Governmentality in educational development:

*Education, development and the role of ICT*

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Writing this thesis has been an incredible journey accompanied by a mixture of emotions: frustration, anger, joy, satisfaction and a dream of life. I wanted to think in new ways rather than follow ready-made academic paths, but this required me to resist old habits of thought. Along the way I have met many wonderful people without whom I couldn’t have overcome this challenge.

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I am truly grateful to all the people I’ve met in the process of my professional career and personal life. They all in a way helped me to write this thesis, which is the product of a kind of intersubjective knowledge. They have challenged me and changed me. They are the source of my experience, which I now want to offer back to the world.
Abstract

Contemporary discourse in the related fields of education and development are increasingly dominated by notions of the knowledge economy, global competition, market compatibility, privatisation, performativity and entrepreneurship. These dominant notions or imaginaries, proliferating through discourse across the world, impact on how we think about education and development and how thoughts are materialised in our everyday actions.

Drawing on a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, this thesis problematises these inconspicuous, taken-for-granted notions, to make them visible and tangible, and to interrogate their role as mechanisms of discourse formation. It traces how such notions are manifested through the rhetorics, structures and trajectories of some instances of ‘education for development’. It works towards a better understanding of how the apparent post-WW2 neoliberal consensus has framed, transmitted and ratified these globalised and globalising discourses, and changed the dynamics of our social construction as citizens of a [post]modern globalised world, through the constitutive power of governmentality.

Recent developments in ICT and digital education technologies have contributed to transfers or mobility of global education policies and a widening technologisation of educational systems. The thesis argues that these changes have been fuelled by transnational development programmes, such as Official Development Assistance funding, public-private partnership funding, and large scale philanthropy - under the rubric of bridging the digital divide. It further argues that these changes at the level of discourse are formed and sustained through relations of knowledge and power, which serve to legitimate the discourse and, in a kind of strategic game, make its dominant imaginaries appear more real.

International policy makers, researchers and consultants are positioned at the centre of production and reproduction of the dominant discourse/s, and the consequent formation of policy and governance. The empirical data for this study comprises interviews with 51 such global knowledge workers, together with the texts of some key national and transnational policy documents. The study shows how these actors have themselves been constructed as subjects in the process of educational globalisation, and how the logic of the knowledge economy has been objectified and naturalised through this technology of the self.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABU:</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN:</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CERI:</td>
<td>Centre for Educational Research and Innovation at OECD</td>
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<td>CSR:</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>DAC:</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>EAFIT:</td>
<td>Escuela de Administracion y Finanza / Instituto Tecnologico</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBS:</td>
<td>Educational Broadcasting System (in Korea)</td>
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<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI:</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>HE:</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>ICRES:</td>
<td>Institute of Evaluation in Colombia</td>
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<td>ICT:</td>
<td>Information and communication technologies</td>
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<td>IMF:</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISTE:</td>
<td>International Society for Technology in Education</td>
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<td>KSP:</td>
<td>Knowledge Sharing Programme (in Korea)</td>
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<td>MDGs:</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MinTic:</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>MoE:</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs:</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>ODA:</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD:</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OLPC:</td>
<td>One Laptop Per Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIAAC:</td>
<td>Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies</td>
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<td>PISA:</td>
<td>Programme for International Student Assessment</td>
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<td>PPP:</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>UNESCO:</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Rationale and background

There is a global policy consensus - perhaps best exemplified in the UN Secretary General's 2012 Global Education First Initiative (GEFI)\(^1\) along with “Education for All”\(^2\) and “Learning for All”\(^3\) - that education is the single most important key for the betterment of individual lives and the development of nations. I do not wish in this thesis to argue with this consensus, but I do want to interrogate some assumptions about global education policy, practice and governance which seem to flow almost invisibly from it, and to problematise the global consensus about how education should be conducted, supported, financed, assessed, and benchmarked. Like all forms of knowledge-making, education is among other things a technique of power. My starting point in this research, then, is to make visible through the lens of Foucault, "the apparent neutrality and political invisibility of techniques of power… [which] makes them so dangerous" (Gordon, 2002:xv).

The study developed out of my own work as a professional educational media producer, based in Korea but involved in international educational networks and in the fostering and sharing of best practice in developing countries. This work ultimately forced me to ask myself the question, what are we\(^4\) – ‘global actors’ in the increasingly globalised domain of education - actually trying to achieve? I wanted to know how some key ideas like that of the global knowledge economy, education for development, the power of

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1 Details can be found on the website, http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/

2 It is a movement to activate a global commitment to ensure quality basic education for all children, youths and adults. [Accessed on 1st March 2014]
   http://www.unesco.org.uk/education_for_all

3 This is the strategy of 2020 in education of the World Bank see the website, [Accessed on 3rd March 2014]

4 I use the term ‘we’ as a political term which works in network in order to achieve a certain consensus, even though the communities each of us belong to work in multiple conditions.
educational technology, and the primacy of the market had become first objectified, then naturalised upon the people involved in these processes. I wanted to question how it was that we actors had become subjects in the supposed process of *globalising* education.

My research is situated in the discursive practices through which education policies, funding models, technologies and content are increasingly transferred or mobilised across the world. I will adopt a Foucauldian theoretical framework to analyse how this discourse is conceptualised and embedded in global actors and policy makers at various levels and in different regions and countries. It is my aim to ask how the discourse is constructed as plausible or natural, and in doing so to reveal some of the dynamics of the modern subject and what Foucault (1980a:131) calls the “regime of truth” by which such subjects are constructed, normalised and governed.

How do we perceive, understand and perform the idea that education will give us better lives and a better collective life? How does this come to be rationalised or materialised in our everyday lives, political discourses and government policies? Why are there so many international agencies, think tanks and consultants telling us how to improve our education systems? Who do they represent, and in which ways might we choose to follow their advice? I hope to show how the notion of education and the notion of development have been coalesced in a way that alters them both and impacts on both individuals and on the social body, and to question how policy makers and other global education actors conceptualise and materialise these notions and link them together in global practices. Indeed I plan to question how the very term ‘global’ is being used to pursue partisan ambitions.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate global education imaginaries and, in the process, to examine prevalent regimes of truth by scrutinising the constitutive powers of governmentality. It is an attempt to discover “how and why certain things (behaviour, phenomena, processes) become a problem” (Foucault, 1983). My fieldwork agenda is to question the discursive practice of policy makers, consultants and other key actors in the process of global
education discourse production, translation and distribution. How do they describe and think about what they do? I am keen to understand to what extent they conceptualise their practice as supporting globalisation, and how their day-to-day practice might be mapped to the notion of a global knowledge economy. As Foucault emphasises, it is essential to investigate micro-mundane and routine discourses if we are to get to the reality of what is going on. Hence this research will pose such questions as:

- What are the discourses of educational globalisation? How are they constituted and distributed, and how are they formed?
- How do supranational organisations deploy these discourses?
- What values appear to be at work in global education policies and governance?
- How do initiators and participants in these policies objectify themselves as actors in the process of education globalisation? What contingencies are at work here?
- What role can Information and communication technology (ICT) play in improving and extending educational opportunities in developing countries? And how can it be supported in terms of finance, infrastructure, and content provision?

My interviewees - policy makers, civil servants, project managers and others - are both the subjects and at the same time objects in the process of educational globalisation, and as such are key personae in the setting up, direction and redirection of policies. They are citizens of particular countries, but also members of various organisations that work across national borders. The words of these interviewees will be analysed to show how global education is conceptualised from a multitude of insider perspectives. I will pay particular attention to consultants from Korea, a comparatively new donor country, in order to look at what if anything is different in their rationales and practices, and ask if they bring a different voice to the global education discourse.

To demarcate the investigation, I will focus on development projects involving the provision and use of educational ICT including digital infrastructure, content and training, and particularly those involving public or
philanthropic funding. I attempt to examine the economic rationalities which may underlie seemingly altruistic practices. I interviewed a number of policy makers and international consultants who are at the forefront of this work, in the hope of revealing contingent motivations and rationalisations underpinning their discursive practice.

The thesis will start with a review of the theory and practice of education globalisation, with a focus on the role of knowledge in global discourse formation. It will then move on to present a genealogy of some key terms and concepts in current education discourse: modernity, development, world class, philanthropy, educational technology and the knowledge economy.

I will investigate the concept of the knowledge economy with a focus on its impact on educational policy regionally and globally, and identify some of the contested meanings of ‘education for development’ in a globalised world driven by the dynamics of marketisation and economic competitiveness. What we call knowledge is in Foucauldian terms socially constructed by power, a phrase that expresses the dynamic relationship between power and knowledge. What kind of knowledge is valued and generally accepted as truth or common sense? How, for instance, is the profoundly influential notion of the ‘knowledge economy’ legitimised and made real? How has this notion acquired such imaginative power that virtually all states accept it as a lodestone of economic and educational policy? I plan to examine them through a Foucauldian lens of governmentality – specifically the range of techniques, both internal and external, used by various authorities to mediate power.

Governmentality is a powerful apparatus for the analysis of global education practice because it points, like education itself, to a process of progressive discursive formation permeating not only individual but social bodies, and operating through technologies of individualisation or “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988a). By interrogating the subjectification and objectification of individual actors, situated in their organisational and national contexts, I hope to develop a better understanding of the complex
dynamics of educational globalisation as a heterogeneous and contingent whole.

The construct of neoliberalism, a key strand in globalisation, will be examined as a strategic game whose rules spell out the need for privatisation, deregulation and a reduction in the scope of national governments, all as a means to the end of enhancing competitiveness. In the field of education, neoliberalism tends to reshape or reconstruct subjectivities towards 'self-entrepreneurship'; with education seen as a kind of market place where individuals strive to improve their market value, and countries, both developed and developing, strive to grow their human capital; a reshaping that can be found in every corner of education from formal schooling to workplace training and other kinds of life-long learning.

My research will play particular attention to the role of the supranational agencies OECD and UNESCO in education for development as such organisations have begun to assume some of the hegemonic functions traditionally associated with nation states. These agencies provide models of 'best practice' in education to member states and developing countries at large, functioning as global panopticons that impose an overarching, self-regulating rationality upon countries' education policies and practices. The OECD, for example, through its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), has positioned itself as a kind of global education surveillance HQ. The supranational organisations also help to channel or mediate funding from national government Official Development Assistance programmes and from multinational corporations (usually in some form of public-private partnership); and generally speaking this channelling and mediating serves to advance the neoliberal agenda.

Philanthropic educational activity is currently worth $548 million annually (UNESCO, 2013a:3), its commonly stated goal being to help narrow the gap between rich and poor, between developed and developing countries. Might these ambitions conceal unstated commercial goals? Much philanthropic funding is focused on widening access to good quality education through the deployment of information and communication technologies, which are
widely viewed as key drivers of development - as captured in the phrase ‘ICT for Development', and as frequently emphasised by policy documents of development agencies, intergovernmental organisations and supranational bodies alike. I would not argue with the assumption that educational quality and opportunity can be enhanced through technology. Nevertheless, I insist on the need to problematise these assumptions in order to identify any underlying relationships between the promotion of educational technology and the opening up of profitable global technology markets. These philanthropic programmes may well be motivated by good will and altruism, but there is likely also to be what Shamir (2008) calls a “market-embedded morality” at work.

Recent years have seen steadily increasing proportions of both FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and ODA (Official Development Assistance) being directed toward ICT for education. This trend is likely to intensify as we move to the Millennium Development Goals target date of 2015. The mobility of technology is seen as a fast-track conduit to educational development. Here I want to scrutinize the motivation of both donors and beneficiaries of these transfers, and attempt to identify the technology-related discourses which have penetrated into both developed and developing countries. Educational ICT clearly does have huge developmental potential, and I intend to show how educational ICTs can function not only as globalising infrastructure development drivers, but also as tools for new, democratic and localised educational practices. Here I employ ICT as an exemplar that is “as much about ideology as it is about innovation” (Selwyn, 2012:ix).

Foucault’s persistent question “What are we today?” (Foucault, 1988b:145) prompts historical analysis of the relationships between our thoughts and our practices. This thesis naturally reflects my own self, constructed as I have

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5 For example, there are campaigns to urge more financial donations to education. See the article “Double aid in a year to defuse ‘time bomb’” by Stewart, W.(2014b) Another example is UN’s ‘Global Education First Initiative’ http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/about.html and ‘Education for All’ campaign by UNESCO http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002192/219221e.pdf
been through my experience as an educational media practitioner across several countries. It also reflects a conviction that philosophical inquiry can have material effects through enhancing the “thinkability” of the typically unthought - in this case, the relations of power that shape current discourse in global education (Barry et al., 1996:2). As Foucault insists, thought is the ground for action, and is therefore linked to becoming an ethical subject. My purpose is not to claim to know ‘the truth’, but to open up a space for intellectual criticism, and perhaps also for alerting people to the dangers of the now almost hegemonic neoliberal approach to global education policy and practice.

The final discursive construct that I focus on is the elusive notion of ‘world class’ education, which I read as a form of education commodification based on traditional, developed-world models of high-status, high-cost schooling. Like other commodities, a world class education is readily measured in terms of status, cost, exchangeability and other market indicators; and these discourses are then materialised, internalised and intensified by individual subjects – teachers, students and parents - frequently giving rise to a kind of education fever which drives its victims to sacrifice everything to equip themselves or their children with the skills necessary to survive in a global competition.

My research includes a case study of Colombia as a site riven by the complexities of discursive interplay. Education here is seen as a key driver of development and prosperity for all, but at the same time is massively privatised and unequal. Colombia stands on the border between developing and developed nations, and I will examine how the Colombian government rationalises its policies and accommodates the market morality of neoliberalism. Colombia currently has four distinct large-scale ICT projects underway, funded either by donor-country ODA or multinational corporate philanthropic finance: Samsung Smart School, Escuela+, ICT Education Capacity Building in Colombia, and Sistema Nacional de Television Educativa (National Educational TV system). I will ask what mechanisms might be sought to produce and sustain effective governance and how the
delivery of education technology and infrastructure can support this. It will also be necessary to assess how much these initiatives benefit the people of Colombia as opposed to the commercial suppliers of this education media infrastructure and content.

Through this research I hope not only to analyse some of the educational and social effects of global policymakers’ decisions and discourses, but also open up for discussion how more accountable, locally-appropriate and post-colonial education development models can be supported through Official Development Assistance and public private partnership projects. I consider how educators, researchers, policy-makers and other practitioners could build a collective ability to harness the power of education to build both human lives, and social and economic resources.

1.2 My reflexive research position constructed in and through experience in society

I start this writing as “a subject that constitutes itself within history and is constantly established and re-established by history” (Foucault, 2002:3). This research process has been a challenge to myself as a researcher with a background of over 20 years of educational media production in Korea. This thesis, therefore, might be seen as a reflexive interpretation built through the perspectives of my own international field experience. I include some descriptions of my encounters and stories along with my interview data as it is a part of my lived experience in the real world. It reflects on the ongoing process of my own subjectification.

It is important in this subjective but systematic writing, to clarify who is talking/writing, based on my trajectory of experience. In specific terms, what is my experience that constitutes my research position at present. When we explain the process of self-making, we need to describe the multiplicities of “self”. Positioning is:
The discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines. There can be interactive positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there can be reflexive positioning in which one positions oneself (Davies, 2000:91).

As I position myself in this context as a researcher on the governmentality of educational globalisation, I have successively adopted a variety of subjective positions; looking back at my past experience as a knowledge economy advocate and becoming sceptical about the processes that drive global development. Following Davies:

The constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as one's own, a person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned. At least a possibility of notional choice is inevitably involved because there are many and contradictory discursive practices that each person could engage in (Davies, 2000:89).

Inevitably, such subject positions reflect the way in which I variously see the world and interpret specific phenomena. As an international project practitioner, I have overseen projects motivated by neoliberal aspirations, not so different from those of other international colleagues. I now find myself challenging these earlier assumptions and seek to write a critical thesis built through my subjective experience and knowledge with view to addressing academic debates, but also to include field practitioners and even non academics who are interested in the international development and education issues.

Before proceeding, I think it is important to explain, at least try to clarify, my own social cultural background with a fable from Aesop, which was quoted in the article of Rhee on subjectivity (Rhee, 2013). I feel an affinity to the
subjectivity she described as a person who stands in a boundary location or more probably in a double bind that resists a sense of belonging towards building a sense of becoming. I find myself in a similar position as I struggle to identify my position, structured as it has been through the demands and customs of ‘Others’, within the Korean professional life that I have followed.

* Aesop tells a fable of *The Bat, the Birds and the Beast*:

A great conflict was about to come off between the Birds and the Beasts. When the two armies were collected together the Bat hesitated which to join. The Birds that passed his perch said: “Come with us”; but he said: “I am a Beast.” Later on, some Beasts who were passing underneath him looked up and said: “Come with us”; but he said: “I am a Bird.” Luckily at the last moment peace was made, and no battle took place, so the Bat came to the Birds and wished to join in the rejoicings, but they all turned against him and he had to fly away. He then went to the Beasts, but soon had to beat a retreat, or else they would have torn him to pieces. “Ah,” said the Bat, “I see now, He that is neither one thing nor the other has no friends (Aesop, no date).

When I was a child in Korea, this character ‘bat’ was considered as a symbol of a traitor or disloyalty, a shameful creature not belonging to one side or the other. With this narrative I was told to draw a line between ‘We’ and ‘Others’, like ‘Red/Blue’, ‘Right/Left’. I was taught that if you are unsure of who or what you are, it is a sign of showing the lack of fidelity or loyalty.

This divisive practice has been naturalised through the passage of Korean history, spanning through the Japanese colonial period from 1910 to 1945, World War II and the Korean War, through to 1953. The Korean War left the country divided into two, South and North by the 38th parallel line.\(^6\) This process has caused my country much upheaval and Koreans had to fight with each other. The scar of the war was made worse by the split between American and Sino-Soviet affiliations. This constant instability caused a conflict of loyalties with challenges to a unified sense of oneself. “When a

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\(^6\) This historical war is well explained in international power games in the writing of Joseph Nye (2000:118-119).
fable reaches this level of collective/cultural narrative, it becomes a tradition, does it not?” (Rhee, 2013:554). Rhee points out that this fable of the demand for exclusive loyalty has powerful cultural resonance for Korea.

As a child I was told that I should not be a bat at all. What does this mean to me now? I am a media professional, an unmarried woman who has lived for periods in other countries for work and study, and travelled widely. I have had an opportunity to experience that ‘dividing between We/Others’. It is not simple at all and much more complicated than Korea’s division by the 38th parallel.

Instead of following the traditional path of Korean women as a homemaker, I pursued my career, a sign of difference. I work a lot in the international field, which is not so common for women in my generation: another sign of difference. But it is not in the past. It is still in my head. I am at the border, not knowing where I am, or rather, constantly shifting from here to there, adopting different identities depending on where I am. Butler (2004:15) says “I am other to myself precisely at the place where I expect to be myself”. It echoes my own struggle to assert a more consistent subjectivity, albeit situated in a certain time and a certain space, and is shifting through my participation in a multitude of discursive practice. If I refuse to stand with one group at all times, does it make me a traitor, or nihilist? I find myself in the position of the bat. Discussing the spoken/unspoken demand for unquestioning loyalty expressed in the fable of the bat, Rhee describes this multiple, complicated, and undefined position as “Bat Subjectivity”.

These various versions of borderland subjectivity are representations of bat subjectivity. This fable, with its multiple readings, doubled origins, and shifting boundaries, can re-present the tale of the bat anew, within different contexts and traditions. I choose to focus on the promiscuous potential of the bat, of wanting it both ways, rather than reading this fable as a lesson in loyalty, exclusion, and shame; You are/act like a bat (Rhee, 2013:554).
In the same sense, I may say that Foucault also has a bat subjectivity without naming himself in this way:

I don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? What is true for writing and true for a love relationship is true also for life. The game is worthwhile insofar as we don’t know what will be the end. My field is the history of thought. Man is a thinking being (Foucault in the interview with Rux Martin, 1988:9).

I resonate with the bat subjectivity inside me despite my long-term struggle toward a more unified rationality. My personal struggle, I feel, is deeply intertwined with Korea’s developmental history.

Stories of economic success in Asia persistently reference the case of Korea (Woo and Suh, 2007; also see Tang, 2007). A devasted Korea in 1953 had to start from nothing but the scars from colonialism under the Japanese and the ruins of the war. It was not just about material nothingness but also mental rigidity and fear for survival. I myself experienced aspects of the development process in Korea as a child but my parents had lived through this hardship in body and mind. The combination of this harsh experience of industrialisation and Confucian tradition brought solidarity to Koreans. Through the wider Asian economic crisis in 1997, for example, Koreans lined up voluntarily to donate gold to save Korea from the debt, which amounted about US $2,170millions (Huh, 2013). This campaign was broadcast live for days portraying the participation of people of all different ages and genders, as an expression of patriotism or loyalty brought about through the fear of once again losing sovereignty. This unusual campaign expressed a cultural homogeneity reflecting loyalty to the country.

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7 In *Polemics, Politics, and Problematisations*, Foucault (1984a:381-384) says that “it is true that I don’t like to get involved in polemics…I prefer not to identify myself”. I argue this is to make a space for possible discussion as a border subjectivity instead of bipolarising and confrontation.
Prior to modern industrial development, Korea had been a monoethnic culture, symbolised by white clothing worn by all ordinary people, as a symbol of cultural ‘purity’. This ‘whiteness’ made Koreans feel that they did not want to be different from others, rather to be obedient and docile people. I was of a generation in which Korean women and their families considered ‘marrying well when young and being a homemaker’ was the best ‘blessing’ for women. Korea’s rapid development has brought profound changes to these traditional values, but such attitudes are deep rooted in the culture and persist in the collective mind.

Nevertheless, being a part of globalisation and making economic progress through international cooperation⁸, Koreans of my generation lived through a transition from a traditional and collectivist to a much more individualist social culture – from an authoritarian society in which individuals expected to sacrifice themselves for the common good, to one in which people did not expect society to look after them. Rather, they had to struggle and take responsibility for their own welfare. The Western conception of social welfare is fairly new, despite collectivism being deeply rooted in Korean society. In the last decade, Korea has become a place where collectivism and neoliberal competition collide yet also coexist. Such a fast development and its counter-effects in Korean society have been characterised as “compressed modernity” (Chang, 1999). And its compressed development history rooted in conjunction and disjunction with anti-Japanism, anti-communism, and pro-Americanism, seems to provoke peculiar anxieties about neo-imperialism (Cho, 2000:59).

There have been many dimensions to Korean development over the last 60 years. In this research I will focus on the role of technology and education in this process, which the government and private enterprises have privileged as a model of the knowledge economy for Korean development through ODA

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⁸ Stiglitz emphasised the positive side of globalisation leading to export-led growth in East Asian countries. “It was their ability to take advantage of globalisation, without being taken advantage of by globalisation, that accounts of much of their success” (Stiglitz, 2007:30). Last one decade, Korea, facing intense global competition, this export-led development, being aggressive, has moved toward combination of being attractive to foreign direct investment.
and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. As a middle aged Korean woman, who has lived through this political, social and economic change I have benefited from one of the richest and most technically developed economies in the world. In 1960 Korea was still one of the world’s poorest countries, and its rapid economic reconstruction since the 1970s was based in the main on a programme of intensive investment in education. There is a universal belief among Korean parents that their duty is to provide their children with a good education, and education has played a key role in driving social mobility in modern Korean society. My parents were not exceptional; they told their children to “take good care of yourself with a good education”. This belief is still embedded in Korean culture and even creates social problems as a result of the pressures of seeking extra schooling or privately paid additional study to enable their children to compete with other students. Furthermore, Korea now has one of the highest rates for higher education in the world, up to 80% since 2000 (Choi, 2011). High investment in education has become a firm foundation of the knowledge economy in Korea, where natural resources are rarely found.

Korea’s transformation in international discourse can be exemplified by one of the Saudi Arabian officers I met at a Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) workshop in 2012 in Riyadh. After the workshop he said that “you Koreans were here in the 70s to build streets and buildings working hard day and night. But now you are here as a knowledge economy ambassadors. How could it happen so quickly?”

This intensive public education investment, together with Koreans’ self-discipline and willingness to invest their own money in education has created not only high standings in international student assessments such as PISA and TIMMS, but also an epidemic of financial and psychological education fever (Kim and Rhee, 2007). In the case of Korea, education and industrialisation have been mutually supporting pillars. Education made a ground for technological learning and “industrialisation enhanced the rate of

KSP is a governmental project to share the Korea’s experience in achieving rapid economic growth with partnering countries launched in 2004 by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea. See the detailed information on the website: http://www.ksp.go.kr/
return on investment in education, further promoting demand for education” (Aubert and Suh, 2007:168).

ICT became a big turning point in Korean economic development. Korean recovery from economic crisis was partly through intensive and quick adaptation of ICT by Korean industries and the creation of highly competitive ICT production (Hong et al., 2007). In January 2000, the Korean government announced a three year plan to transform the country into an advanced, knowledge-based economy. As the World Bank reported,

The Korean economy strategy…consists of 83 associated action plans in the five main areas of information infrastructure, human resource development, development of knowledge-based industry, science and technology, and elimination of the digital divide. The plan was led by five working groups that involved 19 ministries and 17 research institutes (World Bank, 2007).

Continuous ICT training played an important part in the dissemination of ICT in Korea, and the transformation took place according to plan. On the basis of such success and the country’s ICT expertise, Korea unsurprisingly became an important role model for other countries.

I have tried briefly to illustrate the Korean development experience and the country’s path to becoming a knowledge economy ambassador, in order to help explain the origins of Korea’s approach to official development assistance. This might help us to understand the trajectory of Korean ODA in other countries; its approach, attitude and limits.

I have been working at the Educational Broadcasting System (EBS)\(^\text{10}\) in Korea for 24 years as a producer and director of educational content. I have

\(^{10}\) EBS laid its foundation in 1973, as a part of ODA at that time, broadcasting educational programmes to schools, progressing ever since to expand equal educational opportunities to minimise the regional differences in educational backgrounds (see EBS, 2011a). As a public channel focusing on supporting school education as well as lifelong education, regardless of socioeconomic status, EBS has technically evolved to provide the educational content not only by broadcasting but also through online including digital curriculum and textbook development.
also served as chairperson of the Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) Children’s programme working party since 2002, which has provided me with opportunities to work with many international colleagues not only from Asia but also other parts of the world. Until I started this research in 2012, I had been working on international educational media projects, and as a result become increasingly interested in understanding the rationale and politics of educational media policy mobility.

It was a blunt question - “What do you want to sell?” - from one of the government officers whom I met at a Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) workshop in 2011, that made me consider the economic aspects seriously. To that question I simply answered “nothing except perhaps cultural acknowledgment”. Yes indeed, I had been satisfied to have an opportunity to share a different experience which was distinct from Western models. Facing incongruity between the ideal reciprocal world I dreamed of and the reality of market competition, I started to wonder what is going on in the world. I wanted to understand it on the practical level, that of the people in the field who actually carry out the work, as well as that of the decision makers who construct the policies.

Therefore, this research is partly a continuation of my own professional international experience. In a sense it will reveal how my own subject position has been mediated as an international project manager, as reflected in the interviews with professionals who are doing similar work in terms of global education mobility in different locations. My thesis will conclude by shedding new light on both educational development assistance and knowledge mobility programmes as aspects of economic and educational globalisation.

**1.3 The importance of problematisation**

My central theme relates to global education governance rooted in economic development and in particular, the use of ICT in education. ICT as a tool in
schools and higher education or life-long education or training has evolved rapidly with the expansion of ICT in our daily lives. No doubt ICT can have a positive impact and potential, and this can be particularly beneficial when used in education effectively. Yet, the implementation of ICT in education is like a new battlefield, especially in developing countries, from the infrastructure provision to content management. Each stage of policy implementation, from setting up infrastructure to the actual use by students and teachers challenges our assumptions as to how education works. Thus, I problematise this evolution with respect to what has become known as neoliberalism, which I take to be a rationalised and normalised form of governmentality in contemporary societies.

The study thus attempts to investigate a regime of practice, a discursive formation; a field where who is saying what, the rules and rationality imposed and given, and common senses meet and interconnect. Therefore, as a way to examine a part of this complicated global education agenda, I intend to scrutinise how ICT transforms education practices in general and how ICT becomes a key factor of quality education discourse.

At the beginning of the research, I had to challenge myself. It needed “a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different ways” (Foucault, 1988c:328). I have thought, while I was involved in the international development project, this was beneficial for the recipients and had not really considered possible negative consequences. It was also a part of my profession which I highly enjoyed and many of my research interviewees I planned to include were, as far as I have experienced, a group of hard working people with professional passion. It created a dilemma/difficulty for me in relation to how to process this project. Yet such a struggle is a first step to develop a different way of thinking.

Equally, taking a border subjectivity which does not take one side or another but seeks to find space for creating conversations and observations through which a new dialogue can be conceived has been important (Holquist, 2002). I hope to constitute an ‘I’ which is not passively influenced by other
speakers/enunciators (individuals, organisations or states) but which can take the initiative in unpacking the discourses which we normally accept as ‘truth’ or common sense. In this way I aspire to play what Holland et al. (1998) call “a serious game”, constructing a strategic knowledge which makes visible the power relations embedded in neoliberal discourses, and declines to be oppressed by them.

My main analytical point, therefore, is
to attack not so much such and such an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a technique, a form of power. This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him (Foucault, 1982a:212).

This research is about how a certain current of power/knowledge is formed, and about the techniques involved in this process – a form of governmentality. This method of problematisation naturally leads to a critique of the present governmentality of individual subjects who are working on global education discourse and organisations; how they are subjectified and objectify themselves in the course of their profession.

My role here as an academic researcher, in a field where uneven complicated international as well as national power relations are entangled, has been sometimes contradictory. The research, therefore, became a reflexive self-criticising process, but this does not mean that “I say it was all bad”. Rather:
a critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest … to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such (Foucault, 1988e:154-155).
Some people might ask why you cause trouble, when we need to move forward. “Your sceptical attitude won’t help further development. How can you avoid global competition?” I constantly thought about this possible criticism of myself as a practitioner, whenever I read the interview data.

But back to our ontological wondering about becoming an ethical subject, I constantly ask myself how my research can contribute to the production of different development practices starting from becoming an ethical subject “being with and being toward the other” (Venn, 2000:11).

I, am therefore, determined to see it differently from my previous perspective as an international project practitioner and hopefully this can be shared with other international knowledge workers, and provide an opportunity to think about a futuristic 'just society' both for myself and for the people who work in education globalisation now and those who may do so in the near future.

Through this research I do not intend to state regarding education globalisation practice that using ODA, CSR, or PPP is all bad. In fact, almost every interviewee mentioned the productive impact for expanding educational opportunity and access. I argue that problematizing is a philosophical wondering and questioning of what is going on in education globalisation, and at the same time, is a way to think about whether it can be otherwise when we see it differently. I argue without problematisation, we will remain in status quo, if not worse, so problematising the situation of global education and impact can be the first step to (re)constructing a society towards a just, sustainable and livable entity. It will, therefore, hopefully open a space for awareness of what we have not realized in the global education field – to pursue education based on equality and equity\textsuperscript{11} - through my subjective lenses with historical reflexivity. Thinking is action and

\textsuperscript{11} Here I need to distinguish between definitions of equality and equity. Equality refers to a distribution of resources such as wealth or power, and to how far it departs from an equal distribution; as such equality can be considered a matter of fact, and so objective. Equity on the other hand refers to the justice or fairness of the way resources are distributed, which is a matter not of fact but of ethical judgement, and so much more subjective (Bronfenbrenner, 1973). When applying these terms to the distribution of wealth and power between countries - and considering appropriate development or education strategies - it may be argued there could be some 'equitable inequalities', taking into account each country's different geographical and historical starting points and different needs and strengths (Warrington, 2012:100).
this individual action can create a community with like-minded people and map a new trajectory of development in solidarity.

The following content schema shows the structure of my thesis.

Chapter 2 – Theory and methodology
I draw on Foucault's notions of power/knowledge, subjectivity, regimes of truth and strategic games, using these theoretical tools to examine global educational discursivity and guide my discourse analysis. I then outline my research design and methods and describe in detail my approach to in-depth interview and analysis.

Chapter 3 – Modernity, development and neoliberalism
I review some key terms of neoliberal discourse such as modernity, development and globalisation; the changing discourse of knowledge economy, human capital, and market-compatible skills; and the twin neoliberal models of development and education. A literature review helps to show how these ideas have helped to drive global economic and development policies since the end of World War 2.

Chapter 4 – Discourses of ODA and education
I trace the role of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and other supranational organisations in framing global discourses of education, and steering international development policies and practices in relation to education. I focus on discourse of ODA, and PISA as a technology of examination and rationalisation of its global education policies. I note the tendency of educational discourse to increasingly converge with discourses of educational technology.

Chapter 5 - Public-private partnerships
I examine the role of partnerships between public and private sector organisations in driving global education practice; consider issues raised by the involvement of commercial organisations in the provision of educational ICT infrastructure; and look at the role of UNESCO as a global mediator in partnerships to deliver educational ICT projects.
Chapter 6 - Culture, markets and the old imperium
I problematise the neo-imperial apparatus in which the perceived cultural advantages of the West can be exploited to gain advantage in global education markets. Digital education technologies require digital educational content, and so content providers; I examine the BBC’s strategy to position itself as a world leader in educational content. Finally, I note the impact of the notion of ‘world class’ education, its impact in Asian countries (particularly Malaysia), and the ‘education fever’ it gives rise to.

Chapter 7 – Colombian case studies
I review a number of current educational ICT development projects in Colombia, instantiating several different models of development funding: official development assistance, public-private partnership, and corporate philanthropy.

The case studies also exemplify the complex mixture of political ambition, social aspiration, market forces and cultural imperialism that all help to construct the discourse of education for development.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion.
Chapter 2 Theory and methodology

In the introduction I explained my intention to scrutinise and make visible governmentality in global education, my own academic research position and background as an international media practitioner, and my search for answers to the questions thrown up by my research. Like other researchers, I wanted to find the best possible methodology for my research, a methodology which can analyse without prejudice or bipolarisation.

There is continuous debate in social science between the merits of quantitative versus qualitative research methods, but since the 1980s qualitative methods have become more and more significant (Kvale, 1992, 2009; Anastas, 1999; Denzin, 1989a; Denzin et al., 2006). While I understand the importance of evidence, measurement and statistics, this research uses the analysis of discursivity in order to scrutinise mechanisms of power and get close to the lived world, to understand the real world where humans coexist and are confronted by different ideologies. Thus a qualitative approach is appropriate for this task. Philosophically, my research is concerned with the investigation of subject formation in global education governance, with the ethics of this process, and with the impact of such discursivity and practice on people on the ground. I believe this approach requires me to be “my own toughest critic” (Somekh et al., 2011).

Discussing the human and social sciences, Foucault said that “knowledge and power-relations constitute one another by rendering the social world into a form that is both knowable and governable, each being dependent on the other” (Fox, 2003:80). Again, it seems to me that the qualitative approach is the best way to explore how my research respondents see the world that they work in, and to investigate the power/knowledge complexities woven into their discourses.

In my study of global education, although I include numerical data where relevant, the most important kind of evidence is the discursive texts produced by my interviewees, analysed through the method of intersubjectivity. As
Denzin (1989b:9) notes “societies, cultures, and expression of human experience can be read as social texts”. Denzin describes the kind of “intersubjective knowing” I intend to achieve:

Subjective knowing involves drawing on personal experience or the personal experience of others in an effort to form an understanding and interpretation of a particular phenomenon. Objective knowing assumes that one can stand outside an experience and understand it…*intersubjective knowing* rests on shared experiences and the knowledge gained from having participated in a common experience with another person (Denzin, 1989b:27-28 emphasis added).

As a researcher who tried to understand global discursive formation process mainly through interviewing policy makers, international consultants and government officials, I faced the challenge of finding and articulating my ethical stance toward the subjects of my research. Foucault offers a three-point moral foundation for academic researchers which for me is a meaningful framework:

(1) The refusal to accept as self-evident the things that are proposed to us; (2) the need to analyse and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and understanding—thus, the principle of curiosity; and (3) the principle of innovation: to seek out in our reflection those things that have never been thought or imagined (Foucault, 1988d:1).

These three positions - refusal, curiosity and innovation – make up the moral stance of my research, offering a vantage point for an ethical and practical analysis of the complexities of modern society.

### 2.1 Foucault and discourse analysis

I see Foucault as a critic of the humanistic discourse of progress, development or betterment that govern the modern power-knowledge relations and subjectivity that feature in this research. Many social science
researchers have used a Foucauldian approach to analysing social phenomena; for example, Andrew Barry, Nikolas Rose, Michael Peters, Mitchel Dean, Thomas Lemke, Mark Olssen and – most notably in education practice - Stephen Ball. Foucault himself modestly described his approach as an analytic tool rather than a grand theory; nevertheless I consider that his analysis, using the Foucauldian concepts of archaeology and genealogy to track the development over time of the mechanisms of power, has fundamentally changed the way we think about power, moving us away from more traditional ideas of power as wielded by political individuals and nation states.

Foucault emphasizes that:

The role of theory is... not to formulate a global analysis of the ideologically coded, but rather to analyse the specificity of the mechanisms of power and to build, little by little, 'strategic knowledge' (Foucault, 1988:xiv in the introduction by Kritzman).

In this thesis I have adopted the notion of strategic knowledge as a critical tool for examining how global education discourse is constituted and circulated, and in particular for scrutinising the complexities of power in current education policies, discussions and texts. Foucault does not bipolarise social phenomena, but rather uses observation and diagnosis as tools for awareness, and I intend to adopt the same observatory, diagnostic stance toward global educational governance and policy mobility, rather than a polemical or partisan one which hears and sees only one side of the various arguments.

But avoiding bipolarisation does not mean avoiding having a critical or interrogative attitude as a researcher. On the contrary, understanding the mechanisms of power relations necessarily means being ready at times as a researcher to resist or challenge them. Strategic knowledge aims to bring about a crack or disruption in the taken-for-granted rationalities which pervade not just global education discourse and governance, but every other aspect of our lives as well. By always emphasising the historicity of
knowledge, the process by which it came to be as it is – its *genealogy* - Foucault always implies a space for resistance, for making it other than it is.

Foucault sees power, knowledge and ethics as triple axes running through all discursivity (Foucault, 1978; 1982a; 1988; 1991a; Ball, 2013a) and I consider these interrelated axes to be powerful conceptual tools for examining the complexity of global education phenomena. They are intimately related because we cannot separate knowledge from power, or the exercise of power from ethics - the posing of questions about how we are governed, how we govern the self, and what we are today - and these intertwinnings are exercised not only in the social body but also in our individual bodies. In other words, they help to form our subjectivity.

I intend to use these conceptual tools to examine in some detail the ways in which the international transfer or ‘global mobility’ of education values, policies and practices is thought and spoken about by some key actors in the process. Not, I repeat, to provide prescriptions for what should be done differently, but simply to reveal the details and contingencies of education globalisation, to scrutinise the mechanisms of power at work, and to point out their effects.

In the next section, I will discuss further the Foucauldian terms *truth/knowledge, power, governmentality, subjectivity* and *ethics* in order to clarify our understanding of these concepts before deploying them in the analysis of global education discourse. I discuss them separately for clarification of each notion, although in practice they are interwoven and operate simultaneously and in conjunction with one another.

### 2.1.1 Truth / knowledge

For Foucault, it is problematic to think of truth as in any way ‘objective’. For him ‘truth’ does not mean “the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted”, but rather “the *ensemble of rules* according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault, 1980a:132 emphasis added). For Foucault the central
question is not whether a particular idea is true or false, but how the idea is produced, disseminated and accepted as truth in specific societies.

Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power... the truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true (Foucault, 1980a:131).

Foucault (1977:27), then, sees “knowledge as a dimension of power”.

There is no knowledge that does not presuppose power relations; or as Hoy explains:

knowledge is not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve power, but is already a function of human interests and power relations (Hoy, 1986:129).

Specific truths, then, are linked into specific systems of power which produce and sustain them. Foucault (1987:6-7) sees the process as a kind of serious game, “the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience, that is as something that can and must be thought”. The main focus here is history of “veridictions” (Foucault, 1998:460). Thus, the question is not What is true? but rather, How is the truth created? The truth, for Foucault, is to be understood not as something to be discovered but “as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution circulation and operation of statements”; the regime of truth (Foucault, 1980a:133).

My thesis will attempt to examine the regime of truth in the field of education globalisation, by asking: how do we come to accept a certain item of knowledge as ‘true’ and “reproduce ourselves as knowers” (Peters and Burbules, 2004:3)? Who or what is this knowledge for? And how do we come to accept a certain discourse of global education as true? My interviews with knowledge workers in global discourse formation are all attempts to

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12 At the early of his work of archaeology, he states that archaeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge (savoir)/science axis. Archaeology finds the point of balance of its analysis in savoir, that is always mediated by power relations (Foucault, 1970).
understand how these actors are constituted as subjects in this process of knowledge and truth formation.

If knowledge functions as a form of power, it is also the common currency both of education, the process by which we reproduce ourselves as a society; and of research – the process of collecting and analysing ‘evidence’ about the world, measuring it and making it visible through narratives, graphics, tables and charts. Such research knowledge is often deployed by governments, policy makers, think-tanks, NGOs and others to rationalise and confirm the exercise of power within the social body, functioning as what Foucault calls a “technology of government” or dispositive (Barry et al., 1996; Foucault, 1991a; Agamben, 2009).

2.1.2 Power

Foucault’s analytical starting point is power. He poses the questions, *What actually happens when power is exercised over others?* *By what means is it exercised? And what are the effects of power upon those it is exercised over?* (Foucault, 1982a:217). In my thesis how power relations functions in globalisation is essential, and Foucault’s perspective on power is very useful.

Foucault sees power as being intimately coupled with knowledge in a relationship which is reciprocal, correlative, superimposed and interwoven. There is no knowledge without power, and there is no political power without the possession of certain kinds of knowledge (see Foucault, 2002 edited by Faubion); “*the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power*” (Foucault, 2002:xv in the introduction by Gordon).

Unlike traditional understanding of ‘Power’ (capital P) centred on states, Foucault sees ‘power’ as distributed, which is “employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” (1980c:98).

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13 Giorgio Agamben (2009:8), instead, uses the term as *apparatus*; “a set of practices and mechanisms...that aims to face an urgent need and to obtain an effect that is more or less immediate”.
By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure subservience of the citizens of a given state...[nor as] a mode of subjugation...[but] as the multiplicity of force relations, ... as the support which these force relations find in one another,... [and]...as the strategies in which they take effect (Foucault, 1978:92-93 emphasis added).

He argues that even if the focal points of constitutional or juridical power could be removed, there would not be any end to relations or nodes of power or to tensions and conflicts around them. We need a less statist understanding of power dynamics; “We must conceive of power without the king” (Foucault, 1978:91).

Foucault (1978:88-94) sees power thus defined as not purely negative or repressive, but as highly productive. “Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977:194). He describes the way everyday social phenomena are generated by the ‘micro-mundane’ force fields of power and discipline that distribute themselves through every aspect of our social and individual lives like capillaries in our physical bodies (Foucault, 1977;1978).

In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking...of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives ... A synaptic regime of power... [exercised] within the social body, rather than from above it (Foucault, 1980b:39).

To help explain how this mundane everyday power is exercised through both the social body and our individual bodies, Foucault (2004:249) poses the notion of biopower, a direct form of power which saturates entire populations, “a form of power centred not upon the body, but upon life”. As Nealon (2008:46) taking Foucauldian approach sees biopower as “a very efficient mode of power that infuses each individual at a nearly ubiquitous number of actual and virtual sites” in modern societies.

Foucault’s writings return again and again to the mechanisms of power – for example, the related modes of interdiction and concealment (1978:73) – and
to the effects of power, which can operate at the level of desire, pleasure, and knowledge or discourse (Foucault, 1980d:59). It is an especially important notion in discourse analysis. We need to pay attention to these mechanisms and effects if we are to understand how power works upon us, and I intend to scrutinise my textual and interview data for these mechanisms and effects to help explain how neoliberal narratives of education globalisation are transferred across time and space, and accepted alike by think tanks, transnational organisations and policy makers. For example, a mode of interdiction such as ‘world class education’ which is presented as an irrefutable fact without clarification, or ‘excellence’ which is used to talk about quality and standards, will be re-examined in the social context. Through critical discourse analysis, I will unpick “the way they manufacture hierarchical tables of values that often arbitrary privilege one set over others” (Peters and Burbules, 2004:5).

“Power is everywhere…[and] contributes to complex strategical situations in a particular society” (Foucault, 1978:93), so “such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchize” (1978:144). I find this notion of power empowering, since it implies we can find our own responsibility and freedom if we are willing to exercise power on our own behalf. Power produces resistance to itself, and this complex contraflow of power relations is captured in Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which refers to the constitution of governable subjects and the techniques or technologies employed for constituting them. It follows from the polymorphous, contingent and organic nature of Foucauldian power that resistance to it should take the form, not so much of struggle against particular institutions or elite groups, but of struggle against these techniques or technologies of power (Foucault, 1991a). For Foucault, resistance is the most significant foundation for the practice of freedom.

I intend to show that Foucault’s understanding of the relationship between power and knowledge, and the conceptual tools he uses to express the complexities of that relationship, are powerful analytical tools for interrogating the discourse of international education mobility.
2.1.3 Governmentality

As we have seen Foucault’s analytics of power unpack the mechanisms of power, which are no longer seen as primarily juridical or political but as distributed through the social body and individual subjects. And the most powerful of all his conceptions for explaining the mechanisms of productive power is that of governmentality.

The notion of governmentality serves to shift the focus of power analytics away from the government of princes or politicians, to the governance of the population at large, which he calls “governmentalisation of the state” (1991a:103). Governmentality refers both to the technologies whereby people are governed – the art of government and the apparatus of rule; and to the technologies whereby people consent to being governed – the “technology of the self” by which people construct themselves as governed (Foucault, 1988a:18).

Governmentality can be seen as a projection of the power dynamics of the (patriarchal) family onto the management of state affairs. Foucault uses the word economy in its original sense of “household management” to signal this infusion of personal/pastoral power relationships into all aspects of social life and political practice:

The art of government... is concerned with ...how to introduce economy - that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family... [and] how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state (Foucault, 1991a:92).

It follows from this genealogy that Foucault should focus on discipline as the source and matrix of other types of power. Discipline is seen as “a specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise”, and that even when it is used for controlling people en masse, does so in a way which subjects each individual in turn to the same normalising procedures (Foucault, 1977).

Foucault (1977:215) sees discipline as a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, “comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques and procedures”, and
uses the analogy of the prison to suggest how disciplinary techniques operate in the social body through hierarchical observation, normalising judgements and various forms of examination. Foucault(1977:173) adopts the term “panoptism” to describe the whole ensemble of disciplinary mechanisms and procedures brought into play to enable the subjects of power to be available to “a single gaze [which sees] everything constantly”. At the heart of the panoptic ensemble is the apparatus of examination, a technology which combines coercion and consent by synthesising techniques of hierarchical observation with those of normalising judgement. Examination, says Foucault (1977:184-185), “manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected”.

The technique of examination is applied not only in formal education but in many other settings – for example, management accountability and transparency procedures, many kinds of competency qualification, or the application process for almost any kind of aid, from state benefits to official development assistance. We are continuously examined either by others or by ourselves, and all of us become subject to the spotlight of examination in this “ceremony of objectification” (Foucault, 1977:185). The examination turns every individual into a “describable, analysable object under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge” (Foucault, 1977:190). It also gives rise to an apparatus of compulsory documentation under which everyone can be compared to each other and to a ‘normal’ distribution. Examination is a technique of control through normalisation. And it is through this process of discipline and normalisation, Foucault argues, that the modern individual is produced - in the image of the archetypal competitive entrepreneur.

Governmentality involves an interplay between the discipline of the whole population and the discipline of individual bodies. Foucault argues that from around the 17th Century, the business of government has centred increasingly around the deployment of technologies of disciplinary power, and that the art of government has increasingly become the art of projecting governance into the consciousness of the population, in order to shape and
influence the population through their own self – regulatory examination on their actions and behaviour. This is the essence of what he means by “governmentality” (1991a).

Power is seen as working simultaneously through totalisation, that is, the regulation of the entire social body; and through individualisation, or the techniques by which individual subjects assent to their own inclusion in the social body, essentially governing themselves (Peters and Burbules, 2004:65). Governmentality, then, invokes a regime not of institutions or ideologies, but of practices – practices which are accepted because they have their own self-evident logic and rationality. It is a regime “where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted, meet and interconnect” (Foucault, 1991b:75). It is a regime which merges and combines the technologies of domination over others, with the technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988a; 1991a).

Elements of examination, normalisation and panoptism will all figure prominently in my research data. For example: the way in which educators and students are normalised into the assumption that the universal goal of education is to produce globally competitive economic actors who will contribute optimally to economic growth; and the way that supranational organisations set benchmarks, standards and goals for education policy and practice, scrutinise the performance of national education systems, organise international tests and league tables, and influence the distribution of education development aid.

