EDIBLE ASSEMBLAGES AND THE DELEUZIAN EVENT – RETHINKING 'ANOREXIA'

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ABSTRACT

Informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze and the 'new materialisms', the thesis is a post-representational, post-human response to contemporary conceptualisations and practices associated with 'anorexia nervosa'. The thesis puts these ideas to work through a mobile, or connective, ethnographic methodology which blends life on-line and off-line, without giving priority to one or the other. By holding in paradoxical tension *both* anorexia as an "aspirational lifestyle choice" (as it is often conceived in pro anorexic spaces on-line) *and* as a "biologically based serious mental illness" (as it is conceived through medical and psychiatric sense off-line), the thesis disrupts orthodox notions of *what actual* 'anorexia nervosa' is, and *who actual* 'anorexics' are.

By 'promiscuously' engaging with texts which consider choice, determinism and materiality in ways which are rarely put to work in more traditionally bounded 'disordered eating' research, the thesis attempts to destroy 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought and provide an alternative to individualised, cognised, spatio-temporalised representations. As one of the few sustained works which engages with the concept of 'wannarexia', the thesis attempts to produce an account which takes seriously the enchanting intra-action of entities and matter. More specifically it reconsiders interpellation in terms of captivating, expansive, yet unspecific promises which are produced and ignite desire.

By engaging with the possibilities of what it is to eat and to speak, the thesis cleaves a space in which to consider the actual and the virtual of consuming-producing relationships. By drawing attention to non-human actants, the materiality of language and the abstractness of matter, the thesis attempts to provide a robust yet empirically transcendental account of a difficult relationship to feeding the body.

CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING 'ANOREXIA' THROUGH THE DELEUZIAN EVENT

"What is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words? [..] If we then speak of food, how can we avoid speaking in front of the one who is to be served as food?" (Deleuze, 2004, 29).

"The distinction is not between two sorts of events; rather, it is between the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatio-temporal realisation in the state of affairs. The distinction between the event and accident" (Deleuze, 2004, 64).

Introduction

The thesis develops from a critique of contemporary perspectives on 'anorexia' which view it either as a serious mental health problem, or as a lifestyle choice. It also departs from feminist, sociological or psychoanalytic views of anorexia which conceive it as a symptom of wider cultural malaise – such as negative images of femininity or failures of family dynamics. I argue that such perspectives, and the practices that they commend, have severe implications for those who experience a difficult relationship to feeding the body. These perspectives, I will suggest, frequently mis-identify causes, mis-attribute agency, misconstrue choice, fail to address the materiality of bodies, offer unproductive visions of 'recovery', and limit more expansive and ethical possibilities of what 'eating' might become. I argue that as a result, such contemporary conceptualisations and categorisations fail to encounter that which is mobile, singular, shifting and unfinished in the experience of so-called 'anorexia'. Using a theoretical framework informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze, the thesis attempts to free anorexia from the fetters of such categorical thought (which Deleuze conceptualised as 'good sense' and 'common sense' (Deleuze, 2004a)) to open up possibilities for living differently and making sense differently.

The empirical materials for the research are taken from a study of on-line 'pro-anorexia' (pro-ana) forums, and an off-line interview study involving 'Joanne', an active participant in pro-ana sites. Pro-ana sites offer alternatives to medical and feminist conceptualisations, in asserting and debating anorexia as a lifestyle choice. Yet as I show in later chapters, the notion of choice is itself contested and ambivalent. The ethnographic sites, which cannot all be explored in detail, included both on-line and off-line spaces, and as such, on-line life, and off-line life (Markham, 1998) have both been engaged with in a bid to give a different account of living with, and through, a difficult and complex relationship to feeding the body.

My desire has been to unfix good and common sense notions of *what actual* 'Anorexia Nervosa' is and *who actual* 'Anorexics' are - while never becoming forgetful of the lived and everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body. This task becomes possible by engaging with theories pertaining to the event, affect, virtuality and incorporeality, as these are perhaps abstract enough to get into, and under, the conceptual skin of what is presumed concrete about matter (Massumi, 2002, 5). These theories are combined in the thesis with ideas drawn from new, or feminist, materialisms and post-humanism to engage with the visceral, vital, materiality of relationships to feeding the body. Together, these literatures work towards the possibility of destroying 'Anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b), and refusing to take for granted pre-defined, or a priori, borders of materiality, causality, and agency.

The Event in the Context of Anorexia Nervosa and Pro-anorexia

The Deleuzian event is central to the conceptual framework of the thesis. It is connected to the embodied becoming of my thinking connections. The particular value of Deleuze's concept of the event is that it is *of both* bodies *and* language, and therefore avoids unhelpful binary distinctions that have hampered previous research on anorexia, unhelpfully forcing choices *between* matter and ideas, bodies and words, concepts and experience, nature and culture. As Deleuze notes, "[t]he event [..] has an essential relationship to language. But language is what is said of things" (Deleuze, 2004, 25). For my work, the event, its concepts and conceptual connections - in collision and process - were experienced as both affective - sensed

as significant before my thoughtfulness had caught up - and also as the biting point of engagement.

The entanglement of bodies and language, of affect and thought, has been central to my research throughout. It is 'there' in the research question which led me to the field: what is the 'everyday experience' of living with a 'difficult relationship to feeding the body? This entanglement is invoked in a question which Deleuze poses in *Logic of Sense* (2004)[1], "[w]hat is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words?" (ibid. 29). This provocative question has stimulated and challenged me throughout the thesis. As such my engagement has been with speaking and eating. Speaking of food and eating words. With lived concepts and the 'abstractness' of embodied experience (Massumi, 2011). This engagement with lived concepts has allowed into the frame of my engagement with 'anorexia' and 'pro-anorexia' that which is *of the body,* "Of it, but not it. Real, material, but incorporeal" (Massumi, 2002, 5).

Within the thesis 'anorexia' will often be referred to as 'a difficult relationship to feeding the body', as already indicated above. Although this is a mouthful, it feels important to work which seeks to disrupt good and common sense and contests the "assignation of fixed identities" (Deleuze, 2004, 5). A 'difficult relationship to feeding the body' does not pathologise. It highlights embodied struggle and movement – activity and process. It foregrounds the relational aspect of the doer and the done, without individualising the subject on ascription. It engenders a space in which to consider the innumerable human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010) that are enfolded in the digestive relation.

'A difficult relationship to feeding the body' looks towards what a body *does – not what it appears to be, and not what it represents.* It implies process, activity and movement, but not towards a fixed or individualising identity. It de-territorialises the striated spatiality, or fixed terrain, of 'Anorexia Nervosa' and acknowledges *becoming* rather than being. In doing so, this conceptual disruption engenders a schism between 'accidental' appearance, consumables, and the fixed metaphysics

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[1] Following James Williams (2008a) throughout the thesis there will be reference to *Logic of Sense,* rather than '*The Logic of Sense'.* To prefix the text with the determiner 'the', would evoke the idea that there is one definitive logic of sense that we might be concerned with, that it is easily understood, or that it is clearly or succinctly defined.

of being. Becoming disrespectful of the 'proper name' of 'Anorexia' moves possibilities of thought away from 'authenticity' towards a more attuned engagement with bodies, matter, and bodies that matter (Butler, 1993). Although the notion of the proper name, 'Anorexia', will be unpicked throughout the body of the text, what is important to note at this early juncture is the critical stance that both Deleuze, and through him, the thesis, take in relation to the colonising potentials of 'fixed identities' and 'proper names'. The thesis will argue that common sense processes which create categories with proper names, which enable recognition, and good sense processes which ascribe bodies to these categories, and enable prediction, obfuscate the real abstractness of matter. They produce only the same difference, as opposed to intense or singular difference, and, particularly important for the concerns of the thesis, buttress 'Anorexia Nervosa' as a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b).

Common sense abstractions

> "Research on eating disorders is often grounded on a dichotomous way of conceptualising their personal implications, such as false consciousness versus emancipation, and their political dimensions, such as dominance versus freedom. *This type of reasoning mimics and fuels anorexic thinking in terms of one-dimensional absolutes"* (Sauokko, 2008, 2. Emphasis added).

Although the thesis takes a decidedly different track to the one laid out by Saukko, particularly her concern with the anorexic self and identity, in the above quote we have the beginnings of the idea that neither logic, or sense, are isolated. Rather, they flow into other series of 'reasoning' (ibid) thereby producing a nuanced variation of what is sensible and what is nonsense. As such, rather than being a bizarre pathology, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and the sense which informs this relation, *is connected to bifurcations and simplified abstractions which circulate in discourses which are every-day and unremarkable*.

Although the thesis stakes its claim to abstractness, in terms of the concepts and theories it puts to work, this abstraction is *obscure* and distinct, as opposed to *clear* and distinct (Deleuze, 2004b). The association of 'obscurity' and 'distinction' is

important in Deleuzian thought. The entangled relationship between the two informs his critique of demands for 'clearness' in conventional notions of abstraction. For Deleuze, as for Massumi, whose textual methods are explicated more fully in the second chapter, abstractions can never be obviously and succinctly represented. Words never coincide exactly with their referents. To paraphrase Deleuze, I cannot literally say the sense of what I am trying to say: that would be nonsense (2004a). I cannot make clear, *in* propositions, what I feel to be important and relevant. Williams explains further:

> "This is why Deleuze repeats an odd comment about chariots passing through mouths, in *Logic of Sense,* in order to explain how word and thing retain a difference that cannot be resolved by mapping the words onto what they truthfully correspond to, since the chariot does not pass through your mouth" (Williams, 2008a, 48).

In keeping with the paradoxical imperative of obscure abstraction, I imprudently produce an at times 'fleshy' text. Here intervals and folds abound, producing crevices from which potentially different ways of encountering the eating order might emerge. The impetus to operate in this manner is quite contrary to the idea that '*the* devil is *in the* detail'. It is not a question of finding unitary icons, such as God or Devil, and it is certainly not a question of finding them where we might expect to locate them. The 'detail' is not straightforwardly *something* which avails itself to vision, which can then be pointed to with excitable digits. To de-territorialise the obviousness of 'detail', we might say instead that it is about availing ourselves to the reverberations produced through collisions between invisible entities (Deleuze, 2013). By ceasing to look for a God, and giving up our search for a Devil, we might begin to think and feel with mischievous sprites. Those luminous entities who *wait and invite thought to encounter spaces in-between actual details and 'facts'*. Spaces where words and things, in their mixtures and muddles, begin to glow (MacLure, 2013a).

Here I am not suggesting that engaging with the world abstractly, in and of itself, produces thoughts worth encountering. The abstract alone, when conventionally conceived of as separate from, and superior to the messiness of empirical appearances, does not produce real difference. We can note this production of banal distinction or 'same-difference' in the empirical abstractions of good and

common sense which categorise and border bodies, divide subject from object, body from mind, and so on. The point being made here is that such orthodox abstractions are obfuscated in and by their *predictability* and *recognisability* (Deleuze, 2004b)*.* They are not obdurate; in a sense, they are palatable.

The sense that orthodox abstractions produce is too good and too common to produce anything outside of what I am calling 'same-difference', or difference which is immediately undone or resolved by operations that render it stable, recognisable and predictable. These operations, according to Deleuze are resemblance, identity, analogy or opposition. As Deleuze notes:

> "Good and common sense each refer to the other, each reflect the other and constitute one half of the orthodoxy. In view of this reciprocity and double reflection, we can define common sense by the process of recognition and good sense by the process of prediction" (Deleuze, 2004b, 285).

As such, disrupting good and common sense engenders the possibility of encountering the 'subject-object' of inquiry differently. As a set of practices it dislocates the powerful restraints of the dogmatic image of thought, powerful due to its status as something which "[e]verybody knows [and] no-one can deny" (Deleuze, 2004b, 165).

The experimental task taken up by the thesis is the creation of an appropriate dose (Tynan, 2010; Mann O' Donnell, 2010) of distinction and obscurity. A dose which would produce a subject-object that is *un*recognisable and *un*predictable. And while this takes up what Patti Lather notes as the "ethical imperative to risk not being understood" (Lather, 2007), the task is not to suffer obscurity and "scratch sores of *ressentiment"* (Deleuze, 2004a, 173). It is, as noted, a question of dosage. This activity involves creating concoctions of sense and nonsense that paradoxically produce knotty mixtures that deserve attention. By becoming idiotic and forfeiting our geometry set (Deleuze, 2004b), our predictable circles can become elliptical. We can conceive of different problems and different problems of difference.

The Diagnostic Statistical Manual – speaking through good and common sense

In the case of 'Anorexia Nervosa', moving matter is abstracted into the demanding category of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) (APA, 2000; 2013). The new edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) is used by clinicians and researchers to *diagnose and classify* 'mental disorders'. It has been produced by hundreds of 'international experts' in all aspects of mental health. The fifth edition, as with preceding others, defines and classifies 'mental disorders'. It attempts to produce concise and specific criteria intended to facilitate an objective assessment of symptom presentations in a variety of clinical settings - inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinical, private practice, and primary care. In other words it attempts to make 'mental illness', such as 'Anorexia Nervosa', recognisable and predictable through *a clear and distinct* representation which includes the ascription of a 'proper name'.

The DSM, for the purposes of the thesis, is an empirical example of the way in which the authentic and deserving body can be weighed, literally, against the guilty copy (the not-yet 'proper' anorexic) who has yet to prove they are ill enough to be recognised as having a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Yet, the DSM's place within the state of affairs, the everyday and the clinical, is, to a certain extent, one of the 'accidents' which the project engages with. Here the accident can be considered in terms of the actual, as it is what occurs, and the event, as the inside of what occurs, can be considered in terms of the virtual. This apparent separation is no separation at all, for traces of one are always already in the other. They are separated not to bifurcate or border, or suggest that they are collapsible, but rather to highlight the mutual and processual connection between both the virtual and actual and the event and accident.

It is important to note in this opening chapter that engaging with 'the accident' is connected to the thesis' attempt to engage with post-representational theory (MacLure, 2013b). The accident, or what occurs, is manifest in what Deleuze refers to as 'the state of affairs'. The state of affairs, the domain of denotation, manifestation and signification, is what conservative, as opposed to transcendental,

empiricism works with. It is amenable to vision and has a "perceptual thereness" (Ahmed, quoted in Lenz Taguchi, 2013, 711), which can be availed to evidence 'something in particular'. The thesis will suggest that although the accident's discernibility to vision allows empirical boxes to be ticked, it misses the point, or the sense of the event. To return to the way in which the thesis works with the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, what is of particular interest is the way in which the good and common sense of this accidental artefact feeds into incorporeal events and produces paradoxes which "reveal philosophy" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286). Put differently, the clear and distinct logic that would make 'things' such as 'eating disorder recognisable and predictable, is implicated in producing new unknowable territories and rebel elements. But more of this later.

Virtuality and movement

Massumi notes that virtuality is a pivotal Deleuzian concept, yet the least understood (Massumi, 1992, 34). In terms of the thesis' engagement with the body as corporeal and incorporeal, I draw on this 'pivotal' concept for what it offers in terms of disrupting predictability and causality. It engages with "that which is in a process of coming about and never ceases coming about" (Deleuze, 2004, 242). In other words, thinking with virtuality helps the thesis disrupt linear notions of temporality and the accordant causes and effects which are plotted along it. Here, in making reference to the virtual, it is necessary to make distinct the idea that the virtual and actual are in disjointed tandem. They are not separate, and to give one precedence over the other is to miss the point. Williams notes that many theorists:

> "want to pretend that the virtual wants to flee the actual. It can't. It does
> not want to. In Logic of Sense, priority – if we want to keep the term -
> accounts for what Deleuze calls the neutrality of sense or its impassibility
> (2008, 98).

The emphasis on virtual and actual processes, activities and movements is significant throughout the thesis at numerous levels. Perhaps most significantly in terms of movement and process and theories pertaining to them, as they inform the task of refusing to freeze 'Anorexia' as a proper name or final point of identity.

What is the thesis doing?

By seeking a space for intensity and difference to flicker, the thesis will show the working out and working through of conceptual aspects of the Deleuzian event. For instance: sense, the dual and quasi cause, the accident, actualisation and counter-actualisation. The empirical materials, or data, that these concepts are then plugged into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) produce an account whereby the *lived* implications of separating out the actual from the virtual, the corporeal from the incorporeal, is scrutable to further inquiry. Here, what can then be highlighted as problematic is the way in which medical accounts of the eating order, and their reinvestment in *actual*, or proper 'anorexia', serve to reproduce the aborescent logic of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. The thesis draws attention to the strangle-hold of this 'good and common sense' by noting that even where medical expertise is apparently subverted by 'experience based expertise' (Conrad and Stults, 2010), and 'anorexia' is posited as a 'lifestyle choice' by members of the pro-ana community, bodies are still named and organised according to a discourse which produces only the same and the similar. For those who are not already familiar with pro-anorexia sites, Giles (2006) defines them as on-line spaces constructed by and for young people with 'eating disorders'.

> "Typically, pro-ana sites contain archived journals or diaries written by people with eating disorders (EDs), large amounts of information, 'tips' and advice, emotional support, photo galleries, usually of thin models but occasionally of users' own bodies, poetry and song lyrics reflecting the experience of anorexia and related conditions" (Giles, 2006, 464).

It is the contention of the thesis that good and common sense inevitably undercuts the revolutionary and resistant ambitions of the pro-anorexia, or 'pro-ana' discourse and community. Here, ambitions to have difference acknowledged are always already being directed, hostage, to a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b). As captives their relationship to food and feeding the body is always already being represented in a 'cultural freeze frame' (Massumi, 2002). Here, this 'freeze frame', which will eventually be developed through the notion of 'the accident', reduces that which is *both* the body, corporeal*, and* of it, incorporeal, to a respectful and conservative adherence to a set of diagnostic criteria (DSM-IV, APA, 2001, DSM-V,

APA, 2013). Here we can think of this 'logic' in terms of what Deleuze posits as the empiricist's confusion between accident and event (Deleuze, 2004a).

The accident, or *what occurs,* is manifest, as noted above, in what Deleuze refers to as 'the state of affairs'. It is what orthodox empiricism prioritises as it is apparent *to human vision*. This misses the point, or the sense of the event. As Williams notes, "events are much more than an actual thing 'happening' in a limited space and time" (2008, 31). While that which is available to vision is significant in terms of social research, indeed, from a traditionally empirical point of view it may strike common sense chords of being *the most important thing.* However, what will be explored within the thesis is that this propensity to see *in vision* is implicated in the production of, what are conceived of in good and common sense as, 'eating disordered behaviours'. In other words, representationalism (the appearance of an emaciated body, numerical figures represented on weighing scales, a particular Body Mass Index (BMI)) informs embodied and linguistic practices which are slavish to palatable abstractions noted in a previous sub-section. "Like a good magician, representationalism would have us focus on what seems to be evidently given" [it is a] game of smoke and mirrors" (Barad, 2007, 360). Put crudely for the purposes of my argument, representationalism facilitates the belief that we know who has an eating disorder because it is "evidently given".

By putting to work Deleuze's writing from *Difference and Repetition* (2004b) we might take virtuality a little further at this point by looking towards Deleuze's writing on extensity and intensity. Deleuze notes that "intensity is the uncancellable in difference of quantity, but this difference of quantity is cancelled *by extension*, extension being precisely the process by which intensive difference is turned inside out and *distributed* in such a way as to be dispelled, compensated, equalised and suppressed in the extensity which creates it" (Deleuze, 2004b, 295, emphasis added). As such, we might think of the DSM as an apparatus of extensity which turns difference inside out and distributes it in such a way as to suppress it and replace it with the denotative logic of *this or that*, true or false. *Either* having a real illness *or* being healthy. This latter point, the relationship between health and illness will be developed further in the fourth chapter of the thesis.

The abstract *of* everyday embodied experience

> "Deleuze's philosophy is perhaps the most important non-reductive
> contemporary work opposed to the modern foundations of free choices
> and their judgement through actual or predicted consequences.[........]
> Deleuzian selection is not free choice, it is a two-way individuating path
> running through series" (Williams, 2008, 5, emphasis added).

My movement towards a particular understanding of the abstract, in relation to the event and that which is *of the body*, is to engage with the "change synonymous with life" (Massumi, 2011, 1). Working this way is at least in part to show that there is already much abstracting going on. However, the abstractions which name, order and freeze, in their fit with bifurcations which 'haunt metaphysics' (Massumi, 2011), have become good and common sense. They are no longer questionable as anything other than the way *things* are done – and *done to*. This *doing* and *doing to* becomes especially significant in the context of 'saving' or normalising individuals and groups of individuals deemed vulnerable or 'mentally ill'. There will be more about this later in the thesis as Deleuze's notion of the 'proud verb' is put to work and my own conceptualisation of the ashamed adjective is introduced.

It is the contention of the thesis, in its recourse to the abstract as lived, *of bodies* and intimately connected to the change, process, activity and becoming of life, that gains can be made by engaging with a different kind of empiricism. Those put forward by Deleuze and other philosopher-physicist-mathematicians, including William James and Alfred North Whitehead. Here incremental nudges can help inquiry to move away from representing 'the anorexic body', or any other body for that matter, as a fixed entity by becoming radically empirical and activist in its philosophising (Whitehead,1968; Massumi, 2011). Radical empiricism holds to the idea that "everything that is experienced is real in some way and that everything real is in some way experienced. [...] the radical empiricist must hold that 'change itself is immediately experienced" (Massumi, 2011, 4). This experience is felt in its coming about in the 'something stirring' of activity (Massumi, 2011). However, 'something stirring' does not yet know how or why it will be drawn into activities and actualisations. The event is pre individual, creative and unpredictable. Additionally, this 'something stirring' might also be thought of in relation to the way in which

Deleuze writes about the being of the sensible as "something which simultaneously cannot be sensed (from the point of view of the empirical exercise) and can only be sensed (from the point of view of the transcendental exercise") (2004b, 296).

In moving away from entities which can *only* be seen in vision, the thesis does not turn only towards ideas or language. Instead It is in both directions at once, after all, "language is what is said of things" (Deleuze, 2004, 25). To add clarity, without pinning down, what will become apparent as the thesis develops is that working away from that which can only be seen in vision is part of the political work of the project. Working with sense, the sense of the event, opens up divisions between body and mind, matter and ideas, sense and nonsense. In working away from common sense, what must be understood is that sense is not only cognitive. It is at a border between the activities of language and bodies. So, returning to the idea of the empirical, often conceived as that which is observed, we see in the following quote from Deleuze that the event is not merely an esoteric assemblage of complex ideas far removed from the 'real world', on the contrary:

> "The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to *transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas*, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience" (2004, 23, emphasis added).

The abstract, yet embodied task becomes to feel, think and move with that which is not "*in* vision [but] as *with* vision or *through* vision: as a vision effect" (Massumi, 2012, 17). Activity and process is experienced, it makes itself known, both in the bare activity of the world, and as this activity transmutes, through series, becoming the special activity of the mixtures of bodies which bring it about. Events: actualised.

> "We can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of things. You don't deviate from the majority unless there is a little detail that starts to swell and carries you off" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 322).

In the quote above we can note the relevance that activity has to the notion of becoming. As will become clearer later on in the thesis, as I engage more fully with

notions of enchantment and proud verbs, the "little detail", that Deleuze and Guattari note, "that starts to swell and carries you off" (ibid), is not a detail that the devil resides in. Here, by returning to points made earlier in the chapter, regarding the tension of obscurity and distinction, I am able to colour, rather than clarify, the points I am trying to make. Detail ceases to be a scrutable state and becomes an insensible, yet sensed activity. A 'detail' creates changes in the possibilities of 'sense' and as the proud verb rubs two series together things begin to glow (MacLure, 2013a). But as mentioned, these ideas will be developed at a later point in the thesis where they become important and relevant again.

The event of working with, and through the event, is the process of becoming sensitive, but not *soft*, to lived concepts. Becoming sensitive to the endless and multiple, the endlessly and multiply connected abstract concepts which lives are lived through. Processes, ideas and connections always already subsist in the real and abstract *of* the body, its virtual or incorporeal dimension. Not waiting to be *unveiled*, but waiting to be brought about through activities and processes. The previous activities of events passing out engender the necessary momentum for events becoming. Events are carried off through proud verbs into other event actualisations and counter actualisations. As series brush up against one another, leaving an affective trace or tonality, past and future are freed from the linear ordering of good and common sense. Every event may be *singular*, in the sense that it is novel and creative, yet this singularity is not isolated, unitary, or once and for all. Jets of singularity: multiplicities of potential.

Here what I am attempting to articulate is the way in which the event draws on *a past*, but not *the past* of the actualising individual's life. This past is not biographically 'theirs', it was not played out in the state of affairs of *their* life. For instance, 'the fact' that *they* were told by *their* grand-parent that *they* were "a big girl" is not the past of the event actualised. The possibility, the affective virtuality, not actuality, of this gendered and gendering annunciation is. The impersonal momentum of the event which provides the force necessary to swell and carr[y] you off" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 322) is *a* past: dry and incorporeal. It is "free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular, eventum tantum" (Deleuze, 2004a, 172).

As I noted previously, the thesis engages with speaking and eating. Speaking of food and eating words. What this seemingly abstract couplet speaks of is the consumable nature of *things* and the inconsumable nature of *sense* (Deleuze, 2004a). "Everything denoted or capable of denotation is, in principle, consumable and penetrable" (Deleuze, 2004a, 31). Following this different way of thinking with and about the eating order that Deleuze facilitates, it follows that the affective serial circulation of words which are available *to speak* function as barbarous entities, which are available *to eat.* They are consumable, and further to this they are metabolised. In different ways, in different bodies, and at different times in the same body. They are in a process of transmutation and materialisation.

Returning to the issue of event-temporality, the future of the event is not girl A's imagined future, dreamed of in the state of affairs. Nor is it the denoted future that this or that *type* of girl might be expected to have, for instance, as a success or a failure, a Doctor or a Sex Worker. No, the futurity of the event is the mobius strip of a sanguine serpent eating its own tail, the manifold potentialities of *a life.* Here, the 'reason' we might be so tempted to think of an actual person's past and present, aside from the fact that humanism takes things so personally, is the way that we are accustomed to think past-present-future as a linear and individualised progression. It so neatly accords the organising good and organised common sense which "everybody knows [and] no-one can deny" Deleuze, 2004b, 165).

Deleuze's dissection of the event is detailed, yet the implications of the duplicity, or two-sidedness, of the event are immense. As Williams (2008a) notes, for Deleuze, life is depth *and* surface. Causes are dual, explored in their *actual* and *quasi* dimensions. Events are actualised but must also be counter actualised: replayed through verbs and different series which produce a different *sense of* the event. The event is inside what occurs, sense; while the accident is *what occurs*, at the level of manifestation. In speaking of sense we are not talking about meaning, we are speaking of breaking the circular stronghold of the propositions that make anorexia *make sense.* In other words, the logic of good and common sense that represents 'anorexia' as a problem, and medical treatment or recovery as a solution, fails to acknowledge the way in which a problem produces the solution it deserves

(Deleuze, 2004b). Following on from this, the thesis would like to introduce, or encounter, the problem differently. Not as one of pathology, but one of philosophy – ontology and epistemology, or onto-epistemolgy (Barad, 2007).

The work here is not to rescue those deemed 'vulnerable', or protect them from the sense of the event. There is much to learn from its activities and processes (Deleuze, 2004a). Rather, the continual work to be done is to allow sense to emerge without reducing it only to that which is manifest in the state of affairs. While the thesis is interested in the abstract, the interest is by virtue of its capacity to work differently with that which is presumed concrete about matter. Although the theoretical influences which flow into and out of the thesis are away from the fixity of common sense, the thinking is towards how those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body may have more liveable lives. In other words, one of the implications of working with the event is the political hopefulness encountered in the other side of actualisation: counter actualisation. One of the questions which then emerges is how this idea, which Deleuze refers to as our greatest freedom (2004a, 243), might be considered as a means to open possibilities. How might we encounter relationships to feeding the body away from what good sense says anorexia 'is', and what common sense says anorexics 'are'.

Movements *of the body* - moving with sense and questioning 'choice'

The thesis is primarily about movement and sense, particularly movement away from the fixity of good or common sense. For Deleuze the event is sense, not meaning or inference, but *in relation* to them. Sense is not *in* the proposition – denotation, manifestation, signification - it is *of* the proposition, its fourth dimension. My use of '*of*' here helps to re-join sense to the incorporeal dimension *of* the body, its virtual or incorporeal dimension. This idea will be developed in subsequent chapters which use data gathered on-line and off-line, to make luminous a different account of choice or choosing which disrupts the intentional cognitive selection of an autonomous individual. While chapter four engages with discussions occurring on-line; chapter five engages with, but is not limited to, the empirical materials which emerged off-line. In chapter five the thesis works further towards the possibility of disrupting proper names and fixed identities. Here, although what 'Joanne' makes

available to the project evokes the lived and every day of life on, and off-line, the work of the thesis, in its refusal to be satiated with good and common sense, does not simply represent 'what occurred'. It also attempts to engage with the inside of what occurs –which is *both* more *and* less than what 'Joanne' and I produced together in the state of affairs. Put differently, more *and* less than that which could be made manifest, denoted or signified – summed up in propositions alone.

Disrupting the self-contained individual

In working both *with* and *through* the Deleuzian event, and particular notions of affect (Brennan, 2004; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Massumi, 2002; 2011), the thesis does not subsume matter under language, or vice versa. Neither does it take for granted an actual embodied subject split from embodied potential, or virtuality. Here, and by working with Massumi's figuration of the virtual as '*of the body'* – real and abstract, my work seeks to negotiate the necessary task of engaging with the depth of bodies and the surface of language. In taking into account affect, as that which is transmissible between bodies, spaces and entities and as a substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness (Clough, 2007), I have a useful way of troubling the self-contained, cognitively driven subject *and* the intentionality of their choices. As Brennan notes:

> "[O]ur self-contained individual believes he acts of his own accord, and that his impulses and desires come from nowhere other than the history embodied in his genes. He is wrong. The self-contained individual driven by a genetic motor has antecedents of his own. His origins appear to lie in a complex of Platonic and Aristotelian views on form and matter, activity and passivity, subject and object, views that merge with seventeenth-century Cartesianism to give birth to the self-contained individual whose mind and body are separate" (2004, 77).

The thesis neither starts nor stops with the 'object' of 'anorexia' or 'the anorexic' subject. As Massumi notes, "[n]either object nor subject: event" (2011, 6). Within the thesis it becomes apparent that there are implications for 'anorexia', or more appropriately, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, being fixed and represented in terms of the 'same difference' produced by the DSM. It is the contention of the thesis that there is iconoclastic work to be done with regard to 'Anorexia Nervosa'.

Put differently, it is necessary to destroy 'it' as a dogmatic image of thought, firstly so that real difference might be encountered, and secondly, so that the same differences, which are produced through good and common sense, cease to become aborescent structures from which real bodies dangle. Here, aborescent pertains to unitary and linear tree like structures, which Deleuze and Guattari are critical of when taken to be the "image of the world" (2004a, 5), particularly as these "plot[.] a point [and] fix[.] an order" (2004a,7). They oppose aborescent structures to the rhizome which "can be connected to anything other, and must be" (ibid). Their criticism of literature which adheres to tree like structures is "not that they are too abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of a statement [the materiality of words]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 8).

The reification of 'anorexia' and its iconic, elevated status has more than a little to do with what Brennan articulates above: The splitting of the subject from the object, activity from passivity. The thesis argues that those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body are compelled to fit the lived abstraction of embodied experience into the abstract and frozen certainty offered by the DSM and common sense. But in this logic of neat division there can be no winners – failure is imminent on all sides.

> "If you start by presupposing a subject-object divide, there is no way of preventing the separation from the deepening abyss. How can the subject cross the divide to re attach itself to the objectivity 'out there' on the other side?" (Massumi, 2012, 7).

When essences and appearances collide, the Idea of true, real, or 'proper anorexia' is placed on a pedestal, like an angel aloft on a Christmas tree, erected as the dogmatic image of thought. Yet while our angel sits on high, those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body become the lived concept of impropriety: Subject to the neologism 'wannarexic'. These ideas concerning authenticity and impropriety will be engaged with in more detail in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis.

How abstract Ideas have been put to work – introducing sense and the paradox

> "Philosophy is revealed not by good sense but by paradox" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286).

The thesis emerges, as noted earlier, through my affective sense of the Deleuzian event. In other words, the affective and conceptual biting point for my work emerges through a mutual and embodied reading of 'anorexia' through the Deleuzian event and of the Deleuzian event through my empirical work in on-line and off-line spaces. The sensations of both sought each other out to "wrestle" and to "form a combat of energies" (Deleuze, 2013, 48), to wrest sense from their match.

The event, which is sense, is not cognitive or in thoughtful logic, nor is it something contained deeply within bodies and things. Sense is at the border between the proposition and things and this border might be most effectively considered, as I have suggested throughout this chapter, as *of the body:* virtual. This idea is given further weight in terms of the way in which Williams notes that "sense is akin to an affect or mood that can invest very distant and apparently distinct phenomena with a similar sense" (2008, 6), and as Massumi notes, "[a]ffective tonality is what we normally call a 'mood' (Massumi, 1992). Within the thesis I take these ideas of tonality and mood to draw attention to the pre-individuality of both sense and the event. As will become apparent later on, this practice reinforces the impetus in my work to challenge that which is *individualised* and *individualising.* In addition to these points the thesis makes use of 'mood' because of the way it connects to affective transmissions which circulate between bodies, social spaces (Brennan, 2004) and entities. It is also worth noting at this early stage the connection between 'mood' and grammar as this will be worked with later in the thesis through the notion of the 'proud verb'.

To summarise what I have already set in motion, the thesis is an attempt to move away from considering 'anorexia' only as actual: individualised, categorised and fixed. It is a textual-material-affective production of an interrogation of anorexia which draws on and draws out virtuality in the context of the pre-individual, moving and unfixed event. The virtual mentioned here also pertains, at the level of common

usage, to the on-line pro-ana spaces I have worked with. However, this is distinct to, and by no means collapsible, to what Massumi or Deleuze imply by the term. Indeed:

> "The key is always to hold the virtual as a coincident dimension of every event's occurrence [...E]very experience is an occasion of lived abstraction. *As a limit concept, the virtual cannot be thought without paradox – and without working to make the paradox conceptually productive.*[..] To make that limit-experience productive, the thinking must then turn back in the form of new concepts or new variations on old concepts. This must be done in a way that does *not* try to resolve or dismiss the paradox" (Massumi, 2011, 18-19, emphasis added).

As Williams notes "[p]aradoxes matter because they reveal limits within systems and require passages beyond internal rules of validity and consistency" (2008, 25). The idea of 'internal rules of validity' can be seen as meaningful within the context of what was earlier conceptualised, by plugging Deleuze (2004a, 2004b) into Barad (2007), as an apparatus of extensity, the DSM (APA, 2000). Additionally the idea of 'consistency' is interesting in the context of pro-ana spaces where contestation and ambivalence are not foreclosed in the inquiry as contradictory. Put differently, in on-line spaces anorexia as a *choice* is by no means the only way in which sense circulates. There is often recourse, especially when it comes to proving authenticity or 'properness', that is it a mental illness. *Real by virtue of the abstract category it adheres to.*

> "Under what conditions does a difference become regarded as individual? The problem of classification was clearly always a problem of ordering differences" (Deleuze, 2004b, 309).

The thesis will work with, and hold in paradoxical tension – *both* Anorexia as an "aspirational lifestyle choice", as it is often conceived in pro-ana spaces on-line (Dias, 2003; Pollack, 2003; Fox et al, 2005), *and* as a "biologically based serious mental illness", as it is conceived through medical and psychiatric sense off-line (APA, 2000, 2013; Klump et al., 2009). It will also highlight how this paradox is implicated in producing a 'new variation on an old concept' (Massumi, 2011) in the form of an esoteric, portmanteau or 'nonsense' word: the 'wannarexic'.

Here 'nonsense' is not how common sense conceives it. Nonsense is in relation to sense. Indeed it is always already implicated in the production of sense and is not false or pertaining to falsity: "sense and nonsense have a specific relation which cannot occupy that of the true and false" (Deleuze, 2004, 79). However, and as testament to the way in which common sense ideas of the 'proper' or 'actual' play out on-line in pro-ana spaces, 'wannarexia' and the 'wannarexic' are usually considered as false pretenders. This can be noted in the way in which it is mobilised as a pejorative term. The significance of this will become apparent later as the thesis develops, particularly within chapters four and five. Here, as empirical materials are worked with, the problem which emerges is that when bordering and fixing the 'true' or 'actual anorexic', other bodies are materially, ontologically and epistemologically produced as not mattering.

Returning to the aforementioned paradox, '*both', 'and',* are not separate. Rather 'both-and' implies that each element of the paradox is conceived as part of disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses. As Williams notes, "it is not 'both' as separate entities, but as series of transforming asymmetric relations" (2008a, 53). Both elements change and inform the other, they intra-act (Barad, 2007). Framed in this manner, a framing which both emerged from the field as it unfolded, and informed the task of 'bordering the field', it ceases to be a question of whether or not 'anorexia' is a lifestyle choice *or* a mental illness. We cease to operate at the level of the denotative intuition alone which "is then expressed by the form: 'it is that' or 'it is not that' (Deleuze, 2004, 16).

This drive towards fixity and denotation - it is that; it is not that - does not suffice. It is connected to the conservatism of common sense which betrays the ontological conviction of being, rather than becoming. To trouble this conservatism it is necessary to become critical of inquiries emerging from a diverse range of disciplines, which reinvest in ideas of the self-contained, autonomous, cognitively driven subject. To buttress the point that I am attempting to make I would like to return to Paula Saukko's assertion noted in an earlier sub-section of this chapter. Saukko noted that the 'reasoning' mobilised in studies of 'eating disorders' mimics and fuels anorexic thinking in terms of "one-dimensional absolutes" (Sauokko, 2008, 2). Here I would suggest that one of the most insidious and pernicious 'absolutes', to

borrow a term from her, is the actuality of a bordered autonomous and intentional subject. It "mimics and fuels anorexic thinking" (ibid). Or rather, to work within a series of material and linguistic assemblages that feel more apposite, it becomes part of a digestive assemblage which bodies must eat before they can leave the table. It is the fuel which sustains a commitment to being a proper anorexic.

To summarise this idea I would suggest that to disrupt 'anorexia', destroy it as a dogmatic image of thought, it is necessary to un-pick certain abstract consumables: those taken for granted ideas pertaining to the body, what it can do and what it is called.

Sites and Spaces, Texts and Ideas

As will be developed later in further chapters, the mutuality of my reading of the event through 'anorexia', and vice versa, collides in the mutual crossings of my mobile or connective method (Hine, 2000) and Deleuze's own philosophy of 'radical connection' (Williams, 2008). For Deleuze radical philosophical connection is not necessarily well ordered or defined according to external rules or laws. For my methodology the connections which were made between entities, ideas, people, groups and places were not well defined or fixed at the outset according to repeatable methodological 'rules' or 'laws'. Rather, my methodology unfolded in ways which could not have been predicted as I entered the field. For both my methodology and Deleuze's philosophy, things and ideas come about not as '*a* follows *b*' but as '*b* beckons *c*, and *a* waits for both'.

The ideas which have been developed through the course of the project are in relation to the concepts which I put to work, and which worked through me as I engaged with on-line (a youth support network, pro-anorexia sites, you-tube, facebook) and off-line settings (an eating disorder prevention project, an intergenerational feminist project, and face to face meetings with a member of the pro-anorexia community). Within my connective or mobile ethnography on-line and off-line life (Markham, 1998) were both experienced, and therefore both part of 'real' life. Only in relation to 'both-and' has it become possible to move away from fixing anorexia as a mental illness *or* a choice. In turn, both-and, as conjunctive synthesis,

has enabled the production of a different account of living with, and through, a difficult and complex relationship to feeding the body. In later chapters, particularly the fourth and fifth, these ideas will be developed further by drawing on the notion of the 'experiment' to give a post-human account of eating relations. Here I will be considering the 'vibrancy of matter' as having "a not-quite-human capaciousness" (Bennett, 2010, 3).

Having just introduced the post-human (Bennett, 2010; Braidotti, 2011), and the experiment (Arsic, 2008; Mann O'Donnell, 2010), it is possible to return, differently, to the temporalisation of 'anorexia' in the state of affairs and the 'problem with solutions'. Or rather, the problem with problems as they are posed in good and common sense (Deleuze, 2004b; Durie, 2006; Massumi, 1992). Here, what is at stake is the notion of 'recovery' as pertaining to 'health', and 'anorexia' as pertaining to 'Illness', or more precisely, the blunt separation of each *particular* from its co-producing other. It is the contention of the thesis that neither 'anorexia' nor 'recovery' can be chosen in thoughtfulness alone. They cannot be subject to a disembodied will, which, paradoxically, in common sense, is always the true property of the bordered individual subject. Within the thesis, the separation of 'health' and 'illness' will be disrupted through the notions of 'quasi causality', possibilities of 'dosages', auto-immune self-immunisation (Mann O'Donnell, 2010) and counter actualisation. In terms of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, matter can no more cease to embody the affective trace of the event, than it can to bring it about by cognitive intentionality alone.

It is worth clarifying at this point that common sense is inflected by scientific and philosophical series which inform the propositions we mobilise and which mobilise us. As Deleuze notes, with such elegant precision:

> "Every time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs) " (Deleuze, 2004b, 282).

One way in which to avoid this coming together "at all costs" (ibid) is by working through the paradox which:

> "displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, along with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the direction of good sense" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286).

Put differently, by engaging with paradoxes, we can resist the striated pathways which lead to good and common sense evaluations, we can notice the rebel becomings (Deleuze, 2004a, 4; MacLure, 2013a) which, as noted above, cannot be totalised by giving them a proper name, nor can they be equalised or cancelled by being locked within a category.

Paradoxes are away from contradictions which dead end possibilities by presenting *either* one thing *or* the other. Instead, paradoxes take the form *both-and*. Yet refusing to say *it is that* or *it is not that*, is not without political intent, on the contrary. It is the contention of the thesis that recourse to calmly composed common sense, which says 'it is that' and is made possible through the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an apparatus of extensity, does not accommodate sense as that which is a pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies. It borders corporeality but cannot conceive of dimensions *of the body*. This calm common sense is itself implicated in the individualisation of 'problems', the production of problematic individuals, and the collusion of said individuals with the idea that it is indeed with them that *both* pathology *and* choice rests. Or rather, it is indeed *in them* that pathology and choice gnaw and antagonise.

> "The active/ passive dichotomy, as consciousness understands it, is thus a product of the sense of self that divides itself off from the rest of the world on the grounds of its difference. Its understanding of activity is synonymous with the idea of individual intentionality" (Brennan, 2004; 93).

Instead of looking to common sense which would "distinguish pretenders" on "essences and appearances" alone (Deleuze, 2004, 292), the thesis works with the creativity of the event to explore the way in which bodies are compelled to move towards entities as they become enchanted (Bennett, 2010). Here, and by refusing the active/passive dichotomy that Brennan cautions us against, the choices that

bodies make are not cognitive or intentional choices. They are both real and quasi, visceral and virtual.

This brings us to the dual cause of the event, an idea which will be put to work later as I draw on ideas of affect as prior to the experiencing body and transmissible through bodies and the environment. This will become clearer as I work in more depth with the paradox of 'anorexia' as a lifestyle choice and a mental illness, and draw on empirical materials I gathered during eighteen months 'in the field'. As I mentioned a moment ago, the nature of the cause, as it is explicated in *Logic of Sense* (2004a), is dual .In one direction it pertains to the pre individual and incorporeal *of* the body, its potential, which Massimi notes as being "fundamental for the understanding of existence" (Massumi, 2011, 1). While in the other direction it depends, for its *actual causes*, upon mixtures of bodies. In other words, the virtual and the actual are no more separate than the individual from that which is pre-individual and in a process of becoming amongst bodies.

In its dry incorporeality sense moves between the surface of language and the depths of bodies, *it* is "the boundary between propositions and things" (Deleuze, 2004, 25). Yet because it cannot be denoted, and therefore cannot be consumed, it is neither a 'thing' nor a general or a particular idea. Sense does not stay still long enough to be eaten or denoted. It is the fragrant steam which rises from a plate, it informs *how, why* and *who* we do eat, or denote, and rises to our mouths with the consumable, only to escape before it can be digested. The fragrant steam of sense subsists within the food from which it rises, but it is always already receding, returning differently to a plane between words and things. We cannot say that sense exists either 'in' things or 'in' the mind. It has neither a physical nor mental existence (Deleuze, 2004, 23). Sense does not merge with the proposition (denotation, manifestation, signification), yet it does not exist without it. Sense is not the property of individuals, but it cannot come about without their corporeality and incorporeality, without their vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010). However, this boundary is not a boundary as common sense thinks it, by virtue of the fact that it is neither a 'thing', nor a general or a particular idea. This boundary must, by virtue of the relationship sense has to both bodies and language, be conceived as a boundary which is *of both,* yet *in* neither.

"How is it possible to speak of the anorexic as subject when s/he is doubly silenced: first by being positioned as the object of a gaze [...] and, second, through a mental health discourse that positions [their] words as the mere ramblings of hysteria?" (Ferreday; 2012, 142).

Alongside the paradox of mental illness and lifestyle choice I also work with one of Deleuze's own paradoxes which concerns speaking and eating. Often expressed by the infinities *to eat, to speak*, the series of speaking and the series of eating, bought together by infinitives, produce novel and unpredictable events which enable my inquiry to produce an alternative account of both (st)uttering and consuming . This is taken up later in the thesis through what Deleuze refers to as the 'proud verb' and can be seen being put to work in chapters four and five.

I work with the possibilities of to eat/to speak for a number of reasons: firstly to engage with contemporary ideas in feminism and body studies which attempt to move *away from representations* of the body, of denoting it and what it means, towards an acknowledgement of what bodies can *do* (Ferreday, 2012; Warin, 2012). Secondly, to eat/ to speak will be explored as a means to unpick, disrupt, and analyse empirical materials gathered from on-line and off-line spaces, and thirdly, to indicate how questions pertaining to speaking and eating, particularly how "speaking in front of the one who is to be served as food" (Deleuze, 2004) may illuminate the task of generating ethically diffractive research (Barad, 2007). In other words, engage with the issue of how, why and who is denoted or represented: *How, why* and *who* we eat. This mixture of ethics, speaking and silence can be noted in Ferreday's question above, and segues to the final paradox which has already begun to be put to work: the 'paradox of the virtual'.

This idea is central to the thesis' emphasis on movement which remains inscrutable to vision alone, "full of both oneness and manyness, *in respects that don't appear"* (James quoted in Massumi, 2012, 2; also see Blackman and Venn, 2010). Here, this idea of non-appearance is connected to incorporeality and virtuality. It is also important to Deleuze's method of transcendental empiricism which does not confuse accident and event.

> "Events are the only idealities. To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities. A double battle has the objective to thwart all dogmatic confusion between event and essence, and also every empiricist confusion between event and accident" (Deleuze, 2004a, 64).

Within the thesis the task becomes to disrupt the borders and lines drawn by Humanism which serve to limit the territory in which a difficult relationship to feeding the body is lived out, both virtually and actually. This, in a sense, returns me to the points that I attributed earlier to Saukko, and which I in turn developed. Here I am referring to the points she makes about 'reasoning', 'mimicry', 'one-dimensional absolutes', and what she terms 'anorexic thinking' (Sauokko, 2008, 2). Before I note the significance of platonic thought, noted above in the quote taken from *Logic of Sense* (2004a), I would like to detour slightly to unpick the notion of 'anorexic thinking'. Having done this I will be more able to return to the point I am trying to articulate with regard to flows, folds and division.

The notion of 'anorexic thinking' is somewhat problematic*, particularly if we attribute it only to individuals who have been defined, recognised or diagnosed as 'anorexic'*. However, its status as problematic does not stop it from being productive. It has potential. If we cease to consider 'anorexic thinking' "representationally, as grounded in a double identity: of the thinking subject and the concepts it creates" (Massumi, 1992, 4), we are closer to articulating the *sense of* 'anorexia', without attributing it to a particular individual or category of individuals. This, of course, would be good sense.

