Music Policy in Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool

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August 1998
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1. Introduction

1.1 Approaches to Music Policy
Traditionally, the music industry has experienced very little intervention by either central or local government, especially compared to other sectors such as the arts or broadcasting. At a national level, an MMC enquiry into the price of CDs (which concluded that no action should be taken) stands out. However, two reports - *The Value of Music* and *Overseas Earnings of the Music Industry* - have highlighted the importance of the industry in economic terms (the former claimed that the industry is worth £2.5 billion to the domestic economy and that it employed an estimated 115,000 people and the latter said the sector earned a net £571 million in exports in 1995). These have led to some moves by the Labour Government to develop music industry policy and it has established a Music Industry Task Force.

However, other national and local policies, which may not have been formulated with any intention of impacting on the cultural sector, have also been significant, and this should be borne in mind: those concerned with training and education, social welfare, property, tourism, licensing, policing, transport etc. may all have a significant impact on a local music industry.

At a local level a variety of measures have been pursued, although the common thread in all music policies at a local level is to generate broader economic development. The case studies of Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool were chosen as they appear to represent three different approaches to music policy, whilst perhaps sharing some of the difficulties. Broadly, Sheffield has the clearest and longest running strategy toward the music sector as represented in the development of the Cultural Industries Quarter and the National Centre for Popular Music; Liverpool has had a variety of attempts at intervention, most recently involving EU Objective One money and the development of the Merseyside Music Development Association; and Manchester has had a much more laissez faire approach combining more general re-imaging campaigns and limited investment in projects such as In The City.

1.2 Music Scenes and Music Industry
We may at some points in this report refer variously to “music scenes” and the local or national “music industry”. Whilst clearly these two are inextricably linked, we feel that it is a distinction worth noting: our research has pointed to the fact that there are different dynamics involved in generating a music industry infrastructure and the development of an identifiable and vibrant music scene. Of course, the relationship is symbiotic - one may determine the longevity, development or character of the other - but we would not want to equate the two in any simplistic way.
2. Background to Music Policies in Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool

2.1 Sheffield

2.1.1 Economic and Political Factors
Sheffield, once a “classic monocultural city” based almost solely on the steel industry (Taylor, I, 1995) suffered a haemorrhage in employment levels at the start of the 1980s. Upwards of 60,000 jobs were lost in a few years, including 20,000 in 1982, and by 1988 13.2% of the working population were unemployed (the national average was 8.2%)i. Sheffield City Council, and particularly Paul Skelton (then part of the Economic Strategy team, later to be Cultural Industries Team Leader in the Department of Employment and Economic Development) championed the cultural industries as an area for intervention, citing it as one sector which continued to grow despite recessionii. The cultural sector therefore became one of 30 areas identified for intervention.

2.1.2 Music Scene
At around the same time, Sheffield had a group of bands and musicians (The Human League, ABC, Heaven 17, Comsat Angels) who were experiencing national and international success. From the City Council’s point of view, there was a desire to retain some of the benefits of this success (it has been estimated that Sheffield achieved a 5% share of the singles market in 1982) either in terms of inward investment to local music businesses, or in terms of raising the profile of the city as a centre of popular music production. From the musicians point of view, they found that they had to record and in some cases live, outside the city (mainly in London) given the lack of facilities in Sheffield. Paul Skelton:

‘Once I started talking to them they were saying, “we’ve got loads of ideas about how this sector could grow in Sheffield and we want to have a recording studio and attract music makers to the area.”’ [Interview with AB]

This interface between the wishes of policy and musical creativity led to a number of policy initiatives. More recently, the city has produced another crop of bands including Babybird, Longpigs and most successfully, Pulp.

2.1.3 Sheffield Policy: The Leadmill
The first example of public intervention came in 1982 with the opening of the Leadmill Arts Centre and venue on Shoreham St. This was done following a campaign by local arts workers (involving Yorkshire Arts Space) and with council support, although its origins lie more in community arts policy than cultural industries policy.

2.1.4 Sheffield Policy: Red Tape Studios
The desire for recording facilities was partly met by the development of the first ever municipally-owned recording studio in the UK, Red Tape, in 1986, which followed two development reports Municipal Music Services (December 1983) and Municipal Recording Project (1984). It comprised a 4 track studio (expanded to 16 in 1993 and since to 24), rehearsal space and training schemes, and was funded by the Department of
the Environment and the European Social Fund. It is currently undergoing a strategic review.

2.1.5 Sheffield Policy: Audio Visual Enterprise Centre
Two years later the Audio Visual Enterprise Centre (AVEC) opened next to Red Tape. AVEC is essentially a managed workspace of specialist, commercial recording and media facilities, including Human League, Fon and Axis 24 track recording studios; Sheffield Independent Film studios; a gallery (The Site Gallery, original called the Untitled Gallery); and design space.

2.1.6 Sheffield Policy: Workstation
The success of AVEC led the council to develop The Workstation managed workspace facility, dedicated to cultural businesses, adjacent to Red Tape and AVEC which opened in 1993. This was 50,000 square feet of office space and, due to government restrictions on local authority spending, was developed by Paternoster Ltd, the private trading arm of Sheffield Media and Exhibition Charity. The Workstation has since expanded twice since this date and in 1994 attracted the Sheffield Hallam University’s Northern Media School as well as the Independent Television Commission.

2.1.7 Sheffield Policy: Cultural Industries Quarter
The strategic naming of the facilities as the Cultural Industries Quarter happened in 1988 with the publication of the CIQ Mission Statement and an outline Development Plan for the Quarter from 1988 to 1998. Although some have argued that this document is ‘less a strategy and more making sense of what has happened’, it nonetheless helps to define the ambitions and intentions of the CIQ and its role within Sheffield’s economy, as follows.

Stage One (1983 -1992) - ‘local focus’: building and consolidating production, resources, access, training, and facilities which included the establishment of Red Tape, AVEC, Workstation. Establishing the council as a landlord to local cultural businesses it both broke new ground and began to bridge the gap identified by local musicians and film makers.

Stage Two (1989 - 1994) - ‘regional focus’: increasing consumption, promoting the area and adding to the infrastructure to ‘achieve critical mass in the area’ included the establishment of the Media and Exhibition Centre and Northern Media School.

Stage Three (1990 - 1996) - ‘national focus’: attracting visitors to the area and to expand certain sectors. Includes the development of the National Centre for Popular Music, community radio, and improving links to the science park. It also included the building of the Showroom Cinema - a ‘regional leader in independent film’ - with £3m of Lottery money.

