Anthony J. Berry
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Covenant, Constitution and Contract
Control and Accountability in the Cat’s Cradle (part 1 of 2)

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Telephone No: 0161 247-6798. Fax No 0161 247 6854
Abstract

The contribution of theology to control and accounting has been traced through the monastic tradition demonstrating how the Cistercians used decentralized control of their extensive farms in contrast to the centralized control of the Benedictines (Knowles, 1948). The contribution of theology to political economy was traced by Weber and Tawney in their analysis of the Calvinist roots of liberal market capitalism and more subtly by Adam Smith in his ironic use of a phrase from Isaiah Ch 60 as the title for his seminal work on markets.

This paper reports upon a case of the interplay of theology and control and accountability which occurred as the Church of England set out to respond to a financial crisis. Accountability was theorized as stemming from the three elements of covenant, constitution and contract all of which were contested in the ground metaphor of autonomy. It demonstrates how a group of financiers from within the evangelical tradition (which places stress on headship and control) led an attempt to create a new church governance body (a national council) with strongly integrated central control and diminished democratic and conciliar participation. They had described the church as “a cats cradle of autonomous and semi autonomous organizations”. The case then demonstrates how the other theological traditions (anglo-catholic and liberal) were mobilized, over a period of several years, to permit the new body to come into life but to unravel the proposed centralised control and to maintain the existing nature of governance and to enrich the complexity of the “cat’s cradle”.

The case analysis is based upon the theory of eco-systems (as a more formal view of the cat’s cradle) to show how the loosely coupled nature of eco systems with their multiple theological stances and their multi layered processes of relationships and accountabilities were almost impervious to the attempt to shift them into an ordered and controlled hierarchy.

This paper is presented in two parts.
Part I. The bid for control.

Introduction

This paper is a study of control and accountability in the Church of England, a social institution that is primarily concerned with belief and a way of life; it is an example of an institution which works with expressive values. That is its primary concern is the living through of values; (as opposed to consequentialist approach which takes a calculus of benefits and costs). The Church of England is Christian church at the heart of which is the example of the sacrificial love of Jesus. It is also an institution which has over a thousand years of existence; in its present form it has existed since 1545 and since the accession of Elizabeth I and the Book of Common Prayer with the 39 articles of Religion as its doctrinal formulary; (1549, 1552,1559 and 1662).

It may be argued that people create instrumental organisations in order to undertake work for some economic purposes. As these, and others who join, engage with the lived experience they construct a social institution of “shared” and disparate values and meanings. The consequentialist beginnings of organisation do not prevent such organisations becoming infused with these institutional issues, issues which are profoundly affected by the actors’ memberships of other organisations and institutions. In contrast actors engaged in expressive communities may construct organisations to enable them to either work at the values and beliefs, or have such work done on their behalf. As the organisation forms and reforms it sometimes produces a diffusion of the originating institution; it certainly leads to effects upon the originating institution in the mind. For example differences emerge which could once be contained but are then given different organisational forms in new movements. The break between the Eastern and Western churches did not impair their communion\(^1\) but the later separation from the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century into a number of national churches (including the Church of England) was a product of conflict of beliefs and values, both in terms of theology and of spiritual and temporal powers or modes of order.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The eastern and western churches recognised the validity of each others orders and sacraments.

\(^2\) These examples of Schism were breaches of both Faith (belief) and Order, concerned with the relationship of Hierarchy and collegiality.
Religious institutions are exemplars of expressive organisations; especially so is the Christian community as it expresses in action a following of the way of Jesus. However the Christian Institution has formed and reformed churches along the cleavage in beliefs, norms and modes of order. Indeed it has often provided examples of the interplay of institution and organisation. For example Roman and Greek ideas of office (authority by delegation) and the Judaic ideas of “ordination” by the laying on of hands (that is apostolic authority) were combined in the fourth century to yield the concept of episcopate relating to a specific area and to the wider church. (White, 1992)

**Control.**

Control is often framed as a functionalist imperative of integration of activities and of patterns of values and beliefs to maintain unity. Control research and scholarship (Berry, Otley and Broadbent, 1995) has moved towards studies which view organisations as open systems and adopt a naturalistic perspective based upon both social constructions of notions of control and modes of order and of critical reflections of how institutional issues of power are reflected in organisation.

From a position where the both ideology and institution, as well as organisation, are seen as socially constructed then studies of control may focus upon the acts of construction and reconstruction of institutions and organisations where control may be studied as the act of one section or group seeking to privilege their own constructions within the field. This approach acknowledges the interplay of institution and organisation as mutually constituting and constitutive of each other, (Scott 1995).

**The institution.**

Such studies need to start then with the institution which, as it has a history and also a present, and presumably a future, may represent a series of constructions from a number of standpoints. If the holders of the standpoints think themselves to be active in defining the institution and using a “variety of processes” in pursuing their definition we may have to hold a number of different conceptions of the institution in our analysis. From the standpoint of an observer this may be explained as some actors seeking to privilege their views and
beliefs but from the standpoint of the actors it is more of a real here and now struggle for the actual beliefs they hold and the issues they wish to pursue.

The data for this paper were derived from the documents and debates surrounding a major change in the central policy making structures and processes of the Church of England, including the creation of an Archbishop’s Council as a body corporate. As a response to a serious financial crises which began in 1991 the Archbishops of Canterbury and York had created a commission of enquiry in 1994. The Commission reported in the summer of 1995. The report was noted by a meeting of General Synod in November 1995 and it was the intention of the Archbishops and their Commission to bring forward Legislation to the General Synod for July 1996. This was delayed and following consideration by the Follow on Steering Group and then the Revision Committee a modified set of proposals emerged to which approval was given by General Synod in Feb 1998 and Parliamentary Approval and then Royal Assent was given in November 1998. The new Archbishops Council came into being in January 1999.

The author was an actor in the institution and hence a participant observer. It may be argued that detachment is impossible for as the holder of both tacit and explicit standpoints I will automatically privilege one set of views. This may turn out to be the case. Perhaps the dialogues I have had with other actors, including members of the original Commission, members and officers of the General Synod, will provide the stimulus for internal and external reflexivity that will be needed to pursue this study. However much of what follows is based upon the reports and publications surrounding the changes and the debates in the General Synod and also Diocesan Synods.

The paper proceeds by exploring the Church of England and how the proposed changes came to be presented in the summer of 1995(Section A); there follows in Section B an account of the journey from the initial proposals to the substantially modified proposals

3 The first notes of this paper was written in the winter of 1995/1996 and later modified following the General Synod meeting of February 1996. The paper was then developed from and following the General Synod meeting of 1996, 1997 and 1998 and subsequent events.

4 The author was an elected member of the General Synod of the Church of England, which is its governing body.
contained in the Measure sent to Parliament in 1998. Section C provides a discussion of the significance of these processes.

Section A. The Context and the Proposed Changes.

1. The Church of England, a brief description.\(^5\)

The Church of England claims a beginning in the early third century. There were British Bishops at the Council of Arles in 314. The retreat of the Celtic church leaves little continuing evidence. The arrival of Augustine in Kent in 597 is usually taken as the defining moment. The arrival of the Normans (1066) ensured that the Church became more linked with the other European churches, especially by the introduction of a large number of “foreign” bishops and abbots. The separation of ecclesiastical and civil courts which lead to the creation of Roman Canon Law which became the chief agent of papal control in the west. By the 13th century papal control had become very significant and lead to conflicts of power between church and state.

The reformation in the sixteenth century saw a considerable change in church and state powers. It was notable that the Convocations of Clergy of York and Canterbury recognised the King as the Supreme Head on earth of the Church of England.\(^6\) However, unlike the Calvinist churches, the Church of England saw itself as the continuing catholic church and not as a Protestant church. (Though it should be noted that the church in Rome had a different view of matters.) Apart from the bloody reversal under Mary, 1553-1558, the reformation became established under Elizabeth I. The establishment was a vigorous affair, with some considerable pressure to suppress Popish recusants and to constrain the puritans.\(^7\) The Bishops preserved their seats in the House of Lords. The civil war victory of parliament led to a Presbyterian reform, itself reversed with the restoration of the monarchy in 1662. The revolution of 1688 led the church to a quieter period. In the eighteenth

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\(^5\) That this is a mere sketch is underlined by the three volume history of the Church in England by David Edwards (1981 et seq). An insight into the reformation is given by MacCulloch. (1996) biography of Thomas Cranmer

\(^6\) These arrangements for state control of churches was called Erastianism, after the theologian who argued that such arrangements were proper. Hence the Church of England is established by law.

\(^7\) For contrasting protestant and catholic views of these events see MacCulloch 1996 Thomas Cranmer
century the church witnessed the Methodist movement which broke away to form a new church. In the 19th century, the church was caught up in the processes of reform both of its structures and of its finances. New dioceses were created and many new parishes and churches built. Since the reformation, the Monarch has been the Supreme Governor of a Church of England, which is subordinate to Parliament. Twenty-six Bishops sit in the House of Lords, significant changes in Church arrangements require parliamentary legislation and the Prime Minister has a role in the appointment of Bishops.

In this brief, too brief, account of major changes, the deep differences in values and beliefs are clear. The Church of England is a Christian church, based upon the bible and Christian tradition and holds that its founder was Jesus, the Messiah, the Christos. Church histories provide an understanding that there are and have been differences deep enough to create and maintain schisms. (Moorman, 1973; Edwards, 1981)

The common political phrase in the Church of England, “we are a broad church”, expresses both something of the narrowness of some Christian sects and the continuing attempt of the Church of England to be inclusive of different views. In the Church of England, three broad groupings of beliefs may be discerned and these have been given, as always, labels that identify and mislead at the same time. These are the Evangelicals, the Anglo-Catholics and the Liberals.

The Evangelicals claim the authority of scripture as normative for a Christian life often but not always in a narrow textual exegesis. They stress personal conversion and salvation by faith. By the last decades of the 20th century, this strand of the church had been gaining in influence and confidence. They have a restless energy for bringing people to Christ. They have a concern for authority. They were once described as the low church.

The Anglo- Catholics claim the authority of scripture and tradition... In addition they are especially concerned with the continuation of the Church of England as part of the “one,
holy, catholic and apostolic” church... marking the reformation in England anyway as a matter of reform but not of reconstruction. This part of the church, known as the high church party, gained considerable renewal in the 19th century through the Oxford movement view that the church is a divine institution. Keble, Newman and Pusey were among its leaders; Newman later transferring to the Roman Catholic Church and becoming a Cardinal. This 19th century tradition influenced the patterns of worship, introduced robed choirs etc., and took their work into the urban slums of Victorian England. The influence of this tradition was strongest in the rejection of the recent Anglican-Methodist reunion scheme; since then, it feels a little embattled.

The “liberals” have a sense of the church in the present seeking to relate in new ways, open to new insights being more critical of scripture and tradition; (following German 19th century critical scholarship which revolutionised the understanding of scripture). Members in this liberal tradition are likely to agree with Ward\textsuperscript{10} that the four great challenges to the whole Christian Church are errancy of scripture (and tradition); the rise of human knowledge over twenty centuries; the routes to God in other faiths (e.g. Judaism obviously and Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism etc.); the changing conception of men and especially of women, i.e. what does it mean to be human. The Liberals accept the Bible as authoritative but seek to interpret it in relation to the current world.

Each of these traditions has its core adherents with their own journals, organisations and movements. They have founded and run theological colleges and other training centres to provide education and training in their particular traditions. As yet, they still hold enough in common and mutual acceptance that they belong inside the Church of England, although there are pressures from each group to ensure that they have a share of the Episcopal appointments.

The question of Theology, which is the pursuit of understanding of the being and nature of God in revelation and tradition has a vital significance to the church. While common usage of the term “theological” implies minute and meaningless disputes it has been, is and will be the case that theological debate lies at the centre of the continuing task of the Christian

\footnote{Ward A Vision to Pursue.}
community to be reflective in its understanding of God, of itself and of what it means to be a Christian. Even if it may be seen as ideological debate the statements or claims about God carry great significance for Christian churches, whether the nuance is upon personal piety or public and communal polity. Therefore, at heart, the church is about values and beliefs in action; it is an expressive culture.

The Church of England clergy have to assent to both the 39 Articles of Religion and the requirements of the ordinal but there is no demand that members follow a given line. There is for example no equivalent to the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith of the Roman Catholic Church. However, statements of Doctrine are the province of the House of Bishops. Such statements are infrequent; e.g. “Doctrine in the Church of England” (1938), “The Mystery of Salvation” (1996). The statements carry weight but are always offered for further study and exploration.

Of course, the debates and differences between the traditions are complemented by debates which cut across them. A recent example was the decision of the Church of England to ordain women firstly to the diaconate, then latterly to the priesthood, but not to the Episcopacy. This decision in respect of the priesting of women required severally a two thirds majority of the bishops, the clergy and the laity of the General Synod. (And of course approval by parliament and the Royal Assent). Most of the opponents of the ordination of women came from the “stauncher” wings of the evangelical (arguing from scripture that women could not be in charge, headship being reserved for men) and anglo catholic groups (Jesus did not choose any women as apostles and tradition has followed this choice). Some of the latter went off to the Roman Catholic Church, thus providing, in this half millennium, that church with its first group of married priests (an interesting insight about Roman Catholic order and the pragmatic pursuit of advantage). Part of the decision included a provision that each parish was permitted to decide whether it would accept a woman priest; hence, the Church of England maintains two “intelligences”, those for women and those against.11 This maintenance of two integrities cuts across the three groups and is

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11 In the Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod, 1993, there was provision for alternative Episcopal oversight to be available for the anti women priest parishes. Three additional Bishops were made, two in the province of Canterbury and one in York. They are referred to as flying bishops because they were not grounded in any one diocese.
not a bar to preferment for the recently appointed Archbishop of York was, and is, against this change.


In the late 16th and early 17th century Richard Hooker described the church as both spiritual and temporal. In his argument for Episcopate against the Puritans he stressed that the church, reformed and catholic, is an organic not a static institution and will change its organization according to the circumstances. Since the fourth century the basic unit of a Christian church has been the bishop in his diocese, almost always geographically defined. The 44 dioceses of the Church of England cover the land area of England and part of Europe and are legally separate bodies. Within each diocese there are units called parishes (not the same as civil parishes). The priest in each parish holds his cure jointly with the bishop; as the ordinal has it, “my cure and thine”. The reformation settlement lead to the priest being also given legal freehold as a property right of the buildings and the income from lands and assets, together with a right to tithes from the farms.  