In analysing the increasingly globalised discourse of current education policy and practices - as manifested in some key policy documents and research interviews with some key speakers, I hope to use the insights of governmentality to identify some of the effects of neoliberal power in the field of education development. In particular I want to think about where some key assumptions made in the discourse of international education development have come from, and what their unintended contingencies might be; and to investigate some of the gaps and contradictions in a “regime of practices” (Foucault, 1991b:75).
2.1.4 Subject/ subjectivity

The subject and subjectivity are foundational concepts in Foucault, but are defined very differently from the humanist tradition in which the subject is seen as a fixed, coherent and consistent essence which defines a conscious, self-aware individual. Foucault sees subjectivity as socially constituted by interaction through discursivity, and as dynamic, multiple and constantly changing. The individual self is not a fixed essence, but is “constituted in relation to itself as a subject” through discursive processes (Foucault, 1984a:372 also see Foucault, 1976; 1980c; 1982a; Henriques et al.1998, Weedon, 1997). Foucauldian subjectivity is “precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (Weedon, 1997:32).

Human subjects, then, are necessarily situated in and dependent on complex relationships of knowledge and power, since these permeate all social practices and discourses. Individuals both govern and are governed; we are not only subjects, but are also subjected (Foucault, 1982a:208-209). Human beings are constituted or structured as subjects through the effects of power, simultaneously exercising and undergoing it.

They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application (Foucault, 1980c:98 emphasis added).

Somewhat confusingly, Foucault refers to the process by which humans are transformed into subjects through relations of power/knowledge, as objectification – a process which is seen as having several different operational modes. The first mode of objectification he calls “scientific classification” - that is, the process of objectifying the productive subject, through which they become the objects of economic, medical, or social science. This mode is clearly at work in the formulation of the purpose and goals of education to produce subjects of a particular kind, or shape populations in particular directions (Peters and Burbules, 2004).
The second mode of objectification is what Foucault calls “dividing practices” – that is, practices which marshal and divide subjects into different categories such as me and others, developed and developing countries, members and outsiders, local and ‘world class’ (see Foucault, 1977). In the field of international relations such dividing practices often function as a discursive technique which reflects and reinforces the apparatus of political and economic power.

The third mode of objectification Foucault (1982a:208) calls “subjectification” - that is, the way a human being turns themselves into a subject, the way a subject is brought into being. Subjectification takes place through a variety of operations carried out by ourselves on our own bodies, thoughts, emotions and conduct, and is therefore an active process of what Rabinow calls “self-formation”, even while being contingent on the network of power relations and the specific historical or cultural context in which the subject is situated (Rabinow, 1984:11). Subjectification describes, in other words, a particular relationship of the self to the self, situated in a constantly changing matrix of relationships to others (Foucault 1988a:18). And precisely because it is continuously active and productive, subjectification contains within itself the opportunity for reconstituting the subject in different ways, thus opening a space for the possibility of resistance to some of the constitutive dynamics - the possibility of becoming a different subject (Foucault, 2000:459).  

The interviewees in my research – policy makers, civil servants, consultants and other key personnel in setting or shifting the direction of policies – are, then, both subjects and at the same time objects in the process of education

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14 Foucault’s project can be seen as a “critical history of thought”:

The problem is to determine what the subject must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this and that type of knowledge[connaissance]. In short, it is a matter of determining its mode of “subjectification”.

It is linked to a matter of determining “its mode of objectification depending on the type of knowledge [savoir] that is involved” (Foucault, 1998:460). This objectification and subjectification are not independent of each other. From their mutual development and their interconnection, what could be called the “games of truth” comes into being.
globalisation. They are subjects because they are subjectified within a certain *regime of truth*, and they are also objects because they have been objectified themselves as professional actors-out of a specific developmental agenda.

They are also, of course, individual humans, citizens of particular countries, employees of various types of organisation, and each with their own life histories, families and ethical frameworks. In discussing subjectivity it is not possible to ignore the question of ethics.

### 2.1.5 Ethics

If Foucauldian subjectivity is the practice of self-constitution, Foucauldian ethics, sometimes referred to as “the aesthetics of the self”, are concerned with the constitution of a self-critical, reflective self - that is, with the individual’s constitution of him/herself as a moral subject of his/her own actions (Foucault, 1997a). Foucault’s “critical ontology of ourselves” or *ethos* constitutes both a certain kind of relationship with oneself – a “rapport a soi” – and a certain philosophical practice which incorporates both the practice of self-control and the practice of transcending what is imposed (Foucault, 1997a:263). Foucault (1997b:319) wrote that:

> The critical ontology of ourselves... must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

Distinct from, though related to, this notion of ethos, the terms ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ relate rather to the specific codes of behaviour which seek to embody the ethical subject and ethical practice in specific contexts – “a series of acts conforming to a rule, a law or a value” (Foucault, 1987:25-28). Foucault sees ethos as a specific *mode of subjectification*, a particular practice of self-formation, in which an individual constitutes him/herself as a subject which can be consciously worked upon, which recognises moral
obligations, and which has a telos or goal: that is, it aspires to being a certain kind of being (Foucault, 1997c).

Foucault describes this kind of subject as a *knowing subject* – a “sujet de connaissance” – and goes on to argue that the kind of thinking done by knowing subjects is the foundation of ethical practice.

[Thought] is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject…[and] as the very form of action… It can and must be analysed in every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as knowing subject conscious of himself and others (Foucault, 1997c:200-201).

For Foucault the kind of thought practiced by the knowing subject is both an exercise of freedom and a form of action, and this has significant implications for the responsibility of intellectuals; in my research I hope to be able to bring an awareness of this responsibility to my analysis of the texts of Official Development Assistance (ODA), or the words of education policy makers and consultants, or the actions of corporate educational philanthropists. In adopting this approach I hope to show the productive strategic power of neoliberal rationalities and try to open up the possibility of actions to accept or reject based on our ethics. As Mitchel Dean (2010:14) puts it:

the point of a critical ontology of ourselves and our present is to make us clear on these risks and dangers, these benefits and opportunities, so that we might take or decline to take action.

Foucault mentions that a valuable cultural ethos for a researcher to cultivate is the ethos of silence (Foucault, 1988f:4), and I often think about this while trying to use Foucault’s critical conceptual toolkit to unpack the complex assemblage of global education discourse. By ‘silence’ I mean, not a retreat into quietness or a holding back from challenge, but a willingness to sit calmly and observe what people say and do, and then to use the kind of thinking practiced by Foucault’s *knowing subject* to bring things into clearer focus, and consider how we might be able to take a step forward toward a
more just world. There are resonances here with that of the Korean Buddhist guru Bubjung (1976) who once said that the cultivation of emptiness is the best way to achieve fullness or completion.

Building upon Foucauldian ethics, my own starting point as a researcher into issues of government and governance, is the thought that we might be freer than we think (Peters and Burbules, 2004:67). In Foucault's account (itself developed from the Socratic axiom that the foundation of freedom is the mastery of oneself) the relationship “of the self to the self is a possible point of resistance to political power” (Peters, 2005:129). “Experience of the self is an attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available freedom” (Foucault, 1997a:276).

Foucault considered freedom to be an act of refusal – a refusal to follow the routine, to keep repeating the past or the present; and sometimes the act of refusal itself is enough to shed some light on alternative futures which we have not yet thought about, but which might be more equal and just than the present. In this vein, I will seek in this research to ask the question, What kind of educational development do we hope to achieve through official development programmes, transnational performance monitoring and policy making, and worldwide corporate philanthropy? Above all, to ask the question, What kind of beings do we aspire for ourselves and for others to be? (Dean, 1994:199; 1996).

2.1.6 Discourse analysis (or dynamics of discursivity)

Relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (Foucault, 1980c:93).

The final Foucauldian concept I will deploy here is that of discursivity or discourse practice. Discursivity refers to the set of discursive practices that form and characterise a particular thought paradigm or episteme, and in the
context of this research it will help to identify the mechanisms through which neoliberal subjects and institutions constitute and represent their particular “regime of truth”.

*Discourse* for Foucault is an articulation of power, an articulation which is sometimes visible but often invisible, sometimes conscious but more often unconscious - an articulation in which power is continuously exercised, sustained, challenged and won. The shifting nature of discursive power relations can make them difficult to detect, but the point of discourse analysis is precisely to unpack these shifting relationships and observe how discursive power operates upon social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief.

In his article *Orders of Discourse* Foucault (1971:7-8) imagines a conversational exchange between an institution and an apprehensive researcher, in which the researcher says how much she wishes her subject could simply be laid out before her, “calm and transparent, with others responding to my expectations, and truths emerging one by one”. The institution reassures the researcher, telling her, “you have nothing to fear from launching out. We are here to tell you that our discourse is part of the established order of things”.

I too was apprehensive when I first embarked upon discourse analysis, partly because of the extra difficulty I knew I would have as a non-native speaker of English, and partly because I feared I would not be able to see with any certainty what might be hidden beneath the surface of the polished official texts and interview answers. But encouraged by Foucault, I stepped forward into discourse analysis in order to try to make visible some of the invisible dynamics, to unpick the power relations at work in global education discourse, and perhaps to question the established institutional order of things.

My starting point was the idea that language is not merely a method of communication but also a mechanism of power, since it pertains to people collectively, is grounded in social practices, and therefore constitutes a social
institution (see critical discourse analysis by Van Dijk, 1996; Fairclough, 2001). Language in this social and institutional sense is what Gee (2005:97) calls “reflexive”, meaning that it simultaneously reflects reality and constructs it in a certain way.

At the heart of Foucault’s notion of discursivity is the proposition that discourse is productive - that despite appearances, speaking about a thing does not merely point to, but actually constitutes that thing. The productivity of discourse not only permits or makes things possible, but also constrains or interdicts, limiting or forbidding certain meanings even at the syntactic or semantic levels, for example by its use of logical propositions, interrogations, comparisons and verbal polarities such as true / false (Foucault, 1972:141). “Discourses…do not identify objects, they constitute objects, and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention” (Foucault, 1972:49). Thus, discourses

...systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to their language (langue), to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe (Foucault, 1972:49).

This ‘more’ essentially consists, says Foucault (2002:2-3), of the behind-the-scenes struggles and polemics - the strategic games of domination and evasion, action and reaction, question and answer - which act upon the subjects in the discourse and form or transform their subjectivity. The purpose of critical discourse analysis is to identify these strategic games. One of the clearest traces of power in discursivity is in the way that discourse re/produces inequalities of power and status (Jaeger and Florentine, 2012). According to Jaeger and Florentine, discourse can be understood as a contrivance for imposing political, social and linguistic practices on subjects, as it were “behind their back” (Jaeger and Florentine, 2012:4-17).

Specific discourses in specific settings have sets of rules and conventions, or orders of discourse, which effectively set and delimit discursive boundaries; and these orders of discourse, according to Fairclough (1992:33), serve the
interests of dominant social groups, because “orders of discourse embody ideological assumptions, and sustain and legitimise existing relations of power”. Discourses, then, embody not just meaning but power and social relationships, and constitute the subjectivity of discursive subjects. To the extent that they constrain not only what can be said and thought, but also who can speak, when, and with what authority, discourses serve to maintain and reproduce existing structures of knowledge and power; but these constraints are not absolute, so discourses can also at times challenge and disrupt these structures (Foucault, 1977; Taylor, 2004; Ball, 1990; Weedon, 1997; Parker, 2013).

The power diffused through discourse is a subtle power that permeates our institutions, our communities and societies, and ourselves. Members of particular groups in a society generally comply with a certain pre-existing code of belief and behaviour in order to fit in and be accepted, and in doing so they actively engage in a certain discourse or set of discourses. Such a “collective blindness’ is inscribed in the discourses that circulate within organisations, predisposing but in no way determining, what constitutes ‘appropriate’” (Clarke, 2001). For example the policymakers I interviewed at OECD displayed a remarkable uniformity of view when it came to their basic assumptions about global educational objectives; despite coming from different countries, backgrounds and professions they accepted certain claims and assumptions as being self-evident, almost scientifically valid, within the common organisational discourse. Such discursive assumptions have great power, in this case to shape educational policy and its implementation according to an accepted model of global best practice, generally coming from the West. Still I need to point out I also find a rupture in the process of interview showing different rules are applied in their own personal lives such as how to educate their own children. I consider this rupture reveals the limit of language and multiplicity of subject, which constantly shifts.

The purpose of critical discourse analysis in my research is to investigate such questions as: exactly what is being spoken about, exactly what is the
status or position of the speaker; what are the dynamics of power at play in these texts, and which institutional interests are served by what is said (Foucault, 1978:11 emphasis added). Adopting the method of discourse analysis means never taking an item of discourse at face value, without asking, for example: What gives this utterance legitimacy or authenticity? What kind of privileged position do professionals such as economists or social scientists occupy? To what extent can a person employed by a transnational agency such as the OECD, or an international consultancy like Pearson or McKinsey, speak their own mind as opposed to that of the institution they work for? What narrative is being reinforced or undermined? Who stands to lose or to gain?

In this way, I hope to use discourse analysis to help me interrogate the research data for some of the relationships between structures of power, language, social institutions, and subjectivity (Olssen et al., 2004). I take this interrogation as a kind of serious game - a questioning and problematising of the discursive norms to be found in global education policy documents and in interviews with numerous policy makers, think tanks and consultants in various organisations. I am interested in tracing the ways in which these discursive norms are produced, reproduced, circulated, preferred and in the end taken for granted. In studying these texts I hope to use Foucauldian discursivity as a conceptual tool for bringing to light the effects of this discourse, both on the social body and on individual subjects.

The questions I will pose in my discourse analysis include:

- How do neoliberal definitions of knowledge and skill become validated?
- How does neoliberal discourse in education practice arise, and how does it become global?
- How does this discourse function in constituting global subjects?
- What are the contingencies of power involved in the spread of global education policies?
If discourse is a process through which knowledge and subjects are constituted, it is also important to notice the space it offers for potential resistance to the dominant episteme. Discourses as Foucault describes them are not homogenous, but full of disruptions and discontinuities.

Discourses are not one and for all subservient to power or raised up against it…We must make allowance for the complex and unstable powers where discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault, 1978:101).

As power is everywhere, there is also everywhere the potential for resistance. The discontinuities of discourse may give rise to subjects who resist, while it at the same time constructing other subjects as compliant.

For example, the neoliberal imaginary that high quality education effectively equals efficient generation of skills for the global market has come to dominate in both developed and developing countries all over the world. At the same time, this discourse includes within it notions of education as a liberator of human potential and education as driver of social development, and these imaginaries provide grounds for resistance to the dominating discourse, which the postcolonial movement is using to challenge the global spread of ‘world class’, market-oriented education.

When I first began my research, I thought I was looking for models of good practice in educational development, a kind of universal ‘transparent truth’ which I could share with international colleagues and apply in my own practice. I soon realised that the models I was looking for were actually discursive constructs, materialisations of the imaginary modernisation, and structured by relations of power proceeding mainly from institutions of the Western or developed world. Such a realisation, such a turn or different way of thinking, brings with it a certain danger, which I will try to share in this thesis, as I use the conceptual tools of discourse analysis to make visible the
invisible relations of power which run through all discourse (Foucault, 1997a:277).

2.2 Research design and methodology

My fieldwork data consists of official documents from national and global educational and development agencies, and interview data collected from a large group of actors directly or indirectly involved in globalisation discourse. In conducting, analysing, and interpreting these interviews I have tried to be as fair and systematic as I can, wherever possible attempting to verify points through triangulation, and remaining conscious of my own subject position in relation to the interviewees and the themes we discussed. I am committed to providing what MacLure (2010:280) calls “warrant” – that is, evidence for any conclusions I draw from the data to help to understand how subjectivity and power/knowledge are interwoven into the discourse of education governance.

My purpose in analysing both policy texts and interviews with elite actors is partly to enable crosschecking between the two, in order to see how the official texts are represented in personal discourse, and to identify any ruptures between the texts and the interview data. Even though these policymakers are very used to talking about their work and projecting the official view, it’s unavoidable that sometimes their words reveal different thoughts, or hint at more personal dilemmas or ambitions.

Interviewees, their thoughts and actions, existed before I came across them, but their interview data only came into being when I encountered them and participated with them in the construction of this data, which then became a valuable resource for my research. The lens through which I see the interviewees is an analytical one, but it is through interaction that the discourse comes alive and fully present in my experience and in my research. To borrow the expression of Pierre Bourdieu (1999:614), it is “a
discourse which was already there, merely awaiting the conditions for its actualisation”.

I consider the fieldwork data in this research to be an assemblage of elements – interviews, policy documents, media products such as news articles and documentaries, and even anecdotes from personal experience – which are mediated through my gaze, come alive in my writing, and play an important part in my emerging subjectivity as a researcher. If the research process of collecting, presenting, ordering and interpreting data is indeed a process of assemblage, then the purpose of this particular assemblage is to cast a spotlight on, and in so doing to problematise, the ways that education policy and practice is being [re]constructed as a globalised and globalising neoliberal project.

### 2.2.1 Policy as discourse

This research focuses on the impact of globalisation on education considered as an aspect of public culture, and therefore primarily on public sector education; although the public sector is not nowadays (if it ever was) a purely state formation, but is affected by many pressures from supranational organisations, private corporations, and by global discourses of education policy-making which offer both abstract rationales and specific prescriptions for what education systems should be like (Ball, 2012a). It is therefore necessary to look more closely at the global education policy process, and the policy makers, consultants and think tanks who drive it, diagnosing and assessing education problems, rationalising solutions to them, and developing programmes to put them into effect. This process can be considered as creating “the conditions of possibility for certain forms of knowledge and their legitimation as truth-claims, [which] are ‘brought forth’ through power” (Usher and Edwards, 1994:87).

Policy is multi-dimensional, multi-layered, and occurs at multiple sites, and for this reason I use the term policy *mobility* rather than policy *transfer*, since the latter suggests a more simple, two-dimensional movement of policy from
one site to another than is really the case, even in policy mobility between
developed and developing countries (Ball, 2012a).

I will pay particular attention to the role of supranational organisations such
as the OECD, World Bank and UNESCO, which many researchers have
identified as playing a key strategic role in such policy mobility (see Olssen et
al., 2004; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; Dale, 2012; Meyer and Benavot, 2013;
Ball, 2013b). It would be hard to overestimate the role of the OECD in
particular in the production of policy, the dissemination of what is considered
to be ‘best practice’, and the formation of a discourse of international
educational competition. Stephen Ball (2013b:38) has described the OECD’s
work in this area as ‘supranational information management.’

Critical analysis of policy is important for the social scientist because policies
construct what Ball calls “objects of knowledge and subjects of intervention…
They create possibilities for who we are and might be, both in public policy
discourse and institutional practice” (Ball, 2013a:104 emphasis added; see
also Taylor, 2004; Fairclough, 1992; 2001, Braun et al., 2011; Parker, 2013).
Policies are usually embodied in policy texts, but we should not look only at
these products of the policy process:

Policy is both text and action, words and deeds, it is what is
enacted as well as what is intended…Policies are always
incomplete insofar as they relate to or map onto the ‘wild
profusion’ of local practice (Ball, 1994a:10).

It follows that we need to consider policies not only as texts, but also as the
processes involved in the production of policy documents, processes which
are continuously changing and unfinished (Ball, 2013b). Policies are framed
by broader discourses, and should in fact be seen as discursive products.
Moreover they are not simply produced, but travel into different contexts,
organisations, regions and countries, and continue to change as they do so.
They may even re-emerge as a different kind of formation, for example a
profit-seeking business model (Ball, 2007; 2012a).

Although policy is a guide for practice, its implementation in the real world
may be modified, improvised or distorted. According to Rizvi and Lingard
(2010:4) the purpose of policy is to describe a “label for a field of activity”, with policy seen as the *strategy* and implementation as the *tactic* for that activity (2010:53). Policies derive their normative potency from what David Easton called the “authoritative allocation of values”, a phrase which accurately describes the role of policies in global education discourse formation (Easton 1953, cited in Rizvi and Lingard, 2010:4). The key question here, to be kept in mind as we interrogate both policy texts and the utterances of policy makers, is *what kind of values are represented* in the policy development process, and in the ensuing global discourse?

Understanding policies in this way - as products of discourse, as rationalisations of a particular set of power relations in a particular social context, which constitute subjects in particular ways – allows us to see how policy formation can be used to change things for the better, as well as to keep things as they are (Foucault, 1971).

Influential policy texts I will consider include the OECD’s global education reports, the UNESCO policy, and policy texts of the Colombian Ministry of Education (see the appendix 1). The purpose of my analysis of these texts will be to search for clues about their characterisation of development assistance, their objectification of donor/recipient relationships, their internalisation of the discourses of globalisation and the ‘knowledge economy’, and their conceptualisation of the role of ICT and its role in helping to build educational capacity in recipient countries. Following the sociological method of policy analysis recommended by Stephen Ball (1994a; 2013a) and James Gee (2005:6-10), I will focus on the discursive rhetoric employed by the texts - that is to say the ways their language is deployed to make certain ideas seem obvious, up-to-date and taken-for-granted, while others are deprecated as out-dated or irrelevant, implicitly normalising one particular worldview over any alternatives.
2.2.2 Interviewing and ‘researching up’ as qualitative research method

Interviews in qualitative research bring out subjects’ own narratives about what they do, why they do it, and what they think about what they are doing. Interviewing is a discourse practice which like other such practices is structured by conventions and assumptions which speakers accept in order to be seen/heard as making sense. Interviews give us “the means for exploring the points of view of our research subjects, while granting these points of view the culturally honoured status of reality” (Miller and Glassner, 2010:133). In other words, what they have said are not just commentaries on the world; they themselves become objects in the socially-constructed world that we are engaged in researching. Interviews of course involve two people – the researcher as well as the subject – and so also draw attention to the position of the researcher in relation to their research, an important dynamic in the qualitative approach.

Researching up is the practice of interrogating elite actors who wield policy, prestige or managerial/governmental power in a given field of study (Puwar, 1997; Gewirtz and Ozga, 1994). In this study I use researching up in order to get as close as possible to the source of policy formation and practice in global education governance, and to better understand through the interview data how neo-liberal conceptual formations such as ‘education for a global marketplace’ or ‘world class education’ are mobilised and embedded worldwide.

The point of ‘researching up’, then, is to study power at the point where it is most fully and clearly articulated – what Foucault (1980c:97) calls “the point where its intention… is completely invested in its real and effective practices”. This does not mean that these powerful elites see the world in some sense as it really is, or that what they say does not need to be critically interrogated or deconstructed - for they too are subject to the dynamics of their subjectification and objectification in the policy making process. But it does mean that their discourse is able to bring most sharply into focus the
socially-constructed world of global educational policy, so opening it up to investigation by the researcher.

The elite individuals on whom I focus are the specialists, experts, advisors, consultants and policy makers who make up what Foucault calls the regime of conduct, which constitutes “a domain populated with the multiple projects, programmes and plans that attempt to make a difference to the way in which we live” (Dean, 1996:211). The role of these experts is to enact what Rose describes as enunciation, that is, the making possible a certain kind of knowledge by presiding over “the surfaces, networks and circuits around which [knowledge] flows”.

It is thus a matter of analysing what counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of different authorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical conditions for the production and circulation of truths (Rose, 1999:29).

The specialist knowledge of these enonciateurs confers upon them a special role in the articulation and translation of discourse, and governments come to rely on their elite expertise more and more for what Rose (1999:51) calls their “power to speak the truth and [their] capacity to act knowledgably”. The truth they speak is not to do with any ‘universal values’, but to do with the way the intellectual technologies that they wield render particular thoughts thinkable, so that a certain mode of thinking – for example about global education practices - becomes pervasive (Miller and Rose, 1990, also see Mitchell, 2005).

Thus the interviews with knowledge distributors, intellectuals and policy makers in this research are case studies in the struggle for ‘truth’ as experienced by the intellectuals who operate within the “regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. There is a battle ‘for truth’ or at least ‘around truth’ (Foucault, 1980a:132).

Moreover these experts in truth do not operate in isolation. In the “space of flows” of the network society, where as Castells (2010) says, “social practices... occur in a world of mobility and networked connections”, the
experts operate in and through their increasingly global formal and informal networks, rendering their discourse ever more ubiquitous and incontestable.

For example, the international think-tank consultants and policy makers who I met through my research all belong to overlapping professional networks, with experts from the OECD working closely with those in UN agencies like UNESCO, with research foundations, and with academics from higher education institutions such as Cambridge University or Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Academic papers and research reports are often influential in the policy-making process, while the policy experts from time to time get grants to conduct academic research which in turn may be recycled into the policy-making process. In this way certain discourses of global education policy and practice are mediated and reaffirmed as they flow through these global networks.

In my analysis of the interview data, my purpose is to identify and define the regimes of power/knowledge which sustain these discourses of truth. The central issue is

not to determine right or wrong, but to account for the fact that that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which people speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said (Foucault, 1978:11).

What is at issue is the over-all discursive fact, the way in which education is put into practice. Following Ball (1994b), I see these interviews as situated studies in policy formation, with a particular focus on the politics of policy text production.

1) Interview methodology and organisation

The fieldwork for this research consisted of interviews with 51 policy makers and media practitioners in national and multinational organisations, influential think tank researchers, and senior policy practitioners in the field of global education policy-making. Most were working in the public sector (39 out of 51
interviewees), with the remainder from private sector organisations working on public sector or philanthropic projects. Almost all interviews were conducted in interviewees’ places of work, spread across Paris, London, Manchester, Seoul, Bogota and Kuala Lumpur.

The feature common to all interviewees was their involvement in education globalisation discourse as agents at various levels. For example the policy makers and researchers at OECD and UNESCO work on the global/macro level of policy, influencing governments and practitioners across the member countries and worldwide; while the elite think-tank consultants provide research and advice to governments and supranational organisations alike, and are key figures in shaping discourses of education globalisation. At the national or meso level, interviews with government officers explore the dynamic between supranational organisations and nation states, and the role of national public and private sector organisations such as development institutes, universities, broadcasting channels and companies involved in commercial activities related to education globalisation. Finally I used the interviews with the individuals in various media or educational settings to try to understand how discourses of globalisation are embedded in their subjectivity.

In a globalising world, supranational organisations like the OECD and UNESCO have been highly influential in education globalisation discourse, so I was interested to see how people in such organisations take part in and give rise to particular modes of discourse, and how they help to define what Foucault (1970:68) calls the “domains of validity, normativity and actuality”. With their scientific knowledge presented through charismatic, authoritative and confident personae, these interviews occasionally felt less like conversations and more like lectures or press briefings (see appendix 3) - a mode of interaction with which I was not comfortable. I usually tried to interrupt this press briefing mode by posing abrupt questions such as “do you really think so? The market is the only solution?” Or “what about your own children?”

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In interviewing Korean officers, independent consultants and practitioners in the field of education globalisation, I wanted to examine their intentions and strategies in relation to not only education development but also to international aid more widely. An important strand of this research will be an interrogation of the new global imaginary of digital education technology: the extent to which it is fulfilling real educational needs in developing countries, and the extent to which it is simply a lever for opening up a new and highly profitable global market in educational ICT. (It will be explained further throughout the thesis.) Because of my particular interest in educational media and technology, I wanted to include professionals from a major public media organisation involved in both educational broadcasting and online education – hence my inclusion of 5 executives from the BBC and BBC Worldwide.

Then, as a case study in impacts on the ground, I looked at some educational development projects currently being implemented in Colombia, in two cases with Korean ODA involvement – the two countries having an interesting relationship historically, with Korea having leapfrogged Colombia in the development stakes over the last 30 years. Now characterized as an ‘upper middle income’ country and in the process of acceding to the OECD, Colombia is making efforts to develop further through education and to emulate the Korean development trajectory. I wanted to know how Colombian officials perceive the notions of educational ICT and of education globalisation in this particular geographical context. In social science, case studies are the preferred method when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed (Yin, 2003), when in depth enquiry is needed, and when “things may not be as they seem” (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011:53).

I wanted to include some Asian voices, especially given this region’s emerging role in the global economy, in the discourse of ‘world class’ education and as a huge new market for global education providers. So I included interviews with government officials or educational media professionals in Malaysia, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Thus, interviewees included 7 OECD policy makers who frequently work with think tanks and researchers, 2 UNESCO policy makers, 13 Colombian public officials, for example, the Minister of Education, desk officers and mid ranking civil servants, and teachers at schools, 14 Korean public officials (mid ranking civil servants) and private consultants, and 4 consultants from the UK, France and Norway. I also conducted interviews with a number of media professionals working on educational content: producers in the Pacific Asian region, an official of the Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union (in total 6 from East Asia), and senior staff from both the BBC and the BBC’s commercial arm, BBC Worldwide (in total 5 interviewees).

Interviews were set up either through my own professional network accumulated during a 15 year career in the international field, or with the help of my supervisors at MMU/ESRI in the case of UK academic contacts. Interviews with officials of the OECD and UNESCO (very central to my project, and the hardest to set up) were arranged with the help of a professional contact I had at the OECD Paris headquarters. One interview, with a think-tank consultant on international development, was organised after I saw a newspaper article he had written and contacted him directly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations / Nationality</th>
<th>No. of interviewees/position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD (4 different nationalities)</td>
<td>7 policy makers/ researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO (2 nationalities)</td>
<td>2 policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean (governmental officers &amp; agencies)</td>
<td>10 policy makers/ civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(private consultants)</td>
<td>4 think tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian (governmental officers)</td>
<td>Minister of MoE and 4 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(private consultants &amp; commercial agencies)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (consultants)</td>
<td>2 researcher/ think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BBC and BBC world wide)</td>
<td>5 executive producers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian broadcasters</td>
<td>5 Children’s media producers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian governmental officer</td>
<td>1 officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (France/Norway)</td>
<td>2 think tank/ consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 51 interviewees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Interviewees and organisations
Half of the Colombian interviewees were people I have met before my research began, through previous collaborations with the Colombian ministry of Education while working for the EBS; I was introduced to the rest by contacts on the ground.

Asian interviewees were mostly drawn from people I had met previously at the ABU children’s programme conference held every July in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Interviews were conducted in Paris, Korea, Colombia, Malaysia and the UK between March and September 2013. The vast majority of interviews were conducted one-to-one and face-to-face, though because of time pressure four interviews with Asian children’s media practitioners were conducted in a group session, and 2 more interviews, one with an OECD official and another one with a consultant in Colombia, were conducted online via Skype.

Before setting up the schedule for the interview, I sent a consent form with information letter to the interviewees (see the appendix 2). In case I could not send it to them beforehand as the interview was spontaneously introduced on site (additional interviewees), I explained the purpose of the interview and got a signature on the consent form before I started to interview them. A couple of times - for example when interviewing the Minister of Education in Colombia or my co-workers - I verbally explained and got permission for the use of research, considering that verbal consent was sufficient in these instances. In one case I sought permission after the interview, emailing the interviewee the part I intended to cite in my research.

Thus, I tried to conduct this social science research ethically and with informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, not to reveal the professional identities of interviewees. I truly appreciate the time and effort they all spared to spend time on the interviews. Their experiences and thoughts on global education practice were crucially important to this research.
2) The interview as constructed experience

Interview questions were designed to be semi-structured as I wanted to establish a rapport with interviewees, and to give them space to talk - but then to probe their views (Silverman, 2011:162; also see Fontana and Frey, 1994; Rapley, 2004; Schostak, 2005; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Miller and Glassner, 2010).

The interviews were digitally recorded and I made it clear that interview recordings would be kept confidential and not attributed to them by name. By doing so I hoped to make them drop their ‘professional mask’ and feel more comfortable in discussing the real situation as they experienced it. Even so, it was sometimes hard to tell whether the story interviewees were telling was their own, or the official organisational line.

During interviews I tried to remember the fact that the conversation we were having was not simply revealing, but continuously constructing a social reality for them and for me. Tim Rapley (2004:26) gives a perfect picture of the interview scene when he says, “we are never interacting in a historico-socio-cultural vacuum, we are always embedded in and selectively and artfully drawing on broader institutional and organisational contexts” (his italics). Researchers note that it is not usually possibly in the course of an interview to have direct access to facts or events - as Byrne (2004:182) says “get inside someone’s head” - and this should remind us that what an interview produces is a representation of an individual’s views rather than the opinions or views themselves. Language is not simply the channel, but “the matrix of thought” (Foucault cited in Faubion, 1998: xix), and discourse works not just at the conscious but more importantly at the unconscious level as well. Thus interview produces a particular representation or account of an interviewee’s opinion, and the response of interviewee can be treated “as displays of perspectives and moral forms which draw upon available cultural resources” (Silverman, 2011:199).

Thus, I consider that what I took from the interviews was not some abstract truth, but some interesting stories of interviewees. ‘Interesting’ was a word I
used often during the interviews as a way of not confronting interviewees, or revealing what I thought about their answers, but of demonstrating engagement with them and allowing the conversation to flow. Sometimes my slight hesitation or less active response to some interviewees by simply saying ‘interesting’ worked well, especially for those who needed to be convinced that I was persuaded with their logic or explanation.

Many researchers refer to the importance of creating a ‘rapport’ with interviewees (Miller and Glassner, 2010; Oakley, 1982; Ball, 1994b). For me, creating this rapport without feeling intimidated was a big challenge, especially when meeting high-ranking international policy makers or government officials. I tried hard to establish trust and familiarity with interviewees by showing genuine interest in their work, and constraining myself from impulsively ‘talking back’ or making judgements even though this was challenging (Miller and Glassner, 2010:138). The process is in a way one of “mutual self-disclosure”, which as Tim Rapley (2004:25) argues “takes work and does work” (his own italics).

Conducting interviews this way was a learning process for me, but eventually I came to enjoy these interviews as ways of making data come to life. Often interviewees were rather official and cautious to begin with, but then relaxed as I encouraged them to simply describe their work or talked about experiences we had in common. While engaging in a conversation, I was simultaneously reviewing and analysing everything that was being said, but my interviewees didn’t usually seem to notice or be inhibited by this. Sometimes this relaxing into the interview would take some time, but eventually bring forth revelations about interviewees’ internal struggling and doubts about their role. For example, at a 90-minute interview with a UK consultant, the initial rather stiff, official tone relaxed after about an hour and became much more conversational, with the interviewee eventually sharing some quite personal experiences.

Sometimes I politely challenged interviewees, not wishing either to be a passive listener or to overtly question their professionalism. As most of the interviewees were confident elite members, they usually did not take this as
any kind of transgression, but seemed stimulated by my challenges (see Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). One of my interviewees at OECD told me with a laugh, “You media people, you know how to push us into a corner!”

In formulating my questions I did my best to follow the Socratic technique as described by Bourdieu (1999:614-615), that is:

- to propose and not impose, to formulate suggestions... to offer multiple, open-ended continuations to the interviewee’s arguments, to their hesitations or searchings for appropriate expression.

I also tried to begin my questions with ‘how?’ rather than ‘why?’, believing with Howard Becker (1998:58-60) that ‘why’ questions feel like an interrogation or a challenge, prompting interviewees simply to justify their views or actions; whereas ‘how’ questions feel more like an appeal to specialist knowledge or experience, prompting fuller, more detailed and reflective responses.

I often asked interviewees similar or related questions in order to cross-check or triangulate their answers with other answers. I intentionally asked very ‘open’ questions intended to get interviewees to articulate the debates and controversies which might otherwise remain unarticulated - sometimes adopting the air of an innocent newcomer to the field in order to do this. It was more like a tense but quiet battle, what Stephen Ball (1994b:113) describes as “events of struggle... a complex interplay of dominance/resistance and chaos/freedom”.

For cultural reasons, the most challenging interview experiences for me were those carried out in Korea with high ranking male officials who often adopted a rather traditional patriarchal stance faced with a female researcher asking challenging questions designed to problematise their work. I was able to manage these encounters with a certain authority thanks to my 20-year career in a Korean public broadcaster. This gave me a comparative advantage, but also made me realise how difficult it must be for many researchers to interview elite subjects in unfamiliar cultural settings (see Puwar, 1997).
By contrast, interviews with younger female Korean officials, often fairly fresh in their positions as ODA managers, were relatively smooth and collegiate, with a certain cultural closeness and woman-to-woman rapport, as we took turns to talk about ODA problems and strategies. This experience too made me think about my position as a researcher, simultaneously both insider and outsider (Oakley, 1982).

By far the most formal interview I conducted was with the Colombian Minister of Education about Korean ODA-supported educational projects in Colombia. This was conducted with ministry officials present, and even though the atmosphere was very friendly - it was my third meeting with the Minister – a government minister is a socially and politically constructed persona, a rhetorician skilled in being gracious while maintaining control, and in giving the appearance of informality while repeating the official phrases written on the ministry website.

As a practical issue in interviewing I need to mention on a multi language interview: half of my interviewees were (like myself) non-native English speakers. Most interviews were conducted in English, although those with Koreans were conducted in Korean and then translated by me during transcription. Although it was not a practical problem to conduct interviews in English, it sometimes made colloquial exchange and the understanding of conversational nuance a little more difficult. Interviews with Colombians were conducted in a mixture of English and Spanish, with help from interpreters.

I am confident that these translations - Korean to English, Spanish to English, or English to English as a second language - do not affect the validity of the data, especially as my discourse analysis focuses on social and discursive, rather than linguistic, significance (see James Gee, 2005, for the distinction between language-in-use and non-linguistic aspects of discourse). In fact, these language barriers, although they can put difficulties in the way of understanding and certainly make the interviewer work harder, can actually have a beneficial effect on the interview process itself. Conducting the interview in a language which neither interviewer nor interviewee speak natively can help put both parties on a more equal level,
and small misunderstandings can make the interview more playful and the communication more consciously and explicitly mediated - for example via repetitions or rephrasings to confirm understanding.

3) Data collection methods and discourse analysis

All my 51 interviews were recorded on my iPad and transcribed by myself over a period of five months. To begin with I tried to record/transcribe every detail of the interviews, but it took too much time, so I changed my way of working: after listening to each recording for the first time, I wrote a brief note to describe the whole conversation and then marked up the parts I intended to transcribe. Altogether the raw data came to more than 65 hours of interview, and around 165 pages of transcription – which I read again and again in order to consider and reconsider its significance. In appendix 3 I include a sample excerpt of interview data as used for discourse analysis.

It is the researcher’s responsibility to verify the accuracy of the data she collects. To me, this means more than just keeping an accurate record in voice files and transcripts; it also includes taking steps to verify interview data through “triangulation” – that is, correlating what an interviewee says with what is observed or known from separate sources such as documents or other interviews, a practice whose importance in qualitative research cannot be overemphasised (MacLure, 2003; Brannen, 2004; Denzin, 2010; Schostak, 2005). In order to facilitate such triangulation I often put the same or similar questions (about relationships between development and education for example) to almost every interviewee. Afterwards I would compare the answers, try to correlate them to background factors such as national origin or organisation worked for, and check them against official documents on the same topics - for example the OECD’s “OECD work on Education, 2010-2011” (2010), “OECD work on education and skills 2013-2014 (2013a), “Skills Outlook 2013” (2013b), and the Colombian Ministry of Education website as well as its internal reports.
In this research I will set out the interview data together with contextualising policy documents, media materials, comparative interview data and my own analysis, in the search for triangulation. Hopefully this process will enable me to reveal the complexities of education globalisation, enmeshed as it is in social, economic, political and cultural contexts. Sometimes there is a personal context too, with both predictable continuities and surprising ruptures between official views and personal practices or beliefs, setting up interesting dialogic undercurrents and tensions which need to be tactfully negotiated by the researcher.

The assembled data from both interviews and documents will be interrogated using the conceptual tool of discourse analysis, a powerful instrument for identifying macro and micro structures of power as articulated, constructed and constrained in policy texts and interview data. Discourse analysis begins from the assumption that interview narratives are situated in social worlds, and that no individual experience is a purely individual production but is always derived from social contexts reflecting cultural, ideological and historical backgrounds. The discourse found in interview data is socially constructed, and can be deconstructed or translated through the Foucauldian lens of discourse formation or discursivity. Discursivity however is multiply determined and complexly constructed, and the analyst needs to keep their wits about them:

We must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden… with the variants and different effects - according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated (Foucault, 1978:100).

To try to capture this complexity, my analysis will seek to position the data in its social context – interview subjects’ personal situation and trajectory, where they come from or are located, who they work for, how and by whom the texts were created and distributed, and so on - in order to tease out the
strands of intentionality embodied in the discourse. I found the process of analysis of this large body of data overwhelming at times. After returning to it again and again I would sometimes have to stop work and wait for it to settle down in my brain. Then my thoughts would clear and I would experience MacLure’s (2010:282) moment of glow of data inside me when I suddenly see the data’s significance – its narrative - glowing like a line of flowers beside the path.

However I also want to focus on the interviewees as individual subjects who can never be wholly contained within the language they use, bearing very much in mind what Denzin (1991b:68) says in the context of ethnographic studies:

The subject is more than can be contained in a text, and a text is only a reproduction of what the subject has told us. What the subject tells us is itself something that has been shaped by prior cultural understandings. Most important, language, which is our window into the subject’s world (and our world), plays tricks. It displaces the very thing it is supposed to represent, so that what is always given is a trace of things, not the thing – lived experience – itself.

Following Richardson (1990:20), I believe that the narratives found in interview data can reveal human actors’ intentions and goals, and help to make political and economic currents and trends comprehensible as whole. They can also aid us in understanding our own situatedness as listeners, my own embeddedness as social science researchers:

There is only a view from ‘somewhere’, an embodied, historically and culturally situated speaker. From this perspective, the sociologist speaks as a narrator, a person with a point of view; an embodied person responsible for his or her words (Richardson, 1990:27).

With this understanding we can begin to see this thesis as an intersubjective production, shared between the ‘I’ of the interviewer/writer and the ‘I’ of each of my interviewees and text authors, and telling a social story about global education discourse - how it is constructed, distributed and validated, how it becomes embedded in key actors and embodied in policies and practices.
This is indeed a ‘subjective’ way of doing qualitative field research - not in the sense that it is unevidenced or unrigorous, but in the sense that it recognises that all actors, speakers and listeners are themselves unique subjects, constructed in relation to each other through relations of knowledge and power.

As often as possible, therefore, I will include extracts from the interview data, considering this data, socially constructed as it is between interviewer (“I” as a researcher) and interviewee, is often the most vivid way to express what I want to say about the topic at hand. I use the data to stimulate my own interpretation of the process of subjectification and governmentality, and to try to think through how it works in practice. At the same time, I consider the data itself can help readers realise how global education governance is formed and practiced, and lead them to think differently and act independently.
Chapter 3 Modernity, development and neoliberalism

In this chapter I review some key themes in the literature on modernity and development, with a particular focus on how they illuminate the linkages between globalisation and education. My review will be informed by the Foucauldian concept of genealogy, a term that he used to emphasise the historicity of events and the process by which they came to be as they are. In emphasising this genealogy of events and ideas, as entities “totally imprinted by history”, Foucault insists that histories consist not of historical narratives or essences, but of rationalities fabricated in a relatively piecemeal fashion (Foucault, 1984b:78). Moreover this fabricated, imprinted and contingent nature of history also implies the space for resistance, the possibility of making things other than they are (Foucault, 1984b:83).

I make use of Foucault’s notion of genealogy not only to attempt a succession or periodisation of ideas of modernity, development, and so on, and to pick out their continuities and ruptures with ideas of neoliberalism and globalisation – but also to try to distance us from certain ‘obvious’ ways of seeing current practices in education for development, and to defamiliarise or problematise some ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about these practices.

Of course these are very big themes, so I intend to focus on that single genealogical site or node where economic development and education meet under the auspices (as it were) of neoliberalism. The aim of this literature review is to interrogate some of the critical thinking that has been done in the field, in search of conceptual tools which will help me understand the role of public and private education development projects and practices in the real world. My starting point is the notion of modernity, one that is inseparable from almost all ideas of both development and globalisation - to be precise, it should be called ‘globalising tendency’ - since modernity, by signposting

15 I basically take the same analytic stance as Walkerdine who interprets genealogy as “a history of the present in the sense that it finds its points of departure in problems relevant to current issues and finds its point of arrival and its usefulness in what it can bring to the analysis of the present” (Henrique et al, 1984:104).
(guiding) what the future should be like, becomes the background for an understanding of current globalisation phenomena.

3.1 Modernity

*Modernity* in its widest sense encompasses any present moment which is seen as being discontinuous with the past, rapidly changing, and constitutive of the future (Foucault, 1970; 1997b; Dean, 1994; 1996, Featherstone, 1995; Ogborn, 1999). But in this research I am interested in a much more specific version of modernity: the particular forms of economic and social development that took root in western Europe and north America around 100 years ago and were characterised by a speeding up of urbanisation and mass manufacturing, the rise of new, non-material forms of production, and a sudden acceleration in the technologisation and consumerisation of all aspects of the economy, society and culture (Willis, 2007:2). This version of modernity, like others, is teleological, in that it implies that its particular vision of development toward a high-tech, knowledge-based, affluent urban future is the only vision of development there can be for the world as a whole; and although founded on the particular historical experience of a relatively small number of developed Western societies, has established a remarkable global currency as virtually the sole benchmark of progress and goal of all development efforts (Brohman, 1995).

This globalisation of the narrative of modernity is just the latest chapter in the onward march of occidentalism\(^\text{16}\) that has been underway since at least the Enlightenment, and is well described by Venn (2000:147):

> Occidentalism is the institution of a particular imaginary, established in specific representations and tropes, in images, metaphors, symbols and signs which construct the frame of intelligibility of the West. This imaginary… is inscribed in and structures the signifying practices that describe, classify, annotate, analyse, represent, prescribe and order the cultural and material

\(^{16}\)Couze Venn (2000:147) refers ‘Occidentalism’ to the course of Western centred, technologized, universalised, ethnocentric, masculine form of hegemony.
world in ways that have too often become naturalised. In becoming the West, Europe locates itself as the intellectual, spiritual, moral and economic centre of the world, understanding itself as the motive force and the light bringing the whole of humanity to its maturity... [and]... compels ‘others’ to join in the long march toward ‘civilisation’.

In this light of Western modernity, and often under the gaze of Western economists, bankers and other experts, global knowledge and power relations are constituted and constitute each other to render “the social world into a form that is both knowable and governable”, and tend to lay out the one true path to future development (Fox, 2003:30). While there are several different versions of modernity, there can be no doubt that the narratives of modernity have a powerful influence on discourses of development.

An aspect of modernity that particularly interested Foucault was its impact on technologies of government, on governmentality. The much larger, better educated populations and consumer-oriented economies of modern social-democratic states make the art of governance much more complex and contradictory, requiring much more attention both to people’s attitudes to governing and being governed, to the manipulation of surveillance and consent - to what Foucault calls the “governmentalisation of the state” (1991a:103; 1997b). Seen in this light, modernity encodes new, more diffused technologies of power, and rationalises a new kind of subject who is constantly engaged in the practice of self-creation as a political and economic entity (Foucault, 1970; 1997a).

Education is a key apparatus in this process of the construction of subjects, and therefore in the construction of the modernist vision of the future, so that when global development issues began to force themselves onto the international political agenda following World War II, education soon rose to near the top of the list of global reform and investment priorities. Education in developing countries became a testbed for strategies for rapid development in the direction of that modernist future supposedly desired by all - strategies which have achieved differing levels of success in countries like Korea, Malaysia and Colombia.
In the neo-liberal model, educational investment of this kind not only creates more educated political elites, but can also boost social mobility by making elites more meritocratic. Education can help to trigger more radical change as well, as evinced by a liberation movement figure like Nelson Mandela who leveraged his education (an unusually good one for a black South African in the 1950s) to combine both traditional and western values and articulate a path of resistance to power, saying that “Western civilisation has not entirely rubbed off my African background” (Mandela, 2010:23).

All of which raises the question, What kind of development – what kind of progress - does education lead to? Does it inevitably point toward modernity, regardless of regional, national and local social, economic and cultural conditions? Might there be other, less occidentalist, models? This is a question I hope to cast light on in the following literature review.

### 3.2 Development

Investment in ‘development assistance’, now a major policy objective of wealthy nation states and supranational organisations alike, only really began to feature in international political discourse after the end of World War II. The need to assist “underdeveloped” countries – mostly newly-independent former Western colonies - to become more developed was rooted in a post-war economic need to build new global markets for developed-nation companies, and a cold-war political need to tie these developing countries into a Western or US sphere of influence and keep them out of communist hands. In the new discourse of development assistance these priorities sat alongside, mingled with, and were rationalised by themes of modernity, progress, economic development, international cooperation and human betterment.

Since the mid-20th century a complex superstructure of national and international institutions involved in development assistance has grown up, incorporating national Official Development Assistance agencies and programmes; the United Nations and a number of its agencies including...
UNESCO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); other transnational agencies such as the OECD; and a bewildering array of specialised Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), research institutes and think tanks. The UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreement, establishing a global programme and set of targets for development agreed by every UN member, is one of the organisation’s proudest achievements.

But to analyse the discourse around development fully we need to pay attention to the interests and objectives of the policy makers and others who take part in it, and the actual power relations which it helps to bring into existence (Foucault, 1982a). According to Archard, the problem of international development assistance was constructed in the historical context of the end of empires, de-colonialisation and the creation of new nation states, with “under-development” construed simply as a lack of progress toward the happy condition of the former imperial states (Williams, 1999:157). Important, Archard’s analysis of this discourse of development focuses on the ‘enunciation’ of values, and on the enonciateurs, that is the agents and actors who articulate these values of progress, modernisation and so on, and in so doing mobilise or transfer the power relations they uphold.

These enonciateurs are the professional experts - technologists, advisors and consultants - who take loaded political questions and recast them in the neutral language of technology or science, making the proferred solutions seem unquestionable. As Foucault and others have noted, the modernist state is characterised by the ever-growing role of such experts in all aspects of governance, with the effect of transmuting political problems into technical ones:

A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem… We are promised normalisation and happiness through science and law. When [the

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17 Original article is in French, ‘Sociologie du developpement’ ou sociologie du ‘developpement’ cited in French Discourse Analysis by Glyn Williams in 1999.
experts] fail, this only justifies the need for more of the same (Foucault, 1982b:196).

