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The broader setting for this research is the increase in willingness of governments of all political hues to stage sports mega-events. The paper starts from the observation that many states have and do instrumentalise sport to promote their country’s image or ‘brand’ and attempt to gain prestige. This paper argues that Germany employed a deliberate leveraging strategy to improve their nation’s (poor) image abroad. How did Germany do this? This study focuses on three aspects that were central to Germany’s leveraging tactics: a series of long-term, carefully co-ordinated campaigns; the focus on a ‘fan-centred’ approach to the organisation of the event and the creation of a ‘feelgood factor’ around the tournament. More broadly, the article seeks to contribute to the nascent literature on leveraging sports mega-events by employing Chalip’s 2004 model of leveraging legacies as an organising principle and focusing on strategies to improve a nation’s image used by Germany.

Keywords: Leveraging legacies from sports mega-events; ‘image’ leveraging; Germany’s image abroad; sport and tourism

Introduction

Commentators from a wide range of academic disciplines have pointed to both the increasing political salience of sport policy in recent years and the growing trend for states to actively seek to stage expensive and elaborate sports mega-events (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne, 2007; Houlihan & Green, 2009; Weed et al., 2009; Manzenreiter, 2010; Coeffee, 2012; Grix, 2013). In the field of international relations there is growing evidence that states seek to host sports mega-events because, above all, they believe it will enhance their ‘international prestige’ (Strenk, 1979; Black, 2007; Finlay & Xin, 2010). It is clear that many states have and do instrumentalise sport to promote their country’s image or ‘brand’ (Van ham, 2001, p. 2; Fan, 2006) and attempt to gain prestige, a form of power that is understood by scholars to work alongside traditional ‘material’ forces of power such as military might and coercion (see Nye, 1990). Increasingly, the concept of soft power is being used as a macro-level understanding of the rationale behind a state’s decision to use sports ‘megas’ as part of a package of ‘politics of attraction’ (Manzenreiter, 2010; Horne & Whannel, 2012; Grix & Houlihan, 2012). How such ‘soft power’ plays out in practice is not
always clear, but having a positive national image (that is, how states are seen by others) is seen as a pre-requisite to encourage and increase tourism, trade and influence.1

Hosting a successful mega sports event is increasingly acknowledged to be a highly visible and potentially positive signal to other countries (Strenk, 1979; Houlihan, 1994; Van ham, 2001; Preuss, 2007). Such a strategy is also perceived by emerging economies as valuable in accelerating their entry to, and acceptance within, the world’s mature economies. India’s staging of the Commonwealth Games in 2010 and Brazil’s hosting of both the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup (FWC) and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games could certainly be read as attempts by two rapidly expanding economies to announce that they had finally arrived on the international stage. More recently, small Gulf states, such as Qatar and Bahrain, have also become interested in staging sports mega-events with Qatar scheduled to host the 2022 football FWC.2 The mechanisms through which states leverage sports mega-events for their economical, social and reputational benefits, however, are less clear and are only just beginning to be understood (Chalip, 2004; O’Brien & Chalip, 2007).

Therefore, the first section of this paper looks to the nascent literature on ‘leveraging’ sports mega-events for a heuristic device with which to analyse the German strategy. The attempt in this paper is not to report the outcomes of the German strategy of leveraging the 2006 FWC to improve their nation’s poor image, but to analyse some of the mechanisms by which this took place. In so doing, the paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the area of ‘leveraging’ sports mega-events by drawing on and adapting existing models in the field and ‘testing’ (a part of) them against some new empirical data. That is, the purpose is not simply to produce another post-hoc summary of some of the outcomes of the German case, but rather to emphasise throughout the long-termed, well planned nature of the German strategy and understand the ‘levers’ it drew upon to achieve its goal. It is hoped that such a discussion will have relevance for the wider study of leveraging sports mega-events (see Chalip, 2004; Weed, 2008) and could offer points of reference for future event hosts.

The empirical section of the paper looks at the German leveraging strategy by drawing on official government documentation produced by the German government in German and English. In addition, nine in-depth interviews with German actors involved in, or expert on, the 2006 event, are used to add context to the strategy. Although the rationale for staging sports mega-events may vary from country to country, in the case of Germany the strategy was relatively narrow: one of the key aims was to impact positively on the country’s poor image abroad; deriving revenue through increased tourism and inward investment – that is economic leveraging – was also a goal, but secondary, and seen as complimentary to, increasing Germany’s international prestige.

Conceptual Considerations

According to a recent meta-review of sport tourism research, the nascent literature around the strategic ‘leveraging’ of sports mega-events for specific purposes represents a welcome ‘shift’ from a dominant focus on measuring post-hoc impact assessments (Weed, 2009, p. 621). Scholars at the forefront of this work (Chalip, 2004, 2006; O’Brien, 2007; O’Brien & Chalip, 2007) have sought to focus attention on the strategies employed by host cities and states in ‘leveraging’ opportunities from sports mega-events through long-term and carefully planned, pre-event

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1 There are a number of terms similar and relating to ‘international prestige’. The broadest concept is that of a nation’s ‘public diplomacy’ (i.e. relations with external states, both formal and informal). States tend to seek to project a positive ‘image’ of themselves internationally; for the purpose of this paper ‘international prestige’ ought to be understood as both the reputation of a country and its image abroad – it is this that states seek to enhance with the hope of improving trade, incoming tourism and influence in international affairs.

activities. ‘Leveraging’ is generally taken to mean ‘those activities . . . which seek to maximise the long-term benefits from events’ (Chalip, 2004, p. 228) and take the form of a series of interventions with this aim in mind. A mega-event, on the other hand, is a term usually reserved for ‘large-scale, cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance. They are typically organised by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organisations . . .’ (Roche, 1994, p. 1). In general, the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup are considered as sports mega-events, while smaller-scale events, like the Commonwealth Games or Pan-American Games, are usually considered as ‘second order’ events (Black, 2008).

Chalip has put forward a uni-directional ‘model’ to illuminate the processes whereby ‘leveraging’ of a sports mega-event takes place. His original model was designed to analyse the economic leveraging of sports mega-events (2004); later, in a somewhat adapted form it was used in a study of social leveraging of sports events (Chalip, 2006; O’Brien & Chalip, 2007). The intention in this article is to build on this work by presenting an adapted version of Chalip’s original 2004 model to indicate how Germany set out to leverage the 2006 FWC with the intention of improving its national image. Before presenting the model in relation to Germany, the concept of ‘soft power’, used in the discipline of international relations, is introduced as an aid to understanding why states increasingly look to cultural rather than material resources to attempt to change their national image. The purpose here is to introduce a concept developed, contested and debated from an established discipline that could be of use to sport tourism scholars.

