Leadership and social construction – a discursive analysis of Churchill's wartime rhetoric

Ben Kingscott
ABSTRACT

"The New Psychology of Leadership" (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011) emphasises the causal role played by social cognition in the ways people categorise themselves, compare themselves with others and attribute leadership qualities. The problem with this causal account is that the “processes” of categorisation and comparison are taken for granted, and the role of rhetoric in their construction is left undeveloped. Discursive psychology envisages these cognitive processes as something being actively constructed through discourse. Drawing upon recent work on political rhetoric and the discursive tradition a piece of culturally and historically significant rhetoric (Winston Churchill’s first wartime broadcast) was analysed. Haslam et al.’s ideas surrounding category membership, social identity and leader prototypicality as processes of leadership were shown to be not purely cognitive constructs, but rhetorical actions achieved in discourse working towards rhetorical aims.
Introduction

Leadership studies during the 20th Century attempted to explain the phenomena of leadership in terms of the individual, dispositional qualities of the leader. Such “Great Man” theories theorised that it was the innate qualities of the leader (for example, superior intelligence, imagination, charisma) that differentiated and elevated them above those they lead. The pursuance of the precise nature of these qualities continued with the rise of psychometric personality tests (Stodgill & Coons, 1957). It became clear however that issues of leadership could not be explained purely in terms of such static, inflexible personality traits (see Mann, 1959). It was recognised amongst researchers of the need to better appreciate the situational context in which the traits being measuring operated, in particular, the relationship between the leader and the “characteristics, activities and goals of the followers.” (Stogdill, 1948, p.64).

Such theorising led to the development of “contingency” theories of leadership (Fiedler, 1971) where the emphasis lay upon the interaction between the individual and the group (Sarros & Butchatsky, 1996). As Lewin (1952) observed, all behaviour is the product of interaction between the individual and their environment. Within the study of leadership one can conceptualise the “environment” as the social, and the social as something constituted by followers. In light of this, the focus of analysis moved away from the leader to the group to be lead. Such “implicit” leadership theories (see Lord & Maher, 1991) studied the central role of cognition and follower attribution. Leadership is conceptualised here as the process of being perceived by others as a leader, or in other words, the extent to which followers perceive leaders fulfilling leadership stereotypes. Building further on this, the central role played social cognition has been emphasised. Rather than the focus being the interaction between leaders and followers as individuals, leadership studies have turned to the study of both as group members. Most recently, this social cognition approach has most recently been formalised by Haslam, Reicher, & Platow (2011) as the “The New Psychology of Leadership”.

In the “The New Psychology of Leadership” Haslam et al. characterise past theorising in leadership studies as having over-emphasised the role of the individual, whilst “the essential causal role played by the social group remains conspicuously absent” (p.44). Haslam et al. present the argument that it is a shared identity amongst the group (a sense of “us”) that facilitates co-ordinated group action. Once this shared identity has been achieved (what Haslam et al. term a “framing” condition) an individual “emerges” as leader. This individual is attributed the position of leader due their ability to represent the shared group identity (in the terminology utilised by Haslam et al., the individual becomes “prototypical” of the group).

So by what means does any one individual emerge as leader? It cannot be simply a case of group membership for some group members become leaders whilst others don’t. Haslam et al. (2011) helpfully identify four “key rules to effective leadership” (p.75). A leader needs to be an “in-group prototype”, “in-group champion” alongside being an “entrepreneur” and “embedder” of identity. With this then it would appear then we have the means by which one can achieve leadership. In practice however, what do such rules actually entail? For example, what is actually meant by being an in-group prototype, and how does one go about becoming one?

To become an in-group prototype, Haslam et al. state the leader must “emphasise
what they have in common with their followers, whilst at the same time differentiating themselves from other groups that are salient in a particular context” (p.77). Leaders must therefore need to stand “for the group” through displays of in-group prototypical characteristics and qualities. This, in turn, ties into the second rule, of leaders as in-group champions. As Haslam et al. themselves explain, “leadership is not just about being. It is also about doing” (p.109). A leader’s effectiveness is therefore dependent on their behaviour being perceived as “doing it for us” (p.128), or put another way, as championing in-group goals by working towards the group’s defined interest. Championing of in-group goals therefore occurs in concrete terms by the leader “acting in line with group values and norms” (p.132).

Haslam et al. (2011) theorising is based on the assumption that followers categorise and make judgements about leaders based on their actions. Reflect for a moment on this position. Exactly what actions? Haslam et al. contend that to be effective, leaders must “emphasise” commonality with the in-group. They must “differentiate” themselves from the out-group. They must “define” group interests and the social context, and “champion” those group interests within that same defined context. Such an account is driven by cause and effect. Leader’s action shape follower evaluations. These follower evaluations lead to the individual being perceived as a leader. By definition then effective leadership is reliant upon effective completion of these actions. So how then are these prescribed actions achieved in real-world, concrete terms?

