) as a key figure and the father of this movement. Sartre (2006.p.10) argues that phenomenology is the study of appearances. It is the study of

that which appears and "announces itself", without any hidden remains. Husserl's (1999) primary interest was in appearances or what we call perceptions. In terms of the ontological divide of mind and matter Husserl (1999) was interested in studying the human mind. Specifically he was concerned with knowledge of things-in-themselves (i.e. mind independent objects) and knowledge about a priori truths (i.e. knowledge not gained from experience). Solomon (1985.p.144) argues that Husserl (1999) believed it was possible to have knowledge of both things-in-themselves and a priori truths. To make some sense of where emotion stands in Husserl' (1999) thinking we must look at a prior truths.

To understanding a prior truths, Husserl (1999) proposed a method called phenomenological reduction (PR). This method works to suggest that emotion may be a mental occurrence over and beyond material reality. Consider the following - in a newspaper you come across the sentence 'economic slump will cause high prices' you read this and fear creeps over you. Following the PR method, you bracket this sentence and as a sentence it is a part of the world and it represents something you are afraid of. In this way, you bracket everything in your experience as separate from your mind. Things about the world including things that you may feel an emotion about such as fear. You bracket until you come to what Husserl (1999) calls the essences of the mind. These essences are the priori truths you bring with you to the situation. Ontologically, through bracketing, one looks to the mind. Everything is put into brackets as apart from the mind until even the thinker himself is seen as a part of the physical world at which point we bracket him and go into a region abstracted of all matter. This is what Husserl (1999) called the transcendental ego. Here pure ideas are the ultimate a priori truths. They are purely mental and not contaminated by experience. The nature of emotion in this regard would then be whatever is left over once we have bracketed everything from the realm of experience. Consequently, in seeing emotion as something made up of transcendental mental stuff, we abstract it from the world. This includes the things that

we often become emotional about. If emotion is separated from objects in the world than it becomes difficult to think about emotion as a standalone concept. For instance, can we think about anger as just anger and not anger about something in the world?

Ontologically, then we see that for phenomenologists the answers are to be found in the nature of appearances that are pure and abstracted from the world. Epistemologically, Husserl (1999) proposes phenomenological reduction. In so far as one here brackets things found in experience as not part of the mind, the experience of emotion then becomes non-experiential (a contradiction). Abstracting emotion in this way makes it a transcendental quality of the mind imposed upon experience from the outside. As such through phenomenological reduction we are then only gaining knowledge of something that is already within us. Something that is only grounded in the experiences we walk into as we journey through our life. If the current thesis were to adopt this position then it would not be concerned with the contents of the world (emotional experience). It would instead be concerned with some abstract principles. This falls outside the scope of the current thesis.

Empiricists, rationalists, and phenomenologists to this day face the ontological divide of mind and matter. For empiricists emotion is found in the world. For rationalists and phenomenologists the answers lie in the mind. The current thesis ontologically sees emotion as an experience. In this sense the rationalist concern with the mind and the phenomenologists with a concern with appearances offer the overlapping idea that emotion ontologically is an experience. However as remarked in chapter one the possibility of a reality outside of the observers experience is conceded in the current chapter. As such the current thesis sits in a position which is expounded in the section below. This position is commonly called constructive alternativism.

3.3 POSITIVISM AND INTERPRETIVISM

The above section presented the Empiricist who relies on *experience* for scientific knowledge. Then there is the Rationalist who prefers *reason* as the ultimate route to knowledge. The movement known as positivism emphasizes both experience and reason. This is currently the dominant movement in research (Johnson and Duberely, 2000). Positivism is important for two reasons. First emotion studies use this movement (see Mayer and Salovey, 1992; Damasio, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008). Secondly positivism stands in contrast to the position adopted by this thesis (i.e. Constructive Alternativism)

The French philosopher Comte (1865) coined the term positivism. In his version of positivism there are six tenets about how society should be researched. These are ontological and epistemological claims. The six tenets claim that ontologically social science is just like the physical sciences. What is real is material order which we can observe. Epistemologically knowledge is represented as laws explaining how social organizations work as a set of cause-effect instances. These laws are hypothesis represented using language that has a single interpretation (i.e. theory neutral language). The researcher observes instances which are used to confirm or modify some the hypothesis. The hypothesis can be tested by subsequent observations (Bryman, 2004). In a piece meal fashion joined statements (hypothesis) form a picture of how things actually work. Johnson and Duberely (2000 p.39) note that for a positivist

> "The aim of research should be to identify causal explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social behaviour."

A positivist just like the empiricist observes the world. And like the rationalist the positivist constructs reason by putting hypothesis together in statements commonly

expressed as *if that then this follows.* As emphasized in chapter one and two the current thesis is not interested in finding causal laws and testing hypothesis. Nonetheless a body of emotion research has progressed down this route. For example Small and Lerner (2008) studied anger and sadness. The study used a large data sample to facilitate generalization. Statistical analysis (analysis of variance) provided statistically significant results. Anger and sadness impacted one's evaluation of events. Positivists interpret this as a law expressing likelihood of repeat results. Russell (1912) criticizes this approach. Consider the positivist assumption of a physical reality outside the observer. If the observer looks at some object and it appears red than this is due to photons, light particles, bouncing off the object and travelling along a certain causal path towards the eye of the observer. His brain interprets the signals and the object appears red. Russell (1912) argues that this means the object is not red. The redness is the sensation created due to the movement of photons. Aside from its appearance as red the object exists independent of the observer. Knowledge of on this front cannot be obtained through scientific inquiry. The object sits beyond our senses. Epistemologically even if laws were possible studies focused on finding causal relations by looking at statistical trends still fall short of the mark. Positivist studies do not answer 'why' questions on anything more than a shallow level. The respondent's interpretations are not the main focus. This means positivism is not suitable for the current thesis. First a positivist inquiry determines patterns. The current thesis is not about determining causal relations. Ontologically it is the experience of the worker that is center stage. Secondly positivist research will not support an in depth exploration of emotion.

During the 1960's a focus on interpretations – the persons set of concepts employed in making sense of the world – gave rise to Interpretivism (Scwandt, 2001). This philosophical movement is not concerned with quantities employed in representing regularities between variables. Interpretivism proposes that people are not passive agents. Instead they are "active, self-aware, reflexive and capable of perceiving and

generating meaning" (Ramsay, 1998.p.165). As active agents individuals continue to reflect on their position in relation to things they come across in the world. This relationship is one that is described by meanings generated by the active individual (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). There are two important concepts here; one is reflexive research and the other is meaning making. Reflexive research is the understanding that in the process of seeking answers the researcher influences those very answers and influences the research process as a whole (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999). Ignorance of one's influence on the research being conducted enables the increasing impact of bias or preconceptions brought to the research. Interpretivism proposes that the individual recognize biases brought to a situation. Hughes (1980.p.117) explains that

"As far as social reality is concerned, it cannot be studied independently of the theories, conceptions, subjectivities if you will, of the members of that society; and, as an arguable implication, there is no reality apart from the subjectivities for our theories to correspond to. As far as social reality is concerned, it is constituted subjectively."

Chapter seven addresses reflexivity and presents my reflections on my research journey that brought me to learn from experiences. Secondly Interpretivism ontologically tries to make meaning of the subjective world of the individual. If society is constructed by interactions between the individual and other people then surely these interactions constitute the reality one should be concerned with. This is the extreme position adopted by interpretivists. One is agnostic to some objective world lying hidden beneath social reality (Schwandt, 2000). But there are researchers who take a softer position. These are known as soft constructionists. They are interested in social interactions and at the same time acknowledge the existence of a reality outside observation. Soft constructionists sit close to the ideas adopted by the current thesis in that the current thesis is interested in the experience of the worker and yet leaves room to concede the existence of a perceived objective reality – whatever that may be. This enables exploration of emotion as experience whilst at the same time leaving room for ideas in research some of which come from biological studies and stimulate thinking in

organisation research. The position of the current thesis is more fully exposed in the next section on Constructive Alternativism.

One argument is that there exists an objective reality, which at the same time is mediated and interpreted by negotiation and consensus (Longino, 1993). Historically, the argument that interpretations or ideas are somehow primary in explaining the existence of things in the world is not novel. There is a movement called idealism which argues that everything in existence is an idea. For instance, the table being observed by a person exists in the sense that it is known. The table as it may exist outside the observer is in turn an idea in Gods mind. Everything is either an idea in the observers mind or the mind of God that subsumes everything. Therefore, it follows that everything in idealism exists as an idea (Russell, 1912). Both Russell (1912) and Sartre (2010) argue that everything is not an idea. There exist things outside the realm of ideas. This means that a researcher studying emotion can look at a participant and notice the expression on their face. The researcher may talk to the participant to find out more. The participant may in fact not be angry. This illustrates that the internal contents of the mind are not directly accessible. Contents can only be inferred (Sartre, 2010.p.3-5). What the participant says gives a hint about their emotional state. Ontologically, if there is reality beyond observations then we are faced with the question of how to develop reliable knowledge of the emotions the research participant is experiencing. This is an epistemological question. Goldie (2006) argues that a researcher may provide a causal series of events that provides some sort of a biological explanation – a mechanistic theory of cause-effect. Alternatively the research may provide a social account of the person and their social environments. One may directly engage the person. Listen to their accounts of how they experienced emotion. One may induce emotion by providing the person with an emotional story to induce emotional states and talk to them in their emotional state. Goldie (2006) argues that types of knowledge is different from what causal accounts provide. To explore how emotion was experienced by participants, what

is required are philosophical ideas that support methods, which enable the participant to tell their story. For this, the constructive alternativism movement was adopted.

3.3.1 CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM- THESIS ASSUMPTIONS

The above sections covered ideas by empiricists, rationalists, and phenomenologists. This was followed by a look at positivism and interpretivism. The current thesis on this spectrum sits close to the interpretivist movement that arose around the 1960's. Specifically the thesis draws on ideas from a movement called constructive alternativism. This movement proposes ideas that sit broadly within interpretivism and close to soft constructionism. Overall ideas in constructive alternativism are suitable for this thesis because they are about exploring the experience of the individual. In other words about the experience of what it is like to be emotional for the participants. Kelly (1963) proposed the movement during mid-20th century when movements like behaviourism (see Skinner, 1953) treated the individual as a stimulus-response system and in some sense as a passive agent. By contrast Kelly (1955) saw the individual as proactive. The purpose of his philosophy was to conduct research aimed at finding out about how people actively form interpretations of events and make sense of the world. More recent research on emotion shares this aim (Armon-Jones, 1986; Goldie, 2002a; FIneman, 1993, 2003, 2008).

The fundamental postulate of the movement is that "A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events" (Kelly, 2003.p.4). When a person comes across an event they make sense of it, process it, using constructs. They anticipate the event through constructs. Each person has their own set of personal constructs (i.e. subjectivity). Each construct is a bi-polar organization of concepts. So for example if a person comes across a colleague they may use the following constructs about them 'good-bad', 'tall-short', 'upset-happy', or 'angry-

calm'. The colleague is seen as perhaps 'good' at doing appraisals because she remains 'calm' during one to one interactions. The deployment of constructs involves the idea that from situation to situation persons can use the same constructs to ascribe different meanings. This is because each construct is part of a larger set superseding and subordinating collections of constructs. The person can use alternative concepts to make sense of the same event or of different events. Constructs continue to develop through experience and provide meaning in the context of overarching and subordinate constructs (Bannister and Fransella, 1989). I return to the notion of construct in latter sections on data collection and analysis where the repertory grid is presented – a research tool also proposed by Kelly (1955, 1963).

Given the idea of constructs, Kelly (2003) proposes the ontological assumption that there is an objective reality that exists independent of the observer. This reality runs parallel to the personal world of the individual observer (their subjective reality). The two fit together and interlock and this bond develops with the person's experience. This is an active process whereby objective and subjective forces are in flux with each other. The position accommodates the view of the main writers Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2004) and Lazarus (1991, 1994), and Frijda (1986) – all of whom acknowledge the possibility of an objective reality that is perceived and fits with subjective realities. These studies like the current thesis are focused on the emotional experience of the individual. The ideas above fit within interpretivism and specifically within the field of soft constructionism where an objective reality is conceded and the focus remains on the subjective reality of the individual worker (see schwandt, 2000 for soft constructionism).

In terms of epistemology, Kelly (1955, 1969, 2003) proposes a sort of supreme position where the assumption is that subjectivity - the persons collection of constructs organized in a variety of combinations with each other - can provide alternative constructions of any event. The person has the power and freedom to know an event in as many ways as they can contrive it. This assumption is suitable for the current thesis

because it enables the possibility that participants can construct their own personal experiences as they wish. They can experience an emotion as a personal journey. This is what is referred to in the current thesis as the experience of what it is like to be emotional (Goldie, 2002a, 2002b). The assumption that a person can contrive events in many ways is suitable because it provides a leeway to explore many contrivances of emotional experiences. Specifically it shows that each experience is unique. This means that each emotional experience is to be explored in depth and not as part of a regularity or some pattern of repeating units.

The second reason is that given the focus of the current thesis is on the emotional experiences of the individual and how they form beliefs; Kelly (2003) assumes that the participant can contrive emotional experiences from memory in a variety of ways and a part of this is the contrivance of beliefs. Thus, the emotional experiences are meaningful through the ways in which they are also a believing in the world to be a certain way. This assumption provides grounds for the exploration of emotion formed beliefs because both co-exist. This is a feature of subjectivity and one that is accepted under the assumption that participants can interpret their emotions in personal ways. In his endeavors to provide a new perspective on doing research and looking at people as active agents, Kelly (1955, 2003) also emphasized reflexive research practice. Looking at himself he wrote that

"Our own theory, particularly if it proves to be practical, will also have to be considered expendable in the light of tomorrow's outlooks and discoveries. At best it is an ad interim theory"

Kelly (1955.p.14)

The idea is that researchers just like the people they study should reflect on their learning and assumptions and be ready to revise them in light of new experiences

"particularly if it proves to be practical". We need to be flexible as researchers and this means that we must return to our assumptions and review them in terms of how applicable they seem in explaining an event. Kelly (1969.p.55) writes "One does not have to disprove one proposition before entertaining one of its alternatives." In order to do this the competent researcher needs to be capable of replacing one interpretation of an event with some other interpretation. Or the same interpretation revised in light of new experiences. Science of the social can develop if as Kelly (2003.p.5) asserts "There are always other constructions, and there is the lurking likelihood that some of them will turn out to be better." Acknowledging and adopting new constructions or interpretations, may enable a better explanation of social interactions which themselves are often driven by emotion. Constructive Alternativism thus means that the theory itself is applicable to the researcher (Bannister and Fransella, 1989).   As a researcher reflexivity means that I accept that I am not detached from the research process. Akin to the research participants I too had emotional experiences in my research journey. Perhaps one becomes emotional about theory and this influences one's interpretation of empirical data. To this end, I made notes where possible on my research journey. One can keep a diary. Chapter Seven addresses reflexivity as a dimension of doing qualitative research. It explores my reflections in-depth and the limits of my research as well as lessons learnt. Overall, there are three assumptions adopted in the current thesis. Given an emphasis on what it is like to be emotional and gaining knowledge of this, the following are proposed based on Bannister and Fransella, (1989) and Kelly (2003, 1969, 1955).

Ontological Assumption – There is a reality outside the observer within which the observer lives and continues to make sense of through his personal interpretations, which are actively developed throughout life.

Epistemological Assumptions – The first assumption about the nature of knowledge is that alternative constructions of an event can be used by the participant in a given context. The second assumption is that just like the alternative constructions

available to the participants of research, the researcher also enjoys the possibility of changing his constructions which may themselves be challenged in the research process.

Emotion is therefore seen as a construal of events or a social construction of research participants. To this, we add the position proposed by Goldie (2002a) who argues that emotion is a complex of not just constructs but rather something that contains components, namely, feelings, intentionality and beliefs. This offers an understanding of emotion which enables the pursuit, at a philosophical level, of the proposed research. Concluding this section, it is worth noting that the central idea whereby the individual is free to construe the world (Kelly, 1955, 1969, 2003) and thereby bring about emotional experience is one that has been suggested by Sartre (2006, 2010). On this front, Chapters four and five will demonstrate that research findings defined emotion as a complex of components. Moreover, emotion in the world is a form of existing that guides the workers to exercise beliefs and feel his way through things; a finding that extends work by Lazarus (1991) and by Goldie (2002, 2004, 2006).

3.4 CASE STUDY

The case study approach was used to conduct research at the cancer care network. The case study approach arises from the assumption that what is under study is to be examined in great detail (Yin, 2009). For instance, a person or some object can be studied in detail as a system consisting of a collection of small parts, which behave, in their respective relations. These relations and the parts they connect may be researched from multiple points of view. One may take the view of the researcher, or the view of the researched, or perhaps adopt the view of some theory (Stake, 1995). Stake (1995) describes a case as

"A child may be a case. A teacher may be a case. But her teaching lacks the specificity, the boundedness, to be called a case. An innovative program may be a case. All the schools in Sweden may be a case. But a relationship among schools, the reasons for innovative teaching, or the policies of school reform are less commonly considered a case. These topics are generalities rather than specifics. The case is specific, a complex, functioning thing."

<div align="right">Stake (1995) p.76</div>

In this sense, a person might be a case, or alternatively an organization may be taken as a case. However, stake (1995) suggests that vague and less clearly bounded occurrences, such as relationships between people, may be less likely to constitute a case. The reason is that such entities are difficult to bound and define clearly, and therefore not easy to research. In his studies, Freud (1997) often treated his patients as cases. He asked them how they saw their experiences in a certain way. He sought to study how experiences appeared to his research subjects. The current study is also interested in appearances in so far as the individual is under the microscope. The case is taken to be the individual research participant. The case study approach will enable a focused study of the individual person's psychology and specifically their emotional experiences. These experiences are likely those that took place within organizational interactions during a context of change (chapter four elaborates on this further).

3.5 UNIT OF ANALYSIS

In the case study approach, in addition to the case, there is also the unit of analysis. Once the researcher has determined a case, the second priority is to clarify the unit of analysis. Although in organisation research a case under investigation is sometimes the unit of analysis, the two concepts are not always synonymous (Yin,

2009). For example Freud (1997) treated the individual person as a case, but his unit of analysis was the particular dream of the person. It was the dream that illustrated certain psychic forces and the patient's development. In this way the unit of analysis can be nested within the case. Another example is a recent study of emotion and decision processes by Maitlis and Ozcelik's (2004). They treated a British orchestra as their case. The unit of analysis was the drama played out between the performers in that orchestra. So again there is a difference in level of detail. For the current research determining the unit of analysis was partly based on the adopted philosophical position. Epistemologically, the focus is on the interpretations of actors immersed in emotion during change. This means that the unit of analysis should enable attention towards the components of emotional experience.

This includes intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. Thus, each unit of analysis for my research was the personal emotional incident experienced by the research participant. A single incident is one event remembered by a participant. In the current thesis this is their emotional journey through change (Stewart and Stewart, 1981; Cassell and Walsh, 2003; Bell, 2003; Kelly, 2003). The participants shared a total of 36 such incidents. These are emotional episodes where delta team members had formed beliefs about change, and had reacted to organizational change negatively (See data chapters four and five. Appendix 5 also provides summaries of incidents shared by the seven research participants).

Each incident was elicited through semi-structured interviews, which are presented later in the chapter. Generally, elicitation involves asking members to recall emotional stories from memory, and to discuss the feelings and beliefs they had whilst in their emotional experience. A tool used to organize the conversation is known as the repertory grid. Appendix 5.1 provides the grids. These are explained below, where examples of the conversations that took place with the use of repertory grids are provided. Overall, from a unit of analysis viewpoint, in the current thesis the case is the

individual person, the unit of analysis is that person's remembered emotional experiences, and these incidents as products of the psyche involve beliefs as well as feelings. This enables a guide towards organizing how data is viewed.

3.5.1 DATA COLLECTION

The next stage involved the collection of data. Research data in the current thesis took several forms. The basic form was 'conversations'. The semi-structured interview was used. This facilitated the construction of in depth conversations about emotional experiences of participants. Based on Kelly (2003) a conversation is defined as the construction of meanings as outcomes of negotiations between the researched and the researcher. From this viewpoint there is an inherent bias in the interview process because both the researched and the researcher bring with them a bag of concepts from previous experiences. The conversations were held at the hospital in Nottingham. The repertory grid technique was employed to facilitate conversations and to maintain a focus around relevant concepts. Ultimately, using the grid enables the researcher to go deeper and to gain some understanding of the participant's world (Chiari and Nuzzo, 2003).

In order to explore the interviews a certain mindset had to be achieved. In terms of my mindset as a researcher there were preconceptions that I carried with me to the interviews. Initially, after contact had been established with research participants, I had arranged to travel to Nottingham and to carry out interviews at the hospital located near the city center. The first important concern was to think about conducting one to one interviews with the participants. On the day the interviews took place in a room at the hospital. I recorded the conversations using a Dictaphone. Making a recording on a Dictaphone provided the advantage of replaying the tapes at a later date and recovering

any data that might have been lost in the interview. The recordings were translated into transcripts which were analyzed at a later date.

To elicit emotional experiences of the delta team members, I had to establish some trust with them. A part of this was to provide a setting that made them feel secure and gave confidence that our interview conversations were strictly between me (researcher) and the team members (researched). The issue of ethics is addressed in the latter section of the current chapter where similar concerns arise. The second important concern for getting the right mindset was to attend the interviews with an open mind. Given the philosophical concern with how emotional experience is lived by the hospital workers, I had to leave my pre-conceptions behind. The psychoanalyst Jung (1964) once remarked that in collecting and analyzing data (the participant's experiences), one should deliberately forget what has been learnt from books and theories. One should make a conscious attempt to make sense of the data afresh, with minimum preconceptions. The narratives of the team members should be facilitated in their emergence, with guiding dialogue. But is this possible? Well one can take a careful approach and follow the advice by Glaser and Strauss (1967 p.3)

> "Of course, the researcher does not approach reality as tabula rasa. He must have a perspective that will help him see relevant data and abstract significant categories from his scrutiny of the data."

With this advice in mind, however certain I was about it, I proceeded to conduct the seven face to face interviews. Each interview was a conversation between the researcher (myself) and the participant (Delta member) that took place in one of the rooms in the hospital building in Nottingham. The interviews were semi-structured, this means that the structure of the dialogue to some extent emerged by doing the interviews (see appendix 3.1 for interview schedule copy). However, the interviews were not entirely devoid of structure. I used the repertory grid technique (RGT); this is the

framework that Kelly (1963) came up with about half a century earlier when he proposed his philosophical ideas expressed at the beginning of the current chapter. The central tenet underlying RGT is the assumption by Kelly (1963) that people in general make sense of the world in a bi-polar way. What this means is that an observer looking at another person's conduct may perceive it as morally unacceptable and use the term 'immoral'. For this term immoral to have some meaning for the observer, he has to have some internal sense of what is implicitly assumed by the notion "moral". So whilst the observer sees something as immoral conduct, at the same time, he internally negates the suppressed notion of moral conduct. Kelly (1963) argues that it is a set of such bi-polar conceptions that link together to provide an interpretation of the situations we experience in everyday organizational life. Given the bi-polar assumption one can proceed by using the RGT as a way of structuring and representing concepts held by participants. One should also be clear that a bi-polar construct is a connection of two concepts where one is understood with the help of the other as an alternative. Not that one concept is a synonym for the other. In the observers mind, the two are connected as alternatives. In line with the philosophical assumption that the individual is free to contrive events with whatever constructs they wish such bi-polar arrangements of concepts can emerge as willed by the participant. The RGT takes the form of a matrix structure. It was proposed by Kelly (1963) and has since been employed by researchers in several ways (Bell, 2003; Jankowicz, 2003). As a matrix structure the RGT consists of elements, constructs, and ratings. These are the three common parts that together form the grid.

1	Angry so contacted Ben	Anger and frustration at Re-grading	Felt Angry left job	Confrontation with colleague, felt angry, contacted Richard.	Felt frustrated and angry, decided to expanded pathways	8
Felt let down	2	1	1	4	1	Supported

Let Down	7	7	7	3	1	Anger
Trust	7	7	8	7	7	Lack of trust
Angry with Others	1	8	1	1	8	Angry at nobody
More Aware	2	2	2	3	4	Less Aware
Frustration	2	1	1	2	2	Being heard
Others with Unjust behaviour	2	4	2	2	4	Myself with Unjust behaviour
Felt Ignored	4	1	4	4	4	Included
Not appreciated	1	2	2	2	4	Valued
Achieved personal goals	4	4	2	4	4	Not Achieved Personal goals
Self-Aware	2	2	2	1	2	Little insight into self

Figure 3.1 – Sample Grid

Figure 3.1 shows an example of a grid. This was constructed during one of the interviews at the hospital. Vertically aligned on each side of the grid stand the constructs. These are the bipolar structures proposed by Kelly (1963), which were discussed earlier. Each construct consists of two concepts, which sit on opposite ends. So the figure for instance shows several constructs. One example is the construct comprised of two opposing ends, where *"angry with others"* is a concept that sits opposite to "angry at nobody". The logic is that whilst the individual person employs one concept, for instance "angry with others", at the same instance, the person also implicitly holds on to the opposite concept "angry at nobody". By comparing the two concepts, he is thus able to provide significance to the explicitly held concept of "angry with others". In this way, the constructs in the grid forms part of a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewed. This conversation then provides additional significance, which will be explained in the data analysis section. Do constructs always contain what may seem like opposite concepts? Kelly (2003) advocated in his theory the importance of flexibility around constructs. What makes personal construct psychology a journey into the

personal world of the participant is the acceptance that their interpretation of opposite concepts is their own. For instance, the opposite of a 'good act' is generally recognized to be a 'bad act'. However, for a worker involved in change, the opposite of a good act (helping a friend) might be sitting around at his desk playing a game on the computer. Opposites are subjective because constructs are personal constructs (Bannister, 2003).

In figure 3.1 aligned horizontally along the top of the grid are the elements. These can be defined according to the research needs or aims, such that the relevant concepts in the form of constructs are elicited in relation to the elements. Fransella (2003) explains that the elements in a grid can represent many things. An element may be a story, a person's name, or some profession. For my research the elements were incidents (stories). Participants were asked to recall from memory and to share emotional experiences. The reason for selecting these types of incidents was that they provided a platform where concepts relevant for answering the research question were likely to be negotiated. I use the term negotiated because according to constructive alternativism the conversation in an interview is never the actual past experience but rather a co-constructed version. This is where the researcher and the researched use their alternative constructs to negotiate meaning of the topic at hand. Illustrative examples of conversations are provided in the section on grid generation, and throughout the findings chapter.

The third part of the grid consists of ratings. Figure 3.1 shows these ratings, which are in the form of numbers between 1 to 8. Number 1 indicates one end of the matrix represented in the column on your left hand side and number 8 indicates the other end, the right hand side column. A given rating implies the extent to which the participant believes that a certain concept either on left hand side or the opposite one is relevant in explaining some aspect of the incident. Given this structure of the grid I will now provide examples illustrating how the three parts – the elements, constructs, and ratings – were generated in the interview. This will illuminate the guiding role of the grid during interviews.

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3.5.2 THE INTERVIEWS

Prior to conducting interviews there are three things to establish at the outset: the element, the construct, and the ratings. The types of elements employed in data collection are incidents. These are the stories told by the participant, which unfold through a dialogue between the researcher and the researched. The research participants provided 36 such stories. These were windows into their past emotional experiences. The other task was to elicit the personal constructs of participants. Prior to the interviews these were less pre-determined and less known in terms of their content. During the interviews the constructs that emerge come from the participant's recall of memories. Their constructs are reflections of their emotional incidents (Kelly, 2003). Once there is a grasp of elements and constructs, the next thing is to conduct the interview. To expound the interviews, I now provide an illustrative example, describing one of the interviews. This is an interview with the assistant manager of the team, Charlie. The interview took place in one of the rooms provided by the hospital. I began by explaining my research to Charlie, including the reasons for carrying it out, and the aim of my research. In other words what I told her about what I was trying to find.

Me (Researcher): "Well, I am a researcher [usman], trying to develop some knowledge about emotions in the workplace. So I thought you may be able to help, and thanks again for taking time out from work. You know, just a casual free conversation, where you can feel free to talk about times when you experienced some emotion."

Charlie: "You mean emotion, any emotion? In the workplace?"

Me (Researcher) "yeah, just take your time and try to recall whenever you feel you were emotional at work"

Charlie: Ok, so any episode when I experienced emotions?

Me (Researcher) Yeup, what I am really trying to get to grips with, is the way in which you saw things in an emotional state. And, I will be recording

the interview on a Dictaphone with your permission of course. What we talk about here stays between us, so wherever I use ideas learnt from you, I will keep it anonymous and confidential. Just take your time….

The conversation that followed involved Charlie explaining the emotional incidents. And each conversation about the incidents she shared consisted of her reconstructions of past emotional experiences. This is what Kelly (2003) would call alternative constructions in line with the philosophy of constructive alternativism. There was no prescribed structure or sequence which the discussed concepts. Every participant is a different personality. And Charlie told her story. To keep track of incidents I recorded the incidents on blank cards which I later wrote on the grids when we would take a break. So whilst Charlie recalled an incident, I would towards the end of her story, ask her to confirm *"Ok so it's fair to say that this is an incident where you were angry and decided to contact Ben, your team manager"*, she would then reply *"Exactly, it's when I think I felt angry, because she was unfair and went behind my back, and so I made the decision to go to Peter, and clarify the situation".*

Written Down elements on Cards

To record this, I then took a card and wrote on it "Angry at Colleague for going behind back and contacted Peter." In this manner, all the incidents that we discussed

were recorded on corresponding cards. Whilst doing this, I also wrote down notes, to mark any concepts I thought were relevant in the incidents, writing them on a pad as well as the cards. However, one difficulty in recording elements was about managing the conversation. At different points in the interview, Charlie seemed to move tangential to the incident, and at these points I had to guide her back towards the relevant conversation, whilst not losing sight of my research question and objectives. At these points in the interview the participant exhibited emotional expressions, such as changes in facial expressions, varying tones ranging from aggressive accentuated style of speaking, through to hesitant weak whimpering, and bodily postures such as crossed arms. The concepts which Charlie referred to, which I interpreted as somewhat tangential at times, were about emotional situations not directly related to work. But she still associated them with the incident. Here it became difficult to delineate this mesh of concepts. Some of the concepts seemed indirectly related to the incident but not that relevant. She spoke about similar problems she had experienced outside the workplace on a separate occasion. The related incidents she briefly recalled were tangential. They seemed related to the incident itself, in so far as it enriched her recollection of the incident. However, I guided her back by to the original incident by asking her to maintain that focus. One example where this problem of tangential derailment or hijacking of the conversation took place was when an incident was being shared between Charlie and me. In explaining her ordeal, Charlie became overwhelmed by emotion to the point that she broke down into tears and started crying. The incident was about delivery provision and treatment of patients (pathways), and how the recent procedures and performance of the team was not enabling productive outcomes. Charlie felt this was not fair, and was duly angry because other people were not performing, as they should, in her view. She had a separate incident in her private life, where her father had suffered from poor treatment, and she related this with the incident we were discussing. The following passage from our conversation illustrates this problem, and the difficulties involved in managing the situation.

Charlie: Certainly from a point of view of redesigning pathways, about life care for patients, we have been working on delivering services, so that when you come into the hospital, we can work with your GP. So we make sure to design procedures where you get seen within two weeks. And you have to have your first diagnostic check in 31 days, and treatment within 62 days. Say if you have gastrointestinal cancer, and surgery is quite complex and difficult for that, to plan and all. But the bit of the surgery that's never been looked at is what happens after that first treatment. And that's the work we have been looking at, what happens in secondary treatment, which may impact the whole outcome.

Me (Researcher) Ok, sure. Go on

Charlie: So the problem is that we found that two patients with the same symptoms would receive different attention and care. And we have not been able to deal with that. There are people inside and outside our teams, but it's a mess.

At this point in the conversation, Charlie, unexpectedly went silent, and broke down into tears. From the view of a researcher, I was at this moment in unexplored territory. She broke down. To deal with this I had to keep my composure and to provide empathic gestures. I paused the recording on the Dictaphone. This was a good time to give her a moment to recuperate and so I left the room and brought her back some water. I passed her a tissue and a glass of water which I went out of the room to get, while she composed herself. I came back and gave her some time. And then I asked her if she was feeling alright and could continue with the interview. She replied

Charlie: My father, we were going through a very hard time, and he suffered. And it was a similar thing. And now I can't help, but I should have, and we still haven't.

Once the incidents had been recorded and revisited by us, my next act was to help the participant's elicit the constructs for the grid. For this, Caputi and Reddy (1999) explain that one can employ a triadic or a dyadic sequence for eliciting responses. The dyadic sequence involves taking the incidents (written down on paper in my case), and asking the participant to select two incidents, and then compare them for similarities or differences. In the same way, triadic sequence instead involves selecting three incidents and asking the participant to compare these. At the same time, the researcher has the task of coaching the participant and navigating their thinking along the relevant path. In line with this suggestion, for my interviews the elicitation of constructs was rather chaotic and not as neatly structured as some methods may suggest. In the interviews I noted down relevant concepts whilst the members shared their stories. After the incidents had been recorded, I would choose one incident, and revisit the details of the incident. With the written down concepts I had noted, I would then ask the participant to think back and remember whether the concept was important for that incident and why that might be the case. In this manner the participants would sometimes refer to the incident and the concepts, coming up with related associations. In other instances, they would refer to some other incident related to the one currently under discussion. Kelly (1955) has stressed that the grid is a guiding tool, and that because each person is different, one may sculpture this tool to meet the personalities one comes into contact with. To improvise and construct the tool in the context of the interview or therapy (Bannister and Fransella, 1989), such that the person is managed and can himself manage remembering events comfortably (see appendix 5.1 for personal grids of participants).

