The politics of place – national values and social policy in Scotland

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Abstract: Devolution from 1999 has created new spaces for policy divergence within the disUniting Kingdom. Within political discourse «national values» are routinely deployed to evoke allegiance and solidarity with «imagined communities» (Anderson 1991). This article acknowledges heterogeneity within borders and the interconnectedness of the four nations of the UK. Cross-national comparisons indicate that social attitudes do not diverge radically and are refracted by distinctive policy communities, civic institutions and systems of party political competition north and south. Welfare and public services are key sites of contestation in deliberation on policy alternatives. The debate on welfare, social cohesion and the «good society» raises unresolved tensions within centre-left communitarianism between the virtue of pluralist civil society vis-a-vis notions of «strong community» in both unionist and secessionist nationalism. From this perspective the revivification of the «citizen-nation» (Colley, 1999) is a more productive project than the recovery of the nation-state.

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Introduction

The referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014 has given fresh impetus to debates on the place of national values and national identities within the politics of social policy in Scotland and the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. ‘National values’ have been appropriated and deployed by all parties within the independence debate and this highlights deeply rooted tensions and contradictions about the provenance and place of the core values of welfare that inform social policy and public service institutions in Scotland.

We argue that the adversarial debate evident in Scotland since 1999 between secessionist and unionist nationalisms covers over the complex realities of identity within Scotland and the UK. Simplistic constructions of national identity, both Scottish and British have been deployed by political elites to evoke feelings of commonality or distinctiveness to accord with the political values of fairness and thrift. The framing of social policy issues in this way deflects attention from real issues of social need which transcend national boundaries. The distraction applies to debates about the politics of welfare within parties (particularly Labour and the SNP) as well as between parties.

Debates on devolution and Scottish independence have produced a fixation on the politics of identity. This has produced a political paradox in which parties of the centre left present issues of social rights and responsibilities as ‘national’ concerns and concepts of fairness and social justice as national values. There is a danger that the universal conceptions social citizenship which have endured since the 1940s will be threatened by different national settlements in the constituent nations of the UK. We conclude by arguing for a renewed focus on active citizenship and participatory democracy.

Global trend towards devolution

It is often argued that the process of globalisation is promoting higher levels of international homogeneity. National sovereignty is increasingly subject to the influence of supranational associations (the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, International Monetary Fund and United Nations). At the same time, however, place has achieved greater prominence in a «global trend towards devolution », involving «widespread transfer of powers towards regions»
Political devolution in the UK has opened up new spaces for local inflection of trans-national policy agenda. Formal devolution of legislative powers from Westminster (on different terms and with varying powers) followed referenda in Scotland and Wales in 1997 and Ireland in 1998. The UK has been described as «an asymmetrical composite state full of different but inchoate allegiances» (Colley, L. 1999: p.3). Scotland has, of course, been able to exercise considerable policy discretion without self-determination, retaining autonomous civil institutions of law, religion and education. In post-devolution and pre-referendum times, the ‘nation’ is used to construct boundaries between devolved and reserved powers, set against the contingences of inter-regional spillovers (UK) and supranational externalities (European Union). Policy making post-devolution in Scotland involves multi-level governance through complex social and political networks.

Devoluted Scotland is a leaky container. First, as a power container it encompasses controls over law, home affairs, and the police; second, as an economic container it exerts some control over agriculture, fisheries, planning, economic development, training, and tourism; third, as a social container it controls health, social work, housing, and local government; and, fourth, as a cultural container it controls education, the arts and sport, and the natural and built environment. (Law, A. and Mooney, G., 2012a: p.69)

If devolution, as the former leader of the UK Labour Party, John Smith, claimed, reflected «the settled will of the Scottish people», the election of the fourth Scottish Parliament in May 2011 offers an opportunity for reassessment. The Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a majority government for the first time (winning 69 of 129 seats), providing a strong mandate for further devolution of powers. On the 15th October 2012, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Alex Salmond, First Minister of the Scottish Parliament, signed the Edinburgh Agreement for a referendum on an independent Scotland, to be held on 18th September 2014. Should the SNP achieve its aspiration of a velvet divorce from political union with Westminster it seeks to retain five unions - the European Union, NATO, the currency, the Crown and the social union with the rest of the UK.