The account given by Haslam et al. state such actions as something achieved through the “slippery process of meaning-making” (p.137), “the ways in which leaders construct identities so as to give themselves influence and power” (p.143). This is what is meant when Haslam et al. speak of leader as “entrepreneurs of identity”. In practice this means the leader must define the group (in a way that is as inclusive as possible), define themselves as being representative of that group and offer plans of action that promote this group identity. Leadership, Haslam et al. argue, is therefore a proactive process, with the leader having to shape the social context and their place within it. We therefore seem to have an answer to the question posed. However, as before, let us reflect. What advance has been made in operationalising effective leadership actions? The argument the author would wish to make is in fact very little. As postulated by self-categorisation theory (SCT), defining of the group allows for group action, as it is through identification with the group and the adoption of its norms group behaviour becomes possible (Turner, 1982). The aim here is certainly not to dispute or disprove such a claim. The question to be asked here is how groups are being defined and their identity constructed. It is of the author’s opinion to simply state the necessity of defining group categories and identity in facilitating group action, and then to suggest the necessary actions of the leader therefore is to define category boundaries and identity is rather thin theorising.

Perhaps this is an unfair characterisation. The case has been made groups need to be defined and identity constructed, meaning leaders must become “artists of identity”. How? Through “mastery in using one of the basic tools of leadership: language” (p. 173). We appear to be edging closer to our answer. There are actions that need to be performed and the medium by which they are to be performed is language. Haslam et al. (2011) give three uses of language by which identity can be constructed. Firstly, vocabulary. The message itself must be clear and precise. Secondly, “rhetoric”. Rhetoric here refers to the organisation of the message (Atkinson, 1984). Thirdly, the use of poetry to emphasise those parts of speech considered to be of importance. This may be through rhythm,
cadence, stress contrast, repetition and alliteration. This then is the extent of Haslam et al.’s treatment of language. Superficially it may appear the question of “how” posed earlier has been answered. Construction of identity and issues of category boundaries are negotiated through language. But consider again Haslam et al.’s (2011) “uses” of language. All are concerned with what could be broadly referred to as the form of the message. Issues such as clarity, precision, coherence and poetic techniques may well be (and almost certainly are) important in constructing a convincing account of reality, but does it really shed any light on the construction itself?

Social identity theory (SIT) examines the ways by which individuals transform social identities by adopting the categories of the group (Hogg, 2001). Leaders, as argued by Haslam et al. (2011), emerge as the result of adopting such categorical identities and becoming prototypical in-group members. Perceptions and judgements of leadership therefore depend upon how closely any one individual’s behaviour matches the normative behaviours of the in-group. But where do such categories come from? When we speak of prototypes, a prototype of what? Edwards (1997) argues that the basis of cognitive categorisation theories like SIT cast the individual group member as someone who simply extracts sensory information from the immediate environment, recognises patterns within it, stores it as mental representations of phenomena in the world and then talks about them (p.230-231). Within such a paradigm when one speaks of categories their expression becomes something secondary and epiphenomenal. Communication becomes the simple transmission of ideas and mental representations, with its capacity to create meaning ignored (Billig, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

If we are to take such a position seriously, the role of language in the completion of leadership actions become even greater than Haslam et al. make allowance for. Categorisation becomes more than simply an automatic cognitive simplification of the world (Potter & Wetherall, 1987) and instead “the major repository, for commonsense knowledge of the society by members of the society as members of the society” (Schegloff, 2001, p.301). Antaki, Condor & Levine (1996) therefore suggest that while cognitivists view identity as a mental state (see for example Tajfel, 1978), ethnomethodologists view it as way in which people describe themselves. Categories become flexible, linguistic resources in which knowledge about the world is organised and communicated in the form of predicates or category features (Sacks, 1992). If we return to central principles of Haslam et al.’s argument with such a view in mind, issues defining group boundaries, social identity and leader protoypicality became acts of social construction.

Method

In studying issues of political leadership, as in studies of nationalism and group identity, the argument will be presented of the need to attend to the “complex deixis of little words” (Billig, 1995, p.106). Rather than grand displays or explicit statements of what constitutes the group, what the group stands for and the leader’s role within it, it will be argued that these actions are something that are being flagged and negotiated through the subtle use of language. This focus on the minutiae of language will mean this analysis will draw on a wide range of previous research conducted within the broad domain of discursive psychology (Billig, 1985; Potter & Wetherall, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards 1991, 1997, 1998, 2003; Potter, 1996) and more recent work conducted on rhetoric (see Condor, Tileaga & Billig, in press). In outlining the theoretical framework of
the current study, Edwards (1991) deserves to be quoted in full:

“The discursive approach treats talk and texts not as representations of pre-formed cognitions, even culturally provided ones, but as forms of social action. Categorization is something we do, in talk, in order to accomplish social actions (persuasion, blamings, denials, refutations, accusations, etc.). From this perspective, we would expect language’s “resources” not to come ready-made from a process in which people are trying their best to understand the world (whether as individuals or together), but rather, or at least additionally, to be shaped for their functions in talk, for the business of doing situated social actions.”