3.5.3 INTERVIEW SKILLS

In conducting interviews, there are a few skills that are recommended. Fransella (2003) advises that an interviewer who has left his preconceptions at the door in so far

as this is possible and who aims to subsume the concepts of others must construct the conversation meticulously. The key point is that whilst the event is being explained by the participant, careful listening is to be exercised. The reason is that the next question asked by the interviewer may very well be based on the explanations of the interviewed. Fransella (2003) also comments that another skill a competent interviewer must possess is the verbal skill. He refers to George Kelly's work and in his words explains

> "Kelly also says the therapist and counselor need to be verbally skilled that is not so much about vocabulary but about being able to get to the meaning that often lies behind words"

Fransella (2003) p.109.

Bannister (2003) suggests another idea about interview skills; he argues that the researcher must exercise a degree of reflexivity. A researcher must at times step back and consider that what he sees in the behaviour of data for instance may very well be his own behaviour. Reflexivity was briefly commented on in the introduction chapter. Chapter Seven addresses reflexivity. Also the conclusion chapter towards the end of this thesis presents a case (Richard the team manager), which is explained as an awakening to some degree of self-awareness of my own actions as a researcher in the research process. Lessons learnt as a researcher are presented as well.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

In general, emotion research has employed a host of methods. Quantitative analysis has been conducted on variables designed to detect correlations (Buantempo, 2005). This falls in the positivist tradition. From an ontological viewpoint there is a concern with finding regularities. This includes a desire to find probable laws intended to predict how variables might behave over time (Johnson and Duberely, 2000). In comparison,

qualitative analysis is relatively emergent. This means that qualitative methods of analysis are less rigid and more open to interpretations of the researcher (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Lincoln, 1995; Schwandt, 2000). One example is the narrative analysis by Goldie (2009), who wrote about emotion and found themes interwoven in the personal experiences of workers. The choice of method employed in the current thesis falls into the qualitative approach. The data took the form of conversations and repertory grids. In order to analyse the data a procedure was developed, which is presented in this section.

To some extent, the ontology of the interview data implies that qualitative analysis is the suitable tool. The ontology of the data refers to its nature. Conversations by their nature are non-homogenous (Easterby et al, 2008). Consider that the meaning of a word is not similar to the meaning of a number. Generally, compared to a word, a number has a somewhat fixed interpretation. That is, one quantity or occurrence of something is just that. It can be replicated and populated as a summation. By comparison, the use of a word in a conversation is more context sensitive. For example, the meaning of the word 'fear' is sensitive to the sentence it belongs to, and this in turn is sensitive to a paragraph, which is part of a larger argument made by a person who has a history (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). This means that interview data has to be interpreted in relation to the messages hidden in the dialogue that took place during the interviews. This sits in the larger pre-interview and post-interview interpretations. Therefore, the data analysis involved the practice of moving back and forth between words, sentences, passages, and the larger context of the research purpose.

The other data form was the repertory grid. This was prepared during the interview dialogues. The data is a co-construction resulting from the efforts of the participant and the researcher (King and Horrocks, 2010). The structure of the data makes it seem perhaps more homogenous. In particular, the use of numbers in grids to indicate degree of impact a construct represents seems somewhat simplistic. From an ontological

viewpoint, the grid was an organisation of concepts designed to facilitate the participants thinking during the interviews (Fransella, 2003; Bell, 2003; Caputi and Reddy, 1999). Post interview the analysis mapped the personal grid data on the interview transcripts. In this way, grid data was interpreted in relation to the interview dialogues. The interpretation of the data did not treat it as homogenous in nature.

Silverman (2000) has argued that writing up transcripts increases one's familiarity with the content and structure of the conversations. Following on from this, the next step was to analyse the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) explain that data analysis in the qualitative sense involves three stages: Data reduction (breaking down data into smaller parts/codes), Data display (presenting data), and Data verification/conclusion. Interpretivist studies tend to employ coding or the use of excerpts, such as the type recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994), or Corbin and Strauss (1990).

In view of the diversity of methodologies in organisation research, my analysis structure unfolded and developed through iterative movements, back and forth between the collected data and the reviewed literature. Consequently, the analysis structure emerged through the actual practice of doing the data analysis. I began writing up the incidents and in parallel analyzed the transcripts that I had written out. This involved reading the transcripts and teasing out key terms. The terms in the grids were compared with the transcript paragraphs. The explanations of emotional incidents in the transcripts shed light on the corresponding constructs in the grids. In doing the analysis, my thoughts were inspired by Freud (1997), and the structure he used in analyzing his patients. This involved a line by line reading of the transcripts, and making sense of the concepts hidden in the sentences. Figure 3.2 shows the iterative process of moving between the transcript sentences and some of the grid constructs. This is a process that was generated through my interpretations and making sense of data. The arrows show the movement of attention from transcripts to constructs and back (feedback loops). The

constructs in this example were subsumed under the concept of 'unfair treatment', a concept that was generated through analysis. (See figure 3.2)

"We cannot do much, you can't beat this, it has to come from the top to bottom. You just can't. I feel helpless and victimized you know. They don't care they just are in a position to do that" (Transcript sentence)

Control --Anarchy

Influence ----------------------------------Lack of Influence

Unfair

Figure 3.2 Analysis procedures

In order to develop some knowledge and coherence into the accounts shared by the persons; a structure or template for making sense of the data emerged. This structure took the following form illustrated in Figure. 3.3

- Incident Summary - Explaining the incidents in my own words using where helpful the excerpts directly from the interview. Within this summary the grid was situated and compared to transcript paragraphs (explained above).

- The Emotion – Explanation of the emotion(s) in the incidents and what they were about.

- The Beliefs to evaluate and react to the situation – Explanation of what decision was taken.

- Discussion – A critical commentary of the main concepts that constituted what the incidents were about, those used by the participant to see the situation in their own ways.

- How emotion impacted evaluations and reactions - The sequence of arranging the concepts one following or parallel to another.

Fig 3.3 Template

Rather than a mere description of what the participants had told me in the interviews, this template facilitated thinking about the data. The template begins with the general incident summary and funnels concepts towards the specific research questions. An important skill in this process is to maintain skepticism about what appears at first sight to be the case. One has to sometimes go back and forth iteratively between data sets.

The personal grids were situated within the template in figure 3.3. The Grid has been used more so in a qualitative sense rather than in a quantitative fashion. Specifically, the interpretation placed on the grid contents – the concepts, ratings, and elements is an interpretation concerned with making sense of opinions and not the search for causal patterns. Through a pilot study conducted earlier in my first year (Talat, 2007), I had found that personal grid content can be interpreted using statistical methods conducted by previous studies (Jankowicz, 2003). This included cluster analysis, principal components analysis, or simpler techniques such as counting the numerical ratings to calculate means or modes. My analysis of the grids did not treat the ratings, neither the constructs nor elements, as homogenous, but as idiosyncratic. An example is provided below in figure 3.4. The figure shows analysis of ratings conducted in a qualitative way. The figure shows two incidents. These are rated along the construct of distrust and trust. The person in this example rated both incidents 1 on a scale of 1 to 8. The figure shows that 1 represents extreme distrust and 8 represents trust. However the two incidents do not mean the same thing and do not indicate the same distrust. If one reads the passage in incident 1 then it seems that the sort of distrust that is implied in this passage is one where the participant feels let down and it is distrust in this specific sense. This has more meaning when one reads the passage in the larger paragraph to which it belongs. Similarly the passage in incident 2 implies the sort of distrust that is about personal friendship or attack. Distrust means something in the context of the passage which provides importance to the grid ratings.

"Just to get away from the situation, because I felt very let down, I didn't want to stay here. Just because I was so angry, I would have taken any financial hit. I still am angry actually.

INCIDENT 1

"She fought it like a murder trial, threw a lot of stuff at me, to discredit me. It was a personal attack on my character"

INCIDENT 2

1	Incident one	Incident two	8
distrust	1	1	Trust

Figure 3.4. Qualitative Rating Analysis

In other words, even within the same incident, the same rating across two constructs is interpreted in light of the written up transcripts and their meanings in the context of the emotional narratives that team members shared. In conducting the analysis through the aforementioned steps, the participants view was somewhat discerned with the help of a focus on her beliefs. To reiterate what has been explained in the previous chapter: a belief is described as taking the form of a statement, to which a person attaches a degree of certainty that gives it merit over alternative statements. A statement is a belief in so far as it is viewed as the likely explanation for some occurrence, whether mental or material (Kelly, 1955; Bower, 1981; Goldie, 2000). The previous chapter has shown the central role of beliefs in uncovering the need to answer the proposed research question, particularly where beliefs are held in relation to self, others, and goals. To discern a belief, the sentences in the template in figure 3.3 were viewed in the context of the whole template. Here phrases that direct attention towards

the development of an event or behaviour as attributable to another played a central role. Thus, for example the statement *"it is her fault" is different from "it is definitely her fault"*. The latter exhibits a stronger sense of being a belief, whereas the former attributes simply the direction for attributing what occurred through her fault. In this context a grid construct with for example Certain-Uncertain as two opposite poles, adds further strength if the participant provides a rating of 1 on a scale of 1 to 8 in the direction of the concept of *"certain"*. If asked to explain why it is her fault, the participant may then add the explanation that *"It is definitely her fault, because she is incompetent."* Consequently, we can see that from the belief that "she is incompetent" the participant reaches the belief that *"It is her fault"*. In this way beliefs were seen as explanations of the views of the participants. They were explanations about how participants saw themselves or others acting in such and such a way during their emotional experiences or incidents. Beliefs are thus explanations with a degree of certainty attached to them (Goldie, 2009). In this way logic emerges in how one inferentially links beliefs through the narrative structure.

3.7 AUTHENTICITY

The term authenticity is used in different studies to mean different things. In general authenticity in the reviewed literature represents an indication of the quality of the research data and the claim that is made based on conducted research. That is, whether that which is purported to be measured is what is being measured (Silverman, 2000). For Lincoln and Guba (2000) authenticity is a central concern and it involves asking the question

"Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality, trustworthy, related to the way others construct their social worlds) that I

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may trust myself in acting on their implications? More to the point, would I feel sufficiently secure about these findings to construct social policy of legislation based on them?"

<div align="right">Lincoln and Guba (2000) p.178</div>

There are two points here: one is that authentic research is spoken about in terms of a social human existence and not in terms of physical or material development. For example, for my research a concern would be to ask whether the behaviour of research participants does enunciate some social perceptions/beliefs held by them. Lincoln and Guba (2000) argue that research has increasingly shifted from quantification towards a narrative explanation of social truths. The implication is that a truth is authentic within the personal narrative of the individual who presents rational, emotional and intuitive responses as components that integrate through the narrative. That is the participants truth reflects reason that is similar to related experiences. This speaks directly to Fineman's (2008) idea; that narratives can be employed within constructionist research that is about studying interpretations. In this context informed by the research interviews, in chapter four and five my thesis presents participant constructions of experiences that bring out personal truths held by research participants. These are authentic within the context of their experiences.

The second point in the remark by Lincoln and Guba (2000) is about implications that can follow from research findings. For instance, to construct some social policy or legislation one develops outputs, and one may ask about the practical implications that follow from outputs. To this end my thesis presents theoretical implications in the discussion (chapter 5) and practical implications are covered in (chapter 6). Quite apart from this, for case study research design, and from the view of interpretivist research, the notion of validity presents itself through different implication. It is expressed as the underlying reasoning that one can provide to justify claims, particularly in terms of the content of those claims (Stake, 2000).

Therefore, authenticity of research is addressed as the logic running through the presented research data. More precisely, in chapter five, where the data is presented alongside analysis, there are justification and reasons that make arguments valid in the context of participant incidents (see sections 5.5/ 5.6 / 5.7). In other words, as Lincoln and Guba (2000) suggest validity about social phenomena can be intrinsic to narratives that emerge during the research process. So it makes sense to present data (i.e. excerpts) and to para-phrase it into some other concepts, in so far as the link appears reasonable (Miles and Huberman, 1994). My research clings to the assumption that epistemologically, we are concerned with appearances. The current thesis is about how emotion is experienced within the personal constructions of the participants. In view of this the practice of interviewing and developing a narrative through dialogue is an emergent process that enables one to ask the respondent whether a particular conception or belief is represented as they see it. Within the interviews, using the repertory grid the team members were also shown the record incidents, and asked to confirm and comment on its accuracy – "Is this what you mean?" It was at a later stage within the data analysis, where transcripts were utilized, that validity was reasoned through narratives. This added further authenticity to the trustworthiness of the research.

3.8 THE HOSPITAL AND THE PARTICIPANTS

Following from arguments above, this section is about where research was conducted (i.e. the research participants). Chapter one commented on the context in which data was collected. The context involved organizational change taking place at the hospital located in the city of Nottingham, United Kingdom. The hospital like other healthcare institutions in the UK was a public funded health care provider. This meant that the government allocated resources for the hospital out of its annual budget. These resources were then spent on running the hospital. The research participants worked in

an area of the hospital known as the Cancer Care network. The network was a part of a scheme introduced by the government to improve the provision of cancer care and the treatment of patients. It was a part of the UK government's strategy to improve the provision and treatment of cancerous diseases through reallocation of resources.

The purpose was to increase productivity. Cancer care networks were spread in hospitals around the country. They consisted of clinicians, doctors, and Administrators; grouped into teams, which worked with each other. Organisational change presented a good opportunity to do research. The change was taking place in order to improve service delivery speed and quality. A context of change induces emotional experiences in workers because their regular job routines are disrupted and this can be met with emotional reactions (Klarner et al, 2011; Carr, 2001; Elving, 2005). This was certainly the case at the network in the hospital. As chapter four will explore the overall attitude of the participants was negative. There was uncertainty and perceptions not in favor of change. Silverman (2013 p.215-16) proposes that access to research participants is one concern and the second concern is gaining access to data. Access to the participants can often be facilitated if the novice researcher knows someone who is perhaps a friend with somebody in the relevant organization one desires access to. This was the route I was fortunate enough to profit from. The second concern of gaining access to data is about whether the researcher is trusted by all participants (Silverman, 2013 p.216). There is always the danger that not every participant in the research has a reliable impression of the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983 p.78).

Seven participants from the cancer care network at the hospital Nottingham volunteered to take part in the research. The participants had been working together as a team for some years. Some of the participants had been in the profession longer than others.

From a research viewpoint there might arise a concern about the number of participants and about whether seven is a sufficient number. Crouch and McKenzie

(2006) recommend that research based on interviews seeking to study participant views in depth requires less than 20 participants. Such in depth interviews provide what Silverman (1993 p.91) recognizes as "..authentic insight into people's experiences". A review of qualitative PhD studies in the UK conducted by Mason (2010) found research sample sizes consisted of at least 6 participants. Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009) suggest that a sample of 5 to 7 is reasonable for studying participant's interpretations. Qualitative samples in being small enable rigorous exploration of topics. This is particularly suitable for emerging topics such as 'emotional experience of workers in change' where novel conceptions are being explored in their inter-relations (Hartley, 2004 p.328). A criticism is that qualitative approaches such as case studies are a poor basis for generalizations to a wider population (Hartley, 2004 p.324). In case study research one is not there to "enumerate frequencies" (Yin 2003 p.10).

My research interviewed 7 participants and it reaps the above mentioned benefits of greater focus and in-depth exploration of their emotional experiences. The positivist goal of generalizing for the purpose of predicting future variable behavior is not the onus. Qualitative research is not an exact science; rather it is the study of categories that explain how interpretations mater. In due course this can become open to enumeration by other quantitative studies, if they wish to do so. The seven participants made up one such team at the network in Nottingham (i.e. team Delta. A report by the hospital explained that the overall aim of the cancer network was to reduce monetary and non-monetary costs *(i.e. time, low work performance, bad communication)*, and to improve the care for cancer patients. The goal was to detect cancers in early stages as reported by local trusts, and to work diligently to prevent mortality rates from rising in the UK. In this sense, the networks were a form of organisational change. The Delta team worked to this initiative of faster service delivery along with better quality for end of life care for cancer patients. Currently, the team was amidst organizational change. This change had sort of frozen up the network due to shifting around of job roles and the development of

processes to deliver faster services and better patient care. The research participants called the organisational change *"restructuring"*. In the organizational change literature this is defined as a two-stage process. The first stage requires change in the behavior of workers, particularly their beliefs and affective actions. Secondly it requires change in the structures, routines, and tasks carried out by those workers (Burke and Litwin, 1992; Vollman,1996).

According to Meyer et al (1990), such change inside the organization often happens due to changes in the external environment. The study by Meyer et al (1990) specifically explained that changes in a health care provider *(i.e. hospitals)* occur due to changes in costs of acquiring and implementing resources. Consistent with this idea the report by the hospital gave precisely the same reason. Restructuring in the hospital was an exercise in cost reduction, as well as an attempt to improve patient care. New routines were to be established, new reporting lines, and worker training was to be provided to shape attitudes and skills. At the same time the restructuring was not very well understood with the research participants. Their views and the conversations we had are presented and analysed in the empirical chapters four and five which provide research data and interpretations of the data.

In general, as the next chapter will elaborate there were negative perceptions of the change at the hospital as something undesirable. The main reason was that the research participants experienced negative emotions and had very many beliefs to share with me about their feelings. Their perceptions of change were negative because change was alien to them. The people and processes of change were unfair and the impact on their jobs was uncertain. This made the hospital what Fineman (1993) has described as an emotional arena; the data was rich in beliefs along with 36 incidents that participants had shared with me. This somewhat justifies that 7 interviews were sufficient because the experiences were shared in great depth. This provided a deep understanding of emotional experiences. Negative perception of change held by

participants are explored in detail in chapter four where conversations presented alongside analytical commentary and illustrative grid data (also see appendix 5).

Previous studies have investigated links between emotion and cognitive/behavioral processes within hospital settings (Hatfield et al, 1987; Meyerson, 1990; Theorell et al 1993). These studies argue that in a hospital emotions are likely to arise in everyday routines. The reason appears to be the activities one carries out in hospitals. In other words workers in hospital settings deal with life and death, as well as the impact of disease on the lives of patients, relatives, and workers. Concerns about these topics can often invoke emotional responses from hospital workers. The seven research participants in the current thesis will hitherto be collectively referred to as Delta team. Each member in the team had a particular job and associated set of tasks.

RICHARD

The team leader was Richard. He was also the most experienced worker in the team. Richard was a high ranking manager with a wealth of experience in managing people. He had also known and worked with some team members for several years. At the time of the interview Richard shared with me plans about retirement from his job. In what inspired a sense of emotion in me he wanted to go sailing around the world. In this desire one could see that sailing would be a business of managing yet breaking free from organizational structures that were perhaps seen to be adrift. Richard was my guide and he provided access to the other research participants at the hospital in Nottingham. At his request, they had all agreed to take part in the research. The overall response from Ben, one that is expounded in chapter four, was one that did not agree with the organizational change taking place at the hospital.

CHARLIE

The second senior ranking person in the team was the assistant manager named Charlie. Like Richard she had also had several years of experience working in the hospital. She started as a nurse and subsequently she switched her position for managerial roles at the hospital. Charlie was not on route for retirement anytime soon and she held aspirations about developing her career further, something that comes out in the next chapter where she shares her views on the restructuring taking place at the hospital. Particularly she overall felt the change was not good and it would leave her isolated in terms of her professional and personal situation. Richard and Charlie were the two managers I had interviewed from the Delta team at the hospital network. Overall Charlie's personal grid indicated a very angry and negative response to the change. This is a point expounded in chapters four and five.

SUSAN

The third participant was Susan. She was the personal assistant to Ben. She carried out tasks such as organizing meetings, writing letters, and sending memos. Susan seemed like a punctual worker with a sense of organization. She had not worked with anybody other than Richard while at the hospital. Susan saw herself as relatively inexperienced and had been at the hospital for about three years. Susan was not happy about the restructuring because she saw it as a threat to her job and to her career development. Her particular perspective is discussed in chapter four.

DANIELA

The fourth participant was an administrator in the team. Daniela had been with the team for a few years. She was aspiring to continue a career in the Health service. Daniela lived locale and her ambition was to develop so she could advance her career from nursing towards management, a little bit like the team manager Charlie had done. Overall, Daniela was not happy with the restructuring. She felt a little bit afloat and was uncertain about what the restructuring meant for her.

RACHEL

One of the experienced workers at the network was Rachel. She had been a nurse for a number of years and her aim was to make the team work. She was in agreement with the team leader Richard. In Rachel's view, the restricting was ill thought out and it provided little chance for experienced individual like Richard to make decisions. Overall, Rachel did believe like the others that the restructuring was not a good idea and that restructuring was carried out by people who were not familiar with how the hospital worked. It was an outside in approach that was met with perceptions of resistance.

EMMA

Another member of the team was Emma. She was the most calm and least overtly upset in the team about the change. In what she shared with me, Emma seemed to believe in alliance with her team members that the change was a bad idea. There was no rationale provided nor was there any certainty about the impact the change would have for her job. Emma planned to develop her career in the health service. However, her belief in the hospital had gone down. As her personal grid in appendix 3 shows,

Emma was fearful of the impact on her position. This included her position at the network as well as her future plans.

PENNY

The seventh person in the team was Penny. She was an experienced woman with a few years of experience in the health industry. In her role at the network, Penny carried out several tasks on a daily basis including analysis of financial data, developing communication documents, formal recording of patient conditions, reporting data to other teams in the network, attending meetings, and reviewing historical data to produce monthly work output, targets, and costs incurred. She had been the most vocal about her contribution to the network. Penny presented the most negative view out of the whole team. She was very angry with the organizational change. Based on her personal views, she saw herself as a victim of change. In so far as this was somewhat the case with other participants, Penny seemed to believe this the most. Something indicated by her personal grid in appendix 3. A perception explained in latter sections on repertory grid.

Conclusively, it seems that broadly speaking the seven research participants did not support the organizational change at the hospital. The team saw the change as unnecessary and undesirable. Chapter Four expounds this point and explains the attitude towards change categorized into two themes: perception of change and uncertainty. Chapter Five further expounds the emotion formed beliefs about unfairness and adverse impact on job tasks.

3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

One dimension of empirical research that has gained momentum is organization research is ethics (Schwandt, 2000). In a broad sense, ethical considerations in the social sciences, suggests that the stakeholders in a given research process, be treated such that there is no harm to them. In the current study emotional incidents were shared and the implication was that there were boundaries whereby the participants were clearly advised that private matters are respected and they do not have to share anything that may cause them distress.   However, ethical ideas are specific to communities that a person enters and engages. This much has been verified by researchers like Denzin, (2008). What is considered appropriate or acceptable in one organization is not always transferrable to another.   There are many dimensions of ethics and indeed one can write much on the topic (Finley, 2008). For management research one idea that arises is commonly named anonymity. The term anonymity represents the practice of keeping your data sources anonymous, so that no potential harm may reach them. For instance, an organization may suffer through a bad repute if some interpretation of research highlights its weaknesses (Goode, 1996).

For my research, I have kept the name of the hospital and the team members anonymous. This conforms to the conventional practice of research within management studies. A dimension of ethics is the idea of balance of power (Bryman, 2004). In the research process from a theoretical point of view, the researcher usually has more knowledge about the research process than the researched/participants. If the researcher were to disclose every part of research, then the danger is that the participant may be inclined to be not honest in his responses. The participant may try to hide important data from the researcher. In order to deal with this challenge I tried to come across as a trustworthy person. However this may not always work. One may also

try to piece together what is said in a conversation and look out for logical inconsistencies.

A third dimension is the notion of informed consent. This implies that the research participant has been consulted about their role in the research. Consent over becoming intentional partners in developing research was given by the participants involved in the current study. Obtaining participant consent is a concern common in studies where covert observation or undisclosed ethnographic practices occur (Denzin, 1996). For my research, there was no covert participation, and so there was open consent. At the beginning of the meeting, each participant was informally told about the research, and was briefed about their importance in attaining research objectives. All the participants voluntarily agreed to take part in developing the research because they understood and saw the research as important in terms of potential research output and implications. Another ethical dimension also mostly associated with covert observation is deception. Is the researcher honest with participants? This again involves providing correct data to communicate the purpose and nature of one's research. Deception may be argued as acceptable in research where there is no other way of gaining access to an environment that little is known about (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In my research deception was not a significant dimension, because the research was exposed and communicated honestly. Team members at the hospital could not be kept in the dark about the research, because the incidents they had to discuss, would have to be recalled by participants whilst keeping in mind the purpose of the project.

3.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The current chapter presented ideas on research methodology. The chapter started with a review of philosophical ideas including arguments about dualism in philosophy of mind

through to interpretivism. The current thesis proposes that in terms of ontology there may be some objective reality independent of the observer. At the same time there is also a mental reality that develops in flux with objective reality. From the viewpoint of reflexivity the interpretations of the researcher are also imprinted over the interpretations of participants. To enable in-depth inquiry into the personal inner view that furnishes the experience of what it is like to be emotional the research engaged with seven participants who were interviewed on site at the network in Nottingham. This allowed for a deeper focus into the thinking and emotions of their personalities

Chapter Four: Organizational Change and Emotional Experiences

4.1. Introduction

Chapters one and two reviewed current research and found that post world war two and leading up to 1990 the study of emotion was off the research agenda. Subsequently, post 1990, there was an increase in emotion research (Ashkanasy and Humphrey, 2011). On this front whilst studies continue to relate a variety of topics with emotion such as leadership and teamwork; the question "*How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organizational change?"* remains unanswered.

The current chapter addresses this question by looking at two things. First, I explore the context of change at the network in Nottingham where the focus is on research objective one. The context was important because it informed the participant's everyday thinking about change and their emotional experiences. Following this I address objective two. That is, to define emotional experience in terms of intentionality. The data analysis revealed how change was understood by the participants who were emotional about it. On the whole this chapter provides a definition of emotion where as an experience emotion involves the concept of intentionality. The concept of feeling is introduced in relation to intentionality. This to some extent addresses the third objective that is covered along with objective four in the next chapter. In relation to this some themes emerged. The chapter begins by introducing the findings. This is followed by analysis which illustrates the themes that emerged with the help of verbatim extracts and repertory grids. The literature covered in chapter two as well as some additional

literature is also presented and discussed throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis. This sheds light on findings as they emerge.

4.1.2 INTRODUCTION TO FINDINGS

At a general level, analysis of 36 incidents which participants shared with me in our interviews at the network revealed themes about organizational change and the emotions they had experienced. The two emotions felt by participants were anger and fear. On one occasion happiness was experienced. This I will also explore particularly in so far as only 1 incident out of 36 showed happiness. If we look at studies we find that during organizational change negative emotions are experienced because change is *not understood* in terms of the reasons for change. Management does not communicate the reasons for change and the individual worker becomes highly negative and displays resistance through emotion (Ford et al, 2008; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999; Lindblom, 1994). This rationale which I return to in looking at objective 1 shows that indeed participants lacked understanding of change.

4.1.2.1 OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT OF CHANGE: ADDRESSING OBJECTIVE ONE

This section provides a brief overview of the context of change. Overall, the two themes that emerged were perceptions of change and uncertainty about the change. These themes are shown in table 4.1. The table shows an overview of the data and the findings covered in the current chapter. Participants in their experience of anger formed perceptions of change. And in their fear they grew evermore uncertain about the change. Uncertainty was present in all the cases although the terms used to refer to it varied.

Some terms used were 'not sure', 'no idea', 'it's just really uncertain', 'we don't know what will happen'. The data shows some claims made by the participants, which illustrate perceptions of change and uncertainty about change.

Emotion	Theme	Data – Verbatim extracts
Anger/Fear	Perceptions of Change	It's just wrong. Frustrated. I don't care because I don't really understand the impact on my job. There seems to be no need for it. Everybody in the team is feeling in some way worried. Felt insecure. There is inadequate support here. Yes I am feeling very confused. But who is our line manager? Probably wasn't given the being given the support needed or should have had. I would you know support (i.e. other team members to resist change). Its turned me into a cynical negative person at the moment. Their agenda will destroy a lot of what has been built over the past. (The above are quotes taken from the interviews illustrating the perceptions.
Fear and Uneasiness	Uncertain about the Change	Not certain. Confused. No one is sure or knows what is going on. Am I gonna have a job after this? So basically that's dealing with developing future programs when the future isn't actually clear I suppose. Yeah

definitely, there is uncertainty from day to day. This type of thing has been talked about in the past and nothing has happened.

Overview of Change at the Hospital – 4.1

In large part, the perceptions were negative due to lack of understanding about how change impacted job tasks. As a result the participants were uncertain about what was going to happen to 'my' job. This bred anger and fear and frustration (the notion of frustration has a specific meaning discussed later in the chapter). Three emotions seem somewhat surprising. Methodologically the interview was driven by the participants. Participants were not asked to select an emotion provided on a questionnaire. The emotion emerges from the participant as her opinion. This is the philosophical focus of the current research where emotion is not a set of causal patterns but the experience of the person expounded through conversations.

4.1.2.2. OVERVIEW OF INTENTIONALITY (OBJECTIVE TWO)

This section provides an overview of data that addressed research objective two. In the context of perceptions and uncertainty, the participants were intensely emotional. To understand their experiences, one key research objective is to describe what emotion is. This objective draws on the component identified in chapter two as Intentionality. That is research objective two – To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experiences for change management. Feelings are covered in the latter parts where beliefs are somewhat addressed. These components in relation to beliefs are more fully covered in chapter five where research objectives 3 and 4 are addressed. Following

this, chapter six presents a discussion of findings, and addressing research objective 5, it also presents a model of emotion in change.

The term intentionality refers to the idea that emotion is about things that a person comes across in the environment. These may be things imagined in the mind of the observer or perceived by him as existing in the environment - I may be afraid of imagined consequences of change such as redundancy or I may be afraid of actual job loss (Goldie, 2002a.p. 8; Tye, 2008; Lazarus, 1991). This may involve feelings directed at something (Goldie, 2004). A person simply has a feeling of fear directed at the idea of job loss and that is what the feeling is about.

Summarizing responses table 4.2 shows research data. Some of it is analyzed and some is raw data. The data supports the themes; Intentionality, non-Intentionality, and Feelings. These are about research objective two. That is about intentionality. Overall it was found that Intentionality was sometimes discernable during emotional experiences of participants. During some incidents, participants clearly stated what they were angry about something to do with change or afraid of change. The emotion was directed at something. However, intentionality was not discernable during some other emotional experiences. When asked what they were emotional about change some of the participants in speaking about their experiences could not single out an object or an event. The participant's anger or fear was not always about something recognizable in the environment. I explore this in more detail in latter parts of the chapter. A key research finding of this thesis is that intentionality as a feature of emotion needs to be considered as belonging to some emotional experiences in the workplace while it may not always be present in emotion. This I argue in latter parts.

Table 4.2 also shows feelings, which is another component of emotion. The difference between emotion and feelings is not clear in management research (Gooty et al, 2009). A feeling is described by Goldie (2004) as something that happens during

emotion. He argues that feelings are knowledge of the environment in a visceral sense. For instance, a feeling of fear with raised hairs on the back of one's neck alerts the individual of something that may be lurking around the bend in the shadows. This feeling based knowing is a general alert that tells the individual about something in the environment that requires attention. Here feeling is not described as exact knowledge of the world. Such that it is not known exactly what one is afraid of? Feeling is rather an indicator of something that requires attention.

Theme	Theme	Participant	Data – Verbatim extracts/ Grid Data
Intentionality	Intentional (about implementers of change)l	Richard	It was about them not knowing and doing things. (Frustration and Anger)
		Emma	She didn't want me to get ahead(Anger).
		Penny	I deserved it and they just took it away from me (anger). It was about her she was a bad manager (Anger). Sometimes I just felt fear (fear).
		Rachel	They were not doing what they were suppose to do and to provide me with the correct information.(Frustration and Anger)
		Susan	There seems to be no work done. I am angry 'at what they did' and it was 'not fair'.
		Daniela	Anger at not being fairly treated by colleague (change project manager).
		Charlie	They re-graded and didn't take our abilities into consideration
	Non-Intentional (No particular	Richard	Frustrated and in this experience finds it difficult to "you see its not so easy for

	direction just frustration)		me to pinpoint." There is just a frustration inside at "Not being heard" in the midst of change.
		Susan	Struggles to determine what her feeling of frustration is about.
			"I am not sure. I almost had a word for it." 'It's difficult to express." "Its just a feeling you get, do you know what I mean?"
		Charlie	Immense frustration at not being able to influence the situation "felt ignored". See Grid in Appendix Frustration/Being heard construct.
Feelings	loss of who I am (frustration)	Charlie	Nobody knows where the change is headed. There is not enough information. It just feels wrong. I feel something but I am not sure what it is.
		Emma	Not certain. Confused. "We just feel lost." In one situation oppressed by manager felt fear and anger and loss of who she was. Frustrated.
		Susan	"No one is sure or knows what is going on." Unable to do her job as usual feel at a loss. Feels frustrated at unable to change things her way.
		Penny	"I don't know who I am anymore they have taken that away from me." Uncertain and feels just lost. "I have lost the will to live."
		Rachel	"We have been thrown around with no idea of what we are suppose to do.

Qualitative Research provides themes above that are not frequencies repeated in equal measure. The theme intentionality and feelings subsume terms that signify the same meaning. Terms are not added up to equal for instance 'intentionality'.

Emotional experiences through intentionality and feelings – 4.2

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Table 4.2 shows feelings experienced during emotion. These were categorized as the theme 'loss of who I am.' The cases below will demonstrate that this led to a Lack of direction for participants and they felt Frustration. Here emerged the idea of non-intentionality. The participants spoke about their feelings in a very personal way. They identified with the term feeling. It was proximal to who they were in their incidents. Feelings particularly came out when there was uncertainty about the environment and a feeling of loss of who I am. Table 4.2 shows illustrative extracts "I don't know who I am anymore, they have taken that away from me" and another participant remarked "We have been thrown around with no idea of what we are supposed to do". These extracts show a felt loss rather than some rational calculations by the participants.

At the same time, a related idea that appeared in parallel was lack of direction. Amidst change in parallel to loss of identity there was the feeling of lack of direction. The idea is that in everyday job tasks the worker establishes a movement in some direction. So for instance if I am doing a task such as 'typing up a letter' – this action directs me in so far as it is an instance of me becoming more and more that which my job is. In typing a letter, I have a feeling of typing it up as a manager because this task constitutes 'me as manager'. I am becoming that which my job is. My direction is towards my identity as manager. When this 'loss of who I am' settles in it is accompanied by lack of direction towards that identity because I am not sure whether I am any longer working at being a manager. This is frustration.