National identities

National identities and nationalisms are invented and malleable constructs (Anderson, B. 1991; Billig, M. 1995). Historians have long acknowledged that the collective identity of the British is inextricably connected with many different peoples and different histories (Colley, L. 2009). National identity is not fixed but discursively produced. Contemporary discussion encompasses plural and inclusive constructs of national identity, which is one among many overlapping sources of identification that include gender, ethnicity, political allegiance, class, region, age, sexuality and faith.

Political discourse in the UK from 1980 has directed attention to the relative weakening of a unitary British national identity. Collective identity is important in the constitution of political power. Labour politician Gordon Brown (2004, 2006) sought to reclaim symbols of national identity from the Conservative Party, arguing that the Union flag might become «a flag for all Britain – symbolising tolerance, inclusion and unity» (Brown, G. 2004, n.p.). Brown’s reassertion
of Britishness was, in part, a reflection of his personal standing as a Scottish UK premier-in-
waiting (Hassan, G. 2009). Britishness was positioned as uniting all at a time when
multiculturalism was increasingly regarded as a threat to social cohesion from an assimilationist
perspective (Cable, V. 2005). Brown (2007) referred to Britain 52 times in his first conference
speech as leader. In championing «One Nation Labour» the current Labour leader made 60
references to Britain in his 2013 conference address (Miliband, E. 2013).

If Britishness is a «cultural artefact» (Anderson, B. 1991: p.4) forged through time and struggle
(Colley, L. 1999), then similarly there is no single, static version of Scottishness (or nationalism
in Scotland). Rather there are competing images of Scotland and Scottishness that are mobilised
by political elites to serve particular ends (Mycock, A. 2012). Cultural homogeneity cannot be
assumed in small countries. Within the UK there are «varieties of Irishness» (Foster, R.F. 1989)
and cultural variants of Scottishness, Welshness and Englishness (independent of political
institutions). David McCrone (2001: p.28) describes modern Scotland as «a country of city-
states» with distinctive socio-cultural, economic and demographic features between the four
centres of population – Glasgow and Dundee, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. In policy circles the
revival of Gaelic and Scots are important symbols of Scottish identity. The use of religion to
define Scottishness has been most marked historically by divisions between Protestants and
Catholics (which obscure doctrinal schisms e.g. between Presbyterians and Episcopalians). This
is most prevalent in the West of Scotland (Gallagher, T. 1987, 2013). At the 2011 census the
ethnic minority population of Scotland was 4 per cent (192,900) with weak neighbourhood
concentration outside Glasgow (where ethnic minority groups comprise 12 per cent of the

Elite and mass conceptions of Scottishness cannot be assumed to be congruent (Leith, M.S.
2012). Political nationalism encompasses left-right positions and is evident in both unionist
nationalism and secessionist political stances. Daniel Soule, Murray Leith and Martin Steven
(2012: p.3) maintain that, in the current context «all Scotland’s politicians are nationalist in their
outlook». Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders in Scotland all deploy national
values and patriotism in their own versions of unionist nationalism (Ichijo, A. 2012: p.26). Much
attention has focused on emphasising civic rather than ethnic nationalism (McCrone, D. 2001).
Dennis Smith (2013, np) is keen to assert that «Scottish ethnicity, if it exists, has little to do with
Scottish nationhood». The current leadership have sought to displace negative characterisations
of the «cancer of the south» as promulgated by former party leaders (Gardham, M. 2013, np).
Attempts have been made to promote a more inclusive approach to identity that recognises and
values diversity. This re-envisioning of Scottishness enables the reconciliation and valorisation
of divergent traditions. The SNP Member of Parliament (MP) and Member of the Scottish
Parliament (MSP) George Reid (1995) has described the Scottish national identity as «a tradition
built on the common weal of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the Calvinists, the social
concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement and the civic nationalism of
Salmond commented, «[W]e have an attractive identity and it’s all the more so because we don’t
insist on it being a single identity. People are free to be dozens of different things and we should
be confident that Scottishness will be part of that» (McKenna, K. 2013, np). A newly crafted
cosmopolitan Scottishness is presented as both inclusive and yet avowedly distinct.

