Is Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument about abortion tenable?

Crome, Keith J (2008) Is Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument about abortion tenable? Richmond Journal of Philosophy (17). ISSN 1477-6480

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Abstract

My aim in this essay is to examine Peter Singer’s views concerning the morality of abortion, advanced in his Practical Ethics. I shall show that Singer’s argument is not tenable, not because it is rationally unacceptable, i.e. self-contradictory or incoherent, but rather, because of the very rationality of Singer’s position. In this respect, what I argue is that Singer’s claims suppose an exclusively rational—and thus abstract—notion of ethical agency. However, before advancing this criticism, and in order to do so, I shall begin by explaining Singer’s argument, itself established on the basis of what he perceives to be a fundamental weakness in the terms in which the debate over abortion is conventionally staged.