The above section provided an overview of the context of change at the network. Particularly as seen through the eyes of the participants (whether one can see another's perspective is a contentious issue I return to in the penultimate chapter on reflexivity). An overview of objective one was also presented. This was about the definition of emotion with respect to intentionality and feelings. Below I will cover these issues in more detail.

4.1.3 THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE AT THE NETWORK- THE CASES USED TO EXPOUND VIEWS ADDRESSING RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE

I explained earlier that change was understood in a certain way by the participants. There were two types of themes that illustrate their responses to change stated in table 4.1. The angry participant *perceives the change* and does not want change. By contrast, the frustrated and afraid participants were *uncertain about the change*. One may think about whether it is possible to experience several emotions together. This very interesting thought falls outside the scope of the current thesis. One can address it after a good grasp of what emotion is has been developed. Overall, the themes showed that participants did not know what was going on at the network. To explain these two themes further the current section will use some cases that are particularly potent and illustrative of the two themes. These cases go in-depth and delve into the attitude adopted toward the change. The attitude was one of perceiving change as a negative thing. In anger and fear participants resisted the environment and felt uncertainty about where the network was headed. Here these concerns address research objective one, that is, to explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for change management.

Perceptions of change - Participants shared views that can be categorized into two types of Perceptions of change. Those concerned with the long term impact of change and those that are about everyday impact on job tasks. To illustrate the long term impact I will use explanations offered by Richard (the team Leader) and Charlie (the deputy manager). Richard's case is a good example because it strongly demonstrates a focus on long term sustainability of the change at the hospital. He explores the change initiatives at the network. Richard provides explanations about how the context is changing in the long term and the detrimental impact on change

management. Similarly Susan's case was a good example because it showed a focus on sustainability of change. Her perspective was not as high level as Richard's but showed emotions about long term consequences. The use of phrases like "overall it's bad" and "they don't know what they are doing" signaled disapproval of change and poor change management.

The second type of perception was about short term everyday impact of change. This was a concern with everyday tasks and it was a concern for all of the participants. The case that most potently illustrates such resistance is Susan's Case (Richard's Personal Assistant). She vividly described her concerns with what will happen to her job tasks. I will also draw on other participants who demonstrated perceptions. The repertory grids in appendix 5.1 informed analysis. For instance, perception of long term and short term change is represented in Penny's grid where she rates her experiences at an extreme of 8 for Not Trustworthy. She saw change implementers as not trustworthy managers of change. Another example is Emma whose grid showed experiences wherein she believed everyone had a voice (rated 1) but not in change procedures that would be important for enhancing workplace conditions. Change was not supported and implementers of change were rigid, which represented poor management.

Uncertainty about Change – The second theme illustrating the participants understanding of change was 'uncertainty about change'. To some degree uncertainty was expressed by all of the participants. This meant that participants did not understand change and they did not welcome it. Overall change was managed poorly in terms of how it was carried out. Here again, the repertory grids also informed analysis and interpretation (appendix 5.1). For instance, Emma's grid explicitly rated 1 in favor of uncertainty. Daniela's grid showed a rating of 1 for intense feelings of not knowing. There was uncertainty about how their job tasks are impacted. In particular a case that potently illustrates uncertainty was Susan's Case. Her case was a good example because she was completely in the dark about the change. The impact on her job tasks

was not known to her. Her fear involved seeing change as an uncertain enterprise; a threat to her job. There was a defeatist attitude that resonated in her uncertainty. This formed during my conversation with Susan. Other participants had also hinted at this defeatist position. There seemed a certain iterative cycle between fear and uncertainty that only got more intense as Susan shared her incidents with me. I now turn to consider the first theme categorized as 'Perception of change.'

4.2. PERCEPTION OF CHANGE – RICHARD'S LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE

Richard was the senior manager at the network. His case illustrated what I described above as his long term perspective about change management failure which he was angry about. Before delving into the conversations with Richard perhaps it would do well to say a little something about my impression of Richard. Overall through our meetings it seemed that Richard had a strong character. By this I mean that he was the sort of person who seemed fond of leading situations. The first time I had noticed this was when he came into the room at the network when we were about to start our interview. Richard walked through the door and firmly shook my hand. He spoke first "So has everything been ok?" I replied that things were going well. But I also thought that his question meant that if things were not ok then he saw himself as able to address any issues forthcoming because he was the leader of the team. About gaining access to the participants I had spoken to Richard a few weeks earlier. We had met in a pub and I had explained my research and that I needed access to his team for my research. So Richard had some idea about my interests. I explained my research again in the interview. I explained that I was looking into emotional experiences during change and I was interested in his experiences. In a concerned tone Richard asked whether the rest of the participants I had spoken to were happy about the change.

I was cautious to not share what I had found from the other participants. Saying whether participants were happy about the change might influence what Richard had to share with me. I simply reacted with a nod and a smile. In the next 2 hours we had a conversation about the long term impact of change. In the passage below Richard explains a picture of the struggle with a group of people implementing the restructuring. Richard was against the change. He pushed against the change agenda. In the dialogue below he starts off with his general attitude and talks about a meeting about change that formed his perceptions of the change.

Richard: Yes, I took a conscious decision to push it. I could have bit my leg. But I decided that in that particular instance the behavior that I was experiencing from these other people was no longer acceptable. And needed to be challenged. But its difficult for me to pick out specific instances.

Me: ok sure. Please take your time, maybe something comes to mind.

Richard: There was a meeting.[pauses for a minute]…

Richard: "I know what job needs to be done for the future and I believe that the proposal that had been put forward will not do it, will not achieve it. Will destroy a lot of what has been built up over the past few years. It's a desire to preserve not the status quo, but the success that we have had. Let the success continue. You are doing it for the better good then just to hen your own nest

The passage demonstrates a long term understanding of change. His Perception of change was based on his particular reasoning. He was angry because he saw change as ill planned and destructive. Listening to Richard I did sense anger about the change. In the passage his tone of voice was aggressive. He believed the proposals shared in the meeting were bad. He had been in a meeting with people who were put in-charge of planning and implementing change at the network. We called this incident "Angry at meeting proposals". Richard said this was one of the few times he had felt anger. This was in the context of an earlier remark he had made where he had said that he was one of those people

who managed his emotions. From his viewpoint, this was important because he was setting the tone for the rest of the team as their leader.

Let us briefly consider an idea about anger and then return to Richard. The emotion anger paints a negative picture of the world. The angry person typically sees the situation or instigators of change as against him or against what he stands for (Elving, 2005; Lazarus, 1991). Similarly Richard was angry in opposition to the change. He explained in his own words that he made a conscious decision to push it. He actively pushed his view by communicating to the implementers of change that he was angry about the proposals because they *will not achieve it*. The proposal will not achieve success. Richard felt the change was planned and implemented by people who were in it *just to hen their own nest.* In other words, people who wanted change were interested in personal benefit and promotions. However if Richard felt that the change was a failure then this was not just because he thought the proposals were vague or ill-informed. At a deeper level of analysis it seemed that Richard felt that the proposals were an attack on his legacy at the network. Proposals would not preserve the success Richard and his team had built in the past years. He felt angry about this. Studies show that anger is experienced when what is mine is seen as under attack (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Similarly Richard disapproved of the proposals because they represented an attack on what is his. The implication of becoming angry was that change management under the new implementers was seen as a long term threat. The proposals would change the rules and jobs he had worked hard to develop. Addressing objective one the implication is that in anger change is seen as doomed because it will fail for two reasons. The implementers are not sincere and that what has been built by Richard would be destroyed.

Studies also show that in anger a person has a sense of control over the situation and a sense of certainty that increases with anger. A person becomes

certain that his anger is righteous (Zeelenberg, 2006). In Richard's case there was a sense of control as well as immense certainty indicated in his personal grid (see Appendix 5.1 for copy of personal grids).

1	Incident One "Angry at meeting proposals"	7
Control	1	Anarchy
Sure of things	1	Not really sure

Incident one above was rated by Richard as a 1 in favor of control on a scale of 1 to 7. This implies Richard felt that he had control. At the same time, he rated a 1 in favor of *sure of things*. In the context of incident one, it was that Richard in anger felt he had control in so far as what he had built –his legacy – was still intact. He was sure of things in the sense that what he had built should be the success that continues. And he was sure that it would not continue given the change proposals. He was certain that the proposals were bad. This pairing of a sense of control and certainty fuelled anger. Overall in his words Richard saw *long term dis-order*. In anger Richard's perspective had the following logic to it.

The proposals are bad because they are ill informed. These proposals are not researched and not carried out by the right people. If the proposals for change are implemented then what has been put in place by Richard through years of work, the jobs and routines, all of such things will be destroyed. Richard's anger is about such destructive change. He told me that "their plans were no good." With regard to objective one this shows that anger kept Richard certain about the badness of change. The implication was that this constituted resistance to change as certainly a bad thing.

4.2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE – CHARLIE'S LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE

The other participant to demonstrate a long term perspective on change and how change impacted the network was the participant named Charlie. She was the second senior manager in the team. Our conversation took place on an optimistic note. She walked in the room and I shook her hand. She sat across from me in a humble pose. Charlie spoke first and asked "so you're the researcher". I acknowledged her remark with a smile. I explained my research to Charlie. Compared to Richard the view that Charlie took about the change was slightly more personal. Richard was concerned above with the impact of change on the network on the team, and on his legacy. Compared to this Charlie was focused on how change impacted her overall personal role at the network. Like Richard she also viewed change at the network as undesirable, but at the same time in her anger her logic was different. The incident that most potently illustrated her understanding of change was about something called re-grading linked to the change at the network. Charlie's perspective on change came through in discussing this incident.

As a part of change, the network was following a re-grading process. The central idea was that change at the network would involve reviewing grades of managers and other workers such as clinicians and nurses. A grade was a position in the network that indicated job tasks, and determined the employee's salary. High grades meant better positions. Charlie said that through the re-grading process the grades of clinicians/doctors were changed to higher grades. This meant promotions and better remuneration. Charlie argued that this was detrimental in the long term. Change was distinguishing Clinicians and Doctors as more worthy compared to other administrative workers like her. This meant that in the long term there would

be negativity. Workers who were not regarded to a higher grade might feel discriminated. On the face of it one might think that this is deliberate favoritism towards clinical staff and that this represents unfair practice.

However, Charlie explained that the reason was that there was enough information available regarding clinicians/Doctors. Their job tasks and skills were known and information about this was readily available to change implementers. However there was not enough information available to re-grade other workers such as managers and nurses. There was not enough information available to understand the value these non-clinical workers, the nurses, brought to the network. As a result managers like Charlie were overlooked. This made Charlie angry. Couples with a sense of unfair treatment she believed that her contributions to the running of the network were not understood because the right information was not available. In the long term this meant that clinical and medical practices were encouraged through higher grading and promotions whilst managers/nurses felt discouraged because they were relatively invisible and one could expect them to be angry due to a sense of unfair treatment. Their work was not recognized. Applying this to her position at the network Charlie believed that her strategic thinking and expertise were overlooked. She explained in her own words.

"So if you did not have a clinical caseload or weren't physically dealing with patients, you tended to have a place lower down the scale, because the tools were not sophisticated enough to pick up responsibilities around management and strategic thinking"

"They didn't understand the fact that we sit here, and actually through contacts with people, we resource the whole of Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire, and the people who had done the re-grading hadn't understood that, hadn't run to clarify that."

Charlie – Team Assistant Manager

For people like Charlie who were managers this meant disaster in the long term. The clinical side was considered and the non-clinical arm that managed the network as a business model was overlooked. This was unsustainable because re-grading left clinicians motivated but at the same time managers like Charlie felt 'let down' (see appendix 5.1).

Similar to Richard's perspective, Charlie believed that the root of the problem was lack of information and lack of understanding on the part of the people planning the change. However, is there an alternative explanation? According to Trader-Leigh (2002) who built on ideas by Lindblom (1994), managers are more likely to resist change rather than lower level workers, particularly because of their status and influence. The managers that participated in the current study resisted change. The manager's Richard and Charlie resisted change because they believed that in the long term the proposals of change were not sustainable. Their explanation was that the change would be a long term failure because they had not been included in the change. This was at the heart of their anger and their long term perspectives. It seems that they were excluded from the change. In Richard's case he was not consulted about the proposals. In Charlie's case she had not been consulted and had been overlooked by the implementers of change. This exclusion of senior managers in the change process aroused anger and validated their views about organisational change at the network as a non-sustainable enterprise. The attitude was that without their expertise which provides an inner view of how the organization works – the change was not sustainable. Appendix 5.2 provides case summaries that support this view and instantiate it.

4.2.2 EVERYDAY PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE –SUSAN'S CASE

In addressing research objective one that looks at worker emotion and implications for change the ideas above provide the view of two senior managers. The managers adopted a long term view and expressed related perceptions of change. The other research participants I met with were more concerned with the day to day impact of change on their jobs. From a general viewpoint, the operational workers who were in the team at the network were particularly worried about the everyday impact of change. They were afraid of the change and resisted the idea of change. The attitude toward change was elaborated in some passages that were quite revealing. One of the passages is a conversation I had with Susan.

I met Susan on the network premises at the hospital. I noticed that she was quite young. My bias immediately furnished the thought that she was probably a worker with little experience. She also seemed a little tense in her posture. There was something that seemed to worry her. At the same time I thought to myself that my intuition is an element of bias and it is not necessarily to be relied upon, rather it is to be made explicit. Susan's worry became clear once our conversation set off. I started by explaining my research to her.

Researcher: "So I am interested in emotions and how these are experienced in work environments such as this place where you work. The purpose is to learn from your emotional experiences in the workplace. To get an inner view."

Susan: "well than you have come at a good time ..[referring to the change taking place at the network].."

Researcher: "ok, interesting"

She went on to call the change "unclear" and told me that "we don't know what is really going on, on a daily basis. You come in and do your job and you just don't know."

Susan was concerned about the change and she seemed afraid and had remarked "its fear more than anything". What exactly fear as an emotion means is something covered in the latter sections. Compared to senior managers, her short term everyday resistance was different in two ways. First, Susan resisted the change on an everyday basis by showing concern with her own position. She told me "we don't know what is really going on, on a daily basis". Here she is referring to her position, her job at the network. She imagined that she might lose her job. She imagined that her job tasks may not be required anymore. This made her afraid. Losing her job was not something she wanted. The logic employed by Susan is that - if change would lead to job loss and job loss is not wanted than it follows that in the grip of fear Susan resisted job loss. In fear the job loss seemed imminent. This is related to the idea of *immediacy* – the idea that in fear anticipated outcomes seem closer or more likely (Sartre, 2006; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). I will come back to this in the next chapter where immediacy is more fully explored in relation to how emotion forms beliefs. Getting back to our current focus it seems that Susan's Perceptions of change was her anticipation that in work her job tasks were under threat every day. She imagined her tasks might be taken away. This was pronounced when she joked that "I might not have a job tomorrow you know". The attitude here is a general view or perspective that – change is not good because every day I worry about it. Unlike senior management that has a strategic view of things the concern is not with some long term benefit of the network or some strategic consequences. This suggests that perhaps the sort of attitude adopted by Susan is expected at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy. In relation to objective one we might conclude that the emotion fear has a specific implication. This was that it kept Susan quiet regardless of her everyday mental struggle with the thought that she might lose her job. This confirms the idea by Flam (1993) that the emotion 'fear' can have the impact of silencing a person who anticipates undesirable outcomes. The individual stews away inside and suffers

mental worry from day to day. Change that requires management would have to address such suffering on the part of the worker.

The second difference that Susan's perspective brought was that it showed passive resistance. Senior managers Richard and Charlie were overt about their resistance. They openly expressed it. However Susan was very passive. The term passive in the oxford dictionary means "or allowing what happens or what others do, without active response or resistance". The operative term for Susan case here is *allowing*. This distinguishes her reaction from the senior management because it is not up to her to allow or prevent. As a person at low levels in the hierarchy she has no power to resist or to question the change. This is a concern tangential to the focus of the current thesis in the sense that it is about power and the role power plays in implementing change. As in Susan's case there are studies to support the idea that those lower in the hierarchy with less power may be less likely to explicitly fight against the management. However this does show that a negative attitude towards change is something that does not facilitate change. Managing change requires that the emotional turmoil of the worker be addressed (Carr, 2001; Elving, 2005). This may apply especially to those lower down the hierarchy. Klarner et al (2011) argue that mental suffering of the worker is not well understood in terms of how emotional experiences unfold and impact change, particularly where the impact might be adverse.

4.3 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CHANGE

In addition to an attitude of resistance towards change, the research participants also responded with feelings of uncertainty about the change (see table 4.1). Research has found that during change there is uncertainty prevalent amongst workers (Elving, 2005). Studies also propose that uncertainty may be over

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job insecurity in a changing environment where the individual has concerns about her position (Hartley, 1995). A person facing uncertainty may react by building some sort of hope to tackle with the uneasiness experienced (Lazarus, 1991).

Participants in my study experienced uncertainty about their jobs. Susan's case discussed above illustrates uncertainty. She saw the change as an uncertain grip over the network. As a worker at the network she is low in the hierarchy. Compared to management she is powerless to influence change. Powerless employees may experience uncertainty due to lack of influence and they may also feel fear (Elving, 2005). Susan's felt both. Her reasoning was the following. She experienced fear because she saw the change as an unknown force. One may question this by arguing that just because a person sees change as an unknown it does not follow that this provides grounds for negative thoughts. It also does not follow that where no thoughts are involved the person may automatically move from uncertainty towards the experience of fear. There must be grounds. In fear Susan saw uncertainty as something she experienced because as an unknown force the change was replaced in her mind by anticipated outcomes. She anticipated negative undesirable outcomes for her future at the network. Research shows that fear will breed thoughts that are negative and these may seem likely to occur compared to how they would otherwise seem (Goldie, 2002a; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000; Flam, 1993). The reasoning in fear is that change is unknown and in this case change is then anticipated as negative due to fear. Susan explained in her own words as she sat across from me in the interview room.

> "It's been fairly difficult recently, so you have probably come at a good time...... I suppose there have been quite a few emotional times recently because the network is being restructured, so when dealing with that and going through the consultation process, so that's basically dealing with developing future work programs when the future isn't actually clear I

suppose. It's quite emotional because everybody in the team is feeling a bit anxious, or worried, you know."

<div align="right">(Susan – The Personal Assistant to Richard)</div>

Here Susan is referring to a consultation process. This is a process at the hospital that was meant to explain change to workers. These processes consisted of meetings between the employees and the restructurers. In meetings team members were asked to share information about their jobs, particularly to provide details about their job tasks and daily routines. Whilst these processes were taking place, delta team administrators continued to be shrouded in darkness about the restructuring, they simply did not know what the proposed change consisted of. Despite being involved in consultation processes, and the issuing of a document to explain restructuring, Susan and the administrators had little knowledge. This is illustrated by her remark "so that's basically dealing with developing future programs when the future isn't actually clear I suppose." The problem was that there was no clear picture about where the team members stood amidst this sea of change. In relation to research objective one, we find that lack of clarity for the worker who is uncertain can be accompanied by a feeling of fear. Susan's uncertainty was potently illustrated as my conversation with Susan unfolded further.

Me: "Feelings of uncertainty?"

Susan: "Yes, Yes, I mean I don't think it is consciously felt, but it does have an impact on you. I suppose it's just natural these here for now"

Me: "Consciously, what do you mean by that?"

Susan: "I mean that I felt it, but it was not always so obvious you know. In fact now that I look back, I can see that it was something that sort of drove me. I was uncertain, because what if my Boss leaves in this reconfiguration."

Me: "I see, you mean that you sort of were guided by this feeling towards what was important at the time?"

Susan: Yeah definitely, aha, well there is this uncertainty from day to day. You know, you think about what will happen to you, where will you go.

The conversation above illustrates two important ideas. The first idea is that the reconfiguration *(i.e. restructuring)* seems to be pervasive as a subterranean presence inside Susan's mind. In this regard she remarks *"I mean that I felt it, but it was not always obvious"*- this portrays restructuring as a background influence, something hanging in the mind as a feeling, something not always obvious or located within some specific incident. In one sense, this can be thought about as a climate of organizational change, a climate of uncertainty. The second related idea is that her feelings of uncertainty acted as a driving force directing her towards a long term perspective particularly in so far as she was concerned about what will happen to her once Richard leaves the hospital. She might lose her job. If this happened what would happen next. This is what I referred to earlier as anticipatory thinking in fear. Overall then, according to the first idea the feeling of uncertainty almost appears as a mood towards the restructuring. A mood is defined in the literature as a background subterranean tendency to feel good or bad (Forgas and George, 2001b). Here what is referred to in the passage above, by Susan, as "uncertainty from day to day"; *is* a negative undesirable subterranean feeling about the whole notion of change at the network. This negative feeling is a mood in the sense that it prolonged as a background discomfort, not a sharply felt short lived emotion, but rather, uncertainty felt as the day to day condition of working at the hospital. Thus we see that in talking about the restructuring there is a background mood. The second idea above that anticipatory thinking in fear leads to long term concerns suggests that her mood helped direct attention towards job security. Change is met with one's attention focused upon self-preservation in the face of

potential and imaginable threats to job security. Another case that illustrated uncertainty about change was the case of Rachel. She worked within the hospital as an administrator in the team. What is different about Rachel's perspective is that she sees change as an invisible presence. There is no explicit concern with job tasks. In our conversation Rachel told me about a proposal document that explained the restructuring as a necessary and planned change for the hospital and the networks, so that as a consequence better health service provisions would be put in place.

> "The actual proposal document, so it was actually for the restructuring. I felt concerned because this is the first time you have seen it, but also not confirmed because this type of thing has been talked about in the past and nothing has happened.....Because potentially these things take a long while and whether you should, whether you will allow yourself to be concerned for a long period, or just wait and see what happens. Because it could all suddenly be dropped or forgotten about, or you know."

> (Rachel)

From the passage it seems that Rachel was not sure that the change would even happen. For her it seemed that Perceptions of change took the shape of denial that change would actually happen. In one sense she protected herself by not allowing herself to be concerned. It seems that Rachel actively believed that it was alright to be positive. By being positive she seemed to deal with her uncertainty about the restructuring. She remarked *that* "this type of thing has been talked about in the past and nothing has happened" – in other words, there was no need to think about it exhaustively and one should just set it aside, and get rid of this feeling of uncertainty. In Rachel's case uncertainty is exhibited, and it is similar to uncertainty experienced by Susan in so far as there is an effort to protect the self against organizational change. At the same time Susan's case more explicitly signals some subterranean concerns with job tasks, particularly amidst a context of uncertainty. This feeling of uncertainty seems to be rather

like a mood, a persistent humming noise in the background always in some way tainting her view of things.

4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE

Studies have argued that change is an important environment and how change is understood by workers who are emotional and involved in change should be researched (Klarner et al, 2011; Elving, 2005; Carr, 2001). This was the basis of objective one that explored the implications of worker emotional experiences for change management. In the cases discussed above the context of change was poorly understood by the participants involved in change. This was because their concerns were not addressed. The lack of understanding occurred in two ways. On the one hand the two managers Richard and Charlie believed that the implementers of change did not understand what needed to be done. The restructuring proposals they made did not include Richard and Charlie – the result was a sense of unfair treatment and feelings of anger. The change was seen as not sustainable because the implementers were deemed incompetent. Secondly there was lack of understanding at the administrative level. The participants I spoke to complained that they did not understand the change. They did not know how their jobs would be impacted. This gave rise to a climate of negative perceptions of change, feelings of fear, and general uncertainty. In emotion the change was resisted. Overall the experiences of anger and fear had a negative implication for change (i.e. worker disapproval) and this was largely due to the emotions of the workers left un-attended to by the management.

4.5 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES: ADDRESSING RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TWO

The current section addresses objective two. The objective is to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of worker involved in change. Intentionality is the component defined in the second chapter as the essential part of emotion. Importantly, the presence of intentionality is not clear within management literature. Intentionality means that emotional experience is a consciousness of the world. The experience itself consists of the person having emotion about the world or the things within it. This is called intentionality (Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002b). A related component is 'feeling'. Emotion often involves feelings and the difference between the two is something that requires clarity in management research (Gooty et al, 2009; Goldie, 2004). In experiencing emotion, both intentionality and feeling are two components that are addressed in this section. The third research objective covers feelings and other components including intentionality and beliefs, which I turn to in latter parts and return to in chapter five.

4.5.1 INTENTIONALITY

It is argued that intentionality is a necessary part of everyday human experience and more specifically it is an integral part of emotional experience (Tyn, 2008; Goldie, 2002a). If a person experiences the world their attention is always directed at something in the world. This could be a physical thing or imagined thing. Similarly if a person were to become angry than it follows that their anger must be directed at something in their experience of the world. The idea is that emotion must be about something. This aboutness is called intentionality (Tyn, 2008). With regard to intentionality my research shows that emotion is sometimes about things that make up one's experience. Looking at the 36 incidents discussed with the participants, I found that on the one hand emotion was about several things participants experienced at the network. On the other hand,

there were also a few moments when emotion was not clearly discernable as about specific things. If we look at the 36 incidents we find that anger and fear were distinguished in what they were about.

Emotion	Theme	Data – (Emotion was About)
Anger	Intentionality	Unfair Treatment by colleague. Actions by colleague were victimizing. At managers oppressive manner. Maligning remark by colleague. Promotion process was insufficient. Angry could not collect information about work. Asked to act up and process didn't work was angry. At time fiddling. At proposal documents. At pathways process not working. At re-grading process not fair. At confrontation with colleague. At dishonesty of colleague. Needed resource not in place. Offer was not what I deserved.
Fear	Intentionality, Feelings, and Lack of Direction.	Of colleague. Of what might happen. Of restructuring process. Of new role. Of other person taking away my role. Of alternatives. Of not being able to do tasks in future. Of oppressive manager. Seeing the restructuring plans happen. The feeling of frustration turned to emotion through intentionality.

(The above are quotes taken from the interviews illustrating what the emotions were about) **Table. 4.3**

Table 4.3 shows the things that emotion was about. These themes are addressed in detail below. Generally, it seems that anger has been directed at other people or it has been about change processes at work. When directed at other people (i.e. colleagues) anger seems to be specifically about the intent of the other person. Alternatively anger when directed at some process has been about the absence of something that is seen as deserved. By comparison, fear seems to be about what happens to "me" or "what is mine". In the context of organizational change fear was about what will happen to my job tasks. The cases of the participants informed analysis. For instance, Daniela's grid demonstrates that incidents involved anger and fear directed at either colleagues in meetings related to change or at processes seen as not fair (see Appendix 5.1). Similarly, Emma's personal grid shows ratings which at a general level demonstrate that emotion was directed at either tasks (i.e. carrying out processes) or at the actions of another person. To demonstrate this at a specific level the following section provides a detailed example of Rachel's case.

4.5.2 WHY USE RACHEL'S CASE TO ILLUSTRATE INTENTIONALITY

Intentionality was present across the incidents. Summaries in appendix 5.2 provide examples. A case that vividly illustrated how intentionality is involved in emotion was the case of Rachel. We looked at Rachel's case earlier where uncertainty of change was expounded. Returning to her case we find that there was one particular incident that clearly showed the intentionality of her emotional experiences. This incident was about a situation where she had become angry. In this incident we will see that Rachel experiences anger as directed towards what she sees as the intent of the other person involved in the incident. Her incident illustrated a strong focus on the angering aspect of the incident that the emotion seemed to feed upon. This idea has been discussed by Goldie (2002a) who explains that anger for instance is a transient experience that

fluctuates in its relation with the thing it is directed at. This means that the angry person's relation with the angering object is transient in that it develops as the person either becomes angrier or less angry. Rachel's incident showed that it was frustration that was experienced and this turned to anger. The case shows that intentionality was a mediating thing here that functions to link frustration with anger. This is a way of understanding emotion through intentionality. Chapter six presents a model of emotion that situates intentionality at the Centre of emotional experience. This highlights that intentionality is a fundamental concern in providing a definition of emotion (Ashman, 2008; Goldie, 2002a, 2002b).

4.5.3 RACHEL'S INCIDENT

We agreed to label the incident *"the time I couldn't get the information and felt angry"*. Rachel explained that the incident occurred a while back. The fact that it had taken place a few years back and that Rachel remembered the incident vividly meant that her emotional experience lasted in her memory for a long time. Perhaps one could argue that memories with emotional content last longer and can be recalled more readily compared to other non-emotional memories of experiences. That was a thought that had briefly occurred to me. Rachel continued and explained to me that

> "As a part of my job here I have to do a lot of fact finding, information gathering……...If I send something out to somebody, either asking them a question, or asking them to look through these minutes and let me have them back. I would want them to just send me it back. If I have to keep chasing them, that really frustrates me. I get angry"

> Rachel (Administrator)

In this passage resonates the idea that Rachel feels frustrated and angry at her colleague who has failed in providing information related to a job task. Rachel remarks

that one part of her job involves fact finding and information gathering. She gets frustrated and angry when she has to chase the other person for information she needs. In this case clearly Rachel's anger is directed towards a colleague. Therefore it is intentional anger. It is about the colleagues actions as not sufficient which results in Rachel not getting the information she needs. In addition to anger, Rachel said that when she had to chase people for information that she needed she would become frustrated. Her frustration would become anger when she recognized the person responsible for not providing her with the requested information. Frustration was rated a high 1 on a scale of 1 to 8. Giving this rating on her grid, Rachel explained that her frustration was based on her inability to get the information she had requested. Finding out who is responsible enabled her to direct her intense frustration towards her colleague. It seems that frustration turns to anger when intentionality enables Rachel to claim that her colleague is at fault. "If the other colleague had done her job then it would all be fine. You know. But it just does not make sense when you need the information and you are not getting it." In referring to her colleague's failure to provide information, Rachel explained that the anger was something that was not only about some specific act committed at a point in time. Yes, her colleague had failed to provide information however the anger was not just towards the one time she had not provided information. One can look at this another way. Let us say that the colleague failed to provide information. Following on from that, the colleague may have done a number of things such as process reports, access information, have team meetings and other things that constitute her job. As she may have gone about doing such job tasks Rachel saw this colleague through her anger. Rachel admitted that her attention towards this colleague was something she returned to long after the incident had taken place. She claimed "you know she was there and I noticed". The idea is that intentionality spills over from one specific act towards other instances in the environment. Anger at your colleague makes her other actions seem negative and angering. It is a transient shifting of attention from one angering action to other subsequent and perhaps even unrelated reactions by the

same person. Conclusively it seems that frustration turned to anger through intentionality. Appendix 5.2 summarizes and illustrates this idea across the experiences of the research participants. Rachel's attention towards the angering person remained and painted a gloomy picture of the workplace.

What made this idea surprising was that Rachel did not look like a gloomy person. She was quite upbeat and friendly in the interview. One might claim that a person who is generally pessimistic has a negative outlook. However in her case I found it difficult to comprehend that if a gloomy picture was attributable to anything other than her anger then why would Rachel who seemed upbeat and bubbly adopt this gloomy picture of the incident. One interpretation emerges if we consider her grid in more detail. We find that intentionality is indicated at a general level towards all the incidents. The indication came from the construct Inclusion-Exclusion. With a rating of 7 on a 1 to 7 scale.

1					7
Inclusion	7	7	7	7	Exclusion

One interpretation here is to say that Rachel's frustration turned to anger where she felt outside and excluded from all the incidents. On a general level her frustration was about this exclusion (Intentionality). She remarked that she "felt like an outsider". She was an outsider who pointed inward to the change as something that was frustrating. From this general level when she shared the incidents with me her frustration translated to anger at the specific people or objects in the incidents. Thus we see that a more specific sort of intentionality emerges.

Addressing research objective two the current section therefore makes the point that intentionality seems a part of emotion in so far as it was experienced by participants at two levels. There is the general level indicated by my interpretation of the grid data where Rachel feels frustrated at being excluded. At a more specific level this general feeling of frustration turns to anger when attention is directed at the individual person responsible for not providing Rachel with information in the incident discussed above. One common thing is that at both the general and the specific level the frustration and the anger are both about something. Thus intentionality seems involved in all instances of emotional experiences. To this end it seems a necessary condition for defining emotional experiences of workers in general and for those involved in change.

In the section below, I will consider further whether Intentionality is a necessary feature of emotion. The section after that will relate intentionality with the notion of feelings. The next chapter will review the topic of intentionality again and explore how during emotional experience intentionality relates with worker feelings and beliefs.

4.5.4 Non-Intentionality: Anti-thesis of objective two

The idea of non-intentionality is an unexpected finding of my research. The idea is that emotional experience is not always about discernable things that may exist in the material world or exist in a person's imagination. This is antithetical to research objective two which purports the presence of intentionality through emotion as a necessary condition of the workers experience. This idea has not been explored in management studies of emotion. Studies have considered the opposite idea that emotion is about things in experience (i.e. intentionality). In management literature Ashman (2008) refers to the idea that intentionality is a necessary feature of emotion. This is supported by earlier work looking at emotion and intentionality (Tye, 2008; Sartre, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Goldie, 2004). Contrary to this the idea proposed by my analysis is that in some

instances emotional experience may *not* involve intentionality. In other words emotion may be non-intentional.

Although this was not the case in most of the incidents that participants shared with me, it was something that did come out in my conversations with Susan. Recall Susan is the personal assistant to Richard who is the team manager at the network. In the above sections, we looked at her case where we considered the short term Perceptions of change and expressed her uncertainty. Here, I draw attention to an incident Susan spoke with me about which we labeled "Felt bad for colleague and confused/angry". Sitting across from me sipping on her teacup she began with a smile and explained that not so long ago the team manager Richard, to whom she was the personal assistant, was struggling with his job. He worked in a senior management position where he required support in accessing processed information to help make decisions. However she explained that Richard was not getting the support he needed to do his job properly. Lack of resource limited Richard's ability to carry out his tasks. Susan told me that this was wrong. She said that the resources were absent but should have been made available to Richard. The emotion that Susan experienced in thinking about what she saw as unfair treatment of her boss was difficult for her to express.