Here, as I am positing it, 'anorexic thinking' ceases to be a cognitive activity carried out by an individual. It does not result from the occurrences that have taken place in *their* lives. It is not a product of a particular bio-chemical malfunction. Rather, I would suggest that we consider 'anorexic thinking' as unlimited. Not just as actual in the sense that it refers to a humanist orthodox eating order, but Instead, as I have already set out above, in terms of the way in which Deleuze encourages us to consider consumables and sense. As such it becomes possible to suggest that 'anorexic thinking' is pre-individual and affective. It is transmissible, but not itself edible.

While it is concerned with 'eating', what is eaten, or not as the case may be, is not restricted to protein, carbohydrates, fat, vitamins and minerals etcetera. Instead, it feeds off what I previously referred to as 'barbarous entities' and gluttonously devours the logic of platonic division. Both of which fuel the contorted acrobatic displays which are demanded by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, what I termed earlier as an apparatus of extensity.

Having set these ideas up I would now like to highlight the implications of a diet of good and common sense and platonic thought, and an exercise regimen conducted on an apparatus which can only ever produce the same difference. Here it is the logic of platonic division that I would like to engage with a little further by plugging it into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) Saukko's observations regarding mimicry and absolutes and the way in which I have developed the notion of 'anorexic thinking' above. I would like to clarify that although good and common sense circulate throughout all discourses and series, they forge a particularly ruthless cocktail when mixed with state philosophy and science, disciplines which are "striated or gridded" (Massumi, 1992, 6).

When striated disciplines, or orthodox medical and psychiatric perspectives, divide the experiencing subject, 'the anorexic', from the paradoxically abhorrent and spectacular (Ferreday, 2012) object 'anorexia', there is a cutting *apart* of bodies who do not matter, and a cutting *together* of bodies who do. Yet these cuts, and the ethics of the cuts, are rarely questioned. The power of these incisions produce common popular reason, which "everybody knows [and] no-one can deny" (Deleuze, 2004b, 165). In these divisions, or cuts, bodies are not only produced as 'ashamed adjectives'[2], a point I will take time to develop later, they are also, and perhaps more importantly at this point, the matter which enfolds the *sense of* division. In other words, the cuts which divide and create hierarchies, cut together other flows and

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[2] "Humpty Dumpty forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They've a temper some of them – particularly the *verb*: they're the proudest, *adjectives* you can do anything with, but not verbs" (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 -31. Emphasis added) Here Deleuze's working of grammatical forms and materiality offers a way in which to draw attention to the material implication of *becoming-adjective*. In other words, when 'medical experts' *describe* someone as 'an anorexic', through good and common sense *and* an institutionally powerful discourse, the body they produce is one which anything can be done with. This production of a body, which can be *done to*, can be seen to produce a desiring-machine that *does,* that becomes proud, and does the choosing (of anorexia) as a lifestyle choice.

logics. These cuts are repeated, with difference, in discourses which attempt to resist the dominant way in which mixtures of bodies are understood. Put differently we return to the idea noted earlier whereby the aborescent model of what anorexia is, and who anorexics are, remains *a force* (Massumi, 1992) within the context of a resistant community, namely the pro-ana's my work engaged with.

This abstract simplification or division of what is lived and in process, does not allow for an engagement with sense, which is the boundary between propositions and things. The only sort of 'anorexic thinking' that could be recognised would be limited to a concern with accidents such as weight, appearance and actual foodstuffs. What is acknowledged, or recognised, is the proposition (denotation, manifestation, and signification) free of this fourth element. This becomes apparent in the way in which anorexia is temporalised in the state of affairs (manifestation). Here it starts with a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 17.5 (the accident) and stops in recovery and weight gain (also the accident). As such, that which is *of* bodies and in movement is reduced to the abstract taxonomic grid of the DSM. What cannot be acknowledged here is the becomings and the multiplicity of events, the manyness of activities, strivings and unfoldings in vibrant processes of *a* life (Bennett, 2010). While 'actual anorexia' may be actualised in the state of affairs, this present is not without its incorporeal past and future events. All of which leave excess traces t*o be carried off* into novel events. Life, running through series and events, coming into and passing out of one another.

Moving Further from the Self-Contained, Autonomous, Intentional Subject Towards Mixtures of Bodies and the Pre-Individuality of the Event

Elizabeth Grosz notes "[c]onceptions of the subject are projected onto the world as its objective features; in turn, scientific notions are internalised, if only indirectly, through their absorption into popular culture" (1999; 134). Here, this notion of 'internalisation' is far more complex than external cause bringing about internal affect. This reflects the ideas that I have already begun to introduce through the notion of quasi causality in the Deleuzian event. We have here, through Grosz's insight, the idea that within popular culture, a spatiality where good and common

sense affectively flows and circulates, scientific conceptions of the corporeal and cognitive subject are tantamount to the 'objective reality of the world'.

Yet these 'scientific notions', in good and common sense, have no recourse to the abstract of the moving, feeling, sensing and sensuous body, its relationship to consumables and 'sense'. However, as I have already asserted, scientific notions are always already abstract. Yet due to the way in which they resonate with common popular reason this abstraction simply becomes the way *things are done*, and *done to*. As Whitehead notes "[t]he notion of the self-contained particle of matter, self-sufficient within its local habitation, *is an abstraction* [...] There is, in bare matter of fact, "no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence" (quoted in Massumi, 2012, 27, emphasis added). This idea gathers further momentum through Brennan (2004), a quote which has already been presented in this chapter but will now be reworked.

> "Because of this fantasy, our self-contained individual believes he acts of his own accord, and that his impulses and desires come from nowhere other than the history embodied in his genes. He is wrong. The self-contained individual driven by a genetic motor has antecedents of his own. His origins appear to lie in a complex of Platonic and Aristotelian views on form and matter, activity and passivity, subject and object, *views that merge* with seventeenth-century Cartesianism to give birth to the self-contained individual whose mind and body are separate" (Brennan, 2004, 77, emphasis added).

In the above quote we work with the notion that ideas 'merge'. Here Brennan notes that the implications of the coming together of multiple series of philosophical thought produces the "the self-contained individual whose mind and body are separate" (ibid). Yet, the 'self-contained subject' is both vulnerable and responsible (Rose, 1999) in the state of affairs which has been stripped of 'the sense of the event'. Particularly as those affective flows which move between bodies and social spaces must be 'owned' by the affected individual.

This returns the thesis to the idea that the focus only on the '*what occurs*', the accident, is unhelpful to both understanding and relating to those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body. What occurs must be traceable to a 'cause', either

in genes - anorexia as a biologically based serious mental illness (Klump et al, 2009), or amongst the stuff of *their own* lives. Both these ideas of 'cause' relate only to that which can be seen, whether this is through tests on the body or in the recounted stories which emerge through therapeutic treatment. What is not accounted for is that which is pre-individual and affective – can be sensed, and is sensed, although in a manner so fleeting that it cannot be swallowed.

Having noted the way in which 'scientific' notions of the body enter popular culture, its practices and ideas and which in turn become common sense, we will now work with the way in which platonic ideas also circulate in good and common sense. Here particular attention will be drawn to the way in which in on-line pro-ana spaces the idea of 'being a proper anorexic' is in relation to another figure: the 'wannarexic'.

> "The purpose of division then is not at all to divide a genus into species, but, more profoundly, to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic. [...] Platonic dialectic is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety, but a dialectic of rivalry (*amphisbetesis),* a dialectic of rivals and suitors [..] and to distinguish the true pretender from the false one" (Deleuze, 2004 292).

This idea of rivalry, the true and false pretender, will become pertinent as the thesis works with the notion of the pedestal which I link to the dogmatic image of thought and the figure of the 'wannarexic'. This latter esoteric word, which contracts anorexia with a desire to be so, describes a 'figure' which emerges in on-line spaces at a particular point in socio-historical time: a manifestation in the state of affairs. However, I would suggest that this pejorative term was always already in a process of becoming. That it was produced at the same time as, and immanent to, 'Anorexia Nervosa' as a bordered, particularised and individualised 'real illness'. The 'wannarexic', the entity, could be said to haunt 'actual anorexia', moving in affective flows and series of guilt, shame and pride: hovering over bodies and waiting for something of them to turn. What is interesting here is that the production of this 'bad copy' (Deleuze, 2004a) is always already in the processes Brennan previously drew our attention to. The subject split from object, the knower split from the known. The 'wannarexic' also serves to draw attention to the way in which abstract processes of

reification are often common sense by virtue of their 'fit' to powerful ways of organising the world. Here, processes and activities which insist on splitting ideas from matter, only to then make ideas matter more than matter, are part of common sense 'anorexic thinking'.

Dual causes: the *of the* body and mixtures of bodies

There exists a plentiful source of socio-cultural, psycho-social and feminist work (Grosz, 1994; Hepworth, 1999; Lawrence, 1984; Lupton; 1996; MacLeod, 1981; Malson, 1998; McSween, 1986; Orbach, 1982, 1986; Probyn, 2000) which, in moving away from the medical model, brings to bear issues of gender, power, knowledge, resistance, and which troubles anorexia as a "bizarre' pathology" (Brook, 1999; 73). However, it is the contention of the thesis that there remains a scarcity of literature which either attempts to engage with the virtuality of consumables and non-consumables or which attempts to dislodge 'Anorexia Nervosa' as a dogmatic image of thought.

Among the authors noted above it is only Elizabeth Grosz who taps into the notion of the incorporeal by describing anorexia as a 'phantom limb'. This phantom limb is said to keep the 'anorexic' in relation to, or perhaps more appropriately in a relation *of* the mother's body: A connection which must be abandoned in patriarchy (1994; 40). It is my contention, in light of the event and the lever provided by Grosz, that there is still work to be done to create a space for thinking through relationships to feeding the body with that which is both pre-individual and incorporeal (Massumi, 2002). In other words, produce work which explores the virtual as *of the body* and 'sense' as something other than common or cognitive.

> "There are no private or collective events, no more than there are individuals and universals, particularities and generalities. Everything is singular, and thus both collective and private, particular and general, neither individual nor universal. Which war, for example, is not a private affair? Conversely, which wound is not inflicted by war and derived from society as a whole?" (Deleuze, 2004, 173).

The nature of the cause, as it is explicated in the logic of sense, is a dual cause. In one direction it pertains to the pre individual and incorporeal *of the* body: its potential

– the quasi cause. In the other direction it depends for its real or actual causes upon mixtures of bodies. In other words, the virtual and actual are no more separate than the individual from that which is pre individual, in a process of becoming and in contact with affects which exceed definitions of 'choice' as an operation of thoughtfulness alone. This idea of 'mixtures of bodies' also connects to Ferreday's recent assertion:

> "such is the contemporary preoccupation with the relation between bodies and images, that the relation between bodies themselves is almost entirely under theorised, nor is there any meaningful account of the lived experience of anorexia that does not conform to the overcoming/ journey narrative of the misery memoir" (Ferreday, 2012, 153).

Sense is implicated in what might be referred to as agency, but not agency as common sense has it. These are ideas which are developed further in the fourth chapter of the thesis. However, for the time being it is perhaps enough to say that these processes do not *act on* and cause a predictable effect. These processes require a certain leaping *of* the body towards some other entity which has an "open-ended promissory quality" (Bennett, 2010, 32). This pseudo-collusion is how the thesis puts to work the quasi[3] dimension of the dual cause.

As will become clearer as empirical materials are engaged with and as the thesis' methodology is explicated, the account of a difficult relationship to feeding the body which I am putting forward refuses the imposition of a taxonomic grid of anorexic - recovered. It does this not only theoretically (Massumi, 2002, 2011; Deleuze, 2004a) but empirically, through the ambivalent utterances which emerged throughout fieldwork. Although the thesis may be read as attempting to 'speak of the anorexic' (Ferreday, 2012), this is not the case, particularly as it draws on post-human theories which do not 'centre' the subject (Mazzei, 2013). My desire is to disrupt the proper name and also the bodies which it organises, particularly as that which is individualised would be better engaged with away from individualising common sense. As I have already repeated numerous times, there is work to be done which engages with that which is pre-individual *and also* in mixtures of bodies. By working

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[3] There is an interesting collision in relation to the thesis' engagement with the notion of 'wannarexia', as a pejorative term used to refer to 'wannabe anorexic', and an etymological connection to the word 'quasi' which has as synonyms: would be; mock, and virtual.

with anorexia in the context of the event speaking *of* is an act which is beyond both the general and the particular but is aware of its politics.

The politics of bodies waiting, leaping, becoming

> "To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: "My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it." It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi cause of what is produced within us, the Operator. […] The event […] manifests in us the neutral splendour which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective and the private" (Delueze, 2004, 169).

The above quote is particularly important to the thesis and is taken from *Logic of Sense* (2004a)*.* This idea will be put to work throughout the thesis but drawing attention to it early on is important. Noting the significance of this quote is necessary to establish that it was this particular assemblage of words which moved my body towards the event in a manner which might be considered through 'the arc of felt becoming' (Massumi, 2011). This 'arc' is the something stirring of bare activity which Massumi connects to the political dimension of the event. However, the political is not divisible from the aesthetic (see Whitehead, 1964, 1967a, 1967b, 1968, 1978, 1985; James, 1978, 1996a, 1996b). Politics and aesthetics are both always already implicated in elsewhere, other series and semblances. As noted previously through Whitehead, "[t]here is, in bare matter of fact, "no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence" (quoted in Massumi, 2012, 27, emphasis added).

In the language detailed above (Deleuze, 2004, 169) my engagement with lived concepts was actualised. I was invited to turn away from good and common sense while becoming more compelled than ever to figure the politics of the work I wished to carry out. What was the quasi-cause – or rather what was the quasi cause in the context of what I set out to engage with? How would the quasi cause link to those ideas I had found so valuable in Butler (1997) regarding collusion and interpellation? How did quasi-causality connect to other concepts Deleuze works with in his affective register (DeLanda, 2002)?

However, here I would here like to raise a point of caution which arises as I plug into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) the idea that "my wound existed before me, I was born to embody it" (Deleuze, 2004, 169). This assemblage raised questions: how would such an idea move the thesis away from free will *or* determinism? Would working with such an idea be dangerously close to biological determinism or destiny? Would using these ideas be tantamount to reinforcing 'anorexia' as iconic? Although these points will be returned to in the closing chapter as I consider the notion of counter-actualisation, it remains relevant to note the hesitancy and excitement that I felt towards the assemblage of word and things that Deleuze served up (ibid). However, after much consideration, which involved allowing the empirical materials of the study to encounter *the sense of* Deleuze's utterance, I felt a shift, a turning point. I became increasingly affected by the quote as I felt myself decreasingly affected by humanism. As I took the event less personally, I took it more pre-personally.

The movements of the event were sensed as potent and significant in advance of their detours, mergers and crossings. *Logic of Sense* shifted my engagement with anorexia from that which occurs, the accident, to the potential of the inside of what occurs, the event. In feeling both the politics of the project, and the lived concepts, I had to look further. In looking further, in unexpected and unpredictable places within the text, I found that the actualisation of the event is never the final point. Deleuzian metaphysics are of *becoming* not *being*. Instead of a fixed state we find that counter-actualisation, in repetition and difference, is "the freedom by which we develop and lead the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters of actualisations and causes" (2004, 243). In other words, the representation of anorexia, as actualised, is not where our interest and engagement should either start or stop.

Anorexia to Pro Anorexic – The Series of Mental Illness and Lifestyle Choice

> "The moment that the series are traversed by the paradoxical agent, singularities are displaced, redistributed, transformed into one another, and change sets. If the singularities are veritable events, they communicate in one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformations form a *history*" [...]. *The mode of the event is the problematic. One must not say that there are problematic*

events. But that events bear exclusively upon problems and define their conditions" (Deleuze 2004, 64, emphasis added).

While many of the texts previously mentioned (Brook, 1999; Grosz, 1994; Hepworth, 1999; Lawrence, 1984; Lupton; 1996; MacLeod, 1981; Malson, 1998; McSween, 1986; Orbach, 1982, 1986; Probyn, 2000) have made significant contributions to the understanding of eating disorders as more than mental illness, most are published prior to the development of virtual pro-ana communities. In line with all social networking activities, pro-ana sites have increased during the last decade. Optenet (2008), an international IT security company, reported that between 2006 and 2008 the number of pro-ana websites increased globally by 470%. Whether or not this figure is disproportionately large in relation to other social networking sites is debatable, however what this does highlight is that 'anorexia' is an issue which is being engaged with in a significant way. Indeed, in a study of 13 – 17 year old school children, 12.6% of girls and 5.9% of boys claimed to have visited such sites (Custers and Van den Bulck, 2009). While these figures are of course amenable to interpretation, what is interesting is that it creates an opening to contest the power of the medical and psychiatric sense to fully engage with what they consider "biologically based serious mental disorders" (Klump et al., 2009). The figures given for those who are at the very least compelled to inquire into anorexia, how to do or become it (Dias, 2003) are higher than the seven in a thousand females (0.7%) or the one in one thousand males (0.1%), which the Royal College of Psychiatrists state 'get' eating disorders. (Royal College of Psychiatry, 2009). Without drawing any unnecessary conclusions, this taps into the idea that anorexia is not an individual pathology, a cause and effect relation, but rather an assemblage of wider social, cultural and philosophical series enacted by, and enacting, matter – the human and the non-human.

Rather than considering pro-ana and anorexia as distinct discursive objects (Giles, 2006) we see that in the challenge that 'Ana' makes to the 'proper name' of 1874, Anorexia Nervosa, things are not fixed. They are already implicated in the activity of series brushing against one another and leaving an affective trace. Below Deleuze is quoted at length. This engenders a return to concepts mentioned earlier in the chapter, the idea of the 'proud verb' and the conceptualisation I asserted as the 'ashamed adjective'. This reinforces the special relationship which the event has to

language and bodies. Also, the activity of annunciation and the matter of bodies returns us to Deleuze's question – what is more serious – to speak of food or to eat words?

> "But this second duality - body/ language, to eat/ to speak – is not sufficient. The event subsists in language but it happens to things. [...] As a result, the duality is reflected from both sides and in each of the two terms. [..] On one hand there are singular proper names, substantives, and general adjectives [...]; on the other, there are verbs carrying off with them becomings and its train of reversible events and infinitely dividing their present into past and future. Humpty Dumpty forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They've a temper some of them – particularly the verb: they're the proudest, adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs - however, *I* can manage the whole lot of them[...] the non-consumable nature of sense to the edible nature of things, the impenetrability of incorporeal entities without thickness to the mixtures and reciprocal penetrations of substances, and the resistance of the surface to the softness of the depths- in short, the *'pride'* of verbs to the *complacency* of substantives and adjectives" (Deleuze, 2004, 30 – 31).

In the above quote we meet Humpty Dumpty and note his interest in verbs and his derision of adjectives. Adjectives, in their complacency, are unaware of potential dangers, they do not strive or reach beyond themselves. They are content to remain as they are, and this comfort and obliviousness to danger means that anything can be done to them. Humpty, as noted above, contrasts the pliability of adjectives to the pride of verbs. The conceit of the infinitive implies that it does not change for time or (wo)man, tense or subject. This pride, or sense of superiority, arises from the way they conduct themselves, their capacity for change, for difference, which exceeds the actual instance of denotation. Verbs are proud because they communicate across series, their reverberations effect future potential activities. It is not that infinitives are changed in the proposition, in their expression (Williams, 2008a). For instance, *to eat* is not changed in the expression, or denotation, but it is changed, and produces changes in the series when it is in relation to other infinitives, for instance, *to speak*.

Duplicity is in causes, paradoxes and potentials. They are always already coming about multiply. To fix or to freeze the object, divided from the subject, makes its actuality more significant than the lives which it then organises. Petrifying anorexia

serves only to mount it on a pedestal and concretise it as a dogmatic image of thought. It leaves those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body looking up to 'it' – attempting to be 'it', authentic and proper. The thesis will argue that anorexia as an individual, diagnosable, treatable mental illness is a problematic starting place or resting point for inquiry. It will also suggest that this serves to engage with representation rather than the processes and activities of matter, the verbs which bring about events and the impersonal affects which are the "connecting thread of experience […] the invisible glue that holds the world together" (Massumi, 2002, 217).

For the thesis, important and relevant questions are not about accidents alone. What is in the process of becoming important is the provision of an account of embodiment and matter that is *abstract enough* to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete" (Massumi, 2002, 5). For this task I put to work, as I am put to work by, processes, empirical materials, becomings, movements, shifts, affects, series and events.

As this chapter come to a close I would like to give a brief overview of the chapters which unfold from this preliminary text. In chapter two I promiscuously engage with literature (Childers, et al, 2013) to draw attention to why it is important to move towards a more abstract philosophical literature to engage with relationships to feeding the body. Here the thesis becomes critical of those theories which 'centre the subject' (Mazzei, 2013). While time is spent presenting key points from traditional literatures which engage with 'eating disorders', the second part of the chapter offers a review of post-humanism and new materialism. This draws attention to what might become possible when the onto-epistemological focus of inquiry moves away from the bifurcation of determinism and free will. From this review of discussions relevant to 'Anorexia', which include literature from psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural, and feminist perspectives, it is important to note that it is *not* scientific or medical discourses per se which the thesis is critical of, but the good and common sense which operate *within each of these discourses* and which reinforce 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought. This chapter engages with texts which consider choice, determinism and materiality in ways which are rarely put to work in orthodox 'disordered eating' research. In this second chapter I will also begin to talk a little more about the ethics of the doctoral project. In chapter three method and

methodology are discussed. The first part of the chapter is spent introducing the places, people and ideas which afforded me empirical materials. The second part of the chapter considers how I then worked with, and was put to work by, these same-yet-becoming-different materials. This second part of the chapter develops further some of the literature introduced in chapter two. Here I consider the possibilities of becoming-bovine and the limitations and possibilities of coding and representation. These activities are taken further in chapter four. In this chapter I introduce the ideas of trickery and experimentation and explore the question of what a body can do. By exploring notions of temporality, metabolism and the infinitives to eat/ to speak I explore the way in which matter attempts to 'have the last word' in the case of a difficult relationship to feeding the body. In this fourth chapter I engage with 'my own' writing which was provoked by my first meeting with Deleuze, before moving towards an analysis of a particularly interesting discussion which took place on one of the early pro-anorexia sites I observed in my mobile ethnography.

The engagement with empirical materials carried out in chapter four is continued in the fifth chapter. In this section of the thesis I am interested in disrupting the humanist supposition that data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the 'breath of life' that is the autonomous, cognitively intentional, human acts of analysis and interpretation: In short, qualitative research. Here the concepts of accident and event are put to work to produce a different kind of empiricism, one which is concerned with what occurs and also the inside of what occurs. As such this chapter articulates a methodological and textual departure from traditional humanist case studies. In the final chapter of the thesis I argue for the contribution that the thesis makes to knowledge, being as clear as possible about what that contribution is and what its implications are. Within this concluding chapter I draw together the ideas which have been engaged with in preceding chapters drawing attention to the possibilities which arose from a burgeoning desire to write about 'Anorexia Nervosa' in a manner which sought to produce it as *unrecognisable*.

CHAPTER 2: IN PLACE OF A LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

> "Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities"(Deleuze, 2004a, 5).

> "There is some evidence to suggest that applying a psychiatric diagnosis and the theoretical models associated with them […] leads to a worse outcome for some" (CAPSID, 2011).

In the previous chapter the central concerns of the thesis were introduced and developed alongside theories which convey, and conceptualise, the real abstractness of matter (Deleuze, 2004a, 2004b; Massumi, 2002, 2011). This was undertaken to provide an alternative way of engaging with 'Anorexia Nervosa', which did not sever the actual from the virtual (Williams, 2008b) nor take for granted the autonomy, or agency, of 'the human' in relationships to feeding the body. Here, to make a connection between theory and methodology, the first quote presented above draws attention to the way in which fixed identities and proper names can be disrupted – through the paradox. It is the contention of the thesis that the dogmatic aspect of *both* pro-anorexia *and* medical discourses, which can by no means be reduced as they are produced within different bodies and power relations, are what deserve attention.

The previous chapter introduced a move away from the proper name, and concept, 'Anorexia Nervosa', or 'Anorexia', towards the importance of considering instead a difficult relationship to feeding the body. However, and as indicated when the new conceptualisation was introduced, this is not simply a linguistic shift, the movement has material and affective implications. Here, the conceptual shift, in and of itself (which it never really is), is not sufficient to meet the task of producing a different territory in which relationships to feeding the body can be enacted, encountered and inquired into. As Durie notes, paraphrasing Deleuze, the way in which concepts

function within "fields of thought" [are] "defined by internal variables , but also subject to the effects of external variables" (Durie, 2006, 169).

> "This means that a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it. This is also why it is never very interesting to criticise a concept: it is better to build the new function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate" (Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169).

Here it is suggested that the new function, of a *relationship* to feeding the body, finds in the literary-theoretical fields of new-materialism and post-humanism ways to make the proper name, 'Anorexia Nervosa', useless and inadequate. Yet because the 'new function' of choice[4], which is evident in pro-ana discussions, remains within the field of humanism it also remains stuck in a trench that the Idea of bordered, individualised human agency dug. Inquiry cannot stop here.

It is acknowledged that the second chapter of a thesis is traditionally a 'Literature Review'. However, due to the way in which this thesis engages with, analyses and puts to work theoretical literature throughout, bordering this engagement to the confines of one chapter would, methodologically, be counter to the connective and creative impetus of the work being carried out. It would limit the mutually creative flows which become possible as abstract theory and abstract matter enfold one another. As such, this chapter will attempt to promiscuously (Childers, et al, 2013) set the scene as to why this move towards a more abstract philosophical literature was both necessary and important in the context of the points of engagement set out in the previous chapter. Why it was necessary that this inquiry into relationships to feeding the body, paradoxes and proper names moved away from literatures which 'centre the subject' (Mazzei, 2013) to encounter Deleuze's continental philosophy, post-humanism and new-materialism.

In relation to the above point, this second chapter will highlight that what may be termed 'progressive' literatures, i.e. those collections which have for some time contested the power of the medical discourse and patriarchal structures, and which engage with 'anorexia' as an identity or resistance, remain within the conservative

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[4] 'New' because up until the emergence of pro-ana forums the notion of 'choosing anorexia', or feeling chosen by it, may have been privately sensed, but it would not have been communally discussed.

confines of the dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b). In other words, the straight lines and circles which "conventional humanist qualitative methodology" (St Pierre, 2013) pre-supposes does little to produce a different space, or space of difference, whereby relationships to feeding the body can be considered to involve human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010).

Additionally within this chapter the ethics of the doctoral project will be introduced through mobilising Deleuze's enigmatic paradox:

> "what is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words? [..] If we then speak of food, how can we avoid speaking in front of the one who is to be served as food?" (Deleuze, 2004a, 29).

This idea will be put to work to consider the way in which particular literatures serve 'the anorexic' to the reader-eater. Ethically and methodologically, this can be seen to be in relation to a concept coined and introduced in the previous chapter; the notion of the 'ashamed adjective'. The idea of the 'ashamed adjective' is not simply a lazy bifurcation of pride and shame; it is instead a way of theorising the material-political-affective capacity of *being-described*. It is connected to ideas which were introduced in the first chapter in relation to the 'proud verb' and the way in which the relation between infinitives produce change in series. Humpty Dumpty, the elliptical conceptual persona Deleuze writes with:

> "forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They've a temper some of them – particularly the verb: they're the proudest, *adjectives you can do anything with*, but not verbs" (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 -31, emphasis added).

Here Deleuze's working of grammatical forms and materiality offers a way in which to draw attention to the material implication of becoming-adjective. In other words, when powerful bodies, medical practitioners, parents or teachers describe someone as 'an anorexic', through good and common sense and an institutionally powerful discourse, the body they produce is one which anything can be done with. This production of a body, which can be done to, can be seen to produce a desiring-machine that becomes-proud, and feels compelled *to choose* anorexia, *to make* a lifestyle choice.

Although, as noted above, this is not a traditional literature review, per se, the chapter comprises two parts: a selection of texts which discuss 'anorexia and 'pro-Anorexia' *explicitly* (the medical, psychological, psycho-social and feminist) and those which speak of its movements *tacitly* (Deleuze's continental philosophy, post-humanism and new-materialism). Here the idea of the tacit and the explicit returns us to a point raised during the opening chapter, the notion of the 'biting point'. Here, the literature which is referred to as explicit could be said to denote, make manifest and represent 'Anorexia Nervosa' through good and common sense; while the literature referred to as tacit produced something leaping and moving, something *of the body.* In other words, if the *sense of* that which is usually closed down as a pathology or mental illness, gathers momentum, vibrancy and luminosity when it is plugged into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) theories concerned with the abstractness, complexity and movements of matter (Barad, 2007; Massumi, 2002, 2011), it becomes *clear* that neither the traditional object 'anorexia', or the traditional subject, 'anorexic', are as *distinct* as good and common sense thinks. We can find the sense *of 'it'* everywhere and nowhere. The thesis contends that it is at the *obscur*e interplay between the depth of the body and the surface of language (Deleuze, 2004a) that there is the possibility of encountering real difference, rather than the same difference which the DSM and representational methods insist upon.

Do Models Contribute to the Problem of 'Anorexia Nervosa'?

This has indubitably been the most difficult section of the thesis to compose: Perhaps primarily as it requires, momentarily undercutting the methodological desire to destroy proper names and fixed identities. However, by openly operating through the logic of good and common sense, the former of which produces categories, the latter of which assigns 'things' to them, I am able to map the territory I feel it is necessary to deterritorialise (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). Although within each of the discourses which are separated out for the purposes of clarity and discussion there are innumerable connections, there is neither time nor space within this chapter to draw out all of the possibilities that this vast literature presents. As such, a select few will be drawn out further for the purposes of developing the arguments the thesis seeks to make.

As Fox et al concisely note "Anorexia has been variously theorised by medical, social science and feminist scholarship. While the biomedical model evaluates anorexia as a disease with an underlying organic cause to be treated and cured (Urwin et al. 2002), other models have emerged that have concluded that the condition has psychological, social or cultural roots" (2006, 948). Fox et al identify several alternative models, all of which are explicated within the section of this chapter referred to as an explicit literature. To crudely paraphrase the overview they provide they note that psychological theories conceive of anorexia as an identity problem, cultural theories of disordered eating tend to focus on the 'thin ideal' and feminist models suggest that anorexia is either a resistance to, or an inscription of, gendering forces and practices.

Alongside other eating disorders, 'anorexia' is considered as "one of the most prevalent forms of pychopathology amongst women" (Wonderlich, Tierney and Vanderwal, 2010; Klein and Walsh, 2003). It is often referred to as epidemic (Gordon, 1990; Rich, 2006) "marked by chronicity and relapse" (Stice & Shaw, 2004, 206), and the 'recovery' rate is as low as 9% (Levenkron, 2000). Anorexia is often represented within visually shocking terms (Ferreday, 2012), both in relation to its fatality rate (Lask and Bryant-Waugh 2000) and also in terms of the images (B-eat, 2011; Ferreday, 2012) which common sense *recognises* as *what 'anorexia'* is and *who 'anorexics' are.*

From this review of discussions relevant to 'anorexia', which includes literature from psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural, and feminist perspectives, it is important to note that it is *not* scientific or medical discourses per se which the thesis is critical of, but rather, the good and common sense which operate *within each of these discourses* and which reinforce 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought. This becomes particularly nefarious as these ideas come into contact with philosophical ideas such as the autonomous thinking being of Descartes. Here we are reminded of a quote from Deleuze which was used earlier:

> "[E]very time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is
> inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a

philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs)" (Deleuze, 2004b, 282).

Within this section of the chapter each significant discourse will be elaborated in terms of: how it conceives of 'the problem' of 'anorexia'; the way in which it posits the notion of causality; a little about how it pre-supposes the subject and object, knower and known; an indication of how it presupposes a particular notion of ontology; and perhaps most significantly, how it takes for granted the agency of the human subject as opposed to the agentic assemblages which comprise both human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010). In summary, what will be drawn out is the way in which each of these discourses on 'anorexia' pre-suppose metaphysical underpinnings that keep inquiry going around in circles and do little but represent a particular unshifting image of thought. This image of thought is limited to recognisable problems, the same and the similar. Here I would like to return to the thoughts of Saukko and a quote which was engage with in the opening chapter. Saukko notes that:

> "Research on eating disorders is often grounded on a dichotomous way of conceptualising their personal implications, such as false consciousness versus emancipation, and their political dimensions, such as dominance versus freedom. *This type of reasoning mimics and fuels anorexic thinking in terms of one-dimensional absolutes"* (2008, 2, emphasis added).

Although the thesis takes a decidedly different track to the one laid out by Sauokko, particularly her concern with the anorexic self and identity, we return the idea that rather than being a bizarre pathology a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and the sense which informs this relation, is connected to bifurcations and simplified abstractions which circulate in discourses which are every-day and unremarkable.

Here, in the idea of 'versus', which Sauokko puts forward as an indicator of dichotomous thinking, "false consciousness *versus* emancipation", "dominance *versus* freedom", we are reminded of the either-or form which engenders dead ends and contradictions. To this emergent list we could easily add choice *versus* mental illness. To paraphrase Saukko, and cut her assertion together (Barad, 2007) with ideas from Deleuze's *Logic of Sense,* what she terms reasoning the thesis would identify even more distinctly as good and common sense. These can be found in any

discourse but finds particularly fruitful dwellings at the intersection of philosophy and science, an idea we can note from the earlier quote from Deleuze (2004b, 282).

However, as noted in the opening chapter, perhaps what is most interesting is the way Saukko identifies 'anorexic thinking' as informed by commonplace logics, or in her words, reasoning, that are "one dimensional absolutes" (2008, 2). Here, although It is not suggested that the thesis and Saukko's identification of the problem with particular discourses is conflatable, it is worth noting that her conceptualisation of one dimensional absolutes as problematic produces a similar sense to the way in which the thesis works with the idea of the dogmatic image of thought. *Put differently, two very different accounts of 'anorexia' still identify the fixity of obdurate logics as productive of the way in which a particular relationship to food and feeding doesn't just make sense, but the way in which it becomes sense.*

In noting this commonality it is perhaps necessary to highlight what is profoundly different in the way in which each takes up the challenge posed by inflexibility. One, Saukko, works at the level of the personal and the experiential and adheres to the proper name. She mobilises the notion of autonomy and identity to challenge the suppositions that "diagnose anorexic women as having an insufficient self, lack autonomy and self-determination and [,] are vulnerable to outside influences" (2008, 1). The other, the thesis, works at the level of mixtures of bodies, language and entities, that which is felt and yet pre-personal. It contests the proper name, thinks through notions of experimentation and dosages and challenges ideas about human autonomy, agency and impenetrability. In other words, the thesis subverts terms which humanism, Sauokko *and* her objects of critique, can't seem to help but conceptualise in terms of lack and excess.

An explicit Literature

I will now engage with what I termed at the beginning of the chapter as an explicit literature. This will include bio-medical, psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural and feminist perspectives. It will also include texts which engage with 'pro-anorexia' and 'wannarexia'.

The Bio-medical position

'Anorexia Nervosa' first appears in clinical records during 1874 and immediately occupies a peculiar space as a mental illness which is caused by biological dysfunction. Here we can see that once again the body and mind are split and sutured as befits the 'problem'. Within this powerful discourse we can note that 'anorexia' is spatialised within the borders of the individuals mind, but the cause for this malfunction is neurological. Here we might suggest that although human agency is presumed, it is the agency of the medical expert-subject which is paramount, and the patient-object which is determined.

> "Many descriptions of anorexia take a medical standpoint, detailing the effects that the disease's progress has on the body. Medically, anorexia is characterised by weight loss, followed by lowered body temperature, lowered blood pressure, slowed heart rate, loss of menses, thinning of hair, fatigue, and other signs of malnutrition. As the anorexic continues to lose weight, new symptoms develop and intensify. The last, lethal stage for anorexic patients is failure of the liver, kidneys, and finally, the heart" (Levenkron, 2000, 33).

Within this discourse, notable above in the quote from Levenkron, is an emphasis on the manifestation of physical symptoms: What the thesis conceptualises as serious yet accidental to the event. It is also worth noting that the attention which the bio-medical discourse draws to 'symptoms' is reflected in the 'pro-ana' exchanges which feature in chapter four of the thesis. Although 'symptoms' are put to work differently within the context of these pro-ana exchanges, what is important to note is the way in which the 'ill body' serves as an indicator of deserving the proper name: Being indubitably a 'real anorexic' and having 'gone far enough'.

The Psychiatric position

There is a vast clinical literature on the etiology and treatment of anorexia from the nineteenth century to the present day. This discourse promotes a particular kind of objectivity that does not take account of the way in which the apparatus and object, in their intra-activity, produce what does and does not matter (Barad, 2007). Psychiatry cannot think through, or with, the performativity of bodies as they come into contact with other entities. Psychiatric theories, and their corresponding

methods, actively separate out the body and the mind. Here the body becomes the object which is subject to rational, or irrational control. In the case of the former, control and discipline are normative and indicative of a certain respectable and enlightened care of the self, while in the case of the latter, the body object which is controlled *un*reasonably becomes a pathological object for psychiatric scrutiny and normalising procedures. 'Anorexia', of course, falls under the latter understanding.

Within this discourse there is little or no agency attributed to the presenting subject, and recovery is instituted as accepting the status quo and returning to 'normal healthy functioning'. In other words the subject must atone for the abnormality they contain by becoming 'normalised' according to the demands of the state of affairs. The must denote, manifest and signify health as objects which speak on behalf of the care they have received. As Gremillion notes:

> "An 'objective' psychiatry not only reproduces and institutionalizes a mind/body dualism, with all of its attending socio-political levels of power; the division is explicitly articulated as a 'naturally given' structure that is said to 'reveal' rational truths" (1992, 59).

Although it is only a fairly recent development in psychology and psychiatry, Stice and Shaw (2010) note that there is a growing interest, particularly in terms of developing preventative programmes, in what they refer to as *prodromes.* This term refers to early symptoms or clusters of symptoms which are connected to, but distinct from, 'risk factors'. Stice and Shaw note prodromal stages of the development of eating disorders as body dissatisfaction and self-reported dieting, adding that "both involve a high rate of false positives" (2010, 522). In other words, both indicators include a large amount of bodies that will not be identified as meeting the threshold of the DSM definition of 'Anorexia'. They are 'issues' which affect far more than the seven in a thousand females (0. 7%) or one in one thousand males (0.1%) which the Royal College of Psychiatrists states 'get' eating disorders (Royal College of Psychiatry, 2009).

We see in the language of symptoms and abnormality that although there may be a movement away from recognising only fixed and actual 'anorexia' according to the demands of the DSM, this movement still betrays the linearity of Zeno's arrow (Massumi, 2002). In other words the 'starting point' of pathology is nudged

backwards while 'the problem' is individualised to the one who manifests symptoms, or more specifically, prodromes. We also see in this division between symptom and risk factor, an investment in the divisibility of inside and outside, subject and object. Conceived as a symptom, or prodrome, what is being spoken of is *internal*, while as a risk factor, for instance 'the thin ideal', it remains, as yet, *external*. Conceiving of Anorexia in this manner is towards predictability and proper names, and this re-joins us to an idea noted in the previous chapter:

> "Good and common sense each refer to the other, each reflect the other and constitute one half of the orthodoxy. In view of this reciprocity and double reflection, we can define common sense by the process of recognition and good sense by the process of prediction" (Deleuze, 2004b, 285).

Here, with the notion of the prodrome, potentiality or 'something stirring' is reduced to the actual in a manner which reduces the lived abstraction of the body to the taxonomic grid which orders the world and its contents according to denotative intuition: 'It is that; it is not that' (Deleuze, 2004a). In other words, what this implies is that earlier, rather than later, the individual can be pathologised and normalised.

The Psychological position

In 1978 Hilde Bruch was the first psychologist to put forward the idea that 'anorexia' had a social cause, and as such put forward the idea that it was a psycho-social illness. This idea has been taken up by many theorists, including Brumberg (1988) who presents a two stage model in which the second stage is connected to significant changes to *both* body *and* mind. However, Bruch is criticised by Morag McSween (1993) who argues that she mobilises a biological argument to complete her psychological account of 'anorexia'. Here the biological argument being criticised is that 'the anorexic' does not recognise hunger. McSween argues further still that Bruch misrecognises the over receptiveness or docility she points out in patients as a personal lack stemming from family dynamics: Rather than as the effect of doing femininity in general.

Between 1930 and 1950 psychoanalysis emerged as a particularly popular way of understanding 'Anorexia Nervosa' and it remains a therapeutic model. However, due

to the length of open ended treatment and its costly nature it is not often presented as an option within the United Kingdom's National Health Service (NHS). If it is offered there are extensive waiting times which exceed that of other 'treatments' such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2012; B-eat, 2013). Relatedly, during the 1960's a behavioural approach to 'eating disorders' became more popular, owing to the fact that the lengthy nature of treatment still produced unsatisfactory results. Simply put, within this discourse 'A anorexia' is conceptualised as a neurosis which is located within the borders of the individual's psyche. It is limited to the subject-patient's own personal experiences, which include disturbances within the conscious and the unconscious mind. Within this framing there is an emphasis on the abnormality and deficiency of presenting individuals, and it is a model which focusses on lack and has a compensatory view of desire. This can be noted, perhaps most clearly, in the notion of penis envy (Lawrence, 2008) whereby the libidinal economy which values the one, the phallus, and stands in for the Law, produces a sense of lack in young women who have the possibility of producing their own phallic hipbones through emaciation. Due to the way in which relationships to feeding the body are considered as a neurosis there is a presumption of the agency of the human mind to both *cause* and *solve* its own problems. Here the subject which presents as 'eating disordered' engages in therapy not to seek to change or challenge their environment, politically or socially, or to become different, but to fit into and reshape themselves according to the demands of the current social and political milieu.

Steve Levenkron notes that his text *Anatomy of Anorexia* (2000) is based on twenty five years of clinical experience. However, the overwhelmingly heteronormative position he takes with regard to 'anorexia' is particularly reductive and problematic. His assertion, that "it is naturally inherent in femininity to try and be alluring to men" (2000, 14) implies an unproblematic connection between sex and gender and a very crude understanding of desire. Levenkron, as with many psychological accounts, suggests a linear stage model. Within his theory there are four stages. Stage one is characterised by *achievement*, but might not lead to anorexia per se. This 'stage' is said by Levenkron to give rise to a feeling of success in terms of weight loss and a sensation of mastery which may be commended by others. The second phase he terms *security*. The focus to lose weight, even at the expense of relationships and

social life, is the source of safety. As Levenkron notes, rather than being about security per se, it is actually about avoiding insecurity. Stage three is the *assertive* stage where previously nice, amenable, compliant young women are said to become tyrannical within their own family unit.

> "She finds a new voice within herself, a voice that she has longed for, an assertive voice. She is aware that this voice can only be used in defence of her anorexic behaviour and defying opinions about her appearance as expressed by others" (2000, 38).

Stage four, the *pseudo identity stage*, concerns the thesis engagement with the interrelation of the proud verb and the ashamed adjective. Levenkron notes that "while friends and neighbours view the 'vanishing girl' with frustration and worry, others are antagonized by the pathological competitiveness [..] but all are referring to her as *the anorexic*" (2000, 39, emphasis added). Levenkron links this 'notoriety' to a perception of the self as 'special': Defined *in the mind* of self and other. He goes on to suggest that:

> "[t]his pseudo-identity fills in the emptiness she has secretly felt about herself for some time [...S]he now feels that her personality has an effect and is clearly defined by others. She prizes this new found definition."(ibid).

Here we can see the way in which it is the mind which is conceptualised as the seat of agency and vulnerability while the body is posited as dumb matter to be remodelled by the mind's will. An acknowledgment of the agentic capacities of matter is nowhere to be found.

What is interesting in this account is that although it is not developed, due to the metaphysical underpinnings of the discourse and the individualisation of 'the problem', the idea of the other, noted as "friends and neighbours", highlights the point that relationships to feeding the body are always already relational. And here the thesis would not stop at human relations, suggesting instead that relations to non-human and human consumables (noted in the opening chapter as bodies which are denoted) should be explored in the analysis of feeding relations, It was suggested that this method would engage more fully with the materiality of words

and the incorporeality, or virtuality, of matter. Levenkron's notion of pseudo-identity as "fill[ing] in the emptiness she has secretly felt about herself for some time" is not only overwhelmingly gendered, it also accords the model of lack which was noted earlier. Here, rather than engaging with the way in which the production of a different body engenders singular difference, the pseudo-identity is reduced to the same difference for all 'anorexics'.

> "The result of anorexic behaviour produces a sense of assertiveness and identity. To recover from anorexia nervosa would mean to temporarily lose one's self, to achieve everything achieved by the illness" (Levenkron, 2000, 40).

The above quote is interesting for a number of reasons. It has been cut apart (Barad, 2007) from the rest of Levenkron's text to draw attention to the way in which this particular theory takes for granted the authentic human subject, and the abhorrent maleficent object 'anorexia'. We can see here, in the way in which Levenkron separates out anorexic behaviour as the object, from the authentic subject with a real, rather than pseudo identity. Here, recovering is posited as a further loss of self, rather than potential becoming. Recovery is posed as a return to a previous and true self, which can then make the same gains as 'the illness'. It is as though the subject were somehow not really present during the period defined as 'anorexic'. In other words, this logic enables the convenient separation of good girl from bad anorexia. This conveniently allows this powerful discourse to suggest that assertions uttered from 'the anorexic' can really be recognised as 'anorexia speaking', the reified form that Gremillion (1992) draws our attention to.

The Socio-cultural position

Sociologist Bryan Turner (1984) writes:

> "From a sociological perspective, what appears to be significant about anorexia is that it is impossible to detach it from a social aetiology and social symbolism" (1984, 184).

This discourse tends to argue that there is no psychiatric theory about anorexia that adequately accounts for its dramatic rise in incidence. Instead, the socio-cultural position suggests that 'anorexia' is best conceptualised as a symptom of problematic beliefs regarding contemporary expectations on the social roles of women. As Helen

Gremillion notes, this becomes particularly salient when entering into competitive, public and individualistic arenas that are increasingly characteristic of many aspects of social life. Gremillion, in her frequently cited article '*Psychiatry as social ordering: Anorexia Nervosa, a Paradigm*' notes that:

> "to the extent that psychiatric theory and method reify the anorectic condition as separate from culture, the discipline of psychiatry participates in the cultural scapegoating of the 'deviant' female" (1992, 57).

Importantly, being affected by the milieu, be that social, political, cultural or historical, is identified as a problem which resides within the individual, not within complex social mixtures, and certainly not within the psychiatric discourse itself. Further to this point Gremillion argues that:

> "psychiatry exercises power by labelling, organizing, and constructing anorexia as a reified and bounded condition that is removed from cultural ideologies and processes, *as an illness entity which can be grasped and 'fixed'*" (ibid, 59, emphasis added).

As such, she sets about to challenge psychiatric assumptions about anorexia, noting that they themselves are culturally informed:

> "Psychiatry is a cultural practice that tends unquestioningly to support the status quo […] both illness and explanation are embedded by reproducing certain core cultural values and meanings as illness" (Gremillion, 1992, 57).

Gremillion places anorexia within what Butler might term the crucible of social life (2004) and draws attention to the way in which psychiatry produces a problem it can solve, as opposed to engaging with historical and political complexity. Writing at a time before the advent of pro-anorexia sites Gremllion suggested that "it is important to stress the fact that anorexia does not entail a conscious cultural criticism" (1992, 58). Here I would suggest that there is a desire within the pro-anorexia discourse to pose a cultural criticism. However, I would also suggest that by remaining fluent in the good and common sense of state science and philosophy the pro-ana discourse

more often than not buttresses ideas which might be challenged should we destroy 'Anorexia'as a dogmatic image of thought.

Yet the point that Gremillion makes remains important. The cultural criticism that socio-cultural theories attribute to anorexia is, most often, carried out by individuals rather than collectives. Also, the extent to which pro-anorexia communities shift this cultural criticism towards a joint project is, and should remain, endlessly debatable. Here, I wish to add to Gremillion's point, although it may already be implicit. The idea of a cultural criticism which is not necessarily 'conscious', or pragmatically focussed at any one target, does not entirely undercut the potential of such a micro-politics (Arsic, 2008). Also, to suggest that micro-political activities *should* become collective pursuits would imply that the parameters of 'the problem', and the agenda of the criticism, were universally felt and universally rectifiable. This of course, is not the case.