A good example of this technologisation of politics is the standardised macroeconomic prescription for speeding up poorer countries’ development known as The Washington Consensus. The consensus was first propounded in 1989 by an economist, John Williamson, at a conference in Washington hosted by the Institute for International Economics, and was offered as a statement of what was already common ground among key players in development such as the World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury. It took the form of ten economic policy recommendations, including reduction of fiscal deficits, non-progressive tax reform, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of inward foreign investment, privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation of markets, and legal protection of property rights (Williamson, 2004). The consensus presents itself as uncontroversial, expert technocratic advice for governments seeking a model path to development.

In her account of the politics of development in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Hoogvelt describes the standard reaction of professional development advisors to the suggestion that there might be alternative, local paths to development:

> When traditional institutions or values did not fit, they were considered ‘dysfunctional’ to the process of development and regarded as ‘problems’ which comprehensive socio-economic planning could be designed to correct. Progress became a matter of ordered social reform (Hoogvelt, 1997:35-36).

A number of ‘post-colonial’ researchers have critiqued this assumption that development knowledge and practice must be based on the western experience. Thus Mitchell (1991:33) has introduced the term ‘non-West’ to problematise the normalisation of development solutions based on the technologies, management skills and types of expertise that only exist in the West, and to accentuate the underlying question of inequality of power between West and non-West. While Edward Said, discussing the psycho-historical background to the West/East divide, describes the developed/developing division as an imperialist construct, a “binary social
relation” which reduces the non-Western world to a homogenous and inferior entity (Said, 1978). Such post-colonial voices emphasise the social, cultural and psychological costs paid for development by the populations of developing countries, seeking to widen the idea of development to encompass more local and autonomous solutions to the problem of development (a theme I will return to in my interview data analysis.) (Said 1978, Escobar 1996, Hoogvelt, 1997)

Even mainstream economists disagree vociferously about both the appropriateness and the effectiveness of current development assistance policies and practices. Laissez faire economists like William Easterly (2010) and Dambisa Moyo (2009) would see growth in GDP, personal choice and economic freedom as the most important measures of development, and prioritise programmes to attract overseas corporate investment capital over everything else. Easterly (2010) further resists any constraints placed upon the operation of free markets in developing economies, and is critical of any development coordination or supervisory initiatives from the OECD or UN agencies which have any hint of central planning.

On the other hand, sustainability economists like Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz dissent from the so-called Washington Consensus of neo-liberal economic thinking and emphasise a more collectivist approach to economic development. Stiglitz (2001) argues that worthwhile development can never be achieved simply by growing the stock of capital and removing economic distortions, and that policy-makers should be much more sensitive to local sociocultural, political, economic and environmental factors. At his Nobel Prize lecture, Stiglitz (2001) points out that:

 Development represents a far more fundamental transformation of society, including a change in “preference” and attitudes, an acceptance of damage and an abandonment of many traditional way of thinking (emphasis added).

In opposition to decentralised market orientation, Sachs, in his introduction to *The end of Poverty* (2005:2-3), writes that:
Although introductory economics textbooks preach individualism and decentralized markets, our safety and prosperity depend at least as much on collective decisions to fight disease, promote good science and widespread education, provide critical infrastructure, and act in unison to help the poorest the poor…Collective action, through effective government provision of health, education, infrastructure, as well as foreign assistance when needed, underpins economic success.

It’s worth noting in passing that it is just such an emphasis on collectivism and government action that has been most effective at driving both economic and social prosperity in the newly-developed countries of South East Asia such as Korea (Bruton, 1985; Hoogvelt, 1997; Stiglitz, 2007; Willis, 2007).

The ethical question I want to canvass here is not whether we need development, but how we can provide basic needs in development with fewer shortcomings (Peet and Hartwick, 1999). Here the key issue is about responsibility and ethical coexistence, about ‘Being-with and being-towards-the-other’ (Venn, 2000:11).

My own preferred stance as a researcher is to resist the ‘one size fits all’ approach to development which I consider to be rooted in notions of modernity and the supposed universality of the Western experience, and to suggest that each country or region deserves to have its own developmental trajectory based on its particular economic, political, social and cultural circumstances. Such a stance should attempt to interrogate what Kothari (2005:83) calls the “hegemonic histories that often obscure the continuing effects of colonialism”.

3.3 Globalisation

The problem is not with globalisation, but with how it has been managed. Part of the problem lies with the international economic institutions, which help set the rules of the game. They have done so in ways that, all too often, have served the interests of the most advanced industrialised countries, rather than those of the developing world (Stiglitz, 2002:214).
Globalisation is not a single phenomenon but, as Larner (2003:509) puts it, “a complex and multiple set of economic, political, and cultural processes with contradictory consequences”. It is also a thoroughly problematic and contested question, as evidenced by the enormous number of papers and books either welcoming or condemning it: in the field of social science alone the number of publications on the subject soared by almost 1000% between 1999 and 2009 (Guillen, 2010:7-8).

Even definitions are difficult in such disputed territory, but all researchers would agree that globalisation refers to a dramatic worldwide growth in the number and strength of interconnections between previously distant individuals and communities, which are reducing their economic, cultural and even political autonomy (Escobar, 1995; Hannerz, 1996; Hoogvelt, 1997; Scholte, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Roberts and Hite, 2007; McMillin, 2007). Most commentators agree too that a prime mover in globalisation is the relentless drive of modern capitalist corporations to expand beyond former national boundaries and spacial limits and to open up ever new global markets. The neoliberal logic of marketplace globalisation is summed up by Sirkin and colleagues (2008:1) when they predict that soon “we’ll all be competing with everyone, from everywhere, for everything”. As we shall see, this notion of the world as a global competition in which all must take part has had a profound impact on education policy and practice.

Consensus is weaker on the impact of globalisation on the autonomy or sovereignty of nation states (Sassen, 2008)\(^\text{18}\). It is clear, however, that in a global marketplace dominated by multinational corporations and presided over by powerful transnational agencies and trading blocs such as the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organisation, OECD, EU, ASEAN, and so forth - the freedom of action of national governments is at least severely constrained.

\(^{18}\) For example, Desai (2002) puts this complicity in two different aspects: “homogenising impact” considering political economic dimension whereas “heterogizing aspects” are still stand in the position of cultural practices.
In addition to the economic or political aspects, therefore, I want to focus on the cultural or spatial aspects of globalisation in order to examine the cultural impact/possible danger of the current globalising tendency. Discussion of this aspect really began in the 1960s with McLuhan’s notion of a *global village*19 - a vision of a borderless global community, linked up and made one by global media. The advent and spread of computing, the internet and mobile telephony in the last decades of the 20th century enormously speeded up the pace of compression of space and time that McLuhan foresaw, transforming his global *media* village into a global *networked* village, in which transnational media networks neutralise space and construct what some see as an increasingly homogenous global culture, with ICT devices becoming daily necessities even in the least developed countries. Even though the physical space we inhabit still plays a vital role in life and work, this electronic revolution has arguably created a single “transnational space” (Appelbaum, 2005:55, also see Waters and Brooks, 2012). Within this space, what Manuel Castells (1996; 2010) calls a new ‘networking logic’ impacts on culture, power relationships and the way we experience community. In his book *The Network Society*, Castells (1996:469) writes that:

> Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture.

While for Anthony Giddens (1991) network globalisation is a process which disembodies social relations from their once local contexts and restructures them across time and space. “[Under] globalisation… the modes of connection between different social contexts or regions become networked across the earth’s surface as a whole” (Giddens, 1991:63).

Jan Aart Scholte (2005:3) offers a distinction between the term globalisation, referring simply to “the growth of transplanetary connections between

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19 In 1960s, American sociologist Marshall McLuhan, in general, is coined with the term ‘global village’. See *The Gutenberg galaxy: the making of typographic man* (1962). Here I use this term to tease out who the captain is in this global village. If this whole world is considered as one village, who is the leader to manage the order of this village?
people,” and the term *globality*, which he says “resonates with spatiality - that is, it refers to a specific place, location, domain, or human circumstance, and ultimately identifies the planet itself as a unitary site of social relations”. Social geographer Doreen Massey similarly focuses on globalisation’s impact on the way we think about space and time, pointing out that the modernist narrative of parcels of power sited in nation-states – “a space of places” – is giving way to a globalising narrative of a “space of flows”. Massey (1999:35) however rejects any idea of inevitability in this process. Instead she stresses the dynamism of “power geometries”: “the material and the discursive interlock: the way we imagine globalisation will affect the form that it takes”. For Massey (2001:16), globalisation is less about simply crossing or transcending space than about the “meeting up of a multiplicity of trajectories. And the politics lies in the terms of their intersection”.

Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1996:55) also sees the new transnational space as a space of power flows, one constructed by the uneven global distribution of power and by asymmetrical centre-periphery relationships. Hannerz (1992:218) talks of a new global “ecumene” in which the West can be considered – for now - the political and economic, if not the cultural, centre of power. Another researcher who sees the transnational space as a potentially dynamic one is Roland Robertson, who uses the term *meta culture* to encode the shifting linkages between culture, social structure, and the global context. Meta culture helps to explain why certain aspects of local culture remain stubbornly heterogeneous, despite the powerful homogenising tendencies of globalisation. Robertson (1992:34) writes that:

Meta cultures constrain conceptions of culture, mainly in terms of deep-rooted, implicit assumptions concerning relationships between parts and wholes, individuals and societies, ingroups and outgroups, and societies and the world as a whole.

I consider these notions of *ecumene* and *meta culture* to be potential theoretical bases for the defence of cultural difference, and the possibility of collective action to resist or modify the effects of globalisation. Such resistance could perhaps be along the lines suggested by Hines who argues
that globalisation is not an irresistible force like gravity (Hines, 2005), and offers as an alternative the concept of ‘supportive internationalism’:

a global flow of technology, ideas and information to rebuild sustainable local communities... A flow of... culture, money and goods with the end goal of protecting and rebuilding local economies worldwide. Its emphasis is not on competition for the cheapest, but on cooperation for the best (Hines, 2001:5).

The key question (I suggest) is not whether we are pro or anti globalisation, but whether people and communities can influence the kind of globalisation that takes place; whether there are opportunities to democratise globalising processes in order, as Hardt and Negri (2001) put it, to “eliminate inequalities between rich and poor and between the powerful and the powerless, and to expand the possibilities of self-determination”. Because of the newly globalised terrain, such democratic interventions need to be what Foucault (1982a:211) calls “transversal struggles”, that is, struggles which take place across national and regional boundaries, across various communities and across different social structures. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse (cited in Guillen 2010:16) says, “globalisation does not necessarily pose a choice between condemnation and celebration. Rather, it begs to be engaged, compromised, given form”.

3.4 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is in essence a projection forward into the 20th century of classic liberal laissez faire economic philosophy. In the analysis of neoliberalism, I take neoliberal phenomena to be neither theories nor ideologies, but practices - as “way[s] of doing things directed towards objectives and regulating [themselves] by continuous reflection” (Foucault, 2010:318).

In the post-War period, neoliberalism began to manifest itself (Rose, 1996; Foucault, 2010; Hilgers, 2013), as Olssen et al. (2004:135), put it:
in a belief in the sanctity of the market and... [in] opposition to any mechanisms thought to interfere with the 'freedom, prosperity and progress' supposedly guaranteed by [the market].

Neoliberalism goes much further than classical free market economics in extending the rule of the market into all aspects of what was once considered public life, using the policy triad of **liberalisation, privatisation** and **deregulation** to effectively commercialise the social domain - what Scholte (2005:1-3) has called a profound “reconfiguration of social space... intimately linked to shifts in patterns of knowledge, production, governance, identity and the ways that people relate to nature”. The standard neoliberal prescription for developing countries is represented by the ten macroeconomic policy instruments of the 1989 Washington Consensus (described above) – a classic example of the actualisation of neoliberal theory in global governance practice.

For Milton Friedman, one of the best known protagonists of neoliberalism, “economic freedom was [not only] an end in itself” (1962:8), but the only foundation of political freedom, and an unfettered market the only environment where either could flourish. He rejected ideas of collective solidarity and went so far as to oppose the taxation of corporations or the placing upon them of social or regulatory responsibilities. He was against any kind of monopoly, especially state ones, and some of Friedman’s most scornful invective was reserved for the idea of public education, which he thought should be entirely privatised and left to the market, with individuals making consumer choices just as in any other market sector (Friedman, 1962). In fact he compared the role of public authorities in the education system to the regulation of restaurant sanitisation standards – an example of what a Keynesian economist, Hajoon Chang (cited in Milne, 2013) calls “the almost religious mentality” of neoliberal proponents.

The role of the government would be limited to insuring that the schools met certain minimum standards, such as the inclusion of a minimum common content in their programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to insure that they maintain minimum sanitary standards (Friedman, 1962:78).
However in the evolution from classical liberal economics to neoliberalism there is an interesting shift in the perceived role of the state, which despite the anti-state rhetoric of evangelists like Friedman, took on an important role as a guarantor and mediator, albeit at a distance, of free market functioning. As Polanyi points out, even free markets need to be willed into being: “free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Laissez faire itself was enforced by the state” (Polanyi, 2010:8). According to Foucault (1991a), it was now seen as the responsibility of government to create the optimum political and economic conditions for entrepreneurial activity, for competition and for profit. The economic became the central purpose of government – a government which must not govern too much, but which must govern sufficiently to extend the rule of the market, by generalising it “throughout the social body, including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges” (Foucault, 2010:243).

In Foucauldian analysis, this maximalisation of the economic begins to constitute in the social body a new, distinctively neoliberal subjectivity in the form of *homo economicus*, a subject normalised into accepting market forces and competition as the natural order of things (Foucault, 1977; 2010). Homo economicus understands that markets should take priority over the state, that social regulation is dangerous, and that “individual advancement/self-interest [should be promoted] over the collective good and common wellbeing” (Lingard, 2009:18).

### 3.4.1 The neoliberal rationale: competition, innovation, deregulation and privatisation

Competition has been central to capitalist economic theory since at least the time of Adam Smith (McNulty, 1967), but for positivist political economists like Friedman, Hayak, Drucker and Schumpeter the idea of competition is totemic. Competition, free trade and open economies are not merely the one reliable route to economic growth, efficiency and quality, but also the one
reliable guarantor of individual freedom. Joseph Schumpeter (1950:180) wrote that:

how to maintain the freedom of the market and of competition happens to have become the crucial problem of the non-collectivist world, and if we fail to solve it everything else will be pointless.

Not all neoliberal economists took such a doctrinaire approach. Willhelm Röpke for example pointed out in the 1960s that competition was a historical construct and not a principle on which the whole of society could be founded, concluding that “morally and sociologically, competition is a principle that dissolves more than it unifies” (Röpke, W. (1950) The social crisis of our time, cited in Foucault, 2010:243). To neoliberals like Röpke, competition was “atomistic”, and potentially destructive of social integrity (McNulty, 1967:398). But this so-called ‘ordoliberal’ view - German neoliberal approach – has tended to be crowded out by the competition purists.

1) The competition state

Competition and competitiveness is the orthodoxy of the neoliberal state, with Governments taking quasi-entrepreneurial and market modes of action (Burchell, 1996). The arrival in the 1980s of Thatcher and Reagan heralded the adoption of unbridled free market policies not only in the USA and the UK but through much of the world (Cerny, 1997; Olssen, 2003; Hall, 2005; Fougner, 2006). I want here to examine the governmentality not just of citizens but of states themselves, and the ways in which policy-makers from all countries came more and more to use the same discourse of intensive competition as if they were also “optimising corporations” rather than being responsible for the welfare of their populations (Higgins, 2006:10). In international contexts, one of the raisons d’État (purposes of the State) is that the “state must exist and maintain itself in a state of permanent competition with foreign powers" (Foucault, 2010:5).
Cerny (1997:260) describes the classic features of the post-1980s neoliberal economy as follows:

1) a shift from macroeconomic to microeconomic interventionism, with deregulation the trademark of industrial policy;

2) a shift in emphasis away from traditional national-strategic economic activities, toward a more diversified range of rapidly-evolving international competitive activities and marketplaces;

3) a major emphasis on the control of inflation and monetarist stabilisation as the touchstone of state intervention in the economy; and

4) a shift in national policies away from welfare provision – for example full employment, redistributive transfer payments, social service provision etc - to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors.

The neoliberal state thinks and acts more and more like a corporate entity, combining totalisation at the state level with individualisation at the personal level, in order to ready and prime itself for global competition. These characteristics also apply to the phenomenon of global edu-business, where the alluring ideas of the ‘competitive advantage’ conferred by a ‘world class’ education draw people, communities and states into participation in a global education market. This kind of rhetoric, according to Thrift (2005:98):

has been based upon a few key management tropes - globalisation, knowledge, learning, network, flexibility, information technology, urgency - which are meant to come together in a new kind of self-willed subject whose industry will boost the powers of the state to compete economically, and will also produce a more dynamic citizenry.

(Urgency in this context refers to the anxiously perceived need to develop global competitiveness and not to be left behind in the global educational race.)
2) Innovation

Alongside and closely related to competition, a second ideological talisman of neoliberalism is the idea of innovation, seen as the prime driver of new business opportunities and new markets. Peter Drucker (1985:17) defines innovation as:

the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by which they exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or a different service... Entrepreneurs ... need to know and to apply the principles of successful innovation.

For Schumpeter too, innovation - “the discovery of new techniques, sources, and forms of productivity, and the discovery of new markets or new manpower resources” - was a driving force of the capitalist economy (1961, cited in Foucault, 2010:231). Innovation is the technique by which market economies are able to continuously reinvent or reconstitute themselves in new forms and in new discourses.

Ten years ago in The World is Flat Thomas Friedman (2006) brought the themes of competition and innovation together in his vision of a world economy of free trade, open markets and open flows of labour and capital, a ‘flat’ world of opportunity for anyone with the inventiveness and enterprise to grab it. It is an interesting formulation not only because it flies in the face of all the evidence suggesting that unrestrained free markets build up mountains of wealth for the few and valleys of poverty for the many, but also because it portrays the neoliberal global economy as moving on from the production and distribution of goods and services, to the production and distribution of knowledge – a theme to which I shall return:

America, as a whole, will do fine in a flat world with free trade – provided it continues to churn out knowledge workers who are able to produce idea-based goods that can be sold globally and who are able to fill the knowledge jobs that will be created as we not only expand the global economy but connect all the knowledge pools in the world. There may be a limit to the number of good factory jobs in the world, but there is no limit to the number of idea-generating jobs in the world (Friedman, 2006:230).
Innovation has a particular significance in the field of education, where so many of the currents of globalisation converge: the ICT revolution, the knowledge economy and the skills it requires, the construction of the neoliberal subject, and the worldwide competition for jobs. Governments everywhere feel an urgent need to innovate in teaching and learning, to modernise their education policies and practices to keep pace with the rest of the world; and almost everywhere educational ICT is seen as a panacea for achieving such modernisation.

3) Deregulation and privatisation

As noted earlier, the two great economic policy levers advocated by neoliberals, aside from market liberalisation itself (that is, the opening of markets to untrammelled competition and removal of constraints on the movement of capital and labour), are those of deregulation and privatisation. Deregulation refers primarily to the lifting of public rules and social constraints from businesses and employers; while privatisation is the outsourcing or selling-off of public services and assets to private commercial providers. Neoliberal economists view these twin policies, not just as ways of championing the private sector and boosting profits, but also as the best antidotes to the evils of central planning and state control. Public regulation and public provision are seen as inherently less efficient than markets, and incapable of innovation. According to Easterly (2010:81):

central planners are risk averse…They don’t have a search and feedback mentality. Rather they implement a preconceived notion of what will work and keep implementing it whether it is working or not.

From this viewpoint only markets can deliver efficiency and performativity, through the mechanisms of competition and innovation. Freed from the burdens of social regulation, enabled to operate in every sector of the economy including previously public sectors such as utilities, health and education, businesses (it is rationalised) will speedily and continuously find new, more efficient ways to deliver better services, expand market share and
make more money. By the same means, the market will also ensure that inefficient providers, those unable to innovate or compete effectively, will be removed from the scene by going out of business. This is what Foucault (2010:247) meant when he remarked that for neo-liberals the market is "a sort of permanent economic tribunal".

The problem is that in this process of marketising the public sector and deregulating the private, the very notions of public value, public service and the public good become devalued. Collective/social goals make way for private/economic ones, which it is assumed will take care of society's needs through the mechanism of the market. As Stuart Hall (2005:322) put it, "neoliberalism…renounced the attempt to graft wider social goals onto the corporate world".

### 3.4.2 Self-entrepreneurship

As Stephen Ball and many others – for example, Mark Olssen, Michael Peters and Stuart Hall - have pointed out, an economic and political reorientation as profound as that described above does not just result in large scale economic and political change, but also causes “cultural changes and changes in identity and subjectivity” (Ball, 2012a:5). As these changes ripple through the social body, how does the neoliberal regime impact on the subjectivity – the social self - of those living under or through it?

The advancing privatisation of public value, the increasing economisation of all value, finally comes to permeate our lives, recasting our subjectivity as primarily economic actors in a kind of social market, in which we must each take responsibility for the competitiveness of our individual human capital. Nikolas Rose (1996:57) describes this process as the capitalisation of the self:

> Within this new regime of the actively responsible self, individuals are to fulfil their national obligations not through their relations of dependency and obligation to one another, but through seeking to fulfil themselves within a variety of micro-moral domains or
“communities” – families, workplaces, schools, leisure associations, neighbourhoods... It has become possible to actualise this notion of the actively responsible individual because of the development of new apparatuses that integrate subjects into a moral nexus of identifications and allegiances in the very process in which they appear to act out their most personal choices.

Through the operation of Foucauldian governmentality, each subject is normalised into the rationality of the all-pervading neoliberal marketplace. We each become entrepreneurs of our own enterprise - the "enterprise of ourselves". We become self-entrepreneurs, primed to compete (Olssen, 2003:195). And the neoliberal state takes on the somewhat new role of light-touch regulation of these enterprises-of-the-self, doing its best to ensure that we build and maintain our competitive edge in the social market, in a process described by Olssen (2004:137) as one that "seems to be governing without governing".

Self-entrepreneurship is not just a governmental device, but what Foucault calls a “technology of the self”. It permeates our bodies, normalises us as subjects, even reshapes our ‘souls’. It has to, if we are to accept the total challenge of arming ourselves, inside and out, for the life of competition which we face. We expect rewards for competing successfully - prizes of money, power, honour or desirability; but most of us will not be successful, so we must accept and internalise the risk of likely failure too. In the logic of neoliberalism the population is not a set of communities but rather a set of human economic resources.

This is a new iteration of the population as a resource within which individuals, institutions and states must be “lean”, “fit” and flexible, and indeed agile – active citizens in an active society (Ball, 2013a:130).

Thus the self-entrepreneurial subject is normalised as one who, like a neoliberal corporate entity, is economically rational, self-determining, self-sustaining and self-sufficient – a subject who accepts the moral responsibility for their own economic success (Shamir, 2008:7). It’s an example of what Foucault calls biopower, a sophisticated technology of governmentality which
operates on the moral and physical, not just the social, self; and it has the effect of enabling the state to reduce its own burden of responsibility in providing education, training, healthcare and other kinds of social provision. The self-entrepreneurial subject is expected to willingly and continuously invest their own resources in life-long learning and self-maintenance, for fear of falling behind the competition.

It is this self-responsible, self-entrepreneurial individual that Margaret Thatcher had in mind when she said in 1987:

There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves (Thatcher, 1987).

There being “no such thing as society” may well give homo economicus an exhilarating sense of freedom, of being a self-governing subject, even if our freedom of action is severely constrained by the effects of economic policy, by our own competitiveness and by the impersonal operations of the market, not to mention the dynamics of our governmentality. In such neoliberal circumstances, we are free, self-governed agents “whose choices are calculable for governmental purposes” (Higgins, 2006:17). But for most people there are psychological costs to becoming purely individual, purely economic actors. Such a danger is well expressed by Ball (2013a:137-138):

A consequence of continual animation and calculation is for many a growing sense of ontological insecurity; both a loss of a sense of meaning in what we do, and of what is important in what we do… We are in danger of becoming transparent but empty, unrecognisable to ourselves.

3.5 Neoliberalism and education

Education is indispensable to the maintenance of the neoliberal regime and all its technologies of power. It is through education that the new political and economic rationalities are enacted on individual bodies and through the
social body. It is through education that the self-regulating entrepreneurs of the self are created and recreated. And it is only through education that people are equipped with the knowledge and skills they need to be economically competitive in the global marketplace. This last point has become central to international development policies over the last quarter century, with investment in education to deliver useful knowledge to the next generation of workers coming to be seen as the single most important way of stimulating sustainable economic development. But what exactly constitutes “useful knowledge”?

Foucault understands education, both formal schooling and lifelong learning, in a number of ways. Education is seen as an apparatus for generating human capital by equipping the population with the knowledge assets, behaviours and skills they need to contribute effectively to economic growth. It is seen as a site or mode of discourse which defines what we actually mean by knowledge, and what knowledge we value or think most useful. And it is seen as a political means for “maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses along with the knowledge and powers which they carry” (Foucault, 1971:19). Education, that is, is an apparatus for normalising practice and for producing normative individual subjects (Henriques et al., 1984:102). Education is also at the centre of the construction of modernity.

In other words, modern forms of governance and social discipline are secured through education: in an important sense, they work through educating. In modernity, education replaces pre-modern coercion and subjugation. In this respect, education is not simply that which goes on in schools but is an essential part of governmentality, a crucial aspect of the regulatory practices of a range of modern institutions (Usher and Edwards, 1994:84).

Education is, at the same time, entwined with another key theme of the neoliberal, globalising narrative we have been tracing: the idea of human capital. In the 1950s and 60s, the term human capital become a standard way of talking about and defining a nation state’s prosperity. Gary Becker wrote in 1964 that human capital was concerned with “activities that influence future monetary and psychic income by increasing the resources in
people. These activities are called “investment in human capital”. During recovery from the wars of the mid-20th century, the phrase seemed to fit perfectly with the neoliberal moment, the maximalisation of the economic, and the view that a population’s well-being was more-or-less equivalent to its economic usefulness.

3.5.1 Reformation of language from “human capital” to “knowledge economy”

The idea of human capital as a motor of economic development was a highly significant influence on the development strategy of the OECD, the club of developed nations founded in 1961. The organisation’s 1998 report on *Human Capital Investment* recommended that human capital should be “at the heart of strategies in OECD countries to promote economic prosperity, fuller employment, and social cohesion” (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI), 1998). The report noted that the idea of human capital reflected how important well-educated people have become in “knowledge- and competence-based economies”, and referred to human capital as “an intangible asset with the capacity to enhance or support productivity, innovation, and employability” (CERI, 1998:9).

By the late 20th century, neoliberal economist Peter Drucker (1993) was arguing that human or knowledge capital had actually become more important than traditional forms of finance or material capital, so that power was passing from traditional capitalists to the owners of human capital – “knowledge workers”. It followed that education systems must change to keep up, and that learning needed to continue long after formal education ended. “Entrepreneurial society challenges the habits and assumptions of schooling and learning” (Drucker, 1993:246-247).

From the 1960s the notion of human capital found a natural counterpart in another term popularised by Drucker - the *knowledge economy*. In the post-industrial era, developed countries were becoming increasingly dependent on the intangible economic assets of knowledge and skills, as their once
world-leading manufacturing industries were either in decline or shifting to developing countries where labour costs were cheaper. Instead these countries tended to concentrate on data-based industries such as banking, consulting, and intangible asset businesses. The new category of intangible capital is defined by David and Foray (2002:10) as having two forms:

Investment geared to the production and dissemination of knowledge through education, training, R&D and other forms of information coordination; and on the other part, investment geared to sustaining the physical state of the workforce such as expenditure on health and social welfare.

According to David and Foray, in the USA around 1973 the stock of intangible capital began to overweigh that of tangible capital, and it is this moment that constitutes the decisive move to the post-Fordist or knowledge economy.

In the industrial era, sheer quantity of workers had been enough, but in this new type of economy it was the educational quality of the population that mattered. In a knowledge economy, the better-educated worker would be more productive - thus contributing to economic growth - but also make more money, and pay more taxes, thus contributing to political and social stability as well. Moreover, in the new knowledge economy, the power of knowledge was increasingly recognised as the most valuable of commodities, which just like other commodities could be transacted and traded on an increasingly global market.

Across the world, in both developed and developing countries, investment in education and training came to be seen as the best route to national prosperity and global economic development. In its 1999 World Development Report, the World Bank noted that “knowledge, not capital, is the key to sustained economic growth” and went on to declare, in uncharacteristically mystical vein, that “Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can

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20 This outsourcing or off-shoring of production is another important aspect of economic globalisation. “Low-skilled jobs are increasingly seen as being “offshoreable” to less developed countries. Offshoring happens spreadingly from manufacturing to technology-intensive industries, including services” (David and Foray, 2002:10).
easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere” (The World Bank, 1999:1). National governments and transnational agencies concluded that education was the key to building capacity to compete in the global market, and developed policies accordingly. The fruits of such investment in knowledge-building were the neoliberal fruits of transferrability, innovation, competitiveness and growth. According to social anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2007:5), “neoliberalism’s metaphor is knowledge”.

As Foucault noticed, one of the effects of the new orthodoxy of knowledge economy and human capital was to shift responsibility for lack of development in poorer countries away from structural inequalities in the international economic system, onto the failures of developing countries’ education systems.

We are seeing the economic policies of all the developed countries, but also their social, cultural and educational policies, being orientated in these terms. In the same way the problems of the economy of the Third World can also be rethought on the basis of human capital... An attempt is being made to rethink the economic problem of the failure of Third World countries to get going, not in terms of the blockage of economic mechanisms, but in terms of insufficient investment in human capital (Foucault 2010: 232).

Another effect was a gradual shift in the way we think about the purposes and goals of education, away from the idea of a general development of the next generation into the knowledge and understanding needed to live in society, and toward the idea of equipping a population with economically useful skills – the human capital needed to compete in the 21st century global economy. This change, an example of what Foucault (1972; 1977) calls the “reformation of language”, is worth some detailed exploration.

Donald Vandenberg (1990:3) has usefully defined education as an aggregate of phenomena that can be viewed from the perspective of seven distinct ontological domains:

*Historically,* education is the transmission of the human heritage in order to maintain and enhance the level of civilisation...
Anthropologically, education is the humanisation of the young that occurs in the dialogue between the generations... Sociologically, education is the socialisation of the young into the societal roles and values believed necessary and desirable for a society's continued existence. Politically, education is the preparation for citizenship in the state or nation. Economically, education is the preparation for citizenship in the state or nation. Existentially, education is becoming aware of the possibilities of being that enable one to achieve an adult presence to the world as a morally and socially responsible person with one's own value and dignity. Cosmically, education is the journey of becoming at home in the universe (Emphasis added).

Thinking more specifically about the idea of public education as it developed in the West in the 19th and 20th centuries, cultural historian Raymond Williams (1971:163) identifies three distinct rationales at work, based on the differing perspectives of three groups of people that Williams calls the “public educators”, the “industrial trainers”, and the “old humanists”. The public education rationale proceeds from the idea of education as a universal democratic right, and from society's need for the public participation of a well-educated and informed population. The industrial training rationale saw education primarily as preparation of the young for “future adult work, with the parallel clause of teaching the required social character - habits of regularity, 'self-discipline', obedience, and trained effort”. While the humanist rationale articulated the concept of a liberal education, that is the passing-on of bodies of knowledge and cultural values which foster an understanding of our place in the world and our health as moral beings.

My argument is that the ascendancy of the neoliberal rationale and its notions of knowledge economy and human capital have tended to collapse all these different educational functions and perspectives down into one – the economic. The neoliberal subject is a homo economicus, a self-entrepreneur responsible for her or his own competitiveness, and it follows that education is no longer seen as a process of passing on traditional values and knowledge, of enlightenment or of self-fulfillment. Instead education is seen as a process of equipping learners with economically valuable skills, of
making them ‘market-compatible’, of enhancing their productivity and adaptability and therefore their value as human capital assets (see Brown and Lauder, 2006; Marginson, 1997). In the neoliberal view, as Lankshear et al. (2000:22) put it, “knowledge ‘ceases to become an end in itself’; it loses its use value and becomes, to all intents and purposes, an exchange value alone”.

At the risk of over simplifying the flow of development, I offer the following schematisation of the relationship between capitalist eras, technologies and education formations, based on a table produced by Nealon (2008:59).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era of modern capital</th>
<th>Machine</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early:Industrialisation 1848-1890s</td>
<td>Steam engine ‘industrial’</td>
<td>For the limited elite group who lead society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:Fordism-Factory late 1890-late1940s</td>
<td>Combustion Engine ‘factory’</td>
<td>For public education - human capital development to meet the demands of industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late:Post Fordism 1950-1990s</td>
<td>Nuclear-electronic ‘service’-knowledge economy</td>
<td>To develop human capital in the ‘knowledge economy’ Quality of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just-in-time: Finance</td>
<td>Computer chip ‘market’</td>
<td>To develop ‘skill’ and flexibility for market compatibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Relationship between modes of capitalism and education
(The education column and emphases added)

I hope to use this understanding to help in the critical analysis of data from interviews with policy makers, advisors, consultants and practitioners in the field of education for development. Given the overlap noted above between the processes of globalisation and those of digital networking and computerisation, I will focus in particular on projects and policies which revolve around digital educational technologies, and on the discourse which articulates this linkage. Before embarking on my main interview analysis, I would like to share an interview data sample displaying several interesting features to be found in such discourse.
3.5.2 Educational ICT for ‘sale’?

The following is an extract from an interview with a UK-based academic and educational development consultant.

“I don’t have any qualms about saying to ministers - and I have been to meetings where ministers across the whole of Africa have turned up and I’ve shown them the stuff I have got, and I’ve demonstrated it, and said ‘Here is what we have. If you are interested, you can have it - we are willing to come along and run an initial workshop, and after that it will have to be costed’... And then they look at it, and they can say, “oh this might be good”, or they can say “we don’t need that, our teaching is fine”. It’s fine either way, but I don’t have a problem with showing them something new and saying, ‘this could be useful, it has been useful for other schools, you might like to try it.’ Then it is up to them” (UK consultant 1).

One of the unarticulated premises here is that we all have an idea of the power of educational technology to change schooling for the better, even if we have not actually experienced it. As Selwyn (2012:12) notes, “contemporary education is entwined with a range of globalised processes that are predicated upon the use of digital technology”. Another premise is the interviewee’s acknowledged status, conferred by her expertise in educational ICT and her background in a UK academic institution, and which is sufficient to gain her easy access to government ministers in developing African countries. This is the new power, in a globalising world, of enonciateurs: the international experts, consultants and think tanks. It is a kind of soft power wielded primarily by experts from developed countries and exercised upon developing countries; the new knowledge is transferred vertically, from North to South.

Then there is her description of the proffered transfer of educational technology as a purely market transaction, a hawking of wares: “I’ve shown them the stuff I have got. I’ve demonstrated it and said, “Here is what we have. If you are interested you can have it””. The ministers are invited to sample the new technology, but if they like it they will need to buy it. This is a
clear example of knowledge commodification, and of a marketised relationship to oneself and to others: *you need to pay for my work*. The value of knowledge may be universally acknowledged, but in a globalised knowledge economy its value can only be realised via monetisation.

Of course, the education ministers are free to walk away from the offered transaction. The interviewee is not overstepping any moral mark, and will be approved by her professional peers as an effective practitioner. There is no compulsion: “it is up to them”. But in reality it is an offer that is hard to refuse, because it is like rejecting modernity or turning away from the light. So there is an edge of power in her words, not of imperial power for sure but the power of a global marketplace carrying residues of neo-colonialism (see Hardt and Negri, 2000).

Finally there is the normalising function of this text. “I have no qualms…” signals that my interviewee in reality *does* have qualms, (or is aware that they perhaps should have qualms that this vocalisation supresses/denies?), but has ultimately made her peace with the exigencies of the globalised, market-based scenario she describes - with the commodification of knowledge, with the commercialisation of her relationship to others such that her ministerial interlocutors become no more than potential clients, and with the inequalities of power. They all have to be accepted simply because they represent the normal functioning of the market.

In many ways my interviewee exemplifies the neoliberal subject who has rationalised and internalised the logic of the market. And to analyse her interview data in this way enables us not only to get to the bottom of how such subjects speak about and act upon the world, but of how the world itself speaks and acts. *We must understand her discourse, as Foucault puts it, as a form of practice;* “In every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as … ethical or juridical subject, as subject conscious of himself and others... thought is understood as the very form of action” (Foucault, 1997c:201).
Part of my point in reviewing all the various aspects of debates in politics, economics, sociology and cultural studies regarding the neoliberal mode of globalisation was to show how multi-layered and complex global education discourse has become. In the next chapter I will use policy text and interview data analysis to cast light on some mechanisms of power at work - at the supranational, national, organisational and individual levels - in the production of global education discourse.
Chapter 4 Discourses of ODA and education

*The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.*

(US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, second inaugural address, 1937)

In this chapter I ask to what extent the trend toward neoliberal globalisation is reflected in developments in education policy and practice, and in particular in education for development. I will question how such manifestations might be formulated, circulated and naturalised in the subject of the policy makers, think-tank consultants and international advisors working in this field. My aim is to trace the neoliberal transformation “not at the level of political theory, but rather at the level of mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power” (Foucault, 2004:241).

I plan to start with an analysis of some key terms which characterise global discourses of education – terms such as *competition, ranking, marketisation*, and *world class* - and then proceed to examine the *governmentality* or rationalities of government which allow this discourse to be accepted as ‘normal’, its principles taken for granted on the global scale. Problematising this discourse will pave a way to understanding what is going on, and more importantly will explain the process of its construction.

While there is general agreement on the importance of education and training in development, there is lower consensus about policies designed to foster them. There is much current research focusing on how developed countries or supra-national institutions such as the OECD, the World Bank, UNESCO, or the EU might go about mobilising knowledge-infrastructural assistance to developing countries, and much debate about whether such assistance can avoid accusations of either economic exploitation or cultural imperialism (see Harvey, 2003; Olssen et al., 2004; Tikly, 2004; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; Ball, 2012a; 2013b; Dale, 2012; Peters, 2012; Selwyn, 2012). But it is less common for research on education globalisation to encompass
points of view from those who are actually involved in the process, or to analyse the situation from the standpoint of an insider. With this in mind, I intend to examine what Foucault (1991a) called the “technology of government” in education globalisation, and in doing so to come to a better understanding of our own subjectivities in this process (including my own subjectivity as I shift between practitioner and researcher).

In the era of globalisation, national education systems are no longer just the concern of the nation state. Educational questions have become the business of a range of supranational bodies such as the European Union (EU), the OECD and the UN – operating through UNESCO – and the World Bank. For the World Bank and the multilateral development agencies, educational investment and the setting of the educational policy agenda have become key aspects of their vision for development (Ball, 2013b:36-38). The OECD also has stressed the significance of education and training as key elements for participation in the new global knowledge economy (Peters, 2001a; 2001b; Olssen et al., 2004; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; Verger et al., 2012; Ball, 2012a; 2013b, Meyer and Benavot, 2013).

All of these supranational organisations active in the global education field have a role in figuring out how development assistance should be used, and how education can be used to leverage development. As a first step in examining the construction of discourses of education for development, it is important to understand the various rationales that are used for providing development assistance to developing countries.

4.1 The role of the OECD

The work of one particular supranational organisation, the OECD, is so pivotal in the interrelated fields of education, development assistance and globalisation that we need to look in some detail at its history, structure, and operational culture.
The origins of the OECD lie in United States policies for European reconstruction in the immediate post-war period (OECD a).\textsuperscript{21} Willis (2007:2) points out that the motivation for US development assistance to Europe through the Marshall Plan was “more than goodwill”, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2005:83-84) also states that it was driven by moral conviction as well as by the recognition of US prosperity and security.\textsuperscript{22}

In its central policy text, the OECD (2008:7) defines itself as:

A unique forum where the governments… work together to address the economic, social and governance challenges of globalisation as well as to exploit its opportunities…The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and co-ordinate domestic and international policies (emphasis added).

Seven years later, the emphasis has shifted slightly. On the website of OECD (2014a), its vision is:

to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems…we measure productivity and global flows of trade and investment. We analyse and compare data to predict future trends… we compare how different countries’ school systems are readying their young people for

\textsuperscript{21} OECD was established after the Second World War for the economic cooperation. “The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1947 to run the US-financed Marshall Plan for reconstruction of a continent ravaged by war. By making individual governments recognise the interdependence of their economies, it paved the way for a new era of cooperation that was to change the face of Europe. Encouraged by its success and the prospect of carrying its work forward on a global stage, Canada and the US joined OEEC members in signing the new OECD Convention on 14 December 1960”. The OECD was officially launched on 30 September in 1961. The source: http://www.oecd.org/about/history/

\textsuperscript{22} In the UNDP report, it says that “the transfers of $13 billion in aid to Europe which was equivalent to more than 1% of US GDP, were driven by moral conviction, but also by the recognition that US prosperity and security ultimately depended on European recovery” (UNDP, 2005:83-84).
modern life…drawing on facts and real-life experience, we recommend policies designed to improve the quality of people’s lives.

It is worth noting here how the emphasis has shifted slightly between the 2008 and the 2014 texts, from a focus purely on policy coordination between governments, to a wider mission including not just governments but also “real-life experience” and “the quality of people’s lives”. It is worth asking whether this enlargement of scope signals an ambition to go beyond global coordination into global governance, based on the incubation at the level of individual member-country populations of a new neoliberal subjectivity.

The OECD may have just 34 member countries, but its influence truly global. OECD interviewee 1 told me:

“Because here in a kind of ivory tower in Paris we are far away from the real problems of the developing world. The advantage of the OECD is that we have much more leverage…. Here I am able to develop policies… [providing] much bigger leverage helping 34 OECD member countries to improve their policies and hopefully [the benefits] will come down to the people in developing countries all around the world… reach out beyond our members to our partner countries, and that is of course the main purpose of our work”

In a recent speech inaugurating the OECD accession process for Colombia (more on this in Chapter 7), the OECD Secretary-General quoted approvingly former Chilean President Bachelet’s description of the organisation as a “best practice club” (OECD, 2013b). Like most other clubs, you have to be invited to join, and to satisfy a number of rather ill-defined criteria to be considered for potential membership – such as being “like-minded” and a “significant global player”, as well as having an open economy, a pluralist democracy and a respect for human rights.

As you would expect in a best practice club, the OECD’s power is not juridical but consensual power, calculated to support the interests of members rather than non-members. “It is a club where countries meet and
discuss about best practices. It is a coordination between countries, a cooperation, trying to improve policies" (OECD 6).

The OECD’s power is exercised through a series of agreed aims and objectives – summarised in the motto *better policies for better lives*. With its worldwide scope, its numerous research and policy documents and its conferences attended by prestigious political and thought leaders, the OECD is indeed a powerful presence, but one which always needs to operate through the mechanism of consensus. It sets itself up as a central point of global governance and research, with a continuous stream of publications not only on economic policy but many other topics including education.

The OECD does not itself actually implement policies, as several of my interviewees emphasised:

“We do not spend money, and we do not have any legally binding instruments, so the only tool that we have is to give good policy advice...Our job is to develop policies and to present them to our members, hoping to find a consensus so that they agree on them and implement them” (OECD 1).

As this interviewee points out, the OECD does not function through legal power but through the “*soft power*” of “technical expertise” (Seller and Lingard, 2013:188). It is power nonetheless. According to Foucault, such power relations are intelligible “because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation” (Foucault, 1978:95). Modern society does not rely on force but rather on the technology of government, on *governmentality*, and on what Nye (2000:57) calls the “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions”.

The OECD positions itself “as an important node in a transgovernmental network where policy experts can meet, interact and devise coordinated responses to common policy challenges” not only in economic development but also in related areas including education (Eccleston, 2011:246). As my interviewee OECD 1 puts it:

“Not just economic policies. For sure, that is how we started, but now we work on health policies, education policies, environmental
policies, fiscal policies, governance policies. I guess we cover more or less *anything that governments around the world are worried about* (emphasis added).

Although it is a club of 34 countries, a number of other supranational organisations have a seat at the OECD table, and on occasion actually dominate the debate. As OECD interviewee 1 says:

“The World Bank, the IMF, the UN are all in our meetings. They take part as if they were members, except when there is something that needs to be voted on… But they join in the debate, sometimes they even dominate the debate, because they are leading in some regards obviously. So member countries are happy to have them around the table. So [the World Bank] do not just observe, they take part in the DAC and the OECD”.

As a supranational ‘best practice club’ with such wide policy interests and such important global stakeholders, the OECD inevitably takes on some government-like characteristics, despite its open-economy, free-market predilections. According to Lemke (2001:197),

> The economisation of authority works by adapting the underlying organising principle of ‘public’ authorities (i.e. governments) to an imagined field of competitive market relations. In this configuration government itself becomes a sort of enterprise whose task it is to universalise competition and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions.

In this way the OECD can be seen as a kind of ‘helicopter parent’, looking over almost all aspects of its members’ governmental activity. The *raison d'État* of the OECD has been gained by constructing itself “as a centre of policy expertise and comparative international data, based on its programmes of measurement, comparison and analysis” (Seller and Lingard, 2013:189). It is highly influential, therefore, when the OECD identifies education as a litmus test of future economic success (Peters, 2001a; 2001b; Olssen et al., 2004; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; Verger et al., 2012; Ball, 2012a; 2013b, Meyer and Benavot, 2013).
4.2 The rationality of Official Development Assistance:

trojan horse or Christmas present?

According to the OECD, Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC’s 23 List of ODA recipients 24, and to multilateral institutions, for the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD b). 25

The phrase “economic development and welfare of developing countries” very clearly includes the development of education in those countries. But allocation of aid for this purpose, like others, is strictly speaking a matter for individual donor countries. How does the ‘soft power’ of the OECD manifest itself in regulating the distribution of such aid?

Even though OECD does not allocate the budget, they monitor how much member countries spend on ODA each year, where they spend it, and what they spend it on.

“We don’t allocate ODA budget. We have a policy on how member countries should spend and use ODA, and we decide whether the money they spend is ODA or not...[the Government] has to submit

23 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the committee of the OECD which deals with development co-operation matters. Currently there are 26 members of the DAC: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission. [Accessed on 14th September 2013] http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacglossaryofkeytermsandconcepts.htm


“The DAC List of ODA Recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA). These consist of all low and middle income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World Bank with the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU. The list also includes all of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the UN”. (the appendix 3)

25 In general, ‘aid’ usually refers to “a transfer of resources on concessional terms-on terms that are more generous or “softer” than loans obtainable in the world's market” (Cassen et al., 1994:2).
to us in the OECD each year all the money they spent and tell us what money has been spent on what purpose in which countries, and that is what we check here. It’s an airport control tower" (OECD 1).

As the control tower, OECD takes on an oversight role of development assistance policies, as it were on behalf of developing countries. This is the function of the OECD Development Centre within OECD, which focuses on non-member countries. “The development centre put its focus on countries that are outside the OECD… we take care of the developing countries” (OECD 4).

Under a 1970 agreement OECD member countries are recommended to provide ODA of 0.7% of the member country’s Gross National Income (GNI). However, many member countries have yet to meet this quota; Korea, for example, plans to uplift its ODA spending to just 0.25% of GNI by 2015.

The Development Centre monitors both grants and loans, and defines what is meant by multilateral and bilateral aid, monitoring activity in each category. (In general supranational organisations recommend multilateral aid, but many national governments prefer bilateral assistance for various reasons - political, economic or social; more on this later.)

The OECD’s monitoring has two purposes. The first is to ensure the ODA budget is distributed ‘rationally’ and effectively to developing countries, for the second is to collect invaluable data about shifts and trends in aid policy and practice, the intentions of donor and beneficiary countries, and other aspects of the relations between developed and developing countries.

(Of course, such relations are wider than just official development assistance. Even at the purely economic level there are many other types of relationship such as foreign direct investment (FDI), private sector

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26 The best known target in international aid proposes to raise official development assistance to 0.7% of donor’s national income. (It was agreed first in 1970 and has been repeatedly re-endorsed at the highest level at international aid and development conferences.) [Accessed on 28th September 2013] http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm
commerce, bilateral and multilateral trade deals and so on. However the donor-beneficiary relationship inherent in ODA is an important reflection of changing rationalities in international relations.)

The monitoring is done under conditions agreed on by OECD members, with all the resulting expenditure and other data transparently available to all members. Nevertheless the metaphor used by OECD 1 of an airport control tower is revealing, evoking Bentham’s and Foucault’s Panopticon (1977). The metaphor suggests that each member country is aware of this central scrutiny and so exercises self-control to follow the rules they agreed on. The panopticon is normally regarded as a disciplinary technique for policing individuals and groups, but of course can be extended to embrace the worldwide policing of the OECD’s “airport control tower”, which functions as a supranational observation tower for reviewing and inspecting the aid-related activities of the 34 members countries - and also some non-member developing countries - through continuous field research, information distribution, advice, consultancy and policy recommendation.

4.2.1 The purpose of ODA (Official Development Assistance)

Many people equate aid with charity - a one-way act of generosity directed from high-income countries to their low income counterparts. That belief is wrong. Aid should be thought of as a hand up, not a hand out – and as an investment in shared security and shared prosperity. By enabling poor people and poor countries to overcome the health, education and economic resource barriers that keep them in poverty, aid can spread the benefits of global integration, expanding shared prosperity in the process. It can also reduce the mass poverty and inequality that increasingly threaten the collective security of the international community (United Nations Development Programme, 2005:75).