> Me: So take your time. Think it over. Are you feeling what you felt at that time?
>
> Susan: I don't know.
>
> Me: (quiet) ok sure, take your time.
>
> Susan: "I am not sure, I don't know, I don't know; what do you think? Do you understand, you know what I mean....It's hard to sort of place it in the right way. You know when you can imagine the situation you are in....It's aaaaaaaa, I don't know, maybe I, aaaaaaaaa"- (sigh) "I nearly had a word then."

The above passage shows that Susan is having a difficult time pinpointing her heightened sensation about the incident with Richard. Her words "I am not sure, I don't know" indicate that she was uncertain. One possible explanation is that perhaps Susan just could not articulate her memories of the incident. This would be a good explanation if Susan herself had not recognized that she was not sure why but the feeling was there. She recognizes and tries to use words to communicate her experience "I nearly had a word then". However, her experience is just there aimlessly hanging.

Alternatively, if we do not adopt a perspective concerned with how Susan understood her situation then we can simply reduce the sensations of uneasiness she experiences down to some biological imbalance or changes. Goldie and Spicer (2002) point out that studies have reduced emotion down to biological substrates in this way. From another viewpoint if we reflect on this passage in context we must refer to her personal grid first. On a scale of 1 to 8 we can see that the ratings are mostly in favor of 1. Reading the grid we can make out a context. Given there was was already resistance and uncertainty in the background there are some key terms and ratings in the grid below. Susan told me that she did not know (8) and was Uncertain (2) why there was inadequate support for Richard (8). One would think that if Susan saw Richard in trouble than she might be worried about her own job (a concern she had displayed on another incident we had discussed) – however, she rates her sense of job security a (7). So if her job was safe then one may turn to consider why she rates frustration (2) about Richard's situation. We find here that frustration is about Susan seeing the situation as out of her control (7). One may reason that if it was up to her Susan would make the resources available. We therefore see that Frustration is surrounded by the above context of ideas.

1	Felt bad for colleague and confused/angry	8
Knowing	8	Not knowing
Uncertain	2	Certain
Insecure	7	Security
Job Hope	2	Pessimistic
Self-aware	2	Complacent
Control	7	Out of control
Afraid	4	Not afraid
Adequate support	7	Inadequate Support
Frustration	2	Less pressure

To sum up, Susan told me that she did not know and was uncertain why Richard did not get support. She is not concerned about her job, yet she is frustrated because the situation looks like it is out of her control. This feeling of frustration is what she may be referring to when she tells me

> "I am not sure, I don't know, I don't know; what do you think? Do you understand, you know what I mean....Its hard to sort of place it in the right way."

One idea is that in experiencing frustration Susan is having a non-intentional moment. Her frustration is something she is able to imagine when she pictures what Richard might have experienced at the time. However she is unable to find a word for it. Now it seems that if Susan does not know why there was inadequate support then she does not have something to be angry at. She can only be frustrated. If she says that she felt angry then one would ask -what are you angry about? - If you do not know why there is inadequate support then you do not have anything to point at and be angered by. One answer is to consider is that Susan is angry at her inability. She claimed it was out of her control. Here anger can be directed at herself. This may be a reasonable idea if we consider that she rates self-aware (2). To direct anger at herself would involve increase

in attention to self or in self-awareness. If this is the case than one would expect Susan to come out and say that. In fact in our conversation I did ask Susan whether she thought she was to blame. She said she had nothing but the wish to see Richard supported.

In the current case, what we find here is some confusion. Analysis shows that as far as frustration is experienced it involves a sensation of lack of control or lack of ability to change the situation. This means frustration may be expressed as an emotion that is not directed at anything specific because in Susan's case the specific cause of the lack of support is not clear (non-intentionality). Susan is unable to find a word for what she imagines and experiences. Alternatively we find that perhaps Susan blames her- self and intentionality is indeed present in so far as she is angry at herself. But she does not admit to this idea. One might argue that the confusion leads to non-intentionality. Not blaming others and unable to blame herself Susan hangs in a limbo – she cannot find the words to express this emotion. One might claim it's not another person or process because I don't know that thing. And on the other hand it is not me. I return to this idea of non-intentionality in the section below which addresses feelings experienced by the participants during change. The focus in the current section was on intentionality and its presence within emotion (addressing research objective two). In most incidents participants demonstrated the presence of intentionality. Participants were angry or afraid of things such as actions of colleagues related to change. However there were some incidents where intentionality seemed difficult to discern (non-intentionality). In general there was uncertainty and fear of change. On a few occasions the inability to attributed feelings of frustration to anything discrete represented a degree of non-intentionality.

4.6 WHAT ABOUT FEELINGS?

In the paragraphs above objectives one and two have been addressed. Here I want to begin addressing objective three. That is, to investigate relationships between intentionality, feelings and beliefs in workers involved in change. The reason is that a great portion of the current chapter is dedicated to emotion and intentionality. I want to continue this focus by stranding out towards the links between intentionality and feelings as objective three calls for. At the same time I will refer in some capacity to beliefs. The following chapter will address beliefs more fully with regard to both the third and fourth research objectives which build a focus on emotion, intentionality, feelings and beliefs in a change context.

So what is a feeling? James (1957.p.451) argues that feelings are bodily developments which when perceived by the individual bring about the experience of emotion. Whilst contemporary writers argue that indeed emotion involves feelings (Goldie, 2002; Solomon, 2007; Lazarus, 1991) it is unclear how they are situated in management theories that research emotion (Gooty et al, 2009). It is argued that feelings are more than just brute experiences (Goldie, 2004). Emotion may involve feelings that are informative for the emotional person. The nature of how feelings inform is that they direct a person's attention to something in the environment that may need attention (i.e. such as a feeling of threat which involves a person suddenly becoming alert about some dangerous thing nearby). Here a feeling is a general indicator and at the same time it also seems intentional. Feelings direct a person towards the world and towards what needs attention Others like Sieben and Wettergren (2012.p.3) have argued that *"feelings serve as internal guides"* helping see the world in a way that is sometimes beneficial for the individual. At other times this may equally distort reality such that an angry person sees another as blameworthy without reasonable grounds (Goldie, 2004; Fineman, 2005). What makes feelings difficult to situate in relation to emotion is that feelings are

not always easy to identity as part of an emotion such as fear or anger. As Solomon (2007) argues a person can feel bad, or feel loyal, without classifying this as a concrete emotional response that is about something. Overall then it seems that a feeling can be informative and it is intentional. It also seems that a feeling can exist outside identifiable emotions such as anger. So a worker amidst change may claim – 'I have a bad feeling about this restructuring initiative.' What seems definite is put succinctly by Goldie (2002b p.235) that emotion typically "..involve feelings at some point during its existence".

4.6.1 INTENTIONALITY AND FEELINGS AT THE NETWORK

We saw earlier that Table 4.2 shows that feelings involve the theme 'loss of who I am'. Before looking at this theme, the more fundamental concern is to show how feelings were experienced by participants and then build the view further. Analysis of the cases supports the idea that during emotion the participants experienced feelings that were usually about things in their environment. That is, intentionality is a feature of feelings. This idea was referred to above where Goldie (2004) argues that feelings provide you information of things in the environment. In this regard there are two interpretations illustrated in the data. One interpretation is that the feelings experienced by participants in the incidents were intentional. The other is that feelings were not intentional. This latter idea aligns with the argument made in the earlier sections that perhaps emotion is not always intentional.

Analysis of the data suggests that emotion involves feelings. It suggests that intentionality is sometimes a feature of feelings. At other times, feelings may not involve intentionality. It follows that emotion may be non-intentional if feeling is that component of emotion which in a given instance does not involve intentionality. Here, the assumption is that feeling is the only component of emotion that involves intentionality.

Thus, if we can show that feeling does not involve intentionality then it follows that emotion can be without intentionality. However, this assumption is only upheld in this section in order to enable exploration of feelings and to understand how these are situated within emotional experience. In the next chapter, the assumption does not hold and beliefs present a component that runs parallel to feelings and both these components have the potential to display intentionality. In research, it is an ongoing argument whether all the components of emotion involve intentionality or whether intentionality is specific to certain components (Tye, 2008; Goldie, 2002).

4.7 WHY PENNY'S CASE

Penny was probably one of the most emotional participants that took part in my research. She felt very strongly about the change and the incidents she discussed with me were permeated with talk of feelings. This made her case a good opportunity for exploring feelings. If we look at her grid we find that she spoke of feeling incapable throughout her five incidents she shared with me at a high rating of 1 on a scale of 1 to 8. She saw herself as a victim of change and the actions of other people. Her overall picture of the workplace was a negative one. In all of the incidents she shared with me, her anger and fear was directed at colleagues. She indicated that in her incidents colleagues who were involved were poor managers. She gave "Poor management by others" a high rating of 1 in all the incidents she shared with me. In addition feelings of incapability and being a victim of change were present in other cases summarized in appendix 5.2. This section uses Penny's case to provide a detailed view.

4.7.1 Penny's Case – Feelings, Intentionality, and Emotion

The interview with Penny was very emotional. By this, I mean that during the interview Penny expressed a lot of emotion. It was in her facial expressions, her tone, her posture, and in the incidents she shared with me. There were also moments in her interview and within other interviews that I had to actively reflect on my own emotions as a researcher and to manage them. This latter idea about managing your own emotion as a researcher is discussed in chapter seven that looks at the notion of Reflexivity. Overall the one common thread that ran through her incidents was the idea that she was a victim. This meant that her anger was about the blame she placed on others. Penny used her feelings to point out the incompetence in others. This feeling was something that initially surfaced as frustration and this is where she directed it at others who were to blame for wrongdoings. This culminated in anger. This case demonstrates the theme of Feelings. Consider the incident she shared with me about the time colleagues had been dishonest.

We called this incident "fiddling with time made me angry". She explained that amidst organizational change timesheets had been introduced at the network where she worked. These were sheets that could account for any extra hours people had done and would therefore get remuneration. Penny told me that two workers who she knew were fiddling with the time sheets. I asked her to explain further. She said that time fiddling was a practice that involved putting in more hours that a person had actually worked. The implication was that change at the network which had brought about the time sheets provided a way of being dishonest and beating the system. Penny told me that she took it upon herself to complain to Charlie the team assistant manager. I asked about what happened next and she replied

"Instead of the manger dealing with people not pulling their weight, or people who are not doing what they should be, an email goes out to the whole team, making us and also me feel small."

Penny (Administrator)

She believed that unfair practices were taking place. If we look at her personal grid we find that as with the other incidents there was a feeling of incapability experienced by Penny. She gave "felt incapable" a rating of 1 on a 1 to 8 scale (see appendix 5.2 Emma's incident for another example of incapability and frustration as well as other cases summarized in the appendix). In this particular incident we see that Penny feels incapable because she could not stop other people from fiddling with time. But also that the manager she had reported the incident to did not take any action to correct things. Unable to do anything she felt frustrated. It seems that her feeling is one of frustration that is about her-self being unable to modify some aspect of her experience. Her belief in unfair practices and her feelings towards these beliefs drove her into anger. For Penny her feeling of frustration seems to be a loop. Recursively she feels frustrated and recognizes her inability, and this frustrates her more. This built up of frustration is recognized by her. In this regard talking about frustration she told me that "I just contain with a lid, learnt to lip up, and bury it deep inside". And this suppression is something that runs across her incidents. We find that she rated a 1 on a 1 to 8 scale.

8					1
Expressed	1	1	1	1	Lid up

If a feeling of frustration is built up and contained (Lid up), we find that the recursive loop seems to keep working iteratively. Lazarus (1991) suggests that such

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experiences require that one cope psychologically with them. A method of coping for Penny was to blame other people. In anger and feelings of frustration she believed that others were wrong (intentionality). Doing this enabled her to direct the frustration outward and have something to feel angry about. There is another interpretation. The incidents Penny shared with me involved frustration and confusion. Her state of confusion meant that she had a loss of who she was. We find that her inability to modify an experience led to frustration accompanied by her feelings of not knowing who she was at the network. Interpreting confusion one could say she lacked direction. There was another incident that supports this interpretation of Penny's experience. This incident we named "Asked to act up, and was angry". Sitting across from me in the interview room, Penny began by explaining that a while back she was offered a temporary position. Somebody was needed to replace Charlie (the assistant manager); whilst Charlie was on short leave for medical treatment. Penny told me that she was excited and felt proud because she was being recognized by others for her managerial skills. She saw the offer as a chance for career development. However due to change policies put in place Charlie was told at later date that it had been cancelled. According to Penny there was another reason.

Me: Well let's see what comes to mind.

Penny: Okay, being asked to act up, again acting up is when you stand in for somebody; you can then put it on your CV as a role. I was asked to act up into my boss's role when she went into the hospital for an operation. And then a month later she came to me and said – I have decided not to act you up anymore because of what happened with Emma – who is another employee that acted up previously. So Ben is going to do the line management, and you're going to do all the work. That was one situation.

Me: So what did you feel when they asked you to act up and then (made a sympathetic expression)

Penny: I felt privileged, and then I felt shattered. I was not angry, but I felt upset, it hurt. I was asked to act up and then told no, because of what happened when Ellie was here. And to think that I would be like anybody else is an insult anyway. So I was insulted, offended, and hurt.

Me: Ok so you were not angry?

Penny: aaaaaaa, I don't know. It just felt bad.

Me: So did you commit yourself to something at that point? You know, did you say to yourself that you don't appreciate this?

Penny: No I never let work suffer. You say to yourself, well bugger I am not going to do anything. My conscience would not let me do it. I have never done that, as far as I can remember.

According to Penny, she acted up because she was compared to Ellie (a colleague) who had not performed well. We see that she felt bad. She suppresses her feelings implied by her statement "No I never let work suffer. You say to yourself, well bugger I am not going to do anything." Here, she has inability in the sense that she is unable to act up into a role. There is frustration. On her grid we see that Penny rates confusion at this moment as 1 on a rating between 1 and 8. Conclusively, it seems that due to change practices where a person needs to be given some responsibility, the network sees it as a risk. The logic seemed to be that if the other colleague (Ellie) was unable to do the job than promoting Penny may be a risk best avoided during organizational change.

As a consequence, we see Penny suffer and experience confusion and feels lack of direction. In a change context confusion can lead to lower productivity. A worker who feels lack of direction cannot follow change. It seems that inability to influence was a key idea in all of Penny's incidents rated a 1 on a 1 to 8 scale.

Felt Incapable	1	1	1	1	1	Felt Empowered
	—	—	—	—		

Inability leads to frustration. A recursive loop kept lidded by Penny brings about confusion and lack of direction. To cope Penny deploys intentionality and becomes angry. This was the reasoning in all of Penny's incidents. Her feelings followed a course. This recurred in her other incidents where feelings are involved. It seems that feeling is always used in a manner where Penny feels frustration or inability and then she directs this at other colleagues before anger or fear is experienced.

4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE

The section above addressed the proposed objective – To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. With intentionality the finding as follows: Analysis shows emotion can be understood in terms of intentionality. One finding is that frustration was experienced by the participants. In regard to intentionality Rachel's case showed that attention that turned frustration to anger and lingered long after the event. Intentionality was at a general level and at a specific level. Next Susan's case demonstrated non-intentionality. Frustration in her case was something that represented lack of ability. Not directed at anything. Here frustration is felt as an experience without direction. The next section explored feelings. Penny's case showed that frustration is mediated towards anger by intentionality. The logic that relates frustration and anger shows a movement from one to the other and also shows that frustration as a feeling may to some degree exist as non-intentional. However the presence of beliefs is always a sign of intentionality in so far as beliefs were always directed towards things to do with organizational change. The presence of beliefs is also

argued by Lazarus (1992) whose study showed that they are always present within emotion. In a change context the theory has been suggested as a good set of ideas when studying emotion processes within a change context (Klarner et al, 2011).

4.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Overall, there is one unifying idea that comes out of the analysis of the incidents shared by the participants. The idea is that during organizational change emotion involves intentionality which occurs in feeling frustration and intentionality functions to mediate the move from frustration towards ones emotion. The worker defines his emotional experience as one of uncertainty and frustration. The anger or fear that ensues is experienced as about change in general but also about specific persons and processes. Exclusion from change through lack of information about how the workers job is impacted persists as a core view that maintains emotion. Table 4.4 comments further on how the emergent themes have been interpreted.

Theme	Interpretation
Perceptions of Change	Two types of perceptions emerged. There was long term and short term resistance to change. The reason was lack of information. Senior managers saw implementers of change as incompetent and not fair. Administrative workers were afraid the impact on job tasks, which as unknown
Uncertain about the Change	Lack of information also meant there was uncertainty. This was a feeling in the background tainting the view of the participants towards a negative slant. This feeling also

	directed attention towards what might happen (anticipatory thinking) and directed attention towards job security (self-preservation).
Intentionality	This theme appeared to manifest on two levels. There was general intentionality and then there was specific intentionality. We find that in both cases intentionality was present. The question posed here was – is it a necessary feature of emotional experience.
Non-Intentionality	A surprising finding. Non intentionality was present in so far as the worker experienced frustration which was due to a feeling of lack of control and lack of ability. The worker is in limbo. Coupled with the climate of uncertainty of change we find that the worker is unable to find words but experiences the emotion.
Feelings, Intentionality, and Emotion	We find that uncertainty and frustration were present. Uncertainty was about the future. Frustration was without intentionality. The worker experiences emotion as a feeling that persists recursively. Lack of information means that one sees thing out of control and the self as not able to influence. The feeling of frustration and ones inability are connected in a loop back and forth. The worker copes with frustration by pointing to something that can be blamed. This turns then to emotion. All the while the experience persists as change is resisted by workers.

Table 4.4

The ideas from this chapter will resurface in the next chapter, which looks at emotion and beliefs more fully. I will return to ideas covered in this chapter in order to build a picture of emotional experience during organizational change.

The theoretical implications of the research findings presented in this chapter and the next chapter and where these fit within management research as a growing disciplinary sphere are discussed in chapter six. Ultimately, intentionality and feelings alongside the theme of belief are all components that inform the model of emotion presented in chapter 6, section 6.3. In particular the analysis in the

current chapter presented intentionality and this was a central component in its relations with beliefs and feelings. This was also reviewed in chapter two where literature proposed intentionality as a primal component of emotion. It also forms a central component in the model in chapter six. The component 'feeling' was also discussed in the context of change. This also forms a part of the proposed model and as discussed in the current the current chapter feelings can also be intentional – that is, individuals experience feelings as towards change.

CHAPTER FIVE – EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE AND WORKER BELIEFS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented perceptions of organizational change and explored emotion through component parts including intentionality and feelings. This chapter continues that exploration and examines participant 'beliefs'. The current chapter addresses research objectives three and four which were established in the second chapter. Objective three is: to investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. Objective four is: to determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with the components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty.

Analysis showed that both evaluative and reactive beliefs were formed by participants. The beliefs exhibited the features of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The current chapter presents cases illustrating these features. The cases are detailed and they potently illustrate the features. Table 5.1 and appendix 5.2 provide instances from across all the cases which further support's the presence of found features.

In general, emotion research has focused on beliefs in two ways. Either beliefs are antecedents to emotion or they are consequences of emotion (Scherer, 2001.p.372, 1988, 1984; Smith and Kirby, 2001). This has been the focus in cognitive theories and within organization research which has used theories from the former discipline. This has also been recognised in change research (Kiefer, 2005). In the context of the current research focus, what happens during emotion and how beliefs form in that experience

represents relatively unexplored territory. Within Organizational change literature this presents an opportunity for understanding emotion (Klarner et al, 2011). Such understanding would increase knowledge of how emotional workers might react based on beliefs formed in a change context. How the world looks to an emotional person is different from how it would otherwise appear to somebody who is not immersed in emotion. Researching beliefs in that experience represents the opportunity to propose how a worker may see change as perhaps worse than it might otherwise appear.

5.2 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL CONTEXT

The previous chapter demonstrated two themes. These were 'perceptions of change' and 'uncertainty'. Both themes illustrate the idea that change was not supported by the participants. It was seen as an ill understood force that was not implemented properly. Change was something that was not beneficial for the individual and the organization. For the participants the problem was lack of knowledge about the change and this engendered uncertainty about how change would impact their job tasks and future prospects. Participants grew frustrated and by pointing blame at persons or processes (i.e. intentionality) they became emotional.

Developing this further the current chapter examines how emotion forms beliefs. In terms of the inner workings of the mind; how emotion forms beliefs is ill understood. This is supported by arguments reviewed in chapter two. As noted throughout the thesis – the focus is on inner workings of the mind rather than on external forces that impact workers. Initially some understanding of what the term 'belief' means would help in the sense that an idea of what is explored is established. One argument is that a belief is a universal condition of the individual worker. It is a universal condition because the worker in an organization continuously holds beliefs. They are ways of making sense of experiences. Sometimes a belief is represented as a statement about what one sees. A

belief may also be a statement about imagined things in the mind (De Sousa, 1990). For instance, a worker believes that 'organizational change is part of a grand conspiracy and it is harmful'. It will destroy his career. The person has not seen evidence but this makes it no less real for that person. It is real in their mind. A belief is nonetheless held both about the perceived and the imagined world. Alternatively one may believe that one works as a nurse and this belief may be more believable in the sense that one can perceive it more often in the world around them. Rather than just a statement in language ontologically a belief is taken as a mental state of the worker. At its most basic a person, the 'I', must always believe in his own existence in order to believe in anything at all (Lazarus, 1991 p.39-41). In all of the above a belief is something that we think to be the case. It is in these ways that belief is interpreted in the current chapter. Sections in the current chapter will demonstrate that beliefs were used to evaluate situations and to react to change. They also exhibited the features of congruence, immediacy, and certainty which shaped the influence of beliefs.

In the context of the negative atmosphere at the network and perceptions tainted by the background, it seems logical to expect that analysis would show beliefs that do not support change. These beliefs form part of negative emotions of anger and fear. Theory suggests that negative perceptions lead to negative emotions that consist of negative beliefs about relations with the environment (Goldie, 2002a, 2002b, Lacewing, 2004; Solomon, 2007; Lazarus, 1991.p.91-92.).

5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Data analysis revealed that in emotion two types of beliefs were identified as part of emotional experiences of anger and fear of the participants. These are

- Evaluative – A proposition evaluating something in terms of importance in change

- Reactive – A proposition expressing how one will react in to others in change

In addressing research objective three it seems that these beliefs did exhibit intentionality. That is, they were evaluations and reactions that were about things to do with change at the network. Feelings were also involved. The most common feeling being one of frustration at not being able to understand the change. Again the feelings were in this sense also exhibitions of intentionality. Workers felt a degree of negativity and their beliefs immersed in such feelings displayed certain features. These were features that research objective four addresses.

Evaluative and reactive beliefs involved the features of congruence, immediacy and certainty. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the empirical findings. The table identifies the features as themes. From left to right, the columns display themes, beliefs, the participants, and illustrative verbatim extracts with interpretation. Congruence involved evaluations. In their emotional moments, workers evaluated colleagues and processes of change as bad because they were unfair. Also the impact on job tasks was not known. The second theme of Immediacy involved both evaluative and reactive beliefs. In emotional moments people were a threat or problem that is closer or more likely. Participants reacted by forming beliefs to confront the person or to suppress the incident. The third theme was certainty. Participants in anger and fear were certain and very sure about what they believed. Their beliefs were strong in terms of how much they were convinced that such was the case.

Table 5.1. Illustrates Congruence, Immediacy, and Certainty as key themes supported by emotion formed beliefs.

Themes	Beliefs		Data – Verbatim extracts/Comments
Congruence Belief: Change seems unfair and worsening for the participants. (Evaluation)		Richard	"I know what needs to be done" they are not doing what needs to be done
		Susan	"We don't know where this is headed but it does not look good." "Yes it just seems all over the place." "We in the lower levels well you know we are" (implies: replaceable.)
		Emma	"And she kept getting worse. Kept doing it and I really didn't see why." Sees things getting worse and worse. More and more unfair.
		Rachel	They are just not fair sometimes. Its just something you think oh well this is not getting better
		Penny	It got worse "a multiple number of times", Makes her band three administrator the gatekeeper that's what she is called…. She was targeting my time…..It's just going to get worse…
		Susan	Nobody says it but we all know these are difficult times it just does not look too good.
		Charlie	They just didn't do a good job and they could have. She was unfair and went behind my back. We don't know, that pathway bit of the surgery that's never been looked at.
Immediacy Unfair Change. Others perceived as threat. *(Evaluation)*.		Penny	Others not fair." Not listening". "Poor management by others." They said I would be "acted up to that role and then I wasn't, they just don't care." Sense of unfairness on me or what is mine (i.e. job tasks).
		Susan	"that process they talk about but we are just you know….Everybody is afraid….Anything could happen and at any time I might be out of a job". In fear she believes it is a pending threat the change. Can happen any time.
		Daniela	"And she was very critical of me. And I felt quite unfairly because I had actually said to her that I wanted help and support." The colleague was not liked and perceived as a problem.
		Emma	"I am an excellent manager and it is not always fair and it is not necessary." They were seen as a

		threat to her development in her job during the change context
Confronted person or suppressed troubling beliefs about incident (reaction)	Penny	"you just can't do it….it's too much…I have nothing left" She gives up and decides to go about doing her job on a day to day basis by actively forgetting the unfairness from others towards her
	Daniela	I have just Contained it with a lid. "Felt like expressing" but "contained with a lid" – believed there is just an atmosphere of uncertainty contributing to her belief that she can make a difference. Accepts unfairness.
	Charlie	Saw little point in confronting people and believed processes were not working." Re-grading didn't work." Immediate threat to her job. Belief to suppress. On another incident reacted by confronting believed it was too much. Went against "my values".
Certainty Seems wrong and unfair others seen with conviction as threats/problems (Evaluation)	Daniela	Was angry and believed she was "not fairly treated" Remained passive but certain that it was wrong to see that happen to her. Was sure that she was "less valued" during change. Saw it as bad.
	Emma	It seemed unfair the colleague "held on to older structures" there was conviction in the wrongness of the other person. Their "authoritarian behaviour" is seen as such without doubt. (see appendix 5.2 personal grid constructs uncertain-certainty and anxious-certain)
	Rachel	Believed that reconfiguration was unfair on everybody because it was not going anywhere. "annoyed at offer for job" saw it as not enough to reflect her value. "Expoitative." It was unfair that she was excluded from the change this instilled certainty in belief that change was wrong.
Confronted person or suppressed troubling beliefs about incident	` Daniela	"Felt victimized". "There was not much I could, you know." Sees self as passive and therefore not able to react. Suppresses.
	Charlie	Saw the treatment of patients as unfairly blamed on colleagues. "felt let down" by change implementing others and confronted by using authority to "Expand pathways".

	Richard	Directly used authority and confronted to block change implementers. Certain they "did not know what needs to be done." Reacts with certainty of their wrongness and the fairness that needs to be protected as what he described as his "legacy." Believed that others did not care for him or his teams benefit. They were just there to "hen their nest".

Congruence – This is a poorly researched idea in organization studies. Congruence means that during emotion a person's beliefs lead to similar beliefs that are congruent with the emotion being experienced (Bower, 1981). For instance an angry worker will continue in an iterative cycle to believe and focus on the angering aspect of a situation. In this process the worker become angrier and angrier. The emotional experience goes from bad to worse. The participants in my research displayed congruence. Engulfed in uncertainty the participants formed the belief that change was *digging itself into a grave*. The table shows a set of quotes chosen for their potency in illustrating the belief that change was going to get worse. The situation looked like a spiral. I will return to illustrate this in latter sections. The current chapter demonstrates that congruence was indeed present in the experiences of workers. This made certain features of the environment more salient.

Immediacy – This is a contemporary idea proposed by Elster (2009) and by Goldie (2002a). The idea is that in emotion one sees things as magnified, closer, and more likely. This assumption suggests that during emotion beliefs one holds are of a certain sort. Believing when one is emotional is unlike believing the same things when one is not emotional (Goldie, 2002a.p.18). If this is the case than it follows that during emotion beliefs held will be of a sort that exhibit immediacy to the worker. Things seem closer or more likely. The participants in my research believed that others were a threat. They also believed that the likelihood of negative impact of change was high/ magnified. Section 5.6 demonstrates that participants saw others as immediate threats to job tasks.

Certainty – Research focused on emotion as a series of causal events has described certainty as a feature of emotion. Certainty is associated with anger (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2011; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; lerner and keltner, 2001; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). However Goldie (2002a) has argued that certainty must be present in every emotion. One must grasp the certainty of some aspect of the world by believing it to be in a certain way. One focuses on the angering or fearful aspect of a situation as being a certain way such that emotion emerges as a reality of its own kind. The participants in my research were certain in an absolute degree about the threats they faced in the form of persons carrying out organizational change. Section 5.7 demonstrates this in detail.

5.4 INTENTIONALITY, FEELINGS AND BELIEFS

Intentionality seems to be present within both the feelings and the beliefs held by workers involved in change. Chapter four expounded this point where participants expressed feelings towards the change at the network. Participants felt negatively about the initiative and programs of change. The most prevalent feeling was that of uncertainty about the change and a sense of exclusion. One example is an incident Rachel shared with me which we named "Seeing the change proposals concerned with fear". The summary is provided in appendix 5.2. The incident involved the unveiling of change plans. Rachel remembers seeing some documents illustrating "some type of change plans". She explained that her reaction was to initially feel surprised and then feel uncertainty about what was going on. In her uncertainty she formed beliefs about what might happen – this involved anticipating what if scenarios. She felt fear and anticipated negative consequences of job loss and this was despite any hint of job loss in the documents that had been unveiled.

What we see here is a relation between intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. Rachel feels towards change and this represents intentional behavior. Her feelings seem to generate similarly negative beliefs. This also represents intentionality. At the core here sits intentionality as present in two ways, either through feelings or through beliefs. Both components are capable of being experienced as part of the workers emotional experience.

Another example is an incident that Emma, one of the administrators, shared with me. We named the incident "Frustrated with tasks". This was about a time when Emma felt frustration in being incapable of doing the tasks that she had been assigned. Following on from the initial change proposals that had been unveiled at the network; Emma's job role was changing. One of her job tasks now was to implement change in terms of documentation of medical supplies. However there was no clear direction or instructions provided to her. She felt confused and uncertain about her place in change. There was no training provided. With becoming uncertain and her sense of incapability; there was frustration. However what we see is that Emma at the most fundamental level is unable to pinpoint her place in change. She is also unable to attribute clearly where change is happening and who is to blame for the lack of direction and clarity about her role. The lesson to learn from her incident is that intentionality is an essential component in emotional experience that enables one to experience anger or fear 'towards'. Emma's frustration is just her frustration and it is not clearly about change because she cannot pinpoint change or her place within change. But it is towards this idea of change. Once Emma forms beliefs about change her perspective becomes definite and more sensible – it was about the specific process of change that modified her tasks.

Without intentionality it is hard to imagine how emotional experience would exist. Emma's incident shows that one can be confused, frustrated and uncertain and that intentionality is required to ground such experiences into being about the environment of change. Another example that demonstrates relations between intentionality, feelings, and beliefs was an incident that Daniela, another administrator shared with me. This

again demonstrates what Emma's incident demonstrated; that is, intentionality grounds or localizes emotion through feelings and beliefs. We agreed to name the incident "Fear/anger colleague's actions, made me feel victimized". As a part of change initiatives the network implemented training for administrative staff. This was a relatively structured initiative where one could experience change in the form of training. The training involved certain tasks that were meant to instill skills and knowledge in workers. Daniela explained that even before training had started she felt afraid. Her feeling of fear involved thoughts of her failure to complete the training. Similar to Emma's perspective presented above, Daniela also had a sense of 'lack of ability' to cope with change. Her fear was thus her belief that she might not be up to the challenge. However once training had started she gained confidence and her uncertainty about her ability dissipated.

Reflecting on the training sessions Daniela saw them as badly implemented initiatives. She believed that there was inadequate time to learn tasks and develop skills. She felt anger about the lack of organization with which the change had been implemented. However prior to her anger Daniela much like Emma had felt frustrated in anticipating that she might fail in training. Her frustration turned to anger once intentionality was discernable within her belief that training was inadequately implemented. Thus we see that her evaluation about training grounded her anger. In other words, intentionality functions to ground through feelings and beliefs, the person's emotional experience within the environment. In this case the environment of organizational change. The central idea here is that intentionality is a core component of emotion. In all three incidents presented above feelings and beliefs seem to be terms through which this core component manifests. This was the case with the 34 incidents summarized in appendix 5.2. The two components feelings and beliefs are related to three further features of congruence, immediacy, and certainty which were overviewed in the previous section.

5.4 CONGRUENCE: WHY IS PENNY'S CASE A GOOD EXAMPLE?

Although congruence was present for all of the participants, it seems that Penny's case was particularly illustrative (see Appendix 5.2 for case summaries). She was one of the administrators at the network. Penny shared incidents that were all negative. Her overall emotion view was negative and she experienced anger and fear during organizational change. Figure 5.1 shows Penny's personal grid. Her grid shows two things. First what is most noticeable in the grid are the extreme ratings she provided.

1	Asked to act up, was angry	Fiddling with time made me angry	Angry and decided to leave	Angry at Gatekeeper	Afraid of colleague	8
Trustworthy	8	8	8	8	8	Not Trustworthy
Others Not reliable	1	1	1	1	1	Others reliable
Others Not listening	1	3	1	1	1	Acknowledged
Hesitant/Not certain	1	1	1	1	1	Not Hesitant/ certain
Afraid	1	1	1	1	1	Not Afraid
Poor Management by Others	1	1	1	1	1	Good Management by Self
No formal recognition	1	1	1	1	1	Formal Recognition
Confused	1	3	1	1	1	Clear
Felt Incapable	1	1	1	1	1	Felt Empowered

Fig.5.1. Penny's Grid

The reason for these ratings was Penny's tendency to see her situations in a radical way. Secondly, not only do her ratings show a radical view but they also show

that her constructs portrayed her situations as grim and thus congruent with her negative emotions. Ratings along the left hand column use words like 'Others not reliable', 'Others not listening' 'Felt incapable', all seemingly oblique and negative portrayals of her experiences. This is elaborated in the section below.