Mara Selvini Palazolli was (1974) a psychoanalyst, who primarily used object relations theories. She began with the idea that anorexia is a disorder of body cognition. What this idea meant in practice was that those defined as 'anorexic' were assumed not to be able to think hunger. They were said to be unable to distinguish between inner states, impulses and desires. This is a position that Morag McSween's (1999) feminist sociological account is critical of. Although Palazolli moves away from this idea of disordered body cognition as the primary cause of anorexia, suggesting later that the fear of the body-object itself causes anorexia. Here the body-object is not the literal body of 'the anorexia', but rather the bad-object-mother. As McSween points out, for Palazolli, as with Bruch, it is maternal failing which is the cause of 'eating disorder', leading her to suggest that psychiatric and psychological discourses individualise 'the problem' of eating disorder. Additionally, by failing to acknowledge the complexity of femininity in general, these discourses posit the ambivalence that can be found in 'the anorexic body' as an individual abnormality or deviance. Yet, although the thesis would contest the idea that Palazolli's 'inner states' are isolated to the confines of a particular body, seeing them instead as having the capacity to affect and be affected by entities outside the borders of 'the subject' (Clough, 2007), what is interesting is the notion of 'thinking hunger'. Later, through an engagement with experimentation, the thesis will engage

with 'thinking hunger' differently. Not as an activity limited to cognition, but rather as an expansive play of trickery and ruse.

Lee (2001), who has co-edited one of a few critical and cross-cultural accounts of 'disordered eating', notes that ascetic eating practices, not dissimilar to what we now refer to as 'anorexia' can be traced back to the fifth century. However, it is not until much later, 1689, that the symptoms of 'radical wasting' and a 'loss of appetite' became an issue for good and common medical sense. At this point these 'symptoms' of 'radical wasting' and a 'loss of appetite' were thought to be without somatic cause and were instead linked to "sadness and anxious cares" (Gordon, 1990, 14). It is later still, nearly two hundred years in fact, in 1874, that these effects are given a proper name: Anorexia Nervosa, a name which translates as a 'nervous loss of appetite'.

Here, in this crude historical overview, contrary to the fixed representational logic of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual we can note that 'anorexia' is neither timeless nor timelessly true. However, it is also necessary to draw attention to these dates for another reason. The first clear description of 'anorexia nervosa' emerges in the late 17th century, the point at which Cartesian thought gains purchase and while notions of affect, as that which is transmissible and embodied without being owned by the individual, lose purchase (Brennan, 2004). We have in the seventeenth century physician's account 'radical wasting' coupled with 'sadness and anxious cares', yet these are considered to be without somatic cause. However: *without somatic cause* implies a particular bordering of the body, a particular notion of causality and no recognition of the non-human. Here, while the *body is isolated as the corporeal* - the visible, the normatively bordered matter of the human individual, *causality* is linear and bound to the individual human subject. This notion of the body and causality does not take account of autonomic affective responses, which are in excess of consciousness. Nor does it account for an embodied relationship to the environment and other bodies. To follow the logic of good and common sense, which splits the body from the mind, if there is no somatic cause, the only place left is the subject's mind. Additionally, because of the way the body is conceived, this 'mind' is invulnerable to the virtuality of pre-individual affects which move through, and

between, bodies, spaces and non-human entities. As such the human mind paradoxically becomes the seat of agency and vulnerability.

It is also worth noting that 'Anorexia Nervosa', got its proper name at a point at which female maladies and hysterias proliferated in both the social imagination and therapeutic waiting rooms. Yet this nominal identity does a disservice to those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body. The evocation of nervousness isolates the presenting individual, or patient, as the border of said nervousness. There is no redress to the permeability of bodies in relation to the environment or other bodies, nor any engagement with the idea, to quote Brennan, "that the origin for affects is independent of the individual experiencing them" (2004, 13).

Emma Rich (2006) notes two things which are of interest to the thesis, firstly that there is a need for an 'everyday' account of anorexia, and secondly that among the voices which her work engaged with, there emerged a lived paradox: 'Anorexia' as *both* an illness *and* an identity. Although Rich does not refer to this explicitly as a paradox, conceiving it instead as a negotiated perspective which draws on discourses outside of medicine, the *both-and* form can be seen to mirror the interest of the thesis in *both* choice *and* mental illness. The negotiated perspective Rich puts forward is said to emerge from a bid to conceive of "a more positive self-representation of anorexia or anorexic identities" (2006, 284).

However, concerns with Rich's account are significant to the development of the thesis' line of critique, particularly the way in which it departs from inquiries which remain dutiful to the limited project of representational identity politics. It remains the contention of the thesis that 'Anorexia' is an iconic and proper name and can be considered as a dogmatic image of thought. As such by adhering to the proper name little room remains to consider the real difference engendered through particular relationships to feeding the body. In other words, it must be acknowledged that 'anorexia' as a 'fixed identity' and 'proper name' is more powerful than the bodies it purports to describe and order. This of course is not least of all due to the powerful medical discourse which colonises potential and fixes good and common sense understandings. The point that I am trying to make here is that while ever we concern ourselves with rescuing identities and providing positive representation we

are failing to inquire into the material-discursive-ethical (Barad, 2007) limitations of categories which speak so poorly on our behalf.

Although on one hand this move towards a more "positive self-representation of anorexia" (Rich, 2006, 284) may be a strike for difference, the adherence to medical notions of what anorexia *actually* is, in terms of the DSM and appearance, suggests that difference remains the same-difference. One can claim an 'anorexic identity', only when one's physical presentation accords the category's demands. Also, and further to the ontological convictions of the thesis, an 'anorexic identity' does not suffice if being anorexic is tied to being a 'proper anorexic' – adhering to the fixed and unmoving demands of the DSM-IV and V (APA, 2000, 2013). This faithful citation, which grants identity, also subsumes the ambivalence and complexity of becoming under the costly and illusory authenticity of being.

> "Woman is a contradictory, confusing identity, which the anorexic is fully aware of". (Orbach; quoted in Hepworth, 1999; 57).

As can be noted in the above quote, sociologically focussed work on 'eating disorders' often makes links to transitions and contradictions. These observations have been made with regard to cultures (Nasser et al, 2001; Gordon, 2001), gender (Lawrence, 1987, Orbach, 1986, Day, 2010) and education (Lawrence, 1987). Although these observations are significant and important, the special interest the thesis has in movement, time, and the productive capacity of paradoxes means it is necessary to go a little further. It is the contention of the thesis that there remains a need to move from exploring transitions between fixed points, which we can see, make manifest, denote and signify, towards an inquiry which is interested in potentiality and the interval, "the connecting thread of experience" and in Massumi's words, "impersonal affect" (2002, 217).

Feminist position

Feminist research into 'anorexia' began to proliferate in the 1970's and 1980's. Paula Saukko suggests that Feminist analysis of eating disorders tend to:

> "Critically analyse normative discourses on the female body [and have recently] observed that psychiatric discourses that aim to treat women with eating disorders consolidate ideals of strength and fitness similar to those that guide women starving in the first place" (2008, 1).

Feminist analyses could be said to aim to explore 'disordered eating' against the grain of patriarchal structures and norms. However, Morag McSween is critical of some feminist writers, including Susie Orbach (1986). She suggests that rather than reading against the grain to produce a new or different feminist account, what is actually produced is an unsatisfactory supplement to conventional patriarchal accounts of the self, identity and the body. This reflects my own concerns with the influential work of Orbach, particularly the way in which she mobilises the notion of an authentic being. She writes: "it is not possible to change fundamental ways of being and of self-conception, before looking in the mirror and recognising who one is" (1986, 105). This positioning presents a bordered individual, the knower of the known. It raises both the issue of representationalism (Barad, 2007) and also recognition (Deluuze, 2004b). With regard to the latter point, recognition, the thesis follows Deleuze in considering this as reductive of potential difference (ibid). What Orbach implies is that everything is available to contemplation should we think or look hard enough, or, perhaps, engage in enough therapy. We might also think of this hail to recognise who one *really* is as an instance of bio-power or "soft tyranny" (Massumi, 2011, 48). Massumi notes, in *Semblance and Event* that

> "according to Foucault, among the most invidious of regimes of power are the ones that impose an imperative to participate, particularly when the imperative is to express yourself 'truly' or 'authentically' [...] *under orders to be yourself*" (2011, 48, emphasis added).

This order to be oneself can be seen as connected to what Foucault refers to as 'postitive' or 'productive power'. Being yourself "for the system" (ibid) is *being yourself the sake of good and common sense*. It is making the experience of a difficult relationship to feeding the body a scrutable object in the state of affairs: a mental illness which can be prevented, cured and recovered from.

Julie Hepworth's key text *The Social Construction of Anorexia* (1999) notes that it was feminist scholarship which posed the first real challenge to the medical model by forwarding the position that 'eating disorder' was in fact a social and gendered form of protest. In the text she challenges the pathologisation of 'anorexia'. The core aim of the work seeks to draw out the way in which 'Anorexia Nervosa' is *constructed* as

a discursive object, or more particularly, as an object of medical discourse. Throughout the various chapters of the book she explores the intersection of scientific knowledge and knowledge pertaining to women's bodies. Put crudely, what Hepworth suggests is that the way in which particular discourses, here medical and scientific, pose the problem of 'eating disorder', places them in a powerful position to produce the solution. An idea which resonates with the ideas put forwards earlier and credited to Helen Gremillion (1992).

Hepworth draws attention to the way in which this production of knowledge and positioning of 'the problem' fails to account for, or work with, the voices of those who are diagnosed as containing the problem. Hepworth draws on the work of Foucault to suggest that 'anorexia' is a concept which appears at a particular point in history. From this assertion materialises the idea that the 'lowly emergence' of anorexia is, in her terminology, a social construction as opposed to something which is timelessly true and waiting to be unveiled. To draw out this point she explores early ideas about self-starvation as connected to religious asceticism and ecstasy. She also notes how, with the waning of religious dogma, or influence, asceticism and food restriction begin to be taken up by the increasingly powerful world view of medicine and science in the late nineteenth century. Towards the end of the text Hepworth draws attention to the way in which understandings of 'anorexia' have proliferated since the 1980's due to the inter-relationship between disciplinary fields. An issue that the thesis would suggest only continues to develop and bring forth nuanced ways of considering the complexity of relationships to feeding the body.

In *Anorexic Bodies: A Feminist and Sociological Perspective on Anorexia Nervosa* (1993) Morag McSween moves away from psychological accounts of 'anorexia', seeing it as fundamentally about gender. McSween is very critical of the earlier work of Hilde Bruch and her position that eating disorders are caused early in childhood and function to resolve a desire for identity and selfhood. However, she still takes a similar position to Susie Orbach (1986) as she suggests that in self-starvation women try to synthesise contradictory elements in their social position through the creation of what she terms 'the anorexic body'. She suggests that the desire for this body is synonymous with a desire for individuality, which as a feminine subject in contemporary western culture, requires the reconciliation of the hidden

incompatibility between femininity and individuality. She refers to the 'anorexic symptom', and in doing so she mobilises the powerful medical discourse to make her feminist argument. She suggests that the 'anorexic body' is gender neutral and resolves gendered contradictions. She does however make the important point that anorexia is an individual practice, or solution, to a social problem. She also does something interesting to the analysis of 'eating disorder' by suggesting that rather than harvesting meaning in anorexia as telling of some underlying psychological problem, inquiry should look at the practices associated with 'the symptoms'. Although the idea of 'symptoms' is problematic as it remains respectful of the limitations of the medical model, it is my feeling that this refers to what becomes manifest in practice – what 'the anorexic body', to use McSweens terminology, *does*, or can do.

Day and Keys (2008) note that the turn towards post-structural theorists to help understand 'eating disorders' was triggered by a desire, particularly for feminists, to move away from essentialist notions of the body and 'bodily distress'. Here, in the context of the post-structural, and often the feminist, it has been Michel Foucault's texts which have been frequently drawn upon to disrupt pernicious and normalising discourses. However, Foucault's theoretical conceptualisations of docile bodies, the panoptican, bio-power, care for the self, and, of course, the relation between power and knowledge, could be said to now, as a result of the plentiful literature which has emerged through him, to have too much of a logical fit to what we take 'anorexia', and 'anorexics' *to be.*

In other words it makes good and common sense to draw on Foucault as it is a *recognisable* and *predictable* methodological decision. As a method of inquiry which has become predictable and recognisable in the context of 'disordered eating', it is considered unlikely to make 'anorexia' unrecognisable (to itself) and therefore in danger of reinforcing 'it' as a dogmatic image of thought. Here it is not the contention of the thesis that a Foucauldian analysis (see St Pierre, 2013) can no longer offer anything to the matter of relationships to feeding the body. It is necessary however, due to the conceptual interests of the thesis, to make problematic this

methodological 'common sense fit': To refuse the Foucauldian hail and 'wait' for something else to invite thought in.

Having discussed some of the vast literature pertinent to 'Anorexia', the thesis will now move toward discussions concerning 'pro-anorexia' and 'wannarexia'. By comparison these are much smaller literatures, particularly the latter. However due to the problems which the thesis engages with they are by no means less important. Further still, because of the methodological decision to engage with life on-line and off-line, both are extremely important in helping inquiry to move away from static notions of what 'anorexia is' and who 'anorexics are'.

Pro-anorexia

> "If, currently, young people are perceived to articulate self-determination and identity through discourses of risk, danger, choice, and individual freedoms, it is young women in particular who are 'choice biographers' par excellence" (Harris, quoted in Pollack, 2003, 247).

Ferreday notes that the pro-ana community has attracted more criticism and controversy than any other on-line community[5]. She contextualises this claim by noting the 'notorious' Yahoo case of 2001 where all pro-ana sites were removed. (2003, 283).This chimes with Dias (2003; also see Pollack, 2003) who notes that as early as 2001 an American eating disorder advocacy group, ANAD (Anorexia Nervosa and Associated Disorders) requested that internet servers remove pro-anorexia sites from their domains. This desire to make pro-ana spaces vanish is also noted by Fox et al who state that:

> "the pro-ana movement is a largely socially-unacceptable approach to the management of anorexia, and has suffered a powerful media backlash, being characterised as encouraging 'normal' and 'healthy' girls and women to adopt anorexia as a glorified diet (2005, 945).

Here we can see that the mobilisation of normal and healthy, is always already in relation to the unhealthy, or pathological. We can also note that 'the media', where this backlash is said to come from, are always already implicated in perpetuating the visual terms in which anorexia, or a difficult relationship to feeding the body, is

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[5] Here it might be relevant to add 'any other [non-criminal] on-line community'.

recognised (Warin, 2010). Below are quotes taken from a recent B-eat, previously known as the British Eating Disorder Association, publication (2011). These are the words of people whose everyday experience of feeding the body is difficult, regardless of whether or not they look like a 'proper anorexic'.

> "They always show pictures of a person at their worst which can be very triggering for sufferers" (2011, 2).

> "I think it's disgusting that some magazines only run stories if they have pictures of peoples' 'lowest weights' – that needs to change, weight is just a symptom" (2011, 2).

As noted in the opening chapter, pro-ana sites have increased during the last decade (Optenet, 2008) and what this does highlight is that 'anorexia' is an issue which is being engaged with in a significant way (Custers and Van den Bulck, 2009). While figures of those accessing sites are of course amenable to interpretation, what is significant is the opening they create to contest the capacity of medical and psychiatric sense alone to fully engage with what they consider "biologically based serious mental disorders" (Klump et al., 2009). The figures given, for those who are at the very least curious about anorexia, compelled by the 'tips and tricks sections' (Dias, 2003), are considerably higher than the figures which the Royal College of Psychiatrists suggest actually 'get' actual anorexia (2009).

The earlier research on eating disorders, particularly the paradox of feminine agency, resistance and conformity (Lawrence ,1987), is engaged with in the context of pro-ana sites by Day (2010). She suggests that the websites emphasise the benefits of 'anorexia' as a means of coping and providing support to those who engage in extreme and ascetic bodily practices (Dias, 2003; Ferreday, 2003; Fox and Ward, 2006; Fox et al., 2005). She concludes by suggesting that "what are often regarded as destructive health behaviours reproduce accounts of both 'ideal femininity' [and] 'resistance to femininity'" (Day, 2010, 246). The paradox that Day engages with leads her to suggest that theorisations must be mindful of either "celebrating" (ibid) such resistance as pertaining to women's power, or thinking only through what she terms "oppressive discourses" which tend towards determinism. The thesis shares this concern and acknowledges that to fall down on either side would be to neglect both the singularity of the event (Deleuze, 2004a; Massumi,

2011) and the inter-relation of both conjunctive and disjunctive synthesis (Olkowski, 2008).

The significance of academic attempts to engage with pro-ana spaces is noted by Ferreday who suggests that pro-ana spaces are used to communicate the 'day to day experience of *living with* ED[6] (2003, 284, emphasis added). Here the idea of *living with* might be reconsidered in light of the thesis' interest in divisions between known and knower, subject and object. As well as the idea of living with, we might also consider *both* living with *and* through. Living *with*, alone, implies that the known ('anorexia') and knower ('anorexic') are separate and separable: Whereas living *through* brings to bear the productive collisions, eruption and tensions between series and event: The novelty of activity in relation to the bare activity of the world and the manifold potentials reverberating in mixtures of bodies and social spaces. 'Living-with' is individualised, while *living through* emphasises processes and connects to the pre-individual aspect of the event. The way in which subject-object: event, affect one another and produce strange unpredictable mixtures.

Picking up on the point Day makes with regard to theorisations which are too hopeful, or pessimistic, of what 'anorexia' and 'pro-anorexia' speak of, Pollack (2003) asks what a feminist response to such spaces should be. As one of the earlier articles to engage with the issue of pro-anorexia, Pollack makes the interesting point that rather than learning how to be anorexic, these social information forums are spaces which are used by those who *already* have a difficult relationship to feeding the body and wish to maintain 'anorexia'. By drawing on Deleuze and Massumi's ideas, it is possible to disrupt the idea that pro-ana sites can *cause* 'anorexia', it is also possible to suggest that the idea of 'maintenance' reflects some very important flows.

Pollack (2003) operationalises Deleuze and Guattari to evoke the idea that the pro-ana discourse of 'lifestyle choice' is an attempt to move away from the 'disease model'. She suggests that this can be seen as an attempt to reterritorialize 'Anorexia' (2003, 247), adding that the pro-ana discourse can be seen as a 'line of flight' from

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[6] ED is often used as short hand for Eating Disorder.

what she refers to as the "stagnant discourses about patriarchal oppression and bio power" (ibid, 249). This reiterates, with difference, points made earlier in the chapter about the methodological decision to not respond to the Foucauldian hail. It also raises the point made at the outset of this chapter that although the thesis owes much to earlier sociological and feminist work there was still work to be done: not least of all to flush out "stagnant discourses".

However, 'new ideas', particularly those which pertain to matter, do not simply devour older ones. One way of theorising sense does not devour older ones only to 'flush them away', once and for all. To recall one of the quotes which opened the chapter:

> "A concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it. [...] it is better to build the new function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate" (Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169).

Wannarexia

During the introductory chapter the term 'wannarexia' was introduced as an improper name. It was also noted that in the context of the event and *Logic of Sense* (2004a) it could be considered as an esoteric, portmanteau or 'nonsense' word. While there is a good deal of literature on Anorexia, especially from the 1960's onwards and a substantial amount on pro-anorexia since the early 2000's, the amount of literature which explores in any depth the idea of wannarexia is much smaller. One key exception is Giles who notes that data found in pro-ana spaces "offers psychologists and other social scientists unique and privileged access to a 'naturally occurring' discourse (2006, 456) which he conceives as a "rich tapestry of identity work" (2006, 463).

While it has already been suggested that good and common sense sorts and orders bodies according to the demanding diagnostic categories of the DSM-IV and V (APA, 2000, 2013), what Giles' work further points to is the way in which this ordering logic can, in turn, be found in pro-ana spaces. In other words, although the pro-ana logic can on one hand be noted as refusing the boundaries of the medical discourse it can also, on the other hand, speak through it. As such it is not the medical discourse or

science, *per se*, but the merger between good and common sense, science and philosophy (Deleuze, 2004b) which contrives to produce only the *same difference*. Within pro-ana articulations on-line we can note the good sense, which produces categories, and the common sense, which ascribes bodies to categories, in terms such as 'real anorexic', 'faker' or 'wannarexic'. We can see here that although there is resistance to the notion of being 'mentally ill' there remains conformity to the notion of the authentic or 'proper anorexic'. Giles observes and notes this point stating that:

> "Ironically, for a community that actively resists social norms, medical diagnosis operates as a qualification – but this only serves to point up a critical ambivalence towards medicine in the pro-ana community, where site users debate endlessly whether ana is an 'illness' or a 'choice'. Diagnosis serves as nothing more than a mark of authenticity" (Giles, 2006, 475).

In the above quote a good deal of the flows which inform the thesis can be felt, particularly the idea that in the last instance resistance appears to, perhaps fearing its own difference, be tied down to the notion of actual anorexia and 'authenticity'. This point brings to bear the latter part of *Logic of Sense – The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy* where among other things ethics and foodstuffs are considered alongside Deleuze's own reversal of Plato. Although these ideas will be put to work throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis what is important to note at this juncture is that this pertains to the dogmatic image of thought noted at the outset of the thesis. This reiterates, with difference, the way in which platonic Ideas can be seen to circulate in pro-ana articulations. Due to the fact that Deleuze's theory of the event: surface and depth, body and language, does not give primacy to either matter or the idea, his work is a significant lever in terms of reversing the Platonism in pro-ana.

In the opening of the first Appendix Deleuze also notes irony; conceiving it as the superficial aspect of division "which confines singularity within the limits of the individual or the person" (2004a, 158). He adds to this that there is also rivalry which occurs in depth, in the "selection of lineages [..] to distinguish the pretender from the false one" (Deleuze, 2004a, 292). In other words, the irony that Giles is adept at pointing out can be developed by Deleuze. In the context of pro-ana discussions that

which is individualised, anorexia as a mental illness, is also individualising: A marker of (the same) difference. As such debates about who is, and who is not, a proper anorexic make recourse to the medical concept and proper name which carries the affective trace of authority (Massumi, 2002). As such, a 'new' function, in an old field, fails to grow. Here not being a faker or a 'wannarexic' necessities that individuals must recite the category's demands in a fixed present in the state of affairs. To be worthy of the proper name the pro-ana must constantly acquit themselves of the guilt of being a fake or a wannarexic. Yet, to be worthy of the event is not an individual's task, rather events are "occasions of communication rather than isolation" (William, 2008a, 168).

> "In the very general terms, the motive of the theory of Ideas must be sought in a will to select and to choose. It is a question of 'making a difference' of distinguishing the 'thing' itself from its images, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum. (Deleuze, 2004a, 291).

The above quote can be seen in relation to one of the most significant points which Giles (2006) raises with regard to the thesis, the theories it draws on and the empirical materials it works with. He suggests that wannarexics, or 'wannabes' are considered as 'interlopers' who are "bringing the community into disrepute" (Giles, 2006, 471). They are the bad copies that Deleuze is talking about (2004a). We see here that what is at stake is dual, pre individual and in mixtures of bodies. Devaluing or denigrating the 'proper' or 'good name' implies that rather than being placed on a pedestal, alongside iconic anorexia, the good copy receives only the spoiled identity of 'attention seeker'.

Implicit Literature

Having given a brief overview of pro-anorexia and wannarexia the thesis will now move towards an engagement with the literature noted at the beginning of the chapter as speaking of anorexia, pro-anorexia and wannarexia tacitly. Here I am referring to writing on affect and the event and the recent contributions of post-humanism and material feminism.

Affect and the Event

> "Th[e] event is never simply an occurrence for the mind of a conscious human being. It is rather a set of multiple interactions running though

bodies, ideal structures (such as languages or moral codes) and virtual structures (such as relations of emotional investment considered in abstraction from the bodies that carry them)" (Williams, 2008a, 1).

Just as the 'pure' of raw experience in Massumi is not a return to a 'pre-linguistic Eden' (2011, 10), affect is not an atavistic return to an embodied space free of language and culture. Instead, affects are always already in the middle, both subjective and objective, but more than that, "virtually subjective and objective" (Massumi, 2011, 10). The notion of affect which Deleuze and Guattari evoke in *What is Philosophy* does not undertake a return to origins, as if "beneath civilisation we would rediscover, in terms of resemblance, the persistence of a bestial or primitive humanity". (1994, 173). Here we see at least two things which are important, firstly, the way in which Deleuze and Guattari work with affect is away from the notion of linear progress. They do not reiterate the narrative of atavistic past which is never to be returned to; civilised future, which is to be invested in at all cost. Secondly, their evocation of affect does not under cut the important advances made through post-structuralisms intra-actions with feminisms.

Further still, through Deleuzo-Guattarian affect we do not take the ocular individual and bordered body as the starting point of inquiry. Instead we look at the interplays and movements between human and non-human bodies, which are unlimited by chronological time. Engaging with affect also offers inquiry the possibility of destabilising *either or* binaries. Massumi clarifies that pure experience is not naïve or at a remove from language. The purity he is referring to is perhaps best understood as being at the level of 'something stirring', ready to be numerous 'whats' retroactively. However, as noted previously, these moment*s* of 'stirring' are not towards oneness, but manyness.

As I noted in the previous chapter, one of the most significant contributions which Massumi (2002, 2011) and the abstract, activist and process philosophers he draws on make to a reconsideration of 'anorexia', is in relation to movement and the resistance they pose to splitting the subject and object. Through plugging into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) this literature the problem, as it is posited in common sense, was not the starting point of inquiry. Indeed, the way in which 'the problem' is conceived in good and common sense itself became a significant part of the

'problem' which the thesis engaged with. As a result of engaging with particular theories of movement, abstraction and affect, the thesis does not take as its point of departure 'anorexia as a mental illness to be diagnosed, prevented or cured'. Yet neither does it swallow whole the idea that it could be chosen as a lifestyle. It is the contention of the thesis that 'anorexia' is a problem; but not as common sense would have it. *It is problematic first and foremost as an iconic 'proper name' and 'fixed identity'.*

Instead of starting at the beginning I have worked with ideas which unfix identities and proper names (Deleuze, 2004a), ideas which start from the middle. In working with literature which accommodates that which is *of* bodies and language, and insists that there is more to the social, embodied and political world than *what occurs* or can be seen *in* vision, the thesis is adept to tread further backwards and further forwards than good and common sense alone would allow. Through theories of affect, and the language of the event, expansive problems are encountered and secure solutions are dismissed.

What the thesis contends is problematic, ethically, ontologically and epistemologically, are the intra-actions (Barad, 2007) of state science and philosophy (Massumi, 1992) which pre suppose an autonomous, intentional human subject. Dogmatic ideas which divide and (b)order bodies on the basis of common sense abstractions. The thesis contends that these are the stratified ricochets which cut apart the experiencing 'anorexic' body from the abstracted experience, or object, 'anorexia'. Produced as reified and mattering more than that which is potential *and* actual, real *and* abstract, 'anorexia' becomes powerful in a manner which eclipses the lived and everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Indeed, in a recent press release the United Kingdom's National Eating Disorder Association, now known as B-eat, noted that from research that had been carried out with service users 54% strongly agreed, and 20% agreed with the statement "[t]he length of time I spent on a waiting list caused me to feel that I 'wasn't sick enough'", while 40% were told by medical professionals that their BMI wasn't low enough to access treatment quickly.

Returning to the event, Massumi notes that the event itself is subjective self-creation and the clarification of the subjective and the objective is key to understanding the knower/ known. The event, as that which is *inside of what occurs*, is actualised in the state of affairs, in bodies and mixtures of bodies. Yet there is always already the pre individual or objective (Whitehead, Massumi, 2011, 8) residue of activity of previous events passing out in the something stirring of novel events coming about. Massumi suggests, in a manner which is close to passages in *Logic of Sense* (2004a) that "the end of the experience knows its beginning [..] it is a retroactive process" (2011, 9). This retroactivity is not back to front, end to start. Instead it is *of* processes which are both forwards and backward, in excess of the one dimensionality of lines on a grid and apparatuses of extensity. Things are always already becoming different.

> "Each phase of the event must in some way perceive the pertinence of the phases before it, in order to gather the prior phase's momentum into its own unfolding. […] In the overlap and relay, they co-perceive their mutual inclusion in the same event" (Massumi, 2011, 3-4).

Potential, as the momentum of the event, is taken up through the incorporeal dimension *of the body* to be carried off through infinitives – *to cry, to wear, to laugh.* As singular points these event activities cut together, and cut apart, series. They produce change. Yet these transformations, actualised by an enacting body, go much further than the events of a particular someone's life. This is the creative self-enjoyment of what is coming about, (Massumi, 2011) and never ceases to do so (Deleuze, 2004a). It is the aesthetic dimension of the event (Massumi, 2011).

As noted at the start of this section, Massumi utilises the word 'pure' but does so in a manner which is mindful of the static and dust that have gathered around the term. He makes clear that the 'pure' he is talking about is not the common sense understandings of 'pure': this pure experience is not the purity of moral superiority, or racial purity. Rather, this pure is bare activity. It is "virtually both subjective and objective" (James quoted in Massumi, 2011). Here we might say, that this 'pure' is the dry incorporeality of the Deleuzian event. That which is real and abstract, and which bodies, as real and abstract themselves, have a sense of. Not *in* the object of the body, but at the border, or interval, between propositions and things.

Massumi goes on to say that 'pure experience' is overfull with potentiality and virtuality. In other words, pure experience might be said to have a sense of the pre-individuality of the event and its connection to other events which are coming and receding. This is where Deleuze's notion of Chronos and Aion become useful as opposed to linear theories of time which, even when they do connect to space, do not account for that which circulates in spaces and between bodies affectively. The creep between the porous border of sense, in relation to bodies and language, does not come to a final resting place. The proposition, stripped of sense, in the last instance fails to convey the over fullness of experience. To look only to ideas and only to matter, only to words or only to the speaker is, perhaps, both to expect too much and too little of inquiry, even making the empiricist's confusion between accident and event (Deluze, 2004a).

Massumi, as a theorist of affect, does not always explicitly use the word affect when he explicates ideas pertaining to it. This method of exposition engenders a particular aesthetic and political writing which is in line with the interests of the thesis. Affect is not pinned down to a particular definition once and for all. It is not domesticated for the purposes of good and common sense. It is, instead, bought to life through the many ways in which the reader comes of have a *sense of it*: A thinking-feeling in both theory and practice. It might also be said that through repetition and difference Massumi conveys the lived abstractness of affect. Rather than repeating the signifier 'affect', as though the reader should by now know what this 'means', the artistry or aesthetics, of Massumi's writing provides *both* an embodied *and* an intellectual *sense of* affect. As Deleuze and Guattari note:

> "Whether through words, colours, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations [...] The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cry. [...] The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perception the affect from affections, the sensation from opinion"(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176).

For Deleuze the event runs through series, "transforming them and altering sense along the series" (Williams, 2008a, 1). The implications of this are that event activity,

which pertains to the corporeality and incorporality of entities and bodies, changes structures: Structures are moving not fixed. Seriality is the key concept for understanding the scope and function of Deleuze's philosophical movements. Williams notes that:

> "[f]or Deleuze series are not essentially series of objects or substances, they are variations independent of objects, and not limited by them. The variation comes first, not the varied object or connected substance" (2008a, 25).

This quote encapsulates the importance of thinking with movement as an ongoing process, rather than *recognising* its products, what Williams notes above as "the varied object or connected substance" (ibid). The conceptual 'twitch' of series and events, their refusal to become limited within freeze frames which enable us to say 'it is that; it is not that' is perhaps why both series and event provide such a worthwhile challenge to traditional empirical research. This refusal, or what I will phrase as conceptual agitation, returns me to the case that I made in the opening chapter regarding obscurity and distinction, as opposed to clarity and distinction. If the subject-object we are concerned with is the *variation* and not the *varied*, the language and concepts we must draw on to make language "stammer, tremble and cry" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176) cannot be clear and distinct. It cannot, and should not, always be clear and distinct because inquiry would then only be able to engage with objects and substances, as opposed to incorporeal entities and affects which do not reside in clear and distinct spaces, bodies or words. Put diffrently, series and events are not themes or category's under which we can subsume 'actual things': "The varied object or connected substance" (Williams, 2008a, 25).

Yet what remains important to note in relation to series in the context of the thesis is the way in which they produce paradoxes. Series are bought together through a process of disjunctive synthesis – difference and determination – structure and creativity. Disjunctive synthesis is a process which never realises equilibrium and transforms by creating difference, moving through empty places and elements without a place which are mobile factors running along signifying and signified series.

In the context of the arguments developed by the thesis 'wannarexia' is an empty place and an element without a place. It creates difference within the medical series just as it produces difference within the series of choice and desire. Although the heterogeneous pro-ana community is often marked by its resistance to the medical discourse, particularly the idea that anorexia is a mental illness, what became apparent from my empirical work is the way in which this powerful discourse is paradoxically colluded with and resisted. As I worked with the productive paradox of lifestyle choice and mental illness, which emerged from data analysis, what became significant were notions of 'proper' or 'actual anorexia' and improper anorexia or 'wannarexia'.

While anorexia was reified and produced as iconic, the bodies which lived, acted, and did the doing of a difficult relationship to feeding the body were occupants without a place and placeless occupants (Deleuze, 2004a). Put differently, the bodies that mattered, and were permitted to choose anorexia as a lifestyle, had to firstly adhere to the demands of the Diagnostic Statistical Manuals definition of proper anorexia. To legitimately annunciate volition the pro-ana's had to already be faithfully citing the demands of the actual category (Butler, 1993). Otherwise, regardless of the incremental difficulty they experience through their lived and everyday relationship to feeding the body, they risked being marked as a wannarexic.

I would now like to return to the signifying and the signified series. I noted that the signifying series was always in excess and the signified series was always lacking but that this disjunction was not working its way towards equilibrium. Considering 'series' helps me to convey a little more the idea of a moving structure and adds depth to the way in which 'structure' and 'activity' are conceived within the event. In *What is Philosophy* Deleuze and Guattari (1994) note that the event can be understood as a selection in series – two sided in relation to determinacy and chaos – it is a chaomos (ibid). For Deleuze agency is not the only 'thing' which we should think of as having the capacity to change. Indeed, referring back to ideas that were unpicked a moment ago in relation to *variation* and *varied*, 'thing' is perhaps a clumsy word to use. Deleuze's ontology is not one of things per se. His ontology, the entities he assert's actually exist (DeLanda, 2002) are neither containers, nor

contained. He believes in the activity and process of entities, to draw on Barad (2007), their intra-actions. This is why proud verbs and infinities are so central to evenful inquiry. For Deleuze, structures, which we can consider not as interchangeable with, but akin to series, are also always already moving.

> "The two heterogenous series converge toward a paradoxical element, which is their "differentiator". This is the principle of the emission of singularities. The element belongs to no series [signifier or signified]; or rather, it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate throughout them. It has therefore the property of always being displaced in relation to itself, of "being absent from its own place" its own identity, its own resemblance and its own equilibrium. It appears in one of the series as an excess, but only on the condition that it would appear at the same time in the other as lack. But if it is in excess in the one, it is only as an empty square; and if it is lacking in the other, it is only as a supernumerary pawn or an occupant without a compartment. It is both word and object at once: esoteric word and exoteric object "(Deleuze, 2004a, 60).

Above, in the extended quote from *Logic of Sense* (2004a), there comes together many of the ideas which I have attempted to explicate in this section of the chapter. To continue with a focus on 'wannarexia' I would suggest that as a paradoxical element it is the "differentiator" of the series of lifestyle choice (word and thing) and mental illness (word and thing). It belongs neither to the signifying or signified series, "or rather, it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate throughout them" (ibid). 'Wannarexia' circulates between the series as forces seize it (Massumi, 1992), both virtuality and actually. Wannarexia, as differentiator, produces singular difference: It is a turning point that makes the things we think we know, through standard language, crack.

As a portmanteau word it draws attention to the gap between word and thing in both 'lifestyle choice' and 'mental illness'. This reconnects to ideas that were noted in the opening chapter of the thesis through Deleuze's figure of a chariot passing through a mouth. The word (signifying series) and thing (signified series) "retain a difference that cannot be resolved by mapping the words onto what they truthfully correspond to, since the chariot does not pass through your mouth" (Williams, 2008a, 48). The disjunction between the two creates not only a portmanteau word, it also creates a space of indecision where sense and nonsense subsist.

As *both* exoteric object *and* esoteric word wannarexia moves along a twisted cylinder as something that is neither inside nor outside words or things but in relation to both. It is a nonsense word but that does not preclude it from producing sense.

As is well reported, one of the writers that Deleuze himself is influenced by is Friedrich Nietzsche. In the editor's introduction to *Genealogy of Morals* Walter Kaufmann notes that:

> "Nietzsche had an almost pathological weakness for one particular kind of ambiguity […] he loved words and phrases that mean one thing out of context and almost the opposite in the context he gives them. All of them involve a double meaning, *one exoteric, and one esoteric […T]he former is bound to lead astray hasty readers*" (1989, 6).

This "almost pathological weakness" in Neitzsche (ibid) is also, paradoxically, a fortifying strength. Particularly as these ideas are put to work by Deleuze in *Logic of Sense* (2004a) and elsewhere. The interval between the *exoteric and the esoteric*, as Kauffman notes, can lead hasty readers[7] astray. The exoteric, in some sense, is more closely associated with common sense. As exoteric object our understanding is not limited to personal experience, we have an understanding of wannarexia as an imitation, a pejorative. It refers to a suspicious and inauthentic object. However, if we do not read or engage hastily we also consider the esoteric aspect. As an esoteric word its abstruseness makes it impossible to say what that 'really means' but those who take time to chew it over cease to question what it means, in a very broad sense, and begin to consider how it makes selective sense.

It is easy to say that 'wannarexia' is a nonsense, but as we know, this is an implicit part of the sense event. Here we return to the idea of denotation and consumables and that variation precedes the varied. As esoteric word 'wannarexia' conjures a materiality which folds into itself infinitives such as *to be* and *to desire* and as such instigates a variation in the series of what it is *to be* and *to desire*. As *to be* is bought into contact with *to choose* the change along the series produces resonance and

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[7] Nietzsche was particularly critical of fast or non-readers and posited that their problem, of "galloping consumption [was] a disease" (Neitzsche, 1989, 6).

reverberations (Deleuze, 2013) affecting other words and things, namely: 'Anorexia'. Here, the point that I am trying to make is that 'wannarexia' is not the only word (and thing) that is esoteric and exoteric. 'Anorexia', 'Ana' and 'ED' are too. Names proliferate, as notes Deleuze when he speaks of Frege's, or rather, Carroll's paradox. In the fifth series of *Logic of Sense* (2004a) he gives the example of the Knight's song and an exchange between Alice and the knight. Through this example, something's name is not identical to *what it is called – and neither refer to what it really is* (Deleuze, 2004a, 36).

As the thesis focusses mainly on the terms 'anorexia' and 'pro-ana' I would like to cut into the exchange between the Knight and Alice. Not to confuse the argument, but rather to suggest that how we refer to a difficult relationship to feeding the body is not the same as its name and not identical to what it is called – and neither of these refer to what it really is.

Although I have replaced 'song' for 'illness' to draw out the way in which 'Anorexia' also goes by other names, what is quite important is that illness also goes by different names – the name is not identical to *what it is called – and neither refer to what it really is.*

> "The name of the [illness] is called "[Anorexia]" – "Oh, that's the name of the [illness] is it?" Alice said, trying to feel interested. – "No, you don't understand," the knight said, looking a little vexed. "That's what the name of the [illness] is called. The name really is '[Anorexia Nervosa]'." – "Then I ought to have said that's what the [illness] is called'?" Alice corrected herself. – "No, you oughtn't : that's quite another thing! The [illness] is called '[Ana]': but that's only what it's called, you know!" – "Well, what *is* the [illness] then?" said Alice who was by time completely bewildered. – "I was coming to that, the Knight said. The [illness] really is ['a life-style'!] …." (Deleuze, 2004a, 36).

Returning to transitions differently - moving towards the affective labour of being a 'proper anorexic'

In the first chapter the scene was set for the way in which the thesis would attempt to disrupt what is acknowledged as 'anorexia' in both medical and pro-ana discourses.

Attention was drawn to the way in which the focus on that which occurs, adherence to a particular body mass index and the demands of the DSM, was accidental to the event. Also, the point was made that attention paid to the state of affairs, the space of denotation, manifestation and signification, stripped of sense, served to spatialise and temporalise a difficult relationship to feeding the body within frames that simultaneously gave no account of sense, and failed to account for the ways in which the moving, sensuous body incrementally, through processes of becoming, develop what may, *or may not*, be referred to as Anorexia Proper. This recalls Massumi's idea:

> "[w]hen positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement comes a problematic second. After all is signified and sited, there is the nagging problem of how to add movement back into the picture" (Massumi, 2002, 3 – 4).

Earlier in this chapter it was noted that the significance of transitions and contradictions, in relation to an existing literature on 'disordered eating' could more usefully be engaged with in terms of paradoxes. It is now relevant to add further to the notion of transition through ideas which are brought together in Massumi's *Semblance and Event* (2011). Here particular attention will be paid to the way in which he refigures transition in relation to the subject and object. Before the thesis moves on to develop what Massumi offers transitional thinking it is necessary to reiterate that sense is not cognitive, it is *of* the body and *of* language. It is *in nowhere, it is of here, there and everywhere:* Circulating between bodies and social spaces, humans and non-humans. It is both vulnerable in the sense that it is in relation to what came before and what is about to become, but also, due to its dual structure, impassable and impenetrable, refusing to be pinned down to final definitions. Sense, for Deleuze is both-and, "it changes and does not [..] it is pure and yet it is in contact with actual things,[..] sense is everywhere yet also different from actual things" (Williams, 2008a, 4).

In *The Ether and Your Anger: Towards a Speculative Pragmatism* Massumi develops the implications of radical empiricism which suggests that "change itself is immediately experienced" (Massumi, 2011, 4). That which is experienced is real, and contrariwise, that which is real will, in some way, be experienced. The thesis makes

use of these ideas as they allow for a meaningful way in which to engage with the subject and object in a manner which does not sever potential from actual through limiting operations of division. Massumi suggests that 'classically' objects are that which is *in* the world; while perceptions, feelings and sensations are *in* the subject. "What James is saying, by contrast, is that *both are in the transition.* Things and their experience are together in transition [...] "*participation precedes cognition"* (2011, 30-32). In other words, before we decide to decide or choose to choose *we are always already implicated in the general activity of the world: its changes and transitions.* Movements and sensations which refuse ocular capture, while making themselves known, leave a residue of activity. That which is *of the body* is implicated in advance of the 'autonomous agent' or subject's permission. In other words, these quasi causal effects might be thought of as in relation to what Clough describes as a "substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness "(2007,2) and not limited to the human (Barad, 2007b).

Both Clough (2007) and Blackman and Venn (2010) note that the 'Affective Turn', is an epistemological sea change which has been influenced by disciplines ranging from mathematics and neuroscience to physics and biology. While the thesis has already attempted to set in motion the idea of acquitting oneself of the guilt of being an improper anorexic or 'wannarexic', it seems timely to develop this a little further through the idea of 'affective labour' (Blackman and Venn, 2010).

Both lifestyle choice and mental illness are inflected by neo-liberalism: excess, gain, deficit, production. Consumer choice and the healthy worker are capitalism's pulse. However within the context of pro-anorexia further paradoxes are produced- getting bigger and getting smaller at the same time. (Deleuze, 2004a). *To choose to be* anorexic is both towards and conforming to capitalist priorities of choice and lifestyle, the purchase of the desired body through economic and affective flows, while it is also moving away from it in the choice to refuse the plentiful, resource-full body of the healthy productive citizen who can be put to work (Beradi, 2009, Rose, 1995). As such, the infinitive *to choose* produces a different sense depending on the other infinitives it is bought together with. Its denotation remains while its sense is changed through the conditions which produce its activity. Once again this brings to bear the point that what is at stake is not what a particular body represents, but rather, what a

body can *do.* As Blackman and Venn (2010) note, engaging with affect is a means to avoid reification and reducing matter to that which is lumpen and unthinking. As set out in the first chapter, and earlier in this, the process whereby 'anorexia' is reified is related to its iconic and desirable status. Reified and frozen does little to evoke the lived and everyday experience of a difficult relationship to feeding the body.

In this final sub-section of the chapter writers who have been affected by theories of new materialism and post-humanism will be engaged with. As with the previous section, these ideas have been engaged with in this chapter for the way in which they tacitly, rather than explicitly, speak of 'anorexia'. The texts engaged with raise new questions – is new materialism starting to consider what those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body sensed all along - that nature is a trickster, that matter self-organises and kicks back against human intentions? What are the implications of acknowledging the unpredictability of the body-organism in the context of difficult relationships to feeding the body? What new language and practices, material-discursive intra-actions (Barad, 2007) might be necessary to avoid absorbing these insights into the paranoid machine? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).

As set out in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, it is perhaps this literature which has provoked the most unusual and enriching encounters for thought. Within this section of the chapter the possibilities of non-human actants intra-acting (Barad, 2007) with vibrant matter will help the thesis to move further still away from common sense notions of the autonomous subject of enlightenment that chooses, or not as the case may be, to consume. Instead, the strange entanglements of matter will be explored to re consider what a body can do at the threshold of Deleuze's paradox to eat/ to speak.

Post-human and New Empiricisms

> "Protestations in favour of 'human warmth' betray an inability to feel an ardour of a different kind. Stirrings that are not just pre-personal, but impersonal, bodily but inhuman, outside intentionality, open irrevocably to chance" (Massumi, 1992, 47).

> "To become a new body, an old body needs a new milieu through which to move" (Massumi, 1992, 98).

It is the contention of the thesis that post-humanism is valuable to social inquiry, particularly in terms of the way in which it contests human privilege to engender a more thoroughgoing engagement with both matter and ethics. After all, as Jane Bennett notes "we are also non-human and [..] things, too, are vital players in the world" (2010, 4).

The first quote given at the start of this sub-section could be said to be a point of singularity, or a turning point for the thesis in movement. This idea of "an ardour of a different kind" (Massumi, 1992, 47) provoked the inquiry towards affects which were expansive beyond the state of affairs in which empirical materials were gathered. It enabled the production of a different sort of engagement with ideas, people and places, and this can be seen being put to work within chapter five.

Within the second quote there is an important reconnection to the way in which the thesis engages with new materialism and post-humanism and recalls an earlier quote from Deleuze: "a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it. This is also why it is never very interesting to criticise a concept" (Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169). It is hoped that by engaging with these theories which provoke us to encounter the real abstractness of matter, that a new milieu will be created. Within and throughout this new milieu new functions will emerge which make staid ideas about bodies and what they can do, inadequate in the context of consuming and producing relationships.

For those who are not familiar with theories of post-humanism, or are suspicious that the term is inter-changeable with an anti-humanism, the words below offer an ethical rationale for a move towards the post-human. Here the notion of becoming is expanded with regard to community. Ethics are not simply 'at the heart' but in its very cellular and multiple assemblages.

> "[T]o be post-human does not mean to be indifferent to the humans, or to be de-humanised. On the contrary, it rather implies a new way of combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of community, which includes one's territorial or environmental interconnections (Braidotti, 2013, 190).

In her article on '*Nature's Queer Performativity'* Karen Barad considers the "materializing practices of differentiating, where one cannot take for granted that all the actors, actions, and effects are human" (2011, 124). This position on the human and non-human accords a particular ontological framing of course, the realism of Barad and Braidotti or 'higher empiricism' advocated by Deleuze.

> "To be more precise, the point is not merely to include nonhumans as well as humans as actors or agents of change but rather to find ways to think about the nature of causality, origin, relationality, and change without taking these distinctions to be foundational or holding them in place. What is needed then is a way of thinking about the nature of *differentiating that is not derivative of some fixed notion of identity* or even a fixed spacing. Indeed, what is the nature of difference if differentiating doesn't happen in space and time *but in the making of spacetimemattering*? (Barad, 2011, 124 emphasis added).