One of my interviewees, who had experience of working at UNESCO with both developed and developing countries, asked me at the very beginning of our conversation, “is your research about ODA as Trojan horse, or aid as
Christmas present?" Is aid instrumental, or altruistic? My immediate answer to him was "neither and both!" - neither in the sense that I want to examine the mechanisms of development aid in education without inserting my own judgement about the motivations involved; both in the sense that these two options do not exclude one another, that the intentions of governments, agencies and even corporations can be as mixed as those of individuals, as the interview data analysis tended to confirm, and that development assistance can help recipients while at the same time benefitting donors.

My interviewee’s questioning of “Trojan horse or Christmas present” itself represents a critical dilemma for ODA. There are many academic reports on the effectiveness, advantages and disadvantages of ODA, some focusing on what the aid is for, and for whom. And while there is continuous debate about the effectiveness of ODA, there is fairly wide agreement that at its best ODA has indeed contributed to the reduction of extreme poverty and the enhancement of well-being (Stiglitz, 2002; Sachs, 2005; Scholte, 2005). Several of my interviewees told me that, while the model may be imperfect, OECD policy-making on ODA has helped to mobilise support for development.

“When the donors go to developing countries they do not respect the local priorities. They often impose conditions on the aid related to their own expectations...how to adapt recommendations to a local context, how to adapt to local culture. And there is an important role for people who are able to translate and adapt international learning into local cultures” (OECD 2).

However, despite this emphasis on the importance of localisation and the responsibility of experts to translate policies into locally relevant action on the ground, there are also many reports of countries using ODA to impose political or economic conditions on developing countries, or in order to confer advantage on donor country companies by helping them obtain business in a particular national or regional market. For example Mitchell recounts how USAID to Egypt was used in the late 1980s as an instrument of US

27 see for example Sachs, 2005; 2009; Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2010
Government economic policy, with aid being switched on or off according as intergovernment talks went well or badly:

USAID conducts what it terms “cabinet-level dialogue” on macroeconomic policy with the Egyptian government. At times, USAID reports, when this ‘dialogue’ has not been ‘completely successful’ - meaning that the Egyptian government has rejected or delayed implementing American demands – “annual releases of funds have been delayed” (Mitchell, 1991:33).

In his analysis of international biopolitics, Mark Kelly (2010) describes this kind of conditional aid, which recipients are not in a position to reject even while knowing it promotes donors’ political or economic interest, as a kind of "parasitic imperialism".

Too often, in the allocation of bilateral aid, more attention has been paid to the advancement of donor countries’ political and economic self-interest, than to increasing the well-being of poor people in developing countries (see Younas, 2008:671). One of my OECD interviewees emphasised that, while ODA should not be used as an instrument of business development, governments often felt under pressure to present it as such to their media and their electorates, especially in times of economic hardship at home.

“Government should not be doing business through ODA…. Governments should not be asked about Return on Investment [when they provide aid]. But ironically governments emphasise this without thinking, because they go through audit processes and the media scrutinise their activities, and to be honest, people ask, ‘Why do we need to provide foreign aid?’” (OECD 5).

The polite or official term for this kind of conditional assistance is “tied bilateral aid”. Bilateral aid - development assistance between just two countries - can be of course untied; but in tied bilateral aid, assistance is given for spending on a project on condition that some or all of the spending is on goods or services based in the donor country, rather than procured through open competition. Bilateral aid, especially if it is tied, shows a particular tendency to operate in the donor country’s strategic interest, rather
than focusing on the interest of the beneficiary developing countries (Younas, 2008; also see Brech and Potrafke, 2013).

Research by Alesina and Dollar (2000) suggest that bilateral aid from former colonial powers like the UK, France and Portugal is often allocated to their former colonies, with decisions based less on promoting development on the ground than the maintenance of existing governmental ties, regardless of how corrupt the recipient governments might be (also see Mendoza et al., 2009). There is also much evidence that bilateral aid is sometimes given at least in part to secure political favours from recipient countries, for example to vote in the same way as the donor country in votes at the United Nations.

The UK government, having officially abandoned the practice of tied aid in 1994, has recently moved to rehabilitate the practice in the form of “reciprocal trade”. The Guardian newspaper reported a Conservative international development minister as arguing in a 2012 speech that:

> Aid to India was part of a broader plan to build trade and investment links, focusing part of the aid budget on public-private partnerships, outside the scope of traditional aid such as education or maternal health (Doane, 2012).

Specifically, the UK government was seeking the purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon jets by India as a quid pro quo for its development assistance. The UK’s £280 million of aid for India every year, the minister said, was “partly designed to win the bid… it is a very important relationship. The focus is also about seeking to sell Typhoon” (Doane, 2012).

The case of “reciprocal trade” shows the extent to which development assistance can be made to work, not just directly in the economic interest of a donor country, but more indirectly to enhance developed countries’ pursuit of global market competitiveness. As Tore Fougner (2006:165) puts it,

> International competitiveness has been constituted both as a (if not the) central objective in relation to which more or less all state policies should be considered, and as a (if not the) central means
to the resolution of more or less all other problems that the state is confronted with.

One effect of this tendency to use aid as an instrument for building developed country competitiveness is that aid programmes focus less on the poorest countries and increasingly on the middle income countries which have greater potential for market expansion. According to Mold et al.(2008:2),

What will most certainly happen [as a result of the 2008 economic crisis] is a notable shift in the composition of resource flows towards multilateral contributions, as more funds are channeled through the IMF and the World Bank. In this sense, there is a danger that much of the new resources will bypass the poorer, most vulnerable countries – and instead be destined almost exclusively for the emerging markets and middle income countries, in order to reduce systemic risks.

And indeed in 2013 the OECD reported that aid had fallen by 4% in the previous year, and that the decreased total was increasingly being channeled toward middle income countries (OECD, 2013c).

4.2.2 Issues in aid: corruption and democracy

One of the main issues in bilateral development assistance is its failure to deal with abuse by corrupt elites in recipient countries. The issue of corruption needs careful handling, as criticism in this area can so easily sound like paternalism; but corruption can single-handedly defeat the purpose of well-intended aid programmes by diverting the benefits away from poor communities and into private pockets. According to the economist Dambisa Moyo (2009), continuous aid for the last five decades has not much helped the development in Africa, mainly because of corruption and other governance issues. “The more it infiltrates, the more it erodes, the greater the culture of aid-dependency” (Moyo, 2009:37).

Corruption is a recurring problem in ODA. Rich elites are well-positioned to syphon off aid intended for their poor countrymen and women and abuse it
for personal wealth accumulation. Especially in less developed countries, corruption makes existing social inequalities even worse. Recent research has shown that corruption in developing countries was a “formidable obstacle” to achievement of the key UN development goal of Education for All (Vaughan, 2013:8).

According to the NGO Transparency International, corruption “hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority” (Transparency International a).

When it comes to education, what’s at stake is obvious: our future. When corruption prevents young people from exercising their fundamental right to attend school and receive an education, people lose out on their potential, and society suffers (Transparency International b).

One of my UNESCO interviewees told me “[if] IT company X were to bring $1 million to a country’s Minister of Education, immediately the country’s policy makers will be in their pocket”.

According to Moyo (2009), corruption is itself a structural product of the aid system. Too many African governments, she says, view aid as a “permanent, reliable, consistent source of income” which tempts them to do nothing but sit and wait for the flow; when the flow arrives, government bureaucracies use it either ineffectively or corruptly.

Closely related to the question of corruption is the question of democracy. Donor countries have a tendency to focus only on the kind of economic development that can be easily seen and measured, but most researchers and commentators would agree that aid should be used to promote democratic development as well, if only to ensure there are legitimate, sustainable authorities in place to monitor aid receipts, police the channelling of funds and stamp out corruption.

There are dissenting voices, however. Dambisa Moyo believes that economic growth comes before democracy, and that the latter can sometimes get in the way of the former. She argues that because:
the potential positive aspects of democracy have dominated discourse (and aid policy), Western donors and policy makers have essentially chosen to ignore the protests of those who argue that democracy, at the early stages of development, is irrelevant, and may even be harmful (Moyo, 2009:42).

In neoliberal vein, and quoting David Landes, Moyo identifies the main duties of governments as the securing of the rights of private property and personal liberty; the enforcement of contract rights; the provision of stable, responsive, honest, moderate and ungreedy government; the holding down of taxes; and reduction of the government’s claim on the social surplus. She adds that “in their world of aid-dependence, governments have failed at all these tasks and failed spectacularly”, Moyo argues (2009:147).

On the other hand, Pieterse (2012:2) rejects this “growth first, redistribution afterward” argument, arguing that the growth above all approach loses sight of the potential social and environmental costs of development, and leaves no space for democracy and equality. Many who follow this debate will find themselves wondering what development is for, and whether market-driven economic development that brings with it even greater disparities of wealth and an undemocratic, closed society is really worth the struggle?

4.2.3 Bilateral or multilateral aid?

“The OECD countries say that instead of having bilateral aid we should put the money together, and this way the ODA will be more efficient” (OECD 6).

Some of the problems associated with bilateral aid can be tackled by replacing it with multilateral aid organised through transnational channels such as the World Bank or the IMF, and such substitution is already happening especially in the case of large scale projects such as educational ICT infrastructure programmes.

But multilateral aid too raises the intractable question of precisely whose interests are being served? One of my OECD interviewees told me,
“[The World Bank and the IMF] were created to help their members to face crisis. They are more oriented toward developing countries. So the purpose is different, and when the IMF or the World Bank gives money to countries and lends money, they want something in return - hence all this conditionality and [insistence on] structural change” (OECD 6, emphasis added).

The "conditionality" mentioned by OECD 6 refers mainly to the neoliberal structural reforms - deregulation, privatisation, public spending cuts and the rest - which are usually required as the price of financial intervention (Verger et al., 2012). Commonly this conditionality will also include the injection of private sector management techniques into public sector organisations in a bid to enhance efficiency. Such forceful interventions into the governance of beneficiary countries are presented as efforts to ensure that aid is used efficiently and brings maximum benefits through improved structures and systems. But is this all it is?

I argue that such conditions and interventions function as mechanisms of global governmentality. In the globalised world of the 21st century no country can keep its sovereignty intact or its society immune from the impact of decisions made either in global corporation boardrooms or in the offices of supranational organisations such as the OECD or World Bank. Such impacts are not direct or coercive, but rather constitute a global governance system which works indirectly and strategically through the normalisation of, and widespread compliance with, a standardised policy framework - the rules, as it were, of the neoliberal game.

Since it is a kind of serious strategic game, countries compete to play it well: not “to evade regulation”, but on the contrary to take a lead in setting up regulatory regimes that might confer an advantage over competitors; Peters and Burbules (2004:10) call it “the first mover advantage”. Supranational organisations create in collaboration with leading developed countries new technologies and countries race to be the first to employ the latest transnational regulation techniques such as public-private consortia, competitive management models, or financial transparency. Greater visibility
of course is good for democracy, but it can also ease external surveillance: as Strathern (2000:309) puts it, "visibility as a conduit for knowledge is elided with visibility as an instrument for control".

Many large-scale global education projects - for example ‘skills’ promotion through the OECD's PISA and PIAAC, UNESCO's *Education for All* (apart of the Millennium Development Goals) and the World Bank's *Learning for All* programme - are being implemented in developing countries with the help of multilateral aid controlled by supranational organisations. The last mentioned project, the World Bank's Learning for All initiative, is explicitly positioned as helping confer competitive advantages on countries seeking to build a more flexible, market-compatible labour force in order to lift the country into the global middle-income bracket.

The stunning rise of new middle-income countries intensified the desire of many nations to increase their competitiveness by building more skilled and agile workforces. Another set of changes is technological: incredible advances in ICT and other technologies are changing job profiles and skills demanded by labour markets, while also offering possibilities for accelerated learning and improved management of education systems (World Bank, 2011:2).

A country like Colombia might well be taken as a model of the kind of development described here, having used school management reform and educational ICT to try to boost educational outcomes and labour skills, and improve economic competitiveness. Hence the relevance of the education technology case studies in chapter 7.

4.3 The OECD and education: human capital, the knowledge economy and the skills agenda

As we have seen, the OECD has evolved as an instrument of policy advocacy, promoting a range of neoliberal ideas and their application to public governance (Tikly, 2004; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; Ball, 2012a; 2013b).
In this section I look more specifically at how the OECD situates itself within the discourses and rationales of *education* policy formation.

As you might expect, the OECD’s approach to education policy is dominated by an economic logic. From its post-war beginnings the idea of human capital as a motor of economic development has formed the thinking of this club of developed countries, and during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the concept of human capital worked well in equipping populations with an education that made them economically useful. South Korea’s achievement of rapid industrial development, in part through a huge investment in education, is a good example of the human capital approach in action, one that is often held up to developing countries as a model.

During this period all developed countries became increasingly dependent on the intangible economic assets of knowledge and skills, as their once world leading manufacturing industries declined rapidly or shifted to developing countries where labour costs were cheaper. In this new type of economy, the educational *quality* of the working population became a key determinant of success. As the dominant new form of capital was knowledge, ‘human capital’ found a natural counterpart in the idea of a post-industrial ‘knowledge economy’ (Drucker, 1993). Knowledge and innovation were now commodities which you could transact in a market, as well as being crucial ingredients in economic success.

The OECD’s focus on human capital if anything intensified at the OECD in the last decades of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century. A 2007 policy document identifies the building of human capital through education as one of the most important challenges of globalisation, and as a key factor in fostering economic growth, social cohesion and financial stability (Keeley, 2007). In 2008 a key OECD policy text talks of the organisation’s work on education in similar terms, but in slightly different language and without using the phrase ‘human capital’:

> Countries spend a great deal on education, which is crucial to economic growth and social cohesion... [The OECD] helps
countries design and implements effective policies to address the many challenges faced by educational systems. It focuses on how to evaluate and improve outcomes of education; to promote quality teaching and to build social cohesion through education (OECD, 2008:19-20).

The educational discourse in these policy documents and interviews seems faultlessly rational. But rationality, as Flyvbjerg (1996) points out, “is penetrated by power”. It is critical to investigate the mechanisms whereby this apparent rationality is conveyed. The transformations in the OECD's deployment of its discursive power in education – from human capital, through knowledge economy, to skills - highlights a narrower interpretation of the effectiveness of education in the labour market.

**21st century skills**

In the early 21st century, then, there was a shift in the language used by the OECD to describe the economic value of education and training – a new discursive strategy which emphasises the role of the individual in the knowledge economy. The buzzword now is not human capital, but the more specific, narrower term ‘skills’. One of my OECD interviewees was very clear about this shift and what it signifies:

“A country’s human capital is the sum of all the skills of its individuals. ‘Human capital’ is more of a global concept, more of a nationwide concept - while ‘skills’ is more an individual concept. So this is why we moved from ‘human capital’ to ‘skills’, because... in societies which are more liberal, free market, with more individualism, policies are more oriented toward the benefits to the individual, rather than thinking in terms of society” (OECD 6).

This senior OECD policy maker was explaining that education is no longer seen as a collective activity for social good, but rather defined specifically as a goal pursued by individuals to ready them to meet the demands of a competitive labour market. Such a view of course reflects neoliberal thinking, and begins to undermine the traditional assumption that national
governments have a responsibility to provide general education to their populations.

As we have seen, the neoliberal state is seen as having an important role in guaranteeing and refining the stock of human or knowledge capital, but there are still debates about the proper boundaries of public versus private investment in this sphere. On the side of neoliberal economists it should be individual investment based on individual choice. Olssen et al. (2004:149) describe a neoliberal version of human capital, which emphasises private over public investment in education and stresses that “the benefits of investing in education accrued to the individual rather than to society”.

Such transformation of discourse is constructed within “an ideology which promotes markets over the state, and regulation and individual advancement/self-interest over the collective good and common well-being” (Lingard, 2009:18). It reflects a new ideal of the individual who needs to be creative and innovative in accumulating skills, in a life-long learning process which renders them useful in a constantly flexing labour market. ‘Skill’ becomes the keyword for public education as well as lifelong education. By putting more emphasis on individualism in education, governments can adopt a rather distant regulatory position, while letting individuals choose the education or training pathway which gives them the skills they want – or that they can afford. It is the classical neoliberal recipe applied to education: loosen the straightjacket of public provision, and let the people choose what they like. This rationality suggests that “the assumption of material progress through education is a ‘win win’ story for individuals and nations” (Lauder et al., 2012:51).

The interview data below reflects a rationale of “win win” tactics but it also reveals the dangers of a skill-focused education.

“The vision of skills at the OECD is broader than education. [Education is] a way to accumulate skills, but that is just a part of it. Because we really focus on the skills that you can acquire in the labour market. This is very important... in developing countries...[as] even if they don't' go to school they can still have
skills. So education is only a part of the story. Skill is broader than education in that sense. This is why it is paradoxical - because Education is going beyond work. You can do other things in society than just work, but you require skills to work. You require education to be a citizen; that is also a difference I think” (OECD 6).

This paradoxical comment reflects a deep internal contradiction in this interviewee's understanding of the purpose of education. It is as if a person's life as a citizen in society is separated in his mind from their life as a member of the workforce. While acknowledging that education should be about more than just skills, his focus remains on the skill as the only “object of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972:49), which serves to maintain and reproduce existing power and knowledge structures.

At this point it might be useful to look at the OECD skills strategy and its intriguing blend of totalising and individualist approaches. A 2012 OECD skills strategy chart (2012a) recommends a three-phased approach. First, a country should seek to develop the skills it needs by enabling people to learn throughout life, by attracting skilled immigrant workers to fill skills gaps, and by promoting cross-border mobility of higher education and qualifications. Secondly a country should activate its supply of skills by encouraging new workers to bring their skills to the labour market and by retaining the skilled workers who are already there. Thirdly, countries need to put their skilled workforce to efficient use by improving the match between workers' skills and business's requirements, and by helping to boost demand for high-level skills (also see OECD, 2012b; 2014).

The OECD's ability to disseminate its new, enhanced strategy of skills development gives it productive power to impact individual futures as well as national economic prosperity; and the OECD itself emphasises the fact that the new skills agenda demands the restructuring of existing education systems.

“I am talking about real life…You are educated, and some of your education can be useful as skills on the job market. But other parts of your education, they are not useful [for the labour market]
but still they are useful for you as human being and as a citizen. So that’s why I say that skills are narrower than education because when you go to school you learn more things than just skills for work...skills and education are different... the fact that you focus more on skills means that you have to change your education system to make it more adequate to the needs of the labour market... if you are thinking in terms of skills, then you don't teach philosophy. So I personally think that if you focus too much on skills, you will lose all [these other] components of education, this might be one of the implications” (OECD 6 emphasis added).

This is an interesting turning point during the interview. When I asked him to provide rather his personal view on education, he said “I don't think personally” (with a laugh). I talk as an OECD [representative]”. Nevertheless in the middle of interview he lowered his guard and used the word ‘personally’. This signifies a rupture in his official discourse and reveals his personal acknowledgement that the overemphasis on skills to meet the demand of labour market will ultimately change the purpose of education. I argue that such a revealing is possible only through in depth interview, which shows a subject constituted through discursive processes (Foucault, 1976; 1980c; 1982a; 1984a) and contradictory as in flux, and it shows the importance of communication towards understanding each other without bipolarising.

Nevertheless, the market driven economic rationality dominates the field of education in order “to generalize all the schools targeting to adjust the school system for future labour market “(OECD 6). He goes on to say:

“The skills vision is oriented to employability, but then you still can ask, what does that mean? I don't know. Maybe workers are more efficient if they have studied philosophy. Maybe they will think better about problems if they have a different vision of the world. So even that may be useful on the labour market” (OECD 6).

After emphasising the triumphant notion of skill, he became frustrated with our discussion, which felt more like a continuous debate on the meaning of education than just an interview. In the end, he compromised by saying “I
don’t know”. After the long exhausting interview, we compromised at the point of “I don’t know”. I interpreted this moment as a process of mutual understanding: could it be that what he has emphasised through his skills-focused policy work might not be the only solution for the future of education? The skills-based reformation of education will not stop, however, because there are many economic interests vested in it. One of the preoccupations of this thesis is the question of how the imaginary, abstract notion of skill is materialised in global education governance.

Through this analysis of changing concepts of education at the OECD, I have tried to show the underlying rules at work: “the new rules of formation on the basis of rules that are already in operation – but always in the element of a single positivity” (Foucault, 1972:171). The single positivity means here the notion of an economised education whose main purpose is to contribute to national economic success.

Since its “whole rhetoric of allusion and metaphor [has been seamlessly] codified” (Foucault, 1978:17), it is difficult for us to see clearly its mechanisms, and where it is heading. In this context, it is not wrong to say “the meaning of knowledge is at best implicit and at worst virtually empty of content” (Young, 2012:139). Therefore I will scrutinise how the mechanism works in global education discourse in the general policy.

Q: What exactly is quality in education [then]?

A: This has not yet been fully defined, but I think we are talking about cognitive skills, we are talking about knowledge, we are talking about students leaving school [equipped] with creativity and the ability to apply knowledge and to continue learning, we are talking about non-cognitive skills like diligence - these are very difficult to measure. We are actually working on a project to learn how we can measure non-cognitive skills (OECD 2).

This exchange is a lived example of how knowledge and power support each other through evidence-based data, which OECD claims is constantly produced through its research – research which ultimately provide a guide dor how we should think and act. We seem to have reached a stage where
“we are promised normalisation and happiness through science and law” (Foucault, 1982b:196). In the following section, I intend to scrutinise the rationality of research.

In the following section, I intend to scrutinise the rationality of research.

4.4 Evidence based research and the battle for truth

In the era of globalisation, the comparison of data has become a vital tool for the management of almost any organisations, projects or government programmes. It is a tool as Grek et al. point out is heavily dependent on numerical data:

The scale, velocity and scope of the uses of numerical data to manage grow exponentially all the time... Comparison is now cross border; it is both an abstract form of competition and an element of it; it is a proxy for other forms of rivalry (Grek et al., 2009:123).

It follows that the role of research as data production becomes more and more significant and pervasive. The 2010/2011 OECD document OECD Work on Education states that:

We provide comparative data and analysis on education policy-making, to help build efficient and effective educational systems and improve learning outcomes. We provide a forum where governments, business, civil society and academia can share best practice and learn from one another (OECD, 2010:1).

This description of the OECD’s approach to educational research and analysis was repeatedly corroborated by OECD interviewees. OECD 6, for example, put it like this:

“[Our work] is about best practices, based on data. We create data, we compile data, we compare data, we show where the problems are, and we discuss what are the best policies based on the experiences of the different countries” (OECD 6).
But from the vantage point of *governmentality* it is important that we pay attention to this description as a rationalising discourse – one which not merely describes, but reveals and legitimises a particular approach to educational policy-making. The invocation of ‘comparative data’ tends to make policy makers convinced that their policy is thoroughly evidence-based, objective, or even scientific. It appears to be simply the addition of rationality to the process of governing, but is in reality the addition of a new discursive power which can confuse as much as it illuminates.

I argue there is a growing tendency for research interests and the requirements of policy makers to converge, so that policies can be presented by governments as ‘evidence-based’, and socially mediated educational practices increasingly lend themselves to the approaches favoured by researchers.

Neoliberalism as an educational discourse has been very influential, not only changing school practices but also in defining the educational common sense, what can be thought or imagined about schools... [that] any society that wants to remain competitive needs to implement educational reforms emphasizing the development of a flexible, entrepreneurial teaching workforce . . . and a teacher-proof, standards-based and market-oriented curriculum (Fischman, 2009:4).

Policy makers all too easily forget that what comparative data shows depends entirely on what data is selected for comparison. For example, the OECD’s PISA, a triennial global educational league table, uses the same set of tests and background questions for 15 year old students in all participating countries. PISA administrators claim to be able to control for the huge differentials in levels of educational investment, differences in educational culture and expectation, and levels of literacy and school participation between, say, the Colombian Amazon, South Korea, Finland and the US. But a growing number of statisticians believe the methodology is flawed, and that the PISA tests simply do not compare like with like. Leading UK statistician Professor David Spiegelhalter said in a recent BBC radio 4 programme (2013), “As a statistician, I am left with serious concerns about the reliability
of the rankings, of the league tables, and the lack of evidence in PISA’s methodology in compiling them”. (I will revisit the PISA debate later in detail.)

Nevertheless OECD researchers build upon this body of comparative data gathered through desk research, surveys, tests and reviews to create a set of educational development targets or ‘benchmarks’ (another key term in OECD policy texts) which national policy makers are encouraged to align their local systems with. Few would argue that educational policy and practice should be evidence-based. But evidence-based research can also be an instrument of politics.

Still we need to think about the consequences of evidence research, especially if it affects the way of human life (see for example, Shahjahan, 2011). Research can offer knowledge for policy making as well as policy effects.

“I would say that if you want to make an impact, if you want to make the substantive work have an impact, you need to also be involved in the politics. But you should also not do the politics without evidence…The two are necessarily connected. Whenever they are not well connected, there will be a problem” (OECD 2).

I agree that the relation between evidence and politics is crucial, but argue that evidence cannot be reduced to measurable facts and calculations. Discussing the limitations of positivistic evidence-gathering, Hammersley (2005:86) reminds us of the importance of other sources of data including “personal experience” and “judgment”. Similarly, Davies (1999:118) argues that “evidence-based education is not a panacea, a quick fix, cookbook practice or the provider of readymade solutions to the demands of modern education”. In this context, I argue that we need to ask whether the data that have been selected tend to legitimise a particular model of education as constructive of a particular economic and social order - one which reproduces the neoliberal paradigm of the employable, malleable homo economicus.

Closely related to the notion of objective, quantitative evidence in education research is the equally prevalent notion of benchmarking - the setting up of a
standard against which instances can be measured. According to Kamens (2013:123), benchmarking has become "an important social tool for thinking about the contemporary world" and "a way to improve organisational functioning". But the concept is drawn from the domain of physical science, and tends to reinforce the assumption that complex political problems can have purely technical solutions. Stephanie Daza (2013:604) describes this tendency as "neoliberal scientism", which she defines as:

The uneven, albeit worldwide, convergence of the discourses of business and pre-Kuhn views of science, reconfiguring complex ecological and social challenges as apolitical (and often economic) problems in need of technical (nonideological) solutions.28

In the context of global education research and discursivity, the benchmarking of best practice constructs a set of standards of what constitutes ‘cutting edge’ education which gradually become naturalised and unquestionable. Larner and Heron (2002:760) describe the process thus:

These conceptual tools [of benchmarking] give us extra ways and sometimes new ways to think about what is flowing, moving, translated, and assembled through global imaginaries. They also suggest we need to consider how global imaginaries ‘stabilise’ (become rationalities, metadiscourses, logics) as they are communicated in some way, discussed with others, and then held onto as the basis for action and performance.

Some of my OECD interviewees showed some awareness of these stabilising, globalising imaginaries in the discourse of their research reports. For example, OECD interviewee 2 said,

“Now if we are talking about globalisation - what we have noticed is that more and more countries are trying to align their measurement of what are the right skills young people need to the same standards. And there are advantages and disadvantages to this. Of course every country should really be deciding for itself what [its own] necessities are” (OECD 2).

28 Also see Hyslop-Margison and Dale’s term (2005) “scientism as neoliberal ideology”.
While OECD interviewee 1 told me,

"Countries want to have their policy space... But we need a two-level approach: on the one hand we should have a global understanding that we have to lift people out of poverty, that everybody should have access to schooling, etc. But how to implement this? That needs to be done by countries according to their individual constraints and priorities".

My argument is that by constructing a dominant discourse of research focused on comparative data, benchmarking and best practice, the OECD is deploying its discursive power towards particular ends. The OECD thus maintains its status as a Panopticon, using disciplinary technologies to convince its member countries (and many non-members as well) to construct and reconstruct their own educational imaginaries in a globalising mould.

In the end, of course, implementation is done by individual governments or decision makers from each country, and there are choices involved. But in reality political leaders find it hard to reject a global imaginary which consensualises a particular model of development. Having seen the model of a highly-developed, successful scenario for education, along with the legitimacy and reputation conferred by OECD approval, which developing country is going to decide to opt out? For countries desiring to escape from economic difficulties by cultivating their human capital, the OECD offers an irresistible temptation.

"Some governments expect concrete advice on how they can improve their education system. Some governments expect a report, so they can show the world they are working with the OECD. Politics is politics, right? So you have people who are genuinely interested in reform, and you have those who are interested in politics only...They ask us to conduct a review and help [them]" (OECD 2).

"the point is that we cannot directly adapt OECD practices to developing countries. Given the level of development of each economy, you have to know how to translate or to adapt a particular OECD practice in the environment of [a particular] economy...Because you have to take [into] account not only the
historical background but also the current level of development of the economy in order to adopt some of the policies. That's the case, for instance, in education” (OECD 3).

This is what Foucault calls the mode of interdiction, an effect of power which operates at the level of desire and pleasure (Foucault, 1978; 1980). It is all about the power relations which shape and run through the dominant discourse.

One doesn’t have a power which is wholly in the hands of one person who can exercise it alone and totally over the others. It's a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised….it becomes a machinery that no one owns (Foucault, 1980e:156).

In these ways, the OECD with its membership of 34 developed countries exerts its discursive power to influence more and more countries to align to standards which the OECD recommends, and aims to convince aspirant developing countries that they too can realise development through local implementation of the recommended policies.

But it is a long and winding road which can easily fail because of lack of personnel, lack of financial resource, insufficient motivation, corruption or mismanagement. This paradoxical uneasy process will be examined in detail in the Colombian case studies in chapter 7.

4.5 Discourses of PISA

None of that [benchmarking] works if we forget the principle role of education, which is personal. Education is about people, about living, breathing human beings, and the minute we lose sight of that, and start to think only about international league tables and data points and party political policies, we lost sight of the dynamic at the heart of education (Sir Ken Robinson at BBC Radio 4, 2014d).
I return now to look more closely at the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment programme which has already been mentioned. I do this because PISA (along with the US National Centre for Educational Statistics’ four-yearly Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, or TIMSS) has risen to “strategic prominence in international education policy debates” (Meyer and Benavot, 2013:9) and is increasingly influential in driving global educational governance in both developed and developing countries.

“I agree there is not one perfect way to assess [educational] quality or learning outcomes. However if you want to have global learning and the sharing of international experiences, you need to have agreement around a set of standards that everybody can feel comfortable with” (OECD 2 emphasis added).

Through the apparatus of PISA, the OECD has created a firm focal point for global education discourse not by producing a perfect picture of education but rather by stirring up a big debate about its validity and disadvantages, and having created this ‘hot potato’, positioning itself at the centre of global education discourse. Here I intend to scrutinise, not the effectiveness of the PISA design - how good or bad the test model is, what kind of questions are given and how they are measured etc - but rather the impact it has had on global educational governance: how this mechanism works through the policy-making process as an apparatus of education globalisation. In other words, I intend to question whether the OECD indeed has “a set of standards that everybody feels comfortable with” as this interviewee says - or is it rather “an act of technocratic rationality [that claims] to be a politically and ideologically neutral undertaking which produces disinterested data to galvanise education reforms around the world” (Meyer and Benavot, 2013:11).

On 3 December 2013 the most recent PISA results, in which 65 countries took part, were released. Even before they were released they had become a hot issue in education debate. Why do educators, policy makers and the public take it so seriously? What does it mean to them and to the whole social body? Why has it had such productive power in global educational
discourse? As Andreas Schleicher, the OECD official who runs the programme said in an interview, “[PISA] has globalised the field of education” (Stewart, 2012:24).

To analyse this international comparative test in the light of governmentality I will use the concepts of “power of discourse” and “power over discourse” suggested by Siegfried Jaeger and Florentine Maier (2012:37-38). “Power of discourse” refers to the willing incorporation of individuals into a set of normalising power relations in society; whereas “power over discourse” draws attention to the unequal abilities of individuals or groups to either exert influence or be manipulated by others. “These concepts point to the ideological effects of discursive practices which help produce and reproduce unequal power in the world” (Jaeger and Florentine, 2012:4). I think the case of PISA shows these two kinds of power practice combining together.

In terms of the “power of discourse” the PISA studies are presented simply as statistical information about what actually works in education - evidence that policy makers may find it very hard to ignore. At the same time, we need to examine it from the perspective of “power over discourse”: what kind of consequence has it brought to global educational governance? Who can produce such a strong discourse on a global scale?

“The results are given huge publicity, with politicians and commentators from across the spectrum falling on them to justify their own views of how children should be educated” (BBC Radio 4, 2013).

PISA’s statistics influence not only the teaching profession, school managers, students and parents, but also politicians and civil servants. They are “not [simply] a numerical observation of the system but a force to restructure it” (Grek et al., 2009:131).
4.5.1 What PISA means in global education governance

The PISA Day website, hosted on 3 December, 2013 by “the Alliance for Excellent Education” and its nine partner organisations in the USA, explains “Why PISA does matter” as follows:

Because a high ranking on PISA correlates to economic success, researchers have concluded that PISA is one indicator of whether school systems are preparing students for the global knowledge economy of the 21st century.

High-paying jobs and high-profit industries require workers who can think critically, connect ideas, and work across international borders. Rich countries no longer require a large workforce to perform menial tasks, but school systems have traditionally been slow and difficult to change (PISA Day, 2013).

This rhetoric demonstrates sufficiently well the neoliberal educational aim, the tight concatenation between education and economic success. Economic success, high-paying jobs and high profit industries - these words are alluring for both individual students and nation states. As Meyer and Benavot (2013:10) point out, PISA is presented by its advocates as facilitating evidence-based decision-making, aiding national movements for educational reform, and spurring productive labour markets and international competitiveness.

Just as the OECD sprang from US policies during the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, this new comparative education agenda is also, I would argue, in part a reflection of American global power. International comparative assessments of education systems were initially developed in countries such as the USA in the 1950s and 1960s to improve their own education through the study of other systems, and provide knowledge of the quality of other countries’ human capital. Moreover Daniel Tröhler argues that the theoretical reference point of the PISA programme is cognitive psychology, with its belief that intellectual processes are fundamentally uniform regardless of setting or culture, and that this approach is rooted in Cold War technocratic assumptions.
Since the specific concern of the Cold War, education has become a technocratic affair that is dominated by experts and operates largely outside the traditional research institutions, and that means outside the traditional control mechanisms of academia (Tröhler, 2013:158).

The productive power of this particular discourse is not limited to the PISA ranking system, but goes deeper. OECD 2 continues,

“Another thing that is very valuable... in PISA is we have very extensive background questionnaires which we give the students before they undertake the test, to find out about personal background, their learning environment, their teachers and schools, their motivation, their home environment, their socio-economic status, their migrant status... And through all these background questions, when we analyse them in conjunction with the PISA result, we learn a lot about what make students have better learning outcomes. And in fact this is much more valuable than the PISA results themselves” (OECD 2).

Some academics also point out the genuine contribution of PISA through secondary analyses to the theoretical progress of core social science disciplines (Owens, 2013; Torrance, 2006). For example, I agree with Harry Torrance (2006:828) when he suggests the answer to the question whether anything can be learned from comparative studies, “is a clear ‘no’ with respect to the basic league headlines, but ‘perhaps’ when...looking at some of the detail that emerges from analyses of scores in relation to other background data”. This secondary analysis is also a big part of PISA reports, but not on the surface to the public. “There are more data, why they do better... which doesn’t attract media attention” (BBC Radio 4, 2013). Among researchers who analyse and reflect on it this background data is meaningful. But for the general public, educators and decision makers, PISA's influence is all in the direction of reproducing a standardised discourse of normalising but simplistic and ultimately misleading benchmarks.

Here are two reflections on PISA from OECD interviewees:
“ranking is a sort of symbol of globalisation in a way, as we are ranking so many countries according to a common scale, but what is much more important is that we have a growing agreement among more and more countries about what a good and quality education system actually is... how many years of education... was [used as] a proxy for the quality of education. Another proxy used for quality of education was the amount of money [countries] put into the education system... If a country put a large proportion of its GDP into education, then it was seen as a quality education system...[which is] not necessarily linked to the quality of the learning outcome. So this is a big paradigm shift in the last 15 years... and PISA in particular has driven this forward... what we say about PISA is that it is not just about what children know, but about whether they can apply their knowledge in practical settings... a worldwide paradigm shift in the education system: whereas it was about repeating knowledge, now it is about applying knowledge, about being innovative and about creative thinking. Because these are the skills that are needed in society and in the labour market ... it is a global shift” (OECD 2 emphasis added).

“I think this test [PISA] is a good indicator of the quality of education because it tests how students can apply what they have learned in the current life” (OECD 3).

As these interviewees suggest, the present-day PISA programme is linked to a worldwide paradigm shift in education practice, focusing not just on knowledge itself, but on the application of knowledge and the acquisition of skills needed in labour markets. In short, the quality of education is seen as being equal to how well it matches the needs of the market. If it does not match, it is considered a failure. By creating “the international audit culture”, and the comparative data gained through PISA, the OECD researchers and policy makers have tended to reduce education policy to a simple focus on skills (Kamens, 2013:136). It is important to consider how the statistics are used in practice in global education governance, especially in the light of Foucault’s claim that the art of government and empirical knowledge expressed in government statistics work together as a critical political rationality (Rabinow, 1984:14).
4.5.2 PISA and Education reform

The PISA rankings are used to justify a consistent pattern of education system reforms across the world in both developed and developing countries. Regardless of Left or Right, governments all use this data as a magic bullet to enact their favourite reforms with the claim they are based on clear, indisputable statistical evidence. Normalising judgements, through this comparative test, are applied to education systems worldwide, and with this standardised test every student and teacher, school and national education system faces reforms. These reforms are usually in the direction of increased deregulation and privatisation. Marlaine Lockheed (2013:179) notes that, “the rise in the number of countries participating in international assessment occurred concurrently with the rise in education reforms related to decentralisation of education systems”. Based on the empirical data, a certain standardisation of quality education is agreed among the education leaders, leading to a restructuring of education systems in the direction of skills-based teaching and learning.

Pasi Sahlberg, a Finnish education official, considers that PISA is an “illness”, which travels with pundits, media and politicians. “This process where education policies and ideas are lent and borrowed from the business world is often motivated by national hegemony and economic profit, rather than by moral goals of human development” (Sahlberg, cited in Stewart, 2012:24). As a result, educators all feel pressured to measure up to an increasingly standardised and value-laden set of benchmark criteria. This comparison turns out to be a visible mechanism for governing at all levels – at the level of the individual person, of the organisation, and of the nation state.

4.5.3 The mechanism to have more participants

When it raises such a level of debate, particularly in developed countries, why do more and more developing countries want to take part in PISA? In
2012 there were 65 countries all together, including 31 non-OECD members. Part of the answer is that these developing countries wish to take part in a global education discourse, to become more visible to their international peers and to be included in a global educational market place:

“Developing countries expect to get a comparative look at where they stand in terms of learning outcomes of their children. They get a much greater understanding of what practices in their education systems work, and which ones do not, which kinds of school are performing better than others, which students are performing better other than others. They also get a lot of exposure to international best practice. They participate in meetings and processes around PISA, so they get a lot of exposure to colleagues in other countries. This is another benefit of participating” (OECD 2).

Others have their doubts about the validity of PISA tests, but nevertheless still use them:

“It is a global examination…[which] is not fair. It is not fair…

Q: Why do you take part in PISA then?

A: Because you need to be a part of globalisation... Ministry of Education wants to [be able to] compare... When you are in a global world, you need to think that there are some reference [points] in a global matter, in a global way of thinking that are important for people to develop. Because the earth is one ... You have to have some standard... if you have the point of view of an external source, in Colombia it is important to have that point of view of the external source. It sounds stupid, but it is the way of Colombians to analyze their capacities. If you have PISA, it is important for the society and for the country to have a reference [point]… I don’t know if I love it - I don’t - but it is the way this society evaluates itself” (Colombian consultant 1).

Or as Stephen Heyneman puts it in his personal communication with David Kamens (2013:123-126):

They (non OECD members) wanted the prestige of competing and benchmarking themselves against the exclusive club of rich countries represented by the OECD... and the prestige of being
included among the ‘great powers’ was an incentive enough... It becomes a signal to others that the given country and its elite were ready to participate in standard rituals of nationhood in an international community in which assessment had become a major ritual of rationality.

Another driver of participation is the encouragement by international organisations such as UNESCO and donors such as the World Bank. According to Marlaine Lockheed (2013:166), who worked for the World Bank from 1985 to 2004, PISA participation became a tool for judging accountability and aid effectiveness, and even a kind of qualifying precondition for development assistance. It means that taking part in the international school achievement assessment was “a quid pro quo for international donor support for a country’s education sector”. In this way PISA, school system restructuring, and official development assistance policies reveal themselves as linked together with a common basis in neoliberal scientism.

As far as education policy is concerned, the supranational organisations OECD, the World Bank and UNESCO work more or less in unison. For example, the World Bank ten-year strategy *Learning for All* emphasises skills in very similar language to that of the OECD (World Bank, 2011). The Bank’s focus is on “reforming education systems at country level and building a high-quality knowledge base for education reforms at the global level” (World Bank, 2011:5), relating such reforms to enhancing the impact of multilateral aid in this sector.

Multinational corporate entities are also involved in disseminating the global education policy consensus. The Pearson Foundation has produced a series of videos in collaboration with the OECD praising the PISA process and its most successful participants, entitled “Strong performers and successful reformers in education.” 29 When I asked one of my OECD interviewees about this collaboration, they commented:

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29 See the website [http://www.pearsonfoundation.org/oecd/]
“Well in the context of PISA what we want in our reports and our data not to just sit in a cupboard, but to actually be used and to be exploited and so that we can inform better policies... We have partnerships with think-tanks [such as Pearson] so that we can make the best of their research ability coupled with our contribution to the data and the evidence base.

Q: Pearson textbooks are everywhere.

A: Yes [Pearson] have a strong history. No doubt they are very prominent actors in the education field.

Q: What about cultural difference?

A: Clearly that is a problem. You cannot expect a one size fits all solution… I would not agree that is always a good thing (OECD 2).

Multinational corporations have indeed become dominant players in aspects of global education discourse and governance - a phenomenon I will look at in the next chapter.

Throughout this discussion I have tried to analyse the production of knowledge as a form of power; to look at how the OECD’s discursive practices in global education and techniques of power are validated, justified and taken for granted at various levels - by governments, other organisations, and ultimately in ourselves - within an overall coherent system of knowledge; and to show how the OECD’s power produces, through agreement and consensus, what Foucault calls “domains of validity, normativity and actuality” (Foucault, 1972: 68). In PISA we see a prime example of Foucault’s “rituals of truth” which are used to rationalise discursively what kind of education is important, how it should be performed, and how manifested (Foucault, 1977:194).

This coherent system of knowledge/power has been orchestrated by the OECD and other supranational organisations. There are differences of emphasis between them, but the dominant vision of the purpose of education
- the need for it to bend to the demands of the market - is consistent. I argue that what the OECD offers in its educational policy documents and the discourse of its policy makers is a developed-country logic, one which economically developed countries seek to impose on developing country populations in order to create a better fit with the global market economy.

For most of my OECD interviewees, however, their authority and professional position was invested in the conviction that their work had the objective power of scientific evidence. To them their findings were not what Meyer and Benavot (2013:22) refer to as “a contingent institutional phenomenon”; to them they were the truth. The truth here is to be understood “as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution circulation and operation of [neoliberal status quo] statements” (Foucault, 1980c:133). The education policies they produced are nevertheless an example of what Foucault (2010:243) calls "economisation" – that is, the collapse of all other arguments into the economic one.

When I asked one of my OECD interviewees if he had any concerns about possible negative impacts of PISA, he replied:

I don’t think so. We have a situation in which we’ve had a global economic crisis, we have a lot of people who do not have the skills to find jobs and this is not just an economic but also a social problem. (OECD 2)

I argue his remark powerfully captures the mentality of a population subjected to economisation. Certainly many governments sought a quick economic solution to the social problems arising from the crisis. “They believed that renewed economic growth alone would eliminate most if not all of these social problems” (Tang, 2007:197). Especially in East Asia economic development became a primary goal and the in the process the neoliberal rationalities provide these countries with a vison and a strategy (Tang, 2007). This moment was a kind of existential turning point, according to Thrift, “when capitalism began to use its fear of uncertainty as a resource” (Thrift, 2005:1).
The source of evidence through its assessment is not seen as fallible in the context of current neoliberal policy imperatives, which is problemactic (Torrance, 2012). What they say is limited or constrained by macro neoliberal discourse – competition and individualisation. At *economisation* is the root of the all-encompassing drive for 21st century skills, and is now the rationalising foundation of education policies at OECD. To re-emphasise this point, and its potential effect on the human educational project, I share once again here a comment from one of my OECD interlocutors:

“The fact that you focus more on skills means that you *have to change your education system* to make it more adequate to the needs of the labour market…if you are thinking in terms of skills, then you don’t teach philosophy” (OECD 6 emphasis added).

This is the fundamental economistic thrust which drives, not just neoliberal education reforms, but also *fast development* in general: ‘compressed modernity’ in Chang’s phrase (Chang, 1999), or what Daza calls “life in the fast lane” (Daza, 2013: 603).

### 4.6 Another global education survey: PIAAC

In the wake of widespread participation in PISA, the OECD initiated a global survey of adult skills, the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) (OECD, 2013d). The first PIACC report in 2013 signalled a new emphasis on competencies and skills within the knowledge economy paradigm. The report stated that PIACC had been designed:

> to provide insights into the availability of .. key skills in society and how they are used at work and at home. The first survey of its kind, it directly measures proficiency in several information-processing skills – namely literacy, numeracy and problem solving in *technology-rich environments* (OECD, 2013d:23 emphasis added)

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30 In the first test of PIAAC, which was held with the 20 OECD member countries and 3 OECD sub-national entities and 2 non-members, 79.1% of participants took computer based assessment among some computer experience group.
OECD Secretary–General explained that “we need to participate fully in, and benefit from, our hyper-connected societies and increasingly knowledge-based economies” (OECD, 2013d:3).

This new, ‘upgraded’ knowledge economy discourse posits the formation of adult skills as the prime object of education; assumes that, as with school performance and PISA, levels of adult skills can be surveyed and measured quantitatively; and places these skills firmly in the context of the ‘human capital’ requirements of the global knowledge economy.

While PISA seeks to identify ways that schools can operate more effectively, PIAAC focuses on the best ways for adults to acquire the skills that make them more employable, and on the benefits they can derive from using them.

“In PIAAC you measure actual skills. This means that you go to where people are working, and you measure their skills... So the objective of PIAAC is to see if the people who are already working have adequate skills” (OECD 6).

What is being assessed are the “key information-processing competencies” needed for education and training, social and civic life, and participation in the labour market. The 2013 report points out that:

To this end, it collects information on how skills are used at home, in the workplace and in the community; on how these skills are developed, maintained and lost over a lifetime; and on how these skills are related to labour market participation, income, health, and social and political engagement (OECD, 2013d:25).

The emphasis is on the importance of skills for both the betterment of individual lives and the enhancement of national prosperity; 21st century skills should now be top of everyone’s educational priority list.

Skills have a major impact on each individual’s life chances. Low-skilled individuals are increasingly likely to be left behind...and countries with lower levels of skills risk losing competitiveness as the world economy becomes more dependent on skills (OECD, 2013d: 26-28).
This official discourse uses the metaphor of a competitive race in which not just countries but each individual must strive not to be left behind in their continuously-updated portfolio of skills. Lifelong learning and acquisition of skills become a kind of insurance policy against the risk of unemployment, economic disadvantage and poor health. A subtle shift has taken place within neoliberal discourse away from national responsibility for a society’s human capital, toward each individual subject shouldering the responsibility for the market-fitness of their own skillset. Through such an examination, the whole population is manifested as subjected beings and objectify themselves into this neoliberal competitive rationality (Foucault, 1977:184-185).

Moreover, the skills in question are increasingly the cognitive and information-processing competencies which Haycock identified more than 20 years ago as the 21st century survival kit (Haycock, 1991:16). As Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, commented in 2012, "Education offers each individual and nation the best chance of navigating an unknown future – coping with uncertainty, adapting to evolving conditions, and learning how to learn" (Lee, cited in Barber et.al, 2012:3)

In the next section I scrutinise the process of linking education with innovative technology to enhance learning and teaching as an official discourse.

4.7 Technology as the future of education?

The PIAAC survey is mostly computer based, with 79% of participants answering the test questions on computers, and this is not just because it is convenient and cost-effective. It reflects the fact that in the interconnected digital era ICT competence has become a necessary ingredient of the adult skillset. Digital technologies have come to underpin virtually every social and economic activity, education not excepted. In discussions around what targets the international community should set itself beyond the Millenium Development Goals, the slogan of ICT for education is heard more and more
frequently; and one of my aims in this research is to ask what this slogan might mean. How practical and achievable is it? Is it just another globalising infrastructure improvement? Or does it carry within itself the potential for the development of more authentic, local and democratic educational practices?

The problem of ICT infrastructure and connectivity moved centre-stage at the UN's 2013 advocates meeting on post-2015, the date when the current MDGs run out United Nations (2013a). After fifteen years of focusing on pushing up the numbers of children in school worldwide, the emphasis is moving onto providing access to “high quality learning”, especially for children who currently have least access to formal schooling (United Nations, 2013b:2). The UN strategy puts three intractable educational problems together - access, equity and quality - and offers a solution to all three in the form of educational ICT.