The Laos, the whole people of God consists of all the baptised; baptism is the rite of entry to the Christian church; this whole collectivity is sometime referred to as the ecclesia, an institution. The Laos then divides into the laity and the ordained in the Holy Orders of Deacon, Priest and Bishop. Bishops hold their authority in what is held to be a direct line from Peter, (the Apostolic succession), to continue the work that Jesus asked his apostles to undertake on his behalf. Dioceses in England are grouped into provinces of Canterbury and York, each of these having an Archbishop. Canterbury is the senior and is the Primate. For many hundreds of years each province has had a Convocation which included all the Bishops and representatives of the parish clergy of each diocese (who are to this day called prolocutors). However they needed to be given a Royal warrant in order to meet. The Archbishop of Canterbury, ranks second to the Monarch in the United Kingdom and is

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12 So it was all but impossible for a priest, once instituted and inducted into a “living” to be removed from the parish. However a practice has arisen of suspending the presentation of a priest to a cure and appointing a priest in charge on a five or seven year contract.
also recognised as the titular head of the world wide Anglican communion of provinces with approaching one hundred million members.

Technically Bishops are elected to their see by the Chapter of the cathedral; however there is ever only one candidate nominated to them by the crown. The Crown Appointments Commission give two names to the Prime Minister who offers the appointment to the man. If he accepts then the nomination is sent to the chapter. The making of the bishop is by consecration and laying on of hands undertaken by the archbishop and usually by as many other bishops as can attend. The act of laying on of hands is the act of apostolic continuity. Even in this Episcopal church there are differences of view about the role, office and function of Bishops. The catholic tradition is strong in its support of bishops; the evangelical wing can produce arguments (from the earlier centuries) that the priests are the true inheritors of the commands of Jesus, thus making Bishops optional and for some unnecessary.

These ordained roles of Deacon, Priest and Bishop have a very long history. Equally the role of lay people in the church has a considerable history; the effects of the reformation in establishing the two parish wardens elected by the vestry meeting are still with us; the role of the laity in the government of the church is established by law of parliament and it is not possible for the Church of England to be wholly controlled by the clergy.

The tithes were finally redeemed in 1936. In addition over the centuries legacies and gifts provided cathedrals, bishoprics and some parish clergy with vast wealth and incomes. The reform of the 1840’s was extensive and included the removal of much wealth from dioceses to a central pool, the Ecclesiastical Estates, from which Bishops and Cathedral deans and canons were paid and from which parish ministry could be supported. Some of the wealth taken by King Henry VIII was returned in 1704; this fund, known as Queen Anne’s Bounty, persisted until 1948 when it was united with that of the Ecclesiastical Estates to form the Church Commission, a body with 95 commissioners, chaired by Archbishop of Canterbury. The Church Commission is a legal corporation and a registered Charity. Until recently, c1980, it had the funds to pay most of the stipends and pensions of the clergy., but the financial crisis of 1991 partly arose from a recognition that these
funds would no longer be able to maintain that position. Since then voluntary giving by members had steadily increased to fill the gap which in 2002 was about £200million.  

4. Governance.

The current position of the organisation was that the pattern of Diocese and Parish has been maintained. The Church of England is by law established under the rule of parliament in the monarchical governance of the UK. Hence lay people as members of the Lords and Commons had always been heavily involved in the passage of laws concerning reform in the church. However early in the twentieth century the movement for involving lay people more directly in the governance and work of the church lead to the formation in 1919 of the Church Assembly. This body was made up from the Convocations of Canterbury and York together with lay people elected from each of the dioceses. Practice in other parts of the Anglican communion was varied. In many of them Dioceses had established Synods, assemblies of bishop, priests and lay people which together exercised considerable powers of governance of the diocese. But most of these were part of churches which were not “established” and hence took the form of voluntary organisations. For example in the USA the parishes were responsible for appointing and paying their clergy.

In 1969 there was established by Act of Parliament the Synodical government measure by which Synods were established at national, diocesan and local (called deanery) levels. At national level, The General Synod, made up of Houses of Bishops, Clergy and Laity, (the latter being elected from among the clergy and the lay people of the dioceses) was given greater powers than the old church assembly as part of a continuing transfer or delegation of governance of the church from the state to the church organisations, reflecting both the complexity of church governance, the secularisation of society, the declining membership of the church and the wish for the church to govern itself. Even so, the Monarch opens the General Synod and prorogues it at the end of its five year term of office. Any significant legislation has to be approved by General Synod on the basis of a two thirds majority of each of the Houses of Bishops, clergy and laity and then has to be approved by parliament.

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13 The approximate total cost, including pension payments, of the Church of England in 2002 was about £550 million.
Some of the complexity in this process may be seen at the diocesan level by the use of the term Bishop in Synod, a term which expresses the historical authority of the Bishop and the participation of the clergy and laity in many but not all aspects of the work of the Diocese. This model of Bishop in Synod is a means of holding together the apostolic office of Bishop with the “democratic” authority of the clergy and laity. Even so the two systems, the Episcopal and the Synodical, exist in an uneasy relation to each other. In a system of clergy appointments still substantially based upon patronage it is difficult for clergy to actively work against a Bishop on matters of policy; the style is more of offering advice.

4. Accountability.

Accountability has been the subject of many recent debates from a variety of approaches (Munro and Mouritsen, 1996). Accountability in the church is a complex mixture of covenant, (what Laughlin 1996 noted as higher principals), constitution (the legitimate requirements of organizations) and contract (the incomplete specification of responsibilities).

Theological; covenant.

The expressive community of the Church where all authority comes from God and each member is equal in baptism and equally gifted in the Holy Spirit has particular difficulties with authority and power in its organisation. The equality in baptism and in the Spirit leads towards a more inclusive origin and exercise of authority. The primary accountability of a Christian is to God and is a matter of theological beliefs and conscience. This might be seen as a principal and agent relationship with some promises and duties as forming a covenant, which is best seen as a kind of bond of mutuality, between God and his obedient followers. How this is covenant relationship is understood is a matter of the nuances of theological interpretation. The evangelicals stress the obedience or faithfulness through a principal agent chain of God, and the ministers, then the laity, in the context of attention to the Bible; the catholics place more stress on a high view of Bishops and clergy and tradition; the liberals lay the stress upon the individual conscience with a critical interplay of scripture and context; hence the significance of the theological parties (as a holders of differently nuanced kinds of “professional” accountability, Sinclairxxxx).
(b) Ministerial; constitution and contract.

The ideal of ministry in the covenant sense is based upon Jesus’ example of sacrifice and servanthood. This places the parish priest as the servant of the people of God and the Bishop as the servant of the servants. This ideal is spoken even if the practice of Episcopal power has been that of master rather than servant. But even such masters may be servants in a pastoral or caring sense. But as an organization the Dioceses also have some more structured arrangements of responsibility and accountability between the Diocesan Bishop and a Parish priest. These however hold in tension two main threads; that of the “cure of Souls” and that of the rights to property of the “living”. The cure of souls is a charge laid upon the priest by the Bishop, in the word “my cure and thine”. In that sense the sacred work is jointly held by the Bishop and the priest as part of the covenant and not as a contract. This is examined in a three yearly visitation by the Bishop, or his deputy. For centuries distances across dioceses meant that some priests might hardly ever see the Bishop. Lately travel has been easier and there is some more regular meeting. Recently a practice of appraisal has grown, but this is almost always a matter of a development appraisal and not a line management review, so there is little tradition of managerial accountability, nor indeed of mutual accountability for the joint cure.

(c) Legal; constitution and contract.

Through its history the Church following Roman Canon Law has established its own Canon Law which applies to the whole Church. This forms a more contractual context for the bishop and priest. Should the priest transgress Canon (ecclesiastical) Law then the Bishop, following due process, may enforce discipline and may have the alleged offender brought before a church court. Bishops too may be brought before courts. These have full legal standing, an appeal provision, and the parties may be represented by Counsel. But these are very expensive, can be a cause of scandal, and are a last resort.

(d) Autonomy.

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15 The discipline processes were revised in early 2000.
The “clergy freehold” has come to symbolize the assumptions of autonomy and independence that now lie deep in the Church of England. Creating a freehold property right to provide independence and income for the priest was an aspect of the medieval settlement of the Church of England to reduce the power of Bishops. The right to present a person to the living, a right of patronage, is a legal property right which may be entailed with a Manor and hence be in the gift of the Lord of the Manor. Upon induction and institution to a living the priest had control of this income, but not the capital. This might have included rents, mineral rights, endowments and a tithe upon land produce of the whole parish. With the national collection of these properties in order to equalize incomes, priests are now paid a stipend, which, significantly, is paid not by the diocese but through the Church Commissioners. The Inland Revenue regard Anglican priests as self employed. In certain circumstances Bishops can cause the presentation to a living to be suspended and appoint a priest in charge. Even in 2002, when nearly half of all priests are appointed to be in charge the assumptions are still of substantive autonomy.

One informal process of handling conflict is for the powerful to “include” or to “exclude” from their circle of conversation, consultation or consideration. This means that conflict is avoided rather than dealt with, and so in this process mutual accountability can not work because no exploration is possible.

(e) Local Church

As the Church Commissioners do not have enough money to pay stipends each parish has to make a voluntary contribution to ministry costs. These monies are collected in the parish, passed to the diocese, thence to the Church Commissioners who then pay the priest. This convoluted procedure ensures that there is no question of the priest being accountable to the parishioners of the local church. Congregations take up many characteristics of voluntary associations (Harris, 1998). In these Members of congregations are free to debate and decide lower level means and ends. But compared with most secular voluntary organizations, there is a low ceiling in congregations above which goals move up into the

16 Often such owners are not Anglicans or Christians. In many cases they pass the right to the Bishop. Oxford and Cambridge colleges are Patrons of many livings. Values of livings by 1850 varied greatly and some clergy were beneficiaries of several livings, paying curates to do the work of the cure,
category described by Scott 1987 as ‘ultimate’. Members must operate below that ceiling. (Harris 1998).

The consequences of these past and present arrangements is that the Church has a deep operating assumption of organisational independence and autonomy, with little or no accountability; such accountability that does exist being that which reflects the mutuality of fellow workers in the Christian covenant.

(f) Synodical.

The agents have constructed a church temporal which has as Laughlin (2000) noted complex chains of principals and agents in its financial management. Within the Synodical system of governance accountability for monies and work is handled in the context of graciousness in that accountability is rarely demanded but exists as a backdrop or a final reference point. There is a conflation of the organizational and managerial accountability in the synods with the assumptions of autonomy of the clergy where Bishops are more autonomous than other clergy.

The deep assumptions of autonomy underlie much behaviour. It is rooted in the idea of covenant between God and all the individual Christians. It was part of the underpinning of the reformation. It deeply influences the accountability in ministry. But accountability in the church, legal and synodical, is also influenced by this notion, in that any relationship between two or more Christians is infused with covenant theology even if there is a constitutional or legal contract that creates the authority, responsibility and accountability of the parties. Laughlin (1990) recognized the tension between the contractural and communal, but covenant is a more accurate word than communal, and the idea of bond. These differences together with the deep assumptions of autonomy ensure that there is almost no performance accountability in the Synodical system and that demands for it are viewed as ungracious.17

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17 In the diocese of Chester Synodical Boards are supposed to be accountable to Diocesan Synod but they never render an account and requests that they do are rebuffed. In this diocese the Directors of the company which is the Board of Finance do not get regular financial reports and the auditors management letter is not given to them as a matter of course.
Indeed there is a continuous attempt to push matters into the ministry system of the Bishop, where bodies are therefore viewed as autonomous. It is possible for a requirement for accountability which is legitimate in terms of constitution or contract to be denied by displacing it into a covenant relationship and claiming autonomy.

The broader processes in the church allow for these varied interpretations of accountability because it has over the centuries created an institution capable of holding within itself similarities and differences. It has done this by “emerging” varied organisational possibilities in the context of the ordained and lay membership.


One of the central problems that the Archbishops’ commission faced was in identifying the organisation, that is of describing or finding a model of the Church of England. In order to examine the problem they faced; three complementary models of organisation were considered. These are not the familiar models to be found in for example Gareth Morgan’s “Images of Organisation”, rather they are drawn from three sources; firstly, the emerging studies of physical eco-systems and parallel studies by for example Trist, of systems of systems; secondly the economic and geographical studies of spatial relationships of firms and of their interconnectedness, which produces the idea of the embedded firm (Yeung, Grabner) and the image of all parts of the church embedded in a complex field; thirdly the developing interest in cross organisational and cross national production systems which leads to the idea of supply chain management and the idea of the virtual organisation.

In figure 1 each of the blobs represents an organisation complexly connected to some of the others. The complex connections may be the flow of money, goods and services; they may also be the relations of people in churches, social networks, clubs, societies and professional bodies. The domain in and around them is the spaces of interconnection and could be what Adam Smith called the invisible hand of the market. Given that some blobs are bigger than others, more wealth and more power, we might see what Chandler called the visible hand of the market. The emerging conception of organisation here is that of the whole domain, the interconnected system of organisations. While this is something of an
abstraction from great, indeed unknowable complexity,\textsuperscript{18} it is suggestive of the complex eco system of Trist.

The available modes of control in these systems are Competition, Collaboration and Dominance. These conceptions are similar to those proposed by Heide (1994) in a study of market channels where he posited three modes of governance: market based via competition and bidding; based upon non market modes; the first of these being a unilateral hierarchy (dominance in this paper), the second based upon bilateral and multi lateral behaviours (denoted as collaboration in this paper.)

Now while these models are derived from a variety of organisations they do offer models of the Church. As a starting point the Church is seen as such a network or virtual organisation with many organisations (legally independent) within it. For example we can list; Parliament, Lambeth Palace, the House of Bishops, the 44 Dioceses, the Cathedral foundations, the Royal peculiar of Westminster Abbey and Windsor, the Church Commissioners, Parliament, the Privy Council, The Crown Appointments Commission, The Central Board of Finance, the General Synod, the Theological Colleges, the Theological departments of Universities, The dozen Church of England Further Education Colleges, The Diocesan Boards of Education which are statutory Education Authorities, the religious houses and foundations, retreat houses and conference centres, numerous charities including hospitals, Missionary Societies, many para church organisations such as The Evangelical Alliance, Forward in Faith and so on. These are connected by multiple ties, mostly invisible from most of the actors, both of the formal kind enshrined in statutes both ancient and modern, interconnected memberships of councils and boards and by ties of membership of Oxbridge and theological colleges, memberships of the belief groups such as evangelicals, anglo-catholics and liberals which connect through systems of patronage and presentation of clergy to livings. There are also some kinship ties for example “clergy families” and there are three sisters all of whose husbands are Bishops.