The points which Barad makes above, in regard to differentiating are in keeping with some of the points I drew out from *Logic of Sense* (2004a) during my discussion of series and event, namely the way in which "series converge toward a paradoxical element, which is their "differentiator" (2004a, 60). Here, what is particularly important is the way in which she draws out the role of non-human entities as agents of change. Agents not in isolation: but in relation to other human and non-human entities. The point that Barad is making is that all matter, not just human bodies, are entities which have been produced rather than discovered. Further to this, the aforementioned production of difference is not made *by* space and time *as themselves always already formed.* Difference is not simply a historical product, it is a process which implicates, or enfolds ethics, ontology, epistemology space and time. She continues:

> "I have argued that what we commonly take to be individual entities are not separate determinately bounded and propertied objects, but rather are (entangled "parts of") phenomena (materialdiscursive intra-actions) that extend across (what we commonly take to be separate places and moments in) space and time (where the notions of "material" and "discursive" and the relationship between them are unmoored from their (anti)humanist foundations and reworked) (Barad, 2011, 125)

Here Barad articulates succinctly points that were grasped at in the previous chapter. Rather than looking at individual human bodies being ill, being healthy, being agentic, or being determined, we see that they are instead "(entangled 'parts of') what our inquiries engage with. As with the affect of Deleuze's strange paradoxical relation to eat/to speak, Barad does not separate out bodies and languages. The material and the discursive become materialdiscursive intra-actions; the significance of which is that in the intra-action, *as opposed to the interaction,* both are changed and produced differently.

In her philosophical and political project, Jane Bennett inquires into causality and efficacy to produce a theory of "distributive agency" (2010, 31). As previously noted, although the thesis might be said to work primarily with Deleuze's mathematically informed philosophical notion of dual causality, it is worthwhile within this sub-section to also draw on Barad and Bennett's thoughts on cause and effect. In addition, by drawing on these two contemporary thinkers I will be able to engage a little further with ethics. This will both inform a more robust operationalising of causality and also situate the thesis within a trans-disciplinary framework. *Put differently, the thesis will be drawing on philosophical notions of causality and agency which have the affective conceptual trace* (see Massumi, 2002, 20 -21) *of mathematics, physics and political theory.* This of course also has significant implications for the way in which ontology and epistemology are then figured, and refigured. Bennett asks:

> "What method could possibly be appropriate for the task of speaking a word for vibrant matter? How to describe without thereby erasing the independence of things? How to acknowledge the obscure but ubiquitous intensity of impersonal affect? [...] This entails, in my case, a willingness to theorise events [..] as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some human, some not, although all thoroughly material" (Bennett, 2010, xiii).

In *Vibrant Matter* Bennett attempts to paint a positive ontology which stretches received concepts of agency, action and freedom sometimes to breaking point. She disputes the onto-theological binaries of life/matter, human/animal, will/determination, and organic/inorganic by using arguments and other theoretical means to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-affective openness to material vitality.

In sum she sketches a style of political-aesthetic analysis that can better account for the contributions of nonhuman actants.

In the text's preface she uses the notion of enchantment as an impersonal power which she gives as:

> "an affect intrinsic to forms that cannot be imagined (even ideally) by persons. [..T]he figure of enchantment points in two directions: the first towards humans who feel enchanted and whose agentic capacities maybe thereby be strengthened, and the second toward the agency of the things that produce (helpful, harmful) effects in human and other bodies" (xii).

Here it is relevant to make a connection, not a conflation, between Bennett's dual notion of enchantment and the quasi cause of the Deleuzian dual cause. Here enchantment might be thought of as an intensity or a singularity, a turning point which is towards no particular ends.

Further to this connection I would like to take a momentary detour from 'good materialists' to a self-confessed 'bad materialist', (2004) Judith Butler. It could be suggested that the concept of enchantment, as used by Bennett through her reading of Derrida, was so enchanting and evocative in the context of the thesis because of ideas which Butler teased me with in *The Psychic life of Power* (1997). Two aspects of my reading of this text are relevant at this juncture. Firstly, although these are not Butler's terms, there was the idea that something which is both corporeal, and incorporeal, such as power, can have a life – the possibility that it is an entity. And secondly, and most importantly at this point, I was struck by the way in which an entity can compel, or in Butler's Althusserian term, interpellate a subject. Through this notion of 'hailing' I felt my agentic capacity to inquire strengthened.

However, having plugged (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) into my empirical materials the Butlerian concept of interpellation it did not seem to offer any way to think about the capacity of matter to turn, or to feel itself becoming compelled. Further still, there was no way to think about the ways in which the organs of the body could be hailed, an idea I briefly evoke in the fourth chapter as gastro-pellation. In summary, the

concept of interpellation, as explicated in *The Psychic Life of Power* was too cognised and premised on an original lack within the subject to provide a different way of thinking about difference and movement. By contrast, Bennett's notion of enchantment, taken further in following chapters, provided the necessary wonder required to "allow some temporary point of indecision" (MacLure, 2013a, 181). It allowed me to fumble around and experiment with mixtures of ideas, "on the threshold of knowing" (ibid). In summary, Bennett's enchantment (2010), as opposed to Butler's interpellation (1997), enabled me to consider fleshly oscillations as an implicit part of ontological shifts.

Bennett notes that the ethical turn moved political theorists away from canonical notions of will formation towards "a complex set of relays between moral contents, aesthetic-affective styles, and public moods" (xiii). For Bennett, within this distributive theory, agency "becomes distributed across an ontologically heterogenous field, rather than being the capacity localised in a human body or in a collective produced (only) by human efforts" (2010, 23). As such there is "not so much a doer (an agent) behind the deed [..] as a doing and an effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage" (ibid, 28). Bennett's version of agency does not deny human intentionality, but it does trouble the autonomy of the Will and the possibility of what she terms "definitive outcomes" (2010, 32). For instance, speaking of Nietzsche's critique of a uniform recipe for vitality, Bennett notes that he surmises that "[t]he effectivity of a foodstuff varies from body to body [and] the 'same' food in the 'same' body will vary over time as actants enter and leave the scene" (2010, 44).

One of the central problems the thesis engages with is which bodies matter in good and common sense. Who and how bodies are produced as 'occupants without a place'. (Deleuze, 2004a). As such the writing of Karen Barad, on matter, ethics, knowing and being, in *Meeting the Universe Halfway* (2007) has been a significant text for the thesis in development. She notes that

> "matter and meaning cannot be dissociated, not by chemical processing, or centrifuge, or nuclear blast. Mattering is simultaneously a matter of substance and significance (2007, 3).

Barad operationalises a diffractive methodology, which attends to patterns of difference and is "respectful of the entanglement of ideas and other materials in ways that reflective methodologies are not" (2007, 30). In practice, a diffractive method does not fix at the outset of the study, 'what or who' is the subject and 'what or who' is the object. It also draws attention to the way in which lines drawn between object and apparatus are soluble, or rather, constituted differently depending on the intra-action. Barad's agential-realist account proposes that ethics, epistemology and ontology are inseparable. It is her contention that we are always already part of what we are inquiring into, and in this sense, there can be no absolute or objective position.

> "Do I dare disturb the universe?" is not a meaningful question, let alone a starting point for ethical considerations. Disturbance is not the issue, and 'dare' is a perverse provocation. There is no such exterior position where the contemplation of this possibility makes any sense. We are *of* the universe – there is no inside, no outside. There is only intra-acting from within and as part of the world and its becoming" (Barad, 2007, 396).

Barad considers ethics as the grounding source of human experience not vice versa. She notes:

> "the ethical subject is not the disembodied rational subject of traditional ethics but rather an embodied sensibility, which responds to its proximal relationship to the other through a mode of wonderment that is antecedent [or a pre cursor] to consciousness". (2007, 391).

What I take from this is that ethics are not something an individual 'has', in the sense that they have willed themselves to be ethical, as point 3.3 of the university's ethical guidelines suppose:

> "The practice of ethics is about conducting one's business in a disciplined manner within legal and other regulated constraints and with minimal impact on and detriment to others". (MMU, Ethical Framework 3.3 emphasis added)

Ethics are more than can be cognitively thought by rational, autonomous individuals and ticked off on well thought out documents. What this implies in practice is that for all the effort and foresight in the world, all the thinking, reflecting and scenario

planning, the trying times of a research project when ethics materialise and matter, what is called for is in excess of what can be found in standard course textbooks or journal articles under the explicit heading of 'ethics'. As an embodied sensibility we are always already doing ethics. Scrambling the deep physical yolk and the logical shell (Deleuze, 2004a, 162) into an unholy mixture (See Lecercle, quoted in MacLure, 2013b).

An agential realist ontology disrupts representationalism and calls for a "new starting place", which does not take for granted individually formed and functioning entities, or apparatuses. This ontology does away with the "Cartesian belief in the inherent distinction between subject and object, and knower and known" (Barad, 2007, 138). Here, with the notion of apparatus, there is a possible connection to be made to an idea introduced briefly within the previous chapter. Through Barad's post-human reading of the physicist philosopher Bohr there is a way in which we can reconsider the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an 'apparatus of extensity'.

> "[A]pparatuses are the material conditions of *possibility and impossibility of mattering*; they enact what matters and what is excluded from mattering. Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of 'entities' within phenomena, where 'phenomena' are the ontologically inseparability of agentially intra-acting components" (2007, 148, emphasis added).

Here what is in the process of becoming interesting, or what becomes to 'glow' (MacLure, 2013a), is the idea and material practice, of "cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties" (Barad, 2007, 148): How this can be noted as obfuscating the "ontological[..] inseparability of agentially intra-acting components" (ibid). The idea noted above and in the previous chapter of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an apparatus of extensity can be noted as cutting into intensity; separating out the multitude of human and nonhuman agents which intra-act in the phenomenal instance of relationships to feeding the body.

In summary, within this chapter I have promiscuously (Childers, et al, 2013), yet critically, engaged with what I have termed an *explicit* and an *implicit* literature. In the case of the former I have considered scholarship emerging from a variety of disciplines including psychiatry, psychology, and social and cultural studies. In the

case of the latter, the implicit literature, I have put to work texts from new, or feminist materialism, affect theory and post-humanism. It is my feeling, as this Literature review of sorts comes to a close, that the interdisciplinary scholarship of this implicit literature enables a necessary force (Massumi, 1992). The force to push anorexia off its pedestal without supposing that the bodies which its dogmatic image was built from either want, or need, rescuing.

In the next chapter there will be a renewed focus on methodological issues. Alongside the 'doing' of the research, the spaces, people, groups and Ideas the project came into contact with, there will also time spent engaging with the theory as method. For this there will be a continuation of some of the ideas which have just been engaged with in the final subsection of this chapter.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY - MOVEMENT, MULTIPLICITY, SENSE AND THINKING FEELINGS

Introduction

Chapter two began to make the case as to why it became necessary to draw on theories of the post-human, new materialism and Deleuze to engage with difficult relationships to feeding the body. Crudely articulated, this was noted as helping the thesis to disrupt human intentionality whilst also providing a means to engage with structure as moving, as being affected by, and affecting, human and non-human matter. Within this chapter there will be an engagement with the procedural issues of field work and the collection of empirical materials, but there will also be a continuation of the theoretical work which emerged in the earlier chapters. In this sense there will be an account of what occurred in the state of affairs, those activities which can be signified and made manifest – ie 'the field'. However, there will also be recourse to theory as method to engage with the inside of what occurs – the eventfulness of empirical research as it comes into contact with transcendental philosophy.

Although more detail will be provided later in the chapter, it is worth noting that the 'neatness' of the ideas which entered the field, their clarity and distinctness, including *what* 'anorexia' was, and *who* 'anorexics' were, became distinct and obscure through both abstract theories of materiality and the materiality of the 'field'. Although social science and cultural studies training encouraged a troubling of axiomatic notions of 'common sense', the understanding of 'common sense' proceeded with from said training was that it was counter to scientific rigour, rather than informed and affected by it. (Deleuze, 2004b; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Massumi, 2011). As such, it took a good deal of time for this inquiry to become freer of dogmatic presuppositions and to cease "bolstering" what science and psychiatry always thought it knew. Put differently, it took a great deal of emotional and intellectual labour to write with an ardour of a different kind (Massumi, 1993, 47) and to step outside of the shadow of Anorexia as a dogmatic image of thought.

> "The practical point of transcendental philosophy is to unearth and rectify remnants of metaphysical pre-suppositions and beginnings of fixed images and restrictive laws and concepts of science and its methods […] seeking to be free of dogmatic pre-suppositions (including the bolstering of common sense and opinion by the sciences" (Williams, 2008, 110).

Fieldwork and Data Collection - Connecting the Sites

In the case of social research, particularly that which involves young people, the "circumstances which lead us to be telling this story about this object at this time and in this way" (Hine, 2000; 57) are increasingly informed by on-line activities, processes, communications and communities. As Hine notes, in relation to mobile and connective ethnographic work, although we may start from one place, perhaps somewhere off-line, like a youth work project or an after school club, as we engage sensitively with participants and their daily lives, on-line spaces, activities, practices and communities can become meaningful in the context of our inquiries. Hine notes that mobile or connective ethnographies respond to the 'ethnographic crisis by "embracing ethnography as a textual practice and as a lived craft, [while] destabilis[ing] the ethnographic reliance on sustained presence in a found field site" (2000, 43). This call to mobility and critical stance towards the merits of sustained habitation in one particular place chimes with Markham's (2008) observation, that contemporary ethnographic work is less about location, and more about what she conceptualises as locomotion. Put differently, mobile methods are particularly concerned with inquiry's *movements* back and forth between people, places, ideas and organisations, as opposed to lengthy durations in a particular place.

As such, and following the examples of Markham (1998, 2008) and Hine (2000) the thesis does not conceive of life on-line as outside the scope of 'proper' ethnographic interrogation, or disruptive to the boundaries of 'the field'. Indeed, engaging with it and blending (Kozinet, 2010) it into field work, data collection, field notes, the research diary and emergent questions can produce new ways of making the familiar strange and the strange familiar (Geertz 1993).

In the following sections of this chapter I will move forwards, backwards and to the side to introduce spaces, people and themes which became meaningful as the

doctoral project opened up. At the beginning of the research I was involved in a fairly wide range of on and off-line settings. Ultimately, only two of these emerged as key sites for the research. Although not all of the spaces and people included below will be engaged with substantially in the remainder of the thesis, all were significant in the generation of 'the problem' which the thesis engages with. Methodologically the list below – which will be discussed further later in the chapter - goes some way to note some of the most significant human and non-human actants which comprised the arrangement, or assemblage, that was the project in its becoming.

- **'Different Lines'**, a youth work project commissioned by the Local Authority to carry out an Eating Disorder Prevention Project over 12 months. Here my role was as participant observer. Work was carried out with fifty eight young people in eight schools and youth projects. Here there was no acknowledgement of pro-anorexia sites in meetings or in youth work practice. 'Eating disorders' were conceived as mental illnesses with social causes (thin ideal, patriarchy, and the media). As work with Young People began any engagement with eating and food diminished in favour of 'self-esteem and body image'.
- '**The Waves'**, an intergenerational feminist project which had links to Different Lines. This organisation circulated my doctoral projects invitation of participation to members of its network which included youth workers, young people and academics. I had no formal role within this project but they were generous enough to disseminate information about my research.
- **The b-eat Ambassador Network,** co-ordinated by one of the Different Lines stakeholder organisations, b-eat, previously known as the National Eating Disorder Association. This network comprised young women advocating 'recovery' who were given the politically loaded mantle of 'Ambassador' by b-eat. My involvement with this setting was limited to on-line discussions with four Ambassadors.
- **Pro-ana sites**, initially eight were observed, at the same time as being a participant observer at Different Lines. After meeting 'Joanne' her on-line community, or site, was also observed. *The pro-ana sites and the interviews with Joanne eventually come to form the main empirical materials for the research, and comprise the major focus of chapters four and five respectively.*
- **Oldfield House,** an out-patient setting where clinicians worked therapeutically with the 18+ age group. Initially the organisation is contacted as stakeholders in the Different Lines project. Engagement with this site, alongside utterances from Joanne, Ella, and the b-eat Ambassadors lead to a critique of 'recovery' and the political possibilities of Deleuze's notion of counter-actualisation.
- **Youtube**, individually uploaded 'pro-ana stories'. A resource used by Joanne and also where Ella is introduced to the project for the first time. Even prior to observing pro-ana sites I observe and analyse material on youtube.

- **Facebook**; here b-eat ambassadors are able to add me as 'friends', as well as conversing with me by email. Using the facebook name **Ella** gives on youtube information is sent regarding the aims of the project, which she responds to positively. Facebook is also significant later on the project in terms of community and communication, when the pro-ana site Joanne uses, and I observe, closes down.

Design and Conduct of the Research:

Central to the methodology, and related to mobility, movement and paradoxical connection, is a critique of 'good' and 'common' sense which Deleuze explicates in *Logic of Sense* (2004a). This critical engagement is responsive to the nuances of everyday life, and the empirical materials gathered throughout the course of the project. At the outset of the project there was a desire to present a different, unfamiliar, account of 'anorexia'. A desire to find a way of acknowledging the mundane and every day management of a difficult relationship to feeding the body which conceived of emaciation, or what can be seen in vision, as the least, rather than the most, important point of engagement. Implicated in this, of course, is the 'shock' impact of images used on pro-ana sites As Fereday notes

> "A major methodological and practical problem confronting any theorist working on eating disorders, and for body studies more generally, is that of how to avoid reproducing the spectacular regime of looking. Any theorist who has ever shown slides of pro-ana websites, for example, will have experienced the sharp intake of breath from the audience and will know the difficulty of overcoming the deeply ingrained cultural power of such images to inspire shock; this shock reaction is only enhanced by the imagery of pro-ana, which often sets out to beat the mainstream media at its own game by producing the most intense and confrontational images possible. Critique can feel powerless in the face of this apparently 'natural' reaction; there can be an uncanny sense that, for some spectators at least, *the visual 'evidence' of starvation renders inaudible the voices of both theorist and subject (who might be precisely being critical of the very narratives of shock and concern that are being reproduced through the screening of the image)* (Ferreday, 2013, 148. Emphasis added).

Equally, alongside the issues of representation, articulated so well by Ferreday, was my aim not to spatio-temporalise 'anorexia' as *only* in the minds of individuals; either as the 'cause', or as the effect of external causes. Instead, and as noted previously, the intention was to engage with matter and the materiality of bodies and consider

causality through the dual cause of the event. What the dual, rather than mono cause allows is a means to disrupt the volunteerism of lifestyle choice, and the determinism of mental illness: While also engaging with that which is *of the body*, virtual or incorporeal (Massumi, 2002). As noted in the previous chapter, ideas concerning causality developed by new materialist thinkers Karen Barad and Jayne Bennett were also drawn on.

Starting with two sites – but always already in the middle of things.

Prevention Project - Different Lines

Although the project and its methodology, following Deleuze, starts *in the middle of things*, seeking to "be free[r] of dogmatic pre-suppositions (including the bolstering of common sense and opinion by the sciences" (Williams, 2008, 110), the very practical matter of beginning to gather empirical materials began from two spaces initially. Off-line I became involved as a participant observer in an eating disorder prevention project at 'Different Lines', while on-line I began to explore eight pro-anorexia sites for themes and ideas which would help me to refine the parameters of my engagement with the research subject-object and to 'border the field' (Markham, 2008). As noted above, the remainder of the thesis seldom makes substantive reference to the prevention project. However as I outline below, the experience of engaging with this project was generative in surfacing many of the productive problems and conceptual dilemmas that the thesis addresses.

The prevention project was commissioned to a youth work organisation based in the north of England and was in receipt of twelve months local authority funding. This amounted to just under £50,000. The scope of the project was to initially map Tier 1[8] provision available in the locale, in a bid to reduce the number of children and young people who were being diagnosed and hospitalised at Tier 4 of the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAHMS). This commission also involved developing and delivering a programme of activities focussed on raising self- esteem (McGee & Williams, 2000) and which challenged images of 'the thin ideal' in the

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[8] Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services are structured in a four-tiered model, although the tiers are not neatly differentiated. Tier 1 is the primary care that is provided by professionals who are not mental health specialists, for instance school nurses, teachers and social workers (Spratt, Philip and Shucksmith et al 2010).

media (Chaote, 2005). As a participant observer I was able to attend team and project planning meetings and visit schools and youth projects with the lead youth worker. This enabled me to see how prevention was put into practice.

As already noted, pro-ana sites have been emerging since the early 2000's if not prior to this, and have increased during recent years by a sizable amount. As noted, in a study of 13 – 17 year old school children, 12.6% of girls and 5.9% of boys claimed to have visited such sites (Custers and Van den Bulck 2009). However, within the prevention project meetings and youth work practice 'pro-anorexia' was never engaged with. Neither websites, nor the advocacy of anorexia as a 'lifestyle choice', which the 'pro' implies, were either acknowledged or discussed. Given that the project engaged with a similar age range to the study mentioned above, 13 – 19 year olds, this absence of on-line life as an aspect of 'real life' was at least in part due to the way the project conceived of its research problem. In contrast to a Deleuzian problem, which Williams suggests is a "series of tensions demanding transformations but always resisting resolution" (Williams, 2008a, 139). 'Anorexia' was considered as a mental illness, but one which young people could be resilient to if they had high levels of self- esteem. This way of engaging did not acknowledge complex and nuanced aspects of conformity and resistance within 'disordered eating' (Day, 2010), or what the thesis conceptualises as a difficult relationships to feeding the body. It should also be noted, in reference to the aforementioned individualised resilience, that the ascetic 'self -controlled' practices of 'anorexia' may themselves be a source of resilience and 'self-esteem' for some young people, particularly within the context of change and 'transition' (Gordon, 2001; Katzman & Lee, 1997; b-eat Transitions project, 2012 – 2015).

Although 'Different Lines' adhered to, and was respectful of medical and psychiatric notions of anorexia, it also acknowledged socio-cultural 'causes' such as 'the thin ideal'. This said however, social life was problematically conceived of as off-line 'real life'. This notion of what is real and not real (Markham 1998) foreclosed the possibility of fully engaging with the socio-historical context in which 'anorexia' and its becomings now emerge. As such it could be argued that the project thus failed to fully put into practice its own 'preventative' logic.

Another significant observation made whilst at this setting was the way in which 'eating disorder' was conflated with 'image disorder'. Effectively, what this meant in practice was that the already narrow binds of the DSM were reduced further still to aspects of criterion C – "disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced, undue influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation" (APA, 2000). The thesis suggests that criterion C is the point at which the proper name, 'Anorexia Nervosa', gets a bad name. (Giles, 2006). Here, by reducing a difficult relationship to feeding the body to an 'image disorder' a huge amount of affective labour is invested in acquitting 'Proper Anorexia', the reified icon, of the charge of narcissism. Put differently, conceiving of 'anorexia' as 'an image disorder' gives it as category (good sense), and those who are ascribed to it (common sense) a 'bad name'. It is here that anorexia is produced as heavier and lighter at the same time. To lighten a difficult relationship to feeding the body to no more than an example of feminine narcissism begins a process within other series. Here, to convey the seriousness, indeed the weight, of having a difficult relationship to feeding the body the heaviest discourses common sense can muster are drawn on. As Giles notes, "for a community that actively resists social norms medical diagnosis operates as a qualification […] a mark of authenticity" (2006, 475).

The prevention project comprised three phases. Although I was involved in all three I took a leading role only during phase 1 (May 2010 – September 2010) where desk based research and stakeholder consultation took place. Here I mapped resources in the locale; produced a basic literature review and carried out semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. These included conversations with Oldfield House, an adult outpatient eating disorder service, The Waves, an intergenerational feminist archiving project, b-eat, the national eating disorder association and eight school schools and youth projects. From this mapping and consultation exercise relevant and clearly composed information was conveyed to the schools and youth projects where delivery would take place. Information was disseminated through telephone conversations, information packs, and in the case of one school, a face to face visit. The written information which was provided to external partners was designed to be fit for practitioner purposes, in other words, function as a tool by which they could inform young people as potential participants. These young people would then be

asked to give written consent via their parents if they wished to be involved with the 'Different Lines' project.

As phase two commenced (October 2010 – May 2011) an experienced Youth Worker, Caroline, was appointed to deliver activities. During this period my role became to 'support' Caroline, even though I had no prior youth work experience. I was also responsible for collecting evaluation data through Strength and Difficulty Questionnaires (SDQ forms). This data was then used by Different Lines to communicate to the funders, as part of an interim report, the progress which had been made. During the second phase, where work had begun with schools and youth projects both ethical and pedagogical issues became apparent which were beyond the control of either the prevention project, or myself as a participant observer. During the third phase (May 2011 – June 2011) my role was to work with the Assistant Director of Different Lines to produce a final report for the commissioning body, focussing on the impact of the work delivered.

Early in the mapping phase two girls' schools had been identified by multiple stakeholders as having issues with both 'eating disorder' and self-harm, these schools were Holloway Road and St Catherine. As such, along with other mixed and single sex schools, these schools were targeted by the project in line with its preventative aims. However, although the ethical imperative to opt in or opt out was given by Different Lines to the staff in all of the formal and informal educational settings who were approached to take part in the project, the teachers themselves did not always carry out this necessary and ethical task with the young people who they worked with.

At Holloway Road, one of the single sex schools named by stakeholders, including a Consultant Psychiatrist acting as Head of the TaHMS Service (Targeted Mental Health in Schools Service), and the Head Psychologist at the CAMHS service (Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service), the group assembled were students from years 8 to 11 who had been removed from formal classes for conduct issues. At this setting 'Different Lines' delivered an hour long session each week for five weeks, each week the composition of the group varied, with only two of the original nine attendees being present each week. Others either did not turn up or were removed

part way through, without warning, by other members of school staff. This composition of students was mirrored at a mixed sex school, Elmwood Community. Here the large group who were assembled were hostile towards Different Lines practitioners, not least of all because they felt that their pedagogue had not explained fully the outline of the project or why they had been asked to become involved.

St Catherine was the only school to request a face to face meeting with Different Lines and the only school approached who did not wish to participate. As a school with a reputation for success at both GCSE and A Level, the head of PSHE did not feel that the project could be delivered in school hours as young people could not be taken out of formal classes for between four and six weeks. As a school with numerous CV enhancing after school activities, it was also decided that it was not possible for the project to run after formal classes ended either. Young people themselves were not given the opportunity to opt in or out. They had no involvement in the process of choosing. As a significant setting, due to the number of times the school had been noted during mapping, my field notes detail my sense of the school and the priority given to observable, returnable achievement.

Diffractions on the practice of prevention

At both Holloway Road and Elmwood Community School practitioners from Different Lines were used as a resource, primarily according to the agenda of individual teachers. In other words the resources of the eating disorder prevention project were used to occupy young people who had been removed from formal curriculum classes due to behavioural issues. While there was nothing inherently wrong in working with this group of young people, as the funding had been intended to work at tier 1 of the CAHMS service, what was of concern was the way in which many of the young people arrived to the project feeling themselves to be uninformed. This was markedly noticeable when at the end of the fifth week at Elmwood, a week before the intervention was about to withdraw, two young people, male and female, asked me why they were 'here' and no longer in their religious education classes. From these examples I would suggest that pedagogues made decisions relating to participation and resource based on who was and who was not likely to attain academically in the

formal curriculum, rather than who may or may not benefit through engagement. I would suggest therefore that although prevention appears to be a high priority in theory, it is a low priority in practice, especially given the demands that teachers have to negotiate at any given point. To refer this observation back to the possibilities of series and events noted in *Logic of Sense* (2004a), we might think of this as an example of the way in which series, or moving structures, are always coming into contact with other series as they are selected by events. In what might be termed the moving structure of formal education, the curriculum series, comes into contact with the movements of the 'anorexic' series and both are changed. The possibilities of both series are changed as they are selected by the human and non-human entities which actualise events.

In addition to this, the disengagement of some of the young people participating the project meant that the lead Youth Worker, Caroline, often drew on topics and practices she felt most comfortable and familiar with. However, these were arguably at some distance from any engagement with food or feeding. In other words, this conservative practice drew on the 'familiar' to such an extent as to obfuscate any productive disruption and disallowed any critical reflections or moderations of practice. In addition to this conservatism it must also be noted that the programme was based on 'real-life' bias (Markham, 2008) whereby only life off-line was considered sufficiently substantive as to be accounted for, and simplistic notions of self-esteem.

The implications of this practice served to demarcate 'the media' and 'celebrity' as 'the cause' of young women's embodied abjection. The notion of singular causality, 'the media' and the antidote of 'loving yourself', in the context of neo-liberal discourses of individuality and individual choice, reduces that which is both between bodies and social spaces, affective and pre-individual, to the borders of the cognitively intentional autonomous subject. Having been worked on by pastoral power (Golder, 2007), the utterable choice an individual makes to empower themselves, to say, 'loud and proud' in front of others, that they love themselves is both blind to the multiple and interweaving politics of conformity and resistance, and inconsiderate of the permeability of embodied life. It also overlooks the ways in

which other demanding categories, such as class, gender, sexuality and race remind us, to paraphrase Butler (2004) that our bodies are never entirely our own.

Pro-ana Sites - 'Fading Dreams' and a 'House of Addiction'

While the prevention project did not put me in direct contact with participants who might be able to give an 'everyday account' of difficult relationships to feeding the body, it did lead me to other sites, people and ideas. It also highlighted that the exclusion of on-line life, as an aspect of real life, was detrimental to both research and practice. During the same period that I was involved with 'Different Lines' I had also 'arrived' in the virtual field and begun to follow the discussion boards of eight pro-ana sites. Following the ethical guidelines produced by the Association of Internet Researchers (AOIR 2002), it was decided that only exchanges in publicly accessible forums and discussion boards would be engaged with. The Association of Internet Researchers is an academic association which is international in scope and works to advance the cross-disciplinary field of Internet studies. It is a member-based support network promoting critical and scholarly Internet research which exist across academic borders. The Ethics Working Group has produced report to assist researchers in making ethical decisions in their research which was approved by voting members on November 27, 2002.

A frequent theme of the initial entries that I saw was about 'advice' from other members of the community, pleas for help and a search for 'purity'. They initially struck me as spaces of desire: a habitat for the infinitive *to wish.* I felt them to be time-spaces where embodied needs or appetite and the materiality of the body which produced appetite were derided. Talk seemed very much oriented toward an unveiling of a future self. Yet alongside this unveiling was a substantial amount of affective labour, processes and activities which were working for, working towards and earning excavation. At the initial stage of the research, each of the sites was conceived of as textual as the only aspect viewed were archives of the public-and-private discussion boards. Kozinets suggests that for the purposes of research ethics we can "regard the use of some types and uses of computer-mediated cultural interactions as similar to the use of texts" (2010, 142). All of the sites that were

observed throughout the study had *private* inbox functions as well as *public* or communal discussion boards.

Although I was treating the 'data' as textual, I remained mindful of issues of anonymity and confidentiality and as such carried out 'heavy cloaking' (Kozinets 2010). In practice this meant that all of the data copied and pasted to Word documents for early and provisional analysis was changed immediately. Names of sites were changed, as were pseudonyms and all user profile pictures were deleted. At the time of writing the thesis all but two of the sites I had visited and collected empirical material from had disappeared (Dias, 2003). Of the two that remained, one had a very different home page lay-out and access to its discussion board was now limited to site members. The other site, which happened to be the first I encountered when I 'entered the field', remained as the screen shot I had saved. It appeared to be moderated by 'someone' of the same username as before. In the body of the thesis the actual names of sites I visited have not been included and this is in keeping with the practice of 'heavy cloaking' (Kozinet, 2010) I carried out with all on-line data.

As with Day and Keys' method, I 'lurked' (2008, 5). This meant that no attempts were made by me to deceive those visiting the sites by, for example, pretending to be someone who had an interest in seeking advice on weight loss or learning how to have a more ascetic relationship to feeding the body. Lurking is not an uncommon on-line practice, indeed, Conrad and Stults (2010) note that for every active member there are likely to be another twenty 'lurking'. In research practice lurking meant being present but not actively representing myself. Although the practice of 'lurking' is contentious (AOIR, 2002; Denzin, 1999), my decision not to become an active member, or to make myself known, was weighed against the fact that I did not want to disturb the community interaction by potentially becoming another form of surveillance (Fox, Ward, K and O' Rourke 2005) or disrupting what for some was considered a sanctuary (Dias, 2003).

As there was already an abundance of comments and questions on the public-and-private discussion boards which would inform the questions I wished to take to off-line spaces, the decision not to invite members to respond to questions I had formulated was both strategic and ethical. Although it is possible to gain informed

consent in Netography (Kozinet, 2010), and this is something I carried out later when I engaged with b-eat Ambassadors who self-identified as 'recovering', as a feminist researcher aware of the risks involved in talking about risk-taking activities such as difficult relationships to feeding the body, it was important for me to be able to negotiate ethics and consent as an on-going process with potential participants. At this relatively early stage of field work I felt best able to do this in a face to face context. As will become apparent later in the chapter, by using connective ethnography and following the flow of ideas, concepts and phenomenon to different spaces, I was able to meet a member of the pro-ana community off line who I could negotiate informed consent with on a regular basis.

The eight pro-ana sites I explored at this point were considered in terms of postings which attracted both a significant amount of comments from members of the community and had been contributed to over a time period of more than one month. The field notes which were based on these spaces were an extremely significant tool in terms of working ethically and reflexively. They also provided a useful way of noting connections between people, places, ideas and communities. In other words, my field notes not only provided a record of time spent in a particular site, they also recorded how I had got there. As such, although in contrast to more traditional ethnographic work where the field diary documents the location, within the context of my move from location to locomotion (Markham, 2008) the diary remained significant, enabling me to reflexively record the circumstances which led me to be "telling this story about this object at this time and in this way" (Hine, 2000, 57).

Bordering the field

The decision to focus on particular discussions helped me to border the virtual field and the scope of the research more generally; particularly by narrowing searches to communal discussions which engaged with the idea of whether or not anorexia was a lifestyle choice or a mental illness. Within these threads another word became meaningful and visible and so was also followed. This portmanteau word was 'wannarexia', a word which conflates the proper name 'anorexia' with the phrase 'wannabe'. It implies that wannarexics want-to-be-proper anorexics. Although this improper name is most commonly used as a pejorative term for those who 'fake'

anorexia: Giving 'it' and the pro-ana community a bad name while diminishing levels of trust among site members (Giles 2006). Yet from my empirical observations it was also mobilised by members of the pro-ana communities I observed, who wished to acknowledge a degree of complicity or collusion with their 'anorexic' becomings. For instance:

> "maybe i did? i dont know...i've always wanted to be skinny, but then on holiday i was ill, dropped half a stone, and then became addicted to losing more. was i a "wannarexic"?"(Silvery Bones).

The acknowledgement of collusion and desire which 'wannarexia' brings into focus can be connected to the Deleuzian event in terms of desiring, willing and waiting to bring about something which is already in movement. Already becoming but not towards one 'thing', one 'destiny' or one logical outcome. Put differently, the acknowledgment of desire and movement observed on-line disrupted the cultural freeze framing of media and medical representations of anorexia as synonymous with a particular weight or appearance. It also made it necessary for me to engage theoretically with ideas which could conceptualise nuances of embodiment, spatio-temporality, language and causality.

Oldfield House – 18+ out-patient service

One of the sites I had come into contact with through Different Lines was Oldfield House, an adult out-patient service for people with a medically diagnosed eating disorder. At this site I conducted telephone interviews with one Counsellor and freelance therapist, and also with the Director of the centre as part of the prevention project. With the informed consent of the respondents these interviews were recorded using a Digital tapeless phone recorder and were later transcribed. As I have already noted, the prevention project did not lead me directly to participants who were in a position to give an account of 'eating disorder' and as such I made the most of my emergent relationship with Oldfield House by introducing the Director to my own doctoral project in the hope that this might become another field site in my mobile ethnography.

For three months after the initial contact I remained in conversation with the site through telephone and email exchanges. The questions the Director raised pertained mainly to my proposed methodology and ethics as they were unsure of 'what ethnography was'. In response to this I articulated briefly on the telephone 'what ethnography *was'* in the context of my work, and suggested, in light of the invitation that had been extended to me to visit the clinic, that I provide some clear written documentation of my project in advance of any face to face meeting. In light of the Director's lack of familiarity with ethnographic methods, and likely her staff also, I assembled a document to be circulated in advance of my visit. This document was reviewed and approved by my supervisory team before sending electronically to Oldfield House.

As I was attuned to the questions and concerns of the setting in advance I organised six sides of A4 under eight headings: *Introduction*, my name, research background and institution; *Method*: an overview of some key ethnographic principles and ways in which it differs to clinical interviews; *Ethnography and time*, an indication of the significance of duration to my method, mindfulness of client and practitioner timetables, indication of days per week at site; *Ethnography and sampling*, establish a level of rapport and comfort before seeking participants fully informed consent, opportunistic sampling and/ or critical purposive sampling, mutual negotiation of journey together; *Managing risk to participants,* notification that the project adheres to Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) and British Educational Research Association (BERA) guidelines; *Putting 'meeting' into practice - participant information sheets and consent*, inform all service users of my research in the hope that at least one will wish to contribute over time, consent will be regularly negotiated rather than sought only at the beginning of research practice; *Ethical Ethnographic Endings*, mindful of the potential time spent at the site and the in-depth nature of the work, in the event that participants become emotionally attached to the research, and or the researcher, the 'ending' should be a point of mutual negotiation between researcher and participants.

After a considerable investment of time and resource I visited the site to meet with all therapeutic staff, including Tammy the Counsellor, and Sally the Director. The face to face visit enabled me to present myself, my institution and reiterate to all staff the

ideas and themes I had engaged the Director in. I was keen during this meeting to convey to practitioners the ways in which I felt my work to be potentially engaging for the *adults* they worked with. I wanted to indicate an awareness of their own professional discourse by considering in advance the 'problems' which the therapeutic discourse is mindful of, for instance transference and counter transference. I also wanted to draw on a feminist materialist discourses as they were important to the ethics and methods of the project. For instance, I was clear that I wished to give an alternative account of 'anorexia' by engaging *collaboratively with* the voices of the people they worked with.

In the next section I will describe and analyse how this site helped me to become additionally appreciative of 'sensation' and 'matter'. In addition to this I will also explore how it moved my project towards a critical engagement with the notion of 'recovery', the proper name 'Anorexia Nervosa', the implications of being an 'ashamed adjective' and how the politically motivated ascription of vulnerable can be implicated in unethical and undemocratic practices.

> "I find it infuriating that it's portrayed as little middle class girls who are trying to get attention, media portrayals do a huge disservice to sufferers. We deal with every decade here, the oldest client that I have seen is an elderly lady of seventy six. If you eat you can have an eating disorder and it is as individual as the person who has it and may change over time as their situations do" (Tammy, Counsellor and freelance therapist, Oldfield House).

Tammy was the first person I made contact with at Oldfeild House. As can be noted from the quote attributed to her above, she was critical of common sense ideas that it is only young, white, middle class girls who are affected by 'anorexia'. Tammy noted that over the seven years she had worked at Oldfeild there had been a steady proliferation of what she termed 'middle aged' women who had contacted the service. Interestingly, not all of these older women had developed "eating issues" during adolescence. She noted that:

> "In my opinion it could be something to do with the physical and hormonal changes that occur in this age group of females, which is interesting as it mirrors the hormonal changes of puberty".

In terms of the theories I was working with, particularly those of affect and new materialism, I felt that Tammy was sensitive to materiality and did not entirely make cognition the seat of agency and vulnerability. She added to this that she had often thought of anorexia as *the crisis of entering and departing 'Womanhood'"* She added to this by reflecting on her professional experience, suggesting that:

> "Adolescence is a time when young people become more critical of their body and it's similar for older women too. In that sense It's ['anorexia'] a great simplifier in the chaos of life".

Talking to Tammy made me aware of multiple incremental connections amongst activities and processes in the production of affects, particulaarly the real and abstract risks of 'not being anorexic'. Tammy stated that:

> "The longer the duration of eating disorders the harder it is to 'cure' or at least, the recovery is more associated with management. After ten years of suffering hope recedes. Each client is assessed in terms of managing the changes that they must make if they are to have a life which is not dominated by their eating disorder but this is always a very complex journey".

She added to this that she had been working with a client recently who had been 'ill' for thirty years:

> "This lady said 'if I get better I'll look stupid, what's it all been for?' There is this sense of 'I can't go back, I have to carry on even if I don't want to".

Tammy then introduced me to a term she had coined which I found particularly engaging and perspicacious:

> "Anorexia is a rebellion, I call it "the silent scream", it's keeping the world at bay and having pain on your own terms, but it's also an identity crisis so 'recovery' or adapting to a new ways of coping means the crisis has to become more chaotic".

As an out-patient service with limited funding, Tammy said that when clients come to use the service, they, as practitioners, "look for a real desire for change, any ambivalence means that it won't work". She noted that practitioners had to try to "control the control". When I listened back to transcribe the interview, this punchy

statement struck me as violently productive of, rather than disruptive to, the process whereby holding power is always already moving and becoming significant. The desire to seize power and 'be in control', which is seen to be indicative of pathologised 'anorexic' practices, is good sense if it is exerted through medically dogmatic notions of treatment. To 'control the control' inheres the logic, sets in motion for those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body, that if one does not control – one will be controlled. Also, and returning to the Deleuzian paradox to speak/ to eat, if you do not bite you will be bitten – served as food, spoken in front of as a pliable adjective rather than a proud verb. In chapter four the notion of control is returned to through the idea of the experiment and disrupted further still by inquiring into the strange capaciousness of non-human matter in the eating/speaking relation.

The objectified control of 'the anorexic', to which normalising, controlling processes will be administered, has an embodied subject attached to it: Yet practitioners conveniently separate and split off the despised object from the 'real person'. If control (of the body, of food) is the 'problem', common sense says it is that which must be controlled. "Controlling the control" suggests that dominant and powerful discourses must govern and produce potentiality as conservative. The normalising procedures of treatment, or 'subjugating the subjugation', highlight interconnections of power and knowledge as well as affective and incorporeal aspects of matter. We can see through the desire to "control the control" how for those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body power, control and discipline tautologically swallow up possibilities for living differently: Bodies remain in the real and abstract chains of the dogmatic image of thought.

Returning now to Tammy, one of the themes I was most interested in engaging with her was how she worked with the notion of 'recovery'. As we talked her words resonated with ideas I was beginning to formulate with regards to petrifaction, fixing, sensation (Massumi 2002) and the event, particularly the twenty second series of *Logic of Sense*, *Porcelain and Volcano.* Here the idea of "the silent crack" (2004a, 176) repeats, with difference, Tammy's own idea of the 'silent scream'. For Deleuze the silent and imperceptible crack is neither internal nor external yet it makes its way to the surface. He goes on to note that it is at the edge of the crack that everything noisy happens. The silent scream, as with the silent crack is, "incarnated in the depth

of the body" (2004a, 177). Additionally the 'scream' is also connected to Deleuze's writing on Francis Bacon. Deleuze notes that the scream in Bacon's painting, which is of course silent, "is the operation through which the entire body escapes through the mouth" (2013, 13). He continues:

> "If we scream, it is always as victims of invisible and insensible forces that scramble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling" (2013, 43).

The idea noted above, of invisible and insensible forces which are beyond pain and feeling returns us to points noted in the previous chapters. Here *to scream*, as a proud verb, is both beyond the actual 'victim' yet reliant on the body and its orifices to actualise the event which produces a change in the series. To paraphrase Massumi (1992)*,* it is as though the event *to scream* momentarily borrows for itself a pair of lips from which to wail a hollow cry.

I would now like to plug this idea into the notion of difficult relationships to feeding the body, what common sense refers to as 'anorexia', to create a mixture of theory-data that would advance the idea that I have been trying to make regarding the affectivity and incorporeality of the eating/speaking body. To do this I cannot only consider the *actual* occurrences which take place in an individual's life, for instance those instances which are recognised as being connected to the social, political, familial context. These 'causes' alone do not produce screaming spectacles even though they really do produce the wetness of tears, turning of stomachs and shaking of shoulders carried out by mixtues of bodies. Through Deleuze we are afforded an alternative insight which is "beyond pain and feeling" (2013, 43).

Here we return to a thread which I began in the opening chapter and took further during the second, the disjunction between the signifying and signified series. We might say that the denoted silent scream that passes through Tammy's lips, the words, do not, to paraphrase Williams, map onto what they truthfully correspond to "since [an actual silent scream] does not pass through [her] mouth" (Williams, 2008a, 48).

We might say that this is because the scream is not hers. This is common sense, she is speaking of people who she works with, bodies defined as 'anorexic'. But the silent scream is not *theirs* either. Even as it borrows their mouth and the body seizes the oportunity to escape through the opening, the scream remains pre-individual, lying "beyond pain and feeling" (Deleuze, 2013, 43). It is bought about not by things that we can recognise or predict (Deleuze, 2004b), but by "invisible and insensible forces" (Deleuze, 2013, 43).

Following my discussions with Tammy and later the Director of the centre, I prepared to meet the professionals at Oldfield House. At this point I was very optimistic. I felt that I could very clearly 'see the edges' of my project. With this optimism in heart and mind I was surprised to receive the below email two weeks later.

> Hello Sylvie,
>
> Thank you for coming to our team meeting to discuss your research proposal and your request to access our clients to complete your Ph.D dissertation.
>
> The attending counsellors participated in a discussion and review of your proposal. The conclusion was that although we thought the question of the lived experience of anorexia nervosa is a valuable area for research, we could not consent to give you access to our clients. I know this will come as a disappointment to you but hopefully the following summary of the issues raised will offer some clarification of our position.
>
> Our team's primary concern was related to the relatively un-boundaried nature of the methodology. We were concerned that what was being asked of clients in terms of the amount of time and of themselves they would have to give was too vague (and potentially large)for them to be clear at the outset what they were committing to. There was a strong concern expressed by the team about the potential impact of participation on the clients and that this had not been adequately considered, particularly in relation to the risk of dependency or unclear role boundaries arising from the researcher potentially having a lot of personal contact with the participants. It was concluded that our clients are too psychologically vulnerable to be asked to participate.

It was suggested that it might be safer for you to interview recovered persons about their recollections of the experience of having anorexia.

I hope this feedback is of use to you, and wish you the best in your work.

Yours sincerely,

Sally O'Dowd

While I felt the meeting, my preparatory documents, and research project were as 'boundaried' as a piece of inductive qualitative work should be in advance of entering the field, this was not the sentiment of Oldfield House. "The strong concern [regarding] the potential impact of participation on the clients" which was of particular concern in relation to the fear that clients may become 'dependent' on me, or 'unclear' as to my role, seemed an odd justification given that these safeguarding issues had been covered in detail in my talk and textual documents. Suggesting that my method was 'un-boundaried', un-safe, risky, dangerous and even potentially damaging to participants affected me deeply. I felt that my work had been perceived as monstrous and unethical. It took a few days before I could read the email again. Although I was affected, feeling guilty, risky, damaging and monstrous, I copied the email text to a blank word document and read it again as dispassionately as possible. On this second reading I was struck by two particular assertions, firstly the idea that "It was concluded that our clients are *too psychologically vulnerable to be asked to participate*" and secondly "It was suggested that it might be *safer* for you to interview *recovered persons* about their *recollections* of the experience of *having* anorexia.

In relation to the first point, Oldfield House was an adult service, not a child or adolescent service. To suggest that *their* clients were "too psychologically vulnerable" even to be asked to participate struck me as unethical and undemocratic. In my opinion the choice that Sally and her colleagues made foreclosed those of their clients. Additionally, the assumption that engagement with me and the project would pose risks to 'their' out-patient population seemed to disavow the potentials in everyday life for 'risks' of attachment. Deemed too vulnerable the clients themselves were not given the option to decline or accept and much like the young people of St

Catherine they were extradited from the assembly of decision making due to their perceived precarity and institutional powerlessness.

The foreclosure of contributing to an account of 'anorexia' which was not represented through an 'objective' expert medical or psychiatric position, or the sensationalised 'subjective' two page image based accounts of the media chimed with Hepworth's insightful assertion that "social and cultural aspects of anorexia concerned with prevention and treatment are less to do with explanation and more to do with which knowledge and whose knowledge will be allowed into debates" (Hepworth, 1999, 10). Here, it is not that I am criticising the good intentions or care of the professionals at Oldfield House, but rather noting how powerful discourses and practices, such as those which pertain to the protection of young and vulnerable individuals, pre-exist as solutions which recruit individuals, only to set in motion further problems.