In international relations scholars use a variety of concepts to discuss the manner in which states set out to improve their image abroad. An improved image of a state is closely linked to how it is perceived by foreign publics and this is often termed a nation’s international prestige. Increasingly, however, scholars are using Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ (1990) as a useful macro-level term to capture state strategies for improving their image through bidding for and the staging of, sports mega-events, in particular, so-called ‘emerging states’ (Manzenreiter, 2010; Grix and Houlihan, 2012; Horne & Whannel, 2012). Few scholars, however, have analysed the mechanisms with which states have strategically used a ‘soft power’ approach to international relations, including the use of sports megas. For Nye the changing nature of international relations after the end of the Cold War, and the risk attached to deploying traditional military forms of power, has led to ‘intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’ becoming more important in inter-state relations (Nye, 1990, p. 167). This should not be taken, however, to mean that Nye advocates replacing traditional ‘hard power’ with ‘soft power’ in international relations, but rather that states ought to make far more use of the latter; preferably in combination with the former (so-called ‘smart power’; Nye, 2004, p. 32). Nye distinguishes between power to ‘influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants’ (coercive power) and the ability to ‘attract and co-opt them to want what you want’ (Nye, 2004, p. 2). This latter type of power is the essence of ‘soft power’ and it resides in the ability to shape the preferences of others, and align those preferences to your own and as such is similar to Lukes’ ‘third dimension’ of power, ‘the power to shape, influence or determine others’ beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance’ (2007, p. 90) and also to the Habermasian notion of legitimation in relation to explanations of domination within democracies (Habermas, 1979). The sources drawn upon by a state to exert such soft power are very different to those of traditional ‘hard’ power. Nye puts forward three key sources of soft power: a state’s culture, its political values and its foreign policy (Nye, 2004, p. 11, 2008, p. 96).3 Along with sports mega-events, states engage in large-scale language exchanges and support for

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3 This short section on ‘soft power’ relies heavily on Grix and Houlihan (2012) ‘Sports megaevents as part of a nation’s soft power strategy’, unpublished manuscript; Justin Morris lists the English language, Greenwich Mean Time, the ‘Westminster Model’ of government, English Law and the BBC World Service among other ‘soft power’ assets belonging to Britain (see Morris, 2011, pp. 332–333).
research institutes abroad (for example, China and Germany) to disseminate information about their culture and history.

While such a macro concept like ‘soft power’ helps us contextualise why states are increasingly mobilising cultural resources in attempting to influence others in international affairs (Melissen, 2005; Kurlantzick, 2007; Hayden, 2012), in particular, sports mega-events (Black, 2007; Cornelissen, 2011), it does not shed light on the ‘levers’ that a host city or state uses to maximise the opportunities of an event to improve image. Figure 1 is an adapted form of Chalip’s 2004 model of economic leverage and sets out the German strategy to ‘leverage’ the 2006 FWC to change its nation’s poor image abroad. O’Brien and Chalip (2007, p. 299) suggest that ‘empirical work on economic leverage is scant, work on social leverage is virtually non-existent’ and the same could be said for image leverage. While a great deal of literature exists on ‘destination image’, consensus on what ‘image’ refers to in the empirical world is not forthcoming. Florek et al. discuss the make-up of an individual’s view or image of a particular place (2008, p. 203), while students of politics look to a broader notion of national image more akin to a brand (see Van ham, 2001). A country’s image can be built up by information about a country from ‘its products, celebrities, behaviour of its inhabitants or events taking place, all of these reaching different types of audiences’ (Florek et al., 2008, p. 203).

Two obvious additions to Chalip’s 2004 model need explanation: the first is the ‘leveraging’ of the event itself as the starting point of this uni-directional model. Second, a section on ‘outcomes’ is included which is effectively the part where we see if the ‘leveraging’ has had the desired impact. To use Preuss’ term, this would measure in the German case the ‘intangible’ legacy (2007, p. 211) of an improvement in image (or the ‘free’ promotion effect, Preuss & Alfs, 2011, p. 56), but also the regular economic indices that accompany such events, including inbound tourists before, during and after the event, and overnight stays by foreign nationals. Arguably these all contribute to a better image, as satisfied tourists can act as multipliers passing on positive messages about the host country on their return (see below). In addition, sports mega-events are increasingly being used to ‘signal’ messages to external audiences that can ‘help to change the image of the host and the perception of certain aspects of the host city or nation’ (Preuss & Alfs, 2011, p. 66). Although the focus in this paper is on the ‘means’ (to use Chalip’s label) by which Germany achieved these outcomes, it seems reasonable to mention both the ‘means’ and the outcomes to gain a sense of whether Germany’s leveraging strategy was effective.
This model of image leveraging, coupled with empirical data on Germany’s strategy around the 2006 FWC, adds to debates on ‘leveraging’ sports mega-events. The following case, however, makes no claims to be definitive; its purpose is to stimulate debate around the ability of states to leverage sports events to improve their image, especially important as an increasing number of ‘emerging’ and ‘small to medium’ states seek to change the way in which they are viewed by foreign publics (for example, Qatar, Russia, Brazil and so on). The image leveraging model acts as a guiding principle in what follows. The intention is not to explore every single section of Chalip’s model as, for example, O’Brien does in his thorough analysis of a regional surfing festival (2007), but rather to focus on the salient sections linked to image promotion. All six of Chalip’s ‘means’ do arise, however, in Germany’s leveraging of the FWC (following O’Brien, 2007, they are termed ‘tactics’). It ought to be stated clearly that Chalip’s model was not used initially as an inductive tool to investigate the German strategy (as O’Brien did, 2007); rather, an iterative process of data collection, modelling and then assessing the empirical data against the model took place. As such, this paper focuses on the long-term leveraging campaigns undertaken by Germany prior to, during and even after the event. This is then followed by the strategy used to engender a fan-based experience and atmosphere to maximise the possibility of creating a ‘feelgood factor’ and of people taking positive views of Germany home with them. Finally, we look briefly at some of the outcomes of the event to assess whether this image leveraging strategy was successful.