Stage Four (1991 - 1998) - ‘international focus’: making a ‘serious international impact’ in terms of profile, image, tourism (especially through the NCPM), employment and the local economy. Development of cable TV, built environment, film and broadcasting festivals,
training initiatives.\textsuperscript{iv}

The CIQ development should be seen as part of a broader re-imaging of the city which has involved a major focus on youth and sport: World Student Games, UK Sports Institute, Don Valley Stadium etc.\textsuperscript{v}.

Although for some years the CIQ came under the direct auspices of DEED, more recently, following a reorganisation of Sheffield City Council, the appointment of a new Chief Executive and a major consultative exercise, major changes are expected in the running of the Quarter with the appointment of a CIQ Executive and Steering Group. This process is ongoing.

2.1.8 Sheffield Policy: Sound City 1993
In 1993, Sheffield City Council won a bid to stage the second Radio One Sound City. This was intended to raise the profile of the city’s music as well as attract visitors to the many music events staged. Tim Strickland (Artistic Director of the NCPM) argues that it, ‘marked a major recognition of the progress achieved by development work over a 13 year period’\textsuperscript{vi}.

2.1.9 Sheffield Policy: National Centre for Popular Music
The biggest policy initiative - in terms of impact, expenditure and size - has been the National Centre for Popular Music (NCPM), due to open at the end of 1998. A major visitor attraction in the heart of the CIQ, it comprises popular music exhibition, education and performance space and is funded by £15m of Lottery and ERDF money. It is developed by Music Heritage Ltd, a registered educational charity, expects to attract 500,000 visitors a year and claims to be:

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a unique interactive arts and education centre celebrating the diversity and influence of popular music; the only centre of its kind in the world; state of the art technology providing hands-on experience; a celebration of popular music in all its global forms; informing, questioning and challenging...º  [NCPM, 1998]
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a) Development
Key factors about the NCPM development include:

i) \textit{Long Development} within the CIQ - its origins lie in the Manifesto Music Co-operative, a body advising before the establishment of Red Tape in 1986.

ii) \textit{Council Support} - Sheffield City Council has been involved since the beginning, including the commissioning of the first feasibility study in 1988, representation on the non-executive board, support from Sheffield’s major tourism strategy document \textsuperscript{viii}, site location and remaining a central part of the CIQ Strategy.

iii) \textit{Pump Priming}: further support for development was received from Urban Programme, English Tourist Board and Yorkshire and Humberside Arts Board.

iv) \textit{National Lottery}: The NCPM has been made possible by £11m of Arts Lottery funding: ‘the largest Arts Board award to Yorkshire and Humberside ever and the fourth largest award ever made outside London’\textsuperscript{viii}. As such it is a result of both local \textit{and} national policy.
b) **Building**
The NCPM will comprise: environmentally friendly revolving rooftops; 300 capacity cafe bar with live music; 1500 square feet of interactive exhibition space; the world’s only 3D surround sound auditorium; 2500 square feet of music-related shopping; unrivalled education and research facilities; open performance space with regular music and arts events.

c) **Content**
A draft artistic programme promises: different sections on Making Music (performance, recording, promotion) with specific ‘clusters’ on such aspects as sound effects technology and mixing methods; a themed Story of Popular Music with short films and presentations, a ‘timeline’ of social, historical and cultural events and small scale workstations and exhibits; and the development of databases and case studies on key artists accessible to visitors.

d) **Policy Orientation**
The NCPM marks a different approach to music policy in Sheffield, as it is a visitor attraction rather than an attempt to develop the local industry infrastructure, and as such lies more easily within tourism strategies than music industry policy. However, it’s impact is likely to be critical in the future of the CIQ: the projected visitor numbers are between 400,000 and 500,000 per year from year one with an estimated spend of over £30 million per year\(^{ix}\). The impact in terms of live performance is likely to be the most central, certainly in animating the area. Furthermore, its proposed role as an educational centre, including its role as deliverer of music, sound recording and business training, will certainly impact on the local music industry.

2.2 **Manchester**

2.2.1 **Economic and Political Factors**
Manchester also suffered from the economic restructuring of the last 20 years with a decline in its traditional textile industry. The initial response of the council was in line with several other Labour-controlled authorities - outright opposition to the Thatcher government and demands for public intervention. However, from the mid-1980s onwards, Manchester moved toward a policy of partnership with private enterprise. This re-imaging of Manchester as a ‘place to do business with’ is reflected in the change of slogan from ‘Defending Jobs and Improving Services’ to ‘Making It Happen’, but it also had its impact on the cultural sphere.

2.2.2 **Manchester Music Scenes**
Manchester has had several periods when its musicians have experienced national and international success and the city has had a vibrant music scene. These include: 1960s (Hermans Hermits the first to ‘break’ the US); mid-1970s pop acts like 10CC; late 1970s punk -Buzzcocks followed by the influential Joy Division and Manchester acquired some music infrastructure; early 1980s (New Order and The Smiths); late 1980s, with the
emergence Acid House in 1988, quickly followed by the Madchester scene; early 1990s (Take That, Simply Red and Oasis); and late 1990s (emergence of the “new Manchester dance underground”).

“Manchester's like any other British city,” says Anthony Wilson of Factory Records, “it had the Hollies and Herman's Hermits, it then has a couple of years off, then it had 10CC and Barclay James Harvest, then has four years off. That’s what most cities go through, the Bristols, the Glasgows, and the Sheffields. What is very weird is that since the Buzzcocks its been non-stop.” [Interview with AB] This cycle of ‘success’ has led some of those interviewed to refer to the city as ‘the most successful’ outside London: it has also had an influence on policy, convincing policy makers and some sections of the industry that intervention is not necessary.

2.2.3 Manchester Policy: CMDC and Regeneration

Although a policy of the 1987 Thatcher government, and certainly not targeted at the music industry, the redevelopment area of the Castlefield canal basin did impact on two key music venues in the city, the Haçienda and The Boardwalk. Whilst it is not the case that all regeneration initiatives will benefit the music sector, Colin Sinclair, owner of the Boardwalk, says it helped them:

“The only money that I have ever had for the Boardwalk was from the CMDC when they were renovating Knott Mill and Castlefield...[it] wasn't directly related in any way to its content. But at least I got it and thank God for the CMDC because I know that Castlefield and Knott Mill wouldn’t be what they are now without that” [Interview with AB]

2.2.4 Manchester Policy: Commissioned Reports

Manchester City Council has commissioned three major reports into the cultural sector in the last ten years. The first of these in 1988, commissioned jointly with North West Arts, was “The Economic Importance of the Arts and Cultural Industries in Greater Manchester” headed by Derek Wynne of Manchester Metropolitan University. This had little impact on policy in the music sector, although the Economic Initiatives Department did encourage cultural managed workspace (see below); community recording facilities (see below); licensing relaxation (see below); a telematics strategy and other regeneration policies such as city centre housing.