The second point, that it might be 'safer' for me to interview 'recovered persons' is also problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the evocation of 'safer' contextualises the aforementioned 'un-boundaried' nature of my project as inherently un-safe as opposed to iterative and open to processes of amendment and negotiation with my participants. Thirdly, and of extreme importance in relation to my overall project, is the idea that 'recovered persons' are a clearly defined group whose lived experience is no longer challenged by their relationship to feeding the body. The idea that those who are deemed 'recovered' are no longer vulnerable, and can therefore engage in 'not-quite-safe' activities, reinforces the idea that carrying a particular amount of body weight is synonymous with an emotional robustness or thick skin which a body with less weight does not have.

Fourthly, the phrase *"their recollections of the experience of having anorexia"* betrays a linear temporalisation of that which is affective and relational. It also produces a grammatical paradox which conflates the past, *recollections*, with the possessive pronoun *their* and the continuous form of the verb 'to have' - *having*. In other words, expect people to talk in the past tense of that which remains owned and constant. This temporal and grammatical paradox produces the sense that although something may be lived as the constant property of an individual, if one does not meet the

category's demands for anorexia, the increments of a lived relation to feeding the body are reduced to the invulnerable position of 'recovered'.

However, the 'problematic' nature of Oldfield's response turned out, nevertheless, to be productive to the development of the thesis, particularly when their response was plugged into a Deleuzian critique of the well-formed problem. Put differently, the thesis departed firmly from axiomatic divisions between health and illness.

In light of the feedback from Oldfield House and the absence of participants emerging directly through the Different Lines Project I arranged a time to discuss my work with an intergenerational feminist organisation, The Waves, in the hope that they would forward my call for participation through their network database. Out of one thousand youth workers, feminists and young people that The Waves disseminated to my invitation to I received only one response. This came from 'Joanne Jones', a young feminist and as I found out later, a member of the pro-ana community.

The Empirical Need to Draw on the Incorporeal

While I waited for the responses to my call for participation through 'The Waves' I became increasingly involved with on-line spaces. I have already noted my engagement with pro-ana sites, but in addition to this I also spent a considerable amount of time searching the publically accessible site youtube. Indeed between March 2011 and March 2012 my search results for *pro-ana* increased by 25% from just below 18,000 to just over 23,000. It was through this site that I 'met' Ella and the need to draw on language which could convey the immediacy of affective and embodied sense.

On Ella's video there was a message to 'add me on facebook'. To trace her I searched the name she gave through YouTube. There was no face that resembled the one that I had been paying attention to, yet louder and more affective than that there was an embodied disposition rather than a body that I recognised. There was something which was not the body but "*of it*", real and abstract: incorporeal (Massumi, 2002) which I was affected by. The embodied disposition in Ella's

facebook avatar was productive of the sense that this was Ella, even though the well-dressed body had their back to the camera, their head down and shoulders slumped. I recognised 'it', dry and incorporeal. What I saw was not limited to what I saw in vision (Massumi, 2011). Ella's affect on me had already started coming about before dialogue began. When I had received informed consent from Ella I asked her to tell me a little about what she thought of the notion of recovery.

> "Anorexia just seems to be part of who I am, I have always viewed it as just something about me, the same as my love of creative arts, the fact that my eyes are different colours etc. I think that maybe this is a reason recovery has always been so difficult for me, because I feel as though to recover I must lose part of who I am".

In the context of the assumptions made by Oldfield House Ella's thoughts added momentum to my project and the need to think of anorexia as something other than a mental illness or a lifestyle choice. It was perhaps the articulation of loss that struck me most poignantly, reminding me of the words of the anonymous woman Tammy had spoken to me about and the assumptions of Levenkron's stage model (2000) which was built on the metaphysical supposition that subject and object are separate and separable entities.

Joanne Jones - the blended method and the face to face meeting

One of the sites the prevention project bought me into contact with was, as noted, a feminist archiving project, The Waves. Through this site a detailed pro-forma, giving the details of my research aims, what would be asked of potential participants, and what they could expect from me in terms of rights to anonymity, confidentiality and ethical treatment, was disseminated to a thousand youth workers, feminists and young people. As previously mentioned, of the thousand inboxes to receive the email there was one response. This apparent reluctance to engage off-line with the issue of a difficult relationship to feeding the body was striking in its contrast to the number of people who I had seen engaging with similar themes on-line. Although I can only speculate about possible reasons for the lack of response my thinking-feeling (Massumi, 2011), particularly at the time of carrying out fieldwork, was that eating practices produce a particular vulnerability that perhaps potential participant wished to avoid.

Six weeks and three hushed telephone calls after the first email was sent I met a young woman called Joanne who described herself as a feminist. Over the next nine months (March 2011 – November 2011) we met between fortnightly and monthly and produced together seventy hours of recorded interview material. Below is an account of our first meeting through field note excerpts. Following the vivid and embodied account Markham (1998) gives of research and life on-line, I incorporate these notes to draw attention to the way in which the field diary remains essential to the ethnographic process when the field is also constituted by virtual spaces.

15th March 2011

2.30pm
Waiting for Joanne, it feels as though it's been a long time coming. The first call she had made was while I was en route to one of the schools the prevention project was working with. My plan is to introduce myself, my work and take it slowly. I also want to ask her why she has come forwards given that it appears to be a secret she keeps from her partner. I wonder what her story is.

5pm
The meeting went really well. Joanne has seven years of experience with anorexia and pro-ana. While she was still at school she had set up a pro-ana forum under the guise of a creative writing group meaning that the space was unlikely to be 'moderated' or closed down'. Joanne is keen to convey the 'everyday-ness' of having a difficult relationship with the body and has agreed to contribute over time.

7.15pm
Just home and looked through some emails, opened facebook to see if my sister is on-line and Joanne has sent me a friend request. I can't help but read into this that today was a good experience for her and that she is interested in the research. I've accepted the request but had to make a few decisions in situ. I have decided that if Joanne uses facebook to contact me I will respond quickly and ask if it is research related and therefore possible data. I will not contact her first or write on her publically viewable facebook wall. I don't want her to feel as though me, or the research, are 'everywhere'.

These excerpts draw attention to the field diary as a tool which not only records *where we have been*, but also *how we have got there – through off-line and on-line spaces.* The field diary in the context of a blended methodology provides a means to

critically reflect on ethical issues which become apparent as field work develops and as we move back and forth between on- and off-line life. As an incremental process mobile or connective ethnography cannot predict at its inception all of the ethical considerations it may need to, to protect either the researcher or the participants who come forward over time. Therefore, as the project moves the field diary engenders a significant space for ethical reflection and decision making.

Before we had met 'Joanne' had been clear that she would always contact me first as her partner was not aware of the way that anorexia had become meaningful to her again. I was highly aware of the risks she was taking in coming forward and as such the first meeting was an important opportunity to discuss the ethics and politics of the research. Although it is possible to gain informed consent on-line (Kozinet, 2010), I felt most equipped to carry out these ethical procedures in a face to face context. As we talked about the boundaries of my field, what I wanted to find out about, what my questions were, I also wanted 'Joanne' to feel confident that her engagement with the research field had, if not boundaries, clear lines of respect and conduct. The final sentence of the excerpt above indicates the way in which reflexive ethical decisions were made to ensure that Joanne did not feel that either myself, or the research, was 'unbounded'.

During one of our meetings in July 2011 Joanne had mentioned that she was in contact with a group of young women who self-identified as 'pro-ana', and that they arranged face to face meeting, often in London. The idea that the on-line community met off-line was fascinating in terms of contesting notions of 'anorexia' only as an individual and individualising mental illness. It also troubled those forecasts which had considered the virtual as the "apocalypse of corporeal subjectivity" (Keeps cited in Markham 2008, 252). Rather, this move to the face to face reinforced the idea that to be pro-anorexic was communally meaningful. For Joanne and others in the group, this communal meaning was at least in part due to the emotional spatiality of what might usefully be referred to as the field of anorexia. In other words, both face to face and on-line meetings made it possible to engage with others who had 'been there' and had their own stories of first-hand witness to share.

From this it became apparent that the pro-ana community was itself mobile. It moved to spaces which become meaningful and blended on-line and off-line methods of meeting and data sharing. This connection between theory, research and pro-ana practices became increasingly apparent as both myself, and Joanne, experienced the closure of the pro-ana site 'Fragile Beauty'. Rather than a decision to 'leave the field' in a timely and ethically appropriate manner, part of the 'field' left us. For both of us this involved/implied no more data collection from this site, for me discussion boards, for Joanne the private inbox messages she wanted to save.

> S[9]: So I was looking at the website the other day and noticed that it was down, what's happening?
> J: It's completely closed down […] it was a big shock and I think that a lot of people took it hard. But because I mainly used the facebook group, and so did the people that I talked to it was not so bad…But I mean I did rely on it quite a lot, I did not realise how much I relied on the site for support and stuff but I still have my friend facebook group. The whole thing is gone now [..] completely deleted…our messages and everything are gone. I was gutted because she shut it a day early and I was not able to go on and copy and paste stuff that I wanted to keep.

A bond of trust has been abused, something of value maybe lost…..

As I noted previously, whether or not 'ana' and 'anorexia' can be seen as the same discursive object (Giles 2006) is debatable. However, I also noted that rather than investing in identities as real or un-real we might instead explore the ways in which the internet makes identities available and possible (Hine, 2000). Earlier I also introduced the phrase 'wannarexia' and how it had emerged as meaningful in the context of discussions about whether anorexia was a lifestyle choice or a mental illness, a theme which had helped to border the on-line field. The following quotes are from one of the sites I observed on-line. They indicate the complexity of names, embodied relationships and the spectral force of 'authenticity'.

> "No one who is anorexic starts having food problems when they are already at an anorexic weight. We all start somewhere, and we are all different" (sw<3<3tboy).

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[9] S = Sylvie and J = Joanne

"I was a wannarexic, I tell others that want the eating disorder about my story, how I wish I could go back to the day where I looked at my first pro-ana website, how fucking stupid I was. Maybe I already had it though, I do think wannarexics have the start of an eating disorder but maybe someone could maybe talk them out of it but I don't think anything would of scared me off, only if I saw myself now, that would of changed my mind" (strangeasangels95).

"the term wannarexic is ppl who eat normally, untill they want to drop some lbs and goes for this as a diet, and try to be this" (Psychocandy).

"Yes, I agree - eating disorders DO start somewhere but the ones who have that mental component won't be crash dieting. People who lie and claim to have an illness just for the 'social status' that's what I think it means" (Eleph&ntwom&n).

While for the on-line user sw<3<3tboy, 'wannarexia' was where anorexia starts, and strangeasangels95 acknowledged a degree of collusion with the desire that anorexia mobilised, Psychocandy's suggestion indicated the reification of anorexia or 'this', as real and desirable. Rather than conceiving of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, which implies embodied activity, Psychocandy considers anorexia as an authentic ontological position that wannarexics can only ever "try to be". Eleph&ntwom&n's suggestion was that because anorexia has kudos, people who have no rightful purchase on the position, those who have not earned the mantle, claim it for the purposes of 'social status'.

I am drawing attention to 'wannarexia' here as it returns me to earlier ideas concerning internal antagonism and contestation which were noted by Giles (2006) in an earlier chapter. It also provides an opening to explore Joanne's account of what happened in the facebook group she relied on after the closure of 'Fragile Beauty'. The empirical material below is cut apart (Barad, 2007) from the penultimate interview that Joanne and I experienced in November 2011.

S: What things have you been talking about on-line recently?
J: There has been this girl who was part of Fragile Beauty [who] got invited to the facebook group, but she basically faked [..] being really ill […]. Like if you look back at some of her comments, her symptoms were

basically what she was copying off this other girls so it was just offensive.[…]. I've met about eighteen of them at different meets and there are about thirty of us in the facebook group who've all met one another somehow, even if it's through a third party.

S: So I was thinking about faking it, what does that mean? Do you think that what she has done gives pro-ana's and the community a bad name?

J: Yeah, definitely, no one wants to be seen as an attention seeker or anything.[…]. People are still really, really uncomfortable and there are at least a couple of people that have barely posted since it happened [..] it's got a lot more strict because there were a few people on the site that were not using their real facebook account, they were setting up new ones with silly ana names but now you can only join if you are willing to use your own account, so if it turns out that you are not who you said you were then it could almost be used against you, so basically you are showing more trust if you are using your own username.

S: How common do you think this might be? How many people do you think 'fake'?

J: I'd say quite a lot. I don't know because you can't say for definite that someone does or does not have those types of issues [..] it's is part of the reason that I prefer facebook because I know who most of the people are.

In addition to cutting this empirical material *apart* from something, a transcript, I have also cut it *together* with something else, the discussion between sw<3<3tboy, strangeasangels95, Psychocandy and Eleph&ntwom&n. I have done this in part to highlight the proximity of life on-line and off-line, in terms of community concerns. Yet more than that, I have facilitated conditions whereby they can intra-act (Barad, 2007).

Eleph&ntwom&n's assertion raises the issue of truth and falsity through the idea that some people 'lie' about "hav[ing] [an] illness just for the 'social status'", an issue which is also engaged with by Joanne. We can note the challenge which false pretenders, i.e. those who "lie" or 'fake', pose. Not just to the *actual* members of the community*, but virtually*, as this event creates a change in series which may, or may not, produce further threats. The sense of this threat creeps out through Joanne's

clarification that the Facebook community has, post event, "got a lot more strict". Here, what is at stake is in excess of the enacting individuals who lie and are lied to in the state of affairs. Instead, the proud verb, *to lie,* produces a crack in communication, or more appropriately, a communication of events (Williams, 2008a, 36). The gates to past and future assaults on authenticity are opened in the moment that relations between infinitives change. The sense of anorexia, pro-anorexia and wannarexia shift as *to be* (really ill) brushes up against *to lie,* changing further still as both come into contact with *to fake.*

The internal antagonism which can be observed in both instances of empirical materials noted above, can be seen to affect levels of trust on-line. This, in turn, and perhaps paradoxically, engendered an off-line or real-life bias (Markham, 1998) among the pro-ana group that Joanne was part of. As she asserted "I've met about eighteen of them at different meets and there are about thirty of us in the facebook group who've all met one another somehow, even if it's through a third party". Another interesting idea which Joanne draws our attention to is the idea of the *real* facebook profile. This implies that facebook related activities are so ingrained in daily praxis that it can become the guarantor of a trustworthy pro-ana. As guarantor, rather than guarantee, the real facebook profile faces repercussions if the pro-ana is identified as improper: a 'fake' or a 'wannarexic.

As this sub-section of the chapter draws to a close I would like to offer another way of engaging with the materials of the interview noted above. I will do this through Deleuze's writing on *The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy*, the first appendix of *Logic of Sense* (2004a). This will offer another way of considering the gates to past and future assaults on authenticity.

Deleuze notes that there is an impetus in Platonic thought to distinguish, to produce difference. He adds that platonic distinction occurs between two sorts of images, copies and simulacra. Copies are:

> "well founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance", while simulacra
> are like false pretenders, built on dissimilarity, implying an essential
> perversion or deviation" (2004a, 294).

Deleuze goes on to clarify that the platonic motivation to distinguish is based on:

> "selecting among the pretenders, distinguishing good and bad copies or, rather, copies (always well founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph of copies over simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing them from climbing to the surface, and 'insinuating themselves' everywhere" (ibid).

This is a dense yet exciting quote, particularly as it intra-acts with the empirical materials of the November 2011 interview. However, before I begin to make any further cuts I would like to step back for a moment, allowing some theoretical context to take the next dance, as it were. Deleuze, following Nietzsche, seeks to reverse Platonism. This 'means' that the distinctions set about above, between copies and simulacra, are not advocated by Deleuze. He would rather "affirm the rights" of simulacra (ibid), the Nietzschian highest power of the false. To closely paraphrase Deleuze, the simulacra or false pretender, is not to be repressed or despised. Their "insinuating themselves everywhere" (2004a, 294) provides a spanner in the machine. Their 'falsity' resonates across series: "engulf[ing] all foundations, it assures a universal breakdown, but as a joyful and positive event, as an unfounding" (2004a, 300).

For the purposes of the argument I am attempting to make the universal breakdown, "the unfounding", implies the possibility of considering real differences amongst relationships to feeding the body, as opposed to the foundational thinking which reinforces anorexia as a dogmatic image of thought. The critique that Deleuze provides here of Platonic thought, is important within the context of the tentative claims that were made during the opening chapters of the thesis. Namely, those points raised by affect theorist Theresa Brennan who noted the "complex of Platonic and Aristotolelian views on form and matter, activity and passivity, subject and object [that] give birth to the self-contained individual whose mind and body are separate" (Brennan, 2004, 77). I return to this idea to clarify, albeit obscurely, that the thesis is not simply critical of the medical discourse. It is also critical of foundational philosophical ideas which erect distinctions based on the eternally true and eternally false. To summarise, it is most critical of the meeting of the two with good and

common sense. To return to another quote from the opening chapter taken from *Difference and Repetition:*

> "every time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs) " (Deleuze, 2004b, 282)

With this context in mind I will now allow these ideas to mingle with the interview material that Joanne and I produced. From the points that Joanne raises it is apparent that amongst the good copies on the pro-ana site there is unrest triggered by the way in which the simulacra, the bad copy, has climbed to the surface. As she notes, "[p]eople are still really, really uncomfortable and there are at least a couple of people that have barely posted since it happened". The way in which it was possible for the simulacra to copy symptoms "off this other girl" unnerves the community, or rather it produces a crack in the foundations. The terms by which true and false pretenders are based rests entirely on the "world of representation" (Deleuze, 2004a, 299). Although the 'fake' poses a problem in the context of the pro-ana's platonic convictions, according the Deleuze this "twilight of the idols" instigates a necessary challenge. An encounter which provokes him to suggest that:

> "[t]he simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction"* (ibid.)

For the thesis this is particularly significant. Here, the simulacrum, which I would posit within the context of the project as 'the wannarexic', *denies the original*, 'Proper Anorexia', *and the copy*, 'proper anorexic', *the model* , which I will tentatively posit as the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, *and the reproduction,* an endless series of diagnoses.

From Collection to Analysis and Writing – Becoming Bovine

Having given an overview of how I collected empirical materials, in the next section of the chapter I will engage with theories which helped me to engage with the materials gathered. Here, having already noted the problems which emerge in the

context of a difficult relationship to feeding the body when the subject and object are separated out, in this section I will give a little more detail about how contemporary feminist qualitative researchers such as Alecia Youngblood Jackson (2013), Maggie MacLure (2013a, 2013b), and Lisa Mazzei (2013) have, in their work with post-human, new materialist and Deleuzian theories, enabled my own capacity to listen to the symphony of the discordant idea and engage with empirical materials in a manner which goes beyond drawing circles and saying what "everybody knows and no one can deny" (Deleuze, 2004b, 164). Here the symphony of the discordant idea relates to the affective tonality of philosophy as Deleuze explicates it in *Difference and Repetition* (2004b). Opposed to the logic of recognition, a logic which is 'itself' linked to representation and common sense, that which is sonically discordant hums at the tension between clarity and obscurity. This, of course, is different to the clarity and distinctness of Descartes.

At this juncture, having presented details of the mobile or connective ethnographic method employed to gather empirical materials, it seems apposite to engage with the problem of what to do with the voluminous body of material that this produced. To do this I will work with the insights of MacLure in her chapter in *Deleuze and Research Methodologies*, 'Classification or Wonder? Coding as an analytic practice in Qualitative Research' (2013) and then move on to consider the possibilities of a digestive assemblage, a becoming bovine of sorts, as the alchemic data table is engaged with as a second stomach.

As MacLure notes, 'coding' "involves looking for pattern or order in a body of data – such as interview transcripts or field notes – by identifying recurring themes, categories and concepts" (2013, 164). To clarify, although MacLure is critical of the petrified outcomes of coding, she does find a certain value in the process of mingling with data that coding necessitates. She suggests that the process of prolonged engagement with empirical materials which refuse to yield a clear and distinct answer is part of the process whereby the important and relevant emerge. In her concluding remarks MacLure advocates that we produce cabinets of curiosity which are attuned both to classification and to wonder. Here, to add a little to what MacLure already sets out, the task becomes to hold elements or empirical materials in productive tension. Or perhaps more precisely, rather than hold, provide the

conditions whereby they might spin together and produce a peculiar whistle. Here the idea of coding as the production of a cabinet of curiosity necessitates that good and common sense, inherent in classification, is receptive to the affective tonality of wonder.

> "I have argued that what we commonly take to be individual entities are not separate determinately bounded and propertied objects, but rather are (entangled "parts of") phenomena (Barad, 2011,125).

As my engagement with the ideas, people, places and entities which comprised the 'field' of my research developed, so did the coding spreadsheet I had designed early on in my doctoral project. What had started as a repository was soon in the process of becoming a second stomach. Initially this second stomach helped to aid digestion and increase the metabolic rate of the project. This was particularly valuable as my own stomach felt so overfull with rich and emotive empirical materials. The categories and themes that ran down the vertical axis gave order to the half-digested ideas and bits of things which ran across the horizontal axis. As the spreadsheet was in the process of becoming second stomach, the materials which had been bitten off during interviews and explorations of pro-ana sites were not just being held in a passive repository: They were being produced differently as they intra-acted with the alchemic table. Importantly this alchemic table is not an isolated entity, rather it is part of a capacious agentic entanglement which drew on *my own, and my empirical materials, capacities to affect and be affected.*

As I tried to express intent and 'fit' my empirical materials into existing themes within the table there were those bits of things that gave themselves up to a good and common sense fit. For instance, interview data and pro-ana discussions which explicitly referenced 'wannarexia' were coded accordingly:

Wannarexic / faker	FO2.1	FO2.3	FO2.5	GJJ7	DJJ4

However, when I started to consider empirical materials beyond the accident, or what occurred, and started to consider the event, or the inside of what occurs, it became harder to fit data into boxes. The singularity of what I was trying to order resisted an intent that was at the threshold of my body and the machine I had created. These bits of things which resisted, were 'rebel becomings' that evaded

coding, capture, and were insensible in the face of any desire for generality (MacLure, 2013). The empirical materials that my own body and the second stomach worked with bit back, and did so with such force that the molar spreadsheet "that territorialises the flow of becoming" (Ringrose and Coleman, 2013, 15) ruptured.

The second stomach, just like the human stomach, was never dumb matter – it compelled my body to perform particular tasks, often against my intent. 'It' had a gluttonous appetite. Put differently, even when I had made the conscious decision to cease 'coding', cease being slavish to the molarity of coding, my embodied practice remained towards feeding this second stomach. I could not explore empirical materials without assigning a code, to do otherwise felt foolish and wasteful. Here, the demanding organ, the second stomach, had to be challenged. My engagement with data had to become a body without organs, less concerned with volume and order and more inclined towards intensity "gaiety, ecstasy, and dance" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, 167).

Having pushed the alchemic table to breaking point it was necessary to look to other ways of engaging with data. Here the work of Mazzei and Jackson (2012) 'Complicating voice in a refusal to "let participants speak for themselves"' engendered a necessary and relevant mixture of ideas. The very notion of a refusal to let participants speak for themselves seemed extremely provocative, particularly if readers , committed to a particular humanism and ardour (Massumi, 1992) were to 'recognise' this refusal as indicative of epistemic violence, rather than encountering the post-human difference it offered. It struck me as valuable in terms of its potential uses for developing a methodological writing that was less extensive and more concerned with intensity. Their use of Deleuze to transgress the boundaries of data and meaning enabled me to think and feel more freely about the data I was putting to work, and being put to work by. It ceased to be a question of what utterances, gathered on-line and off-line *actually meant* and became an inquiry into what the sonorous productions of bodies *do*. Even more pertinently, which other human and non-human bodies are implicated in this *doing*. They ask:

> "[w]hat might it mean to see a speech act according to Deleuze? How does this inform methodological thinking that discards the truth/fabrication, speech/silence or simple/complex binaries?" (2012, 748).

In the couplings which Mazzei and Jackson put forward it is the truth/ fabrication binary which resonates with the empirical materials of the doctoral project, and therefore the methods which work with this 'problem'. As I have already noted, the thesis works with the Deleuzian event as a means of disrupting the bifurcation of true or false, but what their questions raised was the thinking-feeling that the line of questioning I was proceeding with was important beyond the scope of the problems I was engaging with. They were beyond the general and the particular, they were eventful problems which attempt to distinguish not true or false, but sense and signification, accident and event. As Deleuze notes "problematic ideas are not simple essences, but multiplicities or complexes of relations and corresponding singularities (Deleuze, 2004b, 103).

Additionally, Mazzei and Jackson's re-working of the Body without Organs, to produce the Voice-without-organs, formed a sense which was in keeping with my own work with the event, the way in which I had attempted to disrupt the humanist subject by considering that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies. Mazzei and Jackson note "to think a voice that is not constrained by a speaking subject, a 'voice without organs' if you will, that is not bounded by the binaries between the discursive and the material" (2012, 750). As will become clearer in the following chapters of the thesis , the way in which Mazzei and Jackson disrupt the authority of the speaker by asking what speaking and 'the spoken' does, enabled my own encounters with the voices of 'Joanne' and others to have a similar refusal, a similar post-human ardour.

In 'Data-as-machine' Alecia Youngblood Jackson asks not what data means "as signified or signifier" (2013, 113) but how does it work with, and in connection to other things. Jackson begins the chapter with what she terms a "conventional descriptive piece of data" (ibid) but does not offer categories, themes or patterns. Instead she treats data-as-machine which works when it enters and interrupts flows to produce different ontological possibilities. This, she suggests, exchanges the

traditional qualitative research question 'how do we accurately represent being' for *how does being become in the act of representation?* As such Jackson asks what her participants become when they are plugged into Deleuzian ideas and from this begins to work with the notion of the threshold. She observes:

> "[A] threshold does not become a passageway until it is attached to other things different to itself. Thresholds contain both entries and exits; they are both/and" (2013, 116).

This is interesting as there is here, in this due attention to conjunctive synthesis, both/and, a connection to the paradox which features in my own work. Here, what is different, and worth drawing out as it is difference, not similarity, I am interested in, is that the interconnection of series and events enable a way in which to explore the moving structures which produce the conditions in which events come about.

Folds of drawing in and opening up

In this chapter I have introduced and considered in terms of my theoretical framework, the people and places my mobile and connective ethnography has engaged with. In doing so I have also attempted to analyse aspects of data which were significant to my project. This preliminary introduction of data has set in motion what will occur in the following chapters of the thesis. In the next sections I will put to work in more detail the empirical materials that I have gathered through my engagements, on line and off-line, with 'Joanne' and the pro-ana community.

CHAPTER 4: DISRUPTING COGNITIVE INTENTIONALITY – MOVING FROM THE MANIPULATIVE SUBJECT TOWARDS A PERSPICACIOUS BODY

"Illness presents an eminently moral problem which, while being physical and psychological with very real and often debilitating effects, is also thoroughly philosophical in its import" (Tynan, 2010, 158).

Trickery and Ruse

'The anorexic' tricks the body and tricks hunger according to Deleuze (Arsic, 2008). While this is interesting it is my feeling that this assertion does not do enough to engage with the vibrancy of matter and the question of what a body can *do.* Provoked by Deleuze, the following piece of writing attempts to engage with 'trickery' and attempts to dislodge 'anorexia' from its image of thought (2004b), by taking account of the body's own 'perspicacity' and the agency of matter. By exploring notions of temporality, metabolism (Bennett, 2010) and the proud verbs to eat/ to speak, which emerge in one of Deleuze's early works *Logic of Sense* (2004a)*,* I will explore the way in which matter attempts to have 'the last word' in difficult relationships to feeding the body, by itself *becoming* trickster: If it were not always already so.

In this chapter I will give an overview of an article written by Branka Arsic before engaging with my own writing which was provoked by this first meeting with Deleuze. I will then, in the second part of the chapter, move towards a discussion which took place on 'Fragile Beauty', one of the early sites I observed in my mobile or connective ethnography. The thread, or on-line discussion, is entitled '*This is to the girl who said she wants to be anorexic'*, occasionally abbreviated in the chapter to 'to the girl'. In, amongst, and to the side of the sense, nonsense, trickery and desire which leaps from the thread there haunts a common sense articulation – the popular

notion of 'being in control'. As will become apparent as the chapter develops, 'being in control' is always already paradoxically becoming out of control as the inside and outside of ideas and bodies each enfold one another in uncertain disorienting mixtures.

Here the notion of control is pertinent in the context of the experiment, a concept which will be engaged with in the first part of this chapter. It is the contention of the thesis that *both* the testimonial '*to the girl'*, and the notion of the experiment fail, differently, to destroy 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought. In terms of the former, the address can be seen to attempt to become revolutionary, but in the mobilisation of accidents, and good and common sense, it colludes with the representational logic of the same difference, as opposed to real difference, or singularity. Here I am positing real difference as that which may be experienced by the bodies in their becoming different, becoming sicker and healthier- *but not in terms which can be reduced to weight loss or other empirically observable 'facts', or accidents.* The writing on the experiment that I engage with through Arsic and later through Mann O'Donnell, considers the possibility of 'doses' as a means of avoiding hypochondria (Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 176), which for the purposes of the discussion implies becoming colonised by illness, *as divided from* health.

Here the idea of "small doses of self-dismantling [and] small tastes of de-organisation" (Deleuze and Guattari, quoted in Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 177) is very useful to the thesis' desire to look towards possibilities of movement which would dislodge 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought. This un-doing of the "organised, signified, subjectified" (ibid) self is, as doses implies, not an act. It is an ongoing activity, or rather, experimental practice. It *can* produce the conditions whereby new connections can be made, but only if one does not overdose.

The experimentalist cannot take all their 'meds' at once. Becoming experimental involves a certain 'realism'. A waking up to the idea that neither the hand of God nor a sacrifice made to the dogmatic image of thought can cure what ails you. The point is, what ails *you* is *you*. Not an essential or individualised you, but an organised, signified, subjectified you. To clarify the important point here, it is not a question of complete annihilation. These are "self-destructions that have nothing to do with the

death drive" (Deleuze and Guattari, quoted in Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 177). As Deleuze and Guattari assert:

> "You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn […] you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality" (ibid).

I now want to cut together these ideas of dose and experimentation with the *sense of* the address '*to the girl'*. Below we can see the working of recognition, *"I wish you the best of luck in killing yourself. Because that's all you'll be doing*", and prediction, *"I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you*". As noted at the start of this chapter, part of the sense produced by the address is revolutionary: Yet the mobilisation of accidents, good and common sense, prediction and recognition, collude with the representational logic of the same difference. As such, rather than engaging with "small doses of self-dismantling" (ibid), which are always happening in the middle of things, '*to the girl'* speaks of an inevitable ending.

> "I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you. If this doesn't make you realize how completely stupid running out there and trying to develop anorexia is, then I wish you the best of luck in killing yourself. Because that's all you'll be doing" (unknown author of 'to the girl who wants to be anorexic').

Here, in both notions of control, either being in control of the body through what I will term the super molecular promise of Anorexia, an idea which makes reference to Derrida's idea of the promissory quality of entities (Bennett, 2010); or controlling the 'anorexic experiment' through doses of self-undoing, there remain problems which I will spend time in this chapter teasing out. I will be exploring the way in which the address, '*to the girl'*, becomes impotent in its iconoclastic demythologizing task by representing 'anorexia' through good and common sense. *Put differently, the tools the unknown author 'selects', or perhaps is selected by, to critique 'anorexia' actually reinforce it as a dogmatic image of thought.* The other notion of control, that of experimentation and dosages, although it pushes the limits of possible ways of becoming healthy and becoming ill, fails to account for the not-quite-human-capaciousness-of-matter that Bennett (2010), and other new materialists, draw attention to.

On the Experiment

As I first encountered Branka Arsic's article '*The Experimental Ordinary: Deleuze on Eating and Anorexic Elegance'* (2008) something occurred. Having not previously read Deleuze, or his thoughts about eating, my 'plugging in' (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013) to this text was awkward and ambivalent. What I would speak of it was that I did not care for it, particularly the playful approximation of 'elegance' and 'anorexia'. It hurt my humanist soft spot and filled my head with general and particular images of thought which all danced with 'I think'. The audacity of approximating that which gives rise to 'suffering' to a stylish flourish! It irked me, pricked me, felt poignant to me (Barthes, 2000). Yet what I would speak of it was not what I felt of it, not how I was affected by it. In a bubbling which would not find its way to words, was a ressentiment (Deleuze, 2004a, 170). It was Deleuze's fault that I now felt confused and angry about what I thought I knew. I intended to avoid what I felt seduced by: I would avoid Deleuze and decline the event.

However, this encounter was not limited to a present reading, a looking at words in the state of affairs. Instead something arched over a past-future, not the arrow of time but a thought needle picking up and dropping threads unpredictably. Something in the world produced something capacious. I did not resign myself to having to read Deleuze further, but found myself in the middle of doing so, eating the words that had already been partially digested by Arsic. I had to plug into a blank page and allow bits of things, vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010), to spill out. However, as we will see later, through the words of 'precious pains', it was not the case that "if I spilled out my guts, it would be this article exactly", it was rather, something very different, something towards singularity.

These 'bits of things' spilled; they materialised through matter and language, each fragment happily and unhappily contaminated by a certain visceral leaping. Memories were encountered that could not be reduced or claimed. In the process of writing I tried to become situated in the half a second before actual words emerged. In this situatedness non-human actants surfaced: 'Things' which could not be seen in vision. Phantasms of hysteria and trickery were conjured by spectres of logic

produced an entangled assemblage of words and things. In and amongst these quasi causal elements was the desire to engage with trickery in a manner which disrupted thoughts regarding how and where 'tricks' start and end, and 'who' the 'agent' of the tricks, the tricksters, are. In this inquiry I hoped there might be a way in which to excavate the sedimented cleavage of conscious intentionality and dumb matter which, up to this point, had felt like a foundation rather than a brick wall upon which Humpty, the stoic master, sits "opposing the impassibility of events to the actions and passions of bodies[..] in short, the 'pride' of verbs to the complacency of substantives and adjectives" (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 – 31).

'The Experimental Ordinary' - Deleuze on eating and anorexic elegance.

Arsic discusses Deleuze's notion of the feminine through eating, cooking and anorexia, framing the latter as a "micro-political experimentation in fashioning one's own body on its flight to becoming woman" (2008, 24). She mobilises the Body without Organs (BwO) and the possibilities it gives rise to in relation to the invention of desires . Arsic notes that "Deleuze's understanding of anorexia differs fundamentally from the common understanding of anorexia nervosa" (2008, 35), which she notes as emerging from Freudian suppositions regarding origins, cause and effects. Deleuze is said not to take the 'eating order' or 'shared bodily perception' for granted. In terms of the former, the 'eating order', this is said to presume too much about what the organism 'lives on' (2008, 36), and in terms of the latter, this throws into question the readily available image of thought regarding 'the anorexics' skewed reading of bodily appearance. As Arsic notes:

> "To say that the anorexic has a different image of her own body, which does not adequately represent the 'real' shape of it [....] is to suppose the normalising instance of a shared perception: one should see one's own body the way everybody else sees it" (ibid).

In terms of experimentation, it is the 'organised' organic body which is refused in 'anorexia'. Here the Deleuzian lexicon provides a new weapon for engaging with embodiment, through the notion of the demanding 'organism', which, in the case of 'anorexia' is denied its requests in the process of "becoming the inventor of a light and liquid body" (Deleuze, 1987, quoted in Arsic, 2008, 37). Arsic evokes the idea of natural hunger, without scare quotes or emphasis, stating that anorexia is a "politics

of betrayal of natural hunger" (ibid) as hunger is what the organism subjects the body to.

On closer, or perhaps through a post-human reading, what initially bruised my soft spot, the notion of 'anorexic elegance', can be seen to disrupt linear temporalisations and the ruling *Idea* of the eating (order), " [the] essentially [..] Platonic operation, as Deleuze describes it, of bringing things under the action of the Idea" (MacLure, 2013, 169). Arsic addresses anorexic elegance as being "not about consuming – having things that everybody has – but rather about existing in a mode that subverts the difference between genus and species. *It tries to find its way out of being and not being by entering the existence of becoming or more precisely, of manners.* [...] The formula of anorexic elegance, therefore, is not fashion and consumption but fashion and manners, or style, "a 'mode of life" (Deleuze, 1987, 3).

The notion of 'style' links productively back to some important ideas which have already been introduced through Massumi's *Semblance and Event* (2011), and also through the paradox that my work engages with, mental illness and 'life*style* choice'. Massumi gives a semblance as an aesthetic affect, from which we could make an obvious link to 'anorexic elegance' in Deleuze. Massumi notes the semblance as

> "a 'placeholder' in present perception of a potential 'more' to life' [...] the thing's perceived margin of changability, the thinking feeling of potential appearing [...] A semblance is a direct perception of a life *style.*" (2011, 50-51).

As such, it might be suggested that annunciations of anorexia as a 'lifestyle choice', one side of the paradox the thesis engages with, is not so much the evocation of free will per se, but the sense in present perception of a place holder of a difficult relationship to feeding the body's "perceived margin of changeability". In other words, we might consider this side of the paradox as a lived and abstract disruption of 'Anorexia Nervosa' as an unchanging, static, entity, represented through the good and common sense of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. In addition, the notion of manners is linked to the being of the sensible, "not the given, but that by which the given is given" (Deleuze, 2004b, 176). Not the varied, but the variation, the activity or process by which something becomes (Williams, 2008a, 25).

However, this style, this elegance, is not to be confused with the person who actualises it, it is not 'theirs'. Manners do not exist as 'mine' but are possible only as the effect of the relation that connects impersonal lives. Here there emerges an encounter between 'manners' and Massumi's notion of pre-personal affect:

> "Impersonal affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible glue that holds the world together. In event. The world-glue of affect is an autonomy of event-connection continuing across its own serialised capture in context" (Massumi, 2002, 217).

Manners, much like impersonal affect, are processual yet a-temporal, negating the 'I' that always remains conditioned by time (Arsic, 2008). I would suggest that the style and elegance Deleuze and Massumi bring to bear are in the "fourth person singular" (Massumi, 2011, 134), or perhaps even more singularly, *of* the fourth person singular. Particularly as the evocation of '*of*' makes apparent a link between manners and notions of virtuality, incorporeality, mood and the interval betwixt bodies and language. Additionally, both speaking and eating, which Deleuze brings to bear in in *Logic of Sense* (2004a) relate, in the state of affairs, to manners and etiquette. In other words, manners are both virtual and actual, corporeal and incorporeal.

Here I would like to draw attention to the significance of this divergence of thought and the possibilities which arose from a desire to produce 'anorexia' as *unrecognisable* (Deleuze, 2004b). It is perhaps not only a questioning of the activity of thinking and researching 'anorexia' away from common popular reason, but rather of encountering 'it' as a rebel becoming which exceeds codes and representations as "static relations among already formed entities" (MacLure, 2013, 169-171).

Returning to elegance

Although Deleuze presents 'aesthetic figures' when he speaks about 'anorexic elegance' , for instance, Virginia Woolf, Murnau and Kay Kendal (Arsic, 48,55) I read this as distinct to 'anorexia' manifest in the state of affairs. It is instead, as noted previously, linked to style and manners performed in the fourth person singular. Rather than the conceptual personae, grasped in an absolute form, aesthetic figures

are ceaselessly becoming-other. Therefore, it is not *only* a literal starvation which is heralded as a micro-political rebellion, it is the virtuality of the movement, nuance and novelty of experimentation, the resistance of the stratified gendered and organised body which is in the process of becoming elegant. Although 'aesthetic figures' actualise this becoming, it is not '*theirs'*. The elegance is not some unveiled and latent quality, but rather in and amongst the assemblage of affects, movements, scents and sense which at times glide over actual things, becoming available to processes of individuation, as it were, rather than the possession of individuals.

It might now be helpful to make a link back to the idea noted before regarding the way in which Deleuze questions the 'eating' order, and think of this becoming of anorexic elegance as connected to the paradox of health, whereby illness is an imminent process, not state, of health. Both are connected and moving along a mobius strip of toxin and remedy. "True health can only take the form of a continuous revaluation of illness [.....] which brings about its own autocritique and self-overcoming" (Tynan, 2010, 155). Here it is my understanding that we see an important and relevant connection, or brushing up, between the real and abstract possibilities of counter-actualisation, as opposed to 'recovery', and the 'art of dosages' developed by Nietzsche in his flight from a Socratic 'cure'. Ideas which are taken up by Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in their notion of the BwO (body without organs). Put differently, as with revolution, neither health nor victory can be proclaimed or secured once and for all. It is less a question of how to prevent or cure and more a question of bringing about paradoxically creative, measured, and unpredictable activities which re-double, rather than repair, the cracks which a body's stuttering and vibrating bring about.

I do not want to stray too far from the line of argumentation that I set out for this chapter. However, within this territory of dosages, experiments, health and illness it becomes necessary to draw attention to one of the pernicious effects of engaging with eating (dis)orders *only* through good and common sense which creates categories and assigns bodies to them. Following on from the work of Deleuze and Guattari Sarah Mann O'Donnell describes the art of dosages as 'autoimmune self-immunisation' "by which we prescribe to ourselves just enough of the toxins of organisation and stratification to be able to take our experiments that bit further"

(Tynan, 2010, 156). Here, for my work there are many things going on and coming about and I have to take responsibility for the cuts that I am making here, bringing just one of Mann O'Donnel's incredible insights to bear. However, for the purposes of this chapter, which engages with the organism, the experiment, relationships to feeding the body and the points at which theories-*of*-rub-against-practices-*of,* there is something within this notion of auto-immune self-immunisation which should be interrogated a little further. Particularly in light of the points I have attempted to make regarding the experimenting body.

I am compelled, indeed moved to think-and-feel with the art of dosages and the idea of 'auto-immune self-immunisation', which on one hand appears to have the texture of becoming master of causes and actualisations (Deleuze, 2004a), "allow[ing] the self to deterritorialise and reterritorialise itself into just enough of a balance to continue the experiments" (Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 178). Yet, on the other hand, this seems to glide too easily over the way in which relationships to feeding the body, the experiment, imply numerous human and non-human others in its corporeal and incorporeal mixtures. To engage with the (abstract of the) concrete I would like to draw attention to the way in which the experiment*er* is answerable, in many diverse and paradoxical ways, to funders and stakeholders: parents, mealtimes, friends, siblings, carbohydrates, health practitioners, the stomach, metabolism, hormones and the DSM, and currently, 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought.

I cut together the empirical material below with the idea of the complicated experiment. This 'data' is cut apart from a discussion between 'myself' and 'Joanne'. Cut apart from the other 7,000 words and innumerable movements, sounds and potentials of 'the interview', manifest in the state of affairs.

> S: How are you feeling?
> J: well good because I've actually managed to lose some weight this week but worse because I've not had the energy to do the exercise and I'm trying to find a balance between feeling better because I've not eaten anything and feeling better because I've exercised but I have been struggling to do both
> S: So something that I would like to know more about is why it is difficult to go for meals out?

J well I don't like people seeing what I'm eating anyway and even though I know what a normal portion is I always feel like I'm eating too much or I'm hardly eating anything and its Bens dads birthday tonight so we are all going for an Indian

S: so what are your thoughts there?

L: Scared, it's really difficult with Ben's family because they are all, apart from his dad, quite big and there is no such thing as a normal sized portion. When we went on Monday I was really careful because I know if I eat too much they notice if I don't eat enough they pick up on it so even if I were to eat normally ...I feel I have to over eat to please them.

S: So do you feel you want to do what pleases you rather than what pleases others? Lots of energy seems to be spent on doing things for others and keeping them feeling okay, do you ever feel angry and want to put your foot down?

J: Not really cos i nearly did end up in hospital last time and i know that if I was to say I don't want to eat that Ben would take that really, really bad, he'd have me down the doctor

S: So you said that you were nearly put in hospital, when was that?

J: My grandma nearly had me put in hospital then when I was seventeen, I was nearly sectioned because of my eating habits

In the above empirical materials one of the things that is of interest in the context of dosages is the way in which 'Joanne' is trying to 'experiment'. She notes:

"I'm trying to find a balance between feeling better because I've not eaten anything and feeling better because I've exercised but I have been struggling to do both".

From this we can see that the 'balance' 'Joanne' is trying to accomplish includes affects and proud verbs, *to feel better, to find.* Yet she is finding the experimentation difficult, as she notes, she is 'struggling to do both'. Joanne thinks that she is struggling to find the appropriate mixture which will produce a desired affect. Importantly she does not just want to feel better. Here, I would like to suggest that 'Joanne' wants to find the perfect, perfectly prescribed dose. The point at which a dosage becomes a repeat prescription. A prescription, I would argue, would remove the gift-burden of experimentation. It would promise a feeling-better not just in the present, but in the future as well.

Although experimentation might involve formulas, structural practices that provide particular conditions, these structural practices are always already moving. Bits of things, human and non-human entities get added to the mixture without the express intent of human activity. Objects become apparatus and contrariwise apparatuses become objects (Barad, 2007). Here, on this tangent of 'change' I would like to return to some of the ideas I discussed in previous chapters regarding series, events and proud verbs. As 'Joanne's' corporeality facilitates the bringing together of the infinitives *to feel* and *to find* changes are produced in both series. The residue of affects produced by the event *to feel* seep into the event *to find* and curdle into a desire for certainty that will return 'Joanne', differently, to an organised, stratified, subjectified body. Or perhaps it will not. I cannot predict that it will. What is important here is that it becomes a possibility due to the change in sense which emerges as infinitives intra-act (Barad, 2007) with one another.

To return to the quote with which the chapter commences, health is *both* corporeal *and* incorporeal – touching mixtures of bodies and the philosophical corpus. In other words, although self-immunisation is possible, at the level of the state of affairs, within the territory of the actual where good and common sense circulates readily, it would be unethical and uncritical to suppose that the experiment of dosages is not inf(l)ected by or in relation to, the moving structures of age, gender, race, class and sexuality. We feel this in the material affects produced by Joanne's words above as she speaks of her previous brush with being sectioned: A brush which was conditioned by her age, which was in turn inflected by her gender. This event, to be sectioned, produced a change in the series of eating and speaking, the sense of what is *to eat* and the sense of what it is to not eat.

Here I would like to re-connect the idea of proper names by making the point that potentially radical experiments tend to become formulaic and not simply because eating behaviours accord an inherent logic. On the contrary, as we have seen 'sense' is a moving and movable feast. What I am suggesting is that the grammar of everyday use, What Deleuze and Guattari refer to as standard language, (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176), is not the language of the event. Standard language is always already circumspect to nominal categories and proper names. My point is

that difficult relationships to feeding the body are not predicable, yet they are produced as such by orthodox material-linguistic-affective practices. Here I would like to suggest that the proper name 'Anorexia Nervosa' is an 'assemblage converter' (Bennett, 2010, 42) which conservatively re-shapes experimentation and potentiality into forms that it can recognise. In other words, within the state of affairs more often than not experiments with the 'eating order' are stratified. In the unhelpful and conservative process of becoming-proper bodies are unable to "free aesthesis from its petrification within established [..] models in order to put processes of creativity into contact with everyday experience" (Tynan, 2010, 160). To once again cut 'Joanne's' words together with a discussion of dosages I would like to disrupt an old adage of difference, '*one man's meat is another man's poison*' – '*one man's autoimmune self-immunisation could be a young girl's entry to a psychiatric ward*'. The point that I am trying to make here is that although there is hopefulness in experimentation it is not a hopefulness that is available to all equally.

Returning to Arsic, the article ends by stating that:

> "In thinking about anorexia I don't intend to recommend it. It is up to everybody to invent their own micro politics of pain. Anorexia should be understood to represent a particular strategy of resistance, and rescuing it from the inane ideology of an 'eating disorder', as well as from the blunt theory of a 'consumption' neurosis is a function of such resistance" (2008, 57).

Here, while I do feel that challenging the notion of 'eating disorder' is productive, the idea of *rescuing* anorexia is not. I feel that there is already a good deal of virtual ink spilled by members of the pro-ana community trying to rescue 'it' from becoming a bad name (Giles, 2006). I would suggest, quite contrary to any rescue mission, that we make the standard language of 'anorexia nervosa' cry and tremble (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176), while engaging more abstractly with those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body.