5.5 PENNY'S CASE: PRESENCE OF CONGRUENCE

Analysis of her case showed that Penny had a general mistrust of her workplace and her colleagues. For instance in every incident Penny's grid shows a rating of 8 for *'Not Trustworthy.'* Her general belief was that others at the network were *'Not trustworthy'.* This was her evaluation (evaluative belief) and the danger was that it may have acted as a bias. As a preconception little trust may provide an undue reason to be suspicious of situations one had just entered. I was cautious of this idea and I had noticed the possibility of such bias. During the interview I took a moment to ask Penny whether her lack of trust was due to perhaps a misunderstanding or confusion. After all it did feature in all the incidents. I suggested *'perhaps you should switch your viewpoint'.* At that suggestion she vehemently replied 'they just lie and I can't do it anymore. Their games'. Penny's general belief that they were not trustworthy as liars did not allow her to consider that perhaps there was a misunderstanding at play. This demonstrated narrow thinking and her unwillingness to entertain other viewpoints. Things were bad at the hospital and she believed that it was only going to get worse. The current section demonstrates that Pennys dismal view was due to congruence which was a feature of beliefs held during her emotional experiences. That is an iterative pattern of believing that things were getting from bad to worse.

5.5.1 CONGRUENCE

The beliefs Penny formed featured congruence. An emotional experience that strongly illustrated congruence took place around a year ago. We named it 'Angry at GateKeeper'. About a year back as a part of change a supervisor at the network was assigned to the team Penny was working in. Sitting in the interview and talking to me about the incident I noticed that Penny was emotional in that interview. In recalling her emotional incidents she had become angry herself. Talking about the angry incident made her angry. This is not the focus of my research but a thought I had upon reflecting on this was about the power of emotional memories. Penny explained that the role of the new supervisor – she called her *the* GateKeeper - was to assess the performance of the team on a daily basis. Penny explained that this was a move by management. It was a move that she was angry about. She lamented being supervised closely. Penny said it made it difficult for her to do her job knowing someone was watching over her shoulder. So far in the incident Penny has expressed an evaluative belief. A supervisor had been assigned and this made her angry. In anger she believed that management assigned the supervisor (b1). She evaluated the situation by believing that this change was against her (b2). She further formed the belief that her job was not easy to carry out because of this hindrance (b3). This meant that others could not be trusted to implemented change correctly. For her correct change would be no gatekeeper. A negative picture emerges for Penny. In her words - "The Gatekeeper constantly reminded me of what I shouldn't be doing, and did not give me information to let me do my job. I asked for a bit of information and I was told no …..This Gatekeeper doesn't understand what we do so how she can police things I don't know." A fourth belief is expressed in this passage. The Gatekeeper doesn't understand what we do and therefore can only be a hindrance (b4). This shows that in anger there is a formation of beliefs that displays a grim picture of change.

b1 – Management is to blame

b2 – Situation is against me

b3 – Supervisor is hindrance to job

b4 – Supervisor does not understand anything.

In anger, the beliefs demonstrate that Penny's evaluation gets worse. This is a feature of beliefs known as congruence where b1 as a negative belief leads to other negative beliefs b2, b3, and b4. Elaborating on the incident further Penny told me that everybody was against her at the network. I asked her why she believed that. She said that things were not fair and this made her angry. In anger she continued to believe that things were not fair on her and she suffered (see Table 5.1 for details). The beliefs above are negative in the sense that Penny positions management (change implementers) as a barrier to goal attainment. Her goal shared by the rest of the participants was to continue doing her job as if the organizational change had never occurred. Job tasks were perturbed and the uncertainty experienced by participants expounded in chapter four further added to a dismal picture. The other option is that perhaps Penny wanted to do her job and so participate in change. For this consider another viewpoint.

The term Penny uses to refer to her supervisor is *'the GateKeeper'.* Penny uses the term metaphorically. In the literal sense the term Gatekeeper means a person who keeps guard at a gate or entrance. Curious about this I asked Penny *'why Gatekeeper? Why that word?'* She explained that the supervisor was a gatekeeper because '*she had the keys to everything.'* So she gave me another metaphor! This makes little sense at first glance. One may ask; what is being guarded and the Keys to what? In her mind metaphorically Penny saw the Gatekeeper guarding change and keeping Penny on the outside. By 'keys to everything' Penny means the gatekeeper knew everything about the

organizational change. The gatekeeper is a hindrance to her job and in this sense Penny has a sense of being outside and not a part of change.

The presence of congruence was visible across the variety of incidents shared by the participants. Appendix 5.2 provides examples of congruence at play in incidents. The rationale as illustrated in Penny's case is the following – Congruence resonated in the beliefs that unfairness is getting worse and other are a threat. Congruence did not generate reactive beliefs. This indicates a sense of lack of influence over the situation. The gloomier the picture gets the less we can do about things. The current thesis is a qualitative study that shows congruence in terms of the quality of the formed beliefs as negative. In anger negative beliefs led to related negative beliefs. Congruence has been conceptually argued from a qualitative position (Goldie, 2004) however the current thesis validates this with empirical data provided by respondents. Organizational change literature in studying emotion would expect congruence as a feature of beliefs. This argument is expounded in chapter six where the contribution of this finding is integrated into theory.

5.6 IMMEDIACY: WHY IS DANIELA'S ORDEAL A GOOD EXAMPLE?

Moving on from congruence, the current section looks at 'immediacy'. The idea here is that emotional experience makes the world appear a certain way. This is not a recent idea. However the idea that during emotion beliefs are intentional and of a sort that makes things look closer, magnified, and more likely is a relatively contemporary argument (Goldie, 2009, 2002.p.8; Elster, 2009; Solomon, 2007). The theoretical argument is that beliefs in of an emotional sort are intentional (supported by empirical data from chapter four). The second related point is that such beliefs exhibit immediacy.

A qualitative exposition of this feature is not at present found in organization research. However immediacy is suggested by Lazarus (1991) whose account argues that things require a coping response in emotion and this implies that such things either persons or processes are seen as close threats/problems. Klarner et al (2001) suggests that looking at immediacy using this idea provides a fresh perspective on emotion.

In general, research participants in their emotional experiences believed that change was a threat to their job security. This is where immediacy appeared. Participants believed that people encountered were of a sort as if this was a character trait. That is, in emotion they saw the other person as just that x sort of person. This x signified an immediate threat to their job (see Table 5.1). A case that strongly illustrated how this belief came about was the case of Daniela. Like some of the other participants Daniela was an administrator who worked at the network. The incidents she discussed with me involved anger and fear. The beliefs she formed were both evaluative and reactive. Her incidents showed that in her emotion the beliefs she formed portrayed threats to job security as unfair and more likely than they would otherwise seem to an unemotional person. Emotion formed beliefs are of a sort that is indigenous to that experience of emotion (Goldie, 2002a. p.17-21).

5.6.1 THE PRESENCE OF IMMEDIACY

One incident that illustrated immediacy was "Anger not fairly treated'. Similar to Penny's case presented in the earlier section Daniela's incident involved the evaluation that change was unfair. The incident took place a few months earlier when pushing the agenda change forward a team of workers was gathered at the network. Daniela was a part of the team. It was a new role for Daniela and she explained that she was getting

into the routine. Research suggests that learning new tasks can be cognitively complex and this can involve emotions (Forgas and George, 2001). Daniela was told that the new role was a career enriching move and progress amidst change. Unfortunately a week prior to joining the new team Daniela had been taken ill. Coming back into her new role Daniela was still recovering from her illness. She had approached the assigned leader of the team and explained how she had been ill. She explained that it was going to be a learning curve. The team leader had assured her that support would be provided if needed. Over the next few weeks Daniela tended to her tasks and learnt new things. During this time period the project leader had grown dissatisfied with her performance. Daniela told me that she had asked for support on a number of occasions but that she did not receive the needed support. She explained that the leader was critical of her and expected her to 'learn the job fast.' She described her anger and her beliefs about the situation

> "And I was working with a couple of my colleagues, and one of them was the overall leader of the project. Now, I had quite clearly said to her that things were fine, but I was obviously on a learning curve cause I had been out for three or four months, and so I would need plenty of support and that I would tell her when I was not ok about things. So she let me Motor along, and we motored along, and things didn't move as fast as they could. And she was very critical of me. And I felt quite unfairly because I had actually said to her that I wanted help and support, and I knew I needed it, and I didn't think I could be much more plain than that. And basically, she'd let me run but apparently I was not fast enough. I just thought that was really unfair, so I just told her. I told her, because I don't believe in lidding things up. And she wasn't overly impressed with that."

> *Daniela*

Evaluative Beliefs – The passage illustrates that in anger the general belief formed was that change was fast and this was unfair. At a specific level she remarked

'So she let me Motor along, and we motored along, and things didn't move as fast as they could… she'd let me run but apparently I was not fast enough. I just thought that was really unfair. She believed that the situation was unfair because she could not keep up and did not receive support either. In anger Daniela explained that she believed the leader was 'an unfair person.' Analysis showed that immediacy was a feature of her beliefs.

Immediacy- Recall the definition of immediacy as an emotional state that forms a belief portraying the world as magnified, closer and more likely. In Daniela's case anger has formed beliefs of a general sort and a specific sort. This represents a leap or magnifying effect. In anger her general belief is that change was unfair because it was too fast (b5). The specific belief she forms is that change was too fast and in her job Daniela could not keep up because support was not provided (b6). The magnifying effect occurs when she goes further and forms the belief that the leader is an unfair person (b7). Thus a movement from b5 to b7 is a magnification in the sense that Daniela unduly generalizes. The team leader is believed to just be that sort of person no matter what situation arises. She sees things as they would not otherwise appear in a cold non-emotional state.

b5 – Change is too fast and this makes it unfair

b6 – Cannot keep up because support is not provided

b7- Team leader is an unfair person

Immediacy manifests as a generalization whereby the incident specific belief leads to a larger belief that the team leader is just that sort of person (An unfair person).There is also an alternative explanation here. One argument is that Daniela has displayed immediacy by believing that the team leader is likely to be unfair because she

is an unfair sort of person. The key phrase here is 'likely to be'. In anger if a person believes that somebody is an x type of person than they believe that that person is likely to behave how an x type of person would behave (i.e. unfairly). If the team leader was unfair in that incident than it follows that it is more likely that she will be unfair in other incidents because she is just that sort of person. This shows that in believing such things immediacy manifests as an increase in likelihood of a person as always a threatening sort of unfair person. This is a point suggested by Goldie (2002a) and by Elster (2009). The current thesis has found this contribution which will be further expounded in chapter six covering a discussion of contribution to knowledge.

Reactive Beliefs – Goldie (2004) and Lazarus (1991) argue that in emotion, given an evaluative belief about the environment, the person will form a belief about how to react or cope. Adhering to this idea the research participants formed two types of reactive beliefs. One belief was about coping with the problem at hand (problem focused beliefs). In emotion the participant evaluated a problematic aspect of change. The aspect seemed a magnified problem. So a belief to react was formed. The second type of belief was about escaping out of emotional experience (emotion escape beliefs). Rather than a belief about coping with the problem the priority was on somehow escaping emotion.

In Daniela's example above, she formed a problem focused belief. During her time in the team Daniela believed that she received little support. She was angry because of beliefs B5 and b6 above. She also believed that the team leader was an angry sort of person (b7). In emotion this set of evaluations formed reactive beliefs. In this instance Daniela's emotional sort of reasoning is that if the team leader was seen as unfair and not supportive then she was just that sort of person. Immediacy is the generalization to say 'she is likely to do that because she is just that sort of person'. A person not experiencing emotion might not form this belief. In emotion, Daniela formed the belief that she has 'to confront'. This was her reactive belief. She said:

> so I just told her. I told her, because I don't believe in lidding things up. And she wasn't overly impressed with that."

Daniela's reaction is an emotional one. The team leader does not seem impressed with it. However there seems some reasoning in her emotion. Before looking at this consider instead whether Daniela's reaction can be seen as rational or not rational. Consider that a rational reaction is one that maximizes benefit and minimizes costs (Schick, 1997 p.32). In her anger Daniela decided to confront the team leader. One idea is that confrontation can develop into conflict. This can be non-beneficial because during organizational change conflict is a barrier (Ibarra and Pertiglieri, 2010). If non beneficial actions are not rational ones than Daniela's belief to confront is not a rational reaction. From this viewpoint her reaction is not desirable; assuming that non-rationality is not desirable and rationality is a desirable end.

Alternatively one may review the emotional reasoning that Daniela seems to be reliant upon. She begins with the belief that change is too fast. Relative to this she cannot keep up and sees the team leader as responsible. Through immediacy she magnifies the problem by believing unduly that the team leader is just an unfair sort of person. Under this reasoning she forms a belief to confront the problem. From a rationality viewpoint this may seem wrong because conflict is a barrier to change. From her emotional viewpoint she is confronting as a way of coping with the problem or threat (i.e. the team leader). It is Daniela's person goal of doing her job that faces this problem. This demonstrates a kind of reaction for survival where the worker in emotion prioritizes the personal goal of surviving change.

Daniela's case shows that anger involved evaluative and reactive beliefs. Change was seen as unfair by the research participants. Not being able to keep up with

change was frustrating and unfairness of this made participants angry. They formed two type's beliefs about how to react. Daniela's case has demonstrated that one type of belief is about confronting the problem inducing emotion. The other type of reactive belief is about escaping emotion. Alongside an analysis of certainty the section below will expound on this latter type of reactive belief.

5.7 CERTAINTY – RICHARD'S CASE SHED LIGHT

A feature of beliefs explored in chapter two is 'certainty.' Emotion involves believing and grasping the world in a *certain way* (Goldie, 2002a p.18). The term certainty implies that a belief has a conviction attached to it. The fear of job loss involves believing that it is going to happen. The participants involved in research for the current thesis displayed certainty as having a specific meaning. One illustrative conversation took place between myself and Richard. This case was a good example because of the conviction attached to Richard's emotions about change. He was not just inclined to believe but he believed in an absolute sense. This demonstrated the power of certainty attached to emotion and specifically to the beliefs held during that experience. Following Richard's case I will also provide Emma's emotional experience as another illustration.

5.7.1 RICHARD AND CERTAINTY

The particular incident that shed light on the presence of certainty in emotion was named "Anger and Intolerance at Meeting". Moving in our conversation towards the second half of the interview Richard started talking about the plans of the change implementers. Chapter four reflected on Richards view of implementers. A meeting with

the implementers of change had happened and these implementers were brought from outside the network to fix things. He believed with some conviction that implementers did not know what they were doing. He explained that after the first meeting, which was presented in chapter four, another meeting had taken place and the implementers were in that meeting along with him. He was there as one of the key members and an expert on how the hospital network's ran.

Richard added he had years of experiencing under his belt when it came to managing the hospital environment. I asked what had occurred with the change implementers that had got him wound up. Richard described that *"its was a bit of a joke."* He said that the implementers in his opinion had just come in and had little idea about how the network worked. They were making decisions and suggesting ideas that were never going to work. After listening for a while Richard explained that he had grown frustrated and was becoming agitated and almost angry. In his words he explained his understanding of what had happened.

> Richard: I think this was more informal everybody knew each other. It's difficult. Well I think it's trying to understand why they [the implementors] are concerned about something [the change] and perhaps acknowledge that they are a detailed person. They just get stuck in detail……people just going around circles in details.

I asked Richard about this in more detail. And he added that he was 'frustrated' because he was sure they were wrong. They kept going around in circles. Now looking at his situation the conviction he had comes out to the extent that his belief in the wrongness of the other people was 'too intense'. This came out more when I asked Richard

Researcher: So what about this these other people? You were going to say more?

Richard: Well it's about when somebody start going off at length off on a tangent. And they keep going. It just makes me think yeup that person has no clue......They would never know what to do.

The certainty grows in this second passage. In anger his belief is intentional. It is about the wrong aspect of the behavior of others. As suggested by Goldie (2004) the individual here feeds on the object returning to its angering aspect. There is an absolute in his view. A certainty that *'they have no clue'* and from here the further conviction that *'they would never know what to do'*. This is not the likelihood or closeness of an object that one may find under immediacy. Richard's conviction is an absolute evaluation. He entertains no other alternative or likelihoods. Ultimately Richards evaluation was that the move to bring implementers of change from outside the environment, who knew nothing about the environment, was "unfair on everybody at the network."

Evaluative Beliefs – So I asked Richard "what did you do then?" He replied that in his conscience he had to do something. He was responsible and he could not allow wrong decisions to be made. In his power he could not say no to the implementers. He just sort of ignored or forgot about it as much as he could. In place he had generated the alternative belief that "But I have to learn to live with that. Because I think we all operate differently, don't we". This is suppressing beliefs that are generated in anger and can persist as an uncomfortable experience. Richards's belief to look at the situation differently was really a reaction where the priority lies in escaping from the emotion and from its negativity. He just actively forgot the whole troubling and emotion inducing affair. His reactive belief is one that suppresses what is disturbing his mental life. In Richard's perspective with a sense of certainty this is the right course to adopt. Certainty was potently visible in many of the cases and alongside there was a sense of unfairness (see

appendix 5.2 summary of incidents). Another case that illustrated certainty was Emma's

ordeal at the network. She shared an incident about unfairness. Having met Emma in my

judgment she seemed like a timid person. The kind of worker who would just let others

walk over her when push came to shove as it often might in times of organizational

change. She seemed reserved and took time to open up. The first few minutes of the

interview we sat there talking about the hospital and how her day had been busy. The

incident was named "anger felt maligned over argument". The incident had taken place

recently and she seemed still effected by it. She explained

> "well there is one incident I can think of, very recently, and
> obviously it's very fresh in my mind, where we had, we were in a
> sort of group meeting, and, there were very clearly huge
> differences of opinion around some change proposals, some
> recommendations around interpretations, around what they
> meant. ….the meeting ended up with sort of quite a heated
> argument Aaahhmmmmm, mainly between a colleague from
> another network and myself. She was one of the restructuring
> people."

The passage demonstrates a difference in interpretation about how change ought

to be implemented. This difference was between Emma and another person who was a

change implementer. Again the danger here is that seeing the other as a change

implementer instills at the outset a mistrust of the other colleague. The context of change

explained in the previous chapter is one of lack of knowledge and uncertainty about

where this is all headed. A difference in interpretation of proposals would naturally in

commonsense psychology lead to an emotional response and usually one of anger. A

difference in interpretation can lead to anger (Allcorn, 1994). In this case during the

meeting Emma explained that the argument had heated up very fast and her anger had

come over her eyes like a red mist of negativity. I asked her to explain how it all appeared

Researcher: So in your anger you thought?

Emma: The aaaaa well no, in my opinion I felt that this person had misinterpreted what had come out of a consultation [about change]. The network is going through a major review. We had some proposals that were consulted on and then there is a paper which came out with a response to the consultation. And the structures in the response paper had been slightly altered. As you would expect through the feedback received from our meeting [consultation]. And the structure were slightly different and this person didn't agree with the fact that they should be different. And he was trying to hang on to the structures from the original document. And we Ended up having a heated discussion just like that.

Evaluative beliefs - Analysis shows there are two conflicting certainties. Both Emma and this other person become angry in the meeting. Their certainties about their preferences over structures that should be in place to facilitate change are conflicting. This turns into an argument. The evaluation by Emma is essentially emotional. In her anger she *felt that this person had misinterpreted* the proposals. Her feeling is intentional. It is directed at the incident and more specifically at the colleague's refusal to accept the proposal. More than that this is what Goldie (2002.p.19) calls "thinking of with feeling". Emma's evaluation is not purely feeling. It is feeling drenched believing in the incident. For example she is not feeling without thinking. Her feeling about this other person's wrongness involves many beliefs. These beliefs are of an absolute sort formed during anger. Emma believed that her opinion was the right one. She believed that the other person was just 'stubborn'. Her behavior is similar to what was seen during immediacy. Earlier looking at immediacy we saw the tendency to generalize from an action performed by Daniela's team leader to the belief that the team leader is just that sort of person. Similarly Emma in the current incident believes not just in her heated argument with her colleague as wrongness on her colleague's part. She also forms the general belief that the colleague is a stubborn sort of person. Her belief is absolute. There is an emotional

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certainty in her words. Emma's reasoning may be understood as follows: Evaluation y is reached as an emotional certainty when it involves other evaluative beliefs y_1, y_2, y_3,......y_n. In anger, one forms the belief (y) that she is a stubborn sort of person. This absolute certainty is reached using other beliefs like (y_1) his preference is wrong, (y_2) he misinterpreted the report, (y_3) he is hanging on to the older structures - and so on. The logic here demonstrates an emotional sort of certainty that was present in all of the incidents.

Reactive Belief - In the days following the meeting, a senior manager from the network approached Emma. In a counseling manner the manager had a word with Emma advising her about her emotional reaction and suggesting that she learn to work with other colleagues. Emma believed that the manager was wrong and it was not her fault. She told me that it was unfair how she was blamed when her preference for the new refined report in the meeting was certainly the right choice. I asked Emma about how she coped with the situation. In the meeting with the manger her anger had flared up again. She had generated a belief *to suppress*. Rather than a belief that addresses the problem Emma had given up and mentally suppressed the whole event. This is categorized as one of the emotion escape beliefs generated by the participants. In suppressing emotional beliefs the individual prioritizes an escape from the emotional experience itself. The experience provides a sense of lack of control and uneasiness. Emma said she just actively suppressed the event.

Emma's experience illustrates a few ideas. Her emotion formed both evaluative and reactive beliefs. Her anger was about the disagreement she had with a colleague. She believed with certainty that the colleague was wrong. In her anger she was then approached by a manager. She reacted by forming the belief to forget and suppress her terrible experience. Compared to Daniela's case which illustrated immediacy and formed the belief to cope with the emotion inducing problem; for Daniela the way forward was to escape emotion by suppressing the whole event.

This section looked at certainty and presented the experiences of Richard and Emma. There is reasoning in emotional experience whereby an absolute certainty emerges in believing things about one's environment. Overall the three themes were features that emerged through data analysis. Their presence had been hypothesized. However, all three themes as a part of emotional experience have not been explored in organization research. This research contribution is expounded in chapter six.

5.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The current chapter addressed research objectives three and four. Conclusively the research findings show that participants went through emotional experiences whereby they formed beliefs about the unfairness of the change process. The people implementing change and the processes of change were seen as undesirable mainly because the impact on job tasks was either not known or seen as a threat. This was based on thinking that involved congruence, immediacy, and certainty. All of these features resonated in the experiences of the workers. Chapter six will review the findings and how these contribute to the body of literature that was reviewed in the first two chapters. It will also address objective 3 and present a model that coherently brings together research findings.

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The current chapter discusses the findings of this thesis. The findings presented in the previous two chapters are reviewed and interpreted in terms of their theoretical importance in the field. From a general viewpoint, this provides an answer to the research question established in the first two chapters. The question is; how is emotion experienced by workers involved in organizational change? Research on emotion has posed this question in two ways. On the one hand there has been a focus on the external environments and how external forces of change influence emotion form the outside. From this viewpoint, emotional experience is largely a socially constructed experience shared by members of a community (Berger and Luckman, 1967). On the other hand, research has examined the internal workings of emotion as a mental process. This second option is about how the mind of the emotional person may play out (for instance, consider the experience of being afraid and the mental processes involved). Though social labeling and the interactions and recognition of emotion represent one research possibility, the current thesis maintains an onus on the latter approach. There is room to develop ideas here (Klarner et al, 2011).

This chapter presents a few findings and discusses how they relate to theory. The first finding identifies the implications of emotion for change management. This demonstrates the importance of emotion in managing change. The second finding identifies intentionality as a core component of emotion. This component defines emotion as directed at change and the related micro processes. The third finding introduces

frustration-as-feeling. This extends the idea of intentionality by using it to distinguish emotion and feelings. The fourth finding identifies and discusses beliefs and feelings formed during emotion. In latter parts, a model of emotion in change is provided (figure 6.1). It synthesizes the discussed findings into a coherrent whole and provides a fresh perspective for thinking about emotion. The findings were generated through qualitative research and rather than acting as prescriptions, they are descriptions that illustrate experiences of research participants. The extent to which they are applicable in other organizations is a question addressed in chapter eight, where issues of generalizability are covered. The discussed findings provide ideas that may help understand the reactions of emotional workers during change.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

6.1.1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMOTION FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT (ADDRESSING OBJECTIVE ONE)

Management at the top of the organisation sometimes reacts to external changes in the environment. This includes economic or social trends that require change practices within the organisation (Amiot, et al, 2006). In organisation change, a key resource that requires careful management is the worker. In particular, change is met with groups of workers with their own agendas and interests. In such situations, conflict and emotions can arise (Fineman, 2003 p.120-127). The environment of change is an emotional mess, and it is the management's responsibility to facilitate employees in coping with changes (FIneman, 2003; Huy, 2002).

Fineman (2003 p.130) writes "Change is about feelings and emotion and changing is itself often emotional". That is, as a process, change impacts workplace relationships and interests. One widespread reaction to change is negative emotion such as fear or

anger (Klarner et al, 2011). Thus, emotion is one implication of change. Following on from this, the current thesis proposed objective one, which considers what might be the implication of emotion in change. It states: to explore the implications of workers' emotional experiences for change management. Given the common reaction of anger, fear or even sadness, the worker in that experience sees change as a threat to his or her welfare (Ford et al, 2008; Del Val and Fuentes, 2003). This perception can be found throughout the hierarchy, particularly in the lower levels, where workers often do not understand the change programs or the reason for change (Jones et al, 2008; Lindblom, 2004). Seeing change as a threat, the worker may deliberate in fear the possible adverse consequences for her job prospects. This deliberation may cascade towards thoughts of what all this sudden change means for personal life and family (Elving, 2005). Often, the reason is poor communication by top management (Maitilis and Sonensheim, 2010). There might be fear or anger about change initiatives that are simply not understood. Employees may resist because they do not believe in change (Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004; Spiker, 1994; Sutton and Kahn, 1987). In putting up resistance, workers may ridicule and thwart change initiatives and programs (Lines, 2005). Resistance might come from those who share a sense of personal loss when it comes to their former job tasks and routines (Burke Lake and Paine, 2008). Resistance is a cost and a source of delay in implementing change (Del Val and Fuentes, 2003).

Overall, the literature shows that negative emotional experiences of workers include a sense of threat of the unknown. Change is a movement from the known towards the unknown (Bovey and Hede, 2001). This suggests that change will be difficult to manage because worker emotions are not easy to discern and manage. Worker emotions are covert forms of resistance to change and this makes managing them difficult. Emotions can reduce the willingness of workers to participate in programs designed to manage the transition of the organization from some former to a latter state. This can be a hindrance since worker participation is a key factor in successful change

management (Bovey and Hede, 2001; Erwin and Garman, 2010). From a critical viewpoint, change literature has not focused enough on the individual workers mental mechanisms and how components at this level can generate emotional reactions (Klarner et al, 2011). This remains the case despite the recognition placed by previous studies on mental resistance in the form of emotional reactions (Oreg, 2006; Erwin and Garman, 2010). To contribute to this body of literature, the current thesis drew on the argument by Klarner et al (2011) that providing a perspective from the inner workings of the individual's emotional experience is an opportunity that has not been sufficiently explored. By gauging the participant's emotional experiences, the current thesis proposes two implications for change management. The first implication involves the perceptions of change at the hospital which were formed by emotional participants. There were two types of perceptions to do with the long term and the short term.

First, change was perceived as a long term failure. In anger, change implementers were seen as incompetent and participants felt marginalized. Anger meant change was not supported. Some of this is already documented in literature (see; Maitilis and Sonenshein, 2010; Elving, 2005). What the current thesis further suggests is that anger and the thoughts involved in emotion kept the workers at the NHS from trying to recourse to some other viewpoint that might facilitate change through active participation. Emotion blockaded them. This demonstrates that emotion is a valuable form of resistance to change. Successful management of change involves the successful recognition of emotion and the carrying out of practices aimed at addressing counterproductive emotions. This confirms Klarner et al's (2011) argument that managing emotion during change is a priority on the research agenda. Secondly, in the short term, participants saw change as a constant pressure on their job tasks. There was frustration and fear about whether jobs would be around the next day. Change was an unknown variable. Overall, the perceptions were negative. This poses a hindrance to

change. The current thesis finds that managing change would need to address the hindrance cause by the formation of such emotions and related perceptions.

The second implication is that emotional participants felt uncertainty. Klarner et al (2011) note that during change, emotions may involve uncertainty and this may influence sense-making by workers involved in change. The current thesis confirms this idea and finds that participants were afraid of change and they were uncertain about change due to lack of information about how their job role would be impacted. The current thesis found that emotion coupled with uncertainty meant that participants paid attention to the negative things that might happen and displayed concerns with job security. It is documented in the organization literature that a negative state such as fear or anger may lead to negative construal and a focus on harmful aspects of change. This demonstrates the impact of emotion on the personal sense-making of organizational change (Maitilis and Sonenshein, 2010; Fineman, 2003 p.91-101). The current thesis found that such fear and uncertainty coupled together meant that only negative anticipations such as job loss and failure of change were formed by participants.

The above two implications for change management found by this thesis are that anger and fear gave rise to 'negative perceptions of change as failure' and 'uncertainty about change'. These acted as hindrances. In other words, emotion was a barrier to successful change implementation. Essentially, the human element of change was not recognized and processed. The NHS did not manage employee emotions. Methods for this are proposed in chapter eight, where practical suggestions are made based on the findings of the current study on emotion during organizational change.

6.1.1. THE PRESENCE OF INTENTIONALITY (ADDRESSING OBJECTIVE TWO)

The second finding proposes the concept of intentionality. The finding addresses research objective two, which is to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. Most organization research on emotion has ignored the concept of intentionality. Perhaps this is because most research has not explicitly defined emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). Were research to define emotion, then not addressing intentionality would seem odd. The reason is that in determining whether emotion is about something or not, (i.e. intentionality) one already develops a definition of emotion. This basic rule has been observed by philosophical and cognitive theories of emotion and extends back to Aristotle (2001) and it is still a contemporary concern in research circles outside organizational change literature (Goldie, 2002b; 2004; Tye, 2008).

In the wider scheme of things, to some extent, research on organizations has explored intentionality with respect to corporate identity and morals (Ashman, 2008). In the sub-area of organizational change, Klarner et al (2011) argue that the Lazarus theory provides an opportunity for understanding emotion. Lazarus (1991p.89) argues that intentionality is a central component of emotion. His descriptions portray emotion as a mental state that is always about things one experiences. The current thesis confirms this assertion through empirical research in an organizational change context. The participants that took part in research for the current thesis worked at the network where indeed they experienced emotions *about* things – people and processes involved in the planning and implementation of change. The presence of intentionality opens a new concept for exploration in organizational change research on emotion. Perhaps because of its overtness, other studies have not considered this concept explicitly as an area for research.

Proposing intentionality means addressing two fundamental arguments. One argument is that intentionality is a feature of emotion (Ashman, 2008). The counter argument is that intentionality may not always occur as a feature of emotion (Montague, 2009; Solomon, 1973). This continues as an open debate; however, in organization research and organizational change literature, this is a new concept and thus a new debate. Lazarus (1991) does not question intentionality as rigorously as Goldie (2002a, 2004) does. Lazarus (1991) only suggests that intentionality is necessary by virtue of the idea that emotion is always directed at self or others. Looking at intentionality in more detail, Goldie (2002a.p16) aims to determine whether intentionality, in so far as it is present, exhibits the transient nature of emotion. Much of organization research sees emotion without explicating this point. Klarner et al (2011) argue that the transient nature of emotion as a process in change has been somewhat ignored.

The current thesis argues in section (4.5.1) that intentionality was present and provided emotion with a quality that I termed '*groundedness* in change'. This term means that emotion unfolded for participants as 'continuously about something that perpetuated fear and anger'. In this sense, emotion was similar to Goldie's (2002a) grasp of it as 'in transience'. Analysis showed that emotion feeds on the environment of organizational change, continuously focusing the attention of the observer on emotion inducing aspects. Take the example of Penny. She was a team member at the hospital and her emotional experiences were a continuous struggle against the management. She explained that even when she was not actively conjuring up an emotional incident she could feel the resonance of those experiences. Additionally, when she conjured up an incident, it was a process of shifting attention from one aspect of the angering incident to another. Consider Rachel's incident "Seeing the change proposals concerned with fear". This incident illustrates change as a threat and a process of fear directed at what-If scenarios. Facing the unknown upon hearing about the change proposals, Rachel thought about change and its different faces. Her attention shifted from one threatening

aspect to another. Her fear was about job security and this shifted to other things like exclusion from change and fear of what might happen if she loses her position. Fear is a process of unfolding possibilities to do with change. The process consists of fearing things about change and it is in this sense grounded in the environment as always about things in the environment. It is a continuous shift from one aspect to another. Emotion is a not static; rather, it is a process. At a more general level, this also means that emotion feeds upon things that may not necessarily be a part of organizational change. The worker may be emotional about things encountered in every job tasks. Therefore, intentionality is applicable more generally as a part of emotional experience found both within and outside organizational change.

The current thesis therefore portrays emotion as process. This in part addresses Klarner et al's (2011.p.335) argument that literature "requires a definition of emotion as a process" because it is too often seen as a static thing. The current thesis argues that intentionality provides such a lever that grounds emotion within change; continuously shifting attention from one emotion inducing aspect to related ones. Emotion is change within an environment of change. This is a new way of thinking about emotion and presents scope for exploration by future studies of emotion in workplace experiences (i.e. emotion work). The tripartite model presented in section 6.3 places intentionality at the center of emotional experience. The section where the model is presented picks up on emotion as groundedness in change and argues that intentionality is a central concern that must be addressed in emotion research. This view is espoused by Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), who see intentionality as a central component of emotion.