\textsuperscript{18} This idea suggests three ideal types of interconnected domains. The essential difference is the nature of the connecting or transformation processes which are (a) convergent (b) divergent and (c) multiplex. This analysis is similar to that of Perrow (1992) but is not derived from it, (Berry, 1995).
The complexity of the interconnections suggests that neither the convergent model nor the divergent model is adequate but the multiplex eco-system model might be so.

Now if this multiplex eco-systemic model of the Church is an appropriate description then we can see how experience of it could be both fragmented, frustrating, exciting and liberating, confusing and clarifying. It can not be accused of being simple. Indeed the report of the Archbishops’ Commission spoke of “a cats cradle of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies”, a description which they saw as unfortunate and which appears to be the outcome of an historical evolution. This evolution has been described (Gee, 1996) as having “unpredictable properties emerging out of myriad bits and pieces interacting”. It is not a simple bureaucratic pyramid of the rational legal form.

The ways in which physical eco-systems change has been the subject of much enquiry. Three models are current, that of natural selection wherein the fittest survive; that of chance and necessity wherein survival is a matter of random capability to cope with changing conditions; that of genetic engineering wherein the organisms can learn to avoid environmental or genetic determinism. However the processes of change in the eco-systems of human organisations, which are social institutions, are more opaque and they have not been much studied, (Nohria and Eccles 1992). The choice presented is sometimes seen as that between theoretical approaches to the study of organisations, that of Strategic Choice theory or Environmental determinism or maybe a combination of the two.

But it is an open question or major doubt as to whether the models derived from the level of organisational analysis can be applied at the inter-organisation level with any degree of accuracy (White, 1992). It is however always tempting to use a simple model to deal with complexity. Such an approach may be a case of applying requisite variety, but is more commonly a case of wishful thinking.

The Church as institution has no primary product or service in a conventional or commercial sense, rather the work is about the nature of being in relation to God, now and in eternity. In its manifestation as an eco-systems of organisations it is possible to glimpse
how the organisation patterns express the history of the institutional debates and the present explorations and modes of expression.

Earlier there was mention of the notions of control in the networks. However in social networks the question of authority has been addressed through ideas of monarchy; polyarchy, oligarchy, anarchy, autarchy and of course, democracy. Now in a convergent network monarchy (dominance) and perhaps oligarchy may be readily found. In the divergent network polyarchy and oligarchy may be found. Perhaps too in each kind of network we might find some democracy, through for example trade associations setting rules, standards and conditions of trade. In the multiplex eco-system we might find all of the above modes of authority in some or many parts of the eco-system but it is impossible to have a clear idea of the functioning of the “whole” eco system. It may appear to be anarchic, but there may be a deep structure of values and beliefs that links the parts in varied understanding.

What is also clear is that people appear to have some preferences for modes of authority; and there is strong evidence of cultural and national disposition for these preferences. It seems that the British (Hofstede) prefer the multiplex, rather anarchic modes of authority, perhaps stressing more their individuality than their connections (Whitley 1995, Bachman and Lane 1995) perhaps more competitive than collaborative..

Now to apply these models to the church we can suggest that the Episcopal system in a diocese is a form of a divergent network of authority with the Bishop as source of apostolic authority for the gifts of the spirit and a focus of unity. However it is possible to turn this around and see it as a model of convergence where all the diocesan administration and decisions and decision processes must converge upon the bishop; (even though some may be delegated). The model of Bishop-in-Synod is a version of the divergent and convergent model with the added complexity of the democratically elected members of the Diocesan Synod and of the Bishop’s council. So parts of the eco system can function with more local modes of authority.

The hypothesis here offered is that the “Church of England” has evolved over many hundreds of years into a multiplex eco-system, very complex and polyarchic in its patterns
of authority, a *veritable cats cradle of autonomous organizations with very complex relationships between them*. In contrast the Roman Catholic Church appears to be a mix of convergence and divergence. The causes of this has been proposed to be an outcome of its history and internal differences in theological stances where inclusion has persisted. The processes of how this has occurred are beyond the analysis of this paper because multiplex eco-systems never change everything at once but always change in small ways and then go on through processes of mutual adjustment and evolution i.e. emergence. Hence it is difficult to predict the consequences of any action in any one part or several parts of the eco-system. Indeed one of the curious properties of eco-systems is that when there is a change in one part of it other changes occur in what appear to be distant and unaffected parts.

6. Issues for the Church.

In the early part of the 1990s The church was confronted by a wide array of issues. Among these were;

*Decline in membership.*

The church was an active agent in developing education and still had many thousands of schools. However the rise of education, the modernist scientific programme with its claims to truth and knowledge and the rise of secularism, the first world war and its successor contributed to or went hand in hand with a decline in attendance at public worship. After the second war there was some recovery, followed by the continuation of decline in attendance, a falling off of baptism, marriages and funerals. This decline was not uniform and there were some areas of substantial growth in membership (as measured by the numbers of people choosing to put themselves on Parochial church rolls).

*Financial pressures.*

The financial inheritance of the church had been a blessing and a problem for it both provided resources and insulated the church from some of the consequences of its decline. While parishes lay members had taken on an ever increasing share of the cost of maintaining the clergy (increasing from about 20% in 1990 to approaching 80% in 2002) these national funds meant that there was a substantial cushion. The pressures on the
Church Commissioners to increase their assets and income\textsuperscript{19}, together with their long history of holding property led to some unwise property investments in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. There was a quite spectacular and shocking loss of asset values and of real money, of the order of twenty five percent, some eight hundred million pounds. Expectations of future income fell which was significant because the Commissioners were not allowed to use the assets for income. The problem of the reduction of real income in an inflationary world was serious for the income was mostly used to pay all of the pensions of retired clergy and the greater part of the stipends of active clergy. With an ageing group of active clergy it was also the case that that the greater part of the commissioners future funds would be needed to pay for pensions.

\textit{And consequences...}

Hence the church had to face the reality of having to use the Church Commissioners funds to form a “funded” pension fund for all past service and to cut back upon central contributions for stipends. Yet this left dioceses and parishioners with two unexpected burdens, firstly, from early 1991 by taking over an ever increasing proportion of the cost of clergy stipends and housing and expenses of office and secondly, from, 1999, finding the extra money (29\% of each stipend) to pay into a non-contributory “funded” pension fund.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{The changing patterns of society.}

The Church of England had been powerfully affected by the twentieth century communication revolution which has provided mass access to many other sources of knowing and to other forms of Christian practice. This has reduced the significance of the local priest. The rise of social welfare and other social supports had contributed to this process.

\textsuperscript{19} Some thirty years ago clergy were encouraged to retire at 67. The pensions issue was important for priests had worked until they died for their only income was the benefice. Following provision for a fixed age retirement (1974) the funds of the Church Commissioners paid for pensions but the loss of income meant that there was a need for the formation of a funded pension provision.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} In the Diocese of Chester this means that parish contributions to the cost of the clergy run at about twenty thousand pounds per parish, an increase of about three hundred per cent over the decade.
The claims of women...

The twentieth century claims of women have had a profound effect upon the Church. About sixty per cent of congregations are female. This movement for justice for women had the same power as the eighteenth century debates on the abolition of slavery. It challenged the very basis of authority of the ordained male ministry, a challenge that meant that the church moved very slowly over twenty years to the decisions to ordain women as Deacons, then as Priests. The watershed decision was the declaration by General Synod that there was no Theological objection to the ordination of women as priests. For some this was an undesirable consequence of giving lay people a role in governance and a regrettable outcome of Synodical government. By 2002 there is the beginning of the debate on the ordination of women as Bishops. Again, as with Synodical government, the Church of England is following changes in other Anglican provinces.

The decline in public role...

The decline in public role of the established church had mirrored the decline in attendance. This public role was still surprisingly strong, both in the House of Lords, in civic ceremonies, in education, in services of remembrance and in the passages of people through birth, marriage and death. The rise of the neo-liberal role of the Tory party and the loss of significance of the old establishment led to some conflict between the Church and the Tory government. This was most sharply felt from the publication of the report Faith in the City which called neo-liberal economic policies to account for the damage to people and community. Of course that view was rejected by the new right which has a curiously evangelical stress upon personal morality, almost independent of circumstance. The report told of the stress of inner urban life and the creation of the new poor and the underclass, the marginalisation of public morality into a private morality of individual action; with the economic and political privatisation in a new market economy signifying the decline of the expressive ethic in public life and the reappearance of the consequentialist ethic and in the relationship of the then chief Rabbi with Mrs. Thatcher signifying a pre Christian ethic. So as the church spoke of its concern for the poor and oppressed in its public theology it came under right wing attack for not encouraging a personal morality. Fracture lines in church and
state deepened. The Church of England, with its invitation to live an examined life subject to the dictates of a reflexive conscience was seen as rather woolly when set against the apparent certainties of the Roman Church.

*The uncertainty about the Monarchy.*

Given the established position of the church there was considerable significance in the problems of the monarchy. The troubles in personal lifestyle were now more visible. Typically it was the marriage difficulties, the issues of personal morality that seemed to cause such stress.

*The new worlds of knowledge.*

The rise of the modernist programme dealt some savage blows to theism as it created a hegemony of scientific knowledge and from that hegemony demanded some “scientific proof” of the existence of God. The subtle ontological argument of Anselm was simply out of category. As belief is never subject to the positivist argument, as indeed it turned out that positivism was not, belief was seen as an option not a necessity. But the end of the positivist arrogation of knowledge has not seen the end of its hegemony even when post modernism acknowledges the validity of religious discourses.

*The loss of confidence...*

There was then a sense of then not only of a loss of confidence about belief in God and Jesus’ foundation of the church but also about the institution of the church in the social field and the organisation of the church as, in action, it expressed the core values of the life of Christians.

*From public to private...*

The collapse of the ideals of communism and socialism and the rise fo neo Liberalism had also rendered silent many public and communal voices, including that of the church. It seemed that there was acceptance that the communal did not work, wealth was to be found in individual responsibility, a responsibility echoed in the religious right in the USA
and in England. The church, like other organisations, struggled to find a hearing for its concern for the communal and catholic nature of human experience.

*The end of ideology…*

There were other apparently exogenous issues, for example the debates about the decline or end of ideology in politics, but given the complex interpenetration of institutions these were also endogenous for the church. There was, post collapse of the positivist hegemony, a visible rise of fundamentalisms, not just Islam but also in the churches., but this was to some extent the usual tumbling about of movements e.g. the Charismatic, the youth scene and fashion.

*The fault lines in Christendom.*

The institution of Christianity suffered from carrying its only too visible divisions and separate churches. It was hard to speak of unity from what was perceived as a platform of unfortunate disunity. There had been a variety of attempts at Christian ecumenism; the Anglican-Methodist scheme failed, ditched by the anglo-catholics; the ARCIC debates with the Roman Catholics had limitations due to the unwillingness of the Pope to accept them; the continuing refusal of the Roman and Orthodox churches to accept the validity of Church of England ordinations to priesthood. There were minor links with Lutheran and the Nordic Evangelical churches. These proposed and failed links fail at the stress lines in the three strands of the Church of England where to move in one direction risks the disaffection and separation of the other wing. Other churches experienced the same pressures but the formation of the United Reformed Church from the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches was a sign of hope of reconciliation in England and a further sign was the agreement on Justification between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches.

These differences of beliefs the Christian tradition, marked by theology, nuance, practice, the private and the public, the divisions along clamorous fault lines when the institution intersects with other institutions in the field has left the Church of England troubled, rejected, vulnerable, hopeful and still with over ten thousand priests in service and a worshipping community of one and a half million, with about half of the population
acknowledging themselves to be Christian and thus having some identity in the institution. It had maintained its organisational unity, though this unity was marked by the fault lines in the wider institution that manifested themselves in the organisation by the provision of alternative oversight for the parishes rejecting the ordination of women and by the continuing difficulties of both the Methodist and Roman dialogues.

In this description and analysis there has been attention to the concept of the institution and to that of the organisation. By institution is meant the ecclesia, the world wide Christian communion with the sharing and differing of some values in practice; by the organisation is meant the Church of England as described with its Bishops and Synods and so on within which the issues of the institution are encountered.

A sense of powerlessness...

The long process of decline in private and public connectedness of the organisation to the wider society and to the many that call themselves Christian but do not belong to the organisation has been immutable. Every attempt to change this decline has failed, each attempt at bedrock turning out to be another stratum. This retreat of the sea of faith has not called forth any radical reappraisal within the Church of England of its work. Part of this lack has been caused by the very establishment and the cushion of the Church Commission moneys. Others have held the view that the Christians are a faithful remnant, set to be leaven in the dough or a light in a darkening world. Others saw the debate in terms of either standing against the world or submitting to it. The unanswered question was how the Christian institution and the church arrest could and reverse the decline.

7. Some Responses within the Church.

There have been a number of responses within the church to the pressures upon it;

(a) Financial; during the late 1990s there was a considerable shift at the centre and in the dioceses from year on year budgeting to longer term financial planning including consideration of the need for new sources, stewardship of the historic assets and a wish to bring the devolved financial matters under control.
Financial management of most Church moneys happened at diocesan level which was the level at which key financial decisions were made and at which the levy on Parishes, known as quota or share, was set. However the level of clergy stipends was set, following extensive discussions, by the Central Board of Finance and the General Synod. The 44 dioceses were very different, with some having large assets and a wealthy membership which could plan to finance diocesan self sufficiency and others were, in 1995, faced with projections of a financially driven reduction of clergy of about 30% by 2005.

These patterns followed the social structure of the UK with the great urban diocese most under threat.