The infinitive 'to 'rescue' is not only 'a couple of words', it has material implications. Not only does it create an event through the infinitive or proud verb, rather unhelpfully the event which is evoked involves the heroic subject of humanism and

imperialism. Also, it is my feeling that it is unethical to speak about difficult relationships to feeding the body in terms of understanding; as though sense and nonsense were a non-relation and the marrow of meaning could be extracted (Barthes, 1982). Also connected to the way in which Arsic recommends a particular 'understanding' is the infinitive, or proud verb *to represent*. In addition to the problems of representation per se (see MacLure, 2013), to suggest that anorexia *represents* "a particular strategy of resistance", is to make it speak on behalf of something else. By speaking on behalf of something else it is denied its real difference. To evoke anorexia as a 'resistance', without also engaging with the paradoxical nature of conformity and resistance is unhelpful (See Day, 2010). It is my contention that there can be no radical resistance where proper names are still mobilised. They always, perhaps necessarily so, bring with them a residue of conformity and stratification. Arsic notes that:

> "Needless to say, the experimentation *called anorexia* can be dangerous, indeed lethal. The anorexic has to be able to guide the experiment without being guided by it. She has to experiment without ending in the failure of experimentation, the point at which the experiment turns against the experimenter and becomes deadly" (Arsic, 2008, 58. Emphasis added)

In the above quote the subject, *the anorexic*, and the object, *anorexia*, the knower, *the anorexic-experimenter*, and the known, *the anorexic-experiment*, are positioned in a manner which pre-supposes a human agent who has the capacity to 'be in control' of an experiment. As such it is the contention of the thesis that this conclusion undermines the visceral knowledge of that which is being experimented on – the body-organism – the matter of matter. It does little to make apparent a "lack of fixed object-apparatus distinction" (Barad, 2007, 357).

This point leads me back to my original notes on '*The Experimental Ordinary'* and my critique of the way in which it is only the human which is performing the trickery. Here original writings are enfolded into new idea-machines thereby functioning in the methodological interval of 'data-analysis-interpretation'

Swallowing Hunger

> "An apparent conflict arises between desiring-machines and the body without organs. Every coupling of machines, every production of a machine, every sound of a machine running, becomes unbearable to the body without organs. [The] sound of [the] machine running [is] unbearable to the body without organs" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, 9).

In the case of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, previous relations to the organism shift. The rumbling stomach, the annoying noise from the depths of the body is ignored. The previous practice of relating to the body through externally sourced food transmutes into the body that eats itself- along with hunger. Both are swallowed down into the depths of the body – in the autopoiesis of becoming cannibal.

The organism's appetite has to be silenced. Hunger, both as embodied sensation, and as Idea is refused, and refused so often that the stomach-organ, confused, acidic, and having too much space to think, no longer knows its own stomach-mind[10]. Hunger is in the process of becoming an undefined sensation among other confusing singular flows: tears, nausea, lethargy, thought, affects.

However, appetite cannot be totally forgotten, totally swallowed or refused. There remains something dry and incorporeal about appetite that keeps coming up, connecting to what I will term the gastro-pellation of the noisy stomach. It moves about the arms and legs which are becoming achy, sore and twitchy. So often ignored the sound of the organism changes its refrain, it sneaks back in through other tunes, orchestrating a confused and confusing human non-human dissonance. Take for instance the stomach of a 'well-functioning' body which is accustomed to regular intervals of nourishment, it is capable and clever enough, through its interconnection to other organs including hormones and blood, of self-regulation; of indicating that it has been fuelled sufficiently. However, the stomach in its shrinking disconnection, silenced and forced to the corner of the organism in the depths of the

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[10]Although this is not the basis of the argument, the idea of a second brain in the stomach has been engaged with, particularly in the field of Neurogastroenterology where the interactions between the brain and gut are studied. An article in Scientific American by Adam Hadhazy (2010) notes that "Given the two brains' commonalities, other depression treatments that target the mind can unintentionally impact the gut. The enteric nervous system uses more than 30 neurotransmitters, just like the brain, and in fact 95 percent of the body's serotonin is found in the bowels http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gut-second-brain/[accessed 22nd March 2014]

body, doesn't remain quiet indefinitely. All stomachs rumble from time to time; however, with a difficult relationship to feeding the body this indecipherable cacophony appears to come from outside: a sonorous quality and quantity which cannot be spoken of or eaten indefinitely.

Body-becoming - cartel

'Anorexia nervosa', the stratified and proper name translates from Latin as 'nervous loss of appetite'. But the organism doesn't lack appetite, it is always getting bigger and getting smaller than it was – breaching into territories of sickness, tiredness, lethargy, angst and elation. The body without organs, which is not the body itself as projection (Deleuze and Guatarri, 2004a) is virtual – real and abstract – incorporeal. However to properly consider the 'anorexic's tricks and betrayal' or what Arsic following Deleuze refers to as "a micro-political experimentation" (2008, 43), we must consider also the *actual body* with its blood filled organs and flowing hormonal actants. The disobedient vital organism will not stay where it has been put. Annoyingly it attempts to crack through the strictures towards the mouth opening. Sometimes it cannot be forced back down to the depths and manages to procure things which feel *both* too big *and* too small for a body steeled and practiced at *not doing* this sort of thing. *What was overcome in this acquisition of what was always too big and too small was the actuality of food, the virtuality of intentional will, and the proud verb to refuse.* However, if pride comes before a fall, this is not a "Fall *from*, but a beginning Fall" (Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 163) which entails the almost unbearable waiting for possibility and actuality.

> "If I am nineteen years old, sixty pounds, and eating a carton of yoghurt a day, and it takes me precisely two hours to eat this carton of yoghurt, and I smoke a cigarette every fifteen minutes to prove that I can stop eating, then I will be safe, retaining my dictatorial grip on my body, my life, my world. By contrast, If I so much as taste a bit of unsafe food on my tongue, it will not travel through my body in the usual biological fashion but will magically make me grow, like Alice taking a bite of the wrong cake." (ana4eva).

The language ana4eva serves to the reader seems to contain traces of esoteric riddle which would not be out of place in either Carroll's *Wonderland* or *The Logic of*

Sense. "If I am, x, y, z: what am I?[11]*"* One could almost imagine the haughty caterpillar, through rings of smoke, or the Cheshire Cat through his disembodied smile, presenting this puzzle to the adventuring Alice. However, alongside this answerless riddle we find in the recipe of ascetic bodily practices something real and abstract, virtual or incorporeal. Ana4ever suggests that there is something other than 'usual biology' at work which can bring about magical growth.

For both Deleuze and ana4eva there is more to the body than meets the eye. As we have already noted bodies are causes in relation to one another, causes of "'incorporeal entities' […] *events*" (2004a, 7). Here, the language of the event allows us to engage with this idea of magical growth without discounting it as the bizarre or paranoid fantasy of the mentally ill. The tasting body does not cause the f-actual growth of usual biology; it causes a magical and imperceptible growth which pertains to the incorporeal dimension *of the body*, its potential. To paraphrase Massumi (2002), that which is imperceptible and insensate; but moves through sensation.

In this articulation we have perhaps an awareness of the virtual: the potential *of* the body in movement. However, this movement refuses the final resting place of a distinct emotional state or particular word. It relates to both the depths of bodies and the surface of language. Although the extract evokes a process of becoming, of potential, in the last instant this is somewhat tied to the fixity of *being* an actual anorexic. Ana4eva senses the potential *of* the body, yet potential is not amenable to a dictatorial grip. As such, potential must be sutured to a predictable, determined, individualised actual: physical growth. To an obdurate palette, the uncertainty of embodied potential creates an abject taste on the tip of the tongue. The pre-individuality of the event is individualised through a focus on ana4eva's actual body.

The long term reverberations of a difficult relationship to feeding the body affect what 'it' can do. Veins, ovaries, stomachs, breasts, legs and arms may shrink but they remain defiantly present. They form a cartel and begin making noisier demands for sustenance. Since stomach rumbles can be ignored too easily, blood, hormones and chemicals become actants insisting that difficulty be overcome so that the body is

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[11] Anorexic, Ana, Mentally Ill, Wannarexic etcetera, etcetera

fed. The organism is starting to play its own tricks, engaging in its own experimentation.

The material and bio-chemical connections pertaining to appetite and satiation within the organism and which work to sustain vitality have been attacked. There has been an attempt on upon life. This deliberately disconnected body no longer functions *like* other bodies: It is becoming different. A difficult relationship to feeding the body pushes to the corners of its territory, and treats as suspicious, the organs it must live at the border of.

What is this sensation? Where is the sound coming from? It can't be hunger that was eaten a while ago to assuage some previous affect. More to the point though is the question of what is *to be done* about it. The organism will not eat; but if the organism does not eat it will not quieten. How much to eat? Until the stomach says enough? But the stomach has shrunk and its already full bits of things, acid, angst, butterflies and hunger. The organism can't be trusted: but still the noise, everywhere. Moving and affecting, sanguine and alive: the body is indubitably *with* organs.

The Experimenting Body

I now want to move more firmly away from the idea of a trickster subject to consider a trickster of another kind – the experimenting body. Here I want to consider the 'cleverness' of the body-machine when it cannot, or will not, be fed. Due to the fact that matter, in good and common sense, is so often reduced the dumb material which houses the higher power of the thinking mind, what is often misunderstood is the issue of trust. Those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body can't trust any-body. They cannot eat comfort or assurance spoken by those who are assumed to eat with comfort. Those who have experienced the jolting territory at the surface of sense and in the depth of the body cannot bite the hand that feeds them, or tries to rescue them. It is not necessarily the case that the Other does not know what 'eating disorder' means, this is a miscalculation of 'the problem'. It is more likely that problems emerge because the other thinks they do.

What this abstracted good sense cannot know is the situated intensity of the food-body-consuming assemblage. These "consolations *á l'ameriaine*" (Deleuze, 2004a, 177) - "you won't over eat", "you won't put on lots of weight quickly", "you'll feel better in yourself" - cannot be swallowed. In the case of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, fear inspiring bodily difference is apparent. You cannot assume what a body can do, contrariwise, you cannot assume what it will not do, which is to say that it will always already be doing something – bubbling, effervescing unpredictable potential.

Incrementally, the organism's corporeality and wetness set in motion a biological becoming. As Deleuze was never a little girl, he never experienced this first betrayal, this experimenting body. His change in appetite would lead him to an entirely different machine, an entirely different social power. Questions regarding where this 'trickery' starts and ends, or who or what make the first betrayal both miss the point of middling activity yet provide an interesting encounter for thought. It might be suggested that it is the organism that makes the first move in the far from ideal game. As the matter of the body changes, without permission, or without what we usually take to be permission, a trick is played.

The young girl affectively knows that her change is instigated by an experiment not of her design, an experiment watched by the Other and her own alterity, doubled in language, doubled as she produces her own corporeal and incorporeal double.

> "The ideal little girl incorporeal and anorexic[..] must disengage
> themselves from their real, voracious, gluttonous or blundering images"
> (Deleuze, 2004: 30).

The girl's organism is always already pushing her into a contested and ambivalent spatio-temporality, the demanding category of Woman. Given that "the individual that has never recognised itself within the limits of [gender] the self and the I, even where these are universal" (Deleuze, 2004b, 323), the promissory quality of 'Anorexia Nervosa', as short hand for difference and an apparent alternative to metaphysical limits is a powerful one. Even though the promise is whispered in good and common sense, a body can become enchanted by the possibility of becoming limitless.

Perhaps there is a paradoxical acknowledgement in a difficult relationship to feeding the body of the 'cleverness' of matter. Here, and by relating to it as dumb, to be controlled, restrained and disciplined, is the alibi of a secret: an unholy knowledge of the organism's own knowledge and astuteness, its capacity to become both as lived abstractness and blood filled flesh. Perhaps, without access to the materiality of the language of the event to plug into, the difficult relationship to feeding the body steers and disciplines female matter not because it is fat and stupid, on the contrary, it is steered and controlled because it so cleverly has a sense of its own difference. This difference is always too much and not enough because good and common sense and the 'eating order' reduce difference to mere resemblance, the same, or the similar (Deleuze, 2004b).

A digestive assemblage

I would now like to engage with a digestive assemblage which includes the human and the non-human. Here, to help me engage in a more post-human manner with the body I will draw on Jane Bennett's work on the agency of assemblages and edible matter (2010), Karen Barad's notions of intra-action and entanglement (2007) and Deleuze's notion of the dual cause (2004a). I will put these to work with empirical materials noted at the beginning of this chapter, those emerging from the discussion thread entitled '*To the girl who says she wants to be anorexic'*.

The thread in question is the most sustained discussion that I observed whilst engaging with pro-ana spaces on-line, and emerged one month before the site which hosted it was closed. The thread is initiated, but not written, by a user called Porcelainshell. The empirical materials it produced on the forum amounted to almost ten thousand words from users such as cosmicdancer, Am3thyst and monkigal. Copied to a word document for early and provisional analysis this empirical material became enfolded into other literatures, moments and ideas as I scribbled in the margins. As I scrawled arrows, left coffee stains and made indelible references to pages in books that emerged in the encounter that this discussion provoked. The thread commences thus:

> "In the few short days I have been on this forum I have noticed a number of posts regarding people who want to be anorexic and are here for that sole purpose. I didn't write the following but found it about a year back and wanted to share it with everyone, anorexic or not, in hopes of putting how serious this lifestyle/disease is into perspective. I'd like to know what everyone else's thoughts are on this. (Porcelainshell)

Due to the length of material found and posted by Porcelainshell, just over 3,000 words, it cannot be quoted in its entirety. Additionally, and methodologically, the presumption that reproducing 'word for word' the testament of an individual, would somehow unveil its 'truth' would be counter to my interest in the sense of the event. As such I will write with-and-of the unnamed writer, allowing their words to collapse into 'my own' materiality and 'my' words to hopefully provoke a *sense of* the discussion, rather than conceitedly explaining 'what it really means'.

In addition to the voluminous contributions which emerged over the on-line life of the thread, what was also interesting was the way in which it wrote of the body and went some way to disrupt both good and common sense understandings of eating disorders and also Deleuze and Arsic's ideas regarding the experiment. Put another way, this material intra-acts productively with the ideas I developed earlier with regard to the experimenting body, returning me to cut together the quote which opened the chapter to consider how this attempt to disrupt the p*romise of* 'anorexia', its desirability, is limited by the mobilisation of good and common sense which keeps the territory stratified. Consider these questions, prepared by Deleuze, and by on-line user ANANA respectively, about danger and limits.

> "Is it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack while taking care not to bring it into existence, and not to incarnate it in the depth of the body? More precisely, is it possible to limit ourselves to the counter-actualisation of an event – to the actors or dancers simple, flat representation - while taking care to prevent full actualisation which characterises the victim or the true patient (Deleuze, 2004a, 178 – 179).

> "Do you honestly think that you'll be able to do this and not wind up this way? Do you think you are the one person on earth who can control this, who can just stop??? Do you think that maybe you can just do this, get thin, and stop?? WRONG! It doesn't work that way" (ANANA).

The question that Deleuze posits emerges in the twenty second series of *Logic of Sense*, a portion of the text which engages substantially, as noted in the quote, with the idea of the crack. I cannot, and do not wish to suggest what this quote *means,* but for the purposes of discussion I would like to draw out the sense it evokes as it intra-acts with this discussion of digestive assemblages. As such, rather than saying what any of it means, I will draw out what it points to as important and relevant in relation to an understanding of health and illness.

In the question that begins "[i]s it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack (2004a, 178 – 179) Deleuze invites us to consider the connection of the actual and the virtual, or rather, the reverberations between the two. The crack is neither inside, nor outside, internal or external. It is at "the frontier" (ibid): Where the action happens. What occurs on one side is already beginning on the other plane. Something, a movement, a series of potentialities, is already stirring in the depth of the body, and has done for some time by the point at which there is any sense of a crack up. Contrariwise, there has for some time been a series of virtual events hovering over the body, waiting for something *of the body* to feel compelled. "To become the quasi-cause of what is produced within us" (Deleuze, 2004a, 169).

Deleuze goes on to question whether it is "possible to limit ourselves to the counter-actualisation of an event – to the actors or dancers simple, flat representation" (ibid). Within these evocative mixtures it is important to remember the "ridiculousness of the thinker" (ibid), the one who assumes the uncontested space of "I think". These questions do not have an answer that everyone knows and no-one can deny. They do not yield themselves to a clear distinction between true or false. Yet they do provoke an encounter with the uncertain frontier. Here, something *of* the problem posed by Deleuze produces a sense that *to* dance, *to produce* flat representations is always already informed by previous event activity passing out. As I noted in the opening chapter, "events are much more than an actual thing 'happening' in a limited space and time" (2008, 31). Therefore, I would suggest that counter-actualisations are also "much more than an actual thing 'happening' in a limited space and time" (2008, 31).

What I am suggesting is that a counter –actualisation is not an individual's dance or jig. The steps that the event draws into itself were never limited to something *a subject* learnt within the context of *their life*. The point that I am attempting to make here pertains to choice and to affects. I would suggest that it is not an individual's choice as to whether we "limit ourselves to the counter-actualisation of an event". In other words, the inherence of the incorporeal crack is not a problem that would be resolved by "pulling oneself together". It is not a question of attaining a conscious will, showing strength or resolve in the face of difficulties or challenges. The fights and frolics that compel the body, draw it out, undeniably result in the spilling of fluid, tearing of flesh and audible screams: Yet there are also wars and oscillations with invisible and imperceptible forces (Deleuze, 2013) that take place at the frontier. "[T]aking care to prevent full actualisation which characterises the victim or the true patient" (2004a, 178 – 179) is not a conscious choice that an individual makes. It has much to do with pre-personal affects and the sense which emerges when infinities intra-act - *to starve, to wait, to choose, to live.* It is not that an individual does, or does not, 'choose' to be a "victim or the true patient". There are multiple human and non-human actants within the digestive assemblage of choice, as Bennett notes notes "we are also non-human and [..] things, too, are vital players in the world". (2010, 4).

I will now cut these ideas together with ANANA's who asks "Do you honestly think that you'll be able to do this and not wind up this way". By 'do this' I take the activity ANANA refers to, to imply the deliberate restriction of nutrition supplied to the body. I infer that ANANA is speaking about an individual's intended activity to "get thin". The question they pose, "do you think you are the one person on earth who can control this" is both rhetorical, ANANA knows the correct answer already, "WRONG! It doesn't work that way", and also provocative, it throws down the gauntlet. It evokes what I previously noted as anorexia's super-molecular promise, the promise of intelligible difference that can be recognised in the state of affairs and "a fullness that is elsewhere, [..] a future that, apparently, is on its way" (Bennett, 2010, 32).

ANANA does not appear to think that it is possible to take "dosages of self-dismantling" (Mann O'Donnell, 2010, 177). Or more particularly, they do not feel that 'anorexia' can be controlled, as they strongly note, "It doesn't work that way". But

how do they know? My point here is that ANANA *recognises* relationships to feeding the body in terms of the accidents of the event, for instance, "get[thing] thin", and *predicts* the outcome. Within the utterance ANANA signifies their disbelief with an excess of question marks. In both instances where question marks are used they follow the stop sign. What I infer from this is that for ANANA, and many others who adhere to the logic of good and common sense, controlling something means putting an end to it. If you cannot put an end to 'it' you cannot control 'it'. Yet isn't the activity of *becoming experimental*, as opposed to the state of *being controlled*, carried out in the middle of things, close to the frontier, informed by the crack? I would suggest that ANANA's epistemic-ontological convictions about how things "work" are less concerned with an embodied relationship to feeding the body and more concerned with 'anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought. As such I infer that ANANA senses no possibility of re-territorialising the body or real difference.

As Sarah Mann-O'Donnell notes in her working through of Nietzschian true health "the organism must become ill before it can become healthier, because falling ill makes those who can survive it healthier" (2010, 167). However, it is the contention of the thesis that achieving the proper name gets in the way of a radical experiment. The art and the politics of dosages is left at the shore as advice 'for others'. Captivated by an actualised moment, the deceitful promise of eternal super molecularity, or 'being in control', the important experimentation of counter actualisation is undesirable. Not least of all because in good and common sense it begins to take a dogmatic form that goes by the name 'recovered'.

This of course is not the same as saying 'experimentation' is impossible. Rather, it is to say that the notion and discourse of 'recovery' is incredibly problematic because it divorces health and illness: Spatio-temporalizing them, rather than folding them into the lived and abstract activity of on-going over-coming; the administration of doses. As such, becoming different either through the stratified space of 'anorexia' is reduced to the same difference, the general difference offered through representational thought and thinking. As Deleuze notes in *Difference and Repetition* (2004b):

> "so long as [difference] is subordinated to the criteria of resemblance within perception, identity within reflection, analogy within judgement and opposition within the concept, difference is not regarded as individual difference, it remains only general difference, even though it is born [or actualised] by the individual" (Deleuze, 2004b, 309).

And it is here, with this idea of same difference that the thesis returns, differently, to ideas set out in earlier chapters regarding the accident of a difficult relationship to feeding the body – a particular weight or appearance – which, as with many things appearing in vision – steals the show (see Massumi, 2011).

For the remainder of the chapter I will encounter the data from the thread previously introduced, not to make it make sense, presuming my agency, but rather to make cuts in the middle of things, where things happen, where there is movement. It is worth making note here, in terms of the thesis push towards the destruction of proper names, that writing with the nameless, and pseudonymless, writer of 'to the girl' disrupted the project of thought considerably. In other words, it affected the thinking-feeling of writing. It put a further, indeed methodological, obstacle between thought and its subject-objects. It was harder to gain purchase when writing with the nameless author as compared to writing with words which apparently 'belonged to someone'; even if this was a pseudonym, and further to that, a pseudonym which had been further disrupted in the process of 'heavy-cloaking' (Kozinets, 2010).

Can you have your data and eat it?

> "So...you think starving is a good way to lose weight, do you? I think you've read too many fairy tales. Well, this isn't one. Neither are eating disorders. They are sheer and total HELL. But, since you want one, I'll go ahead and prep you for it. I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you. If this doesn't make you realize how completely stupid running out there and trying to develop anorexia is, then I wish you the best of luck in killing yourself. Because that's all you'll be doing.

In the series entitled '*Porcelain and Volcano*', Deleuze engages with the (im)balances, or disjunctions, of actualisations and counter-actualisations, asking, as noted above, "Is it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack while taking care not to bring it into existence, and not to incarnate it in the depth of the

body?" The address of 'to the girl that wants to be anorexic' from 'the girl who really is' annunciates an irrepressible right to speak "with [the equivalent of] all the gallons of alcohol they have drunk which have actualised the crack in the body" (2004a, 179). The words which are cut together in this thread promise, in their articulation of bearing witness, that they risked something "and went as far as possible in taking this risk" (ibid). It might be suggested that it is this risk, this apparent experimentation, which gives birth to the address and an "irrepressible right" (ibid) to speak of food and expect others to eat words (2004a, 29). Within this opening a pedagogic tone is assumed – "since you want one, I'll go ahead and prep you for it. I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you". Not only does this reduce the real difference of a difficult relationship to feeding the body to the general and particular of 'Anorexia'. It also tacitly makes an identity claim to authenticity and properness by suggesting that 'they' can 'prep you', as they might for an exam, or perhaps for the DSM grading which proves that there is 'really something wrong'.

As I read the address something began to resonate with the thesis' points of engagement. I sensed there was an attempt in the address to destroy Anorexia as the dogmatic image of thought by cutting it together with an iconoclastic style. However, the opening remained within a spatiality of fixed aspiration rather than fluid singular desire .This mixture of words and things assumed that 'anorexia' is 'out there'; that's where the girls who want to be anorexic 'run to'. By evoking the idea of 'running out there' there is a failure to acknowledge the way in which a difficult relationship to feeding the body emerges incrementally, over and through a temporal space which cannot be limited to a past-present-future progression. It also assumes that the body is separate from the worlding of the world and that it is the individual girl's agency which places them in relation to 'anorexia': her choice to "run[..] out there".

Moreover, the idea that "If *this* doesn't make you realize how completely stupid running out there and trying to develop anorexia is" suggests that rather than there being deposits of discursive-material-political affects in the world, functioning as fatty reserves for potential events, the subject actively goes in search for a cause. Here the denotative logic of 'this', in the formulation of "If *this* doesn't make you realize" seems to refer to the 'testimony', the words of the speaker. However, this articulation

presumes that each experimenting body is the same and that the dosage that each can take is the same. What this assertion fails to engage with is the seepage of difference that inspires wonder: how far might *'my'* body be able to go"?

Also worth noting here is the way in which the testimony-warning produces the sense of *ressentiment* that reduces the revolutionary possibilities of the mixture of words and things. Here, this is not to say that it is the bitterness of the speaker, per se, that produces this *ressentiment.* However, as will become clearer a little later on, it is the thesis contention that this also occurs because of the way in which the propositions mobilise the narrative or personal testimony as opposed to working with that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies.

> The completely ironic part about people trying to lose weight by starving is that half the time it does not work. [..]The less you eat, the lower your metabolism goes. You might starve and starve and barely lose anything...or you might be extra lucky...you might starve and starve and gain weight. Your body might just shut itself down and the weight go nowhere and even though you aren't losing, you'll still be HOOKED.

Here what is presented as 'ironic' can more productively be engaged with as a paradox - always getting bigger and smaller at the same time. The slowing of the metabolism links to something noted earlier in the chapter regarding the body carrying out its own experiments – the notion of becoming cannibal and eating yourself alive. Which, for the purposes of re-connecting to the materiality of the body and its connection to other bodies, and mixtures of bodies, produces sensory and olfactory affects –the 'pear drops' odour of Ketoacidosis.

The assertion "you'll still be HOOKED" draws on the psychological, and individualised, good and common sense of an addiction discourse. Indeed, the capitalisation of 'hooked' gains an almost sonorous quality as it stands out from the other words in the proposition. However, in the separation of weight loss and the compulsion to engage in practices which would result in weight loss, i.e. a particular ascetic relationship to feeding the body, there is a disruption of cause and effect. You do not persist because the practice is predictably fruitful: As we see above, the non-human actant of metabolic rate makes it necessary to reconfigure doses.

Rather, in the organism-food-assemblage, everything is always already unpredictable. Here, the perspicacity of matter's own experiment, its capacity to 'shut itself down', is read as the failure of the individual subject's conscious will. Here, as shameful affects become enfolded into sanguine flesh they are breathed out as the matter of fa(c)t : 'I'm still too big".

Additionally, to continue differently with the notion of being 'hooked', this utterance suggests that a line of flight is becoming which is not going towards a particular ends for instance the accident of weight loss. Put differently, in this relational practice of food stuffs and matter, an assemblage which includes the human and the non-human, there is something else at work. Some process which can't be reduced to the accident of that which occurs. There is a sense of something desired and hoped for. Here I would like to make a link between 'Anorexia' and the ideas that Bennett engages with through Derrida's notion of 'messianicity':

> "the open ended *promissory* quality of a claim, image or entity [which is the] condition of possibility of phenomenality: things in the world appear to us at all only because they tantalise and hold us in suspense, alluding to a fullness that is elsewhere, to a future that, apparently, is on its way" (Bennett, 2010, 32).

Bennett continues

> "this promissory note is never and can never be redeemed: the 'straining forwards towards the event' never finds relief. To be alive is to be waiting 'for someone or something that, in order to happen...must exceed and surprise every determinate anticipation' In naming the unfulfillable promise as the condition of the appearance of anything, Derrida provides a way for the vital materialist to affirm the existence of a certain trajectory or drive to assemblages without insinuating intentionality or purposivness" (ibid).

This explication of messianicity has the feel of the Deleuzian event which became 'the biting point' of the thesis, the idea whereby "[t]o the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. (Delueze, 2004a, 169) Additionally, these words provide a relevant return to the notion of dosages as explicated by Nietzsche. Not only for the obvious link to the idea of waiting which was so important for Nietzsche as the philosopher physician (Mann O'Donnel; 2010, 163), but also for

what this opens up in terms of a politics of non-arrival, a "not yet arrived at health" (ibid). Here, the notion of a not-yet-arrived-at-health, as it disrupts the metaphysics of being and nods towards becoming, destabilises the distinction between being anorexic and being well, being proper and being improper. In other words, it enables a refocus not just to become ill, or actualise 'anorexia', but to engage seriously with the "not yet arrived at health" that produces the sense of the event's counter-actualisation.

What these words evoke is continual movement, activity and process. In this sense the event is a theorisation of struggle. Not as the motor of history as Marx would have it, but as more and less than both: Event momentum - events passing out and coming about and always already producing the potential of multiple and moving structures, or series, to be selected by further events. Events are already in the future and already in the past and have both actual and quasi causes. The points of this theory of struggle and potential has dimensions which are infinitely squared, dual structured and caused, multiple, serial and singular. It is obtuse, imperceptible and insensate yet moving through sensation. War is not waged for victory, stability, or fixity to be secured, war is waged on wars. It is actualised through impassioned matter, yet remaining, in part, linked always to dry impersonal affect. The neutral, unpredictable pre individuality of the event.

> "You still won't be able to stop. By the time your body shuts off from malnutrition, you'll be too far in it to *snap* think "Oh...this isn't working...I think I'll eat again." No...you'll be desperate and eat less and less and work out more and more. Eventually, you won't be ABLE to work out. Your muscles will eventually stop cooperating. Then you'll panic and try and eat even less to compensate for not being able to work your ass off (simply a figure of speech, since you're not losing any weight, of course).By then you can't eat less. You're barely eating enough to stay alive as it is and you can't stop. [....] This is true if you weigh 150 or if you weigh 70. You will be fat. Insane is the proper term for it, isn't it? Yes, you might just be one of the lucky ones, one of the ones that doesn't lose weight. But don't sit there and think that means you won't be sick. Not true...not true at all. Your skin and hair will be dry, your teeth sore, your period gone, your bones aching, your muscles cramping...well, no need to go on. You still want this, of course. After all, you won't be like that. You won't be one of the failures. You'll be successful; you'll be thin and perfect. Beautiful.

This is a very interesting section as it invokes the good sense that would have the 'misperception' of matter as insanity, as noted earlier through Arsic, as though there were an 'eating order' and 'body image'. These words draw attention to the unpredictability of the eating order and relationships to feeding the body. Here the idea that "not every – body loses weight" goes some way to indicate the difference of and between bodies, the idea that 'anorexia' or more appropriately, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, can't be reduced to an equation of the same but it can work at the cleavage of difference. In and amongst this section are the accidental examples of aching bones, muscle cramps and sore teeth. Those empirical examples which can stir the personal rather than evoke the pre-personal. It is something within this territory which I find particularly interesting.

The empirically personal of physiological manifestations is denoted: 'your period gone', 'your teeth sore'. Here a couple of words represent the complex embodied assemblage of the intra actions that the materiality of 'period gone', 'teeth sore' conjures. This could be taken, in conjunction with good and common sense notions of 'what a body does' as an indication of lower level hormonal functioning due to reduced body fat, thereby drawing attention to the intra-activities of non-human actors, or stakeholders, that are part of the 'experiment'. But period gone could simply be the organism playing tricks again. Having the organs before birth their activities were always conspiring without consent. Who or what is to say 'period gone' is for sure. What I am trying to convey here is that the flat representation of aching teeth, bones and cramping muscles is both more than words and less than experiencing matter. They themselves have a 'promisory' quality, of properness, which the author has a sense of.

The proposition "you still want this, of course" is asserted not as question or even as a rhetorical question but towards an acknowledgement of the sense that is being produced between words and things. It is in the words that follow "you still want this, of course" that I am pricked (Barthes, 2000), that something turns towards singularity, or perhaps resides at the spaltung or cleavage of the sense of the event and the Cartesian knower and platonic original.

> "You still want this, of course. *After all, you won't be like that*. You won't be one of the failures. You'll be successful; you'll be thin and perfect. Beautiful" (Unknown author of 'to the girl').

Here the idea of 'you won't be like that' works as both promise and threat for those who reside at the margin of properness, those who are always already in danger of not being recognised and equally, those who are at risk of being recognised and thereby vulnerable to molar interventions: being sent into recovery. Here we can recall the threat-promise of Joanne's grandmother. In both cases good and common sense ascribes bodies to orders of generality. Always too ascetic and never ascetic enough. At the point of the 'you' the narrative speaks at the level of second person singular, which reduces the eventful, yearning experience, the 'waiting' as it were, to the possibility of a designated aspirational state – the accident of thinness.

> "Well, since you're going to win, why don't I tell you about your prize, hmm?? It's quite nice. You will be skinny. You will be sickly thin. Your ribs will stand out and your hipbones will be sharp. You won't see it. You'll look in the mirror and see fat. You'll see rolls. You'll look at girls who weigh fifty pounds more than you and wonder why you can't be as thin as they are. You'll look in the mirror every day and swear that you've gained at least ten pounds. Other people will see you shrink but you won't get to watch. You'll never see the truth. Others will though".

"You'll never see the truth. Others will though", "you won't see the truth. You'll never actually know what you look like". This articulation highlights the way in which the speaker of *ressentiment* still speaks through good and common sense. It also calls to mind Arsic's suggestion that "to say that the anorexic has a different image of her own body, which does not adequately represent the 'real' shape of it [....] is to suppose the normalising instance of a shared perception: one should see one's own body the way everybody else sees it" (Arsic, 2008, 36).

Here, this not seeing correctly, or not perceiving correctly is given as a marker of pathology, not simply difference but the proper(tied) territory of insanity.

> "You will not be attractive. You won't. You'll have huge dark circles. Your skin will be pasty pale and have a lovely grey tint to it. Makeup will NOT help this. It won't, so don't think it will. Don't even bother to attempt it. You'll be wasting your time; time that could be better spent doing your

usual pastime, staring into the pantry to watch the food. Of course, people might not notice that you're grey. They could be too busy staring at the dark black, blue, and purple spots you're covered in. Everything you do will result in a bruise. Everything. Do you have pretty hair? You won't anymore. It will be straw dry and dull. Speaking of hair, do you like facial hair? I hope so. You'll have it. I have some lovely sideburns. Quite gorgeous. Actually, I have sexy hair everywhere. Fuzz, fuzz, fuzz. It's hot. All the guys love it and all the girls I know ask how to get some. They're jealous, you know. I tell them how I got it, starving. They never attempt it...I know why though. It's not because they're smart and healthy...no, no. It's because they're weak. Not strong like me. Of course, my muscles are deteriorating as we speak and I can no longer use even my five pound weights but I'm still strong, aren't I? Yes...because I don't eat. And that's true strength, isn't it? Denying yourself the basic fuel you need for life. Yup...strong and smart".

All of this talk of external appearance could be considered as the accident of the event – *what* occurs. It seems to follow a linear logic of degeneration and deterioration. It works to a shock logic raising undesirable issues such as female body hair and bruising and this is the point in the address where reader meets author, so to speak, in the sense that it becomes a personal narrative. Perhaps here it could be suggested that this is a moment of intensity or singularity – a turning point. There is a new kind of passion which emerges when the issue of body hair appears. There is a complex becoming of pride and shame as the accidents, damaged skin and 'excess' hair speak to the properness of meeting good sense criteria for a difficult relationship to feeding the body, while also resonating with a certain disruption of gendered aesthetic codes, a feminine improperness.

There becomes a tongue in cheek pride possible due to a logic of indifference. Jealousy is the only option when real difference, difference in itself is pushed out. Here, this difference in itself is pushed out as the author has nothing but good and common sense to draw on and to "scratch at their sores" (Deleuze, 2004a, 173). They do not have access to the subtlety or nuance of the language of the event, and so they denote and make manifest the accidents of anorexia – making every empiricist's confusion. However, by remaining within this accidental economy, one of representations and appearances, that which is evoked, no matter how prohibitively, falls back into the circle of images – the dogmatic image of thought of 'Anorexia'.

What I have posited as the turning point in the address, the point where the author can no longer remain in the third person, has an urgency of the present. There is here the recognition of the author's fallibility or uncertainty as they cease to denote 'this and that' and begin to ask, what seem to be rhetorical questions.

> "Of course, my muscles are deteriorating as we speak but I'm still strong, aren't I? Yes...because I don't eat and that's true strength, isn't it? Denying yourself the basic fuel you need for life. Yup...strong and smart. Fainting is common too but you might be distracted by the headaches. Take some aspirin...oooh...or don't. Your tummy's too empty; it'll only make you throw up everywhere. it's worth it right? Anything's worth it, even your hair, nails, bones, muscles, possible children, your family's heart, everything. Sacrifice it all, throw it all away. You're thin now, that's what counts, even though you don't know it. You'll probably get chest pains. Maybe heart flutters. This is scary too, because you never wanted to die, you just wanted to be thin. But remember, you can't tell. Telling is forbidden and asking for help is weak".

This cascade of accidents does however seem to respond negatively to the question Deleuze posits in one of the opening quotes of the chapter; whether or not it is possible to keep the crack at the incorporeal surface or whether or not it has to go to the body.

The speaker works with the accidents of the event to make manifest the 'facts' as they 'know them' to be. Here the 'eating disorder' is separated from the materiality of the body, vitamin deficiencies pertain to the body while the eating disorder is located in an unspecified elsewhere. We might here consider 'insomnia' to be indicative of the body 'tricking' 'anorexia' and the human subject, carrying out its own experiment.

> "WHY do you want this?? WHY?!? I know, even after reading this that you're still sitting there, wanting this. Why? What is it you want?? Is it beauty? Do you honestly think you won't be like this?? Do you honestly think malnutrition won't steal your looks? Is it glamour? READ THIS. Show me the glamour. Is it control?? Let me tell you, you'll NEVER be more out of control than you are when you have an eating disorder. You don't control what you put in your mouth. Hell, you don't even control your thoughts. You have NO control. None. Do you honestly think that you'll be able to do this and not wind up this way? Do you think you are the one person on earth who can control this, who can just stop??? Do you think

that maybe you can just do this, get thin, and stop?? WRONG! It doesn't work that way".

"WHY do you want this?? WHY?!? I know, even after reading this that you're still sitting there, wanting this" is a pivotal assemblage of words and real and abstract entities such as 'looks', 'glamour', 'control'. Here, the sense that rises from these words begins to evoke another turning point, a moment of singularity as the address shifts from its vehemently dissuasive beginnings. I would like to suggest that there is here an opportunity to sit with the affective, corporeal pull of words and the process of writing. Throughout the address there is a sense of baffled insight into the pull of the event and the way in which bodies are "tempted to become […] equal", yet here what bubbles is *ressentiment*.

In addition, this is also a pivotal assemblage as it evokes the illusory, perhaps 'messianic' (Derrida, cited in Bennett, 2010) promise *of control*. As I noted earlier, this promise of control is always paradoxical, and might more helpfully be considered in terms of a power-knowledge relation. It is both corporeal, enacted by bodies and things, and incorporeal, belonging to no-one. Having to do with words and matter, it is not a something which can be fixed, harnessed or *occupied*, It is, depending on the series which flow into and out of it, apart from the enacting body - a placeless occupant - an occupant without a place.

> "But do you know what? Self-hatred is the least of your worries now. Because you've likely just signed your own death warrant...and you likely don't even care...yet. But you will. You will care. You will care and you will cry and rage and swear you'd give anything to take it all back. But it's too late, because by the time you're in deep enough to care, you're already dying. It's too late to snap out of it now, no matter how much you want to. This is the reality of anorexia. It is nothing like the powerful articles you read on how so and so overcame it. It is nothing like the beauty you see when you look at that thin model. It is nothing like that beautiful popular girl who naturally weighs 80lbs. It is nothing like anything you've ever lived before and you will never be the same".

The next section of the chapter encounters responses to the address, and as with the above sections I attempt to work with the 'what occurs', the accidental words, while also attempting to engage with the inside of what occurs: the event.

Can you Have Anorexia and Eat It?

> Definite wakeup call! That should be a required read before allowed a membership! I can gladly say I haven't been that severe as above, but I can vouch for the dental care problems...And as an adult trying to find a dentist who won't bring up your ed. It's embarrassing! But they can tell even when you lie. If you are young and not anorexic and just want to be...JUST EXERCISE and EAT HEALTHY- You can't just "become" a disease! (weakness101)

Weakness 101 draws attention to ontology through putting 'become' in scare quotes, highlighting the logic of fixity and a denunciation of the incremental becomings of life, they separate out the states of 'not' and 'want', or absence and desire. In other words Weakness101 erects a division between an ontology of lack, or not being, and an ontology of excess, of being. Here there is a lack of subtlety and nuance which does little to evoke the powerful sense of the event, reducing it to the accidents of health. They state 'just exercise' and 'eat healthy', but as noted previously, these can be considered in terms of "consolations á l'ameriaine" (Deleuze, 2004a, 177).

Further to this, the assemblage of 'eat healthy' and 'just exercise' is problematic as it fails to acknowledge the mixtures of humans and non-humans implicated in these relationships, for instance the metabolism, hormones, acids, proteins, DNA, shared family meals. What is it to 'eat healthily'? The experimentalists Nietzsche and Thoreau would not share the same diet, digressing on the foodstuff of vitalism and the imagination (Bennett, 2010): What was good for the dog did not suit the gander.

> That article is so truthful it hurts because I sit here and remember all those things I went through before my first recovery. It got just about that bad. Now this is my 4th time relapsing. It's ridiculous, shameful and sad. But this is how it will be. If I could go back 8 years I would. I still to this day suffer horrible side effects and I know it will kill me someday (Emmarald)

The most biting aspect of what Emmarald makes manifest is the assertion that "I know it will kill me someday". The first point I am moved to make is that this knowledge is impossible, as Massumi notes in his '*User's Guide'.*

> "For Deleuze, the essence of meaning [which Deleuze and Guattari occasionally call 'essence'], the essence of essence, is best expressed by two infinitives: 'the cut,' and 'to die'. A person is either still alive or already dead. The moment of death is ungraspable" (1992, 20).

Indeed, the cold indifference of the third person paradoxically merges and folds with the immediate enveloping of difference and repetition to invoke the dry incorporeality of 'it'. Emmarald knows *it* will kill them *someday* but this is the abstract 'it' of the mouse's tail (Deleuze, 2004) and event which has "no recognisable tense" (Massumi, 1992, 20).

> "People have to understand that being anorexic is not a choice. It's a mental illness. You can't just wake up one day and decide to become anorexic for the sake of losing weight. It's dangerous and if you're not serious, you'll end up bingeing and feeling bad about yourself. Don't dig a hole for yourself. Most anorexics want to get better--not necessarily gain weight, but I don't think they want to hate food" (Seacret).

> "wow. i only read about half of this and was thinking omg this is so right the whole time. but the wierd thing is after even reading it i still know i'll never not be ana. it's like i don't understand how someone could NOT be anorexic. like...doesn't everyone think about food the way i do? how i love the taste but feel like crying if i eat it? how i never ever stop thinking about it? how i always want to lose just 5 more pounds? it just doesnt seem possible. because even after my doctor made me gain some weight back the whole time i was just waiting until they stopped paying attention so that i could lose it again. and i look at my friends eat and think oh my god how can you not feel disgusted with yourself?! it's like im a different species or breed of human or something. it's sooo frustrating!! (graylouis)"

In this correspondence from graylouis there is a strange mixture of sameness and difference, rather than difference in itself. They note that "i don't understand how someone could NOT be anorexic. like...doesn't everyone think about food the way i do?". This absence of understanding of an alternative 'way of thinking' implies the stratified logic of a particular relationship to feeding the body for them. Here a particular relationship to feeding the body is elevated to a level of universal common sense "doesn't everyone think about food the way i do? how i love the taste but feel like crying if i eat it? how i never ever stop thinking about it? how i always want to lose just 5 more pounds?"

In the final few words of the feedback graylouis says "it's like I'm a different species or breed of human or something". To the side of the denotative logic which gives this as an example that I would suggest is a particularly interesting working of the power of the dogmatic image of thought. Here 'anorexia', as well as an understanding of health as unconnected to illness, and a 'transcendental model of recognition' (Deleuze, 2004b) work to limit the possibilities of living differently or counter actualising as opposed to recovering or being ill.

As greylouis "looks at [their] friends eat and think[s] oh my god how can you not feel disgusted with yourself?" there Is a reduction of the other's difference and particularity. Here, and to evoke the notion of the experiment, is the positivism of what is most often referred to as 'anorexic thoughts'. Here if eating is x and feeling is y, greylouis can only conceive of the one tailed hypothesis which results in repudiation and disgust. "The Kantian object = x where 'x' means 'in general' (Deleuze, 2004a, 111). We might say here that relationships to feeding the body, difficult or elsewise, do not force greylouis to think (Deleuze, 2004b, 175). 'Anorexia' is for now an object of recognition for greylouis: "thought is thereby filled with no more than an image of itself, one in which it recognises itself the more it recognises things: this is a finger, this is a table, [this is anorexia, this is normality]" (ibid).

> "yes...i agree w/ everyone here that this is a really, really well-written article and 100% true...if i spilled out my guts, it would be this article exactly. You know what's sad though? is that this stuff doesn't even bother me anymore, even though I know it should. Like I could care less that I look like sh*t and people look at me weird and I'm cold all the time and my hair is falling out...and I wish I did care...cause at one point in my life I was pretty, and since ana I have not been and I know it, but it's not about being pretty anymore, it's about being thin and about being sick.And the worst part? I don't even care that I'm dying. Doesn't phase me in the least, just like the person who wrote the article said. Anyway, I'll stop rambling and complaining about myself now...sorry. But yes, for anyone who wants to be anorexic...please don't..there is no good end to it. You WILL either end up gaining the weight back or dying, or going up and down in your weight which is miserable too, and you will affect so many other people...that's the worst part, that's one pain that won't go away...knowing that your family or friends have been devastated by

something YOU'VE done. even though it is not fair because it's your own body...it doesn't work like that and trust me I wish it did" (Preciouspains)

Preciouspains feel that what she has read is "100% true" which indicates an agreement with the sensibility of the author. However, something which is 100% true leaves little room for difference. They go on to say "if i spilled out my guts, it would be this article exactly". Here the spilling of guts is interesting as it calls upon the edible nature of things and the trope to speak/ to eat: The visceral sanguine quality of words, their materiality as opposed to their bordered actual dullness. Instead of appearing through typing digits and thinking brain the gut is drawn into the textual-material-affective assemblage *to write.*

In saying they are "cold all the time and [their] hair is falling out" Preciouspains alludes to the possibility of the experimenting body I developed at the start of this chapter. However, possibly the most interesting points Preciouspains makes is: "[b]ut yes, for anyone who wants to be anorexic...please don't..there is no good end to it. You WILL either end up gaining the weight back or dying, or going up and down in your weight which is miserable too". Here the idea that "there is no good end to it" is insightful, not because of the fatalism inherent in the evocation, but rather because of the use of 'it', which speaks its own sense. "The equivocation of 'it' is therefore distributed in accordance with the duality of denotation and expression. The two dimensions of the proposition are organised in two series which converge asymptomatically, in a term as ambiguous as 'it'" (Deleuze, 2004b, 31 – 32).

> "Thinner, it said. You've got to get thinner. But you know, even then, that word was wrong. It is more than Thinness, per se, that you crave. It is the implication of Thin. The tacit threat of Thin. The Houdini-esque-ness of Thin, walking on hot coals without a flinch, sleeping on a bed of nails. You wish to carry Thinness on your arm, with her cool smile" (threesheets2the wind).

This excerpt from threesheets2thewind exudes an evocative and strangely seductive sense. It is a précised, or thinned down, extract from *Wasted* (1998), the work of Marya Hornbacher. Although threesheets does not reference her explicitly, the words moved me to search for them, to move from off-line to on-line and to enter them into an on-line search engine. However, in keeping with the way in which post-human

and new materialists such as Mazei and Jackson engage with 'voice', I would like to show due care and sensitivity. Although it is credited to Hornbacher, as she actualised it, the sense of what these words evoke cannot be reduced to the 'accident of *what occurs* on the page or screen. These words are the force of the Cheshire Cat's smile, moving against nothing and everything, what can and cannot be denoted or made manifest. They paint the scream rather than the horror (Deleuze, 2013).