“We divide the potential or functions of ICT in education into different angles or perspectives: for example we tell them that ICT can improve access to education, it can improve the quality of education, and it can also improve the equity of education” (UNESCO 1).

The starting point for this concern for digital equity is an understanding that great inequalities in wealth, power and opportunity distort and debilitate education systems, and a belief in the potential role of digital technology as a lever of social justice (Resta and Laferriere, 2008: 765). But there is an economic rationale as well. The International Society for Technology in Education (ISTE) returns to the neoliberal concept of 'human capital' to argue that economic necessity is at least as important as 'humanitarian' considerations in justifying the technologising of education. According to ISTE:

the waste of potentially productive lives cannot be tolerated in a society that values the life of each of its citizens. Even if, as a nation, we wish to ignore the social dimension of this waste, we cannot ignore its business consequences. As we move into the Information Age, businesses need highly skilled employees in increasing numbers. For the sake of our national economic health,
we cannot accept a generation of increasing numbers of under-prepared workers. Both for humanitarian and business reasons, we must consider the immediate future as the *Era of Human Capital Development* (Braun, 1990:11 cited in Shutkin, 1988:215, his own emphasis).

Grounds for the optimism surrounding the potential of educational technologies are many and various. It is widely assumed that children 'naturally' take to and enjoy computer-based learning, that it puts powerful new tools into teachers' hands, and that ICT can swiftly solve logistical problems such as the delivery of classroom materials or in-career teacher training. Assumptions are also made about the naturalness of public-private partnerships for the setting up and delivery of educational ICT projects, both in formal education and in further education and workplace training. I argue that these assumptions need to be interrogated, by asking what is actually happening on the ground, and what are the knowledge/power contingencies and dynamics at work in such projects. Selwyn wisely urges the need to critique the dominant discourses of educational ICT, and to be awake to any partiality and provisionality in the evidence - warning us against the danger of accepting overarching grand theories of educational technology (Selwyn, 2012:156).

New technologies are not neutral tools or empty channels through which educational practice can flow unaffected. On the contrary, ICTs are effectively social actors with the power to alter actions and aspirations, and reconfigure subjectivities (see Peters and Burbules, 2004:25; Latour 2007). The *deployment of information technology* into schools can have unforeseen ramifications in terms of inadequate infrastructure, new classroom practices, new teacher training needs, lack of software, commodification and homogenisation of content, equitable distribution and so forth, and each education ICT projects needs to be considered in its full political, economic, social and cultural context (Shutkin, 1998:205-206). This is especially important in developing countries where there are likely to be deep digital divides between rich and poor, urban and rural, those with access and those without.
In the 21st century, Adam Smith's benignly deterministic "invisible hand of the market" operates in new ways. As Higgins (2006:6) puts it, “the invisible hand now has its fingers glued to keyboards connected to the microchips of the world”.

Without denying the liberating, empowering potential of new education technologies, I hope in my case studies and analysis to understand how they might be co-opted by the globalising logic of neoliberalism and the competitive drives of multinational ICT businesses, and used to create conditions more conducive to market expansion and spiraling profits than to educational growth and fulfillment (Bowers, 1998).

One model of how ICTs can impact on school structure and culture is that embraced by the Rocketship group of e-schools in Wisconsin and California, whose 5,000 students spend a quarter of their day online. Rocketship schools employ many fewer teachers than comparable schools, having laid off up to 50% of their teaching workforce, but pay their remaining teachers - the ones who are most successful at the remote delivery of computer-mediated lessons - up to 50% more than the norm (MaTague, 2014; BBC Radio 4, 2014a). The Rocketship school has managed to achieve good performance and popularity through “combining technology” and “competitive teachers” (BBC Radio 4, 2014a).

Rocketship Education became a benchmarking model for Ark Schools, one of the biggest academy chains in the UK, for its “blended learning” model (see Stewart, 2014a; MaTague, 2014). Its ‘innovative’ strategy of “humanising classrooms with ICT” is certainly in tune with dominant global education discourse, but it’s an approach that not all will wish to emulate, as it seems to value those softer aspects of the teacher role - pastoral care, role modelling and moral guidance - that can best be carried out face-to-face, replacing them with a rather reductionist, inhuman performativity.

Performativity, a term imported from the economic realm, is an influential notion within the neoliberal paradigm. In the education domain it implies a shift away from teaching as a form of cultural modelling, toward teaching as
training students to perform in a ranking system. The role of teacher morphs into that of service providers, students and their parents are cast as customers, and grades become the only currency that matters. As Marshal (1999:310) says, “the demands of performativity mean not the pursuit of educational ideals, like personal autonomy or emancipation, but instead the subsumption of education under the demands of efficiency for the total social system”.

In my view the successful deployment of educational ICT requires three elements to come together: *the new technology itself*, for example, infrastructure and digital devices; *cultural and societal adjustments*, for example, changes in practice, in the relationship between teachers and learners, and in the distribution of educational resources; and *new knowledge* - that is, new and innovative digital *educational content*. And it is perhaps the last of these three elements that offers the most immediate hope of transformative impacts on the educational experience of very large numbers of students.

The next chapter looks at the emerging dominance of a new funding mechanism for educational digital technology distribution.
Chapter 5  Public private partnership (PPP): a new form of partnership for education practice

In this chapter I review the role of another key transnational organisation, the UN Education, Science and Culture Organisation (UNESCO), as a mediator in global education practices; and the growing profile of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a method of financing large educational technology projects.

I also scrutinise in detail two educational technology initiatives - One Laptop Per Child and iEd Africa – which not only both occupy an interesting position on the borderline between public and private, but also raise a number of important issues in education for development.

5.1 PPP: a new governance in neoliberal rationality

In the last two decades there has been a growing tendency for public and state organisations to operate along corporate lines. Even in the field of education, traditionally considered a strand of social welfare founded on principles of equity and public good, providers have tended increasingly to act as if they were operating in a competitive environment with the routine rules of business applying. It has come to seem a sensible and pragmatic solution where public funding for education has been limited. In many developed countries the tendency has been encouraged and sponsored by the state itself in order to inject market efficiencies, enhance performance and above all make financial savings in public sector enterprises.

In many respects this is no more than a logical extension of the idea that public and private sector organisations should cooperate with each other, under state sponsorship or encouragement, as a solution for the financing and managing of large-scale, usually capital, projects. Such public-private funding seems especially attractive in times of economic crisis when tax
revenues drop. Thus “public-private partnership” (PPP) projects became common after the economic crisis of the late 1990s, as a way of leveraging scarce funds for strategic capital projects.

These trends have been apparent too in the international projects of the United Nations and its agencies. Of course many development assistance projects, large and small, have always proceeded through a mix of public resources and private or third sector efforts. But public-private partnership began to take centre stage in multilateral development discourse when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated at the Davos World Economic Forum in 1997 that:

“The link between the work of the United Nations and business is a vitally important one…. Strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the private sector will be one of the priorities of my term as Secretary General” (United Nations, 1997).

This UN policy stance was reiterated more recently by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon who in a speech in 2012 at the Korean National Assembly spoke about using partnerships between the public and commercial sectors to “do more with less” in official development assistance projects (News 1, 2012); and it is based on advice from policy advisors such as the distinguished economist Jeffrey Sachs. In 2013 Sachs wrote:

Anti-market sentiment is no friend of poverty reduction. But neither is free-market fundamentalism. Economic growth and poverty reduction can’t be achieved by free markets alone. Disease control, public education, the promotion of new science and technology, and protection of the natural environment are public functions that must align with private market forces (Sachs, 2013).

What Sachs says is perfectly logical, but my focus here is on the subtle shift in the way we think and talk about issues like poverty reduction, education or the role of the state, as a result of this new alignment of public and private interests. As PPPs become increasingly common, the subjectivity of public sector actors is subtly changing. Cerny (1997:260) argues that “to adapt to a range of complex changes in cultural institutional and market structures, both state and market actors are attempting to reinvent the state as a quasi-
enterprise … in a wider world context”. The state now only regulates at a
distance, and is seen primarily as a guardian of profitability.

One consequence of this process is that developing countries are
encouraged to enter into private sector partnerships to solve short or medium
term resource problems, without fully understanding the long term
dependencies that are being set up. Discussing PPP in the context of UK
government policies during the 2000s, Holden (2009) describes the way that
such policies were actively ‘exported’ to developing countries as part of UK
industrial and trade policy. Holden sees this policy transfer as a way of
laying the basis for winning follow-up construction and consultancy contracts
by British companies. In this way,

…the drawbacks of PPP/PFI (private finance investment) may be
accentuated for developing countries as a result of severe
resource constraints, locking them into long-term arrangements
which may divert resources from elsewhere. PPP appears to
release more resources in the short term, but entails expensive

Holden points out that it is a strategy driven less by what is good for the
wellbeing of citizens in developing countries, or even by the ideology of
“knowledge transfer”, than by the direct material interests of British firms;
while on the public side, PPPs usually result in an expensive long-term
commitment to running and/or modernisation costs (Holden, 2009:330).

In Colombia, an astonishing 40% of students are in private schools – almost
all of which are located in urban areas, while rural public schools often don’t
have proper premises, equipment or qualified teachers. The Colombian
government is trying to narrow this urban/private, rural/public educational
divide, via a large-scale and ambitious public-private partnership with Korean
companies financed in part by Korean ODA. In such a scenario the injection
of educational ICT seems like a magic bullet which can swiftly overcome
problems to do with geographic remoteness, lack of access to materials, and
inadequately qualified teachers, and governments often turn to public-private
partnerships for the investment needed to achieve this short-cut to quality. This Colombian case will be explored further in detail in chapter 7.

In summary, PPP may sometimes work well in terms of a) cost sharing, especially to cover financial shortages, b) legitimacy building - as partnerships are usually with internationally well-known institutions, and c) complementary specialisation, with each partner bringing a particular expertise or skillset. However, it can also bring problems of appropriate development, long-term dependency, and global equity.

In an interview with TES magazine John Bangs from Education International, offers food for thought: “the idea that business can substitute for proper taxation, proper governance and proper conception of a public education system is a myth” (Stewart, 2014b:7). In considering how public-private partnerships operate in the field of educational development, close attention needs to be paid to the details of how power is negotiated by the different parties involved, and how it can be mediated by non-commercial agencies in the best interests of developing countries. In this context it is important to understand the role of supranational organisations such as UNESCO.

5.2 The role of UNESCO as a global mediator

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is the only United Nations agency with a mandate to cover all aspects of education, and as such is a focal point for international education policy-making and multilateral aid advocacy. My focus here is on UNESCO’s policies for education and training, and its work with governments and other supranational organisations on the implementation of ICT in education.

Under the motto “Building peace in the minds of men and women”, UNESCO’s overall educational mission is to support the achievement of “Education for All”. Whereas OECD is an economic organisation for a ‘club’ of 34 developed countries, UNESCO has a membership of 195 countries – two more countries than the UN itself. Like the OECD, UNESCO does not
actually implement projects on the ground, but creates the policy contexts within which projects can be implemented by member governments.  

UNESCO’s education objective is to “work with governments and a wide range of partners to make education systems more effective through policy change” (UNESCO, 2013b) - meaning that policy change is a means for educational system development, but is done by consensus and not through coercive power.

(Incidentally, this is why the Foucauldian approach to power, referring not simply to governmental power but to “power as strategy” (Foucault, 1982a) – that is, the power relationships between subjects – can be used to illuminate the dynamics of power in transnational organisations like UNESCO.)

Like the OECD, UNESCO’s recent educational policy discourse emphasises the importance of employment-related skills –“skills for the world of work through technical and vocational education and training” (UNESCO website a) – and in particular the importance of ICT skills development to fit students for work in 21st century employment sectors. Digital technologies are also seen by UNESCO as powerful tools for effective teaching and learning not only in institutional and collective environments such schools or community groups, but also in individual self-study.

There are a number of difficult equity issues involved here, entwined with new technology market development - issues to do with unequal access by teachers and students to technology infrastructure, to service providers, to content and to user expertise. I am not just talking about the digital divide between developed countries and developing countries; more critical in this context is the digital divide between rich urban and poor rural communities, a

31 All the staff I interviewed at both OECD and UNESCO stressed that they are policy makers and do not implement projects. It made me wonder about the boundaries of policy responsibility, and the discourse which blurs these boundaries, shifting responsibility from the policy makers to somewhere else. These supranational organisations provide the educational policies and convince the governments to reform for the better, which is defined by them with professional research-based data. In the end, what they say is that the implementation is in the hands of member governments.
phenomenon common to both developed and developing countries. There is, so to speak, a South in the North and a North in the South: the rural poor and marginalised in developing countries have far less access to new technologies than do the metropolitan rich in those same countries, while the latter have more or less the same opportunities as their equivalents in developed countries. I will explore this complex equation through case studies later in this thesis.

Despite their different constituencies and missions, these two supranational organisations (UNESCO and OECD) often work hand in hand in the context of global education policy, collaborating to disseminate what they consider to be best practice in educational ICT. One of my OECD interviewees talked about his organisation’s close collaboration with UNESCO on the ground in South East Asia:

“My role is [to handle] relationships with non-member countries and partnerships with other international organisations. For example I am a part of the team that will go to Thailand to work on a review together with UNESCO, we will work on Thai education development and policy.

[Q: Is it to diagnose the Current Thai education system and make suggestions?]
A: Yes!

[Q: How to cope with world standards?]  
A: Yes… We will share lessons from our experience in OECD and UNESCO, with the Thai government to suggest ways that they can improve. It will be about teacher policy, about the curriculum, about assessment systems, and about ICT (OECD2).

This example highlights some powerful modalities in the global mobility of education policy discourse and practice, uncovering the process by which UNESCO and OECD policy makers, academics, and think-tank researchers move from country to country, meeting face-to-face with governments and providing empirical evidence to convince local policymakers to follow their lead.

Such mobility is well described by Ball (2012a:12):
The consultants and educational businesses which participate are delivering ‘development’ and aid policy (for a potential profit), developing local policy infrastructures, and embedding prevailing western policy discourses, directly or as ‘spillovers’ into the local policy systems, working with various ‘partners’.

In most cases, the policy-makers, academics and think-tank researchers working under the aegis of UNESCO or OECD come from developed rather than from developing countries. And though they are not politicians, since it is their expert knowledge and advice which constructs the dominant discourse in education worldwide - by exercising what Foucault (1971:11) calls a “pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse” - their role is highly political, as one of my OECD interviewees pointed out.

“I would say that if you want to make a substantive impact you need to also be involved in the politics. But you should not do the politics without evidence, so you need the substantive people... The two are necessarily connected. Whenever they are not well connected, there will be a problem” (OECD 2).

What I want to problematise here is the risk that the education technology standards being transferred to developing countries in this process are Western or developed-nation standards, which may not be most appropriate or in the best interests of teachers and students in the beneficiary countries, and may even be most in the interests of Western technology companies. Could it be that the philanthropic slogan of “access, quality and equity” in educational technology development projects can sometimes act as a cover for the development of new markets for Western institutions and corporations?

The UNESCO researchers and policy makers I interviewed did not think of their work as the exercise of power, but as a kind of neutral mediation. One interviewee described the organisation’s role like this:

“[At] UNESCO we call ourselves the host of new ideas, holding a neutral position trying to come up with foresight visions. For example, we promoted ‘Education for All’, we promote ‘Education for Sustainable Development’. We believe these are the right
directions, but different countries can choose how to go about them…

We call it “country ownership”. We try to help them to own the project: this is your programme, this is your capacity, this is your institution. You must take care of yourself, take care of your staff and take care of your programme. We can help and support and facilitate, either with information or contacts…We are not in a position to tell you where to go, where not to go. We usually take a little bit of a neutral position. We step back … We don’t order” (UNESCO 1).

But I would call into question this idea of neutrality, insisting that everything a powerful supranational organisation does is political. By helping to negotiate the differing interests of different countries that gather under its umbrella, by producing policy that encourages governments to enter into public-private partnerships, by the training it provides for policy makers (often in partnership with IT companies32) and by mediating the commercial activities of corporate ICT suppliers in developing countries – in all these ways UNESCO is acting as an influential political player.

“The role of policy making….we do fundraising but implementation is done by others. There are many companies around with which we can make contract… I think these companies around International organisations are used to get funding from us and manage their business” (UNESCO 2).

5.3 The Parthenon effect

Living as we do in a globalised world, it is often assumed that there is a set of ‘world class’ standards for educational excellence. But this is an assumption I would like to question.

One of my UNESCO interviewees drew my attention to the powerful symbolism of the organisation’s logo, which in using the ancient Greek

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32 UNESCO interviewee1 told me that “for the policy makers’ training, usually we work with Intel, but we try to avoid any bias or influence from them".
Parthenon to represent science, culture and education, effectively identifies these civilising values as European or Western ones.

Figure 1, UNESCO logo

“When I saw first the logo of the UNESCO, I was surprised by this. Isn’t it a symbol of Western culture? For example, in Africa, we sometimes try to simply duplicate western standards, and this doesn’t match well with local realities. Almost every policy document in Africa emphasises worldwide quality and standards. But merely focusing on the quality can be dangerous, as local practices which do not meet these quality thresholds will not be approved... I always say the answer in development is inside you. It should be your policy...otherwise you will continue to live with the feeling of inferiority as looking up to the developed countries” (UNESCO 2, emphasis added).

He was drawing attention here to the danger that education policy reforms recommended by supranational organisations or think tanks, even when they are carried out by local governments, can result in a degree of denial or even suppression of local culture and traditions. Foucault described this process as one in which local values were “driven out, denied and reduced to silence” under the influence of Western expertise (Foucault, 1978:4).

Adapting the Foucauldian notion of governmentality, sociologist Stuart Hall describes this process as a kind of cultural centralisation, achieved “not by direct constraints, but through the active enlistment of the consent and ‘freedom’ of individuals”. What Hall calls “the New Managerialism” aims to reproduce us all as ‘entrepreneurial subjects’, and it does this

by... altering the environment in which people work, and operating new values by ‘modernising’ old practices. You change what individuals do, not by changing their minds but by shifting their practices, and thus the ‘culture’ as well (Hall, 2005:327).
Another of my UNESCO interviewees identified a certain inconsistency between the organisation’s official documents and development practices on the ground, and confided his view that the organisation was essentially an apparatus for encouraging everyone to develop according to a Western model – what he referred to as “dressing boys in adults’ tuxedos”. I argue that the policy transfers which aim to drive developing countries toward ‘modernity’ almost inevitably result in this kind of misfit between the original policy and the context of struggling subjects in the less developed country.

5.4 Quality and quantity in education

Organisations like UNESCO quite properly carry out comparative research on educational policies and practices in member countries. The problem is that comparative research usually implies a benchmark – a reference point or paradigm against which data can be measured; and who decides on the benchmark? One of my UNESCO interviewees told me:

“Official UNESCO documents about [education] in Africa are full of the words “quality” and “standards”. Looking through this lens, you will see some elite primary schools [in Africa] that are better than primary schools in developed countries. The schools for a small number of elite students are... exemplary schools with about 20 students in a classroom per teacher. But in Malawi, for example, 50% or more children are not in any school at all ... You need a quantitative approach, but all too often this is not considered” (UNESCO 1).

This obsession with an abstract idea of educational ‘quality’ is a common phenomenon in developing countries. But whose standard of quality is being used here? The quality being referred to is all too often the Western-equivalent quality of well-equipped international or private schools staffed by highly-qualified, well-paid teachers and with small class-sizes, and is seldom to be found in the public schools that cater for the majority of students. All too often too, ruling elites in developing countries, while publicly endorsing the UNESCO ideal of Education for All, actually prioritise the education of a
limited number of children through these private schools in order to equip them for a global competition for high-status jobs. At the same time they complain that their country is unable to allocate sufficient resources to improve the education of ordinary, underprivileged children and drive the development of the country as a whole.

The danger with UNESCO’s focus on ‘educational quality’ is the danger of applying an external, normalising benchmark which might be inappropriate to the specific local circumstances of individual developing countries or regions. It also normalises the idea of measuring and controlling the quality, through frequent testing, tables, benchmarks and other kinds of performativity, re-intensifying the rationality of competition and setting up a never ending loop of neoliberal discourse.

Osgood (2012:46) puts it like this:

Normalising discourses around the notion of ‘quality’ are cultivated and become embedded, so that it is possible to identify neo-liberal values within the text whereby good quality is deemed ‘attainable’, the acquisition of ‘quality’ becomes possible, through the neo-liberal constructs of regulation, accountability, measurability, excellence/best practice, standardisation and symbolic value.

5.5 Philanthropy and market embedded morality

It is worth acknowledging at this point that market entities can of course act, at least in part, from motives that are moral, philanthropic or charitable. But although commercial enterprises have always disbursed some of their profits in ways that do not directly contribute to their bottom line, the doctrine of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as elaborated in US business schools from the 1940s on, arguably expresses a new, neoliberal, logic of corporate governance in which commercial and moral values converge, and philanthropic or charitable activities become semi- or even completely marketised.
Reckhow, in the introduction to her book *Follow the Money: How the foundation dollars can change public school politics* (2013) expresses her surprise that academics have neglected to investigate philanthropic activities, and why journalists have largely failed to scrutinise the work of the philanthropic foundations. One reason is no doubt the widespread, taken-for-granted assumption that philanthropy is pursued simply as its own reward, and Reckhow points also to the patronage-power wielded by the foundations, whose grants support the work of many academics. She argues, with Frederick Hess, that it is in fact in both the public interest, and that of philanthropy itself, “that skeptical observers step forward and offer gimlet-eyed assessments of philanthropic initiatives” (Reckhow, 2013:4). Certainly I think it is important to interrogate philanthropic practice in the field of international development if we are to understand the power dynamics in global education discourse.

It is perhaps less important to interrogate philanthropic motives, but in the view of Peter Buffett, son of billionaire US philanthropist Warren Buffett, it is resorted to for what he calls “conscience laundering” – enabling successful business people to “feel better about accumulating more than any one person could possibly need to live on by sprinkling a little around as an act of charity” (Buffett, 2013). According to Buffett, such people bring to the act of philanthropy not only their fortunes but their business instincts as well, advertising the importance of running philanthropic projects along efficient, cost-effective lines. “I now hear people ask, ‘what’s the R.O.I. [Return on Investment]?’ when it comes to alleviating human suffering,” writes Buffett (2013).

According to Harvey et al. (2011:428), entrepreneurial philanthropy can be defined as “the pursuit by entrepreneurs on a not-for-profit basis of big social objectives through active investment of their economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources”. At a more microscopic level, Hess (2004) identifies two specific types of philanthropy at work in American education. Firstly, status quo reformers who “advocate providing money, expertise, training, and support, but steer away from radical changes in job security, accountability,
compensation, or work conditions;” and secondly commonsense reformers who seek out “new talents and reward excellence, purging ineffective educators and shuttering ineffective schools, supporting entrepreneurshipships, harnessing competition and accountability”.

Microsoft mogul and philanthropist Bill Gates’ influence is well known to be global and ubiquitous. Perhaps less well known is that he is almost certainly the most influential individual in American education policy today. According to Reckhow (2013:12), “the Gates foundation [ranks] as the third most influential institution [in US education], falling just short of US Congress and the US Department of Education”.

In a speech delivered at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, Gates (2008) introduced the concept of "creative capitalism”, defining it as “an approach where governments, businesses, and non-profits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, 33 doing work that eases the world’s inequities” - a formulation which takes the idea of public-private partnership to a new level of intensity. Of course it is true that the Gates Foundation makes a serious contribution to supporting people in need worldwide; but nevertheless, in selecting the causes and projects to throw its weight behind, its large-scale interventions are not neutral but influence the way development proceeds and is understood in specific ways.

One of those ways is to help rationalise and legitimise the extension of American neoliberal marketisation to everywhere in the world, through what Nye (2009) calls “smart power” – a combination of hard economic and political power, and soft ideological power derived from Gates' worldwide celebrity as computer baron and global philanthropist. Another impact of such “creative capitalism” may be to help in creating new markets, with the

33 Recognition is another value any entrepreneurs need to consider, according to him. “Recognition triggers a market-based reward for good behaviour. In markets where profits are not possible, recognition is a proxy; where profits are possible, recognition is an added incentive”.

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philanthropy as a kind of ‘loss-leader’. Stewart Ewen (2001:25-26) argues that:

As the question of expanding old and creating new markets became a function of the massification of industry, foresighted businessmen began to see the necessity of organising their business not merely around the production of goods but around the creation of a buying public.

Yet another benefit may be the generation through good works of that elusive market-expanding commodity, trust. As Stone (2000) points out, business people use the ‘non-profit’ label as a signal that the business is trustworthy and bona fides.

Hess argues that wealthy philanthropic donors like Gates have become much more than simply private citizens making private contributions. “Donors are now engaged in an effort to reshape public education, alter public policy, and redirect public expenditures” (Reckhow, 2013:4). Their donations are not simply acts of charity: they are also made in order to influence the public discourse and where possible to develop new forms of market value or business opportunities. Horne (2002) talks of the creation of a philanthropic “parapolitical sphere”, where separate policy agendas are developed and lobbied for by wealthy foundations and individuals. This kind of public philanthropic practice helps to give rise to a new kind of market-embedded morality. Shamir (2008:14) puts it like this:

The moralisation of commercial actors does not mean that non-economic considerations are ‘inserted’ or otherwise act as an external add-on to economic rationalities. Rather, the process is one of framing moral issues through the foundational epistemology that dissolves the distinction between market and society and, furthermore, encodes the ‘social’ as a specific instance of the ‘economy’. Moral considerations thus ‘lose’, so to speak, their transcendental attributes or at least their character as liabilities and re-emerge as business opportunities.

Business is becoming more and more engaged with educational practice and education policy-making, and in the process is developing new ways of doing philanthropy - driving educational development, and searching out new
opportunities for capital growth and the making of profits all at the same time. PPP is not a straightforward but a complex multiple form in which political actors and institutions, commercial market interests, and the desire to be developed all interact and are linked strategically. To instantiate this claim I will look at two case studies: One Laptop per Child and iEd Africa.34

5.6 “One Laptop Per Child” case: Means to an end or end in itself?

In the last decade and a half, technology has become an important dimension of learning and teaching, with policy makers placing a steadily growing value on the role of technology in boosting educational effectiveness, even if there have been some dissenting voices. The story of OLPC is an interesting case in point, and here I look at OLPC as a form of practice on the global stage, not in order to question the usefulness of ICT in schooling but in order to look how is the idea of educational ICT has developed such global strategic influence. I should first point out that this case study is compiled from desk research of media reports and not through interview data.

OLPC was founded in 2005 by MIT professor Nicholas Negroponte as a non-profit organisation with financial backing from prestigious corporations such as Google, eBay and NewsCorp, with a vision to:

provide each child with a rugged, low-cost, low-power, connected laptop. To this end, we have designed hardware, content and

34 I renamed to preserve anonymity of the interviewee and the project.
software for collaborative, joyful, and self-empowered learning. With access to this type of tool, children are engaged in their own education, and learn, share, and create together. They become connected to each other, to the world and to a brighter future (OLPC, 2005a).

OLPC targeted underprivileged children in developing countries, seeing access to knowledge via educational technology as a fundamental key to development. From 2006 OLPC was officially supported by the UN Development Programme, who identified it as a symbolically important initiative to break through the digital divide, “especially [for] children, who rarely have access to the educational resources that could enhance their opportunities and lift them out of poverty”. The memorandum of understanding between the UNDP and OLPC - signed at the prestigious World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006 - commits the two organisations to “work together to deliver new technology and learning resources to schools in the world’s least developed countries” (United Nations, 2006).

One example of the scale OLPC hoped to operate on was the partnership with the UN Relief and Works Agency to distribute half a million OLPC laptops to Palestinian children in Gaza between 2010 and 2012 (BBC, 2010). Another was the partnership with the East African Community to distribute 30 million OLPC laptops in the East Africa region between 2010 and 2015 (Fildes, 2010).

Despite its ambitious aims, high profile and UN support, however, the OLPC project has not gone quite according to plan. Initial hopes of selling many millions of its XO computers to developing country governments at a cost of only $100 per machine - it was known as “the MIT $100 computer” - were not realised, as developing nations had difficulty committing to such large expenditures (Resta and Lafferrière, 2008:770, also see Shields, 2013:99-100). Instead XO computers are being distributed, usually with the help of philanthropic or corporate donations, at a cost of $200 each (Fildes, 2010).

And when I visited the OLPC website (http://one.laptop.org/about/countries) in December 2013, it stated that “roughly 2 million” children and teachers in
42 countries are learning with XO laptops – far fewer than the original ambitious targets (OLPC, 2005b). OLPC’s vision of giving educational access to children in poor social conditions in developing countries was well captured in the 2011 documentary “Life in a Day”\(^{25}\), which portrayed people’s lives in 192 countries around the world on a single day. Watching the film what I noticed was not only the amazing technology that made it possible to knit together the lives of people in 192 countries on the same day, but also the story of Abel, a shoeshine boy in Peru.

Abel runs to his house after his work shoeshining on the street, earning small money and gifts from his regular adult customers. As soon as he reaches his humble house in the favela, he brings out his OLPC XO laptop and talks to the camera; “The thing I love the most is my laptop. In Wikipedia, there are stories, history, math, science, religion. It has everything. It is a giant library”. As a Children’s media practitioner, I was a little sceptical about two elements in the sequence. My first reaction was to ask whether his voiced-over words were genuinely his or guided by a director or other adult - something that can happen very easily when working with inexperienced contributors. And secondly, I wondered who was paying for the internet connection through which he could access his virtual library. Suddenly the ideal picture of cheap and accessible technology narrowing the digital divide by bringing education to poor people in developing countries became more fuzzy in my mind. Using mass media for publicity is a very common strategy to get attention, create public consensus, and attract donations to the project.

If it turns out that providing children in developing countries with new technology is a solution for unequal access to education, then it will have been a humanist act which we should feel good about. But what if the rationality of humanism in this case incorporates a desire to open up a new market? According to Usher and Edwards, humanism is a modern form of governance, which repositions people into self-regulation. “Humanism does not remove power but reinscribes it” (Usher and Edwards 1994:84).

Warschauer and Ames (2010) argue that the approach of OLCP is flawed because although it is not operating for a profit, it is nevertheless operating in a kind of market - charging a price for its XO machines that the poorest countries cannot afford. And OLPC President Charles Kane appeared to agree at least in part when he stated in 2010 that the price of OLPC laptops was not competitive enough compared to commercial netbooks and laptops.

Whereas our competition was very limited two years ago, our competition today is high level, from a number of computer manufacturers...[What’s more] they are targeting the education market in a big way (Buderl, 2010 emphasis added).

Interestingly, one of my UNESCO interviewees seemed to bracket OLPC together with private companies who initiate promising technology projects but do not then follow through:

“[Sometimes] a private company will simply initiate a project [and then leave]. For example, One Laptop per Child provides 1000 laptops to 1000 students. BUT, if the government wants to pick up the idea they need to spend money for maybe 10,000 or 100,000 students. It soon gets overheated…” (UNESCO 1).

Could it be that there is a market-embedded morality at work even here, in the heart of this ideal, philanthropic, non-profit model of development through educational technology?

In 2007/8, a kind of business dispute erupted between OLPC and chip maker Intel. The New York Times reported the bust-up under the title of “Intel quits effort to get computers to children”, and recounted how the world’s two most powerful software and chip-making companies, Microsoft and Intel, had initially both opposed OLPC for fear that it would compete in markets that they hoped to develop for themselves. The XO computer was therefore developed with processors built by Intel’s rival AMD. Intel changed its mind in 2007 and briefly joined the OLPC project, only to drop out again amid bitter accusations that it was marketing its own low-cost Classmate laptop (with Intel chips and the Microsoft operating system) to developing countries like Mongolia and Peru - effectively in opposition to OLPC’s XO machines.
Negroponte publicly accused Intel of playing “dirty tricks” in Peru by saying “it is a little bit like McDonald’s competing with the World Food Program” (Markoff, 2008).

In a CNET report on the same events, Negroponte said that Intel had “dumped” Classmate PCs below cost just to keep away OLPCs from reaching “the hands of needy children”. But CNET also quoted Intel as saying that the OLPC had demanded the chipmaker stop working with any company that produces low-cost laptops - a demand which, if true, the tech business site described as “baffling” (Krazit, 2008). It is hard to resist the conclusion, from the language used in this dispute, that OLPC is behaving much like a business operating in a highly competitive market for low-cost laptops in developing countries - while policy makers in those developing countries are presented with the usual marketplace dilemmas: which company’s product should we invest in? Which one suits our needs best? Which will still be around in 5 years time?

One of my UNESCO interviewees makes a similar point:

“The most commonly seen conflict of interests in this area is that if developing countries, particularly, the least developed countries, do not work with international organisations like UNESCO, but instead work directly with the private sector – they will be misled by the companies, and their ICT education policy will include a lot of over-hype… and their ICT in education will be overheated. They will spend too much money on the wrong things” (UNESCO 1).

This interviewee saw the role of UNESCO as acting as a kind of mediator in education technology distribution, holding the ring between competing market players and trying to ensure that the public interest in efficient

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OLPC states that an Intel saleswoman tried to persuade a Peruvian official to purchase Intel PCs instead of XO, but “unfortunately for Intel, the vice minister is a longtime acquaintance of Mr. Negroponte and Seymour Papert, a member of the One Laptop team and an M.I.T. professor who developed the Logo computer programming language. The education minister took notes on his contracts with the Intel saleswoman and sent them to One Laptop officials”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/technology/05laptop.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
development of educational technologies is not lost sight of in the corporate rush to profit.

"Without intervention there will be a lot of conflicts in the area of ICT in education, particularly between the public sector and private sector, because their core interests are very different. For example all the major IT companies – Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, Cisco, Oracle, IBM - have their own different core interests... But we have been working with them for a long time, and they have donated a lot to UNESCO ... to work in developing countries. So in this way UNESCO is in a neutral position, receiving funds from commercial companies, and trying to digest the funds in a way that really benefits the education system of developing countries. That's the unique position of UNESCO – no other organisation can do this... Without UNESCO they would develop a very, very biased ICT education policy that would really benefit the private sector but not bring 100% benefit for their children" (UNESCO 1).

UNESCO’s interventions into education technology markets probably do have the effect this interviewee claims for them, of making them more honest and transparent. But there are also other, complex factors at work in the process of technologising education: physical, digital, human and social factors all intertwine in negotiating the meaning of new technologies in each society (Luyt, 2008; Warschauer, 2002; Resta and Lafferrière, 2008). Moreover it may be argued that the deployments of ICTs into developing countries can be a forerunner and symbol of other, fundamental cultural changes, and that ICTs help to move education systems away from the communal, public sphere and towards the open market. Williams and Edgy (1996:889) see the introduction of ICTs “as an important sign in the processes of individualisation and privatisation – as a symptom of the broader social changes taking place”.

5.6.1 Just walk away

The case of OLPC throws up another important question about educational technology: how far can it function on its own as a trigger, which once pulled can accelerate educational development without further intervention?
Nicholas Negroponte believed that you could give Kids XO laptops, and then “just walk away” (OLPC//News 2010).

You can just hand out XO laptops to children and they will “learn learning”, and this event can happen without investing in traditional educational systems - from teachers to classrooms,” he [Negroponte] says. He calls it the ‘implementation miracle’: “we have found that kids in the remotest parts of the world, when given that connected [laptop]... not only teach themselves how to read and write, but most importantly ... they teach their parents how to read and write” (OLPC, 2010).

Unsurprisingly, many people have disagreed with this ‘walk away’ approach. Many commentators have argued that such confidence in all children’s ability to ‘teach themselves’ and immediately make appropriate use of the new tools represents a version of technological determinism, even “techno-romanticism” (Luyt, 2008), which fails to take into consideration the social and cultural factors which affect children’s readiness for independent learning.

Walter Bender, who left OLCP due to policy differences in 2008, argued that OLPC should not be “just a laptop project. It’s a learning project”.

Building a learning environment is hard work...it’s got to be a prolonged community effort... If you simply present it as, ‘We’re going to give computers to kids,’ the story is not adequate. The key to success is to take a holistic approach to the servers, the infrastructure, the logistics, the software, the preparation and training, the pedagogy, and the community (Buderi, 2010 emphasis added).

The techno-romanticism of Negroponte has been problematised by several other researchers (Luyt, 2008; Spivak, 2010; Warschauer and Ames, 2010), with Warschauer and Ames (2010:34) in particular claiming the OLPC programme was a combination of “Negroponte’s digital utopianism and the constructionist learning theory of Seymour Papert”. Papert, a colleague of Negroponte’s at MIT, saw “learning as highly dependent on students constructing ideas, and individual laptop computers as essential for carrying out such construction in today’s world” (Also see Shields, 2013:99). Both
men believed the low-cost ‘children’s machine’ should be enough to empower young people anywhere to learn without the assistance of, or even in spite of, their schools and teachers.

I would argue that Negroponte’s ‘walk away’ approach is, if not intentionally, a modified form of marketisation. In his book *Being Digital* (1996:85) he says that:

> The information industry will become more of a boutique business. Its marketplace is the global information highway. The customers will be people and their computer agents. Is the digital marketplace real? Yes, but only if the interface between people and their computers improves to the point where talking to your computer is as easy as talking to another human being.

According to him, when the computer and people are connected, there will be a new business created including the education business.

Warschauer and Ames (2010:44) argue that there are two vital problems overlooked by those like Papert who present learning as self-directed constructionism. Firstly, there is the idea that all technologies have a “social envelope”, referring to the degree to which the user is supported in using them. Thus students from high socioeconomic backgrounds are much more likely to be encouraged and guided by family members and peers in using a technology than are students from less privileged backgrounds. That is, the benefit of using technology is not gained from the machines on their own, but rather from the social and technical environment in which the computers are used by learners.

Secondly, it is pointed out that different students have greatly differing abilities to cope with “unstructured learning environments” of the kind envisaged by Papert and Negroponte. Students who already have strong language and literacy skills, or background knowledge of the topic at hand, can certainly learn in such unstructured environments; but “students with weak language or literacy skills or insufficient background knowledge often find the cognitive load of these environments overwhelming, and so learn much less from them” (Warschauer and Ames, 2010:62).
5.6.2 Where do the laptops end up?

Another concern, closely related to the problem of affordability referred to above, is that the OLPC laptops are not ending up in the hands of those that most need them. According to Warschauer and Ames (2010:36-37), more than 80 percent of XO devices have gone to countries categorised by the World Bank as high or upper-middle income. It is a very different outcome from that envisaged by the 2005 MOU with the UNDP, which aimed “to deliver new technology and learning resources to schools in the world's least developed countries (LDCs)” (United Nations, 2006).

In response, some academics and practitioners have wondered whether the cost-to-benefit ratio of these laptops is any better than existing aid programmes working on educational infrastructure support like building schools or libraries, or using more traditional technologies such as TV or radio.

Perhaps more worrying though, was the release in 2013 of a low-cost OLPC tablet device – not designed for underprivileged children in developing countries, but targeted at relatively privileged and technologically super-served North American children. The XO tablet uses Google’s Android operating system and is sold through Walmart for $150, in the US only. The idea was to use profits from XO tablet sales to fund the OLPC development programme, and to develop other versions of the tablet for less developed regions of the world. Nevertheless it seems a long way from the project’s original utopian vision. The report in Popular Science commented:

OLPC is a non-profit that planned to change the world, through cutting-edge technology, by connecting its poorest corners. And now it is selling unnecessary gadgetry to middle-class Americans. Has it completely lost its way? (Nosowitz, 2013).

In the end, it would seem, the logic of globalisation tends to drive all actors, even non-profit ones, to behave more and more like commercial organisations, which must seek out and exploit new markets, or else risk marginalisation.
The next section looks at another ed-tech distribution project which presents both interesting parallels with OLPC, and significant differences.

5.7 iEd Africa: the ambiguity of philanthropy

“iEd Africa” is an educational ICT project in Africa which, initiated by an IT businessman with a view to developing it as a PPP project, has begun to attract various kinds of international development aid. iEd Africa is a pseudonym to provide anonymity for the interviewee and the project.

The iEd Africa case study is based on an interview conducted with a UK-based academic consultant to the project, and casts light not just on the complexities of PPP, but also the local dynamics of educational ICT and the construction of discursivity among think-tanks and consultants.

5.7.1 Build local credibility?

The first thing that struck me during this interview was the struggle of the consultant, a specialist in ICT training for teachers, to find the appropriate description for the iEd Africa project. At various points in our conversation, it was

“an NGO in [Africa]… it’s like an educational charity…”

“it is not quite a NGO but it has that kind of status. So it is like the charitable arm of a corporation, if you like… it is basically a charitable enterprise”

“It is a business model, but it’s a non profit-making business model for sure” (UK consultant 1).

I wondered if the ambiguities of her description might be a reflection of the difficulty she was having in digesting the implications of a business model for delivering educational development. She finally acknowledged that the iEd Africa founder was a businessman looking for funding to recoup his
investment, but it was a formation for which she had clearly struggled to find the right word.

Consciousness finds itself inevitably facing the necessity of *having to choose a language*. With each literary-verbal performance, consciousness must actively orient itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and occupy a position for itself within it, it chooses, in other words, a ‘language’ (Bakhtin, 1981:295).

In this case, I consider that the ambiguity and over-determination of my interviewee’s language was produced by her attempts to reconcile the conflicts and complexities at work in her own response to this educational “charitable enterprise”.

My interviewee’s involvement with iEd Africa was to advise on teacher training to use the equipment and content provided, and was under the auspices of the Commonwealth Education Trust who were supporting her project.

“The project was in response to an initiative by an NGO in [Africa], who had kitted out some primary schools with equipment, with ICT - but there was a need for developing the teachers in order to use it. So they provided the equipment and technical support, but the teachers didn’t know how to use it in the classroom” (UK consultant 1).

Like OLPC, the vision is about access to education for all via digital technology. But in sharp contrast to OLPC, iEd Africa’s approach is to provide not just computers for use in primary classrooms, but a package of content to go along with them, on the very rational assumption that successful educational ICT requires not just technology (digital platforms such as laptops or tablets and a connection to the internet) but also educational content. A third crucial component which often gets forgotten about is the training of practitioners in the effective use of ICT in teaching and learning; and in practice educational ICT projects do not work effectively when any of these three elements is missing or neglected (Williams and Edge, 1996; Resta and Laferriere, 2008). iEd Africa concerned itself both with
the content and with the training - clearly a longer-term and more sustainable approach to educational ICT than Negroponte's "just walk away".

"In practice, step one is the technology, step two is the content, and step three is the teacher development. Without that, your content is completely useless, it will sit on the shelf. It may look beautiful, it may be absolutely professionally produced and very expensive, very gorgeous, but it will be completely useless to a teacher who doesn't have effective pedagogy, because they don't know how to make use of it" (UK consultant 1).

5.7.2 Marketing the education ‘package’

The question of what kinds of content might be suitable to support primary education in a developing country is one I will discuss later in the context of educational content distribution and open educational resources. My focus here is on the content production business model, described by my interviewee like this:

"Now they have produced this massive package of content, they hope to sell it, at a low cost, but sell it to government and schools and other providers, in order to recoup some of the costs he has invested. Because it costs a lot of money - he has got a hundred people working on producing the content at a very intensive rate, and clearly that is expensive" (UK consultant 1).

Moreover, the package of educational content is tied into the computer equipment which iEd Africa has been trialling for free in schools in the African country, but which must ultimately be invested in.

"That's what they are doing now [putting the machines into schools] but they had to get the content ready before they could approach the government. So now they're saying, 'now you can get the whole package'. They do not provide the machines for free - apart from in the trials of course. But if the government want to use [the content] they obviously have to buy the equipment" (UK consultant 1).
At this point it became clear that the project originally described as being “like an NGO” or “an educational charity” has become a systematic edu-business, even if a non-profit one. The deployment of equipment as a trial and the development of an associated content package feels like a ‘loss-leader’ strategy for developing a new market. And hiring a hundred people to work on the content, and provision of training so that there is a ready-made body of practitioners who know how to use both machines and content, seems like an effective marketing strategy. I asked my interviewee about the likely return from the proposed deal with the government in this country:

“It is a business model, but it’s a non profit-making business model for sure. They are not gonna make money out of it, no way”.

Q: If the government accept his proposal, he will make good compensation [for his investment]?

A: (Nodding) He has a business model and in fact, he got a small grant from DFID [Department for International Development] to develop the business model specifically… But whether or not it will work depends on the people who want to buy it having the money to do so.

Longer term, my interviewee saw the future of the project as a public-private partnership between iEd Africa and either national governments or big international donors.

And I think it’s not going to be just governments, I think there has to be some donor involvement… [A PPP is] what they hope for, but they haven’t got public money yet. They are trying to persuade governments, and some governments are interested and some donors like USAid also have been interested in supporting it. So if governments don’t pay, they may get private or entrepreneurial, philanthropic money to roll it out in some places hopefully… I think it is a good deal… for governments, because it is high quality content, very high quality - and that’s not easily available, especially linked to the local curriculum” (UK consultant 1).

My interviewee emphasised the importance of locally relevant, customised content to meet the educational needs of local people. But she also argued –
perhaps somewhat inconsistently - that such content was transferable, and therefore marketable, in different countries: “They are willing to adapt it to the curriculum of any country, once they’ve got the basic package [as] the curricula don’t vary that much at primary level” (UK consultant 1). She also, intriguingly, described the iEd Africa approach as an imposition model ‘to some extent’:

“The iEd Africa model...basically is saying, “your practice is deficient and we can fix it. Here is the package, all you need to do is to work through this process every week and you will be a better teacher”

During this interview, I felt that my interviewee was constructing a narrative about iEd Africa with which she felt comfortable. “It is not that our language tells our stories for us; rather, we appropriate language for our own discursive purposes” as Denzin (1989:72) puts it in a discussion of Foucauldian discursivity. At the end of the interview, and while transcribing and analysing it, I have come to understand a little more my interviewee’s situated position as a professional academic education researcher, from a broadly public service tradition, attempting to negotiate compromises with a global neoliberal discourse and practice. I see it as a process of subjectification and objectification, with her subject being objectified through discourse with me.

5.7.3 The role of research

The final discursive element I want to point out from this case study is the co-option of educational research into the business model – essentially as a marketing tool. As part of the trials they have run in schools in this specific country, iEd Africa has carried out research on the effectiveness of their approach.

“They’re doing research by collecting feedback from people. They have to do that because in order to sell it they have to be able to say to government, “look, this was really successful”.... They've
got to have *independent evidence*” (UK consultant 1 emphasis added).

Research of this kind is primarily carried out as a technique for satisfying the criteria or concerns of potential investors rather than to test a hypothesis or to gather objective data. It is a type of research practice that can also be found in my next case study, that of Samsung CSR in Colombia, so what should we think about the role of researchers in scenarios like this? The researchers themselves no doubt see themselves as professional or academic truth-seekers, but there is a battle going on - in Foucault’s words “a battle about the status of research and the economic and political role it plays” (Foucault, 1980b:132, emphasis added). Here is a battle about looking for evidence which might prove a project successful enough to appeal to customers.

I argue that such research is performative and instrumental in nature –finding a rationale to vindicate a position which has already been adopted - rather than social-scientific or truth-seeking.
Chapter 6  Culture, markets and the old imperium

“Technology will develop further and in the end even, in the poorest countries, the internet speed will catch up the high level. It is a matter of time. And then it will all be about content” (OECD 5).

Until now much of the discussion of educational ICT has focused on problems of the distribution of platforms or infrastructure, and interventions by international policy-makers, development agencies, corporate philanthropists and corporations aimed at improving access to the new technology. But as digital platforms become cheaper and more ubiquitous, and more and more parts of the world become connected into the global network, the focus needs to switch onto another key component of digital educational technology: the actual content of education, meaning not just digital media - though they are of course vitally important – but the whole educational experience which the technology mediates; the educational culture.

Technologies as I have mentioned earlier are not neutral, but carry ideological, cultural and historical imprints within them. We know that computer technology was developed by representatives of a dominant culture, and it rather represents and expresses the interest and values of the more powerful cultural groups (Bowers, 1998). Nevertheless it is true that ICTs are in principle highly transferrable to different parts of the world: digital devices and internet connectivity are in many ways just as usable and useful in Mongolia as they are in Manhattan. Educational contents, however, are much less obviously mobile, with educational materials and other aspects of the educational experience of children in different parts of the world differing in many fundamental ways. The globalisation of educational contents therefore presents us with a different set of analytical problems.

This lack of obvious mobility also presents the rapidly expanding global education market with problems. Edubusinesses, like any other businesses, want standardisation and economies of scale to maximise profits, but if
educational contents need to be appropriate to particular learners in a particular place, it may not be possible to make them equally appropriate to all learners in all places – with obvious potential impacts on profits. There are a number of fundamental tensions involved here, feeding on pre-existing tensions between developed and developing countries, imperial centres and post-colonial peripheries, and shifts in geopolitical gravity. There is also the underlying tension already noticed between the public and communal role of education in social life, and its transformation into a market for educational commodities. Stephen Ball (2012a) points out that one of the effects of the expansion of educational ICT has been to facilitate the penetration of edubusiness both across national borders and into public sector provision.

In this chapter I will problematise these tensions through examining a big media organisation’s global content marketing strategy, a battle for control of education content between public and private players, the rise of open educational resources and massive online open courses, and the marketising of a certain model of western schooling and of western higher education institutions in east Asia. I start with a look at discourses of cultural pride and market dominance at the BBC.