(b) External focus; A decade of evangelism (1990 to 2000) was declared as an Ecumenical programme of the wider ecclesia to proclaim the Christian message, and to recruit followers of the way and members. While much internal work has been done the results so far were just encouraging. The low key experience of the decade was partly explained by the need to pay attention to the inner financial difficulties and to work at the problems of reassuring the clergy that money would be available in the future, both for stipends and pensions.

(c) Organisational; Stimulated by the severe losses at the Church Commissioners the two Archbishops, led by Dr. Carey of Canterbury, established in 1994 an Archbishops’ Commission under the Chairmanship of Michael Turnbull, Bishop of Durham, to consider the central policy making and resource direction machinery of the church.21

The issues in the Turnbull report touched upon many organisational and institutional issues and provided a window through which it was possible to explore the issues of control in the expressive institution.

There follows an account of the commission, the processes of working, the discussion in General Synod in November 1994, the publication of the report and its programme of publicity, the first debate in General Synod in November 1995, further consultation, the “white paper”, GS1188, as a framework for legislation, the second debate in General

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21 There was a current interest in management in the church; see Gill and Burke 1996 Strategic Church
Synod in February 1996, further changes to the proposals via progress reports, the legislation and its approval by Parliament in 1998 and the granting of the Royal Assent.


The terms of reference for the commission, appointed by the Archbishops in February 1994, were to consider policy making machinery and resource direction machinery of the national church. It was asked to report quickly by the summer of 1995. The report spoke of machinery for effective policy making (par 4.2). The Chairman, Bishop Michael Turnbull, had been for many years secretary to the Church Army (a uniformed mission, evangelism and social agency) prior to being Bishop of Rochester. The membership of the commission included very senior lay people in the church; Lord Bridge, chairs and vice chairs from Barclays Bank, Eccles Insurance Group, the Woolwich Building Society, Reckitt and Colman; senior partners from KPMG and a finance house and an ex first division civil servant. They were complemented by the Lay Chair of the House of Laity, (a Law Professor and University pro Vice Chancellor); a Diocesan Secretary, an Archdeacon, a chair of a Diocesan Board of Finance and a retired cathedral provost. The Bishop of Ely was appointed as Theological consultant.

In the Synod meeting of November 1994 an afternoon was set aside for what was described as a consultation. It took the form of an introduction to the work by the Chairman, Bishop Turnbull. At the time some unfortunate incidents in his past had been replayed in the Press. The synod greeted the Bishop with long quiet and supportive applause; expressing love and charity. A wide variety of opinions were offered, but offered in the sense that people could be said to have had their say. The commission did not set out any of their thinking. It was widely known that the commission had a view that there should be a new central body to take over the Synod staff and to abolish Synod’s Boards and Councils, but to leave the Archbishops’ staff at Lambeth and Bishopsthorpe out of the picture. None of this was offered for dialogue.

8(a) The Main Recommendations.

Leadership. SPCK.

22 Lord Bridge was chair of a concurrent Commission on Synodical government.
The Report, entitled “Working as one Body” was published in the summer of 1995. Interestingly it was published after the General Synod had been prorogued. (Elections for the new General Synod were held that summer.) The Commission then went out to dioceses on an missions of explanation prior to the report being discussed at the new General Synod in November 1995. Members of the commission addressed meetings of Diocesan Synods and a tape was made available for discussions in Parishes. Responses were varied, including the ascription to the new National Council of the label, Church of England plc. This label was applied because the report recommended a small National Council, as a body corporate, most of the members of which were to be appointed by the Archbishops including four “Executive Chairmen” to run the new central organisation.

The commission recommended an organisational solution which suggested a new National Council (as a new body corporate) and the transfer to it of the staff of the General Synod, the executive work of the General Synod, the income management of the Church Commissioners, the Central Board of Finance and some other matters. The standing committee of the General Synod together with its Boards and Councils were to be abolished. The General Synod was to lose its right to introduce legislation. The Church Commissioners were to become an Asset management group. There was to be a new Finance Forum as a consultative body between the new Council and the Dioceses with no representation from General Synod. The House of Bishops were encouraged to work at providing vision rooted in the institution to lead the organisation. The staffs of the General Synod and the Church Commissioners were to become a common staff.

What was sought in the report was a marriage of episcopal leadership and executive responsibility, with a severely constrained synodical governance to restore confidence, to provide a consistent, coherent driving force, to provide a stronger sense of corporate responsibility for its mission and well being with the new council determining its overall direction. The House of Bishops were to be charged with developing a broad direction for the church to be presented to General Synod for endorsement.

23 Made Bishop in 1999.
This report argued that it was to be seen as an integrated package not one of a series of options\textsuperscript{24} and while it was to be “debated widely” it must be implemented swiftly.

The membership of the new National Council was set as:

- The two Archbishops

- Four executive chairmen (probably three Bishops and one lay person, presumably financially qualified, appointed by the Archbishops); to direct the work of departments.

- 2 bishops elected from among them

- 2 clergy elected from them (specified as the chairs of the clergy of each province)

- 2 lay persons elected from them (specified as the Chair and vice Chair of the House of Laity).

- The chair of the business committee of General Synod.

- Up to 3 co-opted persons.

- The secretary general as executive head of staff.

The source of authority of the new council was defined in the report as “its effectiveness in undertaking the work” and legally from its incorporation. While the new council would seek a clearer partnership with dioceses and parishes and diocesan Boards of Finance, quite how this was to be done was yet to be decided. The new council would account to the House of Bishops for some of its functions but it would not be accountable to General Synod.

8(b). The problems that were to be addressed.

The Commission had sought views from a wide number of persons. Their presentation of the problems with the current structures were that the organisational pluralism produced

\textsuperscript{24} This echoed Mrs. Thatcher’s resolution that there are no alternatives.
confusion, impeded leadership, contributed to a lack of confidence in the national church, that there was no overall co-ordination or coherence, work was committee bound, that there existed a cats cradle of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, there was no single focus of decision making and strategic planning, power was experienced as negative and it was rather entropic (authors word). The report said that there “is little scope for fundamental differences” between the proposed National Council and the General Synod. There was an appeal for unity here; the report stating that General Synod can not be an executive, cannot be a policy formulation body and that its role was primarily reactive.

Some consideration was given to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s staff at Lambeth palace (some 40 persons compared with the 120 or so in the Synod staff). It was decided to keep the Lambeth staff separate so that the Archbishop could continue to have a personal staff, to cope with the many national and international demands upon him. This was extended to the staff of the Archbishop of York.

The underlying frame was that strategic direction needed a top level command and control managerialist model. There was no exposition as to how the new proposals would work.

8(c). The Theological issues in the Church were of primary significance.

The Turnbull report followed Richard Hooker’s exploration of the polity of the Church and his notion that the Church comes to be both a “society and a society supernatural”. (very similar in meaning to the distinction of institution and organization, Scott, 1995). The fundamental task of the church was to be one, holy, catholic and apostolic and to do this it must be a learning community, where teachers were also learners. Its aims were clear but we have to focus upon objectives; “To speak of the Church’s ‘direction’ and ‘effectiveness’ is to imply a grasp upon the mission which God has given to the Church; but at the same time it demands a critical and imaginative insight into current failures and future possibilities.”(p4).

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25 This was in tune with the appointment by the Archbishop of his Youth Officer, without any consultation with the Board of Education and its youth committee and officers. It was sensed that the Archbishop regarded the staff of General Synod at Church House as part of the problem.
The theological arguments, based upon the gracious gift, in the report were based in the idea that God had already given to the church the resources it needs to be God’s people; the most fundamental of which was the gift of the common fellowship or sharing in the Holy Spirit. The Church had always struggled with the realisation of its corporate existence with a concern for unity, preaching and teaching the gospel. In this work various gifts could be complementary. Leadership in the corporate body entailed the ministry of episcopate (oversight) which preserved a synoptic vision of the whole. The ordained ministry of *deacons, priests and bishops performed for our time the task of leadership* in serving, teaching, encouraging, guiding, co-coordinating and if necessary disciplining the exercise of the manifold gifts of the whole people of God. To be the people of God meant to live in a certain quality of personal, face to face, relationships embodying reconciliation of all things in Christ, living in the light of God’s justice, forgiveness and new life. The office of Bishop was at once personal, collegial and communal. The church could only work with the recognition of many diverse gifts. At the reformation the laity were given a place and a voice in the church’s polity through the role of Sovereign-in-Parliament. The church has been influenced by the conciliar movement of the 14th century, which located the authority of the church not in the hierarchy exclusively but in the whole body of the faithful united in the sacraments. The conciliar model of Bishop-in-Synod was thence derived.

A synod was one way in which counsel may be taken and consent sought; it was a way of focusing a debate in which the constructive character of disagreement and differences may examined for Christians have always engaged in vigorous debate. The communion of the Holy Spirit was always a dynamic holding of the tensions in this process, so clarity should never be bought at the cost of a suppression of variety. A synod was one way in which this variety can be made fruitful to the life of the Church.

The report took up the issue of power, perhaps as to try to preempt an expected critique that they were proposing a new centre of unaccountable power. They wrote that Jesus’ exercise of authority and power was to confront evil, to challenge untruth; acting not as a

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26 This has continued to be denied, but it is difficult to see how working as one body was to be accomplished by creating a new head legally separate from and not accountable to any of the other parts.

27 There was it seems no leadership for the laity.
domineering force but in service, inclusive of those cast out of society, valuing humanity and himself vulnerable. It served the church well when all of the gifts wherever they are found to be were brought together to provide a coherent strategy for the church as a whole. “it does not serve the church well if those who possess those gifts are treated with jealousy or mistrust. At the same time it is prudent to ensure that the Church is protected from human proneness to mistake the limits of those gifts, or to come to enjoy power over others at the very moment when the gifts are recognised.” (p8)

Noting that structures that required consultation inhibit protection of power, enhance the collective impact of work together and provide co-ordination, the report argued that it was a mistake to assume power as a zero sum game and hence the Church should encourage those with gifts to use them in the service of the whole. The church could in its very structures and processes, if it holds to gratitude, love, service, humility and trust, embody the mission upon which it has been sent. This section of the report concluded;

“Thehough Christian wisdom knows the reality of deviousness and self-deception, the Church should not institutionally fetter itself to the expectation of rivalry and mutual suspicion. The wisdom of the Church has been to require consultation between those to whom authority and power has been entrusted and those in relation to whom it is to be exercised. Our recommendations build on this foundation.” (p8,9).

Commentary

A response to anxiety?

Under the stress of the issues explored above the Church had considerable anxieties about,

the perceived relevance of its witness (the belief question); and its capacity to continue its work (the resource question); to maintain its unity (the two integrities question); to remain as a national institution (the establishment question); to maintain its confidence (the reversal of decline question); to present a centre of potency (the powerlessness question);

The membership of the commission was drawn mainly from the commercial and financial world (a bourgeois elite, Percy, 1998) so it was hardly surprising that it produced an
executive focus, rooted in a kind of Strategic Choice theory. Of greater surprise was the fact that the recommendations were almost entirely structural and did not explore how policy was made or how it was to be made. Here we can observe the migration of commercial models of authority for strategic choice resting with those at the top as though they were the legitimate agents of the share-holders. This appeared to reflect a common mode of order in the commercial world.

A. Managerialising the Institution?

Turnbull was an example of a management consultancy assignment. It was faced with a “structure” brief to which it worked in a complex context and prescribed (Blake and Mouton, 1985) a structural solution. It was ideology with a theological gloss (Percy, 1988). There was an analysis of goals for the client which was the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and bypassed the issues of norms and values (the variety of theological or expressive stances) via its conclusions about power and mistrust, did not attend to the issues of how the structures interpenetrate, the connection of the affective and dynamic processes in the organisations and in the wider institution and did not examine, with adequate care, the issues of power and authority of the General Synod or of the gifts of the whole Laos, locating as it did leadership only in the ordained. It did consider the issue of accountability in the sense of a covenant or common fellowship which should be based upon trust. But it rather created an unaccountable National Council and ignored the accountabilities of the organizations as they worked together subsuming this in appeals for acceptance and an impatience for change. Finally it did not discuss or deal with the issues or problems of implementation.

The Synodical system of Bishop in Synod in the diocese had held together the Episcopal system (with authority of tradition and charism) and the rational legal (with authority of law and elected office). One justification for the creation of a new National Council was that it was mimetic to the model, in the primary unit of Diocese, of Bishop in Synod. (Each Diocese has a Bishop’s Council as an executive of the Bishop in Synod). The argument for change rested upon the model of Bishop in Synod lifted to a national level without addressing whether this model could fit the circumstances, the work to be done or the
institutional issues of belief and values. There was no argument presented such that the reader could agree whether these proposals were the best option, for no other options were offered.

Further members of General Synod were to be deprived of their right to introduce legislation, giving this power only to the new Council. Hence the reports view of Synod as being only reactive was to be realised. In essence there was an attempt to add a new unit to the eco system by absorbing what were seen as key national units. It was assumed that the rest would not be troubled.

The proposals produced a structural solution of centralisation and control (absorbing parts into a new unaccountable corporate body) may be interpreted as a defence against these anxieties wherein the organisation was invited to regress from its institutional pluralism to a traditional mode of executive and (arch)episcopal authority as it sought to separate the executive decision making from the legislature of general synod and to rest the charism only in the House of Bishops. The purpose and rationale of this move was so that the Church organisation may be seen as coherent in policy, united and dependable and a proper object for dependence and would be perceived to have clarity of purpose and focus, manage resources centrally and have the capacity to pursue its work.

In his essay Percy(1998) noted “what is so unsatisfactory about Working as One Body is that the approach it takes to itself, to the body of Christ, to individuals, amounts to little more than consecrated pragmatism…because the report is an episcopally driven agenda, more power is slowly but surely being concentrated in the office of Bishop.”

It was observed that there was a reinforcement of the organisational hierarchy (the wish for an integrated machine) as against pluralism, polyarchy and the lack of a thinking through of any adaptive process in order to cope with the pressures, whether those suggested in this paper or those identified in the Turnbull report. A structural solution was proposed with little attention to the process problem.

The argument was offered that new structure for policy and coherence would enable new vision. This was a truncation of the classic managerial analytic process of environment -
strategy-structure-performance, because the external world was as much ignored as the internal world of the church. This was a familiar approach to turbulence and difficulty by pulling things together and hoping that integration would ensure effective adaptation or clearer pursuit of goals whatever the environment. There is a counterpoint to the formulation of the Turnbull report to the effect that the social structure of the institution, in subtle ways, creates strategy through its languages, ideas, values and beliefs.