Social Attitudes

Drawing on the 2012 Scottish Social Attitudes survey, John Curtice (2013: p.5) maintains
«Scottish identity is a near ubiquitous attachment that unites rather than divides most people in
Scotland. It is how British they feel that divides them». The Moreno question is typically used to
establish the balance of state and sub-state identity i.e. people are asked if they feel «Scottish, not British», «More Scottish than British», «Equally Scottish and British», «More British than Scottish» or «British, not Scottish». Dual identities remain common. In 1999 22 per cent of respondents to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey saw themselves as equally Scottish and British. In the 2011 census 18 per cent of the population of Scotland defined themselves as Scottish and British. Part of «being Scottish» is not being English, and this has been associated with the «Englishing of the Conservative Party» from 1997 (McCrone, D. 2001: p.185). In 2013 there remains just one Conservative MP in Scotland. As «being English» became associated with the values of laissez-faire Conservatism (1979-97) followed by the social liberalism and moral authoritarianism of New Labour (1997-2010), «being Scottish» was increasingly positioned as upholding the values of a distinctively Scottish communitarianism. How well does this enduring political rhetoric, which amplifies difference, correspond with contemporary social attitudes?

Trends in public views post-devolution are enabled through comparison of responses to the British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys between 1999-2010 i.e. British Social Attitudes respondents living in England. Based on such analyses John Curtice and Rachel Ormston (2012: p.21) maintain that, «people in Scotland are generally a little more likely than those in England to express social democratic views. However, this difference has not widened since the advent of devolution. Rather, opinion in both countries has moved in a somewhat less social democratic direction». In 1999, 71 per cent of respondents in Scotland and 61 per cent of respondents in England felt that wealth inequalities were too large; falling to 59 per cent in Scotland and 55 per cent in England by 2010. In 1999 84 per cent of respondents in Scotland and 80 per cent of respondents in England felt that income inequalities were too large; falling to 78 per cent in Scotland and 74 per cent in England by 2010. In 2010 20 per cent of respondents in Scotland and 18 per cent in England felt that no students or their families should have to pay undergraduate tuition fees (Curtice, J. and Ormston, R. 2011: p.4). Curtice and Ormston (2012: p.28) claim «the gap has grown wider only because the move away from a social democratic stance has been less marked in Scotland than in England».

Analysis of secondary datasets suggests that «what matters to the public is much the same in Scotland as it is in England» (Ormston, R. and Curtice, J. 2007: p.69). This is reiterated in public opinion research that suggests continuing widespread support for the welfare state in the UK (Diamond, P. and Lodge, G. 2013). Citizens of the devolved territories in the UK have broadly similar aspirations and express support for a European social model (Keating, M. 2009). David McCrone (2006: p.8) argues, «if we divide public opinion in Scotland and England into left, centre and right in ideological terms, in Scotland the centre more resembles the left than it does the right, whereas in England the centre is closer to the right». What we appear to have then is a degree of policy divergence supported by a devolution settlement that may not be matched by attitudinal divergence across the publics that comprise the UK. Devolution produces variation from a UK baseline, usually upwards, that has been mobilised to provoke inter-regional tensions in relation to welfare and public spending (Jeffery, C. 2007).

As often as not, there is little specifically “national” behind the values and principles promoted within nation-building discourses. Clearly similar values may be identified across national boundaries … in the context of overlapping national boundaries, and at time, conflicting national identities, the presence of minor value differences or the priority attached to particular values can assume a heightened political significance … The belief that values are distinctly national may be more important than any objective evidence to the contrary (Henderson, A. and McEwen, N. 2005: p.177).

Based on the above review, we suggest that attempts to codify a set of key «values» and «qualities», or to focus primarily on places and people, rather than systems, «policies or institutions» (Gamble, A. and Wright, T. 2009: p.4), may distract those who seek to understand
the complexities of contemporary devolved societies. The process of devolution has given rise to more sophisticated electoral systems and voting behaviour among the electorate of Scotland. A broad commitment to welfare and public services may produce Labour votes in UK parliament elections (in opposition to an English Conservative majority) and an SNP vote for Holyrood (which uses the additional member system). In the following section we examine how «Scottish values» are deployed in debates in Holyrood on the future of welfare and public services - a key site of contestation in 2013.

National values and welfare reform

Reference to a set of distinctive social values permeates political discourse in Scotland. In opposition John Swinney, then SNP Leader, maintained a vocal campaign to «restore» Scottish values to Scottish public policy vis-a-vis «London Labour».