By analysing the use of the personal pronouns in the political discourse (like the “we” in the speeches of the politicians) it will be argued that the rhetorical mechanisms by which category membership, group norms, issues of agency and other rhetorical actions are negotiated can be identified. The piece of discourse to be analysed is a radio address delivered by Winston Churchill on the 19th May 1940. The speech has been transcribed from the original archived BBC recording and cross-referenced against previously made transcriptions (Rhodes, 1974). The transcription itself combines standard orthography with Jeffersonian notations. This was done for two main reasons. Firstly, to provide the reader with a better appreciation of the flow of speech and style of delivery. Secondly, to allow the author to fully appreciate the nuanced nature of the text to be analysed. The transcription is reproduced fully in the Appendix.

The analysis therefore is of a single pre-scripted political speech. This decision was part of a conscious effort to move away from “the notion of the primacy of everyday, casual, or mundane conversation” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p.66) within discourse analysis. This is not to say that analysis of such talk would find it devoid of leadership actions (see Fairhurst 2007), but rather the focus here is on something slightly different. Pre-written speeches have been consciously constructed in such a way to be as effective as possible. For this reason, the form of analysis utilised here is a comprehensive investigation of the text as a whole. As far as the space has allowed, the speech was approached in such a way that a thread can be discerned, with the intention being not to “quote mine” or break it down into fragmentary and disparate parts, but to appreciate its complex and sometimes linguistically ambiguous nature.

Churchill has been chosen due to his reputation as a particularly effective rhetorician and leader. If the aim of this study is indeed to discern the way in which leadership actions are being achieved through rhetoric, Churchill's speeches should be rich for analysis. In moving away from the treatment of language advocated by Haslam et al. and previous analyses of Churchill's speeches (which mainly focus upon his florid use of language, use of poetry and style of delivery) it is hoped the current approach will shed light upon how it is the speaker (Churchill) constructs a social reality in such a way to achieve particular rhetorical aims, whilst at the same time making it credible and factual so as to be accepted by the imagined community that he wishes to represent.
Analysis

Context

On the 10th May 1940 Churchill succeeded Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. On the same day Nazi Germany began military operations in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Evans, 2000). Within 24 hours Luxembourg had been occupied and German air superiority had been achieved over the Low Countries (Hooton, 2007). At 7.30am on the morning of May 15th French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud telephoned Churchill to inform him "we have been defeated. We are beaten; we have lost the battle" (Shirer, 1990). At 11am the Dutch High Command capitulated (Churchill, 1949).

On the morning of May 16th German troops broke through the Maginot Line. On arriving in Paris, Churchill found the French government preparing for evacuation (Churchill, 1949). French High Command informed Churchill that no strategic reserve troops were operational and no plans for counterattack existed (Gilbert, 1991).

When the War Cabinet reconvened on May 19th, General Ironside reported on the continuing German advance and the dangerous possibility that British troops may become cut off at the Channel Ports. That afternoon Field Marshall Gort messaged Anthony Eden at the War Office. The 1st French Army to his right had faded. Gort proposed a strategic retreat towards Dunkirk and expressed the possible need for evacuation. The War Cabinet ordered Gort to instead move south-west towards Amiens to attempt to rejoin the remaining French forces (Gilbert, 1983). With the Allied defense of Europe becoming increasingly desperate, that evening Churchill took to the BBC and broadcast to the nation for the first time as Prime Minister.

Extract 1

1 I speak to you, for the ↑first time, as Pr:ime Minister (1.3) in a solemn hour,
2 for the life of ↑our country (0.9) of ↑our empire (1.0) of ↑our alli:es (0.9) and,
3 above ↑all (0.6) of the cause of freedom (2.3).

Line 1 begins “I speak to you”. The reader may immediately identify the differentiation being made between Churchill “as Pr:ime Minister” (Line 1) and those listening through the use of the personal “I” and the impersonal “you”. What may not be so obvious however is the function of such a greeting. Ventsel (2007) in his analysis of political discourse in Stalinist Estonia made note of the importance of an opening address such as this. According to Ventsel “the purpose of the obligatory greeting addresses is not to contact or enter a dialogue with the immediate audience of the addresser, but the communication with the “third” party”. Drawing upon the work of Bakhtin (1986) Ventsel argues there exists third party in every dialogue who “in relation to whom the real communicants order their positions” (p.259).