The symptoms of structural inadequacy were not explored in relation to the three tasks of worship, mission and witness. The arguments appeared to be rooted in a structural-functional framework28 in that there was a tacit assumption in the report that strategy was concerned with change and that a tightly integrated executive structure would be the way to produce such coherence and strategy. The report did not address the subtle issues of strategy and policy formulation rather hoping that the new structure could deliver this in a clear manner. How the strategy was to be implemented was not discussed, it appeared to be non-problematic. The important problem of effecting strategy through the 44 dioceses was not discussed. It seemed to be the case that the members of the commission were migrating the modes of control of an instrumental hierarchy (which expects either obedience or compliance) into the church.

The Turnbull proposals followed the system in the USA which has a constitutional settlement which provides for a separation of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There was no discussion in the Turnbull report as to how the legislature was to influence the executive; no provision for committees of the legislature which can require the attendance of the members of the executive. The significance of ignoring the role of Synod in policy arrangements follows from a sense of frustration by the authors that Synod “only has negative power, it does not propose initiatives”: (the evidence that it had done precisely that in the very significant if difficult process of the ordination of women was ignored). This appeared in the report as a sense of frustration because there was no analysis of the matter. Again we can note the migration into the organisation of common right wing and managerialist assumptions (note the membership) of the workers obstruction of the will of

28 There are of course echoes of Fayol’s managerial functionalism.
managers, the managers right to manage and the ordained clergy leaders right to lead and duty to consult.

The issue of managerial or organizational accountability was essentially removed from consideration by the proposal that the new Council would not be accountable to any other body. Accountability in the covenant was not considered explicitly as either important or relevant but it was implicit in the sense that the new council was both part of the covenant at the highest level, that is Archbishop, and further the claim for autonomy for the new council mirrored the deep assumptions of clergy autonomy in the context of the covenant. Those who might oppose this might claim some constitutional or contractual accountability may have a future voice in the debates to come.

B. Some theological issues.

The title “Working as One Body”, but creating a new incorporated and separate head, was revealing of the invasion into, and resonance within, the organisation of the metaphor of command and control by the brain with the rest following along. This metaphor is found in Cybernetics (Beer) and in St Paul, who likened the Church to the body of Christ. In Paul’s metaphor the body has a mystical tone, in the report it has the tone of a body of men, an organisation. The report noted that the church was “not despotic, not democratic, it has a corporate, collective life” (p64). The report also argued that there was no higher status29 in the church than that of the Baptised member. Here the issues in the institution of equality before God in the ecclesia find an altogether different echo in the institutional migration of command and control models from the instrumental worlds of commerce. The organisational pluralism and polyarchy is to be pulled towards “unity”.

The location of theology and vision within the House of Bishops had the further outcome of rendering invisible the practical theology of the actual working of the eco-system. Hence Synod was presumed to be mere instrumentality and there was nothing to gain by an understanding of the role of Synod in the Laos, or of exploring actual theological workings as opposed to statements of ideal types.

29 This seemed to rest upon a singular view of status.
A more critical interpretation of Turnbull may be given in relation to the terms of reference for the commission which focused only upon structures for strategy and policy and resource direction. And through the membership it was witnessing to the privileging of a given view; that is the evangelical theological ascendancy which was clear about the its perception of the task, the report became a matter of proper headship and then mobilising the gifts to get the work done, through a new “top down appointed” council.

*C. A new center of Power.*

The report presented an altogether new picture of the role and authority of the Archbishops in relation to other Bishops and of the national Church. Of course it could be that the proposal was making de jure what had been considered to be or desired to be the case de facto, but it was widely seen as creating organisational power for the Archbishops. But unlike the diocesan model of bishop in synod the new council was actually conceived as a “national council out of Synod” for it was in no sense to be accountable to Synod.

The process described did raise serious concerns and suspicions of the taking of power into the centre, even in the context of an appeal for trust to be given. But perhaps the wish for power to be given to and accepted by leaders were defences against the anxieties provoked by the experience of powerlessness was a conjecture that partly explains how the proposals came to be formulated.

A second critical interpretation relates to the question of power replicating itself. The roles of most of the members of the commission were much as they expected the roles to be for the members of the new National Council. Here was an example of the rational legal being encouraged to “decay” to the traditional (Weber) and the charism required to change will not arise to order.

The removal of the largely elected standing committee of General Synod and its replacement by the largely appointed National Council was further evidence of the concentration of organisational power in a way which cuts across the expressed value in the institution of a baptised equality, sharing in a corporate and collective life.
It was argued that the authors of the Turnbull report sought to privilege one particular view of order, either because they decided that it was appropriate or because it was the model with which they were familiar. The result of their privileging their model was to render invisible, both consciously and subconsciously, to themselves and indeed to many others the actual complex nature of the church as eco-system. The result of this invisibility was that their diagnosis followed from their recommendations as they could not see, because they could not look at, the ways in which the eco-systems managed itself. Hence also rendered invisible was the actual working of the Boards and Councils of Synod, (dismissed as bureaucratic and committee bound, a kind of rubbishing of history), the significance of the policy formulation role of General Synod (because their model excluded “corporate shareholders” from involvement in the running of the enterprise). It also rendered invisible the creative and proactive networking and development processes of General Synod (because Synod was “set up” as an irrelevance to policy coherence). It rendered invisible the somewhat chaotic nature of change and development in the eco-system (because they were working from assumptions of control of integration). So as General Synod cannot be accommodated in their framing it was defined as reactive and just set up as negative. This rendering invisible also had the effect of silencing other understandings of the actual operations of the eco-systems and of alternative ways of managing change in order to handle some problems. It also silenced, in their deliberations, wider theological debate.

Because the work of the Boards and Councils of General Synod, and that of their staff, was made invisible then it was possible for the commission to work with a model of primitive splitting; that the new Archbishops Council would be a good object with assumptions of harmonious working and coherence as against the bad object of Synod and the Synodical Boards and Councils.

This process of exclusion of voices is a common way in which the church deals with conflict. People are simply not spoken to, not heard, excluded rather than engaged with.

D. Episcopacy

Clearly the presence of the institutional issues of history, beliefs and equality of the baptised was troubling to the commission. They write of not wanting to take in a business
culture, perhaps not noticing that it had infused their work. In the report these issues, spoken of in the language of Vision, are passed to the House of Bishops for their deliberation. This separation of value and action seemed to slice through the expressive values of living the way. The report’s ideas of vision were not clarified. There were difficulties here with the Bishops’ role in respect of being responsible for authorizing statements of doctrine. The Bishops do not have a secretariat, they meet infrequently and it was recognised that a more corporate role would need a new form of organisation. The report spoke of the House of Bishops having a more sharply focused and purposeful role, “a wider sense of the shared sense of direction and broad unity of purpose which some feel it lacks” (i.e. stressing the apostolic role over the Diocesan office); it will not suppress openness of debate or differences of view and will build upon a tradition of communal, personal and collegial episcope. The Bishops were to have more influence, the elected were to have much less, natural enough advice from the managerialist commission. The puzzle about the connection and disconnection of “policy” and “vision” or “broad direction” underlined the infusion of other institutional, managerial, values into the organisational language.

The consideration of values of the wider institution were themselves pushed into the House of Bishops as a request for vision. This suggestion assumed that the members of the House of Bishops had a unitary conception and that their collegiate working would cope enough with all their differences; where debate was sharpest and about institutional issues of greater importance this was unlikely to be the case that the 44 diocesan Bishops, of a variety of theological stances, would agree. This meant that the processes of difference will re-emerge in the new setting. This privileging of the dominant view may elicit some countervailing power.

E. The issue of Change.

As the church experienced itself as lacking dependability, both in its own lack of confidence and in the wider institution’s unwillingness to accept that the church adequately represents its values (that is as the number of active worshippers and members declines and the wider institution of Christians keeps away) the proposers, in these reforms, sought
to reinforce dependence by a regression to traditional modes of authority, rather than creating a strategic dialogue and building a constituency for change. This conjecture was based upon the lack of vision in the report, the significance given to traditional role of Bishops; the move away from a conciliar ecclesiology; synod loses its boards, its staff, initiative and accountability, to an executive structure which has an inbuilt elected minority. Here we note the lack of appreciation of the wide spread of charism; the leadership in the spirit of God; the unexplored difference of contract and covenant; managerialism and utilitarianism migrating into the expressive community as a kind of return of a managerial power oriented Protestantism as witnessed by the unexplored issue of the mediation of power and the request for a trust from “us” for “them” which “they” manifestly do not give to “us”.

F. The next steps.

It appeared at the time that the Turnbull report might rapidly be viewed as too simple a (structural and technical) solution to (the wrongly specified) policy problem and unacceptable to many. The wider church institution, manifested in the other theological groupings as well as the other actors in the eco system may be remarkably impervious to such claims to power.. Because the proposers did not consider the likely consequences within the eco-system then the evolutionary modes within the eco-system may operate to slowly reject and modify this transplanted or alien conception of order and control. (As transplanted organisms generate rejection mechanisms). It is very likely that the existing social structures of the institution will quite profoundly affect the proposals for the new structures and seek to re- enact the inter relationships in the eco system that existed and that had not been engaged in the analysis. Note that this hypothesis referred to the eco-system, not to one of its parts. In the next section some evidence regarding this hypothesis will be examined.
References.


Anthony J Berry
MMUBS
Covenant, Constitution and Contract
Control and Accountability in the Cat’s Cradle (part 2 of 2)
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Abstract

The contribution of theology to control and accounting has been traced through the monastic tradition demonstrating how the Cistercians used decentralized control of their extensive farms in contrast to the centralized control of the Benedictines (Knowles, 1948). The contribution of theology to political economy was traced by Weber and Tawney in their analysis of the Calvinist roots of liberal market capitalism and more subtly by Adam Smith in his ironic use of a phrase from Isaiah Ch 60 as the title for his seminal work on markets.

This paper reports upon a case of the interplay of theology and control and accountability which occurred as the Church of England set out to respond to a financial crisis. Accountability was theorized as stemming from the three elements of covenant, constitution and contract all of which were contested in the ground metaphor of autonomy. It demonstrates how a group of financiers from within the evangelical tradition (which places stress on headship and control) led an attempt to create a new church governance body (a national council) with strongly integrated central control and diminished democratic and conciliar participation. They had described the church as “a cats cradle of autonomous and semi autonomous organizations”. The case then demonstrates how the other theological traditions (anglo-catholic and liberal) were mobilized, over a period of several years, to permit the new body to come into life but to unravel the proposed centralised control and to maintain the existing nature of governance and to enrich the complexity of the “cat’s cradle”.

The case analysis is based upon the theory of eco-systems (as a more formal view of the cat’s cradle) to show how the loosely coupled nature of eco systems with their multiple theological stances and their multi layered processes of relationships and accountabilities were almost impervious to the attempt to shift them into an ordered and controlled hierarchy.

This paper is presented in two parts.
Part 2  Control repulsed; the eco system is sustained and enriched.


In section A we have traced the proposals of the Turnbull Commission for significant change in the central organization of Church of England. The proposals had next to be considered by the newly elected General Synod. This section traces how the processes of debate and discussion led to the original proposals being substantially modified as other theological traditions responded to the report and its implications.


In the November 1995 meeting of General Synod there was a debate on the Turnbull proposals. The motion to take note of the Report, a standard process, was carried nem con. However several points were made strongly; first the name of the new council was questioned, it should be called what it was, the Archbishops’ Council; second there was very widespread disquiet about the non elected majority on the new body, the extant standing committee of General Synod having had a clear elected majority; third the transfer of the staff of Synod, the abolition of the Synodical Boards and Councils moving to an executive body was seen as a grab for power and a rejection of synod members contributions; fourthly there was concern that the new council would not have a balance of the different theological traditions; fifthly there was concern about the proposed pace of change; sixthly there was concern that the report sought to diminish the role of synod members and had painted General Synod as a reactive body having only negative power. Given that it was Synod that had mobilised the vote for the ordination of women this attack could be interpreted as a wish to cut synod down to size and give control to the “establishment”; seventhly there were substantive reservations about the theology that had been provided in the report. There was general support for the proposals regarding the new arrangements for the Church Commissioners. The tone of the debate was generally one of suppressed anger at the anti democratic inferences countered by speakers demonising and rubbishing the standing committee and the boards and councils as
ineffective and incompetent. Humour was mobilised by more than one speaker in a rather sadistic way inviting laughter at stories of incompetence which were plainly inventions. The prolocuter of Canterbury\textsuperscript{30} rebutted the idea that the changes would give more power to the Archbishop of Canterbury by the argument that nobody could give the Archbishop more power than he had already. This ascription of omnipotence was not discussed. The new role of the House of Bishops was noted with interest.

An amendment had been tabled to the effect that instead of going ahead, “swiftly” with the proposals there be a six month hold. To the surprise of the platform this got a 40% vote, indicating the degree of disquiet. Something of the feeling in the Synod not being entirely at ease with the proposals was evident in the rather tetchy way in which the Bishop of Durham replied to the debate.

The pace of the proposals was underlined by the decision to have a General Synod meeting in February 1996 in order to get permission to bring forward legislation for the Synod meeting in July 1966. There was a general invitation to people to write to the commission with any comments.

2. The Follow on Steering Group.

Under the oversight of the Archbishops’ Advisory Group and with the consent of the General Synod a Follow On Steering Group was established in early 1996 to bring the legislation to Synod and to prepare the work to be done to implement the Turnbull proposals.

The constitution of the Steering committee was as follows;

Chair; The Ex Chairman of the Woolwich Building Society

4 Chairs of Diocesan Boards of Finance (one of whom was an FCA, another was MD of an Insurance Company)

A Church Commissioner

\textsuperscript{30} Later to be Bishop of Birmingham.
The 3rd Church Estates Commissioner

The secretary of the Church Commissioners

A professor of Law (an ex chair of the house of Laity)

Bishop of Guildford

Bishop of Stepney

A designer, ex lay chair of a deanery Synod and the only woman.

Archbishop of Canterbury’s secretary

The secretary general of the General Synod.

Hence the composition was 8 finance people, 2 bishops from the southern province, two lay people, and two staff members. It may readily be seen that this reflected the anxiety about future finances which had triggered the formation of the Turnbull commission and the work upon financial structures which lay at the heart of the Turnbull recommendations.