The second, commissioned by EID in 1992, was “Manchester First: An Arts and Cultural Strategy for Manchester”, by Urban Cultures. This aimed to provide EID with a strategic approach to cultural policy, but a combination of scepticism about employment potential within EID (backed up by reports from the Centre for local Economic Strategies) and a move toward property development following the 1990 Olympic Bid, meant its impact was minimal in the music sector. The third and most recent, has been the commissioning of a report into Manchester’s Cultural Production Strategy and the introduction of a Cultural Industries Development Service in which MIPC has been centrally involved. This is due for handover shortly.
2.2.5 Manchester Policy: Re-imaging - Events
From the late 1980s onwards, Manchester City Council embarked on a re-imaging exercise. One of the elements of this was to bid for key, global events including the Olympic Games (1996 and 2000 - unsuccessful); the World Cycling championships (1996); World Table Tennis Championships (1997); and Commonwealth Games (2002). Non-sporting events included In The City international music convention (see below); the Arts Council of England’s City of Drama (1994); Global Forum (1995); Festival of Expressionism in (1992); Digital Summer 98 (1998). Alongside these has been the attraction of major conferences and conventions (through the G-Mex centre) and the staging of major concerts at The Nynex Arena. The City Council hoped that these would ‘put Manchester on the map’, that they would signal that the city had changed and was a desirable destination for business and events.

Manchester City Council has, as part of this process, also initiated or aided festivals in the city. The annual Manchester Festival has always had a strong music element; the Olympic Festival in 1990 included the landmark Spike Island concert by The Stone Roses; and more recently the council has been involved in events such as the Repercussion (1997) and Depercussion (1998) dance music festivals in Castlefield and the Northern Quarter Festival (1997 and 1998).

2.2.6 Manchester Policy: Re-imaging - Property Development
The growing emphasis on property development, some of which was specifically music-orientated, led to a number of key developments in the city centre. These include the development of Granada Studio Tours; the G-Mex centre and venue; Metrolink tram system; British Council building; Nynex Arena (the largest indoor concert venue in Europe); Bridgewater Hall (Hallé Orchestra); National Cycling Centre; City Art Gallery Extension; renovation of the Castlefield/Knott Mill (see above); rebuilding of Hulme (an area which produced numerous bands); redevelopment of the canal-side areas through the city centre, including Manchester’s Gay Village with numerous bars and night-clubs.

Whilst both 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 reflect the more general approach to regeneration and have impacted on the city’s music industry only indirectly, the City Council has had a more direct impact in other ways.

2.2.7 Manchester Policy: Managed Workspace
Part of the initiatives resulting from the 1988 report was the development of culture-orientated managed workspace in the city. Three key examples of these have been 23 New Mount Street, Beehive Mills and Ducie House (the latter a private development). The provision, through public and private partnerships, of cheap, short term leases on office and workshop space, seem particularly attractive to the music industry. Andy Spiro is co-owner of Beehive Mills - containing a major dance magazine, promotions, studio/rehearsal space and Sankeys Soap night-club (recently closed) - and argues that it lends itself to small music businesses:
‘there are things about music in that it involves a range of others, it is not just making music but it involves design and recording and there’s a lot that is going out into other sectors... and also in the sense that it is a quite social business ... so there is much more interaction with people in that sense.’ [Interview with AB]

Furthermore, such developments epitomise Manchester’s approach - they were non-direct intervention, they were building based, and they allowed a major role for the market, both in determining which businesses filled them and in recognising the nature of the sector as based on small, closely networked companies.

2.2.8 Manchester Policy: Community Recording Facilities
The council did make small scale attempts at the creation of ‘community’ recording studios, most notably at Abraham Moss (now The Cutting Rooms) in 1990, run by City College; and the Fallover studios in Hulme, demolished in the rebuilding of that area in 1993. These provided cheap access to studios, training and, in Fallover, rehearsal space. However, neither of these are really a music industry policy, as the studios were not up to professional specification, were rarely used by those signed to record companies and were never intended to be a central plank of music industry development as Red Tape has been in Sheffield.

2.2.9 Manchester Policy: The Northern Quarter
Manchester has also been involved, in a much more arms length manner than Sheffield, in the creation of its cultural/creative quarter, The Northern Quarter. This development, whilst certainly not specifically aimed at the music industry, does again highlight Manchester’s approach to the issue.

The Northern Quarter became a location for many pop cultural businesses from the late 1980s, and a number of music-related businesses were sited there - e.g. Eastern Bloc records, Afflecks Palace, Dry 201 bar. More recently a large number of the city’s independent record shops have opened in the area along with 4 cutting edge music venues. Whilst the council only invested minimal funds in the area and was not the motivating force, it has formerly recognised the Northern Quarter as Manchester’s ‘creative quarter’ playing a role in development (building refurbishment) through the Single Regeneration Budget. This is significant: actual investment has been generic and not targeted at music; it has built on existing, organic growth; and the area was already an important site for music production and consumption - a situation which is the opposite of that in Sheffield.

2.2.10 Manchester Policy: In The City
Perhaps the most direct intervention in the local music industry has been Manchester City Council’s aid to the In The City international music convention, which is both based in Manchester and has been staged there from 1992-95 and will be in 1998. In The City was the product of Anthony Wilson (Factory), his partner Yvette Livesy as well as other figures such as Simply Red manager Elliot Rashman. The first annual music convention in Britain, it has always had a distinct Manchester character and bias. The Council provided In The City with about £60,000 of support in kind (office space, printing etc.),
as well as lesser support in subsequent years. It provides an interesting example of Manchester’s approach to music policy for a number of reasons.