**Methodological Foundations and Research Methods**

The model for image leveraging put forward here – a variant of the economic and social models touched on above – is rooted in a post-positivist understanding of the world. Weed (2009) has commented on the lack of theoretical application in sport tourism research; this paper suggests a model of image leveraging founded on an interpretivist epistemology. Research foundations logically lead to and affect the questions posed and the methods upon which we draw (Grix, 2002). For the purpose of this paper the research question driving the piece is ‘what was the leveraging strategy employed by Germany around the 2006 FWC to improve its national image?’ Moreover, what were the ‘levers’ that were used? Although Preuss (2007, p. 215) raises issues about the same mega event producing different legacies in different locations, it seems plausible that some levers will offer generic and universal application, for example, Chalip’s ‘means’ of promoting an event by showcasing ‘via event advertising and reporting and targeted campaigns’ should be applicable to all event hosts independent of geography or ideology. This particular take on interpretivism, which has been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Grix, 2010a), is labelled ‘hard interpretivism’ and builds on the works of Bevir and Rhodes (2006, 2008) in political science. Such an epistemological approach brings one close to, but is nevertheless distinct from, critical realism (Sayer, 1997). The outcome of this is that the researcher considers not only the ideas and beliefs of actors as important in a story of events (i.e. most states believe that sports ‘megas’ will improve their international prestige), but he/she also considers the role played by structures and institutions in shaping the ideas and beliefs that we are interested in. This broad guiding approach has been successfully employed in interventions in the vast literature on ‘governance’ in political science and public administration (Grix, 2010b; Goodwin & Grix, 2011).

The present study entailed in-depth semi-structured interviews with nine commentators with knowledge of, or direct involvement in, Germany’s staging of the 2006 FWC in the summer of 2011 (see Appendix 2 for full names and roles). In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted based on a ‘skeleton’ interview protocol aimed at identifying the rationale behind Germany’s staging the event and the reasons for their perceived success in doing so. This interview protocol comprised of open-ended questions (e.g. ‘The 2006 FWC was universally
understood as a success. What were the key factors behind this?), which were followed up with specific probes (e.g. ‘What were the domestic/international factors . . . ?’/‘Which role did your campaign play?’). Each interview was audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Once transcribed, quotes were sent to the participants in order to check the accuracy of the transcription; specific quotes used in the manuscript were adjusted according to requested changes and a total of 46 single-spaced pages of transcript were coded and analysed. Interviewees were asked permission to publish the quotes and to identify them in the text as interviewees. All consented except two from the German Foreign Office who granted the interviews on the basis of anonymity. The interviews were explained in Table 1.

The interviews should be looked upon as an addition to the directed content analysis of official government documents (in German and English) and secondary literature from which the empirical data were gathered (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Two approaches to this data were undertaken: an initial reading of material to gain an overview of the German FWC Hosting Strategy and all the details this involved. This was followed by a structured analysis of the official government documents focusing on the campaigns used to leverage the sports mega-event and on the fan-centred approach adopted by the hosts. Key themes to emerge from this structured analysis (image leveraging and the ‘atmosphere’ of the event) were then used to analyse secondary literature on the topic. Table 2 lists the key documents used in the analysis.

A final interview with a key actor in the 2006 FWC, Horst R. Schmidt, at the time the General Secretary of the German Football Federation and Vice Chair of the organising committee, took place after the analysis of the material. Schmidt’s central points on Germany’s leveraging strategy mirror the paper’s structure: long-term campaigns, a fan-centred approach (or Fanbetreuung, that is, ‘fan care’) and the creation of a feelgood atmosphere around the event.

It is hoped that this paper – written from a ‘hard’ interpretivist perspective (see above) – can add to the plurality of perspectives to the same social phenomena: the leveraging of sports mega-events. Such a plurality of approaches is a sign of maturity in established academic disciplines and is celebrated as necessary to grasp an understanding of an ever complex social world (see Weed, 2009, p. 625 and for a similar argument in political science, Marsh & Stoker, 2002, pp. 3–4).

Table 1. Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Institution/campaign</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk Officer</td>
<td>German Foreign Office (Culture and Education Policy, Communication and Germany’s Image Abroad)</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariane Derks</td>
<td>Chief Executive, ‘Germany, Land of Ideas’</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Gudrun Doll-Tepper</td>
<td>Sports Policy Specialist; Free University</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Eisenberg</td>
<td>Sports Historian; Centre for British Studies</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Ide</td>
<td>Chief Sports Editor, Tagesspiegel newspaper</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Pfeil</td>
<td>Chief Sports Editor, Der Spiegel</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Sebastian Braun</td>
<td>Sports Sociologist; Humboldt University</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk Officer</td>
<td>German Foreign Office (Sports Promotion in Foreign Policy)</td>
<td>August 2011 (by email)</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horst R. Schmidt</td>
<td>Secretary of the German Football Federation and Vice President of the FIFA 2006 organising committee (currently treasurer of the German Football Federation)</td>
<td>September 2012 (telephone interview)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document title</td>
<td>Produced by</td>
<td>Published date/accessed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The Importance of Tourism’</td>
<td>German Tourist Board</td>
<td>2007; available at <a href="http://www.germany-tourism.de">www.germany-tourism.de</a> (accessed 7 July 2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Brochure entitled: ‘Deutschland. Land Der Ideen’</td>
<td>Land of Ideas Campaign</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2006 FIFA World Cup: Campaigns and Long-Term ‘Leveraging’

In what follows the purpose is to seek out the mechanisms by which Germany undertook its grand strategy of improving its national image. Chalip distinguishes between short-term or ‘immediate’ leveraging by event hosts ‘designed to maximize visitor spending’ and more long-term leveraging that seeks ‘to use events to build the host community’s image in order to enhance the quality of its brand or market position’ (2004, p. 228) and, one could add, its national image abroad. On the latter, the German National Tourist Board and other agencies organised events and promoted Germany as a travel destination well in advance of the FWC (Brauer & Brauer, 2008, p. 12). An excellent example of the long-term leveraging used by the Germans was the campaign launched 12 years prior to the 2006 FWC, (partly in the hope of winning the 2006 bid), by the German National Tourist Board together with the German Football Federation. The campaign was designed to communicate to foreign publics Germany as ‘Destination Germany’ and it involved some 75 million internet users, 25 million print products and approximately ‘5000 fact-finding tours at around 1000 trade fairs’ (FMI, 2006, p. 32). The long-term, pre-event leveraging strategy can be seen as the early stage of a legacy plan – what Weed (2008) has coined the ‘pregnancy period’. Horst R. Schmidt, Vice Chair of the organising committee, described the strategy developed with the aim of improving Germany’s image in the world and ensuring the success of the event:

We developed a cluster of specific measures to achieve this (success of the event, Author). We launched a ‘welcome tour’ to all 31 countries qualified for the tournament. Franz Beckenbauer, the Chair of the organising committee, visited every country and received a high-level reception; he went to the countries to welcome them to Germany . . . this greatly influenced the media coverage of the event positively . . . (Interview, Schmidt)

This ‘cluster’ of measures included several high-level campaigns, bringing together politics, business, NGOs, civil society and cultural organisations (Brauer & Brauer, 2008; Interview, German Foreign Office) to achieve this purpose. Well-orchestrated and resourced national and international campaigns were put together, funded, in the main, by the federal government, but also with partners from business, FIFA and the German Football Federation.