In the assemblage of the human and non-human, threesheets2thewinds regurgitates Hornbacher, while I invite Deleuze and Carroll to join us at dinner. And yet the incorporeality of 'it' appears unannounced and without a gift for the hosts. As I read the words I re-encounter the haughty caterpillar mouthing smoke rings. Here in this mixture of bodies and words, this capacious encounter, we meet the incorporeal aspect of a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Just as the caterpillar's smoke introduces a sense of that which is not the body, but *of it* and en route to becoming indignant expression, transforming into smoke and in the process of becoming reptilian. [T]hreesheets2thewind-and-Hornbacher note that is not a question of actual thin as they assert "you know, even then, that word was wrong". They go on to clarify that it is instead the "tacit threat of thin [,] her cool smile [which] you wish to carry on your arm".

In this chapter, by working with ideas regarding dosages and experiments I have been able to cleave a space in which to consider empirical materials. Not to breathe life into them as though they had passively waited for my human touch, I have instead, in the plugging in (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012), provisionally worked with the sense that was produced at the frontier (Deleuze, 2004a).

In the next chapter I attempt to take up Patti Lather's call to risk not being understood (2007) by further disrupting the humanist supposition that data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the autonomous, cognitively intentional, human acts of analysis and interpretation, in short, qualitative research.

CHAPTER 5: 'JOANNE?' – TOWARDS A POST-HUMAN CASE-STUDY

Introduction

> "[T]he language of humanism. . . a discourse that spawns structure after structure after structure—binaries, categories, hierarchies, and other grids of regularity that are not only linguistic but also very material" (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000,4).

> "[I]n the research relation with data, we must be invited in" (MacLure, 2013b, 662).

Within the first chapter of the thesis my work was introduced and the 'problems', or what were termed as points of engagement, were developed through the use of key concepts and theories. In the second chapter, literature relevant to my area of inquiry was explored and critiqued which further developed the significance of the abstract, affective and embodied theories which the thesis puts to work. These textual movements bled into the methodological chapter wherein the people, places, ideas and entities my work brushed up against were conceptualised as a mobile or connective ethnography (Hine, 2000).

The methodological chapter drew to a close by noting that the chapters which were to follow would make recourse to the empirical, on and off-line materials I have gathered; particularly how flows of theory and practice, as they plugged into one another (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013), set in motion what my work sought to trouble and disrupt. It was also in this third chapter that 'someone' called 'Joanne' was introduced. In this chapter we will meet Joanne for a second time, under increasingly post-human conditions, and with 'her', go further towards the possibilities of disrupting proper names and fixed identities. In other words 'Joanne' the 'someone', or more appositely the individual, will cease to be bordered in the ways that more traditional and humanist inquiry encloses the '*what'* to which it refers.

[I]n philosophical enunciations we do not do something by saying it but produce movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona". (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 64).

To do this I will be working with a conceptual persona, a body who both slithers and leaps, who is cut up and cuts, who administers doses of theory-data. As Deleuze and Guattari note in *What is Philosophy:*

"The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of [their] principle conceptual persona (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 64).

Actualising a sensibility irreducible to the individual, this figure is always biting off more, and less, than can be chewed and digested. Both elegant and awkward, actualising frowns of perturbation whilst becoming the quasi cause of the singular and incorporeal smirk of curiosity, this personae will paint the movements of a scream rather than the horror (Deleuze, 2013) of an emaciated image.

Lecerle notes that Heaven, the space of angelic communication, is a "place of unspeakable boredom, much in need of a serpent to make it interesting". He continues, asserting that, "angels are no poets, in spite of their lyres". In light, or perhaps more appositely, in the shadow of this idea I put forward a figure who begins in the middle of things: the-becoming-sanguine-serpent-of-the-angelic researcher (see Lecercle, 2002 quoted in MacLure, 2013b, 664-5). By working with this conceptual persona this chapter will not be heavenly, It will not be a "polite conversation between angels" (ibid). Instead, it will evoke singular pre-individual veins and invisible forces, which like Eden's own serpent, wait and offer the possibility of transgressive onto-epistemologies (Barad, 2007).

A return to methodology, differently.

In this chapter I am interested in disrupting the humanist supposition that data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the 'breath of life' that is the autonomous, cognitively intentional human acts of analysis and interpretation: In short, qualitative research. As Jane Bennett notes, "process itself is an actant" (2010, 33) and as such it is necessary to consider the process of working with

empirical materials differently. This chapter will do this by working way from good and common sense and attempting to engage with the ways in which we eat empirical materials and how these same empirical materials bite back at us. In this sense we can no longer consider 'empirical materials' as passive, or even impassive; devoid of and having no affects. We must instead think of them as what Jane Bennett refers to as 'Vibrant Matter' which has "a not-quite-human capaciousness" (2010, 3). Here I am chosen by the choice of a move towards the frightening territory of 'not being understood', a position Patti Lather, as noted at the end of chapter four, refers to as an'ethical imperative' (Lather, 2007). As such, and at the necessary risk of 'not being understood', ideas and practices taken from trans-disciplinary post-humanism and new materialisms will be drawn on to allow me to consider data-as-agent, as the Deleuzian quasi cause of affective researching assemblages.

It is hoped that this post-human encounter with data will engender an ethical assemblage of words and things, enabling an engagement with a difficult relationship to feeding the body which does not, in the last instance, mobilise recuperative good or common sense. In other words, although *what* Joanne makes available to the project through her perspicacity and candour evokes the lived and every day of life on, and off-line, the work of the thesis, in its refusal to be satiated with good and common sense regardless of the *actual* lips through which it passes, is to engage with the inside of what occurs. This *inside of what occurs* is both more and less than what Joanne and I produced together in the state of affairs.

To spatio-temporalise and individualise Joanne's account would obfuscate the inside of what occurs in favour of that which is accidental. It would reduce the affective and pre individual flows to the (f)acts of one young woman's life. It is my thinking-feeling that what Joanne contributed to the project, and the problematics it conceived, was more than the *actual* time, insightfulness, desires and frustrations she shared with me. Rather, what 'Joanne's' actualised utterances of embodied and affective labour, proper names, ontological (un)certainty, validity claims and demanding categories opened my work to was the power of good and common sense to produce matter as mattering, or not. *Here good and common sense are considered as real and abstract agentic entities which assemble with other entities to cut real and abstract flesh.*

What occurred was that we met and we talked. The *inside of what occurred* was always more and less, getting bigger and getting smaller than her relationship to feeding the body, her political activities and the communities she was part of. More and less than the theories I engaged with, the conversations I had had over time and the hopes I had regarding the utility of this shared intellectual and embodied endeavour. In working this way my hopes are towards what is possible when accounts lived are opened to the event and the series which are selected by it. As such, I will not trace out a linear and humanist case study. This would sediment or stratify Joanne and the significant contribution she made to the project. I will organise this chapter according to those 'bits of things' which began to glow (MacLure, 2013b), leaving Joanne to become and become again, and allowing the thesis to avoid humanistic ethical folly.

Disrupting the Subject, a Case-Study Undone

> "[Anorexia] is an attempt to make the two incommensurable faces coincide or correspond. However, the two sides do not meet, and every [occurance] remains double. On the one hand, it is a 'de-differenciation' which compensates for the differentiations of the I and the Self in an overall system which renders these uniform; on the other hand, it is a matter of individuation, a protest by the individual which has never recognised itself within the limits of the Self and the I, even where these are universal" (Deleuze, 2004b, 323).

Leading out from the crystals of these ideas I would like to conceive of the data that I will put to work in this, and previous chapters, not as from Joanne as a bounded identity, but instead as *of* Joanne: Her becomings. These are unlimited in the sense that they are no more unconsciously determined than they are intentionally chosen. As I have noted previously when trying to clarify, while leaving sufficiently obscure, the event as *the inside of what occurs* is not limited to the psychic interiority of an individual. In the case of 'Joanne' 'the inside of what occurs does not lead out from her linear past. The event as sense and the sense of the event is not what was said, but rather *of it,* reaching and stretching towards multiple elsewheres. As such, it is not a question of representing "static relations among already-formed entities" (MacLure, 2013a, 169), sorting and coding what occurred into themes. It is a question of engaging with the mad or rebel element, the non-spaces, the occupants without a place and the placeless occupants that mock, and are mocked by, good

and common sense. Those bits of things which fly off from paradoxes and are swallowed, unintentionally, by the body.

Sense is *not only* articulated at the surface of language through propositions, it is also *of the body.* 'Joanne's' becomings will be shown to always already be in relation to other bodies and social spaces, humans and non-humans. It is in this sense that 'data' which was put to work and into language in this text were produced intra-actively by Joanne and I and a number of other (unintentional) actants. While 'Joanne's' contribution is engaged with ethically, responsibly and respectfully, and the words attributed to her emerged from her body and passed through her lips, It is my contention that how and why she speaks of food reflects the words she, and numerous other 'women', incorporeally and affectively eat in ways which "sidestep[..] each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs [...] *eventum tantum.*" (Deleuze, 2004, 172).

Working with *what* Joanne and I produced is *inside the process* of sensing emergent connections to partially digested bits of things - quotes, political antagonisms, frowns, waterless tears, theoretical ideas and long standing research questions. It is in this manner that the sense of the event is away from that which can be seen. It is not just the exoteric object. As I noted in the initial chapter of the thesis, the account I wish to give of a difficult relationship to feeding the body is opposed to the true or the false. Additionally it contests that which only concerns the individual and that which is individualising. Related to previous points I have made with regard to individualising discourses and good and common sense, to engage with the event is to engage with that which is beyond the general and the particular, neither *only* subject nor *only* object, *only* past, present *or* future. Here, as with the affective theories I put it to work with, the event and its singularity, can't be reduced to either or distinctions. The pre-individuality of the event is actualised by bodies, such as 'Joanne's', but not limited to them.

As I have attempted to convey throughout the thesis, the potential and intensity of relationships to feeding the body are reduced to either or distinctions through the logic of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. A lore which is not limited to any one discursive domain. Here I would like to suggest, recalling an idea Giles (2006)

propagated, that the DSM functions as a foundation test whereby pretenders are judged and their pretentions are measured.

DeLanda notes that "*Importance and relevance*, not truth, are the key concepts in Deleuze's epistemology" (2002, 7). This was touched on in the second and third chapter when Deleuze's writing on the simulacrum was drawn on and put to work. Through drawing on Nietzsche's power of the false, the pseudos, Deleuze's reversal of Platonic thought challenges notions of the true and authentic and enables a very productive disruption in the context of my thesis. In other words, through these ideas I am able to question what *proper* anorexia is and who *proper* anorexics are – both of which pertain to identity and ontology as fixed, ideas I have already conceptualised as problematic.

A Smile without Organs?

> "One senses that the smile will survive the effacement of the body"
> (Deleuze, 2013, 21).

The extract below is taken from my field notes. During this time a humanist method of analysis and interpretation formed the cornerstones of what I felt 'proper research' comprised. However, as I return differently to this empirical material I will be engaging with it, and it me, but I will not be 'interpreting' it. Having come into contact with material practices and methods of inquiry that disrupt and dislodge the expert subject, it is possible for me to consider the cuts that I make, and the responsibility that engenders, and the cuts that are made of me, and the entanglement that engenders, away from the spectres of ineptitude and monstrosity.

> 'I' am not, the "intentional subject standing separate and outside of 'the data', digging behind or beyond or beneath it, to identify higher order, meanings, themes or categories [I am] obligated to acknowledge that data have their ways of making themselves intelligible to us" (MacLure, 2013b, 660).

As MacLure goes on to suggest, in her exploration of the possibilities of research without representation, data that makes itself known to us, or rather, affects us, could be conceived as that which is in the process of becoming interesting, "a sarcastic

comment in an interview, or a perplexing incident, or an observed event that makes you feel kind of peculiar" (ibid, 660-661).

I begin this section of the chapter with such a perplexing incident, a smile that made me feel peculiar and which bought about questions and a desire for answers. Yet this became an encounter with the unanswerable that provided me with a taste for more interesting and relevant questions. In keeping with the intent that I have thus far laboured, I will try to move beyond the representational capacity of the *accident,* by also engaging with the event, its intensity, singularity and virtuality.

As noted a moment ago, I will not be interpreting these materials, nor will I spend an extensive amount of time analysing them. They are not lifeless, they already have a strange capaciousness (Bennett, 2010) and I have incorporated them to highlight that analysis is not an activity that can, or should be, located to a past or present. In other words, analysis comes about and keeps coming about. There are analytical points which are actualised in the field diary that are potentialities to be counter-actualised in a future that will only be retroactively defined (Massumi, 2002). As such, we might say that the 'unfounding' (Deleuze, 2004, 299) of post-representational analysis draws into itself, much like the event, a past-present-futurity which seems to hover above itself. With each visit and intra-action something new is produced at the threshold (Jackson, 2013).

The diary extracts were produced six months apart, June and November respectively. Under each entry I will spend a little time drawing out what feels important and relevant to the concerns of this chapter and the wider thesis.

Field Diary June 2011

> Joanne text me ten minutes before the start of the interview to say that she was running late and had had problems – that I was free to cancel the interview if I wanted as she expected to be at least an hour late. I responded saying that I hoped she was okay and that I would rather not cancel. I would see her as soon as she could get to the meeting place. She arrived an hour later and she was visibly thinner since the last time that I had seen her a fortnight ago - I felt a sort of jolt. I felt that to comment on what was visible would be counter to the ethics of the

project. I did not wish her to think that was the most interesting or particular thing about her. Joanne seemed to be in a good mood, I asked her why then moved to suggest the things I would like to talk about, the things I had made note of last week, particularly communities and how she felt about the research – both gleaned interesting responses.

Again it was a tearless, a dry meeting. There were moments where she smiled which seemed to stifle some unsayable thing rather than encourage conviviality or amusement. It was as though she found the predictability of her own response comforting in some way, as though her responses conformed to what 'an anorexic' may say or think. It wasn't a shared smile, and it didn't strike me as a nervous smile either. She looked down and her lips curled at the edges.

Although there was an absence of tears in the interview and Joanne had not seemed perturbed by our communication, at the end of the interview and in the evening afterwards there were lots of ideas that came through for me and I found it hard to leave the site of the interview. I even woke up thinking about it. She has been called a 'wannarexic' on–line by two girls who were older and in her words "severely under-weight, four or five stones". The word for some reason stopped me in my tracks, it was the accusation of being unreal, improper, and inauthentic and I was not sure what to 'do with it' yet. Is it perspicacity on their part and 'something other for me', is this why she smiled when I was asking her about why she came forward – was talking to me part of becoming by enacting – being the doer behind the deed, colluding with anorexic subjection? Was engaging with the project off-line connected to the way in which she and others in the community reinscripted shame on-line? With me did she take her indulgent self, the body that ate, as object?

We both had needs and desires in relation to the time space and issue of matter that we shared, which produced us and which we produced in the questions asked, answers given, abject tears and controlled assertions. I was getting something, I was getting 'data' but what was she getting? She said at the end of the interview when, I asked her about her participation, that she had come to realise things which had been important to her. Something struck me, a question, was I as much a part of her work as she was part of mine?

In this entry to my field diary I note the significance of a smile. A gesture which returns me to the quote that opened this sub-section. Indeed, the residual affective activity that the smile provoked in me, according to my diary, does suggest that the smile's 'itness', its dry incorporeality, did survive the effacement of both mine and

Joanne's bodies in the state of affairs in the interview setting. It is also the smile which makes these collection of words and things, separated by six months resonate to produce a sensation (Deleuze, 2013).

Field Diary November 2011

> J: "I can't meet you Tuesday. I instead get to have an intervention about my ED. I want to drop out of your research, keep what you have, but I don't want to do anymore x"
> S: "Are you okay? Do you want to talk x?"
> J: "Not ok at all. I don't know what to do and I'm scared"
> J: "My fucking mate has taken an OD"

> It was 1.30am by the last text – I fell asleep half an hour before – I felt guilty and responsible but having read a lot of the interviews recently as I transcribed I was confident I had always been ethical and that I had never ever commented on the way that she looked. I had reassured her that she mattered because of what she had to say, not because of the way she appeared. In the morning I asked if she wanted to talk – she said thank you but she couldn't speak – her throat was too sore. It was my feeling that she had binged worse and purged worse than ever and felt there was no room left to manoeuvre.

> She just text, its 3.30pm, saying she appreciated me being in contact and "I don't know. Im just panicking so much. I'm scared that it's going to be 'recover/ eat/ put on weight or leave" Initially I thought she was being sent to a residential place but her "?" to the query makes me think its university. Her next text clarified "leave volunteering with Upstarts etc. It's the whole if I'm not a good role model and cant sort myself out then I can't work there stuff" "Sorry for not being clear. Its an intervention with some of the Upstarts staff x" "I don't know what to do. I don't know how anyone can help"

> I thought last night as I lay awake back to what id noted about being part of her work – the narrative that she gave, the mixture of a new body and new words about it. If she was being made to recover that was not something that she wanted documented, not something she wanted to pass through her lips.

As I previously intimated, it is the contention of the thesis that these empirical materials are not impassive, devoid of or having no affects. Yet this does not stop

me from making, and taking responsibility for (Barad, 2007) the cuts that I make into them to produce further affects.

What I would like to draw attention to from this second entry is the way in which the smile that disturbed me at the time of the interview produced a "temporary point of indecision on the threshold of knowing". A quote I have already attributed to Maggie MacLure during the second chapter. The smile, and the problems it poses, floats over the research project. Like the needle of a sewing machine, rhythmically bobbing across a fabric of problems and solutions, the smile was the indistinct moment between a moving needle's entry and departure. The moment where inside and outside, external and internal, subject and object ceased to be appropriate terms of reference. The cracked smile that first appeared in June pulled up a thread in November as I considered Joanne's departure from the project and her unwillingness to have 'recovery recorded'. Good and common sense would perhaps focus on the accident of the overdose and the threat of treatment, yet the event would be somewhere else. Inside infinitive serial mixtures of *to die*, *to live*, *to take*, *to document*. As Joanne says in the afternoon text massage: "to recover/ [to] eat/ [to] put on weight or [to] leave".

A voice without Organs

Lisa Mazzei writes that "[i]n humanist qualitative inquiry, the assumption is that voice is produced by a unique, essentialist subject. [She] then explain[s] that from a post-human stance, interview data, the voices of participants, cannot be thought as emanating from an essentialist subject nor can they be separated from the enactment in which they are produced, an enactment among researcher-data-participants-theory-analysis – what [she calls] a *Voice without Organs* (VwO)" (2013, 732). Mazzei goes on to note that:

> "[s]ince voice cannot be thought as existing separately from the milieu in which it exists, it cannot be thought of as emanating 'from' an individual person. There is no separate, individual person, no participant in an interview study to which a single voice can be linked – all are entangled" (ibid. 734).

Before Mazzei develops the idea of the VwO she notes the humanist suppositions of the qualitative research project, drawing attention to the way in which the methods "oblige researchers to 'centre' the subject" (ibid). Here I would like to draw attention to the role of the idiot in Deleuze's thinking and suggest that lacking the compass to draw circles can be usefully applied to the way in which we 'draw' our research subjects, or perhaps more appositely, the way we animate and map our subject-objects.

As the chapter moves on I would like to take the ideas that Mazzei develops in this article and put them to work, to explore what they can *do with and to* the empirical materials that joanne-and-I-and-others produced. Here, in using a hyphenated form I am attempting to materialise, rather than represent, the intra-action: put it to work in practice. In the conjoined conjuring and its boundary leakage there is perhaps a way in which to illuminate the impossibility of separateness and to produce the illusory 'I' as somewhat unrecognisable to itself (Deleuze, 2004b). In working with the sense that leaps from what Mazzei produces, and by plugging it into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) the proud verbs *to eat/ to speak* that Deleuze conceptualises in *Logic of Sense* (2004a) I am becoming interested in sloping towards the edible nature of things, cutting them together and apart, waiting to be invited in to the spaceless-places where rocks can be nudged to release dry, neutral and inedible stuff.

Perhaps this returns me differently to the territory of the-becoming-sanguine-serpent-of-the-angelic researcher, or perhaps it produces another encounter with the haughty caterpillar, the rings of smoke and the quasi cause of possibilities and problems. Here the problem is not equitable with either the true or the false, the authentic or the pretender. As Deleuze notes:

> "the problem bears resemblance neither to propositions which subsume under it, nor to the relations which it engenders in the proposition: it *is not* propositonal, although it does not exist outside of the propositions which express it" (Deleuze, 2004a, 140).

Much like sense's special relationship to language, which does not expel, express or contain 'it', the *problem* might be said to have a special relationship to the

proposition whereby 'it', dry and incorporeal, does not exist outside of that which expresses it or brings it about. In other words the problem may be actualised in propositions: But it is not reducible to them. The problem as proposition, as denoted, made manifest, or signified is a red herring becoming a white rabbit, running but always too late, towards *the solution* - its conditioned condition. Sense and the problem might therefore usefully be thought together, not as good or common, but towards mutual illumination or flattening out. In other words, and to work with the glowing imagery of the 1978 film *Watership Down,* rather than chasing a white rabbit further down the rabbit hole to ask it questions and to find out what it knows, become affected also by the problem of Fiver's incorporeal double released in fields of blood; never staying still, relaying from soil and sky.

> "I don't know what it is," answered Fiver wretchedly. "There isn't any danger here, at this moment. But it's coming – it's coming. Oh Hazel, look at the field, its covered with blood". "Don't be silly, it's only the light of the sunset. Fiver, come on, don't talk like this, you're frightening me" (Adams, 2005, 7).

> "That the problem does not exist outside of the propositions which, in their senses, express it means, properly speaking, that the problem *is not*: it inheres, subsists, or persists in propositions and blends with this extra-being that we had previously encountered. This non-being, however, is not the being of the negative; it is rather the being of the problematic, that we should perhaps write as (non)-being or ?-being. " (Deleuze, 2004a, 140).

For Fiver, a small rabbit, it is not that the entity, the thing, 'the danger' is here and now, "the problem *is not*: it inheres, subsists, or persists in propositions" (Deleuze, 2004a ibid), for instance "look at the field, it's covered with blood". Here Fiver is not seeing in vision, but with vision, as a vision effect (Massumi, 2011). Hazel, also a rabbit, is frightened and refuses the sense that is momentarily actualised at the surface: "it's coming – its coming". The blood that seeps through the seams of the field is not the (f)actual blood of one or two rabbits, it is dry and yet still running, real and abstract: incorporeal. Rather poignantly more *it* than *what.* The *it* that passes through Fiver's lips and finds its way to the surface is not a particular identity or entity – the problem is not *what* is coming, the problem is that *it* is, dry and incorporeal - insensate yet sensed (Massumi, 2002).

Hazel is frightened, moved to feel unsafe by the affective transmissions and reverberation that Fiver's wild eyes, the field and sky actualise. Desiring stillness, or stratification, Hazel plugs into that which really petrifies: good and common sense. He gives a clear and distinct reading, unlike Fiver's obscure and distinct reading, of the terrain. He suggests that rather than waterless tears and aliquid blood it is "only the light of the sunset" *causing* this effect. While Fiver speaks of terrifying possibilities, Hazel eats them, perhaps becoming the quasi cause of a different kind of event, on its way to else wheres, or perhaps he wishes to avoid actualisations and skip straight to counter actualisations, securing the health he was given and losing sight of grand health (Deleuze, 2004a, 182). Hazel allows that which is accidental, the sunset, to 'steal the show' (Massumi, 2011).

During the fourth chapter of the thesis I considered the notion of the *crack,* suggesting that it was the frontier, or 'where the action happens'. Having already begun to explore the crack in terms of health and illness it now becomes important and relevant to my discussion of lapins Hazel and Fiver. Deleuze observes that "if one asks why health does not suffice, why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs". He continues:

> "anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through [the crack] in people ready to destroy themselves – better death than the health which we are given.[…] we must not lose sight of grand health (2004a, 182).

Here I do not read the idea of "better death than the health which we are given" as a literal health or death. I do not sense that it is a bombastic repudiation of the flesh or vitality, on the contrary. Within the context of actualisation and counter-actualisations this assemblage of words draws attention to the struggling, experimenting body of *a different* health, a different ontology. A becoming-healthier not a being healthy. (see Mann'O Donnel, 2010; Tynan, 2010).

The pre individuality of the event, that which is 'coming, coming' (and never ceases to do so), is actualised by the twitching writhing body of Fiver. We can *see that*, but

what we cannot see so readily are the manifolds and vectors which also produce the agentic assemblage. As with 'Jonanne', it is not Fiver the individual rabbit we might focus on here, it is the mixtures of bodies in the bloody sky, the field, fear, farmers, human economics, haemoglobin, adrenaline, glucocorticoid, and the surrounding territories of the warrens filled with non-human bodies.

Having engineered this encounter with Fiver and Hazel in a bid to engender a sense of the virtuality of the inside of what occurs, which is always already moving with the actuality of the accident, or what occurs (Williams, 2008a), I would now like to return to the material from my field diary and the interviews which produced them, one from June 2011 and the other from November 2011. As noted previously, this will not be according to themes, but instead according to those bits of things which are the quasi cause of further engagement; to borrow again from MacLure, those bits of things that began to glow (2013b).

As the actual and the virtual must be thought in disjointed tandem it is perhaps time to adopt that disjunctive gait of the angelic researcher becoming sanguine serpent. However, before that I would like to note *what occurs, the accidents,* of the interviews Joanne and I produced together in the state of affairs. Occurring in such a spacetime, or chronos, these things can be denoted, made manifest and signified. 'Joanne' and 'I' met, as *we* had done for months previously, in a cafe a good distance from where we both lived; *I* bought coffee for *myself* and bottled water for *her*; *she* found a table; *we* sat down; *I* activated the digital recorder; *we* talked; an mp3 file was produced; *I* used my laptop to write field notes on the bus home; *I* transcribed the audio file and merged it with the fieldnotes; I highlighted and added comments to the transcript, making links to theories and other empirical materials.

What occurred is represented here in this methodical methodological list of intentional human actors, personal pronouns and apparatuses - buying, sitting, activating, talking, and recording. However, these accidents do too little to engage with the interplay of words and things, the materiality of language and the vibrancy of matter. As Barad notes, "'[t]his' and 'that', 'here', and 'now' don't pre-exist what happens but come alive with each meeting" (2007, 396). Following this I will now try

to also engage with the inside of what occurs while exploring the entangled relation *between* 'researcher' and 'participant'.

As was noted previously, what produced these interviews and transcripts as in the process of becoming interesting was a smile, something actualised by Joanne, *both* coming up from the depth of her body and going down and out as lips curled at the edges. This smiling cracked-up-face produced at its edges a thought that became available to me. As the eyes in the entanglement became downcast and searching, affects emerged. Initially I reflected on this and a question emerged, *was I as much a part of her 'work' as she was part of mine*?

For many months these *reflexive* words made me feel uncomfortable. Perhaps they touched my humanist soft spot that spoke through personal pronouns and was both too shy to make language stutter, tremble, or cry (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176), yet hubristic enough to think of '*my* research', what 'I', and 'I' alone was responsible for. Conversely, reading this *diffractively*, rather than reflexively, it was impossible to pre-suppose that Joanne and I were separate entities (Mazzei, 2013) unaffected in the material intra-activity of the research. The process was itself an actant (Bennett, 2010). Following this diffraction different questions began to matter. For instance, was the agentic assemblage that comprised the field, the method, the apparatuses, language and matter, *rather than 'Joanne' the intentional individual*, producing me differently? Or was the agentic assemblage noted above producing an emergent subject –object relation that stuck in my throat and made its way to my field-notes?

Questions of responsibility are not absent if I step away from the taking of property that emerges from good and common sense. As Braidotti notes.

> "The ethical imagination is alive and well in post-human subjects, in the form of ontological relationality. A sustainable ethics for non-unitary subjects rests on an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or 'earth' others, by removing obstacles of self-centred individualism on the one hand and the barriers of negativity on the other. (Braidotti, 2013, 190).

If I am to take responsibility for the agential cuts I have already and will continue to make within this chapter it is necessary to encounter the notion that research practices do matter, and that the shared practice of meeting, speaking of food and eating words, materialised the world differently (Barad, 2007,89). Put another way, having worked defractively with what occurred and the inside of what occurred, it seems pitifully limited to suggest that 'I' were not also part of Joanne's material discursive work. To think otherwise is to hold tightly to the mythological and paradoxical 'I'. An 'I' which splits ontology and epistemology and takes as good and common sense its own subject position and property: A vantage point which sees from a safe distance the borders of that which it is not, but can now represent.

Overview of the interview

> "The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cry or even sing: this is the style, the 'tone', the language of sensations, or the foreign language within language that summons forth a people to come [….] The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from affectations, the sensation from opinion" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176).

> "The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what our verbal performances say, more readily than we can know the objects those sayings are about is a Cartesian legacy, a linguistic variation on Descartes' insistence that we have a direct and privileged access to the contents of our thoughts which we lack towards the 'external' world. (Rouse, quoted in Barad, 2007, 49).

As I engage with the eventfulness of the empirical, what occurred and the inside of what occurred, it feels both necessary and relevant to make note of some of the scenery from which the empirical materials mentioned earlier, the field notes, were cut apart. This, perhaps, will not produce a clearer or parsimonious account, adding to the already proliferating opacity of words and things rising to the surface, but it will hopefully work with the foreign language within language. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176). In this sensational becoming murkier, the affective tonality of words and things has an increased chance to glow, *to become luminous not by comparison, but as superposition (Barad, 2007, 76), in the combination of disturbances*. As such,

rather than casting shadows of doubt from objects of inauthenticity or falsity, the quasi causal timbre of the glow, which "does not obey our laws and is apt to elude us" (Massumi, 1992, 53)[12] draws instead percepts to the bits of things which do not rest *in* or *on* individuals, but are always already *of them.* "Being worthy of the event is not an individual's task – events are occasions of communication rather than isolation" (Williams, 2008, 168).

As was noted earlier in the chapter, this interview featured a dry smile which escaped my desire for the moistening of 'meaning' (Barthes, 1982), doing me the peculiar favour of becoming unsettled. A becoming Fiver, as it were. This meeting was the first time Joanne and I had 'seen one another' for a month, a much longer period than usual. Although this meant an absence of face to face meetings we remained virtually present to one another through social media newsfeeds. Below are a few of the words which appeared, but perhaps rather than 'words' it may be more apposite to refer to them as an assemblage of words, things and "[p]erformative statements [which] change things by being said, they have an illocutionary force" (Massumi, 1992,29). Perhaps further to this I would like to relate these ideas to Derrida's notion of 'messianicity', noted in the previous chapter as pertaining to the "open-ended *promissory* quality of a claim, image, or entity" (Bennett, 2010, 32). Below are performative promises of what a body can, and will, do.

> "Bah, so frustrated with myself. Only burnt 218 calories today -_-'I'll just have to do some more later! Off to the gym again!"

> "Well, it definitely hurts this morning, but who can complain about losing 2lbs over-night?! =D Going to do the same again today, I think =)"

> "It'll take time, but it'll come off =) x Sweat is fat crying. =) back to the gym today and make it cry a little more, it felt too good yesterday not to!"

To add one more verb and suggest that this is what a body can *be made* (to do) is both possible and relevant. Yet this must be done adroitly, taking good care not to

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[12] Here I am making a link between that which Deleuze refers to as the quasi cause in the Logic of sense and what Massumi engages with, in the context the quantum void of potentiality. This discussion of 'Quarks and company' (1992, 52 – 53) covers very similar ground to Barad's *Meeting the Universe Halfway* 2007)*,* chapter two, pages 71 – 94.

take Decartes' hand and join him in his stovepipe daydreams (Massumi, 2011) of disembodied thought. Here it is not simply the 'I', or cogito, Joanne's or any*one* else's that intends what a body can be made to do. The above performative promises express not so much the will of the individual knowing subject, but the machinations of words and things, that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies. Here we might say that a body's doing, a body being made t(hr)o(ugh) do(ing), is always already comprised of a dual causality – quasi and actual.

These performative statements that 'Joanne' had typed on a keyboard in some other elsewhere had affects. They produced a problem to me 'somewhere' else in a way which cannot be reduced to the division between on-line, o*r* off-line or as a cause effect chain that was in the future of her on-line utterances. Instead, these statements, as they glowed, became a needle of Aion, looping backwards and forwards, picking up incorporeal threads of matter and dropping words: Tying knots which compelled me not to undo them, but to tie them differently.

> "A line of becoming is not defined by the points it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes *between* points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived […] A line becoming only has a middle[…] fast motion" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 323).

The notion that '[s]weat is fat crying. =)' seems to engage with the 'laws' of thermodynamics in a rather interesting way – not simply matter converted to energy – the lowest common denominator of human labour in capitalist societies, but more precisely the conversion of 'fat' into tears of sweat. The production of an unctuous mixture which "fe[lt] too good" not to do[..] again".

As 'Joanne' asks "who can complain about losing 2lbs over-night?!". There is an interesting intervention into logics of time and practice. In one sense, perhaps both common and uncommon, as that which happens 'overnight' disrupts the notion of the intentional human actor. Because they are presumed to be asleep, the intentional will is not being exercised towards a particular effect, a possibility which draws attention to the agency of matter, or the organism, and its capacity for experimentation. Without the cognitively intentional subject in the driving seat the

body, not the mind, has a transformative capacity – it moves – it feels – it feels itself moving (Massumi, 2002) and vibrating with relational agency.

However, these words also, rather more conservatively, temporalise activity to the *actual night* in the state of affairs, the place where accidents happen. Here a cause and effect chain is set up wherein the intentional physical activity occurring hours previously, in the gym, leads to two pounds weight loss by the morning. It is here that something is becoming luminous, something beyond the general and particular which requires nuanced consideration. I would now like to plug into Fiver, the aesthetic figure introduced earlier, and the interdisciplinary practice of new materialism. To become-Fiver, in the context of analysis, is to feel compelled by invisible forces and silent screams (Deleuze, 2013). To say, as it were. "I don't know what it is […] but it's coming – it's coming" (Adams, 2005, 7).

Thinking with and through these literature-machines (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a) opens the inquiry to the reverberations of agency, affect, sense, intent, determinism, the body and the organism in ways which are nipped in the bud by good and common sense. However, although they are nipped in the bud by the language of good and common sense, incorporeally and affectively they manage to grow tubers. Unfortunately though, these suspicious growths all too often tend to be chopped from the experiencing body before being saturated in good and common sense and served through conservative empiricism. Processed and served according to this recipe, affective and incorporeal tubers tend then to be refused as unpalatable and paranoid leaks from abhorrent the object, *the illness*. This recalls the problematics that were set out in the opening chapter of the thesis.

If 'anorexia' is object to the authentic subject it must be denied, prevented and cured, but how can potential be prevented and sense cured? If on the other hand 'anorexia' is conceived as the true or authentic subject matter then becomes overwhelmed by the platonic Idea and that which is lived and living becomes objectified and shameful. This separation of the subject from the object, or the knower from the known, produces 'anorexia' as both inside and outside of the subject depending upon where we look for the singular cause. We thereby fail dismally to conceive of the idea that 'it' is always already in the middle of things as the insensate sensation of something

coming about: The quasi sensory tingling of the virtuality and actuality of a matter shifting somewhere. "There isn't any danger here, at this moment. But it's coming – it's coming. (Adams, 2005, 7).

> "In reality, every point of your body is such a singularity or a turning point; each is potentially the locus of an inflection or change. So though we often become fixated on standard thresholds, such as [weight gain or loss], this is often at the expense of missing more intense ones that remain imperceptible yet determine us more strongly as individuations none the less" (Williams, 2008, 91).

It is not that the above readings of time and matter are contradictory, revolutionary or conservative, insightful or illusory, possible or impossible. It is instead that when it comes to the matter of matter it is important to engage with its real abstractness, its incorporeality, its virtuality. It is important to engage with emergent paradoxes so as not to weigh the true and the false and dead-end possibility for the sake of easy answers. Although the loss of matter is representable *from one point to another,* as a "standard threshold" (Williams, 2008, 91), what the scales 'say' from one morning to the next, the vitality of matter cannot be reduced to a formula of actual causality - calories burnt as compared to those consumed. 'Joanne', as traditional realist, notes she is "[g]oing to do the same again today" in her update. But she can't. She can, in some sense, intend the repetition of the previous day's activities, continue with her experiment, but the difference of the body-organism, from one day to the next, cannot be reduced to single figure variables of causality. The same body is always already becoming different as it intra-acts and either becomes drawn in, or leaps towards, differing agentic assemblages (Bennett, 2010).

To initiate a rejoinder to the notions of sense and dual causality, the 'over-night' effects were both *long since in motion; but also unfinished* at the point at which she steps onto the scales. There are movements *of* the body which scales cannot speak of. Even the sort that Joanne owned which passed electrical signals through her body to determine her weight, body fat percentage, body mass index (BMI), water percentage, muscle percentage, bone mass percentage and estimated the number of calories she had eaten. The real cause of this shift in threshold, this weight loss, was actualised by a number of actants which cannot be reduced to the human. For

instance the water carried around to "fill [a] stomach", the money spent on gym membership, the electricity that powered the treadmill and running machine, reproductive and appetite hormone levels such as grehlin[13] and oestrogen, laxatives and diuretics, adrenaline, the pedometer application on a phone, the kitchen scales, the shelf in the fridge where 'safe foods' are located. In addition to this range of ingredients, many of which are seen, through optics of either plain sight or microscopic technologies, there are also the quasi causes of previous events slopping about in an agentic affective soup women have eaten over the course of many lifetimes - misogynistic words and the affects of pride and shame.

'Joanne's' intra-action with the scales draws attention to the way in which knots of autonomy and mastery can be unpicked and retied to make apparent the significance of technologies by which nature and culture interact (Barad, 2007, 42). Here what occurs in the state of affairs, the accident, is a measurement of matter by a techno-representational apparatus, the inside of what occurs is perhaps possibilities of a new body – *not a body that appears new* as this is not only an actual body caused to change by its own agency, *but a body becoming something other.*

In stepping onto the apparatus something *of them both, in excess of electricity and adrenaline, leap forwards:* Something quasi causal diffracts the agency of each to produce an intermingling of human and non-human material. 'Joanne's' body is actualised as momentarily eventful, full of possibilities: Yet haunted by a proper name. Here issues of actualisation and counter actualisations return differently to the thesis as possibilities of difference are reduced to the same differences of a reduction in weight and being proper or authentic. This changing, potentially deterritorialised body, which is both actual and virtual, very quickly becomes reterritorialised by good and common sense.

Below is an excerpt from the interview which the earlier field notes came. In keeping with Mazzei's insights (2013) I consider this enactment amongst researcher-data-participant-theory-analysis in terms of the 'voice without organs', or VWO. I have cut

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[13] Ghrelin is an amino acid hunger-stimulating peptide and hormone that is produced mainly by cells lining the human stomach and cells of the pancreas.

this data together with the above points, regarding the potentiality of a body to become different, to draw out the way in which the tyranny of doxa stratifies the possibilities of real difference in favour of same difference: proper names, clear topography, and common sense distinctions between inside and outside, subject and object.

I have incorporated the transcribed material at length, not to suggest that 'it' speaks for itself, but also, by making this agential cut, not to assume that 'it' does not produce sensations prior to my analytical work. This connects with ideas I introduced at the start of the chapter, my attempted disruption of the humanist supposition that data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the 'breath of life' that is analysis and interpretation. Here I have also engaged with the idea that matter is vibrant, having "a not-quite-human capaciousness" (Bennett, 2010, 3).

> S: I wondered if you could tell me a little bit about the relationship between you and your eating issues, what it means. Does it make sense when I say 'it'?
> J: Yeah I think, yeah it does it sort of varies day by day and I kind of don't see it as being mine but me being its if that makes sense
> S: Okay so that's a difficult one to talk about but it does make sense for me to use the word 'it'?
> J: Yeah
> S: And does it correspond to your experience if I say that other people prefer to split 'it' off, like I love you but I don't love 'it'
> J: Definitely. My partner says things like 'oh it changed you, I hate what it's done to you'
> S: I wondered as you said that you were 'its', if you felt that 'it' had a power or personality of its own?
> J: Yeah I think, I always really hate being stereotypical, like if I say all the right things then I must just be faking it and be a 'wannarexic', so that's why I don't like talking about the stereotypes of it but yeah, it does feel like that
> S: So 'it' has a capacity? What do you feel about the personalisation of 'it'?
> J: Er well I think it's something that I tried to avoid thinking about for a long time in this relapse because it is something that does happen, it seems silly all these girls talking about Ed or ana or mia in their lives and I didn't want to be that sort of person and fit into that stereotype and it seemed, well that voice had always been there, and I just associated it with this

sort of personality I just never saw it in terms of the names ED, ana and mia like thinking about it more recently it does happen

S: You say a lot about not wanting to be stereotypical, is your difference from them, the others on-line, important to you?

J: Yeah but I think it's more to do with my size, like I almost don't deserve to be that way even in the sense that it would be arrogant if I did say that I was meeting the stereotype because of my size, I'd be a fraud, it feels safer to say I'm different because to say that I'm the same would make me sound like a fraud and make me more vulnerable, wannarexic.

S: So is there a real or true anorexic

J: Errr, no I don't, I know that eating disorders shouldn't be based on somebody's weight but, I know it's based on behaviours and the way that our eyes look...but for me it is about weight, like when I go to the meets, I always feel so disgusting because I'm the biggest one there and that I don't belong there and shouldn't be there and that I don't deserve the label of eating disorder, never mind anorexia because of my size and it even feels sort of stupid saying the word anorexia because of my size even though I know I have the exact same behaviours as someone diagnosed with anorexia it just doesn't feel like something that I can say because ..(trails off)

S: Okay I understand what you just said and I need to think about that in a productive way, that's really insightful. Something that just struck me when you were talking was that you didn't deserve the label and while I understand what you were saying I just wanted to add, so you might respond , aren't eating disorders in practice about a lot of pain and anguish and sacrifice, are you saying you don't deserve that?

J: Ermm I don't know

S: Do you ever think that the criteria that makes possible this idea of a 'proper anorexic' needs to be challenged?

J: No I just want to get there as quickly as possible.

Here, and on the floor once again, the sanguine researcher can sculpt out a trench to engage with the virtuality of a difficult relationship to feeding the body. To consider not *what* but who, how and why something is leaping from 'It'. Which entities, which onto-epistemologies are possible if 'its' becoming borrows lips to say something other than 'I'm too fat'? How might difference in itself become possible, before and after, 'it' is stratified by propositions which lack any sense other than that which is good and common and say. Propositions which mouth "*it's the illness talking, I hate what it's done to you'* "? Represented as a bird in a gilded cage[14] or affixed as a butterfly whose wings are tacked to each DSM criteria who might be possible if

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[14] Hilda Bruch (1978) *The Golden Cage – The Enigma of Anorexia*

inquiry encounters the eating order differently? If it attempts to find a way in which to think and feel with the shuffles, manoeuvres and frictions of the chrysalis while not being aghast if the cocoon contains a Russian Doll or the Cheshire cat's smile?

By using post-human and new materialist theories these embodied utterances cease to be the words, and actions, of 'Joanne' the individual, the feminist, the LGBT activist, the Woman, the pro-ana and they become a voice without organs (Mazzei, 2013) asking questions of what a body can (be made to) do, and what human and non-human actants this doing draws on. Further to this, this voice without organs leads us to territories of actualisations and counter actualisations which make glow the issue of how activities and processes produce female matter as mattering, or not.

Prior to the actual interview, and having re read the transcripts of our previous meetings, I wanted us to talk a little more about the communities Joanne was a member of – the feminist network, the LGBT group, and, of course, the Pro-ana community. I also wanted to bring up the issue of participation again and why *this* research, *our research*, mattered enough to make the hour long journey to the city each week.

As a member of the feminist network Joanne did not feel that she had the right to speak, 'as a feminist' on the issue of body image or 'eating disorder'. She could not speak of food, and relationships to it, in case she was interrogated further as to how and why *she knew such things*. I would like to suggest that how and why 'Joanne' was privy to such knowledge was disruptive to a common sensibility based upon a visual economy. I would also like to suggest that this was something 'Joanne' had a *sense of*. She felt 'too big' to speak as a body who would unquestioningly know, i.e. a 'proper anorexic', a body represented by the DSM; and too small to speak as the youngest and only member of the group whose opinions were antagonistic to the common sense idea that x causes y and z. The question of "what is more serious, to speak of food or to eat words" (Deleuze, 2004a, 29) becomes poignant in this instance as 'Joanne' listened to what other members of the group, the mixture of feminist bodies, felt *caused* body dissatisfaction and eating disorder amongst young women. Were the group speaking in front of the one who was to be served as food (ibid)?

> "I just felt really awkward because the way that they were taking about it was just like the media was this really big horrible thing that was manipulating the way that young women think and from personal experience and also the friends that I have the media has had nothing to do at all with the way that we view our bodies, like maybe a little bit but it wasn't the reason that we started to or it isn't a very big influence now and also it was like the way that they were talking it was like I couldn't join in with the conversation because I do eat really badly and because I do have negative body image myself and I just felt really uncomfortable because I just didn't feel like I belonged to be there because it was almost like I was on the opposite side".

Here, and because 'Joanne' remains respectful of the insidious workings of good and common sense, the categories they produce and the force they express to position bodies, she is an abashed placeless occupant. She cannot surf the paradoxes of bodies and politics. In this sense 'Joanne' sees only the contradictions, and 'either-ors' that good sense alone permits. These movements can also be seen to be at work in Joanne's relationship to other significant communities, the Pro-ana group and also the LGBT group. In terms of the latter, Joanne was concerned with the bodily binaries of butch and femme, and had 'chosen' to become absent from the group she had been part of for years, until she "got smaller" and would, "unquestionably", meet the demands of the category she had chosen. In terms of the Pro-ana group it is both the other-and self that define Joanne as placeless.

Even whilst attempting to move away from a model of pathology, which a feminist discourse of disordered eating seeks to do, the idea of causality remains external. The work of resisting, is in the last instance, remains internal and individualised. A paradoxical failure is set up whereby Joanne's becoming, as is the case for many young women, is imbued with precarity. A failure to resist slenderness, as it pertains to dominant heteronormative ideals of feminine slenderness (Day, 2010) engenders feelings that she is out of place and unable to speak *as a feminist;* while a failure to resist food and a maintenance of a 'normal' level of slenderness undercut her claims to observable' anorexia'.

Here we can see how the notion of resilience mobilised within preventative programmes which are informed by sociological and feminist ideas about disordered

eating, can easily become caught within a highly responsibilitised and individualised discourse. The idea that Joanne feels herself to be on the 'other side' is open to interpretation, what does she imply by the other side? Pro-ana/ Men/ Capitalism/ Conservatism/ Post feminism / all and none of the above? Although none are explicitly referenced what is clear is that she feels herself to be out of place, on the wall with Humpty Dumpty, yet without his mastery of verbs.

Although it could be argued that Joanne is among the best placed at the meeting to speak of food, and that the others who are present may benefit from eating her words, she herself feels out of place, as though she does not belong. The pathologisation and shamefulness of disordered eating in everyday discourses serves to keep her quiet. This, I would suggest, is at least in part due to the fact that her real observable body cannot yet be seen to speak for itself, or 'anorexia', properly. She could not claim a space of annunciation as a real feminist or as a real anorexic. We have seen already that she feels silly saying the word anorexia, "arrogant if [she] did say [she] was meeting the stereotype because of [her] size".

Here we see again the lived implications of setting up 'proper anorexia' as observable emaciation. To speak *as* either a feminist, or a pro anorexic, in this situation would engender the risk of appearing as a false pretender and/ or as pathological. Her weight, which at the time of the meeting was slightly above that which would be diagnosable, serves to maintain her anonymity as a pro-ana during the feminist meeting, allowing her to remain quiet. However, this same body is recognised by her as being too voluminous and abstractly verbose for the pro-ana community, somewhere she wishes to belong.

> "J: I have got a lot of negative comments because I'm like so fat that they feel like I shouldn't be there but even though I have exactly the same behaviours , even though I haven't had period for about four months, even though I have a lot of the symptoms of anorexia because I'm not that underweight they feel like ...
> S: what kind of things have they said if you dont mind me asking
> J: wannarexic (immediate answer – tip of her tongue quick).