The counter argument is that intentionality is not a necessary component of every emotion. Searle (1983) proposes that whilst emotions like fear are clearly about things in one's experience, there are also other mental experiences such as anxiety or sudden elation that are not about things. That is, they are not intentional emotions (Searle, 1983;

Solomon, 1973). For instance, elation is just a sudden experience not about anything in particular. Contrary to this, as Goldie (2000) and Solomon (1977) have noted, emotion involves judgments and as such they must always be about things. This remains fertile territory for exploration. A study that explores the necessity of intentionality in emotion can only do so by including and addressing the concept of intentionality in research. In addressing Klarner et al's (2011) call to research, the current thesis has found intentionality as a central component of the emotional experiences of workers involved in change.

6.1.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FRUSTRATION

The second concept found in relation to intentionality was 'feeling'. Referring to employee ability to cope with change, Saunders and Thornhill (2002) argue that employees often feel uncertain and insecure during organizational change projects. In this sense, feeling as a component of emotion alongside intentionality does manifest during change. However, it is not clear how feeling is defined in relation to emotion in change. Within the wider organization research literature, the notion of feeling is not clearly defined with respect to employee emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). The terms 'emotion' and 'feeling' are often used interchangeably and without any care. However, such complacence may be avoided within organizational change literature. Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define feeling as a state with a subjective quality. The appraisal framework that asserts the onset and persistence of emotion as a result of appraising one's environment is by this very fact dependent on subjective evaluations. At this level, feeling must then be involved as a part of subjective evaluations directed towards the appraised object in the environment. With a similar emphasis on the subjective sense of the world, Solomon (2007, 1973) defines feeling as a sense of 'I' situated in the world. Fineman (2005. p.100) argues that "long before there

was thought, there was feeling, and we are all primarily feeling beings." The 'I' of feeling is primary compared to analytical thinking or evaluations involved in emotion.

The participants working at the network showed this sense of 'I' as a central part of every emotional experience. The experiences revolved around the role of 'I' in becoming angry or afraid. One of the participants (Susan) made a remark that resonated with the way in which the other participants spoke about feelings. Referring to how she felt uneasy and afraid in a change context, she remarked "it's just a feeling you know". This captures the non-analytical and primary essence of feeling. Where participants spoke about feeling, they used the word 'frustration'. Goldie (2002a.p.150) suggests that frustration is a feeling brought about as a part of anger. It is not defined as an emotion and instead it is a less specific experience. He explains that frustration is the individual's sense of inability to influence a situation. It is an '*emotional feeling'* that is part of the emotional experience *(Goldie, 2002a.p56.)*. There are two separate points here that the current thesis addresses. The first point is that frustration is related to emotion. Demonstrating frustration, the participants felt inability during their emotional experiences. In a change context of uncertainty and negativity, there was frustration at one's inability to stop the change – perceived as a threat.

Feeling thus seems directed or intentional in so far as it is about change and related initiatives and programs. The second point is that Goldie (2002a) hypothesizes frustration as emotional feeling. That is, emotion has feeling flowing through it. The current thesis shows a link between the two and expounds this through empirical research. Data analysis shows that feeling and emotion are related through the concept of intentionality. The finding here is to take these three concepts and organize them such that the participants feeling of frustration turned to anger only upon attention being directed towards change process or some person. Goldie (2002a) as well as Klarner et al (2011) in change management have not made this distinction. Seemingly, this is a binding of the three concepts - frustration as feeling-intentionality-emotion. As Goldie

(2002a.p.57) suggests, feeling, when seen as part of emotion, involves apprehension and the current thesis argues that this means feelings enter into emotion upon attention being directed towards something (i.e. intentionality). Feeling towards whether it is frustration or another feeling seems to bring about emotion. This partially shows that feelings can have some information value as suggested by Goldie (2004). This finding in the current thesis does not claim that feeling is reducible to emotion. As Goldie (2002b) argues, one does not need to take a reductionist approach because the danger is that analytical necessity can impoverish the emotional experience of its holistic nature. Overly analytical approaches can rob emotion of its lived complexity and richness.

The above sections addressed objective two. To some extent, in addressing 'feeling' objective three was also addressed, although the latter is primarily addressed in the next section. Overall, it was found that emotional experiences at the network involved intentionality and feelings. Primarily based on theoretical conjectures by Lazarus (1991) and Goldie (2002a, 2002c), the current thesis found empirical evidence of intentionality. This appears as new knowledge in organizational change literature. The first finding shows that emotion involves intentionality in a change context. This defines emotion as a transient experience or a process. Secondly, data analysis found that frustration turns to anger through intentionality. That is, the feeling of frustration turned to anger upon attribution of blame towards some change process. For these findings, the fundamental assumption is that emotion involves both intentionality and feelings. An assumption that is reasonable in the context of reviewed literature. The tripartite model of emotion in section 6.3 draws on both components required for understanding emotional experiences of workers. The model will include intentionality and feelings as components of emotional experience.

6.2 EMOTION, BELIEFS AND FEELINGS

Having established that emotion involves intentionality, the current section discusses the findings that address research objective three, that is – To investigate the relationships between intentionality, beliefs and feelings. The literature reviewed in early chapters demonstrated that organization research has shaped two separate research streams. In one stream, beliefs (i.e. rational statements or assertions) are employed to understand worker behavior. In the other stream, which has gained momentum since the 1990's, emotion has garnered attention (Ashforth and Humphreys, 2011; Hartel et al, 2005). In this latter stream, feeling has gained limited attention (Gooty et al, 2009), and the notion of intentionality has been next to non-existent with a few exceptions (see Ashman, 2008).

By contrast, cognitive theories, many of which inform organizational literature, provide accounts that relate emotion with beliefs, and implicitly rely on intentionality. Generally, cognitive theories have portrayed a belief as either an antecedent to emotion or as a consequence of emotion (Scherer, 2001). There remains a third focus that has not received a lot of attention and this is where the current section places its findings in examining objective three. That is, to consider how emotion forms beliefs. On this front Goldie (2002a, 2002c, 2004) argues that our knowledge of how emotion involves intentionality, beliefs, and feelings remains - to speak analogically - a house still under construction. Several theories have ignored this issue. Goldie and Spicer (2002) critically argue that studies which have considered emotion formed beliefs, attempt to reduce emotion to a set of beliefs (Lyons, 1993; Ortony et al, 1988; Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 1976; Scruton, 1971; Kenny, 1963). Though intentionality and beliefs are considered by these studies, Goldie (2002a) argues that they tend to reason away the emotion.

In the organizational change literature, the significance of intentionality is implicitly proposed by Klarner et al (2011). As stated earlier, their candidate for a promising theory

of 'emotion in change' is the Lazarus theory. This theory relies on intentionality as a central component. Findings in section 6.1.1 showed that indeed intentionality was a central component of emotion. Lazarus (1991) also relates intentionality with beliefs. This is where findings of the current section integrate. The Lazarus theory based on earlier work in Smith and Lazarus (1984) provides a two part description of emotion. The first part involves recognizing and evaluating emotion inducing events as harmful or beneficial (the person forms evaluative beliefs). The second part involves forming reactions to cope with the events (the person forms reactive beliefs).

The current thesis found that emotional workers in organizational change formed evaluative beliefs and two types of reactive beliefs (see appendix 5 for incident summaries). Their evaluative beliefs portrayed change processes as unfair. They believed they were left out of change. They were angry and afraid of the consequences. Adjacent to this, two types of reactive beliefs were held to cope with such unfairness. On the one hand, they believed in overt confrontation with the unfair situations. On the other hand, they believed in prioritizing escape from their emotion and from thoughts about the unfairness they had endured. This was either by suppressing the troubling beliefs (i.e. I just forced myself to forget about it) or by forming alternative evaluations that made the situation more acceptable (i.e. I choose to see it another way and not necessarily as unfair). These findings mean that the Lazarus theory, to some extent, applies to individuals involved in change. It can be used to understand worker reactions.

The current thesis adds the idea that in addition to evaluative beliefs suggested by Lazarus, the worker also forms two types of reactive beliefs presented above. The reactive beliefs were about either coping by confronting and resisting change, or by going along with it. Prior studies show that negative emotions involve beliefs about resistance (Klarner et al, 2011; Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004). Anger may reflect the worker's failure to adapt to change and give rise to beliefs of retaliation (Spiker, 1994). The current findings confirm such resistance; however, the difference is that current

findings also show that a worker can suppress or re-interpret a situation and this is an effort to go along with change. In other words, negative emotion can lead a worker to cope with change by going along with it and not just by offering resistance. For instance, generating a belief to re-interpret a situation and hence escape some negative emotion represents a positive reaction in so far as this facilitates change. Knowledge on this front is important because individual coping strategies of workers ultimately shape the outcome of change in organizations (Paterson and Hartel, 2002).

A third component of emotion is 'feeling'. Earlier sections presented frustration as feeling and data suggested that this turns to an emotion through intentionality; an idea that somewhat provides a distinction between feeling and emotion, which is lacking in the literature (Gooty et al, 2009). The current section discusses findings supporting the idea that 'feeling towards' others enables an evaluation of their importance in 'my' life situations. A feeling towards others portraying them as unfair enabled the worker to believe with certainty in their blameworthiness (see chapter four Penny's case, chapter five Rachel and Emma's cases).

In organisational change literature one of the limits of the Klarner et al (2011) study - which supports the current thesis - is that it does not clarify what the term 'feeling' means. The term is used loosely and synonymously with emotion. Fineman (2003.p.100-101) suggests that a feeling is an indication of one's bodily state and Lazarus (1991) provides a very similar idea of the 'I'. Historically, this idea also resonates in earlier work by James (1957). Based on Damasio (1995), Fineman (2003) also proposes that a feeling might tell us something about our position in our environment. This is closer to the study by Goldie (2004), who proposes that a feeling is a way of attaining general knowledge of one's surroundings. It is a general indicator that a situation is favorable or harmful to interests. Findings in the current thesis suggest that this view is likely to be a good explanation of feelings. In so far as feeling is a general type of knowledge, it is certainly an instance of intentionality. Findings show that workers

at the NHS hospital knew about change as something that feels good or bad in relation to their jobs. In both cases, there is 'feeling towards'. There was no rational clean cut explanation and instead it is just a feeling. For instance a participant remarked "I feel that it is wrong to treat us like this. You feel that you did everything and then this happens and you feel terrible, like an outsider." This sentence contains feelings directed at change aspects where the participant places herself as a victim on the outside of change. The participant feels her position in relation to change. A second example is another illustrative remark by a participant "I am not sure, I don't know, I don't know, what you think? Do you understand, you know what I mean…it's hard to sort of place it in my head". The participant feels something but she has no clear rationale or logical statement. This supports the argument by Goldie (2004) that feeling is some form of knowledge. Traces of this argument can be found in across disciplinary spheres ranging from philosophy to psychology (Tye, 2008; Slovic et al, 2007; Goldie, 2004; Searle, 1983; Solomon, 1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). In organizational change literature this finding can be positioned under the call for research by Klarner et al (2011) who refer to Lazarus (1991, 1994, 2006) and Smith and Lazarus (1984). The latter studies propose intentionality as central to emotion and adding feeling toward as a form of knowing opens room for thinking about the distinction between emotion and feeling in a change context.

The current section addressed objective three and discussed research findings. It was found that emotional experiences of participants demonstrated intentionality. This in turn was instantiated through their beliefs and feelings. The beliefs were directed at change and by contrast participant feelings were less cogent. They experienced 'feeling toward' as a guide to the change environment. The discussion so far builds a picture of emotion as a continuous experience (i.e. process) with intentionality at the core, which is instantiated through beliefs and feelings about change. Emotion is change within a change context. From the viewpoint of organizational change literature, this introduces

ideas that answer the call to research by Klarner et al (2011) aimed at arguments by Lazarus (1991). Further data analysis indicated additional components, which arose during emotional experiences of the participants. The following section explores their relevance to research objective four and related arguments.

6.2.1 CONGRUENCE, IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY

Following the discussion of intentionality, beliefs, and feelings, findings also indicate the presence of three other components, namely, congruence, immediacy, and certainty. Exploring this further, the current section addresses objective four, that is; to determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The components have received some attention in emotion research. In the context of organizational change, they provide a fresh understanding of how emotional experiences of workers develop. This further adds to our picture of the mental working of emotion in a context of change.

6.2.2 THE PRESENCE OF CONGRUENCE

Research findings of the current thesis suggested the presence of congruence. The idea of congruence is rooted in cognitive research. It was in the early 1980's that theories proposed that emotional states of individuals form beliefs that agree with each other. In other words, an angry person forms beliefs that validate his anger and make him angrier. Several studies have represented congruence (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, 1987; Ortony et al, 1988; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Fiedler, 2001; Ekman, 2004; Clore and Huntsinger, 2007). Such theories provide a causation based explanation. One belief

is associated with others in a cause-effect schema. Secondly, the theories portray automatic activations of beliefs whereby emotion is largely an involuntary response (Smith and Kirby, 2001). These accounts leave out the qualitative experience of the worker. They leave out the way in which workers see change during emotion. Goldie (2002a, 2002b) notes that this robs emotion of what essentially makes it what it is – i.e. the quality of having lived the experience. In organization research, there has been some focus on the qualitative approach. Emotional labor studies examine how emotion involves an effort to manage evaluations (Martin et al, 2000; Ashforth and Tomiuk, 2000; Msiska et al, 2014). However, emotional labor studies have not explored congruence. Generally, in this research stream, the role of emotion in forming beliefs has not received attention.

In organizational change literature if one employs the Lazarus (1991) theory, then it seems that emotion formed beliefs network together to build the view of the observer. For instance, beliefs that make the worker angry network close together to propagate the negative aspects of his experience. This etches close to work by Goldie (2002a) whose descriptions of emotion also illustrate congruence. Unfortunately, empirical evidence of congruence in a change context is lacking. Based on reviewed literature, there appears no qualitative study researching emotion and the emergence of congruence. The current study specifically found that congruence was present in emotional experiences shared by participants.

Consider the example of Susan discussed in previous chapters. Her incident illustrates a progressively dismal view of her prospects at the hospital. The incident was named "Afraid of new role." Susan had joined the network and change was taking place. During her first week, there was a meeting she attended. In the meeting she felt fear whilst the following sort of thoughts crawled in her mind - I felt afraid. What if I can't do the job properly? There are so many things. And we are in the middle of change. What if I can't make it through the probationary period? This might not work. And I can't be out of a job.

The incident illustrates that connected thoughts or beliefs appear congruent and aimed towards the conclusion that is failure in her job and job loss. Lazarus (1991) proposes that such thoughts are involved in fear. Goldie (2004) also proposes that the development of thinking in a skewed manner towards fearful conclusions is symptomatic of fear. The current thesis found that in a change context, the participants experienced this process of thinking or believing in a skewed manner congruent with their emotions. The findings add the idea that coping with workers during organisational change requires awareness of congruence as a component of emotion.

A worker with congruence in her thinking may come to a disabling point where one can imagine that she just freezes in fear. In organizational change, the worker may continue to focus on the negative side of things. The drive to participate or contribute to change may be crushed under paralyzing emotions and intense feelings. Studies looking at change and conflict may benefit from a consideration of congruence and how this is a part of emotional experiences and worker reactions. Klarner et al (2011) suggest that beliefs drive the emotional worker to participate or resist change. Congruence seems to be a component of emotion that may explain such behavior. One of the related arguments is that emotion forms reactive beliefs that can lead to lack of participation (Kiefer, 2002). It appears that congruent beliefs network together to illustrate a negative encounter that is associated with worker resentment. It was found that all of the participants in the current study resented change. Their beliefs were congruent towards anger or fear of change projects and reactive beliefs further isolated them from active involvement in change. Participant beliefs about unfair treatment presented in chapters four and five reflect the findings in several change studies (Saunder and Thornhill, 2002; Smollan, 2012). Congruence may lead to resistance or acceptance of change. If one accepts the binary view of emotion as negative or positive, and presumes that one is undesirable whilst the other is desirable, than it follows that congruence would involve inference to the best explanation that is either desirable or undesirable in a situation.

That is, in negative states like anger, the worker will increasingly see the situation as worsening. In a positive state, one would conversely see the situation as perhaps unduly optimistic (Clore and Huntsinger, 2007). This presents an area for further inquiry in relation to the role congruence plays as a factor underlying emotion and change coping efforts.

6.2.3 THE PRESENCE OF IMMEDIACY

Further data analysis revealed a second component of emotion termed 'immediacy'. Literature reviewed in chapter two defined immediacy as a process whereby the object of the observer's emotion seems closer or more likely than it otherwise would for non-emotional observers (Elster, 2012; Sartre, 2006; Goldie, 2002a, Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). Immediacy has been defined by Tappolet (2010 p.333) as a state of emotion (he refers to fear) underlined by the evaluation of a problem as a threat that is immediate. The philosopher Wild (2008 p.135) proposes that this involves an observer coming across what appears more noticeable and thus closer. Lazarus (1991 p.122) also hypothesizes that emotional observers view things as closer than they would appear to other observers. This sort of reaction has been hinted by Klarner et al (2011) in their assertion that emotional workers harbor beliefs of a sort not found in other workers. The implication is that in a change context, the worker in fear might perceive job loss as a close threat or possibility. Fineman et al (2005 p.19) associate this notion with what they call a sort of feeling knowledge. In other words, emotion formed beliefs are of a kind that portray things as closer and this comes with a feeling of imminence. Similar to congruence, the idea of immediacy is that it represents the process by which emotional workers develop beliefs alongside feelings. In general, from a research viewpoint, there is a lack of empirical evidence to explicitly indicate the presence of immediacy in management and in organisational change research on emotion.

Findings in the current thesis indicate that immediacy was indeed present in the emotional experiences of research participants (see chapter section 5.6 and 5.6.1). Looking at anger and fear, the findings show that participants formed beliefs that made change feel like an immediate and a big problem (see summaries in appendix 5.2). Consider the case of Susan. She explained how she anxiously experienced change as an immediate threat around the corner: "that process they talk about but we are just you know…. everybody is afraid……anything could happen and at any time I might be out of a job". For all the participants, there was this feeling of anxiety. Analysis shows that the threat of change seemed ever more imminent for those who recalled being afraid or angry toward change initiatives and programs. Similarly, another example is the incident Daniela shared. She saw change people implementing change as an immediate threat to the healthy functioning of the network. She believed it was unfair. The implementers were a threat because Daniela saw them as just unfair sort of people. This generalization meant that dealing with such people day in and day out meant threat was closer than it otherwise might have been.

Conclusively, based on data analysis, the current research found immediacy as a feature that belongs to beliefs formed during emotion. The impact on a worker involved in organizational change could mean that he or she over reacts because in their interpretation the threat or news of change is represented disproportionately or closer. In this regard, one might assert that emotional workers are more sensitive to change. In latter parts of this chapter, section 6.3 presents immediacy, where it forms a part of the tripartite model of emotion. Generally, past research has not focused on immediacy as a feature of emotion formed beliefs. In particular, reviewed literature on change has not addressed this issue. Perhaps this is evidence of Klarner et al (2011) assertion that mental components of emotion in change have been relatively ill researched. Conclusively, arguments by Lazarus (1991) and others like Goldie (2002a, 2004) and

Elster (2012) call for exploration of immediacy in emotion and this presents an opportunity for further research.

6.2.4 THE PRESENCE OF CERTAINTY

The third component of emotion to emerge through data analysis is termed 'certainty'. Anyone who has experienced an emotion has experienced this sense of absolute conviction in what they perceive or imagine about something. An angry manager, contrary to evidence that suggests otherwise, may perceive a worker as incompetent. In anger, his certainty is unshakeable (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000).

In emotion, this certainty is a strong conviction in the belief held by the worker. Research shows that an emotional person in the face of clear evidence which does not support his or her belief will often continue to blindly cling on to that belief. It is a blinding certainty found in the angry person's sense of the world (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). This conviction is endemic of those who blindly followed what in hindsight seem like the ludicrous ideas of history. A study found that angry people are more likely to blame other people, rather than blame circumstances or blame themselves (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). A similar suggestion is made by Solomon (2007, p. 20) who argues that beliefs drenched with, for instance, feelings of anger or fear, are of a special sort. This is particularly the case in so far as the angry person believes strongly and certainly that he has been wronged by another person, and it is this feeling of certainty that can drive responses rather than some calculated rational plan to react. The study by Lazarus (1991.p.91) suggests that in emotion, certainty is attached to our beliefs about how to react to our environment and other people. Specifically, he suggests that emotion may move us towards some goals. In the context of the current thesis, this implies that certainty may contribute to how one reacts in thinking about what one wants (goal achievement). Lazarus (1991) is not clear on the role of emotion formed beliefs

particularly with regard to whether certainty as a feature of beliefs moves a person to react to the environment whilst that person is emotional. Cummins (2006) suggests that anger moves one to construct a personal interpretation of a situation and this can provide beliefs about how to react given the personal interpretation that varies from person to person. However, certainty as a quality that resonates with beliefs formed during emotion is not clearly articulated in change literature.

The current thesis discusses the findings that demonstrate how certainty was present in emotional experiences of participants (see table 5.1 and appendix 5.1). The findings from chapter five demonstrate that indeed research participants in emotion displayed a degree of certainty. They believed with conviction in the truthfulness of their accounts. For instance, the team manager Richard expressed his belief "They just don't know what they are doing [about the people implementing change]." His ideas about change expressed an absolute conviction in his beliefs that he held in a state of anger. He also stated that "one feels the need to do something because of all the hard work that might go to waste". Similarly, one of the administrators Emma spoke about her belief in the colleague assigned to lead a project she was working on and she said "They just do things and I am not sure why, I asked and she didn't listen. It just is like that. [silence] Getting worse."

Data analysis showed that the emotional participants attached a strong sense of certainty to their view of things. They expressed an unflinching allegiance in their beliefs. The findings demonstrate this idea which has also been suggested in the literature by Fineman (2003.p.91). He has argued that emotionally charged beliefs can often take priority over any organizational notions of rationality. In other words, the participants in the current research might attach certainty to personal beliefs over and above any organizational rationality aimed at the smooth implementation of change.

The overall emotional sort of belief held by the research participants that they were treated unfairly by others who were to blame was not unclenching. This showed the presence of certainty as a feature of beliefs formed during emotion. The second related point is a suggestion rather than a contribution. Based on what is suggested by Lazarus, (1991 p.98-99) that in emotion, one believes in harm or benefit for what one cares about and thus moves towards achieving goals, the current thesis identifies a role 'certainty' might play. Consider that in emotion, the participants of my research believed with strong conviction in the unfair treatment they suffered. The beliefs held by participants, had they not been imbued with such conviction, would not call for the formation of beliefs to react with any sort of urgency. That is, if emotion forms beliefs that are high in certainty, then one may reason that this drives the person to react or cope with a problem more readily than if certainty was lacking. This is a mere suggestion for researchers wishing to further explore the Lazarus theory and utilize related ideas by Goldie (2004, 2002a, 2002b) that stand in line with call for research by Klarner et al (2011).

6.3 THE TRIPARTITE MODEL OF EMOTION

The above sections discussed several components of emotion in a change context. These include intentionality, beliefs, feelings, congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The discussion addressed the research objectives, elaborated several components in relation to theory, and to some extent, commented on their inter-relations. Building the picture further, the current section proposes a model of emotion to illustrate and expound how its components inter-relate and provide a way of thinking about emotion as mental process encompassed by the larger process of change. In the past, research has represented emotion through models (see Klarner et al, 2011; Kiefer, 2002; Huy, 2002).

The Cambridge dictionary defines a model as "something that represents another thing". In other words, a model is an environment that is used to represent another environment. This provides the opportunity to represent emotion in two ways. On the one hand, emotion can be thought about through the different components involved in emotion. On the other hand, a model provides a holistic picture, which illuminates how components relate with each other as a dynamic system.

The core assertion of the proposed model is that it involves intentionality. This sits at the heart of the model and it resonates in all of the components (see model in figure 6.1). Intentionality means that the person who is emotional is involved in the act of apprehending something as the basis of his or her emotion (Goldie, 2004; Lazarus, 1994.1991; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). This may involve other components such as "believing in", or "feeling towards", which in turn, as argued in latter sections, can develop through components like "congruence", situated in the outermost layer of the model. In this way, intentionality resonates through the components sectioned into layers. The main assertion of intentionality that underpins the model is influenced by Lazarus (1994, 1991) and Goldie (2004, 2002a), both of whom adopt the idea as a fundamental concern. Observing from a bird's eye view, the proposed model illustrates intentionalit, and the components at three levels: the core, the middle, and the peripheral level. In organizational change, models have implicitly built in the notion of intentionality (see Huy, 2002 model of emotional balancing). However, it is not explicitly recognized or addressed as a fundamental component in its own right. Addressed here, this represents a shortcoming of emotion research in organisation change literature.

6.3.1 The Change Context: A Process View

In the larger scheme of things, the model represents components as processes across its three concentric levels in figure 6.1. These are encompassed by the wider

organizational change process. From this viewpoint, intentionality represents the worker 'apprehending' change aspects as angering, perhaps by 'believing' or 'feeling' something about them. The point here is that verbs like 'apprehending' depict emotion in the model as an ongoing process, or mental development of workers involved in change. In this instance, emotion involves the components intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – as processes. According to Klarner et al (2011), studies of emotion often tend to ignore this way of thinking. And most of the time, emotion is often viewed as a static frozen picture. The same criticism is levied by Goldie (2002a), who argues that emotion is always changing and descriptions should concede this idea.

In earlier sections, findings suggested that the wider process of change at the hospital harbored the emotional experiences of participants, which were largely negative reactions. The way in which change was managed, or mismanaged, partly accounts for the negative reactions of anger and fear expressed by the participants. Their anger or fear was largely due to poor management of change. This included the perception that diminutive efforts were made by management to involve workers in change. There was also the perception that dissemination of information was badly handled. At an organizational change level, the emotions represent resistance towards such processes poorly designed to manage people through change. The workers shared a sense of being left behind. In this way, one can think about emotion, and in particular, about its components in the model, as micro processes resisting the macro process of change. From a management viewpoint, the tripartite model represents components that need to be recognized and engaged by workers and the management, so that change is administered effectively. Practical implications of this are further explored in the conclusion chapter.

Finally, before moving on to explain how the model works, I want to visit some thoughts about the limits of the model. This will provide the opportunity to appreciate it from another viewpoint. Generally, according to Simon (1986) a model can be normative or

descriptive (Lopes et al, 2006; Smith and Kirby, 2001; Patterson and Hartel, 2002; Forgas, 1995; Simon, 1955). A normative model often involves quantitative analysis, and it acts as a prescription of how things *should be*. By contrast, a descriptive model is largely an illustration of *what was found* and *how it appeared to work as a whole.* The proposed model is an attempt to provide a descriptive explanation.

Critical about the use of a model, Goldie and Spicer (2002) offer the argument that emotion is like the weather system, which is unpredictable because it never repeats itself. It is too complex and most analytical models are too simple. Therefore, models do not provide justice to such occurrences. Contrary to this, the proposed model is a guide to thinking about how emotion unfolds in a change context. Therefore, normative concerns levied by Goldie (2002), whilst valuable, do not impose a great limit. In favor of a model, Klarner et al (2011) have proposed that, whilst there are models of emotion (Kiefer, 2002; Huy, 2002); these do not illustrate emotion as a process. The proposed model with its components, specifically addresses this criticism.

6.3.2 THE MODEL AND ITS COMPONENTS

The tripartite model is illustrated in figure 6.1. It was inductively derived from analysis and interpretation of qualitative data collected through interviews. The innermost layer is the core and represents intentionality. The second middle layer consists of beliefs and feelings, as components that instantiate intentionality (that is, beliefs and feelings are directed at things). The third layer stands on the periphery and consists of congruence, immediacy, and certainty.

Figure 6.1 The Tripartite Model of Emotion

Given its components, the model possesses a particular directionality. The oxford dictionary defines directionality as "having a particular direction of motion, progression, or orientation." The model has an outward directionality and a circular directionality around the circumference. This means that the model is interpreted as initiating from the core layer towards the outer layers. At the outer layer, the three components are related.

The workings of the model unfold whilst the individual is in the grip of emotion. The outward directionality relies on relations that exist between the components. The central assertion of the model, as mentioned earlier, is the existence of intentionality. Data analysis showed that in the 34 incidents, emotion was about something to do with change. The worker is not just angry, but he or she is angry about something, or at something to do with change. For example, in one of the emotional incidents that Emma,

one of the participants, shared with me, she had grown angry at unfair training programs. Her 'anger at the programs' was a process of shifting attention directed at different aspects of the program. This involved the formation of beliefs and feelings directed at, for instance, program administration, or the lack of involvement in designing the program. In anger, Emma's shifting attention involves beliefs and feelings, and this represents a concentric move from the innermost core layer to the middle layer. This is a move from intentionality to the middle layer, where intentionality resonates through Emma's beliefs and feelings about the change program and its aspects (see arrows in figure 6.1). Whilst Emma and others demonstrated intentionality, it was also found that this concept is a fundamental concern, not just for its presence, but for its possible absence as well. In other words, non-intentionality was also an idea that was entertained in chapter four. It was briefly found that some participants struggled to articulate what they felt frustration or fear towards. This throws into consideration the fundamentality of intentionality as a central part of emotion.

In the middle layer, out of the two components, beliefs are more structured than feelings. A belief adopts the following form 'x is acting in a manner that is of a y sort'. Here x is the person or the subject, and y is the unfair action performed (in Emma's example the program development) also known as the predicate. So a belief has a subject and a predicate (see chapter five for examples). By contrast, feelings were raw and less structured. For instance, one participant remarked "It just feels wrong. It's a feeling I have about what's happening." In her feeling, there is no clear subject or predicate. In this sense, it is unlike a belief. Conclusively, the middle layer contains two components, and both involve intentionality. The two reflect varying degrees of discernibility. That is, beliefs are more structured compared to feelings, which, as argued earlier in the chapter, provides a sort of general knowledge in a situation rather than specific detailed assertions. In the model, the two components in the middle layer develop and generate. So for instance, an angry individual's belief is linked with other beliefs, as well as related

feelings. Such development is represented by the components in the third layer. These are congruence, immediacy, and certainty. To the extent that these are developments, one can think of them as processes.

One of these is congruence. This is a mental process that forms beliefs consonant with the felt emotion and its theme (Lazarus, 1991; Fitness, 2000; Forgas and George, 2001). Findings show that angry participants tended to form beliefs that further validated the theme of 'unfair treatment' and enraged the person further. For example, Penny, one of the administrators at the hospital, grew angry in one of her incidents. Her anger subsisted alongside thoughts about unfairness. She had noticed colleagues cheating on a task, and was helpless to do anything about it. She remarked "They just aren't trying, and they just do not understand why it's important. It just is not right and why should they get away with that, when we work. It is about honesty really." In this way, congruent beliefs represent a process of thinking, often indigenous to angry experiences. This shows a consonant process of thinking in emotion.

In the outermost layer, the second process is immediacy. For the emotional individual, this mental process involves the development of beliefs through which objects in the environment seem closer than they might otherwise appear (Elster, 2012; Goldie, 2009, 2004; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). Findings provide the example of Susan, the personal assistant in the team. In a telling incident, Susan had become aware of change and engulfed by fear of job loss. The incident involved abrupt news of change. Susan explained that "It's quite emotional because everybody in the team is feeling a bit anxious, or worried, you know. We are not sure what might happen, it could, any day. It all just seems so sudden, it's everywhere, and everybody is a little worried." Susan went on to talk about change as a process and this further illustrated immediacy, she remarked about change as that "…process they talk about but we are just you know…. everybody is afraid……Anything could happen and at any time I might be out of a job". Her fear provides a sense of closeness to change and characterizes it as a threat. This

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process also involves a feeling of imminent danger. Feelings, as findings suggested in earlier passages, act as a general indicator, hinting towards that which requires attention.

In the proposed model in figure 6.1, the third process in the outermost layer is certainty. Presented in the data chapters and earlier in the current chapter, this is defined as the emotional workers unflinching conviction in a belief (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000; Averill, 2001; Cummins, 2006; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008). There is some certainty involved in the experience of anger. This generates beliefs, as well as a feeling of assurance. Findings support the idea that angry and afraid participants leveraged their view of the situation with such assurance, which, when questioned, would water down to a response based on feeling. A participant would respond with a feeling based certainty – as one participant remarked "It feels wrong. We do not even know what is happening". Overall, the participants in anger or fear were certain of the badness of change. It is proposed that perhaps in line with the negative emotion, the participant, under its influence, perceived things negatively. The evaluation about badness of change is an angry or fearful reaction, and under this reaction, there appears rigidity. An example is the case of Penny, one of the team administrators. A few months back, she had found herself in a situation where change had meant that her current job tasks worked in the position they were already occupying. That is, her job would require little or no change. Penny perceived this with anger as unfair treatment towards her. She explained that beyond doubt they (the implementers) were at fault "You just can't deal with this, it is just unfair. Trust me, I have tried and nothing happens the way you think. I was promised and now there is no acting up for me." In her anger, what Penny is certain about is her accusation that she had not been promoted *[acted up]* during change, and this was in the context of colleagues who had been recognized and promoted.

Penny's certainty is a process that locks her beliefs at the forefront and she is unable to entertain alternative explanations that might justify how she was treated. That is, an

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emotional person often clings on to beliefs such that adoption of alternative explanations or viewpoints becomes difficult or unlikely. Table 6.1 summarizes layer specific components, with descriptions of how they develop.

Layer	Component	Description
Core	*Intentionality*	The idea is that emotion at its core involves attention directed at things.
Second	*Beliefs*	Evaluative and Reactive beliefs generated during emotional experience located in the second layer. These expound intentionality.
Second	*Feelings*	During emotional experience relatively raw and generally informative moments directed at what the emotion is about.
Periphery	*Congruence*	On the periphery of the model congruence is the tendency to infer beliefs to validate the emotion being experienced
Periphery	*Immediacy*	On the periphery of the model congruence leads to immediacy. This latter occurs when during emotion things appear closer or magnified.
Periphery	*Certainty*	On the periphery of the model immediacy leads to certainty whereby certainty is the strength with which a belief is held as valid.

Model Components Table 6.1.

On the circumference of the model in figure 6.2 there are arrows. These indicate relationships between the processes of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. More precisely, the findings implicitly suggest how one can emerge in parallel with others.