   My job is to restore Scotland's values to Scotland's Government. Those Scottish values are deep-seated and cherished. They are values of fairness, honesty and equal opportunity. This party has those traditional Scottish values running through its very core. (Swinney, J. 2002 np)

The re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament draws on a long «tradition of communitarian debate with liberalism» that is often taken to be a defining feature of Scottish social philosophy (Paterson, L. 2002: p.122). The austerity measures that followed the economic crisis revived debate on the amalgam of social and individual responsibility in centre-left politics. Twenty-first century political discourse recalls nineteenth century traditions of Scottish Presbyterianism and late twentieth century debates on the role of the state. Speaking at the 2009 SNP conference, Deputy Leader Nicola Sturgeon proclaimed, «[W]e must reassert our traditional values of probity, thrift and a commitment to hard work. It is to these values - these Scottish values - that we must return and on which we must now build our economic recovery» (np). Margaret Thatcher mobilised stereotypical notions of Scottish prudentialism in her reassertion of Scottish liberalism: «Tory values are in tune with everything that is finest in the Scottish character…the values of hard work, self-reliance, thrift and enterprise» (cited by Henderson, A. and McEwen, N. 2005: p.184).

In January 2013 Sturgeon, now Deputy First Minister, called for an Expert Working Group on Welfare to look at benefit payments in Scotland, to consider changes to the current system in an independent Scotland, and to make initial recommendations for how a welfare system might reflect «Scottish values». This initiative was positioned in direct contrast to The 2020 Vision: Agenda for Transformation report published by the Conservative 2020 group that proposed lower benefits in parts of the country where the cost of living was deemed less expensive (2020 Group, 2013:32). The Scottish Parliament voted in April 2013 to defend universal services - free personal care for older people, no up-front tuition fees for resident Scottish students, concessionary travel, free eye tests, no prescription charges, and retention of the Education Maintenance Allowance for post-compulsory education - deemed to represent the social contract with Scotland's people. In March 2013 Alex Salmond drew evocatively, once more, on Scotland's national bard, Robert Burns, to proclaim, «the rocks will melt with the sun before we allow Tory or Labour to take away the right to free education in Scotland» (SNP 2013, np). The interim report of the Expert Group, published in June 2013, recommended an independent Scotland share the UK welfare system for a transitional period. A new expert panel, convened in August 2013 to continue deliberation, will report in spring 2014. The new members of this group include Jon Kvist, University of Southern Denmark, and an advocate of the Nordic welfare model.
Both the Yes and No campaigns in the lead up to the independence referendum make recourse to Scottish values. Launching *United with Labour* in May 2012 Johann Lamont, elected Holyrood Labour Leader in December 2011, argued, «My Scotland stands for equality and solidarity. For freedom and justice. Those qualities have no borders. To put borders upon them doesn't just render those values meaningless - it contradicts everything that modern Scotland has ever stood for» (Lamont, J. 2012a, np). Launching the *Better Together* campaign in June 2012, supported by Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, Alastair Darling maintained that the referendum was «a chance to re-affirm Scottish values and our expression of them in our partnership with our neighbours» (p.3).

There is less scope for centre-right perspectives to be heard in Scotland. David McCrone (2001: p.25) predicted that Scottish politics would be shaped by whichever of the two main parties - Labour and the SNP - «best expresses the prevailing social democratic mood of the nation». The trade unionist activist Jimmy Reid joined the SNP in 2005 and the Jimmy Reid Foundation (2013) is a vocal advocacy group for the «common weal». The SNP have encroached upon the core ideological territory and key concepts of the Scottish Labour Party (and to some extent its achievements in office). Attempts by the UK Labour Party to «reconstruct Britishness» via Gordon Brown’s initiatives and to borrow «one nationism» from the Conservative Party (Miliband 2012, 2013) revealed a lack of strategy to counter the loss of centre left ground to the SNP who have successfully equated cultural nationalism with social democracy. The SNP sought to colonise territory vacated as the leadership of the UK Labour Party moved to the right. Perhaps the single most striking example of policy divergence between the Labour Party north and south of the England-Scotland border was the adoption of personal health care for the elderly in Scotland, a major expansion of the principle of social citizenship (Hassan, G. and Shaw, E. 2012).