Use here of the first person singular pronoun immediately helps to establish rapport with the audience (Maitland & Wilson, 1987). Invoking “Pr:ime Minister” makes explicit Churchill’s “role”. Role categories normally get enacted “in the doing” interactionally (Schegloff, 1979) rather than through explicit pronouncements, but use of category entitlement here provides Churchill with an increased sense of credibility in what is his first
publicly broadcast speech (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The role of Prime Minister means Churchill is not speaking to his audience as an equal, but from a culturally recognised, intersubjective position of authority (Edwards, 2003).

The possessive “our” (Line 2) is introduced and then repeated in the form of a three-part list (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Churchill as speaker and the individual listeners as audience are constructed as both being a part “of ↑our country 0.9, of ↑our Empire (1.0), of ↑our Allies (0.9)” (Line 2). The use of upgrading produces a hierarchy of category membership. “You” and “I” both belong to “↑our country”, our country belongs to “↑our Empire (1.0)” and the Empire belongs to “↑our Allies”. As such, membership categorisation to the impersonal “you” is made increasingly inclusive. However, the list is not complete (“and, above ↑all”, Lines 2 and 3) and through reference to an emblematic characteristic (Billig, 1985) (“the cause of freedom”, Line 3) group membership comes to be constructed as equatable with “freedom” itself. “The cause of freedom” becomes the overarching relevant category to which both Churchill and the audience belong (Edwards, 2003). “Our” is used to refer to an abstract concept such as “freedom” so as to project it as being possessed by “us”. As a result a hierarchy of categorisation has been introduced alongside an ascription of a group norm. Equating the categories with such a characteristic, and grammatically assigning both himself and those listening to those categories, manages stake and allows for justification of group action. When “we” act, we are acting for the cause of freedom. Freedom is anthropomorphised as something living (“for the life of”) (Line 2) and as something implicitly under threat (“a solemn hour”) (Line 1), although no specific threat has yet been identified. We have here then an in-group being defined and group identity being ascribed by both explicit and pronominal means. Haslam et al may refer to this as an act of framing; for it is only once categorisation has been achieved can a leader become prototypical of that category and champion its identity. But categorisation of the in-group is not enough. The in-group attains identity not only for what it is, but for what it isn’t. Let us consider next how the “threat” here is constructed as being that of the out-group.

**Extract 2**

3 A tremendous battle is raging
4 in France, and Flanders. The Germans, by a remarkable combination (0.6) of
5 air bombing and heavily armoured tanks (1.2) have broken through the,
6 ↑French defences (0.6) north of the maginot line (1.0) and strong columns of
7 their armoured vehicles (0.4) are ravaging the open country (0.8) which, for
8 the first >day or two<, was without↑ defenders!. They have penetrated deeply
9 (0.5) and spread alarm, and confusion, in their tr(g)ack (1.5). Behind them,
10 there are now appearing infantry in lorries (0.8) and behind them again (0.5)
11 the large masses are moving ↓forward (1.9).

With the relevant category already beginning to be worked up, the second role at stake is the adversary, or problem-definitive category (Edwards, 2003). The sentence beginning on Line 3 “A tremendous battle” introduces “The Germans” as fighting “in France”. What is noticeable to the attentive reader is such description comes after prior positioning through listing of the Allies (which would have been understood to include France) with “the cause of freedom” (Extract 1, Line 3). The Germans, in contrast, are described as having “broken” (Line 5) French defences and “ravaging” (Line 7) open country which is described as having been “without↑ defenders!” (Line 8). Both aspects are
provided emphasis through intonation and animated tone. France being said to be "without↑ defenders!" (Line 8) makes implicit an attribution of offence to the problem-definitive category of "The Germans", positioning the Germans as attackers and positioning the Allies as defenders. The second act of framing then, defining of the out-group, is being undertaken in such a way as to introduce issues of positioning. Such positioning opens up questions regarding responsibility by creating an agent-patient distinction (Peters, 1960).

An agent, according to Peters (1960), is someone who is seen to be following a plan and making active choices. The Germans are constructed as agents through assigning a sense of co-ordination and purpose to their reported actions. Lines 9 and 10 repeat the phrase "Behind them". Repetition and listing provides an impression of sequentiality and order. As such, German actions can be construed as not spontaneous but meticulously planned. With this in mind we can return to Line 4 where the German attack is described as a "remarkable combination" of air and ground attacks, followed up by the advance of "armoured vehicles" (Line 7), "infantry in lorries" and "the large masses" (Line 11) in that specific, discrete order.