One is that it is one of the only examples of direct aid to a music industry organisation. However, it was also a product of the close relationships between leading industry figures such as Wilson and policy makers such as Graham Stringer (Stringer famously defended the Hacienda when it was under threat of closure as ‘being to Manchester what Michaelangelo’s David is to Florence’). This illustrated the Council’s recognition of the importance of venue and club scene to Manchester’s economy, but also the way in which Manchester’s policy (arguably like its music industry) has on occasion been the product of close, informal networks. Further, it was, like examples mentioned in 2.2.5, also aimed at attracting both business and tourism. Support for In The City, again as with other strategies, was also not a discernible policy as such - it was not part of an overt strategy and there is little traceable evidence of the support.

2.3 Liverpool

2.3.1 Economic and Political Factors
Liverpool also suffered in economic terms and the poor economic state of the region - it was declared as an European Union Objective One area in 1994 (see below), placing it alongside some of the poorest areas in Europe - also had its impact on cultural and music industries: lower than average spending, and musical talent leaving the city. In 1983 the Labour Party, dominated by the Trotskyist Militant Tendency, took control of the City Council. Policy was rooted in attempts to resist central government spending curbs, improvements to housing and employment issues; and cultural policy was rarely on the agenda. Following the defeat of Militant within the Labour Party, a New Left emerged which included several people who had been involved in Merseyside Arts (such as Keith Hackett). Also raising arts and cultural policy issues were changes in central government finance (e.g. funding cuts for the Royal Philharmonic) and an increased awareness of the economic value of the arts on Merseysidexiv.

In 1987, therefore, Liverpool acquired its first ever formal structure for cultural policy-making, creating the Arts and Cultural Industries Unit - previous arts policy had been administered through the Department of Libraries. Since then a variety of departments and mechanisms have impacted on cultural and music policy, although often non-governmental and non-city council organisations play a larger role than in other cities, epitomised by the role of the Government Office on Merseyside in the Objective One process (see below).

2.3.2 Liverpool Music Scenes
Like Manchester and Sheffield the nature of the city’s musical production has impacted on music policy. Liverpool has an established reputation as a centre for musical production dating from the 1960s with the Beatles and Merseybeat, to the post-punk era of Echo and the Bunnymen and Teardrop Explodes, to Frankie Goes to Hollywood in the mid-1980s and more recently the success of bands like Cast and Lightning Seeds.
However, perhaps unlike Manchester, there is also a greater sense that the city has failed to benefit from this success. Musicians tended to leave the city to pursue success in the London-based industry creating bitterness within the city; there has been a long standing perception of The Beatles deserting Liverpool; and an often quoted statistic is the £250 million grossed by Frankie Goes to Hollywood during the first year of their success, virtually none of which benefited Liverpool. So despite the rich musical heritage and continued success, this factor, has perhaps provided the starting point for local strategy documents aimed at developing the city’s music industry.

2.3.3 Liverpool Policy: Arts and Cultural Strategy 1987
In 1987 Liverpool City Council published its ‘Arts and Cultural Industries Strategy’. The key objective of this strategy was "to maximise the contribution which the arts and cultural industries make to the economic and social well-being of the city". The strategy emphasised the city’s important cultural institutions and achievements and linked culture with local economic development for the first time. It also emphasised community development and quality of life issues, image and tourism, the cultural industries and urban regeneration. However, no major, specifically music-related policies emerged immediately.

2.3.4 Liverpool Policy: City Beat
The City Beat initiative in 1988, aimed to create a Liverpool-based and council-run music production and management company which would develop and commercially exploit local musical creativity. However, the non-profit-making, limited liability company, which it was hoped would stem the constant drift of musical talent from the city to London - did not get off the ground, largely due to strong opposition from local music industry.

2.3.5 Liverpool Policy: Music City
Pete Fullwell, former owner of Eric’s venue and a local band manager, was one of the main forces of criticism behind City Beat and it was he who was commissioned by the council to undertake a study of the local industry and make recommendations for policy. The report, Music City, which was also involved Liverpool University’s Institute of Popular Music, was published in 1991 and advocated development of public and private partnerships to encourage the economic development of the music sector. Shortly after the publication of Music City, a number of initiatives did appear - the ill-fated, proposal to develop a cultural quarter (the backers, Charterhouse, went bankrupt before this got off the ground) and the Liverpool Institute for the Performing Arts (see below).

2.3.6 Liverpool Policy: COMEDIA Report and LIPA
The economic importance of the cultural sector as a whole was re-emphasised with a report on the economic importance of the cultural industries in Liverpool commissioned from COMEDIA in 1990 by the Merseyside Task Force. The report demonstrated that the city’s cultural industries employed about 2,400 people and had gross income of about £70m in 1989-90. The report also estimated that the indirect employment benefits of
these sectors could amount to a further 3,800 jobs in hotels, catering and other ancillary services.

Subsequently, the Liverpool Institute for Performing Arts, a major flagship and costly initiative, backed by Paul McCartney, was given further support in the form of building grants. Also, one official, Keith Hackett played a central role in networking with London-based individuals, McCartney and the EU; and much of LIPA’s public funding was awarded on the basis that LIPA would work to develop the local arts and cultural industries. However, controversy has surrounded the Institute, with it being criticised for not supporting local music enough.

2.3.7 Liverpool Policy: Festivals and Marketing
Liverpool City Council has supported a number of events and festivals aiming to promote music and music consumption. These have included, Larks in the Park in the early-mid 1980s; the Matthew Street Festival since 1993; and others like Africa Oye, the Toxteth Carnival, the Liverpool sea shanty festival, the Earthbeat festival. The Council’s major festival involvement was in 1991 when it organised the John Lennon Memorial Concert as a major profile-raising event for Liverpool. However, the event was surrounded by controversy, resulted in huge debts, and was generally mismanaged by the council which had little experience. Local music producers also felt that the council was looking backwards in its support, rather than to new Liverpool music and began organising the Liverpool Now festival, which, since 1991 has showcased new Liverpool bands with council support.

There have also been a number of marketing initiatives aiming to ‘sell’ Liverpool’s music. In 1995 Liverpool City Council contributed £1,800 for a delegation of music businesses to attend In The City in Manchester. Members of the delegation suggest that this investment paid off in that local bands were subsequently signed. This strategy has also been followed with help given in the mid 1980s in funding a Liverpool stall at US Beatles conventions.

2.3.8 Liverpool Policy: Arts and Cultural Industry Development Fund
In 1996, the City Council’s Economic Initiatives Unit established the Arts and Cultural Industries Development, or ACID, fund. This provides small (up to £5000) grants to cultural businesses, and several music-related initiatives have been supported. In some ways this is similar to Glasgow’s Music Business Development Fund initiative, although broader than just the music sector.