6.1 Pride (and prejudice) at the BBC

In this case study I will examine the technology of pride, a type of discourse formation which leads to the adoption of easy assumptions and prejudices about the world. Pride is a power-oriented mentality which comes naturally to governments, corporations and public organisations, and is to be found too in global education discourse. Identifying manifestations of pride (and its attendant prejudices) can reveal some of the tensions and contradictions "between technology of competence and technologies of the self" (Ball, 2013a:3).

One reason I came to the UK for my research was to have access to the BBC: I wanted to investigate how it had achieved such worldwide status as a
public service station, and how it managed to maintain such high brand value in a seriously competitive marketplace. I knew that education was one of the BBC’s ‘public purposes’ and considered the BBC would be an example of best practice in educational media production and distribution, perhaps including international content mobility.

One of the BBC’s missions is to "bring the world to the UK and the UK to the world" (BBC, 2011). It is a slogan that expresses internationalism, cultural awareness and reciprocity; but I wonder if it also conveys something less comfortable: a certain arrogance, a claim to unique brand value which might also work as a selling point in the international market.

“I think the BBC is the most provincial global organisation in the world, because it is a very self-centred and introspective organisation. It is very hard when you know you are very good - when you know you are probably one of the best players in the world ... then who do you have to learn from, what do you have to learn?” (BBC 1).

It may seem obvious and irrefutable that the BBC is a force for good in the worldwide educational media landscape. But we need to consider how the BBC, like the West more generally, “understands itself as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own image” (Featherstone 1995:89). Furthermore, Foucault reminds us of the existence in discourse of "truth games", the strange strategies which conceal the interweaving relationships between power, self and truth (Martin and Foucault, 1988:15). When analysing interview data from a critical point of view, no assumptions should be irrefutable, however obvious they might seem.

The BBC interviewee 1 quoted above talked about the organisation’s sense of confidence, the sense that it had little to learn from others: "it borders on arrogance" he said. I asked him where he thought this confidence came from.

“It is partly a political hangover of empire. We still think we own the world even if we don’t. The BBC as an organisation is like an exclusive club. It’s very hard to get in, it’s very competitive, we can get the best people from all over the world to come and work here.
So once you are in, there is a tremendous sense that you belong to an exclusive club” (BBC 1).

This discourse, like all discourses, has been constructed by history: the British empire is officially over, but some of its meanings and identities linger on through this feeling of belonging to an exclusive club. There is what Bourdieu and Thompson (1991:23) call a “tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of power”, by actors who “fail to see that the hierarchy is, after all, an arbitrary social construction which serves the interests of some groups more than others”.

The worldwide power wielded by the BBC is what Nye (2009) calls “soft power”, and Bourdieu and Thompson (1991:23) “symbolic power” - a power that is routinely deployed through everyday social relations and cultural life, and which legitimises a hierarchy of relationships in which it is embedded. A small example is provided by an exchange I had in an interview with an Asian media professional in Bangladesh, who seemed shocked when I asked for clarification about the organisation BBC Media Action with which she worked. She gave me a rather pitying look which said, “you don’t know BBC Media Action?” and explained that:

“BBC media action is the charity of the BBC. They are working in Asia and Africa, and we telecast programmes on how to learn English” (Bangladeshi interviewee).

It was common sense to this media practitioner that having a free programme associated with the BBC on her channel guaranteed a superior standard of content. BBC Media Action is the BBC’s international development charity, which aims to “transform lives through media around the world” (BBC website a, no date) and which builds on “BBC fundamental values” to guide its work. Media Action describes itself as a development organisation, with “a distinct character, identity and set of beliefs… including practice-based knowledge of international development” (BBC website b, no date). That the name and “fundamental values” of a UK-based broadcaster and media producer is sufficient foundation on which to build a respected
independent development organisation is evidence of the symbolic power the BBC wields.

20 years ago, I myself was responsible for broadcasting ‘British English’ language programmes on Korean TV (provided free in those days when Korea was still a developing country, although no longer). These English programmes were a welcome intermission from the Americanisation that has predominated since the 1950s, and helps to explain why I still have fondness for British English and for UK culture. This in turn made it more natural for me to come to the UK rather than the US to study. This is another example of symbolic power, isn’t it?

Of course it is true that both the wider BBC and its development charity have contributed much to education and development in countries around the world; but we also need to think about the nature and origins of the BBC’s soft power. It is an example of cultural imperialism, what Hannerz (1991:108) refers to as “the high-tech culture of the metropolis,” which overwhelms the traditional, low-technology, local cultures which it displaces. This is not about empire, but about market expansion cross national borders (Hannerz, 1991).

6.1.1 BBC Worldwide and education as a new market place

“We are currently considering what to do in the education market. … About 5 or 6 years ago we identified that particularly the learning of English - but more importantly the use of video content in schools, in colleges, in higher education - was going to become more and more important. And as the BBC’s core remit is to educate and entertain we felt that we were in a strong position to do something in that market place” (BBC Worldwide interviewee).

The BBC is of course a public media organisation operating under charter from the UK Parliament and financed largely from a Licence Fee paid by all UK TV owners. The BBC’s mission is to “inform, educate and entertain,” and its constitution and funding make it highly responsive to UK public opinion and give it a uniquely public service ethos.
However the BBC’s commercial arm, BBC Worldwide, is responsible for marketising BBC productions and the BBC brand outside the UK, with the proceeds used to top-up the public service BBC’s licence fee income. Operating under the supervision of the same BBC Trust which regulates the public service operation, BBC Worldwide is a purely commercial organisation. Through Worldwide, the BBC is able to step into the international market and commodify its highly influential and valuable brand. It is partly a matter of economic necessity, since successive governments have reduced the real-terms level of the Licence Fee - but partly also a matter of cultural pride on the part of “one of the best players in the world” (BBC interviewee 1).

Entry into this particular market is of course greatly facilitated by the fact that BBC programmes are in the global medium of English, which is spoken in every country of the world and taught in very many school and college classrooms.

Thus BBC Worldwide’s mission is essentially to leverage the BBC’s symbolic power in order to gain market share, using the global reputation of the BBC brand, and the fact that its content is authored in English, as what I would call *technologies of credibility* to open up overseas market development opportunities. In this increasingly competitive global market, the BBC’s long history as a national broadcaster, its use of the English language and its tradition of public service can all be transformed into a kind of commercial capital – a capital accumulation at the national level which both reflects and mediates the assymetrical relations between nations in a globalised world.

“We have seen a big opportunity in the education market, using the BBC brand and using BBC branded content... We see some very powerful opportunities” (BBC Worldwide interviewee).

Thus the BBC Worldwide Learning website – slogan, “Bring Learning to Life” – now advertises “thousands of high-quality, ready-to-licence educational short videos [to]...make learning personalised, engaging and memorable” (BBC Worldwide, 2014).
6.1.2 A victory for the market? The curious case of BBC jam

Where public sector operations meet with commercial activities, there is almost always a kind of power struggle between public values and private interests. A good example is the case of BBC jam.

BBC jam was a large scale and ambitious online digital curriculum project for schools and students, initiated by the BBC in the early 2000s with approval from the UK government. It had a total budget of £150m, and was to provide interactive digital lessons in maths, science, literacy, geography, business studies and languages, from ages 5 to 16. It was launched in 2006 under the slogan "Explore, Learn, Create".

The head of the BBC Learning department said the new service "heralds an exciting development for online learning, and we hope this will make a true impact on education in the UK", and the then BBC Director General Mark Thomson called it an “innovative and distinctive service” (BBC, 2006). But only a year later, in 2007, with only 10% of its planned content live, it was first suspended and then closed down completely by the BBC Trust, after a judicial review was sought by educational software companies who argued that the use of BBC licence-fee money to fund the service was illegal under European state-aid and competition laws. The British Educational Software Association (BESA) complained that this free BBC learning resource damaged their members' business - despite the fact that half of the BBC project's budget was to be spent on commissioning material from outside the Corporation (BBC, 2007). In this situation the BBC Trust felt it had no option but to close the service down, even though half its budget had already been spent.

This way forward reflects the shared view of the trust and the executive board that even a modified version of BBC Jam based around delivery of the curriculum is not deliverable, given the regulatory constraints and ongoing commercial concerns (Gibson, 2008).

So in the end this public sector project to support public school education, financed from the BBC licence fee, was closed down before it had a chance
to attract an audience or have an impact on UK education, because it was
deemed to be in conflict with private sector profits. The BBC, sustained as it
is with public money, could not, it seems, be allowed to interfere too much
with the commercial market in educational materials. There were two
rationalities in conflict here: the rationale of the public's right to free access to
(publicly-funded) digital education content on the one hand; and on the other
hand the rationale of the commercial sector's right to a level playing field for
their business and to protect their profit margin. In this conflict, victory went
to the market.

The case of BBC jam may well be symbolically important in foretelling future
trends in educational market formation, with private profit-making taking
priority over public right of access to free educational content. I argue that
the decision was rather “artificially arranged or contrived forms of the free,
entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals”
(Burchell, 1996:23). The closure seems to have had a rather paralysing
effect on the BBC’s willingness to create further initiatives in the digital
education space. A BBC executive told me:

“About 5 years ago BBC had a big dispute with the education
publishing industry about [a product called] BBC jam, and
everything just stopped, and the BBC panicked a bit about what
we can do and everybody is going very slowly to make sure we
don’t make anybody upset” (BBC 3).

This seems to be a process of compromise – as a conduct upon conduct -
for the BBC, not to disturb commercial markets any further. News of the fate
of BBC jam reached as far as Korea, where media strategists always keep
up to date with world media news. During a discussion about plans for a
Korean digital curriculum service at Korea EBS in 2010, a colleague
commented that “even the BBC couldn’t succeed with its jam project, which
means it wouldn’t work here in Korea either, where the commercial sector
works even faster”. I think this shows how a kind of commercial educational
discourse can spread across the world. It is an example of policy
benchmarking at the international level. As it turned out, in the case of Korea
the Government was determined to invest in a digital curriculum, despite the risk of confrontation from the commercial sector, on the grounds that EBS is responsible for supporting school education. With one eye on promoting Korea’s image as a model of educational ICT integration, the Korean Ministry of Education and Korean Communication Commission (KCC) agreed to finance production of a digital curriculum, free to the public at least for the present.

6.2 Counter-trends and open access

“Among the four elements in new technologies – Content, Platform, Network and Device – most people agree that content is the most important one; the other three parts are technical. In the era of the knowledge economy, content will be the key factor in education, not technology itself” (Korean consultant 5)

All the education and media professionals I interviewed emphasised the importance of content. Content is the top priority, not only to attract customers in an international market, but to be effective educationally. Increasingly ‘being educational’ is a unique selling point. A senior BBC Childrens’ executive told me:

“5 to 10 years ago the children’s entertainment industry would run a mile from anything it considered educational. Now they quite embrace it ... partly because if you look at all the concerns that parents and others have about the amount of television and the amount of technology that children are consuming, if you brand it ‘educational’ it sounds a bit better. It doesn’t have to be educational but as long as you say educational – it’s a successful tactic... Every single [childrens’] programme around the world is marketed as educational. Are they really? I don’t think so” (BBC1).

This interview data reflects the current trend of using the label ‘educational’ as a tactic for market development. Importantly, however, there are some countervailing trends in educational content production and distribution which pull in a different direction to the relentless marketisation of content. While
the sales directors in marketing departments add an ‘e’ for educational to the description of their commercial children’s content to make it more attractive to parents, teachers and media buyers, some broadcast producers have gathered to share their contents for free on an exchange basis. For example both the European Broadcast Union (EBU) and the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) have for many years organised childrens’ programme exchange meetings where producers and directors from the different networks show and exchange their productions with each other and swap production know-how in workshops.

Another important and fast growing non-commercial trend in education content production and distribution is the open educational resource (OER) movement, a revolutionary form of knowledge-sharing made possible by the cheap publishing and mass sharing technologies of the internet. Open educational resources were first formalised at a 2002 conference hosted by UNESCO, which defines OER as:

any type of educational materials that are in the public domain. OERs range from textbooks to curricula, syllabi, lecture notes, assignments, tests, projects, audio, video and animation (UNESCO website b).

Much of the free online curriculum content produced since the late 1990s by BBC Learning for use by teachers in class or for independent learning by students, which are now used by millions of learners and teachers every month, are effectively OERs (BBC interviewee 2). Then in the early 2000s universities, beginning with MIT and Stanford in the US and the Open University in the UK, began to make their lectures and other course materials freely available online to any learner who wanted to make use of them in any way they wished.

The OECD has also been active in promoting OER. A 2007 OECD report defines OERs as “digitised materials offered freely and openly for educators, students and self-learners to use and reuse for teaching, learning and research” (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, 2007:38). The OECD focuses on openness and re-use, advocating the creative commons
approach to licensing to enable all comers to legally copy, use, adapt and re-share educational materials. This OECD report points out that OERs are “accumulated assets that can be enjoyed without restricting the possibilities of others to enjoy them... The value of the resource should be enlarged when used” (CERI, 2007:38).

The OECD’s CERI (2007:64-65) lists six arguments for supporting the spread of OER:

1) The altruistic argument: the free sharing of knowledge is a good in itself.

2) The public resources argument: public educational institutions should make best use of public money by allowing taxpayers free sharing and reuse of resources they have paid for.

3) The economic argument: “what you give, you receive back improved”. By sharing and reusing, the costs for content development can be cut, thereby making better use of available resources.

4) The public relations argument: OER can showcase an institution’s courses and attract new students.

5) Increasing participation argument: OERs are a way of lowering the threshold for new formal learners, some of whom will be motivated to enrol as regular students later on.

6) The innovation argument: Opening sharing will speed up the development of new course content production and delivery models, and stimulate innovation in online teaching and learning.

These are all very powerful arguments, and OER certainly has an important role in constructing a democratic future for teaching and learning (for example see BBC Radio 4, 2004b) – though it can also be argued that publishing courses designed to be taken by hundreds of thousands of students all over the world – in English, naturally – contributes to the homogenising aspect of globalisation. In an interview on a BBC Radio 4 (2014b) programme, “The University of the Future”, Chandrakant Panse,
Professor of Microbiology at MassBay Community College in Massachusetts worries that there will be narrowing in the range of perspectives on offer.

[If MOOCs begin to substitute for conventional colleges] “there will be far fewer people teaching psychology, for example – fewer people teaching philosophy. The problem is, do we all want to be taught philosophy by just a couple of professors, so that we are all clones of either this branch or that branch? That's the fear…The question is, “is that good for education?”

Peters in a similar tone talks of “new forms of ‘information imperialism’ within knowledge capitalism (2012:74); while Thrift and Olds describe a “cultural circuit of capital’ which increasingly has the power to mould the content of people’s lives (2005:93).

Albright has warned (2005:14) of a danger of “a handful of international ‘brands’” dominating the educational resources field if the challenge of instructional design capacity in developing countries is not solved. In the next section I look this challenge in more detail in the context of Latin America.

6.3 The online university and ‘world class’ education

“One of the big issues in Latin America is that education overall is quite low in terms of quality…There is no Latin American university among the top 500 [universities worldwide]… What we believe is that if Latin America wants to jump onto the bandwagon of economic globalisation and modernisation, then higher education needs to be elevated to the place that it deserves” (OECD 4).

My interview with the OECD policy maker quoted here revolved around the crucial notion of educational quality, as well as the global trend for the incorporation of new technologies into education and its potential to change the way education is provided. He considered that the adoption of educational technologies was proceeding faster and faster, that “it seems like it could be a big movement"
In the HE sector, he believed, the advent of online distance learning degrees and massive open online courses presented both a challenge and an opportunity to Latin American universities. These Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are a highly-developed form of OER, and according to some constitute “the most important innovation in education in the last 200 years” (Regalado, 2012).

My interviewee had concerns that many local students might prefer the promise of a distance qualification from a ‘world class’ US or European university to a traditional degree from a local university, especially if the former were cheaper or even free.

“These changes worldwide, especially in the USA and Anglo-saxon countries, could be a challenge to Latin American universities, or it could be an opportunity...today you can’t do a whole [MOOC] degree in Harvard, but if this happens, then Latin American universities should be ready to adapt;... they could disappear, or they may need to merge with each other to be more competitive 37. At the same time, we think it is an opportunity, because people in the Andean mountains may have no access to higher education, but through the internet they can have education... and many other things” (OECD 4).

There are a number of interesting assumptions at work here: that universities in Latin America are competitors in a worldwide higher education market; that American and European models of higher education can be simply transferred via the internet to developing countries without considering local appropriateness, distinctiveness or accountability; and that universities from these developed countries are inherently better than universities in less developed countries because they are ‘world class’.

37 My interviewee told me that he did not like to talk about markets and competition in the context of education, but nevertheless did so. This is an example of what Foucault (1978:68-69) calls “the economy of discourses”, by which he means that the essential features of what speakers say is determined by “their intrinsic technology, the necessities of their operation, the tactics they employ” – rather than what they think they mean. In this case, the interviewee has subjectified the technology of a ‘world class education’, which is inevitably an arena of competition.
While some students may be attracted to MOOCs for the sheer joy of learning, for most what they eventually aim at, as pointed out by a 2013 article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, is “to convert their MOOC success into college credit” (Kolowich, 2013). The business model of MOOCs - which is by no means proven yet - is based on the assumption that a proportion of MOOC learners will at some point enroll as paying students. As my interviewee put it, “they don’t charge for access [to the course content], but they charge if you want to get certification. So you can access information and learn, but if you want a piece of paper to show to your future employer, then you need to pay”. Having a certificate from one of these world class universities, it is presumed, will be well received in the labour market in Latin America.

In order to gauge how Latin American universities are responding to these challenges, the OECD has been researching HE institutions’ online readiness and academic strategies for incorporating online education into their curricula. I asked my OECD interviewee if his survey might be seen as an intrusion upon local educational culture. Were we talking about a transfer of the American eUniversity to Latin America? Or about an authentic Latin American version of the eUniversity?

“I think both things can happen. It can happen that the biggest universities in the world manage to get everywhere... We believe it could happen in three, four, five or 10 years, that you will be able to get a Harvard degree from Bolivia. If that happens, there will be a big change in how we understand higher education today. So there is a risk for some universities, a challenge - but there can also be opportunities for many people” (OECD 4).

For now, fast internet penetration is not yet high enough in countries like Bolivia or Colombia to ignite this online university market. But when developing countries are better equipped with IT infrastructure, the business model that has so far failed in the US to tempt large numbers of new paying students, may take off elsewhere, re-using curricula and course designs that have already been developed to help keep down costs. If it does, it will be an example of Anglo-American educational enterprise, opening up new markets
using competitive pricing, English language tuition and the name of 'world class' educational institutions as unique selling points. The anglicisation of higher education is of course another, well-documented modality of educational globalisation.

My OECD interviewee recognised that local universities bring strengths and depths of their own to the work of educational development, even if they find it difficult to compete with the lure of the global HE institutions. He cited their better knowledge of the local environment, of students' backgrounds and the teaching methods best suited to them, and their better understanding of the needs of the local economy and society. But despite these comparative advantages of local institutions compared with 'world class' universities, my interviewee believed they would have to adapt to survive in the coming global HE market.

“The problem is competition, which comes from the fact that you have to provide something very good for someone to follow your course instead of Harvard's or MIT's course. That is a big challenge for local universities, and that's why they need to think of strategies like clustering with other universities, like becoming strong in one specific area - these are probably the only ways they can survive in the higher education arena” (OECD 4).

In the mind of this policy maker, the 'world class' university and its new technologies of teaching and learning have become imaginary panopticons which all other higher education institutions must keep in mind, adapting their course to the new currents in the global education market. And of course the OECD survey that he himself was conducting of the state of Latin American universities' espousal of eLearning technologies, may be understood as a research instrument of this panopticon.

“We are saying that new technologies make the learning process more flexible... I don't know exactly where it's heading and I don't think anyone knows...So we should not be too arrogant and tell them what to do, if we are not sure we have something which is useful. But we can at least say, ok we have done this exercise and we have a panoramic view of what is happening in the region.. That could be the value of the project” (OECD 4).
To me this rationale is unconvincing. Even if it is not telling HE institutions what to do, the OECD research is certainly helping to gather potentially valuable market intelligence about the local demand for technical infrastructure, course design expertise and online course materials that Latin American universities might need to equip themselves for the global HE market. Might the research not be used to help developed country technology and education consultancy companies to expand into new markets? Or at least to help legitimise a consensus around online distance learning as the future of HE?

I am also concerned that the OECD survey may be an instance of empirical research being used to validate the model of a global educational market dominated by a small number of ‘world class’, highly technologised, developed-country institutions. I am not here trying to problematise my interviewee’s research practice per se, more the power effect it might have on higher education policies in Latin America.

I do not doubt the high quality of education provided by the ‘world class’ institutions that are leading the way in this increasingly technologised market. At the same time I argue that educators and policy makers should consider what kind of education is most appropriate to local needs and the local economic, cultural and social background - culturally sensitive, educationally and locally relevant, technically feasible and accessible (Albright, 2005:14) - and not assume there is only one kind of educational excellence defined by institutions such as Harvard, MIT, Oxford and Cambridge.

I believe this interview data to be an example of what Miller and Rose describe as the “eternally optimistic” character of the discourse of governmentality, the interviewee’s research practice and analysis of HE trends serving as a kind of wish-fulfilment for his and his colleagues’ mission to help ‘make better policies’:

This imperative to evaluate needs to be viewed as itself a key component of the forms of political thought under discussion: how authorities and administrators make judgements, the conclusions that they draw from them, the rectifications they propose and the
impetus that “failure” provides for the propagation of new programmes of government (Miller and Rose, 1990:4).

6. 4 Education fever

Two unexpected additional pieces of research data were given to me by chance. The first occurred in a café in Manchester where I was talking to a friend about my fieldwork. Reflecting the anxiety of ordinary mothers all over the world, I consider this research data resonates with the seriousness of global competition, and the resulting view of education as a form of insurance against an uncertain future. This data is also an example of subjection in the neoliberal practice as a constitution of subjects, which illustrates how neoliberal practices work

...at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc... to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc (Foucault, 1980:97).

A woman sitting at the next table who had overheard our conversation apologetically interrupted us because she wanted to tell me how worried she was about her children’s future. She was the grandchild of Italian immigrants to the UK, had recently moved from London to the North West, and now lived in the countryside just outside Manchester. Her daughter attended the local primary school, and my chance interviewee was unhappy about her progress there. She felt both her daughter and the other local children had too much free time and did too little schoolwork, and she was worried that these children were not ready to compete with children overseas. She could not understand why education policy-makers, school leaders and parents were allowing this to happen. “How can they be so naïve, not to know what others do in Asia, for example?” She tried to compensate for the perceived deficiencies in her child’s formal education by providing as much extra-
curricular support and enrichment as she could; she was on her way to take her daughter to a concert when I met her.

She sounded almost like the “tiger moms” of Pacific Asia and the US\textsuperscript{38}, and her alarm about falling behind in the global competition reminded me of the rhetoric of neo-liberal education policy makers who insist on the need for our children to be educated to ‘global standards’ to equip them to compete on the global market. The anxiety expressed by this mother can be heard from parents everywhere, at home as well as in school. Her fragile, uncertain subjectivity is located, in the words of Pile and Thrift (1995:12), “in, with and by power, knowledge and social relationships”. She is not a special case at all but rather represents the seriousness of competitive education which becomes common in many parts of this world - either in the UK, USA, Korea, Colombia, or Malaysia. It shows the mechanisms of power working through an individual subjectivity.

We have here an imaginary neoliberal world, founded on global labour markets and global competition, in which those who compete successfully do so on the basis of superior knowledge and innovation; and the imaginary has become:

    …a way of thinking shared in a society by ordinary people, the common understandings that make every day practices possible, giving them sense and legitimacy. It is largely implicit, embedded in ideas and practices, carrying within it deeper normative notions and images, constitutive of a society (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010:34).

The woman in the Manchester café has internalised a model of neoliberal competitive globalisation: as a conscientious parent, she thinks her children should be helped to outperform her peers in other countries, including emerging or developing countries. And her concern becomes not just a personal problem for her, but a governmental problem also - a typical power

\textsuperscript{38} Amy Chua (2011) uses the term “tiger mom” in \textit{Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother}, which created debates on strictly disciplined way of parenting. It also can be compared to the expression of “helicopter parents” which appeared in \textit{Between Parents & Teenagers} by Haim Ginott (1985).
practice of totalising and individualising complexity. The fear and uncertainty expressed by my chance interviewee, and shared by many other parents, helps to spur on government efforts to better prepare our students for global competition by means of continuous testing, forcing schools to compete in performance league tables, and by obsessive comparisons of one country’s performance against that of others in a global league table.

Korean parents are second to none in providing education to their children whatever it costs. Sociocultural and educational values in Korea have been a strong driving force of Korean educational development, and Korean attitudes toward education are beyond enthusiastic, almost ‘obsessive’ (Kim and Rhee, 2007:121). This education fever means that parents are willing to go to undergo extraordinary sacrifices for their children’s education, becoming competitive ‘tiger moms’. A recent BBC News report entitled “South Korea’s schools: Long days, high results” quoted a Korean Education Ministry spokesperson thus:

Korea has achieved miraculous growth within a short period of time...we focused on and emphasized achievement within schools and in society, so that students and adults were under a lot of stress, and that led to high suicide rates...we still have a long way to go but we are doing some soul-searching in our society, and our goals are now about how to make our people happier (Chakrabarti, 2013).

The second chance, non-elite voice encountered during my fieldwork was that of a western teacher working in China, interviewed for a BBC news story about attitudes to education and schooling in East Asian countries (Sharma, 2013). The interview gave a different perspective on the same intense and pervading educational anxiety.

The BBC article asked whether the intense drive to succeed at school and university is putting too much pressure on children and parents, or whether it is simply a sign of how much Asian families want their children to do well. The interviewee (‘James’) replied in answer to this question:
I am an English teacher at an extra-curricular training school in Zhejiang, China and I can assure you that the extreme attitude towards education is well beyond what we are used to in the West. For example, parents here are determined to have kids as young as 3 coming to extra English lessons, piano, violin and much more. Failure is not an option here, parents will do what is necessary. It is therefore a huge boom industry and worth getting involved in! (James, Zhejiang province, China in Sharma, 2013).

So this education fever, which leads to emotional and psychological stress in children and extreme anxiety and financial distress for their parents, turns out to be a business opportunity for native English speakers. The English language, valued by non-native speakers for its global currency and its rich and complex cultural associations, is seen by this entrepreneurial teacher as a tool for industry and profit. His possession, by mere chance of birthplace, of fluency in the worldwide lingua franca is powerful evidence of the asymmetry built in to globalisation.

Even in small, remote countries like the Himalayan mountain kingdom of Bhutan, English comes to be seen as the natural language of education. A Bhutanese media professional whom I interviewed for my research told me:
“In Bhutan you start to learn English in kindergarten…all the subjects are in English except for the national language, Chongka. Maths in English; if you study geography, it is in English; if you study history it is also in English” (Bhutanese interviewee).

It seems perfectly natural for a developing country to broaden its children’s competence by objectifying them as world citizens ready to speak the global language. But in this way the capacity to speak English becomes a critical (and globalising) element in education systems across the world, and this in turn has the potential to profoundly effect non-native English speakers’ subjectivity, constraining it within hierarchical, neo-colonial relations of power and privilege (Holland et al, 1998). My concern here is that a country like Bhutan, by having its children learn in English from kindergarten up, risks losing its identity as the subject of its own language and culture.

The problem is that English comes to be seen as the only voice capable of supporting discursivities of transcendence, what Bloomaert calls ‘semiotic mobility’. The capacity for such semiotic mobility, argues Bloomaert (2005:69), is often associated with the more prestigious linguistic resources, and denied to resources which rank lower on the value-scale of discursivity. He points out that minority, unwritten and little-used languages have low discursivity in terms of perceived performance and competence, while the value, meaning and function delivered by dominant languages like English comes to be accepted by all, “on the basis of the prevailing orders of indexicality, and increasingly also on the basis of their real or potential ‘market value’ as a cultural commodity” (Bloomaert, 2005:72).

In the next section I return to the question of how neoliberal governmentality operates at the level of the state, examining Malaysia’s efforts to attract foreign students and investors as an example of the effect of the power wielded by the discourse of ‘world class’ education.
6.5 An education panopticon in Malaysia, and an English ‘public’ school in China

My Malaysian data comes from an interview with a senior bureaucrat in the education section of the government’s “performance management and delivery unit” (PEMANDU), which was set up in 2009 to oversee the implementation and progress of a strategic Economic Transformation Programme and is a key instrument of Malaysia’s ambition to become a high-income nation by 2020 (PEMANDU website). Covering economic development, industrial investment, governance and education, the performance unit is mandated to operate across public and private sectors – setting up PPP wherever possible – and can be seen as an agency for the neoliberal transformation of the Malaysian economy and society.

The transformation programme’s educational strategy stems in part from a desire to emulate the success of neighbouring Singapore in becoming a “global schoolhouse” in the field of business education (Thrift, 2005:94-95). My interviewee told me how the unit went about gathering evidence and preparing policies for the transformation of Malaysia’s education system, in order to make it more fit for purpose in a global knowledge economy.

“We have a platform of problem-solving international panels, a lot of well-known people to come in to give us comments and contribute... We sometimes work with McKinsey, and with Pearson on teacher assessment... For our English teachers’ education, we work with the Cambridge Education group” (Malaysian officer).

Perhaps I should not have been surprised that the Malaysian government should turn to the western world’s leading commercial management consultancy, educational publishing and education consultancy firms to help it build a Malaysia imbued with entrepreneurial values. The discourse of world class education comes complete with its own embedded global marketing strategy, and these Anglo-American global corporations are at the head of the queue to cash in.
My interviewee’s mission was to transform Malaysia into a high-income country through education, and what she believed she needed for this was the highest-quality foreign expertise.

“We use consultants whom we select, we send out what is called an RFP (Request for Proposals) and then evaluate the most suitable proposal…It is a business-like process. We are looking for quality” (Malaysian officer).

The next step was to set up a central IT system for educational performance auditing and quality assurance.

“We have set up a [computer] system whereby performance data on every child in every public school is entered on the database that we set up. [We are] creating a dashboard… [so that] straight away I can look at all the schools in a district and see what is the average performance in each school, what the students are… achieving… and what the teachers are…[achieving]. Like a car, with all its indicators” (Malaysian officer, emphasis added).

Finally, having gathered all the performance statistics it needs to see how fast every student, teacher and school is progressing – ‘Like a car with all its indicators’ – the government will accelerate by introducing the competitive principle and incentivisation to try to get everyone going faster, with rewards for the winners.

“What we do is, we rank all the schools in the country and we finance the top-ranked schools... Schools that perform very well, or which jump significantly up the ranking, the head teachers get a cash reward... I am designing an instrument to assess teachers’ competency. The idea is that if you are a good teacher you can be promoted faster...So we tested all our English teachers, and we graphed the data. Everything we do is based on data” (Malaysian officer).

In this regime of surveillance, competition and rewards for those who ‘succeed’ we see the Foucauldian *panopticon* used as an instrument of productive power to speed up the pathway to a high income country. The value of education narrows to the creation of human capital in order to drive
economic growth, the meeting of statistical performance targets, and the modelling of the entrepreneurial spirit. It is a distinct technology of performativity (See, Marshall, 1999; Lingard, 2009; Ball, 2013b). Ball (2013b:57) argues that this performativity seems to be “a culture or a system of ‘terror’.

It is a regime of accountability that employs judgement, comparison and displays as means of control, attrition and change. The performances of individual subjects or organisations serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of ‘quality’ or ‘moments’ of promotion or inspection. These performances stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation within a field of judgement. Clearly, the issue of who controls the field of judgement and what is judged, what criteria of measurement are used or benchmark or targets set, is crucial (emphasis added).

Another strand of Malaysia’s educational performance management is the computerisation of the country’s classrooms. Like other countries, installing equipment and connectivity into schools has proved easier than supplying the educational content - appropriate to the Malaysian context - that needs to go with them.

“The government has … [supplied computers]... so while the content is lacking, the platform is there.. Actually we are developing some projects [with international partners] … We [buy content from] UK companies, production houses, from global education companies... We can adapt it [to make it effectively] local content… [We outsource] things like portal development, or development of content for internet platforms” (Malaysian officer).

I asked why this digital content could not be produced in Malaysia rather than being supplied from overseas. The answer was that at the moment it was necessary to use foreign experts and well-known foreign brands because this would ensure it was of world class quality. Local content producers were “amateurish… none of them were good [enough]...We are giving them a chance, but they are not putting [in] much investment… You need to make investment if you want a contract” (Malaysian officer).
So even content for Malaysian learners comes to be produced by Western edu-business companies. Shouldn’t the Malaysian government be trying to raise the standards of local production by guiding local companies in how to meet the required criteria, and giving them a chance to improve their standards, instead of dismissing them like this? They say they want educational content appropriate to Malaysia, yet are unwilling to give Malaysians the opportunity to make it. Naturally the foreign ‘experts’ will presume that what has worked in other countries will work in Malaysia as well. Thus one of the effects of the power of global competition is the homogenisation of content.

The same focus on foreign expertise as the only guarantor of quality is also seen in the Higher Education strand of Malaysia’s transformation programme. Here the policy starting point is the argument that in an era of increasing global competition, a pool of highly-educated talent is a critical enabler of economic growth – “the crucial factor separating the winners and the losers”.

Talent has become more important than capital assets or raw materials. An abundance of talent will attract more industries and investments, creating higher-income opportunities and making the country more competitive in the global arena (TalentCorp Malaysia, 2012:8).

The fact, therefore, that no Malaysian universities are currently among the 400 HE institutions included in the Times World University Rankings was considered a problem. In the Talent Roadmap 2020, it asks “Will Malaysia prove to be a winner?” (TalentCorp, 2012:8). Part of Malaysia’s answer is to attract foreign universities to set up branches in Malaysia, partnering with them to develop an “educational hub for the region”. Iskandar Educity’s western HE partners include Newcastle University, Southampton University and Reading University, all of whom have developed or are developing Malaysian campuses at Iskandar – as is SE Asian private education corporation Raffles College (Iskandar Investment, online; Bloomberg Businessweek, 2014, also Ball, 2012a).
The strategy is modelled on (and of course in competition with) next-door Singapore’s Global Schoolhouse, and is an example of what Aihwa Ong calls “smart partnerships” between governments and foreign businesses – with the aim in this case of building a reputation as a global education hub which both drives local economic development and makes inroads into the huge Asian educational market (Ong and Collier, 2005:346). Iskandar is in fact one of many such global hub edu-business initiatives springing up around the world, all of them seen as drivers of economic development and progress, and all predicated on the idea that a ‘world-class’ education is an education on the Western model, warranted by the sponsorship of Western educational institutions.

**Wellington in Tianjin – an English public school model**

While examining social effects of the world class quality education imaginary, I happened to attend a conference at the University of Sheffield in January 2014 and came across Nick Peim’s presentation on how the elite English private school Wellington College has spun off a branch school called ‘Wellington College International’ in Tianjin, the second biggest city in China. The Chinese Wellington College trumpets its offer of both educational excellence and social exclusiveness – obviously accessible only to the wealthiest of the Chinese elite - by advertising what it calls a ‘First Class British Education for 2-18 Year Olds’ (Wellington College International Tianjin). To complete the symbolism, the building is a perfect, brick by brick replica of the original Wellington College in Berkshire.

Although many other UK educational institutions are in the process of transforming themselves into transnational academic corporations, exporting knowledge for profit and jostling with each other for competitive advantage (Ball, 2012b), Wellington College International is perhaps the most egregious example of a neoliberal business plan whose valuable commodity is essentially cultural imperialism, selling knowledge from the cultural centre to
the ‘global minded class’ – the customers of this so-called ‘excellent school’. (Ball, 2012b).

![Wellington College International Tianjin](image)

Figure 4, Wellington College International Tianjin

The idea of a ‘world class education’ is symbolically materialised in the discourse as irrefutable fact, just as Wellington College itself is physically materialised in the replica buildings. And just as the original Wellington College reinforces the gulf between what is available to the wealthiest of the English elite and what is available to everyone else in the UK, so this international trade in knowledge serves to widen gaps between rich and poor in other parts of the world. As Peters and Burbules put it, “knowledge becomes one more resource to be hoarded and monopolised for market advantage” (Peters and Burbules, 2004:49).

If globalisation and neololiberalism bring about the international mobility of knowledge and education, they certainly do not treat these things as public goods. Instead education becomes as Rhee puts it (2009) a ‘tradable commodity’.
6.6 The Postcolonial approach: Creating a community to provide a historical context

Finally this is a story from personal experience, which I share here as symbolic of the possibility of community action to create our own content and transcend intimidation by dominant cultural forms. I think it is relevant, and agree with Denzin (1989:43-44) that personal experience can also be research data as a form of “the story of the self” (Usher, 1998).

The reason I use the term postcolonial approach is in order “to move beyond … complicity with Western knowledge and power, and provide a historical context with which to evaluate the potential of future development strategies” (Kothari, edited by Forsyth, 2005:543).

A decade ago I initiated Asia’s first joint production project for children’s drama, under the auspices of the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) whose children’s programme working party I chaired. The idea of national networks collaborating to joint-produce programmes across a region came from our sister organisation, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), and because no-one in the ABU had experience of collaborating in this way it was at first assumed we would invite a colleague from Europe to executive-produce the co-production. An ABU colleague questioned this assumption: “You say the Asian children’s drama should be the voice of Asian children captured by us - by Asians - so why are we talking about having a European executive producer? Your network is well known for its children’s drama: why don’t you lead the project?” Others agreed that piggybacking on the expertise of the European broadcasters would risk producing an inauthentic portrayal of Asian children’s experience, so I took up the challenge – this was unpaid work I did in addition to my regular work at EBS Korea – and agreed to be an executive producer for the project.

The co-production was successful, became an annual fixture, and expanded from the six original countries to include 13 national networks and to incorporate producer workshops for sharing of experience and skills. In the four years I led the project, I did not feel my identity as a Korean female as a
limitation, but rather that my identity as an Asian facilitated the work. There was a strong sense that the experience of children in Asian cultures was different and unique in ways that could only be seen through Asian eyes.

One purpose of these co-productions was to address the problem that children’s programmes imported from the west – mostly animations from America – are globalising, both in the sense that they seem culturally non-specific and in the sense that they help to create a market for western (American) life styles, tastes and products.

Our alternative was to work with the stories of Asian children in their native environment, using live action rather than animation: a group of Mongolian kids who need to walk to fetch water after school; young Japanese brothers trying hard to make a simple dish for their father’s welcome-home dinner; a Korean boy visiting a Buddhist shrine to pray for the soul of a classmate who had died; a girl from Bhutan who is desperate to have a puppy and secretly adopts one of the hundreds of local street dogs. We wanted to reinforce children’s local identity, make them feel that they were the heroes of their own world, that they were important and powerful in the here and now – instead of admiring anonymous or magical animated characters operating in a strange and imaginary world. I certainly agree with Kvale (1992:34) that “the narratives of a community contribute to uphold the values and the social order of that community”.

One of the producers who most inspired me while carrying out this work was a Mongolian producer who felt uncomfortable whenever she saw a western programme portraying local children’s lives as deprived or constrained by isolation and limited resources. She wanted instead to make programmes that celebrated the richness of local children’s lives, and her serious but playful stories of children in Mongolia were eventually much appreciated at international festivals and by children in many other parts of the world. I would argue that initiatives like these are small acts of postcolonialism, which claims “the right of all people on this earth to the same material and cultural wellbeing” (Young, 2003:2).
As an Asian woman running training courses I often felt challenged by assumptions about my competency – both as an Asian, and as a woman. Trainees from countries like Malaysia, Brunei, Pakistan, India and Indonesia all expected their trainer to be a westerner working through an international NGO or on secondment from a western media organisation; and of course a man. “A woman?” “Are you a trainer or trainee?” were common reactions. But after a while I realised this prejudice was socially constructed and found a way to overcome the distrust. I did my job as well as I could, and invited the trainees to reflect that if I could do what I was doing well, they could too. They either already had or could develop the skills to make great content; it was not the sole preserve of experts from the west, nor of men.

Recontextualising the new discourse is both opening an organisation (and its individual members) up to a process of colonisation (and to ideological effects) and, insofar as the new discourse is transformed, in locally specific ways by being worked into a distinctive relation with other (existing) discourses – a process of appropriation (Fairclough, 2004: 231-232).

I have myself deployed discursive power in this way, I now realise, in my professional work as a media trainer in developing countries in Asia. In my classes I tried not to come in as an outsider telling people what to do. Instead I showcased what I considered to be ‘best practice’ in media production, and told them that they should listen, try it out, and see if it worked for them in their local settings. And I was always amazed by how attentive they were. Such good listeners! They were spellbound by this discourse of best practice, this alluring discourse which seemed to proceed from the experience of development. It felt like a personal, ethical dilemma which accompanies me into my current research.

In democratic societies, power comes with resistance. Given that neoliberal knowledge/power saturates our discourse, threatening to turn the whole world into a hyper-competitive market, how is it possible to resist? One small possible act of resistance is simply to take care of ourselves by learning how to think differently, talk differently and eventually act differently. I consider such resistance to be a kind of ‘strategic game’ – a serious game – which we
need to learn how to play if we are to cultivate alternative visions of modernity. The rules of this game are ethical ones, with ethics defined following Foucault (1997a:265) as a “rapport à soi, which… determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions”.

Hirschman’s (1970) “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” economic logic can perhaps be applied here as a cultural and political dynamic: if people are not happy with a certain product, they can raise their voice to demand modifications, or else simply leave and turn to an alternative product. But this should not be understood to mean that education is a product, buyable and sellable on the market and subject to the law of supply and demand. Education in my view is not just a means but an end. It is a constant, ongoing process of learning how to live as a human being, how to govern oneself and others, and in turn be governed in a historically specific society.
Chapter 7  Reshaping education policy through international development practice: a Colombian case study

The inclusion of Columbian case studies in my research is due in part to the cordial relations between Korea and Colombia dating back to the 1950-1953 war, when Colombia sent several thousand troops to help the South Korean war effort – the only Latin American country to do so. This help in time of need is still to this day ritually referenced in official discourse between the two countries, and South Koreans feel an emotional closeness to Colombia.

While there are very many differences between the development conditions and trajectories between Korea and Colombia, there are some parallels too. Since the 1950-53 war, Korea has transformed itself from developing to developed nation and is now an OECD member and ODA donor. Colombia has lifted itself out of underdevelopment much less quickly and at present belongs to a group of upper-middle income countries which also includes Malaysia (See appendix 4), but since 2013 Colombia has been in the process of accession to the OECD, reflecting the country’s determination to take its place among the developed countries. In this context many Colombians see Korea as a benchmark example of rapid modernisation, and the Korean development story as one they would like to emulate.

Two of the development factors that will be examined by OECD experts during Colombia’s OECD accession process will be education and ICT provision. The country considers educational investment and reform to be crucial both to speeding economic development and to reducing poverty and inequality in Colombian society. In line with the latest neoliberal economic thinking, Colombia wants to grow its human capital by leveraging its education system to enhance its people’s skills; as we have seen, the neoliberal approach to educational reform tends to reshape the education system as a kind of marketplace where individuals compete to sell their skills, reconstructing the subjectivity of learners as ‘self-entrepreneurs’. This
case study will look at some of the ways this approach is playing out on the ground among teachers and learners in Colombia, particularly in relation to educational technology practices.

The Colombian data exemplifies not only global connectedness among supranational organisations, governments, transnational agencies, and enterprises, but also the multiple complexities of ODA and CSR in the era of neoliberalism. While conducting my research I met with a total of 18 interviewees – policymakers and others working on education and economic development projects in Colombia. Interviews were carried out in Manchester, Paris, Seoul, Bogota and the small town of Ubate near Bogota where a model school with a digital classroom is located.

7.1 Genealogy of Colombian development

The national museum in Bogota has an exhibit tracing the connection between Colombia’s plentiful natural resources and the country’s history: it was the region’s gold which triggered Spanish colonisation, but the country is also rich in emeralds, platinum, coal and oil (Cuoro Resources Corporation, no date).

Figure 5, Map of Colombia (Cuoro Resources Corporation)
Colombia is Latin America’s fourth largest economy (OECD, 2013c) - a huge country of 1.4 million square kilometres, twelve times bigger than South Korea, with a population of just under 50 million, about the same as Korea’s. It contains great diversities of ethnicity, culture and wealth, with huge contrasts between remote rural populations and well-connected urban ones.

As Korea was to be in the later 1950s, Colombia was already the recipient of US-sponsored aid in the early 1950s, with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a precursor organisation to the World Bank, choosing the South American country in 1950 for its first ever economic development programme for a developing country (Escobar, 1995).

Only through a generalized [sic] attack throughout the whole economy on education, health, housing, food and productivity can the vicious circle of poverty, ignorance, ill health and low productivity be decisively broken...But once the break is made, the process of economic development can become self-generating (International Bank, 1950: xv cited in Escobar, 1995:24).

The programme proposed a number of radical, systematic economic reforms aimed at making more productive use of the country’s natural resources by encouraging international investment, applying new technologies and production methods, and through “a determined effort by the Colombian people themselves”. The report concluded that:

In making such an effort, Colombia would not only accomplish its own salvation but would at the same time furnish an inspiring example to all other underdeveloped areas of the world (International Bank, 1950: 615 cited in Escobar, 1995:25 emphasis added).

The word “salvation” is revealing here, with its echoes of the discourse of 16th century Christian Conquistadores, and its suggestion that only through the blessings of Western expertise and investment can Colombia be saved from its native, uncivilised state. This discourse assumes that the Western model of development is universally applicable and universally desirable, that
the rules of the development game are already laid down and agreed by all, and that Western expertise will identify the problems and decide how they can be solved (Escobar, 1995). It was a development model rooted in western modernity, and a model which is essentially still in place in Colombia today.

Sixty years later, it is interesting to consider how Colombia is seen by both policy makers and its own people. Colombia’s economy is still overwhelmingly reliant on natural resources and primary industries. Although its economy is growing, most of the growth is still in the areas of mining and commodities (OECD, 2013c).

“Colombia is not developing in a way. It is growing… because it is growing by selling its natural resources, growing by selling bananas, by selling coal, by selling emeralds, by selling oil. So what’s it making?” (UK consultant 2)

Moreover it is a widely shared view that the benefits of the country’s natural resources are not fairly shared out among Colombia’s people.

“I think we are a rich country, talking about national resources and other things… In a sense we are a rich country. But politicians who have been in charge have wasted [the resources] or used them for their own interest, not for the general interest. This business has a long, long history: American companies, international, multinational companies - they take the oil and sell it abroad, and we don’t see the money here” (Colombian officer 2).

As in many other developing countries, this issue is related to corruption among the ruling class (see Moyo, 2009, Vaughan, 2013). A UK consultant working on development projects in Colombia told me,

“Whereas a lot of African countries lack capacity … in places like Latin America, the problem is… corruption – not just in the sense of people stealing money, but in a broad sense… The problem is people who have, not being prepared to share with people who have not… people do not want to give away what they have, they want to accumulate more… Even if it is legal, it is not sustainable to have such inequality… You can’t just grow your way out of poverty in a country like Colombia” (UK consultant 2).
The problem of corruption is not only an ethical question, but also a question of governance, and as such is difficult to separate from questions of social and economic privilege, political responsibility, and a tradition of veneration for strong leaders. One of my Colombian interviewees told me jokingly that “we need a dictator to lead us”. Implicit in this remark is the idea that strong central guidance, leadership and pastoral power, can only be delivered through dictatorial rule. This authoritarian desire is reflected in the cult of General Simon Bolivar, the symbolic national hero of Gran Colombia’s early 19th century wars of independence from Spain. Everywhere you go in Colombia there is a statue of Bolivar gazing down at you, the father and shepherd of the nation surveying and protecting his people. After independence the great republican Libertador declared himself first ‘Lifetime President’ and then ‘Dictator’.

Castells (2005:9), using the data from the UNDP report on democracy in Latin America, reports that 54.7% of people surveyed would prefer an authoritarian regime if it would help alleviate poverty and economic difficulties. It would seem that in the mind of the population, it is economic development that counts, regardless of political regime, and the promise of economic success that wins the popular vote.

For five decades between 1960 and 2012 there was low level civil war between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Peace talks in Havana finally brought the conflict to an end, but the country is still healing the wounds. When President Santos decided to run for reelection in 2014 his campaign emphasised the importance of continuity not just of administration, but of “social peace” and “economic reconstruction” (BBC, 2013b).

7.1.1 Elite networks, social inequality and corruption

Now that the country has relative peace and security, what factors continue to delay Colombia’s development? My interviewees kept returning to the
questions of social and economic inequality; to lack of social mobility, with admission to the ruling elite open only to “the able, the fortunate, and the ruthless” (Mikes, 1966:167); and to corruption.

Corruption, according to Transparency International (Transparency International a), is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. One of my Colombian interviewees said with a sigh, “corruption happens here all the time”. Five months before the Presidential election, for example, there was a news report on the BBC about corruption in the Colombian army: it talked of huge amounts of money being embezzled by Colombian army officers. President Santos referred to the “crime of corruption” and stated that he felt “outraged by the damage that this causes to the armed forces and the country” (BBC, 2014).

Corruption is a betrayal of society and a failure of governance, but it is also inseparably entangled with inequality and elite networks. It is not just about the illicit syphoning-off of money, but also about “elite cartels” which support the wealth and power of their social networks and limit the social mobility of others (Kim and Kim, 2013:247-252). The elites who are entrusted with the levers of political and economic power may not be the main corruptors, but they are certainly the beneficiaries of corruption.