6.3.3 CONGRUENCE AND IMMEDIACY

Congruence is a concept that has mostly been researched by cognitive theories and in most cases it represents a quantitative interpretation (Bower, 1981; Forgas and Bower,

1987; Forgas, 1989; Forgas and George, 2001). At the same time, there are qualitative studies that reflect emotion based congruent thinking (Flam, 1993; Lazarus, 1994; Fitness, 2000). In qualitative terms, congruence is the angry employee's appraisal of something as offensive. With regard to congruence, one concern arises over its relation with immediacy. Can the object of anger appear both congruent (worsening) and closer or more offensive (immediacy)? According to one interpretation of the research findings, in the proposed model, there appears a link between congruence and immediacy. The idea is that the workers emotion involves congruence, and possibly the same experience, may also include immediacy (indicated as the arrow linking the two in figure 6.1). Again an example is the case of Penny. Her case includes an incident named "Afraid of colleague". A while back she had encountered a colleague in a meeting and a quarrel had ensued. This was about perceived unfair practices. The colleague had yelled at Penny and mocked her experience as a low ranking worker at the hospital. During the exchange, and since after that, Penny had become afraid of her colleague. She explained that the colleague "was out to get her". The fear had become intense, such that, if the colleague was walking towards her in a corridor, Penny would avoid eye contact and generally avoid the colleague. She perceived her as a threat, and she perceived her as someone out to get her (i.e. a threat). In Penny's mind, this caricature of her colleague was a result of congruent beliefs underpinning her fear. In Penny's mind what constructed this caricature were her anger based beliefs and feeling towards the colleague, who was perceived as someone with a personal dislike of Penny. In her fear, the colleague also appeared as a close and impending threat lurking around the corner. The implicit suggestion is (indicated by the arrow in the model in figure 6.1): the more congruent beliefs a fearful worker forms, the higher the chances of a situation being characterized as imminent, largely by virtue of the possession of more negative information about the situation. The data suggests this type of link. The implication is that in a change context, an emotional person, let's say an employee who is afraid of change, will perceive change aspects as increasingly worsening (congruence) and this

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might include overestimation of how close the threat appears (immediacy). In other words, an employee who experiences fear may see change as grim, and as more threatening than it might otherwise seem. This may account for the disruptive and uncooperative worker found in change.

6.3.4 IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY

In the model, the next link on the circumference appears between immediacy and certainty in the outermost periphery layer. Data subtly suggests that an emotional worker in the experience of immediacy may also possess some certainty about that experience. Emotion based immediacy remains very scarcely researched (Elster, 2012; Wild, 2008; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). The tripartite model proposes that it may lead to or co-exist alongside a sense of certainty. In the data, there was no clear demarcation between immediacy and certainty, so that one may claim where the bridge lies between the two. However, one can reason that if an angry worker sees some aspect of change as impending or looming overhead, then at the same time, she must be certain about the presence and effect of that aspect. This certainty is built to unshakable levels of conviction in emotion. The threat of change is close and it is certainly a threat and nothing else.

Consider the case of Rachel, one of the team administrators. She shared an incident that involved a lack of resources to carry out some tasks. She had been assigned as the change program initiative manger, and in her new role, she had asked for more personnel. It had been a while and nothing had happened. Rachel had grown angry with the management. There was no response from them. In anger she believed that costs would be very high in the longer run. In her anger she felt that the management had asked for help, and now her talent was being exploited, mainly because they expected

her to do all the work, and this felt unfair. She perceived the costs in terms of failure as very high. In her anger, she thought that management was incompetent, and change would collapse at any moment. In her anger, this feeling of urgency seemed at a peak. She remarked it was *"chaotic"* and *"not sensible".* Thus, in anger she experiences this immediacy. Alongside this, Rachel also stated her version of the incident with extreme conviction. When asked about whether she was sure about how the incident had happened, there seemed little or no doubt in her mind. "They know what they are doing. I mean com'on usman. It really is not like that. There just seems no will to help us, and hhhhmmmmm we are expected to work." Thus, it is implicitly suggested that on the periphery on the tripartite model of emotion, the process of immediacy may also involve certainty. The link between the two has been suggested. This opens room for further inquiry.

6.3.5 Certainty and Congruence

Thirdly, looking at the model in figure 6.1, one can interpret a link between certainty and congruence. This is indicated in the model by an arrow. The process of certainty is often attributed to a feeling attached to a belief (Goldie, 2004; Lazarus, 1994; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984 p.78). It is also associated with the gut feeling one has of immediate certainty and rightness about their conviction of something to be the case (Averill, 2001; Saddler-Smith, 2008 p.75). In some cases, this response might be a feeling and nothing more. It may not be the mathematically rational belief in terms of how efficiently it gets the worker to achieve, say the goal of securing a promotion during change; however, it does feel like the right thing to believe (Lowenstein et al, 2001).

In this way, emotion-based certainty seems to fly in the face of conventional rationale. In the half time at a football game, try explaining the poor skills of a football player to a Manchester United fan, and that certainty in the fault of the other team will instantly stare back at you. Similarly, try explaining to an angry worker that his conviction in wrongdoing on the part of the management is not right. He will quickly rationalize his anger with the generation of more congruent beliefs. In other words, when congruence is challenged, the worker might respond with the generation of more consonant beliefs to validate his or her anger. This idea is supported by the argument of emotional processing in cognitive studies (Forgas, 2006; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984 p.78; Bower, 1981). The argument states that in a worker's memory, emotion is organized at the center of a structure. The structure is used to generate beliefs associated with the emotion. So when an emotional person's belief is challenged, he can use the structure to generate more congruent beliefs in support of the emotion that he or she is experiencing. In the proposed model, this means that certainty underlying an emotion, when challenged, may lead to congruence (i.e. generation of more congruent beliefs in defense of the emotion).

At a general level, the experiences of the participants may be explained with reference to the above argument. Consider the case of Daniela, another administrator in the team at the hospital. Like the other participants working at the hospital, her view of the change was a negative one. She did not understand change and did not favor it. She shared an incident named "Fear of alternatives." The incident involved news of the change, primarily through rumors and gossip. *"There was word around the office and everybody thought it was not good, not good news I mean."* She elaborated that for her, there was a feeling of fear, and she was more certain in that fear, about the badness of change. In fear, she explained that all kinds of thoughts had come to mind, she was unsure of her work on a daily basis. For her, generating more beliefs about the certainty of bad news made it all the more a threat, which loomed overhead. One can, albeit using a somewhat

relaxed interpretation, make sense of her behavior by referring to the above theory on emotional processing.

In fear there she expressed little or no doubt about her assertions, and there seemed a reliance on the held set of beliefs (i.e. in cognitive terms the memory structure surrounding her fear). Were her certainty to be challenged, it might be likely that congruent beliefs would back up her certainty and fear of change as something that amounted to bad news.

However, it should be noted that the data does not explicitly provide support for this kind of argument. Generally, this is because congruence and certainty were components involved in emotion and a part of the model, but their relation was not the key focus of this research. In reference theory however, participant emotional experiences somewhat implicitly suggest and support that certainty might link with congruence (indicated by the arrow in figure 6.1). At a broader level of detail, the proposed model works to integrate the findings of the current chapter. The current section used qualitative accounts to expound the model. The model is an illustration of how emotion and its mental components can be thought about in an organizational change context.

6.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The current chapter has discussed a range of ideas. These address both the research objectives in relation to findings and the relevant theory. Overall, the current thesis is a qualitative study, and in line with this, the findings have provided a deeper understanding of individual experiences. This would not be an approach that one could afford, if one were to conduct a quantitative study aimed at correlations and probability based trends. At the same time, the findings demonstrate a relatively relaxed interpretation compared

with probability based analysis. At the outset of this chapter, the findings included the exploration of why emotion is important in a change context, followed by the finding that intentionality is a key component, alongside other components including beliefs, feelings, congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The findings were integrated towards the latter section of the chapter and a model of emotion was used for this.

The model directly addresses the proposed research question. To the extent that it integrates findings addressing the various research objectives, the model provides a holistic view of how emotion is experienced by workers involved in organizational change. The dynamics of the model are two-fold. Relating the core level to the middle and outermost layer, the model has an outward directionality. Secondly, the model has a circular movement on the outermost level, suggesting links between the components that represent processes on this level. Overall, based on a qualitative study of emotion, the model provides an inductively derived illustration of the mental dynamics of emotion. It brings together components that form a new way of thinking about emotion in change. The next chapter will provide reflexive ideas about the research conducted for this thesis. This is a look at my research journey. Following that, the final chapter reflects on some important thoughts, including the rationale for the current thesis, the practical implications for the NHS involved in change management, the theoretical difference made by this research, the methodological aspect of this research, and related prospects for research.

CHAPTER SEVEN: REFLEXIVITY

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In thinking about his place in the research process, the researcher has two options available to him. The first is to act like the traditional sciences observer who sees himself independent of the problem he studies. The researcher does not influence, nor is influenced by what is studied. The researcher is a neutral observer who represents reality as it is. The second option is to think about how 'I' – the researcher - shapes and is shaped by the forces involved in the research process. The researcher brings to the situation his thoughts, emotions, assumptions – these interplay with what is brought by the research participants and their views. The researcher can recognize this interplay and think about it in the context of changing power-relationships, social norms, time-frames, academic debate, and practice (Steier, 1991). The current chapter is about this second option: Reflexivity.

I reflect on my personal journey through the world of research. The current thesis does not adopt the first option above, where the researcher is a neutral uninfluenced observer. It is impossible for the researcher to not shape and not be shaped by the research process (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Glaser and Straus, 1976.p.3). More to the point, the research process is not so much an unfolding sequence of physical actions (i.e. causal process) but rather it is an experience that is lived by the conscious researcher. Rather than turn a blind eye to what this research experience has to offer, the researcher should embrace it by recognizing it as a learning experience. This is the purpose of the current chapter. That is, to share what has been learnt from the research process as an experience "I" have lived. This chapter is organized in the following way – first I draw on the passive-active dimension of the researcher. This is an argument about the role of the researcher as either the passive receiver of content like a mirror

that reflects reality or as an active agent that carves out and shapes reality. This is followed by reflection on the various relationships formed during research with people and with theory. Then, I provide an illustration of the research stages that I went through. The stages are problem formulation, access to research data, Interpretations and confusion, fitting your contribution to research, and reflecting on reflexivity.

7.1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF REFLEXIVE RESEARCH

Reflecting on my research experience would be a futile undertaking if in doing research I was merely a receptacle of what is around me. That is, if I were a passive thing then I would merely receive data and through a series of physical steps ideas that inform a body of knowledge would emerge and form research output. If research was in this way determined as a series of steps with no free will, then it would be futile to reflect on research experiences because all in the past and future would be pre-programmed. Looking at emotion as a causal series of steps is nonetheless one approach adopted in research. Sartre (2006) argues that the researcher is unlike the pen used to write up a thesis. A pen is determined in so far as it will not bounce up and write a thesis of its own accord. It is also not free to see itself or others in whichever way it wants. The researcher is not at all like the pen. To some extent he is free to pick up a book or select a journal paper. He reasons or feels out the methods appropriate for data collection, analysis, and interpretation and write. This means, for instance, that conversations in a research interview are not data packets transferred from one person to another. The researcher must as much as possible reflect on whether what he has read or been exposed impart an enabling or some disabling influence on his interpretation of a conversation (Gergen and Gergen, 1991). To recognize where a sentence may have been interpreted as such and such implies something more important about reflexive research. It implies that interpretation is involved in every step of the research process therefore reflecting may have something to teach the researcher travelling along doing research. The latter sections will, to a large extent, reflect on a notion called

emotional reflexivity. This seems appropriate given the topic of the current thesis namely emotion.

7.1.2 ENROLLING TO DO RESEARCH AT A UNIVERSITY

Upon enrolling as a student, a person enters into a contract. The person becomes part of an institution. The person adopts a role. Every role in society is guided by rules and norms (Goffman, 1990). Some of these roles are more explicit than others. A researcher for instance can look to a set of rules that describe the tasks he does as a researcher, issued by the institution where he does research and by general wider norms observable in groups and communities of disciplinary specific researchers (Kuhn, 1996).

Joining the university in the first year of the doctoral program along with other researchers, I participated in training. This exposed us to a range of tools. Reflecting back on the experience, we learnt to use qualitative and quantitative tools. There was a sense of membership. It meant that I was part of a larger community of academics. Kuhn (1996) argues that academic communities have their own rules and languages used to regulate the development of research. Members of communities are both liberated and constrained by rules and languages. This includes concepts and norms of practice. I felt liberated because doctoral training provided me with different ways of looking at research. This was an expansion in my worldview. At the same time, I felt somewhat constrained by within-discipline thinking. The training enabled us to think and the tools structured our thinking of research problems.

7.2 EMOTIONAL REFLEXIVITY

The main idea is that a person conducts research as part of a community and this includes the development of relationships with stakeholders in the research area. Such relationships generate and are often regulated through emotion: both positive and negative. Emotional

reflexivity is about reflecting on the influence of such emotions in the research process (Procter, 2013). I found this to be the case when forming relationships with my supervisors, peers, and with others in my area of research I could come across in conferences.

Learning from my Supervisors - In research meetings where conversations are held with a supervisor, the atmosphere can become emotional. For instance, upon hearing that your supervisor has some positive feedback about your ideas, you might feel happy and proud. In my case, when this happened it built my confidence in my ability as a researcher. The relationship between the supervisor and student was nurtured. The hardest thing for a researcher in the beginning of his journey is to learn to take feedback in a constructive manner and to not shut down. Research shows that an individual will tend to resist ideas that do not fit with his worldview (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000).

I found that it was a skill to interpret and integrate feedback into my thinking. The assumptions formed through rigorous examination of theory enclosed in library environments for hours can leave a person with a dense view of a research problem. Theory structures the way in which the researcher apprehends the research problem. The important skill when interpreting new ideas (i.e. feedback) is to loosen this structured view and integrate other ideas to build alternative explanations and reflect on their usefulness. In retrospect, this skill seems like a very important tool for doing research. The lesson is that one must develop the skill to step back from a theoretical viewpoint and to integrate ideas that modify that viewpoint providing a rich manifold of explanations. One must actively recognize his emotion and its influence on thinkin

Relationship with research peers – The doctoral experience was very much like a community particularly when I was around other research students. This meant that there were informal meetings in the doctoral student's area on campus as well as discussions around research problems and understanding. Through such communal experiences, one finds that emotion is contagious. This was very much the case during interactions amongst the doctoral students. As a community, we shared stories of success and failure and this drove positive emotions of hope.

The motivation sometimes came from comparing your research with others. In doing this along with a sense of camaraderie emerged a sense of competition. One may think - if he has completed his literature review then where am I and why have I not reached the same milestone.

Relationship with Theory – For a reflexive viewpoint theory has a particular meaning and importance. As a researcher, I found that theory is not just an explanation of something in a book or journal paper. One thing may be explained in different ways dependent on whether you are a chemist or an anthropologist (Kuhn, 2012.p.51). I found that as a researcher, theory meant an explanation of emotion in terms of the research debates I had read and thought about; and in terms of what they meant for my research focus.

A related idea comes from hermeneutics a movement that argues about context. The idea is that if you take a text and pick a single word in that text you will find that it is situated within a context. The word is to be interpreted in relation to the sentence, the passage, the book, the writer of the book, the reader, the readers historical conditioning and at a wider level the society they live in (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). But one will fall into an infinite regress if one considers that even a single reader has multiple viewpoints passing from one day to the next. This compromises coherence and focus. The point is to refer to words in context by being selective as a researcher. In my role as a researcher, I found myself at a point where I could see many theories. I had to learn to develop the discipline to be selective. This involved directing attention at relevant literature. The tendency to look at every theory that seems somewhat relevant is too great to curb in a single day. In elation or in the instant joy of coming across a theory the danger is that one compromises the epistemic focus they are building for research.

One becomes passionate about a theory they read in a book. They do not recognize its degree of relevance for their research. This is a grave threat that a researcher needs to manage. After data collection and analysis, one finds that the answer generated is not what was initially

expected. One revisits the literature and so needs to be selective again about what is relevant and not. The problem occurred when reviewing theory where one became too passionate and could not judge theory relevance.

But this is the general research process. One may think he is informed when in fact one may be entangled in theoretical structures. On the other hand, good knowledge of a variety of theoretical ideas can be useful in interpreting data in a multiple number of ways (Alvesson, 2009; Martin, 1992). A related issue that I came across in doing research was the problem of too much theory. Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009 p.154) point out that

> "A lack of consensus is healthy as it provides the possibility of perceiving and relating to the world in different ways and of avoiding blockages."

They refer to blockages in interpreting collected data. I found that a blockage was what is explained above as becoming too emotional about ideas that do not necessarily fit within your research. I found on a few occasions that too much attachment with an idea tainted my vision. It is what I wanted to find. The solution here was to actively forget what is read and then interpret the data (Jung, 1964). Alternative ideas that stand in conflict with the researcher's expectation are not therapeutic (Greenberg, 2004). They may be resisted and bring about negative reactions such as anger or fear. The overall lesson is that as a researcher I must continue to manage the balance between theory and interpretation of fresh data based on management of pre-conceptions, at the same time using the array of theories available to me in interpreting data in relation to research focus is a developing skill.

Interaction with Research Participants - If you are not doing an entirely theoretical piece of work, then research participants become very important. The data is the lifeblood of research and knowledge production. In my research I used repertory grids to organize interviews for data collection. The ideas of Kelly (1963, 2003) were a guiding source. He argues

that one has to relate to the research participant as more than just a respondent to questions. The researcher and participants are co-authors of a perspective they share until each one takes their own perspective with them having left the conversation. The interaction with research participants is fraught with complications. The first complication can arise from too much time spent with theory. As a researcher, I came to the interviews having reviewed and digested many theories of emotion. I developed emotional ties with ideas. The interview meant that I had to actively forget and make an effort to listen to the participant rather than think in terms of theory x. The psychoanalyst Jung (1964) once remarked that in collecting and analyzing data, one should deliberately forget what has been learnt from books and theories. One should make a conscious attempt to make sense of the data afresh leaving aside preconceptions. The story of the participant should be facilitated in its emergence through guiding dialogue.

The other idea is that theory can help recognize voices that may otherwise be unspoken and not made explicit by the participant who is perhaps blind to her own position. I found research participants somewhat oblivious to the impact of emotion on their experience. Not one participant confessed something of the sort where, in their moment of emotion, perhaps they found things to be the case of their own fault or myopic vision of things. From the inside, one may be educated to be invisible to what those on the outside can interpret.

An emotion that one may see as essential for understanding the story of a research participant is empathy (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009 p.54). For a while, I believed that if I could put myself in the participants shoes then I would have a grasp on what each word, sentence, and conversation meant. Each research actor has their unique history and they are aware of this at some level (Heidegger, 1978). One may think that each actor's history is the personal causal pathway that leads to meaning making. Then, each research actor has their own cause not shared with any other. In this spirit Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000.p.152) ask "Can the researcher say anything about 'reality' which will be qualitatively superior to other people's statements about it? What about claims to 'truth'?" In thinking about the truth of my research participant's experience, a thought I had was to ask the question that if my research seeks to

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determine emotion and its workings than an understanding of emotional experiences of participants would be of what sort? In this question, the implicit assumption is that emotional experience is amenable to reason. That is, it is a reasoned truth rather than a felt truth that is sought after.

7.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The current chapter is a set of reflections on lessons learnt in doing research. My research journey has instilled a sense of knowledge of self as a researcher facing challenges and a steep learning curve. This includes knowledge of one's skills as a researcher and the experience of interacting with others involved in the research process. My journey as a researcher will continue. The single most important lesson is to reflect that emotion does not take place in isolation. There is the topic of interest and then there are actors in the process. Both are a valuable parts of doing research.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Central to the current thesis is a concern with how individuals involved in organisational change experience emotion. Often, organizational change is a result of the desire for growth and a means for increasing organisational competitiveness in a global arena. A key source for success is the involvement of workers of the organisation's change efforts. In earlier chapters, a review of theory established that change in organizations is often met with emotional reactions by workers. Whilst change is planned by top management, it demands coping efforts from workers throughout the organization (Klarner et al, 2011; Amiot et al, 2006; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). Scholars have argued that emotion presents territory for further exploration. The process of change is not value-free and usually it involves micro-processes whereby emotion is formed in the workers mind (Burns and Jackson, 2011). As a result, change is often met with negative responses such as fear or anger, and these can jeopardize the achievement of organisational goals (Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004). The current thesis has held the position that managing employee emotion is a key goal that underpins the achievement of other broader commercial goals of the organisation.

It seems that a change context gives rise to emotion, and in turn, this consists of mental components that work together in a dynamic environment. To study this, the current thesis adopted an approach focused on the mental components of emotion and their inter-relations. The methodology adopted was based on a qualitative approach. In asking how emotion is experienced by workers involved in organizational change, the aim was to obtain the opinions of individuals in the midst of the storm. Chapter three presented the philosophical assumption of constructive alternativism. Ontologically, what is real may exist inside the persons mind, and in

tandem, there may also be an external reality. Epistemologically, a person is able to construct alternative versions of any given situation. In other words, he may construe a situation in many ways. Hence, knowledge is based on opinion and consensus (Kelly, 2003). Using the case study approach research for the current thesis engaged with workers at a hospital undergoing restructuring in Nottingham, United Kingdom. Each person presented a case, and shared incidents of emotional encounters at work. Analysis enabled deep probing of each incident and the identification of components of emotion, presented in chapters four and five.

Initially, the current chapter will present practical contributions of research findings. The concern is about why the findings matter for the hospital in Nottingham. This is followed by a discussion about the contribution to theory, methodological contribution, and avenues for further research.

8.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

The key practical contribution of this thesis highlights the need for programs that help 'emotional adjustment to change'. For a worker, adjusting to change means coping with how his job and personal life are influenced as a result of changes that are sometimes unexpected. Often enough, such coping involves emotion, and this occurs at multiple levels in the hierarchy (Klarner et al, 2011). Failure of the worker to cope with change, to some extent, signals bad management practices (Ford et al, 2008). At the NHS hospital in Nottingham the findings suggest that management did not sufficiently support workers in their efforts to cope with change. This is reflected in commentary that addressed research objective one in previous chapters. The objective states: to explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for change management.

It was found that communication of change was poor. This included lack of staff involvement in change processes at the hospital, and the poor provision of regular information that increased uncertainty. Participants shared a sense of job insecurity and this resonated throughout the hospital cancer wing. From a practical viewpoint, the workers who took part in this research did

not support the change. They did not understand the change and resented the management. The implication is that organisational change will fail if an information sharing ethos is not sufficiently practiced. This is the main problem that was faced by the workers participating in this study; there was not sufficient information sharing, and as a result, organisational change brought about anger and fear amidst workers. During change a healthy dose of information is essential, otherwise uncertainty and fear can become endemic hindrances to change initiatives (Sutton and Kahn, 1987). Information serves to enable workers to establish confidence in the purpose of change with respect to their jobs (Klarner et al, 2011).

To prevent such failure, worker involvement and information sharing can be practiced. The right policy needs to be established. It is suggested that a policy which is about worker involvement during change and the education of management regarding the role of emotion in change should be developed and adopted. This can be funneled through the hierarchy with programs designed to engage workers at places in the hierarchy, particularly those who are angry or afraid of change. Both the management and worker have to partner and work together. Researching the impact of emotion Avey et al (2008 p.3) propose change is about internal cohesion and that "This organization change is both critical for managers in terms of effective implementation and for employees in terms of acceptance and engagement".

In the NHS the Institute for Innovation and Improvement published case studies available online to the public, titled, 'Productive Case studies: Staff improvements and leadership' (link in appendix 3.0). The purpose of the studies was to show programs used to empower staff, and enable positive change. At the outset, it is somewhat telling that the whole document does not mention the word 'emotion' even once. In the document one of the cases was based on services in Essex and Luton. It is claimed in the case description that programs are about "empowering" workers so that they "*own* the changes they make." Unfortunately, this quickly fades out of focus. The majority of the case highlights improvements in patient care, and there is little focus on worker care.

Compared to this example, the current study found that successful change requires both patient care and worker care. As a part of efforts in this direction, a policy is needed to encourage information sharing and gauging of workers who are expected to practice change in their daily interactions with patients. An environment where it is considered normal and acceptable for staff to remain unaware, and uncertain about change, will most likely breed negative emotions. In addition to programs focused on patient care, there should be programs focused on worker care. A central part of such programs might be about gauging worker anger, fears, or doubts, about change processes. The impact of such developments is expected to be gradual and requires support from top management. Looking to the future, earning employee support is important during change, and this means gauging their emotions in the workplace, perhaps through one to one meetings, or small group meetings. A good example of this is provided by Huy (2002). He described a study of a company in the Information technology sector undergoing restructuring. Power was devolved to middle managers who dealt with workers. One manager failed because she failed to recognize the value of worker participation; instead, her onus was on economic variables. Another manager took it upon himself and engaged with workers in small groups. "I realized that one could not deal effectively with emotions when one was with a crowd. So I began to set up smaller meetings in groups of seven or eight, and I told them I would be available for private meetings after the group discussion." (Huy, 2002 p.21).

Successful and lasting change at the NHS required a soft approach. This should be based on a policy, implemented through programs designed to weed out negative emotion at micro levels of interaction and task co-ordination. This is the recommendation based on findings addressing objective one. Given the recommendations presented in this chapter, a concern that arises is about research generalizability. The term is used to signify the extent to which research findings from a sample apply to the population from which it is drawn (Ali and Yusof, 2011). That is, one may think about the extent to which 'my research findings' apply beyond the participating organisation, to other similar organisations. Qualitative studies often suffer the criticism that they are not designed for generalizations. Traditionally, the latter is seen as a positivist concern.

Applied to the current thesis, what comes to the fore is the research methodology; to be able to generalize, one requires a large sample of data, such that a larger portion of the population is evenly covered (see stratified sampling Bryman, 2004). The larger the sample, the more of the population it covers, and so, presumably, the safer the inferences of research. Generalizability is a basic core concern with studies that look for correlation type associations between variables. This focus misses out what is the central concern of the current thesis. In other words, focusing on correlations for the purpose of prediction, or to better understand such associations, misses out the meanings that organizational actors attach to their environments. Correlation is the search for trends, and it provides relatively superficial knowledge. The things forgone are the meanings that actors attached to the experiences that underpin the trends and variables used to exonerate the quantitative approach. The current thesis, with its interpretivist focus, subscribes to the qualitative approach. The findings provide detailed and deep accounts of the participant's emotional world in a change context. According to Stake (2000) such findings can have practical uses, and they reflect what is actually happening on the ground.

8.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the current thesis, the central implication for theory is the contribution of the tripartite model of emotion. The model illustrates emotion in change. In both organizational change, and the wider encompassing terrain of organizational research, the notion of emotion sits vaguely in the background. Even, the study by Klarner et al (2011), which underpins the argument for researching emotion and its mental components in the current thesis, does not define emotion explicitly. Gooty et al (2009) and Ashman (2008) have cautioned against this growing ignorance in emotion research. Clarity on emotion and its structure in terms of mental components is one way to define emotion. By addressing the research objectives, the current section will expound the contribution to theory. This builds up to the proposed model as the holistic conception of emotion in change, presented in this thesis (see figure 6.1).

Theory covered in earlier parts of the thesis argued that change is often met with negative emotion (Klarner et al, 2011; Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010). Failure by management to gauge emotion can lead to the ineffective implementation of change (Avey et al, 2008). A chief reason why emotion is present during change is the thesis that emotion is an example of adaptive behavior, and since change requires adaptation, one would expect the presence of such behavior (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg, et al, 2008). This makes it all the more important to develop an understanding of what emotion 'is'. Only after this preamble can studies seek to relate more in depth the notion with other organization-wide problems.

Objective two of the current thesis states: to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. The contribution made in addressing this objective is the introduction of intentionality as a fundamental concept that sits at the heart of emotion. Klarner et al (2011) refer to Lazarus (1991) as a prominent theory for developing an understanding of emotion in change. The Lazarus (1991, 1994) theory relies on intentionality, and based on research findings, this has been adopted in the model. The difference this makes is that it brings to the forefront a concept that has not been explicitly recognized in both organizational change literature, and within the wider terrain of organisation research on emotion. In introducing intentionality, the current thesis brings to organizational change literature the idea that emotion is a process. In his philosophical exploration, this argument is proposed by Goldie (2002a p.13) that emotion is not unchanging; it is a continuous stream of beliefs and feelings towards that which one is experiencing as emotional. Robinson (2004) comments that for Goldie (2002a) emotion is a continuous process that unfolds like a narrative. The current thesis, by introducing intentionality in organisation research, provides a concept that portrays emotion as a continuous process of changing attention, directed at various aspects of change. Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004, 2009) represents the tip of the iceberg, and philosophy provides other studies that change literature can draw on, such as Richard Wollheim who influenced Goldie's thinking (see: Goldie, 2006).

The third research objective states: to investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs, and feelings in workers involved in change. Findings that addressed this objective make a specific contribution to a trend that has dominated research and can be rooted in cognitive theories. For the most part, ideas of emotion have been borrowed from cognitive accounts (see Klarner at el, 2011 review) and (Forgas, 2003; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Scherer, 2001; Scherer, 1999; Lazarus 1991; Ortony et al, 1988; Bower, 1981; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 1988). In this area, studies have related emotion and beliefs; a belief has either been an antecedent or a consequence of emotion (Scherer, 2001). The formation of beliefs during emotion has not received sufficient attention. Addressing objective three, the current thesis contributes to this gap.

The contribution is the idea that both beliefs and feelings are instances of intentionality. As such, both components in the middle layer of the tripartite model, represent ways of knowing change through emotion. This addresses Klarner et al (2011) call for research of appraisals through emotion, found in the current thesis as "believing in" and "feeling towards". Both represent an unfolding process of appraising change. As argued by Goldie (2004), emotion through such a conception is not just brute feeling sitting in between beliefs. During change, it represents a way of adapting to the environment (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg et al, 2008). This adaptation may be a hindrance or facilitation. From a practical viewpoint, Fineman (2003 p.131) has highlighted that success is likely "where managers facilitate change rather than command it." The management can gauge employees and facilitate emotional adaptation to change. The difference this makes to theory is the status provided to beliefs and feelings as two appraisal components of emotion, which represent intentionality. Specifically, this contribution is based on a review of Lazarus (1991, 1994), in line with call to research by Klarner at el (2011).

The fourth research objective is: to determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The three latter components were found in philosophical and cognitive studies (Ekman, 2004; Forgas, 2003, 2001; Smith and Kirby, 2001; Scherer, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al, 1988; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The

relationship between beliefs and feelings on the one hand, and congruence, immediacy, and certainty on the other, appears to be that the latter three components are processes illustrating the development of the former two components. This was the finding of the current thesis. The three processes are novel concepts in change literature. Writing about coping with change, emotion studies have been concerned with employee interpretations (Bovey and Hede, 2001; Maitilis and Sonensheim, 2010). Addressing this concern, two findings provide new ground for further reflection. On the one hand, findings showed the presence of congruent beliefs, immediacy based beliefs and feelings, and certainty. Additionally, interpretations made by, for instance, an angry employee, are likely to involve the processes to structure his or her view of change.

Conclusively, as stated at the beginning of this section, the main theoretical contribution is an assembly of the above findings in the form of the tripartite model of emotion, applicable to change, and perhaps to wider organizational developments. This addressed objective five, which states: Based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts the components and dynamics of worker emotional experiences in a change context.

According to Klarner et al (2011) most models of emotion tend to interpret it as a static non-processual part of the larger process of change. There are models about triggers for emotion, coping with change, and change outcomes (Huy, 2002; Liu and Perrewe, 2005b). There is little information on how appraisals are formed during emotional experience. Klarner et al (2011) argue that Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), provide a good set of ideas for deriving a model (see Liu and Perrewe). One of the drawbacks is that a richer picture of emotion has not been built. Klarner et al (2011) suggest that this would include components like intentionality, feelings, and beliefs, that portray emotion as a process, and consider distinctions between its components (Gooty et al, 2009), whilst expounding on the dynamics.

To a large extent, the proposed model provides a picture towards building this sort of understanding. The model provides components across three levels, with intentionality

resonating throughout. Intentionality, at the center means that other components, (as instantiations) are processes, whereby emotion is continuously about what is experienced (aspects of change). The dynamics of the model are twofold. There is a concentric outward directionality, and a circular relation between processes in the outermost layer. Thus, qualitatively, the model contributes a picture of emotion as an intentional experience, involving 'believing in' and 'feeling towards', which dynamically develop through processes of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. This assembly of components provides a novel picture that contributes to the theme of organizational change, nested within the wider domain of organisation research. Looking forward, gauging emotion as an adaptive reaction (Klarner et al, 2011; Zeelenberg, 2008; Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 1986), there is potential to explore concepts for change management.

8.4 METHODOLOGY

Chapter three presented the methodology of this thesis. A methodology that works refers to how research is done from the ground up. This includes concerns about, how the researcher adopts a philosophy of what is researched, what are the right tools be used for doing the research, and why are they the right tools (Easterby-smith et al, 2008; Schwandt, 2000). The current thesis established a focus on interpretations of emotional workers involved in change. For this, the ideas of Kelly (1963, 2003) were adopted, including his ontology of a world that comes from the mind, and may exist outside the observer's perception of it. This world can be known through interpretations that actors have some power over (Chiari and Nuzzo, 2003). The current thesis in particular, contributes a method for data analysis. Admittedly, some mental analysis takes place during conversations one might conduct as part of one to one interviews. Following on from this, once the raw data is in place, (Miles and Huberman, 1994) highlight the importance of analysis and synthesis procedures. This procedure of organising and re-organising the data can provide different perspectives on the same set of data. One is also moving back and forth between perspectives formed and the theory. Discovering this relationship in the context of the

research purpose presents a key part of successful data analysis. The current thesis contributed the analysis procedure in section 3.6. This interweaved data from transcripts, with grid data, and a template structure, designed to further funnel down data in the direction of the research goals. This provides a procedure that may act as a blueprint for further research of emotion, and perhaps for other types of organizational behaviours. One of the advantages of using the repertory grid is that researchers have been able to develop derived methods that display the use of grid elements and constructs with modifications to best suit what is researched (Jankowicz, 2004; Bell, 2003; Stewart and Stewart, 1981). The application of the grid along with the larger encompassing philosophy of constructive alternativism, has induced creative developments in both social and organizational research. The current thesis has applied its ideas to researching emotion in a change context. Future research may explore the prospects of such methodology to emotion research, particularly in terms of its suitability in capturing the process aspect of emotion in organisations.