2.3.9 Liverpool Policy: Objective One and MMDA
One of the most important developments in recent years has been the establishment of Merseyside as an Objective One area under the EU’s Structural Fund programme, representing a total of £1.25 billion to be spent on Merseyside between 1994 and 1999. Specified within the Single Programming Document was the role that arts, culture and media industries could play in economic development, and one entire Objective One driver (Driver 4) was devoted to the sector, including the music industry.
Liverpool City Council subsequently helped sponsor research into the region’s cultural sector by consultants Geoff White and Peter Booth. Their report was to help Government Offices for Merseyside make more informed decisions about the sector, including a specific section on music, and to help those within the sector gain access to Objective One. Their recommendations were adopted but their report was heavily criticised by music industry practitioners involved with a ‘representative’ body, the Merseyside Music Industry Association, for misrepresenting and misunderstanding the music industry.

After protracted manoeuvring on the part of GOM, the City Council and the local industry, significant public investment (£1.1m ERDF with £2.2m private and public match) was agreed to establish the Merseyside Music Development Agency. The MMDA is to act as a mechanism for increasing inward investment, to help market Liverpool’s music production and to develop training. A key part of the MMDA is a Development Fund - incentives for major music industry investment of advances to local bands through the Agency, into Merseyside based music businesses. Reasons behind this can be traced to issues of retention made in 2.2.2.

Although there has been some scepticism about how exactly elements of the scheme will work, the MMDA recently received £600,000 from Objective One and held a ‘highly successful’ launch at the House of Commons on July 23rd.

2.3.10 Liverpool Policy: Duke St / Bold St Quarter
Liverpool has attempted to develop a cultural quarter, based around the Duke St / Bold Street triangle in the city centre, an area where music is an important character and focus, including the Cream night-club. This is one of a series of efforts to establish cultural quarters in Liverpool city centre and, based upon £30m of Objective One funding, is still in its development phase. However, problems persist with conflict over where and how the money should be spent as well as the character of the quarter. One of the areas of conflict has been over what emphasis assistance to businesses like night-clubs should have over the needs of residents.

3. Assessment of Policies in Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool

3.1 Sheffield

3.1.1 Sheffield City Council
Paul Skelton summarised the Council’s viewpoint in early 1997, arguing that the strategy has gone some way to achieving its initial ambition of offsetting job losses, creating new businesses and encouraging a previously marginal sector:

“It’s taken a long time and we’re quite proud of the thousand jobs we’ve got down here now we’ve created the cultural industries sector. Of those thousand about 350 are brand new jobs which have been created by the activity down here, the other 600, 650 or thereabouts, are jobs that have been relocated here that existed before...
we’d like to think we’ve contributed significantly to those jobs surviving and growing...out of the 150 companies that are down here now, only 4 over the last ten years have gone out of commission in some way or another... 4 out of 150 is quite an amazing track record when you compare it to any other group of companies in any other sector.” [Paul Skelton interview with AB]

However, regarding the local authority as a whole, the CIQ team have at various times had to fight hard to protect the policy, both from scepticism in the council and from commitments to other developments (e.g. some sporting initiatives). The restructuring of the council under a new Chief Executive and the EDAW report (below) now seem to have secured the process for the foreseeable future.

3.1.2 Reports Commissioned by Sheffield City Council
In 1997 the Sheffield City Council through the Cultural Industries Quarter commissioned EDAW/Urban Cultures to review progress made in the CIQ and to write a vision for the area into the next century. The report concluded: that by 1997 there had been £35m invested in the CIQ, with £29m coming from the private sector; that there were 150 cultural businesses in the area, a total annual turnover of £20m; and that there were around 1,300 jobs and 1,500 media training places.

A previous business survey, concluded that of the jobs created 64% were men’s; there is a 45 / 55% full time - part time split; but only a ‘modest number’ of the city’s 205,000 jobs were in the cultural sector. The size of the companies is also important - of 69 surveyed, 16 had a turnover under £25,000; 17 between £50,000 and £100,000 and 20 with £100-250,000. Only 6 had turnovers over £500,000 and the ability of these businesses to grow quickly will be key to the expansion of the CIQ. In terms of employment, 74% were micro businesses with 10 people or less and only 6% employed over 25 people. In terms of income, 82% was from sales, of which only 3% was from export and 57% were regional or national sales, suggesting that the ambitions of the CIQ partners to become ‘internationally renowned’ as a centre for cultural production has some way to go. The report argues that the first decade of development has been “bottom up” - a focus on the business base which has created a “micro cluster” of cultural and media businesses. The EDAW Report concluded:

“The CIQ has created 1,300-1,400 jobs in an estimated 150 businesses, generating a total turnover of £25m.... at present the sector is of no more than sub-regional significance; if it is to make a significant contribution to net additional wealth and jobs in Sheffield, these fast-growth, export orientated firms must grow in scale and number.” [EDAW 3.11]

3.1.3 Non-Sheffield Music Industry Assessment
Some of our research has reflected criticism from music industry personnel outside of Sheffield. For instance, Dave Haslam, a Manchester DJ argues that: “There’s cities, like Sheffield, where the Council has taken years trying to figure out how they can develop the music scene and where’s it got them?... The minute the Council started getting involved in Sheffield, no-one was interested in the city.” [Interview with AB]. Others
such as Anthony Wilson, and a former employee in the CIQ, now head of A and R at a major independent label, have questioned what impact investment has had. [Interviews with AB]

3.1.4 Sheffield Music Industry Assessment

Some of those involved in the local music industry have also questioned the extent to which the local music industry has developed or benefited from council policy. Warp Records is one of the biggest genuinely independent dance labels in the UK. Co-owner, Steve, argues that the CIQ has been an ‘irrelevance’ for them, despite the fact that they received some early marketing advice from Red Tape and were tenants of the Workstation for some time. Steve points to the fact that their Workstation tenancy lasted only until they needed bigger space, which they found cheaper in the retail heart of the city. He also criticises the NCPM, arguing that it ‘needs much more industry input’ if it is to be relevant to helping the city’s music industry; and Red Tape for training engineers when the jobs don’t exist for them (this is a debate which is also occurring nationally).

Perhaps most significantly, Warp have argued that in terms of accessing development funds, ‘it’s always much quicker if you need investment money to go to Warners or someone because accessing public money tends to be very slow. Warners can give you it immediately.’ [Interview with AB]. The likelihood of Warp moving to London will both be a blow to Sheffield’s ambitions as a centre for popular music production and an indicator of the difficulties of developing a local industry capable of resisting London’s centralising influence.