3. The second Synod debate; February 1996.

A “white paper” A Framework for Legislation GS1188, was presented to the February synod as a complement to the report. In it the number of elected members of the now to be called Archbishop’s Council was increased by two, one clergy and one lay person but still not by enough to have an elected majority.

In February 1996 there was a second Synod debate upon amended proposals and as modified in the White paper to take note of some changes and then to give permission to bring forward the legislation for change.

The management of the debate was interesting in that the motions were proposed by a lay member of the commission and Chair of the Central Board of Finance, Mr. McLintock, now chair of the Steering Group. In putting the motions forward he made several “humorous” attacks that people who resist change do it from entirely selfish motives and that others who resist change merely slow the inevitable.
There was a strong move from the floor to refer the proposals out to the Dioceses. It was clear that the arguments about power and authority, the role of the new council and its lack of accountability, the removal of any role from General Synod except to passively endorse the proposals from the Archbishop’s Council and the House of Bishops were still matters for concern. The arguments in favour of consulting the dioceses came from the members of the House of Laity and were about consultation with the wider church. Beside as one lay person put it; “the church has moved from a position of resources at the centre and power at the centre to a position of resources at the parishes (who will have to find the money) and more power at the centre”, implying an unstable situation.

Responses to that came from members of the commission who managed (between them) to argue that previously, at the November (1995) Synod, it had been too early and now (February 1996) it was too late for further consultation and that it was important to keep up the momentum for change and in any event we should not “bore the troops”. Another clergy person from the steering group argued that he had read all of the letters and doubted that further consultation would provide anything new. Consultation, he said, needed to be coherent consultation.

In parallel to this debate some work of exploration was going ahead with meetings with diocesan secretaries and also with chairs of the Diocesan Boards of Finance. The chairs of these Boards were concerned that with their removal from the Central Board of Finance they would lose any influence over the amount of moneys each Diocese would have to pay to the centre.

The sharpest comments were about the lack of elected involvement or a majority of the new Council; this new nominated membership was in marked contrast to the elected majority in the Synod Standing Committee. Mr. McLintock could not understand this criticism. Do the 9 elected members make a majority out of 19? Well no if you thought that arithmetic was immutable; yes if you took Mr. McLintock’s argument (and his claim to knowing about these things because he was an accountant) but his argument only followed if it was the case that the two Archbishops did not belong to the Archbishop’s Council in
the same sense of everybody else; meaning that the Council was to advise the Archbishops who did not therefore vote because they are the only persons who decide.

In response to the criticism of managerialism and lack of vision in the report the new Archbishop of York, from the anglo-catholic tradition, said that it is all a waste of time if nothing followed. Another bishop, Chair of the Board fro Social Responsibility, expressing some worries about the new structure and its inwardness and the need to maintain the capacity and willingness of the church to speak to those outside it, addressed the importance of the public theology wherein the church can address wider societal issues.

Two conservative MP’s who were church commissioners expressed concern at the lessening of the links of church and state, especially the issue of the role of the laity in governance of the church in parliament. The proposals for the diminution of the role of the Church Commissioners were welcomed by many who saw them as an anachronism in the “modern Church”, but the taking of their powers into the new unaccountable Council was not seen as an improvement.

The votes on amendments to refer matters to the dioceses and parishes were taken; the numbers of the votes by show of hands was 209 for and 213 against. A formal count was called for; this required that there be a count of persons rather than hands, with the people being given a few minutes to get into the chamber. The result of that was 235 for and 251 against. From a quick tour of the lobbies and some sampling there was substantial evidence the bishops were mostly against reference, as were the clergy but the laity were in favour of reference back to dioceses. The rise in the percentage of synod (from 40% to nearly 50%) wishing more time, more consultation and more reflection was clearly heard. The Archbishop of Canterbury made an emollient statement the following morning.

Commentary.

The confusion about majority and minority exposed the issues of power and control in the wider institution of the church as enacted in this particular Episcopal Church. The statement of Arithmetic clearly marked the authority and the separation of the Archbishops. As this

31 The sleeping issue might have been the proposed reform of the House of Lords and the possible
arithmetic statement was made in reply to the debate it was unchallenged. Maybe it was too breathtaking or maybe it was seen as a statement of truth about which nothing could be done.

Overall the central critical reflections in section A of this paper were reinforced; the extra evidence of this second debate did underline the issues of power and control in culture in the church.

There was one further possibility of political control. It may have been the case that this was a programme of change to recentralise the church by its archbishops because of the financial problems but also because they considered that the social structure of the expressive community was unlikely to agree upon an analysis of the problems and even more unlikely to agree upon a strategy for the church in the next millennium, (note the opacity of the effects of the work of the decade of evangelism); hence they chose a vehicle for change which took the issue out of the synod and other bodies; they chose to create a new structure and, knowing that this was a manoeuvre, became very anxious about pushing through the change arguing against any delay and any further consultation with dioceses. This argument supposes that the movers of the changes did have a programme or development or policy project which can only be revealed when they have taken control through the new structures.

Whether this group was right to assume that a more open approach to strategic change would be useless is another debate. But it may be observed that the approach fitted the authoritarian managerial nature of the times, mirrored in the assertion of the Chairman of the conservative party, Mr. Brian McWhinny, re the public sector when he said first you make radical change then you use tough management to make it stick, to implement it. In response it could be suggested that the Synod was consulted, but the mode of consultation did not give confidence that contrary views are “heard”.

It may be asked why the General Synod went along with this process?. It was possible that the stress in the system led the lay people in the dioceses to elect a more evangelical, conservative group to the new General Synod as a response to the very same anxieties disestablishment of the Church.
which led the centre group into a radical structural change, to conserve and enhance power. Maybe it was the case that the sense of taking action to reorganise was encouraging. So the underlying real approach of the centre in taking control was complemented by the behaviour of the houses of clergy and laity. The loop of unhelpful behaviour was thus completed, and it was not possible to address the underlying assumptions for they had become undiscussable. The interpretation here is that major issue was the anxiety created by the pressures upon the church and its decline. The defences that were being erected to contain these anxieties were not discussable and neither were the anxieties. This undiscussability was itself be undiscussable.

The proposals were a rather British pragmatic kick, there being little in the way of analysis and evidence (more a sense of unease and bad experiences) in the report of the commission. It was as though a change experiment was being conducted in the belief (from commercial command pyramids) that coherence might happen. One piece of evidence for this was the continuing refusal of the Turnbull process (commission or steering committee) to refer the proposals into the democratic Synodical system( i.e. onwards to Dioceses). It was as though the reality was too complex to comprehend and bad objects (Commissioners and Synod) were created as scapegoats for the undeniable problems.

This analysis follows upon the hypothesis of regression to traditional modes of authority. This evidence of proposed change was oddly enough rather counter to what Gee(1996) has described as the current master project which observes organisations deserting systems of “authoritarian hierarchy” for systems of “non authoritarian hierarchy” which have authority widely distributed around them. But as Gee’s description fitted the church prior to Turnbull it may be that the commission was caught up in common solutions of the form; if decentralized then centralise or if centralised then decentralise. 32

32 One member of the steering committee, (appointed because of his managerial work role) commented that the Church of England had had “too much administration and not enough management”. When asked what he meant by management he could find no words, thus supporting the argument here that the institution of managerialism (hence indescribable) is infiltrating the organisation of the church in unconscious ways.
The academic theologians of the University of London contributed a sharp critique in the Synod debates. This was reflected by the unusual route of a public letter on behalf of the Deans of the Cathedrals (Lewis 1996) where it was pointed out that the assertion of McLintock inter alias that the theological basis of the Turnbull commission proposals “had stood up to the challenge” was very firmly denied as it was made “without an answer to questions raised” a state which itself “gives cause for concern” and “we express the desire for the (general) Synod to have time for a full theological debate” on the report of the theological group under the Archbishop of York.

Meanwhile the process begun by the report and further papers and debates was continuing. The next section traces some aspects of those processes.


The first progress report noted that now timing was to be flexible. “The process is too important for the future of the Church and the Gospel for us to be tied to artificial deadlines”. (the last paragraph 56). This stood in contrast to the arguments of urgency and the need to provide the July 1996 Synod with legislation which had been used to deflect the November 1995 and February 1996 Synods from referring the matter to Dioceses. No explanation (or apology) for this was offered to Synod.

GS1209 restated the purpose of the exercise and reminded the reader that they were not responsible to Synod, but to the Archbishop’s Advisory Group. The claim was made that “our national institutions at present are fragmented and less effective than they should be.”, that the weaknesses described in Turnbull “has stood up to challenge” as has the “theological and ecclesiological basis”. The task of the national institutions is to use the gifts given to the Church for the “task of mission”. There was no reference to the Decade of Evangelism, then in its sixth year. The new “Archbishops’ Council would provide a single focus of resource and policy decision making, somewhere where ‘the buck stops’. “The proposals must not be regarded as an end in themselves ...they are means .. to release enthusiasm..at all levels without concern about a lack of effective leadership at the centre.”

It may be noted then that the continuing attention to structure is predicated upon the notion that effective leadership existed and was only disabled by structures.
The authors made the claim that the remedy had won widespread acceptance, not caring to pay attention to the astonishingly narrow vote at the February 1996 Synod, which might be interpreted as a sign of major misgivings. Without argument or explanation, but in discussion with the Standing Committee of Synod, the GS1209 proposed a modification to membership of the Archbishops’ Council which now would mean that half (10) of the 20 members were elected from Synod. (by the addition of one more clergy and one more lay person). This prose and style of presentation suggested that the Steering Group were very reluctant to acknowledge the real and sharp concerns expressed on the floor of General Synod in February 1996, especially by the laity. GS1209 then went on to state that an increase in the numbers from 20 would not be acceptable, presumably either to themselves or to the Archbishop’s Advisory group.

The Archbishop’s Council was now to be accountable to the GS in the following ways;

- by a report of its proceedings;
- by laying an annual budget before Synod; (presumably for approval)
- by laying audited accounts before Synod.
- by members of the Archbishop’s Council being available for questioning (but not debate.)
- by providing regular reports of past and forthcoming business.

General Synod and its members were to (be given back or) keep powers to introduce legislation by putting these arrangements in the hands of the Synod’s six officers. This in essence recreated the (to be abolished) Synod Standing Committee, albeit with a new role and a challenge to find a way of working. The business committee of General Synod was to continue with new elected membership and a Chair nominated by the Archbishops and appointed after approval from General Synod.

A further evolution was to recreate a process for appointments which included strong representation from General Synod. Here an inter group committee was proposed (from the Archbishops’ Council and from General Synod). In this manner the authoritarian
structural solution of Turnbull was being modified to provide processes in which various parts of the eco-system could be linked together.

The revised proposals for the Church Commissioners gave further evidence that the pressures within the eco-system that is the church were still present and still therefore had to be acknowledged. Not only had parliament, through its committee, managed to develop a different level of debate and discussion about the Turnbull proposals, it had derailed the time table for implementation. (Some of the discussion turned upon the adequacy of the proposed pension arrangements and the confidence that may be placed in organisations which had been partly responsible for the financial problems arising.) The revised composition and scale of the Church Commissioners (increased in number from the planned 15 to 29) was one product of these pressures and (para 34) there were still unresolved issues in the relation of Church and State and the new Archbishops’ Council, the proposed new Church Commissioners and Parliament. It became clear that Parliament could take control of all of these matters any time it wished for the Church operates in subsidiarity to it.

The revised proposals for the Church Commissioners included five Cabinet Ministers and the Speaker of the House of Commons, representatives from the cities of York and London together with one representative from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. This latter proposal was greeted with derision by Synod. The turbulence of negotiating these changes was illustrated by the curious fact that a membership of greater than 20 was an absolute number for the Archbishops’ Council and 29 members was now suitable for the new Church Commissioners. It seems that the “centre” was gradually losing control of its bid for control as the range of theological stances in the eco-system slowly recreated aspects of the organisational field which Turnbull had sought to remove. The cats in the cradle had used their claws.

The discussion about transfer of powers from the Church Commissioners to the Archbishops’ Council in GS1209 added a further inter group committee to the evolving structure and processes by suggesting (p27) a “non statutory joint committee” through
which the Commissioners and the Archbishops’ Council could work together may be useful; this followed upon earlier similar proposals re the Cathedrals.

GS1209 then turned to a justification of the reorganisation process. It did this by claiming that “The change we seek is not about management or about structures. It is about a change in culture...” As there is then a statement of desired methods of working in relation to partnership and trust in the shared task of mission, it was difficult to interpret what the authors meant by the claim to seek a change in culture. They did not seem to understand that they were enacting some aspects of the “culture” within the eco-system that is the church; (those to do with beliefs about central authority and order, values of love and generosity, structures of control through oligarchy and limited consultation). And that the processes of debate and discussion were slowly reasserting the conciliar model. They provided four examples of how the new arrangements would help: Ministry, concentrating upon numbers, deployment, training, support and pay. Finance and Pensions, concentrating upon the amalgamation of some parts of the Church Commissioners with some aspects of the work of the Board of Finance to save costs and to join management of income and expenditure on clergy stipends and pensions. National responsibilities, concentrating upon integration and the possibility of new modes of working to replace “committee bound and bureaucratic processes”, but this was presented as a desire with no evidence and no insight into any new policy thinking or processes.

Following the now apparently established notion that all these revisions and changes proceed without accountability to General Synod, the General Synod at its July 1996 meeting agreed to suspend its Standing Orders so that members could ask questions of the Steering Group and the steering group be allowed to reply. In his introduction the Bishop of Guildford spoke of the path of development as a disciplined process of examining issues, that it was not possible to pursue legislation for July, that there would be wide consultation. It was understood but not stated that the Church Commissioners and the parliamentary committee were wanting outcomes at variance with the Turnbull proposals.

Echoing the frustration of the original commission with these evolutionary processes Bishop Michael Turnbull (the eponymous Commissioner) asked (in a somewhat fantastic
intervention) whether the Steering Group would protect the right of the Synod to order the church; and whether it would “see off” the objections of the Church Commissioners and Parliament. The members of the Steering Group again refused to countenance reference to Dioceses; underlined the changes in GS1209 re General Synod control of legislation; restated the model of Bishop-in-Synod; and were asked to get on with it (by a member of the Turnbull commission.) There was a sharp critique of the proposals, a request for direct majority voting for the members of the new Archbishops’ Council, a wish to have power of recall of those elected, a request for elections to assure representations of different strands of theological conviction, and a request for the Archbishops’ Council report to General Synod to be the subject of debate, implying that comment might be made.