The Germans are reported to have broken through "north of the maginot li:ne" (Line 6) with "ai:r bombing and heavily armoured tanks" (Line 5). Specific details are provided; most notably "there are now appearing infantry in lorries" (Line 10). Notice here the use of "now". The appearance of the infantry is constructed in the present continuous tense. Their appearance is not something that could be known without some form of special knowledge or personal observation. Furthermore, the Germans act of "appearing" is something dynamic, it is occurring at the very moment of speech. Experiential reports of this kind provide an account with a sense of "closeness" between the events being described and the speaker, enhancing the credibility of the speaker in its relating (Edwards, 2003). "Alarm, and confusion" (Line 9) performs a similar function by creating the impression of Churchill possessing exceptional observational capabilities. These are not tanks, or planes or infantry lines perceptible to anyone, but reports of other's emotional states. Vivid, evocative descriptions, alongside the plainly stated facts of war, help to provide Churchill's account, and its attribution of agency, with increased objective factuality (Potter, 1996).

Extract 3

11 The re-groupment of the French
12 armies (0.4) to make head against (0.8) and also to str:ike at, this intruding
13 wedge (0.8) has been: proceeding, >for several day:ss< (1.3) largely assisted
14 (0.3) by the magnificent efforts (0.70) of the Royal Air ↑Force.
15 (2.4)

In a similar vein it can be seen how Churchill's account constructs the French as being the patient suffering the effects of the agent. Line 11 describes "The re-groupment of the French armies". Notice it is not "the grouping of the French armies". The French armies have been acted upon and, as indicated with the prefix re-, now must react. Designating the French armies as the object rather than the subject of the verb further positions the French armies as patients. To illustrate, it is possible to construct (or, if you will, reconstruct) the sentence with the French as the subject and the verb as the object. Such a construction (The French armies are regrouping) introduces an agency missing in the original. The question may be asked, why is this important? Agent-patient distinction is
fundamental when accounting for others actions, as it allows for the assigning of blame and responsibility (Wood & Kroger, 2000). When we consider the context of the talk, wartime rhetoric little over twenty years since the “The war to end all wars”, issues of responsibility and take on great significance. As will be discussed at length later, Churchill’s positioning of France (and by implication her Allies) as defensive allows for subsequent construction of Allied action as righteous resistance against the heinous crimes of the enemy. In terms of leadership then, the in-group / out-group distinction is being actively constructed and identity and purpose is being ascribed to both. Perhaps now we can consider how this identity is something being championed by Churchill.

**Extract 4**

15 (2.4)  
16 We must not allow ourselves to be intimidated (0.9) by the presence of these  
17 armoured vehicles in unexpected places behind our lines (1.7). If they are  
18 behind ↑our Front (0.8) the French, are also, at many points (1.1) fighting  
19 actively, behind ↑theirs (2.1). <Both sides are therefore, in an extremely (0.3)  
20 dangerous, position (2.1). And if the French ar:my (0.9) and our own ar:my,  
21 are well handled (0.7) as I believe they will be (1.1) <if the French retain that  
22 genius for recovery and counter-attack> (0.7) for which they have (0.9) so  
23 long been famous (1.7) and if the British ar↑my shows, the dogged endurance  
24 (0.5) and solid fighting power (0.4) of which there have been so many  
25 examples in the past (0.9) then (1.0) a sudden transformation of the scene (0.4)  
26 might (0.4) s:pring into being.  
27 (2.2)

In its simplest form, Churchill here is acknowledging the severity of the threat posed but is presenting the case that recovery is possible. Churchill is offering a vision here of resistance and of the need to uphold group identity from that which wishes to destroy it. In Haslam et al.’s terms, he is acting as an “in-group champion”. Line 16; “We must not allow ourselves to be intimidated”, for example, introduces concepts of necessity through the use of the modal “must”. Modality refers to a speaker’s claims about “the necessity, probability or possibility of beliefs and actions” (Turnbull & Saxton, 1997, p.145). “We”, the relevant category, are necessarily not to be intimidated. See how positioning as a patient here has been achieved semantically as opposed to grammatically elsewhere. Although an agentless passive (“these armoured vehicles”, Lines 16 and 17) follows which fails to assign responsibility to anyone (apart from the vehicles themselves) for the possibility of intimidation, the vehicles in question are almost certainly the same as “their armoured vehicles” (Extract 2, Line 7) already contextually identified with “The Germans” (Extract 2, Line 4). So what has this talk achieved as action? It has introduced an aspect of group identity (“We” as not being intimidated) and reasserted German agency. In offering his vision of resistance, the question may be asked why is it that “we” are not to be intimidated. Churchill’s vision, to be effective as an act of leadership, must be credible and factual. Next then we must consider how such issues of credibility and factuality are being negotiated.

“If they are behind ↑our Front (0.8) the French, are also, at many points (1.1) fighting actively, behind ↑theirs (2.1). <Both sides are therefore, in an extremely (0.3) dangerous, position (2.1)” (Lines 17-20). Churchill utilises here the “rhetoric of argument” as a way of making reasonable the assertions being presented (Edwards & Potter, 1992).
"If" the Germans are behind the French lines, it follows that the French must be behind theirs. "Therefore" both are in a dangerous position. This fact construction device makes Churchill's claims concerning reality external to himself by placing it within a formal argumentative type, providing it with a reassuring sense of rationality. How convincing this piece of logical tautology actually is will be left to the discretion of the reader. Regardless, the function of a constructive device such as this is it allows the reality being presented not to be arising from dispositional bias but logical necessity. As such, both the French and the Germans are in vulnerable positions, laying the groundwork for an explanation of how German vulnerability can be capitalised on and why it will be the case.