Winston Hazel has been a figure on the Sheffield dance music scene for some years as DJ, promoter and record label owner. He has two main issues which he thinks policy has not addressed so far. One is that despite the attempts to promote music production, new musical creativity has been obstructed in the city. This mostly revolves around the licensing issue: from his earliest ventures - he promoted the seminal Jive Turkey dance night in 1989 - to more recent attempts to establish a festival on the Devonshire Green, licensing and planning departments have been obstructive. Indeed, licensing has been a problem for others in the city - until the Republic opened in the CIQ in 1996, no new license had been granted to a night-club in the city centre for 15 years. This highlights a problem for local authority cultural policy: that is that other departments, organisations or structures may obstruct intentions and policy for cultural development.

His second issue is to highlight the lack of animation - street level activity and cultural consumption - in the CIQ: ‘You’ve got no reason to go there unless you’re called to a boring meeting or to have an office there.’ A policy, therefore, which focuses on facilities and attracting business, without any of the organic consumption-driven growth (as in other areas of all three cities) and lacking in significant cultural magnets (before the NCPM opens) will be limited, a view also supported by the EDAW report.

3.1.5 Comment

Further evidence highlights some of the weaknesses of the Sheffield strategy. The two main motivators behind the development in the early 1980s - film and music - still only
represent 30% of the businesses in the CIQ and there are only a handful of music businesses in the Workstation. Our research on the licensing problems as well as the absence of street level animation also support views expressed above. On the latter point, the Division Street area seems more akin to the Bold St area of Liverpool or the Northern Quarter in Manchester - both of which have developed somewhat organically rather than being the product of policy. Also, the success of Babybird, Longpigs and Pulp may undoubtedly support claims that the city continues to produce commercially successful music, but should also be of some concern that all now live, record and are managed from outside Sheffield.

However, one must remember a number of factors. One is that the NCPM is expected to have a significant impact on the area in terms of animation and generation of new cultural and music activity. 400-500,000 visitors a year will indeed have a major impact on the city as a whole. Second is that the cultural business activity in the area has been achieved from a zero point in the 1980s and some of the original concerns of music business at the time - lack of venues and recording studios - has been addressed. The persistence of AVEC as a site for music production and of commercially successful studios is important, as also will be the outcome of Red Tape Studio’s strategic review which is underway at the present time. Also, allegations that the project has been entirely about subsidy, top-down council development and solely public investment are clearly wide of the mark.

3.2 Manchester

3.2.1 Manchester City Council Assessment
Manchester certainly differs from Sheffield in that the lack of a coherent cultural and music strategy means that there has not been the kind of detailed assessment of such a strategy we have seen in Sheffield. However, the general ‘hands-off’ approach of the city to its music industry is endorsed by current Arts and Cultural Policy Officer, Lyn Barber:

‘...the music industry didn’t want any council intervention. What they wanted was a city that they could operate in more effectively. They wanted transport sorting out, they wanted licensing sorted out. They felt we should create a city which doesn’t have the barriers which exist at the moment. So we didn’t include within our strategic vision any specific intervention into the cultural industry sectors and specifically popular music.’ [interview with A Brown]

The council has not embarked on the sort of development strategy which Sheffield has, the perceived continued success of both the city’s music producers and music industry infrastructure are cited as justification for this approach, and the kind of verbal support the industry, or figures within it, receive is seen as the full extent to which intervention should go.
Certainly, support for events such as In The City are viewed favourably by both sides, despite a dispute in 1995 over an unpaid grant (since resolved). It could be argued that Manchester, Glasgow and Dublin’s support for the event could be categorised as support for any other trade conference would be. However, it is clear that for both council and In The City, it was considered more than this. Lyn Barber says: ‘I think [support for In The City] was something were we could actually provide practical support - that would have generic support for the industry.... I think they were supported over a number of years but not directly with money.’ Indeed, Wilson argues that even when the convention takes place elsewhere, Manchester benefits.

3.2.2 Commissioned Reports

The three main reports into Manchester’s cultural sector in the last ten years have all, to some extent, endorsed the approach of the City Council in not going down the path of direct grant intervention and setting up music industry facilities. In particular, the nature of the music industry, it is argued, lends itself to this approach. Whilst warning that ‘Manchester’s prominence as a music city...should not be taken for granted...’ Manchester First argued:

‘...the difficulty for a consistent economic strategy is that as music tastes come and go, bands change and independent labels open and close with all the speed that is appropriate for a “fashion-based” industry.... The industry craves new products, new ideas and it is important that the environment which enables this small scale activity to flourish is maintained - a hands off, but strongly supportive approach from the City Council.’ xvii

All three reports have also supported an approach which tries to establish the right environment for organic creative growth. Therefore issues such as licensing remain a concern; ensuring that the property for music businesses to develop exists is another. There is, for example, an identifiable concern that cheap city centre locations are harder to come by than they may have been ten years ago: areas such as Sackville Street/Princess St and Castlefield/Knott Mill had clusters of music business activity because they were cheap and run down, yet these are now premium rent areas. The Northern Quarter also poses the same problem of what happens when property prices go up. Such concerns were evident to Anthony Wilson ten years ago:

‘if people got moved out of these low rent accommodations in town, there had to be space for these hives of industry, or whatever they were, creative ancillaries of the youth culture industries, and certainly I always saw New Mount Street, for example, as a fine example. You know, they’re aware that they have to keep providing and make sure that that kind of work space is available in the city centre. So that was something that happened which wasn’t money into the music industry, which was part of an infrastructure that I thought was an important thing that they did understand.’ [Interview with AB]

And as the Manchester First document argued:
‘it should not be beyond the wit of policy makers to find the means to prevent land use colonisation... There is a role for the city council and CMDC to promote cultural production by in part holding down property values and rents for artistic production.’

Another concern, which the current Cultural Production Strategy research certainly points to, is that the kind of informal, accidental support given to local music businesses through, say, the Enterprise Allowance scheme, no longer exists. The City Council’s commissioning of such research suggests that some form of intervention may be on the horizon. One feature may be the establishment of an information service for cultural businesses, of which music will form a central plank. This reflects a recognition by the council that some support is needed if the organic growth in the music sector is to continue; if employment is to be strengthened (music accounts for 8.8% of Manchester’s cultural employment at the moment
d; and if small scale networks of creativity are to be nurtured. However, it also remains consistent with an approach which does not seek to generate cultural production from direct council investment.