In the answers from various members of the Steering Committee it became clear again that the evolutionary process were taking over the original proposals. Similar issues were raised about the change of functions of the Church Commissioners, the wish to give dioceses more authority about money flows, as to the necessity of financing bishops and cathedrals separately, as the political necessity of expanding the numbers of Church Commissioners to 29 members in order to maintain the links of church and state. It was observed, by a member of the steering group that Synod’s views would be “taken into account.” But of course no procedure for assessing the views of Synod had been established, there had been no systematic process of consultation.

Commentary

(a) The tone of these questions and partial answers was rather tetchy; it was as though the steering committee were unable to acknowledge that elements outside of them had begun to exact or extract changes which they had not wished and that they were losing control of the implementation process to the actors in the eco-system. It seemed to this observer that the legislation was to be provided to General Synod without seeking the mind of Synod in the formulation process. The use of questions and answers as a form of consultation was experienced as regrettably patronising by many lay and clergy members of the General Synod.
(b) It became evident that the work of the Steering Group was being strongly affected by the eco-system within which it had to operate. Slowly the actors and organisations of the eco-system were beginning to put back in place the connections and possibilities which the original Turnbull proposals sought to remove. It is conjectured that this happened because the social structures of the eco-system as organisations representing the institution are much more enduring than the task structures. There were new links between General Synod and the new revised Archbishops’ Council, between the Archbishops’ Council and the revised Church Commissioners. In parallel it became clear that the financial management within the Archbishops’ Council would have to work with the reality that the 44 dioceses, The 44 Boards of Finance and the Church Commissioners which provided the income will require modes of connectedness (in the new Diocesan Finance Forum) which will look uncannily like the present (but set for abolition) Central Board of Finance. As (necessary) elements of the eco-system were set to be killed off they were, it seemed, recreated but in subtly different forms.

(c) A further example occurred; the Turnbull commission had a conception of a separation of judiciary, executive and legislature much as the U.S. constitution. It conceived of a new world where the legislature would only get legislation from the Archbishops’ Council. It emerged that this was unworkable and unacceptable, for the democratic imperatives had great force, and General Synod repulsed the removal of its Legislation control; it also has its proposed business committee strengthened and a clearer role in appointments such that the old standing committee was being recreated.

5. The process of Legislation; The Second Progress Report October 1996.

(a) The Second Progress Report (October 1996. GS1232.) was published at the same time as the proposed measure contained in GS1228. (The measure, if approved by General Synod, had to go to Parliament for actual legislation).

Again this report reiterated the reasons for the changes. It reported upon the “strategic role” of the council, its need for Vision, the limits on its powers and the work of strategic planning. However most of the strategic planning was focused upon clergy numbers and their stipends and pensions. There was mention of the role of mission and evangelism, but
this did not appear to be central. Neither was there any mention of partnership with dioceses in the development of any strategy for the work of the church. However it did speak of the need for the new council to be “welded as a team”.

The council was now to lay its budget before General Synod for approval; but not to lay its audited accounts for approval as they were the accounts of a separate corporate body.

The trustee role of the Church Commissioners, actively reasserted by the parliamentary committee, meant that they had to give approval for the particular spending of its moneys. Hence the proposal that the Commissioners should only hold assets and the council dispose of the income flows was not possible. Hence a joint allocation group was proposed which would consist of members of the Council and the Commissioners to jointly approve spending. Further there was to be also a Heritage Forum with a joint management committee from the Council and the Commissioners.

The report spoke of the special role of the House of Bishops in the new arrangements.

It spoke of the need for leadership in relation to ministry finance and membership.

The Turnbull report had written of the general uselessness of committees (from its managerialist command and control standpoint) and how they waste time and obstruct work. The Turnbull authors did not choose to understand what the multiple roles of the Boards, Councils and committees had been and was. In this 2nd progress report the authors recanted and explored the useful roles of committees. The Turnbull report had recommended the removal of the Boards and Councils of the general synod and their replacement by Executive chairman. Now the Boards and Councils would remain, for the time being, reporting to general synod via the Archbishops’ Council as they had reported via the Standing Committee of general synod.

A touch of defensiveness was introduced in respect of the new arrangements “if we sought to achieve greater coherence by establishing a hierarchical form of control we would be acting contrary to Anglican ecclesiological principles of consultation and consent, and would immediately and rightly meet with opposition”. This appeared to be a quite remarkable volte face.
With the publication of the draft measure the steam had gone out of the Steering Group and interest and decision began to focus upon the measure and the work of the revision committee.

General Synod was to be invited to give the measure general approval at its sessions in November 1996; it did so and the measure was sent to the revision committee.


(a) The Theological statement June 1997 GSMisc. 491.

For this synod had a Theological statement (GSMisc491) which provided a commentary upon theology and organisation of the church. (see above).

The report (GS Misc. 491, June 1997) of the Archbishop of York’s group provided some Theological Reflections upon the Turnbull proposals. They sought to develop and complement the theology in the Turnbull report. They wrote; “A proper theory of the governance of the Church has to hold together, in a dynamic relationship, ideas (such as Episcopal authority and synodical governance, collegiality and primacy) which at first glance seem in tension”.p7. Yet “the church needs to be able to articulate its vocations and to use its structures to deliver its mission” p8. And further “While sound theology must be at the heart of the Turnbull exercise, this will not of itself ensure sound organisation”.p8 and “the church can and should learn from other human institutions”.p9. The report noted the criticisms of managerialism and argued that as all institutional arrangements are provisional the church must be prepared to adapt its structures in the light of moves to visible unity. Also present units such as parishes should be responsive to cultural and contextual changes, especially in relation to the considerable cultural flux of the late twentieth century.

The report then addressed four models or images of the church;

1. The church as the body of Christ; with Christ as its head or as they argue, origin, thus dealing with the head of the body issue.
2. The church as Communion; the church as Trinitarian and as being in communion emphasises its relational and dynamic nature; echoed in the eco-system model.

3. The church as Pilgrim; the church and individuals being on a pilgrim journey in and toward the light. Structures must embody this and build mutual fellowship and mission, recognising that the institutions of the church have to meet its need for order and the voluntary nature of active participation. This is reflected in new institutional theory as the concern for modes of order.

4. The church as herald; to proclaim what it has heard, believed and been commissioned to proclaim in its prophetic role. The church as herald and prophet must engage with the world with an emphasis upon faith, witness and service. This is an echo of the new institutional notion of the significance of values and beliefs, their origin, evolution and context.

In these four models the theology of the Turnbull report was located, contextualised and significantly extended. The authors then moved from there to consider the church as Learning Community with attention to trust, risk, involvement and reflection. The role of leadership was explored in relationship to authority. The many “..Gifts carry their own authority as their bearers commend themselves to the people of God”. P27. “There needs to be a combination of sufficient freedom, with consequential untidiness,”. The charisma of leadership was not to be annexed to the ordained in the church nor, among the ordained, by the Bishops. Leadership is shared and distributed and all those who exercise it need to be alert to its dangers. Here the authors refute Turnbull and especially acknowledge that the laity exercise leadership. However the office of Bishop does carry special responsibilities as well as the recognition, encouragement and nurture of the gifts of others. Only by wisdom is a balance achieved between freedom and order. P29. In this way the theological considerations of authority and leadership in reorganisation was significantly reshaped by Anglican tradition; but note that Turnbull was not explicitly rejected.

The attempt to substantially limit synodical government in Turnbull was taken up in GS Misc 491 in a discussion of Conciliarity. “This conciliarity is twofold. First it is grounded in the fellowship among the college of Bishops. Secondly it is grounded in the way in which
bishops and representative clergy and laity take counsel with each other.”p30. The conciliar model of Bishop-in-Synod fits the catholic concept of sensum fidelium. Anglican synods were not just to be about taking votes, they were to be a means of taking counsel about what God wills for His church. But while the Bishop has power and authority so does the Synod, by law established. The report noted some tension between accountability and trust. Indeed “conciliarity has weaknesses in that councils and committees find giving dynamic leadership difficult” and there needs to be “space for individual leadership, prophetic witness, initiative and enterprise.”p33. In this way the synodical governance was qualified by recognising the need for change. The use of the term dynamic, in relation to leadership, in these sections did indicate some agreements with the frustrations which lead to the formation of Turnbull and with what needed to be done and the problems of doing it.

The report argued that if the concept of the new Archbishops’ Council needed to be theologically sound. The pilgrim church, it said, needed leadership and governance. Is not the general Synod enough? It asked. It noted that the new Archbishops’ Council resonates with the idea of Bishop-in-Synod and would enable the Synod and the Archbishops to collectively exercise oversight and service. However its success will, they wrote, depended on more than theoretical arguments. It then left the matter to the new Council to consider; “the council will need to examine its role against a sound basis of theological principle to establish guidelines to govern its business.” p55. And in something of a friendly warning it noted that “it will need to be ready to listen to its partners in leadership and governance of the church and to learn from their experience.”

The rest of the report was a discussion of the Role of Bishops,(cf the Ordinal), Suffragan Bishops, Collegiality, the work of the House of Bishops, relationships and Primacy. Turnbull had challenged the Bishops to provide vision for the Church; here the authors reflected upon the historic role of the Bishops (e.g. leadership, unity, mission, oversight, teaching, public roles) within dioceses, nationally and universally in the specific anglican context of an established state church. The response to the call for vision was, inevitably, muted noting only that “the House is well placed to develop a strategic plan for the Church’s mission.” p49.
In summary the report GSMisc 491 did not refute the theology of the Turnbull report but it did challenge it fundamentally. It located it within a wider reading, a wide reading typical of the eco-system view of organisational fields which themselves are products or carriers of differences in values, beliefs and modes of order. (Scott, 1995). Significantly it did not make any recommendations but did challenge the assumptions of headship, power and control in the Turnbull report. This was perhaps not surprising given that the Archbishop was from the catholic tradition.

(b) The 3rd Progress Report. GS Misc 494.

Clearly behind the meetings and reports from the Follow up Steering group were a wide variety of discussions about the evolution of the notion of the new council, its structures and memberships and roles in relation to other bodies. Clearly the once attacked and embattled Church Commissioners had mobilised the Parliamentary committee to good effect, as the trustee role of the Church Commissioners, (a body established by Parliament in 1947) was supported as an element of the relationship of church and State. It became clear that Parliament were not willing to surrender the independence and role of the Church Commissioners to the new Archbishops’ Council.

Once again this 3rd Progress Report reiterated the purposes for the reforms and new arrangements then set out to answer some of the key questions that had been raised.

1. Where is the Vision? There was no answer to the precise question, rather it was hoped that the new arrangements would lead to a new vision and new ways of working with the House of Bishops being given a central role which they already had.

2. Is the Archbishops’ Council (now) a threat to the General Synod? No, they answer, noting that the Turnbull attack on General Synod and its role had been reversed. The Synodical government was to be kept but the new Council was a separate corporate body which has its own powers.

3. Is it to be run by grey suited managerial types? No they said.
The report noted that the draft measure had “rolled up” the proposed executive chairmen and the three nominations for the Archbishops’ Council into six members to be nominated by the Archbishops and approved by general Synod.

In the progress reports there had been an almost surreal debate about the right size of membership for the new Archbishops’ Council. The number had drifted from the 15, proposed for the new Church Commission (but now to be 29) to 19, to 20. 21. 22, with statements made at where the possible was changed by the addition of 1 member into the unworkable. This symbolised the sense that the Steering committee were losing control of the original Turnbull agenda which indeed did appear to be the case.

The report addressed what was in this process for diocese. There was little of substance.

The Turnbull report had sought to abolish the separate role of the Central Board of Finance,(CBF) by absorbing it into the Archbishops’ Council. However the CBF was a 44 dioceses meeting to examine issues of finance and especially stipends, stipends which were decided at national level but now mostly financed at dioceses and parish level. There was to be a new Finance Forum to advise the new Council of what could be managed by the various dioceses in respect of stipends and some other minor matters. The value of this body was underlined by later debates and decisions which extended its membership to include elected members of the General Synod.

The 3rd Progress Report concluded by claiming that the new Council will provide a focal point for policy and strategic thinking, bring together finance and policy responsibilities of the Council, create a stronger partnership between the bodies working nationally, provide greater transparency over the apportionment of central costs and central support, enable mission, provide a coherent unified national staff, accountability to general synod, enhance Episcopal leadership and synodical governance, control costs, bring the 44 dioceses more effectively into decision making at the national level. Much of this appeared to be a mantra with the nuances unexamined.

The report like its predecessors restated the vision behind the changes and went on to provide a summary of the new arrangements. The Church Commissioners Functions re Pastoral Measure 1983 and Dioceses measure 1978 may be shifted via an order initiated by the Archbishop of Canterbury but requires resolution in parliament. Balance of church and state maintained. The Central Board of Finance; absorbed into the new Council but still existing as a body corporate. The Diocesan Finance forum is to replace joint decision with consultation.

Pension Board. 1997 measure; some small changes but the new requirements of clergy pensions to be funded from Jan 1999 meant that it will build its assets at the rate of some £30million per annum.

Boards and councils; still exist pro tem but report to General Synod via the new Council. But in a sharp change from the original Turnbull proposals for appointed executive chairmen, their new Chairmen will no longer be executive members of Council; so they are cut off, when in the past they were a part of the standing committee of General Synod.

Details were provided in relation to the common staff, accountability, central services and costs. Some comments were offered in relation to dioceses and parishes in respect of their being a more coherent view at the centre.

The progress report spoke, perhaps rather wryly, of the Byzantine complexity of the church and its structures without asking why or how that was the case.