Churchill achieves this through offering a script formulation based upon ascribed dispositional norms. The French are said to possess "genius for recovery and counter-attack" (Line 22) and the British "dogged endurance (0.5) and solid fighting power" (Lines 23 and 24). Edwards (2003) refers to ascribed norms of this kind as disposition formulations. Accounting for the disposition of the actors involved allows for a "known" formulation the events which would logically follow (here, "a sudden transformation of the scene", Line 25). What is presented by Churchill is scripting of events not based upon a specific account but on known patterns and sequences (Edwards, 1997). What has been omitted so far, however, is the contingent nature of both the dispositional and script formulations offered. Firstly, the formulations themselves are systematically vague. Edwards & Potter (1992) contrast systematic vagueness of this kind with vivid description. Instead of rich, contextual details offered as justification for the dispositions ascribed, French characteristics are derived from the very fact that they possess them as being "so long been famous" (Lines 22 and 23) and the British upon "so many examples in the past" (Lines 24 and 25). Generalised, narrative accounting of this kind allows for the omission of specific examples making the attributions difficult to refute (Edwards & Potter, 1992). In addition to the vague justifications of the dispositions formulated, the script is contingent upon those identified displaying them. The norms of both the British and the French must be in a sense "lived out", which "if" (Lines 20, 21 and 23) they are "then" (Line 25) the script presented "might" (Line 26) occur. In the construction of reality being presented the magnitude of the problem cannot be hidden, but in spite of this, due to "our" virtues there is a chance they can be overcome. In-group identity has once again been reasserted, and a credible account of future action has been constructed.

We have so far seen how Churchill is providing the framing by which leadership may occur (defining the in-group and out-group) and how he is "championing" the in-group by offering a factual and credible vision of group action. What we must turn to next then are the two "rules" postulated by Haslam et al. thus far neglected, namely issues of leader prototypicality and leaders as embedders of identity. Analysis will show how, through the application of certain pronominal choices, Churchill manages to negotiate himself as representative of the group and at the same time achieve complex rhetorical aims through subtly shifting the boundaries of the in-group in a way that may go unnoticed by the listener. Embedding, as an act of identity construction, will be argued to be something leaders may achieve not only by virtue of grand actions and displays, but also in "banal" terms (Billig, 1995), through close attendance to their language.

Extract 5

33 <We may look with confidence to the stabilization of the front in France (1.1) <and to the general engagement of the masses (0.8)
35 which will enable the qualities of the French (0.5) and British soldiers (0.5) to 36 be matched (0.8) squarely (0.4) against those, of their ↑adversaries (1.9). For 37 myself (1.0), I have invincible confidence in the French army and its leaders 38 (1.5).

Lines 33 to 36 are particularly representative of the kind of identity shifting achievable through the use of pronouns. In this short example pronoun choices have been made to achieve complex categorical aims. Line 33 begins with the use of a particularly ambiguous institutionalized “we”. It is not clear who the referent pertains. “We” may refer to Britain as a whole, the British people, the Government of Britain, the Allies as a collective force, the Empire, up to and including anyone who wishes to uphold “freedom”. “We” however are separate from “the French (0.5) and British soldiers” (Lines 35) indicated here by the use of definitive article. The British and French soldiers are matched against “their ↑adversaries” (Line 36). If it were the case that “we” were to be including both the British and French troops, alongside those they were fighting, why use the third person plural possessive “their” rather than first personal plural possessive “our”? One would suppose that “their” adversaries within such a context would be “our” adversaries. The pronoun choices made here by Churchill however would seem to betray such an interpretation.

Line 37 shifts footing from “we” to “i”. The use of the personal pronoun Churchill himself claims to possess “invincible confidence in the French Army and its leaders” (Line 37). Jarjeis (2007) found the personal “I” was used by politicians attempting to convey personal beliefs or achieve sincerity. Churchill is therefore making the distinction between his own personal beliefs from those of the group that he represents. In an act of distancing, Churchill refers to “the French armies” and his own personal confidence in “its leaders” (Line 37).