3.2.3 Non Manchester Music Industry
Steve Redmond, editor of Music Week argues that Manchester’s approach - a much more laissez faire one than Sheffield - suits the nature of the music industry, which thrives on being left to its own devices. He also suggests that attempts by city councils even to market or showcase music from that city, such as the Liverpool Now festival, are pointless exercises as talent ‘will rise to the top’.

‘I don’t think there any great stars out there who don’t get discovered. There are millions and millions of pounds that are out there chasing so little talent that I think the chances of people escaping are minimal. Its the free market that determines those things, without appearing totally Thatcherite. If you look what’s happened in Manchester and the number of bars there are and stuff, that's basically down to the fact that, as far as I can tell, that there were loads of cheap buildings around that people could move into and set up with fairly low entry-cost and that lead to a lot of other things happening. It wasn’t down to the local authority saying, “This is what we must do.”’ [Interview with AB]

Such a view is also shared by some in the local music industry.

3.2.4 Manchester Music Industry
For those such as Wilson, the argument is clear - the music industry’s success, and Manchester’s in particular, is due to a ‘Darwinian inheritance in that it succeeds because you have to have that winnowing out process... you have to believe in what you’re doing.’ This is a view of the industry which argues that its creative dynamic is the struggle through which musicians have to go to achieve success and that for those with enough talent, success will come sooner or, after hard work and self belief, later. Such a view is also shared by people such as DJ Dave Haslam:
’Historically we’ve done without it [council intervention].... You know, Madchester happened anyway. Madchester would have happened anyway. Those guys knew what they were doing. You know, it developed out of a record shop. It developed out of some guys who listened to records in the early 1980s and wanted to open a record shop. They never needed Council stuff... In Manchester, as I’ve said, it’s to do with making the best out of a bad job, and if the Buzzcocks and New Order and the Smiths, and the Haçienda, and the Boardwalk and whoever else can rise out of nothing, then anybody else can.’ [Interview with AB]

For Haslam this is also a political point: ‘if there’s one nursery under threat, or one old people’s day centre under threat, one bus service under threat, one council-funded drop-in centre under threat, if there’s just one of those, there’s no way that pop music ought to get a penny.’ [interview with AB]

However, for others in the Manchester music industry, and perhaps a younger generation of music businesses, a greater role and greater assistance is desired. Three examples. Martin Isherwood is a teacher at Salford University, a local musician and founding member of The Brilliant Foundation, a music collective in Salford. He is currently trying to develop a council-owned venue and training centre in Salford based, not on the grounds that such facilities don’t exist, but as way of musicians avoiding the exploitation on the live market.

Dave Walker is co-owner of Fat City Records one of the most influential dance sector businesses in Manchester at the present time.

I think there probably is an argument that the local authority as it stands probably know very little about the music industry, but there's no reason why they couldn't get to know, and actually employ somebody who does know... if they just had someone in the council who was offering advice to people, who you could go and see. With us, we've set up a record label purely through trial and error, and that's an expensive way of doing it because you know, you make mistakes and you pay for them, and if there was somebody that you could go and see and cut out some of those things and take some of the short cuts, it would be easier. I think there’s a role for some kind of body within Manchester particularly to support the whole thing. And I think in the end it would be very difficult for that to be privately funded. [Interview with AB]

However, what is interesting is that even here, the belief is in an enabling, rather than interventionist role or the creation of building-based facilities, as Emma Warren and Joanne Wain of Freestyle Promotions illustrate:

EW: ‘I think the local authority helps most indirectly by making sure that the city is receptive to night life and to cultural industries are receptive without necessarily putting any money into it... Because if you look at the cities with a strong club and night life - they tend to have strong cultural industry.’
JW: ‘I don’t agree with that Darwinian theory. [Public help...] is not enabling crap people to exist when good people don’t.’ [interview with AB]

3.2.5 Comment
Partly due to the city’s ongoing musical success, partly due to attitudes of some in the local industry, and partly due to a city council which has prioritised image and flagship developments over cultural industries intervention, Manchester has had a much more laissez faire approach to the music industry. However, a number of issues do need highlighting.

To take one - licensing and the development of a 24 hour economy - problems have persisted which the council has been unable to deal with. A number of clubs - including the flagship Hacienda, Ducie House’s Home night-club and very recently, Sankeys Soap - have been forced out of business due to pressure from organised crime, control of doormen and magistrates and police unable or unwilling to regulate the sector more effectively. Also, experiments with relaxed licensing laws have not been translated into a more strategic 24 hour city policy. This is an area which particularly affects the dance music sector, has been a major problem in all three cities, and as such needs to be considered as part of any music strategy.

Another factor which needs to be borne in mind is that in the past a few prominent individuals may have been seen by the authority as representing Manchester’s music industry. It seems clear from our research that a variety of distinct opinions, networks and viewpoints exist within the local industry and to seek a ‘representative’ body or view on policy is difficult if not impossible. This may, ironically, continue to support a thesis which suggests that direct funding of organisations and facilities by the council is still inappropriate. The possibility of a music/cultural industry advice or information centre would be one example of such a policy, although questions of funding and organisation remain.

There are also important issues which have emerged in new music industry clusters such as exist in the Northern Quarter. This is an important geographical area as it contains many of the new, leading edge music businesses and critical mass of consumption: property, planning and other policies which may not be naturally thought of as music policies may be the most important area for careful handling by the council.

Finally, there have been a number of developments very recently which will be central to the approach of policy to the local music industry. One is the Cultural Production Strategy which aims to provide information and recommendations about support for cultural businesses and may change the picture dramatically. Another is the proposal to form some kind of music industry centre in Salford (see 3.2.4), much more on the Sheffield model. Third are current suggestions for council involvement in showcase concerts and music publishing. All these may signal changes in the relationship between policy and the music industry in Manchester.
3.3 Liverpool

3.3.1 Liverpool City Council Assessment
Parkinson and Bianchini (1993: 155) described the history of cultural policy in Liverpool as ‘a tale of missed opportunities’, a description that is perhaps particularly appropriate with regard to music policy. Liverpool City Council has never implemented a specific music policy as such; nevertheless, over the past 10 years the council has initiated or collaborated in various efforts to intervene in, or directly influence, the city’s music scenes and industries as part of its ‘Arts and Cultural Industries Strategy’. The lack of clear leadership on cultural policy, exacerbated by the economic and political situation - the legacy of Militant, the large number and influence of Quangos, the role of GOM with Objective One, and most recently the loss of control by Labour to the Liberals - may go some way to explaining this.