In November 1996 the draft Measure had been given general approval. The revision committee was made up of five members of the Follow on Steering group and twelve other members of synod, including members of the original Turnbull commission and from the Church Commissioners. The assessors to the revision were 2 staff of the Church Commissioners and one from the Pensions board.
A wide array of representations were made, some substantive, relating to apparent vetoes for Archbishops, not to have both the new Archbishop’s Council and the Central Board of Finance as corporations, requirements for audit and accountability; these were all rejected sometimes by narrow votes of eight to seven. A number of minor and useful tidying up amendments were carried into the revised measure; e.g., the statement of objectives, some text rearrangements etc. In general the committee were always persuaded of the need not to revise the draft measure away from the text and intentions of the generally approved measure; clearly most of the committee saw revision as a minor technical matter. This appears to be the product of a majority of the committee being either from the steering Committee or from the original commission and the church commissioners. The report of the revision committee was accepted by General Synod. The Measure was approved.


Like all the predecessors the report reminded its readers that the vision was based in Theology; this time mentioning the themes of Conciliation and Grace and the wish to see the church as a learning organization, clearly accepting the criticism of the Archbishop of York’s Theological working Group. The report sets out the new structures, restating what has been done. It set out some of the working of the new Finance Committee of the Archbishops’ Council together with arrangements for Ministry and heritage.

Arrangements and timetables for elections and appointments were announced. It was interesting to note the fate of the original desire of the Turnbull Report for the Archbishops to appoint four executive directors and nominate three people of public standing (people it was then explained who were so grand that it would be unthinkable that they would offer themselves for election to General Synod). Now advertisements were to be published inviting persons to apply for consideration for nomination by the Appointments Committee; such nominations to be approved by Synod.

In the event, in November 1988 after the Royal Assent six persons were nominated as members of the Archbishops’ council. They ranged from a pro vice chancellor of a new
university via a young black oxford educated barrister\textsuperscript{33} to a female marketing executive. They were nominated as a group. Synod was not permitted to vote on each of them, thus ensuring that it could not actually even symbolically vote against any one. So democratic accountability was nullified.

In January 1999 the Archbishops’ Council came into being. The chair of the follow on steering group was given a knighthood; the prolocutor of York was also given a gong. Later the secretary general of the General Synod, who became the senior executive of the new Council was also knighted.\textsuperscript{34}

Section C;

1. Reflections.

The "cats cradle" of interconnected organisations and structures which the evangelical headship influenced Turnbull report had scorned and had sought to remove and streamline had been recreated in this evolutionary process. Indeed it may be noted that in some respects the cradle had become more complex than before, with the emergence of joint committees.

(a) The intended end state was that the ideal of corporatism and managerialism and that of demutualisation of the core of synodical Government (by the creation of the legally separate council and the absorption of Synod’s staff) had been achieved even if the context of its proposed working had been significantly changed.

The model of bishop-in-synod had been used as a descriptor of the proposed Archbishops’ council. However it was clear that the new corporation was a model of Archbishops out of synod. The new corporate body was accountable to no other organization.

(b). However the original structure and membership of the proposed national council had been radically altered. From a model of a chair appointed board (as a self perpetuating

\textsuperscript{33} Later in 2002 to become junior minister in The Labour government.

\textsuperscript{34} Later to be appointed in 2002 as the Parliamentary Commissioner for standards.
oligarchy with some elected memberships) it had changed into an elected majority with appointment of six ordinary, if variously gifted, persons. The idea of “working as one body” had been suggested as a real attempt to create working as one head, in the model of a corporate board. The joint committees, the fact of diocesan independence and control of most of the financial resources, the elections of a majority of its members from synodical constituencies has radically changed the character of the head.

The body existed but the head had, to follow the metaphor, been given a brain transplant and others controlled its blood supply. .

(c) Further the Church Commissioners retained their independence, their powers for asset management and involvement in spending decisions. They work with the new Council via joint committees for spending and for Bishoprics and Cathedrals.

(d). While the Central Board of Finance had been absorbed into the new Council membership, the Diocesan Finance Forum had been given a radically changed membership, to include members of general synod from each diocese. The reality of the dioceses as the major sources of money meant that the consultative Finance Forum has the real power of financial choice, to constrain the new Council if it wishes. By early 2000 Diocesan Boards of Finance were beginning to indicate to the new Council and Synod that they could only accept a 2% reduction in their central contributions.

(e). That the Turnbull commission and the follow on steering group and the large part of the revision committee were drawn from the financial parts of the organisations reflected the origins and anxieties which had lead to the setting up of the Turnbull Commission.

(f). The reality of the emerging finances of the clergy was that the parishes will have to find both almost all of their stipends and pension contributions hence the central bodies will become progressively less important. The Pension Board will become more significant than the pensions resources of the Church Commissioners.

(g). The process of amendment of the proposals demonstrate that the modes of order were muddled as between Archbishops and bishops are to be conciliar in practice, the beliefs are untouched; the values of conciliar working have both persisted and modified.
But any item from the Archbishops’ Council will be cleared by the House of Bishops prior to being considered by the other houses. This in practice may lead to estrangement.

(h). It could be argued that the form of corporate managerialism was modified by membership and will be further modified in practice by the unwillingness of the elected members to collude in the degrading of the houses of clergy and laity of general synod, but future elections may be interesting.

(i). It may be that the central church bodies will seek economies by essentially abandoning the work of the Boards and Councils by removing the professional staff. In 2002 the Council seeking to reduce costs has reorganized the Boards into two Divisions.

As the common staff was created it has been noted that the commissioners staff being paid more, will because of TUPE, be given the more senior jobs. Already lay professional staff are being replaced by male clergy.

In effect the Archbishops will have two staffs; their own professional staff at Lambeth and Bishopsthorpe and the staff of their new council.

(j). None of this appears to have affected the major issues facing the church i.e. potency, decline in public standing, decline in membership, severe pressure on financial resources, the emerging pressure of the third province breakaway movement, the emerging pressure to revoke the act of Synod and move to the Ordination of women as Bishops. In one sense it has fulfilled the role of many re-organisations which is to be a substitute for critical analysis and strategic action.

The requirement for coherence in national policy was and is a myth of functional modes of thought. An expressive community needs careful articulation of its beliefs and values. That work will go on and, it seems, it will go on in a highly distributed manner in the styles of leadership spoken of by the Archbishop of York’s theological reflections.

2. Discussion.

The proposers of change clearly had some difficulty in finding a model or theory upon which to hang their suggestions. They turned to the model of the primary unit, the Diocese,
and its latter day mode of working as Bishop-in-Synod. Now this model of Bishop-in-Synod was designed to work at the level of the primary unit that is the Diocese. Essentially the new Archbishops’ Council was to be a new head for the body and, as it was to be a separate legal entity, it was a case of Archbishops' Council out of Synod. The processes of change had led to a change in the structure of the brain in the new head together with significant changes in its embedded connections.

The model of Bishop in Synod is essentially an intra-organisational model. It is not an inter-organisational model and hence is an unlikely basis for sensible description at the inter-organisational level, unless it is assumed that there is a more radical change project than that presented. For the use of the intra level model at an inter organisational level may imply a real desire to recast the Archbishops as the “bosses” of the Diocesan Bishops. Note that the Archbishops are also Diocesan Bishops and do not have the same authority in the other Dioceses of their province, they being more primus inter pares in the House of Bishops. Certainly the nature of the composition of the houses of clergy and the houses of laity of the General Synod do not correspond well to the diocesan model being applied at the inter-organisational or eco-systemic field level.

From this argument it might be observed that the model of Bishop-in-Synod does not fit or provide an adequate model when lifted to the level of the extra-organisational analysis. Hence the original notion of Turnbull to leave the Archbishop of Canterbury’s establishment at Lambeth outside of the proposed arrangements fits with the arguments of this paper. For through the Lambeth Palace the Archbishop can take up his role in between the churches and within the provinces of the Anglican communion as an element of an extra-organisational level of working.

As the Turnbull commission itself, in its unconscious assumptions of order, was a shadow of the mode of operation for the new Archbishops’ Council, so it seems was the heavily financially influenced steering group an emerging shadow of the chief work of financing the clergy, (except of course in neither case was there any directly elected membership). The casting by the Turnbull Report of General Synod as a reactive body, by not seeking to consult it as a body, has been carried on by the steering group for the group did not seek to
involve synod by testing its mind to the evolving arrangements, they simply asked for comments, questions and reactions. Rather General Synod was still cast as a somewhat tiresome necessity with the unfortunate role of deciding upon the actual legislation. This may be taken as evidence of the strength of the apostolic definition of episcopate as the abiding model of authority in the Church of England, such that all other authority including that of the democratically elected lay members of Synod hold their authority in some mode of delegation. (White, 1992). The episcopate so envisaged in the Turnbull commission has been described (Roberts 1996) as “an apostolic succession turned executive employing managerial power” an ascription which derives from, among others, Enteman (1993).

In contrast there was a feeling among Synod members that the arrival of the legislation before General Synod would be the time of reckoning where the powers of the General Synod would be unequivocally asserted. For it was certain that the legislation will require a two thirds majority of each house of the General Synod. It was observed that the Turnbull Commission reported between the end of the 1990-1995 General Synod and the election processes for the 1995-2000 General Synod. The proposals were to be a matter of urgency, to be approved without reference to Dioceses. Slowly the General Synod, by its votes for reference to dioceses and parishes and in proposing amendments had been signaling its increasing discontent and in concert with work in the Commissioners and in Parliament had almost recreated the previous cats cradle of autonomous bodies which the Turnbull Report had found so difficult to understand.

From this analysis it appears that the model of the multiplex eco-system was serviceable, providing as it did a picture of the Turnbull commission proposals as a regressive hypothesis introduced as normative prescription into the eco-system. It partly explains how these proposals were slowly modified by the very pressures and forces that lead to the evolution of the church as eco-system. Especially at risk was the migrating managerialist assumptions and ideology, especially the notions of task and policy command and control, for the re-creation of sundered linkages in the eco-system proceeds apace and will continue. Of course there are many other changes happening within the eco-system through which processes of mutual adjustment were continuing to exert their influence.
This analysis also suggests that the notion of effecting organisational (or indeed cultural) change through such prescription is unlikely to bear much fruit, for the Turnbull prescriptions were essentially structural, and it was the culture-in-action or values-in-action which was modifying them mostly by recreating processes which were designed out. To effect a change in culture would require a quite different mode of intervention and programme of work. This provided evidence for the Scott hypothesis that the behaviour of organisations is socially constructed from conceptions of beliefs, values and regulatory modes and is not likely to be changed much by small alterations in some part of the eco-system, but they may engender reactions which serve to strengthen other beliefs and values.

However given the problem of describing and understanding the church as an eco-system it must also be the case that the changes, however modified, will lead to other changes which are not predictable (Gee, 1992). It is the nature of eco-systems to be exceedingly complex and it can not be assumed that they have long run stability or viability. It was of course the very recognition of the problem of long run viability, using the financial crisis as a trigger, that led to the setting up of the Turnbull commission and the choice of its (rather financial) membership. It was possible that the new arrangements as they emerge will lead to the parishes and other efforts raising the money to sustain the professional clergy and staff at or around the present levels. That would be a significant accomplishment of financial viability. There is little sign that this process has any impact upon the viability of the church eco-system as an expressive community.

The nature of control in this church as eco-system was a struggle between dominance and collaboration, reflecting the managerialist assumptions of strategic choice that are being migrated into the organisation and the beliefs and values of the institution of Christianity. It was clear that the managerialist assumptions of oligarchy and execution fit closer to the evangelicals focus upon headship than they did to the anglo-catholic conceptions of order or more acutely the Liberals conceptions of interpretation and hermeneutics. However the bid for dominance in the Turnbull proposals has been severely dented if not quite defeated in the emergent processes; by the experience and desire for collaboration as the proposals were modified by actors having the power to make claims in the eco-system for their “rights” and obligations to be maintained in substance if not in form. In the sense that the
regressive hypothesis developed in the early part of this paper to explain the genesis of the original proposals is correct then the emergence of significantly modified proposals which were based upon a fuller diagnosis and elaboration would be a sign of either arch conservatism of the eco-system (similar to White’s concept of stability being the ultimate defeat of elite group control) or of viability. It would also be a sign that monarchy is not viable in this eco-system but that polyarchy and oligarchy will continue their uneasy cohabitation with democracy. It seems that the conscious and unconscious attempt to render invisible much of the positive and creative work within the eco-system has foundered upon pre-existing differences within it. This is not to claim that there is an alternative conception of change being mobilised rather it is observed that the control in the eco-system is emergent as we observe adaptation through small and discrete steps to continue its task of replication and evolution of its inner beliefs, values and modes of order.

This case of the struggles for control in the Church of England has been influenced by White’s (1992) conjectures about the role of agency of the elite as a means of control. In this sense the Turnbull Commission was an agent of some of the desires of the elite, the Archbishops and their advisory group, using rationality as a rhetorical weapon, to shake up the present patterns in order to enhance or regain control (from the “1960’s” intrusion of Synodical government) and cut across ossification and the consequences of “specialisation” and to enable new patterns to emerge. In this sense the modified proposals may be seen as adequate. In the first part of this paper it was conjectured that the elite may have a much wider project in mind, a project which is held privately in the sense that “public secrecy goes with internal openness within the agentry” (White p99). Simply to focus upon the “central policy making procedures” could well be a precursor to further possibilities, e.g. bringing the Diocesan Bishops and dioceses into a restructured divisional form of organisation. The movement in the case of vision and so forth into the House of Bishops does fit with White’s point that the patterns resulting from this use of agency are self-concealing and any lasting significance may be publicly discounted, were it to be recognised. Of course organisations are never static, they are always changing in some ways and they are more crescive than designed. The Turnbull Commission also attempted a further task of agents which is to dehistoricise the organisation in order to regain control, to
destabilise and create enough “chaos” in order to effect control. However as White noted “Institutions are hard to change” and “the mechanisms of agency will turn into serpents beneath ones hand.” It seems that such was the case in the Church of England.

The reasons for the partial defeat of the project for control via a new head for the body offered here is that the model of organisation and control being infused into the Church of England presupposes a coherent entity rather than the loosely coupled, multiplex ecosystem of competing theological stances which is argued here to represent the Church of England. Hence this paper is a contribution to the task which White and others (e.g. Yeung) have set out, which is to build understanding of the issues of control in eco-systems.

The material of this case does suggest that the capacity of multiplex eco-systems to resist control being exercised from one point in them may have a wider application when considering the consequences of the shift from centralised to network forms of organisation. Like Humpty-Dumpty they may never be put back together again; but in the eco-system approach there is always the possibility of shifting to new and unpredictable forms.
References.