In one sense the words 'Joanne' puts to work, and is put to work by, have a reductive quality. They focus, while navigating through a defensive sensibility, on what occurs, the accident, the 'behaviours' which play out in the state of affairs. Here 'behaviours' might also be said to include the matter of menstruation, something a 'proper anorexic body' cannot do (APA, 2000)[15] The performative statement '*wanarexic*' positions 'Joanne' as placeless to the proper. This word is part of an agentic assemblage which includes her embodied participation in pro-ana forums, 'the internet', on-line communities, "'choice feminism' (or what some call 'post-feminism')" (Hatton and Trautner, 2013, 74),identity politics and the esoteric word. But perhaps even more eventfully than that, the possibility of such a word through a good and common sense that valorises authenticity and' properness' at the expense of matter.

Concluding thoughts

In this chapter I have tried to work with the empirical, not conservatively, but radically (Massumi, 2011). I have worked with the bits of things which emerged and affected the directions and connections of my project's becoming. This different, or *new new* way of engaging with the empirical has been provoked by Deleuze's suggestion that the task of challenging and disrupting the stranglehold of good and common sense is the work of avoiding the empiricist's confusion between events, accidents and essences;

> "To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities. A double battle has the objective to thwart all dogmatic confusion between event and essence, and also every empiricist confusion between event and accident" (Deleuze, 2004, 64).

As I engaged eventfully and abstractly with the data 'I', 'Joanne', notebooks, cafes, a digital recorder, invisible forces and a laptop produced, I also folded in the other people, places and ideas which produced the agentic assemblages. In other words, there was a disruption of distinct states of 'feildwork' and 'data collection'. This

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[15] In the most recent Diagnostic Statistical Manual, published in 2013 (DSM V), criteria d, 'amenorrhea', or the absence of at least three menstrual cycles, has been removed. At the time of the interview it still comprised part of the claim to the proper name Anorexia Nervosa.

method of engagement has attempted to fold my inquiry into what Lather and St Pierre (2013) refer to as 'the posts'. I have drawn out *what occurs,* the verbal exchanges, the on-line practices, the political activities, but also connected then to the *inside of what occurs.* I have stitched and been stitched up by a needle-becoming-tack of singular and pre-individual sense. It has drawn together patchwork mixtures of bodies with pre-individual and singular textures. To add a final patch I would like to attach the thoughts of MacLure who asserts that a "materially engaged language would [..] be non-representational, non-interpretive, a-signifying, a-subjective, paradoxical and embroiled with matter" (2013, 663).

Put differently, given the points of engagement which have 'invited me in' (MacLure, 2013), and the theories and methods which have chosen me as much as I have chosen them, to have then worked with empirical materials, or data, through the comfortable strides of humanism and constructivism would perhaps have let me run faster and in straighter lines. However, my post-human slithering has enabled me not to simply ogle at 'anorexia', but rather to explore the ways in which powerful, demanding, ordinary and violent categories of good sense, such as those of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), colonise the possibilities of more liveable lives and potential becomings.

To slice into and produce differently some of Deleuze's insights I have tried to avoid moving in the circles humanist inquiry already (thinks it) knows. Forfeiting Heaven, and the ennui it promised, (see Lecercle, quoted in MacLure, 2013b, 665) has enabled my becoming-sanguine-serpent. My speaking in forked tongues hopefully facilitated the necessary speech impediment to make language tremble, or cry (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176). With one prong leaning out towards the virtual and the other slanted to catch the actual, both have intimately connected as they have touched my soft palate and become enfolded into my eating of words and my speaking of food.

CHAPTER 6: CONSIDERATIONS

> "[I]n the philosophy of language and philosophy of events, problems, series and events are interconnected to the point where *any worthy response to our problems is also a response to the problems of others*" (Williams, 2008a, 137, emphasis added).

In this concluding chapter it is important and relevant that I argue for the contribution that I have made to knowledge, being as clear as possible about what that contribution is and what its implications are. This, at a very simplistic level, is a response to the question of 'so what'. As part of this process I will provide a succinct overview of the thesis before introducing what I feel are the limitations of the research. I will also as plainly as possible state what the thesis does, and does not do. This hoped-for lucidity will help me to substantiate the claims to knowledge that I am trying to make and afford the reader clarity about what the inquiry sought to achieve. I will use this chapter to recapitulate the importance of my inquiry while remaining cautious about producing any dogmatic claims regarding its potential impact. What I will try to suggest is that as a result of this doctoral inquiry possibilities and openings have been cleaved asunder; to produce both a semblance of the subject-object of my inquiry (Massumi, 2011) and the subject-objects of further inquiries. I will do this by re-joining to the literatures which were explored in chapter two and throughout the thesis, noting how the particular assemblage of literature and methodology that the thesis has 'plugged into' (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) has enabled a "response to the problems of others": a worthy response, (Williams, 2008a, 137, quoted above).

Within this chapter I will also draw together the ideas which have been engaged with in the preceding chapters, drawing attention to the possibilities which arose from a burgeoning desire to write about 'anorexia nervosa' in a manner which sought to produce it as *unrecognisable* (Deleuze, 2004b). Here I hope to conjure the significance of questioning the activity of thinking and researching 'anorexia' away from common popular reason, and instead encountering 'it' as a rebel becoming (Deleuze, 2004a, 86) which exceeds codes and representations, "static relations among already formed entities" (MacLure, 2013, 169-171). I will note how I have tried to engage with difference and intensity, rather than difference and similarity.

The parameters of the thesis – what it does and does not do

Before I explicate what I feel are the thesis' main contributions to knowledge, I would like to make clear what the thesis sought to accomplish, what it prioritised, and what it did not. This overview will help me to discuss the limitations of the thesis later on in the chapter and lead into a brief discussion of where I think future inquiries would be usefully developed.

- The thesis **does** operationalise the complex conceptual language of the Deleuzian event.

- The thesis **does** provide a critique of the connections between good and common sense, philosophy and science, using the medical discourse and the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) as subject-objects of critique, conceptualising the latter as an apparatus of extensity.

- The thesis **does not** provide an individualised, cognised, spatio-temporalised or first-hand account of 'anorexia'. Instead, it **does** explore relationships to feeding the body as both pre-individual and affective and also within mixtures of bodies. That is to say, as affecting and being affected by mixtures of human and non-human entities.

- The thesis **does** attempt to produce an alternative account of choice by working with the notions of dual and quasi causality.

- The thesis **does not**, in the last instance, take the position that relationships to feeding the body are *either* chosen *or* determined. Instead it **does** advance the position that health and illness, agency and determinism are mutually enfolding paradoxical relations which produce abstract and actual events.

- The thesis **does not** suppose that science, per se, is conservative or restrictive to the task of inquiring into eating relationships. Rather, the thesis **does** hold the contention that what might be termed state philosophy and science (Massumi, 1992) reduce difference to the same difference; thereby reproducing problems and solutions which fail to engage with the real abstractness of matter and the complexity of difficult relationships to feeding the body.

- In keeping with the above point, the thesis **does** draw on trans-disciplinary theories of politics, philosophy and science. Indeed, it is the inter-connection

of trans-disciplinary works such as Deleuze and Barad that have enabled the thesis to produce a different account of relationships to feeding the body.

- The thesis **does not** provide a new dogmatic theory of 'anorexia', or 'disordered eating'. However, it **does** pry a space for rethinking relationships to feeding the body by providing an original consideration of the role that non-human actants play within the eating order.

- The thesis **does not** engage with every aspect of 'anorexia', instead it **does** engage with a specific 'problem' of whether or not 'anorexia' is a choice or an illness.

- The thesis **does not** provide an exhaustive literature review of conventionally cited eating disorder literature, but it **does** provide sufficient material to highlight the scarcity of texts which engage with the incorporeality of the body and the concrete abstractness of eating relations.

- The thesis **does** work rigorously with various concepts which comprise the Deleuzian event, for instance, accident, event, paradox and proud verb.

- The thesis **does** use the concept of series to analyse empirical materials.

- The thesis **does** engage promiscuously (Childers et al. 2013) with literature and ideas about choice, determinism and materiality in ways which are rarely put to work in more traditionally bounded 'disordered eating' research.

- The thesis **does** attempt to produce an account of relationships to feeding the body which disrupts proper names and fixed identities, noting how they can limit liveable lives and colonise potentiality within the human and eating orders.

- The thesis is one of the few sustained works which **does** engage with the concept of 'wannarexia'.

- By working with ideas that contemporary Deleuzian scholars have developed regarding health and illness the thesis **does** develop an alternative account of what it is *to be* healthy.

- The thesis **does** theoretically and methodologically work with paradoxes, it is critical of the limitations of contradictions within social inquiry.

- The thesis **does** acknowledge that it is a small study based on the limited empirical materials gathered throughout the course of the doctoral project,

however, it **does not** suggest that this under cuts the emergent lines of inquiry which the thesis engages with.

- The thesis **does** engage with on-line and off-line spaces and **does** engage with the appropriate ethical considerations of both 'spaces'.

Contribution to knowledge

The bifurcation of choice and determinism haunts many social, cultural and philosophical inquiries. Particularly those which engage with, in varying forms, structure and agency. What I have produced throughout the course of the thesis is a response to this lingering problem. In this response I have plugged empirical materials into what eminent Deleuzian thinker James Williams notes as:

> "perhaps the most important non-reductive contemporary work opposed to the modern foundations of free choices and their judgement through actual or predicted consequences" (2008a, 5).

By engaging empirical materials with a non-reductive work such as *Logic of Sense* (2004a) I have produced an account of the eating order that both questions and disrupts the ascription of proper names and their capacity to order and organise bodies that matter. I have also disrupted fixed identities, highlighting their metaphysical and material(ising) limitations.

I have contributed to the ongoing and extremely important trans-disciplinary conversation on the post-human in a number of ways, taking seriously the watch words of Brian Massumi that "[p]rotestations in favour of 'human warmth' betray an inability to feel an ardour of a different kind" (Massumi, 1992, 47). He continues by noting that what are important are "stirrings that are not just prepersonal, but impersonal, bodily but inhuman, outside intentionality, open irrevocably to chance" (ibid).

The subject-object of my inquiry, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, is deeply visceral, material and at times, indigestible. I feel that one of the most significant contributions the thesis makes to knowledge is its refusal of the humanist hail to shed tears in the state of affairs and make "consolations *á l'americaine* (Deleuze,

2004a, 177). As I noted in the second chapter, encountering Massumi's words and feeling the possibility of "an ardour of a different kind" (1992, 47) was a point of singularity, a turning point for the thesis in movement. It compelled the inquiry towards affects which were expansive beyond individuals, and beyond individuals' sorrows. This is put to work throughout the thesis and can be noted as having a particular impact within chapter five. To summarise this point I would like to draw attention to the materiality of the words "[p]rotestations in favour of 'human warmth', and the abstractness of the matter they affected. It was not that these words had any essential meaning, but the sense they produced enabled a methodological resolve to resist the warrant of what Ferreday terms the "overcoming/journey narrative of the misery memoir" (2012, 153).

Within the thesis 'anorexia' has been reconceptualised as 'a difficult relationship to feeding the body'. As I noted in the opening chapter, 'a difficult relationship to feeding the body' does not pathologise. It highlights embodied struggle and movement, activity and process. It foregrounds the relational aspect of the doer and the done, without individualising the subject on ascription. It cleaves a space in which to consider the innumerable human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010) that are enfolded in the digestive relation. It engages with how "living with transforming impersonal events takes precedence over identifying oneself and maintaining that identity" (Williams, 2008a, 129).

'A difficult relationship to feeding the body' looks towards what a body does – not what it appears to be, and not what it represents. As such it avoids "the cultural tendency either to reduce anorexia to abject spectacle or to elevate it to heroic myth" (Ferreday,2012; 153). It implies process, activity and movement but not towards a fixed or individualising identity. It de-territorialises the striated spatiality of 'Anorexia Nervosa' and acknowledges becoming rather than being. In doing so this conceptual disruption engenders a schism between 'accidental' appearance, consumables, and the fixed metaphysics of being. Working away from the 'proper name' moves possibilities of thought away from 'authenticity' towards a more attuned engagement with bodies, matter, and bodies that matter. Following Deleuze's reversal of platonic thought I disrupted the notion of 'proper anorexia' by engaging with the simulacrum and the power of the false.

As was noted earlier, "a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it. […] it is better to build the new function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate" (Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169) It is hoped that the thesis' attempt to engage with the real abstractness of matter has contributed to that new milieu, and that new functions will emerge which make staid ideas about bodies, and what they can do, inadequate in the context of consuming and producing relationships.

Massumi notes that virtuality is a pivotal concept in Deleuze's work, yet the least understood (Massumi, 1992, 34). Together the virtual and the actual are beyond the general and the particular and to draw this out I have worked with Deleuze's own re working of Plato's one and the multiple, singular and universal. Within the thesis I have rigorously worked with the virtual, drawing it out not in isolation, but in relation. I have shown that although all events require individuals to actualise them, enact or bring about the side of the dual cause which we refer to as *actual*, this actuality is always in relation to *virtuality* and that which is pre-individual. To substantiate this idea I have drawn on ideas taken from James Williams (2008a, 2008b) who notes that Deleuze's philosophy is a structure of interlinked processes that only acquire determination in practical situations. In other words, the virtual is always already 'practical', even though it cannot be reduced to that which occurs in the state of affairs, a spatio-temporally limited present.

I have noted that the pre-individual is connected to Deleuze's own, and other writers' theories of affect and as such have contributed to contemporary discussions within theory and practice regarding this theoretical-methodological area. 'The virtual', as part of Deleuze's ontology, is the process of becoming rather than the stasis of being. Yet importantly, the being *of* the virtual, as indicated a moment ago by drawing attention to the pre-individual, is not reducible to an individual's psychological consciousness. As Robin Durie notes, the intimate relation between problems and solutions "foreshadows [Deleuze's] account of the relation between the virtual and the actual" (2006). Following this idea I suggested that we can think of the relation between the virtual and the actual as one of mutual enfolding, an idea further evinced by James Williams (2008b) who makes clear that the virtual and the

actual cannot be thought separately and that attention to one, at the expense or derision of the other, produces the hierarchal or 'aborescent' (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a) models of thought that Deleuze challenges.

The use of '*of*' is a key indicator of the way, and the points at which, the thesis engages with virtuality, or incorporeality. This emerges from the way in which Massumi articulates the imprecision of clear and distinct lines drawn between body and mind. "Of it, but not it. Real, material, but incorporeal" (Massumi, 2002; 5).Paraphrasing Deleuze, Massumi's suggestion that "contemporary theories, far from being too abstract, are not *abstract enough* to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete" (Massumi, 2002, 5) produced a curve in my own thinking about how I might engage with the materiality of 'the anorexic body'. The virtual, or incorporeal, is central to the way in which the thesis puts both theory and data to work, and, in keeping with Williams' idea mentioned above, acquires determination in practical situations. Here the 'practical situations' referred to include *both* the 'data' presented, or cut apart (Barad, 2007) and the real and abstract conditions which gave rise to such 'data', during my on-line and off-line fieldwork.

Also connected to virtuality, but producing an opportunity to introduce the thesis' contribution to a discussion of space and time, are the notions of the state of affairs and the accident. As the thesis worked with empirical materials it has drawn attention to the way in which the accident can be considered in terms of the actual, as it is *what occurs,* and the event, *as the inside of what occurs,* can be considered in terms of the virtual. This apparent separation was noted as being no separation at all, for traces of one were always already in the other. They are separated *not to bifurcate or border, or suggest that they are collapsible, but rather to highlight the mutual and processual connection between both the virtual and actual:* both-and, not either-or.

Continuing with the notion of both-and, and, either-or, is the significant place that paradoxes occupy within the thesis. Cued by Deleuze's assertion that "[p]hilosophy is revealed not by good sense but by paradox" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286) I have methodologically advocated working with paradoxes, as opposed to contradictions, to allow me to prolong the problem long enough tie knots differently (Deleuze, 2004b) I have also, through the paradox, made connections between my own work

with the paradox and MacLure's (2013a) work with the mad or rebel element in language, noting that "objectively, paradox displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286). I have also engaged with Alecia Youngblood Jackson's work with the threshold, which as she notes:

> "does not become a passageway until it is attached to other things different to itself. Thresholds contain both entries and exits; they are both/and" (2013, 116).

In the third chapter of the thesis I drew out what was different about my engagement with paradoxes and conjunctive synthesis by suggesting that the interconnection of series and events enables a way in which to explore the moving structures which produce the conditions in which events come about and 'where' passageways and thresholds become important and relevant.

Although they are noted above in relation to virtuality, the way in which the thesis works with the concepts of both accident and event contributes to the critique of representation and the development of non-representational theory (MacLure, 2013b). What the thesis has made a case for is the onto-epistemological-ethical (Barad, 2007) 'dangers' of representing' anorexia', particularly as an abstracted diagnosis, weight or appearance. This is in keeping with the recent work of Warin (2010) who refused to give details about her participant's weight and the British Eating Disorder Association publication (B-eat, 2010) which features accounts of people with a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and Ferreday's (2012) engagement with 'spectacular images of thinness'. Put differently, the thesis responds to both the particular representational problems posed for thinkers engaging with 'anorexia', but also prolongs this 'problem' in such a way as to illuminate problems of representation in social inquiry more generally.

The implications of this dual engagement is that it does not isolate 'the problem of representation' to any particular group or entity, as this would perhaps suggest a 'lack' in that group or entity. Instead my inquiry takes a step back to consider 'the problem of representation' beyond the general and particular. The particular contribution that the thesis offers through the mobilisation of accident and event is

that it opens up the possibilities for empirical work to take seriously both what occurs – the accident – and the inside of what occurs – the event. Put differently, the thesis has tried to make the case for engaging with the power of incorporeal and pre-individual entities which cannot be 'captured' through a language of good and common sense, or standard propositional language. It has made the case for an empirical consideration of the intermingling and enfolding of sense and nonsense, which, I would suggest has produced a textuality which risks 'not being understood', a position Patti Lather refers to as an'ethical imperative' (Lather, 2007).

To continue with the idea of daring not to be understood, the thesis has taken up and worked with a concept, connected to the event, which from my review has not as yet received sustained engagement. This concept is the proud verb. The way in which the thesis has taken up the proud verb is in keeping with its interest in movement and the interplay of bodies and language. The way in which the thesis has operationalised and explicated the proud verb has been in its attempts to express the interplay of actual bodies and virtual events, virtual bodies and actual events. It has attempted to draw out the importance of the abstract and infinitive form of the verb by focussing attention on the idea that it is both the property of no-one, but has an important relation to bodies, as they actualise events. Proud verbs, usually in the infinitive form, for instance, *to eat/ to speak,* that Deleuze conceptualises in *Logic of Sense* (2004a) carry events off into past-future events, hence they 'belong' to no one. However, the thesis has also attempted to indicate that the activity and potential of verbs play a role in the individuation process of humans and non-humans: their becomings.

The thesis' take up and re working of the proud verb has attempted to highlight the significance of materiality, and how language is implicated in, rather than contrary to, its multiple becomings. Although writers, including James Williams (2008a) note the significance of verbs, particularly infinitives, at the time of writing the thesis I was unaware of any other work which took up the particular way that Deleuze considers the pride of verbs in *Logic of Sense* (2004a). This concept has proved to be a valuable provocation to the thesis, enabling me to reconsider the politics of being named, an issue which has long been a concern for feminists. As Kramarae notes, "[f]eminists have consistently argued that those who have the power to name the

world are in a position to influence reality."(cited in Moi; 1985, 158). From the proud verb, as it was plugged into my empirical materials, there was a resonance which made available to thought the possibility of the ashamed adjective.

As noted in the first, second and fourth chapters of the thesis the 'ashamed adjective' is not simply a lazy bifurcation of pride and shame, it is instead a way of theorising the material-political-affective capacity of *being –described*. Humpty Dumpty, the elliptical conceptual persona Deleuze writes with, "forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They've a temper some of them – particularly the verb: they're the proudest, *adjectives you can do anything with*, but not verbs" (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 -31. Emphasis added). Here Deleuze's working of grammatical forms and materiality offered me a way in which to draw attention to the material implication of becoming-adjective. In other words, when powerful bodies, medical practitioners, parents or teachers, describe, through good and common sense and an institutionally powerful discourse, someone as 'an anorexic' the body they produce is one which anything can be done with. They can be told that they must enter into therapeutic and/ or re-feeding centres, they can lose their freedom to 'experiment' with the eating order as they find suitable. This production of a body, which can be done to, can be seen to produce a desiring-machine that becomes-proud, and does the choosing (of anorexia) as a lifestyle choice. Additionally, this foreclosure of experimentation was noted in the fourth chapter of the thesis as the proud threat which came from Joanne's grandmother. Within this chapter I noted the role that gender plays both in the process of being named, or produced as an adjective, and experimentation suggesting that *'one man's autoimmune self-immunisation could be a young girl's entry to in-patient treatment'.*

As noted above, the proud verb does not relate to any one individual's feelings of pride, but rather the pre-individual intensity of verbs. As has been explicated in the methodological engagements of the thesis, Deleuze's philosophy is dismissive of factual autobiography and person-based psychology, but this is not to suggest that what individual bodies can *do* is not important. Within Deleuze's transcendental empiricism what exceeds the particular and general individual is what becomes interesting and relevant. As "the traces of [shame and honour] [her] life bequeaths impersonally for others to express anew, in the multiple, ideal relations of 'to shame'

and 'to honour'" (Williams, 2008a, 151). To relate this back to the example I just provided, of Joanne being threatened with a recovery programme, what is at stake is beyond the *actual* event of Joanne's own life, yet it is through her body, what it can do and be made to do, that we can consider the spatio-temporal limitations and possibilities of naming practices, including diagnosis.

To pick up on the post-representational work that the thesis undertakes through the accident and event, this can also be noted through the way that the dogmatic image of thought was engaged with. Early on in the doctoral project I had tried to conceptualise 'anorexia' as a weighty signifier. In other words I wanted to draw attention to the way in which, as a signifier, 'anorexia' was full of other entities pertaining to class, race and gender. As I started to consider relationships to feeding the body I became critical of the limitations of the medical discourse in terms of its compulsion to represent, predict and organise bodies. Through plugging into *Difference and Repetition* (2004b) I was able to find a conceptual language that enabled me to figure the problem of 'anorexia' differently. I became aware that my concern with the 'weightiness' of 'anorexia' had been a concern with its iconic position in numerous discourses. Additionally, as I engaged with *Logic of Sense* (2004a) I became cautious about remaining at the level of propositional thought. Realising that signification, manifestation and denotation did too little to engage with the fourth element, which is sense. I was left with the feeling that I had to plug into different concepts. As such, the inquiry asked the question of 'so what' to the proposition that 'anorexia is a weighty signifier'. The emergent response was that what was important and relevant to consider was not *what* something was, but *how* and *why* it became. To respond to these questions I became interested in the messianic power of 'anorexia', its open-ended *promissory* quality as an entity (Bennett, 2010, 32): *Not powerful in and of itself, but in its relationship to other entities.*

By plugging into the possibility that 'anorexia' had an open ended promissory quality (Derrida, cited in Bennett, 2010) I was able to develop the Althusserian notion of interpellation away from any particular or general notion of a pre-existent or eternal *Law*. As such I was able to suggest that rather than turning, consciously or unconsciously, to the hail of the Law, the turn was not by the body or mind, but *of*

both: quasi causal. I noted that Derrida's notion of messianicity set in motion the thinking feeling of the Deleuzian event which had become 'the biting point' of the thesis, and what I referred to in the fourth chapter as a politics of non-arrival, a "not yet arrived at health" (Mann O'Donnel; 2010, 163). Through the idea of a not-yet-arrived-at-health I was able to destabilise the distinction between being anorexic and being well, being proper and being improper. In other words, I was able to draw attention the enfolding processes of health and illness, actualisation and counter actualisation.

Within chapters four and five I contributed to contemporary thought on the concept of the experiment (Arsic, 2008, Tynan, 2010; Mann O'Donnel, 2010), which both Nietzsche, and through him, Deleuze, work with. Importantly I was able to add to this discussion by noting the role that non-human actants play in relationships to feeding the body, thereby producing a non-human account of 'anorexia' and the digestive assemblage (Bennett, 2010). Additionally, my engagement with the experiment enabled me to draw attention to the way in which even subtle and sophisticated explications of 'anorexia' (Arsic, 2008) can make assumptions with regard to agency. I noted that the subject, *the anorexic*, and the object, *anorexia*; the knower, *the anorexic-experimenter*, and the known, *the anorexic-experiment*, are positioned in a manner which pre supposes a human agent who has the capacity to 'be in control' of an experiment.

As such, I noted that accounts which fail to move with the movements of experimentation do little to make apparent a "lack of fixed object-apparatus distinction" (Barad, 2007, 357). Following this, it has been the contention of the thesis that accounts which separate out subject and object, and do not engage seriously with the agentic capacities of non-human agents undermine the visceral knowledge of that which is being experimented on – the body-organism – the matter of matter. Connected to the above reservations the thesis has asserted regarding the separation of subject and object (Massumi, 2011), it has also attempted to show how and why these domineering onto-epistemologies emerged (Brennan, 2004, Deleuze, 2004a, Barad, 2007), and suggested why these divisions are problematic in the context of relationships to feeding the body.

By engaging with middling activity and the interval the thesis supposes a more expansive space-time, one which refuses the boundaries of individualised, accidental, representational time: chronos alone. One of the ways this is operationalised within the thesis is within the post-human case study posited in chapter five. Here, rather than sketching out a particular past, represented through the actual events of a particular life, leading to one future, an account was produced which engaged with the interplay of problems and solutions.

Retrospective overview of the thesis

The thesis has attempted to show the working out and working through of conceptual aspects of the Deleuzian event. This activity has been stirred by a desire to productively disrupt good and common sense understandings of 'Anorexia Nervosa' and 'Pro-Anorexia' to create a space in which the actual is not severed from the virtual, its movements, processes and activities. Returning to the quote with which this chapter commences, although the thesis selected a problem which was clear and obscure, a problem which cannot have a final solution, the responses which emerged during inquiry are hopefully worthy in the sense that they are responsive to philosophical, ontological and epistemological 'problems' outside of the issues that were focussed on – whether or not 'anorexia' was a lifestyle choice or a mental illness.

The empirical materials, or data, that the thesis has engaged with have highlighted the lived implications of separating out the actual from the virtual, the corporeal from the incorporeal. In working with these materials I have tried to make luminous the idea that reinvestments in actual, or proper 'anorexia', serve to re-produce the hierarchal, or aborescent logic of the Diagnostic statistical Manual. I have tried to draw attention to the power and weight of good and common sense by highlighting that even where medical expertise is apparently subverted by 'experience based expertise' (Conrad and Stults, 2010), and 'anorexia' is posited as a 'lifestyle choice', bodies remained organised according to this powerful discourse. Not because of its inherent truth, but because of the ways in which it insidiously colonised potential understandings of the eating order and relationships to feeding the body. As such, It has been the contention of the thesis that good and common sense alone inevitably

undercut the revolutionary and resistant ambitions of the pro-anorexia or 'pro-ana' discourse, keeping their ambitions hostage to the dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b), represented in 'cultural freeze' (Massumi, 2002).

Here, the idea of 'freeze frame', has been developed through the notion of 'the accident'. The accident, or what occurs, is manifest in what Deleuze refers to as 'the state of affairs', what conservative, as opposed to transcendental empiricism works with due to its amenability to vision and the way in which it can be availed to evidence 'something in particular'. I have suggested that although that which is discernible through vision allows empirical boxes to be ticked, it misses the point, or the sense of the event. Or perhaps more precisely, it misses the sense of the event if it is not also engaged with in terms of the inside of what occurs – the event of sense. As I have previously cited Williams as saying, "events are much more than an actual thing 'happening' in a limited space and time" (2008, 31).

In line with this work carried out with accident and event I have tried to show how a common sense focus on representation or appearance (of an emaciated body or numerical figures registered and represented on scales) informs a particular relationship to feeding the body. This line of thought has connections to earlier significant work on 'eating disorders', particularly Helen Gremillion who argues that:

> "psychiatry exercises power by labelling, organizing, and constructing anorexia as a reified and bounded condition that is removed from cultural ideologies and processes, as an illness entity which can be grasped and 'fixed'"(1992, 59, emphasis added).

Within all of the previous chapters of the thesis there has been a concerted effort to work with the language of the event and not simply that of good and common sense. Put differently, there has been an attempt to engage with something other than denotation, manifestation and signification – our standard language. This has not simply been an exercise in aesthetics, it has also been a political act spirited by a desire to free relationships to feeding the body from a dogmatic image of thought, challenging 'anorexia' as mandate. As Massumi notes:

> "[t]his imprisonment is less an immobility than a stereotyped progression since the order-word acts to carry a body from one pre-defined set of potential relations to another. Everyday language does not entirely straitjacket our potential but it does restrict us to the lowest level of our virtuality. It limits the dynamism of our becoming to the stolid ways of being deemed productive by an exploitative society. It takes us from one bland realm of possibility to another. It delivers us to power". (Massumi, 1992, 40 – 41).

Throughout the thesis I have repeatedly made the case for disruption as an ongoing process, rather than a once and for all moment. This disruption has primarily concerned proper names and fixed identities. I have done this through a critique of good and common sense and by engaging with the productivity of paradoxes. In addition I have been critical of the medical discourse, particularly the power it has to describe, organise and limit embodied potential. However, it is important to note in this closing chapter that this critical engagement with good and common sense is not a totalised or dogmatic critique. Put differently, I have not presumed that the object of my critique, or the spaces where complex problems circulate, can always be referred to in the here and now of the state of affairs. The entities I have engaged with and the notion of ontology that I have mobilised have made it necessary to work at the cleavage of the actual and the virtual.

What I have attempted to make available through a particular affective tonality and theoretical methodological writing is the importance of thinking problems as pertaining to corporeality and incorporeality, and as multiply connected. As Williams notes, all thought is strategic and

> "has a series of pre-suppositions with respect to desires, sensations, individual interests, group interests, and so on, Thought is therefore always an interaction with the problems raised by these desires and their limitless communication with other desires and events" (2008a,115).

A desire to unfix good and common sense notions of what actual 'Anorexia Nervosa' is and who actual 'Anorexics' are - while never becoming forgetful of the lived and everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body, worked with and through me. In this sense, it was not my desire but rather a problem that was available to encounter. This task became possible by engaging with theories

pertaining to the event, affect, virtuality and incorporeality as they engendered a thinking-feeling that was abstract enough to get into, and under, the conceptual skin of what is presumed concrete about matter. (Massumi, 2002, 5). These theories were combined with ideas drawn from new, or feminist, materialisms and post-humanism to engage with the visceral, vital, materiality of relationships to feeding the body. Together, these literatures worked towards the possibility of destroying 'Anorexia' as a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b), and refusing to take for granted pre-defined, or a priori, borders of materiality, causality, and agency. My engagement with eating and speaking has not been about posing well defined problems and creating pristine solutions. Following Deleuze I have tried to

> "[move] away from any type of thought that affirms that a problem has been resolved, and towards seeking ways of replaying problems better, criticising their fixing in an image of thought and creating new concepts at the cutting edge of the return of the problem" (Williams, 2008a, 113).

Further to these points is the idea that re-theorising might also be thought as a question of doses rather than as some kind of 'cure' for socially and materially felt 'ills'. As Olkowski notes "we do not live in Wonderland" (2008, 120) and it is not the case that we would engender a healthier or happier society by doing away with good sense entirely. As Olkowski goes on to note "our actions have consequences" (ibid). Here, what I do think is worth further inquiry is how we conceive of these consequences and how we figure responsibility in relation to them. More pertinently, how do we engage with the paradoxical nature of consequences, or the consequential assemblages that are produced in our intra-actions with the world? How do the moving structures of gender, race, class and sexuality affect how we consider what is, and is not, consequential? Further still, how are the consequences of eating and speaking to be engaged with when we take seriously the porosity of matter and refuse the limitations of mealy mouths? Might we cease to take for granted the idea that clear and distinct bodily entrances, and their sonic representations, hold the key to qualitative inquiry?

Returning to application, what might be the dosages we employ rather than the inoculation we might prescribe? Here, and in keeping with Olkowski's article and the consequences of eating and speaking, how might practice and theory plug into one

another to loosen, or disjunct, the causal or conjoining flow of conjunctive synthesis? Both big and stupid; either real or unreal; either masculine or feminine etcetera, etcetera. How might the virtual and actual, the corporeal and incorporeal, become blended into inquiry without tipping in favour of one or the other. (Olkowski, 2008. 110, Williams, 2008b).

In other words, how might methodologies be developed in a manner which considers the materiality of language, its sonorous travels through depth and surface alongside the abstractness of matter, its limitless virtuality, singularity and appetite for creativity, without making the empiricist's confusion between accident and event?

Within the chapters of the thesis I have tried to make the case that the way in which medical discourses produce 'Anorexia Nervosa' is actually unhelpful to the more expansive problem of difficult relationships to feeding the body. I have often made reference to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, V) which is used by clinicians and researchers to diagnose and classify 'mental disorders'. The DSM has been produced by hundreds of 'international experts' in all aspects of mental health and the fifth edition, as with preceding others, defines and classifies 'mental disorders'. It attempts to produce concise and specific criteria intended to facilitate an objective assessment of symptom presentations in a variety of clinical settings - inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinical, private practice, and primary care. In other words it attempts to make 'mental illness', such as 'Anorexia Nervosa' recognisable and predictable through a clear and distinct representation.

The DSM-5 is the most definitive resource for the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders. Within the thesis, by plugging Barad (2007) into Deleuze (2004a) I have conceptualised the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an apparatus of extensity which can only ever produce the same difference, or the similar, as opposed to the singular or intense of difference. I have argued that this reductive logic mobilises enmity towards those who are deemed as 'false pretenders' or wannarexics. Articulated differently, those who fail to have the same difference become multiply marginalised yet paradoxically inclined to desire the certitude the apparatus offers. The DSM, for the purposes of the thesis, is an empirical example of the way in which

the authentic and deserving body can be weighed, literally, against the guilty copy who has yet to prove they are ill enough to be recognised as having a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Yet, the DSM's place within the state of affairs, the everyday and the clinical, is, to a certain extent, one of the 'accidents' which the project has engaged with. What has been of interest within preceding chapters is the way in which the good and common sense of this accidental artefact feed into incorporeal events and produce paradoxes which "reveal philosophy" (Deleuze, 2004b, 286). Paradoxically the clear and distinct logic that would make 'things' recognisable and predictable, is implicated in producing new unknowable territories and rebel elements such as 'wannarexia'. To quote once more a fragment of *Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, 2004a) which has been key to the thesis:

> "To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: "My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it." It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi cause of what is produced within us, the Operator. […] The event […] manifests in us the neutral splendour which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective and the private" (Delueze, 2004, 169).

In the language detailed above (Deleuze, 2004, 169) my engagement with lived concepts was actualised. I was invited to turn away from good and common sense while becoming more compelled than ever to figure the politics of the work I wished to carry out. The movements of the event were sensed as potent and significant in advance of their detours, mergers and crossings. *Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, 2004a) shifted my engagement with anorexia from that which occurs, the accident, to the potentialities of the inside of what occurs, the processes and activities of sense which exceed the visible and the individual. By thinking-feeling (Massumi, 2011) both the politics of the project, and the lived concepts, I had to look further; in unexpected and unpredictable places within the text. Discovering that the actualisation of the event is never the final point, as Deleuzian metaphysics are of becoming not being, eroded the strictures of 'the problem' as I had previously 'known' them. Instead of fixed states, clear and distinct states, we find that actualisations and counter-actualisation, in repetition and difference, are "the freedom by which we develop and lead the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters of

actualisations and causes (2004, 243). What this enabled me to suggest was that the representation of anorexia, as actualised, is not where social inquiry should either start or stop, and nor, for that matter, is 'recovery'.

As a concept counter-actualisation, which has been noted at various points within the thesis, enabled me to engage differently with the potential of the event. Encountering counter-actualisation triggered a visceral and cerebral practice of imagining expansive movement as opposed to limited ricochets between illness and health, choice and determinism. I would now like to draw on the quote presented a moment ago to draw out the way in which counter-actualisation impacted on my reading of temporality and practice. Importantly, I will try to expand on how counter-actualisation, as with becoming, is never complete. As a process it is not something that we can think of as a marker, as something which is discernible according to denotative logic. In the fourth chapter of the thesis while I was discussing the notion of 'anorexic elegance' I noted that illness was an immanent process, not state, of health. I suggested that it was connected and moving along a mobius of strip of toxin and remedy. I would like here to map out a link between the mobius strip of health and illness and the twisted cylinder of actualisations and counter-actualisations, suggesting that both are forms of continuous critique and overcoming. Here 'the conscious self' is not the motor of critique and overcoming, but rather a part, as with affects, sensations, human and non-human matter, of the machine which has the capacity to do things differently.

What this makes apparent is that no activity is truly the same in repetition. The 'same' ascetic practices will not have the same affect for every-body, or even the same body over time (Bennett, 2010). Both 'sides' of the twisted cylinder are always already part of an entangled quasi-causal assemblage. An assemblage where agency is distributed and affects are unpredictable. No entity or affect stays the same and neither human agency nor desire can make it otherwise. As with revolution, neither health nor victory can be proclaimed or secured once and for all. It is less a question of how to prevent or cure and more a question of bringing about paradoxically creative, measured, and unpredictable activities which redouble, rather than repair, the cracks which a body's stuttering and vibrating bring about. What was resistance is on its way towards numerous other sensations and affects, what will be

at one point be recognised as 'Anorexia Nervosa' was at some other point a lifestyle choice. But in-between both it was ready to be all sorts of 'whats' (Massumi, 2011).

Having read the twenty first series of Logic of Sense (2004a) and encountered the phrase "[t]o the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: "My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it." (Deleuze, 2004, 169) something of me became excitable. My capacity to be affected became voluminous. To suggest that 'It spoke to me' is not to separate the text, the words, as entities entirely distinct to the borders of 'my own self', but to allude to the non-human capaciousness (Bennett, 2010) and materiality of words. Of all the assemblages within *Logic of Sense* this collection of words compelled me. However I did not find agreeable the way in which I felt compelled. What is important here is that I did not object to what the words 'meant', it was not a question of meaning, I objected to what was produced in the intra-action of my present-past-future and this mixture of words and sensations.

There was an immediate excitement, a rushing, a leaping, and a desire to know the next strange and succulent concoction before I had actually read it. As I reconsider this rambunctious aspiration I sense both a desire for certainty, to know what I had always unknowingly known, and a desire to dash the brains of certainty. The meeting disrupted profoundly my sense of privacy, my sense of solidity and separateness. There was something horribly poignant and intoxicating about this invisible abstract entity waiting and having the allure to beckon and enfold. As I read it, materialising the shapes and sensations of the words, I was, in both directions at once, attracted and repelled. In one direction it spoke back to me what I thought I had always had a sense of, at the twitchy level of embodied materiality. In the other direction, the side that would dash the brains of certainty, the sense of destiny I felt was evoked frustrated my wanting something other, something unthinkable. Although this passage is situated at the mid-point of the volume it produced a sensory experience of encountering the first and last page simultaneously, going back and going forwards. I was enchanted, it had a promissory quality but I was not quite sure what sort of promise was being made.

As I turned the pages of the text to the following series *Porcelaine and Volcano* I wrote "there is heroism made of death and destruction, it is powerful and hails" A page and a half into the twenty second series and I drew a small arrow from the paratextual commentary "wrong impression – COUNTER-ACTUALISATION * - Starting point to reconsider 'prevention' and 'recovery'". James Williams gives counter actualisation as "playing out the event in the realm of sense in a different way" (2008a, 31). He notes that there have long been arguments within the philosophy of the event that decry the need to engage with anything other than a set of facts. The empirically observable, the accidents severed from sense, the actual separated from the virtual. Williams notes that this is not the Deleuzian event, for Deleuze there is a desire to turn towards "less concrete effects of changes in actual matters of fact" (2008, 32). He notes that if we focus solely on the actual event, and here I will insert the example of an emaciated body, we fail to encounter the sign of intensity and the logic of sense. "Deleuze is interested in a different and seemingly more abstract concreteness than purely material facts" (2008a, 33). Counter-actualisation, as Williams articulates it, is "a reciprocally determining interaction between sense [which is resistant to fact-based and meaning-based analysis], and the actual side of events" (ibid.).

In the fifth chapter of the thesis I developed a conceptual persona and wrote with a character from a favoured and feared childhood book. This allowed me to compose something other than angelic writing by speaking with a forked tongue. As the thesis draws to a close I would like to write with this bloody trouble-maker once again.

As I started to forget that which I had never really known, the shape of 'destiny' began to disfigure, it started to intra –act with creativity. "To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: "My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it." (Delueze, 2004, 169). Once I had truly begun to engage with multiplicity, not just think it, it was no longer possible to reduce this 'wound' to anything universal or particular. It was beyond both, engendering desire. To 'embody' the 'wound' is not to embody a proper name, such as 'anorexia', as had been one direction of my first reading. The 'wound' is visceral, it is material, but it is also singular. It is a sentiment, a sensibility that is beyond any one individual. And yet the individual becomes, is individuated, in their creative response to this

something which refuses fact-based, or meaning based analysis. Here, this creative response, to do differently, is what makes us worthy of the event. It is perhaps the difference between upon being called to dance, of either standing on the ground and performing a methodical set of operations with your feet or lying on your back, with the light behind you, to cast shadows across a semblance of others.

Limitations of the Research

Having produced the thesis, and been produced by it, I would like to spend a little time to consider what might be conceived as the limitations of the research. This will help me to suggest how I think further inquiries might be progressed in the future.

Although the conceptual language of the event has enabled me to engage differently with the eating order and relationships to feeding the body, it might be suggested that this particular syntax is not accessible to readers who do not have a philosophical or theoretical background. However, I would defend the decision not to produce a less conceptual or philosophical account of the subject-object, particularly as this method allowed me to pose different problems to the ones a geometry set would facilitate (Deleuze, 2004b). I would also argue, given the orthodox power of the dogmatic image of thought, had the thesis been less conceptual or abstract it would have been less able to produce an account which did not take for granted a priori borders and boundaries. In other words, it would have produced 'anorexia' as recognisable and yet another recognisable account of anorexia. In turn I would suggest that it has been relevant and important to operate though a particular, perhaps difficult, textuality, to dislodge taken for granted ideas and cherished meanings.

As noted earlier, counter-actualisation was a significant concept within the thesis' engagement with Deleuzian ontology. It was connected to the issue of living differently (Dyke, 2013) and tacitly influenced what I found problematic with the fixed metaphysics of 'being anorexic', an assertion that remained un-problematic within social inquiries (Rich, 2006) which were concerned with, and uncritical of, the possibilities of identity politics. However, although I feel that the thesis lays the foundations for future work into the possibilities of counter-actualisation, it is noted

that there has perhaps been too little work carried out with this concept and empirical materials.

The thesis has been critical of the good and common sense within the medical discourse and within branches of philosophy, for instance, Platonic and Cartesian thought. With regard to my engagement with the medical discourse my analysis and discussion have tended to focus on what I have conceptualised as an apparatus of extensity, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. Although it was relevant and important to engage with the good sense of the medical discourse, in light of both my empirical materials and also the theories I have used, it is acknowledged that the medical discourse, as with the pro-ana discourse, is heterogeneous and productive of many interesting paradoxes. This leads me to next sub-heading of this final chapter, future areas of inquiry.

Future Potential Areas of Inquiry

In response to the first limitation noted above, I would like to spend time working with other Deleuzian scholars and practitioners who engage with people with difficult relationships to feeding the body to refine and re work how ideas, such as the quasi-cause and incorporeality might be further developed to engage with policy and practice. As noted in the section above, the conceptual language of the event is paradoxically illuminating and obscure, and while this casts shadows of uncertainty, the way in which qualitative inquiry engages with its possibilities should not be obdurate. While it remains my contention that the important and relevant task was to produce a different account of difference, this does not limit future re-workings. On the contrary. The different kind of ground-work that the thesis actualises, a ground work which starts in the middle of things and is suspicious of benevolent and benign beginnings has engaged substantially with the interplay of the physical and the metaphysical, the pre-individual and mixtures of bodies. It has made the onto-epistemological-ethical case for an unfamiliar abstraction. However, the event, which has been conceptually drawn upon and put to work, is never complete. Perhaps, to truly put theory and method to work there is necessarily further work to be done to counter-actualise the event of the thesis. Put differently, the thesis as event, cannot be allowed to remain fixed, it must become in different ways, for different audiences.

To not do so may engender the risk of leaving it to scratch its own ignominious sores.

Further to the second limitation noted in the previous section, and continuing with the point made above, I would like my future inquiry to pick up, in the middle of things, where the small arrow began. Take time to work with the significance of counter-actualisation. For instance, I would be interested to explore how it might be used further to fracture conventional inquiry's hubristic, yet nervously responsibilitised (Rose, 1999) sense of always already knowing, or having to know. I would also be keen to engage in a more thoroughgoing inquiry into what counter actualisation and the body without organs may offer to rethink the notion of recovery. In terms of this latter point, it would be interesting to plug these ideas (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) into the notions of experimentation and dosages (Arsic, 2008; Mann O'Donnell, 2010, Tynan, 2010) and take these further by not just thinking of the 'recovering' or 'experimenting' human subject, but also engaging with non-human actant's to develop a theory of distributed agency (Bennett, 2010) which does not responsibilitise individuals for 'their success', 'their failure', or 'their problems'.

There is perhaps an opportunity to develop the notion of disjunctive and conjunctive relations in the context of practice. In keeping with Olkowski's (2008) article and the consequences of eating and speaking, I would like to engage with how practice and theory might plug into one another to loosen, or disjunct, the causal or conjoining flow of conjunctive synthesis. For instance, both big and stupid, either real or unreal, either masculine or feminine etcetera, etcetera. Although much ink has already been spilt on the problems of bifurcation, as far as I am aware much less has been spent on the sedimentation of toxic conjunctions. To carry out this work it would be valuable to work with scholars and practitioners who, professionally and pedagogically, are in contact with young people. This could potentially be an interesting and practical project which would put abstract theory into concrete practice through various youth focussed activities and events.

In light of the manner and methodology the thesis has engaged with the complexity and nuance of the pro-ana discourse, a future piece of empirical work which explored paradoxes within the medical discourse would be both illuminating and

apposite. Here I would be particularly interested in speaking with psychologists and general practitioners whose work touches on the issues of food and feeding. I would be particularly interested in engaging with them in regard to the notion of enchantment (Bennett, 2010), and how their own 'proper names' and corresponding identities, as Psychologist, Doctor, or Nurse, produce sense in the context of their work. Further to this, I would also like to develop a methodology or analytic practice with this group of practitioners which draws on Deleuze's notion of the simulacrum, the notion of the good and bad copy.

Why Was it Important to Carry Out this Research?

As the thesis draws to a close I would like to suggest why it was important to carry out this research. The tone of the doctoral project has accorded to the interplay of distinction and obscurity, and as such it has attempted to strike a chord within the symphony of the discordant idea. (Deleuze, 2004b). The eating order and relationships to feeding the body are more often than not considered to be human problems, and the cause, differing from model to model, is posited as internal to the subject, or external as an object. As such the work that I have carried out at the interval or fold of both-and has contributed a non-reductive post-human theorisation of what I noted as a dogmatic image of thought: 'Anorexia'. The way that the thesis has engaged with 'anorexia', 'pro-anorexia', and 'wannarexia' on-line and off-line has been responsive to both the increase in pro-ana spaces (Optenet, 2008) and on-line activity and research more generally.

The move towards new onto-epistemologies, and ethical ethics is incremental and although the thesis does not change the world, it does not leave it untouched either. It was important and relevant that the thesis engaged with 'anorexia', 'pro-anorexia' and 'wannarexia' as equally important subject-objects, rather than "distinct discursive objects" (Giles, 2006). By engaging in this way, and avoiding reinvesting in 'real anorexia' and 'improper wannarexia', I was able to engage with the promissory quality of 'anorexia' as different and distinct to difficult relationships to feeding the body.

As I have noted throughout the thesis, it has been important to engage spectacular (Ferreday, 2012) and accidental representation of the body, on-line and off-line, with post-representational ideas and theories. By working with the accident and event, it is my contention that the thesis makes an incremental nudge towards the possibility that future inquiries into consuming relationships will be less concerned with appearance and identity, and increasingly attentive to the differences and desires which leap from bodies and bump into moving structures.

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