Since the Labour Party’s 2011 Scottish Parliament defeat the party has taken incremental steps to reform and adapt policy in preparation for the 2016 Holyrood election. Where Labour in the UK Westminster parliament is making progress, Labour in Scotland faces a considerable challenge in responding to the rise of Alex Salmond’s SNP - although in the council elections of May 2012, (using the Single Transferable Vote system), Scottish Labour held Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, and gained Renfrewshire and West Dunbartonshire (Denver, Bochel and Steven, 2012). In September 2012 Johan Lamont made a controversial «something for nothing» speech to launch a fairness debate on the longer-term affordability of universal benefits (Lamont, J. 2012b). In February 2013 Deputy Leader Anas Sarwar repeated the case for welfare reform based on Scottish Labour values of «community, solidarity, fairness, equality and social justice» (Watson, D. 2013: p.14). Scottish Labour’s Welfare Commission will report after the 2014 referendum. An interim report on support for further powers to the Scottish Parliament in Holyrood indicates that Labour MSPs are prepared to go further than Labour MPs. A shadow cabinet reshuffle in June 2013 has accompanied a loosening of ties with the UK Labour Party. All parties, including Scottish Conservatives, now favour more powers for the Scottish Parliament. Labour and Liberal Democrat proposals are similar in regard to devolved income tax and the retention of welfare benefits and national insurance by Westminster. The opposition centre-left unionist parties are thus all moving in a similar direction in proposing greater powers. Where there is broad consensus on loosely defined social democratic values, disagreement centers on issues of sustainability in the context of contracting resource. Within the congested centre ground parties battle to assert a distinctive policy platform within circumstances of fiscal restraint that articulates with their own interpretation of the national mood and national values.

**Public expenditure and place-based «need»**
Resource allocation in decentralised government is contentious. The economics of relative need is often underscored by cultural readings of “problem” populations and locales. This is evident in a language of subsidy that does not address the erosion of the “residual state role of redistribution, stabilisation and management of the national economic space” (Pike, A. and Tomaney, J. 2009: p.30). Needs must be met within the context of declining resource after a period of year-on-year growth: “The real terms increase in Scottish Government spending between 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 is estimated to have been around 60 per cent (i.e. 5 per cent a year). From 2009-10 to 2016-17, the budget change is estimated to be an 18 per cent real terms cut” (CPPR, 2012: 4). The Government Economic Strategy estimates, “it could take until 2025/26 for the Scottish Government budget to return to 2009/10 levels in real terms - an adjustment period of sixteen years” (Scottish Government, 2011: p.28). The challenges of fiscal restraint are creating difficult choices and some tension between central (Holyrood) and local government (Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities). In 2007 a concordat was agreed between the Scottish Government and the 32 local authorities of Scotland. While Holyrood sets the direction of policy and expected national outcomes, local authorities are responsible for shaping service delivery in response to local needs and circumstances. The Christie Commission (2011: p.viii) on the future delivery of public services has argued that, “Unless Scotland embraces a radical, new collaborative culture throughout our public services, both budgets and provision will buckle under the strain”.

Constraints on social policy divergence bring to the fore debates on the balance of devolved and reserved powers and the financing of devolution. Public expenditure is higher in Scotland than England. During 2011-2012 total expenditure on services per head in real terms in Scotland was £10,240 (12,410 Euro) compared to £8,618 (10,445 Euro) in England (HM Treasury, 2013: p.117). The allocation of public expenditure to the devolved administrations of the UK through the Barnett formula has been subject to increasing attack on the grounds of territorial equity i.e. for failing to adequately reflect the relative needs of the different jurisdictions and regions (Select Committee on the Barnett Formula, 2009). Comparative analyses of spending needs on school education (King, D. et al., 2004; Ball, R. et al., 2012a), healthcare (Ball, R. et al., 2012b) and local social services (King, D. et al., 2007) highlight the contestability of assessments of need and the complexity of resource allocation across different territories using different formulae.