A specific campaign was designed to prepare Germany and the Germans to be hospitable to the crowds of foreign citizens that came for the football – the so-called ‘National Service and Friendliness Campaign’ (see also Kersting, 2007, p. 282; Preuss, 2007, p. 218; Brauer & Brauer, 2008; Florek et al., 2008, p. 210). It is clear from this campaign that German officials believed people to be of central importance to their strategy, for it is, after all, citizens who express attitudes towards a nation. Therefore, fans were central to the leveraging strategy to alter Germany’s image. Some 10,000 ‘service ambassadors’ were posted to areas likely to attract foreign visitors after being trained in workshops up and down the country on such topics as ‘intercultural relations, tolerance, sensibility, hospitality and foreign languages’ (Florek et al., 2008, p. 210); an additional 100,000 people were trained up to be friendly to guests and answer any questions they might have (Federal Government, 2006, p. 10). At the centre of this drive was foreign tourists and the aim was to improve Germany’s reputation ‘as a nice and friendly country to visit. Hotels, restaurants, cafes and the public traffic were at the centre of this campaign’ (Wyludda, 2008, p. 8). Also key to this campaign was the attempt to alter the stereotypes people had about Germany and the Germans (Preuss, 2007, p. 218; see below for more on this). Although foreigners were the recipients of the campaign, it was also aimed at those people likely to come into contact with them: taxi drivers, people at the airport, but also the German media

Ironically, perhaps, the current paper has benefitted from a research grant from the German Academic Exchange Programme for fieldwork in Berlin in the summer of 2011. Part of this programme is to improve Germany’s image in the world by promoting the nation’s language, culture and academic exchange.
and the general public. Brauer and Brauer (2008, p. 13) rightly conclude that the ultimate aim was 'to optimise foreign visitors’ experiences of the country, with a resultant improvement in Germany’s image'.

These comprehensive campaigns were accompanied by the ‘bundling’ (Chalip & McGuirty, 2004) of, inter alia, a large-scale arts and culture programme that accompanied the sporting FWC, designed to make the visit to the FWC and Germany more attractive than it would have been through organisers developing ways to make events ‘more appealing to more people’ (Green, 2001, p. 1). This consisted of some 48 projects at a cost of 30 million Euros, covering 45 German cities, 194 performance, concerts and one exhibition, radio plays and even operas. The international scope of this campaign was enhanced by showing projects in 40 different countries and 87 different international cities (Federal Government, 2006, pp. 83–85).

According to Green (2001, p. 2) such ‘augmentation’ – that is, putting on activities, entertainment and services over and beyond the event itself – enhances and broadens the appeal of an event (see also Smith, 2010, p. 163; on ‘event-themed’ approaches to legacy leveraging, see Smith & Fox, 2007). Chalip and McGuirty (2004, p. 269) point out that event organisers have, in the past, failed to ‘cross-leverage’ events by incorporating additional events into the ‘host destination’s overall mix of tourism products and services’ (2004, p. 268). The organising committee, the German government, Tourist Office and campaign managers were aware of the usefulness of ‘augmentation’ and built it into their leveraging strategy. In fact, such ‘augmentation’ is seen by the Vice Chair of the organising committee as one of the few points of leverage that can be transferred to other countries and hosts (Interview, Schmidt). In Germany, for example, more ‘serious’, yet publicity-generating, ancillary activities included a number of street football initiatives, supporting the world-wide ‘streetfootballworld’ networks, culminating in the first streetfootball world championships held in Kreuzberg, Berlin, in a specially built stadium holding 2000 fans (Federal Government, 2006, pp. 56–57).

Perhaps the best example of a long-term leveraging campaign is that entitled ‘Welcome to Germany: Land of Ideas’. This was launched in 2006 and was designed to improve the German national image by showcasing Germany and attracting tourism and foreign investment. It was so successful that it continues to this day, bringing together key actors from business, science and culture, and facilitating the promotion of Germany’s image externally (FMI, 2006, p. 26). Such an image is made up of a wide variety of factors, which were cleverly brought together under the simple slogan of ‘Land of Ideas’, a phrase made prominent by the (at that time) incoming Federal president, Horst Köhler, in 2004, who suggested Germany should become more than the land of ‘poets and thinkers’ and more than just ‘made in Germany’ (Köhler, 2004; Interview, Dirk). One strand of this campaign was and is designed to attract foreign direct investment into Germany; one of the techniques used to attract attention to this campaign was a series of huge posters of Claudia Schiffer (the world famous model) lying seductively wrapped in a German flag with the banner reading ‘Invest in Germany, boys’ (FMI, 2006, p. 76, for a visual example), or ‘Get your hands on a German Supermodel. See your car dealer’ (Land of Ideas Campaign, 2011). Part of the success of this campaign was – and is – that it is non-partisan and does not belong to a particular company; it crosses party political lines and speaks to actors in business, science and culture alike. The campaign sees itself as a ‘facilitator that brings experts from the triangle of politics-society-economy together and that’s what our initiative does’ (Ariane Derks) – this mirrors Chalip’s leveraging tactic of enhancing business relationships, which can also lead to more longer-term business relationships that go beyond the period of the event itself (see also O’Brien & Gardiner, 2006, p. 29). The central aim of the campaign was and remains to make Germany attractive to foreign publics. According to the CEO of ‘Land of Ideas’, Ariane Derks, the campaign has:

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5 The word ‘idea’ has a resonance abroad and it is a concept under which many things can be subsumed (Interview with Ariane Derks).
a very global aim: our aim is to cater for Germany’s positive domestic and international image . . .
so that Germany is attractive as a Standort (economic location) . . . so that we position ourselves
positively politically, economically, scientifically and socially . . . so that we are (hopefully) more
attractive to people who may wish to work in Germany . . . . (Interview)

It is clear that such a campaign is able to resonate with a number of stakeholders’ interests – an
improved image for Germany abroad is believed to translate into more inbound tourists visiting,
more overnight stays and spending that go far beyond the event itself (see below). It is also
worth noting that Germany has a long history of social corporatism – one reason the German
banking sector is admired (Skidelsky, 2012) – that allows such a campaign to be successful and
may hinder it being emulated by another state wishing to leverage a sports event to improve its
image. Horst R. Schmidt, Vice Chair of the organising committee, reflected that this campaign
was initially hard to get off the ground, as it proved difficult to bring people together from very
different sectors and win them over to the campaign. Also, the campaign initially had problems
with FIFA and its marketing partners, because it originated from German business (Interview,
Schmidt).

Eventually, though, the ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign was to play an important role in
bringing seemingly disparate stakeholders together in mutually beneficial networks. To this day it
promotes Germany through a number of initiatives as a: country to invest in (‘invest in
Germany’), travel destination (‘travel to Germany’, but also ‘culture in Germany’), research
partner (‘research in Germany’), place to study (‘study in Germany’), trusted manufacturer (‘made
in Germany’), place to work (‘work in Germany’) and even as an example of a multicultural
society (‘integration in Germany’) (Land of Ideas Campaign, 2011). The CEO of the ‘Land of
Ideas’ campaign explained that she saw her campaign’s role as a facilitative one, that is, her team
were not in competition with the myriad other campaigns underway, but rather they attempted
to bring together, network and join-up the different campaigns, which, after all, shared a similar
aim of making Germany attractive to visitors and investors. The point here is that this campaign
can be understood as an example of long-term, pro-active leveraging of both the 2006 FWC, but
also the opportunities and networks that arose out of it, including the close working together of
politics and the business sector. Following the success of this campaign before, during and now
after the FWC, the tag line to the brand name ‘Land of Ideas’ has been registered so that no
other country in the world can use it (Land of Ideas Campaign Online, 2012).

The overall motto of the 2006 FWC – agreed on by FIFA and the German Football
Association – was the rather lame ‘A Time to Make Friends’. However, Germany sought to
change its own negative global image (see below) and invested a great deal of time in attempting
to leverage the event to do so. Not only were Germans trained to ‘meet and greet’ (see above)
through nationwide training workshops – not unlike the volunteers for the London 2012
Olympics – the Germans themselves were targeted through a campaign entitled ‘You are
Germany’ designed to reinvigorate German self-confidence (see Kersting, 2007, p. 281).

All of the campaigns mentioned above add up to a comprehensive, long-term approach
to leveraging the benefits of the sporting mega-event in terms of image enhancement. The pre-
planned organisation and nature of the campaigns was commented on by all interview partners –
along with the glorious weather experienced by Germany in the 4 weeks of the tournament – as
being central to the success of the event.

Finally, a key component of Chalip’s leveraging model is the role of the media. A key
component of sports mega-events generally is the global audience they attract. The 2006 FIFA
FWC was a global event ‘aired in a total of 43,600 broadcasts across 214 countries and territories
generating a total coverage of 73,072 hours’ (Dolles & Söderman, 2010, p. 588). To cater for the
global reach of the event, and to meet FIFA requirements, a comprehensive international media

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6 See www.du-bist-deutschland.de. The original campaign, started in 2005, has now changed its focus towards a ‘Child Friendly’ society.
service was made available, along with a platform in many languages, offering journalists free information about Germany. An International Broadcast Centre (IBC) was set up – after internal competition between cities – in Munich on 15 April 2002. The IBC was set among 40,000 m²; designated media centres (with a minimum size of 3000 m²) were set up at each game venue (according to FIFA requirements). Media stands within the stadiums had to be extended to accommodate 300 desks for pitch-side commentators and up to 2000 print press representatives, all of whom were serviced with telephone lines and internet connections. Deutsche Telekom was the single provider of these services which made the job of coordination much easier for the organising committee (FMI, 2006, pp. 47–48), part of the retention of ‘event expenditures’, that is, the use of local or in this case, national, service providers, one of the key points raised by Chalip in his 2004 model of economic leveraging from sports events.

The successful consensus of opinion across diverse groups and interests was consolidated by the lead of ‘Kaiser’ (Emperor) Franz Beckenbauer, a German national treasure, former German national and European football star and manager of the FWC winning national team (1990), who commands the trust of politicians and the public alike. Beckenbauer – in a similar manner to Lord Coe’s involvement in London, 2012 – played a central role in the successful bidding, preparing and managing of the sports mega-event, as discussed above with his exhausting ‘welcome tour’. The organizing committee, whose budget had been set at E430 million and which was chaired by Beckenbauer, was able to record a pre-tax surplus of E135 million and a net profit of E56 million (Federal Government, 2006, pp. 21–22).

A ‘Fan Centred’ Strategy and Camaraderie on the Streets

As the Germans were hoping the FWC would enhance a relatively poor image abroad, they integrated a series of campaigns, ‘bundled’ together a package of arts, culture and several smaller government-led initiatives (e.g. the ‘street soccer’ initiative, see above) with a ‘fan-centred’ strategy to the staging of the FWC in 2006. The federal Government did not see fans as a ‘problem’, but rather set out to ‘treat fans with respect’ (Federal Government, 2006, p. 64), as shown below with the creation of the unique ‘Fan Zones’ and public viewing areas. This strategy is the opposite of the heavy-handed dealings with crowds and spectators which has been shown in other events to lead to tension between event visitors and the authorities (see for example, Green, 2001, p. 13).