Certainly some of those who have worked both in the music industry and with the Council have expressed frustration at the inability to achieve major change with regard to music policy. Wes Wilkie is former Arts and Cultural Industries officer at the council and offers some suspicion of their knowledge of the sector:

`in the past I've seen reports that just are not of any use whatsoever. Who's going to read it? Where's the money coming from to finance it? Does it represent the needs of the community it's supposed to serve? How widely have they consulted? Is it needs led? Is there a hidden agenda? So many other questions...’ [Interview with AB]

Further, the different departments which have been involved in policy making have not helped a coherent approach, and the emphasis has shifted from Arts and Cultural Industries to Economic Initiatives (especially with regard to ACID and Objective One). Another perspective from the local council has been frustration that attempts at intervention - e.g. LIPA, City Beat and the John Lennon Concert - have met with opposition from the local industry and there has been a perception that the local industry is ‘divided’ and ‘difficult’ to deal with.

However, the recent funding of the MMDA through Objective One may signal a change as, at the time of writing, there appears to be renewed and widespread optimism about the project.

3.3.2 Commissioned Reports
There have been a series of reports about the music sector in Liverpool, as described above. Although, as with other cities, there has been the need to re-state the importance of the music sector to the local economy (jobs, number of businesses etc.), there is also a sense of the social value of music to the city. Indeed the voluntary / community arts sector appears to be more prominent in Liverpool than Manchester or Sheffield, something reflected in some policy reports. That different justifications for intervention have been used and different strategies pursued - certainly in contrast to Sheffield - may also reflect some of the political instability in the city.
The role of consultants has been central in the development of policy in recent years and has raised problems for music policy. In particular, the Booth/White report into Objective One was criticised by those in the local industry as being written without wide enough consultation and without enough knowledge of the industry. There has also been a more general perception of the role of consultants in developing Liverpool’s cultural policy - that it is the preserve of a local ‘clique’ with little day to day knowledge of cultural production. Whether such criticism is accurate or not, the issue seems to suggest that consultation must be, and be seen to be: wide and thorough enough with the local industry; undertaken by appropriately skilled people; and transparently impartial.

3.3.3 Non-Liverpool Music Industry

Ian Coburn is the manager of Manchester’s Labatt’s Apollo venue and has worked in both Manchester and Liverpool. He cites a difference in attitude of the council (particularly with licensing): `when I went to Liverpool they were very much sought of “you can't do that”’ and in Manchester its very much a question “well what do you want to and we'll se what we can do to help”’ [Interview with AB]. However, he also points to structural weaknesses about which policy makers can do little:

‘Apart from the fact I would suggest there less disposable income in Liverpool half of Liverpool catchment are is the Irish sea... if you draw a circle around Manchester say 45 minute drive time you get x millions of people, do the same for Liverpool you don't get half the number of people.’ [Interview with AB]

Another perception by those such as Anthony Wilson is that Liverpool has suffered because its successful musicians have left the city, an opinion which has brought him into conflict with some in the city:

‘... as someone who loves Liverpool, in the late 80s it became very difficult because they had a real attitude problem in my opinion, it was really holding them back, everyone was going, ‘Oh fuck them, who gives a shit. If they want to be arrogant and fuck around and the rest of it ...’ And then to even talk about that in the media, which seemed to me relevant, it was then we were accused of knocking Liverpool even more.’ [Interview with AB]

Dave Wibberly, head of A and R at V2 records, and a former Liverpool band member as well as officer in Sheffield’s CIQ, decries the lack of consultation by the local authority with those with experience and knowledge of the industry:

‘Hang on, hang on people in Liverpool, you've got someone here, who's from Liverpool who's done all this shit in Sheffield, who's now got a theoretical base because he's got an MA and done all that studying - not very keen on it, but I've done it - and you don't even ring me for advice, never mind give me a fucking job! You know what I mean. And yeah, it freaks me out. So consequently you've a load of people holding symposiums and I want to smack them, because it really does my head in.’ [Interview with AB]
3.3.4 Local Music Industry

As mentioned above, various attempts at intervention in the local industry have met with criticism and opposition from people in the local music industry and widespread cynicism and frustration has accompanied many of the policy initiatives described. In particular a concern that expensive developments and initiatives (e.g. John Lennon concert, LIPA) have not benefited the local industry led to the development of a ‘representative’ body for the industry - the Merseyside Music Industry Association - to push the industry’s concerns. However, even this has been problematic, with some sections of the local industry, especially in the dance music sector, claiming that the MMIA failed to involve or represent them, or serve their interests. This evidence does suggest that the establishment of representative bodies within the sector is difficult, given the different networks and needs of different musical genres.

There is also a long standing sense that sections of the local industry have not been informed of policy developments and are unaware of their potential. This is especially true of the early stages of the Objective One process which appeared as distant, bureaucratic and secretive. One member of MMIA/MMDA, Martin Dempsey, argues that popular music lacks links with, and experience of, public sector agencies and funding processes: 'the more traditional subsidised art sectors are better at arguing that they are an important economic resource'.

Objective One has effectively seen the MMIA develop into the MMDA and gain large scale funding. To some extent, and despite early difficulties, this has bridged some of the divisions within the industry and the most recent evidence suggests that it has overcome some of the cynicism toward policy initiatives. However, the process is ongoing at the moment and it is too early to see whether it has had any long standing benefit to the local music industry.

3.3.5 Comment

To some extent the problems which Liverpool City Council has experienced in terms of developing its local music industry and music policy has been out of its control. The political and economic situation has perhaps been more of an obstacle than in the other two cities. However, it also seems clear that the description of policy initiatives as a ‘series of missed opportunities’ has some validity and major problems persist in the cultural policy arena. Certainly the importance of widespread and thorough consultation with businesses in the sector is a lesson which needs to be heeded elsewhere as well, given the lack of a tradition of music policy, of suspicion and ignorance both of policy initiatives by the local industry and vice versa, and of the varying different ‘communities’ within a city’s music scene.

The need for clear leadership from policy makers is perhaps another lesson from the Liverpool experience: the arrival of Objective One, for all its problems and early mistakes, has been the galvanising force behind the most major development, the MMDA, and has to some extent overridden the role of the local authority and certainly the Arts and Cultural Industries Department. This process has served to bring both
different sections of the local industry together as well as bring them into close dialogue and development with the policy arena.
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