Employment and social security are matters reserved to the UK Parliament. Recent research suggests that benefit spending per person in Scotland is above the average for the UK but the gap is closing. In 2011-12 benefit spending per person in Scotland was £3,238 per year (3,924 Euro), 2% higher than the average for the UK (£3,176, 3,849 Euro); compared with 7 per cent higher in 2005-6 (Phillips, D. 2013: p.2). Greatest divergence is evident in expenditure on disability benefits, which in 2011-12 - per person in the population - was 22 per cent higher in Scotland (£593, 718 Euro) than in the UK as a whole (£485, 587 Euro) (ibid, p.2). The estimated impact of benefit reforms between 2010 and 2015 on household incomes is broadly similar. Estimates suggest that household incomes in Scotland will contract by 1.6 per cent of net income, on average, compared with 1.7 per cent for the UK as a whole (Phillips, D. 2013: p.3). This is largely attributed to lower rents in Scotland reducing the impact of changes to housing benefit. Employment rates for Scotland and the rest of the UK are also very similar: in 2012, 72.2 per cent in Scotland and 74.4 per cent of the UK as whole (Phillips, D. 2013: p.3). Despite the sharp contraction in public sector employment from 2009 (leaving aside the entry of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB to the public sector when the UK Government became the main shareholder), in 2013 public sector employment still accounts for 23 per cent of total employment in Scotland (Scottish Government National Statistics, 2013), with significant regional variation e.g. 19 per cent in Aberdeenshire, 37 per cent in Dundee City and 47 per cent
in Orkney. The range for the UK as whole is 13 per cent – 18 per cent in the South East of England and 31 per cent in Northern Ireland (Bell, D. et al., 2012: p.5).

Health and education are devolved matters and key areas of policy divergence. Comparison of local authority spending needs as assessed by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in England and the Scottish Executive/Scottish Government suggest that funding models for school education produce similar estimates of relative need but some inequity in resource allocation between 2003 and 2011 (King, D. et al., 2004; Ball, R. et al. 2012a). Although Scotland performs well in cross-national comparisons of pupil attainment, enduring social inequalities in participation and achievement raise questions about the rate of progress facilitated through devolution (Machin, S. et al., 2013; Ridell, S. et al., 2013). Healthcare expenditure comprises 40 per cent of the expenditure of the devolved administrations. Ball et al. (2012b: p.323) maintain that «[R]elative to England, average annual per capita spending on health was 15 per cent higher in Scotland (equivalent to £226 per person, 273 Euro), 9 per cent higher in Wales (£130 per person, 157 Euro), and 6 per cent higher in Northern Ireland (£88 per person, 106 Euro) over the five-year period from 2004/05 to 2008/09». Applying the Scottish formula, Ball et al. (2012: p.322) calculate that «England’s per capita health care expenditure need is around 10 per cent lower than Scotland’s, while Wales’ per capita expenditure need is around 2 per cent lower than Scotland’s, and Northern Ireland’s is around 7 per cent lower than Scotland’s». The higher expenditure in Scotland is justified in terms of higher levels of long-term morbidity and mortality from 1980 (especially for NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde). Although a relatively wealthy country, Scotland has one of the lowest levels of life expectancy in Western Europe (McCartney, G. et al., 2011).

Discussion and conclusion

The balance of individual and social responsibility differs among advanced welfare states (Esping-Andersen, G. 1990) and is subject to further deliberation through processes of decentralisation. In Scotland the devolution settlement has supported an amalgam of competitive and welfare nationalism – a focus on enterprise, individual responsibility and social justice to deliver a Scotland that is both «wealthier» and «fairer». Margaret Arnott and Jenny Ozga (2010) refer to this hybrid mix as «modernised nationalism». The economic crisis from 2008 has impacted on the dual challenge of promoting fairness and competitiveness; a relationship in which fairness is always positioned as subordinate to and dependent on the primary goal of economic growth. The primacy of economic growth is reasserted in Empowering Scotland: The Government’s Programme for Scotland 2013-14 (SG, 2013). The «recovery» of an economic model that has not addressed long-term inequality is questioned by critics who point to the association between national measures of equality, well-being and competitiveness. Mike Danson and Katherine Trebeck (2013: p.3) argue «the structural reason for poverty in Scotland lies in the financialised, consumerised economy which transfers money from the broad base of citizens to a small number of corporations and individuals». The programme outlined in Empowering Scotland suggests continuity with neo-liberal economic policies, and the use of existing devolved powers for remedial purposes.