The public viewing areas played a role in mobilising groups considered or not classified as usual ‘football fans’. This is interesting, as the ability to reach a very wide section of the population clearly contributed to the carnival atmosphere that accompanied Germany’s FWC. A senior sports correspondent at Der Spiegel suggests that:

there was a combination of football and what you could call ‘event’ fans who are not interested in specific things, but events, sometimes it might be a concert, sometimes a facebook party, sometimes a football event – they made up the large crowds and they changed the style of the whole FWC campaign. They like parties, they like contact with foreigners . . . (Interview, Pfeil)

The carnival atmosphere and very fortunate weather – compared by the former Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, as being reminiscent of ‘a Shakespearean midsummer night’s dream, with a touch of Woodstock’ (Brauer & Brauer, 2008, p. 23) – certainly contributed to the event’s success. The atmosphere in Germany over the 4 weeks of the tournament came close to the cultivation of celebration and camaraderie that Chalip (2006, p. 123) calls for in order to leverage a ‘social’ aspect from a sports event. It can also leave an impression on visiting fans from other countries, influencing their views of the host nation (see below). In addition, fans interviewed by Florek et al. (2008, p. 213) spoke of the excellent organisation, clear signage and helpful police and information staff, all of which added to the fans’ experience of the event (volunteers had been specifically trained for this event and for this express purpose, as discussed above). In
another survey undertaken among international fans about 95% said they had received a friendly welcome from their German hosts (German Tourist Board, 2007a). Several interviewees picked up on the fact that there was a 'spill-over' effect from the event and its atmosphere from regular football supporters to a much wider base of the population and, importantly, foreign visitors, who simply got caught up in events. The weather, something that states increasingly try to influence around sports mega-events (China Daily, 2009), appears to have had a profound effect on this:

... the climate here was like in Italy, it was a wonderful summer, people being in the open air ... it was a very special summer, almost a fairy tale. The atmosphere was really marvellous – people who were not really interested in football got infected ... they wanted to be part of it ... there were so many people attending the public viewings which I think for the first time was a really big success with thousands of people on the streets . . . . restaurants opened their doors . . . a party atmosphere . . . you made friends with people in restaurants where you were sitting next to Italians or French and it was like we are all a big family; it was something very special. (Interview, Doll-Tepper)

Journalist Robert Ide goes on to explain the sense of a ‘feelgood factor’ and ‘we-ness’ associated with the event (this is the ‘liminality and communitas’ that Chalip refers to, 2006):

... here in these streets (Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin, Author) people took their TVs out onto the pavement ... in Germany you watch the TV inside, not out on the pavement with others ... if you had a small flat on the basement level, people placed their couch outside on the pavement and – so to speak – made the pavement their living rooms; then 20 others came along and brought beer with them and joined them ... many people were delighted about this atmosphere and the fact that something like this could happen in Germany. (Interview, Ide)

With the fan zones (see below), spontaneous meetings around private televisions turned into communal gatherings and many local restaurants and businesses advertising or showing the football action, a party atmosphere was created the like of which had not been seen in Germany. The notion of relaxing, the Mediterranean climate, the fact that people were all outside, allowed ‘a great opportunity for the Germans to show the world that they can be very enthusiastic fans and hosts’ (Interview, Pfeil). A combination of factors, including the precision planning, led to what the Germans now refer to in their collective memory as the ‘Sommermärchen’ (summer fairytale). Ariene Dirk, the director of the campaign ‘Land of Ideas’ sums it up thus:

Germany did have a lot of luck with the FWC: the organisation, the weather; the Germans succeeded in not being ‘typically German’ and came out of themselves and celebrated the four week party ... [it was] the first time since the War that Germans could proudly fly their flag . . . .

The reference to flag waving is pertinent, as Germany had had decades of attempting to ‘come to terms with its past’ (this process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* had become a national obsession; see Maier, 1990), something that had inhibited a natural sense of attachment of citizens to their nation. In 2006 the world witnessed something very surprising: a spontaneous outpouring of (sport) patriotism which was in sharp contrast to how national feelings had been viewed in Germany previously (see also Kersting, 2007, p. 291). German citizens themselves were fully supportive of the event, given that Germany is a ‘footballing country’ that did not have to be persuaded to stage and support the event (Interview, Schmidt). In fact, an interviewee from the German Foreign Ministry suggested that

... the German people really stood behind the FWC and this was completely accepted and there was a very strong sense of ownership; this is our country, our FWC and we are hosting it and not some elite decided that we have to be nice hosts now and that we have to change our lives for a day or so or for a month but people naturally adopted this [positive – Author] attitude.

Horst R. Schmidt (Interview) believes that the creation of the right atmosphere at a sports mega-event needs the backing of the people. The enthusiasm of the Germans, for example, spilled over into the reception foreigners received from the German hosts, who would have known that
the FWC brings with it a global audience (the cumulative global TV audience was allegedly over 26 billion – see FIFA, 2011), ensuring massive exposure of the their nation and the ability to organise a complex event.

One of the significant leveraging points of this ‘FWC Hosting Strategy’ was the outstanding success of the unique ‘Fan Fests’. As a ‘lever’ for improving fans’ experience of the event, this would be hard to improve on and was, accordingly planned well in advance of the event (Interview, Schmidt; Doll-Tepper). Over 20 million people joined in the party-like celebrations around the large viewing screens which were set up in the 12 host cities in Germany with no major public disorder reported (FMI, 2006, p. 8). The ‘Fan Fests’ served a number of purposes: first and foremost, they offered a street-party atmosphere to fans and by-standers who did not have tickets or who did not want to watch the football in the stadiums. These innovative ‘spaces’ also provided an arena within which fans and people, mostly women, who would not usually follow football, could enjoy a good party atmosphere. Women made up just 22% of all attendees at the FWC matches (overall average age of 34), but some 44% of those present at the fan parties were female (the average age of all present was younger at 31; Federal Government, 2006, p. 82). An initial driver behind the idea of ‘Fan Zones’ and public viewing was, interestingly, safety: the British ambassador in Germany had informed the organising committee to expect some 100,000 travelling English fans. The organising committee knew that there was a maximum of only 20,000 tickets available, raising the possibility of 80,000 disgruntled fans from a country well known for its hooligans. This was one consideration that led to the creation of public viewing areas. The organising committee were surprised how well they worked and the fact that there was no trouble to speak of (Interview, Schmidt).

1 million copies of a free 132-page fan guide (in German and English) was produced for football fans, containing all relevant information for staying in Germany (Federal Government, 2006, p. 63); this was accompanied by 17 so-called stationary ‘Fan Embassies’ at all game venues (plus two at larger venues). These acted as ‘central points of contact for football fans open late into the night, offering information, advice and service for German and foreign football fans.’ (FMI, 2006, p. 63). Some 800 well-trained contact personnel were on hand to offer reassurance, advice and hospitality, serving more than half a million fans throughout the event (FMI, 2006, p. 63).