What we are left is a confused situation. Churchill has made categorical distinctions between not just the French and the British troops, but also between the “we” that he represents and the troops. It would appear such a construction would run counter to the imagined aim of achieving in-group solidarity. However within context a piece of rhetorical action can be discerned. As already touched upon, this strategic use of pronouns may achieve the action of deflecting responsibility. Churchill was speaking at a time of great military failure. By separating the collective “we” from the failing British and French troops there could be a distinction made between the specific military battles being fought and lost and the promise of a more generalised resistance and future hope. By providing the assessment of the French from his own personal standing rather than that of the Government, Churchill could once again deflect possible disaster onto himself rather than the “we” of Government, the British people or “the cause of freedom” (Extract 1, Line 3). As exemplification, we can examine how pronouns are used to achieve the very opposite goal of consubstantiality between “the people” and “the troops” in the following extracts.

Extract 6

69 I am sure I speak for all, when I say (0.6) we are ready to face it 70 (1.2) to en↑dure it (0.9) and to retaliate against it (0.9) to ANY extent (0.6) 71 that the unwritten <laws of war permit> (1.8). There will be many men (0.5) 72 and many women (0.4) in this ↑Island (1.0) who when the ordeal comes upon 73 them (0.5) as come it will (1.0) will feel COMfort (0.7) and even a pr:ide (0.7)
74 that they are sharing the perils of our lads at the front (0.7), soldiers, sailors
75 and airmen, God bless them (1.0) and are drawing away from them a part at
76 least, of the “onslaught, they have to bear” (1.7).

“I am sure I speak for all” (Line 69) can be seen to be an attempt by Churchill to
position himself as representative of the group through consensual warranting. Making the
link between his own views and majority normalises his claims and enhances their
factuality (Edwards & Potter, 1992). On lines 61 and 62 Churchill once again utilises a
three-part list to give the impression of completeness. The ambiguous “it” here serves as
distancing device between the in-group “we”. Notice how seamlessly Churchill transitions
between the first person singular “I” and to the first person plural “we”, and how in doing
so, his own commitment to resist becomes the group’s. In Haslam et al.’s terms,
Churchill’s prototypicality, rather than being an attribution made by followers, becomes
something he orients towards through his talk. Such rhetorical action is achieved in an
adapted form of active voicing. Active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) normally takes the form of
reported speech and is used to provide a sense of consensus and corroboration to
accounts that might otherwise be met sceptically. Churchill here doesn’t quote a specific
individual per se but shifts his own construction of events onto others. In effect what
Churchill is doing is making the claim that “this isn’t my own biased assessment, but
something shared by everyone.” Being a monologue, no opportunity arises for real
corroboration, so this rhetorical device elicits the listener to accept Churchill’s version as
factual.

In “sharing the perils of our lads at the Front” “we” are brought into unity with “the
French (0.5) and British soldiers” (Extract 5, Line 35). The possessive “our” links the
soldiers at Front with the listeners at home. I, we and the soldiers have now achieved
consubstantiality in a way that was absent in Extract 5. Why might this be the case? The
use of modal “will” (Line 71 and 73) and “when” makes factual the claim that resistance will
soon be necessary and inevitable once the war in France has subsided. Whereas the
Battle of France was edging ever nearer its conclusion, the Battle of Britain had yet to
begin. Churchill was well aware that once France had fallen the full force of the German
military would be turned solely upon Britain. What we are witnessing here then is rhetoric
within the context of perseverance and resistance. In Extract 5, Churchill was speaking
within a context of military failing. “We” therefore needed to be distanced from this failing.
Here, however, the troops must become “ours” and “we” must share in part “the
“onslaught, they have to bear”” (Line 76). Rhetorically, Churchill distances present failings
but makes inclusive future resistance.

Extract 7

113 Side by side (1.2)
114 UNAID:ED except by their kith and kin in the great Dominions (0.5)
115 and by the wide empires which rest (0.5) beneath their shield! (1.5)
116 side by side, the British and French peoples have advanced (0.6) to
117 rescue, not only, Europe (0.5) but mankind! (0.6) from the foulest
118 (0.6) and most (0.3) soul, destroying (0.3) tyranny (0.3) which has ever
119 darkened, and stained (0.3) the pages of history (1.3). Behind them
120 (1.6), behind us (1.2), behind:nd the Armies (0.5) and Fleets (0.6) of
121 Britain and France!< <gather, a group, of shattered states (0.6) and
122 bludgeoned races (1.0) the Czechs (0.4), the Poles (0.4), the
123 Norwegians (0.3), the Danes (0.6), the Dutch (0.6), the Belgians (0.9)
124 upon ALL OF WHOM, the long night of barbarism will descend (0.5)
125 unbroken (0.4) even by a ↑star: of hope (0.9), unless we conquer (1.0),
126 as conquer we must (1.0); as conquer we shall.
127 (2.3)

The empires are characterised as being “beneath their shield” (Lines 115). But
whose shield? “the British and French peoples” (Line 116). It is not “our” shield. “Behind
them (1.6) behind us (1.2) behind the Armies (0.5) and Fleets (0.6) of Britain and
France!” (Lines 119-121). Who exactly are “us” within this context? It can’t be “them” as
identified as being the British and French peoples. It also can’t be the Armies and Fleets
(Line 120). It also can’t be the collective force of the Allied nations as all are listed
individually. What is clear however is the way in which these individual components are
brought together into a collective. They are listed in such a way to be exhaustive and all-
embracing before reaching the rhetorical climax “ALL OF WHOM” (Line 124). Now
these disparate entities are the “we” of lines 125 and 126, “unless we conquer (1.0), as
conquer we must (1.0); as conquer we shall.” Resistance to the “soul, destroying (0.3)
tyrrany” (Line 118) is now the job of all, and not only is it necessary, but morally justified.