“Colombia is like two countries...because of a conflict which is not ethnic, not religious, but ideological – and the post-conflict problems...It is the lack of a state. The government has recognised the lack of a state presence... So you need to reclaim... state control” (UK consultant 2).

The post conflict vacuum described here is similar to that described by Hoogvelt (1997:221) when writing about the aftermath of colonial rule: In Latin America the strata of urban middle class from which intellectuals, professionals and governing elites are mainly drawn are of European descent, and are not so interested in native culture or roots in the search for national identity and self- expression. As Elsa Bernal (1997) notes, class and social inequalities combine here with the cultural and ethnic mosaic typical of
central and south American countries, to create a complex post-colonial crisis of identity.

7.1.2 Education as a ladder of social mobility

On the way to the public school in a rural area outside Bogota, I passed a coal mine - a common sight in Colombia, Latin America’s biggest producer of coal. Later I asked a Colombian Education Ministry official about the local economy, and he mentioned that some local school-age children still go to work at the mines with their fathers to make money for their family, instead of attending school. It reminded me of my own school days in 1970s Korea, and the two secondary school classmates who were taken out of school to go to work at a local factory to help their family make a living. I vividly remember how upset I was by their sudden disappearance from the class; partly because I had sympathy for them and feared I too might suddenly be taken away from school.

This is where the quality of a country's education system can be important. Education is widely seen as a tool for meritocracy, a ladder of social mobility, and so it can be – but only if it can be prised loose from the grip of privileged, elite social networks. Improving education can be a powerful driver of development (Stiglitz, 2007; Picketty, 2014), provided it operates as a means of raising the quality of life of the whole population, and is not treated as just another privilege for the elite.

Referring to the entrenched power of privileged social networks in Colombia, one of my OECD interviewees told me:

“Inequality is a big issue in Latin America... [But] improving the quantity of education is not enough. You need to improve the quality of education, but you also need to solve the network problem that we have” (OECD 3).

In Korea, driving up educational standards was central to the development plans of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Each five year plan for industrial and
economic growth included a development strategy for human capital as well (Chae and Woo, 2012). The approach to education was ambitious and visionary; as Stigliz (2007:32) points out, successful development requires “both universal literacy and a cadre of highly skilled individuals capable of absorbing advanced technology”. Education was seen as a key driver not just of national economic development, but of social mobility as well.

In Colombia too, government discourse is all about “quality education for all” - education as a tool for nation-building. However, I argue there is an absence of discourse about removing the barriers of social inequality, lack of social mobility, the domination of elite networks, and corruption. If these problems are not tackled the ideal of ‘education for all’ will not be achieved, and any educational development will simply cover up these sensitive social and ethical problems. Accession to the OECD should in theory be an opportunity to address these complex social issues of inequality and governance in Colombia.

7.2 Joining the OECD club: the path to the panopticon?

25 October 2013 was an important day for the Colombian government, marking the beginning of the country’s accession to the OECD. At the official ceremony in Bogota, the OECD Secretary General, Angel Gurría, said that,

> The OECD brings together governments committed to democracy and the market economy, with the aim of sharing experiences in order to design better policies for better lives and find answers to common challenges….In the coming months… there will … be a series of technical dialogues with OECD experts who will travel to Colombia to assess the application of its policies, practices and standards in relation to those of the OECD. Later we will make recommendations regarding possible reforms (OECD, 2013d emphasis added).

‘Democracy’ and ‘market economy’ are constructed by Angel Gurría as being almost synonymous – a common conflation in OECD discourse. Through its
acceptance by the OECD community, Colombia is now seen to be on the
verge of accomplishing, in the words of that 1950 report of the Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, “its own salvation” - becoming an example
to other underdeveloped countries by adopting “modern techniques and
efficient practices.”

But apart from the market economy platitudes, what does it actually mean for
Colombia to take the long road to membership of the ‘best practice club’ of
the OECD? Firstly, there will be a series of inspections, on-site feasibility
studies and statistics-gathering missions, in which the economy, institutions
and population will be observed as objects of social science, and arguably
subjected as bodies to be ‘drilled’ and ‘normalised’ under the rationality of
progress (Higgins, 2006). There will be no fewer than 250 OECD legal
instruments –“domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977:194) -
that need to be enacted by Colombia.

According to the Secretary General the OECD accession process will itself
provide significant benefits. Access to OECD policy and practice guidance
will help Colombia to innovate, improve its policies and governance, achieve
sustainable growth and raise living standards in Colombia (OECD, 2013f). In
Foucauldian terms, however, the accession process will activate a number
of technologies of normalisation and control in the Colombian social body,
including the education system. The inspectors’ gaze will be focused on
Colombia’s institutions, but also focus our own attention onto not only the
object of knowledge being constructed, but also onto the position of the
knower. (Foucault, 1973:115). As the OECD experts cast their technocratic
gaze upon Colombia’s political, social and economic practices and decide if
they make the country fit for OECD membership, Colombia is being brought
into the disciplinary ambit of the OECD panopticon.

Even if the accession process opens the country up to global good-
governance standards and helps to reduce the degree of social inequality, it
will still be a big challenge to the country’s government culture and sense of
sovereignty. If Colombia is happy to undergo this process it is because of the
percieved benefits conferred by OECD accession, among which the most
important is the enhanced reputation and positioning on the global stage that comes with membership of this prestigious club. By improving the country’s international image, accession engenders confidence, making Colombia more attractive to international investors. The benefit of OECD membership, one of my OECD interviewees told me,

“...is to do with the reputation of the country around the world ... “If you want to improve your reputation...around the world, one key thing you can do is to join the OECD” because... people are going to see Colombia with a different view – not the view of war, the view of guerrillas, the view of drugs”.

7.3 The Korean-Colombian partnership

“Education is a key issue in development, and one of the areas where Latin America is lagging behind other developed and emerging economies. Particularly Asian economies are a good model in terms of how much investment is made in human capital for the economic development...[and] we are putting some effort into this issue” (OECD 4).

The Korean-Colombian “ICT Education Capacity Building Project” is a Korean ODA project launched in 2012 to foster the development of educational ICT infrastructure, digital educational content and teacher-training in Colombia. The project is a tied loan, with provision on the ground in Colombia provided by Korean companies which had to bid for contracts from the Colombian government. Bidding took place in 2013 (See appendix 4). (This Korean ODA case will be examined in detail later in section 7.6.4)

It is not of course just a coincidence that Korean governments and Korean companies started to build connections with Colombian counterparts around that time. On 21 February 2013 an official free trade agreement was signed between the countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013). The agreement was not just about common economic interests but also political and social ones; and in Colombia the education field is the centre point where political, economic, social and cultural development meet.
Interviewing the Colombian Minister of Education in September 2013, I could sense the intensity and exhaustion arising from the approach of national elections in 2014 and an atmosphere of political change in Colombia. The Minister told me:

“30 years ago, your country (Korea) and my country, were at the same level of development, but now you can see the gap is huge...How did that happen? How can we narrow the gap? That's why we need [to improve] the quality of education in this country.... We need partners like you!”

As we have seen however, Colombia has been a recipient of development aid in the past, starting with the World Bank in the 1950s, without achieving the sudden economic and social transformation it aspired to; so it is worth asking why the adoption of Korea as a model or donor should be any more effective. One UK development consultant describes the distinctive Korean approach this way:

“I actually think Korea is a leader in development thinking... In terms of the politics of aid, the new frontiers of aid... In 40-50 years [Korea] has transformed. So who are the people in the world who know about development?...Good experience, bad experience, whatever it might be – the Koreans know what they are talking about” (UK consultant 2).

The same point is made in a more heartfelt way by Korean consultant 1:

“Some developed countries have given development assistance as a gesture of charity rather than to support coexistence. What Koreans do differently from the past is that we do it from the bottom of our hearts... We are truly committed to the mission. We know the hunger [experienced by our neighbours]... What [developing countries] want from us is not moral lectures, but the lessons of how we have achieved economic success so swiftly”.

When I asked the Minister why her government had decided to build up a partnership on ICT use in education with Korea, she replied:

“We recognise that Korea is one of the countries that has the best quality of education in the world..... And we know that the Korean education sector is recognised by UNESCO as one of the
countries that has been most successful in the use of IT in order to improve the quality of education. So we are convinced we have the best partner in the world”.

In this and other official discourses such as the Ministry of Education website, Korea is symbolised as a country which has raised itself from poverty to developed nation status through the combined power of education and technology, serving as a benchmark or development model, and therefore as a natural partner for countries seeking to follow the same route to development.

The Minister’s comments show her to be acutely conscious not just of the problem of uneven development between countries, but also of the interplay between power, knowledge and education. Colombia is working towards giving its population a better education, both as a way of enhancing the country’s human capital and as a potential route to the dream of meritocracy.

7.4 Colombian education policy

For the last two decades the twin watchwords of Colombian education policy, strongly influenced by policy advice from the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development, have been decentralisation and privatisation (Abu-Duhou, 1999; Hanson, 1998; World Bank, 2009).

In 1991 a programme of decentralisation and “school-based management” was introduced to the public school system, largely ending the central administration of schools and a standardised nationwide curriculum. The rationales for the new strategy were to do with institutional modernisation, management efficiency, democratisation, devolution of power and the enhancing of educational standards through innovation and competition (Hanson, 1998). But according to at least one researcher the reform

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39 Almost the same discourse was written ‘In the words of the Minister of National Education at the launch of the Education Policy for Prosperity in 2010’. [http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/w3-article-265917.html](http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/w3-article-265917.html)
dismantled a successful national system without putting effective alternative local and regional centres of power in place (Hanson, 1998).

At the same time, in an effort to ameliorate some of the structural inequalities in Colombian education, the government experimented with subsidising access to the huge private school sector which accounts for around 40% of all secondary school places in the country.\(^{40}\)

In practice both the decentralisation of the public school system and subsidised access to private education have negatively affected public schools and widened the attainment gap between rich and poor students (Hanson, 1998; Bettinger et al., 2009). Certainly there has been no discernible impact on either educational outcomes or on the social inequality gap. According to the PISA survey, educational outcomes are below the OECD average despite considerably higher-than-average overall educational spending, and are particularly poor for children from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds; while in 2010 Colombia’s Gini coefficient rating – the standard measurement of inequality and wealth distribution - was 54.8, putting the country in the top three most unequal countries in Latin America (OECD, 2013c:8-70).

One of my OECD interviewees, who asserts that education should be an enabler of social mobility, explained how the private schools in Colombia were actually entrenching social divisions:

“People with a high socioeconomic background put their children in private school, and then you have a kind of network of ... people who went to these schools, and then they can get a good job, a good position. But it is not because of the quality of their education but because they belong to the same class... The power of networks in Colombia is very high, and the problem is that it increases social immobility” (OECD 3)

\(^{40}\) Introduced in 1991 in an attempt to bridge the gap between the public school system and the private sector, a voucher programme ran for 6 years (Bettinger et al., 2009). The vouchers were distributed in most cases randomly via a local lottery, and benefitted around 125,000 students.
Nevertheless, in the last decade-and-a-half Colombia has made significant progress in many measures of education access, with enrolment rates growing between 1999 and 2009 from approximately 35% to 45% in the pre-primary sector, holding roughly steady at around 90% in the primary sector, and rising from approximately 55% to 75% in the secondary sector (OECD, 2013c:70). Over the last decade, Colombian education policy has changed its focus from an emphasis on access or quantity, to the issue of educational quality as well:

“In the year 2000 we had a lot of problems with kids [not] going to school, they couldn’t afford school, and they left school early – it still happens – so there was a problem of how to get kids into school. It was nothing about quality, just quantity... Now they have been working for the last period of time on the quality [of schooling]. They have got a lot of children into the system, and they are working on the quality of it” (Colombian consultant 3).

Since it came to power in 2010, the current government under President Santos has adopted “quality education for prosperity” as the watchword of its education policy. The Colombian Ministry of Education’s website states that its mission is to:

- grant the right to education with equity, quality and effectiveness criteria to educate honest, competent, accountable citizens, capable of building a happy, fair, productive, competitive, supportive and proud-of-itself society (Colombian Ministry of Education website a)

The government recognises that to achieve this will require radical reform in the five key areas of educational coverage, educational quality, employment skills, technical training and scientific research. Unsurprisingly, given the influence of neoliberal thinking on Colombia’s policy makers, there is a particular emphasis on the need to build human capital by teaching relevant employment skills, with higher education institutions charged with delivering not just academic success but helping graduates to enter the labour market, and many programmes of study designed specifically to prepare students to become entrepreneurs (Colombian Ministry of Education website b). The preoccupation with economic growth is understandable of course, but
almost certain to cut across some of the other goals of educational development such as the boosting of social integration and the promotion of equity and educational quality.

7.5 Curricular autonomy and the technology of examination

Colombia’s geographical and social landscape, its different regions and cultures separated by impermeable mountains and forests, makes universal access to education challenging. In addition, there is no national curriculum, with responsibility for educational provision devolved to local level, so that each educational institution (school) must develop its own programme, within a broad outline framework provided by the Ministry of Education.

“We have a free curriculum, and each institution (school) has got its institutional programme, we call it PEI.41 The institution, the headmaster and the coordinator of the institution – they decide to how to develop their own curriculum” (Colombian officer 2).

This decentralised system forfeits the many benefits to be gained from curriculum standardisation and transparency, from the pooling of data and learning across the system, and from transferability of outcomes and qualifications.

Moreover, while schools have autonomy in terms of what and how they choose to teach, they often lack the financial resources to properly implement their own programmes, once spending on school maintenance and teacher’s salary are accounted for - meaning that they have “virtually no autonomy in managing resources” (OECD, 2013c:72). Hanson (1998:122) also doubted the success of decentralisation in Colombia because “the Ministry of Education itself estimated that only about 200 of the 1,024 municipalities had sufficiently strong infrastructures to manage their education systems”.

41 PEI: Proyeto Educativo Institutional (Institutional Education Project)
“[In the public sector] the government pays per student. All the budget from the government is managed by the Ministry of Education. They devolve this budget to the regional education secretaries. And they distribute the budget according to the number of students... With that you need to pay for teachers, and for school operation and materials for schools” [it is not affected by their performance.] (Colombian officer 2).

In 2002 the government introduced an evaluation system for school performance and league tables, the responsibility of the newly formed Institute of Evaluation (ICRES). The hope was that this new technology of control would help to enhance the quality of education across the system, by celebrating the best performers and shaming the worst. The results, as in other countries which have introduced this kind of competition into public school systems, have sometimes been unhelpful.

“ICRES and Ministry of Education made public the result of every institution, so the whole society knows what happens in every school. And it was a not very good idea... to make public the results, to expose every institution (Colombian consultant 1)

Evaluation/examination can be seen as a “ceremony of objectification”, an apparatus of governmentality for making subjects feel responsible for their performance, and become docile in following social norms (Foucault, 1977:185). It seems likely that introducing performance evaluation and competition between schools, without any other educational reforms to enhance quality of provision, will have the effect of increasing divides between urban and rural schools, undermining the performance of public schools in general, boosting the status of private schools, and deflecting blame for unsatisfactory educational performance away from government and toward individual schools. Some schools struggle under the pressure to compete with other schools against which they are being measured, when the comparison may not be appropriate or fair. It is the private sector that benefits most from the public school evaluation system, as private schools can increase their tuition fees based on their performance.

“[Private schools] have their freedom, they just get permission to operate...For public schools it is all about reputation – If they have
a good reputation, public schools generate more demand in the community. If the public school is good, then parents want to send their kids there” (Colombian officer 2).

By representing schooling as a kind of competition or race to the top, the school evaluation system has the effect of making private schools look more desirable to parents even though (or rather, because) they cost more, reinforcing aspirations to be part of an elite social network.42

Parents are quite rational when they choose schools. They choose schools on the basis of the kind of friends they want their kids to have...But if you choose on the basis of achievement, most parents don’t have that information (Hattie at BBC Radio 4, 2014e).

The point here is that the choice of a private school is really about the social networks children build up at school rather than about relative school achievement, which - if you take into account children’s unequal starting points - is almost always greater in public schools.

Another problem with the national evaluation system, when combined with a devolved curriculum, is that the regional and local differences in school practice are so great that it is almost impossible to compare schools fairly. A Colombian interviewee compared Colombian ICRES to PISA:

“The people from the Atlantic coast are very different from the people at the Pacific coast… and it is a national evaluation (which is) prepared in Bogota …It is not fair… If you go to Finland, and go to Amazones in Colombia , both have important education systems for the society, but you cannot ask the same questions of the students in Finland and the students here” (Colombian consultant 1).

One of the central aspirations of neoliberalism is to make things seem commensurable even when they are incommensurate, so that an exchange

42 For example, the website of ‘International Baccalaureate’ shows the even further growing strength of private schools in Colombia and their enhanced privilege. It can be shown as one of the examples of the limit of meritocracy. See, http://www.ibo.org/iba/countryprofiles/documents/ColombiaCountryProfile_000.pdf
value can be established between them. Measurement becomes a ritualistic technology of the self, as everything we do becomes measured and ranked. We recognise ourselves and are recognised by others as occupying a certain space in the ranking - by occupation, income, nationality, by degree of power, charisma or educational attainment. We get used to conforming to the discipline of measurement and come to accept these hierarchies of value and constraint as normative and normalizing (Foucault, 1977:183).

I want to argue that quality of education is not something that can be measured or ranked. It is by definition not a quantity. It is existential and difficult to define, but part of what constitutes educational quality, in Colombia and every other country, is upholding the idea of education as a public good not a bought commodity, and ensuring educational provision and content meets local needs. Education is not primarily about the passing on of elite culture and privilege, or meeting the demands of global markets; it should be about the fostering of personal development, social cohesion, and aspiration for the whole of society, not just the few.

7.6 New ICT technology - an apparatus for governing the social body?

All countries, both developing and developed, feel the allure of the globalised and globalising idea that the application of digital technologies to teaching and learning can enhance both access to, and the quality of, education. The two case studies already discussed - OLPC and iEd Africa - are examples of philanthropic and/or quasi-commercial approaches to the integration of ICT into education practice in developing countries. The next case study is of an educational ICT project initiated directly by government in Colombia.

In all the interviews I carried out in Colombia, the country’s social and regional inequalities were a common theme. The Minister of Education herself says on the ministerial website that the poorest 70% of Colombian children live in the country’s rural areas, and it was the uneven distribution of good quality education across Colombia’s geographical and social divides that prompted the government’s enthusiasm for rapid introduction of
educational ICT during the early 2000s (Colombian Ministry of Education c). The aim was nothing less than *the development of Colombia through education using ICT*. Surely ICT-integrated education is located as a strategic issue for the government. In this case study, therefore, I intend to examine the “regime of practices” put in place in order to achieve this mission (Foucault, 1991b:75).

Having little experience in this field, the Colombian Ministry of Education emphasised the importance of cooperation with experienced international partners. A Ministry of Education strategy document states that the country requires international cooperation in 13 areas of education, the first of which is “education experiences through web portals and … communication media” (Colombian Ministry of Education d).

Influenced partly by the experience of other countries and partly by the benchmarking of best-practice in global education governance carried out by UNESCO and the OECD, Colombia also identified teacher training as a critical factor in the quality of education, and embarked on a teacher training reform programme. The “Great National Teacher Training Plan” – slogan, “the quality of the education in the country cannot be higher than the quality of its teachers” – was designed in part to increase teachers’ familiarity with the use of ICT in schools, and incorporated a “digital competence certificate” as an essential component of teacher qualification (Colombian Ministry of Education f).

**Teachers’ social positioning and responsibility**

“Actually it is much more important to ensure that the teacher who is there is a quality teacher. So we find that countries who give less attention to the size of classes, and more attention to the quality of the teacher, do better” (OECD 2).

In Colombia there is a major problem with both the quality of teacher training and the status of the profession. An OECD interviewee told me:
“When you look at Colombia you can see that... the quality of teachers’ education is well behind that for other professions... The problem is that the study of education doesn’t have a high reputation, so [teaching] is not attracting the best students” (OECD 3).

An Education Ministry official told me that, sadly, it is common to hear students saying things like, “If I can’t get a job in finance, or in engineering, then I will make do with becoming a school teacher” (Colombian officer 2). It is hard for teachers to feel a sense of pride in their performance when the social status of their profession is so low. Moreover there is a massive divide between the public sector and the very large private school sector in Colombia, with public school teachers being paid significantly less than private school teachers (Colombian officer 2).

It is unlikely that new educational technology projects will take root and bring the benefits hoped for if these professional status issues are not tackled.

In Korea, teaching is considered not just a job but a calling; teachers have high status and are correspondingly highly paid - higher than most other OECD countries (Centre on International Education Benchmarking). The Korean government has a policy of encouraging talented young people to enter the profession by providing 4 years of free university education for ‘teachers to be’, good pay and more-or-less permanent job security once they start teaching (Kim and Rhee, 2007:120). Although the average number of students per class is higher than other developed countries, the OECD considers the Korean education system to be both efficient and cost-effective (CIEB).

The Colombian teacher training programme was a small step toward tackling the problem of teachers’ digital skills and status. Obviously a short course of training in classroom computer use and a certification in digital competence does not in itself bring about a transformation in a teacher’s practice; but it works as a powerful and visible apparatus, an indication that a teacher is eager to be part of the digital education experiment, ready to join the global trend to computerise educational content and delivery.
The new emphasis on digital skills has not of course been welcomed by all teachers. A teacher at a public school in a small town near Bogota reported that one of her colleagues left teaching altogether rather than change his traditional methods and incorporate technology into his teaching. In a discussion I attended at a well-equipped Bogota private school, a teacher arguing that integration of ICT was the responsibility of every teacher was interrupted by another saying, “No! You need to like it. If you don’t like it, you are just scared of it and it doesn’t work”. I thought this exchange was an interesting example of the negotiation of professional identity, with the idea of the professional requirement for continual training and [re]qualification colliding with the idea of the profession as emotional engagement with the work and voluntary participation beyond the requirements of the certificate. Like all professions, teaching is both a calling and a responsibility, and both sides of the teacher personality need to be engaged if classrooms are to become more innovative and interactive places.

**Proactive distribution of technology by Ministry of ICT**

Encouraged by a global discourse of education, technology and market readiness, in 2010 the Colombian Ministry for ICT announced its “Vive Digital” programme seeking “to promote the massive use of the internet to leapfrog to prosperity for all” (MinTIC a). The programme was founded on familiar neo-liberal principles, explained by the Colombian ICT Minister at an OECD meeting in 2013: the use of public-private partnerships (“the market as far as possible, the state as far as needed”); the reduction of tax and regulation to facilitate infrastructure investment; and the prioritising of government investment in capital programmes (Vega, 2013).

As part of Vive Digital, the ICT Ministry embarked in 2013 on a programme of distributing 1.1 million tablet computers in just 2 years, with a goal of reaching a ratio of one computer for every 12 children. In 2014 a further 335,600 tablets were procured for distribution to Colombian public schools (the UK Tablets for Schools organization, 2014).
My interview data in Colombia was full of practical concerns that the school tablet distribution programme was carried out too suddenly and quickly, with insufficient thought about how the equipment would be used, too little coordination, and too little consideration for overall strategic aims.

“The Ministry of ICT and many of the local governments are buying lots of technology. For example, the Ministry of ICT is buying a million tablets, and then they are going to the schools and giving them to the children and the teachers - but they don’t know what to do with them!” (Colombian consultant 3).

Often observable in such projects, and the discourse in which they are embedded, is a certain urgency to act as quickly as possible, as if the agencies involved are in a race to develop their ICT capacity ‘in time’ or ‘before it is too late’. This sense of urgency comes partly from a fear that equipment bought in one year will already be obsolescent by the next, and partly from the pressure exerted by commercial suppliers and contractors who push for the procurement of their own particular educational ICT products. The logic of the market place leads to the logic of a global race.

The result is a tail-chasing, almost desperate need on the part of Colombian state agencies to show their readiness to join the digital era - to show they are *doing something* visible and measurable. The Colombian consultant 3 quoted above went on to say:

“Technology is moving very fast, faster than the education system. So the Ministry of ICT is going faster, and saying, “we don't know what's first, the egg or the chicken,” you know? Should we first get the education system ready to receive the technology, or can we put the technology in first and then make the system go faster? Since it is two different ministries, with two different budgets, and two different mindsets, and different objectives in time” (Colombian consultant 3)

The problem is that the education technology programme comes to be driven by non-educational factors, such as the large financial resources available at this time to the Ministry of ICT owing to a growth in license fees and taxes from the rapidly expanding Colombian ICT sector (OECD, 2013c:37).
risk is that the purpose of introducing the new technology - to help provide access to good quality education across social and geographical divides – becomes lost, and the technology programme becomes a kind of end in itself. It is a version of the “ICT bandwagon” problem identified by a UK consultant I interviewed who has been working in Africa and the EU: “when governments suddenly decide to get on the ICT bandwagon... they just go ahead and do something, and it’s all piecemeal, it’s very fragmented” (UK consultant 1).

A second, related problem identified by interviewees is a lack of coordination between different branches of government, with each ministry working hard to fulfil its own mission in a kind of inter-departmental power struggle. One Colombian consultant told me,

“There is no line of policy to align technology and education. The central problem is that the Ministry of Information and Technology brought in infrastructure and gave tablets [to schools] but is not interested in education topics, not concerned about what children do with it, or what teachers will do [with them] – they are not interested in that. The Ministry of Education just worries about how the teachers can use the technology in the classroom. And the Ministry of Culture is concerned about what digital culture means in the country. The big problem is how to integrate the [work of] these 3 ministries” (Colombian consultant 4).

This lack of coordination is a sign of mismatch or conflict between education policy, technology policy and development policy, which makes proper planning almost impossible. The same consultant told me: “All the problems with policies, competence, infrastructure and technology are new, and we are only thinking about the problem now, right in the middle of the big bang” (Colombian consultant 4).

A third problem observed by my interviewees, in Vive Digital but also in many other similar cases in developing countries, is an inattention to equitable distribution of new technology. According to UNESCO interviewee 1,

“The more serious problem is that... the government will not think about the [in]equity between children living in urban and rural
regions. The majority of the money will be poured into those already rich areas, and those children who already benefit from the best conditions, and those in the rural regions who are not rich will be further isolated” (UNESCO 1).

The point is reiterated by one of my OECD interviewees:

“The problem is that their education policies replicate the inequalities. They tend to invest in the richest area and the richest neighborhood, and most of budget is going to universities instead of primary and secondary schools... And who gets to go to the universities? Those who already have enough money... So when you invest so much money in universities it contributes to replicate the inequalities” (OECD 6).

This problem is both a logistical and an ethical one, a kind of battle for the soul of educational ICT. My next Colombian case study throws up a similar question, that of *who benefits?*, and the proper balance between public and commercial provision in this area. My analysis will ask to what extent the Colombian government’s practice is aligned with its stated policy of achieving not just quality and effectiveness, but also equity in education - attempting, with Foucault, “to inaugurate a critical engagement with our present and to diagnose its practical potential and constraints” (Dean, 1996:210).

### 7.6.1 Samsung Smart School as a form of CSR

As has been mentioned, public-private partnerships are a core principle in Colombia’s digital innovation strategy. The Colombian Ministry of Education has a policy of welcoming partnerships with “companies with Corporate Social Responsibility [or] community-oriented programs [sic] or those interested in investing in education projects”. Such partnerships, while making a ‘strategic contribution’ to the Colombian public sector through helping to provide digital infrastructure or content into schools, can also enhance a company’s competitiveness and profitability (Ministry of Education d). Despite the talk of partnership, supporting local communities and corporate social responsibility, it is clearly understood by all parties that the
companies’ main motivation in undertaking public sector projects is ultimately market development and profit-making.

The Smart School project in Bogota is an example of this policy at work. Opening in September 2013, the school is an exemplary ICT-enhanced classroom funded by the Korean-based multinational ICT giant Samsung as part of its CSR programme, and run as a collaboration between the education department of the local municipality, the private Javeriana University, and the United Way NGO which handles day-to-day administration of the school. The school takes in 240 students from six public schools once a week, to give them experience of learning and teaching through tablet computers, to research the ways in which digital technology can enhance the work of schools, and to demonstrate the potential of these technologies to improve access to good quality education.

In parallel with this public sector CSR project, Samsung provides a similar experimental digital classroom service in a Bogota private school on a purely business basis – an interesting example of the multinational corporation’s agility in using its CSR activities to help develop new markets for its products and services.

Figure 6, Samsung smart school classroom

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A senior Samsung manager I interviewed explained that Samsung has a policy of diverting 1% of its commercial income to CSR projects. “As we make big money, we also need to plan to spend more to support others”, he told me.

“Colombians are very diligent and sincere, working hard, and they are capable of more development. I don’t think Samsung can bring about overall development [by itself], but we can contribute to a better quality of education here. We found the education system was a bit lagging behind, so we decided to make a contribution” (Samsung interviewee 1).

These are honourable motives – although, as is often the case, this CSR project has the beneficial commercial spin-off of helping to promote the company’s image, reputation and brand far more effectively than most advertising campaigns could ever do.

The governance set-up of the Smart School is aligned to the notion of ‘world class’ education, with the multinational corporation, the municipal authority, the private university and the local branch of a US-based worldwide NGO forming a matrix of authority and legitimacy. In this governance matrix Samsung takes the position of reflexive donor while the representatives of the civil community – the private university, the council and the NGO - help to objectify the project to the schools, students, parents and wider public. The involvement of the eminent Javeriana University guarantees academic respectability and enables the project to act not only as an exemplary classroom but also as an educational ICT research experiment; while the participation of United Way – “the largest privately-funded non-profit in the world” (United Way website) - confers the moral respectability of association with a blue-chip international charity. For Samsung’s purposes such a balanced governance system is far more powerful than a direct relationship with a government agency would be, and enables Samsung to drive the project forward with minimum bureaucratic interference or delay.
The content used for teaching in the Smart School is supplied free of charge, at present, by major international educational publishers like Pearson and the Colombian company “Educar” - well-known, successful brands which lend commercial prestige to the project. For these companies, as for Samsung itself, it is not just a free contribution to a worthy educational project, but also a future business opportunity.

“To us at Samsung, it is a public service to support the raising of standards for students and teachers by helping to modernise the Colombian public education system. But when in the future it expands to the private sector, it will give us a good business opportunity. It will act as a good reference for future business. It is not just about giving money away; it is rather that through giving, we can create something more for the future. That is the point of CSR” (Samsung interviewee 1).

I want to argue that the market embedded morality (Shamir, 2008) expressed so clearly in this interview data enacts a fundamental limit to the scope of such public private partnerships to bring about real change. It is obviously to be welcomed that a company like Samsung provides hi-tech facilities and content to a few schools in Colombia, providing a showcase for digital technologies and digital teaching and learning skills: it is an example of what Bill Gates (2008) calls “creative capitalism”. But because it is only a showcase, a build-up to the real business in view, which is about developing a new market for its products and making profits, the impact is inevitably limited. It is unlikely to lead to the long-term, large-scale, countrywide infrastructural and social investments that are needed to really transform Colombian education, opening up access to good quality schooling for all Colombian children through the power of digital technology - which is after all the strategic aim. At best, such projects are likely to be what Robin

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44 This content aid is routed through Pearson’s charity, the Pearson Foundation, “an independent non-profit organisation that aims to make a difference by promoting literacy, learning and great teaching [in collaboration] with leading business, non-profits, and education experts to share good practice; foster innovation; and find workable solutions to the educational disadvantages facing young people and adults across the globe.” About the Pearson Foundation, [Accessed on 9th March 2014]
http://www.pearsonfoundation.org/about-us.html,
Pasquarella calls band-aid – “efforts to patch a broken system” (Hess, 2004). Pasquarella, CEO of the Seattle Alliance for Education, argues that there is nothing wrong with band-aid, but “it just doesn’t change anything”. According to Müller (2013:475), such band-aid “evokes compassionate emotions [but] may hinder the development of a political agenda in the quest for justice”. Such philanthropic band-aids tend to dampen rather than sharpen public awareness of social injustice.

When I visited the Smart School in September 2013 it had not yet opened its doors, but a member of staff was kind enough to demonstrate the use of tablets in this ‘classroom of the future’. I was a little disappointed to find that the demonstration was mainly of classroom management and student assessment software, rather than how the technology could be used to foster engagement or creativity, or support new kinds of teaching and learning.

Later, however, I met a teacher at the private school where Samsung were providing the same equipment and services on a commercial basis. He listed the benefits of the tablet-based classroom.

“There is more student engagement … because they can actually see the content and they save it in class and give it a look afterwards; that’s the first benefit. Whereas students used to have to take every single note from the board, now they have a presentation in the tablet that I’m sharing with them, and they can save the presentation so they can have the contents of the class and review it at home…

The second benefit you have is that the platform allows you to see what each student in the classroom is doing in your own tablet… I can show the students the content… but I can also see what each student is doing, I can help the student from wherever I am, I can correct their work… and I can also share what work the students are doing on their tablets” (Colombian private school teacher).

Here the interviewed teacher sees the benefit of students’ active engagement as well as efficiency and control of teaching and learning. However when it comes to the substance and style of teaching and learning, it would seem that here too not a lot has changed. When I asked about the
new content that the new technology should be facilitating access to, he said that “there is not so much out there, to be honest. We are all aware that it is just starting… The actual content - that we have to assemble [ourselves]… It is very linear, and it is not that exciting for children”. What little content they have found is mostly not in Spanish and not Colombian-produced, but from the USA. Such content is naturally embedded with what Bowers calls the “taken-for-granted patterns of thinking of the people who create them” (Bowers, 2010) and so perpetuates the cultural imperialism once manifested in American school textbooks and now filtered through American educational websites.

Such limitation in the supply of suitable digital educational content is not just a Colombian or Latin American issue, but a worldwide one. A UK consultant specialising in educational ICT told me of the frustrations she often felt after discussions with educational publishers. “To put a textbook on a tablet in interactive form… requires a whole leap forward from traditional publishing in print. It’s an investment of time and energy and development of expertise, and that is not there yet” (UK consultant 1).

This problem raises some rather fundamental questions, complicating the discourse of the digital classroom of the future and of world class standards in digital education. How can we expect local educational content, suitable for local conditions, to be produced, when the benchmarks for what constitutes world class quality content have yet to be set? And how do we justify massive investment in developing the classroom of the future, when the digital-educational content that needs to be taught in that classroom hardly exists?

The Smart School may help to find some answers to these questions. It is due to run for four years, take nearly 5,000 public school children through its digital courses, spin off a mobile education research project, and on completion undergo an in-depth evaluation carried out by Samsung and Javeriana University. Referring to this evaluation, my Samsung interviewee told me:
“We need to see the facts and have no intention of beautifying the result, as we will use the data for many years... It will be difficult to rectify later if we do not get an objective report. This is not about image building, but about utilising the data for long term planning” (Samsung interviewee 1).

Thus, evaluation of public policy becomes as important to private corporates as it is to government, feeding into companies’ market research, product design and business expansion processes. Research and evaluation becomes a driving force of the corporation - particularly so when the business in question is ‘edubusiness’ with its overtones of public good, technical innovation and human development.

### 7.6.2 SCHOOL +; CSR by DirecTV, Discovery and Microsoft

While Samsung has been getting its tablet-based Smart School project off the ground, another multinational philanthropic educational initiative is already well established in Colombia. Escuela+ (School Plus) which started some 5 years ago as a CSR collaboration between Discovery Channel, DirecTV, and Microsoft, with consultancy support from the World Bank, uses digital satellite technology to deliver content to schools. This is a large-scale, pan-Latin America project which by 2013 was reaching schools in Puerto Rico, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru, as well as Colombia.

In essence, Escuela+ is a satellite channel from US satellite giant DirecTV carrying on-demand educational content for elementary and secondary education via a set-top box. The content comes from DirecTV partners Microsoft, Discovery School, National Geographic, Foundation for Education Testing and Skills [Fundacion Torneos y Competencia para la Educacion] and the World Bank (Escuela+ website).

The role of the Colombian Education Ministry is to mediate and supervise Escuela+, and encourage schools to take part in it. This can be seen as a
public-private partnership with the Ministry of Education in the position of facilitator. In 2012 around 140 Colombian schools were connected to the programme, with 430 new connections expected during the following year, rising to 1,600 by 2016 (Ministry of Education 2013a; El Tiempo, 2013). The rapid spread of Escuela+ makes the point that digital education technologies are not confined to online or networked platforms such as computer, tablets and smartphones. The selection of technology should be flexible, where appropriate including more conventional platforms such as TV or radio which may be more practical or economical in the least developed countries or regions where internet connectivity is limited.

For the channel provider DirecTV, this CSR initiative also constitutes a powerful business driver: the rate of roll-out of digital set-top boxes to schools is governed by the rate of addition of private subscribers to their service, with the satellite company agreeing with the Colombian Ministry of ICT to provide two boxes to schools for every 1000 new Colombian subscribers (Ministry of Education, 2013a). DirecTV is strongly marketed and its penetration growing in the Colombian domestic market, so it is unsurprising that school participation numbers are growing as well.

By far the biggest content provider to Escuela+ is Discovery Education, the education arm of Discovery which claims to reach over half of K-12 classrooms, one million educators and 35 million students in the US alone (Discovery Education website a). According to its website, Discovery Education "transforms classrooms …with award-winning digital content, interactive lessons, real time assessment, virtual experiences… classroom contests & challenges, professional development and more," (Discovery Education website b). Like DirecTV, Discovery is extremely active in the Colombian broadcasting market, with 6 TV channels including some of the most popular in Colombia, and heavy expenditure to expand its reach further. Discovery Education’s involvement with Escuela+ will of course bring business as well as social and reputational returns to Discovery (Discovery Education, 2012).
Like Pearson and BBC Worldwide, Discovery also has an educational charity arm, Discovery Learning Alliance, which focuses on educational media projects and teacher capacity-building in developing countries. Is this yet another example of benevolence as brand-building or soft marketing? While conducting this research I found it increasingly hard to tell the difference between corporate business and philanthropic activity. Especially in the field of education media and technology, the boundary seems increasingly blurry and elusive. As BBC interviewee 1 commented, “a market will only go into a territory if they see it as a way they can make money. That's capitalism”. Or as Stuart Hall put it, “the market and market criteria become entrenched as the *modus operandi* of ‘governance’ and institutional life” (Hall, 2005:327).

In 2013, the programming carried by Escuela+ Colombia was supplied by the corporates Discovery, Microsoft, National Geographic, Fondacion Torneos, and – for teaching training programmes - DirecTV (Escuela+, 2013). None of this content was specially made for Escuela+ or for Colombia or even for Latin America: they are essentially American programmes, with the risk once again of an over-reliance on American cultural references and viewpoints and the reinforcement of cultural imperialism. “We are totally American influenced”, a Colombian civil servant told me. “All the material they use [at my child’s school] is from America [USA], Pearson… this kind of textbook” (Colombian officer 2).

Here the discourse of ‘world class education’ merges with a kind of neo-colonial reflex, reinforced by the cultural and economic power of these multinational media corporations, to equate ‘quality’ with ‘Western’, or more specifically ‘north American’. (Colombia of course was never a formal colony of the USA, merely a part for some two centuries of the US sphere of interest and control.)

Writing about the role of such cultural ‘norms’ in the perpetuation of quasi-colonial relationships between former imperialist powers and their former colonies, Young (2003:3) notes:
When national sovereignty had finally been achieved, each state moved from colonial to autonomous, postcolonial status. Independence! However, in many ways this represented only a beginning, a relatively minor move from direct to indirect rule, a shift from colonial rule and domination, to a position not so much of independence as of being in-dependence.

7.6.3 National Educational TV system (Sistema Nacional de Television Educativa)

Another educational TV case study I want to touch on in contrast with Escuela+ is “Sistema Nacional de Television Educativa” (National Educational TV System) initiated by the Colombian Ministry of Education. It is still at the discovery and discussion stage of development. It is also the ODA project through which I myself became involved in educational development assistance in Colombia. I was one of the participants in an initial meeting with the then Colombian Minister of Education, Cecilia Maria Velez, while she visited Korea in 2010. I later attended further meetings to discuss Colombian educational media development and helped organise an initial feasibility study in Bogota in 2011 (EBS, 2011b).

The outcome of the talks between EBS and the Colombian government was a recommendation to set up a public TV channel dedicated to educational content for students and teachers under the full control of the Colombian Ministry of Education. A traditional broadcast channel was seen as having some advantages over more advanced online technologies. Whereas internet infrastructure takes time and money to build, and internet connectivity was around 60-70% penetration of Colombian homes, TV penetration was already at 96%, so that every home and school already had the equipment needed to receive the new service, and no additional costs were likely to be imposed on users. As one of my UNESCO interviewees commented,

“[We recommend to] use ICT for access to education - which means not modern or fancy ICT, but traditional ICT [such as]
satellite or TV. You need to develop a policy to allocate funds to this perspective, instead of buying 1000 computers for 1000 students, while leaving 10,000 or 100,000 students still excluded from the information era” (UNESCO 1).

Such dedicated education channels are quite common in Latin America. Mexico for instance has 8 Television Educativa satellite channels serving different cohorts and grades of the public school system, while Argentina, Panama, Chile, Equador and Venezuela also have dedicated channels. All these education channels are national, public entities, and suggest widespread agreement among Latin American countries about the best way to support such educational broadcasting.

It seems important that the new dedicated channel should be, as in Korea, a free public service provided by the Ministry of Education, as this might be the only way to ensure access for the whole population, not just for paying subscribers as is the case of Escuela+. However, it is considered to be a huge project to organise broadcasting, scheduling, media acquisition and content production appropriate to the needs of Colombia’s decentralised curriculum, under the aegis of a central government department.

The National Educational TV system would likely have a standardising effect on Colombia’s decentralised school-based curricular system – which, whatever its benefits in terms of local relevance and accountability, inevitably increases disparities in performance from region to region and school to school. If it is successful, the National Educational TV’s schedule of curricular programming might begin to introduce a level of consistency to the content of lessons across the Colombian school system. (In fact Margriet Poppema (2012) has pointed out that while the devolution of school and

45 See the website http://www.televisioneducativa.gob.mx/ In Argentina, there are 3 educational channels -TV encuentro, Paka Paka, and Deportv, as well as a central educational portal. In Panama there is the Sertv education channel, and in Chile there is Novasur or TV Educativa del Consejo Nacional de Television. In Equador, starting in 2011 and still under development by the education ministry with help from the Argentine government, there is the Encuentro channel; while Venezuela is developing a Televisora Educativa de Venezuela channel under the auspices of the Venezuelan education ministry and the Fondacion Colombeia.

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curriculum management to the local level is now an orthodox doctrine promoted by the World Bank and accepted by many governments, there is still no conclusive evidence that it improves outcomes.)

The Television Educativa project, like the more established Education Capacity-Building ICT infrastructure programme described in the next section, has the potential to make a big contribution to extending access to good quality education across the public school system. Still it is up to the decision of the Colombian government whether it can be realized like other Latin American countries.

7.6.4 ICT Education Capacity Building (with Korean ODA)

My last Colombian case study does not have the CSR dimension common to the first two. It is a Colombian government initiative to develop “ICT Education Capacity-Building” among Colombian teachers, with the help of Korean ODA.

As a comparatively recently developed country and an emerging international donor, Korea has been trying to adopt its own distinctive approach to ODA, informed by Korea’s own development experience. Korea’s successes as both as global ICT superpower and global education star performer - for example, in PISA results - have made it a kind of ambassador for ICT in general and educational ICT in particular. This discourse of ICT mastery is one in which the Korean social body as a whole participates, and it is worth thinking about how this narrative of the national self has been constructed over the last two decades.

The success of the Korean ICT strategy has been recognised in numerous reports from UNESCO, OECD, the World Bank and elsewhere, and has given Koreans a sense of pride and achievement. It has also accelerated further their hunger for new technology, and given rise to a new discourse of ‘smartness’. Smartness stands for everything we dream that future technology can do for us: saving time, expanding our knowledge and making
us more connected, productive and creative. For Koreans smart technology is the only guarantee that something works well, and the narrative of smartness dominates the social body. Naturally ‘smartness’ dominates thinking about education too, with ‘smart education’ becoming the new watchword over the last few years. At every international education conference in the last couple of years the Korean stand has carried slogans such as “Smart Learning and Teaching” (Seo, 2012; Lee, 2011) and Korea has become a kind of global benchmark for the successful use of ICT in education.

It is unsurprising, then, that ICT investment predominates in Korea’s ODA priorities and practice, both as a way of helping other countries to emulate Korea’s education- and technology-powered path to development, and as a way of expanding future technology markets that will ultimately bring benefits back to the Korean economy (Kim et al., 2011:124).

One of my Korean interviewees described the way in which education and technology policy influenced the country’s choices of where to deploy its ODA budget:

“Practically we have strategic target countries for ODA, based on the selection of recipient countries who are interested in Korean ICT use in education. And - for reasons of continuity and sustainability - ODA projects are carried out in cooperation with the Korean Ministry of Education” (Korean officer 1).

This is the discursive context in which the Korean government entered in 2010 into the “ICT Education Capacity Building” project, in partnership with the Colombian Ministry of Education. It is hard to distinguish the interests of the recipient country from those of the donor country in this instance of ‘tied ODA': it is a thorough mixture of development need, donor philanthropy, ideological redistributive impulse, and hard-nosed economic and industrial policy (see Brech and Potrafke, 2013).

With a combined budget of US$ 34.5 million - mainly from Korea - the project covers the “supply, transportation, delivery, installation, development, training, maintenance, testing and operation of [an] ICT infrastructure [plus]
e-Portal development and enhancement” (Colombian Ministry of Education, 2013b). It is a complete package, including infrastructure and equipment, the setting up and running of a national office and five regional innovation centres, development of a learning management system and education portal, and the training and support of 16,000 teachers - including initial training in rich media educational content production (Colombian Ministry of Education, 2013b; Chae and Woo, 2012).

The capacity building programme is extremely ambitious, not just because of its scale and complexity but because of its holistic approach. Whereas previous Korean ODA programmes tended to focus solely on equipment or infrastructure investment, this one seeks to build all aspects of capacity, including human capacity. The vision is to leverage Korea's unique experience and specialist knowledge to give a long-lasting, high-tech shot in the arm to Colombia's education system. For both governments, such a large-scale development partnership in education was something very new.

1) The tied loan model

The capacity building project takes the form of a bilateral tied loan, with a specification that execution of the work is procured through a bidding process from Korean companies, and that overall project management rests with a Korean government agency – the Korea Educational Research Information System (KERIS). Because it is a tied loan (known in Korean ODA discourse as Economic Development Cooperation Funding/EDCF) the Korean finance is provided by the government-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea, which is also charged with monitoring and appraising project spending, and ensuring transparency and fairness in its execution. It is worth unpicking the tied loan model and discourses surrounding it, as this type of

46 As a governmental organisation, KERIS states its mission as "to develop human resources through e-Learning, regain public trust in education, lay a foundation for a knowledge and information-based society by activation of e-Learning, and to enhance national education and research competitiveness through academy digitalization." http://english.keris.or.kr/es_ak/es_ak_300.jsp
ODA partnership clearly reflects the dynamic power relations, tensions and struggling agents involved in the donor-recipient configuration.

Korea’s interest in using tied ODA is primarily to provide market opportunities for the Korean ICT industry; but another perceived benefit is that it helps the donor government, through its agency, KERIS, to monitor the project’s coherence and implementation, by opening a clear channel of communication with the Korean companies who are delivering it on the ground.

For the donor country, such open channels are considered as a guarantee of accountability and transparency – two things which are enshrined in the rules and guidance on aid policy and practice developed by the World Bank, OECD and other transnational agencies involved in the governance of development assistance. But it may be that such detailed oversight by donor countries limits the possibility of beneficiary countries taking alternative or locally appropriate routes to achieving projects’ aims, or threatens to unbalance the relationship between donor and recipient, which should - certainly in the case of loans - be one of equal business partners, not of patron and client. In the neoliberal landscape, ODA becomes among other things a tool for business development, and this mixture of development assistance and business development makes projects considerably more complicated.

My interview data shows the emergence of some tensions around the lack of control by Colombian officials working on the loan process. A Colombian officer commented on the attitude of commercial companies which try hard to get involved in this ODA business.

“Sometimes I feel like the Korean companies think that because it is a Korean loan, it is their money. It is not, but they think it is their money because it’s a loan from Korea... If you lend me money, you don’t tell me what I have to do with the money. But they think so - that’s one of the big problems... you don’t tell me what I have to do with the money!” (Colombian officer 1)
One commercial sector interviewee who planned to take part in the bidding process expressed a concern that the process would be influenced by lobbying behind the scenes, or that discreet deals would be done between companies and government officials. “We try to make our bidding transparent and fair. But it is very competitive, and other companies who are desperate to win the contract might not act as ethically as we do”. (Korean Commercial sector interviewee1) Business corruption and misuse of aid money are both common in many countries, and of course the main victims are not the donors whose aid is misappropriated, but the population of beneficiary countries who do not receive the development aid intended for them (Vaughan, 2013).

2) Project governance

The Colombian end of the capacity building project is under the control of the Colombian Education Ministry’s Innovation Centre, set up in 2010 to foster innovation and technology use in the national education system (Colombian officer 2); and the Centre has been preparing for the project for some years in order to maximise its potential impact.