Another fan-centred technique was the doubling up of admission tickets to games as tickets for using public transport for free on the day of the event – this was very successful with up to 90% of visitors to the fan miles and public viewing venues arriving by bus or train; the pre-tournament target of transporting at least 50% of spectators to the stadiums by public transport was also exceeded. There is clearly a story to be told here about the leveraging of environmental strategies for sports mega-events, as Germany has for years been at the forefront of developments in Green initiatives (see Dolles & Söderman, 2010). Germany did not experience the type of ticketing problems that dogged the 2012 Olympics, on the contrary, the successful selling of tickets without any hitches added to fans’ satisfaction of the event (Federal Government, 2006, pp. 44–49).

To ease traffic congestion some 3.7 billion Euros were invested by the German federal government in ‘upgrading and expanding projects for the federal highway network’ (Federal Government, 2006, p. 20). It should be noted, however, that this investment was being made anyway and was not budgeted specifically for the FWC. It should also be noted that ploughing investment into infrastructure that was already in a far better state than many other advanced capitalist states is something external observers and those hoping to emulate the German success ought to bear in mind. The efficient German infrastructure meant that the nationally owned German train system (Deutsche Bahn) was able to transport up to 600,000 extra passengers a day – a total of 15 million additional passengers – during the FWC (Federal Government, 2006, p. 29) without any significant disturbances to regular customers (FMI, 2006, p. 5), something other states, the UK in particular, can only dream of. This is in contrast to London 2012, prior to
which London’s Mayor, Boris Johnson, appealed to workers to stay at home in order to ease the suspected chaos – that did not materialise – on a creaking transport infrastructure. It was the well-resourced German system that was able to cope with staging Germany’s 2nd and FIFA’s 18th FWC, contested by 32 national teams, playing 64 games in 12 cities dotted around Germany with a total of 3.3 million people attending (almost) completely sold out matches (matches were 98% full to capacity; FIFA, 2011).

Of Post-Hoc ‘Outcomes’ and Missed Leveraging Opportunities?

A core aim of Germany’s leveraging strategy was the improvement of its poor external image by the breaking down of steadfast stereotypical depictions of the Germans through showcasing its nation and inviting foreign citizens, whose opinions they sought to change, to experience the host nation first hand. Reports on Germany and the Germans in the British press, for example, have, for decades, touched on the Second World War and Nazism, or employed the stereotypical monikers of a ‘dominant’, ‘arrogant’ and ‘dull’ people (Grix & Lacroix, 2006, p. 383). It is noticeable, however, that since 2006, the British press, the worst offenders in the world for ‘German bashing’, the ‘last “acceptable” prejudice’ (Guardian, 2006, 28 June), have become much better disposed towards Germany (Interview, Schmidt; Eisenberg). German historian, Professor Christiana Eisenberg, believes that the
d... tendency of the British tabloids to be much nicer to Germans now may be as a consequence of the FWC... which contributed to a further weakening of the Second World War image of Germany.

While the German press may express a certain amount of Schadenfreude when England lose to Germany at football, the tone of their coverage is not comparable to the British tabloids in the past (Grix & Lacroix, 2006). The head of sport at Der Spiegel believes, for example, that the FWC acted as a catalyst in breaking down stereotypes of Germans and building-up a positive sense of home-grown patriotism. He states:

We [the Germans, Author] think that the FWC in Germany changed our image in the world because the people saw we are multi-cultural, we can party, everybody was like ‘wow’ look at the Germans; this was not the beer festival [in Munich] – it was all over Germany, people did not expect to see the Germans like this: friendly, helpful... I think we are happy about the change to our image in the world – everybody knows already that we can organise the FWC, but the image of a modern, friendly, good-partying nation is new. (Interview, Pfeil)

It is highly likely that incoming tourists and overnight stays by international travellers increased as a result of this sports mega-event, as Figure 2 indicates. Overnight stays by visitors from the UK rose in June and July 2006 by 35.9%, the highest among Germany’s 10 most important source markets (Federal Government, 2006, p. 79; German Tourist Board, 2007b).

**Figure 2.** German tourist board ‘Incoming tourism to Germany’.

*Source: Data taken from German Tourist Board (2004-2011).*
The numbers in Figure 2 need to be contextualised. Germany has been able to capitalise on the global upsurge in international arrivals that rose from 760 million in 2004 to 935 million in 2010. There is a steady increase in the number of incoming tourists and overnight stays by international travellers in Germany, whereby the former is slowly increasing but tourists are clearly staying longer (and spending more). In fact, a survey carried out by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) indicated that the most important economic stimulus was due to a greater willingness among Germans and foreign football fans to spend money. Almost 50% of all businesses who reported a positive effect from the FWC also reported increased sales in this context. (Federal Government, 2006, p. 23)

The 2 million foreign tourists who travelled to Germany during the month-long tournament are estimated to have spent 600 million euros (Deutsche Welle, 11 July 2006). While it is notoriously difficult to find accurate data on the exact economic impact of the FWC on a nation’s economy, half of the companies who reported a positive ‘FWC’ effect on their business thought the gain in reputation of Germany and its products was ‘the underlying reason for the economic success of this mega event’ (Federal Government, 2006, p. 24). The tourism industry seems to have benefitted from the 4-week tournament, allegedly earning ‘an extra 300 million Euros in revenue . . .’ (Deutsche Welle, 2006).

Other indices available suggest that the 2006 FWC was successful. For example, the Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index (2004–2011), which measures foreigners’ views on Germany in respect of six ‘dimensions’ (‘governance’; ‘people’; ‘exports’; ‘culture and heritage’; ‘tourism’ and ‘investment and immigration’; Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index, 2004–2011) shows how Germany has fared before, during and since the FWC. Germany went from seventh in 2004 to first in 2007 on this list and remained in second place in 2011 (Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index, 2004–2011). There is little evidence of any other event or reason that helps explain this turn-around in international image other than the well-planned, well-carried out ‘leveraging’ of the sports mega-event of 2006. Indeed, Spaven identifies an intentionally managed public diplomacy strategy by Germany to alter its image when he states:

. . . Germany’s status . . . seems to be significantly better off in image terms now than it was in late 2005. The only factor that I can find to explain that is the 2006 FWC, around which it managed public diplomacy, in a very broad sense – international influence – as well as I’ve seen any country, and in a purposeful way. What happened in Barcelona was almost incidental; it wasn’t a grand strategy. Germany had a grand strategy, which I think they designed and pulled off very well. (Foreign Commonwealth Office, Uncorrected Evidence, 2010, Q.33)