Discussion

Leadership studies, in the past have traditionally attempted to find the “essence” of
leadership, either in individualistic or situational terms (Grint, 2000). What this study hopes
to have illuminated is the need to consider instead the socially constructed nature of
leadership through language use within discourse. A constructionist view necessitates the
need for leaders to constantly “perform” leadership in their communication and through
discourse (Shotter, 1993). These performances allow followers to attribute leadership to
actors based upon talk or action. As a result, a leader must continually perform leadership
to maintain their attribution as a leader. With this in mind, and in light of the analysis
undertaken, let us re-consider Haslam et al.’s “rules” of leadership in discursive rather than
purely cognitive terms.

The framing condition, the act of defining in-group and out-groups, was found to be
reasserted throughout through both explicit pronouncements of difference and subtle acts
of distancing through Churchill's pronominal choices. Churchill positions himself as the
prototype of this in-group by shifting his own views onto that of group as a whole. “I”
becomes “we” within a sentence and consensus is constructed through active voicing.
Churchill can be conceived as an in-group champion by offering a vision of resistance, but
importantly, through the use of discursive tropes, makes the vision not only credible and
factual, but also necessary and inevitable. As analysis has shown, Churchill can be
considered an “entrepreneur” of identity; particularly in the way the in-group is being
constantly redefined, in what appears to be an attempt to handle issues of responsibility
and blame.

Would it right to characterise Churchill then as an “embedder” of identity? In
light of this analysis the author wishes to argue yes, but in doing so recast radically the
way in which identity embedding is to be conceived. Haslam et al. refer to leaders as
“impresarios of identity” who in order to convince followers that the vision of reality they
present is credible by making a “show of that vision” (p.179). Haslam’s et al. account of
identity embedding becomes something achieved through structuring of action so as to
reflect group norms and values. Leadership, they argue, “needs to become physically embedded in the world in order to have an enduring impact” (p.187). They provide the example of the Nuremberg Rally as such an act. What this analysis has hopefully shown is how this process of “embedding” need not only be conceptualised in such explicit terms but as something that can be attended and constructed through proper application use of “little words” (Billig, 1995, p. 173), and in doing so, moves us beyond Haslam et al.’s rather simplistic account.

Does a social constructionist interpretation negate a more explicitly cognitive approach to leadership processes? Absolutely not. What the author wishes to argue is that these two perspectives can help to enrich the accounts provided by one another. The social cognition approach and the more rhetorically, discursively based approach explored here are in fact attempting to explain the same phenomena, but are doing so by asking two very different questions. Haslam et al. are effectively asking the question “Why?”. Why do some people become leaders? Why are some leaders more effective than other? They then attempt to answer these questions through the search for generalisable factors and variables by which leadership can be understood as a process of cause and effect. A rhetorical approach instead asks the question “How?”. For example, when Haslam et al. speak of the need for leader prototypically, how is this being enacted in the real-world? The aim of this short study was to present to the reader an account by which such leadership variables can be better understood as something being actively constructed through discourse itself.

Qualitative research of this kind within leadership studies is still in its relative infancy, particularly within the discursive tradition. Here, prior work on identity, racial discourse and categorisation has been reapplied within the context of leadership. It would be hoped that research with a similar focus may be undertaken by others. Furthermore, the analysis offered here is of course something to be debated. It was the author’s decision to focus solely on a single piece of rhetoric. How generalisable the conclusions reached would be concerning political rhetoric in the wider sense is unclear and requires further research.

In summary then, this analysis has shown is that although issues of category membership and group identity are a central tenet of Churchill’s rhetoric, the means by which they are being achieved is far more complex than the account provided by Haslam et al.. What this study has helped to elucidate is the fact leadership cannot simply be a case of defining the in-group or out-group in explicit terms, as the in-group and the out-group is constantly shifting and being re-negotiated for rhetorical purposes. As has been witnessed, this act of shifting can take place within a single line of speech. In line with a study by Bull and Fetzer (2006) Churchill use of language was not arbitrary but was something utilised towards a specific end, “to accept, deny, or distance themselves from responsibility for politician action; to encourage solidarity; to designate and identify both supporters and enemies” (p.5).
References


processes. *Crossing the divide: Intergroup leadership in a world of difference*, 31-42.