8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH

The proposed contributions open avenues for further research. In so far as emotion is an adaptive micro-process in the larger process of change, studies have several themes available for research. One theme is the further development of intentionalty as a core concept. Outside the field, this concept has been delineated into types of intentionality relating to emotion (see Tye, 2008). In organisation research the concept has scarcely been touched by emotion studies (Ashman, 2008). Further research on types of beliefs and deeper inquiry into the distinct nature of feelings, will follow as a result of this focus. The notions of congruence, immediacy, and certainty, are next to non-existent in change management literature. Further inquiry on their influence in terms of employee coping behavior in a change context, provides some promise. It has been commented that emotion is a form of adaptation (Klarner et al, 2011; Zeelenberg et al, 2008; Scherer, 2005, Frijda, 1986). A deeper understanding along the above lines of inquiry can

enabled understanding of adaptive responses, and it can facilitate better employee experiences, alongside smoother change implementation. From a practical viewpoint, to avoid the trouble that the NHS hospital in Nottingham ran into, with respect to emotional disengagement of workers, one suggestion is to develop a sustainable change strategy. According to Fineman (2003 p.131) this requires further empirical research into nurturing "emotionally sensitive managers", that facilitate change at the personal coaching level (Huy, 2002). Managers need to be approachable and establish trust with workers during change, so that uncertainty and fears about what might happen are curtailed. If such attempts mean a top down strategy, where change is funneled down through the organisation, than the topic of leadership presents an area where the proposed conception of emotion can be applied and researched. Leadership is defined as a set of processes implemented in order to moderate aspects of the organisation and move it towards a direction (Dinh et al, 2014). A micro-process involved in this appears to be emotion (Dasborough and Ashkanasy, 2002; Day and Sin, 2011; Dinh et al, 2014).

In this regard, emotion as a topic of interest has started to pick up momentum in journals like the leadership quarterly (Dinh et al, 2014). Successful change requires addressing resistance to change, which manifest as the emotional volatilities of workers. At times the top down message from the leadership can clarify the mist. Therefore, leadership studies aimed at successful change (Levay, 2010) seem in this way linked with emotion and its significance for leading successful change through policy aimed at managing employee anxieties, uncertainties, and fears. One must be careful in relating the findings of the current thesis to a concept like leadership because leadership research has also recognized emotion management as "popular ideas and fads" (Zaccaro and Hom, 2003).

Looking forward towards the effective management of emotion as a mental process, a few questions come to the surface; how is emotion as a mental experience managed on a day to day basis during change? How is change implemented by winning employee emotions through emotionally sensitive leadership and management practices? What is the mental picture of emotion that 'leader-follower' or 'management-employee' relations should draw on?

Such questions do not advocate that we necessarily send managers to do courses in psychology or therapy, which are forms of education in their own right (Greenberg, 2004; Kelly, 2003). The point is aptly articulated by Fineman (2003 .p.197) "To be sensitive to emotions does not mean transforming the manger into a psychoanalyst. Basically, and pragmatically, it is increasing the manger's awareness of the role and legitimacy of emotions in organizational transactions, and about the organizational benefits that this can bring." In the current thesis, this means increasing clarity and knowledge around how change may mentally impact workers. Pragmatically, for workers this is about employing methods of coping with emotion during change, both for the self and others.

Overall, the current thesis has illustrated emotion as a variable that requires a clearer conception in organizational change literature. This is a quest that can also benefit academic understanding in other areas of organizational development. Addressing 'what emotion is', has been the onus of the current thesis. How should it be conceived or pictured as a mental process? Ultimately, the transient nature of emotion continues to present challenges for achieving this goal in the future.

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APPENDIX

3.0 EXTERNAL SOURCE

Online publication by the NHS link from the Institute for Innovation and Improvement:
http://www.institute.nhs.uk/quality_and_value/productivity_series/the_productive_series.html

3.1 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE COPY

This section is a set of guidelines that were used to conduct the interviews.

Opening

I. Opening Section (Establish some Rapport) – Meet and Greet. Introduce myself and gently explain the purpose of my visit and how it is entirely optional. *"We can stop at any time you like for a break or if you feel like discontinuing."* Explain it's not anything like an appraisal.
II. Purpose of visit – Explain research aim and output and rationale.
III. Outcome and benefits – Explain the motivation behind the research and the kind of benefits it can have in looking at employees during change.
IV. Ethical Dimension of the Interview should be clarified including confidentiality and anonymity.

Main Body

I. Give example of an emotional incident.
II. Give them time to think up of an incident and while they think make sure the recording equipment and the tools for note taking are all in reach. Keep a neutral face with a friendly demeanor.
III. Listen to the incident and guide any places where they might need to go into more depth. Think 'Beliefs'. Feelings, evaluations, reactions.
IV. To get to deeper thinking ask "Why they thought that or felt that?"
V. Move between emotion and feeling.
VI. Once grid elements down on paper with constructs give them a break for 10 minutes.
VII. Come back ask them to go over grid with you. Get them to provide ratings.

I. Summarize that it was a good experience. You plan to look at the experiences closer.
II. Show appreciation for their participation. Provide option to contact you for feedback. Explain that the data might require coming back for more. Ask how they felt and if the interviews were fine.

5.1 PARTICIPANTS PERSONAL GRIDS

This section contains the personal grids constructed during interviews with the research participants at the network. Each grid consists of elements (i.e. incidents across the top) and constructs in each row. Ratings are provided. The ratings range from 1-5 to 1-8. This has no deliberate significance. The participants in interviews were merely asked whether they were comfortable with a range and to select one. The ratings were filled in by the research participants.

Rachel's Personal Grid

1	Seeing the reconfiguration plan, concerned with fear	Felt annoyed at offer that was not enough	Information gathering feel frustrated and angry	They not listening felt anger /ignored	No Personal assistant, which is needed, feel anger	5
Response	No response	5	5	5	5	Less Response
Concerned	Both	1	1	5	5	Not concerned
Committed Others	1	5	5	5	Not Concerned	Ignorant Others
Inclusion	5	5	5	5	5	Exclusion
Fair	5	5	No Response	5	5	Contain with a lid
Feel Valued	5	5	5	5	5	Exploitative
Beneficial	1	5	1	5	5	Costly
Controlled	1	5	5	5	5	Chaotic
Capacity	5		1	5		Boredom
Sensible	5	5	5	5	5	Not sensible

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Notes: The grid shows that Rachel felt Excluded with a rating of 5 in favour of this pole as oppose to the opposing pole of Inclusion. The situation seemed to be *"Not sensible"* with a high rating of 5 across the incidents. Rachel believed that the restructuring was costly. The cost to her appeared to be a threat, a threat made of the thought that she might loose her job tasks.

Emma's Personal Grid – Administrator in the team.

1	Stakeholder Event felt satisfied, sense of worth	Oppressed by Manager, fear and anger	Anger Felt maligned over argument	Frustrated didn't know what or why	Frustrated with tasks	4
Control	1	4	1	4	2	Less control
Self concerned	1	1	1	1	4	Altruistic
Authoritarian Behaviour	4	1	1	4	4	Everyone has a voice
Dominant	1	1	1	1	3	Sharing
Uncertain	4	1	1	1	3	Certainty
Rigid	4	1	1	1	4	Flexible
Intimidating	4	1	1	1	4	Empowering
Anxious	4	1	1	1	4	Certain

Daniela's Personal Grid – Administrator in the team

1	Satisfied at gaining position	Fear of Alternatives	Anger not fairly treated	Fear/anger colleagues actions, made me feel victimized	Anger at meeting colleague	5
Feel Inadequate	5	1	1	1	1	More things to do
Stressed	5	1	1	1	1	Relaxed
Low Moral	5	1	1	1	1	Motivated
Felt appreciated	1	5	5	5	5	Felt pressured
Felt like Expressing Self	1	1	1	1	1	Contain with a lid

Feel Valued	1	3	5	5	5	Less Valued
Intense Feeling	1	1	1	1	1	Passive
Feel Isolated	5	1	3	5	5	Feel connected with Surroundings

Charlie's Personal Grid - Assistant Manager in the team

1	Angry at colleague for going behind back and contacted Richard	Anger and frustration at re-grading	Felt angry left job tasks	Confrontation with colleague, felt angry, contacted Richard	Felt frustrated and angry, decided to expand pathways	8
Felt let down	2	1	1	4	1	Supported
Let down	7	7	7	3	1	Anger
Trust	7	7	8	7	7	Lack of trust
Angry with Others	1	8	1	1	8	Angry at nobody
More aware	2	2	2	3	4	Less aware
Frustration	2	1	1	2	2	Being heard
Others Unjust behavior	2	4	2	2	4	My Unjust behavior
Felt ignored	4	1	4	4	4	Included
Not appreciated	1	2	2	2	4	Valued
Achieved personal goals	4	4	2	4	4	Not achieved personal Goals
Self aware	2	2	2	1	2	Little insight into self

Penny's Personal Grid - Administrator in the team.

1	Asked to act	Fiddling with time	Angry and	Angry at Gatekeeper	Angry and Frustrated	Afraid of colleague	8

	up, was angry	made me angry	decided to leave		at situation		
Trustworthy	8	8	8	8	8	8	Not Trustworthy
Not reliable	1	1	1	1	1	1	Others reliable
Others Not listening	1	3	1	1	1	1	Acknowledged
Hesitant	1	1	1	1	1	1	Not Hesitant
Afraid	1	1	1	1	1	1	Not Afraid
Poor Management by Others	1	1	1	1	1	1	Good Management by Self
No formal recognition	1	1	1	1	1	1	Formal Recognition
Confused	1	3	1	1		1	Clear
Felt Incapable	1	1	1	1		1	Felt Empowered

Richard's Personal Grid – Team Manager

1	Felt Frustrated and Angry at meeting proposals	Anger and Intolerance at Meeting	7
Others Know	6	7	Others do not know
Control	1	1	Anarchy
Influence	6	1	Lack of Influence
Order	1	7	Dis-order
Not being heard	1	1	Being understood
Others undermining	1	3	Others supporting
Right	7	3	Wrong

Susan's Personal Grid – Team Personal Assistant

1	Fear of restructuring process	Anger at lack of information	Afraid of new role	Felt bad for colleague	Afraid of other person taking my role away	Feeling Fear about my future	8

Knowing	8	8	8	2	4	7	Not knowing
Uncertain	1	1	2	2	4	2	Certain
Insecure	1	2	2	7	4	2	Security
Job Hope	5	8	7	2	2	7	Pessimistic
Self-aware	1	1	2	2	2	2	Complacent
Control	8	7	7	7	7	7	Out of control
Afraid	1		2	4	1	1	Not afraid
Adequate support	8	1	2	7	4	8	Inadequate Support
Frustration	1	1	1	2	2	1	Less pressure

5.2 SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENTS SHARED BY THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

This section provides a summary of the research incidents shared by participants and it highlights the components of covered throughout the thesis namely, intentionality, feelings, beliefs, congruence, immediacy and certainty.

Rachel	
Incident	**Summary of Incident**
"Seeing the change proposals concerned with fear"	This was when Rachel saw change proposals. She was uncertain about change and felt fear because it was unknown. The impact on her job was not known and she spiraled into what-If scenarios (congruence). Change seemed a bad thing. It was a continuous erosion of her current position at work. Slowly chipping away. She believed its impact while not known, could be adverse. She evaluated change as exploitative because it was not communicated. If there was nothing to hide than why not communicate the change clearly. In fear she formed more beliefs characterizing change as a threat, albeit one that is to be feared because she understood that her job could be replaced. It all

	seemed unfair due to asymmetry in what they knew and what the change implementers knew. Uncertainty added to fear because it signaled that all types of possibilities could emerge. It was all chaotic. Did not feel like she was part of change. She was frustrated at being left out and not being included. This turned to fear once Rachel thought about what was fearful such as job loss or implications for her life goals (intentionality). Although the impact of the change on job tasks was not clear the fear she experienced made the change look like a threat that was closer than it would otherwise seem outside of an emotional experience (immediacy). As a process it grew closer everyday she thought about it. In fear she reacted by Suppressing the incident. This was her fear driven formation of her reactive belief.
"Felt annoyed at offer that was not enough"	As part of change there was the creation of a new role. Rachel was offered a job. She was annoyed and frustrated. She felt the offer was not enough. Believed it was exploitative. Believed the impact was immediate costs (congruence and immediacy). Frustrated that the offer did not make sense and could not pinpoint where it was coming from. From frustration unable to reach an emotion due to lack of intentionality (non-intentionality). Reacted by believing that forgetting the offer is best (suppressing).
"Information Gathering feel frustrated and angry"	This was a time of frustration and anger. Rachel experience frustration because she was unable to carry out her job amidst change reforms. The person who was going to provide information

	was not doing that. Believed it was ignorant others (Evaluative beliefs). Frustration turned to anger once the person was blamed as incompetent. Felt excluded from things. Frustration involved aimless chaos and this turned to anger once there was aim towards the person who was responsible (i.e. intentionality). Formed belief to react by forgetting the whole affair (reactive belief). Section 4.5.3 in chapter four shows that intentionality was potently present in this incident as a general and a detailed focus. It turned frustration to anger.
"They not listening felt anger/ignored	During change there was uncertainty. The change was perceived as a bad thing. Rachel felt excluded. She believed that her input was not included. She saw herself as an outsider. Ignored. (Congruence and certainty of exclusion). Was angry and formed the belief that it was not fair and her anger was directed at them, the change implementers (Intentionality). Formed the belief to confront after having suppressed her thoughts was a while (confront).
"No personal assistant which is needed, feel anger"	This was a time when in the backdrop of perception of change as poorly managed and not communicated Rachel was not getting the support she needed. She was frustrated and believed she was being exploited because she did not have the personal assistant that was needed for helping with her job. The implication was that the lack of resource was seen as an imminent threat. It was pending (immediacy). Frustration turned to anger once she was able to pin

	point and direct blame on to persons (Intentionality).

Emma	
Incident	**Summary of Incident**
"Stakeholder event felt satisfied, sense of worth"	This was an event that Emma attended. It was for her development. There was a feeling of satisfaction and being involved in change. The event was thrust upon her as a prescription. At the same time she believed it was empowering. She also felt frustrated at not knowing where the event fit into the whole change process at the network. Against the backdrop of uncertainty it was confusing. She was uncertain. A not very informative incident relative to other data.
"Oppressed by Manager, fear and anger"	This is when Emma was under attack. The manager was oppressive and not supportive. Uncertainty was high. She was self concerned. There was fear and anger. She was afraid with the belief that she had no control and could lose her job (congruence). She was angry with the belief that the manager was rigid and not flexible (Evaluative beliefs). She was certain of this (certainty). At some level she was also frustrated (non-intentionality) and this translated to emotion every time she blamed the manager (intentionality). Reacted by forming the belief that she should forget the incidents (suppression).
"Anger Felt maligned over argument"	There was a meeting to discuss change proposals. A misunderstanding with a colleague unfolded. One of the organizational change people had a different opinion. Before she knew it she was angry. Emma believed outright that the colleague was mistaken and would not let go of legacy systems (Certainty).

	After the meeting her boss blamed her cautioned her. This further fuelled the anger. In anger she believed that she was being maligned. It was not fair on her. She forms the belief to suppress the conflict. (see chapter 5. Section 5.7.1)
"Frustrated didn't know what or why"	The incident was about Emma feeling frustrated over a period of time during change. She was frustrated felt intimidated with talk of change. The rumors. Everyone had a voice and yet there was not clear direction. It was not clear and there was uneasiness. Frustration thus involved a loss of direction. Things seemed closer than otherwise. They seem to be getting worse (immediacy and congruence).
"Frustrated with tasks"	The incident involved frustration at inability to do tasks. Amidst change she was asked to do some tasks and without proper training she struggled. Everyone told her something different about what to do. Believes it's unfair on her. She believed strongly that there was her inability but that it was related to lack of clear direction or instruction (non-intentionality). Her frustration is not yet an emotion because there is nothing to pinpoint the blame on. Its just a cloud of confusion where in her altruistic reaction she considers everyone's instruction and ends with no clear direction, no aboutness. That her frustration is about nothing in particular. It's inability and lack of direction. Forms belief to do nothing and just forget the tasks (suppressing).

Daniela	
Incident	**Summary of Incident**

"Satisfied at gaining position"	The incident was a time when Daniela had been chasing after a position that had opened up as part of change at the network. With uncertainty about change this position would provide satisfaction. She believed that she might otherwise suffer and there would be all sorts of negative consequences (congruence). She secured the position. Elated and satisfied. This incident was somewhat different from the others because it really showed a relaxed but intense positive feeling. Unlike in other incidents change was accepted. Feeling elated was like being satisfied and feeling valued as part of change. This had little value in the context of other incidents. However it showed that change was in this single instance, just momentarily, appreciated due to positive impact for the self.
"Fear of Alternatives"	The incident was when Daniela was afraid of what might happen. She heard about the change proposals while sitting in her office. There was a rumor circulating around the office, that change might mean new jobs would be created and old ones abolished. There was frustration at not knowing more. She felt unable to react with the belief that the impact on her job tasks was not known. In fear she formed negative beliefs about what might happen, job loss, mortgage burden, career deterioration (congruence and immediacy). She felt inadequate during change. She was under duress and felt pressure. The feeling was intense yet one of isolation. She believed she was not a part of the change (Evaluative beliefs). Her reaction in fear was initially to form the belief that she should seek out information. As an administrator at lower levels in the hierarchy she believed that she should stay quiet

	(suppress). This was her reactive belief based on the belief that confronting the situation would only make things worse for her and her job security.
"Anger not fairly treated"	The incident was about a time when Daniela believed she was treated unfairly. She had come back off sick leave. She joined a group of workers. She explained to the team leader that she might take time to learn. She was angry because the team leader would not help her and criticized her performance. The leader was seen as the object of the anger (intentionality). Her actions were unfair. In anger believes that the leader is just that sort of unfair person. Likely to be unfair given any event (immediacy). The threat here is exaggerated. There was certainty in her belief that the leader was just that sort of unfair person. Perhaps a certainty unattainable outside of anger. Formed belief to confront the problem, a reactive belief. (see chapter 5 section 5.6.1.
"Fear/Anger colleagues actions, made me feel victimized"	The incident involved Daniela becoming fearful of the change training sessions. These sessions had been introduced in order to provide some skills and awareness to participants who were extremely uncertain about the change. Moral was low and Daniela initially felt afraid holding the belief that she might not being able to do the tasks. She moved on from this fear when the training made her feel a part of the change. But there was pressure. She grew angry at the pressure. Not being able to fully perform her tasks she felt inadequate. There was frustration and this turned to anger once she pointed her finger at the training sessions as methods used by the

	hospital to blanket the change. The training was confusing and frustration turned to anger with the belief that it was not correct and made her feel inadequate (Evaluative beliefs). The anger generated the belief that she should just swallow the situation and not react. Perhaps this may have been the result of returning to fear of what might happen had she reacted overtly by confronting the training session (reactive belief).
"Anger at meeting colleague"	
	The incident was a time when Daniela had grown vary of a colleague. During change this colleague was believed to deliberately hinder her job tasks. There seemed some ill will that Daniela had not revealed. However the two did not get along. One day the colleague refused to help out on a task that Daniela was struggling with. Specifically there was some information required and this was not being shared. Daniela grew angry and believed in anger that the colleague was wrong and just did not like her. She was frustrated at not being able to complete her job tasks and this turned to anger once she could blame this colleague (evaluative belief). It was unfair from her perspective. There was certainty of an extreme sort here (certainty). Daniela believed with conviction that seemed unshakable that, yes, this colleague was someone who did not like her very much. She reacted by confronting the colleague trying to talk to her (reactive belief). The colleague replied that it was just not in her ability to provide information. This Daniela believed was a lie. In anger this reinforced the belief that the colleague was a bad person. She formed similar beliefs that characterized the colleague as a bad and manipulative person

(congruence).

Charlie

Incident	Summary of Incident
"Angry at colleague for going behind back and contacted Richard"	The incident involved Charlie in an argument with a colleague about how to handle holiday application procedures. These had been modified during the change at the network and there was resistance from the other colleague. Charlie was anger. She formed the belief that the colleague was unfair towards others. The colleague falsely believed that some tasks were her responsibility (evaluative beliefs). Charlie tried to reason with the colleague but this further frustrated her when the colleague refused to acknowledge her attempts as anything but the factual. Charlie characterized the colleague as just that sort of unfair self-centered person. She saw her as a close threat. Closer and a bigger danger than she would otherwise appear outside anger (Immediacy and congruence). Again the certainty she attached to her belief in anger was strong to the extent that she formed the belief to go see the team leader (Richard). Her reactive belief was to confront Richard to intervene.
"Anger and frustration at re-grading"	The incident involved a process known as re-grading. As a part of organization wide change this process was introduced. It involved assessing the positions of workers, administrative and clinical, and assigning grades according to that. The process angered Charlie because she believed that it was not fair on her. She believed the assessments were not detailed enough and not broad enough to cover the full spectrum of what people like her did at the hospital. She believed

	that people who were implanting the change were not competent and this came through in the insufficient workings of the re-grading process (Evaluative beliefs). She felt let down. Unable to do anything to modify the re-grading process she was frustrated and whenever she formed the belief that the process was bias towards clinicians, it fuelled her anger (congruence). Frustration turned to anger by attending to the process as flawed and bias against her. She held her beliefs with an absolute sort of conviction (certainty). The re-grading took on a meaning whereby it was a large and imminent threat to her job and to related things outside the job such as her mortgage, her lifestyle, her relationships (Immediacy). Unable to do anything she formed the belief that she was helpless and just went with things. She reacted by suppressing the whole incident (reactive beliefs).
"Felt Angry left job tasks"	This incident involved frustration with job tasks in the context of change at the network. Charlie had experienced difficulty in carrying out her job because there was what she believed lack of information and support. She was angry with this belief in mind. Alongside she felt that things were wrong. A general indication. Both demonstrate knowing of by believing and at a more general level knowing of something by feeling (intentionality). In anger Charlie believed it was unfair to expect that she would facilitate change provided she was not given the support she asked for. Change processes were unfair on her (Evaluative beliefs). Frustration at inability to complete job tasks turned to anger once processes that hindered support were blamed. She reacted by leaving

	the job tasks to one side and confronting the change implementers. She explained what was and was not possible given the resources. Thus her anger died out once conflict had extinguished.
"Confrontation with colleague, felt angry, contacted Richard"	The change processes had put in place some guidelines. Thereby Charlie's relationships with a colleague had changed in the sense that both were working closer together. The colleague one day ran to Charlie and told on another colleague. She complaint that there was dishonesty and people were not with the change. Charlie grew angry because she believed that this colleague who worked closely with her had some hidden agenda. In anger she formed beliefs about the sort of person her colleague had become. Looking out for her own back and telling on other people so that she would look regal in comparison. Charlie did not trust her. Formed the belief that she could not be relied on. Formed congruent beliefs that there close working relationship headed for doom (congruence). The colleague appeared a closer danger than she perhaps would were Charlie's gaze not shrouded with anger. The reactive belief formed by Charlie led her to contact the team leader to re-organize the working procedures and distance Charlie from her colleague. A reactive belief that enabled anger to diffuse.
"Felt Frustrated and angry, decided to expand pathways"	The incident involved frustration and anger at pathways. The pathways are journeys for terminally ill patients and form end of life care. Charlie was frustrated because she believed that pathways were insufficient. Change had formed certain

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modifications and these were not enough for delivering good end of life care. She believed patients suffered while costs were minimized. (Congruence). She was frustrated because she was unable to make the pathways better. Her frustration turned to anger when she believed that change implementers were to blame (Intentionality). In anger these evaluative beliefs were held with certainty. She also believed that others could not be trusted. So she formed the belief that she needs to take matters into her own hands. The situation seemed impending and closer than ever before (a sense of Immediacy). She formed the belief to confront implementers of change who were expanding pathways. In her anger she was convinced that this was the one way that would work and pathways would become better. Her frustration and anger would thus be extinguished.

Penny	
Incident	**Summary of Incident**
"Asked to act up was angry"	The incident was about gaining a promotion. At one point during Change Penny had found the opportunity for career advancement. She had been promised a promotion and then subsequently that did not materialize. She was angry and felt that she had been wronged. She also believed in anger that others were not to be trusted and were not competent. What she felt and believed was directed towards others who were seen as incompetent (intentionality). The anger formed further negative beliefs including – others are not reliable, they do not listen, they are poor managers, I am a victim and confused, I am incapable – such beliefs propagated the negativity of anger (congruence). Penny was

	also very certain and this was demonstrated by her extreme ratings and her belief that she was a victim at the hands of others who were unfair towards her (Evaluative beliefs and certainty). The belief formed was to cope with the situation by forgetting it (suppressing). In cases explored this tendency to suppress is one option that stands in contrast with the alternative belief to react by confronting others.
"Fiddling with the time made me angry"	The incident was a time when Penny was angry and believed that colleagues were being dishonest and fiddling with time. She believed they were covering it up. They were dishonest people and needed to be exposed. This was not good for the network and for change implementation. These workers were not reliable (evaluative beliefs). She informed her manager. The manager she believed took no action. This manager was poor at her job.

(see chapter 4 section 4.7.1 and chapter 5 section 5.4) |
| "Angry and decided to leave" | The incident involved Penny becoming angry at the way the network was being run amidst change. In anger she had formed the belief that the whole change management project was flawed. In particular she believed that colleagues were not able. One day she had to carry out a job task. It made her angry that she was not able to do the work due to disagreement with colleagues about the methods involved for completing a spreadsheet. She was angry because she felt undermined. She believed that others were no reliable. Others were not trustworthy when it came to completing the spreadsheet and tasks of that sort. They were a |

	threat (Immediacy). The specific spreadsheet she was working on in collaboration with others was interpreted by Penny with a certainty not shared by others. She held steadfast to her beliefs. Anger brought about this strong conviction in her way as the right way to get the task done (certainty). In anger Penny formed more related evaluative beliefs including the belief that she received no recognition from others and that it was her against them. Things were getting from bad to worse. Anger maintained a grim outlook (congruence). She formed the belief to react by suppressing the whole affair and actively forgetting everything (reactive belief). Thus her anger dissipated.
"Angry at Gatekeeper"	The incident was about a time that Penny was angry because she felt and believed she was being policed. A person had been brought in and she was somebody that Penny had despised for being unfair towards her. Penny did not believe that this person had the ability to police her. The term police indicated that Penny believed she was being stalked or watched without due justification. She believed that the gatekeeper was targeting her time and had little right to do so. Things were getting worse. The gatekeeper was a hindrance to her ability to do her job (congruence). See chapter 5 Table 5.1 and section 5.5.1. In anger the gatekeeper is seen as a threat and an imminent one. A threat to the increasing involvement in change programs that Penny desired. Penny reacted by suppressing her anger because she believed she as incapable. Her frustration that had turned to anger towards the gatekeeper (intentionality); was in the end actively suppressed. This was the reactive belief she formed

	in anger.
"Angry and Frustrated at situation"	
	The incident was about a time when Penny was frustrated with her treatment on a team project. As a change initiative the project was about reducing lead times. These were times taken to measure the delivery of certain treatments to patients. Penny believed that her opinion was not considered and she was sidelined. She was frustrated at her inability to influence the project and to influence others. This turned to anger when she realized that she was not being involved to the extent that she wanted to be involved (intentionality). Her anger painted a gloomy picture and the others seemed conspiring and actively sidelining her (congruence). The situation was something that Penny found difficult to cope with. In anger she formed the belief that she could not trust others. Those others were unfair in not providing her with the attention that she believed she deserved. There was a bitter certainty in her beliefs. Anger further confirmed her beliefs. An unshakable certainty was inherent in anger formed beliefs (Certainty). Given her marginal involvement and increasing feeling of anger towards others Penny formed the belief to just forget about the project and go back to her daily basic tasks. She suppressed her anger and related beliefs (reactive belief).
"Afraid of colleague"	
	The incident involved intimidation felt by Penny. She was afraid of a colleague who she believed had intimidated her by shouting at her. On one occasion Penny explained that she had gotten involved in an argument with her colleague. The colleague was higher up the hierarchy at the network. The argument was about a work

	procedure. Penny believed that the colleague shouted and her with the intent to stare her down, and influence her to withdraw her contrasting opinion. Penny was afraid of the colleague. Her fear presented the colleague as a threat that was progressively getting worse (Congruence). In her fear she saw the colleague as a pending threat to her job tasks. She believed the colleague was out to get her. This attributed a villainous character to the colleague who may not have seemed so dangerous had Penny not been shrouded in fear. The threat looks closer than it otherwise would seem (immediacy). The competence of the colleague is attacked in so far as Penny forms the belief that she is incompetent and contriving. Her incompetence is a threat as well in so far as she may inadvertently also harm Penny's career. In fear Penny reacts by initially confronting the fearful colleague by gently explaining her concerns. The colleague countered this with more intimidation. Penny retracted and formed the belief to just get on with her job. A reactive belief to suppress the troubles she faced.

Richard

"Felt Frustrated and Angry at Meeting proposals"	The incident took place not too long ago. There was a meeting about change initiatives and about the plans that had to be developed and implemented at the network. The incident showed anger about the change. He believed with a strong conviction that the change implementers were not doing the right things. Richard was against the change. His frustration was that change implementers did not consider the expertise he had built over time and through experience. His view of the implementers was that they were there to hen their own nest. That is, look out for their

	careers. There was a meeting and the plans shared in the meeting angered Richard. In his anger he saw these implementers of change as not possessing the right experience and the sort of people who thought like amateurs (congruence). Such evaluative beliefs painted a negative picture of change. Richard believed that his opinion was not being heard and he had lack of influence. He saw this as unfair because he was the expert with relevant experience and these outsiders, the change implementers, were the ones who were calling the shots. He felt he was undermined. He felt they were wrong. Both beliefs and feelings are directed towards them (intentionality). The reaction if to form the belief that 'I cannot work with these people'. They are here to destroy what 'I have worked hard to build.' (See chapter 4 section 4.2 and chapter 5 section 5.7.1.)
Anger and Intolerance at Meeting	This incident was about a second meeting. The meeting was met with the same animosity and anger by Richard. The meeting still in the shadow of the previous meeting fared no better in Richards's eyes. He saw the situation getting worse (congruence – see chapter 5. Section 5.7.1). There was a strong conviction in Richards beliefs that the change was doomed. The meeting unveiled more arguments about how to proceed forward. Richard in anger believed that what he had left behind, his legacy, the procedures, the formalized rules, things that had worked well – were being sidelined. He believed it would be unfair on everybody at the network. The knowledge had to come from the inside and not from external actors who acted unilaterally. The frustration turns to anger by pointing fingers at the

| | incompetent change implementers. In anger what seems certain is that 'my way' is right and by comparison alternatives seem less viable. In Richards case he did have more experience. In anger he formed the belief to simply forget the troubling affairs. If he could not change them than no point in mulling. He suppressed. |

Susan

Incident	Summary of Incident
"Fear at restructuring process"	The incident involved her recognition of the idea that the process of change at the network is threatening. She was afraid and believed that restructuring (i.e. change) was a threat to her job tasks. Ever since she had heard rumors her concerns had grown. She believed the change was not very well managed. This was because it was not well communicated. One day she received an email sent out across the network. This email explained the change as an exercise in efficient delivery of patient care and better cost management. It was the latter aspect of cost management that hit Susan. In fear she saw the cost management exercise as the slashing of jobs. Immediately she felt in danger. Things spiraled from bad to worse. She believed that perhaps she would lose her job any moment. An exaggerated reality gripped her (congruence and Immediacy).
"Anger at lack of information"	This was when Susan had found out about the restructuring (Change). There was extreme uncertainty in her mind. The change had not been communicated to her particularly in

	terms of what it meant for her job tasks. There were concerns about whether she would lose her job and what might happen next. In fear the anticipation was to think about more negative outcomes rather than any positive ones (i.e. congruence). She saw a spiral of negative beliefs.
"Afraid of new role"	The incident took place when Susan was a new arrival. She had joined the cancer care network and was settling into her role. She remembers feeling afraid and frustrated. She was frustrated at her inability to learn tasks quicker. Her first meeting involved fear and the belief that she might not be able to carry out the tasks. She might get confused or not step up to expectations (Evaluative beliefs). There were several negative beliefs inferred one leading to another (congruence). Her reaction was to form the belief that she must take a proactive approach and keep going. This enabled escape from emotion (reactive belief).
"Felt bad for colleague and confused/angry"	Thinking about a colleague she believed that he was not treated appropriately by change implementers (Evaluative belief). There was a lack of resources for carrying out job tasks. She Grew angry saw others as threatening to the carrying out of job tasks during change (Evaluative beliefs). Suppressed beliefs. In this incident there is some apparent lack of clarity in terms of what the emotion is about. This is one incident that was rare and demonstrated possible non-intentionality

	(discussed in chapter 4).
"Afraid of other person taking my role away"	This was an incident when Susan had found out about people joining the team. She was afraid that she might lose her job. She believed that job loss was likely (Evaluative belief). This was coupled with the beliefs that another person may be more capable and that another person wanted 'my job.' Spiraled into inferred beliefs sch as implications of job loss (congruence). The more she thought this way the more likely the possibilities seemed and the more her fear grew (certainty). In fear she formed the belief to react by suppressing these thoughts and actively forgetting about them (reactive belief).
"Feeling fear about my future"	This was a time when Susan had found out about the restructuring (Change). There was extreme uncertainty in her mind. The change had not been communicated to her particularly in terms of what it meant for her job tasks. There were concerns about whether she would lose her job and what might happen next. In fear the anticipation was to think about more negative outcomes rather than any positive ones (i.e. congruence). She saw a spiral of negative beliefs. Rumors further engendered negativity.