From an «English perspective» (King, D. et al. 2004, 2007) devolution appears to promote territorial inequality across the UK. However, it is important to approach such analyses with caution. As Gerry Mooney (2009: p.446) argues a selective reading can be used to construct «the idea of welfare dependency among Scots, indeed of Scottish welfare dependency, cosseted by «English» money» (as parodied in The Economist «Skintland» cover of 14th April 2012). From a Scottish centre-left (nationalist and unionist) perspective social policy differentiation, and enhanced powers, are aimed at promoting territorial justice through strategies for poverty reduction (Chaney,
An espoused «Scottish» commitment to egalitarianism and social democratic values is mobilised in calls for greater powers to address Scottish issues (notably enduring income inequalities). There is less political capital in emphasising the shared values and aspirations of the citizens that comprise the UK publics when different parties hold office in the different jurisdictions.

There is a shared enthusiasm across party political boundaries for work as the key route out of poverty. Progressive taxation to produce significant redistributive effects is not likely to prove electorally popular. In Scotland this presents the challenge of promoting a low tax–high spend economic model alongside demands for fiscal autonomy. The SNP programme for 2013-14 supports reform of the welfare system and commits to «design a tax system that encourages Scotland’s growth», reducing inequalities through «preventative spend» (SG, 2013: p.22). Following a Yes vote control over welfare would be used to «develop a system that will encourage those who can and should work into work», a simpler system that ‘makes work pay’ (ibid p.80). Opposition is directed at minimising the impact of austerity measures because they have been imposed «too far and too fast» (Scottish Government, 2013: p.80). Successor schemes include the £33m Scottish Welfare Fund following the abolition of the Social Fund by the UK Department for Work and Pensions in April 2013.

Scottish Labour repeats an appeal to «fairness» via increased levels of individual accountability, which aims to align with popular sentiment. In quickly opposing the UK government’s «bedroom tax» for under-occupation of state-subsidised housing Scottish Labour is attempting to regain its core territory and assert its Scottish credentials. Shadow Cabinet Secretary for Welfare, Jackie Baillie, introduced a Member’s Bill to protect social tenants from eviction arising from housing arrears (in advance of UK Labour’s confirmation in September 2013 of a repeal of the ‘bedroom tax’ if successful in the 2015 Westminster election).

Across the UK there has been a hardening of attitudes towards social welfare and a return to the moralistic rhetoric of personal responsibility (rather than economic failure). Austerite times have resuscitated the «something for nothing» and «nothing for something» problem. The punitive turn in welfare is aided by negative media portrayal of «welfare dependency» that influences public opinion (Mooney, G. 2009). Within this more punitive regime social responsibilities are displaced and re-configured as problems of self-care. This is a version of conformist moral communitarianism that emphasises the obligations of citizenship in «austerity localism» (Featherstone, D. et al., 2012: p.177). Strategies for poverty reduction would need to go beyond «fairness» to address structural inequalities and social exclusion (Scott, G and Mooney, G. 2009). A commitment to egalitarian redistribution would require a (re-)turn towards «socio-economic» rather than «moral communitarianism» (Driver, S. and Martell, L. 1997: p.42). The collective management of risk requires forms of empowerment that amount to more than invitations to «problem» communities to bring themselves to order in desired ways. Mooney (2009: p.447) has warned of «the danger of replicating regressive ways of thinking» by disting negatives outside a framework which foregrounds structural arguments, inequality and the need for redistribution. This is a different form of «othering» that draws on measures of social distance that transcend national boundaries.

Territorial politics is filled with different, often contradictory, class content, not least in the appeal to values of social justice at the same time as enacting neo-liberal policies in the service of Scotland’s global economic competitiveness… In the devolved Scotland, the symbolic national interest in ‘sustainable economic growth’ trumps the partisan interest politics of class. (Law, A. and Mooney, G. 2012b: p.172-3)

An important role for «home international» or four nation studies is to illuminate alternatives and to bring to the fore some of the tensions within devolution. The universal basis of social
citizenship in the UK is threatened by the emergence of different settlements in the constituent nations. Deliberation on the social rights of citizenship is inhibited by a fixation on identities, «national» values, and particularly notions of «Britishness» and «Scottishness». The centre-left faces a shared challenge in developing a compelling vision of social citizenship against a background of resource restriction and shifting public attitudes. Refocusing attention on active citizenship and participatory politics, rather than codifying national differences, would help to support the cultivation of constructive democratic debate within a «citizen-nation» (Colley, L. 1999).

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