In addition, a representative survey of foreign fans undertaken by TNS Infratest on behalf of the German Tourist Board (DZT) in December, 2006, confirmed this enhancement of image by reporting marked improvements in attitudes towards the Germans. For example, improvements over a previous survey in November, 2005, include 8% of Dutch and 5% of Italians who thought Germany a ‘cosmopolitan and hospitable’ country. Traditionally, especially on the football field, relations between these countries have been all but friendly. The Brazilians reported an astonishing 20% increase in answer to the same question over their 2005 result. Overall, some 90% of those surveyed said they would recommend Germany as a tourist destination (German Tourist Board, 2006; Spiegel-Online, 2006). The Chair of the German National Tourist Board at the time, Petra Hedorfer, commented:

It is amazing the impact that fans and world-wide media have had as multipliers on enhancing our image as a [travel] destination and service provider among the citizens in their respective countries in such a short space of time. (German Tourist Board, 2006)

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7 Barcelona is generally cited in the literature as an Olympics that was successful for the host (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 9).
The German National Tourist Board were equally pleased to note the external perception of Germany and the Germans as having markedly improved due to the FWC, unexpectedly so among the bordering nations of the French and Dutch (Federal Government, 2006, p. 26). The German Embassy in London suggested that not since the Berlin Wall fell has there been such an ‘intensive and positive impact on Germany’s image’, which has ‘turned into almost enthusiastic perception’ (Federal Government, 2006, p. 25).

Liminality

While it is clear that the Germans are very good at long-term planning and long-term leveraging strategies, with hindsight, they appeared less well equipped for the spontaneous scale of a sense of ‘celebration’ and ‘social camaraderie’ that accompanied the event. Both of these concepts are key to the creation of ‘liminality’ (Chalip, 2006, p. 113), the ‘feelgood factor’ that often exists around large-scale sports events. While the set-up in Germany positively fostered sociability among fans, non-fans, Germans and foreigners – most strikingly in the official Fan Zones, but importantly also on unofficial side-streets (witnessed first-hand by the author), such ‘liminality’ seemed to take the hosts by surprise. For a period of 4 weeks it appeared that the divisions and cleavages in German society were suspended – witness for example the positive discourse around Mesut O’zil, a German born Turk and one of the stars of the German National Football team. Turks in Germany in the main – the city of Berlin is home to the highest number of Turks outside Istanbul – are not as assimilated in society as Asians are in the UK. The party-like atmosphere generated by the FWC could have been leveraged to attempt to improve understanding between German and Turkish culture, for example. How this is best undertaken is, of course, another matter, as topics which involve different religious views and different understandings of culture are highly sensitive in nature. In summary, the German case reveals some innovative ways in which to create and foster sociability (especially the Fan Zones) – but thought needs to go into capitalising on ‘the social effects’ that events like this generate (Chalip, 2006, p. 123). With hindsight, Horst R. Schmidt, at the time Vice Chair of the organising committee, has a lot to say on how to ‘create’ the right atmosphere: acting as an advisor to the FWC 2010 in South Africa, Schmidt advised that

you cannot just concentrate on the sport. In order to create an atmosphere, the host needs to do something. It doesn’t just happen. We had the resources in Germany to do this. South Africa had a massive handicap because of the topic of safety and criminality – it is difficult to create the right atmosphere . . . these countries (‘emerging’ states, Author) do not have the pre-existing infrastructure.

(Interview, Schmidt)

As a generic leveraging strategy, however, the creation of ‘atmosphere’ or ‘liminality’ is something other hosts can learn from Germany.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted, through the example of Germany’s strategy around the 2006 FWC, to contribute to the nascent literature on leveraging sports mega-events. It began by introducing the concept of ‘soft power’ as a macro-level heuristic to understand the rationale behind states wanting to host major sports mega-events. While ‘soft power’ provides a useful lens through which to capture the motives of advanced capitalist states and, increasingly, ‘emerging’ states, for bidding for and hosting sports ‘megas’, it tells us little about the mechanisms used to leverage such events for social, economic or reputational benefits. Here Chalip’s 2004 model of leveraging sports mega-events was used as a guiding principle with which to assess Germany’s strategy around the 2006 FWC. Chalip’s six ‘means’ of leveraging were found in the German strategy. The German hosts used a variety of methods to achieve its aims: the innovative ‘Fan
Zones’ served not only to create a ‘space’ for the largest street parties seen outside of the Munich beer festival, but also worked to ‘entice visitor spending’ (tactic 1) and create an atmosphere that would make people choose to stay in the country longer (tactic 2). The massive media set-up facilitated the promotion of the event and the host country was serviced by Deutsche Telekom (tactic 3), thus retaining event expenditure within Germany. The ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign played a central role in enhancing business relationships (tactic 4), acting as it did as a ‘facilitator’ across campaigns and across the diverse actors involved in organising and promoting the event. The multitude of campaigns were designed to showcase and advertise the event (tactic 5), and they achieved the latter through a number of posters, banners and other promotions (tactic 6). While it is clear that 2006 will go down as a critical juncture in German collective memory, that is, a “‘seminal moment’ in the life of the host community” (Black, 2007, p. 264), what does it tell us about leveraging sports mega-events?

Preuss’ (2007, pp. 214–215) statement that ‘the same mega event will create a different legacy in different locations’ suggest that lesson learning from leveraging strategies is limited to specific cultural, economic and political contexts. However, there are generic ‘means’ of leveraging legacy, as posited by Chalip’s 2004 model, that can transcend geographical place and ideological regime type: China, for example, still had to use the media to ‘signal’ its message to foreign publics; the UK attempted to keep London 2012 visitors in London as long as possible, putting on ‘augmenting’ programmes around the London Olympics. Germany’s example suggests that while many hosts hope the impact of staging a sports mega-event will be positive, the German public diplomacy strategy of using the 2006 FWC to shape its image employed a number of leveraging strategies to ensure its success. The systematic and purposeful leveraging of a sports mega-event to alter a nation’s image is easier for states which suffer or have suffered from a poor national image.

Germany planned meticulously prior to this event with a number of campaigns targeted at different groups and including a wide array of partners from business, government, civil society, culture and sport. This long-term approach through campaigns coupled with a deliberate fan-centred focus clearly paid off as reports on Germany’s external image and of fans’ experience of the event testify.

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