After a year-long procurement process, Korean technology consortium LG CNS was selected at the end of 2013 as the main contractor, with a final delivery date in the spring of 2015 (LG CNS, 2014). At the same time the Education Ministry’s Innovation Centre put together its own consortium to inject academic and technical expertise into the project’s governance, contracting the EAFIT business and technology university (EAFIT website) and commercial tech consultants Cintel to provide, respectively, research and pedagogical advice, and technical and logistical consultancy. Both Cintel and EAFIT are dedicated to the fostering of competitiveness and public-private corporate partnerships, so their involvement ensures the capacity-building project is imbued with commercial logic. This somewhat collegiate governance model - what EAFIT itself calls a “triple alliance [of] university, private sector [and] government” – is becoming quite common in public
project governance, representing what Sassen calls “an emerging new normativity that has incorporated elements of what was once state authority” (Sassen, 2006:412).

At their best such public-private consortia exemplify, as Rose puts it, “a novel technique of accountability…[allowing] representation of 'partners' from different 'communities' - business, local residents, voluntary organisations, local councils” (Rose, 1996:57). But they can have drawbacks too. According to Korean consultant 2, it sometimes means that there is no one willing to take responsibility for making a big decision, since there’s always a chance it might be the responsibility of one of the other alliance members. In this particular project there are not only multiple parties involved - from both Colombia (management) and Korea (service delivery and implementation) - but multiple languages spoken - Spanish, Korean, and English as an official lingua franca.

In this situation power becomes a more complex flow, a mesh of relations between different groups, structures and discourses that are interdependent and change with circumstances and time (Fairclough, 2001). There are delays and tensions while misunderstandings are cleared up. When questions of responsibility arise, according to one Korean consultant, decisions are frequently postponed while official documents are checked through by lawyers. Differences of technical capacity, differences of procedure, differences between the points of view of donors, recipients, commissioners and providers, and above all the shifting differences of power - all have to be negotiated and communicated, often in different languages. Below, I consider each of the project’s main elements in turn.

3) Technology infrastructure

The capacity-building initiative started with the setting up and equipping of a national coordinating centre, an education ePortal - “Colombia Apprende” - and a learning content management system for Colombian schools; plus five networked ‘innovation centres’ in five regions of Colombia, in buildings...
provided by local universities under contract from the Ministry of Education. Each regional innovation centre contains a multimedia studio as well as technology-enhanced classroom environments, and each will service a network of ten pilot schools which the Korean contractor will also equip with high-tech classrooms and fast internet connections. The regional centres will conduct an intensive programme of teacher training, while a central content development centre will support teachers in the acquisition of digital content production skills, via the regional multimedia studios.

This is a very ambitious project and capacity-building has to start somewhere; but five regional centres and 50 schools - compared to 32 regions, 1,037 municipalities and 25,535 schools across Colombia nationally - is clearly a very small drop in a large ocean, and raises the difficult question of distributional equity. The location of the five centres was decided by the Ministry from among applications by consortia of local authorities, universities and businesses. Clearly, five successful applications implies a large number of unsuccessful regions, and an even larger number of schools missing out on the digital capacity building.

As one of my UK consultant interviewees pointed out, this kind of digital divide is probably an inevitable result of the uneven spread of new technologies and educational practices.

“[The digital divide] will be there anyway. Within one region, if you equip only one school, then you’ve got a digital divide because the rest of the schools haven’t got anything. If you only have limited resources, you have a digital divide. There’s no getting away from that. If you don’t have enough to equip the whole country, then you have a divide, and it’s just a case of how you decide to make that divide” (UK consultant 1).

There is indeed no neat solution to the problem of resource allocation. Nevertheless, I would argue that in developing countries especially it is

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47 This data was from the Colombian governmental website; http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/nomenclaturas-y-clasificaciones/divipola

48 This number of schools was provided by an officer at Ministry of education using the official statistic website. http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/buscandocolegio/
important to target what education development assistance is available to the areas of most intensive educational need, which are invariably in remote and rural areas – and to resist any temptation to allocate new resources to the communities that have the loudest voice or the best business plan. In this case the Colombian Ministry of Education tried to make the allocation of innovation centres fair by publicly soliciting for participants to the project from all Colombia’s regions; but this approach does little to encourage applications from the poorest, least vocal, least well-equipped and least experienced communities.

4) Content

Of course the innovation centres, pilot schools and fast internet connections can only have an impact on quality of education if they are combined with high quality digital content.

“Quality content is very important in order to close the gap between the rich and the poor. Because the rich people they can access the best quality content, text books and other materials, parents can pay for that. But in public sectors the parents cannot access quality content... we are going to produce high quality content and going to offer it to the public in general and …reduce this difference in resources... I think it is the quality of content that will improve the quality of education” (Colombian officer 2)

The question is, who should produce this content? Of course, without a substantial budget for quality content production, it can be user- or peer-group generated, by teachers or even by students, but it needs some training and effort to ensure such resources are usable. This is one reason why the role of government in providing local content is critically important until teachers and students can create their own production capacity.

At the beginning of the capacity-building project the Colombian government assumed that the Korean infrastructure supplier would also be the main content provider - that it would be easier and better to buy such content off the shelf than to create it from scratch - and the original invitation to tender in
early 2013 included a set of content specifications. By the time the contract was awarded, however, the Colombian Ministry of Education had changed its mind. Now the content was to be produced by Colombian educators, with the Korean partners adopting a facilitator role - setting up a coordinating centre for content production, producing some pilot eBooks and training a large number of teachers in content development techniques (Korean consultant 2).

The Colombian government, in other words, exercised its right to be the key actor in the content production process, with appropriate content being produced locally in Colombia, so that Colombian educators would be able to stand on their own feet once the Korean ODA team had gone home. Interestingly, the Korean side quickly adapted to this change of direction, with the Korean agency KERIS readily agreeing to the new approach. Such readiness was probably in part due to the fact the Korean companies were primarily technology and systems, rather than content businesses, as well as the daunting scale of the content production task. But there was also an enlightened recognition of the fact that a simplistic content transfer model would ultimately be unsustainable. A Korean consultant involved in the process told me:

“In the long term, they should build up their own competence to produce educational content. Korean participants providing them with content? I don’t think that works. In the short term that might be easier to do; but that should not be the way and anyway that’s what other donor countries have done. If we do that, what’s the difference [from the western practice]?” (Korean consultant 3)

This is an encouraging sign that, learning from its own very recent history of development, Korea may be ready to adopt a different way of providing aid; recognising that this change of direction demonstrates an understanding that in order to become good global citizens Colombians must start by becoming good Colombian citizens; that part of the role of a good education system is to help build local identities; and that this requires locally-relevant, locally-produced digital educational content. We can see here a process of
recontextualisation into a new discourse of *locally-specific development* (Fairclough, 2004: 231-232).

As with the Sistema Nacional project discussed above, the new nationwide bank of materials will surely have an impact on Colombia’s de-centralised content curriculum, in which each school has hitherto decided how to teach each subject, because although the content will largely be produced at local level, there must be an element of standardisation in the process if an enormous amount of duplication and waste is to be avoided. Thus the capacity-building project will have a systematising effect on curriculum content and materials. In the process it might go on to help develop more equal standards across the Colombian public school system, and perhaps make the materials more marketable to other hispanophone Latin American countries - one of the long-term goals of the Colombian Ministry of Education. I consider this aspect of the capacity-building project to be an act of postcolonial resistance with the potential to enhance the future development of Colombia and its neighbours.

5) **Teacher training**

The capability-building programme includes the training of 16,000 Colombian teachers in digital content creation and technology-enhanced teaching techniques. These 16,000 - 5% of the Colombian public school teacher workforce – will be named “lead teachers” and given responsibility for disseminating their new skills to colleagues in their own and other schools in their neighbourhoods and regions. The idea is that through this competency cascade, the whole teacher workforce will be upskilled.

In fact, the Colombian government considers the upgrading of teachers’ digital skills to be so important that they are introducing a new, compulsory, ICT training course for teachers from 2014, at the end of which they will be certified as digitally expert teachers. There have been complaints from some teachers that they should be financially rewarded for taking on this
‘additional’ role, but this idea was brushed aside by one of my Colombian civil servant interviewees:

“They should be motivated because of themselves, because they are interested, because they will be better teachers. They will conduct more attractive lessons, and students will be more engaged and motivated… So it is not for salary this time… We will offer them a certificate [which says] “You are a special teacher, who knows how to produce and how to use digital content” (Colombian officer 2).

Of course it is true that becoming digital practitioners presents challenges to the teaching profession in Colombia as in every country. But the leaders of the capacity-building project are surely right in insisting that it is necessary in order to improve teachers’ capacity, boost school achievement and enhance the overall quality of education. As a UK assistant head teacher said at a conference I attended recently, “technology won’t replace teachers, but teachers who use technology will probably replace teachers who do not” (Julian Wood, at the Children's Media Conference 2014).

6) Optimistic self-actualisation and digital scarcity

In late 2013 I visited one of the pilot public schools which has been equipped with a ‘digital classroom’ provided with Korean ODA in a small town just outside Bogota. The digital classroom was being used not just for students aged 6 to 15, but also for a range of community groups who take it in turns to use it for teaching and learning. The classroom was fully booked till late evening when I checked the schedule.

Here I met a group of local parents who had themselves missed out on formal education. These parents certainly understood the importance of education in life, but because they had so little education themselves they were not sure how to support their own children’s learning. They told me that they had gone back to class, like their children, seeing the ICT classroom as a place where they could challenge themselves to learn something new. And
inspired by what they had learnt in the digital classroom, this group of mothers had clubbed together to buy a computer, both to support their children's learning and for their own self-study – a powerful instance of what Dean calls "optimistic self-actualisation" (Dean, 1996).

One of my BBC interviewees told me of his hope that, as more and more learners become connected to each other and to a wide range of high quality educational content, communities of learners would increasingly be empowered to create their own educational experiences.

“There is a lowering of the threshold for content creation. That's one of the reasons I am optimistic about educational content – including, in fact especially, content made by ordinary users. The reason this is important is that there are few people you can learn better from than your own peers. Peer to peer learning is incredibly powerful. I'm not saying there's no longer a role for educators, just that some of the most powerful learning online comes from people who are just like you... But it will take away power from the big media content companies in the west, and move the centre of power in the direction of ordinary learners wherever they are" (BBC 2).

While sharing the hope expressed by this interviewee, I wondered how access to this single digital classroom must have to be rationed, and how this paucity of access might effect students’ experience of technology-assisted learning. One of my interviewees, a teacher actively involved in the classroom, talked about this digital scarcity.

“Students like this new digital classroom... they tend to think this technology innovation is cool and easy to use... [And they are] eager to use it more and more... They think they cannot study without computers. .. They become agitated when it doesn't work fast enough...

Q: How do you handle the situation when you have got a limited resource for students?

A: I feel very stressed about it and I try to teach the virtue of patience.
It is a poignant example of the uneven distribution of technology. Both teachers and students can have a positive experience of ICT in teaching and learning, but at the same time the scarcity of access sometimes makes people feel even more frustrated and discouraged than they were before they experienced its benefits (Stewart, 2014c).

Such cognitive change is well illustrated in research conducted by Roy Pea in the US in the 1980s, which found that once a tool or machine becomes a part of life, it opens up a new way of thinking and acting. “It becomes an indispensable instrument of mentality, and not merely a tool” (Pea, 1985;175).

Thirty years on, these rural Colombian newcomers to educational technology were experiencing the same gulf between what they sensed they could do with the new tools, and the limiting scarcity of access to them. As Latour (2002; 2007) points out, new technologies promise to lead their social subjects to a different way of life, but if the promise is to be realised the Colombian government needs to pay careful attention to access factors such as community education, equipment provision, digital literacy and creativity, infrastructure capacity and appropriate local content. Such technologies of social inclusion can form a powerful counter-tendency to the digital divide (see Warschauer, 2002; Resta 2008).

The experience of this community demonstrates some very characteristic impacts of new technologies. On the one hand, it shows the transformation digital technology can bring about in teaching and learning when local mothers who did not finish their basic education and consequently did not know how to support their children’s homework, revisit their schooling with their children on-line. On the other hand is the less beneficial effect that inconsistency of access can have of making subjects unstable, unsure of their role and struggling with their own customary practices. Once the technology has changed the classroom environment it is difficult to go back to traditional, low-tech methods; yet that is what they will sometimes have to do because the new technology is not yet ubiquitous or consistently available.
The new digital classrooms are seen as instruments of rapid educational development and drivers of the knowledge economy; their arrival awakens not just new educational possibilities but also new ways for people to connect to each other and new consumer appetites. It is a challenging experience for the whole community, which in Dean’s words can leave its subjects - teachers, students and parents - “in flux, fragmented and without a stable sense of anchorage in social networks, or, more optimistically, open to the challenges of self-actualisation” (Dean, 1996: 214).

7.7 Recurring patterns in Colombian edtech projects

Colombia is not exceptional among countries in viewing investment in educational technology as key to its future development; indeed the latter is increasingly viewed by governments worldwide as an entry ticket to a race in which the prize is nothing less than full participation in the new global economy. While researching these four case studies in educational technology development in Colombia, each with its distinct goals, partners and funding models, I noticed a number of common factors and forces emerging which I suggest may have wider application to other such projects in other places around the world. I have tried to capture these factors and forces in the diagram below as an example of what Rose calls “the complex assemblage of diverse forces... that regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, [and] organisations”. (Rose, 1996:42)
Figure 8. The factors constructing and constraining educational ICT projects in Colombia, at supranational, national and community level.
‘Atmospheric’ or external factors:

1) **New education technologies** are coming on stream faster and faster, offering new ways to access and distribute educational media, new ways to engage students, new ways to teach and new ways to learn. These technologies are widely seen as key to driving up educational quality and thus development, and are helping to drive policy at community, national and supranational level. But they cannot by themselves solve entrenched social and political problems such as the educational chasm between rich and poor.

2) **Global policy and development funding** help to fuel the global demand for educational technology adoption, but are themselves almost invariably driven by neoliberal notions of a race to achieve a ‘world class education’, and of education as a production line for 21st century knowledge-economy skills and global market compatibility. They are also strongly biased in favour of a market approach to educational provision, competition between providers, and public-private partnerships in which corporations call most of the shots.

3) **National level policies** are driven by the twin ideas that improving educational outcomes is the key to social prosperity and inclusion, economic growth and entry to the club of developed nations; and that adoption of the latest digital educational technologies is a guaranteed, fast-track way of improving educational outcomes. However in many countries there are deep-seated obstacles to taking this apparently simple path to educational development - among them lack of digital infrastructure, and lack of coordination between the different government agencies and commercial players who need to work together to bring edtech projects to fruition.

4) **Global market forces** exert powerful pulls on national and supranational policy-making in this field. Much of the edtech and educational media development is in the hands of multinational corporations, who largely control the new global market for skilled knowledge workers. Educational
technology is itself an expanding global market continually searching for new customers. And corporations are on the look-out for new public-private partnerships, as well as new opportunities for corporate social responsibility initiatives - especially those which might open up potential new markets.

‘Ground level’ or internal factors:

5) **The role of teachers** is crucial in any educational reform or investment programme. The OECD and most other observers agree that “teaching can be improved by making both the selection and training of teachers more demanding” (OECD, 2013c:35). In-service training can help in several ways: by boosting capacity in particular areas of classroom practice such as technology-enhanced teaching; by helping to set practical goals for professional improvement; and by enhancing the status of teachers who have taken the extra training and acquired the additional skills – becoming for instance ‘digitally expert teachers’.

6) **Socio-educational divides** are the single biggest obstacle to successful deployment of educational technologies.

The Colombian government sees good quality education as a way to begin breaking down the country’s historically inherited inequalities, believing that education can pave the way toward “prosperity for all”, with better teaching, educational technology and digital content all leading the way.

It would seem to follow that investment in educational technologies and teacher capabilities, important as this is, needs to be coupled with investment in the breaking down of some more powerful but less tangible, ‘ethical technologies’: the entrenched social, regional and economic inequalities in the distribution of educational opportunities in Colombia.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

In this research I have sought to uncover some of the complexities of educational globalisation, through an examination of policy texts and the discursive practices of ‘global knowledge’ workers, as well as from my own experience in the field. The research process has of necessity been multi-disciplinary, incorporating ideas from the fields of international politics, economics, sociology and philosophy of education. It follows that the end product has more breadth and less depth than I would have liked ideally; nevertheless this interdisciplinary approach has helped me understand the mechanisms of power at work within global discourses of education and development.

I have adopted as my overarching theoretical framework the interrelated Foucauldian notions of power, knowledge, governmentality and subjectivity, and Foucault’s analysis of the post-war neoliberal social formation dedicated to the supremacy of the market and continuous competition. Adopting this approach has been a challenge for me, one which has forced me to see the world in different and unfamiliar ways even while helping to elucidate the observed phenomena of global development and education discourse formation. The difficulty I had itself reflects the impact of power upon me, a modern subject, part of a social body constructed not by coercion, but through a regime of truth which forms knowledge, induces pleasure and reward, and produces and reproduces discourse.

The aim of my analysis in this research has been an examination of how power works productively upon us to bring about ends which we do not predict, and more specifically of how neoliberal rationality is linked to the practices of global education governance. Although my focus as a researcher has been on an academic understanding of these connections rather than on their rightness or wrongness, I have nevertheless attempted not to lose hope for a more just society by scrutinising the rationale of the
prevalent discourses and remaining mindful of opportunities to open up new spaces of awareness.

Much of my research data were collected through interviews with 51 policy makers, researchers, consultants, officials and executives from supranational organisations, international think tanks, government agencies and media organisations. In the so-called global knowledge economy the role of such intellectuals becomes ever more important as *enunciators* of the realities that shape our actions through articulating policy, diagnosing problems and providing solutions. They act as mediators through whom power is exercised, and take a central role in the production, translation and intensification of global policies and practices through their increasingly international networks. My purpose was not to attack their work, but simply to problematise their discourse, and the workings of the institutions in which they are embedded, in order to interrogate the mechanism through which power is exercised and to ask about its impact upon the governed.

In practice I found it impossible to disentangle discourses of education either from discourses of modernity or from discourses of development. In particular, notions of development assistance and of educational investment converge upon a point that is signposted as ‘progress’. Education is widely seen as a crucial site not only of national wealth creation but also of individual wealth, of empowerment and enrichment; that is to say, it operates both at the macro level of economic development and at the micro level of individual enlargement. In Foucauldian terms, the power of educational discourse is both effectively totalising and individualising, simultaneously subjectifying and objectifying. In analysis, it is important to see the different levels of global education discourse - from policy documents of supranational organisations, through statements of national educational policy, to the utterances of elite professionals, teachers and ordinary citizens – as in a sense indivisible, or as points on a continuous spectrum of discourse. Each type of discursive practice consists of “multiple interrelating elements... [which]... mutually condition each other and the field of education” (Shutkin, 2008:206).
I began my analysis at one end of the spectrum with the macro discourse disseminated by supranational organisations like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The two international comparative surveys operated by the OECD, PISA and PIAAC, not only set up the rules of the game in global education governance, but act, as Grek et al. (2009:123) put it, as “highly visible tool[s] for] governing at all levels”.

Deploying large amounts of empirical data to place every participating country into international league tables of educational performance, these surveys are powerful symbols of the vital connection between the discourse of education and that of economic prosperity in the post-industrial era - a connection which is widely understood by governments, media and populations as a question of how to prepare for and survive in a highly competitive race, for what Daza calls “life in the fast lane” (Daza, 2013).

Beyond the PISA and PIAAC surveys, it is hard to overestimate the importance of the wider educational research programmes undertaken by the OECD. They fuel the production of global education policy in the context of “informational capitalism” (Ball, 2013b:1), disseminate what is considered to be best educational practice, and provide a rationale for pressuring nation states to change policies in order to compete more effectively with their international rivals. The empirical data produced by this research is used to define excellence in education systems, to benchmark educational quality, and to link education policies to economic performance. It can be considered as a tactical elaboration of power practice, an order of discourse which empowers those speakers who possess it and disables those who do not. The OECD functions, in short, as a kind of Foucauldian (or Benthamite) *panopticon* - a discursive control tower of educational policy, practice and governance.

I argue that these research programmes function as a kind of “neoliberal scientism” (Daza 2013) which reflects and reproduces a certain regime of truth: a discursivity which tends to shift the balance toward neoliberal structural reform and the reinforcement of a Western-oriented global order. And in this process of production, reproduction and interpretation of
discourse, intellectuals and other knowledge workers function as strategically located and authoritative mediators, often with links to business.

I argue too that the rationalities produced in this way, though more often than not based on occidental models of economic, political, social and cultural development, tend to become routinised and legitimised around the world. It is a form of cultural neo-imperialism, derived from market forces, which gradually becomes ‘common sense’ in every kind of practice, and which conditions and constrains all future possibilities. The discourses through which such common sense is produced, sustained and reproduced are populated by what Foucault calls ‘imaginaries’ - powerful, seemingly-neutral, boundary-constructing concepts which either enable or interdict what is said or thought; concepts such as productivity, innovation, entrepreneurship, performativity, agility, competitiveness: concepts mostly derived from business management and practice, which establish the imaginative limits of discourse and which settle in as items of common sense in every corner of everyday life. Of course, this process of boundary-constructing is never fully successful or complete, because of the multiplicity of both subjects and constraints. “The very fact of multiple determinations undermines this attempt, thereby providing the possibilities of resistance” (Usher and Edwards, 2004:90).

Such common-sensical discourses are intellectual technologies which render existence thinkable, practicable, utterable and inscribable (Miller and Rose, 1990) and through their practice we become subjectified as competitive entrepreneurs-of-the-self, as members of the new species Homo economicus. Such neoliberal subjectification is a seductive rather than a coercive practice, normalising us as people who accept the realities (actually, the imaginaries) of the modern world as a condition of success within it. And one of these seductive realities is the idea that education is primarily about employability, that education is an adjunct to the marketplace. The idea that education is less a process than an output.

The notion of education as a driver of economic development has become very central to post-war economic orthodoxy, and especially to discussions
of the post-industrial knowledge economy posited by U.S economists such as Becker and Drucker. More specifically, the idea of human capital as the end result of educational investment has become a dominant part of economic discourse, with education now located as a kind of insurance policy against an uncertain future - particularly following the serious economic crises of 1998 in Asia and 2008 in the USA and Europe. Increasingly governments see education policy as a means of adjusting the supply of workers equipped with the '21st century skills' demanded by the global labour market. In the era of globalisation, learning is collapsed into earning, and education systems are run increasingly along business lines or opened up to competition, with learners seen increasingly as consumers – self-entrepreneurs who must take responsibility for their own educational choices. (While theoretically open to all, these choices are in reality conditional on a certain level of wealth.) I argue that this idea of learner as consumer is not natural in any sense but socially constructed, and that the notion of consumer choice in education should therefore be put under the severest scrutiny.

With education understood increasingly as a competition, both governments and populations approach it increasingly as a race - a race for the top, or a race to keep up and not be left behind. In the last decade and a half, however, the emphasis in discourses of educational investment and human capital accumulation has gradually shifted from one of sheer educational quantity to a greater concern with educational quality. Two interrelated strands of this concern with quality are of particular interest for this research. One is the rapid spread of the terminology of ‘world class education’, largely benchmarked against US or UK models of excellence; the other the equally rapid adoption of digital technologies to improve educational infrastructures and enhance access to, and quality of, education.

The use of ICTs to enhance educational infrastructure, access, content and quality is now a big and rapidly expanding business, both in more developed countries anxious to keep up with demand for digital skills and lifelong learning, and in less developed nations struggling to bring basic educational
opportunities to poor communities in remote rural areas. Governments are encouraged to adopt policies promoting educational technology both by ed-tech corporations, by other governments who have done so, by supranational organisations like OECD or UNESCO, and by educational and development advisors and consultants - until the desirability and effectiveness of ICT-enhanced learning becomes normalised and normalising within global education discourse formation.

I argue that digital technologies have a dual and paradoxical impact on educational discourse. On the one hand they evoke the potential for radical change to the traditional 'how' and 'where' of education, offering the possibility of greater flexibility, accessibility, equity and learner-centredness. On the other hand they have the potential to “reproduce, perpetuate, strengthen and deepen existing patterns of social relations and structures - albeit in different forms and guises” (Selwyn, 2012:21). All too often the second potential is more evident than the first, and my research suggests this may be because in tech-enhanced education, even more than in other industries, the intellectuals, consultants and policy makers are often so tightly connected to the big business players. When this is the case the spread of ICT in education might actually intensify the process of knowledge commodification already embedded in the knowledge economy metaphor.

The problem is that educational ICT systems, usually developed in wealthy western countries, may be seen as the solution to educational problems in other parts of the world where they are much less appropriate, or may be used in ways that have less to do with enriching quality of or access to education and more to do with simply making money, or with the monitoring, assessing or policing of educational performance. Governments of countries like Colombia, Malaysia and many others make huge investments in ICT infrastructure in the belief that it will boost educational performance and economic prosperity; they also eagerly invite in private companies – preferably with big names such as McKinsey, Discovery, Pearson and so on - to design and provide ICT infrastructure, connectivity, content and services
such as teacher-training, sometimes via direct procurements and sometimes via public-private partnerships.

Educational ICT can be powerfully productive, reaching across time and space to have a transformational impact on teaching and learning. But it is not a fail-safe mantra for improving either access or quality, and at the moment is (whatever else it might be) a battle ground for competing commercial interests, often containing residues of cultural imperialism. My Malaysian and Colombian case studies suggest that the introduction of educational ICT is helping to reinforce trends toward panopticon-like academic surveillance and/or the pursuit of new market opportunities by global technology companies. Technology can never be neutral, but is always a construct of specific states of knowledge and power.

I have tried to exemplify this through an analysis of three educational ICT projects in developing countries - OLPC, iEd Africa and Smart School Colombia. These projects demonstrate a number of archetypal ICT project modalities: the technological determinism of thinking you can distribute laptops and then walk away; the mixed economy of Official Development Assistance funding, external commercial providers and NGOs; and the important role of public-private partnerships, corporate social responsibility and philanthropic funding in launching and sustaining these projects. I found out that edu-tech projects in developing countries are sometimes driven by political or commercial interests as much as by the need to enhance educational effectiveness, and that they sometimes have unforeseen side effects such as the production or reproduction of unsustainable global consumerist appetites.

This thesis posits the existence of a specialist knowledge/practice discourse called development knowledge, by which I mean less a body of academic research and theory about development, than the knowledge that is actually produced by the multiply-diverse processes of development itself. One thing that this discourse draws our attention to is the widely agreed but widely contested ground of education for development - and this is useful because it
reminds us that development is a social and cultural process as well as an economic one.

Another thing that development knowledge focuses our attention onto is the fact that since the 1960s the official development assistance (ODA) policies and practices of wealthy nations have often acted as much in the interest of donor countries as in those of the recipients. For recipient countries, the new global village of digital networks is an imaginary expressway to development and modernity, an invitation to join the global party; but for donor countries it is full of opportunities for global economic and cultural hegemony. The global village is not an egalitarian one, but is a space full of confrontation and negotiation, characterised by what Hannerz (1991:107) calls “an asymmetry of centre and periphery”.

South Korea's approach to ODA is an interesting case in point, especially as two of the case studies in this research involve Korean ODA-assisted projects in Colombia. Korea's own development history is quite unique, the country having moved from severe underdevelopment to wealthy, high-tech modernity in just two generations, and this history has informed the country's development aid strategies and projects. The Korean government plays its part in ODA programmes coordinated by the OECD, but has also sought to promote the ‘Korean economic success story’ as a template for development that might be followed by other countries. Korean ODA projects are both altruistic and self-interested. They are expressions of a willingness to share resources, experience and know-how with countries whose hardships Koreans themselves experienced within living memory; but at the same time, Korea's ODA activity can create new business opportunities for Korean companies, either through the good will created by Korean aid, or as a result of Korean businesses winning contracts to carry out ODA-funded development work.

A major recipient of Korean ODA in this study is Colombia, a country which is about to cross the definitional boundary from developing to developed nation. Now in the process of acceding to the OECD, the Colombian government's educational vision is summed up by the slogan “quality
education for prosperity”, and it sees educational ICT as a key to boosting educational quality and reducing gaps between rich and poor, urban and rural.

After four years of this policy, however, it is hard to see much improvement in equality of access to education. Part of the problem is a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Education, who are focused on integrating ICT into schools and training teachers, and the Ministry of ICT who have simply sped ahead with infrastructure building and equipment distribution in partnership with commercial suppliers. But a more fundamental problem is the very unequal distribution of wealth in Colombia and a long-standing lack of investment in the public school system. More than 40% of Colombian secondary school places are in the private sector and it would seem to be these already privileged schools that have done best from the educational technology investment programme. With a school system already opened up to market forces to this extent, it is going to be difficult to reverse the underlying trend toward greater inequity, unless there is a coordinated effort by both government agencies and political forces to weaken the hold of the elite social networks on their privileged educational position. A related problem is that in the private school sector, where schooling and content are already largely oriented toward US educational models, making schools more open and connected via the internet risks making them even more dependent on teaching and learning materials from North America. Such content of course carries the badge of proven ‘quality’, but it also tends to reflect consumerist, individualist values which arguably have little relevance to local life in Colombia.

Against this complex background, the Colombian Ministry of Education is working with Korean ODA agencies to try to generate locally-relevant digital content sourced from the teachers themselves, as part of their training in new education technologies. The Colombian government has also begun trials of a nationwide educational TV network in hopes of reaching people and schools who are without internet connection for geographic or financial
reasons with educational programmes. When or if the trials will develop into a full-scale service remains to be seen.

**Can it be different?**

The theme of this research is an interrogation of some current discourses of global education policy-making and governance, rather than an elaboration of alternatives to them; but I would hope it can help us to think about different futures as well. By making visible the governmentality at work in globalising educational policies and practices, including those to do with the deployment of educational technologies, my intention is to free ourselves to engage in what Davies (2010) describes as “ethical reflexivity”. When I reflect on my own practice as a researcher – and previously as an international media project manager – the ethical position I want to adopt is one that emphasises not only social justice, but multiplicity and localism in opposition to the current trend towards global normalisation.

In his well-known collation of major economic studies Piketty (2014) argues that the diffusion of knowledge is the most successful tool in avoiding the most extreme inequalities of our past. I agree with this, and my concern is that current global discourses of education risk bringing about global acceptance of full-scale marketisation and homogenisation of education systems, based on a single model of excellence and driven by international development assistance policies as well as by powerful economic interests. I am sometimes asked why I think this is such a problem. As Ball (2011:52) asks, “Should we forget about these worries and concentrate on analysis of institutional effectiveness?” I think we should worry because the societies in which future generations grow up will be determined by their education systems, and ones which are defined solely by concepts of self-entrepreneurship and lifelong competition will produce collections of atomised, selfish, thrusting individuals, rather than inclusive, supportive communities made up of cooperating subjects. It follows that official development assistance should be used to support just and local educational
needs, rather than the one-sided transfer of educational models from developed countries to the rest of the world, and what Scholte (2005:1) has called “wholesale marketisation through privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation” in global education governance.

Education is the human process through which we learn how to be and how to govern ourselves in society - the construction of social subjects who are always in the process of becoming - and cannot be reduced simply to preparation for participation in a global labour market. This is why it is worth giving education at least some protection from the tornado blasts of unrestrained neoliberal competition, commodification and consumerism, global mobility of policy and practice, and economic performativity.

In commodifying knowledge we risk “denying the primacy of human relationships in the production of value, in effect erasing the social” (Ball, 2013b:26). Quality is no doubt vitally significant, but to fit alongside social justice it should be rethought in something beyond economic language based on measurement and calculation.

Moving our discourse away from or beyond the purely economic will make it easier to see that there can be no single, global neoliberal model of development; that development programmes need to take more time and effort to diagnose local needs and find ways of governing projects which make them more inclusive of and accountable to local communities. Such governance models may sometimes slow projects down as they go through periods of argument and negotiation; they may be more messy and uneven; but they will also minimise the potential harm to local cultures, communities and human lives.

Digital educational technologies, when combined with attention to local conditions, local people’s needs and aspirations, have great potential to empower such democratic models of development. The internet is among other things a democratic space which lends itself to community-building and the sharing of ideas and information, and which is not easily suppressed or policed. Allied to educational purposes, connected digital technologies
almost inevitably give rise to communities of enquiry and practice, in which learners and educators work together to create new possibilities for themselves and their society.

I agree with Escobar when he argues that in an era of global cyberculture we need policies which resist marginalisation or domination, and a strategy that integrates demands for social change, technical modernity and fair participation in the world economy (Escobar, 1995). Such resistance requires new ways of seeing and knowing, and according to Foucault starts with self-awareness and knowledge of how to take care of ourselves (Foucault, 1991a; 1997b). In the field of education, I believe this means that public education needs to be defended from the disintegrating forces of competition and commodification, believing with Facer that we can make schools that are “public spaces and democratic laboratories that can play a powerful role in tipping the balance of change in favour of sustainable futures” (Facer, 2011:133).

In this thesis I did not intend to present a recipe for global education governance, only a way of thinking about the impact such governance is having on the world. But I hope that defamiliarising the business-as-usual in global education discourse may be a first step towards developing new, more collective ways of thinking and talking about educational change. Such a project would involve outgrowing our complicity with occidental/ globalising/ neoliberal rationalities of purely economic development, and recontextualising development as a more holistic process embedded in local history and geography. It also involves rethinking our technocentric imaginaries of educational ICT as a fast-track to educational utopia. And it involves going beyond consumerism and the chimera of choice, reinventing an ethics of public provision and fairness, and developing in Holland’s words, “new social competencies in newly imagined communities” (Holland, 1988:272).
Appendix 1) List of policy documents in this thesis

OECD documents: The selection of documents was to illustrate the commonalities at OECD policies and specific changes for ‘skills’ over a decade.

1) About the OECD: Vision. [Online] [Accessed on 23rd May 2014]  
http://www.oecd.org/about/

2) OECD Official Development Aid- Definition and coverage. [Online] [Accessed on 14th September, 2013]  
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm

3) Reducing the risk of policy failure: Challenges for regulatory compliance (in 2000)  


7) OECD work on Education. (2010) [Online] [Accessed on 20 December 2013]  

8) Better skills, better jobs, better lives; Highlights of the OECD skills strategy (2012)  
[Online] [Accessed on 3rd December 2013]  

[Online] [Accessed on 25th May 2014]  
http://skills.oecd.org/documents/Clickable%20pdf%20skills%20strategy%20May%203%202012.pdf

10) OECD work on education and skills (2013) [Online] [Accessed on 22nd December 2013]  
http://www.oecdmybrochure.org/edu/.

11) OECD Skills Outlook 2013: First results from the survey of Adult Skills. In: OECD.  
[Online] [Accessed on 28 December 2013]  
http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/publications.htm

12) Building effective skills strategies at national and local levels. (2014) [Online]  
[Accessed on 25th May 2014]  

13) OECD: Our Mission (2014) [online] [Accessed on 3 August 2014]  
http://www.oecd.org/about/
I also included other supranational organisations’ education strategy:


As a case study of multiplicity of power dynamics in Colombia, I analysed some of education policy documents on Colombian ministry of education and a presentation of the minister of ICT in Colombia regarding his ICT vision and practices.

**Colombian Ministry of Education:**


5) Socios proveedores de contenidos. (Escuela+ internal report)

6) Comité de Innovación No.29. September 2013 (Education, internal report)


**Colombian Ministry for ICT:**


For **Malaysian case study**, I analysed the consulting company, TalentCorp Malaysia texts.


2) *Talent Roadmap 2020 (2012).*
Appendix 2: Informed consent letter

Dear Ms/Mr………

I am a PhD student in the Education and Social Research Institute (ESRI) at Manchester Metropolitan University. I am conducting research on aspects of educational globalisation, with a particular focus on the role of ICT in educational transfers to developing countries. For this research I would very much like to include some thoughts from you, so I am writing to seek your consent to be interviewed by me.

In my thesis I seek to examine the social context and significance of policy makers and educational media practitioners in the process of globalisation, and I am sure your knowledge and experience in the field will make a valuable contribution to my research. If you agree to this interview, I would very much like to arrange a visit accordingly.

If you have any questions about my project, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time to discuss them.

I would like to thank you in advance for your time and co-operation. Your interview will be of great significance to the success of my research. I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Hyunsook Chung

Education and Social Research Institute
Manchester Metropolitan University.

Mobile (44) 7568 321 702
E-mail: hyunsook_c@hotmail.com
Information sheet for research interviewees

You have been invited to take part in a research project undertaken as part of a PhD thesis. Taking part in the project is entirely voluntary. Before you make your decision, it is important that you understand why the research is being carried out, and what it involves. Please take your time to read the following information carefully. If you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me.

**Study title:** Global Education governance formation process (tentative title).

The purpose of this study is to understand aspects of educational globalisation in developing countries by examining the policies, practices and assumptions of policy makers and practitioners in two or three representative locations. The study will focus on educational ICT transfers, as digital media and technologies become an increasingly important aspect of educational development worldwide.

**Why have I been asked to take part?**

I believe that you are a significant actor in this field, and as such are one of the key people who can help me understand some important issues in educational globalisation.

**Significance**

Your contribution to this research is very important. Sharing your views and experiences will enable me to shed additional light on some key issues in the field of education globalisation in an information society.

**Do I have to take part?**

It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you take part. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.

**What will I have to do?**

You will be invited to take part in an interview, which will take approximately 1 hour. During this interview you will be asked questions relating to your work in this field - for example:

- Your own work, experience and views
- The policies and work of your organisation, and how this fits with the work of other agencies
- Your understanding of how developments in this field fit into broader, global trends
Will my name appear in any written reports of this study?

All information I collect from you during the course of the study will be kept strictly confidential. When the research is published it may include references to and quotes from the interviews; however if you wish not to be referred to or quoted by name, you can choose to be anonymised by indicating this on the consent form.

What will happen to the data generated?

If you would like to take part in the research please read and complete the attached consent form.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information.
Consent Form

Title of research: Global Education Governance formation process focusing on ICT use in education

Researcher: Hyunsook Chung
( Education and Social Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University )

I have read the information sheet and I am aware of the purpose of this research study. I am willing to be part of this study and have been given the contact details of the researcher in case I need any further information.

My signature certifies that I have decided to participate, having read and understood the information given and had an opportunity to ask questions.

I ……………………………………………………………………….give my permission for my data to be used as part of this study and understand that I can withdraw at any time and my data will be destroyed.

References and quotations

I am happy for indirect and direct quotations to be used in this study, and attributed to me / but not attributed to me by name [PLEASE DELETE ONE]

Signature……………………………………………Date………………………

For completion by the researcher

I have explained the nature of the study to the subject and in my opinion the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to participate.

Researcher:

Signature……………………………………………Date………………………
Appendix 3: Excerpts of Interview data example

(The sentences in bold is the one I actually used for the main analysis.)

OECD 1 (interviewed on 4 September 2013 in the office at OECD, Paris. 57 minutes)

Q: first of all, can you tell me about your experience and the role at OECD?

A: I have been working in many countries of the world, before coming here, and I think that the goals framework that we - the world - agreed in 2000 was a major breakthrough. It was far from being perfect, but it helped a lot to mobilise support for development. So I definitely hope that we manage to agree on something before 2015 as a follow-up, and that we do even better than we did so far. There is a lot that can be improved, like for example in education [where] it was a very narrow approach that was taken, just to look at primary education, and only to look at numbers of kids that are going to school, but not worrying at all, or measuring, the quality of education. So there is a lot to improve. Of course you still have to bring kids to school, and there are still many countries which do not manage this for many reasons. So it's not that this is not a good ambition, it's just that we hope to introduce a broader approach - for example, to increase access to quality education for everybody, at all levels and ages and for women and girls...

I spent most of my professional life in research… as an economist… I went for many years abroad, working with different governments... That allows you to see things from different perspectives… from North and South. And that is I guess what we need in the OECD, to be at the crossroads between different communities and ways of thinking.

Q: have you experienced any different opinions or any cultural collisions, for example, while working with other developing countries?

There was no clash. I always enjoy working with governments, especially at the professional level, if we talk to each other as economists and people who are interested in development, we have so much in common, and I think there is a kind of convergence also, where we come closer and closer on how to deal with major challenges. Of course there are differences in culture and background, but maybe there are more differences between you and me, and somebody working in the countryside in either your or my country than there are between economists working in ministries in any country around the world, because we have the same worries about development - jobs versus unemployment, income distribution, challenges we all have to deal with in all our countries, and as policy analysts we all use more or less the same approaches - guided of course by different governments. So I never felt strange in any of these countries, I always loved working with colleagues in other countries - the more so because working in those countries you are much closer to the problems and to the solutions than you are here. Because here in a kind of ivory tower in Paris we are far away from the real problems of the developing world. The advantage of the OECD is that we have much more leverage. … Here i am able to develop policies, you have
much bigger leverage helping 34 OECD member countries to improve their policies and hopefully [the benefits] will come down to the people in developing countries all around the world.

Q: Basically the OECD is for 34 member countries but it also works with non member countries and conduct researches and develop policies, don’t you?

A: You are right, it’s not only the 34 members of the OECD we are in touch with.. The Development Centre [of the OECD] .. have many developing and emerging countries on their board, so they are in close touch with many countries around the world. And the work we are doing is on the ground.. so for example when I am doing the post 2015 work I speak to people [in many countries]. For example on of the last missions I did was to speak to a meeting of all African countries, the Africa-wide consultation on post-2015, getting prepared for the post-2015 debate... So we

Regarding whether it’s about the economy only - it’s definitely not. … we would say that economics is part of a broader understanding of social science… its all inter-related, these different backgrounds of course come together, and my understanding would be that the pure econometric approach is one thing, but look at development economics - its a much broader understanding where cultural sciences, social sciences, political sciences all come in as well. And I would guess that most people working in the OECD are not economists in the narrow sense, they are from a diversity of backgrounds. That’s a big advantage of the OECD. You will find people not just from all around the world but from a diversity of backgrounds, and that is what makes it so interesting and so innovative and so good. But you are right - and this is an advantage - we do not spend money, and we do not have any legally binding instruments, so the only tool that we have is to give good policy advice. That is what we do, as the OECD logo says, Better policies for better lives. So our job is to develop policies and to present them to our members, hoping to find a consensus so that they agree on them and implement them.

We don’t allocate ODA budgets. We have a policy on how members countries should spend and use ODA, and we decide whether the money they spend is ODA or not. But we don’t spend any money. Our budget is just for our staff - that's it.

The government… has to submit to us in the OECD each year all the money they spent and tell us what money has been spent on what purposes in which countries, and that is what we check here. It’s an airport control tower. It’s not that we are not superior to any government, but all DAC members agreed on a definition of ODA, Official Development Assistance. This is a definition that we drew up, and we decide whether money that is spent qualifies to be counted as ODA or not.

We are commissioning research now, we are consulting with partner countries to find out what should be part of the picture.. Once we agree on what data we need to capture we will of course monitor what money is flowing or being provided for development - not just ODA, but the bigger picture. So far we publish once a year for each and every DAC member how much money they spend in terms of ODA; in the future we should hopefully have the bigger picture, not only ODA but other resources, and also from other donors, not just DAC members - there is the Arab world, there are many countries like Chile or Korea. Korea is a fascinating example - how quickly you moved from being a receiver of development
assistance to being a provider of development cooperation. So this keeps on changing, and some countries are both at the same time. China and Chile and some countries in the Arab world are receiving development cooperation and at the same time they give it. So it is no longer this simplistic picture of the North giving to the South. Everybody is both giving and taking, so it is an exchange, and hopefully it is an exchange among partners...

Not just economic policies. For sure, that is how we started, but now we work on health policies, education policies, environmental policies, fiscal policies, governance policies. I guess we cover more or less anything that governments around the world are worried about.

Q: Can you tell me more about the relationship with World Bank? How you work with other supranational organisations? Is there any interest conflict?

WB is an observer, they are a standing member of the DAC, they sit around the table like our members - like other observers like Mexico for eg or Chile or Poland who are not yet members... So WB, IMF, the UN are all in our meetings, they take part as if they were members, except when there is something that needs to be voted on, like the accession of a new member country, then observers are not allowed to vote. But they join in the debate, sometimes they even dominate the debate, because they are leading in some regards obviously. So member countries are happy to have them around the table. So [the WB] do not just observe, they take part in the DAC and the OECD.

When it comes to the implementation of policies, we are not engaged in that, it is our members who do that…. (But i can tell you from my experience working with the German government or the Cambodian or the Rwandan government, it is always the same - the WB is such a huge donor or implementer or provider of funding that of course everyone is working closely with them.

Q: What is the advantage of being a DAC member?

A: They have the brilliant opportunity to get the benefit of the best available policy advice - to participate, to contribute, but also to benefit….. So I always came here, and I always took away whatever policies were being developed in the OECD context, brought it home to my colleagues in the ministry or other ministries - "this is gold [good?] standard, please apply." Good ideas, new trends, best practices - the cutting edge is what the OECD calls it... If you compare [our work] with think tanks - they do cutting edge research as well, but this is much too theoretical. The policies which we in the OECD discuss and agree are agreed by practitioners, by governments - its not just theoretical words.

We are in close touch with many think tanks, especially IEM (Institute Economique Molinari). For example I do a series of meetings called DAC Development Debates, and we invite leading thinkers from the top think tanks of the world to come and present their work on emerging cutting edge issues, to allow our member governments to understand, "ok this is something that we have to look at, we have to live up to, we have to think thru". And sometimes it has immediate consequences, sometimes it takes time to be digested.. I can tell you, because i have been working for 15 years with think tanks - it can be hard for a government to understand the research you are doing and to implement the policy advice that you give... These are different worlds - research and [government] ministries. And that is the big
advantage of the OECD. We are working at this intersection between research and policy. So whatever we agree at the OECD - and you could look at all the documents we discuss at DAC meetings - it is relevant to policy makers, and that is what it needs to be.

And we bring think tanks in. This whole discussion about financing for development we are now having to come up with a new approach and a new definition, was started by us bringing in some research done by the European Centre for Development Policy Management on the need to have a new approach to financing for development. So we brought them in, we presented the study, and we started thinking thru this. It had an immediate impact and now it is our biggest project which we will deliver in time for the post 2015 world, where people will look to the richer countries to come up with a new concept that better fits the new world.

Countries want to have their policy space, that's the main conclusion I took away from working in Africa and Asia. But we need a two-level approach: on the one hand we should have a global understanding that we have to lift people out of poverty, that everybody should have access to schooling etc. But how to implement this? That needs to be done by countries according to their individual constraints and priorities. That is maybe the new understanding of sovereignty that we need, one which includes an international responsibility for global challenges.

If you ask me what is development, I would say it is poverty reduction, but with an understanding that poverty is not just income poverty, but includes many dimensions. It is about having enough income, but also about having a voice and a political say, having access to services like education, health etc. That would be my understanding of development. But i would advocate for not using the word "development" any longer.
Appendix 4
## DAC List of ODA Recipients
### Effective for reporting on 2012 and 2013 flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least Developed Countries (per capita GNI &lt;= $1 005 in 2010)</th>
<th>Other Low Income Countries (per capita GNI $1 006-$3 975 in 2010)</th>
<th>Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories (per capita GNI $3 976-$12 275 in 2010)</th>
<th>Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories (per capita GNI $12 276+ in 2010)</th>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
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*Territory:

(1) This is without prejudice to the status of Kosovo under international law.
Appendix 5: Bidding announcement of ODA for “ICT Education Capacity Building” in Colombia

INTERNATIONAL BIDDING ANNOUNCEMENT

In accordance with the guidelines for procurement by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), under the loan agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, the Ministry of Education informs of the Bidding process within the framework of the “ICT Education Capability Building Project” in Colombia.

SCOPE: Supply, transportation, delivery, installation, development, training, maintenance, testing and operation of the ICT infrastructure, e-Portal development (Colombiaaprende) and enhancement, content development & standardization, teacher training and project implementation service for the creation of five Regional Innovation Centers and their implementation in Colombia on a Turnkey basis. (hereinafter, “Integrated System” or “IS”).

BIDDERS: Exclusively to companies incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Korea, which must comply with the requirements and conditions set forth in the Bidding documents and other documents that are an integral part of the bidding process.

REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL CONSULTATION: The Bidding documents are available on the website of the Ministry of National Education and the Colombia Aprende e-portal. Bidding documents can be consulted from 08:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Address: Calle 43 No. 57 – 14 - CAN, Bogota, Edificio del Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1st floor, Subdirección de Contratación.

OFFICIAL BUDGET: The official budget, including VAT, is thirty four million five hundred eighty six thousand one hundred seventy six U.S. Dollars (US$34,586,176), which includes loan resources and local budget, according to Budget Availability Certificate issued by the Ministry of Education and the Budget Certificates for 2013 and 2014.

The Ministry of Education will not be responsible for any costs or expenses incurred by Bidders related with the preparation or delivery of Bids.

Bidders shall be required to submit ‘Anti-Corruption and Malpractice Declaration’ issued by Korean Government, with their bids in the format provided in the bidding document. The original signed ‘Anti-Corruption and Malpractice Declaration’ in the bidding documents must be delivered to The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 38, EUNHAENG-RO, (16-1)YEUIDO-DONG, YEONGDEUNPO-GU, SEOUL 150-996, KOREA, and one copy of the original signed must be delivered to Ministry of Education of Colombia at address above.

CITIZENSHIP SUPERVISION: In compliance with the provisions of Colombian Law 850 of 2003, the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION invites the citizenships organizations to exert social control of this bidding process.

Given in Bogotá, D.C., at 12 days of March, 2013.

Ministerio de Educación Nacional
Calle 43 No. 57 – 14 Piso 1º CAN
Teléfono: 222 28 00, Ext. 4117 - Fax: 222 46 16
Correo electrónico: centrosdeinnovacion@mineducacion.gov.co
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